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[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Independently, moving away from the consumer welfare standard increases inflation", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Biden administration, finally beginning to worry about the political impact of the rising cost of food, fuel and other basic consumer necessities, is neatly dovetailing its push for aggressive antitrust enforcement by blaming inflation on big business and market concentration.\nPolitically speaking, it is a neat fix. It drives one of the central policies of the Biden administration — to shift antitrust enforcement from the consumer welfare standard of the past 45 years back to an earlier era’s more nebulous standard against “bigness.” And it deflects blame for inflation.\nPresident Biden lacks the theatrical flourish of a Huey Long, but he is nevertheless trying out his best version of the Kingfisher routine. “I’ve directed my administration to crack down on what some major players are doing in the economy that are keeping prices higher than they need be,” Biden said in August. The cause of higher prices, he argued, is greedy big business and its stranglehold on the American consumer.\nIt is clear what drives White House anxiety. Food prices have risen about 3.4 percent from last year. After years of low gasoline prices, Americans now pay above $3 a gallon in most parts of the country. Biden is tasking Federal Trade Commission Chair Lina Khan with targeting Big Ag and Big Oil for antitrust action to drive down prices for consumers.\nIf left unchallenged, the Biden administration may succeed in diverting some heat over rising inflation. Large corporations are not in good order with voters on both the left and right. The president cannot be allowed, however, to use a political diversionary tactic that would perversely do the opposite of what he claims to do: Biden’s antitrust policies would raise the prices of basic needs for consumers. \nLet’s start with food prices and Big Ag. \nTwo University of Idaho economics professors, Philip Watson and Jason Winfree, wrote in The Idaho Statesman that larger farms and agricultural companies, which have the capital to invest in expensive technology and economies of scale, actually have been making food steadily more affordable. It is precisely because of these economies of scale that the cost of food, until the disruption of the pandemic, was taking less out of household budgets. The professors conclude that “breaking up Big Ag could have the disastrous effect of raising food prices, which would likely have a disproportionate impact on poorer households.” \nIf the Biden approach to agriculture and food is demagogic, its approach to oil and gas is risible. The current increase in gasoline prices results from the supply chain disruption caused by the pandemic, exacerbated by recent hurricanes and storms. It also may be partly because of the unrelenting hostility of the Biden administration to American energy, putting public lands off limits, killing the Keystone XL pipeline and using regulation to harass the fracking industry, despite the fact that cleaner-burning natural gas has helped reduce America’s greenhouse gas emissions. Technological advances led the United States to surpass Saudi Arabia and Russia in 2018 to become the world’s leading producer of oil. Biden’s antitrust policy also may be contributing to the sudden reversal of this energy glut. It was out of antitrust concerns that Berkshire Hathaway pulled out of a major natural gas pipeline deal earlier this year.\nWhat has been the Biden administration’s response to recent shortages? It has not been to stimulate production at home or to help clear pipeline bottlenecks. Instead, national security adviser Jake Sullivan issued a statement pleading with OPEC and Russia to come to our rescue. OPEC demurred and Russian President Vladimir Putin used Sullivan’s entreaty to issue a humiliating “nyet.”\nThe real cause of inflation, of course, is recovery from a pandemic and the temporary economic depression it caused. It also might be driven by the reckless spending by presidents and Congresses of both parties. Our national debt is now 125 percent of our gross domestic product — higher than the previous high in 1946, when we won a victory over Germany and Japan rather than losing a war to the Taliban.\nBlaming Big Ag and Big Oil for high prices will be popular. It also will be perverse. The abandonment of the consumer welfare standard will, if anything, lead to higher prices in both food and fuel for those least able to pay for it.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Biden\nis neatly dovetailing its push for aggressive antitrust enforcement by blaming inflation on big business and market concentration\nIt drives\nthe\npolicies\nto shift antitrust enforcement from the consumer welfare standard\nback to\nbigness\na political diversionary tactic\nwould perversely do the opposite of what he claims to do\nantitrust policies would raise the prices of basic needs\nexpensive technology and economies of scale\nhave been making food steadily more affordable\nbecause of these economies of scale\nthe cost of food\nwas taking less out of household budgets.\nbreaking up Big Ag could have the disastrous effect of raising food prices\nThe abandonment of the consumer welfare standard will\nlead to higher prices", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Independently, moving away from the consumer welfare standard increases inflation", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The Biden administration, finally beginning to worry about the political impact of the rising cost of food, fuel and other basic consumer necessities, is neatly dovetailing its push for aggressive antitrust enforcement by blaming inflation on big business and market concentration.\nPolitically speaking, it is a neat fix. It drives one of the central policies of the Biden administration — to shift antitrust enforcement from the consumer welfare standard of the past 45 years back to an earlier era’s more nebulous standard against “bigness.” And it deflects blame for inflation.\nPresident Biden lacks the theatrical flourish of a Huey Long, but he is nevertheless trying out his best version of the Kingfisher routine. “I’ve directed my administration to crack down on what some major players are doing in the economy that are keeping prices higher than they need be,” Biden said in August. The cause of higher prices, he argued, is greedy big business and its stranglehold on the American consumer.\nIt is clear what drives White House anxiety. Food prices have risen about 3.4 percent from last year. After years of low gasoline prices, Americans now pay above $3 a gallon in most parts of the country. Biden is tasking Federal Trade Commission Chair Lina Khan with targeting Big Ag and Big Oil for antitrust action to drive down prices for consumers.\nIf left unchallenged, the Biden administration may succeed in diverting some heat over rising inflation. Large corporations are not in good order with voters on both the left and right. The president cannot be allowed, however, to use a political diversionary tactic that would perversely do the opposite of what he claims to do: Biden’s antitrust policies would raise the prices of basic needs for consumers. \nLet’s start with food prices and Big Ag. \nTwo University of Idaho economics professors, Philip Watson and Jason Winfree, wrote in The Idaho Statesman that larger farms and agricultural companies, which have the capital to invest in expensive technology and economies of scale, actually have been making food steadily more affordable. It is precisely because of these economies of scale that the cost of food, until the disruption of the pandemic, was taking less out of household budgets. The professors conclude that “breaking up Big Ag could have the disastrous effect of raising food prices, which would likely have a disproportionate impact on poorer households.” \nIf the Biden approach to agriculture and food is demagogic, its approach to oil and gas is risible. The current increase in gasoline prices results from the supply chain disruption caused by the pandemic, exacerbated by recent hurricanes and storms. It also may be partly because of the unrelenting hostility of the Biden administration to American energy, putting public lands off limits, killing the Keystone XL pipeline and using regulation to harass the fracking industry, despite the fact that cleaner-burning natural gas has helped reduce America’s greenhouse gas emissions. Technological advances led the United States to surpass Saudi Arabia and Russia in 2018 to become the world’s leading producer of oil. Biden’s antitrust policy also may be contributing to the sudden reversal of this energy glut. It was out of antitrust concerns that Berkshire Hathaway pulled out of a major natural gas pipeline deal earlier this year.\nWhat has been the Biden administration’s response to recent shortages? It has not been to stimulate production at home or to help clear pipeline bottlenecks. Instead, national security adviser Jake Sullivan issued a statement pleading with OPEC and Russia to come to our rescue. OPEC demurred and Russian President Vladimir Putin used Sullivan’s entreaty to issue a humiliating “nyet.”\nThe real cause of inflation, of course, is recovery from a pandemic and the temporary economic depression it caused. It also might be driven by the reckless spending by presidents and Congresses of both parties. Our national debt is now 125 percent of our gross domestic product — higher than the previous high in 1946, when we won a victory over Germany and Japan rather than losing a war to the Taliban.\nBlaming Big Ag and Big Oil for high prices will be popular. It also will be perverse. The abandonment of the consumer welfare standard will, if anything, lead to higher prices in both food and fuel for those least able to pay for it.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "blaming inflation on big business and market concentration\nbigness\nraise the prices of basic needs\nmore affordable\ndisastrous effect of raising food prices\nhigher prices", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Independently, moving away from the consumer welfare standard increases inflation\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Biden\nis neatly dovetailing its push for aggressive antitrust enforcement by blaming inflation on big business and market concentration\nIt drives\nthe\npolicies\nto shift antitrust enforcement from the consumer welfare standard\nback to\nbigness\na political diversionary tactic\nwould perversely do the opposite of what he claims to do\nantitrust policies would raise the prices of basic needs\nexpensive technology and economies of scale\nhave been making food steadily more affordable\nbecause of these economies of scale\nthe cost of food\nwas taking less out of household budgets.\nbreaking up Big Ag could have the disastrous effect of raising food prices\nThe abandonment of the consumer welfare standard will\nlead to higher prices", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Biden\nblam\ninflation on\nmarket concentration\nto shift antitrust\nfrom\nconsumer welfare\nback to\nbigness\nantitrust policies would raise the prices of basic needs\ntechnology and economies of\nhave been making food\nmore affordable\nbecause of\neconomies of scale\nthe cost\nwas taking less out of\nbudgets\nbreaking up Big Ag could\nrais\nfood prices\nThe abandonment of\nconsumer welfare\nwill\nlead to higher prices", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Growing FDI protectionism also thumps.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "A country establishing foreign investment laws to protect its national security is nothing new. However, in line with the global rise of foreign direct investment (FDI) protectionism, an ever-growing number of countries are reconsidering what constitutes a threat to their national security or public interest. As a result, an increasing number of governments are establishing FDI screening mechanisms, expanding the range of sectors subject to them, and lowering the thresholds for investments that require prior approval. Investment Monitor’s FDI regulations database offers a general overview of these protectionist policies from country to country as well as the restrictions that have been implemented in relation to Covid-19.\nThe US’s anti-China policies\nThe US is one of the leading proponents of protectionist FDI regulations. The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) was signed into law by then-president Donald Trump in August 2018 and became fully effective in February 2020. The act strengthened and modernised the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to handle national security concerns more effectively. Although no explicit reference about China is made in FIRRMA’s provisions, the primary objective of the act is to give the CFIUS greater visibility into Chinese investment in the US.\nThe EU’s protectionist path\nSimilarly, the EU had already been outlining protectionist measures pre-pandemic. Regulation (EU) 2019/452, the first set of EU-level rules aimed explicitly at FDI, was first adopted in March 2019, and became fully operational in October 2020. The regulation created a cooperation mechanism for member states and the European Commission to exchange information and, if necessary, raise concerns related to specific investments. While the regulation does not replace FDI screening measures within the member states, it aims to encourage cooperation, information sharing and transparency regarding FDI control. Several EU countries, among them Germany, Austria and France, have already toughened their investment regimes following the adoption of the regulation, while others including the Czech Republic, Denmark and Ireland are preparing draft bills that will soon be enacted into law.\nNew era for Chinese FDI regulations\nChina’s Foreign Investment Law (FIL) came into force on 1 January 2020, ushering in a new era for its foreign investment regime. The FIL expanded the scope of China’s national security review to include transactions between two foreign entities if there is a Chinese company or Chinese interests involved. As per rules published in December 2020, a body for security reviews will also be established and headed by the National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce. In addition, in December 2020, the Market Access Negative List was released, which outlines the industries that are either restricted or prohibited from both foreign and domestic investment. While the 2020 list features eight fewer restricted sectors than in 2019 (123 down from 131 in the previous edition), investors in industries such as agriculture, mining and financial services will still face restrictive measures.\nThe impact of Covid-19\nThis protectionist trend has been exacerbated following the Covid-19 outbreak, with a raft of temporary amendments introduced by countries worldwide to protect vulnerable companies from opportunistic foreign takeovers. Numerous countries, including the UK and Japan, implemented measures to protect domestic life sciences companies while Australia made all foreign takeover proposals, regardless of sector or monetary value, subject to up to six months’ scrutiny. As the pandemic rages on in many parts of the world and economic recession looms, it remains to be seen which countries will loosen, extend or make permanent these changes.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "global rise of foreign direct investment\nFDI\nprotectionism\ngrowing number of countries are reconsidering what constitutes a threat to their national security or public interest\nan increasing number of governments are establishing FDI screening mechanisms\ndatabase offers\noverview of these protectionist policies\nUS is\nleading\nprotectionist FDI regulations\nFIRRMA\nwas signed into law by\nTrump\nand became fully effective in February 2020\nact strengthened and modernised\nCFIUS\nto handle national security concerns\nEU’s protectionist path\nthe EU had\nbeen outlining protectionist measures pre-pandemic. Regulation (EU) 2019/452\nbecame fully operational in October 2020\nregulation\nraise concerns related to specific investments\nEU countries\ntoughened\ninvestment regimes following the adoption of the regulation\nChina’s Foreign Investment Law (FIL) came into force on\n2020, ushering in a new era for its foreign investment regime\nFIL expanded the scope of China’s national security review to include transactions between two foreign entities if there is a Chinese company\ninvolved\nprotectionist trend has been exacerbated following\nCovid\nwith a raft of temporary amendments introduced by countries worldwide to protect\ncompanies from\nforeign takeovers", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Growing FDI protectionism also thumps.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "global rise of foreign direct investment\nFDI\nprotectionism\ngrowing number of countries are reconsidering what constitutes a threat to their national security or public interest\nan increasing number of governments are establishing FDI screening mechanisms\ndatabase offers\noverview of these protectionist policies\nUS is\nleading\nprotectionist FDI regulations\nFIRRMA\nwas signed into law by\nTrump\nand became fully effective in February 2020\nact strengthened and modernised\nCFIUS\nto handle national security concerns\nEU’s protectionist path\nthe EU had\nbeen outlining protectionist measures pre-pandemic. Regulation (EU) 2019/452\nbecame fully operational in October 2020\nregulation\nraise concerns related to specific investments\nEU countries\ntoughened\ninvestment regimes following the adoption of the regulation\nChina’s Foreign Investment Law (FIL) came into force on\n2020, ushering in a new era for its foreign investment regime\nFIL expanded the scope of China’s national security review to include transactions between two foreign entities if there is a Chinese company\ninvolved\nprotectionist trend has been exacerbated following\nCovid\nwith a raft of temporary amendments introduced by countries worldwide to protect\ncompanies from\nforeign takeovers", "role": "user" }, { "content": "global rise\nFDI\nprotectionism\ngrowing\nscreening mechanisms\nprotectionist policies\nUS\nleading\nprotectionist\nFIRRMA\nstrengthened\nCFIUS\nprotectionist path\npre-pandemic\nraise concerns\nEU countries\ntoughened\nFIL\nnew era\nforeign investment\nexpanded\nscope\nprotectionist trend\nexacerbated\nCovid\nprotect\nforeign takeovers", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Growing FDI protectionism also thumps.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "global rise of foreign direct investment\nFDI\nprotectionism\ngrowing number of countries are reconsidering what constitutes a threat to their national security or public interest\nan increasing number of governments are establishing FDI screening mechanisms\ndatabase offers\noverview of these protectionist policies\nUS is\nleading\nprotectionist FDI regulations\nFIRRMA\nwas signed into law by\nTrump\nand became fully effective in February 2020\nact strengthened and modernised\nCFIUS\nto handle national security concerns\nEU’s protectionist path\nthe EU had\nbeen outlining protectionist measures pre-pandemic. Regulation (EU) 2019/452\nbecame fully operational in October 2020\nregulation\nraise concerns related to specific investments\nEU countries\ntoughened\ninvestment regimes following the adoption of the regulation\nChina’s Foreign Investment Law (FIL) came into force on\n2020, ushering in a new era for its foreign investment regime\nFIL expanded the scope of China’s national security review to include transactions between two foreign entities if there is a Chinese company\ninvolved\nprotectionist trend has been exacerbated following\nCovid\nwith a raft of temporary amendments introduced by countries worldwide to protect\ncompanies from\nforeign takeovers", "role": "user" }, { "content": "global rise of\nFDI\nprotectionism\ngovernments\nestablishing\nscreening\noffers\nprotectionist policies\nUS\nprotectionist\nstrengthened\nCFIUS\nEU\ntoughened\ninvestment regimes\nFIL\nushering\nnew era for\nforeign investment\nprotectionist trend\nexacerbated following\nCovid", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Startups are doing fine---the pandemic created fertile ground for innovation.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Back in November, the Planet Money newsletter reported that — despite a deadly pandemic and an ugly recession — America was seeing a boom in the creation of new startups. We spoke with University of Maryland economist John Haltiwanger, one of the leading scholars of business formation. Now Haltiwanger has a new study out, and the trend is clear: \"The surge continues,\" Haltiwanger says. \"We're now convinced this wasn't just a blip.\"\nLike so many other areas of the economy, applications for new businesses pulled back in the first half of 2020 but then snapped forward again like a slingshot. Not only was 2020 the best year on record for new business creation since the Census Bureau began tracking it in 2004, but applications for new businesses have continued to soar, through at least last month. In May, there were a half a million applications for new businesses; the second highest month on record, below only last July. In total, there have been more than six million filings for new businesses since the pandemic began. The boom can be seen in both businesses composed of only one self-employed person and businesses that the Census expects will employ multiple people.\nOver the last year and half, we have been reshuffling how and where we work and shop; and that shift has created all sorts of opportunities for entrepreneurs. With the pandemic, it's like someone ripped out an irrigation pipe for brick-and-mortar commerce and plugged it into virtual commerce. It's brought a drought to face-to-face businesses, and a bounty to businesses you interact with on a digital screen. The retail sector alone, driven by e-commerce, accounts for about a third of all the new startup growth. In addition, trucking, warehousing, and delivery services are all seeing surges — which makes sense, as we've seen a massive shift of spending on in-person services to tangible goods that are bought online.\nWe've also seen the rise of remote work and a reshuffling of the population, from city centers to suburbs, and from traditional job centers to \"Zoom Towns.\" Where people go, they bring their dollars. It may help explain why the food and accommodation sector is the greatest area of growth. We've also seen huge growth in the types of businesses that can provide remote services.\nThere are at least two potential theories for what's going on. First, while the boom is undeniably good news, there is a slightly negative take: we've seen a surge in new businesses mainly because the pandemic forced two painful restructurings to the economy. It began by ravaging the face-to-face economy and creating an awkward marketplace where we could only do stuff six feet apart. This suffocated many existing businesses while providing oxygen for others, such as online retailers, video conferencing apps, drive-thrus, delivery services, mask and sanitizer companies, and the like. Yet, many of these new opportunities for pandemic-friendly businesses may prove to be only temporary. Many of them could die as we head back to normal.\nNow that most of us are vaccinated, we're releasing the pressure cooker of our pent-up demand for going out. It's leading to the second major restructuring: new businesses — restaurants, bars, salons and so on — are growing out of the ashes of the businesses scorched by the pandemic. This is great news! It's better than no new businesses. But it's possible that we're now just heading back to normal, as opposed to something new and better. Think of it like the economy doing a pendulum swing from a normal economy to a pandemic economy and back to a normal economy again.\nIt's hard to completely rule out this Negative Nancy take. We don't have many details about what exactly the new businesses created during the pandemic are doing, or how big they're gonna get. More importantly, we still don't have great data on how many and what kinds of businesses died over the last year, and whether these new businesses are merely just filling the massive hole created at the beginning of the pandemic. The data suggests the biggest surges occurred at the beginning and tail ends of the pandemic, which is consistent with the idea that this was a pendulum swing.\nBut Haltiwanger offers a second, more optimistic theory, which says this is about way more than just a pendulum swing: it's a rocket ship to a better economy. As painful as the pandemic has been, he believes it has forced the business world to drop outdated ways of doing things and embrace technology in a new way. \"I don't think any of us had a clue that we could do so much business activity remotely,\" Haltiwanger says. \"That sparks all kinds of new ideas.\"", "role": "user" }, { "content": "despite a deadly pandemic and an ugly recession\nAmerica was seeing a boom in the creation of new startups\nthis wasn't just a blip.\"\napplications for new businesses\nsnapped forward\nlike a slingshot\nwe have been reshuffling how and where we work\nthat\ncreated all sorts of opportunities for entrepreneurs\nIt's brought a\nbounty to businesses you interact with on a\nscreen\nthe boom is undeniably good news\nthis is about way more than just a pendulum swing: it's a rocket ship to a better economy\nthe pandemic\nforced the business world to drop outdated ways of doing things and embrace technology in a new way.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Startups are doing fine---the pandemic created fertile ground for innovation.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "despite a deadly pandemic and an ugly recession\nAmerica was seeing a boom in the creation of new startups\nthis wasn't just a blip.\"\napplications for new businesses\nsnapped forward\nlike a slingshot\nwe have been reshuffling how and where we work\nthat\ncreated all sorts of opportunities for entrepreneurs\nIt's brought a\nbounty to businesses you interact with on a\nscreen\nthe boom is undeniably good news\nthis is about way more than just a pendulum swing: it's a rocket ship to a better economy\nthe pandemic\nforced the business world to drop outdated ways of doing things and embrace technology in a new way.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "America was seeing a boom in the creation of\n startups\nthis wasn't just a blip.\"\nthe boom is undeniably good news\n: it's a rocket ship to a better economy\ntech", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Startups are doing fine---the pandemic created fertile ground for innovation.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "despite a deadly pandemic and an ugly recession\nAmerica was seeing a boom in the creation of new startups\nthis wasn't just a blip.\"\napplications for new businesses\nsnapped forward\nlike a slingshot\nwe have been reshuffling how and where we work\nthat\ncreated all sorts of opportunities for entrepreneurs\nIt's brought a\nbounty to businesses you interact with on a\nscreen\nthe boom is undeniably good news\nthis is about way more than just a pendulum swing: it's a rocket ship to a better economy\nthe pandemic\nforced the business world to drop outdated ways of doing things and embrace technology in a new way.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "despite\npandemic and\nrecession\nAmerica\nseeing a boom in\nstartups\nreshuffling how and where we work\ncreated\nopportunities\nundeniably good news\na rocket ship to a better economy\nforced the business world to\nembrace tech", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Nuclear assurance is incredible for Seoul.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The problem is that Yoon’s observation was fundamentally correct. The nuclear balance on the Korean Peninsula is changing in a profound way. Thanks to North Korea’s development of long-range nuclear capabilities, U.S. cities will soon be in the cross hairs during any war on the peninsula. In the past, Washington could use the threat of a U.S. nuclear response to deter North Korea from using nuclear weapons against the South, because in a worst-case scenario, it would be Seoul and Busan at risk rather than New York and Los Angeles. But North Korean missiles will soon be able to reach the entire United States—forcing U.S. policymakers to consider how much they wish to wager on behalf of their ally. As a result, the U.S. nuclear commitment to South Korea is increasingly founded on promises that are unlikely to be kept in the case of a crisis. Mere reassurance is no longer enough for Seoul, and the United States and South Korea need to update their strategy for nuclear deterrence on the peninsula.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "observation was fundamentally correct\nThe nuclear balance on the Korean Peninsula is changing in\nprofound way\nU.S. cities will\nbe in the cross hairs during any war\nIn the past\nWashington could use the threat of a U.S. nuclear response to deter North Korea\nbecause\nit would be Seoul and Busan at risk rather than New York and Los Angeles\nthe U.S. nuclear commitment to South Korea is increasingly founded on promises that are unlikely to be kept\nMere reassurance is no longer enough for Seoul", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Nuclear assurance is incredible for Seoul.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "observation was fundamentally correct\nThe nuclear balance on the Korean Peninsula is changing in\nprofound way\nU.S. cities will\nbe in the cross hairs during any war\nIn the past\nWashington could use the threat of a U.S. nuclear response to deter North Korea\nbecause\nit would be Seoul and Busan at risk rather than New York and Los Angeles\nthe U.S. nuclear commitment to South Korea is increasingly founded on promises that are unlikely to be kept\nMere reassurance is no longer enough for Seoul", "role": "user" }, { "content": "fundamentally\nnuclear balance\nKorean Peninsula\nprofound\ncross hairs\npast\nU.S. nuclear response\nNorth Korea\nSeoul\nBusan\nNew York\nLos Angeles\nSouth Korea\nincreasingly\nunlikely\nMere reassurance\nSeoul", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Nuclear assurance is incredible for Seoul.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "observation was fundamentally correct\nThe nuclear balance on the Korean Peninsula is changing in\nprofound way\nU.S. cities will\nbe in the cross hairs during any war\nIn the past\nWashington could use the threat of a U.S. nuclear response to deter North Korea\nbecause\nit would be Seoul and Busan at risk rather than New York and Los Angeles\nthe U.S. nuclear commitment to South Korea is increasingly founded on promises that are unlikely to be kept\nMere reassurance is no longer enough for Seoul", "role": "user" }, { "content": "nuc\nbalance on the\nPeninsula\nU.S. cities\nin the cross hairs\nat risk\nNew York and L\nA\nU.S. nuc\ncommitment\nis increasingly founded on promises\nunlikely to be kept\nMere reassurance is no longer enough for Seoul", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Whereas NFU policies are against a specific country.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Terminology\n(1) No First Use (NFU)\nNo First Use is a policy of not using nuclear weapons before another country in an armed conflict. However, it leaves open the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event that the other country uses nuclear weapons first. The concept of NFU encourages nuclear disarmament, and if all nuclear-weapon states, including the nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France) agree to it and establish a global NFU regime, the role of nuclear weapons would be limited to deterring other nuclear-weapon states from using them as well. China has declared an unconditional NFU since its successful nuclear test in October 1964 that it will not use nuclear weapons first under any circumstances.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Terminology\n(1) No First Use (NFU)\nNo First Use is a policy of not using nuclear weapons before another country in an armed conflict. However, it leaves open the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event that the other country uses nuclear weapons first", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Whereas NFU policies are against a specific country.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Terminology\n(1) No First Use (NFU)\nNo First Use is a policy of not using nuclear weapons before another country in an armed conflict. However, it leaves open the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event that the other country uses nuclear weapons first", "role": "user" }, { "content": "No First Use\nis a policy of not using nuclear weapons before another country\nHowever\nleaves open\noption of retaliating\nin the event\nthe other\nuses\nfirst", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Stimulating innovation through companies isn’t enough---AI leadership requires government support.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "But bringing AI’s power to bear on the broader economy can’t be done by private companies alone—it requires an accommodating policy environment and can be accelerated by direct government support. As you recall, soon after Ke Jie’s loss to AlphaGo, the Chinese central government released a sweeping blueprint for Chinese leadership in AI. Like the “mass innovation and mass entrepreneurship” campaign, China’s AI plan is turbocharging growth through a flood of new funding, including subsidies for AI startups and generous government contracts to accelerate adoption. \nThe plan has also shifted incentives for policy innovation around AI. Ambitious mayors across China are scrambling to turn their cities into showcases for new AI applications. They’re plotting driverless trucking routes, installing facial recognition systems on public transportation, and hooking traffic grids into “city brains” that optimize flows. \nBehind these efforts lies a core difference in American and Chinese political culture: while America’s combative political system aggressively punishes missteps or waste in funding technological upgrades, China’s techno-utilitarian approach rewards proactive investment and adoption. Neither system can claim objective moral superiority, and the United States’ long track record of both personal freedom and technological achievement is unparalleled in the modern era. But I believe that in the age of AI implementation the Chinese approach will have the impact of accelerating deployment, generating more data, and planting the seeds of further growth. It’s a self-perpetuating cycle, one that runs on a peculiar alchemy of digital data, entrepreneurial grit, hard-earned expertise, and political will. To see where the two AI superpowers stand, we must first understand the source of that expertise.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "But bringing AI’s power to bear on the broader economy can’t be done by private companies alone\nit requires an accommodating policy environment and can be accelerated by direct government support\nthe Chinese central government released a sweeping blueprint for Chinese leadership in AI\nChina’s AI plan is turbocharging growth through a flood of new funding, including subsidies for AI startups and generous government contracts to accelerate adoption\nThe plan has\nshifted incentives for policy innovation\nBehind these efforts lies a core difference in American and Chinese\nculture: while America’s combative\nsystem aggressively punishes missteps\nin funding technological upgrades, China’s techno-utilitarian approach rewards proactive investment and adoption\nthe Chinese approach will have the impact of accelerating deployment, generating more data, and planting the seeds of further growth. It’s a self-perpetuating cycle\nthat runs on\ndigital data, entrepreneurial grit\nand political will", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Stimulating innovation through companies isn’t enough---AI leadership requires government support.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "But bringing AI’s power to bear on the broader economy can’t be done by private companies alone\nit requires an accommodating policy environment and can be accelerated by direct government support\nthe Chinese central government released a sweeping blueprint for Chinese leadership in AI\nChina’s AI plan is turbocharging growth through a flood of new funding, including subsidies for AI startups and generous government contracts to accelerate adoption\nThe plan has\nshifted incentives for policy innovation\nBehind these efforts lies a core difference in American and Chinese\nculture: while America’s combative\nsystem aggressively punishes missteps\nin funding technological upgrades, China’s techno-utilitarian approach rewards proactive investment and adoption\nthe Chinese approach will have the impact of accelerating deployment, generating more data, and planting the seeds of further growth. It’s a self-perpetuating cycle\nthat runs on\ndigital data, entrepreneurial grit\nand political will", "role": "user" }, { "content": "bringing AI’s power\ncan’t be done\nprivate companies\naccommodating\naccelerated\ndirect government support\ncentral government\nsweeping blueprint\nturbocharging growth\nnew funding\nsubsidies\nstartups\ngovernment contracts\nshifted incentives\npolicy innovation\ncore difference\ncombative\nmissteps\ntechno-utilitarian\ninvestment\nadoption\naccelerating deployment\nplanting the seeds\nfurther growth\nself-perpetuating cycle", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Stimulating innovation through companies isn’t enough---AI leadership requires government support.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "But bringing AI’s power to bear on the broader economy can’t be done by private companies alone\nit requires an accommodating policy environment and can be accelerated by direct government support\nthe Chinese central government released a sweeping blueprint for Chinese leadership in AI\nChina’s AI plan is turbocharging growth through a flood of new funding, including subsidies for AI startups and generous government contracts to accelerate adoption\nThe plan has\nshifted incentives for policy innovation\nBehind these efforts lies a core difference in American and Chinese\nculture: while America’s combative\nsystem aggressively punishes missteps\nin funding technological upgrades, China’s techno-utilitarian approach rewards proactive investment and adoption\nthe Chinese approach will have the impact of accelerating deployment, generating more data, and planting the seeds of further growth. It’s a self-perpetuating cycle\nthat runs on\ndigital data, entrepreneurial grit\nand political will", "role": "user" }, { "content": "bringing AI\nto\nthe\neconomy can’t be\ncompanies alone\nit requires\npolicy\naccelerated by\ngovernment support\nChina’s\nis\ngrowth through a flood of\nfunding\nsubsidies\nstartups and\ncontracts\nThe plan\nincent\ns\ninnovation\nChina’s\nutilitarian approach\nwill\naccelerat\ndeployment\nand plant\nseeds of\ngrowth. It’s\nself-perpetuating", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: And undermines democracy.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Considerable controversy has surrounded the Supreme Court’s sharply divided decisions in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby. Critics argue that giving business corporations unwarranted constitutional protections entrenches corporate power at the expense of democracy by putting legal fictions on the same political plane as human beings. The powerful intuitions and normative concerns underpinning these objections are captured in familiar slogans, such as “End Corporate Rule,” “Corporations Are Not People,” and “We the People, Not We the Corporations.”\nRallying around such catchphrases is a broad social movement demanding that rights be restricted to human beings and corporate personhood be abolished (see here). Support for these proposals – that Susanna Ripken appositely labels “corporate abolitionism” (see here), because, like the abolitionists of the 19th century, the movement frames its cause as an issue of human rights – has spread among local governments, state legislatures, and federal lawmakers.\nWhile we agree that excessive corporate power poses a danger to the the functioning of modern democracies, like Kent Greenfield (see here) and others, we doubt that the proposed remedies are appropriate. To explain why, our new paper identifies and reconstructs three partially overlapping but analytically distinct justifications for corporate abolitionism, which we express in general terms, independently of specific Supreme Court decisions or policy debates.\nBy showcasing the implicit philosophical logic underlying the three arguments against corporate personhood, we give them their strongest articulation and render them more scrutable to normative critique. We conclude that, despite their intuitive appeal, their various limitations show why the abolitionist cause is misguided. We offer a different way of thinking about the problem of corporate power, one that does not rely on abolishing the corporate person.\nThree Arguments Against Corporate Personhood\nWe call the three basic arguments against corporate personhood the Plutocracy Rationale, the Absurdity Rationale, and the Distinctiveness Rationale. The Plutocracy Rationale stems from the fear that conceiving of corporations as bearers of constitutional rights reinforces the immense economic advantages they already derive from their legal personhood, thereby facilitating intolerable and ever-growing inequality in social and political power. The normative underpinning here is broadly speaking egalitarian in orientation. Corporate personhood ought to be abolished because the consequences are offensive to the egalitarian commitments inherent to a democratic society.\nThe Absurdity Rationale expresses the view that, because corporations are not conscious, living agents, corporate personhood must involve a category mistake. Since even lawyers and judges acknowledge that it is a legal fiction, to base our political understandings of rights on such sophistry is to invite inanity into society. The underlying objection here is that law ought to be scrutable and understandable to those subject to it. Because corporate personhood is nonsensical, it is illegitimate and therefore must be eliminated.\nThe Distinctiveness Rationale derives from the concern that if corporate personhood remains, we will be forced to put corporations on the same constitutional footing as us. By treating corporations the same as we do humans, we dilute the political and moral value of our own humanity. The objection here has a Kantian flavor. Since corporations are merely means to human ends, not ends in themselves, they are not, and should not, be considered as equal in normative standing.\nIn sum, corporate abolitionism is motivated by three concerns: a concern for democratic equality; a concern for social/legal coherence; and a concern for the priority of humans in our schemes of normative justification. Abolitionists argue that corporate personhood offends one or more of these values and, consequently, that some aspect of social justice or morality requires that we abandon this legal institution. We critically evaluate and respond to each objection in turn.\nWhy These Arguments Are Misguided\nThe Plutocracy Rationale conjures up images of big business abusing the rights intended for individuals. The focus on large business corporations downplays the fact that corporate personhood is a feature of a large array of business and nonbusiness organizations (including small private companies, cooperatives, nonprofits, political parties, universities, places of worship, municipalities, and states) that enable a modern society to function, all of which would find it difficult to accumulate assets, contract with one another, or access the courts if corporate personhood were abolished. It also ignores the societal and political benefits of corporate personhood, which we argue is a vital tool for collective action, providing an indispensable vector for democratic empowerment.\nIn assuming that person and human being are synonymous, the Absurdity Rationale misunderstands the legal notion of personhood. We demonstrate that law’s “person” is abstract and disconnected from biological, metaphysical, or moral considerations (see also here). The distinction between the legal personhood of human beings and that of corporations cannot be that the former is natural and therefore legitimate, while the latter is artificial and hence illegitimate. Both are artificial in the same sense that other legal institutions are. To refer to “corporate persons” may seem counterintuitive, but it is not incoherent or absurd.\nThe problem with the Distinctiveness Rationale is that it lumps all kinds of constitutional rights together and fails to acknowledge that the assignment of some rights (for example, those meant to limit government overreach) does not need to rest on the presence or absence of human qualities. As we show, corporate persons can be legitimate holders of constitutional rights and, importantly, nothing in the doctrine of corporate personhood requires that corporations be granted the same complement of rights as humans.\nIn sum, the strategy of seeking to abolish corporate personhood or eliminating all corporate rights is ill-conceived. The debate should instead focus on which rights corporations should or should not be granted. The problem is not that corporations are seen as rights-bearing persons. The problem is that the extension of rights to corporations is easily taken too far.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Critics argue that giving business corporations unwarranted constitutional protections entrenches corporate power at the expense of democracy\ncorporate abolitionism\nWhile we agree that excessive corporate power poses a danger\nwe doubt that the proposed remedies are appropriate\ndespite\nintuitive appeal\nthe abolitionist cause is misguided\ncorporate abolitionism is motivated by three concerns: a concern for democratic equality; a concern for social/legal coherence; and a concern for the priority of humans\nThese Arguments Are Misguided\nThe Plutocracy Rationale conjures up images of big business abusing\nrights\ncorporate personhood is a feature of a large array of business and nonbusiness organizations\nincluding small\ncompanies\ncooperatives\nnonprofits\nplaces of worship\nmunicipalities\nand states\nthat enable a modern society to function\nall of which would find it difficult to accumulate assets\ncontract\nor access the courts if corporate personhood were abolished\nIt\nignores the societal and political benefits of corporate personhood\nwhich\nis\nvital\nfor collective action\nproviding an indispensable vector for democratic empowerment\ncorporate persons can be legitimate holders of constitutional rights and\nnothing in the doctrine of corporate personhood requires that corporations be granted the same complement of rights as humans.\nthe strategy of seeking to abolish corporate personhood or eliminating all corporate rights is ill-conceived\nThe debate should\nfocus on which rights\nThe problem is not that corporations are seen as rights-bearing persons. The problem is that the extension of rights to corporations is easily taken too far.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: And undermines democracy.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Critics argue that giving business corporations unwarranted constitutional protections entrenches corporate power at the expense of democracy\ncorporate abolitionism\nWhile we agree that excessive corporate power poses a danger\nwe doubt that the proposed remedies are appropriate\ndespite\nintuitive appeal\nthe abolitionist cause is misguided\ncorporate abolitionism is motivated by three concerns: a concern for democratic equality; a concern for social/legal coherence; and a concern for the priority of humans\nThese Arguments Are Misguided\nThe Plutocracy Rationale conjures up images of big business abusing\nrights\ncorporate personhood is a feature of a large array of business and nonbusiness organizations\nincluding small\ncompanies\ncooperatives\nnonprofits\nplaces of worship\nmunicipalities\nand states\nthat enable a modern society to function\nall of which would find it difficult to accumulate assets\ncontract\nor access the courts if corporate personhood were abolished\nIt\nignores the societal and political benefits of corporate personhood\nwhich\nis\nvital\nfor collective action\nproviding an indispensable vector for democratic empowerment\ncorporate persons can be legitimate holders of constitutional rights and\nnothing in the doctrine of corporate personhood requires that corporations be granted the same complement of rights as humans.\nthe strategy of seeking to abolish corporate personhood or eliminating all corporate rights is ill-conceived\nThe debate should\nfocus on which rights\nThe problem is not that corporations are seen as rights-bearing persons. The problem is that the extension of rights to corporations is easily taken too far.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "corporate abolitionism\nwe doubt that the proposed remedies are appropriate\nthe abolitionist cause is misguided\nMisguided\nincluding small\ncompanies\ncooperatives\nnonprofits\nplaces of worship\nmunicipalities\nstates\nmodern society to function\nabolished\nsocietal\npolitical benefits of corporate personhood\nvital\nfor collective action\ndemocratic empowerment\nthe strategy of seeking to abolish corporate personhood or eliminating all corporate rights is ill-conceived\nwhich rights", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: And undermines democracy.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Considerable controversy has surrounded the Supreme Court’s sharply divided decisions in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby. Critics argue that giving business corporations unwarranted constitutional protections entrenches corporate power at the expense of democracy by putting legal fictions on the same political plane as human beings. The powerful intuitions and normative concerns underpinning these objections are captured in familiar slogans, such as “End Corporate Rule,” “Corporations Are Not People,” and “We the People, Not We the Corporations.”\nRallying around such catchphrases is a broad social movement demanding that rights be restricted to human beings and corporate personhood be abolished (see here). Support for these proposals – that Susanna Ripken appositely labels “corporate abolitionism” (see here), because, like the abolitionists of the 19th century, the movement frames its cause as an issue of human rights – has spread among local governments, state legislatures, and federal lawmakers.\nWhile we agree that excessive corporate power poses a danger to the the functioning of modern democracies, like Kent Greenfield (see here) and others, we doubt that the proposed remedies are appropriate. To explain why, our new paper identifies and reconstructs three partially overlapping but analytically distinct justifications for corporate abolitionism, which we express in general terms, independently of specific Supreme Court decisions or policy debates.\nBy showcasing the implicit philosophical logic underlying the three arguments against corporate personhood, we give them their strongest articulation and render them more scrutable to normative critique. We conclude that, despite their intuitive appeal, their various limitations show why the abolitionist cause is misguided. We offer a different way of thinking about the problem of corporate power, one that does not rely on abolishing the corporate person.\nThree Arguments Against Corporate Personhood\nWe call the three basic arguments against corporate personhood the Plutocracy Rationale, the Absurdity Rationale, and the Distinctiveness Rationale. The Plutocracy Rationale stems from the fear that conceiving of corporations as bearers of constitutional rights reinforces the immense economic advantages they already derive from their legal personhood, thereby facilitating intolerable and ever-growing inequality in social and political power. The normative underpinning here is broadly speaking egalitarian in orientation. Corporate personhood ought to be abolished because the consequences are offensive to the egalitarian commitments inherent to a democratic society.\nThe Absurdity Rationale expresses the view that, because corporations are not conscious, living agents, corporate personhood must involve a category mistake. Since even lawyers and judges acknowledge that it is a legal fiction, to base our political understandings of rights on such sophistry is to invite inanity into society. The underlying objection here is that law ought to be scrutable and understandable to those subject to it. Because corporate personhood is nonsensical, it is illegitimate and therefore must be eliminated.\nThe Distinctiveness Rationale derives from the concern that if corporate personhood remains, we will be forced to put corporations on the same constitutional footing as us. By treating corporations the same as we do humans, we dilute the political and moral value of our own humanity. The objection here has a Kantian flavor. Since corporations are merely means to human ends, not ends in themselves, they are not, and should not, be considered as equal in normative standing.\nIn sum, corporate abolitionism is motivated by three concerns: a concern for democratic equality; a concern for social/legal coherence; and a concern for the priority of humans in our schemes of normative justification. Abolitionists argue that corporate personhood offends one or more of these values and, consequently, that some aspect of social justice or morality requires that we abandon this legal institution. We critically evaluate and respond to each objection in turn.\nWhy These Arguments Are Misguided\nThe Plutocracy Rationale conjures up images of big business abusing the rights intended for individuals. The focus on large business corporations downplays the fact that corporate personhood is a feature of a large array of business and nonbusiness organizations (including small private companies, cooperatives, nonprofits, political parties, universities, places of worship, municipalities, and states) that enable a modern society to function, all of which would find it difficult to accumulate assets, contract with one another, or access the courts if corporate personhood were abolished. It also ignores the societal and political benefits of corporate personhood, which we argue is a vital tool for collective action, providing an indispensable vector for democratic empowerment.\nIn assuming that person and human being are synonymous, the Absurdity Rationale misunderstands the legal notion of personhood. We demonstrate that law’s “person” is abstract and disconnected from biological, metaphysical, or moral considerations (see also here). The distinction between the legal personhood of human beings and that of corporations cannot be that the former is natural and therefore legitimate, while the latter is artificial and hence illegitimate. Both are artificial in the same sense that other legal institutions are. To refer to “corporate persons” may seem counterintuitive, but it is not incoherent or absurd.\nThe problem with the Distinctiveness Rationale is that it lumps all kinds of constitutional rights together and fails to acknowledge that the assignment of some rights (for example, those meant to limit government overreach) does not need to rest on the presence or absence of human qualities. As we show, corporate persons can be legitimate holders of constitutional rights and, importantly, nothing in the doctrine of corporate personhood requires that corporations be granted the same complement of rights as humans.\nIn sum, the strategy of seeking to abolish corporate personhood or eliminating all corporate rights is ill-conceived. The debate should instead focus on which rights corporations should or should not be granted. The problem is not that corporations are seen as rights-bearing persons. The problem is that the extension of rights to corporations is easily taken too far.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "we doubt\nthe\nremedies are appropriate\ndespite\nintuitive appeal\nthe abolitionist cause is misguided\npersonhood is a feature of\nnonbusiness organizations\nincluding small\ncompanies\ncoop\ns\nnonprofits\nworship\nmunicipalities\nand states\nthat enable\nsociety to function\nall of which would find it difficult to accumulate assets\ncontract\nor access\ncourts if corporate personhood were abolished\npersonhood\nis\nvital\nfor collective action\nproviding\ndemocratic empowerment\nseeking to abolish corporate personhood\nis ill-conceived\nThe debate should\nfocus on which rights\nnot\ncorporations\nas rights-bearing persons", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 1. Only warming kills everyone.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "A devastating fact of climate collapse is that there may be a silver lining to the mushroom cloud. First, it should be noted that a nuclear exchange does not inevitably result in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter—the idea that firestorms would make the earth uninhabitable—is based on shaky science. There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would decimate agriculture or make humans extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuclear devices. An exchange that shuts down the global economy but stops short of human extinction may be the only blade realistically likely to cut the carbon knot we’re trapped within. It would decimate existing infrastructures, providing an opportunity to build new energy infrastructure and intervene in the current investments and subsidies keeping fossil fuels alive. In the near term, emissions would almost certainly rise as militaries are some of the world’s largest emitters. Given what we know of human history, though, conflict may be the only way to build the mass social cohesion necessary for undertaking the kind of huge, collective action needed for global sequestration and energy transition. Like the 20th century’s world wars, a nuclear exchange could serve as an economic leveler. It could provide justification for nationalizing energy industries with the interest of shuttering fossil fuel plants and transitioning to renewables and, uh, nuclear energy. It could shock us into reimagining a less suicidal civilization, one that dethrones the death-cult zealots who are currently in power. And it may toss particulates into the atmosphere sufficient to block out some of the solar heat helping to drive global warming. Or it may have the opposite effects. Who knows? What we do know is that humans can survive and recover from war, probably even a nuclear one. Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change. Nuclear war is not an inevitable extinction event; six degrees of warming is.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "nuclear exchange does not inevitably result in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter\nis based on shaky science. There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would decimate agriculture or make humans extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuclear devices.\nhumans can survive and recover from war, probably even a nuclear one. Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change. Nuclear war is not an inevitable extinction event; six degrees of warming is.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 1. Only warming kills everyone.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "A devastating fact of climate collapse is that there may be a silver lining to the mushroom cloud. First, it should be noted that a nuclear exchange does not inevitably result in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter—the idea that firestorms would make the earth uninhabitable—is based on shaky science. There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would decimate agriculture or make humans extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuclear devices. An exchange that shuts down the global economy but stops short of human extinction may be the only blade realistically likely to cut the carbon knot we’re trapped within. It would decimate existing infrastructures, providing an opportunity to build new energy infrastructure and intervene in the current investments and subsidies keeping fossil fuels alive. In the near term, emissions would almost certainly rise as militaries are some of the world’s largest emitters. Given what we know of human history, though, conflict may be the only way to build the mass social cohesion necessary for undertaking the kind of huge, collective action needed for global sequestration and energy transition. Like the 20th century’s world wars, a nuclear exchange could serve as an economic leveler. It could provide justification for nationalizing energy industries with the interest of shuttering fossil fuel plants and transitioning to renewables and, uh, nuclear energy. It could shock us into reimagining a less suicidal civilization, one that dethrones the death-cult zealots who are currently in power. And it may toss particulates into the atmosphere sufficient to block out some of the solar heat helping to drive global warming. Or it may have the opposite effects. Who knows? What we do know is that humans can survive and recover from war, probably even a nuclear one. Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change. Nuclear war is not an inevitable extinction event; six degrees of warming is.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "apocalyptic loss of life\nNuclear winter\nshaky science\nno reliable model\nhow many megatons\ndecimate agriculture\nextinct\n2,476 nuclear devices\nsurvive\nrecover from\nnuclear one\ncannot recover\nrunaway climate change\nnot\ninevitable extinction event\nsix degrees of warming is.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 1. Only warming kills everyone.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.8", "role": "system" }, { "content": "nuclear exchange does not inevitably result in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter\nis based on shaky science. There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would decimate agriculture or make humans extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuclear devices.\nhumans can survive and recover from war, probably even a nuclear one. Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change. Nuclear war is not an inevitable extinction event; six degrees of warming is.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "nuclear exchange does not\nresult in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter\nis based on shaky science. There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would\nmake humans extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuc\ns.\nhumans can survive and recover from war,\neven a nuclear one. Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change. Nuclear war is not an inevitable extinction event;\nwarming is.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Their intersectional analysis fails to explain the global contours of capitalism – spaces of capitalism are always racialized and colonial, but coming to this conclusion requires understanding the spatial organization of capital.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\t\nVP: To conclude: we know that theoretical analysis is always connected to social movements on the ground. What were the sites of struggle that prompted you to investigate social reproduction and class formation in the recent past and today? Are there specific experiences you can speak to here?\nDM and SF: Part of our experience simply has to do with the complex ways in which the left of the 1970s and 1980s struggled in practice and theory to integrate class and gender. Particularly significant for both of us was our involvement in pro-choice struggles in Ontario in the mid- to late-1980s. Participation in this movement really foregrounds how resistant capitalist societies have been to reproductive freedom for women. And this raises all kinds of interesting theoretical and strategic questions in which we have both been interested. But especially since the mid-1990s, when we began to work politically in a less dogmatic Marxist environment (especially in the New Socialist network), we increasingly felt the need to grapple much more seriously with race and racialization – and ultimately with sexuality and ability – as constitutive dimensions of class and gender. Our support for anti-racist and migrant justice movements was certainly an important part of this story. And we found ourselves dissatisfied with just asserting that the axes of multiple oppressions “intersected” in modern capitalist society.\nWhile intersectionality theory has raised important questions, and generated important insights, it tends to flounder at explaining why these multiple oppressions exist and are reproduced throughout late capitalism, and at accounting for the how of their interaction. Because its approach is holistic and unitary, social reproduction theory is, we think, potentially better equipped in these areas. But this requires a lot of work, and a real commitment to learning from the best of anti-racist and anti-colonial theory and practice, in order to overcome some significant shortcomings of early social reproduction theory. By emphasizing the spatial organization of capitalist and working class reproduction, Sue has attempted to take up this challenge in a couple of essays by showing how the spaces of capitalism are always racialized and colonial ones. And our joint contribution in the latest Socialist Register represents an effort to take this somewhat farther by sharply pushing beyond the horizons of the nation-state in order to consider the reproduction of the working class as a global phenomenon in which migration is a central feature. We think this is an especially exciting and challenging time for historical materialist work in these areas. And the living pulse of real social struggles is likely to keep pushing work in these areas for many years to come.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "we know that theoretical analysis is always connected to social movements on the ground\nPart of our experience\nhas to do with\nour involvement in pro-choice struggles in Ontario in the mid- to late-1980s\nParticipation in this movement really foregrounds how resistant capitalist societies have been to reproductive freedom for women\nto grapple much more seriously with race and racialization\nand\nsexuality and ability – as constitutive dimensions of class and gender\nOur support for anti-racist and migrant justice movements was certainly\nimportant\nAnd we found ourselves dissatisfied with just asserting that the axes of multiple oppressions “intersected” in modern capitalist society\nWhile intersectionality theory has raised important questions\ntends to flounder at explaining why these multiple oppressions exist and are reproduced throughout late capitalism, and at accounting for the how of their interaction\nBy emphasizing the spatial organization of capitalist and working class reproduction, Sue has attempted to take up this challenge\nby showing how the spaces of capitalism are always racialized and colonial ones\nour\ncontribution\nrepresents an effort to take this somewhat farther by sharply pushing beyond the horizons of the nation-state in order to consider the reproduction of the working class as a global phenomenon in which migration is a central feature\nthis is an especially exciting\ntime for historical materialist work", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Their intersectional analysis fails to explain the global contours of capitalism – spaces of capitalism are always racialized and colonial, but coming to this conclusion requires understanding the spatial organization of capital.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\t\nVP: To conclude: we know that theoretical analysis is always connected to social movements on the ground. What were the sites of struggle that prompted you to investigate social reproduction and class formation in the recent past and today? Are there specific experiences you can speak to here?\nDM and SF: Part of our experience simply has to do with the complex ways in which the left of the 1970s and 1980s struggled in practice and theory to integrate class and gender. Particularly significant for both of us was our involvement in pro-choice struggles in Ontario in the mid- to late-1980s. Participation in this movement really foregrounds how resistant capitalist societies have been to reproductive freedom for women. And this raises all kinds of interesting theoretical and strategic questions in which we have both been interested. But especially since the mid-1990s, when we began to work politically in a less dogmatic Marxist environment (especially in the New Socialist network), we increasingly felt the need to grapple much more seriously with race and racialization – and ultimately with sexuality and ability – as constitutive dimensions of class and gender. Our support for anti-racist and migrant justice movements was certainly an important part of this story. And we found ourselves dissatisfied with just asserting that the axes of multiple oppressions “intersected” in modern capitalist society.\nWhile intersectionality theory has raised important questions, and generated important insights, it tends to flounder at explaining why these multiple oppressions exist and are reproduced throughout late capitalism, and at accounting for the how of their interaction. Because its approach is holistic and unitary, social reproduction theory is, we think, potentially better equipped in these areas. But this requires a lot of work, and a real commitment to learning from the best of anti-racist and anti-colonial theory and practice, in order to overcome some significant shortcomings of early social reproduction theory. By emphasizing the spatial organization of capitalist and working class reproduction, Sue has attempted to take up this challenge in a couple of essays by showing how the spaces of capitalism are always racialized and colonial ones. And our joint contribution in the latest Socialist Register represents an effort to take this somewhat farther by sharply pushing beyond the horizons of the nation-state in order to consider the reproduction of the working class as a global phenomenon in which migration is a central feature. We think this is an especially exciting and challenging time for historical materialist work in these areas. And the living pulse of real social struggles is likely to keep pushing work in these areas for many years to come.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "connected to social movements\ndissatisfied with just asserting that the axes of multiple oppressions “intersected”\nflounder at explaining why\nexist and are reproduced\nthe how\ninteraction\nspatial organization\nalways racialized and colonial\ntake this\nfarther\nglobal phenomenon", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Their intersectional analysis fails to explain the global contours of capitalism – spaces of capitalism are always racialized and colonial, but coming to this conclusion requires understanding the spatial organization of capital.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "we know that theoretical analysis is always connected to social movements on the ground\nPart of our experience\nhas to do with\nour involvement in pro-choice struggles in Ontario in the mid- to late-1980s\nParticipation in this movement really foregrounds how resistant capitalist societies have been to reproductive freedom for women\nto grapple much more seriously with race and racialization\nand\nsexuality and ability – as constitutive dimensions of class and gender\nOur support for anti-racist and migrant justice movements was certainly\nimportant\nAnd we found ourselves dissatisfied with just asserting that the axes of multiple oppressions “intersected” in modern capitalist society\nWhile intersectionality theory has raised important questions\ntends to flounder at explaining why these multiple oppressions exist and are reproduced throughout late capitalism, and at accounting for the how of their interaction\nBy emphasizing the spatial organization of capitalist and working class reproduction, Sue has attempted to take up this challenge\nby showing how the spaces of capitalism are always racialized and colonial ones\nour\ncontribution\nrepresents an effort to take this somewhat farther by sharply pushing beyond the horizons of the nation-state in order to consider the reproduction of the working class as a global phenomenon in which migration is a central feature\nthis is an especially exciting\ntime for historical materialist work", "role": "user" }, { "content": "theoretical analysis is always connected to\nmovements\nto grapple\nwith race\nsexuality and ability\nwe found ourselves dissatisfied with just asserting\noppressions “intersected”\nintersectionality\ntends to flounder at explaining why\noppressions exist and are reproduced\naccounting for the how of their interaction\nemphasizing\nspatial organization of capitalist\nreproduction\nthe spaces of capitalism are always racialized and colonial\nto\nconsider\nreproduction of the working class as a global phenomenon", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No LIO impact: China supports it, is a structurally constrained power, and the US is just as bad.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Finally, the latter set of supposedly existential normative or ideological threats consists of many elements, including Beijing’s possible overturning of the so-called global liberal international order, Chinese influence operations aimed at U.S. society, the export of China’s political values and state-directed economic approach, and its sale of surveillance technologies and other items that facilitate the rise or strengthening of authoritarian states. These threats all seem hair-raising at first glance. But while significant, they are greatly exaggerated and do not rise to the level of constituting an existential threat.\nBeijing has little interest in exporting its governance system, and where it does, it is almost entirely directed at developing countries, not industrial democracies such as the United States. In addition, there is no evidence to indicate that the Chinese are actually engaged in compelling or actively persuading countries to follow their experience. Rather, they want developing nations to study from and copy China’s approach because doing so would help to legitimize the Chinese system both internationally and more importantly to Beijing’s domestic audience.\nIn addition, the notion that Beijing is deliberately attempting to control other countries and make them more authoritarian by entrapping them in debt and selling them “Big Brother” hardware such as surveillance systems is unsupported by the facts. Chinese banks show little desire to extend loans that will fail, and the failures that do occur are mostly due to poor feasibility studies and the incompetence and excessive zeal of lenders and/or borrowers. Moreover, in both loan-giving and surveillance equipment sales, China has shown no specific preference for nondemocratic over democratic states.\nEven if Beijing were to attempt to export its development approach to other states, the actual attractiveness of that approach would prove to be highly limited. The features undergirding China’s developmental success are not replicable for most (if any) countries. These include a high savings rate; a highly acquisitive and entrepreneurial cultural environment; a state-owned banking system and nonconvertible currency; many massive state-owned industries that exist to provide employment, facilitate party control over key sectors, and drive huge infrastructure construction; and strong controls over virtually all information flows. Moreover, such a model (if you can call it that) is almost certainly not sustainable in its present form, given China’s aging population, extensive corruption, very large levels of income inequality, inadequate social safety net, and the fact that free information flows are required to drive global innovation.\nAlthough China’s combination of economic reform policies and authoritarian political system has been around since the early 1980s, not a single nation has adopted that system either willingly or under Chinese compulsion. There are certainly many authoritarian states and fragile democracies on China’s periphery, but none of them were made that way by China. China’s challenge to the so-called global liberal international order is also exaggerated. In the first place, it is highly debatable whether in fact a single coherent global order even exists. What observers usually refer to as the “liberal international order” (a relatively recent term) actually consists of an amalgam of disparate regimes with different origins, including international human rights pacts, multilateral economic arrangements, and an international court.\nThe United States certainly plays an important or leading role in many of these regimes. But it did not create and does not drive all global regimes—and in fact does not support some of them, such as the International Court of Justice, and has not ratified some critical pacts such as the United National Convention on the Law of the Sea. And many very important global regimes (e.g., regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trade and investment, climate change, and pandemics) have no deep connection to liberal democratic values per se and are supported by Beijing, albeit sometimes more in letter than in spirit.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Beijing’s possible overturning of the so-called global liberal international order\nare greatly exaggerated and do not rise to the level of constituting an existential threat\nBeijing has little interest in exporting its governance system\nEven if Beijing were to attempt to export its\napproach\nthe actual attractiveness\nwould prove to be highly limited. The features\nare not replicable for\nany) countries. These include a high savings rate\nstate-owned banking\nand\nstate-owned industries\nparty control over key sectors\nand strong controls over virtually all information\nsuch a model\nis almost certainly not sustainable\ngiven China’s aging population, extensive corruption\nincome inequality, inadequate social safety net\nChina’s\nauthoritarian political system has been around since the early 1980s, not a single nation has adopted that system either willingly or under Chinese compulsion\nChina’s challenge to the so-called global liberal international order is also exaggerated\nThe United States\ndoes not support\nthe International Court of Justice\nhas not ratified\nUnited National Convention on the Law of the Sea. And many\nregimes\nregarding\nweapons of mass destruction, trade\nclimate change, and pandemics) have no deep connection to liberal democratic values per se and are supported by Beijing", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No LIO impact: China supports it, is a structurally constrained power, and the US is just as bad.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Beijing’s possible overturning of the so-called global liberal international order\nare greatly exaggerated and do not rise to the level of constituting an existential threat\nBeijing has little interest in exporting its governance system\nEven if Beijing were to attempt to export its\napproach\nthe actual attractiveness\nwould prove to be highly limited. The features\nare not replicable for\nany) countries. These include a high savings rate\nstate-owned banking\nand\nstate-owned industries\nparty control over key sectors\nand strong controls over virtually all information\nsuch a model\nis almost certainly not sustainable\ngiven China’s aging population, extensive corruption\nincome inequality, inadequate social safety net\nChina’s\nauthoritarian political system has been around since the early 1980s, not a single nation has adopted that system either willingly or under Chinese compulsion\nChina’s challenge to the so-called global liberal international order is also exaggerated\nThe United States\ndoes not support\nthe International Court of Justice\nhas not ratified\nUnited National Convention on the Law of the Sea. And many\nregimes\nregarding\nweapons of mass destruction, trade\nclimate change, and pandemics) have no deep connection to liberal democratic values per se and are supported by Beijing", "role": "user" }, { "content": "overturning\nl\ni\no\ngreatly exaggerated\nnot\nexistential\ninterest\ngovernance\nBeijing\nexport\nattractiveness\nhighly limited\nnot replicable\nsavings\nbanking\nindustries\nsectors\nvirtually all\nnot sustainable\naging\ncorruption\ninequality\nsafety net\nsystem\naround\nno\nsingle nation\nsystem\nchallenge\nl\ni\no\nU\nS\nnot\nI\nC\nJ\nU\nN\nC\nL\no\nS\nw\nm\nd\ntrade\nclimate\npandemics\nno\nliberal\nper se\nsupported\nBeijing", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No LIO impact: China supports it, is a structurally constrained power, and the US is just as bad.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Beijing’s possible overturning of the so-called global liberal international order\nare greatly exaggerated and do not rise to the level of constituting an existential threat\nBeijing has little interest in exporting its governance system\nEven if Beijing were to attempt to export its\napproach\nthe actual attractiveness\nwould prove to be highly limited. The features\nare not replicable for\nany) countries. These include a high savings rate\nstate-owned banking\nand\nstate-owned industries\nparty control over key sectors\nand strong controls over virtually all information\nsuch a model\nis almost certainly not sustainable\ngiven China’s aging population, extensive corruption\nincome inequality, inadequate social safety net\nChina’s\nauthoritarian political system has been around since the early 1980s, not a single nation has adopted that system either willingly or under Chinese compulsion\nChina’s challenge to the so-called global liberal international order is also exaggerated\nThe United States\ndoes not support\nthe International Court of Justice\nhas not ratified\nUnited National Convention on the Law of the Sea. And many\nregimes\nregarding\nweapons of mass destruction, trade\nclimate change, and pandemics) have no deep connection to liberal democratic values per se and are supported by Beijing", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Beijing’s\noverturning\nthe\nl\ni\no\ngreatly exaggerated and\nnot\nexistential\nhas little interest in exporting\ngovernance\nEven if Beijing were to\nthe\nattractiveness\nwould prove\nlimited\nfeatures\nare not replicable for\ncountries\ninclude\nhigh savings\nstate\nbanking\nand\nindustries\nparty control over\nsectors\nand\nall information\nsuch\nis\nnot sustainable\ngiven China’s aging population\ncorruption\ninequality\nsocial safety\nChina’s\nsystem\nbeen around since the\n1980s, no\nnation\nadopted\nU\nS\ndoes not support\nI\nC\nJ\nnot ratified\nU\nN\nC\nL\no\nS\nmany\nregimes\nregarding\nw\nm\nd\ntrade\nclimate\nand pandemics\nhave no\nconnection to liberal\nvalues\nand are supported by Beijing", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: China’s already enforced their side of a mutual NFU---lack of US reciprocation forces them to backslide.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Create the Conditions for the International Adoption of NFU\nChina has sought to promote NFU internationally, as a key step to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in more countries and to reduce the risk of nuclear use. For Beijing, if another NWS extends a NFU promise to China, it also conveys an acknowledgment of and commitment to mutual vulnerability, which China believes is the foundation for maintaining strategic stability.23\nIndeed, if more countries adopt credible NFU policies, it would generate significant international security benefits. Among the major nuclear powers, for example, credible mutual NFU commitments would reduce their concerns about nuclear first strike and allow them to adopt a more relaxed nuclear posture and maintain more modest nuclear forces. Furthermore, when both sides are confident that no one intends to use nuclear weapons first, at least in theory neither side would need to seriously worry about the occurrence of nuclear conflict anymore. In other words, credible mutual NFU policies would amount to mutual no use policies. Under such circumstances, one’s strategic missile defense capabilities should become much less of a concern to one’s rival. Such concerns over the other side’s strategic missile defense capabilities have been a major source of insecurity among these countries and a significant driving force behind current nuclear modernization efforts, including the development of dangerous exotic nuclear weapon platforms.24\nAs discussed above, demonstrating a credible NFU policy is challenging. A key issue is how a country should make this declaratory policy consistent with its actual military capability and posture. In recent decades, China’s nuclear capabilities have expanded considerably with some traditional nuclear postures changed.25 It is publicly pursuing a nuclear triad capability, has developed much more diversified and technologically sophisticated nuclear forces through a comprehensive modernization program, has added multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) technologies to its strategic missiles, has presumably started operating nuclear weapons outside its territory, has invested in advanced theater-range nuclear forces, and has significantly improved the rapid response capabilities of its nuclear forces and reportedly achieved some LOW capacity.26 In March 2021, Mr. Xi instructed the Chinese military to “accelerate the building of advanced strategic deterrent and joint warfare systems,”27 which probably indicates an even stronger wave of nuclear modernization is on the horizon.\nWhen China’s nuclear capability was much weaker, there were fewer questions about the credibility of its NFU policy. But as China’s nuclear capabilities become stronger and stronger, the credibility of this policy will be under greater scrutiny. It will increasingly find itself in a similar position to the other nuclear powers as it asks them to adopt NFU: how do they prove their NFU commitment if their rivals suspect their military capabilities provide them with options of (limited) first use? Indeed, if China invites the other NWS to forge a multilateral NFU agreement, what assurances would Beijing seek from these other countries to demonstrate the credibility of their promises?\nTo meet this challenge, China and the other NWS should jointly explore if they can agree on a set of observable indicators as a measure of a credible NFU commitment. These indicators would seek to capture key technical, institutional, organizational, and operational features of a country’s nuclear force that can help reveal how a country seeks to maintain its nuclear capabilities and employ its nuclear forces. If it can be done, this set of indicators would be used to evaluate whether a country’s NFU policy meets the minimal standard of being credible. Even if it turns out to be impossible to agree on a common set of indicators, a joint study and dialogue on this topic would be a good opportunity to build better understandings about each other’s views on NFU, which would be a helpful and necessary step if China, or any other country, wishes to promote the international adoption of NFU.\nIn the near-term, China cares mostly about whether the United States – among all the other nuclear-armed states – may be willing to move toward adopting a general NFU policy or a bilateral NFU agreement with China. Washington has been reluctant to do so, not least due to the concerns of allies like Japan. American regional allies worry that a U.S. NFU policy could embolden Chinese conventional aggression against them. And as China’s conventional military capabilities have rapidly advanced in the Asia Pacific region, these concerns have increased.\n\n\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "China has sought to promote NFU internationally\nFor Beijing,\na NFU promise to China\nconveys an acknowledgment of and commitment to mutual vulnerability, which China believes is the foundation for\nstrategic stability\ncredible mutual NFU commitments would reduce their concerns about nuclear first strike and allow them to adopt a more relaxed nuclear posture and maintain more modest nuclear forces. Furthermore, when both sides are confident that no one intends to use nuclear weapons first, at least in theory neither side would need to seriously worry about the occurrence of nuclear conflict anymore.\ncredible mutual NFU policies would amount to mutual no use policies. Under such\nmissile defense capabilities should become much less of a concern to one’s rival\nconcerns over the other side’s\n a significant driving force behind current nuclear modernization efforts, including the development of dangerous exotic nuclear weapon platforms\nIn the near-term, China cares mostly about whether the United States – among all the other nuclear-armed states – may be willing to move toward adopting a general NFU policy or a bilateral NFU agreement with China. Washington has been reluctant to do so", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: China’s already enforced their side of a mutual NFU---lack of US reciprocation forces them to backslide.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "China has sought to promote NFU internationally\nFor Beijing,\na NFU promise to China\nconveys an acknowledgment of and commitment to mutual vulnerability, which China believes is the foundation for\nstrategic stability\ncredible mutual NFU commitments would reduce their concerns about nuclear first strike and allow them to adopt a more relaxed nuclear posture and maintain more modest nuclear forces. Furthermore, when both sides are confident that no one intends to use nuclear weapons first, at least in theory neither side would need to seriously worry about the occurrence of nuclear conflict anymore.\ncredible mutual NFU policies would amount to mutual no use policies. Under such\nmissile defense capabilities should become much less of a concern to one’s rival\nconcerns over the other side’s\n a significant driving force behind current nuclear modernization efforts, including the development of dangerous exotic nuclear weapon platforms\nIn the near-term, China cares mostly about whether the United States – among all the other nuclear-armed states – may be willing to move toward adopting a general NFU policy or a bilateral NFU agreement with China. Washington has been reluctant to do so", "role": "user" }, { "content": "sought\nNFU\nNFU\nChina\ncommitment\nvulnerability\nfoundation\nstability\nmutual NFU\nconcerns\nfirst strike\nmore relaxed\nposture\nmore modest\nforces\nboth sides\nno one\nuse\nfirst\nneither side\nworry\noccurrence\nconflict\nmutual NFU\nno use\nmissile defense\nless\nconcern\nconcerns\ndriving\nmodernization\nexotic\nplatforms\nmostly\nU\nS\nwilling\nadopt\nbilateral\nChina", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: China’s already enforced their side of a mutual NFU---lack of US reciprocation forces them to backslide.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Create the Conditions for the International Adoption of NFU\nChina has sought to promote NFU internationally, as a key step to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in more countries and to reduce the risk of nuclear use. For Beijing, if another NWS extends a NFU promise to China, it also conveys an acknowledgment of and commitment to mutual vulnerability, which China believes is the foundation for maintaining strategic stability.23\nIndeed, if more countries adopt credible NFU policies, it would generate significant international security benefits. Among the major nuclear powers, for example, credible mutual NFU commitments would reduce their concerns about nuclear first strike and allow them to adopt a more relaxed nuclear posture and maintain more modest nuclear forces. Furthermore, when both sides are confident that no one intends to use nuclear weapons first, at least in theory neither side would need to seriously worry about the occurrence of nuclear conflict anymore. In other words, credible mutual NFU policies would amount to mutual no use policies. Under such circumstances, one’s strategic missile defense capabilities should become much less of a concern to one’s rival. Such concerns over the other side’s strategic missile defense capabilities have been a major source of insecurity among these countries and a significant driving force behind current nuclear modernization efforts, including the development of dangerous exotic nuclear weapon platforms.24\nAs discussed above, demonstrating a credible NFU policy is challenging. A key issue is how a country should make this declaratory policy consistent with its actual military capability and posture. In recent decades, China’s nuclear capabilities have expanded considerably with some traditional nuclear postures changed.25 It is publicly pursuing a nuclear triad capability, has developed much more diversified and technologically sophisticated nuclear forces through a comprehensive modernization program, has added multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) technologies to its strategic missiles, has presumably started operating nuclear weapons outside its territory, has invested in advanced theater-range nuclear forces, and has significantly improved the rapid response capabilities of its nuclear forces and reportedly achieved some LOW capacity.26 In March 2021, Mr. Xi instructed the Chinese military to “accelerate the building of advanced strategic deterrent and joint warfare systems,”27 which probably indicates an even stronger wave of nuclear modernization is on the horizon.\nWhen China’s nuclear capability was much weaker, there were fewer questions about the credibility of its NFU policy. But as China’s nuclear capabilities become stronger and stronger, the credibility of this policy will be under greater scrutiny. It will increasingly find itself in a similar position to the other nuclear powers as it asks them to adopt NFU: how do they prove their NFU commitment if their rivals suspect their military capabilities provide them with options of (limited) first use? Indeed, if China invites the other NWS to forge a multilateral NFU agreement, what assurances would Beijing seek from these other countries to demonstrate the credibility of their promises?\nTo meet this challenge, China and the other NWS should jointly explore if they can agree on a set of observable indicators as a measure of a credible NFU commitment. These indicators would seek to capture key technical, institutional, organizational, and operational features of a country’s nuclear force that can help reveal how a country seeks to maintain its nuclear capabilities and employ its nuclear forces. If it can be done, this set of indicators would be used to evaluate whether a country’s NFU policy meets the minimal standard of being credible. Even if it turns out to be impossible to agree on a common set of indicators, a joint study and dialogue on this topic would be a good opportunity to build better understandings about each other’s views on NFU, which would be a helpful and necessary step if China, or any other country, wishes to promote the international adoption of NFU.\nIn the near-term, China cares mostly about whether the United States – among all the other nuclear-armed states – may be willing to move toward adopting a general NFU policy or a bilateral NFU agreement with China. Washington has been reluctant to do so, not least due to the concerns of allies like Japan. American regional allies worry that a U.S. NFU policy could embolden Chinese conventional aggression against them. And as China’s conventional military capabilities have rapidly advanced in the Asia Pacific region, these concerns have increased.\n\n\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "For Beijing\na NFU\nconveys an acknowledgment of\nmutual vulnerability, which China believes is the foundation for\nstability\nmutual NFU\nwould reduce their concerns about\nfirst strike and allow\na more relaxed\nposture and\nmodest nuclear forces\nwhen both sides are confident\nno one intends to use\nfirst\nneither\nwould\nworry about\noccurrence of\nconflict\nmutual NFU\nwould amount to mutual no use\nUnder such\nmissile defense\nshould become\nless of a concern\na\ndriving force behind\nmodernization\nChina cares mostly about whether\nU\nS\namong all\nother\nstates\nmay\nadopt\nbilateral NFU\nwith China", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: “Restrict” isn’t certain---it includes both direct and indirect restraints like the CP.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Whether a given lease provision restricts transfer of a lessee's interest within the meaning of the new chapter depends upon the breadth of the term [*369] \"restrict.\" That term may be viewed narrowly to include only those provisions expressly eliminating or curtailing the legal power of transfer. At the other extreme, the term may be viewed to encompass any provision of an instrument which has the practical effect of impairing marketability. (Simes & Smith, The Law of Future Interests, supra, Restraints on Alienation, § 1111, at pp. 3-4.) This distinction has been characterized as one between direct and indirect restraints (restrictions). CA(13) (13) \"A direct restraint on alienation is a provision in a deed, will, contract or other instrument which, by its express terms, or by implication of fact, purports to prohibit or penalize the exercise [****45] of the power of alienation. These provisions may assume a variety of forms. Thus, the conveyance or devise may contain a direction to the effect that the grantee or devisee shall not alienate, or a condition to the effect that if he attempts [**725] [***482] to alienate, his estate shall be subject to forfeiture, or there may be a contract binding on the grantee to refrain from alienation. … An indirect restraint on alienation arises when an attempt is made to accomplish some purpose other than the restraint of alienability, but with the incidental result that the instrument, if valid, would restrain practical alienability …. Ordinarily an indirect restraint does not restrict the power of alienation but only the fact of alienability.\" (Id. § 1112, at pp. 4-5.) An example of an indirect restraint is a use restriction. Alienation is restricted because the leasehold interest, being limited in possible uses, is less marketable than a lease permitting unlimited use. (See, Comment, Restraints on Alienation: Placing a 13th Century Doctrine in 21st Century Perspective (1988) 40 Baylor L.Rev. 413, 427.)", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Whether a\nprovision restricts\ndepends upon the breadth of the term\n\"restrict.\" That term may be viewed narrowly to include only\nprovisions expressly eliminating or curtailing\nAt the other extreme, the term may\nencompass any provision of an instrument which has the practical effect of impairing\nThis distinction has been characterized as one between direct and indirect restraints (restrictions).\n\"A direct restraint\nis a provision in a deed, will, contract or\ninstrument which, by\nexpress terms\npurports to prohibit or penalize the exercise\nAn indirect restraint\narises when an attempt is made to accomplish some purpose other than\nrestraint\nbut with the incidental result that the instrument\nwould restrain\nAn example of an indirect restraint is a use restriction. Alienation is restricted because the\ninterest, being limited in possible uses, is less marketable than a lease permitting unlimited use", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: “Restrict” isn’t certain---it includes both direct and indirect restraints like the CP.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Whether a given lease provision restricts transfer of a lessee's interest within the meaning of the new chapter depends upon the breadth of the term [*369] \"restrict.\" That term may be viewed narrowly to include only those provisions expressly eliminating or curtailing the legal power of transfer. At the other extreme, the term may be viewed to encompass any provision of an instrument which has the practical effect of impairing marketability. (Simes & Smith, The Law of Future Interests, supra, Restraints on Alienation, § 1111, at pp. 3-4.) This distinction has been characterized as one between direct and indirect restraints (restrictions). CA(13) (13) \"A direct restraint on alienation is a provision in a deed, will, contract or other instrument which, by its express terms, or by implication of fact, purports to prohibit or penalize the exercise [****45] of the power of alienation. These provisions may assume a variety of forms. Thus, the conveyance or devise may contain a direction to the effect that the grantee or devisee shall not alienate, or a condition to the effect that if he attempts [**725] [***482] to alienate, his estate shall be subject to forfeiture, or there may be a contract binding on the grantee to refrain from alienation. … An indirect restraint on alienation arises when an attempt is made to accomplish some purpose other than the restraint of alienability, but with the incidental result that the instrument, if valid, would restrain practical alienability …. Ordinarily an indirect restraint does not restrict the power of alienation but only the fact of alienability.\" (Id. § 1112, at pp. 4-5.) An example of an indirect restraint is a use restriction. Alienation is restricted because the leasehold interest, being limited in possible uses, is less marketable than a lease permitting unlimited use. (See, Comment, Restraints on Alienation: Placing a 13th Century Doctrine in 21st Century Perspective (1988) 40 Baylor L.Rev. 413, 427.)", "role": "user" }, { "content": "restricts\n\"restrict.\"\nnarrowly\nexpressly eliminating\ncurtailing\nterm may\nencompass any provision\npractical effect\nimpairing\ndirect\nindirect restraints\ndirect restraint\nexpress terms\nprohibit\npenalize\nother than\nrestraint\nincidental result\nrestrain\nAn example of an indirect restraint is a use restriction\nrestricted\nbeing limited\npossible uses", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: “Restrict” isn’t certain---it includes both direct and indirect restraints like the CP.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Whether a given lease provision restricts transfer of a lessee's interest within the meaning of the new chapter depends upon the breadth of the term [*369] \"restrict.\" That term may be viewed narrowly to include only those provisions expressly eliminating or curtailing the legal power of transfer. At the other extreme, the term may be viewed to encompass any provision of an instrument which has the practical effect of impairing marketability. (Simes & Smith, The Law of Future Interests, supra, Restraints on Alienation, § 1111, at pp. 3-4.) This distinction has been characterized as one between direct and indirect restraints (restrictions). CA(13) (13) \"A direct restraint on alienation is a provision in a deed, will, contract or other instrument which, by its express terms, or by implication of fact, purports to prohibit or penalize the exercise [****45] of the power of alienation. These provisions may assume a variety of forms. Thus, the conveyance or devise may contain a direction to the effect that the grantee or devisee shall not alienate, or a condition to the effect that if he attempts [**725] [***482] to alienate, his estate shall be subject to forfeiture, or there may be a contract binding on the grantee to refrain from alienation. … An indirect restraint on alienation arises when an attempt is made to accomplish some purpose other than the restraint of alienability, but with the incidental result that the instrument, if valid, would restrain practical alienability …. Ordinarily an indirect restraint does not restrict the power of alienation but only the fact of alienability.\" (Id. § 1112, at pp. 4-5.) An example of an indirect restraint is a use restriction. Alienation is restricted because the leasehold interest, being limited in possible uses, is less marketable than a lease permitting unlimited use. (See, Comment, Restraints on Alienation: Placing a 13th Century Doctrine in 21st Century Perspective (1988) 40 Baylor L.Rev. 413, 427.)", "role": "user" }, { "content": "\"restrict\nmay be viewed narrowly to include\nprovisions expressly eliminating or curtailing\nthe term may\nencompass any provision\nwhich has the practical effect of impairing\nThis distinction has been characterized as\nbetween direct and indirect restraints\nA direct restraint\nby\nexpress terms\npurports to prohibit\nexercise\nAn indirect restraint\narises when an attempt is made to accomplish some purpose other than\nrestraint\nbut with the incidental result\nthe instrument\nwould restrain", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Surge pricing key to supply chain innovations – aff causes shortages", "role": "system" }, { "content": "In fact, allowing that process to play out might spur innovation that helps meet demand in the future. If suppliers know that demand surges lead to sharply rising prices, they would be more likely to invest in so‐​called option‐​ready supply—capacity to ensure a business can capitalize on these extreme market conditions should they occur again. Allowing prices to adjust today therefore makes future shortages less likely. As it happens, the prolonged elevation of demand for hand sanitizer in particular eventually brought in a host of new suppliers, leading to replenished shelves. But this would have happened a lot sooner, with less interim damage to consumer welfare, in the absence of anti‐​price‐​gouging laws.\nWe understand this in normal times. Economists have found that surge pricing for companies such as Uber enhances consumer welfare. When demand for drivers spikes, prices rise, deterring those who do not value the service highly in those particular circumstances from using it. The surging fares not only encourage more drivers onto the road but also encourage drivers to go out at times when or to areas where they expect prices to be higher, making big shortages less likely in those same conditions in the future.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "allowing that process to play out might spur innovation that helps meet demand in the future\nIf suppliers know that demand surges lead to sharply rising prices, they would be more likely to invest in\noption‐​ready supply\ncapacity to ensure a business can capitalize on these extreme market conditions should they occur again\nAllowing prices to adjust\nmakes future shortages less likely.\nprolonged elevation of demand for hand sanitizer\nwould have happened a lot sooner, with less interim damage to consumer welfare, in the absence of anti‐​price‐​gouging laws.\nEconomists have found that surge pricing\nenhances consumer welfare. When demand\nspikes, prices rise, deterring those who do not value the service highly\nThe surging fares not only encourage more drivers onto the road but also encourage drivers to go out at times when or to areas where they expect prices to be higher, making big shortages less likely in those same conditions in the future.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Surge pricing key to supply chain innovations – aff causes shortages", "role": "system" }, { "content": "In fact, allowing that process to play out might spur innovation that helps meet demand in the future. If suppliers know that demand surges lead to sharply rising prices, they would be more likely to invest in so‐​called option‐​ready supply—capacity to ensure a business can capitalize on these extreme market conditions should they occur again. Allowing prices to adjust today therefore makes future shortages less likely. As it happens, the prolonged elevation of demand for hand sanitizer in particular eventually brought in a host of new suppliers, leading to replenished shelves. But this would have happened a lot sooner, with less interim damage to consumer welfare, in the absence of anti‐​price‐​gouging laws.\nWe understand this in normal times. Economists have found that surge pricing for companies such as Uber enhances consumer welfare. When demand for drivers spikes, prices rise, deterring those who do not value the service highly in those particular circumstances from using it. The surging fares not only encourage more drivers onto the road but also encourage drivers to go out at times when or to areas where they expect prices to be higher, making big shortages less likely in those same conditions in the future.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "spur innovation that helps meet demand in the future\noption‐​ready supply\ncapacity to ensure a business can capitalize on these extreme market conditions should they occur again\nless likely\nwould have happened a lot sooner, with less interim damage to consumer welfare, in the absence of anti‐​price‐​gouging laws.\nsurge pricing\nenhances consumer welfare. When demand\nspikes, prices rise, deterring those who do not value the service highly", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Surge pricing key to supply chain innovations – aff causes shortages\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.9", "role": "system" }, { "content": "allowing that process to play out might spur innovation that helps meet demand in the future\nIf suppliers know that demand surges lead to sharply rising prices, they would be more likely to invest in\noption‐​ready supply\ncapacity to ensure a business can capitalize on these extreme market conditions should they occur again\nAllowing prices to adjust\nmakes future shortages less likely.\nprolonged elevation of demand for hand sanitizer\nwould have happened a lot sooner, with less interim damage to consumer welfare, in the absence of anti‐​price‐​gouging laws.\nEconomists have found that surge pricing\nenhances consumer welfare. When demand\nspikes, prices rise, deterring those who do not value the service highly\nThe surging fares not only encourage more drivers onto the road but also encourage drivers to go out at times when or to areas where they expect prices to be higher, making big shortages less likely in those same conditions in the future.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "allowing that process to play out might spur innovation that helps meet demand in the future\nIf suppliers know\ndemand surges lead to sharply rising prices, they would\ninvest in\noption‐​ready supply\nto ensure a business can capitalize on these extreme market conditions should they occur again\nAllowing prices to adjust\nmakes future shortages less likely.\nprolonged elevation of demand\nwould have happened a lot sooner, with less interim damage to consumer welfare, in the absence of anti‐​price‐​gouging laws.\nEconomists have found\nsurge pricing\nenhances consumer welfare\nWhen demand\nspikes, prices rise, deterring those who do not value the service highly\nsurging fares not only encourage\ndrivers onto the road but also encourage drivers to go out at times\nor to areas where they expect prices to be higher, making big shortages less likely\nin the future", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: They’ll eliminate backlog by 2023---it hinges on a sustained period without new influx.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Focusing resources\nGolik said his office has had to triage the cases referred for charges. Lower-level crimes, such as property crimes, were sent to the back burner while prosecutors focused resources on violent crimes.\nBoth the prosecutor’s office and the indigent defense office received pandemic funding from the American Rescue Plan Act to hire additional staff to handle the backlogged filings. Golik said he hired six new deputy prosecutors focused solely on filing the stale cases. Because of this, he anticipates a spike in those lower-level cases working through the courts.\nKimball said he’s seen more people taking plea deals in order to get their cases resolved and serve their prison sentences instead of languishing in the county jail while attorneys prep for trial.\nGolik said he doesn’t feel there’s been an increase in people taking plea deals because those who have been held in jail during the pandemic are accused of high-level crimes and are facing large prison sentences if convicted. Those accused of lower-level crimes have mostly been released from jail while their case is pending because of federal guidance to limit the spread of COVID-19.\nCase filings down\nStatewide, annual case filings dropped by 40 percent compared with 2017, when 44,734 criminal cases were filed in Washington Superior Courts. In 2021, just 26,526 cases were filed statewide. In that time, Clark County saw a 15 percent reduction in annual case filings.\nDespite the drop in case filings statewide, there was only a 14 percent decrease in annual homicide filings and a 28 percent reduction in annual sex crimes. Both of those are areas Kimball and Golik said they’ve seen a spike in locally.\nFairgrieve noted those cases usually take longer to resolve and have many more hearings than lower-level crimes because of the severe consequences of conviction.\nOne notable drop in case filings was for drug charges. Prosecutors filed nearly 10,000 fewer drug charges annually across the state compared with five years ago. Where Washington courts saw 11,085 drug cases in 2017, that number was down to 6,239 in 2020 and dropped to 1,680 in 2021.\nDrug cases resentenced\nThat drop was partly due to the Washington Supreme Court’s February 2021 ruling that the state’s felony drug possession law was unconstitutional. Local law enforcement officials said after the ruling that they’d no longer take enforcement action for simple possession of controlled substances. But Vancouver police spokeswoman Kim Kapp said the agency would still investigate cases with intent to deliver.\nGolik said possession of a controlled substance charges accounted for about 700 cases his office would prosecute each year. However, they were usually the fastest cases resolved and were typically fairly simple. Golik said those cases either quickly went to drug court, the person pleaded guilty or any trial would usually last one day.\nAlthough they’re no longer charging people with that crime, the court ruling also meant old possession convictions would be vacated and often result in people being resentenced. Golik said that made for a “heavy resource lift,” but he’s hoping to finish reworking those old cases by the end of the year.\nWhat now?\nLocal officials find themselves in an all-too-familiar position this month: discussing what pandemic alterations to courthouse operations should remain with the end of the statewide mask mandate and which pieces should go back to how they were before.\n“I’m so hopeful that it lasts this time, because what we really need in the system is a sustained period of time where we can get back to a more normal court process,” Golik said.\nAs COVID-19 mandates come to an end nationwide, Fairgrieve doesn’t anticipate eliminating the remote hearing system. He’s heard strong support from courthouse stakeholders to continue holding more basic hearings, such as first appearances and arraignments, over Zoom. However, he expects changes of plea and sentencing hearings to shift back to in-person so that people can get a more personal sense of closure from cases.\nKimball said he hopes those accused of crimes get more face time soon.\n“I feel like defendants would prefer to be in person more so they don’t feel just like another number, just lost behind a screen, never really seeing that face-to-face,” he said. “God forbid, if I ever went in there, I would want to be able to talk to my attorney face-to-face, see the judge face-to-face, just want to really feel like I’m getting the help that I need and not just shoved in jail in a corner.”\nAssuming the rollback of COVID precautions lasts, Golik hopes that by 2023, the backlog will be minuscule, and justice can be served in a timely manner, again.\nIn the meantime, officials are holding their breath.\n“I’m optimistic,” Kimball said. “I’ve been hopeful for two years now, so I really don’t know what to expect. I’m just taking it one day at a time.”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Lower-level crimes\nwere sent to the back burner while prosecutors focused resources\nBoth the prosecutor’s office and\ndefense\nreceived pandemic funding from the American Rescue Plan Act to hire additional staff to handle the backlogged filings\nStatewide, annual case filings dropped by 40 percent compared with 2017, when 44,734 criminal cases were filed\nDespite the drop\nthere was only a 14 percent decrease in annual homicide filings and a 28 percent reduction in annual sex crimes\nOne notable drop in case filings was for drug charges. Prosecutors filed nearly 10,000 fewer drug charges\n“I’m so hopeful that it lasts this time, because what we really need in the system is a sustained period of time where we can get back to a more normal court process,”\ncourt\ns\ncontinue holding more basic hearings\nover Zoom\nAssuming the rollback of COVID precautions lasts\nby 2023, the backlog will be minuscule, and justice can be served in a timely manner\n“I’m optimistic,”", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: They’ll eliminate backlog by 2023---it hinges on a sustained period without new influx.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Lower-level crimes\nwere sent to the back burner while prosecutors focused resources\nBoth the prosecutor’s office and\ndefense\nreceived pandemic funding from the American Rescue Plan Act to hire additional staff to handle the backlogged filings\nStatewide, annual case filings dropped by 40 percent compared with 2017, when 44,734 criminal cases were filed\nDespite the drop\nthere was only a 14 percent decrease in annual homicide filings and a 28 percent reduction in annual sex crimes\nOne notable drop in case filings was for drug charges. Prosecutors filed nearly 10,000 fewer drug charges\n“I’m so hopeful that it lasts this time, because what we really need in the system is a sustained period of time where we can get back to a more normal court process,”\ncourt\ns\ncontinue holding more basic hearings\nover Zoom\nAssuming the rollback of COVID precautions lasts\nby 2023, the backlog will be minuscule, and justice can be served in a timely manner\n“I’m optimistic,”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Low\nback burner\nfocused\npandemic funding\nA\nR\nP\nadditional staff\nbacklog\ns\ndropped\n40 percent\n14 percent\n28 percent\nnotable drop\ndrug\ns\n10,000 fewer\nso hopeful\nlasts\nwhat we really need\nsustained period\nnormal court process\ncourt\ns\nbasic hearings\nZoom\nrollback\nCOVID\nby 2023\nbacklog\nminuscule\ntimely manner\noptimistic", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: They’ll eliminate backlog by 2023---it hinges on a sustained period without new influx.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Lower-level crimes\nwere sent to the back burner while prosecutors focused resources\nBoth the prosecutor’s office and\ndefense\nreceived pandemic funding from the American Rescue Plan Act to hire additional staff to handle the backlogged filings\nStatewide, annual case filings dropped by 40 percent compared with 2017, when 44,734 criminal cases were filed\nDespite the drop\nthere was only a 14 percent decrease in annual homicide filings and a 28 percent reduction in annual sex crimes\nOne notable drop in case filings was for drug charges. Prosecutors filed nearly 10,000 fewer drug charges\n“I’m so hopeful that it lasts this time, because what we really need in the system is a sustained period of time where we can get back to a more normal court process,”\ncourt\ns\ncontinue holding more basic hearings\nover Zoom\nAssuming the rollback of COVID precautions lasts\nby 2023, the backlog will be minuscule, and justice can be served in a timely manner\n“I’m optimistic,”", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Low\ncrimes\nwere sent to\nback burner\noffice\nreceived\nfunding\nto hire\nstaff to handle\nbacklog\ns\nfilings dropped by 40 percent\nfiled\n10,000 fewer\ncharges\n“I’m\nhopeful that it lasts\nbecause what we\nneed\nis a sustained\ntime\nback to a\nnormal\nprocess,”\ncourt\ns\ncontinue\nhearings\nover Zoom\nAssuming the rollback\nlasts\nby 2023, the backlog will be minuscule, and\ntimely", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: There’s a ton of literature that criticizes any measure short of disarm. That generates solvency deficits based on overconfidence, miscalc, and deterrence orthodoxy.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The nuclear risk reduction framework has received renewed attention in recent years. According to its proponents, nuclear risk reduction offers a straightforward, apolitical framework for addressing nuclear dangers. We disagree, maintaining instead that the nuclear risk reduction agenda offers a false promise for those seeking durable, shared solutions to the nuclear predicament and, by extension, actual risk reduction over the long term. We have offered three arguments to substantiate this claim. First, accurate risk analysis requires a level of knowledge and foresight that is not achievable in nuclear weapons politics. Second, risk analysis invites a faith in managerial control that invariably plays down luck and contingency, fosters potentially dangerous overconfidence, and helps normalize civilizational vulnerabilities. Third, the risk reduction agenda is too indeterminate to offer political guidance or direction. While some argue that risk reduction demands stockpile reductions or the adoption of no first use nuclear policies, others argue that risk reduction is best achieved through nuclear modernization programmes and brinksmanship. Risk taking in the short term can often be argued to reduce risks in the longer term, and risk reduction efforts in one area can frequently increase risks in others. In the absence of better information, risk analysis offers no tools to adjudicate these competing claims. Proponents of the nuclear risk reduction agenda would be right to point out that the current international security environment does not look particularly conducive to radical nuclear policy changes. Implementing common-sense measures of restraint would be better than doing nothing, they might argue. We do not disagree. Our objection is that the radical uncertainty that defines the nuclear world renders ‘risk reduction’ a poor frame for diplomatic action. If what proponents of ‘nuclear risk reduction’ really want to do is to promote nuclear de-alerting, new or improved communication hotlines, ‘deterrence only’ postures, or the adoption of no first use policies, they should just do that and not invite a discussion about unmeasurable risks that can easily be co-opted by those eager to renew nuclear testing programmes, resist doctrinal changes or advance nuclear modernization efforts. It should also be noted that some of the most significant nuclear arms control and disarmament measures that have ever been reached, such as the 1987 Intermediate Range-Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, came about on the back of periods of acute hostility and tension.85 Finally, those involved in the debate should be wary of allowing policy dialogue to grow too narrow. Confining discussions to modest managerial adjustments risks narrowing the gamut of policy options deemed feasible by future policy-makers. Contrary to what its proponents often claim, the risk reduction agenda is severely circumscribed by the putative requirements of nuclear deterrence. Deterrence practices, after all, are necessarily ‘risky’, as the credibility of nuclear deterrence, in particular extended nuclear deterrence, depends on ‘threats that leave something to chance’, i.e. the deliberate maintenance of nuclear risk. Accordingly, the notion that ‘all States—irrespective of their stances on nuclear weapons—share an interest in the urgent pursuit and implementation of measures to reduce the risk of use’ is not particularly meaningful.86 States that have based their security on nuclear deterrence have an interest in maintaining the risk of use. The underlying bet, of course, is that the risk of retaliation and ensuing nuclear escalation helps suppress the risk of straightforward (nuclear) aggression.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "The nuclear risk reduction framework has received renewed attention in recent years\nAccording to its proponents, nuclear risk reduction offers a straightforward, apolitical framework for addressing nuclear dangers\nWe disagree\nmaintaining instead that the nuclear risk reduction agenda offers a false promise for those seeking durable\nshared solutions to the nuclear predicament and, by extension, actual risk reduction over the long term\nWe have offered three arguments to substantiate this claim\naccurate risk analysis requires a level of knowledge and foresight that is not achievable in nuclear weapons politics\nrisk analysis invites a faith in managerial control that invariably plays down luck and contingency\nfosters potentially dangerous overconfidence, and helps normalize civilizational vulnerabilities\nthe risk reduction agenda is too indeterminate to offer political guidance or direction\nWhile some argue that risk reduction demands stockpile reductions or the adoption of no first use nuclear policies, others argue that risk reduction is best achieved through nuclear modernization programmes and brinksmanship. Risk taking in the short term can often be argued to reduce risks in the longer term\nrisk reduction efforts in one area can frequently increase risks in others\nthe nuclear world renders ‘risk reduction’ a poor frame for diplomatic action\nthose involved in the debate should be wary of allowing policy dialogue to grow too narrow\nConfining discussions to modest managerial adjustments risks narrowing the gamut of policy options deemed feasible by future policy-makers\nthe risk reduction agenda is severely circumscribed by the putative requirements of nuclear deterrence\nDeterrence practices\nare necessarily\nrisky\nnotion that ‘all States—irrespective of their stances on nuclear weapons—share an interest in the urgent pursuit and implementation of measures to reduce the risk of use’ is not particularly meaningful\nthat have based their security on nuclear deterrence have an interest in maintaining the risk of use", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: There’s a ton of literature that criticizes any measure short of disarm. That generates solvency deficits based on overconfidence, miscalc, and deterrence orthodoxy.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The nuclear risk reduction framework has received renewed attention in recent years. According to its proponents, nuclear risk reduction offers a straightforward, apolitical framework for addressing nuclear dangers. We disagree, maintaining instead that the nuclear risk reduction agenda offers a false promise for those seeking durable, shared solutions to the nuclear predicament and, by extension, actual risk reduction over the long term. We have offered three arguments to substantiate this claim. First, accurate risk analysis requires a level of knowledge and foresight that is not achievable in nuclear weapons politics. Second, risk analysis invites a faith in managerial control that invariably plays down luck and contingency, fosters potentially dangerous overconfidence, and helps normalize civilizational vulnerabilities. Third, the risk reduction agenda is too indeterminate to offer political guidance or direction. While some argue that risk reduction demands stockpile reductions or the adoption of no first use nuclear policies, others argue that risk reduction is best achieved through nuclear modernization programmes and brinksmanship. Risk taking in the short term can often be argued to reduce risks in the longer term, and risk reduction efforts in one area can frequently increase risks in others. In the absence of better information, risk analysis offers no tools to adjudicate these competing claims. Proponents of the nuclear risk reduction agenda would be right to point out that the current international security environment does not look particularly conducive to radical nuclear policy changes. Implementing common-sense measures of restraint would be better than doing nothing, they might argue. We do not disagree. Our objection is that the radical uncertainty that defines the nuclear world renders ‘risk reduction’ a poor frame for diplomatic action. If what proponents of ‘nuclear risk reduction’ really want to do is to promote nuclear de-alerting, new or improved communication hotlines, ‘deterrence only’ postures, or the adoption of no first use policies, they should just do that and not invite a discussion about unmeasurable risks that can easily be co-opted by those eager to renew nuclear testing programmes, resist doctrinal changes or advance nuclear modernization efforts. It should also be noted that some of the most significant nuclear arms control and disarmament measures that have ever been reached, such as the 1987 Intermediate Range-Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, came about on the back of periods of acute hostility and tension.85 Finally, those involved in the debate should be wary of allowing policy dialogue to grow too narrow. Confining discussions to modest managerial adjustments risks narrowing the gamut of policy options deemed feasible by future policy-makers. Contrary to what its proponents often claim, the risk reduction agenda is severely circumscribed by the putative requirements of nuclear deterrence. Deterrence practices, after all, are necessarily ‘risky’, as the credibility of nuclear deterrence, in particular extended nuclear deterrence, depends on ‘threats that leave something to chance’, i.e. the deliberate maintenance of nuclear risk. Accordingly, the notion that ‘all States—irrespective of their stances on nuclear weapons—share an interest in the urgent pursuit and implementation of measures to reduce the risk of use’ is not particularly meaningful.86 States that have based their security on nuclear deterrence have an interest in maintaining the risk of use. The underlying bet, of course, is that the risk of retaliation and ensuing nuclear escalation helps suppress the risk of straightforward (nuclear) aggression.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "renewed attention\nstraightforward\napolitical framework\nWe disagree\nfalse promise\ndurable\nactual risk reduction\nnot achievable\nluck\ncontingency\ndangerous overconfidence\ncivilizational vulnerabilities\ntoo indeterminate\nstockpile reductions\nn\nf\nu\npoor frame\ngrow too narrow\nnarrowing the gamut\npolicy options\nnuclear deterrence\nrisky\nnot particularly meaningful", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: There’s a ton of literature that criticizes any measure short of disarm. That generates solvency deficits based on overconfidence, miscalc, and deterrence orthodoxy.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The nuclear risk reduction framework has received renewed attention in recent years. According to its proponents, nuclear risk reduction offers a straightforward, apolitical framework for addressing nuclear dangers. We disagree, maintaining instead that the nuclear risk reduction agenda offers a false promise for those seeking durable, shared solutions to the nuclear predicament and, by extension, actual risk reduction over the long term. We have offered three arguments to substantiate this claim. First, accurate risk analysis requires a level of knowledge and foresight that is not achievable in nuclear weapons politics. Second, risk analysis invites a faith in managerial control that invariably plays down luck and contingency, fosters potentially dangerous overconfidence, and helps normalize civilizational vulnerabilities. Third, the risk reduction agenda is too indeterminate to offer political guidance or direction. While some argue that risk reduction demands stockpile reductions or the adoption of no first use nuclear policies, others argue that risk reduction is best achieved through nuclear modernization programmes and brinksmanship. Risk taking in the short term can often be argued to reduce risks in the longer term, and risk reduction efforts in one area can frequently increase risks in others. In the absence of better information, risk analysis offers no tools to adjudicate these competing claims. Proponents of the nuclear risk reduction agenda would be right to point out that the current international security environment does not look particularly conducive to radical nuclear policy changes. Implementing common-sense measures of restraint would be better than doing nothing, they might argue. We do not disagree. Our objection is that the radical uncertainty that defines the nuclear world renders ‘risk reduction’ a poor frame for diplomatic action. If what proponents of ‘nuclear risk reduction’ really want to do is to promote nuclear de-alerting, new or improved communication hotlines, ‘deterrence only’ postures, or the adoption of no first use policies, they should just do that and not invite a discussion about unmeasurable risks that can easily be co-opted by those eager to renew nuclear testing programmes, resist doctrinal changes or advance nuclear modernization efforts. It should also be noted that some of the most significant nuclear arms control and disarmament measures that have ever been reached, such as the 1987 Intermediate Range-Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, came about on the back of periods of acute hostility and tension.85 Finally, those involved in the debate should be wary of allowing policy dialogue to grow too narrow. Confining discussions to modest managerial adjustments risks narrowing the gamut of policy options deemed feasible by future policy-makers. Contrary to what its proponents often claim, the risk reduction agenda is severely circumscribed by the putative requirements of nuclear deterrence. Deterrence practices, after all, are necessarily ‘risky’, as the credibility of nuclear deterrence, in particular extended nuclear deterrence, depends on ‘threats that leave something to chance’, i.e. the deliberate maintenance of nuclear risk. Accordingly, the notion that ‘all States—irrespective of their stances on nuclear weapons—share an interest in the urgent pursuit and implementation of measures to reduce the risk of use’ is not particularly meaningful.86 States that have based their security on nuclear deterrence have an interest in maintaining the risk of use. The underlying bet, of course, is that the risk of retaliation and ensuing nuclear escalation helps suppress the risk of straightforward (nuclear) aggression.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "nuclear risk reduction\nstraightforward\nframework\nWe disagree\noffers\nfalse promise for those seeking durable\nsolutions\naccurate risk analysis requires\nknowledge\nforesight\nnot achievable in nuclear weapons politics\ninvites\nmanagerial control\nplays down luck\ncontingency\nfosters\noverconfidence\nnormalize\nvulnerabilities\nrisk reduction\ntoo indeterminate to offer\ndirection\nstockpile reductions\npoor frame for diplomatic action\npolicy dialogue\ngrow too narrow\nnarrowing\ngamut of policy options\nDeterrence\nnecessarily\nrisky", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Ukraine proves deterrence works. Russia has not attacked a NATO ally, largely due to ambiguous posture.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nRUSSIA, UKRAINE, NATO, AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE\nMany analysts see the war in Ukraine as a sign that core aspects of the nuclear revolution, like nuclear deterrence and extended deterrence,16 are failing. In fact, the case serves just about the opposite conclusion, showing how the prospect of mass destruction limits both sides’ options and prevents escalation.\nThe possibility of nuclear use has haunted the Russian invasion of Ukraine since the renewal of hostilities in early 2022. Russia has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.17 Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials have issued a series of nuclear threats, only some of which can be described as veiled. While few experts have called the use of nuclear weapons likely, many have expressed concern that the chances are higher than they have been since the Cold War.18 Can the nuclear revolution and all that it entails—deterrence and nonuse—endure this challenge?\nAt the risk of stating the obvious, Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine is not a failure of nuclear deterrence by the United States and its allies. Ukraine did not have a formal military alliance with a nuclear power ahead of the war. It does not have nuclear weapons itself. In this narrow sense, the war has not tested the nuclear revolution. However, there is still a possibility that the situation could escalate to a war between NATO and Russia. How is the nuclear revolution holding up? Are both sides acting as if they have escaped a state of mutual vulnerability and the caution that this condition entails?\nThe signs are actually encouraging thus far.19 Russia and its nuclear adversaries eye each other warily and issue threats, but both sides have avoided crossing each other’s red lines, and the chances of direct conflict are low. Some observers have expressed concern that because nuclear war at the highest levels of intensity is unthinkable, President Putin would conclude that fighting against NATO countries at lower escalation levels would be permissible.20 But there is no evidence that President Putin believes a limited NATO-Russia war is safe. In fact, he has suggested the opposite, claiming that if Ukraine joined NATO, then NATO countries would “automatically” be at war with Russia, and such a war could not be limited. In early February 2022, he told a French journalist, “Russia is a military superpower and a nuclear superpower . . . There will be no winners and you will be drawn into this conflict against your own will.”21\nRussia has been careful not to target any NATO country openly and directly, whether that country has its own nuclear arsenal or not. Extended deterrence is supposed to be more challenging than this. Doubts that the United States would retaliate against a Soviet strike on Western Europe, thereby opening itself up to attack, inspired the French to secure independent nuclear capabilities in the late 1950s and early 1960s. French leader Charles de Gaulle was worried that the United States would not “trade New York for Paris.”22 It is not unreasonable to assume Eastern European countries today share similar concerns. Would the nuclear-armed NATO countries be willing to escalate against Russia for the sake of Poland or Lithuania? Apparently, Russia thinks that the risk is too high: it has been wary of attacking NATO supply lines to Ukraine at their sources, despite the support being instrumental in slowing and sometimes rolling back the Russian invasion.23\nAt the same time, deterrence has limited NATO’s ability to push back against Russia directly. While being deterred can be frustrating, the alternative—a great power war with no clear ceiling of escalation—would be worse.\nNATO’s most challenging deterrence task has involved convincing Russia that using one or more of its approximately 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be too costly. Tactical nuclear weapons are primarily designed for battlefield use and have a limited range and yield but are still much more powerful than conventional arms.24 The United States and its allies have strong reasons for deterring Russian use of all nuclear weapons. While the nuclear taboo might not evaporate due to a single violation, we cannot predict the potential effects.25 The world is better off not learning.\nThe challenge would be familiar to students of the nuclear revolution: Trying to deter with threats that are difficult to make credible, without provoking the deterrence target to establish credibility. The problem calls for a “threat that leaves something to chance.”26 Any NATO guarantee to meet nuclear use with nuclear use would lack credibility because Russia has more at stake in Ukraine and NATO would be opening itself up to devastating retaliation which Russia, despite its conventional fighting limitations, could deliver. But NATO could credibly threaten to put in motion an escalatory process that neither side could fully control in response to Russian nuclear use. Russia might decide that the risks of such a development are too high.\nNot only does the ambiguity of a threat that leaves something to chance help the threatener overcome questions of credibility, but it also allows for strategic flexibility. As international relations scholar Richard Betts explains, past American leaders “made their threats vague enough that they avoided being boxed into a stark choice between going ahead with escalation or being exposed as bluffers.”27\nIn general, the Biden administration has used ambiguous threats wisely. While saying that the United States would work to prevent “World War III,” one administration official also said that “all bets are off” if Russia starts using nuclear weapons.28 President Joe Biden himself said that Russian nuclear use might be the first step to “Armageddon.”29 The potential for out-of-control escalation may be enough to deter Russia while keeping the United States’ strategic options open.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Many analysts see the war in Ukraine as a sign that core aspects of the nuclear revolution, like\ndeterrence and extended deterrence,\nare failing.\nthe case serves\nthe opposite conclusion, showing how the prospect of mass destruction limits both sides’ options and prevents escalation.\nThe possibility of nuclear use has haunted the Russian invasion of Ukraine since the renewal of hostilities in\n2022. Russia has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.\nPutin and\nRussian officials have issued a series of nuclear threats\nWhile few experts have called the use of nuclear weapons likely, many\nexpressed concern\nchances are higher than they have been since the Cold War.\nRussia’s initial invasion\nis not a failure of nuclear deterrence by the United States and\nallies. Ukraine did not have a formal military alliance with a nuclear power\nthe war has not tested the nuclear revolution.\nthere is still a possibility that the situation could escalate\nThe signs are\nencouraging thus far.\nRussia and\nnuclear adversaries eye each other warily and issue threats, but both sides\navoided crossing each other’s red lines, and the chances of direct conflict are low.\nobservers have expressed concern that because nuclear war at the highest levels of intensity is unthinkable,\nPutin would conclude\nfighting against NATO countries at lower escalation levels would be permissible.\nthere is no evidence that\nPutin believes a limited NATO-Russia war is safe.\nhe\nsuggested the opposite, claiming\nif Ukraine joined NATO,\nNATO countries would “automatically” be at war with Russia, and such a war could not be limited.\nRussia has been careful not to target any NATO country openly and directly\nExtended deterrence is supposed to be more challenging than this.\nRussia thinks that the risk is too high: it has been wary of attacking NATO supply lines to Ukraine at their sources, despite\nsupport being instrumental in slowing and sometimes rolling back the Russian invasion.\nNATO’s most challenging deterrence task has involved convincing Russia that using\ntactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be too costly.\nThe United States and\nallies have strong reasons for deterring Russian use of\nnuclear weapons.\nThe challenge would be\nTrying to deter with threats that are difficult to make credible, without provoking the deterrence target to establish credibility. The problem calls for a “threat that leaves something to chance.”\nAny NATO guarantee to meet nuclear use with nuclear use would lack credibility because Russia has more at stake in Ukraine and NATO would be opening itself\nto devastating retaliation which Russia, despite\nconventional\nlimitations, could deliver.\nNATO could credibly threaten to put in motion an escalatory process that neither side could\ncontrol in response to Russian nuclear use. Russia might decide that\nrisks of such a development are too high.\nNot only does\nambiguity\nhelp the threatener overcome questions of credibility, but it\nallows for strategic flexibility.\npast American leaders “made\nthreats vague enough that they avoided being boxed into a stark choice between\nescalation or being exposed as bluffers.”\nthe Biden administration has used ambiguous threats wisely.\none\nofficial\nsaid\n“all bets are off” if Russia starts using nuclear weapons.\nBiden\nsaid\nRussian nuclear use might be the first step to “Armageddon.”\nThe potential for out-of-control escalation may be enough to deter Russia while keeping the United States’ strategic options open.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Ukraine proves deterrence works. Russia has not attacked a NATO ally, largely due to ambiguous posture.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Many analysts see the war in Ukraine as a sign that core aspects of the nuclear revolution, like\ndeterrence and extended deterrence,\nare failing.\nthe case serves\nthe opposite conclusion, showing how the prospect of mass destruction limits both sides’ options and prevents escalation.\nThe possibility of nuclear use has haunted the Russian invasion of Ukraine since the renewal of hostilities in\n2022. Russia has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.\nPutin and\nRussian officials have issued a series of nuclear threats\nWhile few experts have called the use of nuclear weapons likely, many\nexpressed concern\nchances are higher than they have been since the Cold War.\nRussia’s initial invasion\nis not a failure of nuclear deterrence by the United States and\nallies. Ukraine did not have a formal military alliance with a nuclear power\nthe war has not tested the nuclear revolution.\nthere is still a possibility that the situation could escalate\nThe signs are\nencouraging thus far.\nRussia and\nnuclear adversaries eye each other warily and issue threats, but both sides\navoided crossing each other’s red lines, and the chances of direct conflict are low.\nobservers have expressed concern that because nuclear war at the highest levels of intensity is unthinkable,\nPutin would conclude\nfighting against NATO countries at lower escalation levels would be permissible.\nthere is no evidence that\nPutin believes a limited NATO-Russia war is safe.\nhe\nsuggested the opposite, claiming\nif Ukraine joined NATO,\nNATO countries would “automatically” be at war with Russia, and such a war could not be limited.\nRussia has been careful not to target any NATO country openly and directly\nExtended deterrence is supposed to be more challenging than this.\nRussia thinks that the risk is too high: it has been wary of attacking NATO supply lines to Ukraine at their sources, despite\nsupport being instrumental in slowing and sometimes rolling back the Russian invasion.\nNATO’s most challenging deterrence task has involved convincing Russia that using\ntactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be too costly.\nThe United States and\nallies have strong reasons for deterring Russian use of\nnuclear weapons.\nThe challenge would be\nTrying to deter with threats that are difficult to make credible, without provoking the deterrence target to establish credibility. The problem calls for a “threat that leaves something to chance.”\nAny NATO guarantee to meet nuclear use with nuclear use would lack credibility because Russia has more at stake in Ukraine and NATO would be opening itself\nto devastating retaliation which Russia, despite\nconventional\nlimitations, could deliver.\nNATO could credibly threaten to put in motion an escalatory process that neither side could\ncontrol in response to Russian nuclear use. Russia might decide that\nrisks of such a development are too high.\nNot only does\nambiguity\nhelp the threatener overcome questions of credibility, but it\nallows for strategic flexibility.\npast American leaders “made\nthreats vague enough that they avoided being boxed into a stark choice between\nescalation or being exposed as bluffers.”\nthe Biden administration has used ambiguous threats wisely.\none\nofficial\nsaid\n“all bets are off” if Russia starts using nuclear weapons.\nBiden\nsaid\nRussian nuclear use might be the first step to “Armageddon.”\nThe potential for out-of-control escalation may be enough to deter Russia while keeping the United States’ strategic options open.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "deterrence\nextended deterrence\nmass destruction\noptions\nescalation\nhaunted\nhigher\nnot\nformal military alliance\nnuclear power\nnot tested the nuclear revolution\nescalate\nencouraging\nwarily\nred lines\ndirect conflict\nlow\nunthinkable\npermissible\nno evidence\nlimited NATO-Russia war\nsafe\nautomatically\nlimited\nNATO\nopenly and directly\ntoo high\nNATO supply lines\ninstrumental\ncredible\nprovoking the\ntarget\nchance\ncred\nmore at stake\ndeliver\nescalatory process that neither side could\ncontrol\ntoo high\nambiguity\ncred\nstrategic flex\navoid\nescalation\nbluffers\nwisely\nall bets are off\nArmageddon\nout-of-control escalation\ndeter Russia", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Ukraine proves deterrence works. Russia has not attacked a NATO ally, largely due to ambiguous posture.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Many analysts see the war in Ukraine as a sign that core aspects of the nuclear revolution, like\ndeterrence and extended deterrence,\nare failing.\nthe case serves\nthe opposite conclusion, showing how the prospect of mass destruction limits both sides’ options and prevents escalation.\nThe possibility of nuclear use has haunted the Russian invasion of Ukraine since the renewal of hostilities in\n2022. Russia has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.\nPutin and\nRussian officials have issued a series of nuclear threats\nWhile few experts have called the use of nuclear weapons likely, many\nexpressed concern\nchances are higher than they have been since the Cold War.\nRussia’s initial invasion\nis not a failure of nuclear deterrence by the United States and\nallies. Ukraine did not have a formal military alliance with a nuclear power\nthe war has not tested the nuclear revolution.\nthere is still a possibility that the situation could escalate\nThe signs are\nencouraging thus far.\nRussia and\nnuclear adversaries eye each other warily and issue threats, but both sides\navoided crossing each other’s red lines, and the chances of direct conflict are low.\nobservers have expressed concern that because nuclear war at the highest levels of intensity is unthinkable,\nPutin would conclude\nfighting against NATO countries at lower escalation levels would be permissible.\nthere is no evidence that\nPutin believes a limited NATO-Russia war is safe.\nhe\nsuggested the opposite, claiming\nif Ukraine joined NATO,\nNATO countries would “automatically” be at war with Russia, and such a war could not be limited.\nRussia has been careful not to target any NATO country openly and directly\nExtended deterrence is supposed to be more challenging than this.\nRussia thinks that the risk is too high: it has been wary of attacking NATO supply lines to Ukraine at their sources, despite\nsupport being instrumental in slowing and sometimes rolling back the Russian invasion.\nNATO’s most challenging deterrence task has involved convincing Russia that using\ntactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine would be too costly.\nThe United States and\nallies have strong reasons for deterring Russian use of\nnuclear weapons.\nThe challenge would be\nTrying to deter with threats that are difficult to make credible, without provoking the deterrence target to establish credibility. The problem calls for a “threat that leaves something to chance.”\nAny NATO guarantee to meet nuclear use with nuclear use would lack credibility because Russia has more at stake in Ukraine and NATO would be opening itself\nto devastating retaliation which Russia, despite\nconventional\nlimitations, could deliver.\nNATO could credibly threaten to put in motion an escalatory process that neither side could\ncontrol in response to Russian nuclear use. Russia might decide that\nrisks of such a development are too high.\nNot only does\nambiguity\nhelp the threatener overcome questions of credibility, but it\nallows for strategic flexibility.\npast American leaders “made\nthreats vague enough that they avoided being boxed into a stark choice between\nescalation or being exposed as bluffers.”\nthe Biden administration has used ambiguous threats wisely.\none\nofficial\nsaid\n“all bets are off” if Russia starts using nuclear weapons.\nBiden\nsaid\nRussian nuclear use might be the first step to “Armageddon.”\nThe potential for out-of-control escalation may be enough to deter Russia while keeping the United States’ strategic options open.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Ukraine\nserves\nthe\nconclusion\nhow\nmass destruction\nprevents escalation.\nnuclear use has haunted the\ninvasion\nRussia’s\ninvasion\nis not a failure of\ndeterrence\nUkraine did not have a formal military alliance with a nuclear power\nthe war has not tested the nuclear revolution.\nthere is\npossibility\nthe situation could escalate\nsigns are\nencouraging\nadversaries eye each other warily\nboth\navoided\nred lines\nchances of direct conflict are low.\nthere is no evidence\nPutin believes a limited\nwar is safe.\nRussia has been careful not to target\nNATO\nRussia thinks\nrisk is too high\nto deter with threats\ndifficult to make credible, without provoking the\ntarget\ncalls for a “threat that leaves something to chance.”\nAny\nguarantee\nwould lack cred\nRussia has more at stake\nNATO could\nthreaten\nan escalatory process\nneither side could\ncontrol\nRussia might decide\nrisks\nare too high.\nambiguity\nhelp\novercome\ncred\nallows for strategic flex\nleaders “made\nthreats vague enough\nthey avoid\nbeing boxed into\nescalation\nBiden\nused\nthreats wisely.\npotential for out-of-control escalation may\ndeter Russia", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: North Korea’s posture is defensive", "role": "system" }, { "content": "It would make sense for Pyongyang to threaten using nuclear weapons if an enemy appears to be winning a war aimed at overthrowing the regime. Facing such an existential threat, the regime would believe it had nothing to lose by playing its last and most fearsome card. Short of that scenario, however, attempting nuclear blackmail would not be an attractive option for the North Korean government. In general, countries attempting to change the policies of other states by threatening the use of nuclear weapons have been unsuccessful. The target states don’t take the threat seriously, believing the threatening state is not prepared to suffer the political consequences of nuclear aggression. Multiple official government statements indicate North Korea wants global recognition as a “responsible nuclear power.” This gives Pyongyang an incentive to demonstrate good international nuclear weapons citizenship. Nuclear coercion against South Korea during peacetime would immediately puncture that aspiration. Initiating a conventional war against the South while using nuclear weapons as a shield would be a losing strategy for Pyongyang. It would be sheer folly to expect that South Korea would not fight back against North Korean aggression. Moreover, the South’s conventional forces are stronger than North Korea’s. Since 2010, South Korean governments have vowed to retaliate militarily against any lethal North Korean attacks. This has not changed as a result of Pyongyang acquiring of nuclear weapons. If North Korea is the attacker, a threat by Pyongyang to initiate the escalation from the conventional level to the nuclear level is not credible because the United States is vastly superior to North Korea at the nuclear level. Threatening the first use of nuclear weapons against either the United States or South Korea would be an extremely risky move for Pyongyang because it might invite a devastating pre-emptive attack. Pyongyang’s modus operandi is to intimidate adversaries by cultivating a reputation for unpredictability and belligerence. In practice, however, the North Korean government appears rather risk-averse. Pyongyang has backed down when confronted with a resolute response from its adversaries, as in the aftermath of the tree-trimming incident in 1976 and the tensions over South Korea’s border loudspeakers in 2015. North Korea’s nuclear expansion does not necessarily indicate intent to practice nuclear blackmail. North Koreans have reasons to believe a large and highly survivable nuclear arsenal is necessary to deter the United States from attacking their country. North Korea suffered extensive U.S. carpet bombing during the Korean War. Since then, Washington has maintained nuclear threats against North Korea in various ways, including basing tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea from 1958 to 1991, regularly flying aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons near North Korean territory, and making official statements such as then-U.S. President Donald Trump’s 2017 comment that he could “totally destroy North Korea.” The United States has massive conventional and nuclear forces and is hard at work trying to improve its ability to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles. The South Korean government is seeking to build a capability to destroy North Korean ballistic missiles before they launch. With such formidable potential enemies, it is not unreasonable for Pyongyang to believe it needs a large and sophisticated nuclear weapons arsenal to convince Americans and South Koreans that it has a second strike capability, meaning it could absorb a nuclear attack and still be able to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker. While North Korea’s development of tactical nuclear weapons might suggest a plan to use nukes for warfighting or coercion rather than insurance, they could also be part of a fundamentally defensive strategy. Kim must account for the scenario in which his armies are losing a conventional war to superior South Korean-U.S. forces but he cannot nuke a major U.S. or South Korean city without bringing upon himself U.S. nuclear retaliation that would extinguish his regime and state. He might see the use of a tactical nuclear weapon against an enemy military target – rather than an enemy city – as a battlefield equalizer that would not necessarily draw massive U.S. retaliation, and might even frighten South Korean or U.S. forces into halting their advance. Henceforth, the prominent feature of the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis will not be nuclear coercion, but rather mutual assured destruction (MAD). As a result of the North Korean nuclear buildup, U.S. and South Korean anti-missile defenses are currently losing the battle of capabilities against North Korean missiles. This is no doubt what Kim intended. Rather than maintaining a minimal arsenal that enemy systems could possibly cancel out, he is building a larger and more robust arsenal that can overwhelm enemy defenses. South Korea’s “kill chain” missile defense concept requires Seoul to know when and from where Pyongyang plans to launch a missile. Already difficult, this will become even harder as North Korea deploys missiles on submarines and transitions to solid fuel, which requires far less preparation time than liquid fuel. The U.S. ground based interceptor (GBI) system has 44 missile-killing missiles based in Alaska and California, along the presumed path of enemy missiles incoming from Northeast Asia. This system would be hard pressed to shoot down even a small number of ordinary ballistic missiles. Kim may already have enough missiles to defeat the system, and he plans to mass produce nuclear bombs and their delivery vehicles. North Korea has apparently successfully tested a hypersonic glide vehicle, which can maneuver to avoid missile defenses such as the GBI system. For its part, North Korea has no defense against incoming U.S. nuclear missiles. Thus, for the foreseeable future, barring a dramatic new breakthrough in anti-missile defense technology, North Korea and its potential adversaries will feel safe only to the extent they believe their offensive capabilities are survivable enough to deter the other side from attacking. It will be a tense stability that reinforces the status quo rather than opening opportunities to redress it.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "It would make sense for Pyongyang to threaten using nuclear weapons if an enemy appears to be winning a war aimed at overthrowing the regime. Facing such an existential threat, the regime would believe it had nothing to lose by playing its last and most fearsome card. Short of that scenario, however, attempting nuclear blackmail would not be an attractive option for the North Korean government.\ncountries attempting to change the policies of other states by threatening the use of nuclear weapons have been unsuccessful\ntarget states don’t take the threat seriously, believing the threatening state is not prepared to suffer the political consequences of nuclear aggression.\nNorth Korea wants global recognition as a “responsible nuclear power\nThis gives Pyongyang an incentive to demonstrate good international nuclear weapons citizenship. Nuclear coercion against South Korea during peacetime would immediately puncture that aspiration. Initiating a conventional war against the South while using nuclear weapons as a shield would be a losing strategy for Pyongyang\nthe South’s conventional forces are stronger than North Korea’s\nPyongyang’s modus operandi is to intimidate adversaries by cultivating a reputation for unpredictability and belligerence\nIn practice, however, the North Korean government appears rather risk-averse. Pyongyang has backed down when confronted with a resolute response from its adversaries\nNorth Koreans have reasons to believe a large and highly survivable nuclear arsenal is necessary to deter the United States from attacking their country. North Korea suffered extensive U.S. carpet bombing during the Korean War\nSince then, Washington has maintained nuclear threats against North Korea in various ways, including basing tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea from 1958 to 1991, regularly flying aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons near North Korean territory, and making official statements such as then-U.S. President Donald Trump’s 2017 comment that he could “totally destroy North Korea.” The United States has massive conventional and nuclear forces and is hard at work trying to improve its ability to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles. The South Korean government is seeking to build a capability to destroy North Korean ballistic missiles before they launch. With such formidable potential enemies, it is not unreasonable for Pyongyang to believe it needs a large and sophisticated nuclear weapons arsenal to convince Americans and South Koreans that it has a second strike capability, meaning it could absorb a nuclear attack and still be able to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker\nWhile North Korea’s development of tactical nuclear weapons might suggest a plan to use nukes for warfighting or coercion rather than insurance, they could also be part of a fundamentally defensive strategy\nHe might see the use of a tactical nuclear weapon against an enemy military target – rather than an enemy city – as a battlefield equalizer that would not necessarily draw massive U.S. retaliation, and might even frighten South Korean or U.S. forces into halting their advance.\nAs a result of the North Korean nuclear buildup, U.S. and South Korean anti-missile defenses are currently losing the battle of capabilities against North Korean missiles.\nRather than maintaining a minimal arsenal that enemy systems could possibly cancel out, he is building a larger and more robust arsenal that can overwhelm enemy defenses.\nFor its part, North Korea has no defense against incoming U.S. nuclear missiles. Thus, for the foreseeable future, barring a dramatic new breakthrough in anti-missile defense technology, North Korea and its potential adversaries will feel safe only to the extent they believe their offensive capabilities are survivable enough to deter the other side from attacking. It will be a tense stability that reinforces the status quo rather than opening opportunities to redress it.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: North Korea’s posture is defensive", "role": "system" }, { "content": "It would make sense for Pyongyang to threaten using nuclear weapons if an enemy appears to be winning a war aimed at overthrowing the regime. Facing such an existential threat, the regime would believe it had nothing to lose by playing its last and most fearsome card. Short of that scenario, however, attempting nuclear blackmail would not be an attractive option for the North Korean government.\ncountries attempting to change the policies of other states by threatening the use of nuclear weapons have been unsuccessful\ntarget states don’t take the threat seriously, believing the threatening state is not prepared to suffer the political consequences of nuclear aggression.\nNorth Korea wants global recognition as a “responsible nuclear power\nThis gives Pyongyang an incentive to demonstrate good international nuclear weapons citizenship. Nuclear coercion against South Korea during peacetime would immediately puncture that aspiration. Initiating a conventional war against the South while using nuclear weapons as a shield would be a losing strategy for Pyongyang\nthe South’s conventional forces are stronger than North Korea’s\nPyongyang’s modus operandi is to intimidate adversaries by cultivating a reputation for unpredictability and belligerence\nIn practice, however, the North Korean government appears rather risk-averse. Pyongyang has backed down when confronted with a resolute response from its adversaries\nNorth Koreans have reasons to believe a large and highly survivable nuclear arsenal is necessary to deter the United States from attacking their country. North Korea suffered extensive U.S. carpet bombing during the Korean War\nSince then, Washington has maintained nuclear threats against North Korea in various ways, including basing tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea from 1958 to 1991, regularly flying aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons near North Korean territory, and making official statements such as then-U.S. President Donald Trump’s 2017 comment that he could “totally destroy North Korea.” The United States has massive conventional and nuclear forces and is hard at work trying to improve its ability to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles. The South Korean government is seeking to build a capability to destroy North Korean ballistic missiles before they launch. With such formidable potential enemies, it is not unreasonable for Pyongyang to believe it needs a large and sophisticated nuclear weapons arsenal to convince Americans and South Koreans that it has a second strike capability, meaning it could absorb a nuclear attack and still be able to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker\nWhile North Korea’s development of tactical nuclear weapons might suggest a plan to use nukes for warfighting or coercion rather than insurance, they could also be part of a fundamentally defensive strategy\nHe might see the use of a tactical nuclear weapon against an enemy military target – rather than an enemy city – as a battlefield equalizer that would not necessarily draw massive U.S. retaliation, and might even frighten South Korean or U.S. forces into halting their advance.\nAs a result of the North Korean nuclear buildup, U.S. and South Korean anti-missile defenses are currently losing the battle of capabilities against North Korean missiles.\nRather than maintaining a minimal arsenal that enemy systems could possibly cancel out, he is building a larger and more robust arsenal that can overwhelm enemy defenses.\nFor its part, North Korea has no defense against incoming U.S. nuclear missiles. Thus, for the foreseeable future, barring a dramatic new breakthrough in anti-missile defense technology, North Korea and its potential adversaries will feel safe only to the extent they believe their offensive capabilities are survivable enough to deter the other side from attacking. It will be a tense stability that reinforces the status quo rather than opening opportunities to redress it.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "attempting nuclear blackmail would not be an attractive option for the North Korean government\nnuc\ns\nunsuccessful\nNo\nKo\nresponsible nuclear power\npuncture\nrisk-averse\nU\nS\nNo\nKo\ncarpet bombing\nnuclear threats\nbasing t\nn\nw\ns\nSo\nKo\nt\nn\nw\ns\nfundamentally defensive strategy\nt\nn\nw\nbattlefield equalizer\nNo\nKo\nNo\nKo\nattack", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: North Korea’s posture is defensive\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "It would make sense for Pyongyang to threaten using nuclear weapons if an enemy appears to be winning a war aimed at overthrowing the regime. Facing such an existential threat, the regime would believe it had nothing to lose by playing its last and most fearsome card. Short of that scenario, however, attempting nuclear blackmail would not be an attractive option for the North Korean government. In general, countries attempting to change the policies of other states by threatening the use of nuclear weapons have been unsuccessful. The target states don’t take the threat seriously, believing the threatening state is not prepared to suffer the political consequences of nuclear aggression. Multiple official government statements indicate North Korea wants global recognition as a “responsible nuclear power.” This gives Pyongyang an incentive to demonstrate good international nuclear weapons citizenship. Nuclear coercion against South Korea during peacetime would immediately puncture that aspiration. Initiating a conventional war against the South while using nuclear weapons as a shield would be a losing strategy for Pyongyang. It would be sheer folly to expect that South Korea would not fight back against North Korean aggression. Moreover, the South’s conventional forces are stronger than North Korea’s. Since 2010, South Korean governments have vowed to retaliate militarily against any lethal North Korean attacks. This has not changed as a result of Pyongyang acquiring of nuclear weapons. If North Korea is the attacker, a threat by Pyongyang to initiate the escalation from the conventional level to the nuclear level is not credible because the United States is vastly superior to North Korea at the nuclear level. Threatening the first use of nuclear weapons against either the United States or South Korea would be an extremely risky move for Pyongyang because it might invite a devastating pre-emptive attack. Pyongyang’s modus operandi is to intimidate adversaries by cultivating a reputation for unpredictability and belligerence. In practice, however, the North Korean government appears rather risk-averse. Pyongyang has backed down when confronted with a resolute response from its adversaries, as in the aftermath of the tree-trimming incident in 1976 and the tensions over South Korea’s border loudspeakers in 2015. North Korea’s nuclear expansion does not necessarily indicate intent to practice nuclear blackmail. North Koreans have reasons to believe a large and highly survivable nuclear arsenal is necessary to deter the United States from attacking their country. North Korea suffered extensive U.S. carpet bombing during the Korean War. Since then, Washington has maintained nuclear threats against North Korea in various ways, including basing tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea from 1958 to 1991, regularly flying aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons near North Korean territory, and making official statements such as then-U.S. President Donald Trump’s 2017 comment that he could “totally destroy North Korea.” The United States has massive conventional and nuclear forces and is hard at work trying to improve its ability to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles. The South Korean government is seeking to build a capability to destroy North Korean ballistic missiles before they launch. With such formidable potential enemies, it is not unreasonable for Pyongyang to believe it needs a large and sophisticated nuclear weapons arsenal to convince Americans and South Koreans that it has a second strike capability, meaning it could absorb a nuclear attack and still be able to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker. While North Korea’s development of tactical nuclear weapons might suggest a plan to use nukes for warfighting or coercion rather than insurance, they could also be part of a fundamentally defensive strategy. Kim must account for the scenario in which his armies are losing a conventional war to superior South Korean-U.S. forces but he cannot nuke a major U.S. or South Korean city without bringing upon himself U.S. nuclear retaliation that would extinguish his regime and state. He might see the use of a tactical nuclear weapon against an enemy military target – rather than an enemy city – as a battlefield equalizer that would not necessarily draw massive U.S. retaliation, and might even frighten South Korean or U.S. forces into halting their advance. Henceforth, the prominent feature of the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis will not be nuclear coercion, but rather mutual assured destruction (MAD). As a result of the North Korean nuclear buildup, U.S. and South Korean anti-missile defenses are currently losing the battle of capabilities against North Korean missiles. This is no doubt what Kim intended. Rather than maintaining a minimal arsenal that enemy systems could possibly cancel out, he is building a larger and more robust arsenal that can overwhelm enemy defenses. South Korea’s “kill chain” missile defense concept requires Seoul to know when and from where Pyongyang plans to launch a missile. Already difficult, this will become even harder as North Korea deploys missiles on submarines and transitions to solid fuel, which requires far less preparation time than liquid fuel. The U.S. ground based interceptor (GBI) system has 44 missile-killing missiles based in Alaska and California, along the presumed path of enemy missiles incoming from Northeast Asia. This system would be hard pressed to shoot down even a small number of ordinary ballistic missiles. Kim may already have enough missiles to defeat the system, and he plans to mass produce nuclear bombs and their delivery vehicles. North Korea has apparently successfully tested a hypersonic glide vehicle, which can maneuver to avoid missile defenses such as the GBI system. For its part, North Korea has no defense against incoming U.S. nuclear missiles. Thus, for the foreseeable future, barring a dramatic new breakthrough in anti-missile defense technology, North Korea and its potential adversaries will feel safe only to the extent they believe their offensive capabilities are survivable enough to deter the other side from attacking. It will be a tense stability that reinforces the status quo rather than opening opportunities to redress it.\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "attempting nuclear blackmail would not be an attractive option for\nNo\nKo\nattempting to change the policies of other states by threatening\nnuc\ns have been unsuccessful\ntarget states don’t take the threat seriously\nNo\nKo\nwants\nrecognition as a\nresponsible nuclear power\nNuclear coercion\nimmediately puncture that aspiration\nIn practice\nthe\ngovernment appears\nrisk-averse\nPyongyang\nhave reasons to believe a large and\nsurvivable\narsenal is necessary to deter the U\nS\nNo\nKo\nsuffered extensive\ncarpet bombing during the Korean War\nWashington has maintained nuclear threats\nincluding basing t\nn\nw\ns in So\nKo\nregularly flying aircraft\nnear\nKorean territory\nand making official statements\nthat\ncould “totally destroy North Korea\ndevelopment of t\nn\nw\ns\ncould\nbe part of a fundamentally defensive strategy\nmight see\na t\nn\nw\nagainst a\ntarget\nrather than\ncity\nas a battlefield equalizer\nNo\nKo\nhas no defense against\nU.S. nuclear missiles\nNo\nKo\nwill feel safe only to the extent they believe their offensive capabilities are survivable enough to deter\nattack", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 8No impact---attacks will be small, no dispersion, and countermeasures solve", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The bioterror WMD myth. Those who have overemphasized the bioterrorism threat typically portray it as an imminent concern, with emphasis placed on high-consequence, mass-casualty attacks, performed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This is a myth with two dimensions.\n The first involves the identities of terrorists and what their intentions are. The assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass-casualty weapons and pursue capabilities on the scale of 20th century, state-level bioweapons programs. Most leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and present. But they consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be quite small. This judgment is backed up by historical evidence. The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks in the past were small-scale, low-casualty events aimed at causing panic and disruption rather than excessive death tolls. \n The second dimension involves capabilities and the level of skills and resources available to terrorists. The implicit assumption is that producing a pathogenic organism equates to producing a weapon of mass destruction. It does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for the processes of scaling up, storage, and dissemination. These processes present significant technical and logistical barriers.\n Even if a biological weapon were disseminated successfully, the outcome of an attack would be affected by factors like the health of the people who are exposed and the speed and manner with which public health authorities and medical professionals detect and respond to the resulting outbreak. A prompt response with effective medical countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can significantly blunt the impact of an attack.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Those who have overemphasized\nbioterror\nportray it as an imminent concern, with emphasis\non high-consequence, mass-casualty attacks\nThis is a myth\nassumption is that terrorists would seek\nmass-casualty weapons\nleading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe\nthe risk of\nlarge-scale bioterrorism attacks to be quite small. This\nis backed\nby historical evidence\nattempts\nin the past were small-scale\nassumption is that producing a pathogenic organism equates to producing a weapon\nIt does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for\nscaling up, storage, and dissemination. These\npresent significant\nbarriers\nEven if a\nweapon were disseminated successfully\nmedical countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can significantly blunt the impact of an attack.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 8No impact---attacks will be small, no dispersion, and countermeasures solve", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The bioterror WMD myth. Those who have overemphasized the bioterrorism threat typically portray it as an imminent concern, with emphasis placed on high-consequence, mass-casualty attacks, performed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This is a myth with two dimensions.\n The first involves the identities of terrorists and what their intentions are. The assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass-casualty weapons and pursue capabilities on the scale of 20th century, state-level bioweapons programs. Most leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and present. But they consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be quite small. This judgment is backed up by historical evidence. The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks in the past were small-scale, low-casualty events aimed at causing panic and disruption rather than excessive death tolls. \n The second dimension involves capabilities and the level of skills and resources available to terrorists. The implicit assumption is that producing a pathogenic organism equates to producing a weapon of mass destruction. It does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for the processes of scaling up, storage, and dissemination. These processes present significant technical and logistical barriers.\n Even if a biological weapon were disseminated successfully, the outcome of an attack would be affected by factors like the health of the people who are exposed and the speed and manner with which public health authorities and medical professionals detect and respond to the resulting outbreak. A prompt response with effective medical countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can significantly blunt the impact of an attack.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "overemphasized\nimminent concern\nhigh-consequence, mass-casualty attacks\nmass-casualty weapons\nleading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts\nlarge-scale bioterrorism attacks to be quite small.\nhistorical evidence\nsmall-scale\nIt does not.\nscaling up, storage, and dissemination.\nsignificant\nbarriers\nEven if\nmedical countermeasures,\nsignificantly blunt the impact of an attack", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 8No impact---attacks will be small, no dispersion, and countermeasures solve\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The bioterror WMD myth. Those who have overemphasized the bioterrorism threat typically portray it as an imminent concern, with emphasis placed on high-consequence, mass-casualty attacks, performed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This is a myth with two dimensions.\n The first involves the identities of terrorists and what their intentions are. The assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass-casualty weapons and pursue capabilities on the scale of 20th century, state-level bioweapons programs. Most leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and present. But they consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be quite small. This judgment is backed up by historical evidence. The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks in the past were small-scale, low-casualty events aimed at causing panic and disruption rather than excessive death tolls. \n The second dimension involves capabilities and the level of skills and resources available to terrorists. The implicit assumption is that producing a pathogenic organism equates to producing a weapon of mass destruction. It does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for the processes of scaling up, storage, and dissemination. These processes present significant technical and logistical barriers.\n Even if a biological weapon were disseminated successfully, the outcome of an attack would be affected by factors like the health of the people who are exposed and the speed and manner with which public health authorities and medical professionals detect and respond to the resulting outbreak. A prompt response with effective medical countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can significantly blunt the impact of an attack.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "bioterror\nas an imminent concern, with\nmass-casualty attacks\nis a myth\nleading biological disarmament and non\nprolif\nexperts believe\nrisk of\nlarge-scale bioterror\nto be quite small. This\nis backed\nby historical evidence\nattempts\nwere small-scale\nknowledge and resources\nnecessary for\nscaling\nstorage, and dissemination.\npresent significant\nbarriers\nmedical countermeasures\nsignificantly blunt the impact", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No terrorist resurgence — COVID checks.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The COVID-19 pandemic also creates mitigating conditions for the terrorist threat in much of the world. Around the globe, people are implementing physical distancing measures and, therefore, removing a significant terrorist target: crowds. Physical distancing measures make tactics such as vehicle rammings, stabbings, and bombings far less effective. Without the crowds that usually allow these relatively simple attacks to generate casualties, terrorists may determine that their plans are best perpetrated once physical distancing measures are no longer in place.\nWhile it may be convenient to think of terrorists as relatively omnipotent, my work in counter-terrorism has demonstrated that this is far from the case. Terrorists, like everybody else, can and do get sick, as do their family and friends, creating a burden on care. At the same time, the economic devastation caused by the virus has likely left many would-be terrorists without a source of income. They may be struggling with daily subsistence, meaning devoting additional resources (both in time and money) to attack planning and weapons/component procurements may take a back seat to more immediate needs.\nThe intense media focus on COVID-19 may also dissuade some would-be terrorists from engaging in attacks during the pandemic. Most terrorists seek recognition for their attacks, with the ultimate goal of sowing fear in a population. This is difficult to do if no one is paying attention to you. A recent attack in France demonstrates how little media attention some attacks are generating. Even for a COVID-19 attack (involving an infected individual), this tactic also does not guarantee media attention. The reality is that anyone we come into contact with could be a virus carrier – determining responsibility would be difficult and far from instantaneous, minimizing one of terrorism’s objectives: instilling fear. This fear would also likely be mitigated by the current environment, which is one where fear is already pervasive due to the global pandemic.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "COVID\ncreates mitigating conditions for the terrorist threat\npeople are implementing physical distancing measures and\nremoving a significant terrorist target: crowds. Physical distancing measures make tactics such as\nbombings far less effective\nTerrorists, like everybody else, can and do get sick, as do their family and friends, creating a burden on care.\neconomic devastation caused by the virus has likely left many would-be terrorists without a source of income. They may be struggling with daily subsistence, meaning devoting additional resources\nboth in time and money\nto attack planning and weapons\nprocurements may take a back seat to more immediate needs\nintense media focus on COVID\nmay also dissuade some would-be terrorists from engaging in attacks during the pandemic. Most terrorists seek recognition for their attacks, with the ultimate goal of sowing fear\nThis is difficult to do if no one is paying attention to you. A recent attack in France demonstrates how little media attention some attacks are generating.\ndetermining responsibility would be difficult and far from instantaneous, minimizing one of terrorism’s objectives: instilling fear\nThis fear would also likely be mitigated by the current environment, which is one where fear is already pervasive due to the\npandemic", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No terrorist resurgence — COVID checks.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The COVID-19 pandemic also creates mitigating conditions for the terrorist threat in much of the world. Around the globe, people are implementing physical distancing measures and, therefore, removing a significant terrorist target: crowds. Physical distancing measures make tactics such as vehicle rammings, stabbings, and bombings far less effective. Without the crowds that usually allow these relatively simple attacks to generate casualties, terrorists may determine that their plans are best perpetrated once physical distancing measures are no longer in place.\nWhile it may be convenient to think of terrorists as relatively omnipotent, my work in counter-terrorism has demonstrated that this is far from the case. Terrorists, like everybody else, can and do get sick, as do their family and friends, creating a burden on care. At the same time, the economic devastation caused by the virus has likely left many would-be terrorists without a source of income. They may be struggling with daily subsistence, meaning devoting additional resources (both in time and money) to attack planning and weapons/component procurements may take a back seat to more immediate needs.\nThe intense media focus on COVID-19 may also dissuade some would-be terrorists from engaging in attacks during the pandemic. Most terrorists seek recognition for their attacks, with the ultimate goal of sowing fear in a population. This is difficult to do if no one is paying attention to you. A recent attack in France demonstrates how little media attention some attacks are generating. Even for a COVID-19 attack (involving an infected individual), this tactic also does not guarantee media attention. The reality is that anyone we come into contact with could be a virus carrier – determining responsibility would be difficult and far from instantaneous, minimizing one of terrorism’s objectives: instilling fear. This fear would also likely be mitigated by the current environment, which is one where fear is already pervasive due to the global pandemic.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "mitigating conditions\nterrorist threat\nphysical distancing measures\nremov\ncrowds\nfar less effective\ncan and do get sick\nburden on care.\neconomic devastation\nwithout a source of income\nstruggling with daily subsistence\ntime\nmoney\nattack planning\nweapons\nprocurements\nback seat\nintense media focus\nCOVID\ndissuade\nterrorists\nengaging in attacks\nrecognition\nno one is paying attention to you.\nlittle media attention\ndifficult\nfar from instantaneous\nminimizing\ninstilling fear\nalready pervasive", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No terrorist resurgence — COVID checks.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.3", "role": "system" }, { "content": "The COVID-19 pandemic also creates mitigating conditions for the terrorist threat in much of the world. Around the globe, people are implementing physical distancing measures and, therefore, removing a significant terrorist target: crowds. Physical distancing measures make tactics such as vehicle rammings, stabbings, and bombings far less effective. Without the crowds that usually allow these relatively simple attacks to generate casualties, terrorists may determine that their plans are best perpetrated once physical distancing measures are no longer in place.\nWhile it may be convenient to think of terrorists as relatively omnipotent, my work in counter-terrorism has demonstrated that this is far from the case. Terrorists, like everybody else, can and do get sick, as do their family and friends, creating a burden on care. At the same time, the economic devastation caused by the virus has likely left many would-be terrorists without a source of income. They may be struggling with daily subsistence, meaning devoting additional resources (both in time and money) to attack planning and weapons/component procurements may take a back seat to more immediate needs.\nThe intense media focus on COVID-19 may also dissuade some would-be terrorists from engaging in attacks during the pandemic. Most terrorists seek recognition for their attacks, with the ultimate goal of sowing fear in a population. This is difficult to do if no one is paying attention to you. A recent attack in France demonstrates how little media attention some attacks are generating. Even for a COVID-19 attack (involving an infected individual), this tactic also does not guarantee media attention. The reality is that anyone we come into contact with could be a virus carrier – determining responsibility would be difficult and far from instantaneous, minimizing one of terrorism’s objectives: instilling fear. This fear would also likely be mitigated by the current environment, which is one where fear is already pervasive due to the global pandemic.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "COVID\ncreates mitigating conditions for the terrorist threat\nphysical distancing\nremov\na significant\ntarget: crowds\ndistancing\nmake tactics\nfar less effective\nTerrorists\nget sick\neconomic devastation\nleft\nterrorists without\nincome\nThey may be struggling with\nsubsistence\ndevoting\ntime and money\nto\nplanning\nmay take a back seat\nintense media focus on COVID\nmay\ndissuade\nterrorists\nterrorists seek recognition\nThis is difficult\nif no one is paying attention", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: It's an empirical question, answered by statistical methods---failing to code based on exogenous variables corrupts their evidence", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Before we review our approach in detail, it may be useful to explain why this type of analysis has not been pursued successfully in the past and what makes our effort different from other, broadly related projects. We are not the first to apply an IV framework (more specifically) or multi-equation models (more broadly) to the democratic peace. However, previous attempts suffer from two major problems. First, previous studies have typically used a dyad (country pair) as the unit of observation in analyzing conflict, which requires some summary measure(s) of democracy for a pair of countries rather than the state-level (monadic) democracy measure. 6 Use of a dyadic aggregate to represent regime type creates a discrepancy between the first stage regression (predicting democracy at the country level) and the outcome stage regression (predicting conflict at the dyad level). 7 We avoid this problem by using the directed dyad as the unit of observation in predicting conflict, distinguishing between the potential challenger and target in a dispute. This allows us to connect the first stage equations (predicting the challenger’s and target’s regime types) and the outcome stage equation seamlessly. Doing so has several benefits: the outcome stage model could directly include country-level covariates (such as challenger’s and target’s democracy) without having to convert them to a dyadic summary. This also allows us to estimate the system of equations jointly rather than relying on the “forbidden regression.” 8\nSecond, a more daunting challenge in applying an IV approach to democratic peace research is the difficulty of finding a plausible instrument for regime type — a variable that is strongly correlated with regime type but is unrelated to war. This is the challenge that has plagued empirical researchers in many fields. For example, a recent study of the effect of regime type on economic growth uses a diffusion-based measure of democracy (i.e., average value of democracies in a given region) as an instrument for democracy (Acemoglu et al. 2019). However, diffusion-based instruments such as this are unlikely to be a valid instrument, due to spatial spill-over, interdependence, and, most importantly, simultaneity (Betz, Cook, and Hollenbach 2018). Recognizing problems with spatial instruments, McDonald (2015) seeks to exploit the very discrepancy between country-level and dyad-level designs as the source of identification. His discussion, however, lacks a clear explanation as to why some determinants of regime type do not influence conflict. 9\nWe turn to a demographic variable — average female fertility rate in a given country — as a source of variation in regime type that is exogenous to international conflict. As we will argue below, a lower fertility rate is a strong driver of democratization. We will also present theoretical arguments and a series of falsification tests that support the claim that average national fertility rate does not directly influence international conflict.\nIt outweighs and turns the case\n1---Democracies are ineffective at global governance---can never achieve meaningful arms control", "role": "user" }, { "content": "this type of analysis has not been pursued successfully in the past\nwhat makes our effort different from other\nprojects. We are not the first to apply an IV framework\nor multi-equation models\nto the democratic peace. However, previous attempts suffer from two major problems. First, previous studies have typically used a dyad\nas the unit\nwhich requires\nsummary measure(s)\nfor a pair\nrather than the\n(monadic) democracy measure\nUse of a dyadic aggregate to represent regime type creates a discrepancy between the first stage regression (predicting democracy at the country level) and the outcome stage regression (predicting conflict at the dyad level).\nWe avoid this problem by using the directed dyad as the unit of observation in predicting conflict, distinguishing between the potential challenger and target in a dispute. This allows us to connect the first stage equations\nand the outcome stage equation seamlessly\nThis\nallows us to estimate the system of equations jointly rather than relying on the “forbidden regression.”\nSecond, a more daunting challenge\nis the difficulty of finding a plausible instrument for regime type — a variable that is strongly correlated with regime type but is unrelated to war. This is the challenge that has plagued empirical researchers in many fields. For example, a recent study\nuses a diffusion-based measure\nHowever\ninstruments\nare unlikely to be\nvalid\ndue to spatial spill-over, interdependence, and\nsimultaneity\nWe turn to a demographic variable\nfertility rate\nas a source of variation in regime type that is exogenous to international conflict\na lower fertility rate is a strong driver of democratization\nalso\nfertility\ndoes not\ninfluence international conflict", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: It's an empirical question, answered by statistical methods---failing to code based on exogenous variables corrupts their evidence", "role": "system" }, { "content": "this type of analysis has not been pursued successfully in the past\nwhat makes our effort different from other\nprojects. We are not the first to apply an IV framework\nor multi-equation models\nto the democratic peace. However, previous attempts suffer from two major problems. First, previous studies have typically used a dyad\nas the unit\nwhich requires\nsummary measure(s)\nfor a pair\nrather than the\n(monadic) democracy measure\nUse of a dyadic aggregate to represent regime type creates a discrepancy between the first stage regression (predicting democracy at the country level) and the outcome stage regression (predicting conflict at the dyad level).\nWe avoid this problem by using the directed dyad as the unit of observation in predicting conflict, distinguishing between the potential challenger and target in a dispute. This allows us to connect the first stage equations\nand the outcome stage equation seamlessly\nThis\nallows us to estimate the system of equations jointly rather than relying on the “forbidden regression.”\nSecond, a more daunting challenge\nis the difficulty of finding a plausible instrument for regime type — a variable that is strongly correlated with regime type but is unrelated to war. This is the challenge that has plagued empirical researchers in many fields. For example, a recent study\nuses a diffusion-based measure\nHowever\ninstruments\nare unlikely to be\nvalid\ndue to spatial spill-over, interdependence, and\nsimultaneity\nWe turn to a demographic variable\nfertility rate\nas a source of variation in regime type that is exogenous to international conflict\na lower fertility rate is a strong driver of democratization\nalso\nfertility\ndoes not\ninfluence international conflict", "role": "user" }, { "content": "not\nsuccessfully\ndifferent\nprevious attempts\nmajor problems\ndyad\nunit\nsummary measure(s)\n(monadic)\ndiscrepancy\nfirst stage regression\noutcome stage regression\navoid this\ndirected dyad\nunit\ndistinguishing\nseamlessly\n“forbidden regression.”\nplausible instrument\nregime type\nstrongly correlated\nregime type\nunrelated to war\nplagued\ndiffusion-based\nvalid\nspatial spill-over\ninterdependence\nsimultaneity\ndemographic\nfertility rate\nvariation in regime type\nexogenous\nstrong driver\nfertility\nnot\nconflict", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: It's an empirical question, answered by statistical methods---failing to code based on exogenous variables corrupts their evidence\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "this type of analysis has not been pursued successfully in the past\nwhat makes our effort different from other\nprojects. We are not the first to apply an IV framework\nor multi-equation models\nto the democratic peace. However, previous attempts suffer from two major problems. First, previous studies have typically used a dyad\nas the unit\nwhich requires\nsummary measure(s)\nfor a pair\nrather than the\n(monadic) democracy measure\nUse of a dyadic aggregate to represent regime type creates a discrepancy between the first stage regression (predicting democracy at the country level) and the outcome stage regression (predicting conflict at the dyad level).\nWe avoid this problem by using the directed dyad as the unit of observation in predicting conflict, distinguishing between the potential challenger and target in a dispute. This allows us to connect the first stage equations\nand the outcome stage equation seamlessly\nThis\nallows us to estimate the system of equations jointly rather than relying on the “forbidden regression.”\nSecond, a more daunting challenge\nis the difficulty of finding a plausible instrument for regime type — a variable that is strongly correlated with regime type but is unrelated to war. This is the challenge that has plagued empirical researchers in many fields. For example, a recent study\nuses a diffusion-based measure\nHowever\ninstruments\nare unlikely to be\nvalid\ndue to spatial spill-over, interdependence, and\nsimultaneity\nWe turn to a demographic variable\nfertility rate\nas a source of variation in regime type that is exogenous to international conflict\na lower fertility rate is a strong driver of democratization\nalso\nfertility\ndoes not\ninfluence international conflict", "role": "user" }, { "content": "this\nhas not been pursued\nin the past\na\ndaunting challenge\nis\nfinding a\ninstrument for regime type\ncorrelated with regime type but\nunrelated to war. This\nplagued\nresearchers\ninstruments\nare unlikely\nvalid\ndue to\nspill-over, interdependence, and\nsimultaneity\na demographic variable\nfertility\nas\nvariation\nis exogenous", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: It resolved all South Korea’s fears. It spurs greater role in decision-making and integrated deterrence.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "WHITE HOUSE — South Korea agreed not to pursue its own nuclear weapons program, in return for a greater decision-making role in U.S. contingency planning in the event of a North Korean nuclear attack and a more muscular U.S. presence in the region.\nThe deal is part of the so-called Washington Declaration, announced Wednesday, as President Joe Biden hosts South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol in a state visit to celebrate the two countries’ 70th year of bilateral relations and discuss the allies’ future relationship.\n“Our mutual defense treaty is ironclad, and that includes our commitment to extended deterrence,” said Biden during his joint White House press conference with Yoon, referring to the 1953 agreement signed at the end of the Korean War that commits Washington to help South Korea defend itself, particularly from North Korea.\nHe repeated a line from his administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review that a nuclear attack against the United States or its allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime.\nSpeaking through an interpreter, Yoon called the Washington Declaration “an unprecedented expansion and strengthening” of the extended deterrence strategy — a term also known as the American nuclear umbrella. It says the United States will respond to attacks on its allies and partners “across the spectrum of potential nuclear and non-nuclear scenarios.”\n“Our two countries have agreed to immediate bilateral presidential consultations in the event of North Korea's nuclear attack and promised to respond swiftly, overwhelmingly and decisively using the full force of the alliance, including the United States’ nuclear weapons,” Yoon said.\nIn a briefing to reporters Tuesday, senior administration officials said that under the Washington Declaration, Seoul will “maintain its nonnuclear status and continue to abide by all the conditions of its signatory status to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.” The NPT, which South Korea ratified in 1975, prohibits signatories from developing nuclear weapons.\nThe two countries will also establish the U.S.–Republic of Korea Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), a “regular bilateral consultation mechanism that will focus on nuclear and strategic planning issues and will give our ROK allies additional insight in how we think about planning for major contingencies,” the official added.\nBeyond greater information sharing, Seoul will have a greater voice in the deliberations of U.S. weapons deployment, he said.\nGrowing doubt\nBiden is trying to demonstrate that his pledge to defend South Korea is “credible and rock-solid,” said Scott Snyder, director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Giving South Korea a greater say in nuclear planning is needed to address the country’s increasing sense of vulnerability from North Korea, Snyder told VOA.\nAs Pyongyang moves rapidly with its nuclear weapons program, including developing missiles that can target American cities, there has been growing doubt among South Koreans on whether Washington would risk its own safety to protect Seoul and whether Seoul should continue to rely on U.S. extended deterrence.\nIn January, Yoon told his defense and foreign ministry officials that if the threat posed by North Korea “gets worse,” his country may “introduce tactical nuclear weapons or build them on our own.”\nSeoul walked back Yoon’s comments following an international backlash. However, the narrative of South Korea having its own nuclear deterrence capability has become more mainstream in the country’s national security discourse.\nA 2022 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs showed that 71% of South Koreans say their country should build its own nuclear weapons.\nMore muscular deterrence\nThe U.S. official said the deal would mean enhanced integration of South Korean conventional weapons into U.S. strategic planning, and a more muscular approach to deterrence through increased war games and deployments of military assets, including U.S. nuclear ballistic submarine visits to South Korea, which has not happened since the early 1980s.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "South Korea agreed not to pursue its own nuclear weapons program, in return for a greater decision-making role in U.S. contingency planning in the event of a North Korean nuclear attack and a more muscular U.S. presence in the region\npart of the\nWashington Declaration\nmutual defense treaty is ironclad\nthat includes\ncommitment to extended deterrence\nsaid Biden\nHe repeated\nthat a nuclear attack against the U\nS\nor its allies\nis unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime\nYoon called the Washington Declaration “an unprecedented expansion and strengthening” of the extended deterrence strategy\nthe U\nS\nwill respond to attacks on\nallies\nacross the spectrum of potential nuclear and non-nuclear scenarios\ncountries\nagreed to\nbilateral\nconsultations in the event of North Korea's nuclear attack and promised to respond swiftly, overwhelmingly and decisively using the full force of the alliance, including the U\nS\nnuclear weapons\nThe two countries will also establish the\nNCG\na\nregular bilateral consultation mechanism that will focus on nuclear and strategic planning issues and will give our ROK allies additional insight in how we think about planning for major contingencies\nBeyond greater information sharing, Seoul will have a greater voice in the deliberations of U.S. weapons deployment\nGiving South Korea a greater say in nuclear planning is needed to address the country’s increasing sense of vulnerability from North Korea\nAs Pyongyang moves rapidly with its nuclear weapons program\nthere has been growing doubt among South Koreans on whether Washington would risk its own safety to protect Seoul and whether Seoul should continue to rely on U.S. extended deterrence\nthe deal would mean enhanced integration of South Korean conventional weapons into U.S. strategic planning, and a more muscular approach to deterrence through increased war games and deployments of military assets, including U.S. nuclear ballistic submarine visits to South Korea, which has not happened since the early 1980s", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: It resolved all South Korea’s fears. It spurs greater role in decision-making and integrated deterrence.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "South Korea agreed not to pursue its own nuclear weapons program, in return for a greater decision-making role in U.S. contingency planning in the event of a North Korean nuclear attack and a more muscular U.S. presence in the region\npart of the\nWashington Declaration\nmutual defense treaty is ironclad\nthat includes\ncommitment to extended deterrence\nsaid Biden\nHe repeated\nthat a nuclear attack against the U\nS\nor its allies\nis unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime\nYoon called the Washington Declaration “an unprecedented expansion and strengthening” of the extended deterrence strategy\nthe U\nS\nwill respond to attacks on\nallies\nacross the spectrum of potential nuclear and non-nuclear scenarios\ncountries\nagreed to\nbilateral\nconsultations in the event of North Korea's nuclear attack and promised to respond swiftly, overwhelmingly and decisively using the full force of the alliance, including the U\nS\nnuclear weapons\nThe two countries will also establish the\nNCG\na\nregular bilateral consultation mechanism that will focus on nuclear and strategic planning issues and will give our ROK allies additional insight in how we think about planning for major contingencies\nBeyond greater information sharing, Seoul will have a greater voice in the deliberations of U.S. weapons deployment\nGiving South Korea a greater say in nuclear planning is needed to address the country’s increasing sense of vulnerability from North Korea\nAs Pyongyang moves rapidly with its nuclear weapons program\nthere has been growing doubt among South Koreans on whether Washington would risk its own safety to protect Seoul and whether Seoul should continue to rely on U.S. extended deterrence\nthe deal would mean enhanced integration of South Korean conventional weapons into U.S. strategic planning, and a more muscular approach to deterrence through increased war games and deployments of military assets, including U.S. nuclear ballistic submarine visits to South Korea, which has not happened since the early 1980s", "role": "user" }, { "content": "greater decision-making role\ncontingency planning\nmore muscular U.S. presence\nironclad\nend of that regime\nunprecedented expansion and strengthening\nextended deterrence\nacross the spectrum\nbilateral\nconsultations\nswiftly\noverwhelmingly\ndecisively\nincluding\nnuclear weapons\nconsultation mechanism\nplanning issues\nadditional insight\ngreater voice in the deliberations of U.S. weapons deployment\ngreater say\naddress the country’s increasing sense of vulnerability\ngrowing doubt\nrisk its own safety\nenhanced integration\nconventional weapons\nmore muscular approach\nincreased war games\ndeployments of military assets", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: It resolved all South Korea’s fears. It spurs greater role in decision-making and integrated deterrence.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "WHITE HOUSE — South Korea agreed not to pursue its own nuclear weapons program, in return for a greater decision-making role in U.S. contingency planning in the event of a North Korean nuclear attack and a more muscular U.S. presence in the region.\nThe deal is part of the so-called Washington Declaration, announced Wednesday, as President Joe Biden hosts South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol in a state visit to celebrate the two countries’ 70th year of bilateral relations and discuss the allies’ future relationship.\n“Our mutual defense treaty is ironclad, and that includes our commitment to extended deterrence,” said Biden during his joint White House press conference with Yoon, referring to the 1953 agreement signed at the end of the Korean War that commits Washington to help South Korea defend itself, particularly from North Korea.\nHe repeated a line from his administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review that a nuclear attack against the United States or its allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime.\nSpeaking through an interpreter, Yoon called the Washington Declaration “an unprecedented expansion and strengthening” of the extended deterrence strategy — a term also known as the American nuclear umbrella. It says the United States will respond to attacks on its allies and partners “across the spectrum of potential nuclear and non-nuclear scenarios.”\n“Our two countries have agreed to immediate bilateral presidential consultations in the event of North Korea's nuclear attack and promised to respond swiftly, overwhelmingly and decisively using the full force of the alliance, including the United States’ nuclear weapons,” Yoon said.\nIn a briefing to reporters Tuesday, senior administration officials said that under the Washington Declaration, Seoul will “maintain its nonnuclear status and continue to abide by all the conditions of its signatory status to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.” The NPT, which South Korea ratified in 1975, prohibits signatories from developing nuclear weapons.\nThe two countries will also establish the U.S.–Republic of Korea Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), a “regular bilateral consultation mechanism that will focus on nuclear and strategic planning issues and will give our ROK allies additional insight in how we think about planning for major contingencies,” the official added.\nBeyond greater information sharing, Seoul will have a greater voice in the deliberations of U.S. weapons deployment, he said.\nGrowing doubt\nBiden is trying to demonstrate that his pledge to defend South Korea is “credible and rock-solid,” said Scott Snyder, director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Giving South Korea a greater say in nuclear planning is needed to address the country’s increasing sense of vulnerability from North Korea, Snyder told VOA.\nAs Pyongyang moves rapidly with its nuclear weapons program, including developing missiles that can target American cities, there has been growing doubt among South Koreans on whether Washington would risk its own safety to protect Seoul and whether Seoul should continue to rely on U.S. extended deterrence.\nIn January, Yoon told his defense and foreign ministry officials that if the threat posed by North Korea “gets worse,” his country may “introduce tactical nuclear weapons or build them on our own.”\nSeoul walked back Yoon’s comments following an international backlash. However, the narrative of South Korea having its own nuclear deterrence capability has become more mainstream in the country’s national security discourse.\nA 2022 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs showed that 71% of South Koreans say their country should build its own nuclear weapons.\nMore muscular deterrence\nThe U.S. official said the deal would mean enhanced integration of South Korean conventional weapons into U.S. strategic planning, and a more muscular approach to deterrence through increased war games and deployments of military assets, including U.S. nuclear ballistic submarine visits to South Korea, which has not happened since the early 1980s.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Korea agreed not to pursue\nnuc\ns\nin return for\ndecision-making role in\ncontingency planning\nand\nmore muscular U.S. presence\ndefense treaty is ironclad\nBiden\nrepeated\nnuclear attack against\nallies\nwill result in\nend of\nregime\nYoon called\nDeclaration\nunprecedented expansion\nof\nextended deterrence\nU\nS\nwill respond\nacross\nspectrum of\nnuclear and non-nuclear scenarios\ncountries\nagreed to\nbilateral\nconsultations in the event of North Korea's\nattack and promised to respond swiftly\nusing\nfull force\nincluding\nnuclear weapons\nconsultation mechanism\nwill focus on\nplanning issues and\ngive\nROK\ninsight\nSeoul will have a greater voice\nneeded to address\nsense of vulnerability\nthere has been\ndoubt among South\nwhether Washington would risk its own safety to protect Seoul\nthe deal\nmean enhanced integration of\nconventional weapons into\nstrategic planning\nthrough\nwar games and\nmilitary assets", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Western man is only breaking from its contradiction with the normative roots of liberalism---using politics to redress those externalities voids unsustainability.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Today the world seems profoundly broken. Decades of endemic financial crisis and stagnant real wages have produced planetary inequality of such magnitude that eight white men now own the same wealth as the poorest half of the world’s population (Oxfam, 2017). Seemingly nihilistic armed conflicts engulf many regions of world, contributing to a reality in which one in every hundred people on the planet lives as a refugee (Connor and Krogstad, 2016). It is now ninety-five percent likely that temperatures will rise above the two-degree Celsius threshold, making the most dangerous effects of global climate change largely inevitable (Raftery et al., 2017). And this does not even include the success of racist, alt-right, and fascist movements across the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. All this at a time when governments and institutions around the world seem completely ill-equipped to even begin engaging the issues central to human survival.\nThis brave new world is not only profoundly dispiriting, it poses very serious challenges to those whose academic and political practice involves critically engaging the world with the aim of crafting the theoretical tools – or, as Amı´lcar Cabral (1979) might suggest, weapons – needed to change it. Today, the academic workbench of concepts, theories, and analysis seems woefully inadequate to honestly stare into the abyss before us, much less provide meaningful guidance for systemic transformation. One reason for the considerable gulf between available theories and present political realities stems from the fact that much of the intellectual tradition structuring the academy today was built alongside imperial or liberal political and historical trajectories. Many of the cherished thinkers we draw upon to construct the contemporary political imaginaries were often coconspirators in the solidification of the European state system and Western imperialism. During the twentieth century, theorists engaged in celebrating a politics of mass demonstration and deliberation, social movements, democratization, and post-Cold War cosmopolitan civil society. The theoretical lessons learned from these historical moments now seem either complicit in, or overly stressed by, the weight of the current pressures. Similarly, many of the political and theoretical apparatuses used to critique this history pale in the face of a historical moment that seems to demand a renewed militancy of purpose, a willingness to take risks for justice, and the urgent need for even more vibrant and vital networks of human solidarity.\nIt is not surprising, therefore, that within the current conjuncture political thinkers in the Western academy have begun returning to the shelves of the African anticolonial archive (for example: el-Malik and Kamola, 2017; Pha˙ m and Shilliam, 2016; el-Malik, 2016). The twentieth-century struggles against colonialism in Africa, the African diaspora, and around the world, seem to once again speak in instructive and unexpected ways. There is good reason for this return. These voices are poetic yet strident, theoretical but immediately practical to the particularities of struggle. These writings on colonialism, race, class, violence, and governance avoid abstract musing – and the polish and perfection of argument that goes along with it. Instead, they are timely statements made with great urgency. The assumed audience of African anticolonial thought was often not scholars, but rather one’s immediate and intimate comrades. The horizons of these texts and arguments often contain futures filled with possibility, even if the specific outlines are not entirely discernable in the present moment.\nSeveral recent books have argued, in different ways, that returning to thinkers of African anticolonial struggle greatly enriches the theoretical understandings and political struggles of the present. Gary Wilder’s Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World (2015), Robbie Shilliam’s The Black Pacific: Anti-Colonial Struggles and Oceanic Connections (2015), and Achille Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason (2017) all make the compelling argument that the ideas, concepts, and modes of argument developed during anticolonial struggles in Africa and by the African diaspora are uniquely suited to help make sense of – and intervene into – the present. Unlike previous debates about ‘African philosophy’ or the popular turn towards ‘comparative’ or ‘global’ political theory, these three authors neither seek to ‘bring’ black and African voices ‘into’ an academic field; nor do they take anticolonial thought as confined to a location, limited to specific set of ‘problems’, or focused exclusively on the aim of national independence. Instead, Wilder, Shilliam, and Mbembe treat the work of anticolonialism as a human inheritance, one that transcends time and space. Wilder, for example, clearly states that he is less interested in ‘provincializ[ing] Europe’ than in working to ‘deprovincialize Africa and the Antilles’ (p. 10). To do so, he tackles the political and intellectual work of Aime´ Ce´saire and Le´opold Se´dar Senghor in ways that force attention to their broader commitment to articulating a postnational (and post-continental) human politics, as a radical critique of Western modernity rather than the limited plotting of national independence or a black political identity. Similarly, Shilliam foregrounds the epistemic and manifest networks through which the liberatory desires embedded within black power movements and RasTafari spiritual practices circulated among religious, activist, and youth communities in Aotearoa (New Zealand) and beyond. Mbembe also rejects the compartmentalization of ‘Africa’ from the world, demonstrating that the racialized practices and knowledges once used to justify the colonization of Africa have become widely generalized beyond race. The political and epistemic practices that used ‘Black’ and ‘Africa’ as references to concoct racialized categories have become universalized beyond race.\nThese authors share a commitment to rereading African peoples, practices, and thought – especially as they relate to the refusal of the Western modern and colonial project – as central to understanding the contemporary condition. They contextualize anticolonial thinkers within their specific conjuncture, while taking care not to reduce their arguments to these temporal and spatial contexts. This work short-circuits the all-to-common assumption that the anticolonial project is a finished – or largely failed – project. However, rather than rebutting such accusations, Wilder’s Freedom Time gracefully argues that such claims are only relevant if one assumes that Ce´saire and Senghor, the two protagonists of his book, were primarily concerned with ending colonial rule within particular geographical spaces. Wilder argues that contemporary readers often miss the fact that these two thinkers understood their complex intellectual and political projects as engaged in a wholesale rebuilding of modern humanity beyond the nation-state. As such, the work of Ce´saire and Senghor should not be understood through the lens of national independence, but rather read for the not-yet-realized political visions they contain. Wilder writes: ‘Scholarship long promoted one-sided understandings of Ce´saire and Senghor as either essentialist nativists or naive humanists…Negritude, whether embraced or criticized, was treated as an affirmative theory of Africanity rather than a critical theory of modernity’ (p. 8). Wilder argues instead that Ce´saire and Senghor actually reject ‘the doxa that self-determination required state sovereignty’ and instead proceeded from a position that ‘colonial peoples cannot presume to know a priori which political arrangements would best allow them to pursue substantive freedom’ (p. 2). In this way, Ce´saire and Senghor were intellectuals who lived as complex and fluid thinkers engaged in a ‘pragmatic orientation’ that ‘was inseparable from a utopian commitment to political imagination and anticipatory politics through which they hoped to transcend the very idea of France, remake the world, and inaugurate a new epoch of human history’ (p. 2). This requires understanding Ce´saire and Senghor as practicing a form of thinking that is simultaneously ‘strategic and principled, gradualist and revolutionary, realist and vision, timely and untimely’ (p. 2).\nWilder’s book alternates chapters between Ce´saire and Senghor, tracing the evolution, exchange, and collaboration between these two intellectuals, as well as tracing how their ideas evolved over the course of their engagement with party and state politics. Reading these texts as already instantiated within a political terrain makes it possible to grasp their full nuance. For example, in a chapter on Senghor’s African socialism, Wilder writes that Senghor ‘called neither for France to decolonize Africa nor for Africa to liberate itself, but for Africans to decolonize France’ (p. 214). To this end, African socialism was not simply a political platform, or an effort to remake Marxist theory, but rather a way of imagining the world that left open the possibility that Africans were the agents of ‘planetary salvation’ and ‘human emancipation’ (p. 215). This approach helps explain the seemingly quixotic political commitment that Senghor held concerning regional federalism and his insistence on maintaining a fraternal relationship between Senegal and France (two political positions often cited as evidence of his inability to uphold the true promise of national independence). Instead, Wilder suggests that thinking ‘with Ce´saire and Senghor’ requires us to ‘engag[e] a future that might have been’. While the specific conclusions Ce´saire and Senghor arrive at might not necessarily ‘be applied to our times’, ‘the problems they identified’ still ‘persist’, and their ‘utopian realist thinking, at once concrete and world-historical, still resonates’ (p. 256).\nShilliam’s book, The Black Pacific, similarly traces connections among anticolonial activists and intellectuals across space and time. However, rather than examining the exchange between Francophone Africa, France, and the Caribbean, Shilliam locates his study in the dense relationships between the Ma¯ori and Pasifika peoples of Aotearoa (New Zealand) and the ‘children of Legba’. Legba is a reoccurring figure from African cosmology that mediates the spiritual and physical worlds. Shilliam opens with the story of a 1979 exchange between Ma¯ori elders and their guests, a black theater troupe and a RasTafari band visiting Aotearoa NZ from England. The elder, or kaumātua, greeted the visitors, saying: ‘everyone being one people’ to which the theater director replied: ‘the ancestors are meeting because we have met’ here today (p. 1). This exchange reflects Shilliam’s larger argument about the already existing ‘deep, global infrastructure of anti-colonial connectivity’ (p. 3). He contrasts these lived and meaningful connections with the colonial ethnographic mapping practices that sought – and still seek – to firmly establish separation between colonial subjects, with a gaze remained firmly trained on Europe. Shilliam counters by offering a ‘decolonial science of “deep relation”’ (p. 13) that draws out the moments of connectivity between the spiritually synchronistic descendants of Legba, the Pacific Island figure of Ta¯ne/Ma¯ui, and the Arcadian Hermes within the Western philosophical tradition. In doing so, Shilliam provides evidence of the profound spiritual bonds that ground relations of strength and connectivity. He argues that, while the ‘manifest world is a broadly (post)colonial one, structured through imperial hierarchies that encourage the oneway transmission of political authority, social relations and knowledge’, there also exists alongside this world vast ‘hinterlands of the spiritual domains’ (p. 20). Legba, Ta¯ne/Ma¯ui, and the Arcadian Hermes continually assist in that translation and binding of the manifest and spiritual worlds and, in doing so, they eschew a ‘developmentalist understanding of time’ in favor of one that can account for ‘the reparation of ancestral ties’ (p. 21). Re-grounding anticolonialism in this shared spiritual inheritance emphasizes the dense human connections that, through their cultivation, might inform the healing of colonial wounds. Shilliam demonstrates the durability of these deep relations in chapters examining the movement and adaptation of Black Power in Aotearoa NZ, the embrace of the political concept of blackness among the Ma¯ori and Pasifika peoples, the spiritual and cultural circulation between liberation, RasTafari, and indigenous Ra¯tana theologies, and the movement of Ma¯ori and Pasifika activists between Ethiopia, South Africa, the Caribbean, and the African diaspora in England.\nUnlike Wilder and Shilliam, who locate anticolonial thinking and practice within the expansive spatial, temporal, and spiritual realities of specific individuals, Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason engages in nothing less than a rewriting of the history of modernity as the ‘mobiliz[ation]’ of ‘Africa and Blackness’ with the goal of ‘the fabrication of racial subjects’ (p. 129). As a ‘river with many tributaries’, Mbembe’s book examines the evolving nature of race and Blackness within a world in which ‘Europe is no longer the center of gravity’ (p. 1). The book moves rapidly and expansively between theoretical engagements – with Fanon, Ce´saire, Foucault, Arendt, and others – and the historical events that created both modernity and racialized partition (the slave trade, the Haitian and American Revolutions, the AlgerianWar, and others). He re-casts ‘the biography’ of the ‘assemblage that is Blackness and race’ into ‘three critical moments’: the Atlantic slave trade, the ‘birth of writing’ marked by [black people] Blacks demanding ‘the status of full subjects in the world of the living’ (spanning from the Haitian Revolution, abolition, African decolonization, American civil right movement, to the dismantling of apartheid), and concluding with the current period of ‘neoliberalism’ (p. 3). In this latest period, we now inhabit an economic and racial order defined by the ‘industries of the Silicon Valley and digital technology’, in which ‘time passes quickly’, where workers have been replaced by ‘laboring nomads’, and ‘the tragedy of the multitude’ – comprising ‘superfluous humanity’ – has become ‘that they are unable to be exploited at all’ (p. 3). Within this new epoch, race and Blackness have taken on new forms such that the colonial technologies once developed to separate and manage human beings according to racialized categories have now become replaced by a universalized Blackness that extends beyond race: ‘for the first time in human history, the term “Black” has been generalized. This new fungiblity, this solubility, institutionalized as a new norm of existence and expanded to the entire planet, is what I call the Becoming Black of the world’ (p. 6). Islamophobia, for example, operates according to the traditional logics of racism; however, the characteristics once used to describe supposedly biological races has now been applied to ‘“culture” and “religion”’ (p. 7). While Blackness has become universalized beyond race, Mbembe argues that the ‘Western consciousness of Blackness’ – which reduces humans to ‘a racial subject and site of savage exteriority’ – has always existed alongside the ‘Black consciousness of Blackness’, namely the articulation of Blackness within ‘a long history of radicalism, nourished by struggles for abolition and against capitalism’ (pp. 28, 30). Blackness therefore exists within a ‘manifest dualism’, both ‘the living crypt of capital’ through which ‘skin has been transformed into the form and spirit of merchandise’, but simultaneously ‘the symbol of a conscious desire for life, a force springing forth, buoyant and plastic, fully engaged in the act of creation and capable of living in the midst of several times and several histories at once’ (p. 6). Drawing from these ‘reserves of life’, and the awesome refusal to ‘retreat from humanity’ that defines Black life, makes it possible to maintain the ‘possibility of restitution, reparation, and justice’ (p. 179). For Mbembe, whatever our own ‘horizons of…struggle’ might be today, the fundamental struggle remains ‘how to belong fully in this world that is common to all of us, how to pass from the status of the excluded to the status of the right-holder, how to participate in the construction and the distribution of the world’ – that is, the creation of a ‘world in common’ (p. 176).", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Today the world seems profoundly broken\nfinancial crisis and stagnant real wages\nplanetary inequality\narmed conflicts\nglobal climate change\nracist, alt-right, and fascist movements\nat a time when governments and institutions around the world seem completely ill-equipped to even begin engaging the issues central to human survival\nthe academic workbench of\ntheories, and analysis seems woefully inadequate to honestly stare into the abyss before us\nThe twentieth-century struggles against colonialism\naround the world, seem to once again speak in instructive\nways\nThese writings on colonialism, race, class, violence, and governance avoid abstract musing\nthe refusal of the Western modern and colonial project\ncontextualize\ntheir specific conjuncture, while taking care not to reduce their arguments to these temporal and spatial contexts. This work short-circuits the all-to-common assumption that the anticolonial project is a finished – or largely failed – project\ncontemporary readers often miss the fact that\npolitical projects as engaged in a wholesale rebuilding of modern humanity beyond the nation-state.\nengaged in a ‘pragmatic orientation’ that ‘was inseparable from a utopian commitment to political imagination and anticipatory politics through which they hoped to\nremake the world\nthinking\nrequires us to ‘engag[e] a future that might have been’\nthe problems they identified’ still ‘persist’, and their ‘utopian realist thinking, at once concrete and world-historical, still resonates’\nthe awesome refusal to ‘retreat from humanity’\nmakes it possible to maintain the ‘possibility of restitution, reparation, and justice’\nwhatever our own ‘horizons of…struggle’ might be today, the fundamental struggle remains ‘how to belong fully in this world that is common to all of us", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Western man is only breaking from its contradiction with the normative roots of liberalism---using politics to redress those externalities voids unsustainability.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Today the world seems profoundly broken. Decades of endemic financial crisis and stagnant real wages have produced planetary inequality of such magnitude that eight white men now own the same wealth as the poorest half of the world’s population (Oxfam, 2017). Seemingly nihilistic armed conflicts engulf many regions of world, contributing to a reality in which one in every hundred people on the planet lives as a refugee (Connor and Krogstad, 2016). It is now ninety-five percent likely that temperatures will rise above the two-degree Celsius threshold, making the most dangerous effects of global climate change largely inevitable (Raftery et al., 2017). And this does not even include the success of racist, alt-right, and fascist movements across the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. All this at a time when governments and institutions around the world seem completely ill-equipped to even begin engaging the issues central to human survival.\nThis brave new world is not only profoundly dispiriting, it poses very serious challenges to those whose academic and political practice involves critically engaging the world with the aim of crafting the theoretical tools – or, as Amı´lcar Cabral (1979) might suggest, weapons – needed to change it. Today, the academic workbench of concepts, theories, and analysis seems woefully inadequate to honestly stare into the abyss before us, much less provide meaningful guidance for systemic transformation. One reason for the considerable gulf between available theories and present political realities stems from the fact that much of the intellectual tradition structuring the academy today was built alongside imperial or liberal political and historical trajectories. Many of the cherished thinkers we draw upon to construct the contemporary political imaginaries were often coconspirators in the solidification of the European state system and Western imperialism. During the twentieth century, theorists engaged in celebrating a politics of mass demonstration and deliberation, social movements, democratization, and post-Cold War cosmopolitan civil society. The theoretical lessons learned from these historical moments now seem either complicit in, or overly stressed by, the weight of the current pressures. Similarly, many of the political and theoretical apparatuses used to critique this history pale in the face of a historical moment that seems to demand a renewed militancy of purpose, a willingness to take risks for justice, and the urgent need for even more vibrant and vital networks of human solidarity.\nIt is not surprising, therefore, that within the current conjuncture political thinkers in the Western academy have begun returning to the shelves of the African anticolonial archive (for example: el-Malik and Kamola, 2017; Pha˙ m and Shilliam, 2016; el-Malik, 2016). The twentieth-century struggles against colonialism in Africa, the African diaspora, and around the world, seem to once again speak in instructive and unexpected ways. There is good reason for this return. These voices are poetic yet strident, theoretical but immediately practical to the particularities of struggle. These writings on colonialism, race, class, violence, and governance avoid abstract musing – and the polish and perfection of argument that goes along with it. Instead, they are timely statements made with great urgency. The assumed audience of African anticolonial thought was often not scholars, but rather one’s immediate and intimate comrades. The horizons of these texts and arguments often contain futures filled with possibility, even if the specific outlines are not entirely discernable in the present moment.\nSeveral recent books have argued, in different ways, that returning to thinkers of African anticolonial struggle greatly enriches the theoretical understandings and political struggles of the present. Gary Wilder’s Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World (2015), Robbie Shilliam’s The Black Pacific: Anti-Colonial Struggles and Oceanic Connections (2015), and Achille Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason (2017) all make the compelling argument that the ideas, concepts, and modes of argument developed during anticolonial struggles in Africa and by the African diaspora are uniquely suited to help make sense of – and intervene into – the present. Unlike previous debates about ‘African philosophy’ or the popular turn towards ‘comparative’ or ‘global’ political theory, these three authors neither seek to ‘bring’ black and African voices ‘into’ an academic field; nor do they take anticolonial thought as confined to a location, limited to specific set of ‘problems’, or focused exclusively on the aim of national independence. Instead, Wilder, Shilliam, and Mbembe treat the work of anticolonialism as a human inheritance, one that transcends time and space. Wilder, for example, clearly states that he is less interested in ‘provincializ[ing] Europe’ than in working to ‘deprovincialize Africa and the Antilles’ (p. 10). To do so, he tackles the political and intellectual work of Aime´ Ce´saire and Le´opold Se´dar Senghor in ways that force attention to their broader commitment to articulating a postnational (and post-continental) human politics, as a radical critique of Western modernity rather than the limited plotting of national independence or a black political identity. Similarly, Shilliam foregrounds the epistemic and manifest networks through which the liberatory desires embedded within black power movements and RasTafari spiritual practices circulated among religious, activist, and youth communities in Aotearoa (New Zealand) and beyond. Mbembe also rejects the compartmentalization of ‘Africa’ from the world, demonstrating that the racialized practices and knowledges once used to justify the colonization of Africa have become widely generalized beyond race. The political and epistemic practices that used ‘Black’ and ‘Africa’ as references to concoct racialized categories have become universalized beyond race.\nThese authors share a commitment to rereading African peoples, practices, and thought – especially as they relate to the refusal of the Western modern and colonial project – as central to understanding the contemporary condition. They contextualize anticolonial thinkers within their specific conjuncture, while taking care not to reduce their arguments to these temporal and spatial contexts. This work short-circuits the all-to-common assumption that the anticolonial project is a finished – or largely failed – project. However, rather than rebutting such accusations, Wilder’s Freedom Time gracefully argues that such claims are only relevant if one assumes that Ce´saire and Senghor, the two protagonists of his book, were primarily concerned with ending colonial rule within particular geographical spaces. Wilder argues that contemporary readers often miss the fact that these two thinkers understood their complex intellectual and political projects as engaged in a wholesale rebuilding of modern humanity beyond the nation-state. As such, the work of Ce´saire and Senghor should not be understood through the lens of national independence, but rather read for the not-yet-realized political visions they contain. Wilder writes: ‘Scholarship long promoted one-sided understandings of Ce´saire and Senghor as either essentialist nativists or naive humanists…Negritude, whether embraced or criticized, was treated as an affirmative theory of Africanity rather than a critical theory of modernity’ (p. 8). Wilder argues instead that Ce´saire and Senghor actually reject ‘the doxa that self-determination required state sovereignty’ and instead proceeded from a position that ‘colonial peoples cannot presume to know a priori which political arrangements would best allow them to pursue substantive freedom’ (p. 2). In this way, Ce´saire and Senghor were intellectuals who lived as complex and fluid thinkers engaged in a ‘pragmatic orientation’ that ‘was inseparable from a utopian commitment to political imagination and anticipatory politics through which they hoped to transcend the very idea of France, remake the world, and inaugurate a new epoch of human history’ (p. 2). This requires understanding Ce´saire and Senghor as practicing a form of thinking that is simultaneously ‘strategic and principled, gradualist and revolutionary, realist and vision, timely and untimely’ (p. 2).\nWilder’s book alternates chapters between Ce´saire and Senghor, tracing the evolution, exchange, and collaboration between these two intellectuals, as well as tracing how their ideas evolved over the course of their engagement with party and state politics. Reading these texts as already instantiated within a political terrain makes it possible to grasp their full nuance. For example, in a chapter on Senghor’s African socialism, Wilder writes that Senghor ‘called neither for France to decolonize Africa nor for Africa to liberate itself, but for Africans to decolonize France’ (p. 214). To this end, African socialism was not simply a political platform, or an effort to remake Marxist theory, but rather a way of imagining the world that left open the possibility that Africans were the agents of ‘planetary salvation’ and ‘human emancipation’ (p. 215). This approach helps explain the seemingly quixotic political commitment that Senghor held concerning regional federalism and his insistence on maintaining a fraternal relationship between Senegal and France (two political positions often cited as evidence of his inability to uphold the true promise of national independence). Instead, Wilder suggests that thinking ‘with Ce´saire and Senghor’ requires us to ‘engag[e] a future that might have been’. While the specific conclusions Ce´saire and Senghor arrive at might not necessarily ‘be applied to our times’, ‘the problems they identified’ still ‘persist’, and their ‘utopian realist thinking, at once concrete and world-historical, still resonates’ (p. 256).\nShilliam’s book, The Black Pacific, similarly traces connections among anticolonial activists and intellectuals across space and time. However, rather than examining the exchange between Francophone Africa, France, and the Caribbean, Shilliam locates his study in the dense relationships between the Ma¯ori and Pasifika peoples of Aotearoa (New Zealand) and the ‘children of Legba’. Legba is a reoccurring figure from African cosmology that mediates the spiritual and physical worlds. Shilliam opens with the story of a 1979 exchange between Ma¯ori elders and their guests, a black theater troupe and a RasTafari band visiting Aotearoa NZ from England. The elder, or kaumātua, greeted the visitors, saying: ‘everyone being one people’ to which the theater director replied: ‘the ancestors are meeting because we have met’ here today (p. 1). This exchange reflects Shilliam’s larger argument about the already existing ‘deep, global infrastructure of anti-colonial connectivity’ (p. 3). He contrasts these lived and meaningful connections with the colonial ethnographic mapping practices that sought – and still seek – to firmly establish separation between colonial subjects, with a gaze remained firmly trained on Europe. Shilliam counters by offering a ‘decolonial science of “deep relation”’ (p. 13) that draws out the moments of connectivity between the spiritually synchronistic descendants of Legba, the Pacific Island figure of Ta¯ne/Ma¯ui, and the Arcadian Hermes within the Western philosophical tradition. In doing so, Shilliam provides evidence of the profound spiritual bonds that ground relations of strength and connectivity. He argues that, while the ‘manifest world is a broadly (post)colonial one, structured through imperial hierarchies that encourage the oneway transmission of political authority, social relations and knowledge’, there also exists alongside this world vast ‘hinterlands of the spiritual domains’ (p. 20). Legba, Ta¯ne/Ma¯ui, and the Arcadian Hermes continually assist in that translation and binding of the manifest and spiritual worlds and, in doing so, they eschew a ‘developmentalist understanding of time’ in favor of one that can account for ‘the reparation of ancestral ties’ (p. 21). Re-grounding anticolonialism in this shared spiritual inheritance emphasizes the dense human connections that, through their cultivation, might inform the healing of colonial wounds. Shilliam demonstrates the durability of these deep relations in chapters examining the movement and adaptation of Black Power in Aotearoa NZ, the embrace of the political concept of blackness among the Ma¯ori and Pasifika peoples, the spiritual and cultural circulation between liberation, RasTafari, and indigenous Ra¯tana theologies, and the movement of Ma¯ori and Pasifika activists between Ethiopia, South Africa, the Caribbean, and the African diaspora in England.\nUnlike Wilder and Shilliam, who locate anticolonial thinking and practice within the expansive spatial, temporal, and spiritual realities of specific individuals, Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason engages in nothing less than a rewriting of the history of modernity as the ‘mobiliz[ation]’ of ‘Africa and Blackness’ with the goal of ‘the fabrication of racial subjects’ (p. 129). As a ‘river with many tributaries’, Mbembe’s book examines the evolving nature of race and Blackness within a world in which ‘Europe is no longer the center of gravity’ (p. 1). The book moves rapidly and expansively between theoretical engagements – with Fanon, Ce´saire, Foucault, Arendt, and others – and the historical events that created both modernity and racialized partition (the slave trade, the Haitian and American Revolutions, the AlgerianWar, and others). He re-casts ‘the biography’ of the ‘assemblage that is Blackness and race’ into ‘three critical moments’: the Atlantic slave trade, the ‘birth of writing’ marked by [black people] Blacks demanding ‘the status of full subjects in the world of the living’ (spanning from the Haitian Revolution, abolition, African decolonization, American civil right movement, to the dismantling of apartheid), and concluding with the current period of ‘neoliberalism’ (p. 3). In this latest period, we now inhabit an economic and racial order defined by the ‘industries of the Silicon Valley and digital technology’, in which ‘time passes quickly’, where workers have been replaced by ‘laboring nomads’, and ‘the tragedy of the multitude’ – comprising ‘superfluous humanity’ – has become ‘that they are unable to be exploited at all’ (p. 3). Within this new epoch, race and Blackness have taken on new forms such that the colonial technologies once developed to separate and manage human beings according to racialized categories have now become replaced by a universalized Blackness that extends beyond race: ‘for the first time in human history, the term “Black” has been generalized. This new fungiblity, this solubility, institutionalized as a new norm of existence and expanded to the entire planet, is what I call the Becoming Black of the world’ (p. 6). Islamophobia, for example, operates according to the traditional logics of racism; however, the characteristics once used to describe supposedly biological races has now been applied to ‘“culture” and “religion”’ (p. 7). While Blackness has become universalized beyond race, Mbembe argues that the ‘Western consciousness of Blackness’ – which reduces humans to ‘a racial subject and site of savage exteriority’ – has always existed alongside the ‘Black consciousness of Blackness’, namely the articulation of Blackness within ‘a long history of radicalism, nourished by struggles for abolition and against capitalism’ (pp. 28, 30). Blackness therefore exists within a ‘manifest dualism’, both ‘the living crypt of capital’ through which ‘skin has been transformed into the form and spirit of merchandise’, but simultaneously ‘the symbol of a conscious desire for life, a force springing forth, buoyant and plastic, fully engaged in the act of creation and capable of living in the midst of several times and several histories at once’ (p. 6). Drawing from these ‘reserves of life’, and the awesome refusal to ‘retreat from humanity’ that defines Black life, makes it possible to maintain the ‘possibility of restitution, reparation, and justice’ (p. 179). For Mbembe, whatever our own ‘horizons of…struggle’ might be today, the fundamental struggle remains ‘how to belong fully in this world that is common to all of us, how to pass from the status of the excluded to the status of the right-holder, how to participate in the construction and the distribution of the world’ – that is, the creation of a ‘world in common’ (p. 176).", "role": "user" }, { "content": "world\nbroken\nfinancial crisis\nwages\ninequality\nconflicts\nclimate change\nracist\nfascist\ngovernments\nill-equipped\nbegin engaging\nhuman survival\nworkbench\ntheories\nwoefully inadequate\nstare into\nstruggles\ncolonialism\nonce again\nwritings\ncolonialism\nviolence\navoid abstract\nrefusal\ncolonial project\ntaking care\narguments\ntemporal\ncontexts\nshort-circuits\nassumption\nanticolonial\nfailed\nmiss\nprojects\nrebuilding\nhumanity\npragmatic orientation\ninseparable\nutopian\nanticipatory politics\nrequires\nfuture\nproblems\nrealist thinking\nconcrete\nhistorical\nresonates’\nretreat\nhumanity\npossible\npossibility\nreparation\nhorizons\nfundamental struggle\nbelong fully\ncommon", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Western man is only breaking from its contradiction with the normative roots of liberalism---using politics to redress those externalities voids unsustainability.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Today the world seems profoundly broken. Decades of endemic financial crisis and stagnant real wages have produced planetary inequality of such magnitude that eight white men now own the same wealth as the poorest half of the world’s population (Oxfam, 2017). Seemingly nihilistic armed conflicts engulf many regions of world, contributing to a reality in which one in every hundred people on the planet lives as a refugee (Connor and Krogstad, 2016). It is now ninety-five percent likely that temperatures will rise above the two-degree Celsius threshold, making the most dangerous effects of global climate change largely inevitable (Raftery et al., 2017). And this does not even include the success of racist, alt-right, and fascist movements across the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. All this at a time when governments and institutions around the world seem completely ill-equipped to even begin engaging the issues central to human survival.\nThis brave new world is not only profoundly dispiriting, it poses very serious challenges to those whose academic and political practice involves critically engaging the world with the aim of crafting the theoretical tools – or, as Amı´lcar Cabral (1979) might suggest, weapons – needed to change it. Today, the academic workbench of concepts, theories, and analysis seems woefully inadequate to honestly stare into the abyss before us, much less provide meaningful guidance for systemic transformation. One reason for the considerable gulf between available theories and present political realities stems from the fact that much of the intellectual tradition structuring the academy today was built alongside imperial or liberal political and historical trajectories. Many of the cherished thinkers we draw upon to construct the contemporary political imaginaries were often coconspirators in the solidification of the European state system and Western imperialism. During the twentieth century, theorists engaged in celebrating a politics of mass demonstration and deliberation, social movements, democratization, and post-Cold War cosmopolitan civil society. The theoretical lessons learned from these historical moments now seem either complicit in, or overly stressed by, the weight of the current pressures. Similarly, many of the political and theoretical apparatuses used to critique this history pale in the face of a historical moment that seems to demand a renewed militancy of purpose, a willingness to take risks for justice, and the urgent need for even more vibrant and vital networks of human solidarity.\nIt is not surprising, therefore, that within the current conjuncture political thinkers in the Western academy have begun returning to the shelves of the African anticolonial archive (for example: el-Malik and Kamola, 2017; Pha˙ m and Shilliam, 2016; el-Malik, 2016). The twentieth-century struggles against colonialism in Africa, the African diaspora, and around the world, seem to once again speak in instructive and unexpected ways. There is good reason for this return. These voices are poetic yet strident, theoretical but immediately practical to the particularities of struggle. These writings on colonialism, race, class, violence, and governance avoid abstract musing – and the polish and perfection of argument that goes along with it. Instead, they are timely statements made with great urgency. The assumed audience of African anticolonial thought was often not scholars, but rather one’s immediate and intimate comrades. The horizons of these texts and arguments often contain futures filled with possibility, even if the specific outlines are not entirely discernable in the present moment.\nSeveral recent books have argued, in different ways, that returning to thinkers of African anticolonial struggle greatly enriches the theoretical understandings and political struggles of the present. Gary Wilder’s Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World (2015), Robbie Shilliam’s The Black Pacific: Anti-Colonial Struggles and Oceanic Connections (2015), and Achille Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason (2017) all make the compelling argument that the ideas, concepts, and modes of argument developed during anticolonial struggles in Africa and by the African diaspora are uniquely suited to help make sense of – and intervene into – the present. Unlike previous debates about ‘African philosophy’ or the popular turn towards ‘comparative’ or ‘global’ political theory, these three authors neither seek to ‘bring’ black and African voices ‘into’ an academic field; nor do they take anticolonial thought as confined to a location, limited to specific set of ‘problems’, or focused exclusively on the aim of national independence. Instead, Wilder, Shilliam, and Mbembe treat the work of anticolonialism as a human inheritance, one that transcends time and space. Wilder, for example, clearly states that he is less interested in ‘provincializ[ing] Europe’ than in working to ‘deprovincialize Africa and the Antilles’ (p. 10). To do so, he tackles the political and intellectual work of Aime´ Ce´saire and Le´opold Se´dar Senghor in ways that force attention to their broader commitment to articulating a postnational (and post-continental) human politics, as a radical critique of Western modernity rather than the limited plotting of national independence or a black political identity. Similarly, Shilliam foregrounds the epistemic and manifest networks through which the liberatory desires embedded within black power movements and RasTafari spiritual practices circulated among religious, activist, and youth communities in Aotearoa (New Zealand) and beyond. Mbembe also rejects the compartmentalization of ‘Africa’ from the world, demonstrating that the racialized practices and knowledges once used to justify the colonization of Africa have become widely generalized beyond race. The political and epistemic practices that used ‘Black’ and ‘Africa’ as references to concoct racialized categories have become universalized beyond race.\nThese authors share a commitment to rereading African peoples, practices, and thought – especially as they relate to the refusal of the Western modern and colonial project – as central to understanding the contemporary condition. They contextualize anticolonial thinkers within their specific conjuncture, while taking care not to reduce their arguments to these temporal and spatial contexts. This work short-circuits the all-to-common assumption that the anticolonial project is a finished – or largely failed – project. However, rather than rebutting such accusations, Wilder’s Freedom Time gracefully argues that such claims are only relevant if one assumes that Ce´saire and Senghor, the two protagonists of his book, were primarily concerned with ending colonial rule within particular geographical spaces. Wilder argues that contemporary readers often miss the fact that these two thinkers understood their complex intellectual and political projects as engaged in a wholesale rebuilding of modern humanity beyond the nation-state. As such, the work of Ce´saire and Senghor should not be understood through the lens of national independence, but rather read for the not-yet-realized political visions they contain. Wilder writes: ‘Scholarship long promoted one-sided understandings of Ce´saire and Senghor as either essentialist nativists or naive humanists…Negritude, whether embraced or criticized, was treated as an affirmative theory of Africanity rather than a critical theory of modernity’ (p. 8). Wilder argues instead that Ce´saire and Senghor actually reject ‘the doxa that self-determination required state sovereignty’ and instead proceeded from a position that ‘colonial peoples cannot presume to know a priori which political arrangements would best allow them to pursue substantive freedom’ (p. 2). In this way, Ce´saire and Senghor were intellectuals who lived as complex and fluid thinkers engaged in a ‘pragmatic orientation’ that ‘was inseparable from a utopian commitment to political imagination and anticipatory politics through which they hoped to transcend the very idea of France, remake the world, and inaugurate a new epoch of human history’ (p. 2). This requires understanding Ce´saire and Senghor as practicing a form of thinking that is simultaneously ‘strategic and principled, gradualist and revolutionary, realist and vision, timely and untimely’ (p. 2).\nWilder’s book alternates chapters between Ce´saire and Senghor, tracing the evolution, exchange, and collaboration between these two intellectuals, as well as tracing how their ideas evolved over the course of their engagement with party and state politics. Reading these texts as already instantiated within a political terrain makes it possible to grasp their full nuance. For example, in a chapter on Senghor’s African socialism, Wilder writes that Senghor ‘called neither for France to decolonize Africa nor for Africa to liberate itself, but for Africans to decolonize France’ (p. 214). To this end, African socialism was not simply a political platform, or an effort to remake Marxist theory, but rather a way of imagining the world that left open the possibility that Africans were the agents of ‘planetary salvation’ and ‘human emancipation’ (p. 215). This approach helps explain the seemingly quixotic political commitment that Senghor held concerning regional federalism and his insistence on maintaining a fraternal relationship between Senegal and France (two political positions often cited as evidence of his inability to uphold the true promise of national independence). Instead, Wilder suggests that thinking ‘with Ce´saire and Senghor’ requires us to ‘engag[e] a future that might have been’. While the specific conclusions Ce´saire and Senghor arrive at might not necessarily ‘be applied to our times’, ‘the problems they identified’ still ‘persist’, and their ‘utopian realist thinking, at once concrete and world-historical, still resonates’ (p. 256).\nShilliam’s book, The Black Pacific, similarly traces connections among anticolonial activists and intellectuals across space and time. However, rather than examining the exchange between Francophone Africa, France, and the Caribbean, Shilliam locates his study in the dense relationships between the Ma¯ori and Pasifika peoples of Aotearoa (New Zealand) and the ‘children of Legba’. Legba is a reoccurring figure from African cosmology that mediates the spiritual and physical worlds. Shilliam opens with the story of a 1979 exchange between Ma¯ori elders and their guests, a black theater troupe and a RasTafari band visiting Aotearoa NZ from England. The elder, or kaumātua, greeted the visitors, saying: ‘everyone being one people’ to which the theater director replied: ‘the ancestors are meeting because we have met’ here today (p. 1). This exchange reflects Shilliam’s larger argument about the already existing ‘deep, global infrastructure of anti-colonial connectivity’ (p. 3). He contrasts these lived and meaningful connections with the colonial ethnographic mapping practices that sought – and still seek – to firmly establish separation between colonial subjects, with a gaze remained firmly trained on Europe. Shilliam counters by offering a ‘decolonial science of “deep relation”’ (p. 13) that draws out the moments of connectivity between the spiritually synchronistic descendants of Legba, the Pacific Island figure of Ta¯ne/Ma¯ui, and the Arcadian Hermes within the Western philosophical tradition. In doing so, Shilliam provides evidence of the profound spiritual bonds that ground relations of strength and connectivity. He argues that, while the ‘manifest world is a broadly (post)colonial one, structured through imperial hierarchies that encourage the oneway transmission of political authority, social relations and knowledge’, there also exists alongside this world vast ‘hinterlands of the spiritual domains’ (p. 20). Legba, Ta¯ne/Ma¯ui, and the Arcadian Hermes continually assist in that translation and binding of the manifest and spiritual worlds and, in doing so, they eschew a ‘developmentalist understanding of time’ in favor of one that can account for ‘the reparation of ancestral ties’ (p. 21). Re-grounding anticolonialism in this shared spiritual inheritance emphasizes the dense human connections that, through their cultivation, might inform the healing of colonial wounds. Shilliam demonstrates the durability of these deep relations in chapters examining the movement and adaptation of Black Power in Aotearoa NZ, the embrace of the political concept of blackness among the Ma¯ori and Pasifika peoples, the spiritual and cultural circulation between liberation, RasTafari, and indigenous Ra¯tana theologies, and the movement of Ma¯ori and Pasifika activists between Ethiopia, South Africa, the Caribbean, and the African diaspora in England.\nUnlike Wilder and Shilliam, who locate anticolonial thinking and practice within the expansive spatial, temporal, and spiritual realities of specific individuals, Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason engages in nothing less than a rewriting of the history of modernity as the ‘mobiliz[ation]’ of ‘Africa and Blackness’ with the goal of ‘the fabrication of racial subjects’ (p. 129). As a ‘river with many tributaries’, Mbembe’s book examines the evolving nature of race and Blackness within a world in which ‘Europe is no longer the center of gravity’ (p. 1). The book moves rapidly and expansively between theoretical engagements – with Fanon, Ce´saire, Foucault, Arendt, and others – and the historical events that created both modernity and racialized partition (the slave trade, the Haitian and American Revolutions, the AlgerianWar, and others). He re-casts ‘the biography’ of the ‘assemblage that is Blackness and race’ into ‘three critical moments’: the Atlantic slave trade, the ‘birth of writing’ marked by [black people] Blacks demanding ‘the status of full subjects in the world of the living’ (spanning from the Haitian Revolution, abolition, African decolonization, American civil right movement, to the dismantling of apartheid), and concluding with the current period of ‘neoliberalism’ (p. 3). In this latest period, we now inhabit an economic and racial order defined by the ‘industries of the Silicon Valley and digital technology’, in which ‘time passes quickly’, where workers have been replaced by ‘laboring nomads’, and ‘the tragedy of the multitude’ – comprising ‘superfluous humanity’ – has become ‘that they are unable to be exploited at all’ (p. 3). Within this new epoch, race and Blackness have taken on new forms such that the colonial technologies once developed to separate and manage human beings according to racialized categories have now become replaced by a universalized Blackness that extends beyond race: ‘for the first time in human history, the term “Black” has been generalized. This new fungiblity, this solubility, institutionalized as a new norm of existence and expanded to the entire planet, is what I call the Becoming Black of the world’ (p. 6). Islamophobia, for example, operates according to the traditional logics of racism; however, the characteristics once used to describe supposedly biological races has now been applied to ‘“culture” and “religion”’ (p. 7). While Blackness has become universalized beyond race, Mbembe argues that the ‘Western consciousness of Blackness’ – which reduces humans to ‘a racial subject and site of savage exteriority’ – has always existed alongside the ‘Black consciousness of Blackness’, namely the articulation of Blackness within ‘a long history of radicalism, nourished by struggles for abolition and against capitalism’ (pp. 28, 30). Blackness therefore exists within a ‘manifest dualism’, both ‘the living crypt of capital’ through which ‘skin has been transformed into the form and spirit of merchandise’, but simultaneously ‘the symbol of a conscious desire for life, a force springing forth, buoyant and plastic, fully engaged in the act of creation and capable of living in the midst of several times and several histories at once’ (p. 6). Drawing from these ‘reserves of life’, and the awesome refusal to ‘retreat from humanity’ that defines Black life, makes it possible to maintain the ‘possibility of restitution, reparation, and justice’ (p. 179). For Mbembe, whatever our own ‘horizons of…struggle’ might be today, the fundamental struggle remains ‘how to belong fully in this world that is common to all of us, how to pass from the status of the excluded to the status of the right-holder, how to participate in the construction and the distribution of the world’ – that is, the creation of a ‘world in common’ (p. 176).", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the world seems\nbroken\nfinancial crisis\ninequality\nconflicts\nclimate\nracist, alt-right\nfascist movements\nwhen governments\nseem\nill-equipped to\nbegin engaging\nissues central to human survival\nstruggles against colonialism\nseem\nonce again\ninstructive\nThese writings\navoid abstract musing\nrefusal of the\nmodern\ncolonial project\nshort-circuits the\nassumption\nthe anticolonial project is\nfailed\nreaders often miss\npolitical projects\nengaged in a\nrebuilding of modern humanity\nengaged in\npragmatic orientation\ninseparable from\ncommitment to political imagination and\npolitics\nto\nremake the world\nrequires\na future that might have been\nthe\nrefusal to ‘retreat from humanity’\nmakes it possible to maintain\npossibility o\nreparation, and justice’\nremains ‘how to belong fully in this world\ncommon to all of us", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: DAOs are AI.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Could a DAO be deemed as an entity separate from the human entities that run it? It is argued that the “autonomous” character of a DAO is incompatible with the notion of legal personhood, as legal personhood is recognized if there is one or more identified players responsible for the actions of a particular entity. Besides, it could be said that the formation of a DAO functioning via AI technology and run by an e-director can be attributed a legal personhood alike a conventional corporation. Thus, DAO can be deemed as a separate legal entity from its human actors and so these actors can be protected from the liabilities of the DAO. On the other hand, an AAI DAO run by AAI technology will be attributed an AAI legal personhood alike a conventional corporation with rights and duties. AAI DAO will appoint its own director having its own shareholders etc. comprehended on an AAI dimension not be influenced by humans which could be seen as a model of running AAI systems in AAI society such as robo-justice, robo-administration, robo-health system etc.\nIt has to be taken into consideration that control of the blockchain through identifiable players and practices translates into control of the code, of the network, and/or of the decision-making course. Hence, present technology DAO is an elementary model of autonomous systems programmed and controlled in a way by humans in comparison to AAI DAO systems generated by AAI technology run by humanoid robots and being out of any control of humans functioning in an AAI society in which robo-justice can be implemented.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "an AAI DAO run by AAI technology will be attributed an AAI legal personhood alike a conventional corporation with rights and duties. AAI DAO will appoint its own director having its own shareholders etc. comprehended on an AAI dimension not be influenced by humans which could be seen as a model of running AAI systems in AAI society\npresent technology DAO is an elementary model of autonomous systems\nin comparison to AAI DAO systems generated by AAI technology run by\nrobots and being out of any control of humans functioning in an AAI society", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: DAOs are AI.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Could a DAO be deemed as an entity separate from the human entities that run it? It is argued that the “autonomous” character of a DAO is incompatible with the notion of legal personhood, as legal personhood is recognized if there is one or more identified players responsible for the actions of a particular entity. Besides, it could be said that the formation of a DAO functioning via AI technology and run by an e-director can be attributed a legal personhood alike a conventional corporation. Thus, DAO can be deemed as a separate legal entity from its human actors and so these actors can be protected from the liabilities of the DAO. On the other hand, an AAI DAO run by AAI technology will be attributed an AAI legal personhood alike a conventional corporation with rights and duties. AAI DAO will appoint its own director having its own shareholders etc. comprehended on an AAI dimension not be influenced by humans which could be seen as a model of running AAI systems in AAI society such as robo-justice, robo-administration, robo-health system etc.\nIt has to be taken into consideration that control of the blockchain through identifiable players and practices translates into control of the code, of the network, and/or of the decision-making course. Hence, present technology DAO is an elementary model of autonomous systems programmed and controlled in a way by humans in comparison to AAI DAO systems generated by AAI technology run by humanoid robots and being out of any control of humans functioning in an AAI society in which robo-justice can be implemented.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "AAI\nrun by AAI\nattributed\nlegal personhood\nrights\nduties\nown director\nown shareholders\nAAI dimension\nAAI DAO\nAAI technology\nrobots\nout of any control", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: DAOs are AI.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "an AAI DAO run by AAI technology will be attributed an AAI legal personhood alike a conventional corporation with rights and duties. AAI DAO will appoint its own director having its own shareholders etc. comprehended on an AAI dimension not be influenced by humans which could be seen as a model of running AAI systems in AAI society\npresent technology DAO is an elementary model of autonomous systems\nin comparison to AAI DAO systems generated by AAI technology run by\nrobots and being out of any control of humans functioning in an AAI society", "role": "user" }, { "content": "a\nDAO run by\nAI\nwill be attributed\npersonhood\nwith rights and duties\nsystems generated by\nAI\nrun by\nrobots\nout of\ncontrol of humans", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: US heg is possible and preferable—collapse of long-term dominance causes WW3 through miscalc.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nYet if the United States were as weak as so many people claim, it wouldn’t have to practice restraint. It is precisely because the country is still capable of pursuing a world-order strategy that critics need to explain why it should not. The fact is that the basic configuration of international power has not changed as much as many imagine. The earth is still round; the United States still sits on its vast, isolated continent, surrounded by oceans and weaker powers; the other great powers still live in regions crowded with other great powers; and when one power in those regions grows too strong for the others to balance against, the would-be victims still look to the distant United States for help.\nAlthough Russia possesses a huge nuclear arsenal, it is even more an “Upper Volta with rockets” today than when that wisecrack was coined, in the early Cold War. The Soviets at least controlled half of Europe. China has taken the place of Japan, stronger in terms of wealth and population but with unproven military capabilities and a much less favorable strategic position. When imperial Japan expanded in the 1930s, it faced no formidable regional competitors, and the Western powers were preoccupied with the German threat. Today, Asia is crowded with other great powers, including three whose militaries are among the top ten in the world—India, Japan, and South Korea—all of which are either allies or partners of the United States. Should Beijing, believing in Washington’s weakness, use its own growing power to try to alter the East Asian strategic situation, it might have to cope not only with the United States but also with a global coalition of advanced industrial nations, much as the Soviets discovered.\nThe Trump years were a stress test for the American world order, and the order, remarkably, passed. Confronted by the nightmare of a rogue superpower tearing up trade and other agreements, U.S. allies appeased and cajoled, bringing offerings to the angry volcano and waiting hopefully for better times. Adversaries also trod carefully. When Trump ordered the killing of the Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani, it was reasonable to expect Iran to retaliate, and it may still, but not with Trump as president. The Chinese suffered through a long tariff war that hurt them more than it hurt the United States, but they tried to avoid a complete breakdown of the economic relationship on which they depend. Obama worried that providing offensive weapons to Ukraine could lead to war with Russia, but when the Trump administration went ahead with the weapons deliveries, Moscow acquiesced with barely a murmur. Many of Trump’s policies were erratic and ill conceived, but they did show how much excess, unused power the United States has, if a president chooses to deploy it. In the Obama years, officials measured 50 times before deciding not to cut, ever fearful that other powers would escalate a confrontation. In the Trump years, it was other countries that worried about where a confrontation with the United States might lead.\nGREAT POWER, GREAT RESPONSIBILITY\nThe United States is “lazily playing with a fraction of her immeasurable strength”—so the British historian Arnold Toynbee commented somewhat ruefully in the early 1930s. At the time, U.S. defense spending was between two and three percent of GDP. Today, it is a little over three percent. In the 1950s, during the Eisenhower administration—often seen as a time of admirable restraint in U.S. foreign policy—the United States had almost one million troops deployed overseas, out of a total American population of 170 million. Today, in an era when the United States is said to be dangerously overextended, there are roughly 200,000 U.S. troops deployed overseas, out of a population of 330 million. Setting aside whether this constitutes “lazily playing with a fraction” of American strength, it is important to recognize that the United States is now in peace mode. Were Americans to shift to a war footing, or even a Cold War–type footing, in response to some Chinese action—for instance, an attack on Taiwan—the United States would look like a very different animal.\nAt the height of the late Cold War, under President Ronald Reagan, the United States spent six percent of GDP on defense, and its arms industry produced weapons in such quantity and of such quality that the Soviets simply could not keep up. The Chinese could find themselves in a similar predicament. They might “run wild for the first six months or a year,” as Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the commander of the Japanese fleet during World War II, predicted about his own forces. But in the long run, as he also warned, against a provoked America and its allies, they might well meet the same fate as other U.S. rivals.\nThe question is not whether the United States is still capable of prevailing in a global confrontation, either hot or cold, with China or any other revisionist power. It is. The real question is whether the worst kinds of hostilities can be avoided, whether China and other powers can be encouraged to pursue their aims peacefully, to confine the global competition to the economic and political realms and thus spare themselves and the world from the horrors of the next great war or even the still frightening confrontations of another cold war.\nThe United States cannot avoid such crises by continuing to adhere to a nineteenth-century view of its national interest. Doing that would produce what it produced in the past: periods of indifference and retrenchment followed by panic, fear, and sudden mobilization. Already, Americans are torn between these two impulses. On the one hand, China now occupies that place in the American mind that Germany and the Soviet Union once held: an ideological opponent that has the ability to strike at American society directly and that has power and ambitions that threaten the United States’ position in a key region and perhaps everywhere else, too. On the other hand, many Americans believe that the United States is in decline and that China will inevitably come to dominate Asia. Indeed, the self-perceptions of the Americans and the Chinese are perfectly symmetrical. The Chinese think that the United States’ role in their region for the past 75 years has been unnatural and is therefore transient, and so do the Americans. The Chinese believe that the United States is in decline, and so do many Americans. The danger is that as Beijing ramps up efforts to fulfill what it has taken to calling “the Chinese dream,” Americans will start to panic. It is in times like this that miscalculations are made.\nPerhaps the Chinese, careful students of history that they are, will not make the mistake that others have made in misjudging the United States. Whether Americans have learned the lessons of their own history, however, remains to be seen. A century-long pattern of oscillation will be difficult to change. It will be especially so when foreign policy experts of all stripes regard support for a liberal world order as impossible and immoral. Among other problems, their prescriptions suffer from an unwarranted optimism about the likely alternatives to a U.S.-led order. Realists, liberal internationalists, conservative nationalists, and progressives all seem to imagine that without Washington playing the role it has played these past 75 years, the world will be just fine, and U.S. interests will be just as well protected. But neither recent history nor present circumstances justify such idealism. The alternative to the American world order is not a Swedish world order. It will not be a world of law and international institutions or the triumph of Enlightenment ideals or the end of history. It will be a world of power vacuums, chaos, conflict, and miscalculation—a shabby place indeed.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "if the United States were as weak as so many people claim, it wouldn’t have to practice restraint. It is precisely because the country is still capable of pursuing a world-order strategy that critics need to explain why it should not.\nthe basic configuration of international power has not changed\nmuch\nthe United States still sits on its vast, isolated continent, surrounded by oceans and weaker powers; the other great powers still live in regions crowded with other great powers; and when one power in those regions grows too strong for the others to balance against, the would-be victims still look to the distant United States for help.\nRussia\nis even more an “Upper Volta with rockets” today than when that wisecrack was coined\nThe Soviets at least controlled half of Europe. China has taken the place of Japan, stronger in terms of wealth and population but with unproven military capabilities and a much less favorable strategic position.\nimperial Japan\nit faced no formidable regional competitors, and the Western powers were preoccupied\nToday, Asia is crowded with other great powers, including three whose militaries are among the top ten in the world—India, Japan, and South Korea—all of which are either allies or partners of the United States.\nThe Trump years were a stress test for the American world order, and the order,\npassed\n, U.S. allies appeased and cajoled\nAdversaries also trod carefully.\nThe Chinese suffered through a long tariff war\nbut they tried to avoid a complete breakdown of the economic relationship\nwhen\nTrump\nwent ahead with the weapons deliveries, Moscow acquiesced with barely a murmur.\nTrump’s policies\ndid show how much excess, unused power the United States has\nGREAT POWER, GREAT RESPONSIBILITY\nIn the 1950s, during the Eisenhower administration—often seen as a time of admirable restraint in U.S. foreign policy—the United States had almost one million troops deployed overseas, out of a total American population of 170 million. Today\nwhen the United States is said to be dangerously overextended, there are roughly 200,000 U.S. troops deployed overseas, out of a population of 330 million.\nAt the height of the late Cold War\nthe United States spent six percent of GDP on defense, and its arms industry produced weapons in such quantity and of such quality that the Soviets simply could not keep up. The Chinese could find themselves in a similar predicament. They might “run wild for the first six months or a year,”\nBut in the long run\nagainst a provoked America and its allies, they might well meet the same fate as other U.S. rivals.\nThe real question is whether the worst kinds of hostilities can be avoided, whether China and other powers can be encouraged to pursue their aims peacefully, to confine the global competition to the economic and political realms and thus spare themselves and the world from the horrors of the next great war\nThe United States cannot avoid such crises by continuing to adhere to a nineteenth-century view of its national interest. Doing that would produce\nperiods of indifference and retrenchment followed by panic, fear, and sudden mobilization.\nRealists, liberal internationalists, conservative nationalists, and progressives all seem to imagine that without Washington playing the role it has played these past 75 years, the world will be just fine, and U.S. interests will be just as well protected. But neither recent history nor present circumstances justify such idealism. The alternative to the American world order is\nwill be a world of power vacuums, chaos, conflict, and miscalculation—a shabby place indeed", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: US heg is possible and preferable—collapse of long-term dominance causes WW3 through miscalc.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nYet if the United States were as weak as so many people claim, it wouldn’t have to practice restraint. It is precisely because the country is still capable of pursuing a world-order strategy that critics need to explain why it should not. The fact is that the basic configuration of international power has not changed as much as many imagine. The earth is still round; the United States still sits on its vast, isolated continent, surrounded by oceans and weaker powers; the other great powers still live in regions crowded with other great powers; and when one power in those regions grows too strong for the others to balance against, the would-be victims still look to the distant United States for help.\nAlthough Russia possesses a huge nuclear arsenal, it is even more an “Upper Volta with rockets” today than when that wisecrack was coined, in the early Cold War. The Soviets at least controlled half of Europe. China has taken the place of Japan, stronger in terms of wealth and population but with unproven military capabilities and a much less favorable strategic position. When imperial Japan expanded in the 1930s, it faced no formidable regional competitors, and the Western powers were preoccupied with the German threat. Today, Asia is crowded with other great powers, including three whose militaries are among the top ten in the world—India, Japan, and South Korea—all of which are either allies or partners of the United States. Should Beijing, believing in Washington’s weakness, use its own growing power to try to alter the East Asian strategic situation, it might have to cope not only with the United States but also with a global coalition of advanced industrial nations, much as the Soviets discovered.\nThe Trump years were a stress test for the American world order, and the order, remarkably, passed. Confronted by the nightmare of a rogue superpower tearing up trade and other agreements, U.S. allies appeased and cajoled, bringing offerings to the angry volcano and waiting hopefully for better times. Adversaries also trod carefully. When Trump ordered the killing of the Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani, it was reasonable to expect Iran to retaliate, and it may still, but not with Trump as president. The Chinese suffered through a long tariff war that hurt them more than it hurt the United States, but they tried to avoid a complete breakdown of the economic relationship on which they depend. Obama worried that providing offensive weapons to Ukraine could lead to war with Russia, but when the Trump administration went ahead with the weapons deliveries, Moscow acquiesced with barely a murmur. Many of Trump’s policies were erratic and ill conceived, but they did show how much excess, unused power the United States has, if a president chooses to deploy it. In the Obama years, officials measured 50 times before deciding not to cut, ever fearful that other powers would escalate a confrontation. In the Trump years, it was other countries that worried about where a confrontation with the United States might lead.\nGREAT POWER, GREAT RESPONSIBILITY\nThe United States is “lazily playing with a fraction of her immeasurable strength”—so the British historian Arnold Toynbee commented somewhat ruefully in the early 1930s. At the time, U.S. defense spending was between two and three percent of GDP. Today, it is a little over three percent. In the 1950s, during the Eisenhower administration—often seen as a time of admirable restraint in U.S. foreign policy—the United States had almost one million troops deployed overseas, out of a total American population of 170 million. Today, in an era when the United States is said to be dangerously overextended, there are roughly 200,000 U.S. troops deployed overseas, out of a population of 330 million. Setting aside whether this constitutes “lazily playing with a fraction” of American strength, it is important to recognize that the United States is now in peace mode. Were Americans to shift to a war footing, or even a Cold War–type footing, in response to some Chinese action—for instance, an attack on Taiwan—the United States would look like a very different animal.\nAt the height of the late Cold War, under President Ronald Reagan, the United States spent six percent of GDP on defense, and its arms industry produced weapons in such quantity and of such quality that the Soviets simply could not keep up. The Chinese could find themselves in a similar predicament. They might “run wild for the first six months or a year,” as Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the commander of the Japanese fleet during World War II, predicted about his own forces. But in the long run, as he also warned, against a provoked America and its allies, they might well meet the same fate as other U.S. rivals.\nThe question is not whether the United States is still capable of prevailing in a global confrontation, either hot or cold, with China or any other revisionist power. It is. The real question is whether the worst kinds of hostilities can be avoided, whether China and other powers can be encouraged to pursue their aims peacefully, to confine the global competition to the economic and political realms and thus spare themselves and the world from the horrors of the next great war or even the still frightening confrontations of another cold war.\nThe United States cannot avoid such crises by continuing to adhere to a nineteenth-century view of its national interest. Doing that would produce what it produced in the past: periods of indifference and retrenchment followed by panic, fear, and sudden mobilization. Already, Americans are torn between these two impulses. On the one hand, China now occupies that place in the American mind that Germany and the Soviet Union once held: an ideological opponent that has the ability to strike at American society directly and that has power and ambitions that threaten the United States’ position in a key region and perhaps everywhere else, too. On the other hand, many Americans believe that the United States is in decline and that China will inevitably come to dominate Asia. Indeed, the self-perceptions of the Americans and the Chinese are perfectly symmetrical. The Chinese think that the United States’ role in their region for the past 75 years has been unnatural and is therefore transient, and so do the Americans. The Chinese believe that the United States is in decline, and so do many Americans. The danger is that as Beijing ramps up efforts to fulfill what it has taken to calling “the Chinese dream,” Americans will start to panic. It is in times like this that miscalculations are made.\nPerhaps the Chinese, careful students of history that they are, will not make the mistake that others have made in misjudging the United States. Whether Americans have learned the lessons of their own history, however, remains to be seen. A century-long pattern of oscillation will be difficult to change. It will be especially so when foreign policy experts of all stripes regard support for a liberal world order as impossible and immoral. Among other problems, their prescriptions suffer from an unwarranted optimism about the likely alternatives to a U.S.-led order. Realists, liberal internationalists, conservative nationalists, and progressives all seem to imagine that without Washington playing the role it has played these past 75 years, the world will be just fine, and U.S. interests will be just as well protected. But neither recent history nor present circumstances justify such idealism. The alternative to the American world order is not a Swedish world order. It will not be a world of law and international institutions or the triumph of Enlightenment ideals or the end of history. It will be a world of power vacuums, chaos, conflict, and miscalculation—a shabby place indeed.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "U\nS\nweak\nwouldn’t have to practice restraint\nstill capable\nworld-order strategy\nbasic configuration\ninternational power\nU\nS\nvast\nisolated continent\noceans\nweaker powers\ncrowded\nother great powers\ntoo strong\nbalance\nU\nS\nhelp\nUpper Volta with rockets\nChina\nwealth\npopulation\nunproven military capabilities\nless favorable strategic position\npreoccupied\ncrowded\ngreat powers\nmilitaries\ntop ten\nIndia\nJapan\nSo\nKo\nallies\npartners\nU\nS\nTrump years\nstress test\npassed\nappeased\ncajoled\ncarefully\ncomplete breakdown\nacquiesced\nbarely a murmur\nexcess\nunused power\nGREAT POWER, GREAT RESPONSIBILITY\nadmirable restraint\none million\noverseas\n170 million\ndangerously overextended\n200,000\noverseas\n330 million\ncould not keep up\nChinese\nsimilar predicament\nrun wild\nlong run\nprovoked America\nallies\nhostilities can be avoided\nconfine\neconomic\npolitical realms\nhorrors\nnext great war\nU\nS\nnineteenth-century view\npanic\nfear\nsudden mobilization\nRealists\ninternationalists\nnationalists\nprogressives\njust fine\nprotected\nrecent history\npresent circumstances\nidealism\nalternative\npower vacuums\nchaos\nconflict\nmiscalc", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: US heg is possible and preferable—collapse of long-term dominance causes WW3 through miscalc.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.1", "role": "system" }, { "content": "if the United States were as weak as so many people claim, it wouldn’t have to practice restraint. It is precisely because the country is still capable of pursuing a world-order strategy that critics need to explain why it should not.\nthe basic configuration of international power has not changed\nmuch\nthe United States still sits on its vast, isolated continent, surrounded by oceans and weaker powers; the other great powers still live in regions crowded with other great powers; and when one power in those regions grows too strong for the others to balance against, the would-be victims still look to the distant United States for help.\nRussia\nis even more an “Upper Volta with rockets” today than when that wisecrack was coined\nThe Soviets at least controlled half of Europe. China has taken the place of Japan, stronger in terms of wealth and population but with unproven military capabilities and a much less favorable strategic position.\nimperial Japan\nit faced no formidable regional competitors, and the Western powers were preoccupied\nToday, Asia is crowded with other great powers, including three whose militaries are among the top ten in the world—India, Japan, and South Korea—all of which are either allies or partners of the United States.\nThe Trump years were a stress test for the American world order, and the order,\npassed\n, U.S. allies appeased and cajoled\nAdversaries also trod carefully.\nThe Chinese suffered through a long tariff war\nbut they tried to avoid a complete breakdown of the economic relationship\nwhen\nTrump\nwent ahead with the weapons deliveries, Moscow acquiesced with barely a murmur.\nTrump’s policies\ndid show how much excess, unused power the United States has\nGREAT POWER, GREAT RESPONSIBILITY\nIn the 1950s, during the Eisenhower administration—often seen as a time of admirable restraint in U.S. foreign policy—the United States had almost one million troops deployed overseas, out of a total American population of 170 million. Today\nwhen the United States is said to be dangerously overextended, there are roughly 200,000 U.S. troops deployed overseas, out of a population of 330 million.\nAt the height of the late Cold War\nthe United States spent six percent of GDP on defense, and its arms industry produced weapons in such quantity and of such quality that the Soviets simply could not keep up. The Chinese could find themselves in a similar predicament. They might “run wild for the first six months or a year,”\nBut in the long run\nagainst a provoked America and its allies, they might well meet the same fate as other U.S. rivals.\nThe real question is whether the worst kinds of hostilities can be avoided, whether China and other powers can be encouraged to pursue their aims peacefully, to confine the global competition to the economic and political realms and thus spare themselves and the world from the horrors of the next great war\nThe United States cannot avoid such crises by continuing to adhere to a nineteenth-century view of its national interest. Doing that would produce\nperiods of indifference and retrenchment followed by panic, fear, and sudden mobilization.\nRealists, liberal internationalists, conservative nationalists, and progressives all seem to imagine that without Washington playing the role it has played these past 75 years, the world will be just fine, and U.S. interests will be just as well protected. But neither recent history nor present circumstances justify such idealism. The alternative to the American world order is\nwill be a world of power vacuums, chaos, conflict, and miscalculation—a shabby place indeed", "role": "user" }, { "content": "the U\nS\nis\ncapable of pursuing a world-order strategy\nthe U\nS\nsits\nisolated\nthe other\npowers\nlive in regions crowded with other\npowers\nand\nstill look to the\nU\nS\nfor help\nRussia\nis\nan “Upper Volta with rockets\nAsia is crowded with\npowers\nincluding three\nmilitaries\namong the top ten\nall\nallies\nof the U\nS\nTrump years were a stress test\nand the order\npassed\nhostilities can be avoided,\npowers can be encouraged to pursue\naims peacefully\nand\nspare\nthe world from the\nnext great war\nThe alternative\nis\npower vacuums\nchaos\nconflict\nand miscalc", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 2 – Growth turns environment – empirical data.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Most people believe that capitalism is to blame for climate change and environmental degradation. But numerous scientific studies have arrived at a surprising conclusion.\nEvery year, the Heritage Foundation ranks countries around the world based on economic freedom in a kind of capitalism index. Analysis has shown that the world’s most economically “free” countries also registered the highest scores on Yale University’s EPI environmental index, averaging 76.1 (on a scale from 0 to 100), while the “mostly free” countries averaged 70.2. These two groups have a significant lead over the “moderately free” countries, which received much lower ratings (59.6 points) for their environmental performance. The countries rated by the Heritage Foundation as either “mostly unfree” or “repressed” received by far the worst Environmental Performance Index scores (46.7 and 50.3, respectively).\nResearchers at Yale University found that there is not only a correlation between the Heritage Foundation’s index and their own EPI, but also between the EPI and the “Ease of Doing Business Index” which is published each year as part of the World Bank’s Doing Business Report and is generally regarded as the world’s most comprehensive and reliable gauge of the ease of doing business, with higher ratings indicating better, usually simpler, regulations for businesses and stronger protections of property rights. According to the researchers at Yale University, the correlation between the “Ease of Doing Business Index,” which they refer to as a measure of “economic liberalism” (i.e., an indicator of how capitalist an economy is), and the EPI is 0.72.\nIn 2016, researchers published a study in the journal Sustainability that included an evaluation of the correlation between the EPI and the “Open Market Index” (OMI) compiled by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The OMI measures a country’s openness to free trade and is thus an important indicator of economic freedom. The researchers found a high degree of overlap between the OMI index and the EPI: 19 of the OMI’s 27 highest-scoring countries also appear in the top 27 of the EPI. The survey covered a total of 75 countries, including all G20 and EU members. Together, these countries account for more than 90 percent of international trade and investment. The researchers conclude: “It is evident that there is a strong connection between OMI and EPI scores, supporting our hypothesis that countries with an open economy score higher in environmental performance. Overall, our evidence shows that the level of the openness of an economy is associated with a country’s environmental protection.”\nAnother study, “Is Free Trade Good for the Environment?” by Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor, uses sophisticated mathematical modeling to explore the correlation between free trade – a key feature of capitalism – and environmental pollution. The study finds: “Our estimates of the scale and technique elasticities indicate that if openness to international markets raises both output and income by 1%, pollution concentrations fall by approximately 1%. Putting this calculation together with our earlier evidence on composition effects yields a somewhat surprising conclusion: freer trade is good for the environment.”\nOf course, it can be argued that capitalism leads to stronger economic growth, which in turn leads to an increase in resource consumption. However, the analyses show that, at an early stage of a country’s economic growth, a high level of environmental degradation is observed, while, after a critical point of economic growth, a gradual decline in environmental degradation is reported.\nIn addition, there are two real-world observations that also disprove the argument that stronger economic growth automatically leads to greater environmental pollution:\nIn non-capitalist countries, environmental degradation has been a far more serious problem than in capitalist countries.\nThe correlation between economic growth and increasing resource consumption is becoming ever weaker in the age of dematerialization.\nOn the basis of numerous data series, Andrew McAfee has shown how economic growth has decoupled from the consumption of raw materials. Data for the USA show that of 72 raw materials, only six have not yet reached their consumption maximum. Although the US economy has grown strongly in recent years, consumption of many commodities is actually in decline. And the results of all these studies point in the same direction: capitalism is not the problem, it is the solution – both economically and environmentally.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "people believe\ncapitalism is to blame for climate change and environmental degradation\nnumerous scientific studies have arrived at a surprising conclusion\nAnalysis has shown that the world’s most economically “free” countries also registered the highest scores on Yale University’s EPI environmental index\nResearchers\nfound\na correlation between\nthe EPI and\nthe world’s most comprehensive and reliable gauge of the ease of doing business\na measure of\nhow capitalist an economy is\nresearchers found a high degree of overlap between the OMI index and the EPI\nthese countries account for more than 90 percent of international trade and investment\ncountries with an open economy score higher in environmental performance\nthe level of the openness of an economy is associated with a country’s environmental protection\nAnother study\nfinds\nif openness to international markets raises both output and income by 1%, pollution concentrations fall by\n1%\nfreer trade is good for the environment\nit can be argued that capitalism leads to\nan increase in resource consumption\nanalyses show that\nafter a critical point of economic growth\na gradual decline in environmental degradation is reported\nreal-world observations\ndisprove the argument that stronger economic growth automatically leads to greater environmental pollution\nIn non-capitalist countries, environmental degradation has been a far more serious problem\nThe correlation between economic growth and increasing resource consumption is becoming ever weaker in the age of dematerialization\nOn the basis of numerous data series\nshown how economic growth has decoupled from the consumption of raw materials\nof 72 raw materials, only six have not yet reached their consumption maximum\nconsumption of many commodities is actually in decline\nthe results of all these studies point in the same direction: capitalism is not the problem\nit is the solution", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: 2 – Growth turns environment – empirical data.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Most people believe that capitalism is to blame for climate change and environmental degradation. But numerous scientific studies have arrived at a surprising conclusion.\nEvery year, the Heritage Foundation ranks countries around the world based on economic freedom in a kind of capitalism index. Analysis has shown that the world’s most economically “free” countries also registered the highest scores on Yale University’s EPI environmental index, averaging 76.1 (on a scale from 0 to 100), while the “mostly free” countries averaged 70.2. These two groups have a significant lead over the “moderately free” countries, which received much lower ratings (59.6 points) for their environmental performance. The countries rated by the Heritage Foundation as either “mostly unfree” or “repressed” received by far the worst Environmental Performance Index scores (46.7 and 50.3, respectively).\nResearchers at Yale University found that there is not only a correlation between the Heritage Foundation’s index and their own EPI, but also between the EPI and the “Ease of Doing Business Index” which is published each year as part of the World Bank’s Doing Business Report and is generally regarded as the world’s most comprehensive and reliable gauge of the ease of doing business, with higher ratings indicating better, usually simpler, regulations for businesses and stronger protections of property rights. According to the researchers at Yale University, the correlation between the “Ease of Doing Business Index,” which they refer to as a measure of “economic liberalism” (i.e., an indicator of how capitalist an economy is), and the EPI is 0.72.\nIn 2016, researchers published a study in the journal Sustainability that included an evaluation of the correlation between the EPI and the “Open Market Index” (OMI) compiled by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The OMI measures a country’s openness to free trade and is thus an important indicator of economic freedom. The researchers found a high degree of overlap between the OMI index and the EPI: 19 of the OMI’s 27 highest-scoring countries also appear in the top 27 of the EPI. The survey covered a total of 75 countries, including all G20 and EU members. Together, these countries account for more than 90 percent of international trade and investment. The researchers conclude: “It is evident that there is a strong connection between OMI and EPI scores, supporting our hypothesis that countries with an open economy score higher in environmental performance. Overall, our evidence shows that the level of the openness of an economy is associated with a country’s environmental protection.”\nAnother study, “Is Free Trade Good for the Environment?” by Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor, uses sophisticated mathematical modeling to explore the correlation between free trade – a key feature of capitalism – and environmental pollution. The study finds: “Our estimates of the scale and technique elasticities indicate that if openness to international markets raises both output and income by 1%, pollution concentrations fall by approximately 1%. Putting this calculation together with our earlier evidence on composition effects yields a somewhat surprising conclusion: freer trade is good for the environment.”\nOf course, it can be argued that capitalism leads to stronger economic growth, which in turn leads to an increase in resource consumption. However, the analyses show that, at an early stage of a country’s economic growth, a high level of environmental degradation is observed, while, after a critical point of economic growth, a gradual decline in environmental degradation is reported.\nIn addition, there are two real-world observations that also disprove the argument that stronger economic growth automatically leads to greater environmental pollution:\nIn non-capitalist countries, environmental degradation has been a far more serious problem than in capitalist countries.\nThe correlation between economic growth and increasing resource consumption is becoming ever weaker in the age of dematerialization.\nOn the basis of numerous data series, Andrew McAfee has shown how economic growth has decoupled from the consumption of raw materials. Data for the USA show that of 72 raw materials, only six have not yet reached their consumption maximum. Although the US economy has grown strongly in recent years, consumption of many commodities is actually in decline. And the results of all these studies point in the same direction: capitalism is not the problem, it is the solution – both economically and environmentally.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "capitalism\nclimate change\nenvironmental degradation\nnumerous scientific studies\nfree\nhighest scores\nEPI\ncorrelation\nmost comprehensive\nreliable gauge\nhow capitalist\nhigh degree of overlap\nmore than 90 percent\nhigher\nopenness of an economy\nenvironmental protection\nstudy\nopenness to international markets\n1%\nfall\n1%\ngood\nresource consumption\nanalyses\ncritical point\ngradual decline\nreal-world observations\ndisprove\nautomatically\nnon-capitalist\nfar more serious\never weaker\ndematerialization\nnumerous data series\ndecoupled\n72\nsix\ndecline\nall\nsame direction\nnot the problem\nsolution", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: 2 – Growth turns environment – empirical data.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Most people believe that capitalism is to blame for climate change and environmental degradation. But numerous scientific studies have arrived at a surprising conclusion.\nEvery year, the Heritage Foundation ranks countries around the world based on economic freedom in a kind of capitalism index. Analysis has shown that the world’s most economically “free” countries also registered the highest scores on Yale University’s EPI environmental index, averaging 76.1 (on a scale from 0 to 100), while the “mostly free” countries averaged 70.2. These two groups have a significant lead over the “moderately free” countries, which received much lower ratings (59.6 points) for their environmental performance. The countries rated by the Heritage Foundation as either “mostly unfree” or “repressed” received by far the worst Environmental Performance Index scores (46.7 and 50.3, respectively).\nResearchers at Yale University found that there is not only a correlation between the Heritage Foundation’s index and their own EPI, but also between the EPI and the “Ease of Doing Business Index” which is published each year as part of the World Bank’s Doing Business Report and is generally regarded as the world’s most comprehensive and reliable gauge of the ease of doing business, with higher ratings indicating better, usually simpler, regulations for businesses and stronger protections of property rights. According to the researchers at Yale University, the correlation between the “Ease of Doing Business Index,” which they refer to as a measure of “economic liberalism” (i.e., an indicator of how capitalist an economy is), and the EPI is 0.72.\nIn 2016, researchers published a study in the journal Sustainability that included an evaluation of the correlation between the EPI and the “Open Market Index” (OMI) compiled by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The OMI measures a country’s openness to free trade and is thus an important indicator of economic freedom. The researchers found a high degree of overlap between the OMI index and the EPI: 19 of the OMI’s 27 highest-scoring countries also appear in the top 27 of the EPI. The survey covered a total of 75 countries, including all G20 and EU members. Together, these countries account for more than 90 percent of international trade and investment. The researchers conclude: “It is evident that there is a strong connection between OMI and EPI scores, supporting our hypothesis that countries with an open economy score higher in environmental performance. Overall, our evidence shows that the level of the openness of an economy is associated with a country’s environmental protection.”\nAnother study, “Is Free Trade Good for the Environment?” by Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor, uses sophisticated mathematical modeling to explore the correlation between free trade – a key feature of capitalism – and environmental pollution. The study finds: “Our estimates of the scale and technique elasticities indicate that if openness to international markets raises both output and income by 1%, pollution concentrations fall by approximately 1%. Putting this calculation together with our earlier evidence on composition effects yields a somewhat surprising conclusion: freer trade is good for the environment.”\nOf course, it can be argued that capitalism leads to stronger economic growth, which in turn leads to an increase in resource consumption. However, the analyses show that, at an early stage of a country’s economic growth, a high level of environmental degradation is observed, while, after a critical point of economic growth, a gradual decline in environmental degradation is reported.\nIn addition, there are two real-world observations that also disprove the argument that stronger economic growth automatically leads to greater environmental pollution:\nIn non-capitalist countries, environmental degradation has been a far more serious problem than in capitalist countries.\nThe correlation between economic growth and increasing resource consumption is becoming ever weaker in the age of dematerialization.\nOn the basis of numerous data series, Andrew McAfee has shown how economic growth has decoupled from the consumption of raw materials. Data for the USA show that of 72 raw materials, only six have not yet reached their consumption maximum. Although the US economy has grown strongly in recent years, consumption of many commodities is actually in decline. And the results of all these studies point in the same direction: capitalism is not the problem, it is the solution – both economically and environmentally.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "numerous\nstudies\nshow\neconomically “free”\nregistered the highest\nEPI\na correlation between\nthe EPI\nand\nhow capitalist an economy is\nEPI\ncountries account for\n90 percent of\ntrade\nAnother study\nif openness\nraises\noutput\nby 1%, pollution\nfall by\n1%\nIn non-capitalist\ns\ndegradation has been\nserious\nOn the basis of\ndata\ngrowth\ndecoupled from\nraw materials\nof 72 raw materials, only six have not\nreached\nconsumption maximum\nall\npoint in the same direction: capitalism is\nthe solution", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Biden’s PC is key—we’re only this close because it.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nPresident Joe Biden's economic agenda—largely built around two key pieces of legislation—is currently at a standstill in Congress, hanging by a thread nearly nine months into his time in office.\nDemocrats control the U.S. House, Senate and White House but have so far been unable to pass legislation that was key to Biden's successful 2020 presidential campaign, and the clock is ticking.\nAfter a brief recess, the U.S. House and Senate will fully return next week and try to pass a $1 trillion infrastructure package and up to $3.5 trillion package to massively expand the social safety net to include universal pre-kindergarten, paid family leave, expanded health care benefits and other progressive measures that Biden campaigned on.\nSenate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi have both set October 31 as their deadline for getting the Democrats' crucial legislation through, as they face threats to their razor-thin majority margins heading into the 2022 election cycle.\nHere are five key factors as Biden hopes to loosen the logjam and hold to his campaign promises:\nProgressives flex\nProgressive Democrats have so far blocked efforts in the House to pass the infrastructure bill that received bipartisan support in the Senate. The proposal, which would dole out millions to states for improvements to highways, bridges, broadband expansions and more priorities backed by both parties, has been linked to a separate expansion of the social safety net that is backed only by Democrats.\nSenator Bernie Sanders, a Vermont Independent who caucuses with Democrats and chairs the influential Budget Committee, has applauded House progressives who have blocked any vote on the infrastructure bill until the Senate outlines its plans for the larger social spending plan.\nEarlier this month, he told Democrats they should vote against the infrastructure vote if it came up, arguing in a statement that it would \"end all leverage that we have to pass a major [social safety net expansion] bill.\"\nRepresentative Pramila Jayapal, a Washington Democrat who chairs the Congressional Progressive Caucus, said in a statement that progressives are holding to Biden's campaign promises.\n\"This agenda is not some fringe wish list: it is the President's agenda, the Democratic agenda, and what we all promised voters when they delivered us the House, Senate and White House,\" she said.\nHouse Republican leaders have instructed all members to vote against the bill so Democrats have little room for defections in their 220 majority to the GOP's 212 minority, giving progressives room to hold off bills as they push their priorities.\nPelosi recently told reporters at the Capitol that she won't bring up legislation that won't pass.\nModerates stand firm\nDemocrats hold an advantage in the Senate only if all 50 senators vote together, backed with a tie-breaker from Vice President Kamala Harris, so the pathway to passing the larger spending proposal to advance social programs is narrow.\nSenators Joe Manchin of West Virginia and Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona have emerged as the key moderates blocking advancement on the package.\nManchin has argued that he would rather see a number closer to $1.5 trillion, rather than the $3.5 trillion that Biden and Democratic leaders have proposed for the package.\n\"Let me make it very clear: There's a lot of speculation about what number on reconciliation—my number has been 1.5,\" Manchin told reporters at the Capitol last week. \"This is going to take time to get this done. Getting it done quickly is not going to benefit anybody.\"\nMeanwhile, Sinema, who has faced backlash from Democrats over her decision to block the bill, also has voiced criticism over the price tag of the sweeping plan. She's had multiple meetings with the Biden administration in recent weeks.\n\"Senator Sinema said publicly more than two months ago, before Senate passage of the bipartisan infrastructure bill, that she would not support a bill costing $3.5 trillion,\" Sinema spokesman John LaBombard said in a statement. \"While we do not negotiate through the press, because Senator Sinema respects the integrity of those direct negotiations, she continues to engage directly in good-faith discussions with both President Biden and Senator Schumer to find common ground.\"\nBiden's political prowess\nBiden, who was in the U.S. Senate for nearly four decades before becoming vice president to Barack Obama for two terms starting in 2009, has been touted as a \"dealmaker\" and \"Senate whisperer.\"\nIn recent weeks he's taken countless calls among all factions of his party to try to hash out agreements on his agenda pieces.\nDuring a pre-recorded video message to the Democratic National Committee's fall convention over the weekend, he stressed that Democrats can only pass his agenda through unity.\n\"My message is simple, we need to stay together,\" he told the Democrats. \"We won 2020 as a unified party.\"\nCNN reported that in a private phone video call with progressive Democrats last week, Representative Ro Khanna, a California Democrat, suggested that Biden should get Sanders and Manchin to meet in person to try and hash out their differences after publicly feuding. But Biden quipped it would be like \"homicide\" to get the two on the same page.\nSanders had come out swinging in a hastily-called press conference at the Capitol directly responding to Manchin's claims that progressives were seeking entitlements.\n\"First, let's be clear—poll after poll, including polls in West Virginia, shows us that what we are trying to do in this legislation is enormously popular,\" Sanders told reporters. \"Senator Manchin has been critical of the $3.5 trillion proposal that many of us support, but the time is long overdue for him to tell us with specificity what he wants and does not want and explain that to the American people.\"\nBiden is a long-time friend of Manchin, and he has embraced his one-time foe for the Democratic presidential nomination, Sanders, as key to getting his agenda through.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Biden's economic agenda—largely built around two key pieces of legislation—is currently at a standstill in Congress, hanging by a thread nearly nine months into his time in office.\ncrats control the U.S. House, Senate and White House but have so far been unable to pass legislation\nHere are five key factors\nProgressive Democrats have so far blocked efforts in the House to pass the infrastructure bill that received bipartisan support in the Senate.\nPelosi recently told reporters at the Capitol that she won't bring up legislation that won't pass.\nJoe Manchin of West Virginia and Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona have emerged as the key moderates blocking advancement on the package.\nManchin has argued that he would rather see a number closer to $1.5 trillion, rather than the $3.5 trillion that Biden and Democratic leaders have proposed for the package.\nSinema\nalso has voiced criticism over the price tag of the sweeping plan.\nBiden\nwho was in the U.S. Senate for nearly four decades before becoming vice president to Barack Obama for two terms starting in 2009, has been touted as a \"dealmaker\" and \"Senate whisperer.\"\nIn recent weeks he's taken countless calls among all factions of his party to try to hash out agreements on his agenda pieces.\nBiden is a long-time friend of Manchin, and he has embraced his one-time foe for the Democratic presidential nomination, Sanders, as key to getting his agenda through", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Biden’s PC is key—we’re only this close because it.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Biden's economic agenda—largely built around two key pieces of legislation—is currently at a standstill in Congress, hanging by a thread nearly nine months into his time in office.\ncrats control the U.S. House, Senate and White House but have so far been unable to pass legislation\nHere are five key factors\nProgressive Democrats have so far blocked efforts in the House to pass the infrastructure bill that received bipartisan support in the Senate.\nPelosi recently told reporters at the Capitol that she won't bring up legislation that won't pass.\nJoe Manchin of West Virginia and Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona have emerged as the key moderates blocking advancement on the package.\nManchin has argued that he would rather see a number closer to $1.5 trillion, rather than the $3.5 trillion that Biden and Democratic leaders have proposed for the package.\nSinema\nalso has voiced criticism over the price tag of the sweeping plan.\nBiden\nwho was in the U.S. Senate for nearly four decades before becoming vice president to Barack Obama for two terms starting in 2009, has been touted as a \"dealmaker\" and \"Senate whisperer.\"\nIn recent weeks he's taken countless calls among all factions of his party to try to hash out agreements on his agenda pieces.\nBiden is a long-time friend of Manchin, and he has embraced his one-time foe for the Democratic presidential nomination, Sanders, as key to getting his agenda through", "role": "user" }, { "content": "unable to pass legislation\nfive key factors\nblocked efforts\nJoe Manchin\nKyrsten Sinema\nkey moderates\nprice tag\nnearly four decades\n\"dealmaker\" and \"Senate whisperer.\"\ntaken countless calls\nall factions\nhash out agreements\nlong-time friend of Manchin\none-time foe\nSanders\nkey to getting his agenda through", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Biden’s PC is key—we’re only this close because it.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nPresident Joe Biden's economic agenda—largely built around two key pieces of legislation—is currently at a standstill in Congress, hanging by a thread nearly nine months into his time in office.\nDemocrats control the U.S. House, Senate and White House but have so far been unable to pass legislation that was key to Biden's successful 2020 presidential campaign, and the clock is ticking.\nAfter a brief recess, the U.S. House and Senate will fully return next week and try to pass a $1 trillion infrastructure package and up to $3.5 trillion package to massively expand the social safety net to include universal pre-kindergarten, paid family leave, expanded health care benefits and other progressive measures that Biden campaigned on.\nSenate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi have both set October 31 as their deadline for getting the Democrats' crucial legislation through, as they face threats to their razor-thin majority margins heading into the 2022 election cycle.\nHere are five key factors as Biden hopes to loosen the logjam and hold to his campaign promises:\nProgressives flex\nProgressive Democrats have so far blocked efforts in the House to pass the infrastructure bill that received bipartisan support in the Senate. The proposal, which would dole out millions to states for improvements to highways, bridges, broadband expansions and more priorities backed by both parties, has been linked to a separate expansion of the social safety net that is backed only by Democrats.\nSenator Bernie Sanders, a Vermont Independent who caucuses with Democrats and chairs the influential Budget Committee, has applauded House progressives who have blocked any vote on the infrastructure bill until the Senate outlines its plans for the larger social spending plan.\nEarlier this month, he told Democrats they should vote against the infrastructure vote if it came up, arguing in a statement that it would \"end all leverage that we have to pass a major [social safety net expansion] bill.\"\nRepresentative Pramila Jayapal, a Washington Democrat who chairs the Congressional Progressive Caucus, said in a statement that progressives are holding to Biden's campaign promises.\n\"This agenda is not some fringe wish list: it is the President's agenda, the Democratic agenda, and what we all promised voters when they delivered us the House, Senate and White House,\" she said.\nHouse Republican leaders have instructed all members to vote against the bill so Democrats have little room for defections in their 220 majority to the GOP's 212 minority, giving progressives room to hold off bills as they push their priorities.\nPelosi recently told reporters at the Capitol that she won't bring up legislation that won't pass.\nModerates stand firm\nDemocrats hold an advantage in the Senate only if all 50 senators vote together, backed with a tie-breaker from Vice President Kamala Harris, so the pathway to passing the larger spending proposal to advance social programs is narrow.\nSenators Joe Manchin of West Virginia and Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona have emerged as the key moderates blocking advancement on the package.\nManchin has argued that he would rather see a number closer to $1.5 trillion, rather than the $3.5 trillion that Biden and Democratic leaders have proposed for the package.\n\"Let me make it very clear: There's a lot of speculation about what number on reconciliation—my number has been 1.5,\" Manchin told reporters at the Capitol last week. \"This is going to take time to get this done. Getting it done quickly is not going to benefit anybody.\"\nMeanwhile, Sinema, who has faced backlash from Democrats over her decision to block the bill, also has voiced criticism over the price tag of the sweeping plan. She's had multiple meetings with the Biden administration in recent weeks.\n\"Senator Sinema said publicly more than two months ago, before Senate passage of the bipartisan infrastructure bill, that she would not support a bill costing $3.5 trillion,\" Sinema spokesman John LaBombard said in a statement. \"While we do not negotiate through the press, because Senator Sinema respects the integrity of those direct negotiations, she continues to engage directly in good-faith discussions with both President Biden and Senator Schumer to find common ground.\"\nBiden's political prowess\nBiden, who was in the U.S. Senate for nearly four decades before becoming vice president to Barack Obama for two terms starting in 2009, has been touted as a \"dealmaker\" and \"Senate whisperer.\"\nIn recent weeks he's taken countless calls among all factions of his party to try to hash out agreements on his agenda pieces.\nDuring a pre-recorded video message to the Democratic National Committee's fall convention over the weekend, he stressed that Democrats can only pass his agenda through unity.\n\"My message is simple, we need to stay together,\" he told the Democrats. \"We won 2020 as a unified party.\"\nCNN reported that in a private phone video call with progressive Democrats last week, Representative Ro Khanna, a California Democrat, suggested that Biden should get Sanders and Manchin to meet in person to try and hash out their differences after publicly feuding. But Biden quipped it would be like \"homicide\" to get the two on the same page.\nSanders had come out swinging in a hastily-called press conference at the Capitol directly responding to Manchin's claims that progressives were seeking entitlements.\n\"First, let's be clear—poll after poll, including polls in West Virginia, shows us that what we are trying to do in this legislation is enormously popular,\" Sanders told reporters. \"Senator Manchin has been critical of the $3.5 trillion proposal that many of us support, but the time is long overdue for him to tell us with specificity what he wants and does not want and explain that to the American people.\"\nBiden is a long-time friend of Manchin, and he has embraced his one-time foe for the Democratic presidential nomination, Sanders, as key to getting his agenda through.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Biden's economic agenda\nis currently at a standstill\nProgressive Democrats have\nblocked efforts\nManchin of\nSinema\nhave emerged as the key moderates blocking advancement\nvoiced criticism over the price tag\nBiden\nwho was in the U.S. Senate for\nfour decades\nhas been touted as a \"dealmaker\" and \"Senate whisperer.\"\nIn recent weeks he's taken countless calls among all factions\nto\nhash out\nhis agenda\n.\nBiden is a long-time friend of Manchin, and he has embraced his one-time foe\nSanders\nas key to getting his agenda through", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Synthetic food production is the only way to solve in time", "role": "system" }, { "content": "It should be stated that the evidence on the safety of “GMO” foods is in, and the results are clear. Genetic engineering presents no unique hazards compared to other methods that create genetic modification, such as traditional breeding or hybridization. Major scientific organizations, including the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the National Academies of Science, and the American Medical Association (AMA) all back GMOs as being safe. In a meta-review of the safety of genetically engineered crop research that evaluated 1,783 research papers and reports from the years 2002 to 2012, no significant hazards were identified.70,71 The European Commission funded 1,340 research projects from 500 independent teams looking at GMO safety and none found risks.69 In addition to the lack of harm found in GMO use, there are substantial benefits to using GMOs: lower food prices; less pesticide use, which is safer for farmers; less water needed; increased crop yields; and more stable prices.69 There is also necessity: The UN FAO estimates that the world will need to grow 70% more food by 2050 just to keep up with population growth. There may be 10 billion people on earth, requiring more food to be grown in the next 75 years than has been produced in all of human history.72 Climate change, with the loss of arable land, will worsen this problem. Maximizing food production through GMOs may be the only avenue to provide people with enough food.\nStates CP", "role": "user" }, { "content": "evidence on the safety of “GMO” foods is in\nare clear\nGenetic engineering presents no unique hazards\nIn addition to the lack of harm found in GMO use, there are substantial benefits to using GMOs: lower food prices; less pesticide use, which is safer for farmers; less water needed; increased crop yields; and more stable prices.\nThere is also necessity\nMaximizing food production through GMOs may be the only avenue to provide people with enough food.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Synthetic food production is the only way to solve in time", "role": "system" }, { "content": "evidence on the safety of “GMO” foods is in\nare clear\nGenetic engineering presents no unique hazards\nIn addition to the lack of harm found in GMO use, there are substantial benefits to using GMOs: lower food prices; less pesticide use, which is safer for farmers; less water needed; increased crop yields; and more stable prices.\nThere is also necessity\nMaximizing food production through GMOs may be the only avenue to provide people with enough food.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "lower food prices\nless pesticide use\nless water needed\nincreased crop yields\nmore stable prices\nonly avenue to provide people with enough food.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Synthetic food production is the only way to solve in time\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.4", "role": "system" }, { "content": "evidence on the safety of “GMO” foods is in\nare clear\nGenetic engineering presents no unique hazards\nIn addition to the lack of harm found in GMO use, there are substantial benefits to using GMOs: lower food prices; less pesticide use, which is safer for farmers; less water needed; increased crop yields; and more stable prices.\nThere is also necessity\nMaximizing food production through GMOs may be the only avenue to provide people with enough food.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "GMO\npresents no\nhazards\nsubstantial benefits\nlower\nprices\nless pesticide\nless water\nincreased\nyields\nmore stable prices\nalso necessity\nMaximizing food\nthrough GMOs\nonly avenue to provide\nenough food", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No SCS war – China will avoid confrontation.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Shaoyu, 2-20-2020, South China Sea Threat Assessment: Is China a Threat or a Paper Tiger?, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2020/02/20/south-china-sea-threat-assessment/\n\nTensions in the South China Sea continue to rise. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s Rear Admiral Lou Yuan, regarded as a hawkish military commentator, recently proclaimed that the continuing dispute over the ownership of the South China Sea could be resolved by sinking two US aircraft carriers. Statements like these result in a legitimate fear that China’s increasing presence in the South China Sea might spark a kinetic military conflict with the United States. However, while most Western scholars and media are paying excessive attention to the rise of China, few are contemplating China’s weaknesses in the region. Despite China’s constant verbal objections and rising tensions with the United States in the last century, the world has yet to witness any major military confrontation between the two superpowers. China will continue to avoid directly confronting the United States in the South China Sea for at least another decade because China’s military remains immature and defective. China’s weak joint command system, which has become an essential instrument in modern warfare, comprises its first major military weakness. If any military operations are to be conducted in a region such as the South China Sea, the integration and cooperation between the air force, navy, and landing army is indispensable. However, even as it boasts the second largest defense spending figures worldwide, China only recently created their first and only joint command system, the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC), under President Xi Jinping’s new national defense and military reform. In addition, around 70 percent of the PLA soldiers belong to the PLA Army, and almost all senior officers on the CMC are army officers. This imbalance has the potential to cause serious complications, such as interservice rivalry for the newly formed Joint Staff Department, when it comes to decision-making involving naval and aerial affairs―areas in which army officers have no experience. The Chinese are certainly attempting to resolve this problem by establishing departments like the PLA Joint Logistic Support Force, which handles logistical operations and oversees the military supplies, infirmaries, and barracks of the PLA. However, the “peace disease”―an idea that a period of prolonged peace can weaken a state’s military ability―continues to hamper China’s military modernization, as there has been no opportunity to test its joint command system in actual combat. The last time China had a full-fledged military conflict was forty years ago with Vietnam, which concluded with a Chinese defeat. If the CMC hopes to win a direct military engagement with US naval forces, it must compensate for lack of experience in operating a joint command system. Until it does so, China’s military poses little threat to the United States and its allies. Sea power is crucial for taking control of the South China Sea. The Chinese Navy is divided into the North, East, and South Fleets. Among the four divisions, the PLAN’s South Fleets poses the most immediate threat because it is currently active in the South China Sea. Together, the fleets possess only one aircraft carrier in operation: the Liaoning, an abandoned Soviet-era vessel that was purchased from Ukraine as a training ship, but reportedly had to return to port immediately due to an engine failure during a sea trial. The country’s one and only domestically built aircraft carrier, the Type 001A, is under scrutiny, as it is believed that the carrier manager might have leaked classified information of Liaoning to the CIA. In contrast, the United States possesses nineteen aircraft carriers, far outnumbering the Chinese. Although the number and strength of aircraft carriers do not necessarily determine the victor of a confrontation, the tonnage of a country’s navy might. Larger tonnage provides more space for fuel, weapons, and ammunition, and a vessel with bigger hull not only has more rounds to fire but also the capability to endure longer voyages. The United States Navy has a total tonnage at least two times greater than that of PLAN’s. China also lags in its ballistic missiles. For instance, China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) only began to field its Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) DF-26 in 2016, and the country’s arsenal only consisted of ninety Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) as of 2019. In comparison, the United States had a total of 405 deployed ICBMs and 278 non-deployed ICBMs as of 2017. In reality, China’s stockpile of weapons and equipment is still substantially inferior to that of the United States, deterring a full-fledged war from breaking out in the South China Sea. Alone, China’s military is insufficient to face the United States in direct confrontation and would therefore be forced to turn to its allies. China currently lacks any such dependable military allies in the South China Sea. China’s leading ally in the region,\n\n\n North Korea, is a totalitarian regime with a struggling economy, and most of its vessels are only operable within fifty nautical miles of its coast. Although China and North Korea maintained strong relations during the Cold War era, the Beijing-Pyongyang relationship has gradually declined since the beginning of the twenty-first century and the start of North Korea’s nuclear program. China has joined the United Nations in implementing sanctions against North Korea because of its unauthorized nuclear testing. Although China remains North Korea’s closest friend, an alliance is rather far-fetched. Moreover, the international scrutiny that North Korea faces, as well as its deficient economy, means that it lacks the resources to support Chinese forces in the South China Sea if serious military conflict were to occur. In contrast, the United States can easily depend on South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and the Philippines to provide naval support. In addition, although the United States is not allied with most of the Southeast Asian nations, the increasing cooperation between the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is similar to a military alliance with no written agreement. The United States and ten ASEAN navies have commenced multiple maritime drills as part of a joint exercise extending into the South China Sea, countering China’s presence in the region. In contrast, China and ASEAN only had their first joint maritime exercise last year, which mostly focused on the code for unplanned encounters at sea, search and rescue operations, and communication exercises. In addition, US allies in the region have increased their defense budgets to combat growing Chinese influence. Although China’s navy has recently commissioned the Nanchang guided-missile destroyer (the biggest surface warship ever made), the vessel is only powerful in relation to other Chinese ships, which are around 3,000 tons less powerful than the United States’ Zumwalt-Class destroyer in terms of displacement. Consequently, China is slowing its plan to build two aircraft carriers for each of its regional fleets to build the Nanchang. China may be aiming for a hegemonic position in Asia, but that does not mean it will succeed. The country’s military―specifically its navy―is still immature. China is undoubtedly on the rise, yet the country still has many profound and systemic problems within its military. Perhaps some of these problems could be resolved with China’s continued growth, but institutional change―especially when problems are so ingrained into the system―takes a long time. Based on what defense analysts currently observe, China does not pose a military threat to the United States in the South China Sea; therefore, there is no need to invest more resources and capital into the Pacific for the time being. However, the United States should maintain its presence in the area by continuing to foster relationships with its allies while keeping a close eye on China’s movements. Sacrificing resources for the sake of military proliferation in a region where such action is unneeded is a wasteful move that the United States should avoid.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "while most Western scholars and media are paying excessive attention to the rise of China, few are contemplating China’s weaknesses in the region.\nthe world has yet to witness any major military confrontation between the two superpowers\nChina will continue to avoid directly confronting the United States in the South China Sea for at least another decade because China’s military remains immature and defective. China’s weak joint command system, which has become an essential instrument in modern warfare, comprises its first major military weakness. If any military operations are to be conducted in a region such as the South China Sea, the integration and cooperation between the air force, navy, and landing army is indispensable\nChina only recently created their first and only joint command system\nThis imbalance has the potential to cause serious complications, such as interservice rivalry for the newly formed Joint Staff Department, when it comes to decision-making involving naval and aerial affairs―areas in which army officers have no experience.\nthe “peace disease”―an idea that a period of prolonged peace can weaken a state’s military ability―continues to hamper China’s military modernization, as there has been no opportunity to test its joint command system in actual combat. The last time China had a full-fledged military conflict was forty years ago with Vietnam, which concluded with a Chinese defeat\nIf the CMC hopes to win a direct military engagement with US naval forces, it must compensate for lack of experience in operating a joint command system. Until it does so, China’s military poses little threat to the United States and its allies\nthe country’s arsenal only consisted of ninety\n(ICBM) as of 2019. In comparison, the United States had a total of 405 deployed ICBMs and 278 non-deployed ICBMs as of 2017\nChina’s stockpile of weapons and equipment is still substantially inferior to that of the United States, deterring a full-fledged war from breaking out in the South China Sea.\nChina’s military is insufficient to face the United States in direct confrontation\nChina currently lacks any such dependable military allies in the South China Sea. China’s leading ally in the region,\nNorth Korea, is a totalitarian regime with a struggling economy, and most of its vessels are only operable within fifty nautical miles of its coast\nthe international scrutiny that North Korea faces, as well as its deficient economy, means that it lacks the resources to support Chinese forces in the South China Sea if serious military conflict were to occur. In contrast, the United States can easily depend on South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and the Philippines to provide naval support\nthe increasing cooperation between the United States and\nASEAN) is similar to a military alliance with no written agreement. The United States and ten ASEAN navies have commenced multiple maritime drills as part of a joint exercise extending into the South China Sea, countering China’s presence in the region\nUS allies in the region have increased their defense budgets to combat growing Chinese influence.\nChinese ships\nare around 3,000 tons less powerful than the United States’ Zumwalt-Class destroyer in terms of displacement.\nChina is slowing its plan to build two aircraft carriers\nChina may be aiming for a hegemonic position in Asia, but that does not mean it will succeed. The country’s military―specifically its navy―is still immature.\nthe country still has many profound and systemic problems within its military\ninstitutional change―especially when problems are so ingrained into the system―takes a long time\nChina does not pose a military threat to the United States in the South China Sea", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: No SCS war – China will avoid confrontation.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Shaoyu, 2-20-2020, South China Sea Threat Assessment: Is China a Threat or a Paper Tiger?, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2020/02/20/south-china-sea-threat-assessment/\n\nTensions in the South China Sea continue to rise. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s Rear Admiral Lou Yuan, regarded as a hawkish military commentator, recently proclaimed that the continuing dispute over the ownership of the South China Sea could be resolved by sinking two US aircraft carriers. Statements like these result in a legitimate fear that China’s increasing presence in the South China Sea might spark a kinetic military conflict with the United States. However, while most Western scholars and media are paying excessive attention to the rise of China, few are contemplating China’s weaknesses in the region. Despite China’s constant verbal objections and rising tensions with the United States in the last century, the world has yet to witness any major military confrontation between the two superpowers. China will continue to avoid directly confronting the United States in the South China Sea for at least another decade because China’s military remains immature and defective. China’s weak joint command system, which has become an essential instrument in modern warfare, comprises its first major military weakness. If any military operations are to be conducted in a region such as the South China Sea, the integration and cooperation between the air force, navy, and landing army is indispensable. However, even as it boasts the second largest defense spending figures worldwide, China only recently created their first and only joint command system, the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC), under President Xi Jinping’s new national defense and military reform. In addition, around 70 percent of the PLA soldiers belong to the PLA Army, and almost all senior officers on the CMC are army officers. This imbalance has the potential to cause serious complications, such as interservice rivalry for the newly formed Joint Staff Department, when it comes to decision-making involving naval and aerial affairs―areas in which army officers have no experience. The Chinese are certainly attempting to resolve this problem by establishing departments like the PLA Joint Logistic Support Force, which handles logistical operations and oversees the military supplies, infirmaries, and barracks of the PLA. However, the “peace disease”―an idea that a period of prolonged peace can weaken a state’s military ability―continues to hamper China’s military modernization, as there has been no opportunity to test its joint command system in actual combat. The last time China had a full-fledged military conflict was forty years ago with Vietnam, which concluded with a Chinese defeat. If the CMC hopes to win a direct military engagement with US naval forces, it must compensate for lack of experience in operating a joint command system. Until it does so, China’s military poses little threat to the United States and its allies. Sea power is crucial for taking control of the South China Sea. The Chinese Navy is divided into the North, East, and South Fleets. Among the four divisions, the PLAN’s South Fleets poses the most immediate threat because it is currently active in the South China Sea. Together, the fleets possess only one aircraft carrier in operation: the Liaoning, an abandoned Soviet-era vessel that was purchased from Ukraine as a training ship, but reportedly had to return to port immediately due to an engine failure during a sea trial. The country’s one and only domestically built aircraft carrier, the Type 001A, is under scrutiny, as it is believed that the carrier manager might have leaked classified information of Liaoning to the CIA. In contrast, the United States possesses nineteen aircraft carriers, far outnumbering the Chinese. Although the number and strength of aircraft carriers do not necessarily determine the victor of a confrontation, the tonnage of a country’s navy might. Larger tonnage provides more space for fuel, weapons, and ammunition, and a vessel with bigger hull not only has more rounds to fire but also the capability to endure longer voyages. The United States Navy has a total tonnage at least two times greater than that of PLAN’s. China also lags in its ballistic missiles. For instance, China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) only began to field its Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) DF-26 in 2016, and the country’s arsenal only consisted of ninety Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) as of 2019. In comparison, the United States had a total of 405 deployed ICBMs and 278 non-deployed ICBMs as of 2017. In reality, China’s stockpile of weapons and equipment is still substantially inferior to that of the United States, deterring a full-fledged war from breaking out in the South China Sea. Alone, China’s military is insufficient to face the United States in direct confrontation and would therefore be forced to turn to its allies. China currently lacks any such dependable military allies in the South China Sea. China’s leading ally in the region,\n\n\n North Korea, is a totalitarian regime with a struggling economy, and most of its vessels are only operable within fifty nautical miles of its coast. Although China and North Korea maintained strong relations during the Cold War era, the Beijing-Pyongyang relationship has gradually declined since the beginning of the twenty-first century and the start of North Korea’s nuclear program. China has joined the United Nations in implementing sanctions against North Korea because of its unauthorized nuclear testing. Although China remains North Korea’s closest friend, an alliance is rather far-fetched. Moreover, the international scrutiny that North Korea faces, as well as its deficient economy, means that it lacks the resources to support Chinese forces in the South China Sea if serious military conflict were to occur. In contrast, the United States can easily depend on South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and the Philippines to provide naval support. In addition, although the United States is not allied with most of the Southeast Asian nations, the increasing cooperation between the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is similar to a military alliance with no written agreement. The United States and ten ASEAN navies have commenced multiple maritime drills as part of a joint exercise extending into the South China Sea, countering China’s presence in the region. In contrast, China and ASEAN only had their first joint maritime exercise last year, which mostly focused on the code for unplanned encounters at sea, search and rescue operations, and communication exercises. In addition, US allies in the region have increased their defense budgets to combat growing Chinese influence. Although China’s navy has recently commissioned the Nanchang guided-missile destroyer (the biggest surface warship ever made), the vessel is only powerful in relation to other Chinese ships, which are around 3,000 tons less powerful than the United States’ Zumwalt-Class destroyer in terms of displacement. Consequently, China is slowing its plan to build two aircraft carriers for each of its regional fleets to build the Nanchang. China may be aiming for a hegemonic position in Asia, but that does not mean it will succeed. The country’s military―specifically its navy―is still immature. China is undoubtedly on the rise, yet the country still has many profound and systemic problems within its military. Perhaps some of these problems could be resolved with China’s continued growth, but institutional change―especially when problems are so ingrained into the system―takes a long time. Based on what defense analysts currently observe, China does not pose a military threat to the United States in the South China Sea; therefore, there is no need to invest more resources and capital into the Pacific for the time being. However, the United States should maintain its presence in the area by continuing to foster relationships with its allies while keeping a close eye on China’s movements. Sacrificing resources for the sake of military proliferation in a region where such action is unneeded is a wasteful move that the United States should avoid.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "China will continue to avoid directly confronting the United States in the South China Sea for at least another decade because China’s military remains immature and defective.\nChina’s military poses little threat to the United States and its allies\nChina does not pose a military threat to the United States in the South China Sea", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: No SCS war – China will avoid confrontation.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "while most Western scholars and media are paying excessive attention to the rise of China, few are contemplating China’s weaknesses in the region.\nthe world has yet to witness any major military confrontation between the two superpowers\nChina will continue to avoid directly confronting the United States in the South China Sea for at least another decade because China’s military remains immature and defective. China’s weak joint command system, which has become an essential instrument in modern warfare, comprises its first major military weakness. If any military operations are to be conducted in a region such as the South China Sea, the integration and cooperation between the air force, navy, and landing army is indispensable\nChina only recently created their first and only joint command system\nThis imbalance has the potential to cause serious complications, such as interservice rivalry for the newly formed Joint Staff Department, when it comes to decision-making involving naval and aerial affairs―areas in which army officers have no experience.\nthe “peace disease”―an idea that a period of prolonged peace can weaken a state’s military ability―continues to hamper China’s military modernization, as there has been no opportunity to test its joint command system in actual combat. The last time China had a full-fledged military conflict was forty years ago with Vietnam, which concluded with a Chinese defeat\nIf the CMC hopes to win a direct military engagement with US naval forces, it must compensate for lack of experience in operating a joint command system. Until it does so, China’s military poses little threat to the United States and its allies\nthe country’s arsenal only consisted of ninety\n(ICBM) as of 2019. In comparison, the United States had a total of 405 deployed ICBMs and 278 non-deployed ICBMs as of 2017\nChina’s stockpile of weapons and equipment is still substantially inferior to that of the United States, deterring a full-fledged war from breaking out in the South China Sea.\nChina’s military is insufficient to face the United States in direct confrontation\nChina currently lacks any such dependable military allies in the South China Sea. China’s leading ally in the region,\nNorth Korea, is a totalitarian regime with a struggling economy, and most of its vessels are only operable within fifty nautical miles of its coast\nthe international scrutiny that North Korea faces, as well as its deficient economy, means that it lacks the resources to support Chinese forces in the South China Sea if serious military conflict were to occur. In contrast, the United States can easily depend on South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and the Philippines to provide naval support\nthe increasing cooperation between the United States and\nASEAN) is similar to a military alliance with no written agreement. The United States and ten ASEAN navies have commenced multiple maritime drills as part of a joint exercise extending into the South China Sea, countering China’s presence in the region\nUS allies in the region have increased their defense budgets to combat growing Chinese influence.\nChinese ships\nare around 3,000 tons less powerful than the United States’ Zumwalt-Class destroyer in terms of displacement.\nChina is slowing its plan to build two aircraft carriers\nChina may be aiming for a hegemonic position in Asia, but that does not mean it will succeed. The country’s military―specifically its navy―is still immature.\nthe country still has many profound and systemic problems within its military\ninstitutional change―especially when problems are so ingrained into the system―takes a long time\nChina does not pose a military threat to the United States in the South China Sea", "role": "user" }, { "content": "China will\navoid\nconfronting the U\nS\nin the S\nC\nS\nfor at least another decade because China’s military remains immature and defective\nThis imbalance has the potential to cause serious complications\nwhen it comes to decision-making\nareas in which army officers have no experience.\nthe “peace disease”\ncontinues to hamper China’s military modernization\nChina’s military poses little threat to the U\nS\nand\nallies\nChina’s stockpile of weapons\nis\nsubstantially inferior\ndeterring a full-fledged war\nChina currently lacks any\ndependable military allies\nin the region\nthe U\nS\ncan\ndepend on So\nKo\nJapan\nTaiwan\nAustralia\nthe Philippines\nASEAN\nthe country\nhas many\nsystemic problems within its military\ninstitutional change\ntakes a long time", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Risks global food scarcity and war", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nThe United States faces many threats to our National Security. These threats include continuing wars with extremist elements such as ISIS and potential wars with rogue state North Korea or regional nuclear power Iran. The heated economic and diplomatic competition with Russia and a surging China could spiral out of control. Concurrently, we face threats to our future security posed by growing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges which create incubators for extremist and anti-American government factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be a nuanced and comprehensive National Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power including a Food Security Strategy.\nAn American Food Security Strategy is an imperative factor in reducing the multiple threats impacting our National wellbeing. Recent history has shown that reliable food supplies and stable prices produce more stable and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence.\nFood insecurity drives mass migration around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, generating conflicts, and threatening our own security by disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be correlated with protests and riots. Food price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings. Repeatedly, history has taught us that a strong agricultural sector is an unquestionable requirement for inclusive and sustainable growth, broad-based development progress, and long-term stability.\nThe impact can be remarkable and far reaching. Rising income, in addition to reducing the opportunities for an upsurge in extremism, leads to changes in diet, producing demand for more diverse and nutritious foods provided, in many cases, from American farmers and ranchers. Emerging markets currently purchase 20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports and that figure is expected to grow as populations boom.\nMoving early to ensure stability in strategically significant regions requires long term planning and a disciplined, thoughtful strategy. To combat current threats and work to prevent future ones, our national leadership must employ the entire spectrum of our power including diplomatic, economic, and cultural elements. The best means to prevent future chaos and the resulting instability is positive engagement addressing the causes of instability before it occurs.\nThis is not rocket science. We know where the instability is most likely to occur. The world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and food insecure countries. This alarming math is not just about total numbers. Projections show that the greatest increase is in the age groups most vulnerable to extremism. There are currently 200 million people in Africa between the ages of 15 and 24, with that number expected to double in the next 30 years. Already, 60% of the unemployed in Africa are young people. \nToo often these situations deteriorate into shooting wars requiring the deployment of our military forces. We should be continually mindful that the price we pay for committing military forces is measured in our most precious national resource, the blood of those who serve. For those who live in rural America, this has a disproportionate impact. Fully 40% of those who serve in our military come from the farms, ranches, and non-urban communities that make up only 16% of our population. \nActions taken now to increase agricultural sector jobs can provide economic opportunity and stability for those unemployed youths while helping to feed people. A recent report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs identifies agriculture development as the core essential for providing greater food security, economic growth, and population well-being.\nOur active support for food security, including agriculture development, has helped stabilize key regions over the past 60 years. A robust food security strategy, as a part of our overall security strategy, can mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and agricultural prosperity while materially contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security.\n\n\nFetus DA—\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "threats include\nextremist elements such as ISIS and\nwars with\nNorth Korea or\nnuclear\nIran\nheated\ncompetition with Russia and a surging China could spiral out of control\ngrowing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges\nte incubators for extremist\nfactions\nresponse\nmust be\nincluding\nFood Security\nRecent history has shown that\nstable prices produce more stable and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence.\nFood insecurity drives mass migration around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, generating conflicts, and threatening\nsecurity by disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be correlate\nwith protests and riots\nFood price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings\nEmerging markets\npurchase 20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports and that figure is expected to grow as populations boom.\nThe world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and food insecure countries\nthese situations deteriorate into shooting wars\nOur active support for food security, including agriculture development, has helped stabilize key regions over the past 60 years. A robust food security strategy\ncan mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and agricultural prosperity while materially contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Risks global food scarcity and war", "role": "system" }, { "content": "threats include\nextremist elements such as ISIS and\nwars with\nNorth Korea or\nnuclear\nIran\nheated\ncompetition with Russia and a surging China could spiral out of control\ngrowing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges\nte incubators for extremist\nfactions\nresponse\nmust be\nincluding\nFood Security\nRecent history has shown that\nstable prices produce more stable and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence.\nFood insecurity drives mass migration around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, generating conflicts, and threatening\nsecurity by disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be correlate\nwith protests and riots\nFood price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings\nEmerging markets\npurchase 20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports and that figure is expected to grow as populations boom.\nThe world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and food insecure countries\nthese situations deteriorate into shooting wars\nOur active support for food security, including agriculture development, has helped stabilize key regions over the past 60 years. A robust food security strategy\ncan mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and agricultural prosperity while materially contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security", "role": "user" }, { "content": "ISIS\nNorth Korea\nIran\nRussia\nChina\nstable prices\ninstability\nunrest\nviolence\nmass migration\ndestabilizing neighboring populations\ndiplomatic relationships\nshocks\ncorrelate\nHaiti\nMadagascar\nArab Spring\n20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports\ngrow\ndeteriorate into shooting wars\nactive support\nag\nstabilize key regions\nag\ncontribut\nworld’s security", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Risks global food scarcity and war\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "threats include\nextremist elements such as ISIS and\nwars with\nNorth Korea or\nnuclear\nIran\nheated\ncompetition with Russia and a surging China could spiral out of control\ngrowing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges\nte incubators for extremist\nfactions\nresponse\nmust be\nincluding\nFood Security\nRecent history has shown that\nstable prices produce more stable and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence.\nFood insecurity drives mass migration around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, generating conflicts, and threatening\nsecurity by disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be correlate\nwith protests and riots\nFood price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings\nEmerging markets\npurchase 20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports and that figure is expected to grow as populations boom.\nThe world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and food insecure countries\nthese situations deteriorate into shooting wars\nOur active support for food security, including agriculture development, has helped stabilize key regions over the past 60 years. A robust food security strategy\ncan mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and agricultural prosperity while materially contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security", "role": "user" }, { "content": "threats include\nISIS\nNorth Korea\nnuclear\nIran\nRussia\nChina\nhistory has shown\nstable prices produce\nsecure countries.\nFood insecurity drives mass migration\ndestabilizing\npopulations\nand threatening\ndiplomatic relationships.\nEmerging markets\npurchase 20 percent of U.S.\nexports\nto grow as populations boom.\ninsecure countries\ndeteriorate into shooting wars\nOur active support for\nag\ndevelopment\nstabilize key regions\ncontribut\nto\nthe world’s security", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: It's the most appealing option for species conservation", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Vicarious liability in the context of the ESA offers an appealing option for environmentalists and other interested parties to hold state and local governments liable when their authorization causes a third party to take endangered species. As described in Part III.B., under the vicarious liability doctrine, Louisiana could be liable for licensing shrimp trawling vessels and gear that do not have TEDs installed. This theory, however, has faced almost unanimous disapproval in the academic literature, and there is binding precedent upholding it in only a few jurisdictions.235 The doctrine may be on thin ice. A limited version of vicarious liability that focuses on state or local governments’ misfeasance (that is, affirmative actions that cause others to commit a take) is much more likely to persuade a court than a broader theory encompassing nonfeasance.236 The narrower version of vicarious liability proposed in this Note is consistent with the text and general purpose of the ESA, would be a desirable and reasonable practical tool for conservation, and could form the basis for a successful challenge to Louisiana’s regulatory program. \n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Vicarious liability in the context of the ESA offers an appealing option for environmentalists and other interested parties to hold state and local governments liable when their authorization causes a third party to take endangered species\nthere is binding precedent upholding it in only a few jurisdictions\nA limited version of vicarious liability that focuses on state or local governments’ misfeasance\nis\nlikely to persuade a court\nvicarious liability\nwould be a desirable and reasonable practical tool for conservation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: It's the most appealing option for species conservation", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Vicarious liability in the context of the ESA offers an appealing option for environmentalists and other interested parties to hold state and local governments liable when their authorization causes a third party to take endangered species\nthere is binding precedent upholding it in only a few jurisdictions\nA limited version of vicarious liability that focuses on state or local governments’ misfeasance\nis\nlikely to persuade a court\nvicarious liability\nwould be a desirable and reasonable practical tool for conservation", "role": "user" }, { "content": "appealing option\nstate or local governments’ misfeasance\nvicarious liability\npractical tool for conservation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: It's the most appealing option for species conservation\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.7", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Vicarious liability in the context of the ESA offers an appealing option for environmentalists and other interested parties to hold state and local governments liable when their authorization causes a third party to take endangered species. As described in Part III.B., under the vicarious liability doctrine, Louisiana could be liable for licensing shrimp trawling vessels and gear that do not have TEDs installed. This theory, however, has faced almost unanimous disapproval in the academic literature, and there is binding precedent upholding it in only a few jurisdictions.235 The doctrine may be on thin ice. A limited version of vicarious liability that focuses on state or local governments’ misfeasance (that is, affirmative actions that cause others to commit a take) is much more likely to persuade a court than a broader theory encompassing nonfeasance.236 The narrower version of vicarious liability proposed in this Note is consistent with the text and general purpose of the ESA, would be a desirable and reasonable practical tool for conservation, and could form the basis for a successful challenge to Louisiana’s regulatory program. \n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Vicarious liability\nof the ESA offers an appealing option for environmentalists\nto hold\nlocal governments liable when their authorization causes a third party to take endangered species\nvicarious liability that focuses on\ngovernments’ misfeasance\nis\nlikely to persuade a court\nvicarious liability\nwould be a desirable and reasonable\ntool for conservation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Prefer us on disease\n1. COVID thumps – standard healthcare sufficient to head of pandemics\n2. Pandemics cant cause extinction\n3. COVID proves healthcare is resilient AND innovation has only improved", "role": "system" }, { "content": "[TITLE]: Industry Innovation: How has COVID-19 changed global healthcare?\nWhile the COVID-19 pandemic has placed unparalleled demands on modern healthcare systems, the industry’s response has vividly demonstrated its resilience and ability to bring innovations to market quickly.\nThe effects of the pandemic on the industry continue to be profound. The shifts in consumer behavior, an , and the likely deep and lasting economic impact will potentially affect healthcare companies no less—and quite possibly more—than those in other sectors. Around the world, more than  we polled believe COVID-19 will fundamentally change their businesses, and 85 percent predict lasting changes in customers’ preferences. Among healthcare leaders, two-thirds expect this period to be the most challenging in their careers.1\nTo meet both the humanitarian challenge and the obligation to their stakeholders, leaders of healthcare organizations need to meet the innovation imperative. History tells us that organizations that invest in innovation during a crisis  (exhibit). What’s more, a crisis can create an urgency that rallies collaborative effort, breaks through organizational silos, and overcomes institutional inertia.\n\nDuring the course of this year, the healthcare industry has produced inspiring examples of innovation in products, services, processes, and business and delivery models, often in partnership with other sectors. For example, Sheba Medical Center in Israel is working with TytoCare to keep COVID-19 patients in their homes by supplying them with special stethoscopes that both listen to their hearts and transmit images of their lungs to a care team that can intervene as appropriate.2 In the United States, Zipline, which specializes in delivering medical supplies to remote areas, quickly formed a partnership with Novant Health in North Carolina to distribute supplies to hospitals via drones.3 The adoption of telehealth has exploded, from 11 percent of consumers using it in 2019 to , and well more than half of healthcare providers polled indicate higher comfort with this care-delivery method than before.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "COVID-19 changed\nhealthcare\nWhile the COVID-19\nhas placed unparalleled demands on\nhealthcare\nthe industry’s response has vividly demonstrated\nresilience and ability to bring innovations\nquickly\nleaders of healthcare organizations\nmeet the innovation imperative\na crisis can create\nurgency that rallies collaborative effort\nbreaks\norganizational silos\nand overcomes\ninertia\nDuring\nthis year\nthe healthcare industry has produced inspiring examples of innovation in products\nservices\nprocesses\nand business and delivery models\nSheba\nis working with TytoCare to keep COVID\npatients in their homes\nZipline\nquickly formed a partnership\nto distribute supplies to hospitals via drones\nThe adoption of telehealth has exploded\nfrom 11 percent\nusing\nto", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Prefer us on disease\n1. COVID thumps – standard healthcare sufficient to head of pandemics\n2. Pandemics cant cause extinction\n3. COVID proves healthcare is resilient AND innovation has only improved", "role": "system" }, { "content": "[TITLE]: Industry Innovation: How has COVID-19 changed global healthcare?\nWhile the COVID-19 pandemic has placed unparalleled demands on modern healthcare systems, the industry’s response has vividly demonstrated its resilience and ability to bring innovations to market quickly.\nThe effects of the pandemic on the industry continue to be profound. The shifts in consumer behavior, an , and the likely deep and lasting economic impact will potentially affect healthcare companies no less—and quite possibly more—than those in other sectors. Around the world, more than  we polled believe COVID-19 will fundamentally change their businesses, and 85 percent predict lasting changes in customers’ preferences. Among healthcare leaders, two-thirds expect this period to be the most challenging in their careers.1\nTo meet both the humanitarian challenge and the obligation to their stakeholders, leaders of healthcare organizations need to meet the innovation imperative. History tells us that organizations that invest in innovation during a crisis  (exhibit). What’s more, a crisis can create an urgency that rallies collaborative effort, breaks through organizational silos, and overcomes institutional inertia.\n\nDuring the course of this year, the healthcare industry has produced inspiring examples of innovation in products, services, processes, and business and delivery models, often in partnership with other sectors. For example, Sheba Medical Center in Israel is working with TytoCare to keep COVID-19 patients in their homes by supplying them with special stethoscopes that both listen to their hearts and transmit images of their lungs to a care team that can intervene as appropriate.2 In the United States, Zipline, which specializes in delivering medical supplies to remote areas, quickly formed a partnership with Novant Health in North Carolina to distribute supplies to hospitals via drones.3 The adoption of telehealth has exploded, from 11 percent of consumers using it in 2019 to , and well more than half of healthcare providers polled indicate higher comfort with this care-delivery method than before.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "COVID-19 changed\nhealthcare\nthe COVID-19\nunparalleled demands\nhealthcare\nvividly demonstrated\nresilience\nability to bring innovations\nquickly\nmeet the innovation imperative\nurgency\nrallies collaborative effort\nbreaks\norganizational silos\novercomes\ninertia\ninspiring examples\ninnovation\nCOVID\npatients in their homes\nvia drones\ntelehealth has exploded", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: Prefer us on disease\n1. COVID thumps – standard healthcare sufficient to head of pandemics\n2. Pandemics cant cause extinction\n3. COVID proves healthcare is resilient AND innovation has only improved\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.6", "role": "system" }, { "content": "COVID-19 changed\nhealthcare\nWhile the COVID-19\nhas placed unparalleled demands on\nhealthcare\nthe industry’s response has vividly demonstrated\nresilience and ability to bring innovations\nquickly\nleaders of healthcare organizations\nmeet the innovation imperative\na crisis can create\nurgency that rallies collaborative effort\nbreaks\norganizational silos\nand overcomes\ninertia\nDuring\nthis year\nthe healthcare industry has produced inspiring examples of innovation in products\nservices\nprocesses\nand business and delivery models\nSheba\nis working with TytoCare to keep COVID\npatients in their homes\nZipline\nquickly formed a partnership\nto distribute supplies to hospitals via drones\nThe adoption of telehealth has exploded\nfrom 11 percent\nusing\nto", "role": "user" }, { "content": "COVID-19 changed\nhealthcare\nCOVID\nplaced unparalleled demands on\nhealthcare\nvividly demonstrated\nresilience and ability to bring innovations\nquickly\nleaders\nmeet the innovation imperative\na crisis can create\nurgency that rallies collaborative effort\nthe healthcare industry has produced inspiring\ninnovation in products\nservices\nand business\nmodels\nSheba\nworking with TytoCare to keep\npatients in\nhomes\nZipline\ndistribute supplies\nvia drones\ntelehealth has exploded\nto", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of organizing towards the Party---that’s the best way to create accountability mechanisms, educate and mobilize, and connect local struggles towards international liberation", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nI would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement.\nMy goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States.\nOne of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them.\nThe base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed.\nThe question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base?\nPut simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing.\nBy “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism.\nParty organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus.\nFurthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing.\nHaving a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions.\nWe also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring.\nWhat is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal.\nIn the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends.\nThe use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself.\nIt is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement.\nMany of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism.\nThe long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion.\nI strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing\nparty organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States\nOne of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics\nThe base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base\nDual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed\nonce we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next\nto mobilize the base\nwe need to have already done the work of building a communist party\nwe must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing\nBy “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis.\nA party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism\nParty organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy.\nour struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level\nparty organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions\nsuch accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing\nHaving a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects\nallows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions\nWhat is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth\nIt is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal\nindividual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations\nServing the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends\nwe ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism\nThe finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion\nparty organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions\ninto a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of organizing towards the Party---that’s the best way to create accountability mechanisms, educate and mobilize, and connect local struggles towards international liberation", "role": "system" }, { "content": "base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing\nparty organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States\nOne of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics\nThe base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base\nDual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed\nonce we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next\nto mobilize the base\nwe need to have already done the work of building a communist party\nwe must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing\nBy “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis.\nA party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism\nParty organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy.\nour struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level\nparty organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions\nsuch accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing\nHaving a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects\nallows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions\nWhat is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth\nIt is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal\nindividual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations\nServing the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends\nwe ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism\nThe finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion\nparty organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions\ninto a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed", "role": "user" }, { "content": "solidify\npowerful revolutionary socialist tendency\ncurrent state of the left\none in which revolution is not currently possible\ndual power\nconcretely demonstrate\nDual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed\nwe need to have already done the work of building a communist party\npublic face as a communist party\nadopts the party model\nformally unified\nparty line determined by democratic centralist decision making\ninternal methods\nholding party members accountable\nunifying party member action\neducating\nformal organization\ntied to and informed by\nunified national and international strategy.\nonly at the national\nheld accountable for their actions\nnot as one independent group criticizing another independent group\nas comrades with a formal organizational unity\nsharpen each others strategies\nhelp correct chauvinist ideas and actions\nCreating formal unity\nparty procedure\ndealing with and correcting\nnot simply meet peoples needs\npull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves\nskills\nstrategies\nideas\nactive role\nbecoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy\nalongside\naspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth\nexplore the possibility of unification\nlong term goal\nbuilding dual power\nrecruitment\neducation\nestablishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror\nunified openly and transparently\nmeeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing\nradicalizing\nrecruiting\norganizing\nmost useful method for achieving these ends\nmake it clear\nis not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism\nrevolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism\nbest path\nopen a conversation", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of organizing towards the Party---that’s the best way to create accountability mechanisms, educate and mobilize, and connect local struggles towards international liberation\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.2", "role": "system" }, { "content": "base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing\nparty organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States\nOne of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics\nThe base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base\nDual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed\nonce we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next\nto mobilize the base\nwe need to have already done the work of building a communist party\nwe must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing\nBy “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis.\nA party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism\nParty organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy.\nour struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level\nparty organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions\nsuch accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing\nHaving a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects\nallows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions\nWhat is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth\nIt is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal\nindividual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations\nServing the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends\nwe ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism\nThe finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion\nparty organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions\ninto a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed", "role": "user" }, { "content": "base building and dual power\ncan be best forwarded through party organizing\nto solidify\na powerful revolutionary socialist tendency\nBy building institutions\nwe\nconcretely demonstrate that communists can offer\nrelief\nDual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed\nWe must refuse covert front organizing and\nhave a public face as a communist party\nparty organizing\nadopts the party model\nwhose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party\ncreates internal methods for holding\nmembers accountable, unifying\naction\nand\neducating\nmembers\nour struggle\nfunctions not only at the national but at the international level\nparty organizing allows\norganizations and\norganizers to be held accountable\ncriticism\nfunction\nas comrades\nworking\nto sharpen each others strategies and\ncorrect\nideas and actions\nimperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing.\nformal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these\nallows us to address\nproblems\nThe party model creates a means for sustained growth\nthat allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared\nIt is important\nto explore\nunification\nas a long term goal\nServing the people means meeting\nmaterial needs while\neducating\nradicalizing,\nand organizing. The party model remains the most useful\nbase building\nis not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but\npursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy\nfighting capitalism", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The plan is nature—that includes any man-made object and is divisible.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nIt depends on how you define nature, of course. We often define nature as anything that goes on in the world without the intervention of people. In that sense, cities are divorced from nature by definition. But I don’t see any reason to define nature that way. Humans are one of the many animal species that inhabit Earth. Anything that these animal species do is natural, and the same applies to humans. If it is in our nature to build structures that house millions of individuals, then that makes cities just as natural a phenomenon as, say, coral reefs or ant nests.\n\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "We often define nature as anything that goes on in the world without the intervention of people.\nBut I don’t see any reason to define nature that way. Humans are one of the many animal species that inhabit Earth. Anything that these animal species do is natural, and the same applies to humans.", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: The plan is nature—that includes any man-made object and is divisible.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "\nIt depends on how you define nature, of course. We often define nature as anything that goes on in the world without the intervention of people. In that sense, cities are divorced from nature by definition. But I don’t see any reason to define nature that way. Humans are one of the many animal species that inhabit Earth. Anything that these animal species do is natural, and the same applies to humans. If it is in our nature to build structures that house millions of individuals, then that makes cities just as natural a phenomenon as, say, coral reefs or ant nests.\n\n\n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "nature\nwithout the intervention of people\nI don’t see any reason to define nature that way\nmany animal species\nanimal species\nnatural\nsame applies to humans", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, highlight the text to support the argument. Highlight approximately the amount of text specified by the highlight ratio. \n\nTag: The plan is nature—that includes any man-made object and is divisible.\n\nHighlight Ratio: 0.5", "role": "system" }, { "content": "We often define nature as anything that goes on in the world without the intervention of people.\nBut I don’t see any reason to define nature that way. Humans are one of the many animal species that inhabit Earth. Anything that these animal species do is natural, and the same applies to humans.", "role": "user" }, { "content": "We often define nature as\nwithout\npeople\nBut I don’t see\nnature that way. Humans are\nanimal species\nAnything\nthese animal species do is natural", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, underline the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Alt’s paradigm crushes resistance to material aspects of colonialism by reducing all movements to a binary.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Corey: This relational, interdependent focus is also important amongst settlers ourselves – perhaps as a way to counter the flattening of differences that occurs amongst settlers, particularly in solidarity work. Settlers obviously need to be doing our own work and challenging ‘our’ institutions and practices that serve to protect or further colonization. But we can’t do this if we flatten the differences and ignore the inequalities and power relationships that exist within settler society. Not only does such flattening prevent much needed alliances but flattening itself can actually work to protect certain elements of settler colonialism. For instance, white supremacy works to naturalize white settler presence. In terms of solidarity then, I find it problematic for myself, as a white, class privileged, cis-hetero, and able bodied male (as well as people like me) to demand other peoples to act in solidarity, while also not holding myself (and others like me) responsible and accountable to other forms of violence that may be a contributing factor to the further reification of structures that support settler colonialism, like the State. Now I’m not arguing for the continued eschewal of Indigenous governance and legal orders because others experience violence, but rather, that the substantive recognition of Indigenous governance and legal orders also requires a dismantling of other, related forms of domination. This latter dismantling I see as necessary but also insufficient for the dismantling of settler colonialism. These sites and spaces of domination and resistance are distinct, but also connected dialectically. This seems to be something that settlers, white settlers specifically, have yet to articulate and take up, critique and act against. And this is perhaps most evident in how settlers seem to be continuously waiting for instruction from Indigenous peoples on how to act. Rita: I wonder if this relational approach is a more useful direction for settler colonial studies, not unlike the kind of work you do Jeff, in thinking about colonialism in a global, comparative context. Jeff: And I think, the more you can make those links, the British occupation of Maori territory is directly related to HBC’s strategy to begin treaty making here... All those things are interrelated. They are shared, and they are seen as shared strategies. The other thing I see is this impulse to delocalize it... it’s always that kind of Free Tibet Syndrome... the further away acts of genocide are from your location, the more outrage expressed at these injustices. It’s a way of avoiding complicity, but it’s also a way of recasting the gaze. It’s like, ‘We’re not going to look right here, because this appears to be fairly peaceful’ And so it’s always that sort of re-directing away from localized responsibility, and almost magnifying impacts farther away. Rita: So what settler colonial studies does do, is help us relocate to locality, which is helpful. You mention the HBC. I wonder what was the relationship between the Hudson Bay Company in Canada and the East India Company or the East Africa Company? If we’re thinking about settler colonialism as a structure, how is it related to other modalities of gendered and sexualized white supremacy? How are the logics of State sovereignty and authority over nonwhite bodies connected? If we’re thinking about it, as non-Indigenous peoples being ‘in solidarity’, part of that is locating, attacking the whole structure of imperialism that is deeply gendered and homonationalist, that depends on neo-liberal projects of prioritizing able-bodied workers who can serve capitalism. Corey: Part of this, I think, what we’ve been discussing here, relates to what I sometimes see as the framing of ‘settler’ as event, rather than structure – where we are perhaps overly focused on the question of ‘who’ at the expense of the ‘how’. If we don’t understand how settlers are produced we run the risk of representing settlers as some sort of transhistorical subject with transhistorical practices. So I’m worried that while in one moment the term ‘settler’ denaturalizes our – that is all non-Indigenous peoples – presence on Indigenous lands, in the next, and through this construction of the ‘settler’ as transhistorical, we renaturalize it. In short, we go from a disavowal of colonization, to its representation as inevitable. Here is where I think a historical materialist or genealogical approach to the production of settler subjects may be useful in showing how this production is conditioned by but also contingent on a number of factors – white supremacy, hetero-patriarchy, capitalism, colonization, the eschewal of Indigenous governance and legal orders, environmental degradation, etc. Now this is also not to say that the binary of Indigenous/Settler isn’t accurate. I think its fundamental. Rather, I think it is possible and important to recognize that there have been, and are, individuals (or even collectives) that might be referred to as something other than settlers by Indigenous peoples, perhaps as cousins. Or in a similar vein, that there have been and are practices by settlers that aren’t colonial (and here is where centering Indigenous peoples’ accounts of Indigenous-settler relations, as well as their own governance, legal and diplomatic orders is crucial). But I think it’s just as important to recognize that these relations have and do not occur despite settler colonial and imperial logics, and thus outside of the binary. Rather, such relations occur in the face of it. The binary then is fundamental as the logics that uphold the binary cannot be ignored due to the existence of possiblly good relations as the logics that uphold the binary threaten those relations through the pursuit of the elimination of Indigenous peoples. Rita: Yet, how do we act in light of these entanglements, and with, rather than overcoming differences? Corey: Tuck and Yang (2012) had this really great article, “Decolonization is not a Metaphor.” In it, they talk about the importance of an ethics of incommensurability – a recognition of how anti-racist and anti-capitalist struggles are incommensurable with decolonization. But what I’ve been thinking about recently is whether these struggles are incompatible. For example, in the Indigenous resurgence literature, there is a turn away, but it’s also not an outright rejection. It also demands settlers to change. Yet recognizing that settlers are (re)produced, the change demanded is not just an individual transformation, but one connected to broader social, economic, and political justice. There are then, it seems, potential lines of affinity between decolonization and others, though incommensurable, struggles. And in order to sustain this compatibility in the face of incommensurability, relationships are essential in order to maintain accountability and to resist repeating colonial and other relations of domination, as well as, in very strategic terms, in supporting each other’s resistance. \n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "Corey: This\ninterdependent focus is\nimportant amongst settlers ourselves\nas a way to counter the flattening of differences that occurs amongst settlers, particularly in solidarity work. Settlers obviously need to be\nchallenging ‘our’ institutions and practices that\nfurther colonization. But we can’t do this if we flatten the differences and ignore the inequalities and power relationships that exist within settler society. Not only does such flattening prevent much needed alliances but flattening\ncan\nprotect\nelements of settler colonialism\nthe substantive recognition of Indigenous governance and legal orders also requires a dismantling of other, related forms of domination\nsites and spaces of domination and resistance are distinct, but\nconnected dialectically. This seems to be something that settlers, white settlers specifically, have yet to articulate and take up, critique and act against\nthis is\nmost evident in how settlers seem to be continuously waiting for instruction from Indigenous peoples on how to act\nRita\nIf we’re thinking about settler colonialism as a structure, how is it related to other modalities of gendered and sexualized white supremacy?\nIf we’re thinking about it, as non-Indigenous peoples being ‘in solidarity’, part of that is locating, attacking the whole structure of imperialism that is deeply gendered and homonationalist, that depends on neo-liberal projects of prioritizing able-bodied workers who can serve capitalism\nCorey: Part of this\nrelates to\nthe framing of ‘settler’ as event, rather than structure – where we are perhaps overly focused on the question of ‘who’ at the expense of the ‘how’. If we don’t understand how settlers are produced we run the risk of representing settlers as some sort of transhistorical subject with transhistorical practices\nwhile in one moment the term ‘settler’ denaturalizes\nall non-Indigenous peoples\npresence on Indigenous lands\nthrough this construction of the ‘settler’ as transhistorical, we renaturalize it\nwe go from a disavowal of colonization, to its representation as inevitable. Here is where\na historical materialist\napproach to the production of settler subjects may be useful in showing how this production is conditioned by but also contingent on a number of factors – white supremacy, hetero-patriarchy, capitalism, colonization, the eschewal of Indigenous governance and legal orders, environmental degradation, etc.\nit is\nimportant to recognize that there\nare\nindividuals\nor\ncollectives\nthat might be referred to as something other than settlers by Indigenous peoples, perhaps as cousins\nthere have been and are practices by settlers that aren’t colonial\nand here is where centering Indigenous peoples’ accounts of Indigenous-settler relations, as well as their own governance, legal and diplomatic orders is crucial\nit’s just as important to recognize that these relations have and do not occur despite settler colonial and imperial logics, and\noutside of the binary\nsuch relations occur in the face of it\nCorey\nrecognizing that settlers are (re)produced, the change demanded is not just an individual transformation, but one connected to broader social, economic, and political justice. There are\nlines of affinity between decolonization and others\nstruggles\nin order to sustain this compatibility\nrelationships are essential\nto maintain accountability and to resist repeating colonial and other relations of domination, as well as\nin supporting each other’s resistance", "role": "assistant" } ]

[ { "content": "Based on the argument in the tag, emphasize the rhetorically powerful parts of the text to support the argument. \n\nTag: Alt’s paradigm crushes resistance to material aspects of colonialism by reducing all movements to a binary.", "role": "system" }, { "content": "Corey: This relational, interdependent focus is also important amongst settlers ourselves – perhaps as a way to counter the flattening of differences that occurs amongst settlers, particularly in solidarity work. Settlers obviously need to be doing our own work and challenging ‘our’ institutions and practices that serve to protect or further colonization. But we can’t do this if we flatten the differences and ignore the inequalities and power relationships that exist within settler society. Not only does such flattening prevent much needed alliances but flattening itself can actually work to protect certain elements of settler colonialism. For instance, white supremacy works to naturalize white settler presence. In terms of solidarity then, I find it problematic for myself, as a white, class privileged, cis-hetero, and able bodied male (as well as people like me) to demand other peoples to act in solidarity, while also not holding myself (and others like me) responsible and accountable to other forms of violence that may be a contributing factor to the further reification of structures that support settler colonialism, like the State. Now I’m not arguing for the continued eschewal of Indigenous governance and legal orders because others experience violence, but rather, that the substantive recognition of Indigenous governance and legal orders also requires a dismantling of other, related forms of domination. This latter dismantling I see as necessary but also insufficient for the dismantling of settler colonialism. These sites and spaces of domination and resistance are distinct, but also connected dialectically. This seems to be something that settlers, white settlers specifically, have yet to articulate and take up, critique and act against. And this is perhaps most evident in how settlers seem to be continuously waiting for instruction from Indigenous peoples on how to act. Rita: I wonder if this relational approach is a more useful direction for settler colonial studies, not unlike the kind of work you do Jeff, in thinking about colonialism in a global, comparative context. Jeff: And I think, the more you can make those links, the British occupation of Maori territory is directly related to HBC’s strategy to begin treaty making here... All those things are interrelated. They are shared, and they are seen as shared strategies. The other thing I see is this impulse to delocalize it... it’s always that kind of Free Tibet Syndrome... the further away acts of genocide are from your location, the more outrage expressed at these injustices. It’s a way of avoiding complicity, but it’s also a way of recasting the gaze. It’s like, ‘We’re not going to look right here, because this appears to be fairly peaceful’ And so it’s always that sort of re-directing away from localized responsibility, and almost magnifying impacts farther away. Rita: So what settler colonial studies does do, is help us relocate to locality, which is helpful. You mention the HBC. I wonder what was the relationship between the Hudson Bay Company in Canada and the East India Company or the East Africa Company? If we’re thinking about settler colonialism as a structure, how is it related to other modalities of gendered and sexualized white supremacy? How are the logics of State sovereignty and authority over nonwhite bodies connected? If we’re thinking about it, as non-Indigenous peoples being ‘in solidarity’, part of that is locating, attacking the whole structure of imperialism that is deeply gendered and homonationalist, that depends on neo-liberal projects of prioritizing able-bodied workers who can serve capitalism. Corey: Part of this, I think, what we’ve been discussing here, relates to what I sometimes see as the framing of ‘settler’ as event, rather than structure – where we are perhaps overly focused on the question of ‘who’ at the expense of the ‘how’. If we don’t understand how settlers are produced we run the risk of representing settlers as some sort of transhistorical subject with transhistorical practices. So I’m worried that while in one moment the term ‘settler’ denaturalizes our – that is all non-Indigenous peoples – presence on Indigenous lands, in the next, and through this construction of the ‘settler’ as transhistorical, we renaturalize it. In short, we go from a disavowal of colonization, to its representation as inevitable. Here is where I think a historical materialist or genealogical approach to the production of settler subjects may be useful in showing how this production is conditioned by but also contingent on a number of factors – white supremacy, hetero-patriarchy, capitalism, colonization, the eschewal of Indigenous governance and legal orders, environmental degradation, etc. Now this is also not to say that the binary of Indigenous/Settler isn’t accurate. I think its fundamental. Rather, I think it is possible and important to recognize that there have been, and are, individuals (or even collectives) that might be referred to as something other than settlers by Indigenous peoples, perhaps as cousins. Or in a similar vein, that there have been and are practices by settlers that aren’t colonial (and here is where centering Indigenous peoples’ accounts of Indigenous-settler relations, as well as their own governance, legal and diplomatic orders is crucial). But I think it’s just as important to recognize that these relations have and do not occur despite settler colonial and imperial logics, and thus outside of the binary. Rather, such relations occur in the face of it. The binary then is fundamental as the logics that uphold the binary cannot be ignored due to the existence of possiblly good relations as the logics that uphold the binary threaten those relations through the pursuit of the elimination of Indigenous peoples. Rita: Yet, how do we act in light of these entanglements, and with, rather than overcoming differences? Corey: Tuck and Yang (2012) had this really great article, “Decolonization is not a Metaphor.” In it, they talk about the importance of an ethics of incommensurability – a recognition of how anti-racist and anti-capitalist struggles are incommensurable with decolonization. But what I’ve been thinking about recently is whether these struggles are incompatible. For example, in the Indigenous resurgence literature, there is a turn away, but it’s also not an outright rejection. It also demands settlers to change. Yet recognizing that settlers are (re)produced, the change demanded is not just an individual transformation, but one connected to broader social, economic, and political justice. There are then, it seems, potential lines of affinity between decolonization and others, though incommensurable, struggles. And in order to sustain this compatibility in the face of incommensurability, relationships are essential in order to maintain accountability and to resist repeating colonial and other relations of domination, as well as, in very strategic terms, in supporting each other’s resistance. \n", "role": "user" }, { "content": "flattening of differences\ncan’t do this\nprevent\nalliances\ncan serve capitalism\nrun the risk\ntranshistorical subject with transhistorical practices\nrenaturalize it\nrepresentation as inevitable\nhistorical materialist\napproach\ncapitalism\naren’t colonial\noutside of the binary\nnot just an individual transformation\nconnected\nlines of affinity\nrelationships are essential", "role": "assistant" } ]