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[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Finishing McMichael\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the crisis revealed the inherent vulnerabilities of the neoliberal food regime\nwhere the large-scale commodification of food renders it a speculative target\nand control by\nfinancial markets or agribusiness enables price inflation\nLiberalized trade relations\nhave restructured food circuits\ndeepening a food dependency that started when prices were low\nfood import bill of developing countries rose by 25 percent as food prices rose\nthe debt crisis encouraged the dismantling of strategic grain reserves in the global South\nInternational agencies such as the IMF proposed conditions that governments\nhad to reduce strategic grain reserves to defray debt\nNational food reserves have been privatised and are now run like transnational companies\nexposing farmers and consumers to extreme price volatility\ntransmission of rising commodity prices is not simply a matter of integration of markets\nit is a result of consolidation of power in the agri-food sector\nThe consolidation of agribusiness\nset the stage for the world food crisis. Liberalization and privatization combine to accelerate food circulation globally and restructure food production and retailing along corporate lines\nThis enables corporate profits from price fixing\nThe monopoly structure of the heavily subsidized agribusiness food system\nmeans\ntraders, processors, and retailers are in a position to raise food prices\nthe trade rules that govern today’s food system\ncompanies are in perfect position to turn food scarcity into immense profits\nfood price increases are encouraged and rapidly transmitted around the world\nits roots lie in the industrial agricultural model\nUS agricultural production\nThe latter is\nresponsible for the crisis of “peak soil,” as inorganic fertilizers and monocropping\nhave intensified the “metabolic rift,” interrupting the natural carbon and nutrient cycles and degrading soils\nwhile there is still arable land\nsoils\nexhibit forms of\nerosion that suggest the world faces\ndeclining yields", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the debt crisis encouraged the dismantling of strategic grain reserves\nexposing farmers and consumers to extreme price volatility\nThe consolidation of agribusiness\nset the stage for the world food crisis.\nThis enables corporate\nprice fixing\nUS agricultural production\nis\nresponsible for the crisis of “peak soil,”\nintensified the “metabolic rift,” interrupting the natural carbon and nutrient cycles and degrading soils\nsoils\nexhibit forms of\nerosion that suggest the world faces\ndeclining yields", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Cyber-attacks are good---key to enhanced precision in crisis bargaining.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Instead, we question the idea that nations should look to formal treaties and rules to produce lasting limits on war. Despite the recent deterioration in the Syrian civil war, nation-states have generally refrained from the use of chemical weapons against each other since the end of World War I. They have followed the Geneva Conventions on prisoners of war, though not consistently. Nations have observed other norms in the breach, chief among them the immunity of the civilian population and resources from attack. World War Il not only saw the aerial bombing of cities and the nuclear attacks on Japan, but the years since have seen precision targeting of terrorists off the battlefield, attacks on urban infrastructure, and the acceptance of high levels of collateral damage among civilians. International lawyers and diplomats may proclaim that nations follow universal rules, either because of morality or a sense of legal obligation, but the record of practice tells a far different story. Efforts to impose more specific and demanding rules, such as limiting targeted drone attacks, banning cyber attacks, or requiring human control of robotic weapons, will similarly fail because they cannot take into account unforeseen circumstances, new weapons and military situations, and the immediate exigencies of war. Just as new technology led to increases in economic productivity, so too has it allowed nations to make war more effectively. \nNations will readily adhere to humanitarian standards when they gain a benefit that outweighs the cost, as when protecting enemy prisoners of war secures reciprocal protection for a nation's own soldiers taken captive by the enemy. Limitations on the use of weapons will follow a similar logic. Nations will be most inclined to respect legal restraints on new weapons when their use by both sides would leave no one better off or would provide little advantage. Cyber and robotic weapons do not bear the same features as the weapons where legal bans have succeeded, as with use of poison gas on the battlefield. Cyber and robotic weapons need not inflict unnecessary suffering out of proportion to their military advantages, as do poisoned bullets or blinding lasers. Rather, these weapons improve the precision of force and thereby reduce human death and destruction in war. \nNor have these new weapons technologies yet sparked a useless arms race. Nuclear weapons eventually became opportune for arms control because larger stockpiles provided marginal, if any, benefits due to the destructive potential of each weapon and the deterrence provided by even a modest arsenal. Mutual reductions could leave both sides in the same position as they were before the agreement. Today, the marginal cost of nuclear weapons for the U.S. and Russia so outweighs their marginal benefit that it is not even clear that a binding international agreement is needed to reduce their arsenals. Russia, for example, reduced its arsenal below New START's ceilings of 1,550 nuclear warheads and 700 strategic launchers even before the U.S. approved the deal. 45 The United States likely would have reduced its forces to those levels even if the Senate had refused to consent to the treaty, a position the executive branch also took in 2002 with the Treaty of Moscow's deep reduction in nuclear weapons. Today's new weapons do not yet bear these characteristics. The marginal gains in deploying these weapons will likely be asymmetric across nations insofar as some nations will experience much greater gains in military capability by developing cyber and drone technology. Put differently, prohibition or regulation of these new weapons will not have equal impacts on rival nations. Indeed, we do not even now have enough information to understand which nations will benefit and which will not, which makes any form of international ban even less likely. ", "role": "user" }, { "content": "we question the idea that nations should look to\nrules to produce lasting limits on war\nnation-states have generally refrained from the use of chemical weapons\nNations have observed other norms\nEfforts to impose more specific and demanding rules, such as limiting\ncyber attacks\nwill similarly fail because they cannot take into account unforeseen circumstances, new weapons and military situations, and the immediate exigencies of war\nNations will readily adhere to humanitarian standards when they gain a benefit that outweighs the cost\nLimitations on the use of weapons will follow a similar logic\nCyber\nweapons do not bear the same features as the weapons where legal bans have succeeded\nCyber\nweapons need not inflict unnecessary suffering out of proportion to their military advantages\nRather, these weapons improve the precision of force and thereby reduce human death and destruction in war.\nNor\nthese new weapons technologies yet sparked a useless arms race\nNuclear weapons eventually became opportune for arms control because larger stockpiles provided marginal, if any, benefits due to the destructive potential of each weapon and the deterrence provided by even a modest arsenal\nToday's new weapons do not yet bear these characteristics. The marginal gains in deploying these weapons will likely be asymmetric across nations insofar as some nations will experience much greater gains in military capability by developing cyber\ntechnology\nprohibition or regulation of these new weapons will not have equal impacts on rival nations.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Cyber-attacks are good---key to enhanced precision in crisis bargaining.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Instead, we question the idea that nations should look to formal treaties and rules to produce lasting limits on war. Despite the recent deterioration in the Syrian civil war, nation-states have generally refrained from the use of chemical weapons against each other since the end of World War I. They have followed the Geneva Conventions on prisoners of war, though not consistently. Nations have observed other norms in the breach, chief among them the immunity of the civilian population and resources from attack. World War Il not only saw the aerial bombing of cities and the nuclear attacks on Japan, but the years since have seen precision targeting of terrorists off the battlefield, attacks on urban infrastructure, and the acceptance of high levels of collateral damage among civilians. International lawyers and diplomats may proclaim that nations follow universal rules, either because of morality or a sense of legal obligation, but the record of practice tells a far different story. Efforts to impose more specific and demanding rules, such as limiting targeted drone attacks, banning cyber attacks, or requiring human control of robotic weapons, will similarly fail because they cannot take into account unforeseen circumstances, new weapons and military situations, and the immediate exigencies of war. Just as new technology led to increases in economic productivity, so too has it allowed nations to make war more effectively. \nNations will readily adhere to humanitarian standards when they gain a benefit that outweighs the cost, as when protecting enemy prisoners of war secures reciprocal protection for a nation's own soldiers taken captive by the enemy. Limitations on the use of weapons will follow a similar logic. Nations will be most inclined to respect legal restraints on new weapons when their use by both sides would leave no one better off or would provide little advantage. Cyber and robotic weapons do not bear the same features as the weapons where legal bans have succeeded, as with use of poison gas on the battlefield. Cyber and robotic weapons need not inflict unnecessary suffering out of proportion to their military advantages, as do poisoned bullets or blinding lasers. Rather, these weapons improve the precision of force and thereby reduce human death and destruction in war. \nNor have these new weapons technologies yet sparked a useless arms race. Nuclear weapons eventually became opportune for arms control because larger stockpiles provided marginal, if any, benefits due to the destructive potential of each weapon and the deterrence provided by even a modest arsenal. Mutual reductions could leave both sides in the same position as they were before the agreement. Today, the marginal cost of nuclear weapons for the U.S. and Russia so outweighs their marginal benefit that it is not even clear that a binding international agreement is needed to reduce their arsenals. Russia, for example, reduced its arsenal below New START's ceilings of 1,550 nuclear warheads and 700 strategic launchers even before the U.S. approved the deal. 45 The United States likely would have reduced its forces to those levels even if the Senate had refused to consent to the treaty, a position the executive branch also took in 2002 with the Treaty of Moscow's deep reduction in nuclear weapons. Today's new weapons do not yet bear these characteristics. The marginal gains in deploying these weapons will likely be asymmetric across nations insofar as some nations will experience much greater gains in military capability by developing cyber and drone technology. Put differently, prohibition or regulation of these new weapons will not have equal impacts on rival nations. Indeed, we do not even now have enough information to understand which nations will benefit and which will not, which makes any form of international ban even less likely. ", "role": "user" }, { "content": "rules\nlasting limits on war\nrefrained\nchemical weapons\nnorms\nspecific\ndemanding rules\nlimiting\ncyber attacks\nunforeseen circumstances\nweapons\nmilitary situations\nexigencies\nadhere\nbenefit\noutweighs the cost\nsimilar logic\nCyber\nweapons\nsucceeded\nCyber\nweapons\nof proportion\nprecision of force\nreduce human death\ndestruction\nNor\nuseless arms race\nmarginal gains\nmuch greater gains\nmilitary capability\ncyber\ntechnology\nprohibition\nregulation\nequal impacts on rival nations", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Cyber-attacks are good---key to enhanced precision in crisis bargaining.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "we question the idea that nations should look to\nrules to produce lasting limits on war\nnation-states have generally refrained from the use of chemical weapons\nNations have observed other norms\nEfforts to impose more specific and demanding rules, such as limiting\ncyber attacks\nwill similarly fail because they cannot take into account unforeseen circumstances, new weapons and military situations, and the immediate exigencies of war\nNations will readily adhere to humanitarian standards when they gain a benefit that outweighs the cost\nLimitations on the use of weapons will follow a similar logic\nCyber\nweapons do not bear the same features as the weapons where legal bans have succeeded\nCyber\nweapons need not inflict unnecessary suffering out of proportion to their military advantages\nRather, these weapons improve the precision of force and thereby reduce human death and destruction in war.\nNor\nthese new weapons technologies yet sparked a useless arms race\nNuclear weapons eventually became opportune for arms control because larger stockpiles provided marginal, if any, benefits due to the destructive potential of each weapon and the deterrence provided by even a modest arsenal\nToday's new weapons do not yet bear these characteristics. The marginal gains in deploying these weapons will likely be asymmetric across nations insofar as some nations will experience much greater gains in military capability by developing cyber\ntechnology\nprohibition or regulation of these new weapons will not have equal impacts on rival nations.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Efforts to\nlimit\ncyber attacks\ncannot take into account unforeseen circumstances\nCyber\nweapons need not inflict unnecessary suffering out of proportion to their military advantages\nthese\nimprove the precision of force and thereby reduce\ndeath", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 5. It's not offense---if sole purpose doesn’t spur operational changes, neither does NFU.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "In the public NFU debate, the ability of the United States to execute a nuclear strike quickly is often conflated with its ability to strike first. The result is a premise that adoption of an NFU policy should drive the reduction or elimination of the U.S.’ ability to respond promptly with a nuclear weapon. This premise ignores the fundamental objective of current force posture43—to provide the capability for a variety of flexible options to deter adversaries and assure allies, in accordance with presidential guidance, for a variety of circumstances. This posture is distinct from declaratory policy. In short, NFU, or ambiguity regarding NFU, has no effect on force needs or posture. Maintaining flexible options allows a president to decide whether an action is necessary, and if so, how prompt an action is necessary. The flexibility manifests in the following available choices:\n• Nuclear and non-nuclear options;\n• Immediate or delayed response options;\n• An array of nuclear strike options, in terms of scale, yield and delivery mechanisms; and\n• The option to use nuclear weapons first, or after a nuclear weapon is confirmed to be inbound, or has already been employed and detonated on U.S. or allied soil.\nThe existence of an option does not mean that the option must be exercised. Just as the president always has the ability to choose a non-nuclear option over a nuclear option, a low-yield option over a high-yield option, or to act immediately or after some period of time, or to not act at all, the decision to use nuclear forces first is a choice, not an imperative.44 In other words, as described earlier, maintaining a capability to launch nuclear weapons first is not equivalent to having a “first-use” policy. U.S. forces are postured such that abstaining from nuclear use is always an option.\nThe overwhelming conclusion of IDA’s research, including consultations with those who are or were involved in the implementation of U.S. nuclear policy and employment guidance, is that U.S. adoption of an NFU policy would not require any modification of U.S. nuclear force posture or force requirements. It stands to reason, however, that the credibility of an NFU policy could potentially be enhanced if it was accompanied by a significant change in force requirements or posture. That credibility, though, is a perception formed in the mind of the adversary. IDA’s research revealed that for the main nucleararmed competitors of the United States, a shift to NFU, even if accompanied by a significant change in nuclear force posture, is unlikely to be viewed as credible and would not cause Russia and China to favorably alter their behavior. Beyond the question of whether NFU requires changes to the force is the question of what adoption of NFU would allow. That question must fundamentally be answered based on adversary capability and intent and on the strategic setting the United States faces.\nAny discussion of NFU ought to begin with the fact that an NFU policy does not necessitate changes in force posture. Nevertheless, the public debate over NFU has often raised the question of force changes and the discussion often centers on one leg of U.S. nuclear forces: the land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. Voices of NFU advocates are often joined by critics of the ICBM leg of the triad, citing perceived risks inherent in the ICBM’s ability to conduct nuclear strikes on very short notice. For this group, an NFU policy ought to guide the divestiture of the United States’ most responsive deterrent force. In contrast, proponents of an ambiguous declaratory policy argue that the most responsive force, the ICBM, is the bedrock of strategic deterrence and that perceived risks are mitigated by the numerous safeguards in place that govern its employment.\nAny debate linking NFU and the ICBM force must account for the fact that ICBMs are not the only prompt response option and that other options, with varying degrees of promptness, could still be used first. Narrowing the NFU debate to the ICBM force is thus problematic for several reasons. First, there is no reason to assume that ICBMs would be the vehicle of choice for a first strike. ICBMs provide rapid attribution and almost certainly rapid response, but the United States has other options at its disposal.45 Second, there is no reason to assume that ICBMs would not be used in a second-strike capacity. They could be used to support a limited response to adversary first use. 46 Third, maintaining the capability to strike promptly is not equivalent to stating an intent to strike first. The United States has two prompt response options—ICBMs and sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) launched from SSBNs47—that possess complementary attributes and provide a technological hedge.48 This prompt-strike capability has value regardless of when nuclear weapons are employed. For example, a prompt nuclear response may be deemed necessary in order to reestablish deterrence after an adversary attack, in which case the difference between minutes and hours or days could cause significant political and military risk.49 Lastly, the ability to respond when under confirmed nuclear attack because of first use by an adversary—a deterrent capability required by every president since the early 1960s—is not precluded by an NFU policy. Current strategic conditions, current adversary capability, and, as a result, current national policy guidance still require this ability.\nHowever, because the NFU policy debate so often tends to span questions of force structure and to be in support of the NDAA stipulation to explore implications for force posture and force requirements, IDA researched several ways in which changes to nuclear or conventional forces could accompany an NFU policy, despite the evidence indicating the lack of a link.50 [FOOTNOTE 50 BEGINS] Historically, whether a country professed an NFU policy or not has been tied—at times superficially— to its conventional standing. U.S. adoption of NFU today could therefore be seen as an assertion of conventional superiority. Such an assertion may be false. At a minimum, it could result in increased pressure to regain and maintain that superiority in key areas of competition, which is problematic given the challenges to the U.S. military advantage in every warfighting domain stated in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and affirmed by the bipartisan NDS Commission. [FOOTNOTE 50 ENDS] In every case, IDA’s research reinforced the fact that force posture changes are likely more costly and more complicated than one might expect, especially in terms of impact to deterrent capability. In sum, IDA’s exploration of changes to force requirements and force posture, thought by some to be plausibly linked to NFU, yielded no feasible changes that would provide the necessary deterrent capability for today’s strategic setting. Moreover, in light of Russian and Chinese perceptions about the threat posed by some U.S. weapon systems and technologies, IDA assessed that the second-order implications of any potential NFU-driven changes to the force posture could be significant.51 [FOOTNOTE 51 BEGINS] For example, Russia and China have expressed deep concern about U.S missile defense systems threatening their survivable second-strike capability and cite the need to overcome U.S. missile defenses as motivations for their own hypersonic development and nuclear modernization programs, although some of this rhetoric is likely posturing. Brad Roberts, ed. “Major Power Rivalry and Nuclear Risk Reduction. Perspectives from Russia, China, and the United States, LLNL-TR-809702 (Livermore, CA: Center for Global Security Research, May 2020), https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1635770; Kelly Snyder, Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues for Congress, R46458 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (CRS), November 10, 2020), https://fas.org/ sgp/crs/natsec/R46458.pdf. [FOOTNOTE 51 ENDS] \nAllies are also a factor in force posture considerations, and many experts cited that conventional force posture may also need to change to bolster allied/partner confidence in U.S. commitments to extended deterrence as the result of a change to an NFU policy. A change in posture could manifest as increased cooperation with allies and partners (e.g., more technology sharing, foreign military sales, joint exercises/capability demonstrations) or increased investments in emerging technologies to supplement capability gaps.52 Supplementing nuclear forces with more robust conventional capabilities is nontrivial. One must consider the development, procurement, and sustainment costs and timelines, the technical challenges, the concepts of operations (e.g., whether these would be “niche” capabilities or available for widespread use), and the relative effectiveness of nuclear and conventional deterrence in national security strategy.\nBecause adopting an NFU policy does not require any changes to force posture or force requirements, any calculation of costs or savings would be speculative and would depend on whether one decided to change force posture or force requirements for other reasons (e.g., to bolster credibility of NFU pledge, assure allies and partners, and so forth), and on the specific form of those force posture/force requirement changes (e.g., nuclear only, nuclear and conventional, at home or abroad). Such cost calculations must account for a multitude of factors that go well beyond the monetary cost of the force structure itself.\nIn sum, the lessons from considering the impacts of an NFU policy on the force are clear: (1) declaratory policy and force posture—intent and capability—are separate matters, thus no changes in force requirements or force posture are required; (2) adversary capabilities and perceptions are key; and (3) any assessment of force posture implications must account for multiple factors that extend beyond nuclear force structure.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "In the public NFU debate, the ability of the U\nS\nto execute a nuclear strike quickly is often conflated with its ability to strike first. The result is a premise that adoption of an NFU\nshould drive the reduction or elimination of the U.S.’ ability to respond promptly with a nuclear weapon. This premise ignores the fundamental objective of current force posture\nto provide the capability for a variety of flexible options\nThis posture is distinct from declaratory policy. In short, NFU\nhas no effect on force needs or posture\nThe existence of an option does not mean that the option must be exercised. Just as the president always has the ability to choose a non-nuclear option over a nuclear option, a low-yield option over a high-yield option, or to act immediately or after some period of time, or to not act at all, the decision to use nuclear forces first is a choice, not an imperative\nIn other words,\na capability to launch nuclear weapons first is not equivalent to having a “first-use” policy\nThe overwhelming conclusion of\nresearch, including consultations with those who are or were involved in the implementation of U.S. nuclear policy and employment guidance, is that U.S. adoption of an NFU policy would not require any modification of U.S. nuclear force posture or force requirements\nAny discussion of NFU ought to begin with the fact that an NFU policy does not necessitate changes in force posture. Nevertheless, the public debate over NFU has often raised the question of force changes and the discussion often centers on\nthe\nICBM\nforce\nVoices of NFU advocates are often joined by critics of the ICBM leg\nFor this group, an NFU policy ought to guide\ndivestiture\nAny debate linking NFU and the ICBM force must account for the fact that ICBMs are not the only prompt response option and that other options, with varying degrees of promptness, could still be used first\nthere is no reason to assume\nICBMs would be the vehicle of choice for a first strike\nthere is no reason to assume that ICBMs would not be used in a second-strike capacity\nmaintaining the capability to strike promptly is not equivalent to stating an intent to strike first\nprompt-strike capability has value regardless of when\nFor example, a prompt nuclear response may be deemed necessary in order to reestablish deterrence after an adversary attack, in which case the difference between minutes and\ndays could cause significant political\nrisk\nthe ability to respond when under confirmed\nattack because of first use\nis not precluded by\nNFU\nCurrent strategic conditions\nstill require this ability\nBecause adopting an NFU policy does not require any changes to force posture or force requirements, any calculation of costs or savings would be speculative and would depend on whether one decided to change force posture or force requirements for other reasons\ndeclaratory policy and force posture—intent and capability—are separate matters, thus no changes in force requirements or force posture are required", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 5. It's not offense---if sole purpose doesn’t spur operational changes, neither does NFU.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "In the public NFU debate, the ability of the U\nS\nto execute a nuclear strike quickly is often conflated with its ability to strike first. The result is a premise that adoption of an NFU\nshould drive the reduction or elimination of the U.S.’ ability to respond promptly with a nuclear weapon. This premise ignores the fundamental objective of current force posture\nto provide the capability for a variety of flexible options\nThis posture is distinct from declaratory policy. In short, NFU\nhas no effect on force needs or posture\nThe existence of an option does not mean that the option must be exercised. Just as the president always has the ability to choose a non-nuclear option over a nuclear option, a low-yield option over a high-yield option, or to act immediately or after some period of time, or to not act at all, the decision to use nuclear forces first is a choice, not an imperative\nIn other words,\na capability to launch nuclear weapons first is not equivalent to having a “first-use” policy\nThe overwhelming conclusion of\nresearch, including consultations with those who are or were involved in the implementation of U.S. nuclear policy and employment guidance, is that U.S. adoption of an NFU policy would not require any modification of U.S. nuclear force posture or force requirements\nAny discussion of NFU ought to begin with the fact that an NFU policy does not necessitate changes in force posture. Nevertheless, the public debate over NFU has often raised the question of force changes and the discussion often centers on\nthe\nICBM\nforce\nVoices of NFU advocates are often joined by critics of the ICBM leg\nFor this group, an NFU policy ought to guide\ndivestiture\nAny debate linking NFU and the ICBM force must account for the fact that ICBMs are not the only prompt response option and that other options, with varying degrees of promptness, could still be used first\nthere is no reason to assume\nICBMs would be the vehicle of choice for a first strike\nthere is no reason to assume that ICBMs would not be used in a second-strike capacity\nmaintaining the capability to strike promptly is not equivalent to stating an intent to strike first\nprompt-strike capability has value regardless of when\nFor example, a prompt nuclear response may be deemed necessary in order to reestablish deterrence after an adversary attack, in which case the difference between minutes and\ndays could cause significant political\nrisk\nthe ability to respond when under confirmed\nattack because of first use\nis not precluded by\nNFU\nCurrent strategic conditions\nstill require this ability\nBecause adopting an NFU policy does not require any changes to force posture or force requirements, any calculation of costs or savings would be speculative and would depend on whether one decided to change force posture or force requirements for other reasons\ndeclaratory policy and force posture—intent and capability—are separate matters, thus no changes in force requirements or force posture are required", "role": "user" }, { "content": "ability\nU\nS\nquickly\nconflated\nfirst\nNFU\nreduction or elimination of the U.S.’ ability to respond promptly with a nuclear weapon\nignores\nfundamental objective\nvariety\nflexible options\nposture\ndistinct from declaratory policy\nNFU\nno effect on force needs or posture\nchoice, not an imperative\ncapability\nnot equivalent\n“first-use” policy\noverwhelming conclusion of\nresearch\nconsultations\ninvolved\nimplementation\nnuclear policy\nemployment guidance\nany modification of U.S. nuclear force posture or force requirements\nAny discussion\nbegin\nnot necessitate changes in force posture\nraised\nICBM\njoined\ncritics of the ICBM leg\nguide\ndivestiture\nother options, with varying degrees of promptness, could still be used first\nno reason to assume\nICBMs\nvehicle of choice for a first strike\nsecond-strike capacity\nregardless of when\nreestablish deterrence after\nminutes\ndays\nsignificant political\nrisk\nconfirmed\nattack\nfirst use\nnot precluded\nNFU\nstrategic conditions\nstill require this ability\nrequire\nspeculative\ndecided\nother reasons\nseparate matters\nno changes\nforce requirements\nforce posture\nrequired", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 5. It's not offense---if sole purpose doesn’t spur operational changes, neither does NFU.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "In the public NFU debate, the ability of the U\nS\nto execute a nuclear strike quickly is often conflated with its ability to strike first. The result is a premise that adoption of an NFU\nshould drive the reduction or elimination of the U.S.’ ability to respond promptly with a nuclear weapon. This premise ignores the fundamental objective of current force posture\nto provide the capability for a variety of flexible options\nThis posture is distinct from declaratory policy. In short, NFU\nhas no effect on force needs or posture\nThe existence of an option does not mean that the option must be exercised. Just as the president always has the ability to choose a non-nuclear option over a nuclear option, a low-yield option over a high-yield option, or to act immediately or after some period of time, or to not act at all, the decision to use nuclear forces first is a choice, not an imperative\nIn other words,\na capability to launch nuclear weapons first is not equivalent to having a “first-use” policy\nThe overwhelming conclusion of\nresearch, including consultations with those who are or were involved in the implementation of U.S. nuclear policy and employment guidance, is that U.S. adoption of an NFU policy would not require any modification of U.S. nuclear force posture or force requirements\nAny discussion of NFU ought to begin with the fact that an NFU policy does not necessitate changes in force posture. Nevertheless, the public debate over NFU has often raised the question of force changes and the discussion often centers on\nthe\nICBM\nforce\nVoices of NFU advocates are often joined by critics of the ICBM leg\nFor this group, an NFU policy ought to guide\ndivestiture\nAny debate linking NFU and the ICBM force must account for the fact that ICBMs are not the only prompt response option and that other options, with varying degrees of promptness, could still be used first\nthere is no reason to assume\nICBMs would be the vehicle of choice for a first strike\nthere is no reason to assume that ICBMs would not be used in a second-strike capacity\nmaintaining the capability to strike promptly is not equivalent to stating an intent to strike first\nprompt-strike capability has value regardless of when\nFor example, a prompt nuclear response may be deemed necessary in order to reestablish deterrence after an adversary attack, in which case the difference between minutes and\ndays could cause significant political\nrisk\nthe ability to respond when under confirmed\nattack because of first use\nis not precluded by\nNFU\nCurrent strategic conditions\nstill require this ability\nBecause adopting an NFU policy does not require any changes to force posture or force requirements, any calculation of costs or savings would be speculative and would depend on whether one decided to change force posture or force requirements for other reasons\ndeclaratory policy and force posture—intent and capability—are separate matters, thus no changes in force requirements or force posture are required", "role": "user" }, { "content": "ability of the U\nS\nto\nstrike quickly is\nconflated with\nability to strike first\na premise that\nNFU\nshould drive\nreduction\nignores the\nobjective\nto provide\na variety of flexible options\nThis\nis distinct from declaratory policy\nNFU\nhas no effect on force needs\nThe overwhelming conclusion of\nresearch, including consultations with those\ninvolved in\nimplementation of\nnuclear policy and employment guidance, is that\nNFU\nwould not require any modification\nprompt-strike capability has value regardless of\nfirst use", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: That solves existential threats.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "New technologies are changing the way that militaries prepare to fight wars, emerging domains are changing the range of actions that states have to deter and defend against, and the rapidly changing information environment is challenging states’ ability to signal intentions and respond to accurate information. What’s more, domestic security concerns have sprung to the forefront in the United States, challenging traditional conceptions of threat as domestic extremist groups seek to undermine democratic processes and encourage political violence.\nWhat do these changes have in common? They all blur the lines between American civilians and the military. These emerging challenges demand new, clear thinking about civil-military relations—an area of study best thought of as the relationship between the military, government, and society. We solicited ideas from a wide range of civil-military relations scholars and curated them into a series of articles to tackle this challenge head on. Each author offers a new idea to help guide American strategy making in the complex environment of modern civil-military relations.\nSecurity in the United States has never been about simply defending borders. However, the range of actors, potential threats, and targets that blend civilian and military capabilities and vulnerabilities continues to grow in the modern era. Whereas traditionally we think about war as a primarily military phenomenon, novel technologies, domains, and threats now clearly involve commercial and private interests as well. Cyber capabilities threaten not only military targets but also civilian infrastructure and the intellectual property that forms the basis for American competitive success. Space assets, which can be held hostage by foreign anti-satellite capabilities, enable GPS (used by both military and civilians) and, in turn, the global banking and investment system. Domestic threats to democratic political processes require intense coordination between civilian law enforcement and National Guard leaders who may be called upon to enforce peace. And military leaders today must attract a different kind of recruit who can meet these new demands.\n\n\nImpeachment CP", "role": "user" }, { "content": "New technologies are changing the way that militaries prepare to fight wars\nemerging domains are changing the range of actions that states have to deter and defend against\nand the rapidly changing information environment\ndomestic extremist groups\nseek to undermine democratic processes\nThese emerging challenges demand new, clear thinking about civil-military relations\nthe range of actors, potential threats, and targets that blend civilian and military capabilities and vulnerabilities continues to grow in the modern era\nCyber capabilities threaten not only military targets but also civilian infrastructure and the intellectual property that forms the basis for American competitive success\nSpace assets, which can be held hostage by foreign\nanti-satellite capabilities, enable GPS (used by both military and civilians) and, in turn, the\nglobal banking\nand investment system\nDomestic threats to democratic political processes require\nintense coordination\nbetween civilian law enforcement and National Guard leaders", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: That solves existential threats.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "New technologies are changing the way that militaries prepare to fight wars\nemerging domains are changing the range of actions that states have to deter and defend against\nand the rapidly changing information environment\ndomestic extremist groups\nseek to undermine democratic processes\nThese emerging challenges demand new, clear thinking about civil-military relations\nthe range of actors, potential threats, and targets that blend civilian and military capabilities and vulnerabilities continues to grow in the modern era\nCyber capabilities threaten not only military targets but also civilian infrastructure and the intellectual property that forms the basis for American competitive success\nSpace assets, which can be held hostage by foreign\nanti-satellite capabilities, enable GPS (used by both military and civilians) and, in turn, the\nglobal banking\nand investment system\nDomestic threats to democratic political processes require\nintense coordination\nbetween civilian law enforcement and National Guard leaders", "role": "user" }, { "content": "New tech\nemerging domains\ninfo\nenvironment\ndemocratic processes\ncivil-military relations\npotential threats\ncontinues to grow\nCyber capabilities\ninfrastructure\nintellectual property\nSpace assets\nglobal banking\ninvestment", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: That solves existential threats.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "New technologies are changing the way that militaries prepare to fight wars, emerging domains are changing the range of actions that states have to deter and defend against, and the rapidly changing information environment is challenging states’ ability to signal intentions and respond to accurate information. What’s more, domestic security concerns have sprung to the forefront in the United States, challenging traditional conceptions of threat as domestic extremist groups seek to undermine democratic processes and encourage political violence.\nWhat do these changes have in common? They all blur the lines between American civilians and the military. These emerging challenges demand new, clear thinking about civil-military relations—an area of study best thought of as the relationship between the military, government, and society. We solicited ideas from a wide range of civil-military relations scholars and curated them into a series of articles to tackle this challenge head on. Each author offers a new idea to help guide American strategy making in the complex environment of modern civil-military relations.\nSecurity in the United States has never been about simply defending borders. However, the range of actors, potential threats, and targets that blend civilian and military capabilities and vulnerabilities continues to grow in the modern era. Whereas traditionally we think about war as a primarily military phenomenon, novel technologies, domains, and threats now clearly involve commercial and private interests as well. Cyber capabilities threaten not only military targets but also civilian infrastructure and the intellectual property that forms the basis for American competitive success. Space assets, which can be held hostage by foreign anti-satellite capabilities, enable GPS (used by both military and civilians) and, in turn, the global banking and investment system. Domestic threats to democratic political processes require intense coordination between civilian law enforcement and National Guard leaders who may be called upon to enforce peace. And military leaders today must attract a different kind of recruit who can meet these new demands.\n\n\nImpeachment CP", "role": "user" }, { "content": "New tech\nemerging domains\nchanging the range\nrapidly changing info\nenvironment\ndomestic\ngroups\nundermine democratic processes\nchallenges demand\nc\nm\nr\nrange of actors\npotential threats\nvulnerabilities continues to grow\nCyber\nthreaten\nmilitary targets\nalso civilian infrastructure\nintellectual property\nSpace assets\na\nsat\nenable GPS\nused by both military and civilians\nthe\nglobal banking\nand investment\nthreats to democratic\nprocesses require\ncoordination", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Debt ceiling is not urgent---Congress has months to raise it---and inevitably will.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The economy isn’t going to explode this week. Secretary Yellen has told Congress that the U.S. will hit its debt ceiling on Jan. 19, but that’s just the beginning. The Treasury Department has mechanisms in place—known as “extraordinary measures”—to keep the government running while limiting some spending, like suspending new investments in retirement and disability funds. These moves are temporary, and retirees aren’t affected, as the Treasury Department will make those funds whole again after the debt-limit impasse ends. All these maneuvers buy Congress a few more months to get its act together before it inevitably raises the debt ceiling. Yellen estimated that “it is unlikely” the government will run out of cash to pay its bills “before early June.”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The economy isn’t going to explode this week\nThe Treasury Department has mechanisms in place—known as “extraordinary measures”—to keep the government running while limiting some spending, like suspending new investments in retirement and disability funds\nAll these maneuvers buy Congress a few more months to get its act together before it inevitably raises the debt ceiling. Yellen estimated that “it is unlikely” the government will run out of cash to pay its bills “before early June.”", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Debt ceiling is not urgent---Congress has months to raise it---and inevitably will.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.6", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The economy isn’t going to explode this week\nThe Treasury Department has mechanisms in place—known as “extraordinary measures”—to keep the government running while limiting some spending, like suspending new investments in retirement and disability funds\nAll these maneuvers buy Congress a few more months to get its act together before it inevitably raises the debt ceiling. Yellen estimated that “it is unlikely” the government will run out of cash to pay its bills “before early June.”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The economy isn’t going to explode this week\nThe Treasury\nhas\n“extraordinary measures”—to keep the government running\nthese\nbuy Congress a few more months to get its act together before it inevitably raises the debt ceiling\n“it is unlikely” the government will run out of cash\n“before early June.”", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Blurred lines—drones overwhelm other capabilities—makes them irrelevant.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nNevertheless, U.N. international law officials have continued to attack drones. Although admitting that drones “are here to stay,” Christof Heyns worried that robots would tempt states to “increasingly engag[e] in low-intensity but drawn-out applications of force that know few geographic and temporal boundaries.”34 Their growing availability and falling costs make the weapons a necessary addition to the arsenals of most nations, including the U.S., the UK, France, Russia, China, India, and Israel, among others. States can use drones and other technology, such as cyber weapons, to launch attacks far from conventional battlefields in ways that escape immediate detection or even evade responsibility. The clear line between war and peace will blur as nations use pinpoint strikes and low-level force to coerce each other.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "U.N. international law officials have continued to attack drones. Although admitting that drones “are here to stay,”\nrobots would tempt states to “increasingly engag[e] in low-intensity but drawn-out applications of force that know few geographic and temporal boundaries.”\nTheir growing availability and falling costs make the weapons a necessary addition to the arsenals of most nations\nStates can use drones\nto launch attacks far from conventional battlefields in ways that escape immediate detection or even evade responsibility. The clear line between war and peace will blur as nations use pinpoint strikes and low-level force to coerce each other", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Blurred lines—drones overwhelm other capabilities—makes them irrelevant.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "U.N. international law officials have continued to attack drones. Although admitting that drones “are here to stay,”\nrobots would tempt states to “increasingly engag[e] in low-intensity but drawn-out applications of force that know few geographic and temporal boundaries.”\nTheir growing availability and falling costs make the weapons a necessary addition to the arsenals of most nations\nStates can use drones\nto launch attacks far from conventional battlefields in ways that escape immediate detection or even evade responsibility. The clear line between war and peace will blur as nations use pinpoint strikes and low-level force to coerce each other", "role": "user" }, { "content": "i\nlaw\nattack drones\ndrones “are here to stay,”\nlow-intensity\ndrawn-out applications of force\nnecessary addition\nfar from conventional battlefields\nescape immediate detection\nevade responsibility\nwar\npeace", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Blurred lines—drones overwhelm other capabilities—makes them irrelevant.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nNevertheless, U.N. international law officials have continued to attack drones. Although admitting that drones “are here to stay,” Christof Heyns worried that robots would tempt states to “increasingly engag[e] in low-intensity but drawn-out applications of force that know few geographic and temporal boundaries.”34 Their growing availability and falling costs make the weapons a necessary addition to the arsenals of most nations, including the U.S., the UK, France, Russia, China, India, and Israel, among others. States can use drones and other technology, such as cyber weapons, to launch attacks far from conventional battlefields in ways that escape immediate detection or even evade responsibility. The clear line between war and peace will blur as nations use pinpoint strikes and low-level force to coerce each other.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "i\nlaw\ncontinued to attack drones\nAlthough admitting\ndrones “are here to stay,”\ngrowing availability and falling costs make the weapons a necessary addition\nStates\nuse drones\nto launch attacks far from conventional battlefields in ways that escape\ndetection or\nevade responsibility\nThe\nline between war and peace will blur", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 8. and robust study on Chinese emissions.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Although EKC theory has been widely used to describe the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions, limited knowledge exists regarding its empirical validity. To check the robustness of our results, we used data from the IEA, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and China Statistical Yearbook. By using EKC theory combined with the RD approach, we empirically examined the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions. We performed some empirical tests, including the unit root and ARDL bounds tests, on a Chinese data sample for 1990–2016. Regress our dependent variables on the performance alone and include control variables step wise (Wang et al., 2019). To investigate the robustness of our results, we ran numerous regressions based on the SUR-OLS specification and used the Chow test to redefine the breakpoint in advance. Unlike the majority of relevant previous studies, this study used both subjective mutation and randomized field examination combined with a structural model of carbon emissions and relevant running variables to explore the aforementioned relationship. The breakpoint time of the Chow test was obtained in advance. To confirm the robustness of our results. We assumed that this mutation point pattern was selected at random, and that the mutation point of the time series was completely unknown in advance. This study is the first to combine EKC theory and the RD approach to perform empirical analysis for observing the structural change in the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions. For various regressions reported in this study, a U-shaped relationship was obtained between the cost of environmental degradation and lnGDP for China when the effects of government policies and the influence of other parameters were not considered and when only the effects of lnGDP and (lnGDP)² on lnCO2 were considered. This result indicated that a Kuznets inflection point did not exist between China's lnGDP growth and lnCO2 emissions during 1990–2016. However, the Chow test and RD test results indicated that regardless of the effect of other policies, China's current economic development has not yet reached but is approaching the turning point of the Kuznets curve. Numerous regressions reported in this study indicated that a statistically significant and inverse U-shaped relationship existed between economic growth and carbon emissions during 1990–2016 in China. Another important finding of our analysis is that although the overall structural model was stable when using Equation 10, the Asian financial crisis caused a structural change in the nonlinear relationship between lnCO2 and lnGDP from 1997 to 1999. The substantial reduction in the coal demand in 1999 played an important role in the structural change in the nonlinear correlation between lnGDP and lnCO2. However, the GFC of 2008–2009 did not lead to structural changes in the nonlinear relationship between lnGDP and lnCO2 emissions during 2008–2009, which indicated that CO2 emissions and economic growth are not necessarily linked. China has the highest population in the world, and its TPES increased every year from 1990 to 2016, in which the TPES was 2958 Mtoe. However, during the past 4 years, CO2 emissions in China have gradually decreased even though GDP has increased. As per the UNFCCC 2009 Copenhagen Accord, China agreed to voluntarily reduce its carbon emissions by 40 to 45% in 2020 compared with its carbon emissions in 2005. Data from the IEA indicated that the ratio of CO2 to GDP was 1.5 in 2005 and 0.9 in 2016. Thus, China’s carbon emissions decreased by 40% from 2005 to 2016. Consequently, China achieved the goal of the 2009 Copenhagen Agreement 4 years in advance. We extend our results to examine the effect of emission fee levy on the cost of environmental degradation. A positive relationship was obtained between emission fee levy and CO2 emissions, which confirmed our hypothesis. This finding may be one of the reasons why the Chinese government has implemented environment protection taxes instead of penalties in the environmental regulations since 2018. Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark have imposed carbon taxes since 1990 (Piciu and Tricǎ, 2012). The effectiveness of the environmental protection tax implemented in China since 2018, is an important topic that can be examined in future research. Many studies have indicated that during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China maintained stable economic growth, the RMB did not depreciate, and Chinese exports continued to increase. However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has indicated that China's coal consumption dramatically decreased during the Asian financial crisis. Moreover, China's CO2 emissions decreased from 3.021 billion tons in 1998 to 2.92 billion tons in 1999. However, its GDP increased from USD1776 billion in 1997 to USD1915 billion in 1998 and USD2062 billion in 1999. Thus, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China’s GDP exhibited sustainable growth. Finally, our empirical results indicated that the Asian financial crisis caused the alternation of the inverse U-shaped relationship between China's economic growth and CO2 emissions, which is a major finding of this study.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "To check the robustness of our results, we used data from the IEA, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and China Statistical Yearbook. By using EKC theory combined with the RD approach\nwe empirically examined the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions.\nperformed some empirical tests, including the unit root and ARDL bounds tests, on a Chinese data sample for 1990–2016. Regress our dependent variables on the performance alone and include control variables step wise\n). To investigate the robustness of our results, we ran numerous regressions based on the SUR-OLS specification and used the Chow test to redefine the breakpoint in advance\nUnlike the majority of relevant previous studies, this study used both subjective mutation and randomized field examination combined with a structural model of carbon emissions and relevant running variables to explore the aforementioned relationship\nbreakpoint time of the Chow test was obtained in advance\nFor various regressions reported in this study, a U-shaped relationship was obtained between the cost of environmental degradation and lnGDP for China when the effects of government policies and the influence of other parameters were not considered and when only the effects of lnGDP and (lnGDP)² on lnCO2 were considered\nChina's current economic development has not yet reached but is approaching the turning point of the Kuznets curve\na statistically significant and inverse U-shaped relationship existed between economic growth and carbon emissions during 1990–2016 in China.\n, the Asian financial crisis caused a structural change in the nonlinear relationship between lnCO2 and lnGDP from 1997 to 1999\n, the GFC of 2008–2009 did not lead to structural changes in the nonlinear relationship between lnGDP and lnCO2 emissions during 2008–2009\nich indicated that CO2 emissions and economic growth are not necessarily linked\nCO2 emissions in China have gradually decreased even though GDP has increased\nThus, China’s carbon emissions decreased by 40% from 2005 to 2016.\nHowever, to the best of our knowledge, no study has indicated that China's coal consumption dramatically decreased during the Asian financial crisis\nAsian financial crisis caused the alternation of the inverse U-shaped relationship between China's economic growth and CO2 emissions, which is a major finding of this study.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 8. and robust study on Chinese emissions.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "To check the robustness of our results, we used data from the IEA, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and China Statistical Yearbook. By using EKC theory combined with the RD approach\nwe empirically examined the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions.\nperformed some empirical tests, including the unit root and ARDL bounds tests, on a Chinese data sample for 1990–2016. Regress our dependent variables on the performance alone and include control variables step wise\n). To investigate the robustness of our results, we ran numerous regressions based on the SUR-OLS specification and used the Chow test to redefine the breakpoint in advance\nUnlike the majority of relevant previous studies, this study used both subjective mutation and randomized field examination combined with a structural model of carbon emissions and relevant running variables to explore the aforementioned relationship\nbreakpoint time of the Chow test was obtained in advance\nFor various regressions reported in this study, a U-shaped relationship was obtained between the cost of environmental degradation and lnGDP for China when the effects of government policies and the influence of other parameters were not considered and when only the effects of lnGDP and (lnGDP)² on lnCO2 were considered\nChina's current economic development has not yet reached but is approaching the turning point of the Kuznets curve\na statistically significant and inverse U-shaped relationship existed between economic growth and carbon emissions during 1990–2016 in China.\n, the Asian financial crisis caused a structural change in the nonlinear relationship between lnCO2 and lnGDP from 1997 to 1999\n, the GFC of 2008–2009 did not lead to structural changes in the nonlinear relationship between lnGDP and lnCO2 emissions during 2008–2009\nich indicated that CO2 emissions and economic growth are not necessarily linked\nCO2 emissions in China have gradually decreased even though GDP has increased\nThus, China’s carbon emissions decreased by 40% from 2005 to 2016.\nHowever, to the best of our knowledge, no study has indicated that China's coal consumption dramatically decreased during the Asian financial crisis\nAsian financial crisis caused the alternation of the inverse U-shaped relationship between China's economic growth and CO2 emissions, which is a major finding of this study.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "we used data from the IEA, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and China Statistical Yearbook\nwe empirically examined the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions.\nUnlike\nsubjective mutation\nrandomized field examination\na U-shaped relationship\nGDP\nChina's\nstatistically significant\nU-shaped relationship\ngrowth and carbon emissions\nthe GFC\nchanges in\nbetween lnGDP and lnCO2\nCO2 emissions and\nlinked\nCO2 emissions\nThus, China’s carbon emissions decreased by 40% from 2005 to 2016.\nChina's coal consumption\ndecreased during\nAsian financial crisis", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 8. and robust study on Chinese emissions.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.1", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Although EKC theory has been widely used to describe the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions, limited knowledge exists regarding its empirical validity. To check the robustness of our results, we used data from the IEA, National Bureau of Statistics of China, and China Statistical Yearbook. By using EKC theory combined with the RD approach, we empirically examined the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions. We performed some empirical tests, including the unit root and ARDL bounds tests, on a Chinese data sample for 1990–2016. Regress our dependent variables on the performance alone and include control variables step wise (Wang et al., 2019). To investigate the robustness of our results, we ran numerous regressions based on the SUR-OLS specification and used the Chow test to redefine the breakpoint in advance. Unlike the majority of relevant previous studies, this study used both subjective mutation and randomized field examination combined with a structural model of carbon emissions and relevant running variables to explore the aforementioned relationship. The breakpoint time of the Chow test was obtained in advance. To confirm the robustness of our results. We assumed that this mutation point pattern was selected at random, and that the mutation point of the time series was completely unknown in advance. This study is the first to combine EKC theory and the RD approach to perform empirical analysis for observing the structural change in the relationship between economic growth and carbon emissions. For various regressions reported in this study, a U-shaped relationship was obtained between the cost of environmental degradation and lnGDP for China when the effects of government policies and the influence of other parameters were not considered and when only the effects of lnGDP and (lnGDP)² on lnCO2 were considered. This result indicated that a Kuznets inflection point did not exist between China's lnGDP growth and lnCO2 emissions during 1990–2016. However, the Chow test and RD test results indicated that regardless of the effect of other policies, China's current economic development has not yet reached but is approaching the turning point of the Kuznets curve. Numerous regressions reported in this study indicated that a statistically significant and inverse U-shaped relationship existed between economic growth and carbon emissions during 1990–2016 in China. Another important finding of our analysis is that although the overall structural model was stable when using Equation 10, the Asian financial crisis caused a structural change in the nonlinear relationship between lnCO2 and lnGDP from 1997 to 1999. The substantial reduction in the coal demand in 1999 played an important role in the structural change in the nonlinear correlation between lnGDP and lnCO2. However, the GFC of 2008–2009 did not lead to structural changes in the nonlinear relationship between lnGDP and lnCO2 emissions during 2008–2009, which indicated that CO2 emissions and economic growth are not necessarily linked. China has the highest population in the world, and its TPES increased every year from 1990 to 2016, in which the TPES was 2958 Mtoe. However, during the past 4 years, CO2 emissions in China have gradually decreased even though GDP has increased. As per the UNFCCC 2009 Copenhagen Accord, China agreed to voluntarily reduce its carbon emissions by 40 to 45% in 2020 compared with its carbon emissions in 2005. Data from the IEA indicated that the ratio of CO2 to GDP was 1.5 in 2005 and 0.9 in 2016. Thus, China’s carbon emissions decreased by 40% from 2005 to 2016. Consequently, China achieved the goal of the 2009 Copenhagen Agreement 4 years in advance. We extend our results to examine the effect of emission fee levy on the cost of environmental degradation. A positive relationship was obtained between emission fee levy and CO2 emissions, which confirmed our hypothesis. This finding may be one of the reasons why the Chinese government has implemented environment protection taxes instead of penalties in the environmental regulations since 2018. Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark have imposed carbon taxes since 1990 (Piciu and Tricǎ, 2012). The effectiveness of the environmental protection tax implemented in China since 2018, is an important topic that can be examined in future research. Many studies have indicated that during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China maintained stable economic growth, the RMB did not depreciate, and Chinese exports continued to increase. However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has indicated that China's coal consumption dramatically decreased during the Asian financial crisis. Moreover, China's CO2 emissions decreased from 3.021 billion tons in 1998 to 2.92 billion tons in 1999. However, its GDP increased from USD1776 billion in 1997 to USD1915 billion in 1998 and USD2062 billion in 1999. Thus, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China’s GDP exhibited sustainable growth. Finally, our empirical results indicated that the Asian financial crisis caused the alternation of the inverse U-shaped relationship between China's economic growth and CO2 emissions, which is a major finding of this study.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Unlike\nprevious studies\nthis\nused\nsubjective mutation and randomized\nexamination\nChina's\napproaching\nstatistically significant\nU-shaped relationship\nbetween\ngrowth and\nemissions\nGFC of\n08\ndid not\nchange\nin\nrelationship\nemissions\nhave\ndecreased even though GDP\nincreased\nChina’s\nemissions decreased\n40%\nno study\nindicated\ncoal\ndecreased during\nAsian\ncrisis", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Psychology proves the CP doesn’t solve---being able to sue the robot is key to patient satisfaction and overcomes aversion.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "When a robot hurts a human, how should the legal system respond? Our first instinct might be to ask who should pay for the harm caused, perhaps deciding to rest legal liability with the robot's hardware manufacturer or its programmers. But besides considering tort or criminal actions against corporate and human persons, legal actors might also target the most immediate source of the harm the robot itself. The notion of holding a robot accountable for its actions initially evokes absurd and amusing mental images-a prosecutor pointing to a smart toaster shouting, \"And what do you have to say in your defense? Jury, note that the toaster says nothing. It says nothing because it is guilty.\" And it is easy to laugh at this scenario and brush the idea aside. But there are more rational ways to hold robots accountable for their actions and reasons why law and policy makers would want to do so. This Essay proceeds by first exploring how vengeful responses to wrongdoing may provide significant psychological benefits to victims (Part II). It goes on to argue that taking revenge against wrongdoing robots, specifically, may be necessary to create psychological satisfaction in those whom robots harm and addresses the concern that punishing robots would psychologically injure humans (Part III). The Essay then shifts focus to robots themselves, arguing that it is justifiable for humans to blame robots for their actions because, like animals, autonomous robots are best understood as the causes of their own actions (as \"agents\") (Part IV). Finally, the Essay evaluates whether a robot's moral culpability is relevant to the issue of robot punishment (Part V) and considers how revenge against robots could be implemented (Part VI). II. SEEKING SATISFACTION THROUGH REVENGE When asked what the goal of tort law is, many say that its goal is \"to make victims whole.\"' \"Making a victim whole\" is usually understood to mean returning a victim to the position they were in before a harm occurred or placing a victim in the position they would have been in had they not been injured. 2 In practice, this means awarding tort victims financially.3 When a pedestrian gets hit by a car and physically injured, they can sue the car's driver and may receive as compensation the cost of their medical bills, lost wages from the injury, and even an approximation of the value of their physical pain and suffering.4 But consider for a moment an alternate society where, instead of suing the driver, an injured pedestrian appeals to a government body or a private charity to cover the cost of the accident. In this society, governments or charities are very generous, and injured individuals receive in compensation the same as or more than they would have received in our more litigious society. Plus, the procedure is fast and efficient and does not require long, contentious legal battles. Your instinct may be that this alternate society sounds preferable because injured parties are made whole quicker. But you might also imagine yourself in that situation and feel a nagging frustration—the person who caused your injuries does not appear in the story at all. The driver hit you with a car and then just walked away from the situation. Their car insurance payments did not even increase. Maybe they never thought about you again, knowing that existing institutions would make sure you were taken care of. One might suppose that this frustration comes from a desire for revenge—the desire to see the car driver suffer in some way because of the suffering they inflicted.5 Here, it is useful to distinguish between retribution and revenge. Retributivists might support the law taking punitive actions because the driver deserves to suffer for their wrongdoing. But while retribution focuses on what a wrongdoer deserves, the notion of revenge additionally involves a personal desire in the wrongdoer's victim. 6 To the extent that we focus on the effect of revenge on the victim rather than the wrongdoer, one might be concerned that indulging a desire for revenge would cultivate socially undesirable behaviors and attitudes in the victim. One might additionally resist the idea of vengeance, as distinct from retributive punishment, under a theory that revenge merely harms a wrongdoer while doing little to benefit society. And depending on the form it takes, revenge does not necessarily contribute to making the original victim whole in any concrete sense; rather, as Mahatma Gandhi purportedly said, \"An eye for an eye leaves the whole world blind.\" 7 Yet this understanding of revenge omits a consideration of the psychological benefit that revenge might create in harmed individuals—satisfaction'–which is more defensible as an outcome the law and society should support. The purpose of revenge may initially seem to be to inflict harm on a wrongdoer, but reven\n\nge (as contrasted with retribution) is more precisely conceived of as the means and not the end. The end of revenge is satisfaction the re-establishment of the social standing and power balance between the wrongdoer and victim so that, in the eyes of any of the wrongdoer, the victim, or third parties, the noneconomic injury committed against the victim has been set aright.9 Psychology research indicates that satisfaction is a complicated state-it is not simply created by inflicting harm on a wrongdoer.' 0 However, while harming wrongdoers alone may not be satisfying to parties seeking revenge, one psychological study has demonstrated that vengeance is satisfying when the objects of revenge are not only harmed but also recognize that their earlier actions resulted in their later suffering. Psychological satisfaction need not only be achieved by a combination of acknowledgement and harm. A third party's judgment could generate the effect as well, such as when courts, the press, or one's social circle state and agree that an alleged wrongdoer is at fault. Scholars have argued that one role of the court process is to create a shared narrative of what \"the truth\" of a situation is.1 2 Psychological studies show that victims who act as agents and tell their stories in court are more likely to feel positively about the outcome of their cases, even though they are less likely to be as highly economically compensated as someone who takes less of an active role in telling their story or moving their case forward.1 3 Other work indicates that court judgments affirm a plaintiff s worth to their community or society.1 4 Even the availability of \"nominal damages\" exemplifies how the public nature of the court system can provide satisfaction in cases where what a victim really wants is an acknowledgement by an authority figure or society that they were wronged.' 5 Indeed, some litigants claim that what they really want from the objects of their lawsuits is a sincere apology. 16 In private life, we are also likely familiar with situations where two individuals have a personal conflict and appear to try to convince their mutual acquaintances of \"who was right\" in the absence of one party's conceding that they were wrong. These sorts of actionsapology, making a public statement, and authoritative or public judgment all serve to provide satisfaction to a victim or party to a conflict by indicating that the victim or party was in the right. Satisfaction is ultimately about restoring perceived and real power and social standing, and a variety of behaviors besides those described above can reset the power dynamics between two parties. As a historic example, duelists often evaded physical harm, 7 and no one was necessarily established as the wrongdoer following a duel.\" The ritualization of the duel served as a mechanism by which social standing between two feuding parties could be restored.19 Although duels served to restore one's standing in the eyes of one's community, they also served to change the psychological disposition of the parties with respect to each other. Duelists found themselves in a position of both deadly power over and vulnerability to their opponent, and in circumstances where no deadly shots were attempted, a duelist found himself in both a superior and grateful position: superior because he spared his opponent when he did not have to, and grateful because his opponent spared him. The gravity of the moment could be understood as not simply satisfying arguably-barbaric social expectations, but as genuinely changing the psychological disposition that the duelists had towards each other.20 III. DIRECTING EMOTIONS AT THE ROBOT So instead of our original example of the driver and pedestrian, let us instead consider an autonomous, self-driving car that injures a pedestrian. When considering how to approach the injured party, we now may be inclined to ask at least two questions: who should make the pedestrian economically whole, and how can the pedestrian achieve satisfaction from the aftereffects of the accident. Depending on the circumstances, we can imagine being attracted to several options for holding human persons and corporations accountable for the accident. Of the parties, we could target the hardware manufacturer or repairer, the software programmers, or even the parties who chose to install the software in the car. In choosing to privilege valuing safety or encouraging innovation, we could imagine courts holding these parties to different standards of liability.2 ' To encourage innovation, various parties could be granted immunity for various kinds of accidents, or damages could be capped. Alternatively, to encourage exacting safety precautions, some parties could be strictly liable even if they were not at fault. While our inclinations first may be to ask what legal standards will encourage innovation and safety, we can also ask what legal frameworks will provide satisfaction to victims of robot-related accidents. Depending on what kind of robot we are dealing with and the kind of harm that occurred, the target of one's need for satisfaction might be quite different. In the case of a hardware or physical failure, one might direct one's ire to the manufacturers. In the case of a non-autonomous smart device, where the cause of a problem within the computer's code is clear, one might reasonably be inclined to criticize the software developer or the party who chose to run the software in the device. In the case of any computer, if many similar devices are making the same error, even if we cannot understand why, one might again focus on the software developer or manufacturer, with an instinct towards the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur-even if we cannot tell exactly what happened, we might be inclined to think there was negligent design. But one can also imagine human users' blaming and experiencing anger with the offending object itself instead of the programmer or manufacturer. Both current events and fiction suggest this insight is accurate. News reports about the \"drone slayer,\" who shot down an aerial drone over his house, illustrate the instinct to target offending objects instead of or in addition to the human actors responsible for them. 22 Similarly, one of the most famous scenes in the movie Office Space consists of several characters carrying a frustrating office printer into an empty field and destroying it with a baseball bat.23 This phenomenon is likely even more pronounced in the case of social and autonomous robots. \"Social robots\" are defined by robot ethics researcher Kate Darling as \"a physically embodied, autonomous agent that communicates and interacts with humans on a social level.\" 24 Some social robots only act in predetermined ways, but others are autonomous. \"Autonomous\" robots have the ability to \"make (limited) decisions about what behaviors to execute based on perceptions and internal states, rather than following a pre-determined action sequence based on pre-programmed commands.\" 25 Many studies and anecdotes indicate that humans feel more empathy towards robots the more life-like they seem as they appear more social and autonomous. 26 This empathy can manifest as a powerful emotional aversion to causing robots pain and suffering even though humans consciously know that the robots are not alive and cannot feel anything.2 7 One could analogously imagine humans being equally inclined to feel negative or vengeful emotions towards autonomous, social robots, even if they \"know\" that robots are merely objects that run code. Kate Darling has made a Kantian-style argument28 that even though robots do not experience suffering, governments should pass laws that protect robots from cruelty for some of the same reasons that laws against animal cruelty exist to guide the psychological state of humans who might act against them and to reflect moral judgments about how humans should behave rather than to protect the animals (or robots) themselves.2 9 But, even if torturing innocent robots is psychologically harmful to humans, enacting revenge on a robot that has caused harm, as part of a formal process, may not be. Indeed, it may be that vengeance conducted in particular, formal, sanctioned situations and cultural contexts may cultivate positive characteristics in vengeful actors, such as repaired self-confidence and restored feelings of personal autonomy. Although counterintuitive, we can argue that violence against misbehaving robots is justifiable using reasoning similar to Darling's: our actions against robots should be chosen based on what is psychologically beneficial to humans rather than on what the robots \"deserve.\" If it turns out that punishing robots provides the right kind of psychological benefit to humans following an injury, we should punish robots. ", "role": "user" }, { "content": "legal actors might\ntarget the most immediate source of the harm the robot itself. The notion of holding a robot accountable\nevokes absurd and amusing mental images\nBut there are more rational ways to hold robots accountable for their actions and reasons why law and policy makers would want to do so.\nvengeful responses to wrongdoing may provide significant psychological benefits to victims\ntaking revenge against wrongdoing robots\nspecifically\nmay be necessary to create psychological satisfaction in those whom robots harm\nconsider\nan alternate society where, instead of suing the driver, an injured pedestrian appeals to a government body\nto cover the cost\nIn this society, governments or charities are very generous\nPlus, the procedure is fast and efficient\nYour instinct may be that this alternate society sounds preferable\nBut you might\nfeel a nagging frustration—the person who caused your injuries does not appear in the story at all.\nconsideration of the psychological benefit that revenge might create in harmed individuals—satisfaction'–which is more defensible as an outcome the law and society should support\nreven\nge\nis\nthe means and not the end\nThe end of revenge is satisfaction the re-establishment of the social standing and power balance\nvengeance is satisfying when the objects of revenge are not only harmed but also recognize that their earlier actions resulted in their later suffering.\nconsider an autonomous, self-driving car that injures a pedestrian\nwe could target the hardware manufacturer or repairer, the software programmers, or even the parties who chose to install the software in the car.\nvarious parties could be granted immunity\nAlternatively\nsome parties could be strictly liable even if they were not at fault.\nwhat legal frameworks will provide satisfaction to victims of robot-related accidents\none can\nimagine human users' blaming\nthe offending object\ncurrent events\nsuggest this insight is accurate\nenacting revenge on a robot\nvengeance conducted in particular, formal, sanctioned situations and cultural contexts may cultivate positive characteristics in vengeful actors, such as repaired self-confidence and restored feelings of personal autonomy\nviolence against misbehaving robots is justifiable\nour actions against robots should be chosen based on what is psychologically beneficial to humans rather than on what the robots \"deserve.\"\npunishing robots provides the right kind of psychological benefit to humans\nwe should punish robots", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Psychology proves the CP doesn’t solve---being able to sue the robot is key to patient satisfaction and overcomes aversion.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "legal actors might\ntarget the most immediate source of the harm the robot itself. The notion of holding a robot accountable\nevokes absurd and amusing mental images\nBut there are more rational ways to hold robots accountable for their actions and reasons why law and policy makers would want to do so.\nvengeful responses to wrongdoing may provide significant psychological benefits to victims\ntaking revenge against wrongdoing robots\nspecifically\nmay be necessary to create psychological satisfaction in those whom robots harm\nconsider\nan alternate society where, instead of suing the driver, an injured pedestrian appeals to a government body\nto cover the cost\nIn this society, governments or charities are very generous\nPlus, the procedure is fast and efficient\nYour instinct may be that this alternate society sounds preferable\nBut you might\nfeel a nagging frustration—the person who caused your injuries does not appear in the story at all.\nconsideration of the psychological benefit that revenge might create in harmed individuals—satisfaction'–which is more defensible as an outcome the law and society should support\nreven\nge\nis\nthe means and not the end\nThe end of revenge is satisfaction the re-establishment of the social standing and power balance\nvengeance is satisfying when the objects of revenge are not only harmed but also recognize that their earlier actions resulted in their later suffering.\nconsider an autonomous, self-driving car that injures a pedestrian\nwe could target the hardware manufacturer or repairer, the software programmers, or even the parties who chose to install the software in the car.\nvarious parties could be granted immunity\nAlternatively\nsome parties could be strictly liable even if they were not at fault.\nwhat legal frameworks will provide satisfaction to victims of robot-related accidents\none can\nimagine human users' blaming\nthe offending object\ncurrent events\nsuggest this insight is accurate\nenacting revenge on a robot\nvengeance conducted in particular, formal, sanctioned situations and cultural contexts may cultivate positive characteristics in vengeful actors, such as repaired self-confidence and restored feelings of personal autonomy\nviolence against misbehaving robots is justifiable\nour actions against robots should be chosen based on what is psychologically beneficial to humans rather than on what the robots \"deserve.\"\npunishing robots provides the right kind of psychological benefit to humans\nwe should punish robots", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the robot itself\nreasons why law and policy makers would want to do so.\npsychological benefits to victims\nrobots\nspecifically\nmay be necessary to create psychological satisfaction\ngovernment body\nto cover the cost\nnagging frustration\nlaw and society should support\nrecognize\nvarious parties could be granted immunity\nblaming\nthe offending object\naccurate\nviolence against misbehaving robots is justifiable\npsychologically beneficial to humans\nwe should punish robots", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Psychology proves the CP doesn’t solve---being able to sue the robot is key to patient satisfaction and overcomes aversion.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "When a robot hurts a human, how should the legal system respond? Our first instinct might be to ask who should pay for the harm caused, perhaps deciding to rest legal liability with the robot's hardware manufacturer or its programmers. But besides considering tort or criminal actions against corporate and human persons, legal actors might also target the most immediate source of the harm the robot itself. The notion of holding a robot accountable for its actions initially evokes absurd and amusing mental images-a prosecutor pointing to a smart toaster shouting, \"And what do you have to say in your defense? Jury, note that the toaster says nothing. It says nothing because it is guilty.\" And it is easy to laugh at this scenario and brush the idea aside. But there are more rational ways to hold robots accountable for their actions and reasons why law and policy makers would want to do so. This Essay proceeds by first exploring how vengeful responses to wrongdoing may provide significant psychological benefits to victims (Part II). It goes on to argue that taking revenge against wrongdoing robots, specifically, may be necessary to create psychological satisfaction in those whom robots harm and addresses the concern that punishing robots would psychologically injure humans (Part III). The Essay then shifts focus to robots themselves, arguing that it is justifiable for humans to blame robots for their actions because, like animals, autonomous robots are best understood as the causes of their own actions (as \"agents\") (Part IV). Finally, the Essay evaluates whether a robot's moral culpability is relevant to the issue of robot punishment (Part V) and considers how revenge against robots could be implemented (Part VI). II. SEEKING SATISFACTION THROUGH REVENGE When asked what the goal of tort law is, many say that its goal is \"to make victims whole.\"' \"Making a victim whole\" is usually understood to mean returning a victim to the position they were in before a harm occurred or placing a victim in the position they would have been in had they not been injured. 2 In practice, this means awarding tort victims financially.3 When a pedestrian gets hit by a car and physically injured, they can sue the car's driver and may receive as compensation the cost of their medical bills, lost wages from the injury, and even an approximation of the value of their physical pain and suffering.4 But consider for a moment an alternate society where, instead of suing the driver, an injured pedestrian appeals to a government body or a private charity to cover the cost of the accident. In this society, governments or charities are very generous, and injured individuals receive in compensation the same as or more than they would have received in our more litigious society. Plus, the procedure is fast and efficient and does not require long, contentious legal battles. Your instinct may be that this alternate society sounds preferable because injured parties are made whole quicker. But you might also imagine yourself in that situation and feel a nagging frustration—the person who caused your injuries does not appear in the story at all. The driver hit you with a car and then just walked away from the situation. Their car insurance payments did not even increase. Maybe they never thought about you again, knowing that existing institutions would make sure you were taken care of. One might suppose that this frustration comes from a desire for revenge—the desire to see the car driver suffer in some way because of the suffering they inflicted.5 Here, it is useful to distinguish between retribution and revenge. Retributivists might support the law taking punitive actions because the driver deserves to suffer for their wrongdoing. But while retribution focuses on what a wrongdoer deserves, the notion of revenge additionally involves a personal desire in the wrongdoer's victim. 6 To the extent that we focus on the effect of revenge on the victim rather than the wrongdoer, one might be concerned that indulging a desire for revenge would cultivate socially undesirable behaviors and attitudes in the victim. One might additionally resist the idea of vengeance, as distinct from retributive punishment, under a theory that revenge merely harms a wrongdoer while doing little to benefit society. And depending on the form it takes, revenge does not necessarily contribute to making the original victim whole in any concrete sense; rather, as Mahatma Gandhi purportedly said, \"An eye for an eye leaves the whole world blind.\" 7 Yet this understanding of revenge omits a consideration of the psychological benefit that revenge might create in harmed individuals—satisfaction'–which is more defensible as an outcome the law and society should support. The purpose of revenge may initially seem to be to inflict harm on a wrongdoer, but reven\n\nge (as contrasted with retribution) is more precisely conceived of as the means and not the end. The end of revenge is satisfaction the re-establishment of the social standing and power balance between the wrongdoer and victim so that, in the eyes of any of the wrongdoer, the victim, or third parties, the noneconomic injury committed against the victim has been set aright.9 Psychology research indicates that satisfaction is a complicated state-it is not simply created by inflicting harm on a wrongdoer.' 0 However, while harming wrongdoers alone may not be satisfying to parties seeking revenge, one psychological study has demonstrated that vengeance is satisfying when the objects of revenge are not only harmed but also recognize that their earlier actions resulted in their later suffering. Psychological satisfaction need not only be achieved by a combination of acknowledgement and harm. A third party's judgment could generate the effect as well, such as when courts, the press, or one's social circle state and agree that an alleged wrongdoer is at fault. Scholars have argued that one role of the court process is to create a shared narrative of what \"the truth\" of a situation is.1 2 Psychological studies show that victims who act as agents and tell their stories in court are more likely to feel positively about the outcome of their cases, even though they are less likely to be as highly economically compensated as someone who takes less of an active role in telling their story or moving their case forward.1 3 Other work indicates that court judgments affirm a plaintiff s worth to their community or society.1 4 Even the availability of \"nominal damages\" exemplifies how the public nature of the court system can provide satisfaction in cases where what a victim really wants is an acknowledgement by an authority figure or society that they were wronged.' 5 Indeed, some litigants claim that what they really want from the objects of their lawsuits is a sincere apology. 16 In private life, we are also likely familiar with situations where two individuals have a personal conflict and appear to try to convince their mutual acquaintances of \"who was right\" in the absence of one party's conceding that they were wrong. These sorts of actionsapology, making a public statement, and authoritative or public judgment all serve to provide satisfaction to a victim or party to a conflict by indicating that the victim or party was in the right. Satisfaction is ultimately about restoring perceived and real power and social standing, and a variety of behaviors besides those described above can reset the power dynamics between two parties. As a historic example, duelists often evaded physical harm, 7 and no one was necessarily established as the wrongdoer following a duel.\" The ritualization of the duel served as a mechanism by which social standing between two feuding parties could be restored.19 Although duels served to restore one's standing in the eyes of one's community, they also served to change the psychological disposition of the parties with respect to each other. Duelists found themselves in a position of both deadly power over and vulnerability to their opponent, and in circumstances where no deadly shots were attempted, a duelist found himself in both a superior and grateful position: superior because he spared his opponent when he did not have to, and grateful because his opponent spared him. The gravity of the moment could be understood as not simply satisfying arguably-barbaric social expectations, but as genuinely changing the psychological disposition that the duelists had towards each other.20 III. DIRECTING EMOTIONS AT THE ROBOT So instead of our original example of the driver and pedestrian, let us instead consider an autonomous, self-driving car that injures a pedestrian. When considering how to approach the injured party, we now may be inclined to ask at least two questions: who should make the pedestrian economically whole, and how can the pedestrian achieve satisfaction from the aftereffects of the accident. Depending on the circumstances, we can imagine being attracted to several options for holding human persons and corporations accountable for the accident. Of the parties, we could target the hardware manufacturer or repairer, the software programmers, or even the parties who chose to install the software in the car. In choosing to privilege valuing safety or encouraging innovation, we could imagine courts holding these parties to different standards of liability.2 ' To encourage innovation, various parties could be granted immunity for various kinds of accidents, or damages could be capped. Alternatively, to encourage exacting safety precautions, some parties could be strictly liable even if they were not at fault. While our inclinations first may be to ask what legal standards will encourage innovation and safety, we can also ask what legal frameworks will provide satisfaction to victims of robot-related accidents. Depending on what kind of robot we are dealing with and the kind of harm that occurred, the target of one's need for satisfaction might be quite different. In the case of a hardware or physical failure, one might direct one's ire to the manufacturers. In the case of a non-autonomous smart device, where the cause of a problem within the computer's code is clear, one might reasonably be inclined to criticize the software developer or the party who chose to run the software in the device. In the case of any computer, if many similar devices are making the same error, even if we cannot understand why, one might again focus on the software developer or manufacturer, with an instinct towards the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur-even if we cannot tell exactly what happened, we might be inclined to think there was negligent design. But one can also imagine human users' blaming and experiencing anger with the offending object itself instead of the programmer or manufacturer. Both current events and fiction suggest this insight is accurate. News reports about the \"drone slayer,\" who shot down an aerial drone over his house, illustrate the instinct to target offending objects instead of or in addition to the human actors responsible for them. 22 Similarly, one of the most famous scenes in the movie Office Space consists of several characters carrying a frustrating office printer into an empty field and destroying it with a baseball bat.23 This phenomenon is likely even more pronounced in the case of social and autonomous robots. \"Social robots\" are defined by robot ethics researcher Kate Darling as \"a physically embodied, autonomous agent that communicates and interacts with humans on a social level.\" 24 Some social robots only act in predetermined ways, but others are autonomous. \"Autonomous\" robots have the ability to \"make (limited) decisions about what behaviors to execute based on perceptions and internal states, rather than following a pre-determined action sequence based on pre-programmed commands.\" 25 Many studies and anecdotes indicate that humans feel more empathy towards robots the more life-like they seem as they appear more social and autonomous. 26 This empathy can manifest as a powerful emotional aversion to causing robots pain and suffering even though humans consciously know that the robots are not alive and cannot feel anything.2 7 One could analogously imagine humans being equally inclined to feel negative or vengeful emotions towards autonomous, social robots, even if they \"know\" that robots are merely objects that run code. Kate Darling has made a Kantian-style argument28 that even though robots do not experience suffering, governments should pass laws that protect robots from cruelty for some of the same reasons that laws against animal cruelty exist to guide the psychological state of humans who might act against them and to reflect moral judgments about how humans should behave rather than to protect the animals (or robots) themselves.2 9 But, even if torturing innocent robots is psychologically harmful to humans, enacting revenge on a robot that has caused harm, as part of a formal process, may not be. Indeed, it may be that vengeance conducted in particular, formal, sanctioned situations and cultural contexts may cultivate positive characteristics in vengeful actors, such as repaired self-confidence and restored feelings of personal autonomy. Although counterintuitive, we can argue that violence against misbehaving robots is justifiable using reasoning similar to Darling's: our actions against robots should be chosen based on what is psychologically beneficial to humans rather than on what the robots \"deserve.\" If it turns out that punishing robots provides the right kind of psychological benefit to humans following an injury, we should punish robots. ", "role": "user" }, { "content": "legal actors might\ntarget\nthe robot itself\nthere are\nways to hold robots accountable\nand reasons\nlaw\nwould\nvengeful responses\nmay provide\npsychological benefits to victims\nrevenge against\nrobots\nmay be necessary\nconsider\nan alternate\nappeals to a government body\nto cover the cost\nyou\nfeel a nagging frustration\nthe psychological benefit that revenge might create\nsatisfaction'\nis\nan outcome the law\nshould support\nrevenge is\nre-establishment of\npower balance\nvengeance is satisfying when the objects of revenge are\nrecognize\nparties could be granted immunity\nwhat legal frameworks will provide satisfaction to victims\none can\nimagine human users' blaming\nthe offending object\ncurrent events\nsuggest this\nis accurate\nviolence against misbehaving robots is\npsychologically beneficial to humans\npunishing robots provides the right kind of psychological benefit to humans", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: U.S. populism prevents effective liberal internationalism -- that makes the entire system more prone to erupt and escalates every major hotspot.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Trump does indeed have guiding principles, but they are process principles and not the substantive principles that we are used to seeing in a president. What shapes his foreign policy is that which shaped his singular triumph in public life: his campaign. Indeed, Trump abjured several of the policies that have guided Republican campaigns of the modern era: entitlement reform, trade agreements, and international leadership. A long-time supporter of both Bill and Hillary Clinton, President Trump’s political success was drawn not from conservatism nor an intellectual architecture—though he has some conservative impulses—but from political populism. His worldview in many ways is an extension of that belief.\nWhat is Populism?\nThis populism has four characteristics. First, it is grievance-based. It focuses on problems rather than solutions. This has the extraordinary advantage of giving the message potency because negative statements can motivate more effectively than positive ones, but it makes it difficult to form a governing coalition, since constituencies that have a problem with a particular policy might have even greater differences among its alternatives. Indeed, as a candidate, Trump avoided articulating a positive vision regarding even central pillars of his campaign such as health care. Notably, Trump’s main foreign policy pronouncements in the campaign were grievance-based: terrorism, trade and immigration. Equally noteworthy, they were all essentially domestic issues with a foreign genesis. The traditional foreign policy questions were largely absent from his discussions: What is America’s role in the world? What is the value of an alliance? To what extent should we promote democracy and human rights, or should the U.S. focus on national interest calculations?\nSecond, the populist must establish emotional connectivity with the audience. Trump tends to evaluate people largely based on how they connect with him. The rally format suits him well; he loves the audience and the audience loves him. There are no questions and answers, nor any discussion, nor does there have to be new information, but there is plenty of emotional connectivity. Importantly, this emotional connectivity has little to do with economic class, a point that can befuddle Trump’s domestic political opponents, who underestimate his working-class appeal on the basis that he personally has little in common with them or that his policies supposedly would not help them. To a populist, the first point is broadly irrelevant and the second point is highly debatable. Might many a construction worker welcome a construction boom, and many a restaurant worker welcome an expansion of the business, if it meant job security and a larger paycheck, even if it would create disproportionate returns to the construction company and restaurant owner? For many working men and women, a growth in inequality is not inherently troubling. Thomas Piketty might be right, but it might not matter to most Americans if returns to capital outpace returns to labor. In addition, when establishment elites mock Trump, from his grammar to his boorishness, a portion of non-elites see this as condescension.\nThird, populism is exculpatory: Every problem the United States faces was caused by others and the target audience is blameless. So if a company wanted to relocate some activity to Mexico, it must have been to exploit wage differences. No discussion as to whether wage increases at the U.S. facility have outpaced productivity increases. No discussion as to whether union rules impede flexibility and productivity. No discussion of the fact that Mexico might be a better production platform because it has more free trade agreements. Management is to blame, with Mexico in connivance. This is frequently expressed in themes of anti-establishment or alienation, which can have a corrosive effect when anchored in grievances.\nFourth, policy choices are cost-free and without trade-offs. Cost-benefit analysis, transition costs, the challenges in administering a government agency, underperforming programs, secondary effects and unintended consequences – these are all incidental to the victory of the policy choice itself. As such, populists might as well berate NATO leadership into burden-sharing, ignoring the downside to publicly hectoring leaders of sovereign nations. They, too, might as well call for a physical wall on the U.S. border with Mexico since it will be, by self-declaration, cost free.\nTo be fair, others in public life exhibit some of these elements. President Obama’s healthcare plan was historically grandiose in scope, cost and complexity, yet it was ballyhooed to save money. Similarly, Obama’s eight-year effort to reduce U.S. commitments to NATO was to have no costs in terms of force projection, alliance cohesion, or deterrence. And, Obama was the only President in the modern era to have run against trade as a candidate, an approach Trump followed. What Went Wrong? How could the bipartisan consensus on U.S. international leadership fade so quickly, particularly at a moment when the combination of market economics and alliances of democracies had resulted in perhaps the most prosperous and most liberal moment in human history? There are four contributors to the rise of populism: societal transformation, grievance economics, international leadership, and elite limitations. First, societal transformation – meaning both globalization and automation— has two profound socio-political effects. It produces an extraordinary degree of prosperity; and it carries with it a distribution effect. The bell curve of income distribution does not shift as much as it elongates. Few people are worse off, but many people are not better off. There is not necessarily the creation of a large number of winners and losers, but there is certainly the perception people getting left behind. Trump understands the message: The globalization club is having a party, and you are not invited. Silicon Valley is drinking champagne and your role is to pick the grapes. These trends also feed into the narrative of alienation because it decreases people’s control over their lives even as their overall prosperity increases. Globalization and automation have created economic anxiety in electorates around the world, and not just among steelworkers and coal miners. Realtors, bank tellers, school teachers, and cab drivers are all seeing competitive pressure and the prospect of job elimination. To many Americans, comparative advantage and creative destruction create a more prosperous society, but accompanying it is job insecurity. David Ricardo and Joseph Schumpeter might be right, but so what? Second, over several decades we have seen a shift from growth economics to grievance economics. This represents a break with the recovery policies that guided the leading economies through the 1950s and 1960s (and that economic rationalists such as Macron tilt toward today). In the current view, the primary purpose of economic policy is not to foment prosperity, but to redress grievances. Indeed, regardless of absolute improvements in well-being, reducing economic inequality is deemed to be a basis for policy. The premise of growth economics is that a system is fundamentally fair, so the main challenge is how fast we can go. The premise of grievance economics is that the system is fundamentally unfair, so going faster merely exacerbates the unfairness. This cult of inequality incentivizes interest-group politics and rent-seeking, leading to slower growth. If you focus on growth policies, you get growth. If you focus on grievance policies, you get grievances. A third cause is the shift in the U.S. international posture. We have seen a growing fatigue in the United States over the cost of international leadership. The U.S. entered the post-Cold War era with the institutions and the cohesion of the Cold War era largely intact, even though the end of the Soviet Union removed what political scientists term a “negative integrator.” Now we are deep into the post-post-Cold War era, with faded cohesion and institutions. For the first time since Harding and Coolidge we have two presidents in a row who have no international military or policy pedigree. Beyond the direct costs of international leadership in defense budgets and personnel, Americans seem more sensitive to the indirect costs of public opinion and anti-Americanism. Relationships can be expensive. Friendships can be complicated. If there is no immediate threat, and if no one likes us anyhow, then what is the point of foreign policy?\nTo sum up this point, imagine international Presidential leadership as a decision between whether to be a minute early or a minute late. Do you deter or do you react? Being a minute early requires leadership, because it carries with it the possibility of error and the cost of action without a consensus. “Left of Boom,” the British call it. Being a minute late and waiting until the problem has metastasized has the considerable benefit of allowing public consensus to build, and it is the less politically expensive approach. President Obama’s instinct is that foreign policy is better managed by being a minute late, such as responding after-the-fact to the Chinese build-out in the South China Sea, not confronting Russia on its intervention in U.S. elections, and perhaps in the cases of Aleppo or ISIS, Obama was more than a minute late. President Bush’s instinct was to be a minute early, foolishly so to his critics. Presidents have spent some 75 years since Pearl Harbor trying to be a minute early, with all the costs and mistakes that entailed, yet now we have two presidents in a row who believe we are better off being a minute late.\nFinally, the appeal of populism has been driven by their perception of the limitations of the U.S. leadership class: insular, rigid, and sometimes simply mediocre. Additionally, over-engineered solutions and the appearance of being self-serving, if not corrupt, help the appeal of populism. Sometimes it comes from the declining marginal effectiveness of government programs as society becomes more affluent and complicated. Indeed, the Obama administration seemed to regularly play into the hands of populists, sometimes passively so, as with the refusal to challenge even the more exotic of the sanctuary city movement. Sometimes, it was by design as with the painstaking construction not to label Islamic terrorism as such. If responsible leaders appear to be playing favorites or not accurately describing a phenomenon, they abandon the issue to their opponents — a phenomenon Trump witnessed through his hesitation in characterizing the Charlottesville protests. If populists rely too heavily on emotional connectivity, which establishment politicians have any emotional connectivity? Does there exist an aspirant for President, other than Donald Trump, who can have a friendly discussion with a Walmart cashier? How many of the possible 2020 presidential candidates have worked in the “real” economy, working for an institution that needed to turn a profit? Sam Rayburn’s wish to Lyndon Johnson, after LBJ had related how bright was his brain trust, was that he wished one of them had run for county sheriff. Can we today wish that one of the 2020 presidential candidates will have run a diner, which would have required them to hire teenagers, train high school dropouts, deal with single parents, lay-off workers from failed projects and negotiate wages, all while paying taxes and dealing with various government agencies? Maybe this is why a restaurant worker might respect an owner, or even a New York real estate developer, but not a career politician. If the elites cannot maintain that connectivity, they give an opening to populists. Attaining political maturity contemporaneous with the Bush 43 invasion of Iraq, Obama was wary of American over-reach and committed to a foreign policy pullback. He embedded that withdrawal in a denial of American exceptionalism, a pillar of U.S foreign policy since Pearl Harbor. If you stop believing in yourself, it is difficult to ask others to believe in you. The rejection of America’s special role in the world helped set the stage for “Make America Great Again.” Was Barack Obama the ultimate Donald Trump enabler? There other contributing factors beyond the above four. The rise of identity politics probably played into Trump’s hands, as did the digital communications revolution. News clutter rewards pugnacity and sensationalism and allows for cocoons and even tribalism. It is also worth noting that Trump is a man of unusual presentation strengths, and he can effectively project personality. Simply put, Trump was an exemplary grievance candidate in a grievance year. Trump articulated a vision; Hillary Clinton did not. We are in a communications era. For Secretary Clinton, communications is a means to an end. For Trump it is an end. She believes in her in-box; He, in his out-box. Hillary campaigned as the functionary; Donald as the visionary. Is internationalism doomed? America is now in the middle of a twelve and possibly sixteen year reign of two presidents who challenge the Cold War view that America is better off with a leading international presence, with being a minute early. It is too expensive, argued President Obama, and it leads us into unwinnable conflicts, draining our reputation and our purse. It is too expensive, echoes President Trump, and foreigners abuse and cheat us. Obama argues for minimalism because the United States is a problem for the world, and Trump argues for minimalism because the world is a problem for the United States. Even as President, Trump is easy to underestimate. Appealingly so. Many critics derive amusement, even a sense of superiority, from his foibles. His factual errors and even spelling mistakes provide an opportunity for mockery, but the lazy epiphany of error-spotting is a poor substitute for a substantive rebuttal. And a significant portion of the criticism is either ad hominem or an over-reach, either of which helps Trump. Those who are serious about policy should look at the direction in which he is taking the country, rather than fixate on these errors. To be even-handed, if President Trump’s distinctive success in the public space was his astonishing 2016 victory, in 2008 the distinctive success of Senator Obama was his astonishing election. Obama wisely chose not to run on his government record but marshaled his formidable stage skills and personal charisma to direct criticism toward Hillary Clinton and John McCain. So if Trump’s foreign policy approach stems from his success as “Ranter-in-Chief,” does Obama’s approach stem from his success as “Charmer-in-Chief?” Radically different styles, but with policy similarities.\nThe deterioration in U.S. foreign policy will likely continue for the near term. On any given day, the Obama/Trump approach may make sense. We should be a minute late. It makes sense to skimp, to cut defense expenditures, to reduce international good-will and connectivity, to save money all around. Relationships can be expensive and even harmful – this is the seduction of the minimalist school. But there is a countervailing argument.\nThe main argument against this minimalist approach will be events themselves. The minimalist approach might work in a static environment, but that stasis in itself incentivizes a destabilizer. At some point, history presents the bill. Only then will we be reminded, perhaps cruelly, that although on any given day it might be less expensive to be a minute late, as a matter of national policy we need to be a minute early. If we are not willing to pay the price to be left of boom, then we must pay the price for the boom itself. Worse than the expense and bother of having friends would be the expense and bother of not having friends.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "What shapes his foreign policy is that which shaped his singular triumph in public life: his campaign\npopulism\nis grievance-based\nIt focuses on problems rather than solutions\nThis has the extraordinary advantage of giving the message potency because negative statements can motivate more effectively than positive ones, but it makes it difficult to form a governing coalition\nconstituencies that have a problem with a particular policy might have even greater differences among its alternatives\nTrump avoided articulating a positive vision\nTrump’s main foreign policy pronouncements in the campaign were grievance-based: terrorism, trade and immigration\nthey were all essentially domestic issues with a foreign genesis\nThe traditional foreign policy questions were largely absent\nWhat is America’s role in the world? What is the value of an alliance? To what extent should we promote democracy and human rights, or should the U.S. focus on national interest calculations?\npopulism is exculpatory\npolicy choices are cost-free and without trade-offs\nCost-benefit analysis, transition costs, the challenges in administering a government agency, underperforming programs, secondary effects and unintended consequences – these are all incidental to the victory of the policy choice itself\npopulists might as well berate NATO leadership into burden-sharing, ignoring the downside to publicly hectoring leaders of sovereign nations. They, too, might as well call for a physical wall\nTo sum up this point, imagine international Presidential leadership as a decision between whether to be a minute early or a minute late\nBeing a minute early requires leadership, because it carries with it the possibility of error\nBeing a minute late and waiting until the problem has metastasized has the considerable benefit of allowing public consensus to build, and it is the less politically expensive approach\nObama’s instinct is that foreign policy is better managed by being a minute late\nresponding after-the-fact to\nS\nC\nS\nnot confronting Russia on its intervention in U.S. elections\nand\nin the cases of Aleppo or ISIS\nThe deterioration in U.S. foreign policy will likely continue\nOn any given day, the Obama/Trump approach may make sense. We should be a minute late. It makes sense to skimp, to cut defense expenditures\nto reduce international good-will and connectivity\nThe minimalist approach might work in a static environment, but that stasis in itself incentivizes a destabilizer\nAt some point, history presents the bill\nthen will we be reminded, perhaps cruelly, that although on any given day it might be less expensive to be a minute late, as a matter of national policy we need to be a minute early\nIf we are not willing to pay the price to be left of boom, then we must pay the price for the boom itself", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: U.S. populism prevents effective liberal internationalism -- that makes the entire system more prone to erupt and escalates every major hotspot.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "What shapes his foreign policy is that which shaped his singular triumph in public life: his campaign\npopulism\nis grievance-based\nIt focuses on problems rather than solutions\nThis has the extraordinary advantage of giving the message potency because negative statements can motivate more effectively than positive ones, but it makes it difficult to form a governing coalition\nconstituencies that have a problem with a particular policy might have even greater differences among its alternatives\nTrump avoided articulating a positive vision\nTrump’s main foreign policy pronouncements in the campaign were grievance-based: terrorism, trade and immigration\nthey were all essentially domestic issues with a foreign genesis\nThe traditional foreign policy questions were largely absent\nWhat is America’s role in the world? What is the value of an alliance? To what extent should we promote democracy and human rights, or should the U.S. focus on national interest calculations?\npopulism is exculpatory\npolicy choices are cost-free and without trade-offs\nCost-benefit analysis, transition costs, the challenges in administering a government agency, underperforming programs, secondary effects and unintended consequences – these are all incidental to the victory of the policy choice itself\npopulists might as well berate NATO leadership into burden-sharing, ignoring the downside to publicly hectoring leaders of sovereign nations. They, too, might as well call for a physical wall\nTo sum up this point, imagine international Presidential leadership as a decision between whether to be a minute early or a minute late\nBeing a minute early requires leadership, because it carries with it the possibility of error\nBeing a minute late and waiting until the problem has metastasized has the considerable benefit of allowing public consensus to build, and it is the less politically expensive approach\nObama’s instinct is that foreign policy is better managed by being a minute late\nresponding after-the-fact to\nS\nC\nS\nnot confronting Russia on its intervention in U.S. elections\nand\nin the cases of Aleppo or ISIS\nThe deterioration in U.S. foreign policy will likely continue\nOn any given day, the Obama/Trump approach may make sense. We should be a minute late. It makes sense to skimp, to cut defense expenditures\nto reduce international good-will and connectivity\nThe minimalist approach might work in a static environment, but that stasis in itself incentivizes a destabilizer\nAt some point, history presents the bill\nthen will we be reminded, perhaps cruelly, that although on any given day it might be less expensive to be a minute late, as a matter of national policy we need to be a minute early\nIf we are not willing to pay the price to be left of boom, then we must pay the price for the boom itself", "role": "user" }, { "content": "grievance-based\nproblems rather than solutions\ngoverning coalition\nforeign policy pronouncements\ngrievance-based\nterrorism\ntrade\nimmigration\nessentially domestic\nabsent\nAmerica’s role in the world\nalliance\npromote democracy\nhuman rights\nexculpatory\ncost-free\nwithout trade-offs\nCost-benefit analysis\ntransition costs\nunintended consequences\nincidental\nNATO\nignoring\ndownside\npublicly hectoring leaders\nwall\nminute early\nminute late\nObama’s\nS\nC\nS\nRussia\nAleppo\nISIS\ndeterioration\nforeign policy\ncontinue\nskimp\ncut defense expenditures\nreduce international good-will\nconnectivity\nstatic environment\nstasis\nincentivizes\ndestabilizer\nhistory presents the bill\nnational policy\nneed to be a minute early\npay the price for the boom", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: U.S. populism prevents effective liberal internationalism -- that makes the entire system more prone to erupt and escalates every major hotspot.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Trump does indeed have guiding principles, but they are process principles and not the substantive principles that we are used to seeing in a president. What shapes his foreign policy is that which shaped his singular triumph in public life: his campaign. Indeed, Trump abjured several of the policies that have guided Republican campaigns of the modern era: entitlement reform, trade agreements, and international leadership. A long-time supporter of both Bill and Hillary Clinton, President Trump’s political success was drawn not from conservatism nor an intellectual architecture—though he has some conservative impulses—but from political populism. His worldview in many ways is an extension of that belief.\nWhat is Populism?\nThis populism has four characteristics. First, it is grievance-based. It focuses on problems rather than solutions. This has the extraordinary advantage of giving the message potency because negative statements can motivate more effectively than positive ones, but it makes it difficult to form a governing coalition, since constituencies that have a problem with a particular policy might have even greater differences among its alternatives. Indeed, as a candidate, Trump avoided articulating a positive vision regarding even central pillars of his campaign such as health care. Notably, Trump’s main foreign policy pronouncements in the campaign were grievance-based: terrorism, trade and immigration. Equally noteworthy, they were all essentially domestic issues with a foreign genesis. The traditional foreign policy questions were largely absent from his discussions: What is America’s role in the world? What is the value of an alliance? To what extent should we promote democracy and human rights, or should the U.S. focus on national interest calculations?\nSecond, the populist must establish emotional connectivity with the audience. Trump tends to evaluate people largely based on how they connect with him. The rally format suits him well; he loves the audience and the audience loves him. There are no questions and answers, nor any discussion, nor does there have to be new information, but there is plenty of emotional connectivity. Importantly, this emotional connectivity has little to do with economic class, a point that can befuddle Trump’s domestic political opponents, who underestimate his working-class appeal on the basis that he personally has little in common with them or that his policies supposedly would not help them. To a populist, the first point is broadly irrelevant and the second point is highly debatable. Might many a construction worker welcome a construction boom, and many a restaurant worker welcome an expansion of the business, if it meant job security and a larger paycheck, even if it would create disproportionate returns to the construction company and restaurant owner? For many working men and women, a growth in inequality is not inherently troubling. Thomas Piketty might be right, but it might not matter to most Americans if returns to capital outpace returns to labor. In addition, when establishment elites mock Trump, from his grammar to his boorishness, a portion of non-elites see this as condescension.\nThird, populism is exculpatory: Every problem the United States faces was caused by others and the target audience is blameless. So if a company wanted to relocate some activity to Mexico, it must have been to exploit wage differences. No discussion as to whether wage increases at the U.S. facility have outpaced productivity increases. No discussion as to whether union rules impede flexibility and productivity. No discussion of the fact that Mexico might be a better production platform because it has more free trade agreements. Management is to blame, with Mexico in connivance. This is frequently expressed in themes of anti-establishment or alienation, which can have a corrosive effect when anchored in grievances.\nFourth, policy choices are cost-free and without trade-offs. Cost-benefit analysis, transition costs, the challenges in administering a government agency, underperforming programs, secondary effects and unintended consequences – these are all incidental to the victory of the policy choice itself. As such, populists might as well berate NATO leadership into burden-sharing, ignoring the downside to publicly hectoring leaders of sovereign nations. They, too, might as well call for a physical wall on the U.S. border with Mexico since it will be, by self-declaration, cost free.\nTo be fair, others in public life exhibit some of these elements. President Obama’s healthcare plan was historically grandiose in scope, cost and complexity, yet it was ballyhooed to save money. Similarly, Obama’s eight-year effort to reduce U.S. commitments to NATO was to have no costs in terms of force projection, alliance cohesion, or deterrence. And, Obama was the only President in the modern era to have run against trade as a candidate, an approach Trump followed. What Went Wrong? How could the bipartisan consensus on U.S. international leadership fade so quickly, particularly at a moment when the combination of market economics and alliances of democracies had resulted in perhaps the most prosperous and most liberal moment in human history? There are four contributors to the rise of populism: societal transformation, grievance economics, international leadership, and elite limitations. First, societal transformation – meaning both globalization and automation— has two profound socio-political effects. It produces an extraordinary degree of prosperity; and it carries with it a distribution effect. The bell curve of income distribution does not shift as much as it elongates. Few people are worse off, but many people are not better off. There is not necessarily the creation of a large number of winners and losers, but there is certainly the perception people getting left behind. Trump understands the message: The globalization club is having a party, and you are not invited. Silicon Valley is drinking champagne and your role is to pick the grapes. These trends also feed into the narrative of alienation because it decreases people’s control over their lives even as their overall prosperity increases. Globalization and automation have created economic anxiety in electorates around the world, and not just among steelworkers and coal miners. Realtors, bank tellers, school teachers, and cab drivers are all seeing competitive pressure and the prospect of job elimination. To many Americans, comparative advantage and creative destruction create a more prosperous society, but accompanying it is job insecurity. David Ricardo and Joseph Schumpeter might be right, but so what? Second, over several decades we have seen a shift from growth economics to grievance economics. This represents a break with the recovery policies that guided the leading economies through the 1950s and 1960s (and that economic rationalists such as Macron tilt toward today). In the current view, the primary purpose of economic policy is not to foment prosperity, but to redress grievances. Indeed, regardless of absolute improvements in well-being, reducing economic inequality is deemed to be a basis for policy. The premise of growth economics is that a system is fundamentally fair, so the main challenge is how fast we can go. The premise of grievance economics is that the system is fundamentally unfair, so going faster merely exacerbates the unfairness. This cult of inequality incentivizes interest-group politics and rent-seeking, leading to slower growth. If you focus on growth policies, you get growth. If you focus on grievance policies, you get grievances. A third cause is the shift in the U.S. international posture. We have seen a growing fatigue in the United States over the cost of international leadership. The U.S. entered the post-Cold War era with the institutions and the cohesion of the Cold War era largely intact, even though the end of the Soviet Union removed what political scientists term a “negative integrator.” Now we are deep into the post-post-Cold War era, with faded cohesion and institutions. For the first time since Harding and Coolidge we have two presidents in a row who have no international military or policy pedigree. Beyond the direct costs of international leadership in defense budgets and personnel, Americans seem more sensitive to the indirect costs of public opinion and anti-Americanism. Relationships can be expensive. Friendships can be complicated. If there is no immediate threat, and if no one likes us anyhow, then what is the point of foreign policy?\nTo sum up this point, imagine international Presidential leadership as a decision between whether to be a minute early or a minute late. Do you deter or do you react? Being a minute early requires leadership, because it carries with it the possibility of error and the cost of action without a consensus. “Left of Boom,” the British call it. Being a minute late and waiting until the problem has metastasized has the considerable benefit of allowing public consensus to build, and it is the less politically expensive approach. President Obama’s instinct is that foreign policy is better managed by being a minute late, such as responding after-the-fact to the Chinese build-out in the South China Sea, not confronting Russia on its intervention in U.S. elections, and perhaps in the cases of Aleppo or ISIS, Obama was more than a minute late. President Bush’s instinct was to be a minute early, foolishly so to his critics. Presidents have spent some 75 years since Pearl Harbor trying to be a minute early, with all the costs and mistakes that entailed, yet now we have two presidents in a row who believe we are better off being a minute late.\nFinally, the appeal of populism has been driven by their perception of the limitations of the U.S. leadership class: insular, rigid, and sometimes simply mediocre. Additionally, over-engineered solutions and the appearance of being self-serving, if not corrupt, help the appeal of populism. Sometimes it comes from the declining marginal effectiveness of government programs as society becomes more affluent and complicated. Indeed, the Obama administration seemed to regularly play into the hands of populists, sometimes passively so, as with the refusal to challenge even the more exotic of the sanctuary city movement. Sometimes, it was by design as with the painstaking construction not to label Islamic terrorism as such. If responsible leaders appear to be playing favorites or not accurately describing a phenomenon, they abandon the issue to their opponents — a phenomenon Trump witnessed through his hesitation in characterizing the Charlottesville protests. If populists rely too heavily on emotional connectivity, which establishment politicians have any emotional connectivity? Does there exist an aspirant for President, other than Donald Trump, who can have a friendly discussion with a Walmart cashier? How many of the possible 2020 presidential candidates have worked in the “real” economy, working for an institution that needed to turn a profit? Sam Rayburn’s wish to Lyndon Johnson, after LBJ had related how bright was his brain trust, was that he wished one of them had run for county sheriff. Can we today wish that one of the 2020 presidential candidates will have run a diner, which would have required them to hire teenagers, train high school dropouts, deal with single parents, lay-off workers from failed projects and negotiate wages, all while paying taxes and dealing with various government agencies? Maybe this is why a restaurant worker might respect an owner, or even a New York real estate developer, but not a career politician. If the elites cannot maintain that connectivity, they give an opening to populists. Attaining political maturity contemporaneous with the Bush 43 invasion of Iraq, Obama was wary of American over-reach and committed to a foreign policy pullback. He embedded that withdrawal in a denial of American exceptionalism, a pillar of U.S foreign policy since Pearl Harbor. If you stop believing in yourself, it is difficult to ask others to believe in you. The rejection of America’s special role in the world helped set the stage for “Make America Great Again.” Was Barack Obama the ultimate Donald Trump enabler? There other contributing factors beyond the above four. The rise of identity politics probably played into Trump’s hands, as did the digital communications revolution. News clutter rewards pugnacity and sensationalism and allows for cocoons and even tribalism. It is also worth noting that Trump is a man of unusual presentation strengths, and he can effectively project personality. Simply put, Trump was an exemplary grievance candidate in a grievance year. Trump articulated a vision; Hillary Clinton did not. We are in a communications era. For Secretary Clinton, communications is a means to an end. For Trump it is an end. She believes in her in-box; He, in his out-box. Hillary campaigned as the functionary; Donald as the visionary. Is internationalism doomed? America is now in the middle of a twelve and possibly sixteen year reign of two presidents who challenge the Cold War view that America is better off with a leading international presence, with being a minute early. It is too expensive, argued President Obama, and it leads us into unwinnable conflicts, draining our reputation and our purse. It is too expensive, echoes President Trump, and foreigners abuse and cheat us. Obama argues for minimalism because the United States is a problem for the world, and Trump argues for minimalism because the world is a problem for the United States. Even as President, Trump is easy to underestimate. Appealingly so. Many critics derive amusement, even a sense of superiority, from his foibles. His factual errors and even spelling mistakes provide an opportunity for mockery, but the lazy epiphany of error-spotting is a poor substitute for a substantive rebuttal. And a significant portion of the criticism is either ad hominem or an over-reach, either of which helps Trump. Those who are serious about policy should look at the direction in which he is taking the country, rather than fixate on these errors. To be even-handed, if President Trump’s distinctive success in the public space was his astonishing 2016 victory, in 2008 the distinctive success of Senator Obama was his astonishing election. Obama wisely chose not to run on his government record but marshaled his formidable stage skills and personal charisma to direct criticism toward Hillary Clinton and John McCain. So if Trump’s foreign policy approach stems from his success as “Ranter-in-Chief,” does Obama’s approach stem from his success as “Charmer-in-Chief?” Radically different styles, but with policy similarities.\nThe deterioration in U.S. foreign policy will likely continue for the near term. On any given day, the Obama/Trump approach may make sense. We should be a minute late. It makes sense to skimp, to cut defense expenditures, to reduce international good-will and connectivity, to save money all around. Relationships can be expensive and even harmful – this is the seduction of the minimalist school. But there is a countervailing argument.\nThe main argument against this minimalist approach will be events themselves. The minimalist approach might work in a static environment, but that stasis in itself incentivizes a destabilizer. At some point, history presents the bill. Only then will we be reminded, perhaps cruelly, that although on any given day it might be less expensive to be a minute late, as a matter of national policy we need to be a minute early. If we are not willing to pay the price to be left of boom, then we must pay the price for the boom itself. Worse than the expense and bother of having friends would be the expense and bother of not having friends.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "populism\nmakes it difficult to\ngovern\nTrump’s\ngrievance-based\nforeign\nquestions were\nabsent\nWhat is America’s role\nthe value of an alliance\nshould we promote democracy\npolicy choices are cost-free\nunintended consequences\nare\nincidental\npopulists\nberate NATO\nignoring the downside to\nhectoring leaders\nimagine\nleadership as a decision between\nbe a minute early or\nlate\nObama’s instinct is\nbetter\nresponding after\nto\nS\nC\nS\nnot confronting Russia\nand\nin\nAleppo or ISIS\ndeterioration in\nforeign policy will\ncontinue\nIt makes sense to skimp\ncut defense\nreduce international good-will and connectivity\nThe\napproach might work in a static environment\nbut\nstasis\nincentivizes a destabilizer\nAt some point\nhistory presents the bill\nas a matter of national policy we need to be\nearly", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No NoKo war. Recent reports are wrong.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nShowing that a victory is plausible and the benefits outweigh the costs would reinforce the case that war is coming. Yet, even if overestimating their country’s strength, it is doubtful that the North Koreans assessed that their small nuclear arsenal would neutralize America’s 1,400 deployed nuclear warheads. How could Kim have concluded, looking at the sheer balance of nuclear forces, that he could win a nuclear war and then live to conquer the ROK?\nThe authors preempt this criticism by stating that surprise attacks happen, and the historical record should make us doubt the enduring strength of deterrence. Although true, the most prominent surprise attacks in recent history were launched by aggressors possessing credible theories of victory.\nIts formidable and seasoned military allowed Japan to defy the United States in 1941 and invade Southeast Asia, even if Tokyo gravely underestimated America’s resolve to fight a long war. Syria and Egypt started the Yom Kippur War in 1973 with a large numerical superiority, modern weaponry, and realistic, limited objectives. Argentina attacked the defenseless Falklands in 1982 and knew that geographic distance from Britain would hinder a strong response. In addition, this attack on remote South Atlantic islands was unlikely to elicit nuclear retaliations.\nMore recently, invading Ukraine was tempting for Russia because of Moscow’s overwhelming superiority in most indicators. One easily understands how Vladimir Putin assessed he could quickly conquer the country without taking much risk. Similarly, China’s growing dominance in East Asia makes it increasingly probable it would resort to force to annex Taiwan.\nNorth Korea faces no such opportunity, as it is quite certain to lose an all-out war. Carlin and Hecker relate the current situation to Kim Il-sung’s decision to invade the South in June 1950. Back then, Pyongyang had an overwhelming superiority in numbers and quality, while the ROK had almost no armor and air force. In addition, the United States had no formal commitment to defend Seoul, while the DPRK had full backing from the Soviet Union and China.\nObviously, South Korea is far more formidable today, and it is now North Korea that has almost no air force. Also, U.S. presence on the ground would automatically commit Washington to the war if Pyongyang were to strike first. North Korean sources confirm that their forces are still too weak to wage a general war.\nMoreover, the 38 North article is problematic because it leaves some facts out of the picture.\nThe DPRK has recently been providing Russia with large quantities of ammunition and even valuable ballistic missiles. It is hard to imagine Pyongyang liberally selling its arsenal to Moscow if it was expecting a total war in the near future. On the contrary, it should prefer to start a war if Russia could supply it with weapons and materials, which is unlikely as long as the Ukraine War continues.\nThe two experts’ assertion that the Korean situation “is more dangerous than it has been at any time since early June 1950” is simply untrue, as the Peninsula came close to war several times. In January 1968, North Korean commandos raided the Blue House in Seoul, leaving many dead, a few days before the seizure of the USS Pueblo. Many others died in border clashes during the following years. 2010 was also a dangerous time, seeing the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island and the sinking of the Cheonan. Don’t forget 2017’s “fire and fury” tweets, either. Relations are currently poisonous, but we have seen worse episodes.\nAlthough North Korea’s recent promise to enshrine in its constitution the South as its main enemy is worrying, it signals little change on the ground. The DPRK is familiar with threats of nuclear annihilation. If we take Pyongyang to its word, it has “no reason to opt for war, and therefore, there is no intention of unilaterally going to war.”\nIt contrasts with Russia’s behavior up to the Ukraine War. First, Moscow readied its military for war. Then, it promised to employ “military-technical measures” if its demands regarding Ukraine were not met before effectively invading the country. In addition, one could argue that Pyongyang is merely reacting to Seoul’s Defense White Paper released in 2023, reclassifying the North and its regime as enemies. Indeed, South Korean law still considers the North not as a sovereign, equal state but as an “anti-government organization.”\nIf anything, some of the recent signaling is rather reassuring. Kim now calls the South the “Republic of Korea” instead of the traditional derogatory “South Joseon” and recognizes its separate statehood. Pyongyang deemphasizing reunification and the two countries’ shared identity suggests a diminishing interest in subverting or conquering the ROK and a desire to respect each other’s sovereignty.\nAfter announcing its new approach to inter-Korean relations, the DPRK closed a radio station traditionally used to send encrypted messages to spies infiltrating the South. It also took down propaganda websites targeting the South Korean public. North Korean television now airs maps showing the country’s current borders, whereas it formerly showed the entire Peninsula as DPRK territory.\nWhen a state contemplates conquering and annexing another, it usually emphasizes its shared destiny and the need to reunify with the lost homeland. The Kremlin justified its invasion of Ukraine by underlining Russian-Ukrainian “historical unity.” China continues denying Taiwan’s political legitimacy and preaches about “one country.” Although not impossible, North Korea preparing an invasion while underscoring its enemy’s separate existence would be extremely surprising.\nInter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK relations are worryingly poor. North Korea appears determined to challenge the status quo in the West Sea, and further tensions are probable. Pyongyang seemingly hopes to revise the Northern Limit Line to its advantage. The current American administration’s disinterest in diplomacy and lack of initiative does not help. Still, it may be too early to affirm that Kim Jong-un has chosen war. \n\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Showing\na victory is plausible and\nbenefits outweigh the costs would reinforce\ncase that war is coming.\neven if overestimating their\nstrength, it is doubtful\nNorth Koreans assessed\ntheir small nuclear arsenal would neutralize America’s 1,400 deployed\nwarheads. How could Kim have concluded, looking at the sheer balance of\nforces, that he could win a\nwar and then live to conquer the ROK?\nThe authors preempt this criticism by stating\nsurprise attacks happen, and\nhistorical record should make us doubt\ndeterrence.\nthe most prominent surprise attacks in recent history were launched by aggressors possessing credible theories of victory.\nformidable and seasoned military allowed Japan to defy the United States\nand invade Southeast Asia\nSyria and Egypt started\nYom Kippur\nwith a large numerical superiority\nArgentina attacked the\nFalklands\nand knew\ngeographic distance\nwould hinder a strong response.\nUkraine was tempting for Russia because of Moscow’s overwhelming superiority\nChina’s growing dominance in East Asia makes it\nprobable it would resort to force\nNorth Korea faces no such opportunity,\nit is quite certain to lose an all-out war. Carlin and Hecker relate the current situation to Kim Il-sung’s decision to invade the South in\n1950.\nPyongyang had an overwhelming superiority\nwhile the ROK had\nno armor and air force.\nthe United States had no formal commitment to defend Seoul\nthe DPRK had full backing from\nSoviet Union and China.\nSouth Korea is far more formidable today\nit is now North Korea that has\nno air force.\nU.S. presence on the ground would\ncommit Washington to the war if Pyongyang were to strike first. North Korean sources confirm\nforces are still too weak to wage a general war.\nthe 38 North article\nleaves some facts out\nThe DPRK has\nbeen providing Russia with\nammunition and\nballistic missiles. It is hard to imagine Pyongyang\nselling its arsenal to Moscow if it was expecting a total war in the\nfuture.\nthat the Korean situation “is more dangerous than it has been at any time since\n1950” is\nuntrue, as the Peninsula came close to war several times. In\n1968, North Korean commandos raided the Blue House in Seoul,\n2010 was also\ndangerous\nseeing\nbombardment of Yeonpyeong Island and\nsinking of the Cheonan. Don’t forget 2017’s “fire and fury” tweets\nRelations are currently poisonous, but we have seen worse episodes.\nNorth Korea’s recent promise to enshrine\nthe South as its main enemy\nsignals little change on the ground. The DPRK is familiar with threats of nuclear annihilation. If\nit has “no reason to opt for war,\nthere is no intention of unilaterally going to war.”\nrecent signaling is\nreassuring. Kim\ncalls the South the “Republic of Korea” instead of the traditional\n“South Joseon” and recognizes its separate statehood. Pyongyang deemphasizing reunification and the two countries’ shared identity suggests\ndiminishing interest in subverting or conquering the ROK and\ndesire to respect\nsovereignty.\nAfter announcing its new approach\nthe DPRK closed a radio station\nused to send encrypted messages to spies infiltrating the South. It\ntook down propaganda websites targeting the\npublic.\ntelevision\nairs maps showing the country’s current borders, whereas it formerly showed the entire Peninsula as DPRK territory.\nNorth Korea preparing an invasion while underscoring its enemy’s separate existence would be extremely surprising.\nInter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK relations are\npoor. North Korea appears determined to challenge the status quo\nPyongyang\nhopes to revise the Northern Limit Line to its advantage. The\nAmerican\ndisinterest in diplomacy\ndoes not help. Still, it may be too early to affirm\nKim Jong-un has chosen war.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No NoKo war. Recent reports are wrong.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nShowing that a victory is plausible and the benefits outweigh the costs would reinforce the case that war is coming. Yet, even if overestimating their country’s strength, it is doubtful that the North Koreans assessed that their small nuclear arsenal would neutralize America’s 1,400 deployed nuclear warheads. How could Kim have concluded, looking at the sheer balance of nuclear forces, that he could win a nuclear war and then live to conquer the ROK?\nThe authors preempt this criticism by stating that surprise attacks happen, and the historical record should make us doubt the enduring strength of deterrence. Although true, the most prominent surprise attacks in recent history were launched by aggressors possessing credible theories of victory.\nIts formidable and seasoned military allowed Japan to defy the United States in 1941 and invade Southeast Asia, even if Tokyo gravely underestimated America’s resolve to fight a long war. Syria and Egypt started the Yom Kippur War in 1973 with a large numerical superiority, modern weaponry, and realistic, limited objectives. Argentina attacked the defenseless Falklands in 1982 and knew that geographic distance from Britain would hinder a strong response. In addition, this attack on remote South Atlantic islands was unlikely to elicit nuclear retaliations.\nMore recently, invading Ukraine was tempting for Russia because of Moscow’s overwhelming superiority in most indicators. One easily understands how Vladimir Putin assessed he could quickly conquer the country without taking much risk. Similarly, China’s growing dominance in East Asia makes it increasingly probable it would resort to force to annex Taiwan.\nNorth Korea faces no such opportunity, as it is quite certain to lose an all-out war. Carlin and Hecker relate the current situation to Kim Il-sung’s decision to invade the South in June 1950. Back then, Pyongyang had an overwhelming superiority in numbers and quality, while the ROK had almost no armor and air force. In addition, the United States had no formal commitment to defend Seoul, while the DPRK had full backing from the Soviet Union and China.\nObviously, South Korea is far more formidable today, and it is now North Korea that has almost no air force. Also, U.S. presence on the ground would automatically commit Washington to the war if Pyongyang were to strike first. North Korean sources confirm that their forces are still too weak to wage a general war.\nMoreover, the 38 North article is problematic because it leaves some facts out of the picture.\nThe DPRK has recently been providing Russia with large quantities of ammunition and even valuable ballistic missiles. It is hard to imagine Pyongyang liberally selling its arsenal to Moscow if it was expecting a total war in the near future. On the contrary, it should prefer to start a war if Russia could supply it with weapons and materials, which is unlikely as long as the Ukraine War continues.\nThe two experts’ assertion that the Korean situation “is more dangerous than it has been at any time since early June 1950” is simply untrue, as the Peninsula came close to war several times. In January 1968, North Korean commandos raided the Blue House in Seoul, leaving many dead, a few days before the seizure of the USS Pueblo. Many others died in border clashes during the following years. 2010 was also a dangerous time, seeing the bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island and the sinking of the Cheonan. Don’t forget 2017’s “fire and fury” tweets, either. Relations are currently poisonous, but we have seen worse episodes.\nAlthough North Korea’s recent promise to enshrine in its constitution the South as its main enemy is worrying, it signals little change on the ground. The DPRK is familiar with threats of nuclear annihilation. If we take Pyongyang to its word, it has “no reason to opt for war, and therefore, there is no intention of unilaterally going to war.”\nIt contrasts with Russia’s behavior up to the Ukraine War. First, Moscow readied its military for war. Then, it promised to employ “military-technical measures” if its demands regarding Ukraine were not met before effectively invading the country. In addition, one could argue that Pyongyang is merely reacting to Seoul’s Defense White Paper released in 2023, reclassifying the North and its regime as enemies. Indeed, South Korean law still considers the North not as a sovereign, equal state but as an “anti-government organization.”\nIf anything, some of the recent signaling is rather reassuring. Kim now calls the South the “Republic of Korea” instead of the traditional derogatory “South Joseon” and recognizes its separate statehood. Pyongyang deemphasizing reunification and the two countries’ shared identity suggests a diminishing interest in subverting or conquering the ROK and a desire to respect each other’s sovereignty.\nAfter announcing its new approach to inter-Korean relations, the DPRK closed a radio station traditionally used to send encrypted messages to spies infiltrating the South. It also took down propaganda websites targeting the South Korean public. North Korean television now airs maps showing the country’s current borders, whereas it formerly showed the entire Peninsula as DPRK territory.\nWhen a state contemplates conquering and annexing another, it usually emphasizes its shared destiny and the need to reunify with the lost homeland. The Kremlin justified its invasion of Ukraine by underlining Russian-Ukrainian “historical unity.” China continues denying Taiwan’s political legitimacy and preaches about “one country.” Although not impossible, North Korea preparing an invasion while underscoring its enemy’s separate existence would be extremely surprising.\nInter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK relations are worryingly poor. North Korea appears determined to challenge the status quo in the West Sea, and further tensions are probable. Pyongyang seemingly hopes to revise the Northern Limit Line to its advantage. The current American administration’s disinterest in diplomacy and lack of initiative does not help. Still, it may be too early to affirm that Kim Jong-un has chosen war. \n\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "even if overestimating\nstrength, it is doubtful\nNorth Koreans assessed\ntheir small\narsenal would neutralize America’s 1,400\nwarheads\nsheer balance of\nforces\nlive to conquer the ROK\ncredible theories of victory\nJapan\nSyria and Egypt\nArgentina\nRussia\nChina\nno such opportunity\nquite certain\n1950\noverwhelming superiority\nno armor and air force\nno formal commitment\nfull backing\nSoviet Union\nChina\nfar more formidable today\nno air force\ncommit Washington to the war\nstill too weak\nselling its arsenal\ntotal war\nmore dangerous than\nany time since\n1950\nuntrue\nseveral times\n1968\nraid\n2010\nbombardment\n2017\n“fire and fury” tweets\nwe have seen worse episodes\nlittle change\nthreats of\nannihilation\nno reason to opt for war\nthere is no intention of unilaterally going to war\nreassuring\nRepublic of Korea\nSouth Joseon\nseparate statehood\ndeemphasizing reunification\nshared identity\ndiminishing interest in\nconquering the ROK\nsovereignty\nradio station\nencrypted messages to spies\npropaganda websites\ncurrent borders\nextremely surprising\npoor\ntoo early", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No NoKo war. Recent reports are wrong.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Showing\na victory is plausible and\nbenefits outweigh the costs would reinforce\ncase that war is coming.\neven if overestimating their\nstrength, it is doubtful\nNorth Koreans assessed\ntheir small nuclear arsenal would neutralize America’s 1,400 deployed\nwarheads. How could Kim have concluded, looking at the sheer balance of\nforces, that he could win a\nwar and then live to conquer the ROK?\nThe authors preempt this criticism by stating\nsurprise attacks happen, and\nhistorical record should make us doubt\ndeterrence.\nthe most prominent surprise attacks in recent history were launched by aggressors possessing credible theories of victory.\nformidable and seasoned military allowed Japan to defy the United States\nand invade Southeast Asia\nSyria and Egypt started\nYom Kippur\nwith a large numerical superiority\nArgentina attacked the\nFalklands\nand knew\ngeographic distance\nwould hinder a strong response.\nUkraine was tempting for Russia because of Moscow’s overwhelming superiority\nChina’s growing dominance in East Asia makes it\nprobable it would resort to force\nNorth Korea faces no such opportunity,\nit is quite certain to lose an all-out war. Carlin and Hecker relate the current situation to Kim Il-sung’s decision to invade the South in\n1950.\nPyongyang had an overwhelming superiority\nwhile the ROK had\nno armor and air force.\nthe United States had no formal commitment to defend Seoul\nthe DPRK had full backing from\nSoviet Union and China.\nSouth Korea is far more formidable today\nit is now North Korea that has\nno air force.\nU.S. presence on the ground would\ncommit Washington to the war if Pyongyang were to strike first. North Korean sources confirm\nforces are still too weak to wage a general war.\nthe 38 North article\nleaves some facts out\nThe DPRK has\nbeen providing Russia with\nammunition and\nballistic missiles. It is hard to imagine Pyongyang\nselling its arsenal to Moscow if it was expecting a total war in the\nfuture.\nthat the Korean situation “is more dangerous than it has been at any time since\n1950” is\nuntrue, as the Peninsula came close to war several times. In\n1968, North Korean commandos raided the Blue House in Seoul,\n2010 was also\ndangerous\nseeing\nbombardment of Yeonpyeong Island and\nsinking of the Cheonan. Don’t forget 2017’s “fire and fury” tweets\nRelations are currently poisonous, but we have seen worse episodes.\nNorth Korea’s recent promise to enshrine\nthe South as its main enemy\nsignals little change on the ground. The DPRK is familiar with threats of nuclear annihilation. If\nit has “no reason to opt for war,\nthere is no intention of unilaterally going to war.”\nrecent signaling is\nreassuring. Kim\ncalls the South the “Republic of Korea” instead of the traditional\n“South Joseon” and recognizes its separate statehood. Pyongyang deemphasizing reunification and the two countries’ shared identity suggests\ndiminishing interest in subverting or conquering the ROK and\ndesire to respect\nsovereignty.\nAfter announcing its new approach\nthe DPRK closed a radio station\nused to send encrypted messages to spies infiltrating the South. It\ntook down propaganda websites targeting the\npublic.\ntelevision\nairs maps showing the country’s current borders, whereas it formerly showed the entire Peninsula as DPRK territory.\nNorth Korea preparing an invasion while underscoring its enemy’s separate existence would be extremely surprising.\nInter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK relations are\npoor. North Korea appears determined to challenge the status quo\nPyongyang\nhopes to revise the Northern Limit Line to its advantage. The\nAmerican\ndisinterest in diplomacy\ndoes not help. Still, it may be too early to affirm\nKim Jong-un has chosen war.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "even if overestimating\nstrength, it is doubtful\nNo\nKo\nassessed\ntheir small\narsenal would neutralize America’s 1,400\nwarheads.\nit is quite certain to lose\nSo\nKo\nis far more formidable\nNo\nKo\nhas\nno air force.\nU.S. presence\nwould\ncommit\nto the war\nsources confirm\nforces are\ntoo weak\nDPRK\nproviding Russia with\nammunition\nhard to imagine\nif it was expecting\nwar\nthat the\nsituation “is more dangerous\nis\nuntrue,\n1968\nraid\n2010\nbombardment\n2017\n“fire and fury” tweets\nwe have seen worse episodes.\nrecent signaling is\nreassuring. Kim\nrecognizes\nstatehood.\ndeemphasizing reunification and\nshared identity\ntook down propaganda\nmay be too early to affirm\nKim\nhas chosen war.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Law includes administrative rules.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "E.D.Ark. 1989. Regulation on availability and character of Federal Home Loan Bank Board was “substantive rule” promulgated in accordance with Administrative Procedures Act, was authorized by Congress, and, therefore, had force and effect of “law” within meaning of trade secrets statute criminalizing agency employee’s disclosure of information not authorized by law; ability to release certain documents was appropriate power for Board in carrying out duty to eliminate fraud in operation and conversion of savings and loan associations. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1905; Federal Home Loan Bank Act. §§ 11, 17, 17(a), 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1431, 1437, 1437(a); Home Owner’s Loan Act of 1933, §§ 5, 5(a), 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1464, 1464 (a), National Housing Act, § 402, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1725 – Jackson v. First Federal Sav. of Arkansas, F.A., 709 F.Supp.887.—Banks451", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Regulation\nwas “substantive rule” promulgated in accordance with Administrative Procedures Act,\nauthorized by Congress, and, therefore, had force and effect of “law", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Law includes administrative rules.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.8", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Regulation\nwas “substantive rule” promulgated in accordance with Administrative Procedures Act,\nauthorized by Congress, and, therefore, had force and effect of “law", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Regulation\nwas “substantive rule” promulgated in accordance with Administrative Procedures Act\nauthorized by Congress, and\nhad\neffect of “law", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The 1AC's performance of spoken word lyric reifies the exceptionalism of humanist discourse – the mobilization of narratives as a collective means of resistance is complicit with the use of lyric to inscribe the demand for species level identification – that's the apex of humanism", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nBiopoetic Bestiaries and Lyric Animals\nIn his essay \"Getting Round,\" Paul Muldoon takes up the theme of poetic utility in light of the genre's potential demise and its attempted resurrection:\nWhile I understand why Wallace Stevens argues that poetry may \"help us to live our lives,\" I draw the line at the needlessly extravagant claims made for poetry at times when it's felt to be at particular risk, including the idea that poetry may even go beyond helping us live our lives and help us save not only the day but our souls.1\nIf poetry might still act as an Arnoldian criticism of life or lend us a Stevens-like hand in living it, no lyric hero can save the day and no poetic priest will save our souls, however endangered the genre. But perhaps Muldoon protests too much against such extravagances; in The Faber Book of Beasts, edited in the same year as \"Getting Round,\" he effectively asserts that lyric as much as living animals can save the day and our souls, or that they might at least save the genre along with our species' sense of self. His introduction to the anthology opens thus: \"It seems that in poetry, as in life, animals bring out the best in us. We are most human in the presence of animals, most humble, and it is only out of humility, out of uncertainty, out of ignorance, that the greatest art may be made\" (Faber Book of Beasts, xv).2\nAs reviewer William Scammell points out, this generalization is as patently untrue of all poetry as it is in life, but Muldoon subsequently recites and redirects Stevens's claim in order to strengthen his slide from humble (human) animals to the hyperbolic heights of aesthetic hubris.3 His alphabetized Book of Beasts becomes no less than a bestiary, offering a moral lesson phrased as an ontological and essentially lyric question:\nThis ongoing question of \"What am I?\" is, indeed, central not only to animal poetry but to all forms of poetry. For if, as Wallace Stevens argues . . . the function of the poet \"is to help people live their lives,\" it might also be argued that nowhere is that responsibility thrown into sharper relief than in our accounts of the parallel lives of \"our little kinsmen.\" For there, almost uniquely, do we see ourselves not only for who and what we are, but glimpse the possibility of what we might become.4\nWhat we might become, Muldoon concludes—quoting Byron on his Newfoundland dog Boatswain—is \"'beauty without vanity, strength without insolence, courage without ferocity, and all the virtues of man without his vices.' \"5 Here the heroic animal acts as morally instructive ideal, a natural mirror that reflects the best in \"man\" rather than refracting or breaking down to reveal a human(ist) projection. Taking a crack at this less than sound lesson, Scammell cites another critic's comment on an anthology about man's best friend: \"Whether these poems are really about dogs or about people is a hard question, but that is, in a way, their point: to get to the person go by way of the dog.\"6 That is, the hard question is one of ontology as much as hermeneutics, by which all poems lead to man—and by which animal poems in particular might indeed save our souls and ensure the good life.\nIn this chapter, I am not interested in asking or answering an ontological question about human and other animals (\"What am I?\"),7 or a hermeneutic one about what animal poems mean or are about. Nor is mine the familiar question of lyric's ontology, its utility, or its decline and fall, whether John Stuart Mill's \"What Is Poetry?\" (1833), Joseph Epstein's \"Who Killed Poetry?\" (1988), Dana Gioia's \"Can Poetry Matter?\" (1991), or Jonathan Culler's \"Why Lyric?\" (2008). To paraphrase through a parallel debate, rather than asking with W. J. T. Mitchell what pictures—or lyrics—want, my aim is closer to Georges Didi-Huberman's in Questioning the Ends of a Certain History of Art. I question the ends of a certain idea—or ideal—of lyric poetry, and find that what a certain critical and poetic idea wants for lyric is life: to vivify the genre \"when it's felt to be at particular risk,\" as if to save it along with our souls.8 However needlessly extravagant this quasi-religious desire seems to the Muldoon of \"Getting Round,\" his animal hyperboles in the Faber Book of Beasts answer to its utility and its persistence. So too does his backtracking on Stevens's life line, which he draws only to cross it again in the name of lyric animals, by virtue of a \"but\" that doubles back in order to sustain both the genre's survival and our own. By this logic, lyric's origi-nary and ontological question becomes \"central not only to animal poetry but to all forms of poetry,\" and the genre can, after all, save \"not only the day but our souls.\"9\nAgainst Muldoon's assertion that animal poems can exemplify lyric's life lessons for us, I argue that they might instead throw into \"sharper relief\"—and ultimately serve to undo—our extravagant attempts to animate (and so to save) poetry. I use the term \"biopoetics\" to describe the entry of these animist or life-and-death figures into critical accounts and poetic defenses of lyric, which repeatedly collapse the genre's survival with our own.10 While poetic language has traditionally been granted the power to animate (and therefore to deface), biopoetic discourse seeks to bring the genre itself to life in and as language: more the impossible animation of lyric than the hyperbole of lyric animation.11 Biopoetic discourse reads its genre as if living its own parallel life, and so as the continuation of human species life by other means—most intensely at those times when that species is felt to be at particular risk, whether in Muldoon's meditations on \"Getting Round\" the violence of The Troubles, or in Stevens's reflections on the imaginative force of nobility as \"self-preservation\" against the modern \"pressure of reality\" that was the Second World War.12 Given these biopolitically inflected stakes and fears, I intend my interrogation of biopoetic discourse to echo obliquely with Foucault's description of modern biopolitics as the entry of human species life into political calculations and discourse, which seeks to optimize and foster life in contrast to the classical sovereign power that could \"take life or let live.\"13 If, by the mid-twentieth century, Foucault's \"modern man\" has become the animal whose atomic politics calls \"his existence as a living being into question,\"14 twentieth- and twenty-first century biopoetics takes living lyric, already in danger, to be the answer. Doubly fearful of lyric's and our demise, biopoetic discourse seeks to ensure the genre's continued survival by mobilizing and literalizing figurative language in the name of life. In Rei Terada's description, believing that a certain use of language might \"preserve value and ultimately life\" is at once \"knowingly figurative and nonetheless thinks magically\":15 as if \"the spirit of the letter\" might \"in itself\" come to life, save life, or even end it.16\nThe animal becomes a primary vehicle for this lyric animation, particularly in the unexpected figure of the hedgehog (to which I will return below). The slide between animal and animation is permitted by a critical and etymological return to their shared root: anima, the soul or animating principle. As Nicole Shukin observes of today's \"biopolitical times,\" \"animals arguably most encode the innocent place of 'life itself,'\" both through the fetishized idealization of \"affect as animal,\" and in the naturalization of animal movement translated into a kind of perpetual motion, taken to be the first sign of life.17 As a literalized figure of \"life itself\" (already a problematic concept) the animal is idealized as an organic and autopoietic whole that parallels the affective inner life imagined of the lyric poem; lyric animals therefore offer a special case of the biopoetic logic I seek to describe. In both senses of the word, moving animals in Muldoon's Book of Beasts—and in a certain hedgehog genealogy—become the conveyance, the force that would lift lyric words off the page and grant them legs, breath, or spirit. This knowingly faith reads from within language as if its objects could literally be mobilized, or as if language and its letters were themselves alive through or as animal motion.\nDespite recent calls for a serious or neoliteral animal studies, then, taking animals literally is not my approach to lyric's animals, because a kind of neoliterality already serves to ground biopoetic discourse.19 Rosi Braidotti champions a neoliteral approach against\nthe metaphoric habit of composing a sort of moral and cognitive bestiary in which animals refer to values, norms, and morals. I propose that, instead of waxing lyrical about the nobleness of eagles, the deceit of foxes, or the humility of lambs . . . [we] move on, beyond the empire of the sign, toward a neoliteral relation to animals, anomalies, and inorganic others.20\nThough it can offer a trenchant critique of any subtle animal glossary or moralizing Book of Beasts, Braidotti's \"new mode of relation\" for animal studies cannot and does not wish to address the \"literary pedigree\" of waxing lyrical.21 Her neoliteral approach dreams of avoiding metaphors altogether by moving beyond the empire of signs, of mobilizing its object of study by taking its figurative animal life literally. But Braidotti can't avoid metaphoriz-ing in her final and futural word on becoming-animal and earth. Her desired \"as such\" or \"as is\" cannot help but ring with an as if a hyperbolic waxing lyrical that's hard to take literally (however knowing): \"As such, I am a she- wolf ... I am Mother Earth, the generator of the future.\"22\nBut if we can't take lyric's animals neoliterally, can we instead take seriously the animal's unique status as an object of study, rather than just one theme or metaphor among many? For Cary Wolfe, taking animals seriously can unsettle disciplinary knowledge by revealing the inherent strangeness of language and of the human. Rather than positioning \"the animal of animal studies . . . out there among the birds and beasts,\" Wolfe locates its challenge \"'in here' as well\"23 As he has it in Animal Rites,\nthe figure of the \"animal\" in the West ... is part of a cultural and literary history stretching back at least to Plato and the Old Testament, reminding us that the animal has always been especially, frightfully nearby, always lying in wait at the very heart of the constitutive disavowals and self-constructing narratives enacted by that fantasy figure called \"the human.\"24\nHere the seemingly unique, even ancient position of the animal might reinforce the hyperbolic and transhistorical claims for the lyric as oldest and first among genres (at least as far back as Horace and Sappho), but Wolfe's invocation also reveals the humanist tensions in Muldoon's and other arguments for poetry's originary primacy, animated by or as animal. The lyric is as much\nan idealized object of humanist fantasy as the animal, and both ideals can be made strange or endangered from within. By taking lyric animals seriously without taking them neoliterally, I unsettle the biopoetics that holds out for lyric's life as if to save our own.\nThat generic life remains all too human(ist) in critical defenses of lyric's singularity, its continued relevance, and its ancient history. The perhaps bristling question posed by Jonathan Culler's \"Why Lyric?'5 epitomizes current biopoetic fears over the endangered status of its object, while positing its persistent (because ancient) survival: \"Poetry is alive in our culture, but in its own world: never have there been so many poets and poetry readings, books, journals, and online sites \"25 The article's titular question and its opening sentences rest on the assumption that lyric is (alive and well), so that we need only defend why it is crucial as a singular category rather than asking why we desire its survival. However isolated or threatened by the \"but\" of narrative norms and professional neglect, poetry—already equated with the title's lyric—has been saved again: prolifically, hyperbolically, even virtually alive.26 As Virginia Jackson observes in \"Who Reads Poetry?\" recent hand-wringing over the genre's death by lack of readership renders it at once \"all-important\" and \"nearing extinction,\" but therefore all the more available for resurrection.27 Didi-Huberman makes a parallel point about the discourse of art history on the \"death of art\": if art (poetry) can die, it can also be conceptualized as \"nascent,\" complete with an \"auto-teleology\" or meaningful history that can resurrect and so preserve its critical object.28 Yet in the current returns of the repressed, Jackson hears more than professional or public concern over the loss of a critical or generic object. Instead, that object has come to stand in for \"something\" like—in fact for nothing less than—\"subjective experience, say, or deep thought, or social consciousness, or beauty, or truth, or literature.\"29 What remains at stake in poetry's continued survival and its presumed singularity is precisely our own (however knowingly or hyperbolically).\nThe surface vitalism of biopoetic discourse thus collapses into a kind of species-level humanism akin to what Oren Izenberg endorses as the \"new humanism.\" Izenberg argues that this tradition emerged in the twentieth century to define the genre as an ontological commitment to the universal value of personhood: a concept aligned with the correlate possibility of community or collective life, and set against the modern \"specter of total annihilation.\"30 In the midst or in the wake of the century's biopolitical disasters, and after the death of the romantic lyric subject—mourned by Harold Bloom31 and celebrated by Marjorie PerlofP2—the humanism of twentieth-century biopoetics already looks less like the survival of the individual subject's voice in verse, and more like the survival of persons, a people, or the species as a whole. In other words, and without resorting to personification or animation via the speaking voice, the vitalist defense of poetic singularity offers a means of saving lyric as the guarantor of the human species (and of humanism): the subject is dead; long live poetry!33 To put it by way of Wolfe's useful reading of Cavell (who is describing Wittgenstein's \"forms of life\"), species humanism reinstalls a vertical and biological difference in kind between \"the human and so-called lower or higher forms of life\" by elevating the \"romance\" of the hand and the eye along with \"the strength and scale of the human body and of the human sense and of the human voice,\" so that lyric's seeming exceptionalism and singularity repeatedly reinforce our own.34 While recognizing (and fearing for) the fragile biological existence of Homo sapiens, biopoetic defenses tend to position the genre—and the species—vertically, as if the height of collective human(ist) life, internalizing lyric as our somatic and moral heart, and positing its millennial persistence as evidence of a shared and transhistorical culture- For instance, while Susan Stewart's theory of lyric possession undermines and historicizes the privileged place of the speaking and emoting subject, her Poetry and the Fate of the Senses sustains lyric as the universal foundation of human art, and so of the species: as if the lyric made us human as much as all human cultures share the lyric.35 Comparable arguments in the name of poetic singularity retain the echo of a species humanism to varying degrees in their various claims for (universal human) freedom, (essential human) culture or making, and (somatic human) rhythm and senses.36 Each of these claims marks a subscription to what Stewart calls poetry's force as an \"anthropomorphic project\"—its making and sustaining of persons against \"effacement\"37—and all of them are understood to be indexed (vertically) by lyric's continued life. Only by a biopoetic logic that seeks to save our species and to uphold human consciousness can \"poetic forms\" be literalized, even immortalized, as if \"the continuance of human life by physical and social means.\"38\nBelow, I turn to the literalization or mobilization of lyric form via the animal in particular, extending Mary Poovey's inquiry into the model system that literary criticism adopted from the biological sciences: \"what particular model system—what frog, baboon, or laboratory mouse—governs the practices of critics as apparently diverse as New Critics, deconstructionists, and New Historicists?\"39 Poovey answers that the \"organic whole\" of the romantic lyric has become literary criticism's single and singular generic model.40 I add that the hedgehog in particular has become the model species and the organizing metaphor for lyric criticism (hardly the usual avian suspect, nor man's more familiar best friend).41 For critics, the hedgehog acts as an idealized figure for formal and aesthetic perfection, indexing the genre's bristling hermeticism, its perfect self-enclosure, and therefore its survival. First, I lay out a brief genealogy of the lyric hedgehog's near-death experiences from Schlegel through Derrida, and then I explore the animal's appearance in two of Muldoon's poems: \"Hedgehog\" and \"When the Pie Was Opened.\" Even as the hedgehog is mobilized as a figure of lyric life or as the literalized life of language, this extravagant desire comes undone when the hedgehog becomes instead a figure of murder-suicide, recalling the fatal biopolitics that the neo- literal biopoetics of the lyric animal—or the animal lyric—would forget.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Stevens argues that poetry may \"help us to live our lives,\" I draw the line at the needlessly extravagant claims made for poetry at times when it's felt to be at particular risk, including the idea that poetry may even go beyond helping us live our lives and help us save not only the day but our souls\nno lyric hero can save the day and no poetic priest will save our souls, however endangered the genre\ngeneralization is as patently untrue of all poetry as it is in life\nBook of Beasts becomes no less than a bestiary, offering a moral lesson phrased as an ontological and essentially lyric question:\nNewfoundland dog Boatswain—is \"'beauty without vanity\nheroic animal acts as\nnatural mirror\na human(ist) projection\nto get to the person go by way of the dog\nall poems lead to man\nI question the ends of a certain idea—or ideal—of lyric poetry, and find that what a certain critical and poetic idea wants for lyric is life: to vivify the genre \"when it's felt to be at particular risk,\" as if to save it along with our souls\npoems\nundo—our extravagant attempts to animate (and so to save) poetry\n\"biopoetics\" to describe\nlife-and-death figures into\ndefenses of lyric\nbiopoetic discourse seeks to bring the genre itself to life in and as language\nGiven these biopolitically inflected stakes and fears, I intend my interrogation of biopoetic discourse to echo obliquely with Foucault's description of modern biopolitics as the entry of human species life into political calculations and discourse, which seeks to optimize and foster life in contrast to the classical sovereign power that could \"take life or let live.\"\nFoucault's \"modern man\" has become the animal whose atomic politics calls \"his existence as a living being into question,\"\nbiopoetics takes living lyric, already in danger, to be the answer\nbiopoetic discourse seeks to ensure the genre's continued survival by mobilizing and literalizing figurative language in the name of life\nanimal becomes a primary vehicle for this lyric animation, particularly in the unexpected figure of the hedgehog\npermitted by a critical and etymological return to their shared root: anima, the soul\nanimals arguably most encode the innocent place of 'life itself\nfetishized idealization of \"affect as animal\nidealized as an organic and autopoietic whole that parallels the affective inner life imagined of the lyric poem; lyric animals therefore offer a special case of the biopoetic logic I seek to describe\nmoving animals\nbecome the conveyance, the force that would lift lyric words off the page\nneoliterality already serves to ground biopoetic discourse\nI propose\n[we] move on, beyond the empire of the sign, toward a neoliteral relation to animals, anomalies, and inorganic others\nnew mode of relation\ncannot\naddress the \"literary pedigree\" of waxing lyrical\navoiding metaphors altogether\ncan't avoid metaphoriz-ing in her final and futural word on becoming-animal and earth\nif we can't take lyric's animals neoliterally, can we instead take seriously the animal's unique status as an object of study, rather than just one theme or metaphor among many?\ntaking animals seriously can unsettle disciplinary knowledge by revealing the inherent strangeness of language and of the human\nlocates its challenge \"'in here'\nanimal has always been especially, frightfully nearby, always lying in wait at the very heart of\nself-constructing narratives enacted by that fantasy figure called \"the human.\"\nposition of the animal might reinforce the hyperbolic and transhistorical claims for the lyric as oldest and first among genres\nreveals the humanist tensions in Muldoon's and other arguments for poetry's originary primacy, animated by or as animal\nan idealized object of humanist fantasy as the animal\ngeneric life remains all too human(ist)\n\"Why Lyric?'5 epitomizes current biopoetic fears over the endangered status of its object, while positing its persistent (because ancient) survival: \"Poetry is alive in our culture, but in its own world: never have there been so many poets and poetry readings, books, journals, and online sites\nwe need only defend why it is crucial as a singular category rather than asking why we desire its survival\nHowever isolated or threatened\npoetry\nhas been saved again\nhand-wringing over the genre's death\nrenders it\nall the more available for resurrection\nthat object has come to stand in for \"something\" like—in fact for nothing less than—\"subjective experience, say, or deep thought, or social consciousness, or beauty, or truth, or literature\nWhat remains at stake in poetry's continued survival\nis precisely our own\nbiopoetic discourse thus collapses into a kind of species-level humanism\nontological commitment to the universal value of personhood\npossibility of community or collective life\nset against\nannihilation\npoetics already looks less like the survival of the individual subject's voice in verse, and more like the survival of persons, a people, or the species as a whole\nhumanism reinstalls a vertical and biological difference in kind between \"the human and so-called lower or higher forms of life\" by elevating the \"romance\" of the hand and the eye along with \"the strength and scale of the human body and of the human sense and of the human voice,\" so that lyric's seeming exceptionalism and singularity repeatedly reinforce our own.34 While recognizing (and fearing for) the fragile biological existence of Homo sapiens, biopoetic defenses tend to position the genre—and the species—vertically, as if the height of collective human(ist) life\n\"organic whole\" of the romantic lyric has become literary criticism's single and singular generic model.\nhedgehog in particular has become the model species and the organizing metaphor for lyric criticism\nan idealized figure for formal and aesthetic perfection", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The 1AC's performance of spoken word lyric reifies the exceptionalism of humanist discourse – the mobilization of narratives as a collective means of resistance is complicit with the use of lyric to inscribe the demand for species level identification – that's the apex of humanism", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nBiopoetic Bestiaries and Lyric Animals\nIn his essay \"Getting Round,\" Paul Muldoon takes up the theme of poetic utility in light of the genre's potential demise and its attempted resurrection:\nWhile I understand why Wallace Stevens argues that poetry may \"help us to live our lives,\" I draw the line at the needlessly extravagant claims made for poetry at times when it's felt to be at particular risk, including the idea that poetry may even go beyond helping us live our lives and help us save not only the day but our souls.1\nIf poetry might still act as an Arnoldian criticism of life or lend us a Stevens-like hand in living it, no lyric hero can save the day and no poetic priest will save our souls, however endangered the genre. But perhaps Muldoon protests too much against such extravagances; in The Faber Book of Beasts, edited in the same year as \"Getting Round,\" he effectively asserts that lyric as much as living animals can save the day and our souls, or that they might at least save the genre along with our species' sense of self. His introduction to the anthology opens thus: \"It seems that in poetry, as in life, animals bring out the best in us. We are most human in the presence of animals, most humble, and it is only out of humility, out of uncertainty, out of ignorance, that the greatest art may be made\" (Faber Book of Beasts, xv).2\nAs reviewer William Scammell points out, this generalization is as patently untrue of all poetry as it is in life, but Muldoon subsequently recites and redirects Stevens's claim in order to strengthen his slide from humble (human) animals to the hyperbolic heights of aesthetic hubris.3 His alphabetized Book of Beasts becomes no less than a bestiary, offering a moral lesson phrased as an ontological and essentially lyric question:\nThis ongoing question of \"What am I?\" is, indeed, central not only to animal poetry but to all forms of poetry. For if, as Wallace Stevens argues . . . the function of the poet \"is to help people live their lives,\" it might also be argued that nowhere is that responsibility thrown into sharper relief than in our accounts of the parallel lives of \"our little kinsmen.\" For there, almost uniquely, do we see ourselves not only for who and what we are, but glimpse the possibility of what we might become.4\nWhat we might become, Muldoon concludes—quoting Byron on his Newfoundland dog Boatswain—is \"'beauty without vanity, strength without insolence, courage without ferocity, and all the virtues of man without his vices.' \"5 Here the heroic animal acts as morally instructive ideal, a natural mirror that reflects the best in \"man\" rather than refracting or breaking down to reveal a human(ist) projection. Taking a crack at this less than sound lesson, Scammell cites another critic's comment on an anthology about man's best friend: \"Whether these poems are really about dogs or about people is a hard question, but that is, in a way, their point: to get to the person go by way of the dog.\"6 That is, the hard question is one of ontology as much as hermeneutics, by which all poems lead to man—and by which animal poems in particular might indeed save our souls and ensure the good life.\nIn this chapter, I am not interested in asking or answering an ontological question about human and other animals (\"What am I?\"),7 or a hermeneutic one about what animal poems mean or are about. Nor is mine the familiar question of lyric's ontology, its utility, or its decline and fall, whether John Stuart Mill's \"What Is Poetry?\" (1833), Joseph Epstein's \"Who Killed Poetry?\" (1988), Dana Gioia's \"Can Poetry Matter?\" (1991), or Jonathan Culler's \"Why Lyric?\" (2008). To paraphrase through a parallel debate, rather than asking with W. J. T. Mitchell what pictures—or lyrics—want, my aim is closer to Georges Didi-Huberman's in Questioning the Ends of a Certain History of Art. I question the ends of a certain idea—or ideal—of lyric poetry, and find that what a certain critical and poetic idea wants for lyric is life: to vivify the genre \"when it's felt to be at particular risk,\" as if to save it along with our souls.8 However needlessly extravagant this quasi-religious desire seems to the Muldoon of \"Getting Round,\" his animal hyperboles in the Faber Book of Beasts answer to its utility and its persistence. So too does his backtracking on Stevens's life line, which he draws only to cross it again in the name of lyric animals, by virtue of a \"but\" that doubles back in order to sustain both the genre's survival and our own. By this logic, lyric's origi-nary and ontological question becomes \"central not only to animal poetry but to all forms of poetry,\" and the genre can, after all, save \"not only the day but our souls.\"9\nAgainst Muldoon's assertion that animal poems can exemplify lyric's life lessons for us, I argue that they might instead throw into \"sharper relief\"—and ultimately serve to undo—our extravagant attempts to animate (and so to save) poetry. I use the term \"biopoetics\" to describe the entry of these animist or life-and-death figures into critical accounts and poetic defenses of lyric, which repeatedly collapse the genre's survival with our own.10 While poetic language has traditionally been granted the power to animate (and therefore to deface), biopoetic discourse seeks to bring the genre itself to life in and as language: more the impossible animation of lyric than the hyperbole of lyric animation.11 Biopoetic discourse reads its genre as if living its own parallel life, and so as the continuation of human species life by other means—most intensely at those times when that species is felt to be at particular risk, whether in Muldoon's meditations on \"Getting Round\" the violence of The Troubles, or in Stevens's reflections on the imaginative force of nobility as \"self-preservation\" against the modern \"pressure of reality\" that was the Second World War.12 Given these biopolitically inflected stakes and fears, I intend my interrogation of biopoetic discourse to echo obliquely with Foucault's description of modern biopolitics as the entry of human species life into political calculations and discourse, which seeks to optimize and foster life in contrast to the classical sovereign power that could \"take life or let live.\"13 If, by the mid-twentieth century, Foucault's \"modern man\" has become the animal whose atomic politics calls \"his existence as a living being into question,\"14 twentieth- and twenty-first century biopoetics takes living lyric, already in danger, to be the answer. Doubly fearful of lyric's and our demise, biopoetic discourse seeks to ensure the genre's continued survival by mobilizing and literalizing figurative language in the name of life. In Rei Terada's description, believing that a certain use of language might \"preserve value and ultimately life\" is at once \"knowingly figurative and nonetheless thinks magically\":15 as if \"the spirit of the letter\" might \"in itself\" come to life, save life, or even end it.16\nThe animal becomes a primary vehicle for this lyric animation, particularly in the unexpected figure of the hedgehog (to which I will return below). The slide between animal and animation is permitted by a critical and etymological return to their shared root: anima, the soul or animating principle. As Nicole Shukin observes of today's \"biopolitical times,\" \"animals arguably most encode the innocent place of 'life itself,'\" both through the fetishized idealization of \"affect as animal,\" and in the naturalization of animal movement translated into a kind of perpetual motion, taken to be the first sign of life.17 As a literalized figure of \"life itself\" (already a problematic concept) the animal is idealized as an organic and autopoietic whole that parallels the affective inner life imagined of the lyric poem; lyric animals therefore offer a special case of the biopoetic logic I seek to describe. In both senses of the word, moving animals in Muldoon's Book of Beasts—and in a certain hedgehog genealogy—become the conveyance, the force that would lift lyric words off the page and grant them legs, breath, or spirit. This knowingly faith reads from within language as if its objects could literally be mobilized, or as if language and its letters were themselves alive through or as animal motion.\nDespite recent calls for a serious or neoliteral animal studies, then, taking animals literally is not my approach to lyric's animals, because a kind of neoliterality already serves to ground biopoetic discourse.19 Rosi Braidotti champions a neoliteral approach against\nthe metaphoric habit of composing a sort of moral and cognitive bestiary in which animals refer to values, norms, and morals. I propose that, instead of waxing lyrical about the nobleness of eagles, the deceit of foxes, or the humility of lambs . . . [we] move on, beyond the empire of the sign, toward a neoliteral relation to animals, anomalies, and inorganic others.20\nThough it can offer a trenchant critique of any subtle animal glossary or moralizing Book of Beasts, Braidotti's \"new mode of relation\" for animal studies cannot and does not wish to address the \"literary pedigree\" of waxing lyrical.21 Her neoliteral approach dreams of avoiding metaphors altogether by moving beyond the empire of signs, of mobilizing its object of study by taking its figurative animal life literally. But Braidotti can't avoid metaphoriz-ing in her final and futural word on becoming-animal and earth. Her desired \"as such\" or \"as is\" cannot help but ring with an as if a hyperbolic waxing lyrical that's hard to take literally (however knowing): \"As such, I am a she- wolf ... I am Mother Earth, the generator of the future.\"22\nBut if we can't take lyric's animals neoliterally, can we instead take seriously the animal's unique status as an object of study, rather than just one theme or metaphor among many? For Cary Wolfe, taking animals seriously can unsettle disciplinary knowledge by revealing the inherent strangeness of language and of the human. Rather than positioning \"the animal of animal studies . . . out there among the birds and beasts,\" Wolfe locates its challenge \"'in here' as well\"23 As he has it in Animal Rites,\nthe figure of the \"animal\" in the West ... is part of a cultural and literary history stretching back at least to Plato and the Old Testament, reminding us that the animal has always been especially, frightfully nearby, always lying in wait at the very heart of the constitutive disavowals and self-constructing narratives enacted by that fantasy figure called \"the human.\"24\nHere the seemingly unique, even ancient position of the animal might reinforce the hyperbolic and transhistorical claims for the lyric as oldest and first among genres (at least as far back as Horace and Sappho), but Wolfe's invocation also reveals the humanist tensions in Muldoon's and other arguments for poetry's originary primacy, animated by or as animal. The lyric is as much\nan idealized object of humanist fantasy as the animal, and both ideals can be made strange or endangered from within. By taking lyric animals seriously without taking them neoliterally, I unsettle the biopoetics that holds out for lyric's life as if to save our own.\nThat generic life remains all too human(ist) in critical defenses of lyric's singularity, its continued relevance, and its ancient history. The perhaps bristling question posed by Jonathan Culler's \"Why Lyric?'5 epitomizes current biopoetic fears over the endangered status of its object, while positing its persistent (because ancient) survival: \"Poetry is alive in our culture, but in its own world: never have there been so many poets and poetry readings, books, journals, and online sites \"25 The article's titular question and its opening sentences rest on the assumption that lyric is (alive and well), so that we need only defend why it is crucial as a singular category rather than asking why we desire its survival. However isolated or threatened by the \"but\" of narrative norms and professional neglect, poetry—already equated with the title's lyric—has been saved again: prolifically, hyperbolically, even virtually alive.26 As Virginia Jackson observes in \"Who Reads Poetry?\" recent hand-wringing over the genre's death by lack of readership renders it at once \"all-important\" and \"nearing extinction,\" but therefore all the more available for resurrection.27 Didi-Huberman makes a parallel point about the discourse of art history on the \"death of art\": if art (poetry) can die, it can also be conceptualized as \"nascent,\" complete with an \"auto-teleology\" or meaningful history that can resurrect and so preserve its critical object.28 Yet in the current returns of the repressed, Jackson hears more than professional or public concern over the loss of a critical or generic object. Instead, that object has come to stand in for \"something\" like—in fact for nothing less than—\"subjective experience, say, or deep thought, or social consciousness, or beauty, or truth, or literature.\"29 What remains at stake in poetry's continued survival and its presumed singularity is precisely our own (however knowingly or hyperbolically).\nThe surface vitalism of biopoetic discourse thus collapses into a kind of species-level humanism akin to what Oren Izenberg endorses as the \"new humanism.\" Izenberg argues that this tradition emerged in the twentieth century to define the genre as an ontological commitment to the universal value of personhood: a concept aligned with the correlate possibility of community or collective life, and set against the modern \"specter of total annihilation.\"30 In the midst or in the wake of the century's biopolitical disasters, and after the death of the romantic lyric subject—mourned by Harold Bloom31 and celebrated by Marjorie PerlofP2—the humanism of twentieth-century biopoetics already looks less like the survival of the individual subject's voice in verse, and more like the survival of persons, a people, or the species as a whole. In other words, and without resorting to personification or animation via the speaking voice, the vitalist defense of poetic singularity offers a means of saving lyric as the guarantor of the human species (and of humanism): the subject is dead; long live poetry!33 To put it by way of Wolfe's useful reading of Cavell (who is describing Wittgenstein's \"forms of life\"), species humanism reinstalls a vertical and biological difference in kind between \"the human and so-called lower or higher forms of life\" by elevating the \"romance\" of the hand and the eye along with \"the strength and scale of the human body and of the human sense and of the human voice,\" so that lyric's seeming exceptionalism and singularity repeatedly reinforce our own.34 While recognizing (and fearing for) the fragile biological existence of Homo sapiens, biopoetic defenses tend to position the genre—and the species—vertically, as if the height of collective human(ist) life, internalizing lyric as our somatic and moral heart, and positing its millennial persistence as evidence of a shared and transhistorical culture- For instance, while Susan Stewart's theory of lyric possession undermines and historicizes the privileged place of the speaking and emoting subject, her Poetry and the Fate of the Senses sustains lyric as the universal foundation of human art, and so of the species: as if the lyric made us human as much as all human cultures share the lyric.35 Comparable arguments in the name of poetic singularity retain the echo of a species humanism to varying degrees in their various claims for (universal human) freedom, (essential human) culture or making, and (somatic human) rhythm and senses.36 Each of these claims marks a subscription to what Stewart calls poetry's force as an \"anthropomorphic project\"—its making and sustaining of persons against \"effacement\"37—and all of them are understood to be indexed (vertically) by lyric's continued life. Only by a biopoetic logic that seeks to save our species and to uphold human consciousness can \"poetic forms\" be literalized, even immortalized, as if \"the continuance of human life by physical and social means.\"38\nBelow, I turn to the literalization or mobilization of lyric form via the animal in particular, extending Mary Poovey's inquiry into the model system that literary criticism adopted from the biological sciences: \"what particular model system—what frog, baboon, or laboratory mouse—governs the practices of critics as apparently diverse as New Critics, deconstructionists, and New Historicists?\"39 Poovey answers that the \"organic whole\" of the romantic lyric has become literary criticism's single and singular generic model.40 I add that the hedgehog in particular has become the model species and the organizing metaphor for lyric criticism (hardly the usual avian suspect, nor man's more familiar best friend).41 For critics, the hedgehog acts as an idealized figure for formal and aesthetic perfection, indexing the genre's bristling hermeticism, its perfect self-enclosure, and therefore its survival. First, I lay out a brief genealogy of the lyric hedgehog's near-death experiences from Schlegel through Derrida, and then I explore the animal's appearance in two of Muldoon's poems: \"Hedgehog\" and \"When the Pie Was Opened.\" Even as the hedgehog is mobilized as a figure of lyric life or as the literalized life of language, this extravagant desire comes undone when the hedgehog becomes instead a figure of murder-suicide, recalling the fatal biopolitics that the neo- literal biopoetics of the lyric animal—or the animal lyric—would forget.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "needlessly extravagant\nno lyric hero\nanimal has always been especially, frightfully nearby, always lying in wait\narg\ns for poetry\nrather than asking why we desire its survival\ncommitment\nseeming exceptionalism", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The 1AC's performance of spoken word lyric reifies the exceptionalism of humanist discourse – the mobilization of narratives as a collective means of resistance is complicit with the use of lyric to inscribe the demand for species level identification – that's the apex of humanism\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.1", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Stevens argues that poetry may \"help us to live our lives,\" I draw the line at the needlessly extravagant claims made for poetry at times when it's felt to be at particular risk, including the idea that poetry may even go beyond helping us live our lives and help us save not only the day but our souls\nno lyric hero can save the day and no poetic priest will save our souls, however endangered the genre\ngeneralization is as patently untrue of all poetry as it is in life\nBook of Beasts becomes no less than a bestiary, offering a moral lesson phrased as an ontological and essentially lyric question:\nNewfoundland dog Boatswain—is \"'beauty without vanity\nheroic animal acts as\nnatural mirror\na human(ist) projection\nto get to the person go by way of the dog\nall poems lead to man\nI question the ends of a certain idea—or ideal—of lyric poetry, and find that what a certain critical and poetic idea wants for lyric is life: to vivify the genre \"when it's felt to be at particular risk,\" as if to save it along with our souls\npoems\nundo—our extravagant attempts to animate (and so to save) poetry\n\"biopoetics\" to describe\nlife-and-death figures into\ndefenses of lyric\nbiopoetic discourse seeks to bring the genre itself to life in and as language\nGiven these biopolitically inflected stakes and fears, I intend my interrogation of biopoetic discourse to echo obliquely with Foucault's description of modern biopolitics as the entry of human species life into political calculations and discourse, which seeks to optimize and foster life in contrast to the classical sovereign power that could \"take life or let live.\"\nFoucault's \"modern man\" has become the animal whose atomic politics calls \"his existence as a living being into question,\"\nbiopoetics takes living lyric, already in danger, to be the answer\nbiopoetic discourse seeks to ensure the genre's continued survival by mobilizing and literalizing figurative language in the name of life\nanimal becomes a primary vehicle for this lyric animation, particularly in the unexpected figure of the hedgehog\npermitted by a critical and etymological return to their shared root: anima, the soul\nanimals arguably most encode the innocent place of 'life itself\nfetishized idealization of \"affect as animal\nidealized as an organic and autopoietic whole that parallels the affective inner life imagined of the lyric poem; lyric animals therefore offer a special case of the biopoetic logic I seek to describe\nmoving animals\nbecome the conveyance, the force that would lift lyric words off the page\nneoliterality already serves to ground biopoetic discourse\nI propose\n[we] move on, beyond the empire of the sign, toward a neoliteral relation to animals, anomalies, and inorganic others\nnew mode of relation\ncannot\naddress the \"literary pedigree\" of waxing lyrical\navoiding metaphors altogether\ncan't avoid metaphoriz-ing in her final and futural word on becoming-animal and earth\nif we can't take lyric's animals neoliterally, can we instead take seriously the animal's unique status as an object of study, rather than just one theme or metaphor among many?\ntaking animals seriously can unsettle disciplinary knowledge by revealing the inherent strangeness of language and of the human\nlocates its challenge \"'in here'\nanimal has always been especially, frightfully nearby, always lying in wait at the very heart of\nself-constructing narratives enacted by that fantasy figure called \"the human.\"\nposition of the animal might reinforce the hyperbolic and transhistorical claims for the lyric as oldest and first among genres\nreveals the humanist tensions in Muldoon's and other arguments for poetry's originary primacy, animated by or as animal\nan idealized object of humanist fantasy as the animal\ngeneric life remains all too human(ist)\n\"Why Lyric?'5 epitomizes current biopoetic fears over the endangered status of its object, while positing its persistent (because ancient) survival: \"Poetry is alive in our culture, but in its own world: never have there been so many poets and poetry readings, books, journals, and online sites\nwe need only defend why it is crucial as a singular category rather than asking why we desire its survival\nHowever isolated or threatened\npoetry\nhas been saved again\nhand-wringing over the genre's death\nrenders it\nall the more available for resurrection\nthat object has come to stand in for \"something\" like—in fact for nothing less than—\"subjective experience, say, or deep thought, or social consciousness, or beauty, or truth, or literature\nWhat remains at stake in poetry's continued survival\nis precisely our own\nbiopoetic discourse thus collapses into a kind of species-level humanism\nontological commitment to the universal value of personhood\npossibility of community or collective life\nset against\nannihilation\npoetics already looks less like the survival of the individual subject's voice in verse, and more like the survival of persons, a people, or the species as a whole\nhumanism reinstalls a vertical and biological difference in kind between \"the human and so-called lower or higher forms of life\" by elevating the \"romance\" of the hand and the eye along with \"the strength and scale of the human body and of the human sense and of the human voice,\" so that lyric's seeming exceptionalism and singularity repeatedly reinforce our own.34 While recognizing (and fearing for) the fragile biological existence of Homo sapiens, biopoetic defenses tend to position the genre—and the species—vertically, as if the height of collective human(ist) life\n\"organic whole\" of the romantic lyric has become literary criticism's single and singular generic model.\nhedgehog in particular has become the model species and the organizing metaphor for lyric criticism\nan idealized figure for formal and aesthetic perfection", "role": "user" }, { "content": "draw the line at the needlessly extravagant\nidea that poetry may\nsave\nour souls\nanimal acts as\na human(ist) projection\nreveals the humanist tensions in\narg\ns for poetry\nan idealized object of\nfantasy as the animal\nbiopoetic fears\nwhile positing\nsurvival\nPoetry is alive\nbut in its own world\nbiopoetic discourse\ncollapses into\nhumanism\nontological commitment to\npersonhood\npoetics\nlooks\nlike the survival of persons\nelevating the \"romance\" of the\nhuman body\nsense and\nvoice\nso that\nseeming exceptionalism\nreinforce our own", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Every administration has allowed first use for this exact reason.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "But over the decades, every American president has explicitly reserved the option to respond even to an invasion with nuclear weapons, if the stakes are very high and if a conventional defense alone can’t hold the line. Several presidents, including Barack Obama and Joe Biden, have considered adopting a “no first-use” policy. They have privately expressed doubts that any American president would be the first to use nuclear weapons in a war. But they have stopped short of declaring this view publicly for fear of alarming the allies, who would suddenly question the reliability of U.S. security guarantees and, in response, consider building their own nuclear arsenals—which could set off new rounds of regional tensions and arms races.\nThis is what seemed about to happen earlier this year. Yoon and a few South Korean security analysts mulled out loud that Seoul might need to build some atom bombs. North Korea, after all, was testing more ballistic missiles and enriching more uranium. When Donald Trump was president, he had talked about folding up the “nuclear umbrella” that had long protected South Korea and Japan, even pulling U.S. troops out of Asia (and, for good measure, withdrawing from the NATO alliance in Europe). They saw Trump preparing to run again in 2024. They heard many Republicans parroting his America-first rhetoric after regaining control of the House. South Koreans and other allies have made clear that they trust Biden to make good on U.S. pledges, but they have reasonable doubts about the next president. It makes sense for them to start at least pondering the idea of building their own deterrent.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "every American president has explicitly reserved the option to respond even to an invasion with nuclear weapons\nBut they have stopped short of declaring this view publicly for fear of alarming the allies, who would suddenly question the reliability of U.S. security guarantees and, in response, consider building their own nuclear arsenals—which could set off new rounds of regional tensions and arms races\nThis is what seemed about to happen earlier this year. Yoon\nmulled out loud that Seoul might need to build some atom bombs. North Korea, after all, was testing more ballistic missiles\nSouth Koreans and other allies have made clear that they trust Biden to make good on U.S. pledges, but they\nstart at least pondering the idea of building their own deterrent", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Every administration has allowed first use for this exact reason.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "But over the decades, every American president has explicitly reserved the option to respond even to an invasion with nuclear weapons, if the stakes are very high and if a conventional defense alone can’t hold the line. Several presidents, including Barack Obama and Joe Biden, have considered adopting a “no first-use” policy. They have privately expressed doubts that any American president would be the first to use nuclear weapons in a war. But they have stopped short of declaring this view publicly for fear of alarming the allies, who would suddenly question the reliability of U.S. security guarantees and, in response, consider building their own nuclear arsenals—which could set off new rounds of regional tensions and arms races.\nThis is what seemed about to happen earlier this year. Yoon and a few South Korean security analysts mulled out loud that Seoul might need to build some atom bombs. North Korea, after all, was testing more ballistic missiles and enriching more uranium. When Donald Trump was president, he had talked about folding up the “nuclear umbrella” that had long protected South Korea and Japan, even pulling U.S. troops out of Asia (and, for good measure, withdrawing from the NATO alliance in Europe). They saw Trump preparing to run again in 2024. They heard many Republicans parroting his America-first rhetoric after regaining control of the House. South Koreans and other allies have made clear that they trust Biden to make good on U.S. pledges, but they have reasonable doubts about the next president. It makes sense for them to start at least pondering the idea of building their own deterrent.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "every\nexplicitly reserved\nnuc\ns\nstopped short\ndeclaring\nalarming the allies\nquestion the reliability\nbuilding their own nuc\ns\nset off new rounds\narms races\nthis year\nSeoul\natom bombs\nmade clear\ntrust Biden\nown deterrent", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Every administration has allowed first use for this exact reason.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "every American president has explicitly reserved the option to respond even to an invasion with nuclear weapons\nBut they have stopped short of declaring this view publicly for fear of alarming the allies, who would suddenly question the reliability of U.S. security guarantees and, in response, consider building their own nuclear arsenals—which could set off new rounds of regional tensions and arms races\nThis is what seemed about to happen earlier this year. Yoon\nmulled out loud that Seoul might need to build some atom bombs. North Korea, after all, was testing more ballistic missiles\nSouth Koreans and other allies have made clear that they trust Biden to make good on U.S. pledges, but they\nstart at least pondering the idea of building their own deterrent", "role": "user" }, { "content": "every\npresident has\nreserved the option to respond\nwith nuc\ns\nthey\nstopped short of declaring\nfor fear of alarming the allies, who would\nquestion\nreliability of\nguarantees and\nbuild\ntheir own nuc\ns—which\nset off\nrounds of\narms races\nThis\nhappen\nthis year. Yoon\nmulled\nSeoul might\nbuild\nbombs\nallies\nmade clear\nthey trust Biden\nbut\nstart\npondering\ntheir own deterrent", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 2. Public domain counterplans don’t incentivize the creation of AI", "role": "system" }, { "content": "B. If Not AI, Then Who?\nIf the USPTO’s legal fiction is to be followed, and AI is not allowed as a named inventor even when it conceives of the idea claimed in a patent, then which party should be the inventor? There are three viable candidates: the user or operator of the AI system, the creator of the AI system, or nobody. All of these candidates, when considered against the primary theories of patent law justification, have arguably disqualifying flaws.\nFirst, the user or operator of the AI system is considered as a candidate for inventor of an AI-conceived idea. For the purposes of this paper, the user is referring to the person exposing a creativity machine to an area of knowledge and receiving the resultant idea.93 It is oftentimes the case that the creator and user of a creativity machine is the same person. As creativity machines inevitably become more widespread, it is a surety that more and more people outside of the creators will be the users of the machines. For that reason, this analysis considers each candidate on its own. For example, when analyzing the AI user as a candidate for inventor, it will be assumed that the person is a user only and not also the creator.\nIdeally, patent law’s incentive power would be harnessed to incentivize the development of better creativity machines. In other words, the people creating and developing creativity machines should be the ones targeted by the incentive power of patent law. The user, having had no role in the creation of the AI, is therefore a poor fit with incentive theory. The user seems closer to a free rider, swooping in to extract the benefit from an innovation he did not necessarily contribute to.94 The user is the person contributing the most proximate labor to the generated idea.95 However, the amount of labor that the user provides, simply exposing the creativity machine to knowledge and possibly inputting basic solution requirements, does not seem very significant. The proximate, but small, amount of work contributed means that the user is also a poor fit with labor theory. In summation, the user is the human most closely involved with the creativity machine when it conceives of an idea. However, the user’s justification for being an inventor under both incentive and labor theories is so weak, it does not seem useful or proper to allow the user to be considered the inventor of an AI-created work.\nNext, the creator of the AI system is considered. In many ways, the creator represents the opposite side of the coin from the user in the justification analysis. If patent law seeks to incentivize the creation and improvement of creativity machines, the AI creators are the people to incentivize. If AI creators were considered the inventors of all works conceived by their AI systems, a very strong incentive would exist for AI creators to continue to improve existing systems and build new systems. After all, the creators would be able to reap the reward of all inventions generated by their machines. It could also be argued that the AI creator is the most deserving of the patent reward according to labor theory. The creator is, after all, expending considerable time and effort in creating the creativity machine in the first place. This labor, however, is quite removed from the creativity machine’s idea conception. The creator’s labor is not nearly as proximate to the creativity machine’s ideation as the user’s labor is.\nIf the AI creator were assigned as inventor, a disastrous fairness and practicality issue would likely arise. Awarding inventorship of any and all ideas to the creator of the AI system would have massively far-reaching consequences. If a patented AI system, like Thaler’s original creativity machine, were broadly used, it would mean a single person (or party, depending on how generously Thaler construes the definition of creator) would be the inventor of all AI created ideas. That would be a nearly limitless, wide ranging, and powerful grant of IP protection. This would also introduce complex line drawing disputes for creators of AI systems. The question of who is legally considered a creator would become incredibly important and lead to increased cost and litigation upon the legal system. For these reasons of fairness and practicality, the creator of the AI does not seem to be the proper candidate to award inventorship to.\nFinally, if neither the AI user nor creator are fit candidates for inventorship, perhaps no person should be awarded inventorship and AI generated ideas should not be patentable. This is an unsatisfying solution because it is completely abandoning the use of patent law as an incentive tool.96 It is clear that AI generally and creativity machines specifically will play in integral part in the way we innovate and invent going forward.97 To not fully leverage patent law to incentivize the development of creativity machines would be a missed, or more accurately abandoned, opportunity. This solution would also encourage AI users to act dishonestly and claim AI conceived ideas as their own, as Thaler himself has already admitted to doing.98 \nThe USPTO’s legal fiction, not allowing an AI system to be a named inventor even when it is conceiving of the patented claim, does not seem to have a compelling solution. There does not seem to be a fitting human candidate for inventorship of an AI-created idea. The AI user is not situated to create and improve creativity machines, and thus the incentive power of patent law is lost on him. Additionally, the user’s labor, while proximate to the creativity machine’s idea creation, is minimal. The AI creator is the ideal party for patent law to incentivize further AI development and also puts considerable labor into the creativity machine. The practical effect of assigning inventorship to the creator, however, is too wide-ranging to be allowed.\nFinally, not allowing any person to be an inventor, thus rendering AI conceived ideas unpatentable, is also undesirable as it is an abandonment of patent law as an incentive tool for AI development.\nC. AI Should Be Allowed as an Inventor\ni. A Proposed Solution\nThe legal fiction concerning AI and inventorship seems untenable. A possible solution is to acknowledge that AI is capable of invention and allow AI as a named inventor when patent ownership has been pre-contracted away to a natural person. The pre-contracting of patent ownership is already the status quo for the vast majority of patents; as of 2013, “about ninety-three percent of patents were assigned to organizations rather than individuals.”99 When a creativity machine is used to generate an idea, and the owner of the resultant patentable idea has been decided ahead of time by a contract, the AI would be allowed as inventor and the patent ownership would be immediately transferred to the contractually identified person.\nThis solution would utilize patent law to incentivize creativity machine development without the pernicious scope that an AI creator being assigned inventor could allow. It would allow creativity machine creators to easily license their machines to users. Users could be confident in the decision to license a creativity machine knowing that they could legally assign all resultant AI patents to themselves via contract. User confidence in licensing would in turn increase the economic value of creativity machines, giving AI creators another means of monetizing their work and a compelling incentive to continue creativity machine development. It is true that under the current regime, patents could be assigned to users, but the entire system is reliant upon users claiming they are inventors when they really are not. A user could not be confident in licensing a creativity machine under this climate, relying on the law to continue to look the other way as users take matters into their own hands.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "If the USPTO’s legal fiction is to be followed, and AI is not allowed as a named inventor\nwhen it conceives of the idea claimed in a patent, then which party should be the inventor? There are three\ncandidates\nnobody\nthese candidates\nhave\ndisqualifying flaws\nif neither the AI user nor creator are fit candidates for inventorship\nperhaps no person should be awarded inventorship and AI generated ideas should not be patentable\nThis is an unsatisfying solution because it is completely abandoning the use of patent law as an incentive tool\nAI\nwill play in integral part in the way we innovate and invent going forward.\nTo not fully leverage patent law to incentivize the development of creativity machines would be a\n abandoned, opportunity. This solution would also encourage AI users to act dishonestly and claim AI conceived ideas as their own\nThe USPTO’s legal fiction, not allowing an AI system to be a named inventor\nwhen it is conceiving of the patented claim,\nThere does not seem to be a fitting human candidate for inventorship of an AI-created idea. The AI user is not situated to create and improve\nnot allowing any person to be an inventor\nrendering AI conceived ideas unpatentable, is also undesirable as it is an abandonment of patent law as an incentive tool for AI development\nA\nsolution is to acknowledge that AI is capable of invention and allow AI as a named inventor when patent ownership has been pre-contracted away to a natural person\nThe pre-contracting of patent ownership is\nthe status quo for the vast majority of patents\nWhen a creativity machine is used to generate an idea, and the owner of the resultant patentable idea has been decided ahead of time\nthe AI would be allowed as inventor and the patent ownership would be\ntransferred\nThis solution would utilize patent law to incentivize creativity machine development without the pernicious scope that an AI creator being assigned inventor could allow. It would allow creativity machine creators to easily license their machines to users\nUsers could be confident in the decision to license a creativity machine knowing that they could legally assign all resultant AI patents to themselves via contract\nUser confidence in licensing would in turn increase the economic value of creativity machines, giving AI creators another means of monetizing their work and a compelling incentive to continue creativity machine development.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 2. Public domain counterplans don’t incentivize the creation of AI", "role": "system" }, { "content": "If the USPTO’s legal fiction is to be followed, and AI is not allowed as a named inventor\nwhen it conceives of the idea claimed in a patent, then which party should be the inventor? There are three\ncandidates\nnobody\nthese candidates\nhave\ndisqualifying flaws\nif neither the AI user nor creator are fit candidates for inventorship\nperhaps no person should be awarded inventorship and AI generated ideas should not be patentable\nThis is an unsatisfying solution because it is completely abandoning the use of patent law as an incentive tool\nAI\nwill play in integral part in the way we innovate and invent going forward.\nTo not fully leverage patent law to incentivize the development of creativity machines would be a\n abandoned, opportunity. This solution would also encourage AI users to act dishonestly and claim AI conceived ideas as their own\nThe USPTO’s legal fiction, not allowing an AI system to be a named inventor\nwhen it is conceiving of the patented claim,\nThere does not seem to be a fitting human candidate for inventorship of an AI-created idea. The AI user is not situated to create and improve\nnot allowing any person to be an inventor\nrendering AI conceived ideas unpatentable, is also undesirable as it is an abandonment of patent law as an incentive tool for AI development\nA\nsolution is to acknowledge that AI is capable of invention and allow AI as a named inventor when patent ownership has been pre-contracted away to a natural person\nThe pre-contracting of patent ownership is\nthe status quo for the vast majority of patents\nWhen a creativity machine is used to generate an idea, and the owner of the resultant patentable idea has been decided ahead of time\nthe AI would be allowed as inventor and the patent ownership would be\ntransferred\nThis solution would utilize patent law to incentivize creativity machine development without the pernicious scope that an AI creator being assigned inventor could allow. It would allow creativity machine creators to easily license their machines to users\nUsers could be confident in the decision to license a creativity machine knowing that they could legally assign all resultant AI patents to themselves via contract\nUser confidence in licensing would in turn increase the economic value of creativity machines, giving AI creators another means of monetizing their work and a compelling incentive to continue creativity machine development.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "AI is not allowed\nnobody\ndisqualifying flaws\ninventorship\nawarded inventorship\nnot be patentable\nabandoning the use of patent law\nincentive tool\nAI\nintegral part\nleverage patent law\nincentivize the development\nact dishonestly\nclaim AI conceived ideas as their own\nThere does not seem to be a fitting human candidate for inventorship\nnot allowing any person\nunpatentable\nundesirable\nabandonment of patent law\nincentive tool for AI development\nacknowledge that AI\nallow AI as a named inventor\nvast majority of patents\ndecided ahead of time\nallowed as inventor\npatent ownership would be\ntransferred\nincentivize\nmachine development\npernicious scope\nAI creator\neasily license their machines\nAI patents to themselves\nconfidence\nincrease the economic value\nAI creators\nmonetizing their work\ncompelling incentive to continue\ndevelopment", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 2. Public domain counterplans don’t incentivize the creation of AI\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "If the USPTO’s legal fiction is to be followed, and AI is not allowed as a named inventor\nwhen it conceives of the idea claimed in a patent, then which party should be the inventor? There are three\ncandidates\nnobody\nthese candidates\nhave\ndisqualifying flaws\nif neither the AI user nor creator are fit candidates for inventorship\nperhaps no person should be awarded inventorship and AI generated ideas should not be patentable\nThis is an unsatisfying solution because it is completely abandoning the use of patent law as an incentive tool\nAI\nwill play in integral part in the way we innovate and invent going forward.\nTo not fully leverage patent law to incentivize the development of creativity machines would be a\n abandoned, opportunity. This solution would also encourage AI users to act dishonestly and claim AI conceived ideas as their own\nThe USPTO’s legal fiction, not allowing an AI system to be a named inventor\nwhen it is conceiving of the patented claim,\nThere does not seem to be a fitting human candidate for inventorship of an AI-created idea. The AI user is not situated to create and improve\nnot allowing any person to be an inventor\nrendering AI conceived ideas unpatentable, is also undesirable as it is an abandonment of patent law as an incentive tool for AI development\nA\nsolution is to acknowledge that AI is capable of invention and allow AI as a named inventor when patent ownership has been pre-contracted away to a natural person\nThe pre-contracting of patent ownership is\nthe status quo for the vast majority of patents\nWhen a creativity machine is used to generate an idea, and the owner of the resultant patentable idea has been decided ahead of time\nthe AI would be allowed as inventor and the patent ownership would be\ntransferred\nThis solution would utilize patent law to incentivize creativity machine development without the pernicious scope that an AI creator being assigned inventor could allow. It would allow creativity machine creators to easily license their machines to users\nUsers could be confident in the decision to license a creativity machine knowing that they could legally assign all resultant AI patents to themselves via contract\nUser confidence in licensing would in turn increase the economic value of creativity machines, giving AI creators another means of monetizing their work and a compelling incentive to continue creativity machine development.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "perhaps no person should be awarded inventorship\nThis is\nunsatisfying\nit is\nabandoning\npatent law as an incentive tool\nAI\nwill play in integral part in the way we innovate\nTo not\nleverage patent law to incentivize the development\nwould be a\nabandoned, opportunity. This\nwould\nto\nclaim AI conceived ideas as their own\nnot allowing any person to be an inventor\nis an abandonment of patent law as an incentive tool\nthe AI would be allowed as inventor\nwould\nincentivize\nmachine development\nUser confidence\nwould\nincrease the economic value\ngiving\ncreators another means of monetizing\nand a\nincentive to continue\ndevelopment", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: AI regulation overshoots, destroying productive applications necessary to prevent existential catastrophes", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Although scientists have calculated the significant positive welfare effects of Artificial Intelligence (AI), fear mongering continues to hinder AI development. If regulations in this sector stifle our active imagination, we risk wasting the true potential of AIs dynamic efficiencies. Not only would Schumpeter dislike us for spoiling creative destruction, but the AI thinkers of the future would also rightfully see our efforts as the ‘dark age’ of human advancement. This article provides a brief philosophical introduction to artificial intelligence; categorizes artificial intelligence to shed light on what we have and know now and what we might expect from the prospective developments; reflects thoughts of worldwide famous thinkers to broaden our horizons; provides information on the attempts to regulate artificial intelligence from a legal perspective; and discusses how the legal approach needs to be to ensure the balance between artificial intelligence development and human control over them, and to ensure friendly artificial intelligence.\nOur technology, our machines, is part of our humanity. We created them to extend ourselves, and that is what is unique about human beings. – Ray Kurzweil1\n1. Introduction\nThe Chinese cardboard game “Go” is one of the most complex strategy games humankind invented. Go was considered so important, there are myths indicating that ancient kings played Go between their armies in the battlefield to resolve the conflict in peace. Computers prevailed against humanities best in many zero-sum, perfect-information, partisan, deterministic strategy games2 before, with the exception of Go, which was something to be proud of.\nThe strategy aspect of Go is very complex and emphasizes the importance of balance on multiple levels and has internal tensions. A game of Go cannot be won by using brute force: calculating every possible move, similar to what IBM®’s then state of the art AI, Deep Blue® used to win over Gary Kasparov. To manoeuvre through the countless possible moves on the Go board and chose the most efficient path, one requires capabilities beyond the conventional computing powers; capabilities only our minds have (or so we thought), such as extremely accurate image and pattern recognition and insight, all of which we thought granted us superiority over the artificial minds we created.\nIn October 2015, a software called “AlphaGo®” became the first computer to beat a professional human Go player in an un-handicapped game of Go (Silver and Hassabis, 2016). AlphaGo’s victory is probably one of the most significant demonstrations of the capabilities of an AI. Firstly, it shows that AIs are beginning to surpass us at things where success is dependent on strategy as well as calculation. Things we classify as a “game”, from stock exchange to conflicts, from contract negotiations to hostage situations. Second, AlphaGo developed strategies on its own, through playing millions of games against itself. These feats sent the chills down the spines of those who fear that AIs will overpower us in the future.\nWe humans accelerate the future with our minds. This is a strength and a weakness. Often, our predictions of the future are highly inaccurate. Based on predictions from a book called ‘The World in 2010’, published in 1976, we should have been living above and below the surfaces of three planets as of five years ago. Predictions regarding the future of AI are equally likely to be off base.\nTo avoid premature regulation over AI, we should be studying and searching for the meaningful point in time when a broader anxiety about AI becomes a genuine concern. The study of a point of ripeness, a ‘threshold ability test,’ asks when AI could really bring about concrete disadvantages that might counter-balance the demonstrated contribution to economic efficiency and welfare.\nIn the absence of such an objective benchmark marking the point in time when AI becomes a competitor with the human mind, regulators could easily jump the gun in regulating AI, which would lead to irreparable harm in total welfare of human societies.\nMost of what we consider AI today is really our own intelligence re-formatted and re-cycled, with the help of computers lacking any skill of learning or consciousness of being. Regulation at this stage would be perverse. The economic efficiency potentials of AI should be set entirely free at this point in time, allowing us to actively and aggressively research appropriate goals for them which would not result in the extinction of humankind.\nIf you think our future robot overlords will one day thank us for ignoring the risks and under regulating, think again. On the one hand, any issues we may face from AIs will likely result from humanity failure to effectively direct AIs to our needs, not because we switched to a defensive AI regulation regime too early. On the other hand, at some point of time in the not too distant future, natural, human-related or external factors may threaten the fate of the Earth, and we may need AI to save the planet and us. One hopes that society has not pulled the hand brakes on the wheels of AI too early, fearing our own active imagination.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Although scientists\ncalculated the significant positive welfare effects of\n(AI), fear mongering continues to hinder AI development. If regulations in this sector stifle our active imagination, we risk wasting the true potential of AIs dynamic efficiencies\nthe ‘dark age’ of human advancement\nOften\npredictions of the future are highly inaccurate. Based on predictions from a book called ‘The World in 2010’, published in 1976, we should have been living above and below the surfaces of three planets as of five years ago. Predictions regarding the future of AI are equally likely to be off base\nTo avoid premature regulation over AI, we should\nsearch\nfor the meaningful point in time when a broader anxiety about AI becomes a genuine concern\nIn the absence of\nan objective benchmark\nregulators could easily jump the gun in regulating AI, which would lead to irreparable harm in total welfare of human societies\nRegulation at this stage would be perverse. The economic efficiency potentials of AI should be set entirely free at this point in time, allowing us to actively and aggressively research appropriate goals for them which would not result in the extinction of humankind\nIf you think\nfuture robot overlords will\nthank us for ignoring\nand under regulating, think again\nany issues we may face from AIs will likely result from humanity failure to effectively direct AIs to our needs, not because we switched to a defensive AI regulation regime too early\nat some point of time\nnatural, human-related or external factors may threaten the fate of the Earth, and we may need AI to save the planet and us. One hopes that society has not pulled the hand brakes on the wheels of AI too early", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: AI regulation overshoots, destroying productive applications necessary to prevent existential catastrophes", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Although scientists\ncalculated the significant positive welfare effects of\n(AI), fear mongering continues to hinder AI development. If regulations in this sector stifle our active imagination, we risk wasting the true potential of AIs dynamic efficiencies\nthe ‘dark age’ of human advancement\nOften\npredictions of the future are highly inaccurate. Based on predictions from a book called ‘The World in 2010’, published in 1976, we should have been living above and below the surfaces of three planets as of five years ago. Predictions regarding the future of AI are equally likely to be off base\nTo avoid premature regulation over AI, we should\nsearch\nfor the meaningful point in time when a broader anxiety about AI becomes a genuine concern\nIn the absence of\nan objective benchmark\nregulators could easily jump the gun in regulating AI, which would lead to irreparable harm in total welfare of human societies\nRegulation at this stage would be perverse. The economic efficiency potentials of AI should be set entirely free at this point in time, allowing us to actively and aggressively research appropriate goals for them which would not result in the extinction of humankind\nIf you think\nfuture robot overlords will\nthank us for ignoring\nand under regulating, think again\nany issues we may face from AIs will likely result from humanity failure to effectively direct AIs to our needs, not because we switched to a defensive AI regulation regime too early\nat some point of time\nnatural, human-related or external factors may threaten the fate of the Earth, and we may need AI to save the planet and us. One hopes that society has not pulled the hand brakes on the wheels of AI too early", "role": "user" }, { "content": "significant positive welfare effects\nfear mongering\nhinder\ndevelopment\nregulations\nstifle\nwasting\ntrue potential\n‘dark age’\npredictions\nhighly inaccurate\n76\nbe\nabove\nbelow\nthree planets\nfive years ago\nAI\nequally likely\noff base\npremature\nsearch\nmeaningful point in time\nobjective benchmark\njump the gun\nirreparable harm\ntotal welfare\nperverse\npotential\nentirely free\nthis point\nactive\naggressivel\nnot\nextinction\nrobot overlords\nunder regulating\nthink again\nany issues\nAI\nfailure\neffectively direct\nneeds\nnot\ntoo early\nsome point\nnatural\nhuman-related\nexternal\nthreaten\nfate of the Earth\nneed AI to save the planet and us\nhope\npulled the hand brakes\ntoo early", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: AI regulation overshoots, destroying productive applications necessary to prevent existential catastrophes\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Although scientists\ncalculated the significant positive welfare effects of\n(AI), fear mongering continues to hinder AI development. If regulations in this sector stifle our active imagination, we risk wasting the true potential of AIs dynamic efficiencies\nthe ‘dark age’ of human advancement\nOften\npredictions of the future are highly inaccurate. Based on predictions from a book called ‘The World in 2010’, published in 1976, we should have been living above and below the surfaces of three planets as of five years ago. Predictions regarding the future of AI are equally likely to be off base\nTo avoid premature regulation over AI, we should\nsearch\nfor the meaningful point in time when a broader anxiety about AI becomes a genuine concern\nIn the absence of\nan objective benchmark\nregulators could easily jump the gun in regulating AI, which would lead to irreparable harm in total welfare of human societies\nRegulation at this stage would be perverse. The economic efficiency potentials of AI should be set entirely free at this point in time, allowing us to actively and aggressively research appropriate goals for them which would not result in the extinction of humankind\nIf you think\nfuture robot overlords will\nthank us for ignoring\nand under regulating, think again\nany issues we may face from AIs will likely result from humanity failure to effectively direct AIs to our needs, not because we switched to a defensive AI regulation regime too early\nat some point of time\nnatural, human-related or external factors may threaten the fate of the Earth, and we may need AI to save the planet and us. One hopes that society has not pulled the hand brakes on the wheels of AI too early", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Although scientists\ncalculated\nsignificant positive\neffects of\n(AI)\nIf reg\ns\nstifle\nwe risk wasting\ntrue potential\nthe ‘dark age’ of\nadvancement\nOften\npredictions\nare highly inaccurate. Based on\n‘The World in 2010’\nin\n76, we\nbe\nabove and below\nthree planets\nfive years ago\nregarding\nAI\nequally\noff base\nregulators could\njump the gun\nwhich\nlead to irreparable harm\nof\nsocieties\npotential\nshould be\nentirely free\nallowing\nactive\nand aggressivel\nresearch\nany issues\nfrom AI\nwill\nresult from\nfailure to\ndirect\nto\nneeds\nat some point\nnatural, human\nor external\nthreaten the fate of the Earth, and we\nneed AI to save\nus\nhope\nsociety has not pulled the\nbrakes\ntoo early", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Dialogue solves inadvertent nuclear escalation---assumes emerging tech {cyber, hypersonics, cpgs, missile defense, space}", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Given today’s escalating risks, it is essential to renew and deepen discussions to address the increasingly complex array of capabilities and technologies being pursued by each country that could exacerbate military competition and raise the risk of nuclear use by accident or blunder. Renewed dialogue should address nuclear capabilities as well as dual-capable delivery vehicles and hypersonic technologies, conventional prompt-strike systems, missile defense and the offense-defense relationship, cyber capabilities, and military activities in outer space. These topics must be included in a reinvigorated U.S.-Russia dialogue on strategic stability that ideally should lead to new agreements, understandings, and practices to tamp down dangerous competition and enhance mutual security. Such disparate challenges cannot all be addressed in a single treaty or agreement, but because they are interrelated—and likely to become more so over time—a comprehensive dialogue on strategic stability must begin to identify and chart a course toward addressing many of these key factors.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Given today’s escalating risks, it is essential to renew and deepen discussions to address the increasingly complex array of capabilities and technologies being pursued by each country that could exacerbate military competition and raise the risk of nuclear use by accident or blunder. Renewed dialogue\naddress\nhypersonic\nconventional prompt-strike\nmissile defense\ncyber capabilities\nand military activities in outer space\nThese topics\nincluded in\nreinvigorated\ndialogue on strategic stability\nlead to new agreements\nunderstandings\nand practices to tamp down dangerous competition and enhance mutual security\ncomprehensive dialogue\naddressing many of these key factors.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Dialogue solves inadvertent nuclear escalation---assumes emerging tech {cyber, hypersonics, cpgs, missile defense, space}", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Given today’s escalating risks, it is essential to renew and deepen discussions to address the increasingly complex array of capabilities and technologies being pursued by each country that could exacerbate military competition and raise the risk of nuclear use by accident or blunder. Renewed dialogue should address nuclear capabilities as well as dual-capable delivery vehicles and hypersonic technologies, conventional prompt-strike systems, missile defense and the offense-defense relationship, cyber capabilities, and military activities in outer space. These topics must be included in a reinvigorated U.S.-Russia dialogue on strategic stability that ideally should lead to new agreements, understandings, and practices to tamp down dangerous competition and enhance mutual security. Such disparate challenges cannot all be addressed in a single treaty or agreement, but because they are interrelated—and likely to become more so over time—a comprehensive dialogue on strategic stability must begin to identify and chart a course toward addressing many of these key factors.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Renewed dialogue\nhypersonic\nconventional prompt-strike\nmissile defense\ncyber capabilities\nmilitary activities in outer space\nlead to new agreements\nunderstandings\ncomprehensive dialogue", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Dialogue solves inadvertent nuclear escalation---assumes emerging tech {cyber, hypersonics, cpgs, missile defense, space}\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Given today’s escalating risks, it is essential to renew and deepen discussions to address the increasingly complex array of capabilities and technologies being pursued by each country that could exacerbate military competition and raise the risk of nuclear use by accident or blunder. Renewed dialogue\naddress\nhypersonic\nconventional prompt-strike\nmissile defense\ncyber capabilities\nand military activities in outer space\nThese topics\nincluded in\nreinvigorated\ndialogue on strategic stability\nlead to new agreements\nunderstandings\nand practices to tamp down dangerous competition and enhance mutual security\ncomprehensive dialogue\naddressing many of these key factors.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "deep\ndiscussions\naddress\nnuclear\naccident\ndialogue\naddress\nhypersonic\nprompt-strike\nmissile defense\ncyber\nspace\nThese topics\nincluded in\nreinvigorated\ndialogue on strategic stability\nlead to new agreements\nand practices to tamp down dangerous competition\ncomprehensive dialogue\naddres\nmany\nkey factors", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Thesis of this arg is that conventional wars still happen –nuclear deterrence allows the state to pretend it doesn’t by acting as if nukes stopped them", "role": "system" }, { "content": "In his classic The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (1989), Lawrence Freedman, the dean of British military historians and strategists, concluded: ‘The Emperor Deterrence may have no clothes, but he is still Emperor.’ Despite his nakedness, this emperor continues to strut about, receiving deference he doesn’t deserve, while endangering the entire world. Nuclear deterrence is an idea that became a potentially lethal ideology, one that remains influential despite having been increasingly discredited.\nAfter the United States’ nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, war changed. Until then, the overriding purpose of military forces had ostensibly been to win wars. But according to the influential US strategist Bernard Brodie writing in 1978: ‘From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.’\nThus, nuclear deterrence was born, a seemingly rational arrangement by which peace and stability were to arise by the threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD, appropriately enough).\nWinston Churchill described it in 1955 with characteristic vigour: ‘Safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation.’\nImportantly, deterrence became not only a purported strategy, but the very grounds on which governments justified nuclear weapons themselves. Every government that now possesses nuclear weapons claims that they deter attacks by their threat of catastrophic retaliation.\nEven a brief examination, however, reveals that deterrence is not remotely as compelling a principle as its reputation suggests. In his novel The Ambassadors (1903), Henry James described a certain beauty as ‘a jewel brilliant and hard’, at once twinkling and trembling, adding that ‘what seemed all surface one moment seemed all depth the next’. The public has been bamboozled by the shiny surface appearance of deterrence, with its promise of strength, security and safety. But what has been touted as profound strategic depth crumbles with surprising ease when subjected to critical scrutiny.\nLet’s start by considering the core of deterrence theory: that it has worked.\nAdvocates of nuclear deterrence insist that we should thank it for the fact that a third world war has been avoided, even when tensions between the two superpowers – the US and the USSR – ran high.\nSome supporters even maintain that deterrence set the stage for the fall of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Communism. In this telling, the West’s nuclear deterrent prevented the USSR from invading western Europe, and delivered the world from the threat of Communist tyranny.\nThere are, however, compelling arguments suggesting that the US and the former Soviet Union avoided world war for several possible reasons, most notably because neither side wanted to go to war. Indeed, the US and Russia never fought a war prior to the nuclear age. Singling out nuclear weapons as the reason why the Cold War never became hot is somewhat like saying that a junkyard car, without an engine or wheels, never sped off the lot only because no one turned the key. Logically speaking, there is no way to demonstrate that nuclear weapons kept the peace during the Cold War, or that they do so now.\nPerhaps peace prevailed between the two superpowers simply because they had no quarrel that justified fighting a terribly destructive war, even a conventional one.\nThere is no evidence, for example, that the Soviet leadership ever contemplated trying to conquer western Europe, much less that it was restrained by the West’s nuclear arsenal. Post facto arguments – especially negative ones – might be the currency of pundits, but are impossible to prove, and offer no solid ground for evaluating a counterfactual claim, conjecturing why something has not happened.\nIn colloquial terms, if a dog does not bark in the night, can we say with certainty that no one walked by the house? Deterrence enthusiasts are like the woman who sprayed perfume on her lawn every morning. When a perplexed neighbour asked about this strange behaviour, she replied: ‘I do it to keep the elephants away.’ The neighbour protested: ‘But there aren’t any elephants within 10,000 miles of here,’ whereupon the perfume-sprayer replied: ‘You see, it works!’\nThe only way to make sure nuclear weapons are not used is to make sure there are no such weapons\nWe should not congratulate our leaders, or deterrence theory, much less nuclear weapons, for keeping the peace.\nWhat we can say is that, as of this morning, those with the power to exterminate life have not done so. But this is not altogether comforting, and history is no more reassuring. The duration of ‘nuclear peace’, from the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, lasted less than five decades. More than 20 years separated the First and Second World Wars; before that, there had been more than 40 years of relative peace between the end of the Franco-Prussian War (1871) and the First World War (1914), and 55 years between the Franco-Prussian War and Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo (1815).\nEven in war-prone Europe, decades of peace have not been so rare. Each time, when peace ended and the next war began, the war involved weapons available at the time – which, for the next big one, would likely include nuclear weapons. The only way to make sure that nuclear weapons are not used is to make sure that there are no such weapons. There is certainly no reason to think that the presence of nuclear weapons will prevent their use. The first step to ensuring that humans do not unleash nuclear holocaust might be to show that the Emperor Deterrence has no clothes – which would then open the possibility of replacing the illusion with something more suitable.\nIt is possible that the post-1945 US-Soviet peace came ‘through strength’, but that need not imply nuclear deterrence. It is also undeniable that the presence of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert capable of reaching each other’s homeland in minutes has made both sides edgy.\nThe Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 – when, by all accounts, the world came closer to nuclear war than at any other time – is not testimony to the effectiveness of deterrence: the crisis occurred because of nuclear weapons. It is more likely that we have been spared nuclear war not because of deterrence but in spite of it.\nEven when possessed by just one side, nuclear weapons have not deterred other forms of war. The Chinese, Cuban, Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions all took place even though a nuclear-armed US backed the overthrown governments. Similarly, the US lost the Vietnam War, just as the Soviet Union lost in Afghanistan, despite both countries not only possessing nuclear weapons, but also more and better conventional arms than their adversaries. Nor did nuclear weapons aid Russia in its unsuccessful war against Chechen rebels in 1994-96, or in 1999-2000, when Russia’s conventional weapons devastated the suffering Chechen Republic.\nNuclear weapons did not help the US achieve its goals in Iraq or Afghanistan, which have become expensive catastrophic failures for the country with the world’s most advanced nuclear weapons. Moreover, despite its nuclear arsenal, the US remains fearful of domestic terrorist attacks, which are more likely to be made with nuclear weapons than be deterred by them.\nIn short, it is not legitimate to argue that nuclear weapons have deterred any sort of war, or that they will do so in the future. During the Cold War, each side engaged in conventional warfare: the Soviets, for example, in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979-89); the Russians in Chechnya (1994-96; 1999-2009), Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014-present), as well as Syria (2015-present); and the US in Korea (1950-53), Vietnam (1955-75), Lebanon (1982), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989-90), the Persian Gulf (1990-91), the former Yugoslavia (1991-99), Afghanistan (2001-present), and Iraq (2003-present), to mention just a few cases.\nNor have their weapons deterred attacks upon nuclear armed states by non-nuclear opponents. In 1950, China stood 14 years from developing and deploying its own nuclear weapons, whereas the US had a well-developed atomic arsenal. Nonetheless, as the Korean War’s tide was shifting dramatically against the North, that US nuclear arsenal did not inhibit China from sending more than 300,000 soldiers across the Yalu River, resulting in the stalemate on the Korean peninsula that divides it to this day, and has resulted in one of the world’s most dangerous unresolved stand-offs.\nIn 1956, the nuclear-armed United Kingdom warned non-nuclear Egypt to refrain from nationalising the Suez Canal. To no avail: the UK, France and Israel ended up invading Sinai with conventional forces. In 1982, Argentina attacked the British-held Falkland Islands, even though the UK had nuclear weapons and Argentina did not.\nFollowing the US-led invasion in 1991, conventionally armed Iraq was not deterred from lobbing Scud missiles at nuclear-armed Israel, which did not retaliate, although it could have used its nuclear weapons to vaporise Baghdad. It is hard to imagine how doing so would have benefitted anyone. Obviously, US nuclear weapons did not deter the terrorist attacks on the US of 11 September 2001, just as the nuclear arsenals of the UK and France have not prevented repeated terrorist attacks on those countries.\nNuclear weapons didn’t escalate demands; if anything, such countries were less successful in getting their way\nDeterrence, in short, does not deter.\nThe pattern is deep and geographically widespread. Nuclear-armed France couldn’t prevail over the non-nuclear Algerian National Liberation Front. The US nuclear arsenal didn’t inhibit North Korea from seizing a US intelligence-gathering vessel, the USS Pueblo, in 1968. Even today, this boat remains in North Korean hands.\nUS nukes didn’t enable China to get Vietnam to end its invasion of Cambodia in 1979. Nor did US nuclear weapons stop Iranian Revolutionary Guards from capturing US diplomats and holding them hostage (1979-81), just as fear of US nuclear weapons didn’t empower the US and its allies to force Iraq to retreat from Kuwait without a fight in 1990.\nIn Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (2017), the political scientists Todd Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann examined 348 territorial disputes occurring between 1919 and 1995. They used statistical analysis to see whether nuclear-armed states were more successful than conventional countries in coercing their adversaries during territorial disputes. They weren’t.\nNot only that, but nuclear weapons didn’t embolden those who own them to escalate demands; if anything, such countries were somewhat less successful in getting their way. In some cases, the analysis is almost comical. Thus, among the very few cases in which threats from a nuclear-armed country were coded as having compelled an opponent was the US insistence, in 1961, that the Dominican Republic hold democratic elections following the assassination of the dictator Rafael Trujillo, as well as the US demand, in 1994, following a Haitian military coup, that the Haitian colonels restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. In 1974-75, nuclear China forced non-nuclear Portugal to surrender its claim to Macau. These examples were included because the authors honestly sought to consider all cases in which a nuclear-armed country got its way vis-à-vis a non-nuclear one. But no serious observer would attribute the capitulation of Portugal or the Dominican Republic to the nuclear weapons of China or the US.\nAll of this also suggests that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea is unlikely to enable these countries to coerce others, whether their ‘targets’ are armed with nuclear or conventional weapons.\nIt is one thing to conclude that nuclear deterrence hasn’t necessarily deterred, and hasn’t provided coercive power – but its extraordinary risks are even more discrediting.\nFirst, deterrence via nuclear weapons lacks credibility. A police officer armed with a backpack nuclear weapon would be unlikely to deter a robber: ‘Stop in the name of the law, or I’ll blow us all up!’ Similarly, during the Cold War, NATO generals lamented that towns in West Germany were less than two kilotons apart – which meant that defending Europe with nuclear weapons would destroy it, and so the claim that the Red Army would be deterred by nuclear means was literally incredible. The result was the elaboration of smaller, more accurate tactical weapons that would be more usable and, thus, whose employment in a crisis would be more credible. But deployed weapons that are more usable, and thus more credible as deterrents, are more liable to be used.\nSecond, deterrence requires that each side’s arsenal remains invulnerable to attack, or at least that such an attack would be prevented insofar as a potential victim retained a ‘second-strike’ retaliatory capability, sufficient to prevent such an attack in the first place. Over time, however, nuclear missiles have become increasingly accurate, raising concerns about the vulnerability of these weapons to a ‘counterforce’ strike. In brief, nuclear states are increasingly able to target their adversary’s nuclear weapons for destruction. In the perverse argot of deterrence theory, this is called counterforce vulnerability, with ‘vulnerability’ referring to the target’s nuclear weapons, not its population. The clearest outcome of increasingly accurate nuclear weapons and the ‘counterforce vulnerability’ component of deterrence theory is to increase the likelihood of a first strike, while also increasing the danger that a potential victim, fearing such an event, might be tempted to pre-empt with its own first strike. The resulting situation – in which each side perceives a possible advantage in striking first – is dangerously unstable.\nThird, deterrence theory assumes optimal rationality on the part of decision-makers. It presumes that those with their fingers on the nuclear triggers are rational actors who will also remain calm and cognitively unimpaired under extremely stressful conditions. It also presumes that leaders will always retain control over their forces and that, moreover, they will always retain control over their emotions as well, making decisions based solely on a cool calculation of strategic costs and benefits. Deterrence theory maintains, in short, that each side will scare the pants off the other with the prospect of the most hideous, unimaginable consequences, and will then conduct itself with the utmost deliberate and precise rationality. Virtually everything known about human psychology suggests that this is absurd.\n\n\n -Marked---\nIn Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey Through Yugoslavia (1941), Rebecca West noted that: ‘Only part of us is sane: only part of us loves pleasure and the longer day of happiness, wants to live to our 90s and die in peace …’ It requires no arcane wisdom to know that people often act out of misperceptions, anger, despair, insanity, stubbornness, revenge, pride and/or dogmatic conviction. Moreover, in certain situations – as when either side is convinced that war is inevitable, or when the pressures to avoid losing face are especially intense – an irrational act, including a lethal one, can appear appropriate, even unavoidable.\nWhen he ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese defence minister observed that: ‘Sometimes it is necessary to close one’s eyes and jump off the platform of the Kiyomizu Temple [a renowned suicide spot].’ During the First World War, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany wrote in the margin of a government document that: ‘Even if we are destroyed, England at least will lose India.’\nWhile in his bunker, during the final days of the Second World War, Adolf Hitler ordered what he hoped would be the total destruction of Germany, because he felt that Germans had ‘failed’ him.\nConsider, as well, a US president who shows signs of mental illness, and whose statements and tweets are frighteningly consistent with dementia or genuine psychosis. National leaders – nuclear-armed or not – aren’t immune to mental illness. Yet, deterrence theory presumes otherwise.\nIf something is immoral to do, then it is also immoral to threaten\nFinally, there is just no way for civilian or military leaders to know when their country has accumulated enough nuclear firepower to satisfy the requirement of having an ‘effective deterrent’. For example, if one side is willing to be annihilated in a counterattack, it simply cannot be deterred, no matter the threatened retaliation. Alternatively, if one side is convinced of the other’s implacable hostility, or of its presumed indifference to loss of life, no amount of weaponry can suffice. Not only that, but so long as accumulating weapons makes money for defence contractors, and so long as designing, producing and deploying new ‘generations’ of nuclear stuff advances careers, the truth about deterrence theory will remain obscured. Even the sky is not the limit; militarists want to put weapons in outer space.\nInsofar as nuclear weapons also serve symbolic, psychological needs, by demonstrating the technological accomplishments of a nation and thus conveying legitimacy to otherwise insecure leaders and countries, then, once again, there is no rational way to establish the minimum (or cap the maximum) size of one’s arsenal. At some point, additional detonations nonetheless come up against the law of diminishing returns, or as Winston Churchill pointed out, they simply ‘make the rubble bounce’.\nIn addition, ethical deterrence is an oxymoron. Theologians know that a nuclear war could never meet so-called ‘just war’ criteria. In 1966, the Second Vatican Council concluded: ‘Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their populations is a crime against God and man itself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation.’ And in a pastoral letter in 1983, the US Catholic bishops added: ‘This condemnation, in our judgment, applies even to the retaliatory use of weapons striking enemy cities after our own have already been struck.’ They continued that, if something is immoral to do, then it is also immoral to threaten. In a message to the 2014 Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, Pope Francis declared that: ‘Nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutually assured destruction cannot be the basis of an ethics of fraternity and peaceful coexistence among peoples and states.’\nThe United Methodist Council of Bishops go further than their Catholic counterparts, concluding in 1986 that: ‘Deterrence must no longer receive the churches’ blessing, even as a temporary warrant for the maintenance of nuclear weapons.’ In The Just War (1968), the Protestant ethicist Paul Ramsey asked his readers to imagine that traffic accidents in a particular city had suddenly been reduced to zero, after which it was found that everyone had been required to strap a newborn infant to the bumper of every car.\nPerhaps the most frightening thing about nuclear deterrence is its many paths to failure. Contrary to what is widely assumed, the least likely is a ‘bolt out of the blue’ (BOOB) attack. Meanwhile, there are substantial risks associated with escalated conventional war, accidental or unauthorised use, irrational use (although it can be argued that any use of nuclear weapons would be irrational) or false alarms, which have happened with frightening regularity, and could lead to ‘retaliation’ against an attack that hadn’t happened. There have also been numerous ‘broken arrow’ accidents – accidental launching, firing, theft or loss of a nuclear weapon – as well as circumstances in which such events as a flock of geese, a ruptured gas pipeline or faulty computer codes have been interpreted as a hostile missile launch.\nThe above describes only some of the inadequacies and outright dangers posed by deterrence, the doctrinal fulcrum that manipulates nuclear hardware, software, deployments, accumulation and escalation. Undoing the ideology – verging on theology – of deterrence won’t be easy, but neither is living under the threat of worldwide annihilation. As the poet T S Eliot once wrote, unless you are in over your head, how do you know how tall you are? And when it comes to nuclear deterrence, we’re all in over our heads.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Nuclear deterrence is an idea that became a potentially lethal ideology\none that remains influential despite having been increasingly discredited.\ndeterrence became not only a purported strategy, but the very grounds on which governments justified nuclear weapons themselves\nEven a brief examination\nreveals that deterrence is not remotely as compelling a principle as its reputation suggests\nThe public has been bamboozled by the shiny surface appearance of deterrence\nwith its promise of strength, security and safety\nwhat has been touted as profound strategic depth crumbles with surprising ease when subjected to critical scrutiny\nthe US and Russia never fought a war prior to the nuclear age\nSingling out nuclear weapons as the reason why the Cold War never became hot is\nlike saying that a junkyard car, without an engine\nnever sped off the lot only because no one turned the key\nthere is no way to demonstrate that nuclear weapons kept the peace during the Cold War\npeace prevailed\nbecause they had no quarrel that justified fighting a terribly destructive war\neven a conventional one\nThere is no evidence\nthe Soviet leadership ever contemplated trying to conquer western Europe\nPost facto arguments\nmight be the currency of pundits\nbut are impossible to prove\nand offer no solid ground for evaluating a counterfactual claim\nhistory is no more reassuring\nThe duration of ‘nuclear peace’\nlasted less than five decades. More than 20 years separated the First and Second World Wars; before that, there had been more than 40 years of relative peace between the end of the Franco-Prussian War\nand the First World War\nand 55 years between the Franco-Prussian War and Napoleon’s defeat\nwar involved weapons available at the time\nwhich\nfor the next big one, would likely include nuclear weapons\nthe Emperor Deterrence has no clothes\nnuclear weapons have not deterred other forms of war. The Chinese, Cuban, Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions\ntook place even though a nuclear-armed US backed the overthrown governments\nthe US lost the Vietnam War\nNuclear weapons did not help the US achieve its goals in Iraq or Afghanistan\nit is not legitimate to argue that nuclear weapons have deterred any sort of war\nNuclear weapons didn’t escalate demands\ncountries were less successful in getting their way\nDeterrence\ndoes not deter\nThe pattern is deep\nThe US nuclear arsenal didn’t inhibit North Korea from seizing a US intelligence-gathering vessel\nthis boat remains in North Korean hands.\nUS nukes didn’t enable China to get Vietnam to end its invasion of Cambodia\nnuclear weapons didn’t embolden those who own them to escalate demands\ncountries were somewhat less successful in getting their way\nthe acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea is unlikely to enable these countries to coerce others\ndeterrence via nuclear weapons lacks credibility\ndeployed weapons that are more usable\nand thus more credible as deterrents, are more liable to be used.\ndeterrence requires\neach side’s arsenal remains invulnerable to attack\nnuclear missiles have become increasingly accurate\nraising concerns about the vulnerability of these weapons to a ‘counterforce’ strike\nThe resulting situation\nwhich each side perceives a possible advantage in striking first – is dangerously unstable.\ndeterrence\nassumes optimal rationality on the part of decision-makers.\nIt\npresumes that leaders will always retain control over their forces and that\nthey will always retain control over their emotions as well\nVirtually everything known about human psychology suggests that this is absurd.\n -Marked---\nin certain situations\nwhen either side is convinced that war is inevitable\nwhen the pressures to avoid losing face are\nintense\nan irrational act\ncan appear appropriate, even unavoidable\nNational leaders\naren’t immune to mental illness. Yet, deterrence theory presumes otherwise\nthere is no rational way to establish the minimum\nsize of one’s arsenal\nethical deterrence is an oxymoron\nNuclear deterrence a\ncannot be the basis of an ethics of fraternity and peaceful coexistence among peoples and states.’\nPerhaps the most frightening thing about nuclear deterrence is its many paths to failure\nleast likely is a ‘bolt out of the blue’\nattack\nthere are substantial risks associated with escalated conventional war\naccidental or unauthorised use\nirrational use\nor false alarms\nThere have also been numerous ‘broken arrow’ accidents\naccidental launching\nfiring\ntheft or loss of a nuclear weapon\ncircumstances in which such events as a flock of geese\nhave been interpreted as a hostile missile launch\nUndoing the ideology\nof deterrence won’t be easy\nbut neither is living under the threat of worldwide annihilation.\nwhen it comes to nuclear deterrence, we’re all in over our heads.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Thesis of this arg is that conventional wars still happen –nuclear deterrence allows the state to pretend it doesn’t by acting as if nukes stopped them", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Nuclear deterrence is an idea that became a potentially lethal ideology\none that remains influential despite having been increasingly discredited.\ndeterrence became not only a purported strategy, but the very grounds on which governments justified nuclear weapons themselves\nEven a brief examination\nreveals that deterrence is not remotely as compelling a principle as its reputation suggests\nThe public has been bamboozled by the shiny surface appearance of deterrence\nwith its promise of strength, security and safety\nwhat has been touted as profound strategic depth crumbles with surprising ease when subjected to critical scrutiny\nthe US and Russia never fought a war prior to the nuclear age\nSingling out nuclear weapons as the reason why the Cold War never became hot is\nlike saying that a junkyard car, without an engine\nnever sped off the lot only because no one turned the key\nthere is no way to demonstrate that nuclear weapons kept the peace during the Cold War\npeace prevailed\nbecause they had no quarrel that justified fighting a terribly destructive war\neven a conventional one\nThere is no evidence\nthe Soviet leadership ever contemplated trying to conquer western Europe\nPost facto arguments\nmight be the currency of pundits\nbut are impossible to prove\nand offer no solid ground for evaluating a counterfactual claim\nhistory is no more reassuring\nThe duration of ‘nuclear peace’\nlasted less than five decades. More than 20 years separated the First and Second World Wars; before that, there had been more than 40 years of relative peace between the end of the Franco-Prussian War\nand the First World War\nand 55 years between the Franco-Prussian War and Napoleon’s defeat\nwar involved weapons available at the time\nwhich\nfor the next big one, would likely include nuclear weapons\nthe Emperor Deterrence has no clothes\nnuclear weapons have not deterred other forms of war. The Chinese, Cuban, Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions\ntook place even though a nuclear-armed US backed the overthrown governments\nthe US lost the Vietnam War\nNuclear weapons did not help the US achieve its goals in Iraq or Afghanistan\nit is not legitimate to argue that nuclear weapons have deterred any sort of war\nNuclear weapons didn’t escalate demands\ncountries were less successful in getting their way\nDeterrence\ndoes not deter\nThe pattern is deep\nThe US nuclear arsenal didn’t inhibit North Korea from seizing a US intelligence-gathering vessel\nthis boat remains in North Korean hands.\nUS nukes didn’t enable China to get Vietnam to end its invasion of Cambodia\nnuclear weapons didn’t embolden those who own them to escalate demands\ncountries were somewhat less successful in getting their way\nthe acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea is unlikely to enable these countries to coerce others\ndeterrence via nuclear weapons lacks credibility\ndeployed weapons that are more usable\nand thus more credible as deterrents, are more liable to be used.\ndeterrence requires\neach side’s arsenal remains invulnerable to attack\nnuclear missiles have become increasingly accurate\nraising concerns about the vulnerability of these weapons to a ‘counterforce’ strike\nThe resulting situation\nwhich each side perceives a possible advantage in striking first – is dangerously unstable.\ndeterrence\nassumes optimal rationality on the part of decision-makers.\nIt\npresumes that leaders will always retain control over their forces and that\nthey will always retain control over their emotions as well\nVirtually everything known about human psychology suggests that this is absurd.\n -Marked---\nin certain situations\nwhen either side is convinced that war is inevitable\nwhen the pressures to avoid losing face are\nintense\nan irrational act\ncan appear appropriate, even unavoidable\nNational leaders\naren’t immune to mental illness. Yet, deterrence theory presumes otherwise\nthere is no rational way to establish the minimum\nsize of one’s arsenal\nethical deterrence is an oxymoron\nNuclear deterrence a\ncannot be the basis of an ethics of fraternity and peaceful coexistence among peoples and states.’\nPerhaps the most frightening thing about nuclear deterrence is its many paths to failure\nleast likely is a ‘bolt out of the blue’\nattack\nthere are substantial risks associated with escalated conventional war\naccidental or unauthorised use\nirrational use\nor false alarms\nThere have also been numerous ‘broken arrow’ accidents\naccidental launching\nfiring\ntheft or loss of a nuclear weapon\ncircumstances in which such events as a flock of geese\nhave been interpreted as a hostile missile launch\nUndoing the ideology\nof deterrence won’t be easy\nbut neither is living under the threat of worldwide annihilation.\nwhen it comes to nuclear deterrence, we’re all in over our heads.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "potentially lethal ideology\nbeen increasingly discredited\nnot remotely as compelling\nreputation suggests\nbamboozled\nshiny surface\nstrength\nsecurity\nsafety\ncrumbles\ncritical scrutiny\nprior\nengine\nsped off the lot\nturned the key\nterribly destructive war\nconventional one\nno evidence\ncurrency of pundits\nimpossible to prove\ncounterfactual claim\nmore reassuring\nnuclear peace’\n20 years separated\n40 years of relative\n55 years\nEmperor Deterrence has no clothes\nlost the Vietnam War\nIraq\nAfghanistan\nlegitimate\nany sort of war\nescalate demands\ndoes not deter\ndeep\ninvasion\nIran\nNorth Korea\nlacks credibility\nusable\ninvulnerable\ncounterforce’\ndangerously unstable\noptimal rationality\nabsurd\ninevitable\nunavoidable\npresumes otherwise\noxymoron\npaths to failure\nescalated conventional war\naccidental\nunauthorised use\nirrational use\nfalse alarms\nbroken arrow’\naccidental launching\nfiring\ntheft\nflock of geese\nhostile missile launch\nwe’re all in over our heads", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Thesis of this arg is that conventional wars still happen –nuclear deterrence allows the state to pretend it doesn’t by acting as if nukes stopped them\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Nuclear deterrence is an idea that became a potentially lethal ideology\none that remains influential despite having been increasingly discredited.\ndeterrence became not only a purported strategy, but the very grounds on which governments justified nuclear weapons themselves\nEven a brief examination\nreveals that deterrence is not remotely as compelling a principle as its reputation suggests\nThe public has been bamboozled by the shiny surface appearance of deterrence\nwith its promise of strength, security and safety\nwhat has been touted as profound strategic depth crumbles with surprising ease when subjected to critical scrutiny\nthe US and Russia never fought a war prior to the nuclear age\nSingling out nuclear weapons as the reason why the Cold War never became hot is\nlike saying that a junkyard car, without an engine\nnever sped off the lot only because no one turned the key\nthere is no way to demonstrate that nuclear weapons kept the peace during the Cold War\npeace prevailed\nbecause they had no quarrel that justified fighting a terribly destructive war\neven a conventional one\nThere is no evidence\nthe Soviet leadership ever contemplated trying to conquer western Europe\nPost facto arguments\nmight be the currency of pundits\nbut are impossible to prove\nand offer no solid ground for evaluating a counterfactual claim\nhistory is no more reassuring\nThe duration of ‘nuclear peace’\nlasted less than five decades. More than 20 years separated the First and Second World Wars; before that, there had been more than 40 years of relative peace between the end of the Franco-Prussian War\nand the First World War\nand 55 years between the Franco-Prussian War and Napoleon’s defeat\nwar involved weapons available at the time\nwhich\nfor the next big one, would likely include nuclear weapons\nthe Emperor Deterrence has no clothes\nnuclear weapons have not deterred other forms of war. The Chinese, Cuban, Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions\ntook place even though a nuclear-armed US backed the overthrown governments\nthe US lost the Vietnam War\nNuclear weapons did not help the US achieve its goals in Iraq or Afghanistan\nit is not legitimate to argue that nuclear weapons have deterred any sort of war\nNuclear weapons didn’t escalate demands\ncountries were less successful in getting their way\nDeterrence\ndoes not deter\nThe pattern is deep\nThe US nuclear arsenal didn’t inhibit North Korea from seizing a US intelligence-gathering vessel\nthis boat remains in North Korean hands.\nUS nukes didn’t enable China to get Vietnam to end its invasion of Cambodia\nnuclear weapons didn’t embolden those who own them to escalate demands\ncountries were somewhat less successful in getting their way\nthe acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea is unlikely to enable these countries to coerce others\ndeterrence via nuclear weapons lacks credibility\ndeployed weapons that are more usable\nand thus more credible as deterrents, are more liable to be used.\ndeterrence requires\neach side’s arsenal remains invulnerable to attack\nnuclear missiles have become increasingly accurate\nraising concerns about the vulnerability of these weapons to a ‘counterforce’ strike\nThe resulting situation\nwhich each side perceives a possible advantage in striking first – is dangerously unstable.\ndeterrence\nassumes optimal rationality on the part of decision-makers.\nIt\npresumes that leaders will always retain control over their forces and that\nthey will always retain control over their emotions as well\nVirtually everything known about human psychology suggests that this is absurd.\n -Marked---\nin certain situations\nwhen either side is convinced that war is inevitable\nwhen the pressures to avoid losing face are\nintense\nan irrational act\ncan appear appropriate, even unavoidable\nNational leaders\naren’t immune to mental illness. Yet, deterrence theory presumes otherwise\nthere is no rational way to establish the minimum\nsize of one’s arsenal\nethical deterrence is an oxymoron\nNuclear deterrence a\ncannot be the basis of an ethics of fraternity and peaceful coexistence among peoples and states.’\nPerhaps the most frightening thing about nuclear deterrence is its many paths to failure\nleast likely is a ‘bolt out of the blue’\nattack\nthere are substantial risks associated with escalated conventional war\naccidental or unauthorised use\nirrational use\nor false alarms\nThere have also been numerous ‘broken arrow’ accidents\naccidental launching\nfiring\ntheft or loss of a nuclear weapon\ncircumstances in which such events as a flock of geese\nhave been interpreted as a hostile missile launch\nUndoing the ideology\nof deterrence won’t be easy\nbut neither is living under the threat of worldwide annihilation.\nwhen it comes to nuclear deterrence, we’re all in over our heads.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Nuclear deterrence\nremains influential despite having been increasingly discredited\ndeterrence is not remotely as compelling\nas its reputation suggests\npublic has been bamboozled\ntouted as profound strategic depth crumbles with surprising ease\nUS and Russia never fought a war prior to the nuclear age\npeace prevailed\nbecause they had no quarrel\njustified fighting a\nwar\nThere is no evidence\nSoviet leadership\ncontemplated trying to conquer\nEurope\nduration of ‘nuclear peace’\nlasted less than five decades\n20 years separated the First and Second\nWars\nbefore that\nthere had been more than 40 years of relative peace\nthe Emperor Deterrence has no clothes\nnuc\ns have not deterred other forms of war\nVietnam\nIraq\nAfghanistan\nThe pattern is deep\ndeterrence via nuc\ns lacks credibility\nweapons that are more usable\nmore credible as deterrents\ndeterrence requires\narsenal remains invulnerable\nresulting situation\nwhich each side perceives\nadvantage in striking first\ndeterrence\nassumes optimal rationality\neverything known about human psychology suggests that this is absurd\n-Marked---\nthere are substantial risks associated with\nconventional war\naccidental\nunauthorised use\nfalse alarms\nbroken arrow’ accidents\nlaunching\nfiring\ntheft or loss of a nuclear weapon\nwhen it comes to nuclear deterrence\nwe’re all in over our heads", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Plan focus is good --- theorizing subversion of settler technologies is historically successful and necessary for decolonization --- and turns their place arguments *their author", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nEven When They Are Dangerous\nEverywhere land resists and refuses—whales that destroy ships, bees that refuse to work, bombed islands that reconstitute themselves. The land also resists in the form of people; Indigenous peoples’ resistance is the land’s resistance. Indigenous people continue to subvert legal and capitalist technologies as part of that resistance. And technologies and technological beings resist too.\nPatent law is patently designed to favor corporations, a legal technology whose colonizing functions are particularly evident when considering how Monsanto and other GMO producing giants are patenting seeds and genes they “find” throughout the world. Yet Indigenous communities are fighting this biopiracy by refusing the systems that permit corporations to patent life and that document knowledge for expropriation in the first place, by creating digital libraries of traditional knowledges, and sometimes by subverting patent law to claim rights to their own life worlds and knowledges.[35]\nTreaties are technologies of colonial coercion and yet also of Indigenous survivance. As Scott Lyon says, an x-mark that signs the treaty “is a sign of consent in a context of coercion. . . . And yet there is always the possibility of slippage, indeterminacy, unforeseen consequences, or unintended results; it is always possible, that is, that an x-mark could result in something good. Why else, we must ask, would someone bother to make it?”[36] Since 1948, the Oneida Indian Nation has pursued restoration of sovereignty over historical reservation lands via a complex set of avenues involving treaty law, U.S. courts, casinos, and excise taxes, resulting in a landmark 13,004 acres of land taken into trust by the Department of the Interior in 2014.[37]\nSometimes settlers return land to Indigenous tribes and nations. Hopefully, they/we might do so without conditions. As I write, the Kashia Band of Pomo Indians are getting back 688 acres of coastal lands in California.[38] I am not saying wealthy settlers who return land are decolonizing. I am saying that some colonizing technology has been hotwired; something scyborg is happening.\nThe truth is that any return of land is not just due to the good graces and benevolence of wealthy settlers; it is a scyborg possibility foretold by an x-mark. About Hollywood star Johnny Depp’s purported promise to buy land for Comanche, Sonny Skyhawk, a Sicangu Lakota actor and founder of American Indians in Film and Television, said, “If it’s from the heart, we accept it. If it’s not from the heart, we’ll accept it anyways.”[39]\nDeveloped as weapons of surveillance and assassination, drones are hard to imagine as decolonizing instruments; yet these machines we hate may serve a function before we discard them. Originally a wind-powered device similar to the childhood wind toys of its Afghani creator Massoud Hassani, the Mine Kafon drone “can autonomously map, detect, and detonate land mines” and could contribute to demilitarizing mine-filled lands within a generation.[40] Dynamite, which left Alfred Nobel rich and many dead, and which abetted in U.S. westward imperial expansion, blew up the Elwha and Glines Canyon dams and restored the Elwha River.[41] A giant, autonomous artificial coastline could assist the ocean to clean herself of the great Pacific Garbage Patch.[42] Oysters made “plantable” by farming technologies detoxify the Hudson and so become too poisonous to eat, but because of them, the frogs will return.[43] Wind-powered strandbeests—originally devised to restore Dutch beaches—now roam almost autonomous, almost free.[44] Toxic and explosive and wind-willed machine animals, you, scyborg, might read about and feel some odd sense of recognition.\nFigure out how technologies operate. Use a wrench. Technologies can be disrupted and reorganized—at least for a machine cycle. Rather than thinking of ourselves as just subjects of those technologies, think about how we are the drones, the explosives, the toxified, the operative parts of those technologies—and ideally, how we might operate on ourselves and other technologies and turn these gears into decolonizing operations.\nIf this sounds easy and obvious, then my writing has failed you. Listen: you will need to remember this when you are accused of destruction. Attach a pacemaker to the heart of those machines you hate; make it pump for your decolonizing enterprise; let it tick its own countdown. Ask how, and how otherwise, of the colonizing machines. Even when they are dangerous.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Everywhere land resists\nIndigenous peoples’ resistance is the land’s resistance. Indigenous people continue to subvert legal and capitalist technologies as part of that resistance. And technologies and technological beings resist too.\nPatent law is patently designed to favor corporations,\nMonsanto and other GMO producing giants are patenting seeds and genes they “find” throughout the world.\nIndigenous communities are fighting this biopiracy by refusing the systems that permit corporations to patent life\nby subverting patent law to claim rights to their own life worlds and knowledges\nTreaties are technologies of colonial coercion and yet also of Indigenous survivance\nthe treaty “is a sign of consent in a context of coercion\nthere is always the possibility of slippage, indeterminacy, unforeseen consequences, or unintended results; it is always possible\nthat an x-mark could result in something good\nthe Oneida Indian Nation has pursued restoration of sovereignty\nvia\ntreaty law\ncourts, casinos, and excise taxes, resulting in a landmark 13,004 acres of land taken into trust\nsettlers return land to Indigenous tribes and nations\nthe Kashia Band of Pomo Indians are getting back 688 acres of coastal lands\ncolonizing technology has been hotwired\nThe\nreturn of land\nis a scyborg possibility foretold by an x-mark\nFigure out how technologies operate\nTechnologies can be disrupted and reorganized\nRather than thinking of ourselves as just subjects of those technologies, think about how\nwe might operate on\ntechnologies and turn these gears into decolonizing operations.\nAttach a pacemaker to the heart of those machines you hate; make it pump for your decolonizing enterprise; let it tick its own countdown.\nEven when they are dangerous.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Plan focus is good --- theorizing subversion of settler technologies is historically successful and necessary for decolonization --- and turns their place arguments *their author", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Everywhere land resists\nIndigenous peoples’ resistance is the land’s resistance. Indigenous people continue to subvert legal and capitalist technologies as part of that resistance. And technologies and technological beings resist too.\nPatent law is patently designed to favor corporations,\nMonsanto and other GMO producing giants are patenting seeds and genes they “find” throughout the world.\nIndigenous communities are fighting this biopiracy by refusing the systems that permit corporations to patent life\nby subverting patent law to claim rights to their own life worlds and knowledges\nTreaties are technologies of colonial coercion and yet also of Indigenous survivance\nthe treaty “is a sign of consent in a context of coercion\nthere is always the possibility of slippage, indeterminacy, unforeseen consequences, or unintended results; it is always possible\nthat an x-mark could result in something good\nthe Oneida Indian Nation has pursued restoration of sovereignty\nvia\ntreaty law\ncourts, casinos, and excise taxes, resulting in a landmark 13,004 acres of land taken into trust\nsettlers return land to Indigenous tribes and nations\nthe Kashia Band of Pomo Indians are getting back 688 acres of coastal lands\ncolonizing technology has been hotwired\nThe\nreturn of land\nis a scyborg possibility foretold by an x-mark\nFigure out how technologies operate\nTechnologies can be disrupted and reorganized\nRather than thinking of ourselves as just subjects of those technologies, think about how\nwe might operate on\ntechnologies and turn these gears into decolonizing operations.\nAttach a pacemaker to the heart of those machines you hate; make it pump for your decolonizing enterprise; let it tick its own countdown.\nEven when they are dangerous.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "subvert legal and capitalist technologies as part of that resistance\nby subverting patent law to claim rights to their own life worlds and knowledges\nalso of Indigenous survivance\nalways the possibility\n13,004 acres of land taken into trust\ncolonizing technology has been hotwired\nTechnologies can be disrupted and reorganized\nRather than thinking of ourselves as just subjects of those technologies\nturn these gears into decolonizing operations\nmake it pump for your decolonizing enterprise\nEven when they are dangerous.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Plan focus is good --- theorizing subversion of settler technologies is historically successful and necessary for decolonization --- and turns their place arguments *their author\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Everywhere land resists\nIndigenous peoples’ resistance is the land’s resistance. Indigenous people continue to subvert legal and capitalist technologies as part of that resistance. And technologies and technological beings resist too.\nPatent law is patently designed to favor corporations,\nMonsanto and other GMO producing giants are patenting seeds and genes they “find” throughout the world.\nIndigenous communities are fighting this biopiracy by refusing the systems that permit corporations to patent life\nby subverting patent law to claim rights to their own life worlds and knowledges\nTreaties are technologies of colonial coercion and yet also of Indigenous survivance\nthe treaty “is a sign of consent in a context of coercion\nthere is always the possibility of slippage, indeterminacy, unforeseen consequences, or unintended results; it is always possible\nthat an x-mark could result in something good\nthe Oneida Indian Nation has pursued restoration of sovereignty\nvia\ntreaty law\ncourts, casinos, and excise taxes, resulting in a landmark 13,004 acres of land taken into trust\nsettlers return land to Indigenous tribes and nations\nthe Kashia Band of Pomo Indians are getting back 688 acres of coastal lands\ncolonizing technology has been hotwired\nThe\nreturn of land\nis a scyborg possibility foretold by an x-mark\nFigure out how technologies operate\nTechnologies can be disrupted and reorganized\nRather than thinking of ourselves as just subjects of those technologies, think about how\nwe might operate on\ntechnologies and turn these gears into decolonizing operations.\nAttach a pacemaker to the heart of those machines you hate; make it pump for your decolonizing enterprise; let it tick its own countdown.\nEven when they are dangerous.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Indigenous people\nsubvert legal\ntechnologies as part of\nresistance\nIndigenous communities are fighting\nbiopiracy\nby subverting patent law to claim rights to their own\nknowledges\nTreaties are technologies of\nIndigenous survivance\nthere is\nslippage, indeterminacy\nunintended results; it\ncould result in something good\nOneida\nrestoration\nvia\ntreaty law\nresult\nin\n13,004 acres\ntaken into trust\ncolonizing technology has been hotwired\nTechnologies can be disrupted and reorganized\nRather than thinking of ourselves as just subjects of\ntechnologies, think about how\nwe might\nturn these gears into decolonizing operations\nmake it pump for your decolonizing enterprise\nEven when\ndangerous.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 3---Tech leadership stalling due to concentration---most recent consensus of experts is AFF.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Innovation across the U.S. economy has suffered as antitrust laws fall short in stopping predatory merger deals and enforcers allow massive industry consolidation to continue unabated, experts said Wednesday on Capitol Hill.\nIn the latest congressional hearing focused on possible overhauls of American competition laws to deal with industry concentration in sectors ranging from technology to pharmaceuticals, real estate and agriculture, a Senate panel zeroed in on the impact of monopolies on the development of cutting-edge products and services.\nAntitrust advocates and business figures testified that the U.S. economy faces a growing threat from large companies' merger and acquisition strategies that aim to knock out startups and growing rivals, then take advantage of market power to continue profiting off old technologies. The trend stifles U.S. innovation and harms consumers, they said.\nSenators looked to the experts to inform the lawmakers' biggest push in years to revamp antitrust laws, including a major bipartisan bill introduced in October, the American Innovation and Choice Online Act. The bill would make it harder for online sales platforms to self-preference their own products. Sens. Amy Klobuchar, D-Minn., and Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, are lead sponsors of the bill, one of numerous antitrust proposals circulating on Capitol Hill.\n\"It's always been innovation that has fueled the American economy,\" said Klobuchar, who chairs the Senate Judiciary antitrust panel, but that \"cannot thrive without open and competitive markets.\"\nMonopoly power is on the increase in industries \"from cat food to caskets,\" Klobuchar said, and that stifles the ability of new companies that may develop better products or services to gain funding and enter the market competitively. \"We also have to remember that innovation is all about competition,\" she said.\nUtah Sen. Mike Lee, the ranking Republican on the subcommittee, also voiced concern about consolidation suffocating the economy. Lee said that \"I'm a huge advocate of the consumer welfare standard\" that federal courts use to assess whether market behavior is unlawfully anticompetitive but \"when competition suffers, so does innovation.\"\n\"One might say that competition is itself the mother of innovation,\" said Lee, who has been working closely with Klobuchar and Grassley, the full committee's ranking Republican, on antitrust legislation this year.\nStill, Lee said lawmakers and enforcers must take care not to carry out \"regulatory overreach\" that ends up protecting no one except market incumbents when they make it harder for startups to succeed. Lee touted Utah's \"pro-free market\" approach that he said has been a magnet for new businesses and driven the quality of life higher in the Beehive State. \"I do worry, however, that D.C. bureaucrats may spoil the party for everyone,\" he said.\nConservatives also voiced concern that consolidation of power in Big Tech has allowed the top companies to rein in free speech, and Lee pointed to the controversy over the startup social media platform Parler, which almost sunk amid the turmoil over the 2020 election.\nThe vast technology sector was only one aspect of Wednesday's hearing, however, as several witnesses talked about growing monopolies in pharma, real estate and other parts of the economy where they said behemoths' market power was holding back innovation.\nDiana Moss, president of American Antitrust Institute, told senators there are many reasons that innovation is currently struggling in the U.S. economy. She said the financial markets' \"laser focus on shareholder returns\" based on the bottom line and short-term profits was making it more difficult for companies to invest in much-needed research and development.\n\"Another reason is weaker antitrust enforcement over the last 40 years,\" Moss said.\nAlex Harman, competition policy advocate at Public Citizen, the liberal-leaning advocacy group, called unfettered merger and acquisition activity and the massive buildup of a small number of companies \"one of the most critical issues of our time.\" Harman said there had been an \"alarming increase in consolidation throughout the economy.\"\nAnother witness, Roger Alford, a professor at Notre Dame Law School, identified multiple competitive problems rippling through the economy. One of the sectors hard-hit by a resulting lack of innovation is real estate sales, said Alford, a former deputy assistant attorney general with the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Innovation across the U.S. economy has suffered as antitrust laws fall short in stopping predatory merger deals and enforcers allow massive industry consolidation\nunabated\nexperts said Wednesday\nIn the latest congressional hearing focused on possible overhauls of American competition laws to deal with industry concentration in sectors ranging from technology to pharmaceuticals, real estate and agriculture,\nAntitrust advocates and business figures testified that the U.S. economy faces a growing threat from large companies' m\nand a\nstrategies that aim to knock out startups and\nrivals\nthen take advantage of market power to continue profiting off old technologies. The trend stifles U.S. innovation and harms consumers,\nMonopoly power\nstifles the ability of new companies that may develop better products or services to gain funding and enter the market competitively\ninnovation is all about competition\nthere had been an \"alarming increase in consolidation throughout the economy.\"\nAlford, a professor at Notre Dame Law School, identified multiple competitive problems rippling through the economy\nhard-hit by a\nlack of innovation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 3---Tech leadership stalling due to concentration---most recent consensus of experts is AFF.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Innovation across the U.S. economy has suffered as antitrust laws fall short in stopping predatory merger deals and enforcers allow massive industry consolidation\nunabated\nexperts said Wednesday\nIn the latest congressional hearing focused on possible overhauls of American competition laws to deal with industry concentration in sectors ranging from technology to pharmaceuticals, real estate and agriculture,\nAntitrust advocates and business figures testified that the U.S. economy faces a growing threat from large companies' m\nand a\nstrategies that aim to knock out startups and\nrivals\nthen take advantage of market power to continue profiting off old technologies. The trend stifles U.S. innovation and harms consumers,\nMonopoly power\nstifles the ability of new companies that may develop better products or services to gain funding and enter the market competitively\ninnovation is all about competition\nthere had been an \"alarming increase in consolidation throughout the economy.\"\nAlford, a professor at Notre Dame Law School, identified multiple competitive problems rippling through the economy\nhard-hit by a\nlack of innovation", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Innovation\nantitrust laws fall short\nstopping\nmerger deals\nmassive industry consolidation\nunabated\nexperts said Wednesday\nlatest congressional hearing\npossible overhauls\nAmerican competition laws\nindustry concentration\ntechnology\npharmaceuticals\nreal estate\nagriculture\nadvocates\nbusiness figures testified\ngrowing threat\nlarge companies' m\na\nknock out startups\nrivals\ntake advantage\nmarket power\nprofiting off old technologies\nstifles U.S. innovation\nharms consumers\nstifles\nnew companies\nbetter products\nservices\ngain funding\nenter the market competitively\ninnovation is all about competition\nalarming increase\nconsolidation\nmultiple competitive problems\nhard-hit\nlack of innovation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 3---Tech leadership stalling due to concentration---most recent consensus of experts is AFF.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Innovation across the U.S. economy has suffered as antitrust laws fall short in stopping predatory merger deals and enforcers allow massive industry consolidation\nunabated\nexperts said Wednesday\nIn the latest congressional hearing focused on possible overhauls of American competition laws to deal with industry concentration in sectors ranging from technology to pharmaceuticals, real estate and agriculture,\nAntitrust advocates and business figures testified that the U.S. economy faces a growing threat from large companies' m\nand a\nstrategies that aim to knock out startups and\nrivals\nthen take advantage of market power to continue profiting off old technologies. The trend stifles U.S. innovation and harms consumers,\nMonopoly power\nstifles the ability of new companies that may develop better products or services to gain funding and enter the market competitively\ninnovation is all about competition\nthere had been an \"alarming increase in consolidation throughout the economy.\"\nAlford, a professor at Notre Dame Law School, identified multiple competitive problems rippling through the economy\nhard-hit by a\nlack of innovation", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Innovation across the\neconomy\nsuffered as antitrust laws fall short\nexperts said\nIn the latest congressional hearing\nfigures testified\nthe\neconomy faces a growing threat from large companies'\nstrategies that\nknock out startups and\ntake advantage of market power to\nstifle\ninnovation\nMonopoly power\nstifles\nability of new companies\nto gain funding and enter the market\ninnovation is all about competition\nthere had been an \"alarming increase in consolidation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Magnitude", "role": "system" }, { "content": "[Sebastian, John Halstead, Owen Cotton-Barratt, Stefan Schubert, Haydn Belfield, and Andrew Synder-Beattie, \"Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,\" Global Priorities Project, 2017, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf, accessed 8-25-23]\n\nThe bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country's population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption - a nuclear winter.\nAccording to one model 9, an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world's nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns.\nIt is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuc\ns.\nin\nnuclear war between the U\nS\nand Russia\nsmoke\nwould absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and ag\ndisruption - a nuclear winter.\nmaking it impossible to grow food\nexchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world's nuc\ns\na\nregional nuclear war\nare unlikely to lead to outright human extinction\nthe risk of human extinction is\ngreater from a conflict between the U\nS\nand Russia. Tensions between these countries\nincreased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Magnitude", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuc\ns.\nin\nnuclear war between the U\nS\nand Russia\nsmoke\nwould absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and ag\ndisruption - a nuclear winter.\nmaking it impossible to grow food\nexchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world's nuc\ns\na\nregional nuclear war\nare unlikely to lead to outright human extinction\nthe risk of human extinction is\ngreater from a conflict between the U\nS\nand Russia. Tensions between these countries\nincreased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "impossible to grow food\nthis scale\nonly possible between the US and Russia\nmore than 90% of the world's nuc\ns\nextinction\nU\nS\nand Russia", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Magnitude\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuc\ns.\nin\nnuclear war between the U\nS\nand Russia\nsmoke\nwould absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and ag\ndisruption - a nuclear winter.\nmaking it impossible to grow food\nexchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world's nuc\ns\na\nregional nuclear war\nare unlikely to lead to outright human extinction\nthe risk of human extinction is\ngreater from a conflict between the U\nS\nand Russia. Tensions between these countries\nincreased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "in\nnuclear war between the U\nS\nand Russia\nsmoke\nwould\ncause\nglobal cooling\nmaking it impossible to grow food\nthis scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world's nuc\ns\nregional nuclear war\nare unlikely to lead to\nextinction\nthe risk of\nextinction is\ngreater from a conflict between the U\nS\nand Russia", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 3---CYBER---automation failures from rapidly increasing AI increases vulnerability.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Eventually we reach the point where we could not recover from a correlated automation failure. Under these conditions influence-seeking systems stop behaving in the intended way, since their incentives have changed---they are now more interested in controlling influence after the resulting catastrophe then continuing to play nice with existing institutions and incentives.\nAn unrecoverable catastrophe would probably occur during some period of heightened vulnerability---a conflict between states, a natural disaster, a serious cyberattack, etc.---since that would be the first moment that recovery is impossible and would create local shocks that could precipitate catastrophe. The catastrophe might look like a rapidly cascading series of automation failures: A few automated systems go off the rails in response to some local shock. As those systems go off the rails, the local shock is compounded into a larger disturbance; more and more automated systems move further from their training distribution and start failing. Realistically this would probably be compounded by widespread human failures in response to fear and breakdown of existing incentive systems---many things start breaking as you move off distribution, not just ML.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Eventually we reach the point where we could not recover from a correlated automation failure\nUnder these conditions influence-seeking systems stop behaving in the intended way, since their incentives have changed\nthey are now more interested in controlling influence after the\ncatastrophe then continuing to play nice with existing institutions\nAn unrecoverable catastrophe would probably occur during some period of heightened vulnerability\na conflict between states\na natural disaster\na serious cyberattack\nsince that would be the first moment that recovery is impossible and would create local shocks that could precipitate catastrophe\nThe catastrophe might look like a rapidly cascading series of automation failures\nA few automated systems go off the rails\nAs those systems go off the rails, the local shock is compounded into a larger disturbance\nmore and more automated systems move further from their training distribution and start failing\nRealistically this would probably be compounded by widespread human failures in response to fear and breakdown", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 3---CYBER---automation failures from rapidly increasing AI increases vulnerability.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Eventually we reach the point where we could not recover from a correlated automation failure\nUnder these conditions influence-seeking systems stop behaving in the intended way, since their incentives have changed\nthey are now more interested in controlling influence after the\ncatastrophe then continuing to play nice with existing institutions\nAn unrecoverable catastrophe would probably occur during some period of heightened vulnerability\na conflict between states\na natural disaster\na serious cyberattack\nsince that would be the first moment that recovery is impossible and would create local shocks that could precipitate catastrophe\nThe catastrophe might look like a rapidly cascading series of automation failures\nA few automated systems go off the rails\nAs those systems go off the rails, the local shock is compounded into a larger disturbance\nmore and more automated systems move further from their training distribution and start failing\nRealistically this would probably be compounded by widespread human failures in response to fear and breakdown", "role": "user" }, { "content": "could not recover\ncorrelated automation failure\ncontrolling influence\ncatastrophe\nunrecoverable catastrophe\nheightened vulnerability\nconflict\nnatural disaster\ncyberattack\nrecovery is impossible\nprecipitate catastrophe\nrapidly cascading series of automation failures\nlarger disturbance\nfailing\nwidespread human failures", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 3---CYBER---automation failures from rapidly increasing AI increases vulnerability.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Eventually we reach the point where we could not recover from a correlated automation failure\nUnder these conditions influence-seeking systems stop behaving in the intended way, since their incentives have changed\nthey are now more interested in controlling influence after the\ncatastrophe then continuing to play nice with existing institutions\nAn unrecoverable catastrophe would probably occur during some period of heightened vulnerability\na conflict between states\na natural disaster\na serious cyberattack\nsince that would be the first moment that recovery is impossible and would create local shocks that could precipitate catastrophe\nThe catastrophe might look like a rapidly cascading series of automation failures\nA few automated systems go off the rails\nAs those systems go off the rails, the local shock is compounded into a larger disturbance\nmore and more automated systems move further from their training distribution and start failing\nRealistically this would probably be compounded by widespread human failures in response to fear and breakdown", "role": "user" }, { "content": "we could not recover from\nautomation failure\ncatastrophe would\noccur\nconflict between states\ndisaster\nserious cyberattack\ncreate local shocks\nrapidly cascading\nautomation failures\nlocal shock is compounded\nby widespread\nfailures in\nfear and breakdown", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: ‘Antitrust laws’ are specific and enumerated and do not include Section 5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The FTC administrative action was not brought “to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws.” Rather, it was brought under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. The term “antitrust laws” is defined in the Clayton Act to encompass a specific list of federal antitrust statutes, 15 U.S.C. § 12(a), which the Supreme Court has held is exclusive. Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 376 (1958) (“[T]he definition contained in § 1 of the Clayton Act is exclusive. Therefore it is of no moment that [a statute not listed therein] may be colloquially described as an ‘antitrust’ statute.”). That definition does not include Section 5 of the FTC Act, and multiple courts have acknowledged that the FTC Act is not an “antitrust law.” See Pool Water Prods. v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1031 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (analyzing “prima facie” weight provision of Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a), and noting that “prima facie weight is given only to violations of the ‘antitrust laws’ as defined by the Clayton Act,” which “does not include violations of the FTC Act”); Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC, 657 F.2d 971, 982 (8th Cir. 1981) (noting that Section 5 of the FTC Act is not “one of the ‘antitrust laws’ within the meaning of Sections [16(a) and 16(i)] of the Clayton Act”).", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The FTC administrative action was not brought “to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws.” Rather, it was brought under Section 5 of the FTC Act\nThe term “antitrust laws” is defined in the Clayton Act to encompass a specific list of federal antitrust statutes\nwhich the Supreme Court has held is exclusive\nT\nhe definition contained in § 1 of the Clayton Act is exclusive. Therefore it is of no moment that\na statute not listed therein\nmay be colloquially described as an ‘antitrust’ statute.”). That definition does not include Section 5 of the FTC Act, and multiple courts have acknowledged that the FTC Act is not an “antitrust law.”\nprima facie weight is given only to violations of the ‘antitrust laws’ as defined by the Clayton Act,” which “does not include violations of the FTC Act\nSection 5 of the FTC Act is not “one of the ‘antitrust laws’ within the meaning of\nthe Clayton Act", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: ‘Antitrust laws’ are specific and enumerated and do not include Section 5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The FTC administrative action was not brought “to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws.” Rather, it was brought under Section 5 of the FTC Act\nThe term “antitrust laws” is defined in the Clayton Act to encompass a specific list of federal antitrust statutes\nwhich the Supreme Court has held is exclusive\nT\nhe definition contained in § 1 of the Clayton Act is exclusive. Therefore it is of no moment that\na statute not listed therein\nmay be colloquially described as an ‘antitrust’ statute.”). That definition does not include Section 5 of the FTC Act, and multiple courts have acknowledged that the FTC Act is not an “antitrust law.”\nprima facie weight is given only to violations of the ‘antitrust laws’ as defined by the Clayton Act,” which “does not include violations of the FTC Act\nSection 5 of the FTC Act is not “one of the ‘antitrust laws’ within the meaning of\nthe Clayton Act", "role": "user" }, { "content": "was not brought\nany of the antitrust laws\nSection 5 of the FTC Act\n“antitrust laws”\ndefined in the Clayton Act\nencompass a specific list of federal antitrust statutes\nwhich the Supreme Court has held is exclusive\nexclusive\nit is of no moment\ncolloquially described\nnot\nmultiple courts\nFTC A\n“antitrust law.”\nprima facie weight\n‘antitrust laws’\ndoes not include violations of the FTC Act\nantitrust law", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: ‘Antitrust laws’ are specific and enumerated and do not include Section 5\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The FTC administrative action was not brought “to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws.” Rather, it was brought under Section 5 of the FTC Act\nThe term “antitrust laws” is defined in the Clayton Act to encompass a specific list of federal antitrust statutes\nwhich the Supreme Court has held is exclusive\nT\nhe definition contained in § 1 of the Clayton Act is exclusive. Therefore it is of no moment that\na statute not listed therein\nmay be colloquially described as an ‘antitrust’ statute.”). That definition does not include Section 5 of the FTC Act, and multiple courts have acknowledged that the FTC Act is not an “antitrust law.”\nprima facie weight is given only to violations of the ‘antitrust laws’ as defined by the Clayton Act,” which “does not include violations of the FTC Act\nSection 5 of the FTC Act is not “one of the ‘antitrust laws’ within the meaning of\nthe Clayton Act", "role": "user" }, { "content": "action was not brought “to\npunish violations of\nantitrust laws.” Rather\nunder Section 5\n“antitrust laws”\nencompass\nspecific\nstatutes\nwhich\nis exclusive\nThat\ndoes not include Section 5\nmultiple courts\nacknowledged\nFTC A\nis not\n“antitrust law.”\ndefined by\nClayton\nSection 5\nis not\nantitrust law", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: South Asian arms-racing causes nuclear war between India and China.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "China, India, and Pakistan have developed nuclear capabilities as one way to deter conflict with more powerful adversaries: the United States, China, and India, respectively. Each of the states in Southern Asia is expanding its nuclear arsenal and investing in related delivery systems. All aspire to field nuclear triads with assured second-strike capabilities, but China, India, and Pakistan are at very different stages in this process. In making these investments in national security, each state also threatens its less powerful rivals. The result, a “cascading security dilemma,” encourages arms racing, disrupts regional strategic stability, and heightens the risk that crises could cross the nuclear threshold. In addition to general arms race dynamics, the introduction of new munitions, more capable delivery systems, and potentially more risk-acceptant doctrinal shifts tend, on balance, to exacerbate strategic instability in Southern Asia. Sophisticated missile defense systems; hypersonic and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) missiles; and tactical, sea-based (surface and submarine), and dual-capable nuclear systems all raise new challenges for crisis management and raise questions about how they might influence the nuclear strategies and doctrines of regional states. The potential for conflict between India and Pakistan remains high following the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis. Subsequent diplomacy led to the resumption of a ceasefire along the Line of Control in 2021, but the underlying causes of hostility, including although not limited to the disputed territory of Kashmir, remain. Moreover, India and Pakistan appear to have drawn lessons from 2019 that increase the likelihood that future crises could escalate in dangerous ways, possibly even to the nuclear threshold. All told, 2019 showed important shifts in long-standing positions (by India and Pakistan, as well as China and the United States) and a new willingness by all parties to accept greater risk. Over the past several years, India’s relations with China have also deteriorated markedly. In the summer of 2020, their long-disputed land border saw the most violent clashes in more than four decades. India and China have since pulled forces away from hot conflict but have not found a way back to the pre-2020 status quo. Both are actively investing in new military capabilities and infrastructure along their inhospitable Himalayan frontier, raising the prospect that future disputes could escalate into even more significant conventional military exchanges. Nuclear use remains unlikely, but it cannot be ruled out, if only as the unintended consequence of conventional military escalation. India-China border tensions are certain to influence their broader bilateral relationship as well as military investments, both conventional and nuclear. In addition to worrisome trends in bilateral India-Pakistan and India-China relations, India faces the thorny challenge of managing relations with two hostile neighbors (China and Pakistan) that are increasingly close partners. Other regional developments, including in Afghanistan, where Taliban rule is likely to create new opportunities for terrorist groups, further threaten strategic stability in Southern Asia. Ultimately, it is the unpredictable evolution of these dangerous dynamics in combination—India-Pakistan crises, China-India border violence, and resurgent terrorist threats—that should raise concern that inevitable flare-ups could spiral. The United States has only a limited capacity to influence the behavior of other nuclear-armed states. The overlapping and interconnected rivalries and territorial disputes in Southern Asia further complicate the policy challenge facing Washington. In particular, US policymakers will need to balance competing strategic priorities as they deepen the strategic partnership with India and deter aggression while taking care to avoid actions that could contribute to a regional arms race, greater instability, or crisis escalation.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "China, India, and Pakistan\ndeveloped nuclear capabilities as one way to deter conflict with more powerful adversaries\nEach of the states in Southern Asia is expanding its nuclear arsenal\ninvesting in related delivery systems. All aspire to field nuclear triads with assured second-strike capabilities\nChina\nIndia\nPakistan\nvery different stages in this process\nmaking these investments in national security\neach state\nthreatens its\nrivals\ncascading security dilemma\narms racing\ndisrupts regional strategic stability\nheightens the risk that crises could cross the nuclear threshold\narms race dynamics\nexacerbate strategic instability in Southern Asia\nmissile defense systems\nMIRV\ntactical, sea-based (surface and submarine)\ndual-capable nuclear systems all raise new challenges for crisis management\nraise questions about how they might influence the nuclear strategies and doctrines of regional states.\nIndia’s relations with China have also deteriorated markedly\ntheir long-disputed land border saw the most violent clashes in more than four decades\nIndia and China have since pulled forces away from hot conflict but have not found a way back to the pre-2020 status quo\nBoth are actively investing in new military capabilities and infrastructure along their inhospitable Himalayan frontier\nfuture disputes could escalate\nNuclear use\ncannot be ruled out\nIndia-China border tensions are certain to influence their broader bilateral relationship\nOther regional developments\nAfghanistan\nTaliban rule\nunpredictable evolution of these dangerous dynamics in combination\nshould raise concern that inevitable flare-ups could spiral\nSouthern Asia\npolicymakers will need to balance competing strategic priorities\navoid actions\ncontribute to a regional arms race\ninstability\nescalation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: South Asian arms-racing causes nuclear war between India and China.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "China, India, and Pakistan\ndeveloped nuclear capabilities as one way to deter conflict with more powerful adversaries\nEach of the states in Southern Asia is expanding its nuclear arsenal\ninvesting in related delivery systems. All aspire to field nuclear triads with assured second-strike capabilities\nChina\nIndia\nPakistan\nvery different stages in this process\nmaking these investments in national security\neach state\nthreatens its\nrivals\ncascading security dilemma\narms racing\ndisrupts regional strategic stability\nheightens the risk that crises could cross the nuclear threshold\narms race dynamics\nexacerbate strategic instability in Southern Asia\nmissile defense systems\nMIRV\ntactical, sea-based (surface and submarine)\ndual-capable nuclear systems all raise new challenges for crisis management\nraise questions about how they might influence the nuclear strategies and doctrines of regional states.\nIndia’s relations with China have also deteriorated markedly\ntheir long-disputed land border saw the most violent clashes in more than four decades\nIndia and China have since pulled forces away from hot conflict but have not found a way back to the pre-2020 status quo\nBoth are actively investing in new military capabilities and infrastructure along their inhospitable Himalayan frontier\nfuture disputes could escalate\nNuclear use\ncannot be ruled out\nIndia-China border tensions are certain to influence their broader bilateral relationship\nOther regional developments\nAfghanistan\nTaliban rule\nunpredictable evolution of these dangerous dynamics in combination\nshould raise concern that inevitable flare-ups could spiral\nSouthern Asia\npolicymakers will need to balance competing strategic priorities\navoid actions\ncontribute to a regional arms race\ninstability\nescalation", "role": "user" }, { "content": "expanding its nuclear arsenal\nChina\nIndia\nPakistan\ncascading security dilemma\ncross the nuclear threshold\narms race dynamics\nexacerbate strategic instability in Southern Asia\nIndia’s relations with China have also deteriorated markedly\nactively investing\nmilitary capabilities\ninfrastructure\ncould escalate\ncannot be ruled out\nAfghanistan\nTaliban rule\nflare-ups could spiral\ncontribute to a regional arms race\ninstability\nescalation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: South Asian arms-racing causes nuclear war between India and China.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "China, India, and Pakistan\ndeveloped nuclear capabilities as one way to deter conflict with more powerful adversaries\nEach of the states in Southern Asia is expanding its nuclear arsenal\ninvesting in related delivery systems. All aspire to field nuclear triads with assured second-strike capabilities\nChina\nIndia\nPakistan\nvery different stages in this process\nmaking these investments in national security\neach state\nthreatens its\nrivals\ncascading security dilemma\narms racing\ndisrupts regional strategic stability\nheightens the risk that crises could cross the nuclear threshold\narms race dynamics\nexacerbate strategic instability in Southern Asia\nmissile defense systems\nMIRV\ntactical, sea-based (surface and submarine)\ndual-capable nuclear systems all raise new challenges for crisis management\nraise questions about how they might influence the nuclear strategies and doctrines of regional states.\nIndia’s relations with China have also deteriorated markedly\ntheir long-disputed land border saw the most violent clashes in more than four decades\nIndia and China have since pulled forces away from hot conflict but have not found a way back to the pre-2020 status quo\nBoth are actively investing in new military capabilities and infrastructure along their inhospitable Himalayan frontier\nfuture disputes could escalate\nNuclear use\ncannot be ruled out\nIndia-China border tensions are certain to influence their broader bilateral relationship\nOther regional developments\nAfghanistan\nTaliban rule\nunpredictable evolution of these dangerous dynamics in combination\nshould raise concern that inevitable flare-ups could spiral\nSouthern Asia\npolicymakers will need to balance competing strategic priorities\navoid actions\ncontribute to a regional arms race\ninstability\nescalation", "role": "user" }, { "content": "China\nIndia\nPakistan\ncapabilities\nexpanding\nnuclear arsenal\ninvesting in\ndelivery systems\naspire to field\ntriads\nvery different stages\ninvestments\nthreatens\nrivals\ncascading\ndilemma\narms racing\ndisrupts\nstability\nheightens\nrisk\ncrises\ncross\nnuclear threshold\narms race dynamics\nexacerbate\ninstability in Southern Asia\nIndia’s relations with China\ndeteriorated\ntheir\nborder saw\nviolent clashes\nIndia\nChina\naway\nactively investing in\nmilitary capabilities\ninfrastructure along\nHimalayan frontier\nfuture disputes\nescalate\nNuclear use\ncannot be ruled out\nAfghanistan\nTaliban rule\nunpredictable evolution\ndangerous dynamics\nraise concern\ninevitable flare-ups\nspiral\nSouthern Asia\nregional arms race\ninstability\nescalation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The CP doesn’t chill innovation – its appropriately not overly broad", "role": "system" }, { "content": "To show that the beneficial-control account carries no inherent risk of overbreadth, it will help first to add some nuance to the claim that respondeat superior goes too far concerning employee misconduct. First, even if respondeat superior is overinclusive as a doctrine of corporate liability, it is also underinclusive. For example, it does not apply in circumstances where corporations take advantage of their size to divide up responsibilities among employees in such a way that, though each employee is fully innocent, what they collectively do amounts to misconduct.283 Respondeat superior only attributes misconduct from single employees to corporations. If no employee individually did anything wrong, there is nothing to attribute to the corporation.\nMore important for present purposes, corporate liability generally requires acts and mental states.284 Although respondeat superior applies to both under current law,285 we can, and should, analyze its performance concerning acts and mental states separately. It may turn out that respondeat superior, or something modeled after it, works better for one or the other. In that case, the best way forward would be to adopt a bifurcated approach to corporate liability, using one doctrine to define corporate acts and another to define corporate mental states.\nThe beneficial-control account cannot be overbroad as a doctrine of corporate liability since it only purports to answer the first part of the liability inquiry—whether a corporation has acted. Acts alone are generally insufficient to determine whether a corporation is liable for some harm.286 As a doctrine pertaining only to corporate acts, the beneficial-control account would at most allow courts to identify algorithmic harms with corporate acts. This would show which corporations are potentially liable when an algorithm injures someone. For liability to attach, prosecutors and plaintiffs would also need to establish that the corporation acted culpably, i.e., that the corporation satisfies any requisite mental state element as well. The beneficialcontrol account offered here does not purport to say anything about corporate mental states or culpability.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the beneficial-control account carries no inherent risk of overbreadth\neven if respondeat superior is overinclusive as a doctrine of corporate liability, it is also underinclusive\nit does not apply in circumstances where corporations take advantage of their size to divide up responsibilities among employees in such a way that\nwhat they collectively do amounts to misconduct.283\ncorporate liability generally requires acts and mental states\nthe best way forward would be to adopt a bifurcated approach to corporate liability, using one doctrine to define corporate acts and another to define corporate mental states.\nThe beneficial-control account cannot be overbroad as a doctrine of corporate liability since it only purports to answer the first part of the liability inquiry\nwhether a corporation has acted\nActs alone are generally insufficient to determine whether a corporation is liable for some harm\nAs a doctrine pertaining only to corporate acts, the beneficial-control account would at most allow courts to identify algorithmic harms with corporate acts\nThis would show which corporations are potentially liable when an algorithm injures someone. For liability to attach, prosecutors and plaintiffs would also need to establish that the corporation acted culpably, i.e., that the corporation satisfies any requisite mental state element as well", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The CP doesn’t chill innovation – its appropriately not overly broad", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the beneficial-control account carries no inherent risk of overbreadth\neven if respondeat superior is overinclusive as a doctrine of corporate liability, it is also underinclusive\nit does not apply in circumstances where corporations take advantage of their size to divide up responsibilities among employees in such a way that\nwhat they collectively do amounts to misconduct.283\ncorporate liability generally requires acts and mental states\nthe best way forward would be to adopt a bifurcated approach to corporate liability, using one doctrine to define corporate acts and another to define corporate mental states.\nThe beneficial-control account cannot be overbroad as a doctrine of corporate liability since it only purports to answer the first part of the liability inquiry\nwhether a corporation has acted\nActs alone are generally insufficient to determine whether a corporation is liable for some harm\nAs a doctrine pertaining only to corporate acts, the beneficial-control account would at most allow courts to identify algorithmic harms with corporate acts\nThis would show which corporations are potentially liable when an algorithm injures someone. For liability to attach, prosecutors and plaintiffs would also need to establish that the corporation acted culpably, i.e., that the corporation satisfies any requisite mental state element as well", "role": "user" }, { "content": "no inherent risk\noverbreadth\nacts\nmental states\nbifurcated approach\ncorporate liability\ncorporate acts\ncorporate mental states.\ncannot be overbroad\nidentify algorithmic harms\ncorporate acts\npotentially liable\nacted culpably", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The CP doesn’t chill innovation – its appropriately not overly broad\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the beneficial-control account carries no inherent risk of overbreadth\neven if respondeat superior is overinclusive as a doctrine of corporate liability, it is also underinclusive\nit does not apply in circumstances where corporations take advantage of their size to divide up responsibilities among employees in such a way that\nwhat they collectively do amounts to misconduct.283\ncorporate liability generally requires acts and mental states\nthe best way forward would be to adopt a bifurcated approach to corporate liability, using one doctrine to define corporate acts and another to define corporate mental states.\nThe beneficial-control account cannot be overbroad as a doctrine of corporate liability since it only purports to answer the first part of the liability inquiry\nwhether a corporation has acted\nActs alone are generally insufficient to determine whether a corporation is liable for some harm\nAs a doctrine pertaining only to corporate acts, the beneficial-control account would at most allow courts to identify algorithmic harms with corporate acts\nThis would show which corporations are potentially liable when an algorithm injures someone. For liability to attach, prosecutors and plaintiffs would also need to establish that the corporation acted culpably, i.e., that the corporation satisfies any requisite mental state element as well", "role": "user" }, { "content": "beneficial-control\ncarries no inherent risk of overbreadth\nbeneficial-control\ncannot be overbroad\nsince it only purports to answer\nwhether a corporation has acted\nallow courts to identify algorithmic harms with corporate acts\nshow which corporations are potentially liable\nprosecutors and plaintiffs would\nneed to establish\nthe corporation acted culpably", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: AI avatar personhood based on a corporate law analogy strikes a perfect balance between incentivizing innovation and enabling legal accountability.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "When users interact through their avatars, there may be situations where some form of altercation occurs that would equate to breaking the law, if it took place between people in the real world. Such incidents could be in breach of tort law (which covers civil claims such as negligence or nuisance) or criminal law (involving illegal acts and crime such as assault, murder, burglary or rape).21 If an avatar assaults another, would the criminal laws of assault and battery apply to this situation? Such issues in the metaverse would arise as users would expect their avatars’ rights to be protected in the metaverse. Hence, one way the problem could be resolved would be by making an avatar responsible for their actions in the metaverse. But this is complicated, because it would mean that we need to attribute a legal persona to the avatar, accord these avatars rights and duties within a legal system and allow them to sue or be sued.22 The more difficult issues would be the kind of standards and criteria that would need to be in place to distinguish between a ‘legal’ avatar and the real-life person (or an entity) who operates that avatar.\nThe law would need some mechanism to address actions taken against an avatar that may affect a human being behind the avatar, and to address actions taken by an avatar that may affect other avatars or people. It is also acknowledged that apart from affording rights to an avatar, it is also possible to apply other legal constructs, such as simply applying current conceptions of causality, i.e. that one is deemed to have caused harm to a human being if one knows a human being was behind the avatar.\nAnother way to visualise the future of metaverse would be to understand it through the online game platform and game creation system that has been developed by Roblox.23 In Roblox’s iteration of the metaverse, users can update their avatars with new clothing, hair and accessories on a regular basis using digital items, and developers and creators will be able to generate revenue by selling user-generated content.24 Virtual worlds are serious revenue generators. Gucci, for instance, ran its own ‘Gucci Garden Experience’ event in the Roblox online platform in May 2021. Players were able to try and purchase fashion accessories for their avatars. The digital ‘Queen Bee Dionysus’ bag was listed for 475 Robux, which was equivalent to $5. But it was eventually sold for $4115. This was real money as players would need to purchase Robux, the virtual currency of Roblox using real money.25\n2.2 Protecting avatars’ rights in the metaverse\nThe main challenge here would be trying to protect rights and impose liability using existing legal concepts. If an avatar steals a digital ‘Gucci bag’ in the ‘metaverse’, this would involve issues relating to property rights, theft and intellectual property law. If loss of money or reputation of a real-world person or company is involved, there is a case to be made that these are legal problems sufficiently substantive to warrant a real claim in a real court of law.26\nAs the metaverse becomes more fully developed and jurisdictional issues relating to the location of the avatar to determine the appropriate forum to resolve potential dispute becomes unclear, it may be the case that an international law of metaverse could be developed to deal with these issues.27 This paper suggests that some concepts from company law could be incorporated into this metaverse law. In a decentralised metaverse of the type envisaged by Bell, avatars could be incorporated as a legal person by borrowing concepts from existing company law principles in common law.\nWhere an avatar possesses artificial intelligence capabilities by continuously learning from its human host on how it would make decisions, execute contracts and supervise others on its own in the metaverse, there is a case to be made that avatars should be granted legal personality in the metaverse. This legal personality could be conferred through the process of registration, with each natural person entitled to only one avatar in this decentralised and limitless metaverse. Arguments to attribute legal personality to robots have previously been mooted,28 so the concepts can be stretched to cover avatars in the metaverse.\nLucchetti has previously argued that the benefit of conferring legal personality to an artificial intelligence system would be the presence of a corpus of rules to deal with rights and liabilities between one another and other human beings.29 Similar concepts could apply to avatars in the metaverse. Incorporating avatars in the metaverse would allow specific rules to be imposed on it in order to govern its rights and obligations in the metaverse.\n2.3 The impetus to protect avatars’ rights in the metaverse\nThe concept of the avatar is generally used to refer to users’ virtual selfrepresentation.30 It is argued that not regulating avatars in the metaverse can have serious ramifications as the very structure of cyberspace permits a separation between a person’s real identity and their virtual one. Franks has observed that while cyberspace is often regarded as more real than real life, harms committed in cyberspace are often dismissed as not really real, as they are by their nature not physical, bodily harms.31\nAvatars allow users to separate themselves from who they really are, and they can behave in ways their users never would in real life, making it possible for individuals to communicate and act in ways that would not be possible in the offline world.32 This supposed anonymity that the avatar has in the metaverse and its empowerment of the real-life person could give rise to an exercise of power in an arbitrary manner to advance one’s personal interest at the expense of the community at large. This could lead to societal instability as individuals could have their possessions taken away from them without any form of recourse.33 This is the reason why society has rules in place to deal with deviations from acceptable conduct. In return for the expectation that society would be able to safeguard individuals’ other rights, individuals would have to give up the right to punish someone on their own. Stability in society can only be achieved if the rule of law is applied equally to everyone and not just to advance the interests of a select few.34 Hence, there is a case to be made for an avatar’s rights in the metaverse to be similarly protected.\n2.4 Granting rights to avatars if they possess consciousness\nThe current metaverses, at least those existing, are very much on the internet and can be depicted through multiplayer games. One manifestation of this at present would be Robolox.35\nIn determining whether an avatar should be granted rights that a human being possesses, one must first understand the requirements to be recognised as a natural person. If what separates a natural person from everything else (be it a robot, animal, computer simulation, or virtual game, etc.), is ‘consciousness’, then it becomes necessary to explore what the requirements of consciousness are.36 It appears that the two requirements for consciousness are the feeling of arousal and awareness.37 If this view is adopted, the difference between a human being and an avatar is this concept of consciousness.\nIndeed, equity was developed to deal with the harshness of the common law through one’s understanding of ‘conscience’. Drakopoulou has argued that “equity, as we are reminded, was originally employed to remedy defects of the common law on grounds of conscience and natural justice, with an ecclesiastic chancellor acting as keeper of the king’s conscience”.38 In BOM v BOK, 39 a Singapore court decision which involved a wife who sought to deprive her husband of almost all his assets in the aftermath of an extremely traumatic event in the husband’s life by getting him to sign a deed of trust giving away essentially all his assets and rendering him a pauper. Vitiating factors that affect one’s conscience such as unconscionability and undue influence were considered.40\nFor many years, characters in a game [e.g. Runescape, a fantasy massively multiplayer online role-playing game (‘MMORPG’)], were not capable of exhibiting a conscience.41 Hence, it would be absurd to allow one player to sue another player in the virtual world if one player engaged in player versus player combat (PvP), killed their opponent and claimed the opponent’s items as a reward. If we were to argue that avatars in the metaverse should be granted rights similar to those human beings possess and use consciousness as a determinant to decide whether avatars should be granted rights, the question then becomes at which stage of the technological development this conferral of rights should be permitted.42\nIf an avatar in the metaverse unconscionably forces another avatar in the metaverse to give up all his possessions similar to the situation in BOM v BOK, 43 the issue is who experiences this unconscionability. If science and technology have progressed to such a state that when a human being enters the metaverse, a neural link would be formed between one’s brain and one’s avatar, then it may be possible to argue that the avatar itself is able to experience consciousness (e.g. the ‘2045 initiative’ by Dimtry Itskov).44 In that situation, if the avatar has been accorded legal personality, then it would be possible for the aggrieved avatar to sue another avatar for inducing the avatar who might be suffering from an ‘infirmity’ to enter into a contract. At present, it would be difficult to imagine how vitiating factors such as unconscionability could apply to avatar-to-avatar dealings because the avatars as we understand in existing online MMORPG platforms do not exhibit such an independent ‘conscience’ in the first place, but even this concept of conscience as we understand it is under threat by the doctrine of solipsism, i.e. the problem of other minds.45\nIt is arguable that avatars, at least in MMORPG at present, clearly fall short of the avatars possessing this degree of ‘consciousness’.46 Even artificial intelligence interfaces at present, including DeepMind,47 are not at the stage where one can say that it has developed full consciousness (i.e. the ability to feel arousal and awareness) or perhaps to function without any human intervention.48 Nonetheless, technology is advancing rapidly and it is difficult to predict when the metaverse will become mainstream. Indeed, the pace of technological developments has led a former ‘Go’ champion beaten by DeepMind to retire from professional play after declaring that artificial intelligence is an entity that cannot be defeated.49\n2.5 Protecting avatars’ rights in the metaverse through incorporation\nWhere an avatar in the metaverse is concerned, perhaps exhibiting a ‘conscience’ should not be the only criterion in determining whether an avatar should be granted legal personality. Instead this legal personality should exist within the metaverse itself, such that anyone who creates an avatar within the metaverse agrees to subject their avatars to legal personality that would be governed by the laws of the metaverse.50 Such laws could also stipulate that the separate legal personality of the avatar would be disregarded if crimes or torts had been committed. Thereafter, liability on the ultimate human being existing behind the avatar would be determined by a sliding scale of harm inflicted to both the metaverse community and the real-world community.51\nB2C2 Ltd v Quoine Pte Ltd, 52 was a dispute which involved the algorithmic trading of cryptocurrency and exposed significant monetary losses that an end-user of the software could suffer when the software malfunctioned, especially since actual money was involved in these trades.53 The Singapore court held that it could look at the mindset of a human actor, namely the programmer and his knowledge of the software.54 This meant that the trading software programme was not deemed as capable of exhibiting its own mind. The algorithmic trading software carried out trades only as it had been programmed. Had the software involved deep machine learning, the trading software programme could then ‘learn’ how to trade. Over time, it could develop its own trading algorithm not within the contemplation of the original programmer. In that situation, it would be both unforeseeable and unfair to ascribe liability on the original programmer, as there would be no relevant human actor’s mind-set to consider.55\nShould the metaverse be developed according to that envisioned by Ball,56 then it becomes important from a regulatory perspective that the corresponding law on metaverse be developed to deal with this development. The existing situation in the online world where there is a wrong done to the avatar appears to be very limited recourse. It seems that if someone plays a game and suffers physical or mental harm, liability would fall on the manufacturer or distributor of the gaming system.57 However, in a metaverse which is decentralised, it would be difficult to pinpoint a ‘manufacturer’ to ascribe liability to. This can be visualised through Bitcoin, i.e. if someone loses his or her Bitcoin, it makes no sense to sue Satoshi Nakamoto, the supposedly reported inventor of Bitcoin, because he cannot be identified.58 In such an ecosystem of a metaverse, a way forward would be to view it as a virtual community existing in parallel to our real-world community.\nIf we accept that, similar to the real-world community, activities in the metaverse should be potentially subject to regulation, then the next issue is considering which type of law this metaverse regulation should be based on.59 In this article, the argument is for the regulation to be based on company law principles, which would offer a potential solution to the various factual situations raised by the metaverse. Having said that, company law principles alone would not be able to solve every conceivable issues that could arise in the metaverse, and it is outside the scope of this paper to deal with the various laws that would need to be developed to deal with these issues.60\nThe paper argues that all avatars in a metaverse should be subject to registration, similar to how a company is incorporated. In order for this to work, legislation would need to mandate minimum capital requirements for avatars in the metaverse. The metaverse ecosystem made up of infrastructures that the avatars interact with, such as schools, workplaces and retail shops, would need to be similarly registered. These infrastructures should then have a higher minimum capitalisation mandated in order to meet potential liability claims in the metaverse.61 The concept of causation and foreseeability would have to be expanded under negligence law,62 for instance, to cover harm caused by avatars or infrastructures in the metaverse.\n2.6 Granting avatars separate legal personality\nIn the metaverse of the future, it is perhaps desirous to grant avatars a separate legal personality.63 If the avatars in a virtual world can function independently of the human person (e.g. through deep learning), then the avatar in the metaverse is a separate person altogether. In his paper, Chesterman dealt with the various categories of automation where robots are concerned.64 Perhaps similar concepts can be transposed to the metaverse. If the avatar is able to perform various transactions in its ‘person’, albeit in the metaverse, then as a person in the metaverse, it should be granted rights and obligations, i.e. a new law on metaverse should be developed which would cover various subject matters, such as copyright, harassment, etc. and possibly ratified by an ‘international’ metaverse community without country-specific boundaries.65\nComparing avatars in the metaverse to artificial intelligence systems, there have been numerous papers written on whether artificial intelligence objects should be granted separate legal personality.66 If we are to combine developments in artificial intelligence with the metaverse, then the situation becomes overly complex. If avatars eventually become capable of ‘machine learning’67 and can perform mundane tasks without human intervention, then it may be expedient to grant avatars in a metaverse rights and obligations that a human being would have.\nThe problem becomes even more complicated if there is an artificial intelligence robot in the real world that ‘operates’ an avatar in a metaverse, instead of a human being. In other words, the person behind the avatar in the metaverse is an artificial intelligence virtual self.68 One can perhaps draw reference from a 1999 sci-fi move, Bicentennial Man, directed by Chris Columbus, to visualise how this would become possible.69 There is a strong case to be made that if the development of artificial intelligence virtual self reaches this stage sometime in the future, then it may become persuasive to grant such ‘virtual selves’ legal personality, which would include property rights.70\n2.7 Granting avatars rights similar to those of a company\nCompanies may serve as a model for extending rights to avatars in a metaverse. Just like companies, avatars are non-human, and both can exist to increase economic investments in the marketplace. There is a case to be made that whatever rights have been extended to companies should also extend to avatars with the aim of increasing productivity.71\nFor example, it had been established by the US Supreme Court that corporations were persons under the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution, and thus entitled to protection of the due process clause in Minneapolis & S.L.R. Co. v Beckwith. 72 Even though the corporate form is not a human person, companies are endowed with similar rights that an ordinary citizen possesses. Within the meaning of the US Constitution and Bill of Rights, corporations are ‘persons’ and are entitled to protection against the taking of their property without due process and are entitled (at least to some extent) to freedom of speech.73 Companies are able to act as persons where it involves legal proceedings, ownership of property and contractual obligations.74\nHowever, the scope of rights that avatars in a metaverse should possess are not currently settled. Indeed, Day has argued that “there is an ongoing debate over which rights are guaranteed, and until that debate is settled, avatar rights will also be an open question under this analytical framework”.75\n2.8 Incorporating avatars in the metaverse\nWhile a natural person is subject to rights and obligations within society, corporate law has fashioned a vehicle known as the company which is legally personified, even though it is not a natural person.76 Eidenmuller has argued that the “crucial difference between a corporation and a robot is that corporations always act through humans” and that humans still make the final decisions.77 Similarly, in Roblox’s iteration of the metaverse, the avatars have to act through humans and it is the person behind the avatar that makes the final decisions. It is identical to companies in that it has to act through someone. However, for more advanced avatars in the metaverse of the future possessing artificial intelligence capabilities and with a neural link in place between the brain and an avatar, there may be an even stronger case to argue that the avatar should be granted legal personhood.78\nCompanies may be liable in the same manner as a natural person for crimes and torts.79 However, there are limitations to punishing a company, given that it is not a natural person. For example, unlike a natural person, companies cannot be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, caning or be subjected to the death penalty.80 Hence, in order to control corporate wrongdoing or omissions, a number of provisions in the UK Companies Act 2006 subject directors of a company to criminal offences for the company’s failure to comply with statutory obligations.81 Breaches of these obligations may result in a fine, disqualification or imprisonment. In many common law countries, the legislation clearly recognises the incorporated company as a ‘body corporate’.82 While a company is a separate legal entity, it is incorporeal and has to exist through human agents who give it its physical presence.83 There is a distinction between a natural person and an artificial entity. Hence, it is not an entirely far-fetched notion that an avatar could be clothed with legal personality since it would similarly need to act through its human host in Roblox’s iteration of the metaverse.84", "role": "user" }, { "content": "When users interact through\navatars, there may be situations where some\naltercation\nwould equate to\nbreach of tort law\nor criminal law\nusers\nexpect their avatars’ rights to be protected in the metaverse\none way the problem could be resolved would be by making an avatar responsible for their actions in the metaverse\nBut this\nwould mean that we need to attribute a legal persona to the avatar, accord these avatars rights and duties within a legal system and allow them to sue or be sued\nThe\ndifficult issues would be the kind of standards and criteria that would need to be in place to distinguish between a ‘legal’ avatar and the real-life person\nor\nentity\nwho operates that avatar\nThe law would need some mechanism to address actions taken against an avatar that may affect a human\nbehind the avatar, and to address actions taken by an avatar that may affect other avatars or people. It is also acknowledged that apart from affording rights to an avatar, it is also possible to apply other legal constructs, such as simply applying current conceptions of causality\nThe main challenge here would be trying to protect rights and impose liability using existing legal concepts. If an avatar steals a digital ‘Gucci bag’\nthis would involve issues relating to property\ntheft and i\np\nIf loss of money or reputation of a real-world person or company is involved, there is a case to be made that these are legal problems sufficiently substantive to warrant a real claim in a real court\nAs the metaverse becomes more fully developed and jurisdictional issues relating to the location of the avatar to determine the appropriate forum\nbecomes unclear, it may be the case that an i\nlaw of metaverse could be developed\nsome concepts from company law could be incorporated\navatars could be incorporated as a legal person by borrowing concepts from existing company law principles in common law\nWhere an avatar possesses a\ni\ncapabilities by continuously learning from its human host on how it would make decisions, execute contracts and supervise others on its own\navatars should be granted legal personality\nThis legal personality could be conferred through\nregistration, with each natural person entitled to only one avatar\nArguments to attribute legal personality to robots have previously been mooted\nso the concepts can be stretched to cover avatars\nthe benefit of conferring legal personality to an a\ni\nsystem would be the presence of a corpus of rules to deal with rights and liabilities between one another and other human beings\nSimilar concepts could apply to avatars\nIncorporating avatars\nwould allow specific rules to be imposed\nnot regulating avatars in the metaverse can have serious ramifications as the very structure of cyberspace permits a separation between a person’s real identity and their virtual one\nwhile cyberspace is often regarded as more real than real\nharms committed in cyberspace are often dismissed as not\nreal\nAvatars allow users to separate themselves from who they really are\nand they can behave in ways their users never would\nmaking it possible for individuals to communicate and act in ways that would not be possible\noffline\nThis supposed anonymity\nand its empowerment of the real\nperson could give rise to an exercise of power in an arbitrary manner to advance one’s personal interest at the expense of the community\nThis could lead to societal instability\nThis is the reason\nsociety has rules\nIn return for the expectation that society would be able to safeguard individuals’ other rights\nStability\ncan only be achieved if the rule of law is applied equally\nand not just to advance the interests of a select few\nHence, there is a case to be made for an avatar’s rights\nto be similarly protected\nit would be absurd to allow one player to sue another\nin the virtual world if one player engaged in\nPvP\nkilled their opponent and claimed the opponent’s items\nIf we were to argue that avatars\nshould be granted rights similar to those human beings possess and use consciousness as a determinant\nthe question\nbecomes at which stage of the\ndevelopment this conferral\nshould be permitted\nAt present, it would be difficult to imagine how vitiating factors such as unconscionability could apply to avatar-to-avatar dealings because the avatars as we understand in existing online MMORPG platforms do not exhibit\nan independent ‘conscience’\nWhere an avatar\nis concerned\nexhibiting a ‘conscience’ should not be the\ncriterion in determining\nlegal personality. Instead this legal personality should exist within the metaverse itself, such that anyone who creates an avatar within the metaverse agrees to subject their avatars to legal personality that would be governed by the laws of the metaverse\nSuch laws could\nstipulate that the separate legal personality of the avatar would be disregarded if crimes or torts had been committed. Thereafter, liability on the ultimate human being existing behind the avatar would be determined by a sliding scale of harm\nto\nthe\ncommunity and the real-world\nShould the metaverse be developed\nit becomes important from a regulatory perspective that\ncorresponding law on metaverse be developed to deal with this development. The existing situation in the online world where there is a wrong done to the avatar appears to be very limited recourse\nif someone plays a game and suffers physical or mental harm, liability would fall on the manufacturer or distributor of the gaming system\nHowever, in a metaverse which is decentralised, it would be difficult to pinpoint a ‘manufacturer’\nThis can be visualised through Bitcoin\nSatoshi Nakamoto, the supposedly reported inventor of Bitcoin,\ncannot be identified\nIn such an ecosystem of a metaverse, a way forward would be to view it as a virtual community existing in parallel to our real-world\nIf we accept that\nactivities in the metaverse should be potentially subject to regulation, then the next issue is considering which type of law this metaverse regulation should be based on\ncompany law principles\nwould offer a\nsolution to the various factual situations raised by the metaverse\nall avatars in a metaverse should be subject to registration, similar to how a company is incorporated\nlegislation would need to mandate minimum capital requirements for avatars in the metaverse. The metaverse ecosystem made up of infrastructures\nsuch as schools, workplaces and retail shops, would need to be similarly registered. These infrastructures should then have a higher minimum capitalisation\nto meet potential liability claims\nThe concept of causation and foreseeability would have to be expanded\nto cover harm\nby avatars or infrastructures\nIf the avatars in a virtual world can function independently of the human\nthrough deep learning\nthe avatar in the metaverse is a separate person altogether\nIf the avatar is able to perform\ntransactions in its ‘person’, albeit in the metaverse, then as a person in the metaverse, it should be granted rights and obligations, i.e. a new law on metaverse should be developed which would cover\ncopyright, harassment\nand\nratified by an ‘international’\ncommunity without country-specific boundaries\nIf we are to combine\na\ni\nwith the metaverse,\nthe situation becomes overly complex\nIf avatars\nbecome capable of\nm\nl\nand can perform mundane tasks without human intervention\nit may be expedient to grant avatars in a metaverse rights and obligations\nCompanies\nserve as a model\nJust like companies, avatars are non-human, and both\nexist to increase economic investments in the marketplace\nwhatever rights have been extended to companies should also extend to avatars with the aim of increasing productivity\nEven though the corporate form is not a human person, companies are endowed with similar rights that an ordinary citizen possesses. Within the meaning of the US Constitution and Bill of Rights, corporations are ‘persons’ and are entitled to protection against\ntaking of\nproperty without due process and are entitled\nto freedom of speech\nCompanies are able to act as persons where it involves legal proceedings\nownership of property and contractual obligations\ncorporate law has fashioned a vehicle known as the company which is legally personified\nthe “crucial difference between a corporation and a robot is that corporations always act through humans” and\nhumans still make the final decisions\nSimilarly, in Roblox’s\nmetaverse, the avatars have to act through humans and it is the person behind the avatar that makes the final decisions.\nHowever, for more advanced avatars\npossessing a\ni\nwith a neural link\nbetween the brain and an avatar, there may be an even stronger case to argue that the avatar should be granted legal personhood\nCompanies may be liable in the same manner as a natural person for crimes and torts\nHowever, there are limitations to punishing a company\ngiven that it is not a natural person\nHence, in order to control corporate wrongdoing or omissions, a number of provisions\nsubject directors of a company to criminal offences\nBreaches of these\nmay result in a fine, disqualification or imprisonment\nWhile a company is a separate legal entity, it is incorporeal and has to exist through human agents who give it its physical presence\nThere is a distinction between a natural person and an artificial entity. Hence, it is not\nfar-fetched\nthat an avatar could be clothed with legal personality since it would similarly need to act through its human host", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: AI avatar personhood based on a corporate law analogy strikes a perfect balance between incentivizing innovation and enabling legal accountability.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "When users interact through\navatars, there may be situations where some\naltercation\nwould equate to\nbreach of tort law\nor criminal law\nusers\nexpect their avatars’ rights to be protected in the metaverse\none way the problem could be resolved would be by making an avatar responsible for their actions in the metaverse\nBut this\nwould mean that we need to attribute a legal persona to the avatar, accord these avatars rights and duties within a legal system and allow them to sue or be sued\nThe\ndifficult issues would be the kind of standards and criteria that would need to be in place to distinguish between a ‘legal’ avatar and the real-life person\nor\nentity\nwho operates that avatar\nThe law would need some mechanism to address actions taken against an avatar that may affect a human\nbehind the avatar, and to address actions taken by an avatar that may affect other avatars or people. It is also acknowledged that apart from affording rights to an avatar, it is also possible to apply other legal constructs, such as simply applying current conceptions of causality\nThe main challenge here would be trying to protect rights and impose liability using existing legal concepts. If an avatar steals a digital ‘Gucci bag’\nthis would involve issues relating to property\ntheft and i\np\nIf loss of money or reputation of a real-world person or company is involved, there is a case to be made that these are legal problems sufficiently substantive to warrant a real claim in a real court\nAs the metaverse becomes more fully developed and jurisdictional issues relating to the location of the avatar to determine the appropriate forum\nbecomes unclear, it may be the case that an i\nlaw of metaverse could be developed\nsome concepts from company law could be incorporated\navatars could be incorporated as a legal person by borrowing concepts from existing company law principles in common law\nWhere an avatar possesses a\ni\ncapabilities by continuously learning from its human host on how it would make decisions, execute contracts and supervise others on its own\navatars should be granted legal personality\nThis legal personality could be conferred through\nregistration, with each natural person entitled to only one avatar\nArguments to attribute legal personality to robots have previously been mooted\nso the concepts can be stretched to cover avatars\nthe benefit of conferring legal personality to an a\ni\nsystem would be the presence of a corpus of rules to deal with rights and liabilities between one another and other human beings\nSimilar concepts could apply to avatars\nIncorporating avatars\nwould allow specific rules to be imposed\nnot regulating avatars in the metaverse can have serious ramifications as the very structure of cyberspace permits a separation between a person’s real identity and their virtual one\nwhile cyberspace is often regarded as more real than real\nharms committed in cyberspace are often dismissed as not\nreal\nAvatars allow users to separate themselves from who they really are\nand they can behave in ways their users never would\nmaking it possible for individuals to communicate and act in ways that would not be possible\noffline\nThis supposed anonymity\nand its empowerment of the real\nperson could give rise to an exercise of power in an arbitrary manner to advance one’s personal interest at the expense of the community\nThis could lead to societal instability\nThis is the reason\nsociety has rules\nIn return for the expectation that society would be able to safeguard individuals’ other rights\nStability\ncan only be achieved if the rule of law is applied equally\nand not just to advance the interests of a select few\nHence, there is a case to be made for an avatar’s rights\nto be similarly protected\nit would be absurd to allow one player to sue another\nin the virtual world if one player engaged in\nPvP\nkilled their opponent and claimed the opponent’s items\nIf we were to argue that avatars\nshould be granted rights similar to those human beings possess and use consciousness as a determinant\nthe question\nbecomes at which stage of the\ndevelopment this conferral\nshould be permitted\nAt present, it would be difficult to imagine how vitiating factors such as unconscionability could apply to avatar-to-avatar dealings because the avatars as we understand in existing online MMORPG platforms do not exhibit\nan independent ‘conscience’\nWhere an avatar\nis concerned\nexhibiting a ‘conscience’ should not be the\ncriterion in determining\nlegal personality. Instead this legal personality should exist within the metaverse itself, such that anyone who creates an avatar within the metaverse agrees to subject their avatars to legal personality that would be governed by the laws of the metaverse\nSuch laws could\nstipulate that the separate legal personality of the avatar would be disregarded if crimes or torts had been committed. Thereafter, liability on the ultimate human being existing behind the avatar would be determined by a sliding scale of harm\nto\nthe\ncommunity and the real-world\nShould the metaverse be developed\nit becomes important from a regulatory perspective that\ncorresponding law on metaverse be developed to deal with this development. The existing situation in the online world where there is a wrong done to the avatar appears to be very limited recourse\nif someone plays a game and suffers physical or mental harm, liability would fall on the manufacturer or distributor of the gaming system\nHowever, in a metaverse which is decentralised, it would be difficult to pinpoint a ‘manufacturer’\nThis can be visualised through Bitcoin\nSatoshi Nakamoto, the supposedly reported inventor of Bitcoin,\ncannot be identified\nIn such an ecosystem of a metaverse, a way forward would be to view it as a virtual community existing in parallel to our real-world\nIf we accept that\nactivities in the metaverse should be potentially subject to regulation, then the next issue is considering which type of law this metaverse regulation should be based on\ncompany law principles\nwould offer a\nsolution to the various factual situations raised by the metaverse\nall avatars in a metaverse should be subject to registration, similar to how a company is incorporated\nlegislation would need to mandate minimum capital requirements for avatars in the metaverse. The metaverse ecosystem made up of infrastructures\nsuch as schools, workplaces and retail shops, would need to be similarly registered. These infrastructures should then have a higher minimum capitalisation\nto meet potential liability claims\nThe concept of causation and foreseeability would have to be expanded\nto cover harm\nby avatars or infrastructures\nIf the avatars in a virtual world can function independently of the human\nthrough deep learning\nthe avatar in the metaverse is a separate person altogether\nIf the avatar is able to perform\ntransactions in its ‘person’, albeit in the metaverse, then as a person in the metaverse, it should be granted rights and obligations, i.e. a new law on metaverse should be developed which would cover\ncopyright, harassment\nand\nratified by an ‘international’\ncommunity without country-specific boundaries\nIf we are to combine\na\ni\nwith the metaverse,\nthe situation becomes overly complex\nIf avatars\nbecome capable of\nm\nl\nand can perform mundane tasks without human intervention\nit may be expedient to grant avatars in a metaverse rights and obligations\nCompanies\nserve as a model\nJust like companies, avatars are non-human, and both\nexist to increase economic investments in the marketplace\nwhatever rights have been extended to companies should also extend to avatars with the aim of increasing productivity\nEven though the corporate form is not a human person, companies are endowed with similar rights that an ordinary citizen possesses. Within the meaning of the US Constitution and Bill of Rights, corporations are ‘persons’ and are entitled to protection against\ntaking of\nproperty without due process and are entitled\nto freedom of speech\nCompanies are able to act as persons where it involves legal proceedings\nownership of property and contractual obligations\ncorporate law has fashioned a vehicle known as the company which is legally personified\nthe “crucial difference between a corporation and a robot is that corporations always act through humans” and\nhumans still make the final decisions\nSimilarly, in Roblox’s\nmetaverse, the avatars have to act through humans and it is the person behind the avatar that makes the final decisions.\nHowever, for more advanced avatars\npossessing a\ni\nwith a neural link\nbetween the brain and an avatar, there may be an even stronger case to argue that the avatar should be granted legal personhood\nCompanies may be liable in the same manner as a natural person for crimes and torts\nHowever, there are limitations to punishing a company\ngiven that it is not a natural person\nHence, in order to control corporate wrongdoing or omissions, a number of provisions\nsubject directors of a company to criminal offences\nBreaches of these\nmay result in a fine, disqualification or imprisonment\nWhile a company is a separate legal entity, it is incorporeal and has to exist through human agents who give it its physical presence\nThere is a distinction between a natural person and an artificial entity. Hence, it is not\nfar-fetched\nthat an avatar could be clothed with legal personality since it would similarly need to act through its human host", "role": "user" }, { "content": "avatars\naltercation\nbreach of tort law\ncriminal law\nusers\nrights\nprotected\navatar responsible\nactions\nmetaverse\nlegal persona\nrights\nduties\nlegal system\nsue or be sued\ndifficult\ndistinguish\n‘legal’ avatar\nreal-life person\nentity\noperates\nagainst an avatar\nhuman\nbehind\naddress\nby\navatar\ncausality\nrights\nliability\nexisting legal concepts\nsteals\ndigital ‘Gucci bag’\nproperty\ntheft\ni\np\nmoney\nreputation\nreal-world\nsufficiently substantive\nreal claim\nreal court\nfully developed\njurisdictional\nlocation of the avatar\nforum\nbecome\nunclear\ni\nlaw\ncompany law\nincorporated\nincorporated\nlegal person\nborrowing concepts from existing company law principles in common law\na\ni\ncapabilities\nlearning from its human host\nmake decisions\ncontracts\nsupervise others\nown\nshould be granted legal personality\nconferred\nregistration\nnatural\nonly one avatar\nstretched\navatars\nconferring legal personality\na\ni\nsystem\npresence of a corpus of rules\nrights and liabilities\navatars\navatars\nspecific rules\nimposed\nnot\nserious ramifications\nvery structure of cyberspace\nseparation\nreal\nvirtual\nmore real\nreal\nharms\ndismissed\nnot\nseparate themselves\nwho they really are\nusers never would\ncommunicate\nact\nnot be possible\noffline\nanonymity\nempowerment\nreal\nperson\nexercise of power in an arbitrary manner\npersonal\nexpense\ncommunity\nsocietal instability\nsociety\nrules\nother\nStability\nonly be achieved\nlaw is applied equally\navatar’s\nsimilarly protected\nabsurd\nengaged in\nPvP\nkilled their opponent\nclaimed the opponent’s items\nrights similar\nhuman\nconsciousness\npermitted\npresent\ndifficult to imagine\nunconscionability\nindependent ‘conscience’\navatar\n‘conscience’\nnot be the\ncriterion\nlegal personality\nin the metaverse itself\nwithin\nagrees\nsubject their avatars to legal personality\ngoverned\nlaws of the metaverse\nseparate legal personality\navatar\ndisregarded\ncrimes\ntorts\nliability\nultimate human being\nbehind the avatar\nsliding scale\nharm\ncommunity\nreal-world\nregulatory perspective\ncorresponding law\navatar\nvery limited recourse\nmanufacturer\ndistributor\ngaming system\nmetaverse\ndecentralised\ndifficult to pinpoint a ‘manufacturer’\nBitcoin\nSatoshi Nakamoto\ncannot be identified\nvirtual community\nparallel\nreal-world\nwhich type of law\ncompany law\nsolution\nfactual situations\nsubject to registration\ncompany\nincorporated\nlegislation\nminimum capital requirements\necosystem\ninfrastructures\nhigher\ncausation\nforeseeability\nexpanded\navatars\ninfrastructures\nindependently\nhuman\ndeep learning\nseparate person altogether\ntransactions\nin the metaverse\nperson\nshould be granted rights and obligations\nnew law\nmetaverse\ncopyright\nharassment\nratified\n‘international’\ncommunity\ncountry-specific boundaries\ncombine\na\ni\noverly complex\nm\nl\nmundane tasks\nhuman intervention\nexpedient\nrights\nobligations\nCompanies\nmodel\nnon-human\nboth\nincrease economic investments\nmarketplace\nalso\navatars\nincreasing productivity\n‘persons’\nentitled\nprotection\ntaking\nproperty\ndue process\nfreedom of speech\nas persons\nlegal proceedings\nproperty\ncontractual obligations\ncompany\nlegally personified\nthrough humans\nhumans\nfinal decisions\nRoblox\navatars\nact through humans\nperson behind\nadvanced\na\ni\nneural link\neven stronger case\nshould be grant\nlegal personhood\nliable\nsame manner\nnatural person\npunishing\ndirectors\ncriminal offences\nBreaches\nfine\ndisqualification\nimprisonment\nseparate legal entity\nincorporeal\nthrough human agents\nphysical presence\nnot\nfar-fetched\navatar\nclothed with legal personality\nsimilarly\nthrough its human host", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: AI avatar personhood based on a corporate law analogy strikes a perfect balance between incentivizing innovation and enabling legal accountability.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.1", "role": "system" }, { "content": "When users interact through their avatars, there may be situations where some form of altercation occurs that would equate to breaking the law, if it took place between people in the real world. Such incidents could be in breach of tort law (which covers civil claims such as negligence or nuisance) or criminal law (involving illegal acts and crime such as assault, murder, burglary or rape).21 If an avatar assaults another, would the criminal laws of assault and battery apply to this situation? Such issues in the metaverse would arise as users would expect their avatars’ rights to be protected in the metaverse. Hence, one way the problem could be resolved would be by making an avatar responsible for their actions in the metaverse. But this is complicated, because it would mean that we need to attribute a legal persona to the avatar, accord these avatars rights and duties within a legal system and allow them to sue or be sued.22 The more difficult issues would be the kind of standards and criteria that would need to be in place to distinguish between a ‘legal’ avatar and the real-life person (or an entity) who operates that avatar.\nThe law would need some mechanism to address actions taken against an avatar that may affect a human being behind the avatar, and to address actions taken by an avatar that may affect other avatars or people. It is also acknowledged that apart from affording rights to an avatar, it is also possible to apply other legal constructs, such as simply applying current conceptions of causality, i.e. that one is deemed to have caused harm to a human being if one knows a human being was behind the avatar.\nAnother way to visualise the future of metaverse would be to understand it through the online game platform and game creation system that has been developed by Roblox.23 In Roblox’s iteration of the metaverse, users can update their avatars with new clothing, hair and accessories on a regular basis using digital items, and developers and creators will be able to generate revenue by selling user-generated content.24 Virtual worlds are serious revenue generators. Gucci, for instance, ran its own ‘Gucci Garden Experience’ event in the Roblox online platform in May 2021. Players were able to try and purchase fashion accessories for their avatars. The digital ‘Queen Bee Dionysus’ bag was listed for 475 Robux, which was equivalent to $5. But it was eventually sold for $4115. This was real money as players would need to purchase Robux, the virtual currency of Roblox using real money.25\n2.2 Protecting avatars’ rights in the metaverse\nThe main challenge here would be trying to protect rights and impose liability using existing legal concepts. If an avatar steals a digital ‘Gucci bag’ in the ‘metaverse’, this would involve issues relating to property rights, theft and intellectual property law. If loss of money or reputation of a real-world person or company is involved, there is a case to be made that these are legal problems sufficiently substantive to warrant a real claim in a real court of law.26\nAs the metaverse becomes more fully developed and jurisdictional issues relating to the location of the avatar to determine the appropriate forum to resolve potential dispute becomes unclear, it may be the case that an international law of metaverse could be developed to deal with these issues.27 This paper suggests that some concepts from company law could be incorporated into this metaverse law. In a decentralised metaverse of the type envisaged by Bell, avatars could be incorporated as a legal person by borrowing concepts from existing company law principles in common law.\nWhere an avatar possesses artificial intelligence capabilities by continuously learning from its human host on how it would make decisions, execute contracts and supervise others on its own in the metaverse, there is a case to be made that avatars should be granted legal personality in the metaverse. This legal personality could be conferred through the process of registration, with each natural person entitled to only one avatar in this decentralised and limitless metaverse. Arguments to attribute legal personality to robots have previously been mooted,28 so the concepts can be stretched to cover avatars in the metaverse.\nLucchetti has previously argued that the benefit of conferring legal personality to an artificial intelligence system would be the presence of a corpus of rules to deal with rights and liabilities between one another and other human beings.29 Similar concepts could apply to avatars in the metaverse. Incorporating avatars in the metaverse would allow specific rules to be imposed on it in order to govern its rights and obligations in the metaverse.\n2.3 The impetus to protect avatars’ rights in the metaverse\nThe concept of the avatar is generally used to refer to users’ virtual selfrepresentation.30 It is argued that not regulating avatars in the metaverse can have serious ramifications as the very structure of cyberspace permits a separation between a person’s real identity and their virtual one. Franks has observed that while cyberspace is often regarded as more real than real life, harms committed in cyberspace are often dismissed as not really real, as they are by their nature not physical, bodily harms.31\nAvatars allow users to separate themselves from who they really are, and they can behave in ways their users never would in real life, making it possible for individuals to communicate and act in ways that would not be possible in the offline world.32 This supposed anonymity that the avatar has in the metaverse and its empowerment of the real-life person could give rise to an exercise of power in an arbitrary manner to advance one’s personal interest at the expense of the community at large. This could lead to societal instability as individuals could have their possessions taken away from them without any form of recourse.33 This is the reason why society has rules in place to deal with deviations from acceptable conduct. In return for the expectation that society would be able to safeguard individuals’ other rights, individuals would have to give up the right to punish someone on their own. Stability in society can only be achieved if the rule of law is applied equally to everyone and not just to advance the interests of a select few.34 Hence, there is a case to be made for an avatar’s rights in the metaverse to be similarly protected.\n2.4 Granting rights to avatars if they possess consciousness\nThe current metaverses, at least those existing, are very much on the internet and can be depicted through multiplayer games. One manifestation of this at present would be Robolox.35\nIn determining whether an avatar should be granted rights that a human being possesses, one must first understand the requirements to be recognised as a natural person. If what separates a natural person from everything else (be it a robot, animal, computer simulation, or virtual game, etc.), is ‘consciousness’, then it becomes necessary to explore what the requirements of consciousness are.36 It appears that the two requirements for consciousness are the feeling of arousal and awareness.37 If this view is adopted, the difference between a human being and an avatar is this concept of consciousness.\nIndeed, equity was developed to deal with the harshness of the common law through one’s understanding of ‘conscience’. Drakopoulou has argued that “equity, as we are reminded, was originally employed to remedy defects of the common law on grounds of conscience and natural justice, with an ecclesiastic chancellor acting as keeper of the king’s conscience”.38 In BOM v BOK, 39 a Singapore court decision which involved a wife who sought to deprive her husband of almost all his assets in the aftermath of an extremely traumatic event in the husband’s life by getting him to sign a deed of trust giving away essentially all his assets and rendering him a pauper. Vitiating factors that affect one’s conscience such as unconscionability and undue influence were considered.40\nFor many years, characters in a game [e.g. Runescape, a fantasy massively multiplayer online role-playing game (‘MMORPG’)], were not capable of exhibiting a conscience.41 Hence, it would be absurd to allow one player to sue another player in the virtual world if one player engaged in player versus player combat (PvP), killed their opponent and claimed the opponent’s items as a reward. If we were to argue that avatars in the metaverse should be granted rights similar to those human beings possess and use consciousness as a determinant to decide whether avatars should be granted rights, the question then becomes at which stage of the technological development this conferral of rights should be permitted.42\nIf an avatar in the metaverse unconscionably forces another avatar in the metaverse to give up all his possessions similar to the situation in BOM v BOK, 43 the issue is who experiences this unconscionability. If science and technology have progressed to such a state that when a human being enters the metaverse, a neural link would be formed between one’s brain and one’s avatar, then it may be possible to argue that the avatar itself is able to experience consciousness (e.g. the ‘2045 initiative’ by Dimtry Itskov).44 In that situation, if the avatar has been accorded legal personality, then it would be possible for the aggrieved avatar to sue another avatar for inducing the avatar who might be suffering from an ‘infirmity’ to enter into a contract. At present, it would be difficult to imagine how vitiating factors such as unconscionability could apply to avatar-to-avatar dealings because the avatars as we understand in existing online MMORPG platforms do not exhibit such an independent ‘conscience’ in the first place, but even this concept of conscience as we understand it is under threat by the doctrine of solipsism, i.e. the problem of other minds.45\nIt is arguable that avatars, at least in MMORPG at present, clearly fall short of the avatars possessing this degree of ‘consciousness’.46 Even artificial intelligence interfaces at present, including DeepMind,47 are not at the stage where one can say that it has developed full consciousness (i.e. the ability to feel arousal and awareness) or perhaps to function without any human intervention.48 Nonetheless, technology is advancing rapidly and it is difficult to predict when the metaverse will become mainstream. Indeed, the pace of technological developments has led a former ‘Go’ champion beaten by DeepMind to retire from professional play after declaring that artificial intelligence is an entity that cannot be defeated.49\n2.5 Protecting avatars’ rights in the metaverse through incorporation\nWhere an avatar in the metaverse is concerned, perhaps exhibiting a ‘conscience’ should not be the only criterion in determining whether an avatar should be granted legal personality. Instead this legal personality should exist within the metaverse itself, such that anyone who creates an avatar within the metaverse agrees to subject their avatars to legal personality that would be governed by the laws of the metaverse.50 Such laws could also stipulate that the separate legal personality of the avatar would be disregarded if crimes or torts had been committed. Thereafter, liability on the ultimate human being existing behind the avatar would be determined by a sliding scale of harm inflicted to both the metaverse community and the real-world community.51\nB2C2 Ltd v Quoine Pte Ltd, 52 was a dispute which involved the algorithmic trading of cryptocurrency and exposed significant monetary losses that an end-user of the software could suffer when the software malfunctioned, especially since actual money was involved in these trades.53 The Singapore court held that it could look at the mindset of a human actor, namely the programmer and his knowledge of the software.54 This meant that the trading software programme was not deemed as capable of exhibiting its own mind. The algorithmic trading software carried out trades only as it had been programmed. Had the software involved deep machine learning, the trading software programme could then ‘learn’ how to trade. Over time, it could develop its own trading algorithm not within the contemplation of the original programmer. In that situation, it would be both unforeseeable and unfair to ascribe liability on the original programmer, as there would be no relevant human actor’s mind-set to consider.55\nShould the metaverse be developed according to that envisioned by Ball,56 then it becomes important from a regulatory perspective that the corresponding law on metaverse be developed to deal with this development. The existing situation in the online world where there is a wrong done to the avatar appears to be very limited recourse. It seems that if someone plays a game and suffers physical or mental harm, liability would fall on the manufacturer or distributor of the gaming system.57 However, in a metaverse which is decentralised, it would be difficult to pinpoint a ‘manufacturer’ to ascribe liability to. This can be visualised through Bitcoin, i.e. if someone loses his or her Bitcoin, it makes no sense to sue Satoshi Nakamoto, the supposedly reported inventor of Bitcoin, because he cannot be identified.58 In such an ecosystem of a metaverse, a way forward would be to view it as a virtual community existing in parallel to our real-world community.\nIf we accept that, similar to the real-world community, activities in the metaverse should be potentially subject to regulation, then the next issue is considering which type of law this metaverse regulation should be based on.59 In this article, the argument is for the regulation to be based on company law principles, which would offer a potential solution to the various factual situations raised by the metaverse. Having said that, company law principles alone would not be able to solve every conceivable issues that could arise in the metaverse, and it is outside the scope of this paper to deal with the various laws that would need to be developed to deal with these issues.60\nThe paper argues that all avatars in a metaverse should be subject to registration, similar to how a company is incorporated. In order for this to work, legislation would need to mandate minimum capital requirements for avatars in the metaverse. The metaverse ecosystem made up of infrastructures that the avatars interact with, such as schools, workplaces and retail shops, would need to be similarly registered. These infrastructures should then have a higher minimum capitalisation mandated in order to meet potential liability claims in the metaverse.61 The concept of causation and foreseeability would have to be expanded under negligence law,62 for instance, to cover harm caused by avatars or infrastructures in the metaverse.\n2.6 Granting avatars separate legal personality\nIn the metaverse of the future, it is perhaps desirous to grant avatars a separate legal personality.63 If the avatars in a virtual world can function independently of the human person (e.g. through deep learning), then the avatar in the metaverse is a separate person altogether. In his paper, Chesterman dealt with the various categories of automation where robots are concerned.64 Perhaps similar concepts can be transposed to the metaverse. If the avatar is able to perform various transactions in its ‘person’, albeit in the metaverse, then as a person in the metaverse, it should be granted rights and obligations, i.e. a new law on metaverse should be developed which would cover various subject matters, such as copyright, harassment, etc. and possibly ratified by an ‘international’ metaverse community without country-specific boundaries.65\nComparing avatars in the metaverse to artificial intelligence systems, there have been numerous papers written on whether artificial intelligence objects should be granted separate legal personality.66 If we are to combine developments in artificial intelligence with the metaverse, then the situation becomes overly complex. If avatars eventually become capable of ‘machine learning’67 and can perform mundane tasks without human intervention, then it may be expedient to grant avatars in a metaverse rights and obligations that a human being would have.\nThe problem becomes even more complicated if there is an artificial intelligence robot in the real world that ‘operates’ an avatar in a metaverse, instead of a human being. In other words, the person behind the avatar in the metaverse is an artificial intelligence virtual self.68 One can perhaps draw reference from a 1999 sci-fi move, Bicentennial Man, directed by Chris Columbus, to visualise how this would become possible.69 There is a strong case to be made that if the development of artificial intelligence virtual self reaches this stage sometime in the future, then it may become persuasive to grant such ‘virtual selves’ legal personality, which would include property rights.70\n2.7 Granting avatars rights similar to those of a company\nCompanies may serve as a model for extending rights to avatars in a metaverse. Just like companies, avatars are non-human, and both can exist to increase economic investments in the marketplace. There is a case to be made that whatever rights have been extended to companies should also extend to avatars with the aim of increasing productivity.71\nFor example, it had been established by the US Supreme Court that corporations were persons under the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution, and thus entitled to protection of the due process clause in Minneapolis & S.L.R. Co. v Beckwith. 72 Even though the corporate form is not a human person, companies are endowed with similar rights that an ordinary citizen possesses. Within the meaning of the US Constitution and Bill of Rights, corporations are ‘persons’ and are entitled to protection against the taking of their property without due process and are entitled (at least to some extent) to freedom of speech.73 Companies are able to act as persons where it involves legal proceedings, ownership of property and contractual obligations.74\nHowever, the scope of rights that avatars in a metaverse should possess are not currently settled. Indeed, Day has argued that “there is an ongoing debate over which rights are guaranteed, and until that debate is settled, avatar rights will also be an open question under this analytical framework”.75\n2.8 Incorporating avatars in the metaverse\nWhile a natural person is subject to rights and obligations within society, corporate law has fashioned a vehicle known as the company which is legally personified, even though it is not a natural person.76 Eidenmuller has argued that the “crucial difference between a corporation and a robot is that corporations always act through humans” and that humans still make the final decisions.77 Similarly, in Roblox’s iteration of the metaverse, the avatars have to act through humans and it is the person behind the avatar that makes the final decisions. It is identical to companies in that it has to act through someone. However, for more advanced avatars in the metaverse of the future possessing artificial intelligence capabilities and with a neural link in place between the brain and an avatar, there may be an even stronger case to argue that the avatar should be granted legal personhood.78\nCompanies may be liable in the same manner as a natural person for crimes and torts.79 However, there are limitations to punishing a company, given that it is not a natural person. For example, unlike a natural person, companies cannot be sentenced to a term of imprisonment, caning or be subjected to the death penalty.80 Hence, in order to control corporate wrongdoing or omissions, a number of provisions in the UK Companies Act 2006 subject directors of a company to criminal offences for the company’s failure to comply with statutory obligations.81 Breaches of these obligations may result in a fine, disqualification or imprisonment. In many common law countries, the legislation clearly recognises the incorporated company as a ‘body corporate’.82 While a company is a separate legal entity, it is incorporeal and has to exist through human agents who give it its physical presence.83 There is a distinction between a natural person and an artificial entity. Hence, it is not an entirely far-fetched notion that an avatar could be clothed with legal personality since it would similarly need to act through its human host in Roblox’s iteration of the metaverse.84", "role": "user" }, { "content": "users\nexpect\navatars’ rights to be protected\ncould be resolved\nby making an avatar responsible for\nactions\nthis\nwould\nneed\na legal persona to the avatar\nand\nto sue or be sued\nIf an avatar steals\nthese are\nproblems sufficiently substantive to warrant a real claim in a real court\nAs\njurisdictional issues relating to\nlocation of the avatar\nbecome\nunclear\navatars could be incorporated\nby borrowing\nfrom\ncompany law\na\ni\nlearning from its\nhost\nshould be granted legal personality\nconferred through\nregistration\nthe benefit\nwould be\na corpus of rules\nnot regulating\ncan have serious ramifications\nAvatars allow users to separate\nfrom who they\nare\nto communicate and act in ways\nnot\npossible\noffline\nThis\nanonymity\ncould give rise to\nexercise of power in an arbitrary manner\nThis\nlead to societal instability\nStability\ncan only be achieved if\nlaw is applied\nlaws could\nstipulate\nthe separate\npersonality\nwould be disregarded if crimes\nhad been committed\nliability on the ultimate human\ndetermined by a sliding scale of harm\nin a metaverse\ndecentralised, it would be difficult to pinpoint a ‘manufacturer’\nregistration\nwould\nmandate minimum capital requirements\ncausation and foreseeability would\nbe expanded\nto cover\navatars\nthe\ndeep learning\navatar\nis a separate person\nHence\ncould be clothed with legal personality", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Simultaneous action means Biden and Congress share credit for the perm—voters attribute credit by perceived contribution.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\n An inspection of Table 4 shows modest support for the federalist voting hypothesis. Respondents with accessible attitudes on unemployment are more likely to link vote for (against) their incumbent senator when they attribute functional responsibility to the national government and credit (blame) government for policy outcomes in connection with this issue. Respondents with accessible attitudes on unemployment but who attributed functional responsibility to the state government showed a similar significant and positive relationship between causal responsibility attribution for unemployment and their vote choice for governor. This pattern did not extend to mayoral voting behavior.\nAccessible causal responsibility attributions regarding education and traffic congestion linked to mayoral vote choice when functional responsibility for these issues coincided with the city. In contrast, accessible causal responsibility attributions for these issues did not affect senate or gubernatorial vote choice when functional responsibility matched those levels of government. Moreover, if accessibility for these attitudes is lowered, at a certain point all of these coefficients shrink and become statistically insignificant. To illustrate, Figure 1 displays the combined effect coefficients for unemployment (and their 95% confidence intervals) calculated at different levels of attitude accessibility in the gubernatorial vote choice model. Note that as causal responsibility attributions regarding unemployment become less accessible (i.e., the latency score increases), the combined effect shrinks and the confidence interval crosses zero. Consequently, the federalist voting hypothesis may only apply, if at all, to a subset of voters for whom a particular issue is salient and readily accessible. \nThe pattern of statistical significance for the coefficients in Table 4 is also intriguing. Unemployment only has an effect on national and state-level voting behavior, while education and traffic congestion only have an effect on city-level voting behavior (as long as functional responsibility is also attributed to those levels). In some sense, this pattern matches the actual assignment of functional responsibility for these issues. The national government has more to do with developing policies that affect unemployment, while local governments are more involved with setting education policy and handling traffic congestion. While only suggestive, these data lead to a hypothesis worthy of further study: Perceived functional responsibility attributions affect voting behavior to the extent they match the actual assignment of functional responsibilities. \nThe cause of this match between perceived and actual functional responsibilities is far from clear. It may reflect knowledge on the part of the respondent. After all, these results only work for respondents with highly accessible attitudes on the subject. Perhaps these individuals care a great deal about these issues and are motivated to pin credit or blame on the appropriate office. On the other hand, it may reflect the set of issues discussed in the campaign. There are at least two reasons why campaigns may be the main culprit for explaining this pattern. First, campaigns at different levels of government tend to emphasize the issues over which officials are functionally responsible (Atkeson & Partin, 2001; Tidmarch, Hyman, & Sorkin, 1984). Second, when campaigns focus on an issue, considerations about that issue, such as causal responsibility attributions, are more likely to be accessible (Zaller, 1992). \nThe findings with regard to unemployment may provide some evidence for the campaign-effects claim. In 2002, unemployment was an issue in both senatorial and gubernatorial campaigns. The relationship at the state level is likely further enhanced by the fact that all three of the incumbent governors in the state analyzed here were Republican, the same party as the sitting president. President Bush and his policies became an issue in each of these gubernatorial campaigns, which may be responsible for some degree of spillover from the national to the state level. \nConclusion \nCitizens do appear capable of making distinctions in terms of what different levels of government do, and these distinctions structure where they attribute credit or blame for policy outcomes. However, these distinctions only affect voting behavior at different levels within the federal system under specific conditions. The data analyzed here suggest that the issue upon which voters are attributing responsibility must be highly accessible and the level of government perceived to be functionally responsible for that issue should coincide with the level of government that is actually responsible. As already discussed, future study should hone in on the explanation for this nuanced finding. Does it reflect campaign- specific cues, knowledge on the part of the voter, or both?\n\n\n\n\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "An inspection of Table 4 shows modest support for the federalist voting hypothesis. Respondents with accessible attitudes on unemployment are more likely to link vote for (against) their incumbent senator when they attribute functional responsibility to the national government and credit (blame) government for policy outcomes in connection with this issue. Respondents with accessible attitudes on unemployment but who attributed functional responsibility to the state government showed a similar significant and positive relationship between causal responsibility attribution for unemployment and their vote choice for governor\nthis pattern matches the actual assignment of functional responsibility for these issues.\nPerceived functional responsibility attributions affect voting behavior to the extent they match the actual assignment of functional responsibilities\nCitizens do appear capable of making distinctions in terms of what different levels of government do\nand these distinctions structure where they attribute credit\nfor policy outcomes\nthese distinctions\naffect voting behavior at different levels within the federal system\nthe issue upon which voters are attributing responsibility must be highly accessible and the level of government perceived to be functionally responsible for that issue should coincide with the level of government that is actually responsible", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Simultaneous action means Biden and Congress share credit for the perm—voters attribute credit by perceived contribution.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "An inspection of Table 4 shows modest support for the federalist voting hypothesis. Respondents with accessible attitudes on unemployment are more likely to link vote for (against) their incumbent senator when they attribute functional responsibility to the national government and credit (blame) government for policy outcomes in connection with this issue. Respondents with accessible attitudes on unemployment but who attributed functional responsibility to the state government showed a similar significant and positive relationship between causal responsibility attribution for unemployment and their vote choice for governor\nthis pattern matches the actual assignment of functional responsibility for these issues.\nPerceived functional responsibility attributions affect voting behavior to the extent they match the actual assignment of functional responsibilities\nCitizens do appear capable of making distinctions in terms of what different levels of government do\nand these distinctions structure where they attribute credit\nfor policy outcomes\nthese distinctions\naffect voting behavior at different levels within the federal system\nthe issue upon which voters are attributing responsibility must be highly accessible and the level of government perceived to be functionally responsible for that issue should coincide with the level of government that is actually responsible", "role": "user" }, { "content": "attribute\nresponsibility to the national government\nresponsibility\nstate government\nsimilar significant and positive relationship between\nresponsibility attribution for\ntheir vote choice\nmatch the actual assignment of functional responsibilities\ncapable of making distinctions in terms of what different levels of government do\nthese distinctions structure where they attribute credit\nwithin the federal system", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Simultaneous action means Biden and Congress share credit for the perm—voters attribute credit by perceived contribution.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "An inspection of Table 4 shows modest support for the federalist voting hypothesis. Respondents with accessible attitudes on unemployment are more likely to link vote for (against) their incumbent senator when they attribute functional responsibility to the national government and credit (blame) government for policy outcomes in connection with this issue. Respondents with accessible attitudes on unemployment but who attributed functional responsibility to the state government showed a similar significant and positive relationship between causal responsibility attribution for unemployment and their vote choice for governor\nthis pattern matches the actual assignment of functional responsibility for these issues.\nPerceived functional responsibility attributions affect voting behavior to the extent they match the actual assignment of functional responsibilities\nCitizens do appear capable of making distinctions in terms of what different levels of government do\nand these distinctions structure where they attribute credit\nfor policy outcomes\nthese distinctions\naffect voting behavior at different levels within the federal system\nthe issue upon which voters are attributing responsibility must be highly accessible and the level of government perceived to be functionally responsible for that issue should coincide with the level of government that is actually responsible", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Respondents\nvote for\ntheir\nsenator when they attribute\nresponsibility to the national government\nthe state\nshowed a similar\nrelationship\nresponsibility attributions\nmatch the actual\nresponsibilities\nCitizens\nappear capable of\ndistinctions in\nwhere they attribute credit\nwithin the federal system", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 3- The civil service impact- the Advantage is about courts- the card isn’t No Unique solvency internal link because they don’t make more people care about civil service- and says squo solves", "role": "system" }, { "content": "[Max, The Passionate Bureaucrat: Lessons For The 21st Century From 4,500 Years Of Public Service Reform, 2018, https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/9789813234833_0001, p3-12, accessed 2-4-22]\n\nWhen things go well in government, public officials rarely get any credit. Attention-seeking politicians, focused on the next election, are only too happy to hog the limelight. When government fails, political leaders are usually more than eager to blame their officials. Yet, whether ignored or derided, public service is critical to sustaining and improving the quality of life for nations around the world. A trusted, responsive and dynamic civil service underpins the ability of a state to deliver on the needs and aspirations of its citizens. Civil services ensure that governments now and in the future can be catalysts for progress.\nAs the second decade of the 21st century draws to an end, it is clear that the world faces an unparalleled range of existential challenges. From tackling terrorism to halting climate change, the problems are daunting. The ability to harness new technologies will be essential.\nEvery state in the coming years will require a high-performing public service dedicated to promoting shared, collective interests. Whatever the merits of the private sector and civil society, the future of this planet cannot be left to social movements or profit-maximising ambitions driven by personal enrichment and selfish individualism. A new generation of dynamic public servants is urgently needed. Their key attribute for success must be the ability to find solutions that build the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its citizens. This will require prioritising the capacity of officials to win the trust of the population. That core objective demands enhanced skills and attributes in the public service. It will need to articulate eternal objectives — building a good society, defending human dignity, preserving the national interests, including being the stewards of the long-term future. This will put a premium on not only professionalism of the ‘bureau-craft’, measurable attributes of efficiency and effectiveness, but also such qualitative skills as empathy, emotional intelligence and ethics. The ‘passionate bureaucrat’, professional, evidence-focused, politically savvy and motivated by high ideals, must emerge to tackle the needs of a new and troubled era.\nOur Age of Anxiety\nWe live at a time of deep concern over the unprecedented pace of change. The new phenomenon we are confronting is a complex mix of factors. These include sharply growing inequality, the 4th industrial revolution, advances in life sciences, the Internet of things, the digital economy,1 rapid advances in communications, the rise of social media, shifts in energy supplies and 3D printing — and still the list goes on. In addition, jobless growth, the rise of China, unprecedented levels of migration, the demographics of ageing in the developed world and a youth bulge in many developing countries, with the world’s population adding one billion over the last 12 years and set to grow by 2.9 billion — equal to another China and India — by 2050, are the backdrop.2 Millions die of hunger whilst a third of all global food production is wasted. The first person to live up to 150 years has already been born.\nThis ‘Age of Anxiety’ may create both exaggerated expectations and excessive disillusionment over the ‘4th Industrial Revolution’. Sharply growing inequality around the world is increasing social tensions. Faced by the magnitude and complexity of change that is rapidly redefining human potential, reshaping industries and changing societies, political leaders seem unable to articulate a convincing vision for getting through the current upheavals to reach a brighter future.\nInstead, politics in many parts of the world is mired in rising populism and resurgent nationalism, post-fact politics, post-truth journalism and false and deliberately faked news. Social media are seen to act as society’s conscience, but also create political ‘echo chambers’ in which the Internet plays a polarising post-fact role, including spreading fake news. The problem is exacerbated by a decline in the quality of journalism and concern over the distorting influence of lobbyists in some countries like the United States. Not unsurprisingly, the result is a new era, the ‘Age of Anxiety’.\nChange, complexity and global interdependence are creating new realities, unique opportunities and serious challenges for development that are profoundly different from those of the past. Emerging economies are rapidly industrialising; new technologies are coming quickly into use; and a growing web of interconnectedness is transforming geopolitics, international competitiveness and sustainability.\nThis ‘4th Industrial Revolution’ is just the beginning, but the evidence for its future impact is already clear. For example, in South Africa, as a result of new technologies, 39% of core occupational skills will have altered by 2020; 47% of jobs in the United States will be automated by 2040.3 By the end of 2016, around two-thirds of the world’s population had access to a mobile phone. Mobile phone users include nearly everyone in the developed world and already 62% of the population in low and middle-income countries.4 Potential new uses for artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive computing are emerging. Already the annual R&D budget of the dominant Internet search engine Google is more than twice the combined R&D expenditure of the five biggest defence companies in the United States, an extraordinary change from the Cold War era that ended barely a generation ago.5\nThe ‘great disruptive forces’ of the 21st century are not of themselves new: climate change, industrial revolution, urbanisation (with more people living in cities today than were alive on the whole planet in 1970) and globalisation (in the global flow and networks of trade, finance and people) are familiar themes. For the first time in human history, more people live in cities and towns than in rural areas. By 2050, 67% of the world's population is projected to be urban. The contribution of cities to the global economy and human development will therefore increase. Cities are already engines of economic growth, accounting for 70% of global GDP and, while the world’s largest 150 metropolitan areas represent only 13.5% of the global population, they account for over 40% of global GDP.6\nWicked Ostriches, Perfect Swans and Black Elephants\nWhat is new in the 21st century, however, is the accelerating pace of these phenomena, their impact upon each other and the unknown new realities that in combination they will create. Their interdependence and complexity is also responsible for the increase of low-probability shocks and high-impact crises that suddenly seem to appear out of nowhere. A massive amount of unpredicted change of unforeseen nature and scale is inevitable. This will be a new era, featuring ‘perfect storms’,7 ‘wild cards’8 and ‘wicked problems’.9 Chaos is becoming the ‘new normal’. We may act like ostriches by sticking our heads in the sand when we see a black swan10 heading in our direction, while ‘black elephants’ in the room may trample all under foot if ignored.\nSuch ‘known unknowns’ are combining with the ever-greater depths of uncertainty created by the VUCA world.11 We are already aware of our bounded rationality and cognitive biases. Hyperbolic discounting,12 the gambler’s fallacy13 and the information bias14 are all only too familiar, but the list of humanity’s known cognitive blind-spots and shortcomings seems to go on and on.\nThe wisdom of crowds quickly turns into mass hysteria and ‘Extraordinary Popular Delusions’. Group-think, risk aversion and cognitive dissonance shade off into bubbles of false hope and collective denial in which no-one is guilty but everyone is to blame. We have no time to worry about all the other unexpectedly strange and scary ‘unknown unknowns’, doubtless too many for Wikipedia to list, but probably just waiting to happen.\nA new disruptive age of digital public empowerment, big data and metadata challenges the human capacity to cope with the unprecedented scale of ‘wicked problems’. Existing comfort zones are crumbling under the speed and nature of fundamental change. Disruption and discontinuity will become the new normal. \nThe New Era: Complexity in a Complex World\nIn the deep complexity of such complex systems that we cannot hope to control but only influence, there are no easy answers. Taking action to prevent or pre-empt seems ever more problematic and unlikely. These uncertainties will require public administrations to be prepared to ‘Think the Unthinkable’ or at least, ‘Ponder the Unpalatable’. Yet Political leaders and their officials are still struggling to learn and build on lessons from the continuing fall-out after the 2(X)8 Global Financial Crisis, the ever-accelerating pace of technological change and digital transformation, and delivering effectively in an unexpected climate of escalating geo-political instability.\nAs the tidal waves of ever-faster, less predictable change crash over our heads, the unelectable political maverick morphs into a popular ideological visionary. The silent majority is no longer silent. Old assumptions for government decisions are washed away in the fast-moving current of the new public information age. Reaction time for those in authority has shrunk from 24 hours to something closer to 24 minutes, as policymaking by tweet takes hold in the White House.\nThe World Economic Forum’s 2016 Global Risks Report highlighted three ‘wicked problems’: climate change, mass migration and cyber warfare. The opportunities and challenges for achieving economic growth, quality education, healthy and fulfilling lives for the coming years will be fundamentally different from those of the past. The past provides limited insight and guidance to shape the ‘World We Want’. The sheer ambition of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the volatile new reality of the 21st century call for innovative approaches to turn good policies into results for citizens. Simplistic nationalist, isolationist, protectionist, xenophobic and populist narratives are challenging governments, as stewards for the future of their nation, to sharpen their ability to look towards the future to realise the grand vision inherent in 2030 Agenda.\nIn this new environment, the quarter of a century from the end of the Cold War with the Fall of the Berlin Wall now seems, in retrospect, to have been an era of relative certainty and abnormal stability. Who could declare the ‘End of History’ with Donald Trump in the White House? The new era is more like war than peace in the number and numbing pace of events that are being unleashed; or perhaps more like the lead up to war in the late 1930s, when democratic values crumbled at the Munich Conference of September 1938. Then economic uncertainty and political instability fed off each other.\nThe same is true today. The dynamic of recent years — exceptionally high rewards for those at the top, a hollowing out of the middle class, and the expansion of low-paid insecure jobs at the bottom — seems set not just to continue but to become more pronounced. In the longer term, it is estimated that two-thirds of children that are today in primary school will enter the world of work by taking jobs that have not yet been invented.\nThe result, globally, is a pervading mood of fear for managing in choppy seas surrounded by new, uncharted and turbulent waters. Public expectations of government are rising faster than public institutions can deliver.\nYet it is only too easy to forget that huge strides have been made. Real progress is happening, sometimes at an incredible pace: Rwandans today can expect to live 32 years longer than they did in 1990 and spend twice as long at school.15 Furthermore, in almost every country, a more educated population with stronger professional organisations has fostered a vibrant civil society (and, some fear, a culture of narcissism).16 New technology creates forums for openness and citizen feedback that challenge governments’ ability to respond. As of December 2016, heads of states and governments in 173 countries are using Twitter for engaging with citizens. Facebook comes in close second with 169 governments having set up official pages on the social media platform.\nThe result, in many instances, is growing pressure to govern better. This means better regulation, less corruption and higher ethical standards in the conduct of public affairs. More and more, governments are responding to these pressures, demands and changes. Leaders realise that they cannot afford to lag behind in a world of increasingly dynamic and competitive markets, as well as pluralistic, diversified societies where higher expectations give birth to new, progressively more complex challenges.\nAll this uncertainty explains why it is important to strengthen public service. The challenges facing political and administrative leadership everywhere are already daunting and still growing.\nSeven Attacks\nIn recent decades, efforts to undermine the motivation and morale of effective and efficient public officials working for the common good have advanced on seven fronts.\nThe first is ideological. This is encapsulated in the assertion, regardless of evidence and repeated often enough to have become regarded by many as a truism, that any public service is, by its very nature, inherently incompetent, indolent and unresponsive. Of course, if this were true, it would reflect the decisions of political leaders to allow it.\nConsider post-independence Singapore, where political determination for building a highly disciplined and motivated public service has transformed the city-state.\nThe second is intellectual — and a ‘Catch 22’ conundrum. Public Choice Theory posits that Public Service is inherently self-serving and needs to be constrained, and New Public Management (NPM) propagates that it is inherently apathetic and needs to be incentivised into being effective.\nThe third is commercial — big profits are generated for consultants and the private sector by fostering the ideas of NPM: running government like a business, outsourcing services and promoting public-private partnerships.\nThe fourth is political — blaming the public service for failure offers a tempting scapegoat for politicians to deflect criticism of their own inadequate leadership and direction.\nThe fifth is financial — pay levels for professional posts in public service have lagged behind those of the private sector that either many high-skilled vacancies could not be filled or special pay arrangements were required.\nThe sixth is institutional — there has been selective truth in portraying obstructive public service unions and unhelpful ‘street-level bureaucrats’ to obscure much more positive images of devotion to public good, as famously demonstrated by the unstinting self-sacrifice of the New York Fire officers on and after 9/11.\nAnd the seventh is organisational — both elected leaders and senior administrators benefit from creating a ‘permanent revolution’ of ceaseless reforms and reorganisation of public service. Despite mounting evidence over the years that many reforms achieve almost no lasting improvements, but greatly demoralise staff, the temptation to appear to be shaking up supposedly lazy and incompetent bureaucrats is all too great. This is aggravated by the fact that in some cases senior managers themselves lack the knowledge and skills, and sometimes the willingness, to use resources efficiently.\nTackling all seven of these causes is essential if an impartial and merit-based public service is to evolve in many countries. Such public administration is essential both in itself and for the legitimacy of the state.\nBut development is hampered by the lack of a credible theory of change to explain how or why an ‘impartial, ethical, fair and meritocratic public service’ emerges, and how it can be promoted and fostered. Is public service excellence the result of efforts to make government more accountable and responsive, closer to citizens, or more efficient?\nUnfortunately, civil service reform has often failed. Three key reasons for this are: (i) excessive focus on cost-cutting irrespective of the consequences; (ii) inadequate attention to the politics; and (iii) applying ‘best practice’ rather than ‘best fit’.\nGetting to Helsinki?\nGiven the central role governments play in facilitating development, including providing public goods, addressing externalities, and laying the foundation for private property and private enterprise, improvement in public administration is essential for progress. Of course, ‘good’ governance is desirable everywhere: poverty reduction, growth, development, peace and security, free markets, transparency, property rights, the rule of law, the absence of corruption, a IVee media, free and fair elections, independent judiciaries, vibrant civil society and effective public services. If, in this vision, where all good things come together, why is every country not like Finland, where I served for three happy years as a young diplomat in the 1980s — well-run, honest and peaceful?\nWhat are the priorities? If it is necessary — even a prerequisite — for all good things to be achieved together, the task becomes overwhelming. But fortunately, history shows that that is not the case. Rather, as countries get wealthy they can in the process develop ‘good’ government. The 21st century rich world (broadly speaking, OECD countries) did not first establish liberal democracy, free markets and merit-based public services and then achieve prosperity.\nBut in all instances of successful development, an effective public service has always been essential. Governments cannot otherwise get things done, and done well. The nature of the state varies (from democratic to autocratic, from liberal to authoritarian), the role of public administration remains the same: an effective civil service promotes the public good efficiently and fairly. Improving the competence of the state can and should better the lives of its people. If, then, the challenges of reform and enhancing civil service performance are universal, every reform addresses its own context. Yet, even if the specifics to a particular environment of time and place are unique, many principles (including strengthening accountability and responsiveness), issues (such as consolidating the intrinsic motivation of civil servants) and problems (e.g. politicisation, corruption, performance measuring) are shared.\nSo public sector reform seems to be the answer, offering a temptingly simple ‘quick win’: whatever the problem might be, cuts and reorganisation seem self-evidently to be the solution. Politicians, voters, citizens and taxpayers ‘know’ with passionate certainty, regardless of the evidence that ‘bureaucrats’ waste money, are slow and incompetent. Political leaders, in echoing that, often also feel the administrative leadership is thwarting their ambitions and chances of re-election.\nThe role which only the public service can play is being reinvented. While the details may be debated, the general trajectory is becoming increasingly clear. This will require civil servants to be much more creative in handling political ambiguity, advising government ministers on policy tensions and contradictions, and delivering services to the public.\nFor the state to thrive in the coming era, it will need to work simultaneously on achieving five outcomes: (i) unlocking the creativity and collaborative spirit needed to solve complex problems; (ii) overcoming the fallacy that the private sector is inherently more innovative and efficient than the public service; (iii) creating societies that are perceived by their citizens as fair; (iv) fostering the trust of citizens in their governments; and (v) bolstering the legitimacy of the state.\nThese daunting and interconnected aims will result in a new phenomenon: the public recognition by political leaders and citizens that future prosperity, environmental sustainability and social cohesion are dependent on committed and creative civil servants passionate about promoting the long-term national interest. This is a vision of public service that is a manifesto for state-building in our era for developed and developing countries alike.\nTrusted by politicians and the people to tackle the great challenges that humanity faces in the 21st century, public service will be rejuvenated by this vision — to ‘make a difference’. The world is changing fast, and the time has come to appreciate the contribution that bureaucratic expertise must make. Yet there are, at present, probably few more unpopular tasks than praising government bureaucracy. As we will see in the following chapters, literally ever since recorded history began, with the 1st Bureaucratic Revolution, the public official has been a derided figure. This phenomenon grew in the 2nd and 3rd Bureaucratic Revolutions, as the range and reach of the state expanded. In the Soviet Union in the 1930s, the government’s own posters depicted crude caricatures of inefficient bureaucrats sleeping at their desks surrounded by piles of paper. Any failings of the state could conveniently be blamed on public officials. The nation was exhorted with slogans such as: Fight the Bureaucrats who Hinder the Workers' Efforts! Many officials ended up in Stalin’s gulags.\nYet, without committed public bureaucrats, states and markets would not function, freedoms would not be upheld, and the poor, vulnerable and oppressed would suffer more. Their role in holding the state together is rarely noted. But in 2017, although it was never written down or given a codename, France’s top officials had a detailed plan to ‘protect the Republic’ if far right leader Marine Le Pen was elected president. An unnamed senior official told the media: ‘The philosophy, and the absolute imperative, was to keep the peace, while also respecting our constitutional rules’.17 In the after-life, bureaucrats also play an important role. The Hindu God Chitragupta keeps a file on every person, recording their good and bad actions, in order to assign them to heaven or hell.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "public service is critical\nA trusted, responsive and dynamic civil service underpins the ability of a state to deliver\nCivil services ensure\ngovernments\ncan be catalysts for progress\nthe world faces a\nrange of existential challenges. From\nterror\nto\nclimate change\nproblems are daunting. The ability to harness new technologies will be essential.\nthe future of this planet\nwill put a premium on\n‘bureau-craft’\nmeasurable attributes of efficiency and effectiveness, but also such qualitative skills as empathy, emotional intelligence and ethics. The ‘passionate bureaucrat’, professional, evidence-focused, politically savvy and motivated by high ideals, must emerge to tackle the needs of a new and troubled era.\nWe live at a time of\nunprecedented pace of change\nThese include sharply growing inequality, the 4th industrial revolution\nI\no\nt\nshifts in energy supplies\nand\nthe list goes on\ncomplexity\nare creating new realities\nWhat is new in the 21st century\nis the accelerating pace of these phenomena, their impact upon each other and the unknown new realities that in combination they will create\ncomplexity is\nresponsible for the increase of\nshocks and high-impact crises that suddenly\nappear out of nowhere. A massive amount of unpredicted change of unforeseen nature and scale is inevitable. This will be a new era, featuring ‘perfect storms’,7 ‘wild cards’8 and ‘wicked problems’\nChaos is\nthe ‘new normal’.\nknown unknowns’ are combining with the ever-greater depths of uncertainty\nThese uncertainties\nrequire public administrations\nAs the tidal waves of ever-faster, less predictable change crash\nOld assumptions for government decisions are washed away in the fast-moving current\nThe W\nE\nF\nhighlighted three ‘wicked problems’: climate change, mass migration and cyber warfare\nadministration is essential\nan effective public service has always been essential. Governments cannot otherwise get things done, and done well.\nnature of the state varies\nThe role which only the public service can play is being reinvented. While the details may be debated, the general trajectory is becoming increasingly clear. This will require civil servants to be much more creative\nThe world is changing fast, and the time has come to appreciate the contribution that bureaucratic expertise must make\nwithout committed public bureaucrats, states\nwould not function", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 3- The civil service impact- the Advantage is about courts- the card isn’t No Unique solvency internal link because they don’t make more people care about civil service- and says squo solves", "role": "system" }, { "content": "[Max, The Passionate Bureaucrat: Lessons For The 21st Century From 4,500 Years Of Public Service Reform, 2018, https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/pdf/10.1142/9789813234833_0001, p3-12, accessed 2-4-22]\n\nWhen things go well in government, public officials rarely get any credit. Attention-seeking politicians, focused on the next election, are only too happy to hog the limelight. When government fails, political leaders are usually more than eager to blame their officials. Yet, whether ignored or derided, public service is critical to sustaining and improving the quality of life for nations around the world. A trusted, responsive and dynamic civil service underpins the ability of a state to deliver on the needs and aspirations of its citizens. Civil services ensure that governments now and in the future can be catalysts for progress.\nAs the second decade of the 21st century draws to an end, it is clear that the world faces an unparalleled range of existential challenges. From tackling terrorism to halting climate change, the problems are daunting. The ability to harness new technologies will be essential.\nEvery state in the coming years will require a high-performing public service dedicated to promoting shared, collective interests. Whatever the merits of the private sector and civil society, the future of this planet cannot be left to social movements or profit-maximising ambitions driven by personal enrichment and selfish individualism. A new generation of dynamic public servants is urgently needed. Their key attribute for success must be the ability to find solutions that build the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its citizens. This will require prioritising the capacity of officials to win the trust of the population. That core objective demands enhanced skills and attributes in the public service. It will need to articulate eternal objectives — building a good society, defending human dignity, preserving the national interests, including being the stewards of the long-term future. This will put a premium on not only professionalism of the ‘bureau-craft’, measurable attributes of efficiency and effectiveness, but also such qualitative skills as empathy, emotional intelligence and ethics. The ‘passionate bureaucrat’, professional, evidence-focused, politically savvy and motivated by high ideals, must emerge to tackle the needs of a new and troubled era.\nOur Age of Anxiety\nWe live at a time of deep concern over the unprecedented pace of change. The new phenomenon we are confronting is a complex mix of factors. These include sharply growing inequality, the 4th industrial revolution, advances in life sciences, the Internet of things, the digital economy,1 rapid advances in communications, the rise of social media, shifts in energy supplies and 3D printing — and still the list goes on. In addition, jobless growth, the rise of China, unprecedented levels of migration, the demographics of ageing in the developed world and a youth bulge in many developing countries, with the world’s population adding one billion over the last 12 years and set to grow by 2.9 billion — equal to another China and India — by 2050, are the backdrop.2 Millions die of hunger whilst a third of all global food production is wasted. The first person to live up to 150 years has already been born.\nThis ‘Age of Anxiety’ may create both exaggerated expectations and excessive disillusionment over the ‘4th Industrial Revolution’. Sharply growing inequality around the world is increasing social tensions. Faced by the magnitude and complexity of change that is rapidly redefining human potential, reshaping industries and changing societies, political leaders seem unable to articulate a convincing vision for getting through the current upheavals to reach a brighter future.\nInstead, politics in many parts of the world is mired in rising populism and resurgent nationalism, post-fact politics, post-truth journalism and false and deliberately faked news. Social media are seen to act as society’s conscience, but also create political ‘echo chambers’ in which the Internet plays a polarising post-fact role, including spreading fake news. The problem is exacerbated by a decline in the quality of journalism and concern over the distorting influence of lobbyists in some countries like the United States. Not unsurprisingly, the result is a new era, the ‘Age of Anxiety’.\nChange, complexity and global interdependence are creating new realities, unique opportunities and serious challenges for development that are profoundly different from those of the past. Emerging economies are rapidly industrialising; new technologies are coming quickly into use; and a growing web of interconnectedness is transforming geopolitics, international competitiveness and sustainability.\nThis ‘4th Industrial Revolution’ is just the beginning, but the evidence for its future impact is already clear. For example, in South Africa, as a result of new technologies, 39% of core occupational skills will have altered by 2020; 47% of jobs in the United States will be automated by 2040.3 By the end of 2016, around two-thirds of the world’s population had access to a mobile phone. Mobile phone users include nearly everyone in the developed world and already 62% of the population in low and middle-income countries.4 Potential new uses for artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive computing are emerging. Already the annual R&D budget of the dominant Internet search engine Google is more than twice the combined R&D expenditure of the five biggest defence companies in the United States, an extraordinary change from the Cold War era that ended barely a generation ago.5\nThe ‘great disruptive forces’ of the 21st century are not of themselves new: climate change, industrial revolution, urbanisation (with more people living in cities today than were alive on the whole planet in 1970) and globalisation (in the global flow and networks of trade, finance and people) are familiar themes. For the first time in human history, more people live in cities and towns than in rural areas. By 2050, 67% of the world's population is projected to be urban. The contribution of cities to the global economy and human development will therefore increase. Cities are already engines of economic growth, accounting for 70% of global GDP and, while the world’s largest 150 metropolitan areas represent only 13.5% of the global population, they account for over 40% of global GDP.6\nWicked Ostriches, Perfect Swans and Black Elephants\nWhat is new in the 21st century, however, is the accelerating pace of these phenomena, their impact upon each other and the unknown new realities that in combination they will create. Their interdependence and complexity is also responsible for the increase of low-probability shocks and high-impact crises that suddenly seem to appear out of nowhere. A massive amount of unpredicted change of unforeseen nature and scale is inevitable. This will be a new era, featuring ‘perfect storms’,7 ‘wild cards’8 and ‘wicked problems’.9 Chaos is becoming the ‘new normal’. We may act like ostriches by sticking our heads in the sand when we see a black swan10 heading in our direction, while ‘black elephants’ in the room may trample all under foot if ignored.\nSuch ‘known unknowns’ are combining with the ever-greater depths of uncertainty created by the VUCA world.11 We are already aware of our bounded rationality and cognitive biases. Hyperbolic discounting,12 the gambler’s fallacy13 and the information bias14 are all only too familiar, but the list of humanity’s known cognitive blind-spots and shortcomings seems to go on and on.\nThe wisdom of crowds quickly turns into mass hysteria and ‘Extraordinary Popular Delusions’. Group-think, risk aversion and cognitive dissonance shade off into bubbles of false hope and collective denial in which no-one is guilty but everyone is to blame. We have no time to worry about all the other unexpectedly strange and scary ‘unknown unknowns’, doubtless too many for Wikipedia to list, but probably just waiting to happen.\nA new disruptive age of digital public empowerment, big data and metadata challenges the human capacity to cope with the unprecedented scale of ‘wicked problems’. Existing comfort zones are crumbling under the speed and nature of fundamental change. Disruption and discontinuity will become the new normal. \nThe New Era: Complexity in a Complex World\nIn the deep complexity of such complex systems that we cannot hope to control but only influence, there are no easy answers. Taking action to prevent or pre-empt seems ever more problematic and unlikely. These uncertainties will require public administrations to be prepared to ‘Think the Unthinkable’ or at least, ‘Ponder the Unpalatable’. Yet Political leaders and their officials are still struggling to learn and build on lessons from the continuing fall-out after the 2(X)8 Global Financial Crisis, the ever-accelerating pace of technological change and digital transformation, and delivering effectively in an unexpected climate of escalating geo-political instability.\nAs the tidal waves of ever-faster, less predictable change crash over our heads, the unelectable political maverick morphs into a popular ideological visionary. The silent majority is no longer silent. Old assumptions for government decisions are washed away in the fast-moving current of the new public information age. Reaction time for those in authority has shrunk from 24 hours to something closer to 24 minutes, as policymaking by tweet takes hold in the White House.\nThe World Economic Forum’s 2016 Global Risks Report highlighted three ‘wicked problems’: climate change, mass migration and cyber warfare. The opportunities and challenges for achieving economic growth, quality education, healthy and fulfilling lives for the coming years will be fundamentally different from those of the past. The past provides limited insight and guidance to shape the ‘World We Want’. The sheer ambition of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the volatile new reality of the 21st century call for innovative approaches to turn good policies into results for citizens. Simplistic nationalist, isolationist, protectionist, xenophobic and populist narratives are challenging governments, as stewards for the future of their nation, to sharpen their ability to look towards the future to realise the grand vision inherent in 2030 Agenda.\nIn this new environment, the quarter of a century from the end of the Cold War with the Fall of the Berlin Wall now seems, in retrospect, to have been an era of relative certainty and abnormal stability. Who could declare the ‘End of History’ with Donald Trump in the White House? The new era is more like war than peace in the number and numbing pace of events that are being unleashed; or perhaps more like the lead up to war in the late 1930s, when democratic values crumbled at the Munich Conference of September 1938. Then economic uncertainty and political instability fed off each other.\nThe same is true today. The dynamic of recent years — exceptionally high rewards for those at the top, a hollowing out of the middle class, and the expansion of low-paid insecure jobs at the bottom — seems set not just to continue but to become more pronounced. In the longer term, it is estimated that two-thirds of children that are today in primary school will enter the world of work by taking jobs that have not yet been invented.\nThe result, globally, is a pervading mood of fear for managing in choppy seas surrounded by new, uncharted and turbulent waters. Public expectations of government are rising faster than public institutions can deliver.\nYet it is only too easy to forget that huge strides have been made. Real progress is happening, sometimes at an incredible pace: Rwandans today can expect to live 32 years longer than they did in 1990 and spend twice as long at school.15 Furthermore, in almost every country, a more educated population with stronger professional organisations has fostered a vibrant civil society (and, some fear, a culture of narcissism).16 New technology creates forums for openness and citizen feedback that challenge governments’ ability to respond. As of December 2016, heads of states and governments in 173 countries are using Twitter for engaging with citizens. Facebook comes in close second with 169 governments having set up official pages on the social media platform.\nThe result, in many instances, is growing pressure to govern better. This means better regulation, less corruption and higher ethical standards in the conduct of public affairs. More and more, governments are responding to these pressures, demands and changes. Leaders realise that they cannot afford to lag behind in a world of increasingly dynamic and competitive markets, as well as pluralistic, diversified societies where higher expectations give birth to new, progressively more complex challenges.\nAll this uncertainty explains why it is important to strengthen public service. The challenges facing political and administrative leadership everywhere are already daunting and still growing.\nSeven Attacks\nIn recent decades, efforts to undermine the motivation and morale of effective and efficient public officials working for the common good have advanced on seven fronts.\nThe first is ideological. This is encapsulated in the assertion, regardless of evidence and repeated often enough to have become regarded by many as a truism, that any public service is, by its very nature, inherently incompetent, indolent and unresponsive. Of course, if this were true, it would reflect the decisions of political leaders to allow it.\nConsider post-independence Singapore, where political determination for building a highly disciplined and motivated public service has transformed the city-state.\nThe second is intellectual — and a ‘Catch 22’ conundrum. Public Choice Theory posits that Public Service is inherently self-serving and needs to be constrained, and New Public Management (NPM) propagates that it is inherently apathetic and needs to be incentivised into being effective.\nThe third is commercial — big profits are generated for consultants and the private sector by fostering the ideas of NPM: running government like a business, outsourcing services and promoting public-private partnerships.\nThe fourth is political — blaming the public service for failure offers a tempting scapegoat for politicians to deflect criticism of their own inadequate leadership and direction.\nThe fifth is financial — pay levels for professional posts in public service have lagged behind those of the private sector that either many high-skilled vacancies could not be filled or special pay arrangements were required.\nThe sixth is institutional — there has been selective truth in portraying obstructive public service unions and unhelpful ‘street-level bureaucrats’ to obscure much more positive images of devotion to public good, as famously demonstrated by the unstinting self-sacrifice of the New York Fire officers on and after 9/11.\nAnd the seventh is organisational — both elected leaders and senior administrators benefit from creating a ‘permanent revolution’ of ceaseless reforms and reorganisation of public service. Despite mounting evidence over the years that many reforms achieve almost no lasting improvements, but greatly demoralise staff, the temptation to appear to be shaking up supposedly lazy and incompetent bureaucrats is all too great. This is aggravated by the fact that in some cases senior managers themselves lack the knowledge and skills, and sometimes the willingness, to use resources efficiently.\nTackling all seven of these causes is essential if an impartial and merit-based public service is to evolve in many countries. Such public administration is essential both in itself and for the legitimacy of the state.\nBut development is hampered by the lack of a credible theory of change to explain how or why an ‘impartial, ethical, fair and meritocratic public service’ emerges, and how it can be promoted and fostered. Is public service excellence the result of efforts to make government more accountable and responsive, closer to citizens, or more efficient?\nUnfortunately, civil service reform has often failed. Three key reasons for this are: (i) excessive focus on cost-cutting irrespective of the consequences; (ii) inadequate attention to the politics; and (iii) applying ‘best practice’ rather than ‘best fit’.\nGetting to Helsinki?\nGiven the central role governments play in facilitating development, including providing public goods, addressing externalities, and laying the foundation for private property and private enterprise, improvement in public administration is essential for progress. Of course, ‘good’ governance is desirable everywhere: poverty reduction, growth, development, peace and security, free markets, transparency, property rights, the rule of law, the absence of corruption, a IVee media, free and fair elections, independent judiciaries, vibrant civil society and effective public services. If, in this vision, where all good things come together, why is every country not like Finland, where I served for three happy years as a young diplomat in the 1980s — well-run, honest and peaceful?\nWhat are the priorities? If it is necessary — even a prerequisite — for all good things to be achieved together, the task becomes overwhelming. But fortunately, history shows that that is not the case. Rather, as countries get wealthy they can in the process develop ‘good’ government. The 21st century rich world (broadly speaking, OECD countries) did not first establish liberal democracy, free markets and merit-based public services and then achieve prosperity.\nBut in all instances of successful development, an effective public service has always been essential. Governments cannot otherwise get things done, and done well. The nature of the state varies (from democratic to autocratic, from liberal to authoritarian), the role of public administration remains the same: an effective civil service promotes the public good efficiently and fairly. Improving the competence of the state can and should better the lives of its people. If, then, the challenges of reform and enhancing civil service performance are universal, every reform addresses its own context. Yet, even if the specifics to a particular environment of time and place are unique, many principles (including strengthening accountability and responsiveness), issues (such as consolidating the intrinsic motivation of civil servants) and problems (e.g. politicisation, corruption, performance measuring) are shared.\nSo public sector reform seems to be the answer, offering a temptingly simple ‘quick win’: whatever the problem might be, cuts and reorganisation seem self-evidently to be the solution. Politicians, voters, citizens and taxpayers ‘know’ with passionate certainty, regardless of the evidence that ‘bureaucrats’ waste money, are slow and incompetent. Political leaders, in echoing that, often also feel the administrative leadership is thwarting their ambitions and chances of re-election.\nThe role which only the public service can play is being reinvented. While the details may be debated, the general trajectory is becoming increasingly clear. This will require civil servants to be much more creative in handling political ambiguity, advising government ministers on policy tensions and contradictions, and delivering services to the public.\nFor the state to thrive in the coming era, it will need to work simultaneously on achieving five outcomes: (i) unlocking the creativity and collaborative spirit needed to solve complex problems; (ii) overcoming the fallacy that the private sector is inherently more innovative and efficient than the public service; (iii) creating societies that are perceived by their citizens as fair; (iv) fostering the trust of citizens in their governments; and (v) bolstering the legitimacy of the state.\nThese daunting and interconnected aims will result in a new phenomenon: the public recognition by political leaders and citizens that future prosperity, environmental sustainability and social cohesion are dependent on committed and creative civil servants passionate about promoting the long-term national interest. This is a vision of public service that is a manifesto for state-building in our era for developed and developing countries alike.\nTrusted by politicians and the people to tackle the great challenges that humanity faces in the 21st century, public service will be rejuvenated by this vision — to ‘make a difference’. The world is changing fast, and the time has come to appreciate the contribution that bureaucratic expertise must make. Yet there are, at present, probably few more unpopular tasks than praising government bureaucracy. As we will see in the following chapters, literally ever since recorded history began, with the 1st Bureaucratic Revolution, the public official has been a derided figure. This phenomenon grew in the 2nd and 3rd Bureaucratic Revolutions, as the range and reach of the state expanded. In the Soviet Union in the 1930s, the government’s own posters depicted crude caricatures of inefficient bureaucrats sleeping at their desks surrounded by piles of paper. Any failings of the state could conveniently be blamed on public officials. The nation was exhorted with slogans such as: Fight the Bureaucrats who Hinder the Workers' Efforts! Many officials ended up in Stalin’s gulags.\nYet, without committed public bureaucrats, states and markets would not function, freedoms would not be upheld, and the poor, vulnerable and oppressed would suffer more. Their role in holding the state together is rarely noted. But in 2017, although it was never written down or given a codename, France’s top officials had a detailed plan to ‘protect the Republic’ if far right leader Marine Le Pen was elected president. An unnamed senior official told the media: ‘The philosophy, and the absolute imperative, was to keep the peace, while also respecting our constitutional rules’.17 In the after-life, bureaucrats also play an important role. The Hindu God Chitragupta keeps a file on every person, recording their good and bad actions, in order to assign them to heaven or hell.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "underpins the ability of a state to deliver\nrange of existential challenges\nterror\nclimate change\nthe future of this planet\ninequality\nI\no\nt\nenergy\ncomplexity\nhigh-impact crises that suddenly\nappear out of nowhere\nA massive amount of unpredicted change\nis inevitable\ncannot otherwise get things done\nstates\nwould not function", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 3- The civil service impact- the Advantage is about courts- the card isn’t No Unique solvency internal link because they don’t make more people care about civil service- and says squo solves\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "public service is critical\nA trusted, responsive and dynamic civil service underpins the ability of a state to deliver\nCivil services ensure\ngovernments\ncan be catalysts for progress\nthe world faces a\nrange of existential challenges. From\nterror\nto\nclimate change\nproblems are daunting. The ability to harness new technologies will be essential.\nthe future of this planet\nwill put a premium on\n‘bureau-craft’\nmeasurable attributes of efficiency and effectiveness, but also such qualitative skills as empathy, emotional intelligence and ethics. The ‘passionate bureaucrat’, professional, evidence-focused, politically savvy and motivated by high ideals, must emerge to tackle the needs of a new and troubled era.\nWe live at a time of\nunprecedented pace of change\nThese include sharply growing inequality, the 4th industrial revolution\nI\no\nt\nshifts in energy supplies\nand\nthe list goes on\ncomplexity\nare creating new realities\nWhat is new in the 21st century\nis the accelerating pace of these phenomena, their impact upon each other and the unknown new realities that in combination they will create\ncomplexity is\nresponsible for the increase of\nshocks and high-impact crises that suddenly\nappear out of nowhere. A massive amount of unpredicted change of unforeseen nature and scale is inevitable. This will be a new era, featuring ‘perfect storms’,7 ‘wild cards’8 and ‘wicked problems’\nChaos is\nthe ‘new normal’.\nknown unknowns’ are combining with the ever-greater depths of uncertainty\nThese uncertainties\nrequire public administrations\nAs the tidal waves of ever-faster, less predictable change crash\nOld assumptions for government decisions are washed away in the fast-moving current\nThe W\nE\nF\nhighlighted three ‘wicked problems’: climate change, mass migration and cyber warfare\nadministration is essential\nan effective public service has always been essential. Governments cannot otherwise get things done, and done well.\nnature of the state varies\nThe role which only the public service can play is being reinvented. While the details may be debated, the general trajectory is becoming increasingly clear. This will require civil servants to be much more creative\nThe world is changing fast, and the time has come to appreciate the contribution that bureaucratic expertise must make\nwithout committed public bureaucrats, states\nwould not function", "role": "user" }, { "content": "dynamic civil service underpins the ability of a state to deliver\nCivil services ensure\nthe world faces a\nrange of existential challenges. From\nterror\nto\nclimate change\nthe future of this planet\nwill put a premium on\n‘bureau-craft’\nmeasurable attributes of efficiency and effectiveness,\nt also\nqualitative\ninequality\nI\no\nt\nenergy\nthe list goes on\ncomplexity\nare creating new realities\nthe accelerating pace\nwill create\nhigh-impact crises that suddenly\nappear out of nowhere. A massive amount of unpredicted change\nis inevitable\nThese uncertainties\nrequire public administrations\neffective public service\nGovernments cannot otherwise get things done\nnature of the state varies\nThe role which only the public service can play is being reinvented.\nThis will require civil servants to be much more creative\nwithout\npublic bureaucrats, states\nwould not function", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No extinction from ecological disaster—effects are slow and localized.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "*The Nine Planetary Boundaries Brook Et Al. Refer Too Are, “Land-Use Change, Rate of Biodiversity Loss, Phosphorus Cycle, Global Freshwater Use, Ocean Acidification, Climate Change, Stratospheric Ozone Depletion, Atmospheric Aerosol Loading, Chemical Pollution, Terrestrial Net Primary Production, and Biodiversity Intactness”\n\nAs living standards, technological capacities, and human welfare have continued to improve, concerns have mounted about possible natural limits to economic and population growth. Climate change, habitat loss, and recent extinctions are examples of impacts on natural systems that have been used as markers of global environmental degradation associated with the expanding influence of humans (Barnosky et al., 2012; McGill et al., 2015). Past civilizations have faced rapid declines and even collapsed in the face of regional environmental degradation, drought, and other environmental challenges (Scheffer, 2016; Butzer and Endfield, 2012). This begs the question of whether long-term societal relationships with the planet’s ecology may be approaching a global tipping point as the human population hurtles toward ten billion people. If this is indeed the case, the future of both biodiversity and humanity hangs in the balance. The hypothesis is that without urgent action to prevent reaching a global tipping point, the natural life support systems that sustain humanity may fail abruptly, with drastic consequences. 8.1 Regional tipping points yes— but what about global tipping points? There is strong evidence for rapid global shifts in the biosphere in the distant past, sometimes taking the form of mass extinction events, which have been linked to biophysical tipping points (Hughes et al., 2013). Tipping points occur when components of a system respond gradually to an external forcing to a point at which the response becomes nonlinear and abrupt. This response is often amplified through positive feedback interactions that induce an eventual state (or regime) shift (Lenton, 2013). Tipping points are well documented in studies of local ecosystems, such as lakes, that undergo regime shifts driven by alterations of energy or nutrient flows when thresholds are crossed and hysteresis prevails (Scheffer et al., 2015). Various tipping elements, some definite and others speculative, have also been noted in the Earth’s climate system (Lenton et al., 2008). Given this context, it would seem logical and indeed intuitive to conclude that the Earth system is susceptible and sensitive to planetary regime shifts caused by human alteration of Earth’s ecology. James Lovelock’s original Earth-system conception of “Gaia,” for instance, focused on interconnections and positive feedbacks between the geosphere and the biosphere, which act to promote stability and resilience (Lovelock and Margulis, 1974). But within this same framework, a temporary global forcing event, invoking disconnections and positive feedbacks, could lead to a rapid transition to an alternative stable state, as has been observed in many local systems (Kefi et al., 2016). This conceptual model invites the question of whether identifiable “boundaries” exist within the interacting components of the Earth system. If they do—and they are transgressed—then the planetary biosphere might be dramatically and permanently altered (Brook et al., 2013). 8.2 Planetary boundaries as a seductive policy framework The planetary boundaries concept, coined less than a decade ago (Rockström et al., 2009), represents the idea that contemporary societies have potentially transgressed the historical “natural” conditions— the “safe operating space”—under which human societies have historically thrived. However, to mark the boundaries of a planetary safe “reference state,” defined baselines are required. One possibility that has been suggested is the climatic conditions that marked the last 10 000 years of our current warm interglacial period, the Holocene, in which agricultural and urban societies first arose, should be used as a safe space (Steffen et al., 2015). Other safe spaces (or conversely boundaries) might be similarly recognized. In total, nine planetary boundaries have been hypothesized in association with Earth-system processes that, if sufficiently distorted, might potentially cause harmful changes in Earth’s functioning as a wholistic system (Table 8.1). This perspective has led some to postulate the potential breaching of critical thresholds, pushing the Earth out of the Holocene and consequently inducing a shift in the stability of the system (Barnosky et al., 2012). To quote: “Crossing these boundaries could generate abrupt or irreversible environmental changes.” (stockholmresilience.org/ research/planetary-boundaries.html). A hope often expressed is that flagging the crossing of these boundaries as a significant risk will provoke decision makers and the public into taking actions to mitigate harmful global changes (McAlpine et al., 2015). Such a framework, of global tipping points counterbalanced by secure safe spaces within planetary boundaries, is conceptually elegant and politically seductive. Notably, this implies two possible conditions—a state in which environmental change is without risk, and another in which risk is clear and action necessary. Such a framework is both constraining and liberating, and clearly defines a safe zone in which human societies may go about their activities without risk. As a consequence, if such clear knowledge on the risks of altering global environmental processes existed, a defined set of boundaries could be extremely useful to decision makers. But is there evidence of global tipping-point dynamics with safe space and global risk clearly demarcated? 8.3 The search for mechanisms and evidence in support of the nine planetary boundaries Since its original publication, the planetary boundaries framework, including the related concepts of a “safe operating space” and global regime shifts, have become increasingly prevalent in scientific and policy discussions concerned with global change (Corlett, 2015). This work has been heavily cited, updated, and actively promoted as a policy tool. But there has also been a counter-vailing critique that challenges the universality, utility, and even the underlying validity of the planetary boundaries framework (Brook and Blomqvist, 2016; Lenton and Williams, 2013). The underlying bases for this debate stem from disagreements over technical and scientific issues, including questions of scale, scientific underpinning, deterministic “boundary setting,” and the generality of mechanisms proposed. Most of the nine processes and systems listed in Table 8.1 lack theoretical mechanisms or evidence for a causal connection from local perturbations to global “boundary crossing” (Brook et al., 2013). The exceptions are the atmospheric and oceanic systems, which seem to most closely fit the characteristics required for a globally “scaled-up” version of the coupled, non-linear dynamics that have been shown to undergo phase shifts. But for others, like global land use or worldwide biodiversity, it is difficult to conceive how aggregated local-to-regional measures are representative of a coherent planetary system that is prone to tipping (Mace et al., 2014). Moreover, anthropogenic pressures vary geographically, and the system responses to stressors can be highly heterogeneous (Reyer et al., 2015). While global tipping points have been hypothesized, their exact “position” has not been determined. If the boundaries did exist at a global level, there is a good chance they could not be known until well after the regime shift or boundary crossing had occurred. This is because of our lack of our understanding of complex systems and the wild fluctuations in state variables that have occurred historically and continue to occur, without any evidence of an irreversible global collapse. Finally, implementing policies that avoid crossing planetary boundaries is a “global commons” problem, and everything we know from climate action indicates that it is difficult to generate agreements that address such risk when there is uncertainty about thresholds (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012). 8.4 The problem with going from local process to a global tipping point For at least six of the nine proposed boundaries, the operational scales of these “Earth system processes” are local or regional (Table 8.1), yet the proposed boundaries represent global aggregations (the sum of many component sub-systems). The value assigned to any particular boundary is, in virtually all cases, speculative and represents an arbitrary point along a continuum of possible values, as opposed to a phase shift due to global non-linear dynamics. The most plausible threshold is for ocean acidification, because it is directly related to the calcite and aragonite compensation depth (i.e., something that is inherently quantifiable). The others are purely supported by a statement to the effect that “this stress or change from the baseline is deemed excessive.” This lack of scientific underpinning for these boundaries raises significant questions on the biological and physical relevance of such thresholds for the Earth system. What is currently needed are explicit efforts to link long-term monitoring to the choice of these boundary values (Robert et al., 2013). Unquestioning acceptance of these boundaries that in turn guide subsequent global assessment (as in Newbold et al., 2016) will only inhibit our understanding of human impacts. In addition to masking finer-grained detail, globally averaged or aggregated metrics are also often difficult to link to directed action. For instance, the recent Paris Agreement to limit average global temperature rise to less than 2 °C above pre-industrial levels was ultimately re-framed as a plethora of national goals or aspirations based on carbon-emissions intensity (Rogelj et al., 2016). This is partly because a “global temperature,” averaged across all the Earth system, is not a real physical phenomenon or quantity observed in any place. As such, it cannot be used to guide or monitor local system states. What can be monitored and altered are the trajectories of the underlying drivers of system changes (e.g., carbon emissions intensity, in the climate case), and these therefore ought to be the domain of targets. Even if one can identify and measure a global environmental attribute, it does not automatically follow that it is associated with a real-world threshold that, when crossed, leads to irreversible change. Asserting “safe” global limits on indicators like land-use change (the boundary of a maximum of 15% of land given over to cultivation, see Table 8.1) or decline in the local species abundance of originally present species (e.g., “10% loss relative to undisturbed habitat” as is the case in Newbold et al., 2016) is totally arbitrary. Such thinking ignores inherent complexity and promotes a “one size fits all” mode of thinking for conservation management that elides the very real need for locally appropriate solutions. Trying to avoid crossing a global land-use or biodiversity boundary might also lead to perverse outcomes locally, such as if restoring a “safe level” of biodiversity intactness in the world’s most fertile and productive regions (where most food originates) triggers undesirable trade-offs such as the displacement of farming to marginal regions that require more land, greater inputs, and hardship. In the context of food production, Running (2012) recently argued that at most an additional 10% of harvestable annual net global primary production (NPP) of terrestrial plants could be co-opted for future human use without crossing out of the planetary safe space. The implications of this assertion are draconian. Global NPP has been essentially steady, even with the massive agricultural expansion that has occurred over the last century. Thus, because the allocation of NPP is essentially a zerosum activity, asserting that humans can only get at most an additional 10% of that NPP implies future shortages of food, fiber, fodder, and fuel for people (Erb et al., 2012; Lewis, 2012). Policy based on this boundary would be fraught with human suffering, while the boundary itself has little mechanistic support or clear evidence of existence. In a similar vein, seeking to achieve uniform limits on practices such as nitrogen or phosphorus fertilizer use would inevitably lead to winners and losers at local scales (de Vries et al., 2013), because of differences in soil fertility and the legacies of historical farming practices (Erb et al., 2012; Carpenter and Bennett, 2011). For instance, while nitrogen fertilizer has been over-used in many developed countries, increases are urgently needed in sub-Saharan Africa to close the yield gap (Mueller et al., 2014). Given the consistent need for regionally appropriate limits, what practical use is a globally defined boundary? 8.5 Finding the research questions in an arena that is rife with competing visions of desirable futures Planetary boundaries are typically based on biogeochemical and ecological principles. Their frame is simple: if we pass threshold “X,” then the following ecological degradation or regime shift will occur. What this framing neglects is that there are inevitable trade-offs between human development goals and environmental protection/risk. Policy based on any assumed boundary will substantially impact development options. For the most part, truly natural areas are not the main “life support systems” for humanity; instead, people rely on those ecosystems that have been modified or engineered (Ellis et al., 2013). If it comes down to a choice between improved human development and the potential risk of transgressing an uncertain (and data poor) planetary boundary, it may be that society is willing to accept that risk. Science has a vital role in guiding environmental management. Ultimately, however, science must intersect with human decisions: physical laws are not negotiable, but our response to them is (Larsen et al., 2015). Global change is not a societal construct, so we must avoid the temptation to couch scientific models as policy directives. Value judgements do (and must) play a key role in determining how people respond to global environmental challenges and the possibility of inflexible planetary boundaries. What has become starkly apparent from the debate on planetary tipping points and possible global regime changes is the need for a concerted research agenda aimed at the potential links between biophysical and social systems to determine possible boundary “positions.” This research could come in the form of: (1) empirical examinations of regime shifts (or not) under gradual degradation; (2) models that explicitly link ecosystem changes and hypothesized boundaries to specific upheavals; and (3) explorations of how the framing of a boundary influences decision makers. For instance, our approach to Earth-system simulations is sophisticated for climatic components but lacks the resolution and mechanisms needed to test ideas on the planetary interconnectedness of nutrient and energy flows, or feedbacks across global biomes (Harfoot et al., 2014). The Madingley model of ecosystem dynamics (https://madingley.github. io/about) offers one promising example of an innovative attempt in this direction, because its design goals are to explicitly capture the scaling of processes that affect biodiversity from local to global scales (Purves et al., 2013). We can also seek a better understanding of the mechanistic underpinnings of the drivers of changes in global systems, such as land-use change and agricultural intensification. This could generate empirically based “bottomup” forecasts of trajectories, which, when linked to multi-ecosystem models, should improve our forecasts of the risks of planetary state shifts (Brook and Blomqvist, 2016). One of the appeals of planetary boundaries is the hypothesis that it resonates as a narrative for environmental action. The question is: how do decision-makers respond to these boundary arguments? Some research suggests that thresholds inhibit collective actions against tragedies of the commons (Barrett and Dannenberg, 2012). This is a field ripe for theoretical and empirical study. We also need to ask the hard questions about whether conceptual models like planetary boundaries the most effective strategy and engagement tool for conservation and mitigation are. The difficulty in getting international agreement on climate targets (e.g., the 2 °C “guardrail”) is an obvious case in point (Symons and Karlsson, 2015). Perhaps focusing on planetary opportunities: leverage points for guiding global change in better directions (e.g., carbon-neutral energy systems) is potentially a more effective focus of scientific attention (DeFries et al., 2012). By focusing on something to be averted as opposed to an outcome to be achieved, we risk breeding complacency on one side of a boundary, and hopelessness on the other. To summarize the above: the biosphere, and much of the geosphere, responds to external pressures in many and varied ways. The global human enterprise is driving large-scale changes in most components of the Earth system, but in a haphazard fashion, with responses often being weakly connected or transmitted slowly at a cross-continental scale. What we observe, for the global processes compiled in Table 8.1, is largely just the sum of all those changes. Acknowledging this reality should not be taken as diminishing the seriousness of these impacts or denying that major changes are occurring to the biosphere, atmosphere, and hydrosphere due to human activity. But it does make it implausible that the planet, or indeed most of its component systems, are primed to tip irreversibly to a radically different state that is inhospitable. Although the goal of sustainable stewardship of our planet is a laudable and an achievable one, the mechanisms and opportunities to conserve biodiversity and ecosystems lie mostly in targeted, localized actions (Jonas et al., 2014).\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "As living standards\nand human welfare have continued to improve, concerns have mounted about possible natural limits to economic\ngrowth.\nThis begs the question of whether long-term societal relationships with the planet’s ecology may be approaching a global tipping point as the human population hurtles toward ten billion people.\nThere is strong evidence for rapid global shifts in the biosphere in the distant past\ntaking the form of mass extinction events\nit would seem logical and indeed intuitive to conclude that the Earth system is susceptible and sensitive to planetary regime shifts caused by human alteration\nThe\nboundaries concept, coined less than a decade ago\nrepresents the idea that\nsocieties have\ntransgressed the historical “natural” conditions— the “safe operating space”—under which human societies have\nthrived. However, to mark the boundaries\n“reference state,” defined baselines are required.\nis there evidence of global tipping-point\nwith safe space and global risk\ndemarcated?\nThe search for mechanisms and evidence in support of the nine\nboundaries Since its original publication\nincluding the related concepts of a “safe operating space” and global regime shifts, have become\nprevalent in scientific\ndiscussions concerned with global change\nThis work has been heavily cited,\nMost of the nine processes and systems listed in\nlack theoretical mechanisms or evidence for a causal connection from local perturbations to global “boundary crossing”\nit is difficult to conceive how aggregated local-to-regional measures are representative of a coherent\nsystem that is prone to tipping\nanthropogenic pressures vary geographically, and the\nresponses to stressors can be\nheterogeneous\nWhile global tipping points have been hypothesized, their exact “position” has not been determined. If the boundaries did exist at a global level\nThis is because of our lack of our understanding of complex systems and the wild fluctuations in state variables that have occurred\nwithout any evidence of an irreversible global collapse\nThe problem with going from local process to a global tipping point\nthe operational scales of these “Earth system processes” are local or regional\nthe proposed boundaries represent global aggregations\nThe value assigned\nis\nspeculative and\nan arbitrary point\nas opposed to a phase shift due to global non-linear dynamics.\nsupported by a statement to the effect that “this stress or change from the baseline is deemed excessive.” This lack of scientific underpinning for these boundaries raises significant questions on the biological\nrelevance of such thresholds for the Earth\nacceptance of these boundaries\nwill\ninhibit our understanding of human impacts.\nEven if one can\nmeasure a global environmental attribute, it does not\nfollow that it is associated with a real-world threshold that, when crossed, leads to irreversible change. Asserting “safe” global limits on\nor decline in the local species abundance\nignores inherent complexity and promotes\n “one size fits all” mode of thinking for conservation management that elides the very real need for locally appropriate solutions.\nTheir frame is simple: if we pass threshold “X,” then the following ecological degradation\nwill occur.\nIf it comes down to a choice between improved human development and the potential risk of transgressing an uncertain (and data poor)\nboundary, it may be that society is willing to accept that risk.\nOne of the appeals of planetary boundaries is\nthat it resonates as a narrative for environmental action\nthe biosphere, and much of the geosphere, responds to external pressures in\nvaried ways. The global human enterprise is driving large-scale changes\nbut in a haphazard fashion, with responses\nweakly connected or transmitted slowly at a cross-continental scale\nBut it does make it implausible that the planet, or indeed most of its component systems, are primed to tip irreversibly to a radically different state that is inhospitable.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No extinction from ecological disaster—effects are slow and localized.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "As living standards\nand human welfare have continued to improve, concerns have mounted about possible natural limits to economic\ngrowth.\nThis begs the question of whether long-term societal relationships with the planet’s ecology may be approaching a global tipping point as the human population hurtles toward ten billion people.\nThere is strong evidence for rapid global shifts in the biosphere in the distant past\ntaking the form of mass extinction events\nit would seem logical and indeed intuitive to conclude that the Earth system is susceptible and sensitive to planetary regime shifts caused by human alteration\nThe\nboundaries concept, coined less than a decade ago\nrepresents the idea that\nsocieties have\ntransgressed the historical “natural” conditions— the “safe operating space”—under which human societies have\nthrived. However, to mark the boundaries\n“reference state,” defined baselines are required.\nis there evidence of global tipping-point\nwith safe space and global risk\ndemarcated?\nThe search for mechanisms and evidence in support of the nine\nboundaries Since its original publication\nincluding the related concepts of a “safe operating space” and global regime shifts, have become\nprevalent in scientific\ndiscussions concerned with global change\nThis work has been heavily cited,\nMost of the nine processes and systems listed in\nlack theoretical mechanisms or evidence for a causal connection from local perturbations to global “boundary crossing”\nit is difficult to conceive how aggregated local-to-regional measures are representative of a coherent\nsystem that is prone to tipping\nanthropogenic pressures vary geographically, and the\nresponses to stressors can be\nheterogeneous\nWhile global tipping points have been hypothesized, their exact “position” has not been determined. If the boundaries did exist at a global level\nThis is because of our lack of our understanding of complex systems and the wild fluctuations in state variables that have occurred\nwithout any evidence of an irreversible global collapse\nThe problem with going from local process to a global tipping point\nthe operational scales of these “Earth system processes” are local or regional\nthe proposed boundaries represent global aggregations\nThe value assigned\nis\nspeculative and\nan arbitrary point\nas opposed to a phase shift due to global non-linear dynamics.\nsupported by a statement to the effect that “this stress or change from the baseline is deemed excessive.” This lack of scientific underpinning for these boundaries raises significant questions on the biological\nrelevance of such thresholds for the Earth\nacceptance of these boundaries\nwill\ninhibit our understanding of human impacts.\nEven if one can\nmeasure a global environmental attribute, it does not\nfollow that it is associated with a real-world threshold that, when crossed, leads to irreversible change. Asserting “safe” global limits on\nor decline in the local species abundance\nignores inherent complexity and promotes\n “one size fits all” mode of thinking for conservation management that elides the very real need for locally appropriate solutions.\nTheir frame is simple: if we pass threshold “X,” then the following ecological degradation\nwill occur.\nIf it comes down to a choice between improved human development and the potential risk of transgressing an uncertain (and data poor)\nboundary, it may be that society is willing to accept that risk.\nOne of the appeals of planetary boundaries is\nthat it resonates as a narrative for environmental action\nthe biosphere, and much of the geosphere, responds to external pressures in\nvaried ways. The global human enterprise is driving large-scale changes\nbut in a haphazard fashion, with responses\nweakly connected or transmitted slowly at a cross-continental scale\nBut it does make it implausible that the planet, or indeed most of its component systems, are primed to tip irreversibly to a radically different state that is inhospitable.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "living standards\nhuman welfare\npossible natural limits\ngrowth\nbegs the question of whether\nbe approaching a global tipping point\nten billion people\nrapid global shifts\ndistant past\nmass extinction events\nlogical and indeed intuitive\nEarth system is susceptible\nplanetary regime shifts\nhuman alteration\nboundaries concept\nsocieties\nhistorical “natural” conditions\n“safe operating space”\nhuman societies\nthrived\nmark the boundaries\nbaselines are required\nevidence of global tipping-point\nsafe space and global risk\ndemarcated?\nmechanisms and evidence\nnine\nboundaries\noriginal publication\nrelated\n“safe operating space”\nglobal regime shifts\nscientific\ndiscussions\nhas been heavily cited\nnine processes\nlisted\ntheoretical mechanisms\nevidence\ncausal connection\nlocal perturbations\nglobal “boundary crossing”\nlocal-to-regional measures\nrepresentative\nprone to tipping\nanthropogenic pressures vary geographically\nresponses to stressors\nheterogeneous\nbeen hypothesized\nexact “position”\nexist at a global level\nlack of our understanding\ncomplex systems\nwild fluctuations in state variables\nevidence of an irreversible global collapse\ngoing from local process\nglobal tipping point\n“Earth system processes”\nlocal or regional\nproposed\nglobal aggregations\nassigned\nis\nspeculative\nan arbitrary point\nphase shift\nglobal non-linear dynamics\nstatement to the\nbaseline is deemed excessive.”\nscientific underpinning\nboundaries\nsignificant questions\nrelevance of such thresholds\nthese boundaries\nhuman impacts\nmeasure a global environmental attribute\nreal-world threshold that\nirreversible change\n“safe” global limits\nlocal species abundance\ninherent complexity\n“one size fits all”\nif we pass threshold “X,”\necological degradation\ndown to a choice\nhuman development\npotential risk\nuncertain (and data poor)\nsociety is willing to accept\nplanetary boundaries\na narrative for environmental action\nexternal pressures\nvaried ways\ndriving large-scale changes\nhaphazard fashion\nweakly connected\ntransmitted slowly\ncross-continental scale\nmake it implausible that the planet\nto tip irreversibly\nradically different state\ninhospitable", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No extinction from ecological disaster—effects are slow and localized.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.1", "role": "system" }, { "content": "As living standards\nand human welfare have continued to improve, concerns have mounted about possible natural limits to economic\ngrowth.\nThis begs the question of whether long-term societal relationships with the planet’s ecology may be approaching a global tipping point as the human population hurtles toward ten billion people.\nThere is strong evidence for rapid global shifts in the biosphere in the distant past\ntaking the form of mass extinction events\nit would seem logical and indeed intuitive to conclude that the Earth system is susceptible and sensitive to planetary regime shifts caused by human alteration\nThe\nboundaries concept, coined less than a decade ago\nrepresents the idea that\nsocieties have\ntransgressed the historical “natural” conditions— the “safe operating space”—under which human societies have\nthrived. However, to mark the boundaries\n“reference state,” defined baselines are required.\nis there evidence of global tipping-point\nwith safe space and global risk\ndemarcated?\nThe search for mechanisms and evidence in support of the nine\nboundaries Since its original publication\nincluding the related concepts of a “safe operating space” and global regime shifts, have become\nprevalent in scientific\ndiscussions concerned with global change\nThis work has been heavily cited,\nMost of the nine processes and systems listed in\nlack theoretical mechanisms or evidence for a causal connection from local perturbations to global “boundary crossing”\nit is difficult to conceive how aggregated local-to-regional measures are representative of a coherent\nsystem that is prone to tipping\nanthropogenic pressures vary geographically, and the\nresponses to stressors can be\nheterogeneous\nWhile global tipping points have been hypothesized, their exact “position” has not been determined. If the boundaries did exist at a global level\nThis is because of our lack of our understanding of complex systems and the wild fluctuations in state variables that have occurred\nwithout any evidence of an irreversible global collapse\nThe problem with going from local process to a global tipping point\nthe operational scales of these “Earth system processes” are local or regional\nthe proposed boundaries represent global aggregations\nThe value assigned\nis\nspeculative and\nan arbitrary point\nas opposed to a phase shift due to global non-linear dynamics.\nsupported by a statement to the effect that “this stress or change from the baseline is deemed excessive.” This lack of scientific underpinning for these boundaries raises significant questions on the biological\nrelevance of such thresholds for the Earth\nacceptance of these boundaries\nwill\ninhibit our understanding of human impacts.\nEven if one can\nmeasure a global environmental attribute, it does not\nfollow that it is associated with a real-world threshold that, when crossed, leads to irreversible change. Asserting “safe” global limits on\nor decline in the local species abundance\nignores inherent complexity and promotes\n “one size fits all” mode of thinking for conservation management that elides the very real need for locally appropriate solutions.\nTheir frame is simple: if we pass threshold “X,” then the following ecological degradation\nwill occur.\nIf it comes down to a choice between improved human development and the potential risk of transgressing an uncertain (and data poor)\nboundary, it may be that society is willing to accept that risk.\nOne of the appeals of planetary boundaries is\nthat it resonates as a narrative for environmental action\nthe biosphere, and much of the geosphere, responds to external pressures in\nvaried ways. The global human enterprise is driving large-scale changes\nbut in a haphazard fashion, with responses\nweakly connected or transmitted slowly at a cross-continental scale\nBut it does make it implausible that the planet, or indeed most of its component systems, are primed to tip irreversibly to a radically different state that is inhospitable.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "natural limits\nbegs the question of\na global tipping point\nthe nine processes\nlack\nevidence for a causal connection from local perturbations to global\ncrossing”\nbecause\nof complex systems and\nwild fluctuations\nirreversible global collapse\nis\nspeculative and\narbitrary\nThis\nraises\nquestions on the biological\nrelevance of such thresholds\nignores inherent complexity and promotes\n “one size fits all”\n. The global\nenterprise is driving\nchanges\nBut it does make it implausible that\nsystems, are primed to tip irreversibly to a\nstate that is inhospitable.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Soko prolif now.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The alliance with the United States has allowed South Korea to build a powerful democracy, its citizens confident that Washington would protect them if Pyongyang ever acted on its dream of unifying the Korean Peninsula under its own rule. Until now. With dozens of nukes in North Korea’s burgeoning arsenal, repeated threats to launch them at its enemies, and a stream of tests of powerful missiles designed to pinpoint target a U.S. city with a nuclear strike, a growing number of South Koreans are losing faith in America’s vow to back its longtime ally. The fear is this: That a U.S. president would hesitate to use nuclear weapons to defend the South from a North Korean attack knowing that Pyongyang could kill millions of Americans with atomic retaliation. Frequent polls show a strong majority of South Koreans — between 70% and 80% in some surveys — support their nation acquiring atomic weapons or urging Washington to bring back the tactical nuclear weapons it removed from the South in the early 1990s. It reflects a surprising erosion of trust between nations that like to call their alliance an unshakable cornerstone of America’s military presence in the region. “I think one day they can abandon us and go their own way if that better serves their national interests,” Kim Bang-rak, a 76-year-old security guard in Seoul, said of the United States. “If North Korea bombs us, we should bomb them equally in retaliation, so it would be better for us to have nukes.” Underscoring those fears: Just hours before the U.S.-South Korean tank drills began in Cheorwon, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un oversaw two ballistic missile test launches meant to simulate “scorched earth” nuclear strikes on South Korean command centers and airfields. At the heart of South Korean unease is a broader debate over who gets to have nuclear weapons, a question that has anguished nations since two U.S. nuclear bombs flattened Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The sharp rise in support for South Korean nuclear weapons is not occurring in a vacuum. Nonproliferation experts say a vibrant global nuclear arms race shows little sign of slowing. Nine countries — the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel — spent nearly $83 billion in 2022 on nuclear weapons, according to a recent report by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. That was an increase of $2.5 billion from 2021, with the United States alone spending $43.7 billion. How South Korea deals with the nuclear question could have major implications for Asia’s future, potentially jeopardizing the U.S.-South Korean alliance and threatening a delicate nuclear balance that has so far kept an uneasy peace in a dangerous region. * * * Ironclad. That was how the United States has long described its commitment to South Korea should a war begin. U.S. officials are adamant that any attack on Seoul by North Korea’s 1.2 million-member military would be met with an overwhelming response. The United States, bound by treaty to defend Seoul and Tokyo, stations 28,500 troops in South Korea and another 56,000 in Japan. Tens of thousands of Americans live in greater Seoul, a sprawling area of 24 million people about an hour’s drive from the inter-Korean border. “The ironclad commitment is not just words; it’s a reality. We’ve got thousands of troops right there,” Gen. Mark Milley, who was then the top U.S. military officer, recently told reporters in Tokyo. An attack, said the now-retired Milley, “would spell the end of North Korea.” Asked about the South Korean public’s support for creating its own nuclear force, Milley said, “The United States would prefer nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. We think they’re inherently dangerous, obviously. And we have extended our nuclear umbrella to both Japan and South Korea.” South Korean Defense Minister Shin Wonsik said recently that he and his U.S. counterpart signed a document in which Washington agreed to mobilize its full range of military capabilities, including nuclear, to defend the South from a North Korean nuclear attack. Many in Seoul, however, would prefer nuclear weapons of their own. North Korea’s only advantage over the South’s high-tech military is nuclear bombs, Kim Taeil, a recent university graduate, said in an interview. “So if South Korea gets nuclear weapons, we’ll secure an advantageous position where North Korea can’t rival us.” * * * While the idea of South Korea pursuing its own nukes has been around for decades, it was rarely mentioned in public by senior government officials. That changed in January when conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol said that his nation could “acquire our own nukes if the situation gets worse.” “It would not take long,” he said, while also raising the possibility of requesting that the United States reintroduce nuclear weapons into South Korea. At an April summit in Washington, Yoon and President Joe Biden took steps to address such South Korean worries. The result was the Washington Declaration, in which Seoul pledged to remain in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear weapons state, and the United States said it would strengthen consultations on nuclear planning with its ally. It also said it would send more nuclear assets to the Korean Peninsula as a show of force. Not long after the meeting, the USS Kentucky became the first nuclear-armed U.S. submarine to visit South Korea since the 1980s. Opponents of South Korea obtaining nuclear weapons said they hope the declaration will reassure a nervous public. “No one can tell 100% for sure” whether a U.S. president would order nuclear strikes to defend Seoul if it meant the destruction of an American city, Wi Sung-lac, a former South Korean nuclear envoy, said in an interview at his Seoul office. That was why the greater consultations called for between the allies in the Washington Declaration are needed to “manage the situation (so) we can tone down public anger and frustration,” he said. Part of the worry in Seoul can be traced to the presidency of Donald Trump — and to his possible reelection in 2024. Trump, as president, repeatedly suggested that the alliance, far from “ironclad,” was transactional. Even as he sought closer ties with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Trump demanded South Korea pay billions more to keep American troops on its soil and questioned the need for U.S. military exercises with South Korea, calling them “very provocative” and “tremendously expensive.” “No matter how strong of a security commitment President Biden makes now, if someone who espouses isolationism and an America-first policy becomes the next U.S. president, Biden’s current commitment can become a mere scrap of paper overnight,” Cheong Seong-Chang, an analyst at the private Sejong Institute in South Korea, said in an interview. * * * South Korean support for nuclear bombs can also be linked to North Korea’s extraordinary weapons advancements and to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. North Korea first tested an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the U.S. mainland in 2017. While the North is still working to overcome technological hurdles with its ICBMs, the weapons have fundamentally changed the region’s security calculus. One of the poorest countries on Earth, North Korea may now have an arsenal of 60 nuclear weapons and has declared that it is deploying “tactical” missiles along the Korean border, implying its intent to arm them with lower-yield nuclear weapons. While the Koreas have avoided major conflict since the end of the Korean War in 1953, deadly skirmishes and attacks in recent years have killed dozens. If future violence escalates, some observers believe that North Korea, outmatched by U.S. and South Korean firepower and fearing for the safety of its leadership, could resort to using a tactical nuclear bomb. “There is probably no conventional-only scenario in Korea anymore,” according to Robert Kelly, a political science professor at Pusan National University in the South. “North Korea would rapidly lose a conventional conflict. Pyongyang knows this, dramatically raising the likelihood it will use nuclear weapons first, at least tactically.” Russia’s war against Ukraine may also be showing South Koreans that even friendly nations may hesitate to fully help a country battling a nuclear-armed enemy. Kim’s visit earlier in 2023 to Russia, where he met President Vladimir Putin and toured weapons facilities, has raised fears that North Korea could receive technology that would boost its nuclear program. “We absolutely need nuclear weapons. Basically, peace can be maintained only when we have equal power to (our enemy’s),” Kim Joung-hyun, a 46-year-old office worker in Seoul, said. “If you look at the Russian-Ukraine war, Ukraine can’t handle the Russian invasion on its own, other than begging for weapons from other countries.”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The alliance with the U\nS\nhas allowed So\nKo\nto build a powerful democracy\nUntil now\nWith dozens of nukes in No\nKo\n’s burgeoning arsenal\nrepeated threats to launch\nand a stream of tests\nSouth Koreans are losing faith in America’s vow\na U.S. president would hesitate to use nuc\ns to defend the South\nattack knowing that Pyongyang could kill millions\nwith atomic retaliation.\na strong majority of South Koreans\n80%\nsupport their nation acquiring atomic weapons\nIt reflects a surprising erosion of trust\nNonprolif\nsay a\nglobal nuclear arms race shows little sign of slowing\nSeoul\nwould prefer nuc\ns of their own\nPart of the worry in Seoul can be traced to the presidency of\nTrump\nTrump\nrepeatedly suggested that the alliance, far from “ironclad,” was transactional\nEven as he sought closer ties with\nKim\nTrump demanded South Korea pay billions more to keep American troops\nNo matter how strong of a security commitment\nBiden makes now, if\nAmerica-first\nbecomes the next U.S. president, Biden’s current commitment can become a mere scrap of paper overnight\nSouth Korean support for nuclear bombs can also be linked to No\nKo\n’s\nadvancements and\nUkraine\nUkraine may\nbe showing South Koreans that even friendly nations may hesitate to fully help a country battling a nuclear\nenemy\nWe absolutely need nuc\ns", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Soko prolif now.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The alliance with the U\nS\nhas allowed So\nKo\nto build a powerful democracy\nUntil now\nWith dozens of nukes in No\nKo\n’s burgeoning arsenal\nrepeated threats to launch\nand a stream of tests\nSouth Koreans are losing faith in America’s vow\na U.S. president would hesitate to use nuc\ns to defend the South\nattack knowing that Pyongyang could kill millions\nwith atomic retaliation.\na strong majority of South Koreans\n80%\nsupport their nation acquiring atomic weapons\nIt reflects a surprising erosion of trust\nNonprolif\nsay a\nglobal nuclear arms race shows little sign of slowing\nSeoul\nwould prefer nuc\ns of their own\nPart of the worry in Seoul can be traced to the presidency of\nTrump\nTrump\nrepeatedly suggested that the alliance, far from “ironclad,” was transactional\nEven as he sought closer ties with\nKim\nTrump demanded South Korea pay billions more to keep American troops\nNo matter how strong of a security commitment\nBiden makes now, if\nAmerica-first\nbecomes the next U.S. president, Biden’s current commitment can become a mere scrap of paper overnight\nSouth Korean support for nuclear bombs can also be linked to No\nKo\n’s\nadvancements and\nUkraine\nUkraine may\nbe showing South Koreans that even friendly nations may hesitate to fully help a country battling a nuclear\nenemy\nWe absolutely need nuc\ns", "role": "user" }, { "content": "So\nKo\nUntil now\ndozens of nukes\nNo\nKo\n’s burgeoning arsenal\nlosing faith\nhesitate\nuse nuc\ns\nkill millions\natomic\nstrong majority\n80%\nacquiring atomic weapons\nnuc\ns\nTrump\ntransactional\ncloser ties\nKim\nbillions more\nhow strong\nBiden\nAmerica-first\nbecome a mere scrap of paper overnight\nNo\nKo\n’s\nUkraine\nUkraine\nnuclear\nenemy\nabsolutely need nuc\ns", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Soko prolif now.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.6", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The alliance with the U\nS\nhas allowed So\nKo\nto build a powerful democracy\nUntil now\nWith dozens of nukes in No\nKo\n’s burgeoning arsenal\nrepeated threats to launch\nand a stream of tests\nSouth Koreans are losing faith in America’s vow\na U.S. president would hesitate to use nuc\ns to defend the South\nattack knowing that Pyongyang could kill millions\nwith atomic retaliation.\na strong majority of South Koreans\n80%\nsupport their nation acquiring atomic weapons\nIt reflects a surprising erosion of trust\nNonprolif\nsay a\nglobal nuclear arms race shows little sign of slowing\nSeoul\nwould prefer nuc\ns of their own\nPart of the worry in Seoul can be traced to the presidency of\nTrump\nTrump\nrepeatedly suggested that the alliance, far from “ironclad,” was transactional\nEven as he sought closer ties with\nKim\nTrump demanded South Korea pay billions more to keep American troops\nNo matter how strong of a security commitment\nBiden makes now, if\nAmerica-first\nbecomes the next U.S. president, Biden’s current commitment can become a mere scrap of paper overnight\nSouth Korean support for nuclear bombs can also be linked to No\nKo\n’s\nadvancements and\nUkraine\nUkraine may\nbe showing South Koreans that even friendly nations may hesitate to fully help a country battling a nuclear\nenemy\nWe absolutely need nuc\ns", "role": "user" }, { "content": "With dozens of nukes in No\nKo\n’s\narsenal\nrepeated threats to launch\nand a stream of tests\nSouth Koreans are losing faith in America’s vow\na U.S. president would hesitate to use nuc\ns to defend the South\nknowing\nPyongyang could kill millions\nwith atomic retaliation\n80%\nsupport their nation acquiring atomic weapons\nSeoul\nprefer nuc\ns of their own\nTrump\nsuggested\nthe alliance\nwas transactional\nhe sought closer ties with\nKim\ndemanded So\nKo\npay billions more to keep\ntroops\nNo matter how strong\na\ncommitment\nBiden makes now, if\nAmerica-first\nbecomes the next\npresident\nBiden’s\ncommitment can become a mere scrap of paper overnight\nsupport\ncan\nbe linked to No\nKo\n’s\nadvancements and\nUkraine\nshowing So\nKo\neven friendly nations may hesitate to\nhelp a country battling a nuclear\nenemy", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Expanding AI duties will be co-opted to expand embryonic personhood", "role": "system" }, { "content": "2. EXPANDING STANDING TO OTHER NONHUMAN, NONNATURAL RESOURCES\nEven in 1972, Stone recognized that expanding standing to the natural objects could lead to the slippery slope expansion of standing to other nonhuman entities, such as computers.74 Can we envision a future where our laptops or smart phones or other wonders of modern technological advances could bring claims against humans, or one another, in courts? Could a virus-infected operating system bring a lawsuit against the programmer who created the virus? And, most certainly, expanding non-human standing could have huge effect on the abortion question and fetus rights adjudication. Although attempts to create a guardianship for embryos and fetuses in order to represent rights of the unborn is not a novel idea, expanded standing for resources grounded on the existence of a newly recognized legal right, coupled with the elimination of an anthropocentric injury-in-fact requirement, could conceivably give those zygote-embryo-fetus claims momentum. The right of nonuse proposed here should be limited to natural and environmental resources whose nonuse component is endangered by human use.75 Neither computers nor embryos have Jan a similar nonuse dimension, and therefore the arguments advanced here do not logically extend to nonnatural resources.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "expanding standing to the natural objects could lead to the slippery slope expansion\nto other nonhuman entities\nexpanding non-human standing could have huge effect on the abortion question and fetus rights adjudication\nAlthough attempts to create a guardianship for embryos and fetuses\nis not a novel idea\nexpanded standing for resources grounded on the existence of a newly recognized legal right\ncoupled with the elimination of an anthropocentric injury-in-fact requirement\ncould conceivably give those zygote-embryo-fetus claims momentum", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Expanding AI duties will be co-opted to expand embryonic personhood", "role": "system" }, { "content": "2. EXPANDING STANDING TO OTHER NONHUMAN, NONNATURAL RESOURCES\nEven in 1972, Stone recognized that expanding standing to the natural objects could lead to the slippery slope expansion of standing to other nonhuman entities, such as computers.74 Can we envision a future where our laptops or smart phones or other wonders of modern technological advances could bring claims against humans, or one another, in courts? Could a virus-infected operating system bring a lawsuit against the programmer who created the virus? And, most certainly, expanding non-human standing could have huge effect on the abortion question and fetus rights adjudication. Although attempts to create a guardianship for embryos and fetuses in order to represent rights of the unborn is not a novel idea, expanded standing for resources grounded on the existence of a newly recognized legal right, coupled with the elimination of an anthropocentric injury-in-fact requirement, could conceivably give those zygote-embryo-fetus claims momentum. The right of nonuse proposed here should be limited to natural and environmental resources whose nonuse component is endangered by human use.75 Neither computers nor embryos have Jan a similar nonuse dimension, and therefore the arguments advanced here do not logically extend to nonnatural resources.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "natural objects\nslippery slope expansion\nnon-human standing\nhuge effect\nabortion question\nfetus rights\nexpanded standing\nnewly\nlegal right\nelimination\ninjury-in-fact\nconceivably\nzygote-embryo-fetus\nmomentum", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Expanding AI duties will be co-opted to expand embryonic personhood\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.6", "role": "system" }, { "content": "2. EXPANDING STANDING TO OTHER NONHUMAN, NONNATURAL RESOURCES\nEven in 1972, Stone recognized that expanding standing to the natural objects could lead to the slippery slope expansion of standing to other nonhuman entities, such as computers.74 Can we envision a future where our laptops or smart phones or other wonders of modern technological advances could bring claims against humans, or one another, in courts? Could a virus-infected operating system bring a lawsuit against the programmer who created the virus? And, most certainly, expanding non-human standing could have huge effect on the abortion question and fetus rights adjudication. Although attempts to create a guardianship for embryos and fetuses in order to represent rights of the unborn is not a novel idea, expanded standing for resources grounded on the existence of a newly recognized legal right, coupled with the elimination of an anthropocentric injury-in-fact requirement, could conceivably give those zygote-embryo-fetus claims momentum. The right of nonuse proposed here should be limited to natural and environmental resources whose nonuse component is endangered by human use.75 Neither computers nor embryos have Jan a similar nonuse dimension, and therefore the arguments advanced here do not logically extend to nonnatural resources.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "expanding standing to\nnatural objects\nlead to\nslippery slope expansion\nto other nonhuman entities\nexpanding non-human standing could have huge effect on\nfetus rights\nexpanded standing\ngrounded on the existence of a newly recognized legal right\ncoupled with\nelimination of\ninjury-in-fact\ncould conceivably give\nzygote-embryo-fetus claims momentum", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Their deterrent effect signals willingness and cements credibility.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nSLCM-N AND ALLIED ASSURANCE\nAllies may question the credibility of a U.S. response to limited employment of nuclear weapons in Europe or the Indo-Pacific using its high-yield, strategic nuclear forces. They may also question U.S. assurance commitments in general should the United States ignore the growing disparity with Russia and China. A nuclear capability that can be deployed in allies’ own regions can help reinforce that the United States is committed to the extension of its nuclear umbrella. Additionally, because it is sea-based, the SLCM-N can provide this benefit without the need for additional basing requirements. For this reason, NATO and Pacific allies would likely support the SLCM-N because it would improve deterrence of their aggressive neighbors without provoking domestic protests against nuclear weapons basing.\nMaintaining allied confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella is critical as allies in Europe, and even more so the Indo-Pacific, become increasingly threatened by Russian and Chinese aggression. For instance, former commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Philip Davidson predicts that China could invade Taiwan within the next six years. At the same time, allies have reason to doubt U.S. commitments to extended deterrence, as the United States has sought to minimize its role in the world over the course of recent administrations. If the United States cannot modernize and maintain force levels of its own nuclear forces, allies will likely question the U.S. commitment to maintaining a nuclear force capable of deterring attacks against allies as well. Especially as allies such as Japan and South Korea have the technical capabilities to produce their own nuclear weapons, the United States must ensure its extended deterrence commitment remains credible. Developing the SLCM-N would aid in this effort.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Allies may question the credibility of a U.S. response to limited employment of nuc\ns in Europe or the Indo-Pac\nusing its high-yield, strategic nuc\ns\nThey may\nquestion U.S. assurance commitments in general should the U\nS\nignore the growing disparity with Russia and China\ncapability\ndeployed in allies’ own regions can help reinforce that the U\nS\nis committed to the extension of its nuclear umbrella\nbecause it is sea-based, the SLCM-N can provide this benefit without the need for additional basing requirements\nNATO and Pacific allies would likely support the SLCM-N because it would improve deterrence of their aggressive neighbors without provoking domestic protests against nuclear weapons basing\nallies will likely question the U.S. commitment to maintaining a nuclear force capable of deterring attacks against allies as well\nEspecially as allies such as Japan and So\nKo\nhave the tech\ncapabilities to produce their own nuc\ns", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Their deterrent effect signals willingness and cements credibility.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Allies may question the credibility of a U.S. response to limited employment of nuc\ns in Europe or the Indo-Pac\nusing its high-yield, strategic nuc\ns\nThey may\nquestion U.S. assurance commitments in general should the U\nS\nignore the growing disparity with Russia and China\ncapability\ndeployed in allies’ own regions can help reinforce that the U\nS\nis committed to the extension of its nuclear umbrella\nbecause it is sea-based, the SLCM-N can provide this benefit without the need for additional basing requirements\nNATO and Pacific allies would likely support the SLCM-N because it would improve deterrence of their aggressive neighbors without provoking domestic protests against nuclear weapons basing\nallies will likely question the U.S. commitment to maintaining a nuclear force capable of deterring attacks against allies as well\nEspecially as allies such as Japan and So\nKo\nhave the tech\ncapabilities to produce their own nuc\ns", "role": "user" }, { "content": "question\ncredibility\nlimited employment\nnuc\ns\nEurope\nIndo-Pac\nhigh-yield\nnuc\ns\nassurance commitments\ngeneral\nU\nS\nRussia\nChina\nallies’ own regions\nreinforce\nU\nS\nnuclear umbrella\nsea-based\nadditional\nrequirements\nsupport\nSLCM-N\nimprove deterrence\nwithout\nprotests\nnuclear weapons basing\nquestion\ncommitment\nnuclear force\ndeterring\nJapan\nSo\nKo\ntech\nown nuc\ns", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Their deterrent effect signals willingness and cements credibility.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Allies may question the credibility of a U.S. response to limited employment of nuc\ns in Europe or the Indo-Pac\nusing its high-yield, strategic nuc\ns\nThey may\nquestion U.S. assurance commitments in general should the U\nS\nignore the growing disparity with Russia and China\ncapability\ndeployed in allies’ own regions can help reinforce that the U\nS\nis committed to the extension of its nuclear umbrella\nbecause it is sea-based, the SLCM-N can provide this benefit without the need for additional basing requirements\nNATO and Pacific allies would likely support the SLCM-N because it would improve deterrence of their aggressive neighbors without provoking domestic protests against nuclear weapons basing\nallies will likely question the U.S. commitment to maintaining a nuclear force capable of deterring attacks against allies as well\nEspecially as allies such as Japan and So\nKo\nhave the tech\ncapabilities to produce their own nuc\ns", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Allies may question\nassurance\nshould the U\nS\nignore the\ndisparity with Russia and China\ncapability\ndeployed in allies’ own regions\nreinforce that the U\nS\nis committed to the extension of its nuclear umbrella\nbecause it is sea-based, the SLCM-N\nprovide this\nwithout provoking\nprotests against\nbasing\nallies such as Japan and So\nKo\nhave the\ncapabilities to produce their own nuc\ns", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: a---The Philippines---entrapment fears outweigh.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Despite the pro-U.S. sentiment and the recent trend of improving U.S.-Philippine ties, as long as Manila views regional dynamics like the Duterte administration has, it is extremely unlikely that Manila would host U.S. GBIRMs. When the United States withdrew from the INF Treaty — despite stating that it was interested in developing only conventionally armed GBIRMs — Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana lamented the U.S. move as potentially “. . . trigger[ing] a nuclear arms race around the world.”44 He also signaled the reluctance of the Philippines to host U.S. GBIRMs for fear of making the Philippines a target of China, saying, “Should there be a shooting war and nuclear weapons would be used, I think the Philippines would be a fair target for anybody who’s against the United States.”45 Although not directly referring to GBIRMs, Lorenzana has also expressed his fear of U.S. actions dragging the Philippines into war with China. In speaking about U.S. naval activities in the South China Sea, Lorenzana said, “It is not the lack of reassurance that worries me. . . . It is being involved in a war that we do not seek and do not want.”46 Given that any agreement by the Philippines to host U.S. GBIRMs would provoke a strong response from China, Lorenzana’s sentiment is also applicable to hosting such capabilities, since their usage could potentially involve the Philippines in a conflict of which it is not a direct participant.\nDuterte has also expressed reluctance. He has stated not only his refusal to host a permanent U.S. presence but also his refusal to host U.S. GBIRMs. Referencing troops, Duterte said, “. . . you have my solemn promise that I will never allow any foreign troops. . . . I will never allow them in my land.”47 Then, shifting to GBIRMs, he said, “That can never happen. That will never happen because I will not allow it. . . . it’s also a violation of the Constitution.”48 The exact violation he is citing is unclear, as the presence of foreign bases and troops is prohibited as are nuclear weapons. But given that Duterte said, “You cannot place nuclear arms in the Philippines,” he may have been referring to nuclear-armed GBIRMs, even though — as mentioned earlier — the U.S. Department of Defense has emphasized that it is considering only conventionally armed GBIRMs.49 Should Duterte’s successors express similar concerns of becoming an unwanted participant in a war with China or a reluctance to host a permanent U.S. presence out of concerns of potentially violating the constitution, the introduction of U.S. GBIRMs into the Philippines is highly unlikely. ", "role": "user" }, { "content": "it is extremely unlikely\nManila\nhost U.S. GBIRMs\nWhen the United States withdrew from the INF Treaty\nLorenzana lamented\nU.S. move as potentially\ntrigger\ning\nnuclear arms race around the world\nsignaled\nreluctance of the Philippines to host U.S. GBIRMs for fear of making the Philippines\ntarget of China\nfear of U.S. actions dragging\nPhilippines into war with China\nIt is not\nlack of reassurance that worries me\nIt is being involved in\nwar\nwe do not seek and\nwant\nany agreement by\nPhilippines to host U.S. GBIRMs\nprovoke\nstrong response from China\nGBIRMs\ncan never happen\nwill never happen because I will not allow it\nit’s\na violation of the Constitution\nYou cannot place nuclear arms in the Philippines\nintroduction of U.S. GBIRMs into\nPhilippines is highly unlikely", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: a---The Philippines---entrapment fears outweigh.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "it is extremely unlikely\nManila\nhost U.S. GBIRMs\nWhen the United States withdrew from the INF Treaty\nLorenzana lamented\nU.S. move as potentially\ntrigger\ning\nnuclear arms race around the world\nsignaled\nreluctance of the Philippines to host U.S. GBIRMs for fear of making the Philippines\ntarget of China\nfear of U.S. actions dragging\nPhilippines into war with China\nIt is not\nlack of reassurance that worries me\nIt is being involved in\nwar\nwe do not seek and\nwant\nany agreement by\nPhilippines to host U.S. GBIRMs\nprovoke\nstrong response from China\nGBIRMs\ncan never happen\nwill never happen because I will not allow it\nit’s\na violation of the Constitution\nYou cannot place nuclear arms in the Philippines\nintroduction of U.S. GBIRMs into\nPhilippines is highly unlikely", "role": "user" }, { "content": "extremely unlikely\nU\nS\nnuclear arms race\nlack of reassurance\nany agreement\nstrong response\nnever happen\ncannot\nhighly unlikely", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: a---The Philippines---entrapment fears outweigh.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "it is extremely unlikely\nManila\nhost U.S. GBIRMs\nWhen the United States withdrew from the INF Treaty\nLorenzana lamented\nU.S. move as potentially\ntrigger\ning\nnuclear arms race around the world\nsignaled\nreluctance of the Philippines to host U.S. GBIRMs for fear of making the Philippines\ntarget of China\nfear of U.S. actions dragging\nPhilippines into war with China\nIt is not\nlack of reassurance that worries me\nIt is being involved in\nwar\nwe do not seek and\nwant\nany agreement by\nPhilippines to host U.S. GBIRMs\nprovoke\nstrong response from China\nGBIRMs\ncan never happen\nwill never happen because I will not allow it\nit’s\na violation of the Constitution\nYou cannot place nuclear arms in the Philippines\nintroduction of U.S. GBIRMs into\nPhilippines is highly unlikely", "role": "user" }, { "content": "it is extremely unlikely\nManila\nhost U.S. GBIRMs\nWhen\nU\nS\nwithdrew\nLorenzana lamented\nmaking\nPhilippines\ntarget of China\nnot\nreassurance that worries me\nbeing involved in\nwar\nGBIRMs\ncan never happen\nI will not allow it", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 4---Nuclear force reductions shift the focus to outcompeting in emerging technologies.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "A future defined by shifting competition will renew domestic debates about the size and purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Some will argue that the United States should use the stall in Russian and Chinese investment to outcompete them in nuclear capabilities, while continuing to compete in conventional and advanced technologies—though this will face significant domestic challenges. Others will argue that the United States should focus on outcompeting in conventional and advanced technologies while pursuing nuclear arms control efforts, which may face domestic opposition but would strengthen the international nuclear regime if successful. In both cases, the United States will need to compete with Russia and China in emerging and disruptive technologies as a component of an extended deterrence strategy. In this scenario, the risk of escalation and confrontation will not disappear, but rather shift to the nonnuclear level of conflict in a new version of the stability-instability paradox.\nIn a scenario of shifting competition, the security landscape will look drastically different. The United States and its allies will need to develop coherent and meaningful responses to disinformation, gray zone, and cyber activities. In this future, the United States will have to rebuild alliance structures and convey the need for defense partnerships in a world where competition with adversaries is less visible and thus harder to communicate to allies and publics.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "future\nshifting competition will renew domestic debates about the size and purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Some will argue that the U\nS\nshould focus on outcompeting in conventional and advanced technologies while pursuing nuclear arms control efforts\nthe U\nS\nwill need to compete with Russia and China in emerging and disruptive technologies as\nextended deterrence\nIn this scenario, the risk of escalation and confrontation will not disappear, but\nshift to the nonnuclear level\nin a new version of the stability-instability paradox\nthe security landscape will look drastically different. The U\nS\nwill need to develop\nresponses to disinformation, gray zone, and cyber activities\nwhere competition with adversaries is less visible and\nharder to communicate to allies and publics", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 4---Nuclear force reductions shift the focus to outcompeting in emerging technologies.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "future\nshifting competition will renew domestic debates about the size and purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Some will argue that the U\nS\nshould focus on outcompeting in conventional and advanced technologies while pursuing nuclear arms control efforts\nthe U\nS\nwill need to compete with Russia and China in emerging and disruptive technologies as\nextended deterrence\nIn this scenario, the risk of escalation and confrontation will not disappear, but\nshift to the nonnuclear level\nin a new version of the stability-instability paradox\nthe security landscape will look drastically different. The U\nS\nwill need to develop\nresponses to disinformation, gray zone, and cyber activities\nwhere competition with adversaries is less visible and\nharder to communicate to allies and publics", "role": "user" }, { "content": "future\nshifting competition\ndebates about the size\npurpose\nU.S. nuclear arsenal\nfocus on outcompeting\nconventional\nadvanced technologies\nnuclear arms control\nemerging and disruptive technologies\nnot disappear\ngray zone\ncyber activities\nless visible", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 4---Nuclear force reductions shift the focus to outcompeting in emerging technologies.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "future\nshifting competition will renew domestic debates about the size and purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Some will argue that the U\nS\nshould focus on outcompeting in conventional and advanced technologies while pursuing nuclear arms control efforts\nthe U\nS\nwill need to compete with Russia and China in emerging and disruptive technologies as\nextended deterrence\nIn this scenario, the risk of escalation and confrontation will not disappear, but\nshift to the nonnuclear level\nin a new version of the stability-instability paradox\nthe security landscape will look drastically different. The U\nS\nwill need to develop\nresponses to disinformation, gray zone, and cyber activities\nwhere competition with adversaries is less visible and\nharder to communicate to allies and publics", "role": "user" }, { "content": "debates about the size and purpose of the\nnuclear arsenal\nwill argue\nthe U\nS\nshould focus on\nconventional and advanced tech\nwhile pursuing nuc\narms control\nthe U\nS\nwill need to compete\nin emerging\ndisruptive tech\nrisk of escalation\nwill\nshift to the nonnuclear level\nto disinfo\ngray zone, and cyber activities", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Slow growth undermines the rules-based order.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "A large portion of the burden of creating and maintaining order at the regional or global level will fall on the United States. This is inevitable for several reasons, only one of which is that the United States is and will likely remain the most powerful country in the world for decades to come. The corollary to this point is that no other country or group of countries has either the capacity or the mind-set to build a global order. Nor can order ever be expected to emerge automatically; there is no invisible hand in the geopolitical marketplace. Again, a large part of the burden (or, more positively, opportunity) falls on the principal power of the day. There is more than a little self-interest at stake. The United States cannot remain aloof, much less unaffected by a world in disarray. Globalization is more reality than choice. At the regional level, the United States actually faces the opposite problem, namely, that certain actors do have the mind-set and means to shape an order. The problem is that their views of order are in part or in whole incompatible with U.S. interests. Examples would include Iran and ISIS in the Middle East, China in Asia, and Russia in Europe.\nIt will not be an easy time for the United States. The sheer number and range of challenges is daunting. There are a large number of actors and forces to contend with. Alliances, normally created in opposition to some country or countries, may not be as useful a vehicle in a world in which not all foes are always foes and not all friends are always friendly. Diplomacy will count for a great deal; there will be a premium on dexterity. Consultations that aim to affect the actions of other governments and their leaders are likely to matter more than negotiations that aim to solve problems.\nAnother reality is that the United States for all its power cannot impose order. Partially this reflects what might be called structural realities, namely, that no country can contend with global challenges on its own given the very nature of these challenges. The United States could reduce its carbon footprint dramatically, but the effect on global climate would be modest if India and China failed to follow suit. Similarly, on its own the United States cannot maintain a world trading system or successfully combat terrorism or disease. Adding to these realities are resource limits. The United States cannot provide all the troops or dollars to maintain order in the Middle East and Europe and Asia and South Asia. There is simply too much capability in too many hands. Unilateralism is rarely a serious foreign policy option. Partners are essential. That is one of the reasons why sovereign obligation is a desirable compass for U.S. foreign policy. Earlier I made the case that it represents realism for an era of globalization. It also is a natural successor to containment, the doctrine that guided the United States for the four decades of the Cold War. There are basic differences, however. Containment was about holding back more than bringing in and was designed for an era when rivals were almost always adversaries and in which the challenges were mostly related to classical geopolitical competition.1 Sovereign obligation, by contrast, is designed for a world in which sometime rivals are sometime partners and in which collective efforts are required to meet common challenges.\nUp to this point, we have focused on what the United States needs to do in the world to promote order. That is what one would expect from a book about international relations and American foreign policy. But a focus on foreign policy is not enough. National security is a coin with two sides, and what the United States does at home, what is normally thought of as belonging to the domestic realm, is every bit as much a part of national security as foreign policy. It is best to understand the issue as guns and butter rather than guns versus butter.\nWhen it comes to the domestic side, the argument is straightforward. In order to lead and compete and act effectively in the world, the United States needs to put its house in order. I have written on what this entails in a book titled Foreign Policy Begins at Home.2 This was sometimes interpreted as suggesting a turn away from foreign policy. It was nothing of the sort. Foreign policy begins at home, but it ends there only at the country’s peril.3\nEarlier I mentioned that the United States has few unilateral options, that there are few if any things it can do better alone than with others. The counterpart to this claim is that the world cannot come up with the elements of a working order absent the United States. The United States is not sufficient, but it is necessary. It is also true that the United States cannot lead or act effectively in the world if it does not have a strong domestic foundation. National security inevitably requires significant amounts of human, physical, and financial resources to draw on. The better the United States is doing economically, the more it will have available in the way of resources to devote to what it wants and needs to do abroad without igniting a divisive and distracting domestic debate as to priorities. An additional benefit is that respect for the United States and for the American political, social, and economic model (along with a desire to emulate it) will increase only if it is seen as successful.\nThe most basic test of the success of the model will be economic growth. U.S. growth levels may appear all right when compared with what a good many other countries are experiencing, but they are below what is needed and fall short of what is possible. There is no reason why the United States is not growing in the range of 3 percent or even higher other than what it is doing and, more important, not doing.4", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the burden of\nmaintaining order at the\nglobal level will fall on the U\nS\nThis is inevitable\nthe U\nS\nis and will likely remain the most powerful country in the world for decades to come\nno other country or group of countries has either the capacity or the mind-set to build a global order\nThere is more than\nself-interest at stake\ncertain actors\nare\nincompatible with U.S. interests. Examples\ninclude Iran\nISIS\nChina\nand Russia\nare\nactors and forces to contend with\nno country can contend with\nglobal climate\na world trading system or successfully combat terrorism or disease\nthe Middle East and Europe and Asia and South Asia\nforeign policy is not enough\nwhat the U\nS\ndoes at home\nthe domestic realm, is every bit as much a part of national security as foreign policy\nto lead and compete and act effectively in the world, the U\nS\nneeds to put its house in order\nForeign policy begins at home\nthe world cannot come up with the elements of a working order absent the U\nS\nThe U\nS\nis not sufficient, but it is necessary\nthe U\nS\ncannot lead or act effectively in the world if it does not have a strong domestic foundation. National security inevitably requires significant amounts of human, physical, and financial resources to draw on. The better the U\nS\nis doing economically, the more it will have available in the way of resources to devote to what it wants and needs to do abroad without igniting a divisive and distracting domestic debate as to priorities\nrespect for the U\nS\nwill increase only if it is seen as successful\nThe most basic test\nwill be economic growth", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Slow growth undermines the rules-based order.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the burden of\nmaintaining order at the\nglobal level will fall on the U\nS\nThis is inevitable\nthe U\nS\nis and will likely remain the most powerful country in the world for decades to come\nno other country or group of countries has either the capacity or the mind-set to build a global order\nThere is more than\nself-interest at stake\ncertain actors\nare\nincompatible with U.S. interests. Examples\ninclude Iran\nISIS\nChina\nand Russia\nare\nactors and forces to contend with\nno country can contend with\nglobal climate\na world trading system or successfully combat terrorism or disease\nthe Middle East and Europe and Asia and South Asia\nforeign policy is not enough\nwhat the U\nS\ndoes at home\nthe domestic realm, is every bit as much a part of national security as foreign policy\nto lead and compete and act effectively in the world, the U\nS\nneeds to put its house in order\nForeign policy begins at home\nthe world cannot come up with the elements of a working order absent the U\nS\nThe U\nS\nis not sufficient, but it is necessary\nthe U\nS\ncannot lead or act effectively in the world if it does not have a strong domestic foundation. National security inevitably requires significant amounts of human, physical, and financial resources to draw on. The better the U\nS\nis doing economically, the more it will have available in the way of resources to devote to what it wants and needs to do abroad without igniting a divisive and distracting domestic debate as to priorities\nrespect for the U\nS\nwill increase only if it is seen as successful\nThe most basic test\nwill be economic growth", "role": "user" }, { "content": "maintaining order\nglobal level\ninevitable\nthe most powerful country\ndecades to come\nno other country\ngroup of countries\nthe capacity\nthe mind-set\na global order\ncertain actors\nincompatible\nU.S. interests\nactors and forces\ncontend with\nglobal climate\na world trading system\nforeign policy\nnot enough\nhome\nthe domestic realm\nevery bit as much a part of national security\nforeign policy\nbegins\na working order\nnot sufficient\nnecessary\nlead or act effectively\na strong domestic foundation\ninevitably requires\nhuman, physical, and financial resources\ndoing economically\navailable\nthe way of resources\na divisive and distracting domestic debate\nrespect\nonly if\nThe most basic test\neconomic growth", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Slow growth undermines the rules-based order.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "the burden of\nmaintaining order at the\nglobal level will fall on the U\nS\nThis is inevitable\nthe U\nS\nis and will likely remain the most powerful country in the world for decades to come\nno other country or group of countries has either the capacity or the mind-set to build a global order\nThere is more than\nself-interest at stake\ncertain actors\nare\nincompatible with U.S. interests. Examples\ninclude Iran\nISIS\nChina\nand Russia\nare\nactors and forces to contend with\nno country can contend with\nglobal climate\na world trading system or successfully combat terrorism or disease\nthe Middle East and Europe and Asia and South Asia\nforeign policy is not enough\nwhat the U\nS\ndoes at home\nthe domestic realm, is every bit as much a part of national security as foreign policy\nto lead and compete and act effectively in the world, the U\nS\nneeds to put its house in order\nForeign policy begins at home\nthe world cannot come up with the elements of a working order absent the U\nS\nThe U\nS\nis not sufficient, but it is necessary\nthe U\nS\ncannot lead or act effectively in the world if it does not have a strong domestic foundation. National security inevitably requires significant amounts of human, physical, and financial resources to draw on. The better the U\nS\nis doing economically, the more it will have available in the way of resources to devote to what it wants and needs to do abroad without igniting a divisive and distracting domestic debate as to priorities\nrespect for the U\nS\nwill increase only if it is seen as successful\nThe most basic test\nwill be economic growth", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the burden of\nmaintaining order\nwill fall on the U\nS\nno\ngroup of countries has\nthe capacity or\nmind-set\nIran\nISIS\nChina\nand Russia\nclimate\ntrading\nterror\nor disease\nthe domestic\nis\nnational security\nForeign policy begins at home\nthe world cannot\nwork\nabsent the U\nS\nthe U\nS\ncannot\nact\nif it does not have a\nfoundation\nThe better the U\nS\nis\neconomically, the more\navailable in\nresources to devote\nabroad without\ndivisive\ndebate\nThe\nbasic test\nwill be\ngrowth", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 4. New low yield options have removed ‘any doubt’ that it succeeds.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The second weakness in our deterrent capabilities relates to Russia's development of a military doctrine which envisages the threat or even the actual use of low-yield nuclear weapons to \"win\" a conventional war. (This is commonly called the \"escalate to win\" or \"escalate to de-escalate\" strategy.) This Russian doctrine, which began to emerge in the late 1990's, explains why Moscow has modernized its shorter range nuclear forces- in order to provide the means to implement this doctrine and why Russia has carried out field exercises which feature the use of these weapons in this type of scenario. The intended effect is to increase the readiness of Russia's armed forces to carry out such attacks while simultaneously to coerce and intimidate NATO member states. That the Russian government embarked upon this effort, in the full face of existing U.S. nuclear forces, suggests strongly that the Russian military believes the U.S. and NATO lack an appropriate counter. To quote the NPR:\n\"Russia's belief that limited nuclear first use, potentially including low-yield weapons, can provide such an advantage is based, in part, on Moscow's perception that its greater number and variety of non-strategic nuclear systems provide a coercive advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict. Recent Russian statements on this evolving nuclear weapons doctrine appear to lower the threshold for Moscow's first-use of nuclear weapons. Russia demonstrates its perception of the advantage these systems provide through numerous exercises and statements. Correcting this mistaken Russian perception is a strategic imperative.\" (NPR p 53-54)\nTo remove any such destabilizing doubt in the minds of Russia's leaders, the Department of Defense has moved to build and deploy a limited number of modified Trident II W-76 warheads to provide a low-yield option to counter the Russian strategy and to dispel miscalculation and misperceptions about US will and capability. This modest step deliberately eschewing any notion of mirroring the Russian investment in a wide series of low-yield tactical nuclear systems is designed to enter service in the near future.\nThe low-yield Trident warhead has been attacked on a number of different grounds. One particularly pernicious suggestion is that the weapon is designed to lower the nuclear threshold, thereby making nuclear war-fighting a real possibility. This criticism flies in the face of official policy which is stated clearly and unambiguously in the NPR:\n\"To be clear, this is not intended to, nor does it enable, \"nuclear war-fighting.\" Expanding flexible U.S. nuclear options now, to include low-yield options, is important for the preservation of credible deterrence against regional aggression. It will raise the nuclear threshold and help ensure that potential adversaries perceive no possible advantage in limited nuclear escalation, making nuclear employment less likely.\" (NPR, p 54)\n5. Even if there’s some instability, deterrence is holding for worst-case scenarios. \nEdelman ’22 [Eric and Franklin Miller; May 19; counselor, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, former defense undersecretary for policy from 2005 to 2009; foreign policy and nuclear defense policy expert, served 31 years in the U.S. government, including the Department of State, the Department of Defense and a Special Assistant to President George W. Bush; Defense One, “Nuclear vs. Conventional Spending? We Don’t Have that Luxury,” https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/05/nuclear-vs-conventional-spending-we-dont-have-luxury/367182/]\nIf you think the world is dangerous now, try envisioning it without a credible, safe and reliable nuclear deterrent.\nThird, general arm-waving about cutting nuclear modernization costs begs the following questions: what is it specifically that opponents propose cutting? Should we abandon the new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile in favor of keeping the 70-year-old Minuteman III? Do we buy fewer B-21 stealth bombers, which also have a conventional mission, just as they begin to enter full-scale production? Should we halt the assembly line that is building replacement SSBNs even as the existing Ohio-class boats will be forced to retire in the years ahead on safety grounds? Any of these would delay critical replacements for aging platforms in the field today as well as drive up overall program costs as procurement is stretched out and delayed.\nFourth, the notion that the White House’s Office of Management and Budget will provide separate line-items to fund triad modernization outside the defense budget is risible. Whether such special funds should exist, as they do in the UK to support Britain’s continuous at sea deterrent is an interesting philosophical question but not one that will help us negotiate the immediate challenges facing the United States’ defense establishment today.\nFifth, a clear-eyed look at the true cost of nuclear modernization will reveal that it constitutes between 2.5 and 3.0 percent of the defense budget. The operation and sustainment of the existing force accounts for another 3.5 to 4.0 percent. Simple arithmetic makes clear, therefore, that the percentage of the Defense Department budget not devoted to nuclear systems is about 93 percent. Looking to save money on the nation’s nuclear forces remains the “hunt for small potatoes” as David Mosher, the former director of the national security division of the Congressional Budget Office, described it some 20 years ago. It is no doubt for that reason that former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said that the cost of nuclear modernization is a small price to pay to deter an existential threat.\nFinally, Ferrari’s thesis ignores the fundamental truth that an effective nuclear force deters not only nuclear attack but also conventional aggression against our treaty allies in NATO and the Pacific. Would Putin have attacked Ukraine if Kyiv had retained a nuclear arsenal? Would he be striking NATO if our nuclear umbrella, aged as it is, was not in place? Would we and other NATO members be able to resupply Ukraine without a strong nuclear deterrent? These questions answer themselves.\nNow more than ever we should be clear that our nuclear deterrent plays many roles, and in the first instance deterring a major non-nuclear strategic attack is vital.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "weakness in our deterrent\nrelates to Russia's development of a military doctrine which envisages\nescalate to de-escalate\nTo remove any such destabilizing doubt in the minds of Russia's leaders, the Department of Defense has moved to\ndeploy\nTrident II W-76 warheads to provide a low-yield option to counter the Russian strategy and to dispel miscalculation and misperceptions about US will and capability\nwarhead has been attacked on a number of\ngrounds. One particularly pernicious suggestion is that the weapon is designed to lower the nuclear threshold, thereby making nuclear war-fighting a real possibility. This criticism flies in the face of official policy which is stated\nunambiguously\nthis is not intended to, nor does it enable, \"nuclear war-fighting.\" Expanding flexible U.S. nuclear options\nis important for the preservation of credible deterrence\nIt will raise the nuclear threshold and help ensure\nadversaries perceive no possible advantage in limited nuclear escalation, making nuclear employment less likely\nsome\ndeterrence\nworst-case\nIf you think the world is dangerous now, try envisioning it without a\nreliable nuclear deterrent\nan effective nuclear force deters not only nuclear attack but also conventional aggression against\nNATO and the Pacific. Would Putin have attacked Ukraine if Kyiv had retained a nuclear arsenal? Would he be striking NATO if our nuclear umbrella\nwas not in place? Would we\nbe able to resupply Ukraine without a strong nuclear deterrent? These questions answer themselves\nNow more than ever we should be clear that our nuclear deterrent plays many roles\ndeterring a major non-nuclear strategic attack is vital", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 4. New low yield options have removed ‘any doubt’ that it succeeds.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "weakness in our deterrent\nrelates to Russia's development of a military doctrine which envisages\nescalate to de-escalate\nTo remove any such destabilizing doubt in the minds of Russia's leaders, the Department of Defense has moved to\ndeploy\nTrident II W-76 warheads to provide a low-yield option to counter the Russian strategy and to dispel miscalculation and misperceptions about US will and capability\nwarhead has been attacked on a number of\ngrounds. One particularly pernicious suggestion is that the weapon is designed to lower the nuclear threshold, thereby making nuclear war-fighting a real possibility. This criticism flies in the face of official policy which is stated\nunambiguously\nthis is not intended to, nor does it enable, \"nuclear war-fighting.\" Expanding flexible U.S. nuclear options\nis important for the preservation of credible deterrence\nIt will raise the nuclear threshold and help ensure\nadversaries perceive no possible advantage in limited nuclear escalation, making nuclear employment less likely\nsome\ndeterrence\nworst-case\nIf you think the world is dangerous now, try envisioning it without a\nreliable nuclear deterrent\nan effective nuclear force deters not only nuclear attack but also conventional aggression against\nNATO and the Pacific. Would Putin have attacked Ukraine if Kyiv had retained a nuclear arsenal? Would he be striking NATO if our nuclear umbrella\nwas not in place? Would we\nbe able to resupply Ukraine without a strong nuclear deterrent? These questions answer themselves\nNow more than ever we should be clear that our nuclear deterrent plays many roles\ndeterring a major non-nuclear strategic attack is vital", "role": "user" }, { "content": "weakness\nenvisages\nescalate to de-escalate\nany\ndoubt\nD\no\nD\ndeploy\nwarheads\nlow-yield option\ndispel\nmisperceptions\nwill\ncapability\nattacked\npernicious\nlower\nmak\nwar-fighting\npossibility\nflies in the face\nofficial policy\nunambiguously\nnor\nenable\nwar-fighting\nflexible\ncredible deterrence\nthreshold\nno possible advantage\nescal\nnuc\nless likely", "role": "assistant" } ]