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[ { "answer_id": 41958, "body": "<p>Section 20a of the German Constitution added in 2002 states:</p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>Article 20a [Protection of the natural foundations of life and\n animals]</p>\n \n <p>Mindful also of its responsibility towards future generations, the\n state shall protect the natural foundations of life and animals by\n legislation and, in accordance with law and justice, by executive and\n judicial action, all within the framework of the constitutional order.</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>This adopts what American environmentalists would call a \"conservationist\" stance (i.e. that the environment including animals should be preserved for the benefit of people in the future) as opposed to an \"environmentalist\" stance (i.e. that the environment is intrinsically something entitled to protection in its own right and not just because of its future value to human beings).</p>\n\n<p>The German Civil Code (BGB) § 90a, adopted in 1990 (or 1998, it isn't entirely clear from my sources), states (in <a href=\"https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=615\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">the definitional introductory part of the Code (in English translation)</a>). This appears in a larger context as follows:</p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>Division 2 Things and animals</p>\n \n <p>Section 90 Concept of the thing</p>\n \n <p>Only corporeal objects are things as defined by law.</p>\n \n <p><strong>Section 90a Animals</strong></p>\n \n <p><strong>Animals are not things. They are protected by special statutes. They\n are governed by the provisions that apply to things, with the\n necessary modifications, except insofar as otherwise provided.</strong></p>\n \n <p>Section 91 Fungible things</p>\n \n <p>Fungible things as defined by law are movable things that in business\n dealings are customarily specified by number, measure or weight.</p>\n \n <p>Section 92 Consumable things</p>\n \n <p>(1)Consumable things as defined by law are movable things whose\n intended use consists in consumption or in disposal.</p>\n \n <p>(2)Movable things are also regarded as consumable if they are part of\n a warehouse store or another aggregate of things whose intended use is\n the disposal of the individual things.</p>\n \n <p>Section 93 Essential parts of a thing</p>\n \n <p>Parts of a thing that cannot be separated without one or the other\n being destroyed or undergoing a change of nature (essential parts)\n cannot be the subject of separate rights.</p>\n \n <p>Section 94 Essential parts of a plot of land or a building</p>\n \n <p>(1)The essential parts of a plot of land include the things firmly\n attached to the land, in particular buildings, and the produce of the\n plot of land, as long as it is connected with the land. Seed becomes\n an essential part of the plot of land when it is sown, and a plant\n when it is planted.</p>\n \n <p>(2)The essential parts of a building include the things inserted in\n order to construct the building.</p>\n \n <p>Section 95 Merely temporary purpose</p>\n \n <p>(1)The parts of a plot of land do not include things that are\n connected with the land only for a temporary purpose. The same applies\n to a building or other structure that is connected with a plot of land\n belonging to another by a person exercising a right over that land.</p>\n \n <p>(2)Things that are inserted into a building for a temporary purpose\n are not parts of the building.</p>\n \n <p>Section 96 Rights as parts of a plot of land</p>\n \n <p>Rights that are connected with the ownership of a plot of land are\n regarded as parts of the plot of land.</p>\n \n <p>Section 97 Accessories</p>\n \n <p>(1)Accessories are movable things that, without being parts of the\n main thing, are intended to serve the economic purpose of the main\n thing and are in a spatial relationship to it that corresponds to this\n intention. A thing is not an accessory if it is not regarded as an\n accessory in business dealings.</p>\n \n <p>(2)The temporary use of a thing for the economic purpose of another\n thing does not give it the quality of an accessory. The temporary\n separation of an accessory from the main thing does not deprive it of\n the quality of an accessory.</p>\n \n <p>Section 98 Commercial and agricultural inventory</p>\n \n <p>The following are intended to serve the economic purpose of the main\n thing:</p>\n \n <ol>\n <li><p>in the case of a building that is permanently equipped for commercial operations, in particular a mill, a smithy, a brewery or a\n factory, the machinery and other equipment intended for the business,</p></li>\n <li><p>in the case of a farm, the equipment and livestock intended for the commercial operations, the agricultural produce, to the extent that it\n is necessary to continue the farming until the time when it is\n expected that the same or similar produce will be obtained, and manure\n produced on the farm.</p></li>\n </ol>\n \n <p>Section 99 Fruits</p>\n \n <p>(1)Fruits of a thing are the products of the thing and the other yield\n obtained from the thing in accordance with its intended use.</p>\n \n <p>(2)Fruits of a right are the proceeds that the right produces in\n accordance with its intended use, in particular, in the case of a\n right to extract component parts of the soil, the parts extracted.</p>\n \n <p>(3)Fruits are also the proceeds supplied by a thing or a right by\n virtue of a legal relationship.</p>\n \n <p>Section 100 Emoluments</p>\n \n <p>Emoluments are the fruits of a thing or of a right and the benefits\n that the use of the thing or the right affords.</p>\n \n <p>Section 101 Division of fruits</p>\n \n <p>If a person is entitled to receive the fruits of a thing or of a right\n until a particular time or from a particular time on, he is entitled\n to the following, unless otherwise provided:</p>\n \n <ol>\n <li><p>the products and parts stated in section 99 (1), even if he is to receive them as the fruits of a right, to the extent that they are\n separated from the thing during the period of entitlement,</p></li>\n <li><p>other fruits to the extent that they are due during the period of entitlement; however, if the fruits consist in remuneration for\n permission of use or of enjoyment of fruits and benefits, in interest,\n in profit shares or other periodically paid income, the person\n entitled has a right to a share corresponding to the duration of his\n entitlement.</p></li>\n </ol>\n \n <p>Section 102 Reimbursement of costs of production</p>\n \n <p>A person who has a duty to hand over fruits may claim reimbursement of\n the costs of producing the fruits to the extent that they reflect\n proper business practices and do not exceed the value of the fruits.</p>\n \n <p>Section 103 Allocation of charges</p>\n \n <p>A person who has a duty to bear the charges on a thing or a right\n until a specified time or from a specified time on must, unless\n otherwise provided, bear the periodically recurring charges in the\n proportion of the period of time of his duty, and bear other charges\n to the extent that they are payable during the period of time in which\n he has the duty.</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>Some of the word choices are not the most idiomatic ways to translate into American legal English.</p>\n\n<p>A better translation for \"things\" would be \"tangible property\". A more natural translation of Section 90a in American Legal English would be:</p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>Animals are not property. They are protected by special statutes. They\n are governed by the provisions that apply to tangible personal\n property, with the necessary modifications, except insofar as\n otherwise provided.</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>Similarly, the word \"fruits\" while understandable, would more often be translated into American Legal English as \"proceeds\", and American law wouldn't really make the distinction between \"Fruits\" in Section 99, and \"Enoluments\" in Section 100, at all.</p>\n\n<p>Also, most American jurisdictions would, unlike Article 90a, usually focus on the distinction between \"pets\" or \"companion animals\" and property, while not doing so for livestock in most circumstances, as the German civil code does.</p>\n\n<p>One of the classic trick questions on the American bar exam is to set up a criminal law question involving what would an an assault or a murder, but to substitute a dog or a cat for a person, which transforms the crime into theft or vandalism, since in the criminal law, animals are generally treated as property subject to some specific exceptions for animal cruelty and blackmail.</p>\n\n<p>German law addresses to some extent that sense that trips up American law students each year, that this absolute treatment of animals as having merely property status, derived from English common law, is unduly harsh.</p>\n\n<p>Two recent law review articles explain what these recent changes in the legal status of animals in Germany mean.</p>\n\n<p>A <a href=\"https://www.animallaw.info/sites/default/files/vol10_p283.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">law review article from 2004</a> explores the important changes in the legal status of animals in Germany that occurred in 2002. The abstract of the article explains:</p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>In the summer of 2002, Germany welcomed animals into the folds of\n constitutional protection. With the addition of the words “and the\n animals,” Germany became the first country in the European Union\n (“E.U.”), and the second on the European continent,1 to guarantee the\n highest level of federal legal protection to its nonhuman animals.\n Though a welcomed development in the eyes of most Germans, this\n groundbreaking event received very little attention on the world\n stage. Common misconceptions about the ramifications of the\n constitutional amendment resulted in limited to no accurate\n representation in worldwide media. Likewise, international\n policymakers and animal protectionists have shown little awareness of\n this development and its potential implications. In addition to\n possible legal effects, the social implications of such an occurrence\n in a major western country are vast. International leaders will\n certainly take note as the effects of this change begin to take place\n in Germany’s laws and, increasingly, in its international policies.</p>\n \n <p>More importantly, the global animal protection community should take\n note of what is possible, and what can be learned from the\n achievements of Germany’s animal protection community. This study\n traces the legal and social developments leading to Germany’s\n constitutional amendment which provides protection to animals, showing\n how this legal highpoint was achieved. </p>\n \n <p>Multiple sources are used, including congressional, judicial, and\n party documents, press releases, international media reports, personal\n communication with leaders in four major German animal protection\n organizations, interviews with a key Ministry official, and published\n materials. </p>\n \n <p>This study will also critically assess the claims of the animal\n protection and opposition communities in order to predict where German\n animal law is going and what effects this change will have on the\n treatment of animals both within Germany and internationally.\n Concluding thoughts will address how the international animal\n protection community can understand this legal victory in a\n constructive context.</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>Footnote 1 in the abstract states: </p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>BV 1992 § 24 (in 1992, Switzerland recognized the inherent worth of\n animals (die W¨urde der Lebewesen) in its constitution). Federal laws\n of a similar manner exist in Germany (Animal Protection Law\n implemented Sept. 1, 1990, art. 90a Tierschutzgesetz in der Fassung\n der Bekantuachung (Tierschutzgesetz), v. March 25, 1998 (BGB 1 I 1094)\n [hereinafter Tierschutzgesetz], and Austria (Art. 285 ABGB implemented\n July 1, 1988), but Switzerland was the first country to acknowledge\n the interests of animals within its national constitution. This\n development had virtually no international impact, however, and\n receives little attention outside of Switzerland.</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>The abstract of <a href=\"https://www.animallaw.info/sites/default/files/lralvol16_2_p213.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">a 2010 law review article</a> on the topic further explains:</p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>In 2002, an animal protection clause was added to Article 20a of the\n German Constitution. Designed as a state objective, the nature of the\n animal protection clause decidedly influences its application. As a\n state objective, it is directed at all three branches of government,\n and each branch must ensure within its sphere of competence the\n realization of the stated goal. </p>\n \n <p>The Federal Constitutional Court has yet to address the precise scope\n of the provision. This Article examines the likely future effects of\n the animal protection clause. With respect to the legislative branch,\n this Article addresses the question of whether the state objective\n demands that a standing provision be created for animal protection\n groups. With respect to the judicial and executive branches, this\n Article focuses on three fundamental rights that are most likely to\n come into conflict with animal protection: freedom of religion;\n freedom of teaching, science, and research; and freedom of artistic\n expression. Seismic shifts in constitutional adjudication are not\n likely to be expected.</p>\n \n <p><strong>The provision does not give rights to animals. However, at a minimum,\n it prohibits circumventing the Animal Protection Act by construing\n that statute in light of the Constitution. The animal protection\n clause removed the disproportionality between certain fundamental\n rights and the interest in animal protection. It mandates a balancing\n of constitutional interests and eliminates doubts regarding the\n constitutionality of the Animal Protection Act, especially with\n respect to the fundamental rights discussed.</strong></p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "international", "germany", "comparative-law", "animals" ]

[ { "answer_id": 86274, "body": "<p>You are likely thinking of <em>United States v. The Progressive, Inc.</em>, <a href=\"https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/FSupp/467/990/1376343/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979)</a> and the related injunction against a letter by Charles R. Hansen. However, these were not prosecutions; they were applications by the United States for injunctions to prevent the publication of the material.</p>\n<p>The allegation relating to <em>The Progressive</em> was that an article due to be published would be in violation of the &quot;born secret&quot; clause of the <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_Energy_Act_of_1954\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Atomic Energy Act of 1954</a> (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2011 and following). The author was journalist Howard Morland.</p>\n<p>That act declares as <em>restricted</em> (see <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2014\" rel=\"noreferrer\">42 U.S.C. 2014</a>):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category pursuant to section 2162 of this title.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The U.S. argued:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>that its national security interest also permits it to impress classification and censorship upon information originating in the public domain, if when drawn together, synthesized and collated, such information acquires the character of presenting immediate, direct and irreparable harm to the interests of the United States.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>It is not universally accepted that the information was actually gleaned wholly from public knowledge, but that would not have made a difference to the government's position on the injunction.</p>\n<p>There was a related letter by Charles R. Hansen, containing instructions for a hydrogen bomb, that was also enjoined by the United States against being published in the <em>Daily Californian</em>. This was eventually the one actually first published, and is known colloquially as &quot;the Hansen Letter.&quot;</p>\n<p>Ultimately, after the <a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/09/17/paper-prints-h-bomb-letter-barred-by-us/daf6fe68-baed-4ed1-b0a6-156dbce370ee/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Hansen letter was published in <em>The Press Connection</em></a> and <a href=\"https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/09/19/second-paper-publishes-details-on-h-bomb/876f56d3-e2cb-4343-bc05-e1cafde209f4/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">the Chicago Tribune</a> (two publications not enjoined by court order), the government withdrew its request to prevent the publication, and the other publications went forward.</p>\n", "score": 16 }, { "answer_id": 91030, "body": "<p>As Jen said, there were no prosecutions but during the Manhattan Project, there were several investigations of possible leaks that discussed things remotely close to the actual work being conducted. One notable incident a cartoonist named Alvin Schwartz came under investigation of having received nuclear secrets from the Manhattan project employees after he penned and published a Superman story for the daily newspaper strip that use of the term &quot;cyclotron.&quot; At the time, cyclotrons were real devices that were used (and still used) to separate fissile material from non-fissile material. The investigation was halted after Shwartz explained that he first read the term in a &quot;Popular Mechanics&quot; article that was published over a decade prior to his own use of the term.</p>\n<p>It's important to note that any time classified tech is described accurately in fiction or public articles, the authors are typically investigated to identify the leaker who gave them the secrets. Tom Clancy was once investigated for describing near perfectly the working mechanics of some tech that allowed U.S. Submarines to run quietly. Turns out no one told Clancy, he had just read publicly available info and made an educated guess about what was going on and turned out to be incredibly accurate. In training to handle classified material, this is something that those holding a clearance of any type are trained to be aware of. Two documents that are not classified may, in combination, reveal classified info. For example, one document that reveals Mr. James Bond is an employee at MI6, another document might reveal that Mr. Bond filed for travel expenses to Moscow on February 14th, and a third document that confirms that Agent 007 arrived in Moscow alive and well on the 15th of February. Separately, they might not reveal much, but combined, it can be deduce that Agent 007 and James Bond are one and the same, which could prove bad for Mr. Bond, now that it's open knowledge it's assumed that Russia knows who he is. If he's still in Russia, this could get him arrested or killed. Let's hope Q doesn't leave his schematics lying around.</p>\n<p>It should also be noted that, in the U.S. at least, a journalist or other civilian with no access to classified documents is rarely prosecuted for publishing classified info but may be put under intense scrutiny as the assumption is that they are working with an insider to expose secrets. The investigation is usually looking for the source of the leak. In the case of someone who deduced it from publicly available info, this might be useful in determining how to write stuff for the public consumption to prevent it. In the case of an actual source feeding them something they should not know, it could be met with disciplinary action (At the very least, it's a good way to get yourself fired. At the worst, it's a jail sentence.).</p>\n<p>While Prior Restraint (Government action that prohibits speech or expression prior to it being made) is allowed in the U.S., it is under very limited circumstances that the publication of such information would &quot;would cause inevitable, direct, and immediate danger to the United States.&quot; (<a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prior_restraint\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Source</a>) As such, it's very rarely granted or enforced in modern U.S. Law.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-states", "freedom-of-speech", "legal-history", "secret", "national-security" ]

[ { "answer_id": 77397, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\">germany</a>\nI am reasonably sure that works like this would be Public Domain, i.e. not copyrighted in the first place. In Germany, copyright (or more precisely, <em>Author's Right</em>) can only be held by a <em>natural person</em>, which is a legal term of art that essentially means &quot;human being&quot;. There are two groups of natural persons involved here: the programmers and the creators of the works which are part of the training set. However, I can't see how either group could have a reasonable claim of copyright.</p>\n<p>Note: there have been similar discussions about GitHub Copilot, an AI that writes code for you. It is my understanding that the process used by GitHub Copilot is roughly comparable to the process used here. With GitHub Copilot, there have been instances where significant snippets which are part of the training set have appeared in the output with only minor alterations. In this case, it is likely that the original author will have copyright over that portion of the output.</p>\n<p>However, <em>IFF</em> a human being were actually involved in <em>selecting</em> specific works, then there is probably a copyright based on the creative decision of selecting <em>this particular</em> work and rejecting all the others. This is similar to the classic textbook example of a driftwood sculpture: the creative process here is not creating the sculpture but choosing to pick up <em>this particular</em> piece of driftwood instead of the hundreds of others on the beach.</p>\n<p>So, if you simply generate these works and publish <em>all of them</em>, there is no copyright. If you generate a large batch and then <em>select</em> a certain number, then the person who made the selection might hold a copyright.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 94077, "body": "<h2>The work is public domain</h2>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/australia\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-australia-tooltip-container\">australia</a></p>\n<p>To have original copyright a work must have a <a href=\"http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca1968133/s32.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">qualified person</a> as author: “qualified person means an Australian citizen or a person resident in Australia.”</p>\n<p>The <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2023C00068\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Regulations</a> extend coverage to works published in international jurisdictions “as if the foreign work or subject‑matter were made or first published in Australia.” So, the still require a “qualified person” but the definition would be changed to substitute the foreign nationality/residence.</p>\n<p>Australian courts have held that AI can be listed as inventors (but not owners) of patents, the Patents Act does not require an inventor to be a person the way the Copyright Act does for an author. Current <a href=\"https://www.maddocks.com.au/insights/whos-work-copyright-in-ai-generated-artwork\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">case law</a>, <em>Telstra Corp Ltd v Phone Directories Co Pty Ltd</em> [2010] FCAFC 149, found that a predominantly computer created telephone directory was not subject to copyright due to the absence of an author.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 94088, "body": "<h2>Nobody has a copyright</h2>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-states\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-states-tooltip-container\">united-states</a></p>\n<p>A few years ago, there was a discussion <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monkey_selfie_copyright_dispute\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">if a monkey can have copyright</a>, but the case settled. Now, USPTO enacted a rule together with the library of congress on 16th march 2023, that <a href=\"https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/16/2023-05321/copyright-registration-guidance-works-containing-material-generated-by-artificial-intelligence\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">only a human can create a copyright interest.</a> See their rule (emphasis mine):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>II. The Human Authorship Requirement</p>\n<p>In the [Copyright] Office's view, it is well-established that copyright can protect only material that is the product of human creativity. Most fundamentally, the term “author,” which is used in both the Constitution and the Copyright Act, <strong>excludes non-humans</strong>. The Office's registration policies and regulations reflect statutory and judicial guidance on this issue.</p>\n<p>[...]</p>\n<p>III. The Office's Application of the Human Authorship Requirement</p>\n<p>[...]</p>\n<p><strong>When an AI technology determines the expressive elements of its output, the generated material is not the product of human authorship.[31] As a result, that material is not protected by copyright and must be disclaimed in a registration application.[32]</strong></p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 94090, "body": "<p>Since the &quot;contemporary artists&quot; have not been dead for 70 years, their works are copyrighted and may be used as training data only with an appropriate license, which should specify terms under which derived works can be produced and whether royalties must be paid in return.</p>\n<p>For practical purposes, that means it makes no real difference if the trainer, operator or prompt gives acquire partial copyright, their contribution is dwarfed by that of the artists that produced the original works.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 94060, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-kingdom\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-kingdom&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-kingdom&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-kingdom-tooltip-container\">united-kingdom</a></p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/48/contents\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">U.K. legislation</a> allows for computer-generated work to be the subject of copyright. A work is computer generated when the work is &quot;generated by computer in circumstances such that there is no human author of the work.&quot;</p>\n<p>Further,</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In the case of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the author shall be taken to be the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>However, it is <a href=\"https://www.shoosmiths.com/insights/articles/who-owns-the-ipr-in-ai-generated-artwork\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">widely recognized that this leaves ambiguity about who this would be in any given instance</a>.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "copyright", "artificial-intelligence" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94140, "body": "<p>No.</p>\n<p>There is no reason for anyone to believe that a country's Air Force would purchase a military jet fighter in reliance upon a comment made by the company in a promotional video intended for the general public. And, even if it did, generally &quot;buyer beware&quot; applies to international purchases of military equipment. It would not be reasonable for the UAE to rely on the video in question as authoritative. And, I very much doubt that the specifications of the jet fighter provided by the seller to the UAE military said the same thing.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "false-advertising", "uae", "government-contracts" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94117, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>I'm pretty sure the bank could go after the owner for any difference\nbetween the unpaid loan balance and what they're able to sell it for.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Incorrect. The news report states &quot;it ceased making payments toward the $725 million <strong>non-recourse</strong> CMBS loan&quot;.</p>\n<p>The term &quot;non-recourse&quot; means that the bank can't go after the owner and is limited to recovering its debt from the collateral.</p>\n<p>The term &quot;recourse&quot; means that the bank can go after the owner in a lawsuit for amounts still owed after the collateral is applied to the debt.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The question is, would something like this force them to write down on\ntheir GAAP financials the value of any other loans they've extended.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The bank extended the loan, so if the real property is worth less than the amount of the debt, the bank has to write off the balance of the debt on this secured loan. If the bank writes off the loan, it gets a tax deduction in the amount of the write off, however. The written off debt is also taxable income to Park Hotels &amp; Resorts Inc. to the extent that the company as a whole is not insolvent.</p>\n<p>In California, the &quot;default rule&quot; is that the owner occupied residential mortgages are non-recourse loans, but that loans secured by personal property and other mortgages are recourse loans. Unlike California and about four other states, owner occupied residential mortgages in other U.S. states are also recourse by default.</p>\n<p>A non-recourse loan on a mortgage of a hotel is not the default rule (even in California) and is contrary to usual commercial practice. Park Hotels &amp; Resorts Inc., in this case, obtained an extraordinarily favorable deal with CMBS (normally it would be a recourse loan with personal guarantees from all related companies and from multiple top executives and investors of the borrower), perhaps in exchange for a higher interest rate than it might otherwise have secured.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>answers relating to all jurisdictions would be fascinating, especially\nthose of England.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The way that real estate in financed in England is so profoundly different from U.S. practice that it isn't really possible to even analogize to this situation in California.</p>\n<p>For reasons related to tax laws, the structure of English mortgage laws, English insolvency laws, and the way that customary commercial real estate financial deals have evolved over time in England, the kind of deal that was struck between Park Hotels &amp; Resorts Inc. and CMBS in this case would have been structured completely differently if it had been done in England. It might be legal to do the same deal in England, but that isn't what firms trying to achieve the same objectives would actually have done.</p>\n<p>I know only enough about how real estate finance in handled in England in deals like this to know that it is completely different from how it is handled in the U.S. I am not familiar enough with real estate finance practices there to know how it would actually be done there.</p>\n", "score": 7 } ]

[ "loan", "mortgage" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94123, "body": "<p>See Shelter, &quot;<a href=\"https://england.shelter.org.uk/professional_resources/legal/renting/assignment/assignment_of_assured_and_assured_shorthold_tenancies\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Assignment of assured and assured shorthold tenancies</a>&quot;:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>Periodic assured and assured shorthold tenants</strong></p>\n<p>Periodic assured and assured shorthold tenants whose tenancy agreement says nothing about assignment cannot assign their tenancies unless their landlord consents. In this case, landlords may withhold consent for any reason, whether reasonable or not.</p>\n<p>A tenant who assigns the tenancy without consent leaves the assignee in a vulnerable position as this is a breach of a term of the tenancy and is a discretionary ground for possession. The exception to this is where a premium has been paid for the grant of tenancy, for example a tenancy deposit that is greater than one-sixth of the annual rent is a premium.</p>\n<p>Otherwise, where the tenancy agreement:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p>allows assignment freely and without consent, assignment is allowed</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>expressly makes provision for the tenant to assign with the landlord's consent, the tenant will be able to assign with consent and\nsuch consent cannot be unreasonably withheld</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>forbids assignment, an assignment would be a breach of the tenancy agreement and could be subject to possession action</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Fixed-term tenants</strong></p>\n<p>The rights of assured and assured shorthold tenants with fixed-term tenancies to assign their tenancies are governed by their tenancy agreements.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "england-and-wales", "tenancy-rules", "assured-shorthold-tenancy" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94069, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/england-and-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container\">england-and-wales</a></p>\n<p>There's no law specifying that shirts must be worn by people visiting shops or restaurants.</p>\n<p>As the owner or tenant of the property the business can set the rules for who is allowed entry and service, provided it does not discriminate based on a '<a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/part/2/chapter/1\" rel=\"noreferrer\">protected characteristic</a>' in the Equality Act.</p>\n<p>The business can set a 'dress code' and refuse entry to people who are not dressed to code.</p>\n<p>If a rule says &quot;no topless people&quot; that's OK. If a rule says &quot;men must not be topless&quot; then on the face of it that's unlawful discrimination. If a rule requires smart footwear that's OK. If a rule says &quot;women must wear high heels&quot; then on the face of it that's unlawful discrimination.</p>\n<p>Generally the business can refuse to serve a person and require the person to leave the premises. If the person refuses to leave then they commit the civil tort of trespass. If the person then obstructs the lawful activity of the business or damages its property then they commit the criminal offence of aggravated trespass.</p>\n", "score": 18 }, { "answer_id": 94065, "body": "<p>In the U.S. there is frequent signage on store and restaurant fronts that amounts to a &quot;No shirt, no shoes, no service&quot; message. This would likely fall under a pre-emptive &quot;Trespass&quot; warning as the store owner can refuse to allow a sale transaction to go through and ask the offender to leave if they do not comply. At this point, if the offender refuses to comply and leave, they could be charged with trespassing.</p>\n", "score": 12 }, { "answer_id": 94087, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/spain\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;spain&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;spain&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-spain-tooltip-container\">spain</a></p>\n<p>This has been in the <a href=\"https://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/world-news/latest-spain-tourist-rules-including-27355209\" rel=\"noreferrer\">UK news</a> (WalesOnline, which is where I happened to read it) recently - in some areas of Spain there are laws, and not just about inside certain establishments:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In hotspots such as Barcelona and Majorca, topless men and women wearing bikinis face fines of up to €300 (£253) if they’re spotted walking around away from the beach. This can also include adjacent streets - so keep your shirts and cover-ups on until you hit the sand.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Or in the <a href=\"https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/spain/safety-and-security\" rel=\"noreferrer\">words of the UK Foreign Office</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In some parts of Spain it’s against the law to be in the street wearing only a bikini or swimming shorts. Being bare-chested is also illegal in some areas in Spain. You may be fined if you’re caught wearing swimwear on the seafront promenade or adjacent streets.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 7 } ]

[ "england-and-wales", "any-jurisdiction" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94030, "body": "<h2>A Presidential Pardon does not affect the States at all</h2>\n<p>A president clearly can not pardon himself for a state crime, because the president does not have that as an enumerated power. Presidential pardons are limited in the Constitution, Article II Section 2 Clause 1.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The President... shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for <strong>Offenses against the United States</strong>, except in Cases of Impeachment.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>A person convicted of a state crime is not convicted of an offense against the United States, and thus, the conviction does not become moot by a presidential pardon. He stays incarcerated, as he is still convicted in the state prison and not pardoned of the state crime.</p>\n<p>It takes a pardon from the state's governor to pardon a crime on the state level.</p>\n<h2><a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/22562/can-president-of-the-united-states-pardon-himself-if-convicted-of-treason-or-som\">It's unclear if a president can pardon themselves</a></h2>\n<p><a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/a/22571/10334\">Ohwilleke's excellent answer</a> covers the problem of a person being president trying to pardon themselves of a federal crime.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "constitutional-law", "us-constitution", "president", "pardon" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94085, "body": "<p>If the seller of a company signed an NDA, that NDA would make it illegal <em>for them</em> to tell you whatever the NDA covers (except there may be legal requirements that would override an NDA).</p>\n<p>That doesn't mean you cannot find out in any other legal way. For example, the company's accountant most likely knows a lot of things, and if they didn't sign an NDA, they may be free to tell you. Obviously the government will know things, as you said, the company had to be registered, the sale had to be registered, and you can't just close a company down and make it disappear. Especially since any obligations of the company will continue to exist for many years.</p>\n<p>Say the company in question bought office furniture from you and was supposed to pay in 60 monthly installments. Selling the company doesn't stop that, closing the company down won't stop that, signing an NDA won't stop that. You will still be able to find the company and make them pay.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-states", "california", "non-disclosure" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94106, "body": "<h2>YES in <a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a></h2>\n<blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stvo_2013/__23.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">§23 StVO</a></p>\n<p>(1a) Wer ein Fahrzeug führt, darf ein elektronisches Gerät, das der Kommunikation, Information oder Organisation dient oder zu dienen bestimmt ist, nur benutzen, wenn</p>\n<ol>\n<li>hierfür das Gerät weder aufgenommen noch gehalten wird und [...]</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(1a) Whoever is driving a vehicle may only use an electrical device that is serving communication, information, or organization or destined to be used for this if... 1. they don't pick the device up or hold it and [...]</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>That is <strong>plenty</strong> clear: holding the device is banned in any way, and implies using it under German legal precedent.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 94111, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p><em>&quot;The observer can only observe that the holder is holding the phone and can't determine if they are using it or not. This is my opinion of the matter. Thus, in a democratic society, the holder of a phone decides if he/she is using it or not.&quot;</em></p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Your opinion is irrelevant. It's why the <strong>United Kingdom</strong> has tightened up the law. Holding a phone while driving, even when stationary, is an offence except in a few limited circumstances.</p>\n<p>The <a href=\"https://srb.co.uk/driving-whilst-holding-a-mobile-phone-is-now-illegal/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Solicitors Regulation Authority</a> says</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>Laws have changed for driving and using a mobile phone</strong></p>\n<p>Driving whilst using a mobile phone for texting or calling has been illegal since 2003. However, the law did not cover holding a mobile phone which allowed using social media or playing a game.</p>\n<p>As of 2022, it is illegal to hold a mobile phone whilst driving. Breaking this law could lead to a £200 fine and 6 points on your licence.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Anyway, if you are holding a phone you are not in proper control of the vehicle. The UK's Highway Code <a href=\"https://www.gov.uk/guidance/the-highway-code/using-the-road-159-to-203\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">rule 160</a> states</p>\n<blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li>drive or ride with both hands on the wheel or handlebars where possible. This will help you to remain in full control of the vehicle at all times.</li>\n</ul>\n</blockquote>\n<p>This means unless you are operating the gear lever, or auxiliary controls, with the other hand. You must be in proper control of the vehicle at all times.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 94107, "body": "<p>It depends on the statute being interpreted.</p>\n<p>For example, in <a href=\"/questions/tagged/british-columbia\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;british-columbia&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;british-columbia&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-british-columbia-tooltip-container\">british-columbia</a>, s. 214.2(1) of the <em>Motor Vehicle Act</em> prohibits &quot;holding [an electronic device] in a position in which it may be used.&quot;</p>\n<p>Under such a statute, it doesn't matter whether it is actually in use, but only whether it <em>may</em> be used.</p>\n<p>And in <em>R. v. Tannhauser</em>, <a href=\"https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcca/doc/2020/2020bcca155/2020bcca155.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">2020 BCCA 155</a> the Court of Appeal held that even when the phone is turned off, it is still an &quot;electronic device&quot; within the meaning of the prohibition:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>[52] ... a cellphone that is turned off can be turned on; a cellphone with a dead battery can be plugged in (see <em>R. v. Jahani</em>, <a href=\"https://www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/2017/2017bcsc745/2017bcsc745.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">2017 BCSC 745</a>, where a ticket was upheld for a person who did just that); a cellphone with software limiting its functionality can, potentially, be used to disable that software.</p>\n<p>[53] Importantly, the legislature’s intention to promote road safety supports this reading. All of the above actions have the potential to distract the driver. The purpose of public protection is served by understanding that this form of distracted behaviour is indeed prohibited.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/a/91411/46948\">Statutes can redefine or deem words to have particular meanings</a>, including by deeming the word &quot;use&quot; to include things that would not be typically considered &quot;use.&quot; This is not an attempt to alter the metaphysical reality. It is simply constructing <em>legal</em> meaning.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 94108, "body": "<h2>why would that matter?</h2>\n<p>Lawmakers are not stupid, that’s why in every jurisdiction I know of, the offence is <strong>holding</strong> the phone.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "legal-terms" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94104, "body": "<p>The situations cannot reasonably be compared legally. In <a href=\"https://casetext.com/case/wynn-v-vilsack\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Wynn v. Vilsack</a>, a motion for preliminary injunction was granted (and the program was <em>not</em> ruled unconstitutional). In the ruling, the court found that the evidence &quot;does not support a finding that USDA continues to be a participant, passive or active, in discrimination&quot;, and does find that there were past successful remediation efforts, thus &quot;the Court expresses serious concerns over whether the Government will be able to establish a strong basis in evidence warranting the implementation of Section 1005's race-based remedial action&quot;, moreover &quot;Plaintiff has convincingly shown that the relief provided by Section 1005 is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest&quot;. The court finds that there is a good-enough case that the law fails strict scrutiny. Incidentally, Congress repealed that law.</p>\n<p>On the other hand, in Evanston, we have no facts or concrete legal allegations (e.g. drafts of a legal complaint). The <a href=\"https://cityofevanston.civicweb.net/document/50624/Adoption%20of%20Resolution%2037-R-27,%20Authorizing%20the.pdf?handle=E11C7B73E1B6470DA42362AB80A50C46\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">cited memorandum</a> is a recommendation, not a law. There does exist at least one available <a href=\"https://www.cityofevanston.org/home/showpublisheddocument/90573/638249272128130000\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">council action from 2019</a> which says that</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The Chief Financial Officer is hereby authorized to divert all adult\nuse cannabis funds received by the Illinois Department of Revenue for\nsales of adult use cannabis to a separate fund in a City account for\nlocal reparations. SECTION 3: The City may receive donations to this\nfund from separate organizations, corporations, and individuals\nestablished herein by the City Council.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The city also has <a href=\"https://www.cityofevanston.org/government/city-council/reparations\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">a page</a> referring to Ordinance 102-O-20 (not available) indicating that &quot;The Committee will work with residents, City staff and experts to explore and identify programs and opportunities to be supported by the Reparations Fund&quot;. The <a href=\"https://www.cityofevanston.org/home/showpublisheddocument/66184/637677439011570000\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Program Guidelines</a> §3 indicates that a person may be eligible for money if they are an ancestor, direct descendant, or &quot;other&quot; who has suffered from a &quot;City ordinance, policy, or procedure that served to discriminate against the Applicant in the area of housing&quot;. It thus does not exclude Asian and Hispanic homeowners, LGBTQIA2S+, Catholic, Muslims or anyone else, except insofar as a Catholic was not demonstrably the victim of such discrimination. The city also provides an <a href=\"https://www.cityofevanston.org/home/showpublisheddocument/67191/637715545144570000\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">extensive historical study</a> of past government discrimination in housing. You may be able to eke out more concrete information on what they have done <a href=\"https://www.cityofevanston.org/government/boards-commissions-and-committees/reparations-committee\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">here</a>, at the reparations committee website.</p>\n<p>In terms of <em>potential</em> differentia between the USDA program and the Evanston program, the most obvious difference would be in terms of prior remediation efforts. If you sue Evanston for their program, they could defend the program as providing the remediation that justifies the program – which had already been provided in the USDA program.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "united-states", "fourteenth-amendment" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94076, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a></p>\n<p>The term &quot;child&quot; is expressly defined for various offences. For example, for <a href=\"https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/section-172-20190919.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">s. 172</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>child means a person who is or appears to be under the age of eighteen years.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The offence of &quot;<a href=\"https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/section-163.1.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">child pornography</a>&quot; is expressly defined to relate to &quot;a person who is or is depicted as being under the age of eighteen years.&quot;</p>\n<p>The offence of &quot;<a href=\"https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-46/section-172.1-20150717.html#wb-cont\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">child luring</a>&quot; has several variants, for luring those who are or who the accused believes to be under the age of 18, 16, or 14. They are all called &quot;child luring.&quot;</p>\n<p>Other sections criminalize conduct in relation to a child without defining the term. See e.g. <a href=\"https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-46/section-243.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">s. 243</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Every person who in any manner disposes of the dead body of a child, with intent to conceal the fact that its mother has been delivered of it, whether the child died before, during or after birth, is guilty...</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>For s. 243, courts had to conduct statutory interpretation in order to determine the meaning of the word &quot;child.&quot; The Supreme Court of Canada held that &quot;child&quot; in this offence includes children born alive and fetuses that were likely to have been born alive. See <em>R. v. Levkovic</em>, <a href=\"https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/13031/index.do\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">2013 SCC 25</a>.</p>\n<p>I know this is Canadian law, rather than Massachusetts law, but one thing you can take away from this is that terms can take on distinct legal meanings from one provision to another. And where a term is not expressly defined in statute, its meaning will be enunciated by a court. These meanings need not line up with the definitions you find in a dictionary.</p>\n<p>But, for a general description from a specialized dictionary, see <em>Black's Law Dictionary</em>, 10th ed. (2014):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>child</strong>. <strong>1</strong>. An unemancipated person under the age of majority. <strong>2</strong>. <em>Hist</em>. At common law, a person who has not reached the age of 14. <strong>3</strong>. A boy or girl; a young person. <strong>4</strong>. A son or daughter. <strong>5</strong>. A baby or fetus.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 7 }, { "answer_id": 94075, "body": "<p>&quot;Child&quot; in the US typically means a minor, someone who is not yet 18. Someone would be either a child or an adult. Your belief in coded language for some reason is not part of this legal definition.</p>\n<p>Child can also mean offspring, say in the use of wills.</p>\n<p>If different definitions are used, they would be defined in the applicable law.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://thelawdictionary.org/child/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Black's Legal dictionary</a></p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 94091, "body": "<p>In the case of Massachusetts (Mass.) the definition of &quot;child&quot; means different things depending on the laws in question. Generally, a &quot;child&quot; for the purposes of the legal age of criminal prosecution is defined as any child younger than 12 years old at the time of the crime (Mass. has the highest age of criminal prosecution in the United States.) Federally, this age is any child younger than 11 years of age.</p>\n<p>In terms of Age of Consent (the legal age in which a person may give consent to a sexual relationship) is 16 years and over. Federally, this is 18 years or older.</p>\n<p>Legally speaking, 18 is the age at which a person is considered a legal adult (although I know few 18 year olds who have adult sensibilities... but I also know a few 60+ year olds who have no adult sensibilities... you're only young once but you can be immature forever as they say.). This means that you can legally vote, smoke, screw (if you're one of the prudish states that has 18 as the age of legal consent... like California.), and die for your nation (but you can't drown your sorrows until you're 21.). Additionally, unless you are legally emancipated, your rights can be restricted by a legal guardian (parents or other parental substitute).</p>\n<p>All people above the age of criminal liability but below the age of legal adulthood are also handled through a juvenile court system in the U.S. (I don't think this applies to federal courts as they don't have one, but they so rarely prosecute crimes compared to the state... let alone juvie crimes) although judges may grant exception for legal juviniles to be tried in adult court if the crime is serious enough (or they're close to legal adulthood either). Juvie Courts are less open than adult court and any juvenile record is sealed after the offender turns 18 (meaning that if you were a 13-year-old busted for taking the neighbor's car on a joy ride, it won't follow you to adulthood in the legal system. The public memory will not always forget).</p>\n<p>In your particular scenario, one of a few things could have happened. Either she was 16 at the time of the rape and did not consent, OR she was 15 at the time of the rape (which even if she did give consent, it doesn't matter as the law says she's not able to give it no matter what.) and has since had a 16th birthday while the trial makes its way through the courts. Another possibility is that the relationship involved someone who was traveling from out of state OR she traveled out of state to meet him, which makes this a crime that could involve the Federal Government, in which case, she is not yet 18 and thus it was a statutory rape (even if she was consenting to the encounter).</p>\n<p>Finally, the article or speaker who called her a child might not be using a legal sense of the word, but a more colloquial sense, in which case, the range is considerably broader (As a general rule, among the uninformed, child has a broad range. While she is a teenager, she is still young enough that she would be living with her parents and not yet ready to &quot;leave the nest&quot; as an adult would. Biologically speaking, humans have a long adolescent period compared to most animals, with a biological maturity taking as long as 25 years by some estimates.) and it's not uncommon for our language to reflect that. As such, the claim might not be one of legal childhood, but a frame of reference to remind adults that she's still got a lot of growing up to do and the accused rapist ignored that when he had sex with her. Remember, he's going to be judged by a jury of his peers... the prosecution wants them to use there vernacular understanding of her age, not their legal understanding.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 94101, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>I searched for the legal definition of a &quot;child&quot; under Massachusetts\nlaw and could not find any definition.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The definitions are right there in the criminal statutes. The relevant MA statutes are quite clear and different ages apply to different offenses. <em>See, e.g.</em>, the following:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>§ 22A. Rape of child; punishment</p>\n<p>Whoever has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a\nchild under 16, and compels such child to submit by force and against\nhis will or compels such child to submit by threat of bodily injury,\nshall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for\nany term of years. . . .</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 22A.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>§ 22B. Rape of a child during commission of certain offenses or by use\nof force; penalties</p>\n<p>Whoever has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a\nchild under 16, and compels such child to submit by force and against\nhis will or compels such child to submit by threat of bodily injury\nand: . . .</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 22B.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>§ 22C. Rape of a child through use of force by certain previously\nconvicted offenders; penalties</p>\n<p>Whoever has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a\nchild under 16, and compels such child to submit by force and against\nhis will or compels such child to submit by threat of bodily injury,\nand has been previously convicted of or adjudicated delinquent or as a\nyouthful offender for: indecent assault and battery on a child under\n14 as set forth in section 13B; aggravated indecent assault and\nbattery on a child under 14 as set forth in section 13B ½; indecent\nassault and battery on a person 14 or older as set forth in section\n13H; assault of a child with intent to commit rape as set forth in\nsection 24B; rape of a child with force as set forth in section 22A;\naggravated rape of a child with force as set forth in section 22B;\nrape and abuse of a child as set forth in section 23; aggravated rape\nand abuse of a child as set forth in section 23A; rape as set forth in\nsection 22; or a like violation of the laws of another state, the\nUnited States or a military, territorial or Indian tribal authority,\nshall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for\nany term of years, but not less than 20 years. . . .</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 22C.</p>\n<p><em>See generally</em> <a href=\"https://malegislature.gov/Laws/GeneralLaws/PartIV/TitleI/Chapter265\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265,</a> §§ 13b to 27a.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "criminal-law", "legal-terms", "massachusetts" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94100, "body": "<p>The general rule is that a warrant is required to enter private property (absent constitutional case law exceptions to the warrant requirement such as exigent circumstances and consent), and that a warrant is available only when there is probable cause that a crime has been committed.</p>\n<p>Whether the neglect or abuse of an animal constitutes a crime within the meaning of this 4th Amendment requirement could potentially be seen as a gray area, since historically, in the absence of statutory authority in early common law, an owner of an animal had absolute authority to deal with his or her property (the animal) as the owner of the animal saw fit.</p>\n<p>The purpose of the statute is to clarify that this conduct by an animal owner constitutes a crime for 4th Amendment search and seizure purposes by making a state law determination that it is a crime, which states can do, even though they can't change the constitutional requirement under the 4th Amendment.</p>\n<p>Also, just because a state can authorize law enforcement to get a warrant for any search authorized by the U.S. Constitution, that doesn't mean it has to allow law enforcement to do so in every case where it is constitutional for the state to do so.</p>\n<p>The duty to get a warrant for law enforcement to enter onto private property at all arises not only from other state statutes, but also from the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (as incorporated to apply against state and local governments though the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).</p>\n<p>But, the constitutional requirement has case law exceptions, so it isn't required in all circumstances. In particular, exigent circumstances, and the consent to entry exceptions, which are allowed by constitutional criminal procedure case law, could apply to the requirement to get a warrant in the first place.</p>\n<p>But, law enforcement needs to have the authority to search at all with a warrant under state law, for an exception to the warrant requirement to be relevant. This statute appears to carry out that purpose by authorizing searches for this particular purpose. For what it is worth, it is not the best drafted possible statute to achieve this objective, and it could have been written to be more clear, but it still gets the job done.</p>\n<p>So, in answer to the top-line question, no, I wouldn't read this statute as requiring a warrant in every possible circumstance in order to go onto private property to check on an animal, although a warrant would be required in every case where an exception to the warrant requirement under 4th Amendment case law does not apply.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Section 578. Is an animal related statute rather than people.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The people involved are the property owners. The property owner's rights in their real property are potentially infringed if there is a warrantless entry.</p>\n<p>The human beings owning the animals are potentially violating a law which the State of Missouri wants law enforcement officers to be able to enforce (the relevant laws are <a href=\"https://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneChapterRng.aspx?tb1=578.005%20to%20578.023\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">the state animal cruelty and agricultural laws expressly referenced in the statute</a>, so, it is irrelevant that &quot;Barry County Missouri has no animal control laws or leash laws&quot;).</p>\n<p>Among other things these statutes make it a crime if a person &quot;Has custody or ownership of an animal and fails to provide adequate care[.]&quot; As the question claims that: &quot;The definition &quot;Adequate care&quot; is vague as well.&quot; But the question also notes that: &quot;The 578 statute has been challenged for being unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary which was overruled but that was serious abuse case.&quot;</p>\n<p>The state has a right to decide what is and is not illegal. It is not prohibited from banning treatment of animals that is not serious abuse. The state has every right to make it a crime to fail to provide adequate care for an animal, even if that failure to provide adequate car does not constitute severe abuse.</p>\n<p>Also, keep in mind that a lawful search requires only probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and a good faith belief that an exception to the warrant requirement is present.</p>\n<p>If the law enforcement officer has a good faith belief that the animal will die or seriously suffer or be hidden by the owner in the time that the law enforcement officer reasonably thinks that it will take to get a warrant, the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies.</p>\n<p>The fact that the lawful search later reveals that a crime was no committed does not mean that the search was improper. A mere belief that an animal was abused or neglected and that exigent circumstance were present with a reasonable factual basis (e.g. a tip from a neighbor who seems credible and claims to have personal knowledge of the facts) will usually suffice to establish probable cause.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>So warrant needed or not? and if so, what legal action can be taken\nfor trespass, rights violations under color of law etc. if any?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>If there is a search without a warrant or probable cause was not present, and an exception to the warrant requirement does not apply, and the property owner believes that their 4th Amendment rights were intentionally violated by law enforcement in the warrantless search in violation of clearly established law to the contrary, a civil lawsuit against the law enforcement officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be brought in state or federal court.</p>\n<p>The employer of the law enforcement officer can be sued as well, under the same statute, if the warrantless search in violation of the clearly established constitutional right was made pursuant to an express policy of the law enforcement officer's employer. But the fact that the law enforcement officer violated someone's rights does not automatically make the law enforcement officer's employer civilly liable for the wrong.</p>\n<p>In most U.S. states, law enforcement officers are protected by state law governmental immunity from common law trespass lawsuits for their conduct while carrying out their official duties, but I haven't checked specifically to see if that is the case in Missouri.</p>\n<p>A claim of a 4th Amendment violation can also be a ground for suppressing evidence obtained with an unlawful search when defending a prosecution under some ordinance or statute that relies upon that evidence.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "police", "missouri" ]

[ { "answer_id": 85403, "body": "<p>In the UK, in general, they would have to take reasonable steps to ensure their safety. A museum has to ensure the safety of legitimate visitors, and also trespassers if it can <a href=\"https://www.insolvencydirect.bis.gov.uk/freedomofinformationtechnical/technicalmanual/ch1-12/chapter8/part7/part_7.htm\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">reasonably foresee a hazard</a> that a trespasser would encounter. However gluing oneself to a wall is not a normal hazard of museums, and anything that followed from that act (e.g. injuring yourself when you collapsed due to lack of sleep) would fall under the &quot;<a href=\"https://www.blytheliggins.co.uk/an-author-of-your-own-misfortune/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">author of own misfortune</a>&quot; doctrine.</p>\n<p>I'm not aware of any specific precedents on point, but the principles above would seem to suggest that once someone has done such a thing, leaving them there would be a legal course of action, although the museum couldn't let them suffer from hunger or thirst (e.g. by leaving them there over a day when the museum is closed, or by preventing friends from bringing food or drink). Also the museum would have to let them try to free themselves, and allow anyone who might help to do so. They would probably have to permit any necessary damage to the property the protester was glued to as well, on the grounds that the protester is more important than the property (although civil and possibly criminal liability for the damage would follow).</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "united-kingdom", "protest", "trespassing" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94093, "body": "<p>The two primary factors that govern the outcome are laws on &quot;unapproved devices&quot; and &quot;practicing without a license&quot;. Carrots are only subject to ordinary food safety regulations in the US, and the outcome would not change by substituting broccoli, mustard, filet mignon, or &quot;lots of water&quot;. Drugs that are introduced on the market have to be approved by the FDA, but legacy foods do not. We are in the realm that requires no FDA approval of carrots. The line, for product-purveyors, is drawn by <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/21/321\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">21 USC 321(g)(1)</a>, and <a href=\"https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations/warning-letters/santhigram-kerala-ayurvedic-co-us-inc-625892-05192022\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">here</a> is an FDA warning letter to an Ayurvedic medical treatment maker / seller.</p>\n<p>There are ample law concerning &quot;practice of medicine&quot;, and there is the First Amendment which erects a strong barrier against laws which aim to prohibit people from disseminating an officially-unapproved viewpoint (to simplify matters, I presume – contrary to fact – that no medical authority has endorsed the specific efficacy of carrots). The government cannot punish you for taking approach A or B.</p>\n<p>If you have a license to practice medicine (of the relevant kind), you may be subject to state licensing-board sanctions for making unapproved claims (one of the factors that overrides the First Amendment). If you have no license, then the question is whether your activity falls within the realm of &quot;practicing medicine&quot; in the state. In Washington, the line is drawn via <a href=\"https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=18.71.011\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">RCW 18.71.011</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A person is practicing medicine if he or she does one or more of the\nfollowing: (1) Offers or undertakes to diagnose, cure, advise, or\nprescribe for any human disease, ailment, injury, infirmity,\ndeformity, pain or other condition, physical or mental, real or\nimaginary, by any means or instrumentality...</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Technically, you cannot advise a person to take an aspirin if they have a headache. However, this law is within the scope of business regulations, so part of the line not directly encoded in that definition (related to the requirement to have a license) is that you are doing this as a business.</p>\n<p>A person must have a state license in Washington to be a &quot;common school&quot; (K-12) teacher. Your gym teacher can tell you to eat carrots to cure your depression or whatever, and there is some (miniscule) chance that the teacher will get punished for giving such advice. A person does not have to have a license to be a university professor, therefore telling a student to eat carrots will lead to no government sanctions, though the employer may fire or reassign you, depending on circumstances. The crucial question is not whether you are advocating eating carrots, but what business you are engaged in, whereby in the course of that business you give advice. A person with a medical degree and license who is a greeter at Walmart is not subject to government sanctions for advising &quot;Eat carrots to cure your tumor / depression&quot;.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "licensing", "medical" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94071, "body": "<p>When Bob buys a thing, it becomes his, and it ceases to be the property of the seller. By &quot;buy&quot;, we understand that to mean &quot;pays for and receives physical control of&quot;. At that point, Bob is responsible to control of his new property. His ownership of the property is not contingent on him leaving the store.</p>\n<p>You might assign blame to the shop if they were negligent in some way, for example if they hire a thief to do the exit-check and the door guard takes Bob's property. Obviously, the thief is ultimately liable, but the store might under special circumstances be liable if they indirectly caused his loss. A store does not have an obligation to guarantee that a customer immediately and securely exits the store after making a purchase, so they are not liable for failing to immediately eject him from the store after buying the goods.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 94078, "body": "<h2>Bob’s loss</h2>\n<p>Unless there is a term in the contract where the seller maintains risk in the item until it leaves the premises. Such terms are not uncommon in contracts where a product is to be shipped but generally wouldn’t apply in a brick and mortar establishment.</p>\n<p>There is a case on point in <a href=\"/questions/tagged/australia\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-australia-tooltip-container\">australia</a> where a bank was not liable for money stolen from customers during a robbery in which the fly-up screens were activated - anything outside the screens, including a just made withdrawal that the customer had not touched was held to be at the customer’s risk. From memory, the bank may have covered the losses as a PR gesture even though they were not liable.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "england-and-wales", "liability", "theft", "any-jurisdiction", "private-property" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91119, "body": "<h2>The law presently doesn't define “dead”</h2>\n<p>Therefore each doctor must decide on the basis of their own knowledge and experience when someone is dead. In those circumstances, it is common for doctors to be unwilling to call a brain dead individual who still has respiratory and circulatory function “dead”, even if those functions require a machine.</p>\n<p>Contrast this with <a href=\"/questions/tagged/new-south-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-new-south-wales-tooltip-container\">new-south-wales</a>, a jurisdiction where the type of law reform proposed has already happened: <em>Human Tissue Act</em> 1983 <a href=\"http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/hta1983160/s33.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">s33</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>33 When death occurs</strong></p>\n<p>For the purposes of the law of New South Wales, a person has died when there has occurred--</p>\n<p>(a) irreversible cessation of all function of the person's brain, or</p>\n<p>(b) irreversible cessation of circulation of blood in the person's body.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 91121, "body": "<p>The details are fleshed out in <a href=\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4166875/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">this article</a>. Outside of India, jurisdictions differ as to whether they accept whole-brain-death vs. brain-stem death as &quot;death&quot;. The article points out that there is not widespread awareness of the relevant medical concepts in India (which impacts the laws that are enacted). Brain-stem death was &quot;legalized&quot; by <a href=\"https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/A1994-42.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">The Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994</a>. The act sort of defines the term:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>“brain-stem death” means the stage at which all functions of the\nbrain-stem have permanently and irreversibly ceased and is so\ncertified under sub-section (6) of section 3</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>but this is, apparently, insufficiently clear to practicing physicians, and there are or have been doubts about the legal procedure of certifying brain-death. Under the act, it is allowed to take organs <em>if</em> &quot;it appears to be a case of brain-stem death, [and] that such death has been\ncertified under sub-section (6)&quot;. Sub-section (6) allows but does not require a certification of brain-stem death, though one state, Maharashtra, passed a resolution making such a declaration mandatory.</p>\n<p>The article points out that there is little literature on the actual practices of brain-death determination, &quot;no sufficient evidence to determine the minimally acceptable observation period between clinical exams&quot;, and other medical issues which are discussed in the article.</p>\n<p>This means that physicians do face or have faced significant uncertainty as to when it is legal to remove organs for transplant. As a general rule, when there is considerable risk of personal liability associated with one's decisions and since great liability attaches to removing organs from a non-dead person, removing physician option (w.r.t. certification of brain-stem death) reduces physician probability of liability, therefore may increase the supply of available organs.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "death", "india" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94080, "body": "<h2>In general, signing means you cannot deny the accuracy of the information in the future</h2>\n<p>In general, there is no prohibition on knowingly stating falsehoods under the law. That is, it is not illegal to lie.</p>\n<p>Exceptions include when you are under penalty of perjury (e.g. on oath in court), when you are making certain declarations to government (e.g. your tax return), you are acting dishonestly to cause gain or harm others (e.g. fraud), etc.</p>\n<p>However, by signing the document, you may create a legal fact that is independent of the real-world facts. For example, if you sign a receipt for $1,000 then you create a legal presumption that you received $1,000 even if there was actually only $500 in the envelope. You would need some pretty spectacular evidence to overcome that presumption.</p>\n<p>Now, I don’t know what you are signing that has factual errors in it but, if they are material errors, don’t. Just don’t.</p>\n", "score": 23 }, { "answer_id": 94073, "body": "<p>Signing a document does not inherently mean anything, but it might commit you to something (a contract), or might constitute a sworn statement (an affidavit that you have never eaten pork). It is illegal (perjury) to knowingly make a false sworn statement, but it is not illegal to agree to something that you won't want to agree to (paying $100 per month rather than $10).</p>\n<p>If you e.g. affirm, as shown by your signature with an associated declaration that &quot;everything contained in this document is true to the best of my knowledge&quot;, that you intend to do X or that you have never done X but that is false, you can easily be sued, because you committed fraud. It could even be criminal perjury, in cases where the company asks questions that pertain to security clearances or things about bank accounts which often require swearing to facts, as required by law. It doesn't affect the validity of the contract, it bears on the punishment that you will receive for making false statements.</p>\n", "score": 6 } ]

[ "contract-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 32730, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>They come to her house excessively and have even told her if she has\nhouse guests they will arrest her. Can they really do that?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Absent special circumstances such as those discussed below, however, having house guests is not a crime, and some laws that purport to prohibit this are unconstitutional.</p>\n<p>But, there are a variety of proper and improper reasons that this could be happening, as well as some that are in a legal gray area.</p>\n<p>Clearly, the police are doing this for some reason, proper or improper, because it is a sustained pattern of conduct that seems to be singling out one person. But, without more of a factual context it is hard to tell what that reason is so that it is possible to determine whether or not their threat has a legal basis.</p>\n<p>Like most legal questions, the answer cannot be provided in a vacuum and a full factual context is necessary to know if the police conduct is illegal or not.</p>\n<p><strong>Valid Reasons</strong></p>\n<p><em>Part of A Pattern Of Evidence Showing A Suspected Vice Offense</em></p>\n<p>One possible subtext is that the police believe that the premises is a <em>de facto</em> house of prostitution, or that she is dealing drugs out of the house, even though they don't yet have the evidence to arrest her on those suspicions.</p>\n<p>The police could be implying in their threat to arrest her that the presence of &quot;house guests&quot; would give them probable cause to arrest her on suspicion of a vice offense such as prostitution or drug dealing.</p>\n<p><em>Municipal Ordinance Violations</em></p>\n<p>Many valid reasons involve municipal ordinances, almost all of which can be punished by arrest and incarceration just like a misdemeanor criminal offense, even when the ordinance does not describe conduct that would usually be considered to be criminal in nature.</p>\n<p>For example, municipal codes usually authorize law enforcement to arrest someone for a zoning violation, even though it would be very unusual to arrest someone for violating a zoning law.</p>\n<p>There are often municipal ordinances which limit how many house guests you can have at any one time in a single family house or apartment, such as fire codes and laws designed to prevent loitering and gang activity, and there are often rules that prohibit certain kinds of activities like loud and disorderly parties (especially where alcohol is served or available). But, these ordinances almost never prohibit all house guests.</p>\n<p>The police could think that she is operating a short term leasing operation (i.e. Air B-n-B) or hotel, in a place where this use of the property is banned by municipal ordinance, and it appears that her &quot;house guests&quot; fit this description.</p>\n<p>Many municipal ordinances impose curfews on minors, and someone could be arrested for having a party at which minor house guests are present after curfew under some of those municipal ordinances.</p>\n<p>Some municipal ordinances (or even sometimes state laws), which are not always constitutional or valid under federal housing laws, prohibit unrelated people from cohabiting, either because the cohabitation amounts to <em>de facto</em> polygamy, or because zoning laws prohibit more than a certain number of unrelated people from living at a residence.</p>\n<p><em>Valid Reasons Particular To Certain Individuals</em></p>\n<p>If someone is on probation or parole or house arrest or out on bail pending criminal charges, the conditions of that criminal sentence or bail condition could also limit the ability of someone to have house guests.</p>\n<p>For example, if someone had previously been convicted of disorderly conduct and noise violations and contributing to the delinquency of minors, with a wild party, a probation condition for that person might prohibit them from having house guests during the duration of the probation sentence.</p>\n<p>Similarly, many probation, parole and bail conditions, prohibit the person released in the community from associating with known felons or gang members.</p>\n<p>Civil or criminal protection orders can also prohibit particular people (e.g. ex-spouses) from being at a particular location.</p>\n<p>Many states impose restrictions on where sex offenders can reside that could be implicated in this case.</p>\n<p>A few states also have a criminal sanction of &quot;exile&quot; on the books that prohibits certain people from being in certain jurisdictions following their conviction.</p>\n<p><strong>Gray Area Reasons</strong></p>\n<p>It is also entirely possible that the police are asserting rights to do things that they don't actually have the right to do. And, in most jurisdictions in the U.S., it is not categorically unconstitutional for law enforcement officers to lie to members of the public about their authority or other matters, in order to achieve a law enforcement purpose, even if they would be violating the law if they followed through on their lies about what they are permitted to do.</p>\n<p><strong>Improper Reasons</strong></p>\n<p>There could also be clearly improper reasons for this conduct. For example:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p>perhaps a police officer wants men to say away from his ex-spouse or daughter, even though he has no right to do so and his colleagues are backing him up, or</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>perhaps the police think that her house guests are disreputable and are taking matters into their own hands without legal authority to keep &quot;bad people&quot; out of territory in their &quot;beat&quot;, or</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>perhaps they suspect but can't prove that she deals drugs or conducts some other sort of illegal activity at her residence, or</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>perhaps she is one of the few black residents of the neighborhood (or her house guests are black) and the police want to harass her to cause her to leave the neighborhood, and they don't think that she will be able to punish them for their misconduct effectively though legal channels before getting fed up and moving away. For example, if they make an arrest and can articulate some kind of alleged probable cause even if it doesn't hold up in court, they may be able to dramatically inconvenience this women with impunity, particularly if the local trial court judges that would consider the arrest decide to side with the police even when misconduct would be clear to a neutral observer.</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 5 }, { "answer_id": 32729, "body": "<p>The police legally cannot arrest a person for having guests. They can come to the house to talk to the owner, or others who are there. They can arrest a person if they have probable cause that a crime was committed or is being committed, such as murder or disturbing the peace. </p>\n\n<p>Suppose that owner A habitually invites over guests who disturb the peace. Someone could file a complaint requesting that A be enjoined from having more that 3 guests, or something like that, aimed at stopping the noise that accompanies these visits. The court might then issue a temporary restraining order or a permanent injunction for some cause. Were there such an injunction, violating it is a crime, and A could be arrested. The police cannot, however, \"take the law into their hands\" and issue an injunction – that comes from a court.</p>\n\n<p>Supposing that there is no such court order, and supposing that the police simply have it in for A, A can try to sue the city for harassment, including a <a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1983\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">federal civil rights lawsuit</a>. Whether or not A will succeed depends on what the actual facts are.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "criminal-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94004, "body": "<h2>You don't have to interact with people if you don't want to</h2>\n<p>If you don't want to talk or otherwise interact with somebody in a personal capacity, you don't have to. Your reasons for doing so are your reasons.</p>\n<p>Some of the congregation may have roles that require them to interact with Jane in what I will loosely call an &quot;official&quot; capacity. For example, if one of the congregants is a government employee and government business requires the interaction, they would have to do so.</p>\n<p>It gets a little tricky when there is not a clear legal duty to interact. For example, if a congregant is an employee of a company with which Jane has business and who would normally be the person to interact with Jane, they might reasonably claim that they have a religious belief that prevents them from doing so. Anti-discrimination law may require the employer to make reasonable accommodations for that belief, for example, by getting a different employee to interact with Jane.</p>\n", "score": 16 }, { "answer_id": 94009, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a></p>\n<p>See <em>Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada St. Mary Cathedral v. Aga</em>, <a href=\"https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/18895/index.do\" rel=\"noreferrer\">2021 SCC 22</a>.</p>\n<p>In that case, two members of a religious organization were expelled. The Court held that any remedy would have to be found in legal rights such as &quot;rights in property, contract, tort or unjust enrichment ⸺ and statutory causes of action.&quot;</p>\n<p>In many circumstances, &quot;there [is] no legal right attached to the plaintiff’s membership in his religious congregation&quot; and therefore the courts will have &quot;no jurisdiction to determine whether [they were] properly expelled.&quot;</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In sum, courts can only intervene in the affairs of a voluntary association to vindicate a legal right, such as a right in property or contract. Membership in a voluntary association is not automatically contractual. Even a written constitution does not suffice. Membership is contractual only where the conditions for contract formation are met, including an objective intention to create legal relations. Such an intention is more likely to exist where property or employment are at stake. It is less likely to exist in religious contexts, where individuals may intend for their mutual obligations to be spiritually but not legally binding. A voluntary association will be constituted by a web of contracts among the members only where the conditions for contract formation are met.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 13 }, { "answer_id": 94008, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/usa\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;usa&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;usa&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-usa-tooltip-container\">usa</a></p>\n<h1>You have a constitutional right to associate with whom you please</h1>\n<p>The Supreme court has long held that the 1st amendment right to free speech, assembly, and petition also includes the freedom of association.</p>\n<p>This right to association can be on cultural, religious and/or political grounds and the religious grounds are established.</p>\n<p>This would ostensibly also include the right to not associate with people who have religious, political or cultural ideals you find abhorrent.</p>\n<h2>How Free Speech Rights Protect the Freedom to Associate</h2>\nConstitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation\n<blockquote>\n<p>It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the\nadvancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the\n'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth\nAmendment, which embraces freedom of speech. Of course, it is\nimmaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association\npertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and\nstate action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to\nassociate is subject to the closest scrutiny. It appears from the\nCourt's opinions that the right of association is derivative from the\nFirst Amendment guarantees of speech, assembly, and petition, although\nit has at times been referred to as an independent freedom protected\nby the First Amendment. The doctrine is a fairly recent construction,\nthe problems associated with it having previously arisen primarily in\nthe context of loyalty-security investigations of Communist Party\nmembership, and these cases having been resolved without giving rise\nto any separate theory of association.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/377/288.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">source - 1</a> <a href=\"https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/361/516.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">source - 2</a></p>\n", "score": 10 }, { "answer_id": 94027, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/usa\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;usa&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;usa&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-usa-tooltip-container\">usa</a></p>\n<p>Any law enabling such a tort would violate at least 3 Constitutionally-protected rights in the U.S.</p>\n<p>The government is explicitly forbidden by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution from &quot;prohibiting the free exercise&quot; of religion. The circumstances under which the government can prohibit either an individual person or a religious organization from exercising the tenets of their religion are quite narrow and this does not approach such a circumstance.</p>\n<p>Next up is freedom of expression. This emanates from the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Expression also can only be limited by the government under exceptionally narrow circumstances. Even <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Socialist_Party_of_America_v._Village_of_Skokie\" rel=\"noreferrer\">holding an openly neo-Nazi demonstration through a heavily-Jewish town</a> is considered protected free speech. While there are a few exceptions (for example, slander or incitement,) a church expressing disagreement with a former member's actions by not associating with them doesn't come remotely close to any exception to freedom of expression.</p>\n<p>And that 'associating' part brings us to the third reason such a ruling could not be legal: freedom of association. While, unlike freedom of speech and freedom of religious practice, freedom of association isn't explicitly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, courts have ruled that <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NAACP_v._Alabama\" rel=\"noreferrer\">the right to associate</a> or <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boy_Scouts_of_America_v._Dale\" rel=\"noreferrer\">to not associate</a> with others is protected by the U.S. Constitution, especially when that association (or non-association) is expressive in nature.</p>\n<p>It's also worth noting that Jane herself is exercising exactly these three rights in deciding to cease certain religious practices, no longer associate with her former church, and express her disagreement with their views. She would literally be suing them for doing the same things that she herself is doing.</p>\n", "score": 7 } ]

[ "united-states", "religion", "colorado" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94070, "body": "<p>An NDA is a contract between parties, hence the &quot;A&quot; which stands for &quot;agreement&quot;.</p>\n<p>If the buyer asks for an NDA with those terms as a part of the deal and the seller agrees to it, then yes, it's possible. If the seller does not agree to the NDA terms, then further negotiations may lead to an agreement. Otherwise the buyer may choose to not complete the purchase.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "non-disclosure" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94059, "body": "<p>Yes. For example, corporations can own copyright.</p>\n<p>They may own copyright after <a href=\"https://ised-isde.canada.ca/site/canadian-intellectual-property-office/en/copyright/transfer-ownership\" rel=\"noreferrer\">assignment</a> (this is true across much of the commonwealth and in the U.S.).</p>\n<p>In some jurisdictions, <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/a/87607/46948\">when a work is made for hire, the employer may be deemed the author and initial owner (e.g. U.S.) or just the initial owner (e.g. Canada).</a></p>\n", "score": 6 } ]

[ "copyright" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94054, "body": "<p>Under European rules (GDPR, ePrivacy), you only need consent here if you both</p>\n<ul>\n<li>access or store information on the user's device (such as cookies), and</li>\n<li>this access/storage is not strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>A session cookie is strictly necessary for providing a log-in functionality, so such cookies are unlikely to require consent. In contrast, cookies for measuring ad impressions are not strictly necessary for showing the website content. Necessity must always be thought from the user's perspective, not from the provider's economic needs.</p>\n<p>If you use one cookie for multiple purposes, you should analyze each purpose separately. Maybe setting a cookie does not require consent under one purpose, but accessing the same information for a different purpose could require consent.</p>\n<p>If you have to ask for consent, this consent must be in line with the GDPR's requirements in Art 7. Consent must be freely given, i.e. there must actually be a way to decline the consent without suffering detriment. Consent must be informed, i.e. the user must be told directly for what consent is being sought, without having to click through to a long privacy policy. Consent must be specific, so it must be possible to consent for one purpose while declining consent for another.</p>\n<p>An &quot;I agree to the terms of service and privacy policy&quot; checkbox cannot constitute valid GDPR consent because it fails all these criteria: I cannot use the service without agreeing, I'm not told essential information up front (you cannot expect users to actually read long privacy policies), and this is an all-or-nothing bundle that does not allow specific choices.</p>\n<p>If you do not have to ask for consent, you should still be transparent about your use of cookies, for example by providing a paragraph on this topic in your privacy notice. I think showing a cookie banner would be a bad idea in that scenario, since it could be confused with an invalid consent banner (no way to decline the cookies).</p>\n", "score": 11 } ]

[ "gdpr", "privacy", "ccpa", "cookies" ]

[ { "answer_id": 28662, "body": "<p>The legality of the stop may be somewhat up in the air, but it would seem that the vehicle is not in the Texassure database, so it is reasonable to think that the person driving is not insured, and therefore is breaking the law. And that is all that is required: that the suspicion is reasonable. Until someone makes a sufficiently persuasive legal stink about this, it is probably a legal stop. <a href=\"http://allentexascriminallaw.com/2014/11/can-an-officer-stop-me-for-no-insurance/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">This article</a> gives some legal discussion. One applicable case is <a href=\"https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/16-40817/16-40817-2017-04-28.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">US v. Broca-Martinez</a>, a Texas case where a person was pulled over for being \"unconfirmed\" w.r.t. the insurance database: the court held that this was a reasonable suspicion.</p>\n\n<p>Thereafter, a charitable interpretation is that you misunderstood the request in providing your sister's information when he asked for your license and insurance: but you are expected to understand that when they request your license and proofs of insurance, they mean you the driver, and not the car owner. That they is even more suspicious, although I understand your confusion. At your hearing you cane explain why you didn't comply with the first officer's request, and the judge may they chalk this up to a simple misunderstanding rather than intentional deception. The problem is that you are expected to know – whether or not you've ever been pulled over before – that you have to provide license, registration, and proof of insurance. You will have a hard time making it believable that you didn't understand what the officer told you and what the law requires.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 28660, "body": "<p>The stop is legal. The plates are and are required to be publicly displayed and the police car’s computer is probably scanning all the plates around it and raising flags for things like no insurance or other reasons to stop a car.</p>\n\n<p>Police officers make arrests when they have reason to believe the arrestee has committed an offence. They don’t have to be right – indeed they quite often aren’t. So, yes, your arrest was justifiable.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "united-states", "texas", "driving" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94045, "body": "<p>In <a href=\"https://law.justia.com/cases/oklahoma/supreme-court/1989/10494.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Guinn v. Church of Christ</a>, plaintiff withdrew from the church after an internal investigation of her conduct. The church apparently held as a matter of religious doctrine that she must repent of her sins, also that withdrawing from the church is doctrinally impossible. The transgressions were widely publicized within the church; a lawsuit over outrage and invasion of privacy ensued. The upshot of the appeal is that the church can be held liable for post-withdrawal actions, but before that, the church has a privilege to communicate such transgressions (the church is not subject to secular judicature of its actions w.r.t. its members).</p>\n<p>Contract law is not relevant here, what matters is that a person can knowingly and intelligently waive their right to litigate against a party, and while one is a member of the church which has such a waiver as part of their disciplinary doctrine, one cannot sue the church for its doctrinary actions as long as the actions do not constitute a threat to public safety which would justify state interference. Although the church argued that church membership is irrevocable, the court found that &quot;Just as freedom to worship is protected by the First Amendment, so also is the liberty to recede from one's religious allegiance&quot;. Given that plaintiff had withdrawn consent yet the church subsequently announced the transgressions without her consent, the church was thus found to be liable.</p>\n<p>In <a href=\"https://casetext.com/case/stepek-v-doe\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Stepek v. Doe</a>, the court similarly affirmed that a church enjoys a privilege against charges of defamation, when the plaintiff continues to operate within the church, not having left the church.</p>\n<p>So it can &quot;work&quot;, to some extent. The person can always withdraw consent; the person has no legal recourse in case consent has not been withdrawn. The article is correct as far as it goes, which is not far enough: it errs in not stating what the legal consequences of of the transgressor leaving the church are.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "religion", "consent", "freedom-of-religion", "freedom-of-assembly" ]

[ { "answer_id": 80211, "body": "<p>It depends on the jurisdiction, and what you hire the officer to do. It is generally legal to hire an off-duty police officer, and <a href=\"https://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-5---employee-conduct/5120---off-duty-employment\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">here</a> is what Seattle says about that. They are held to the same standards as when they are on duty; they have to be off duty (and not on sick leave). They do have to submit an approval form that describes what they will do. While in uniform, the work has to be of a law enforcement or traffic enforcement nature (thus not bill-collecting or vehicle repo), also you can't work in an alcohol or marijuana sales establishment. Some of your interests would probably not be covered, since zoning-type infractions (pool) are not within the purview of the police, but burning trash on the sidewalk would be. Because of the requirement for approval, you probably can't pay to get a response to a robbery (still takes 24 hours to get &quot;short notice&quot; approval).</p>\n<p>It is not clearly illegal to offer an officer money to &quot;do his job&quot;, but it is also not clearly legal. It is illegal (<a href=\"https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9A.68.010\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">bribery</a>), if you</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>With the intent to secure a particular result in a particular matter\ninvolving the exercise of the public servant's vote, opinion,\njudgment, exercise of discretion, or other action in his or her\nofficial capacity, he or she offers, confers, or agrees to confer any\npecuniary benefit upon such public servant</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>It is not obvious whether a peace officer is a public servant, as defined under the law. A <a href=\"https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9a.04.110\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">&quot;public servant&quot;</a> is</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>any person other than a witness who presently occupies the position of\nor has been elected, appointed, or designated to become any officer or\nemployee of government, including a legislator, judge, judicial\nofficer, juror, and any person participating as an advisor,\nconsultant, or otherwise in performing a governmental function</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>and a &quot;peace officer&quot; is</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>a duly appointed city, county, or state law enforcement officer</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>By statutory stipulation, a LEO is &quot;appointed&quot;, and they are an employee of the government. Then when you hire them to do something, do you do so &quot;with the intent to secure a particular result in a matter involving the exercise of the public servant's exercise of discretion in his or her\nofficial capacity&quot;? If so, it is bribery (a crime).</p>\n<p>Since LEOs can legally be hired to enforce the law when off duty, the legality of that hiring must depend on the &quot;particularity&quot; of the job. If an officer has the discretion to arrest Smith for a criminal act, but declines to do so, then you cannot pay him to act otherwise. Officers generally have the discretion to arrest (or not) anyone committing a crime, so hiring an officer to &quot;control traffic&quot; or &quot;work security&quot; is not influencing the officer to exercise a <em>particular</em> form of discretion.</p>\n<p>The crucial question would be, why <em>didn't</em> they enforce the law in the first place?</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 80212, "body": "<h2>Yes, it’s the illegal act of corruption</h2>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/new-south-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\">new-south-wales</a></p>\n<p><a href=\"http://www8.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/viewdoc/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ca190082/s249b.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">s249B</a> of the <em>Crimes Act</em> criminalises an agent (the police officer in your case) from corruptly receiving an inducement or reward to do or not do something or to show favour or disfavour to a person. It’s also a crime to offer or make such an inducement or reward. Both punishable by 7 years.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 80239, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/england-and-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\">england-and-wales</a></p>\n<p>Payments to someone <em>to do a job that they're already obliged to do</em> are referred to as '<strong>Facilitation Payments</strong>' and are explicity illegal.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>Facilitation payments are bribes</strong> under the Act\njust as they are under the old law</p>\n<p>...</p>\n<p>Facilitation payments, which are <strong>payments to\ninduce officials to perform routine functions\nthey are otherwise obligated to perform,\nare bribes.</strong> There was no exemption for such\npayments under the previous law nor is there\nunder the Bribery Act.</p>\n<p><Sub><Sup><a href=\"https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-quick-start-guide.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">The Bribery Act 2010 - A Quick Start Guide</a></Sub></Sup></p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Paying a policeman to investigate a criminal or arrest someone that was breaking the law would be almost the textbook example of this crime.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 80264, "body": "<p>Since there is no country... In Germany, it is legal to offer or give money to a police officer for having done his duty - let's say police officers return your kidnapped daughter unharmed, and you are very happy about it. It is <em>illegal</em> for the police officers to take the money, or to ask for the money. And it is obviously illegal to pay or to try to pay a police officer for not doing his duty, both for you and the police officer. (The rest of the answer would be quite irrelevant in the USA, because even this case where it is very understandable to offer money, it's illegal in the USA).</p>\n<p>But I have the impression you are not offering the money to do his duty - you are offering money for the police officer to act in a certain way. Let's say you suspect your neighbour to be a thief. The police officer has the same suspicion, but the evidence is just enough to make it a judgement call for the officer to pay your neighbour a visit or not. In this case, if the police officer acted because you paid him, I wouldn't say he is doing his duty. His duty is to think about the situation and do what he thinks is the most suitable action which <em>may or may not</em> result in him questioning your neighbour. His duty is <em>not</em> to question your neighbour. So even if paying a police officer to do his duty was legal for you (it's not legal even in Germany for the police officer), that's not what you would be doing.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "police" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94042, "body": "<p>Distinguishing a case which was decided by a higher court does not violate the doctrine of <em>stare decisis</em>. If the case can be distinguished, then it is not a controlling precedent. The term &quot;controlling&quot; indicates not only that the decision is binding on lower courts, but also that it applies to (or cannot be distinguished from) the facts of the specific case in question.</p>\n<p>Whether a precedent is &quot;controlling&quot; or not, in a particular case, could itself be a question for an appellate court. So if a lower court distinguishes a previous decision and therefore declines to follow it, the appellate court could say that was an error, and set aside the lower court's decision for not following a controlling precedent.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "common-law", "precedent" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94043, "body": "<p>The <a href=\"https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&amp;docid=228677&amp;doclang=EN\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Schrems II decision (C-311/18)</a> primarily discussed the &quot;Privacy Shield&quot; adequacy decision, but also covered SCCs. The CJEU confirmed that SCCs are generally valid. However, the CJEU also pointed out that the data exporter must first consider whether SCCs can actually be used in their specific context. From paragraph 141 of the judgment:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>It follows that Clause 4(a) and Clause 5(a) and (b) in that annex oblige the controller established in the European Union and the recipient of personal data to satisfy themselves that the legislation of the third country of destination enables the recipient to comply with the standard data protection clauses in the annex to the SCC Decision, before transferring personal data to that third country. […]</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Translated to normal English: the SCC terms require the data exporter and data importer to check that the legal environment in the destination country actually allows the importer to comply with the terms of the SCCs. Since Schrems-II, it is common to prepare a &quot;transfer impact assessment (TIA)&quot; that contains such analysis.</p>\n<h2>Options for valid SCC-based international transfers</h2>\n<p>A Schrems-II compliant data transfer based on SCCs could work in the following scenarios:</p>\n<ol>\n<li>there are no problematic laws in the destination country</li>\n<li>while there might be problematic laws, they do not apply to the data importer</li>\n<li>even if the data importer is subject to problematic laws, supplemental safeguards such as end-to-end encryption prevent the personal data from falling into unauthorized hands</li>\n<li>(unofficial theory:) even if the data importer is subject to problematic laws, the risk of these laws being invoked is negligible in practice</li>\n</ol>\n<p>Let's analyze these options for the case of EU to US transfers:</p>\n<ol>\n<li><p>The Schrems II case seems to deny the first option, since it explicitly found that the lack of legal redress means that the US do not provide an &quot;adequate&quot; level of data protection. After the judgment, some such as the US government argued that this was based on outdated laws (cases take a long long time), and that the current legal environment is perfectly fine. After additional changes to US government policy, the EU Commission later joined this argument and issued a new &quot;Data Privacy Framework&quot; adequacy decision in 2023.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>I occasionally saw US companies arguing that they are not subject to problematic laws like FISA 702 because they are not a communications provider. If true, that may have been a valid argument.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>The <a href=\"https://edpb.europa.eu/our-work-tools/our-documents/recommendations/recommendations-012020-measures-supplement-transfer_en\" rel=\"noreferrer\">EDPB published recommendations on implementing supplemental measures</a> such as pseudonymization or encryption to protect the GDPR-covered personal data even when it is processed in the US. However, these supplemental measures have to operate with an extreme threat model: successfully defending against access by US government three-letter agencies (NSA, FBI, CIA).</p>\n<p>In practice, these recommendations ruled out any use of US-based cloud or SaaS services, and did not provide a reasonable option for continuing EU→US data transfers. But since claims about supplemental measures are easier to make than to verify (and since most data protection authorities did not actively seek out potential data transfer violations), this was a very common choice. Supervisory authorities note that details about the supplementary measures should be provided to data subjects on request, but this has been rare.</p>\n<p>Where I have seen details about such measures, they were usually techniques like transport encryption (like HTTPS) and encryption at rest, which fall clearly short of the EDPB recommendations. Sometimes, I've seen attempts at anonymization, but usually implemented for an US-centric view of &quot;PII&quot; that ignores the nuances of the GDPR's &quot;personal data&quot; concept. Techniques that could actually work – like homomorphic encryption – have been largely absent in this space, but that unsurprising given the novelty and overhead of such technologies.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>The EU's CJEU did not permit a risk-based approach to TIAs, but it has found blessing in the UK, and it has been widely practiced by industry.</p>\n</li>\n</ol>\n<h2>In B2B, the customers might be on the hook</h2>\n<p>In a B2B context, there is another aspect: Who is the data controller who is primarily responsible for GDPR compliance? Often, we have a US SaaS provider who offers a pre-formulated DPA/SCC, and an EU-based customer company. In many cases, the EU-based customer will be the data controller, and responsible for the international data transfer. The SaaS provider would typically be a &quot;data processor&quot;, who has no direct GDPR obligations and is only responsible for fulfilling their contract with their customers.</p>\n<p>In such constellations, the US-based providers often advertise themselves as 100% GDPR-compliant, even though the real question is whether the customers can use that service in a GDPR-compliant manner.</p>\n<h2>Figma's policies</h2>\n<p>In the case of Figma, this means that most of the risk of having potentially invalid SCCs is not shouldered by Figma, but by their EU-based customers.</p>\n<p>FYI, the <a href=\"https://help.figma.com/hc/en-us/articles/360041060434-General-Data-Protection-Regulations-GDPR-\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Figma GDPR FAQ</a> you linked in turn links to <a href=\"https://static.figma.com/uploads/6b3f57508ca7aa8464ae2a83809c8362c4a9b535\" rel=\"noreferrer\">their full DPA</a> (<a href=\"https://web.archive.org/web/20230719180626/https://static.figma.com/uploads/6b3f57508ca7aa8464ae2a83809c8362c4a9b535\" rel=\"noreferrer\">permalink</a>), which lists supposed supplementary measures in Exhibit C (in addition to the security measures in Exhibit B). These supplementary measures are of a solely organizational nature, such as consulting with expert legal counsel, nicely asking the government to contact the customer directly, and publishing an annual transparency report. The DPA also includes a transparency report, noting that between 1 July 2022 and 30 June 2022, zero US government requests were received, and that no court found Figma to be subject to FISA 702.</p>\n<p>While I have my doubts about the suitability of such measures to <em>prevent</em> government access, a transparency report is useful for making risk-based arguments. I tried looking for their updated report which should be due this month, but realized that &quot;Figma Transparency&quot; is impossible to search for online :)</p>\n", "score": 5 } ]

[ "gdpr", "data-protection" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94029, "body": "<h2>Read the ToS of the website</h2>\n<p>News websites implement such measures because unscrupulous people infringe on the copyright of their articles. Typically, such websites <strong>also</strong> have terms os service that explicitly makes usage of the website contingent on not scraping the website. For example, <a href=\"https://help.nytimes.com/hc/en-us/articles/115014893428-Terms-of-Service\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">the New York Times</a> say:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<ol start=\"4\">\n<li>PROHIBITED USE OF THE SERVICES</li>\n</ol>\n<p>You may not access or use, or attempt to access or use, the Services to take any action that could harm us or a third party. You may not use the Services in violation of applicable laws or in violation of our or any third party’s intellectual property or other proprietary or legal rights. You further agree that you shall not attempt (or encourage or support anyone else's attempt) to circumvent, reverse engineer, decrypt, or otherwise alter or interfere with the Services, or any content thereof, or make any unauthorized use thereof. <strong>Without NYT’s prior written consent, you shall not:</strong></p>\n<p>(i) access any part of the Services, Content, data or information you do not have permission or authorization to access or for which NYT has revoked your access;</p>\n<p>(ii) use robots, spiders, scripts, service, <strong>software or any manual or automatic device, tool, or process designed to data mine or scrape the Content, data or information from the Services, or otherwise access or collect the Content, data or information from the Services using automated means;</strong></p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Violating the Terms of Service means, you are in breach of contract and got no license to access any of the data. This allows claims starting with breach of contract and going up to intruding into the servers and violating various computer crime laws. However, do note that having a possible charge does not mean that it will result in a trial or even conviction.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 94036, "body": "<p>It is hard to prove a negative (there is no comprehensive list of things that are legal). However a specific user agent name is not mandated by any law, so there can hardly be a law against changing it [*] (think of it this way, instead of using jsoup you could write your own crawler/parser - there is no government agency that would knock at your door and ask you to use a specific name for your software).</p>\n<p>Here in <a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a> there is a law against circumventing effective protective measures to get access to a computer system, but it is doubtful that a website would be considered a computer system in the meaning of the law, and relying on the user agent would not be effective protective measures.</p>\n<p>A site might try to ban scraping via their terms of service, but that would not always be enforceable, and would not depend on your user agent name. I still would not recommend to rely on data that a company does not want you to scrape, because even without legal measures they have ways to make this infeasible as a business model (and there might be legal issue such as copyright that still apply).</p>\n<p>But as far as UA names go, knock yourself out.</p>\n<p>[*] If it is a configurable property of your software. The software itself might have terms of service that prevent you from changing its properties, but I take it this is not what you are asking about.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "internet", "software" ]

[ { "answer_id": 61816, "body": "<p>Jury trials in common law jurisdictions are simply a fact, and don't need or get justification. Jury trials are ancient. In England the Scandinavians had an assembly, the þing (&quot;thing&quot;) for deciding matters, such as guilt. Under Norman rule this became systematized, to the point that the Magna Carta Art. 39 states the law that</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>No free man shall be captured, and or imprisoned, or disseised of his\nfreehold, and or of his liberties, or of his free customs, or be\noutlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor will we proceed\nagainst him by force or proceed against him by arms, but by the lawful\njudgment of his peers, and or by the law of the land</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>There was a period subsequently where the King gained more power and trials were more arbitrary and oppressive through the Star Chamber, leading to various reforms such as the birth of the US. The right to a jury trial is for reasons of historical precedent part of the US constitution.</p>\n<p>Because of the legal right to a jury (especially in criminal cases), the only question that can reasonably come up is for a defendant to ask if they will have better chances with a bench trial versus a jury trial. All it takes is one person on a jury to not be convinced to avoid a conviction, so superficially you'd think an accused person would prefer a jury trial to increase their odds of not being convicted. This is encouraged by a mind-set &quot;the state versus the citizen&quot;, where the prosecution and the judge are both agents of the government. On the other hand, the average citizen is more likely to misunderstand the import of evidence, and be less able to disregard statements made during the trial that were held inadmissible.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 61817, "body": "<p>Civil and criminal trials are fundamentally different, at least as far as the idealized versions go: in a <em>civil</em> trial, you have a disagreement between two &quot;regular citizens&quot; who are <em>equal</em>. There is no imbalance of power.</p>\n<p>In a criminal trial, you have a regular citizen vs <em>the entire government and society as a whole</em>. There is a substantial imbalance of power, and almost all of the rules and procedures for criminal trials are there to make sure this imbalance of power cannot be abused or even accidentally disadvantage the defendant.</p>\n<p>The idea of &quot;a jury of your peers&quot; ties into that as well: its intent is to make sure that the people determining the defendant's guilt are &quot;regular citizens&quot; as well, that they have similar life experiences, similar education, similar background, etc. It could be argued, for example, that the subset of people who go to law school and become judges and prosecutors are not a representative sample of society, especially when you look at lower income neighborhoods. In the US, for example, the percentage of judges who are people of color is significantly lower than in the entire population, whereas the percentage of defendants of color is significantly higher.</p>\n<p>Of course, the <em>idealized versions</em> may not necessarily be congruent with reality. For example, civil suits between a consumer and a mega corporation are most definitely <em>not</em> a disagreement between equals, and when you look at a criminal trial against some well-connected billionaire with friends in very high places, you have to ask yourself which direction the imbalance of power is actually pointing in reality.</p>\n<p>It also gets more complicated when the government is one of the two parties in a civil suit, or even different parts of the government are suing each other.</p>\n<p>But at its core, these assumptions: &quot;a disagreement between equals&quot; vs. &quot;the entire society against one person&quot;, underly a lot of the differences between civil and criminal trials.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 61822, "body": "<p>The underlying <em>justification</em> for the jury trial is essentially to maintain the popular legitimacy of the justice system.</p>\n<p>It should be noted that in its original incarnation, the jury were expected to know the defendant and the victim, so as to better judge their overall characters. In very early times, juries were also expected to do the legwork of investigation for themselves, rather than simply listening to evidence submitted in court under the supervision of a judge.</p>\n<p>In the case of aristocratic defendants tried by aristocratic peers, it is of course an obvious point that a jury of aristocrats would tend to know an aristocratic defendant. Defendants drawn from the common masses tended to be tried by a jury of reputable figures drawn from the local community - in that sense not necessarily what true criminals and vagabonds would consider their peers, but certainly the jury would be drawn from the lowest ranks of local people who would be regarded as having some stake in the social order and were embedded in local life.</p>\n<p>There are notorious examples in history of the judicial process being operated despotically, such as the Star Chamber, and of terrible consequences following indirectly for the despot (in that case, the beheading of Charles Stuart). Accumulated experience persuaded those at the highest levels that the principle of deferring to the judgment of the multitude on matters of justice, was the safest guarantee against tyrannies, and a guarantee against judicial proceedings triggering popular rebellions.</p>\n<p>It is only later, perhaps as late as Victorian times (although I can't be sure offhand of the exact era), that juries were expected to be strangers to the defendant and victim, and to reach a verdict only on the evidence adduced in court. Investigation was increasingly handled by professional law officers and police forces.</p>\n<p>At least some of the impetus for this was because growing populations and migrations meant juries could not always be expected to know both defendant and victim, and because more cases occurred in which a jury knowing one or more of the parties would lead to bias.</p>\n<p>So the &quot;accuracy&quot; of the jury system - in the technocratic sense of delivering verdicts that correctly apply the existing law to the facts - is of only secondary concern. A primary concern is that accountability for the verdict is passed to the jury, to redirect potential grievance away from the judiciary when correct verdicts cause grievance amongst at least some of the local populace.</p>\n<p>It also acts to relieve steam from the system when a judge may undoubtedly have convicted a defendant, but for whatever reason a jury (as representatives of broader community opinion) do not think a conviction is consistent with a just outcome, or have a different systematic perception of the evidence than a judge would.</p>\n<p>Notably in recent times, when Kenny Noye was infamously acquitted in 1985 for stabbing a policeman to death, it acted as the strongest possible signal of the public's loss of trust and confidence in the police (in contrast to the professional judiciary who habitually took the word of the police as gospel), and confirmed the need for the police reforms (which were already underway at the time, but followed a period of significant lawlessness and corruption amongst police officers in the 1970s).</p>\n<p>Noye was later jailed for an unconnected knife murder, if that bears on the likely &quot;accuracy&quot; of the jury's verdict on him in 1985.</p>\n<p>But many serious convictions dating from the 1970s and 80s were later reversed following eventual acceptance amongst the judiciary that the police had often been liars, and jury cases like that of Noye essentially helped to shock the system non-destructively, and served to stem the further accumulation of miscarriages generally.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 61818, "body": "<p>This is more political than legal, but...</p>\n<p>I believe the rationale is not “accuracy”, it is actually just reverse. Jury trials, like <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blackstone%27s_ratio\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blackstone's_ratio</a> is all about the state proving that the accused is guilty, and not just executing someone because a single person said so, whether that person be a lord or a judge or whatever.</p>\n<p>Jury trials ensure that guilty people go free. They also reduce the chances of innocent people being punished, possibly fatally. They also ensure that there <strong>are</strong> innocent people, because if nobody is ever found not guilty there’s no reason to bother, and the accused become guilty simply by being accused.</p>\n<p>Watch some of the 1st Amendment auditors on YouTube and see cops saying that people are engaged in suspicious behavior and need to show they evidence (typically in the form of a government issued I’d) that they are not engaged in criminal activity and if they don’t comply they will be arrested. Sometimes they even are arrested and charged with hindering an investigation to determine what crimes they have committed. Typically such arrest gets tossed out and occasionally result in law suits and settlements. Imagine if they weren’t, if a cop just saying you didn’t help him determine what crimes you had committed was enough to get you years in jail?</p>\n<p>Jury trials, and jury nullification, is one way society tries to reign in government overreach.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "criminal-law", "jury", "civil" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94017, "body": "<p>If you want some boilerplate text to just drop in and have done, you are going to be disappointed. But you don't need a lawyer either. Treat it as a coding job. First, list all the ways you are going to store and process identifiable user data. If someone is going to process it on your behalf, identify them too. Draw a chart showing the paths that user data is going to take. (Storage is a form of processing)</p>\n<p>Then look at the 6 bases for processing user data and figure out which ones apply to each step. E.g. if the user asks you to do something then that is one basis under which you can process their data. See how much coverage you can get without asking for consent.</p>\n<p>For each third party (e.g. Google) figure out what data is to be sent to them, and where they will be. Google has data centres in the EU specifically so you can get them to process user data without sending it outside the EU.</p>\n<p>Check the third party contracts for these services, including the confidentiality clauses. Link that to the processing they will do for you.</p>\n<p>Finally, pull all this together into a single summary of what you are going to do with the data and the bases under which you will do it.</p>\n", "score": 7 }, { "answer_id": 94022, "body": "<h2>No one is forcing you to run a business</h2>\n<p>If you <em>choose</em> to do so, you are <em>obliged</em> to comply with the law.</p>\n<p>Complying with the GDPR (among many other things) is simply a cost of doing business. If that costs so much that the business is unviable, don’t run the business.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 94026, "body": "<p>I have seen many people on this platform, utterly clueless about the practical parts of the GDPR. I guess they deal in law theoretically, not in actually bringing an App to market. And that is fine, that is what this site is about.</p>\n<p>So please, do not write that up yourself. Either get educated about the GDPR beforehand. Which you <em>should</em> already be, if you were an App developer through your day job. Because those trainings are mandatory, company wide, in many juristictions where it applies, how else would the company comply with laws? Or, get a lawyer. Serious companies do <em>both</em>.</p>\n<p>A lawyer is not as expensive as you think. Per hour, they don't cost much more than a senior developer. Just for starters, to comply with the GDPR you need to show terms of service, saving which version which user agreed to, showing and prompting for agreement if the latest hasn't been signed, allowing the user to self-delete their account allowing the user to know which data has been saved on them by you. All of this has to be automated, if you don't want to be hit by a lawsuit later. Because there are legal deadlines, and you don't want your side hustle to be something that you cannot leave unattended for a weekend.</p>\n<p>So assuming a senior developer at roughly the same rate as a junior lawyer actually implements just the neccessary minimum, you are looking at 20, maybe 30 hours of work if done well. Obviously you can always do a shitty job in less, but lets assume you do it looking good in the UI, well tested and reasonably bug free and secure.</p>\n<p>After investing 30 hours just into the GDPRs practical implementation, hiring someone for a few more hours to write up the terms of service, seems pretty reasonable.</p>\n<p>I <em>strongly</em> advise you to educate yourself on this topic. Because there are details that a lawyer <em>knows</em>, but since they don't code or look at your source, will never be able to warn you about properly.</p>\n<p>As an example, if you use Google fonts from a CDN, you have already breached the GDPR. And you have not even programmed the first screen yet. Obviously the fonts will be loaded from the CDN before the user can agree to any terms, displaying the text of the terms needs the font. So before the user has had even the chance to consent to anything, you have already leaked their IP address to a third party. Because that is what technically happens, the CDN gets to know the user's IP address, because your app made it available by calling it from the users device. To comply with the GDPR, the font has to be packaged with your app or loaded from your own backend server, not loaded from a CDN.</p>\n<p>A lawyer could tell you that, if you ask them. But they cannot review your source code and tell you <em>that you did that</em>. That is not their job or expertise.</p>\n<p>So, you will need both, just like any other company: you need to educate yourself so you know to program in compliance with the law <em>and</em> you need a lawyer for that one page of paperwork.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "gdpr" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93623, "body": "<p>Because prosecutions on indictment are commenced in the name of the Crown (“R”) in respect of crimes which were historically regarded as offences against the monarch. The law relating to these crimes is ancient and was described in works like Hale’s <em><a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historia_Placitorum_Coron%C3%A6\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Pleas of the Crown</a></em> (1736) and Foster’s <em><a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foster%27s_Crown_Law\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Crown Law</a></em> (1762).</p>\n<p>In contrast, summary criminal procedure is a more recent development which has its origin in civil proceedings between subjects. These prosecutions were commenced in the name of an individual police officer or other informant, in inferior courts which were subject to review by the “<a href=\"https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superior_court\" rel=\"noreferrer\">royal courts</a>.”</p>\n<p>Thus, when the assizes and quarter sessions were abolished and replaced with a single court which would hear all “<a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Court_for_Crown_Cases_Reserved\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Crown cases</a>” (and not summary prosecutions), it was natural to call it the Crown Court.</p>\n", "score": 6 }, { "answer_id": 93613, "body": "<h3>The legislative reason</h3>\n<p>The Crown Court is a single, unified court, first established by the <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1971/23/enacted\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Courts Act 1971</em></a>, s. 4:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>There shall be a Crown Court in England and Wales which shall be a superior court of record.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>This has been superseded by the <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/54\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Senior Courts Act 1981</em></a>, but the name remains the same.</p>\n<h3>Historical context</h3>\n<p>The Crown Court replaced the previous Courts of Quarter Session and Courts of Assize. There were also two experimental crown courts previously set up in Manchester and Liverpool in 1956 that had also fused the assize and quarter sessions jurisdiction.</p>\n<h3>The Royal Commission's reasons for recommending this name</h3>\n<p>The Royal Commission on Assizes and Quarter Sessions (the Beeching Report) explains the choice of &quot;Crown Court&quot; as the name to be used (I would link, but I only found a print edition):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>[W]e propose that the new court be called the Crown Court and, from now on, we refer to it as such. Not all of us feel that this name is ideal, and the lay members in particular would prefer one which gave a clear indication of the kind of business dealt with by the court. The logical answer would be to have a Civil High Court and a Criminal High Court, but the majority of us feel that it would be anomalous to have a High Court sitting at a number of centres which will normally be presided over by Circuit judges only. Also, only a small proportion of the work of the new court will in fact be dealt with by High Court judges. An alternative of &quot;the Criminal Court&quot;, when contrasted with the High Court dealing with civil work, seems to most of us to suggest a lower level of court for criminal cases than for civil. We are conscious that our own solution carries with it the anomaly that High Court judges who, with the nomenclature we propose, will take their title from a court with civil jurisdiction, will be sitting in a criminal court, but we see no way round this and in the end have decided to adopt the title of &quot;Crown Court&quot;, as representing the best solution.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "criminal-law", "england-and-wales", "legal-terms", "court", "legal-history" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94018, "body": "<p>By definition, a tip is at the discretion of the customer, so what you have is a service charge – a service charge is legal. It is legal to offer free delivery for orders over a stated amount, and to charge a percentage as delivery charge for lesser amounts. There is no specific law requiring a business to use the term &quot;service charge&quot; and no law forbidding them to separate the mandatory from the voluntary parts of the service charge / tip. However, if the amount charged is called a tip, it must go to the employee, whereas a &quot;service charge&quot; can go to the business. Therefore, it would be illegal to call it a tip but treat it as a service charge.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "california", "restaurants" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93997, "body": "<p>Consumer goods are to be delivered in a reasonable time: 30 days. This assumes (as implied by the question) that the contract has no specific date of delivery. <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/section/28/enacted\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">The law says</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Unless there is an agreed time or period, the contract is to be\ntreated as including a term that the trader must deliver the goods—\n(a)without undue delay, and (b)in any event, not more than 30 days\nafter the day on which the contract is entered into.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-kingdom", "consumer-protection" ]

[ { "answer_id": 1570, "body": "<p><strong>Yes the woman is guilty of murder</strong> (under the law OP described)</p>\n<p>The issue of common law mens rea (the guilty conscience) is moot as it is no longer a component of the crime, see <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mens_rea\" rel=\"noreferrer\">here</a>.</p>\n<p>Almost all jurisdictions today have codified crimes so the common law mens rea is not relevant, for example, in Texas a person commits murder if they &quot;intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual&quot;; feeling guilty about it or knowing it was wrong is not an issue.</p>\n<p>In the facts you describe the person &quot;intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual&quot;; the fact that she did not consider the victim to be a person is immaterial. As described, she would have a hard time with an insanity plea in the same way that a white supremacist murderer would for classifying members of other races as &quot;non-persons&quot;.</p>\n<p>You can see why the common law usage would no longer work.</p>\n", "score": 8 }, { "answer_id": 94003, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>A clause is added to the constitution declaring unambiguously that all unborn foetuses fitting a certain set of criteria are human beings with all the attendant basic rights etc.<br />\nA pregnant woman, whose unborn child matches the set of criteria exactly, but who absolutely, unequivocally and unambiguously believes that her unborn foetus is not a human being, procures an abortion.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Under those circumstances, the woman would be guilty. Although mistake of fact is a defense for most crimes, this is actually a mistake of <em>law</em>, which is not a defense.</p>\n<p>There was a somewhat ridiculed <a href=\"https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/archive/C093542S.PDF\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">case</a> in which a court decided that a bee was legally a fish for the purposes of a particular law. But the court wasn't wrong; the law literally defined invertebrates as fish. Honestly believing that bees are not fish would not save you if you violated such a law in regards to a bee. It doesn't even matter that you are <em>correct</em> that a bee is not really a fish; you're still guilty. The law is allowed to have ridiculous definitions, and you still have to abide by those definitions. The definition (from that case) in question reads:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>“ ‘[f]ish’ means a wild fish, mollusk, crustacean, invertebrate,\namphibian, or part, spawn, or ovum of any of those animals.” <a href=\"https://casetext.com/statute/california-codes/california-fish-and-game-code/division-05-general-provisions-and-definitions/chapter-1-general-definitions/section-45-fish\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">(Stats. 2015, ch. 154, § 5.)</a></p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>So, it doesn't matter that the woman honestly believes that the unborn is not a human being. She knows (or should know) that the <em>law</em> unambiguously considers it to be a human being.</p>\n<p>If the woman believed that what she was destroying was not only not a human being but <em>not an unborn foetus</em>, however, that would be a mistake of fact and she likely would not have the required intent. (For example, if the doctors lied and told her that it was a tumor, and she believed them, she wouldn't be criminally liable for having it removed.)</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "united-states" ]

[ { "answer_id": 1313, "body": "<p><a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statelessness\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Statelessness</a> is a very serious condition.</p>\n\n<p>It is quite likely that a person such as you describe may be required to board an aeroplane to that country but will not be permitted to pass through immigration on arrival - <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mehran_Karimi_Nasseri\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Mehran Karimi Nasseri</a> lived in Charles de Gaulle airport for 18 years in this condition.</p>\n\n<p>There are many people in the world who are stateless and this may or may not affect their lives. Citizenship is generally only an issue when crossing international borders or in employment situations, the latter is significant in advanced countries but less of an issue in countries with less-developed economies.</p>\n", "score": 10 }, { "answer_id": 1318, "body": "<h2>Generalities</h2>\n<p>To determine whether it's possible to be deported in this situation, it would first be necessary to distinguish between various types of removals, e.g. removal at port when you have been denied entry right out of the plane/at the border, removal for some immigration violation, or deportation after a criminal conviction. Many other details can also matter.</p>\n<p>Also, the exact procedure will vary somewhat from one country to the next, as it depends on local law. What you found is a generic warning from the perspective of the receiving country but it does not mean that most countries can or do deport stateless people. I think it's mostly intended to scare people off renouncing their citizenship, especially if they naively think this would be an easy way to avoid being removed from a country where they are staying illegally.</p>\n<p>But in any case, removing someone typically involves the country where you want to send them to, especially if the person to be removed has no valid travel document. Even if you are in fact a citizen, if you ditched your passport, the deporting state will contact the relevant consulate to obtain permission to deport you to that country. But the world is a vast place and there have been cases of countries taking some liberties with these principles or of consulates accepting people who had no link with them.</p>\n<p>What happens after that will also vary. If you somehow managed to reach the territory of a country and are found to have no right to be there, you can typically be detained. If the country can't find a way to remove you, you could be detained indefinitely or simply released after some time. Being caught at the border or only later also makes a difference in terms of the applicable procedure.</p>\n<h2>An example</h2>\n<p>Now, to be a little more specific, I can tell you how it's supposed to work in France (I only chose France because that's the country I am most familiar with). If you land in France and you are refused entry, the carrier that brought you there generally has to bring you back to your point of departure, your country of citizenship or any place that will admit you (but this provision does not apply if you have been removed to France by another country, to avoid “bouncing” people back-and-forth between two countries).</p>\n<p>In the meantime, you can in any case be detained for up to four days, during which you can appeal the decision to refuse you entry, lodge an asylum application, ask your consulate or the person you wanted to visit to be informed of your situation or ask to see a lawyer or advisor (there are <em>pro bono</em> legal advisors employed by state-funded charities who work in those detention centres) or a medical doctor. You can also leave at any time if it's to go elsewhere than France. This 4-day delay can be extended several times by a judge, up to 20 days in total, if the authorities can prove they have a good chance to find a place to send you but need the extra delay.</p>\n<p>At the end of this period, if they haven't found any solution (and you haven't filed for asylum), you are released with an 8-day visa and officially “invited” to leave the country before the end of this period. Obviously, everybody knows that there is a great chance you will abscond and simply remain in the country illegally but that's the way used to deal with this in a legally plausible manner.</p>\n<p>After that, if you are still in France, you are in the same situation as thousands of undocumented migrants (or “<em>sans-papiers</em>”). If you get caught for some reason (random police check, raid on a place where you work illegally, etc.), the authorities can detain you again (for 5 days at first, extendable by a judge, now up to 90 days in total) and get a shot at deporting you. If they still cannot (no consulate will recognise you, you come from a dangerous country, etc.), you will be released again. In practice, the authorities (police, etc.) try to avoid wasting resources on people they will ultimately have to release so if they know you cannot be forcibly removed (because of your personal situation, because your country is at war, etc.), they will often simply let you go.</p>\n<p>The actual conditions are pretty harsh (and deteriorating) but legally, this detention is not a punishment and should only happen to the extent that it facilitates your removal. That's why people should in principle be released as soon as it becomes clear that timely removal will be impossible. I have heard before of people being released <em>en masse</em> following a coup in their country of origin, as judges would deem the situation too unstable to expect a removal in the next 90 days.</p>\n<p>Depending on your personal situation, you might eventually find a way to qualify for some sort of residence permit (but having stayed illegally in the past basically disqualifies you for naturalisation, even decades down the line). Obviously you cannot work legally and if you are also stateless and have no ID, many other things are extremely complicated.</p>\n<p>Most of this should be pretty typical, at least for European countries, even if there are occasionally a few surprising differences. How long (or even whether) you can be detained varies a lot for example, all the way to indefinite or prison detention in some places.</p>\n", "score": 5 } ]

[ "citizenship", "immigration" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93985, "body": "<p><strike>There's nothing that I can find that specifically refers to any offence for allowing one's goats to roam free, but</strike> there are at least two national, and probably more at state / municipal level, laws that deal with obstructing the highway - therefore potentially making the goat owner liable for any injury or damage shown to be caused by their (in)action:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_30_42_00002_195648_1517807321068&amp;sectionId=14500&amp;sectionno=8B&amp;orderno=20\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Section 8B</a>, National Highways Act:</li>\n</ul>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Punishment for mischief by injury to national highway.--</p>\n<p>Whoever commits mischief by doing any act which renders or which he knows to be likely to render any national highway referred to in sub-section (1) of section 8A impassable or <strong>less safe for traveling</strong> or conveying property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, or with a fine, or with both.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_00037_186045_1523266765688&amp;orderno=317\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Section 283</a>, Indian Penal Code (IPC):</li>\n</ul>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Whoever, by doing any act, or by omitting to take order with any property in his possession or under his charge, causes <strong>danger, obstruction or injury to any person in any public way</strong> or public line of navigation, shall be punished, with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>There are also animal-welfare related laws to consider, such as:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_5_23_00037_186045_1523266765688&amp;sectionId=46050&amp;sectionno=289&amp;orderno=323\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Section 289</a> IPC:</li>\n</ul>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Negligent conduct with respect to animal.</p>\n<p>Whoever knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with any animal in his possession as is sufficient to guard against any probable <strong>danger to human life, or any probable danger of grievous hurt from such animal</strong>, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://www.indiacode.nic.in/show-data?actid=AC_CEN_16_18_00001_196059_1517807317734&amp;sectionId=4023&amp;sectionno=3&amp;orderno=3\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Section 3</a> Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act:</li>\n</ul>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Duties of persons having charge of animals.</p>\n<p>It shall be the duty of every person having the care or charge of any animal to take all reasonable measures to ensure the well-being of such animal and to prevent the infliction upon such animal of unnecessary pain or suffering.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 7 }, { "answer_id": 93987, "body": "<p><strong>United Kingdom</strong></p>\n<p>In UK there are many areas where 'owned' grazing animals roam freely: the New Forest, moorland, mountain roads etc. If you hit one, it's not the fault of the person who owns it, although someone <em>with</em> the animal(s) must take proper control of them. Compare this with hitting a wild creature such as a deer - who are you going to sue?</p>\n<p>Section 170 of the <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1988/52/section/170\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Road Traffic Act 1988</a> requires that if the animal is a <strong>horse, cattle, ass, mule, sheep, pig, goat or dog</strong> the driver must stop and provide their identity, details of insurance, etc. to any involved party.</p>\n<p>If you can't do that, you must report the accident at a police station.</p>\n<p>For that list of animals, the requirements are the same as causing damage to a person, to another vehicle or to property.</p>\n", "score": 6 } ]

[ "india", "traffic", "animals", "safety" ]

[ { "answer_id": 94000, "body": "<p>In the US, derogatory speech is protected under the First Amendment. There have been <a href=\"https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/966/harmful-to-minors-laws\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">a number of attempts</a> to limit internet speech that is deemed to be &quot;harmful to minors&quot; which have not been successful, and at that the laws have based the characterization of harm as &quot;being obscene&quot; pursuant to the <a href=\"https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1585/miller-test\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Miller test</a>. Moreover the law were limited to commercial dissemination to children, whereas your scenario is <em>about</em> children.</p>\n<p>It is possible that a parent of a participant would get into child-welfare type legal trouble for encouraging their child to assault another child, but that would not include encouraging a child to use unkind words against another child.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "internet" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93998, "body": "<h2>What does the contract say?</h2>\n<p>If it says that they have the right to unilaterally alter the terms by providing you with notice by email, then they have the right to unilaterally alter the terms by providing you with notice by email.</p>\n<p>These types of service contracts typically have such terms.</p>\n", "score": 15 } ]

[ "contract-law", "netherlands", "domain-name", "belgium" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93986, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-states\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-states-tooltip-container\">united-states</a></p>\n<p>Generally speaking, selective enforcement by a regulator is not actionable in U.S. law, nor is it a defense to a prosecution.</p>\n<p>A regulatory agency has no legally enforceable duty to enforce the law in the same way against every possible violator of the law. <em>See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York</em> 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.)</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>It is fundamental that selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws\nis subject to constitutional constraints. Nevertheless, the conscious\nexercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal\nconstitutional violation so long as the selection was [not]\ndeliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard . . . . [t]here is a\npresumption that prosecution for violation of the criminal law is in\ngood faith.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><em>United States v. Amon</em>, 669 F.2d 1351, 1355-56 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982) (citations and some punctuation marks omitted).</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>To support a defense of selective or discriminatory prosecution, a\ndefendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima\nfacie, (1) that, while others similarly situated have not generally\nbeen proceeded against because of conduct of the type forming the\nbasis of the charge against him, he has been singled out for\nprosecution, and (2) that the government’s discriminatory selection of\nhim for prosecution has been invidious or in bad faith, i.e., based\nupon such impermissible considerations as race, religion, or the\ndesire to prevent his exercise of constitutional rights.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><em>United States v. Berrios</em>, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974).</p>\n<p>A review of challenges to selective enforcement of statutes raised as a defense to a selective prosecution in the tax area, with related case law, can be found <a href=\"https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/aba_tax_times/08win/07-ptr.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">here</a>.</p>\n<p>There is such a thing as &quot;group of one&quot; discrimination under the equal protection clause, but it requires a showing a personal animus unrelated to any regulatory purpose and a singling out of someone for enforcement that is literally enforced against no one else. <em>See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech</em> 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (The Equal Protection Clause gives rise to a cause of action on behalf of a &quot;class of one&quot; when the plaintiff does not allege membership in a class or group, but alleges that they have been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for such treatment.)</p>\n<p>The typical &quot;group of one&quot; equal protection clause case involves a local government enforcing a zombie law against someone that a local official has a grudge against for some unrelated reason like the regulatory target's son being unfaithful to the local regulator's daughter.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "regulations", "competition" ]

[ { "answer_id": 83353, "body": "<h2>Yes</h2>\n<p>Written contracts do not have to be written in any particular language or character set. <a href=\"https://researchimpact.uwa.edu.au/research-impact-stories/comic-book-contracts/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Purely visual</a> contracts are used and are legally binding.</p>\n<p>If a pictorial term is ambiguous it is resolved by the court the same way as a textual term would be.</p>\n", "score": 8 }, { "answer_id": 93929, "body": "<h2>Thumbs up emojis are equivalent to signatures in Canada.</h2>\n<p>Recently, a <a href=\"https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/06/canada-judge-thumbs-up-emoji-sign-contract\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Canadian judge ruled</a> that a thumbs-up emotional was legally equivalent to a signature.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>This court readily acknowledges that a 👍 emoji is a non-traditional means to ‘sign’ a document but nevertheless under these circumstances this was a valid way to convey the two purposes of a ‘signature’,” he wrote.</p>\n<p>Keene also dismissed defence concerns that allowing the thumbs up emoji to signify acceptance “would open up the flood gates” to new interpretations of other emojis, including the ‘fist bump’ and ‘hand shake’. In finding that the thumbs-up can be used to enter into contracts, Keene said the court “cannot (nor should it) attempt to stem the tide of technology and common usage” of emojis.</p>\n<p>“This appears to be the new reality in Canadian society and courts will have to be ready to meet the new challenges that may arise from the use of emojis and the like.”</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>It also appears that other emojis thst convey acceptance of a deal such as the fist bump or handshake would also qualify as being equivalent to a signature.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "contract-law", "oregon" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93993, "body": "<p>Per <a href=\"https://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/pdf/other_forms/inheritance/itl8.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">https://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/pdf/other_forms/inheritance/itl8.pdf</a></p>\n<p>The forms may be filed by the executor of the estate, the Administrator of the estate/brokerage accounts, or a Class A beneficiary (spouse, domestic partner, child, parent, etc.)</p>\n<p>Unless the broker is also managing the estate (unlikely), they are not responsible for filing L-8. Either the executor of the estate or the daughter's attorney needs to complete the form and file it with the state.</p>\n<p>If the daughter is 18 or older, &quot;Assets that are owned by or in the name of a trust do not require a waiver or L-8, but must still be reported on any return filed.&quot; In that case, the daughter's attorney should file a return with the Inheritance Tax Branch. However, if the daughter is under 18 and the trust is structured such that she will not receive some or all of the money until she is an adult, the daughter's attorney does need to file L-8 in addition to the return.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-states", "new-jersey" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93984, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>What is an “estate,” as in a “housing estate” or “council estate”?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>See <a href=\"https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/88956\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Oxford English Dictionary</em>: &quot;housing, <em>n.1</em>&quot;</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>housing estate</strong> <em>n. British</em> a residential area in which the houses, streets, etc., have all been planned and built at the same time.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>And see <a href=\"https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/42589\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">&quot;council, <em>n.</em></a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>council estate</strong>, <em>n.</em> (also <strong>council housing estate</strong>) a group of houses erected by a council</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "legal-terms", "common-law", "trusts-and-estates", "any-jurisdiction" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93975, "body": "<p><strong>France: No</strong></p>\n<p><a href=\"https://cashessentials.org/french-authorities-remind-merchants-that-accepting-cash-is-obligatory/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">CashEssentials</a> writes</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>French Authorities Remind Merchants that Accepting Cash is Obligatory</strong></p>\n<p>France practices what is sometimes referred to as a hard version of legal tender. That means that the acceptance of cash is compulsory by law. According to <a href=\"https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000022375969&amp;cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719&amp;dateTexte=20100621\" rel=\"noreferrer\">article R642-3 of the penal code</a>, the refusal to accept coins and banknotes which are legal tender is punished by a second-class fine, which is currently set at €150.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Edit: another source of information is in <a href=\"https://www.connexionfrance.com/article/Practical/Money/Can-shops-in-France-refuse-to-take-payments-in-cash\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Can shops in France refuse to take payments in cash?</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>Some exceptions remain</strong><br />\nThere are some circumstances, however, where shops are not legally required to accept cash payments.</p>\n<ul>\n<li>If coins or banknotes are in poor condition, shops can refuse to take them</li>\n<li>If you try to use more than 50 coins to make a single payment</li>\n<li>If a shop does not have the correct money to give you change</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Finally, some shops are authorised not to accept cash payments for safety reasons (such as shops that open late at night). This extends to objects, such as parking meters, which are allowed to be fully cashless to limit cases of vandalism.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<HR>\n<p><strong>Canada: Yes</strong></p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/cash-coronavirus-questions-answered-1.5609691\" rel=\"noreferrer\">CBC News</a> writes</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>Is it legal for a store to refuse my cash?</strong></p>\n<p>The Bank of Canada says it's up to sellers to determine what kinds of payment they will accept for transactions, and there is &quot;no law&quot; that would require anyone to accept bank notes or any other form of payment for a commercial transaction.</p>\n<p>However, in certain circumstances, refusing to take cash in a store may actually violate provincial human rights codes.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<HR>\n<p><strong>UK: Yes</strong></p>\n<p>The <a href=\"https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/605030\" rel=\"noreferrer\">UK Parliament</a> reports on a <em>petition</em> that they debated</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>Make it unlawful for shops to refuse cash payments.</strong><br />\nMake it illegal for retailers and services to decline cash payments.</p>\n<p>The government does not plan to mandate cash acceptance. While the government recognises the ability to transact in cash remains important to millions of people across the UK, particularly those in vulnerable groups, it remains the choice of individual businesses as to whether to accept or decline any form of payment, including cash or card. This may be based on factors such as customer preference and cost.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 10 } ]

[ "france" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93979, "body": "<p>Article 175 of the <a href=\"https://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/en/laws/view/3581/en\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Criminal Code</a> says:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A person who distributes, sells or displays in public an obscene document, drawing or other objects shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than 2 years, a fine of not more than 2,500,000 yen or a petty fine. The same shall apply to a person who possesses the same for the purpose of sale.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>This has been interpreted to require pixelization, blurring, censorship bars, or other means of obscuring genitalia.</p>\n<p>See the <a href=\"https://cbldf.org/2013/12/core-magazine-pleads-guilty-in-japanese-obscenity-case/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">2013 guilty plea by publishers of Core Magazine</a> for an example prosecution under art. 175 for insufficient censorship.</p>\n<p>The law apparently does not reach material that is produced and edited and sold outside of Japan (even if filmed in Japan). See e.g. the discussion of <em>Realm</em> (1976) in Kirsten Fischer, <em>The Art of Censorship in Postwar Japan</em>, p. 198-199:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>[the film] was not prosecutable because of Ōshima’s innovative production strategy ... He had imported the film stock from France, shot the film\nin Kyoto, and then exported the undeveloped film back to France, where\nhe developed and edited it and finally distributed it internationally, including importing it back to Japan.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>A &quot;heavily cut form [was] eventually screened in Japan.&quot;</p>\n", "score": 5 } ]

[ "internet", "privacy", "liability", "pornography", "japan" ]

[ { "answer_id": 78041, "body": "<p>No, a loan is not taxable to the borrower and the repayment of principal is not taxable to the lender. Interest paid is a deductible expense for a business borrower and interest received is income to the lender.</p>\n<p>The form of the lent property and repaid property is irrelevant; each will be valued at fair market value. (Quirks are possible if amounts borrowed and repaid don't actually match.)</p>\n<ol start=\"3\">\n<li>If it's a capital contribution to a partnership, it's not taxable.</li>\n</ol>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 77688, "body": "<blockquote>\n<ol>\n<li>If a party, such as a company, is lent Bitcoin (BTC), sell it to pay expenses, and then pays back the loan in USD would that be a\ntaxable event for the lender?</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Yes.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<ol start=\"2\">\n<li>If so is there any way to avoid that-- perhaps by paying back the loan back equivalent amount of Bitcoin?</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<p>No.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<ol start=\"3\">\n<li>Is a Bitcoin denominated capital contribution ever not a taxable event?</li>\n</ol>\n</blockquote>\n<p>A capital contribution (i.e. a transfer of property, in kind, to a company in exchange for equity in the company) of Bitcoin is usually not a taxable event until the Bitcoin is sold.</p>\n<p>The sale is income to the company, although most closely held companies have pass through taxation, so it is taxed to the owners of the company on a pass through basis.</p>\n<p>In a C-corporation, however, the conversion of Bitcoin to anything else would be a taxable sale of the C-corporation to which the Bitcoin was contributed upon which corporate entity level income taxes would be due.</p>\n<p>In general, the answer for Bitcoin is generally going to be the same as the answer would be for pork bellies or bushels of wheat or barrels of oil.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "cryptocurrency", "tax-law", "loan", "federal-tax-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93977, "body": "<h2>Human rights are not inviolate</h2>\n<p>Even the <a href=\"https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/2021/03/udhr.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Universal Declaration of Human Rights</a> recognises this in Article 29.</p>\n<p>This is obviously true when you think about it: there will be circumstances where the human rights of two individuals are in conflict - one of them must lose. Ongoing debates in the USA on abortion are an example of this.</p>\n<p>Accepting that the proposed law is hyperbolic (in the current political climate - many laws passed in Nazi Germany were equally hyperbolic), there is no conflict with the Human Rights Act.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/section/6\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">s6</a> deals with this head on:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>So, we start from the happy place that the Minister can’t have Bob’s balls. However it continues:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to an act if—</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>So, it looks like Bob’s balls might still be on the block.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(a) as the result of one or more provisions of primary legislation, the authority could not have acted differently; or</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Fortunately for Bob, the ABRA primary legislation gave the Minister discretion so he <em>could</em> have acted differently.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(b) in the case of one or more provisions of, or made under, primary legislation which cannot be read or given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights, the authority was acting so as to give effect to or enforce those provisions.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Assuming the court accepts that the provisions “ cannot be read or given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights” which seems to be the case: you can’t remove an unwilling person’s testicles without violating their rights, the court must accept that the Minister “ was acting so as to give effect to or enforce those provisions.”</p>\n<p>Too bad for Bob.</p>\n<p>You seem to be struggling under the misapprehension that human rights can never be violated by the government. This is not the case.</p>\n<p>Even in nations with Constitutional protection of rights, the law allows for the government to restrict or limit them where appropriate. For example, even in the USA, my freedom of expression does not extend to sharing top secret information with a journalist.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "united-kingdom", "constitutional-law", "human-rights", "separation-of-powers", "constitutional-rights" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93943, "body": "<p>Suppose the shop bills you $2000 and you have a $750 deductible. You pay them $750, your insurance company pays $1250. Now suppose instead that the shop purports to waive the deductible. In order to get the insurance company to pay $1250 they still have to bill $2000. Then they don't collect the $750 from you. Presumably they write it off as bad debt.</p>\n<p>It smells like insurance fraud to me, on two counts: first, the shop expects to receive $1250 for a service but they produce a bill of $2000 for the insurance company's benefit and then do not seek payment from the insured party for any balance purportedly due beyond $1250. Second, the insured party has a contract with the insurer undertaking to pay the first $750 of the claim but has conspired with the shop to avoid paying that amount through deception.</p>\n<p>Had the shop played by the rules, they would have billed $1250 and the insurer would have paid $500. The shop isn't waiving your deductible; it's getting it out of the insurance company by fraud, with your collusion.</p>\n<p>Another way of handling this is that the auto body shop submits an estimate for the cost necessary to restore the car to a certain degree but then restores the car to a lesser degree. If everyone is aware that this is happening then it might be acceptable, depending on the terms of the insurance policy.</p>\n", "score": 5 }, { "answer_id": 93944, "body": "<p>This is legitimate because the insurance company is unilaterally determining the value of the repair.</p>\n<p>What happened when you got into an accident? You reported the claim and the adjuster inspected your vehicle. The adjuster then used parts price lists, standardized labor guides and a locale-specific labor rate to come up with a value of the repair and hence loss. You may dispute the insurer's assessment, but note that no body shop has become involved yet. You then took the insurance estimate to a body shop.</p>\n<p>A body shop, barring specific &quot;one-stop&quot; contracts with the insurer, has no obligation to accept the estimate and repair work. I could open a shop that charged $1000/labor hour, which would blow past any insurance. More realistically, this occurs when an owner wants factory parts and the insurer is only willing to pay for aftermarket parts, so the owner is billed the difference.</p>\n<p>Conversely, they could charge less than what the insurer estimates, which is what happened here. For example, a shop could use aftermarket or junkyard parts.</p>\n<p>In fact, if you completely own the car, you may choose to spend the money on a vacation instead of repairing the car. Or perhaps you may choose to sell the car as-is or junk it and use the money towards a new one. Another option that people take is to repair the car themselves and keep the difference. In this case, you get the same check.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 93945, "body": "<p>This doesn’t directly answer the question for Colorado, or address specific claim procedures your policy may require, but every time I have made an insurance claim, (in Washington state) my insurance company, (USAA) has paid me, not the repair shop.</p>\n<p>Each time they have asked me to submit 3 written estimates, determined a fair payment amount, and cut me a check minus the deductible. I believe that early claims in decades past the amount was an average, while the last claim I submitted they paid me the full amount of the most expensive estimate.</p>\n<p>I was then free to negotiate with whichever shop I chose to do the work, make the repair myself, or choose to not repair the vehicle. I have exercised all three options at various times and never had a reason to question whether or not this was legal.</p>\n", "score": 0 }, { "answer_id": 93951, "body": "<p>Although this is expressly prohibited in the case of <a href=\"https://codes.findlaw.com/co/title-6-consumer-and-commercial-affairs/co-rev-st-sect-6-22-105.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">hail-caused roof damage</a>, Colorado has not enacted any such prohibition w.r.t. car repairs. A shop might have a direct contractual relation with an insurance company and their contract might preclude waiving the deductible, so if they did it would be breech of contract on their part (illegal). If they have no direct relation with the insurance company, then they can do as they see fit, except fraud is not legal.</p>\n<p>The repair shop can submit a damage analysis estimating that the cost to restore will be $2,000, and the insurance company will pay them $1,250. Whether or not the insurance company requires the customer to pay $750 is up to the repair shop. There is no fraud if they do not demand the $750, since $2,000 was the true, actual and honest cost of repair. The customer has no contractual obligation with the insurance company to pay $750, the only potential obligation is with the repair shop, for the particular level of repair done on the car. It <em>would</em> be fraud if the insurance company falsely claimed that the cost of repair would be $2,750. The repair shop's statement is simply &quot;this is how much it costs to restore the vehicle to pre-damage condition&quot;, so the insured can get a cheaper repair job and not be fully-restored – that is their right.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.bodyshopbusiness.com/is-it-legal-to-waive-a-customer-s-deductible/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">This analysis</a> may be useful to understanding the legal issues.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "fraud", "car-insurance" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93968, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>GDPR seems quite clear that if you are recording calls, video and/or audio, you must get consent.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><strong>Wrong.</strong></p>\n<p>The GDPR requires that your have a legal basis for processing personal data. Consent is a legal basis but there are others.</p>\n<p>With respect to note taking, the GDPR only applies to “personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.”</p>\n<p>So, if they notes are not about an individual (and many B2B phone calls will not be) or are neither automated nor filed, the GDPR does not apply. If they are captured by the GDPR, you need to have a legal basis for the notes. Again, consent is one but it is not the only one.</p>\n", "score": 6 } ]

[ "united-kingdom", "gdpr", "recording" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93255, "body": "<h2>In accordance with the terms of the trust deed</h2>\n<p>Those terms of the will that are related to the trust will become the trust deed in the absence of one included for the purpose.</p>\n<p>The trustee(s) can administer the trust on behalf of the beneficiaries in accordance with the terms. Unless the deed expressly prohibits the sale (either in total or subject to conditions) the trustee(s) can do what they think proper.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-states", "new-jersey", "trusts-and-estates" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93973, "body": "<p>If 'literally 300' attorneys declined your case on the basis of a phone call, without looking into the details, I can see three options:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>You are unable to communicate the nature of your case clearly.<br />\nIn this posting, you mentioned complaints against a company, a municipality, and a landlord, plus being evicted. Focus on explaining <em>one</em> case.<br />\nIf you think you 'know for a fact' that you have several big payouts coming, there is the first problem. <em>Nobody</em> knows what a jury will decide. An attorney might hesitate to work for a client who does not understand this. Litigation is always a risk.</li>\n<li>All your cases actually lack merit, a lawyer sees this and you do not. Not knowing the cases, I cannot tell. (And no, you should not explain them in detail on the web. If they do have merit, posting your strategy hurts the cases.)</li>\n<li>Your state has a <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vexatious_litigation#United_States\" rel=\"noreferrer\">vexatious litigant</a> list and you are on it. That would not prevent an attorney from taking your case, but it might make them hesitate.</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 5 } ]

[ "united-states" ]

[ { "answer_id": 89298, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Does this mean that the fragment stolen by giazotto is copyright free?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>No. If people are using the work, they may be paying a license fee for the privilege, or they may be violating the copyright. The behavior of others is not a good way of judging how you should behave. For example, in many cities in Europe you can see people boarding trams or buses without buying tickets, but that doesn't mean that public transportation is free of charge. Some of those people are breaking the law, but most of them bought a ticket on the previous tram or hold a monthly pass.</p>\n<p>If there was in fact a fragment, it wasn't &quot;stolen,&quot; and even if the piece was based on a fragment, whether that fragment was in the public domain or not, and whether Giazotto used it legally or not, that would not allow others to use the work without permission. The parts that he composed are protected by his copyright even if the fragment is in the public domain. But if the fragment were more recent and therefore also under copyright, well then you would risk infringing <em>two</em> copyrights instead of just one.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>is it safe to cover Giazotto's work without getting sued for it?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Assuming you mean &quot;without obtaining a license,&quot; it depends on what you do with the cover. If you only play it for your closest friends without giving them a copy, it's probably safe.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>I am composing a piece that uses this but I refuse to continue because that last thing I want is some guy in India try to sue me because they managed to buy the rights to adagio in g minor</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>You have a couple of other options. You can find out who actually owns the rights and ask them for permission, or you can hire a lawyer in the hope of determining that your proposed composition does not actually require a license.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 89289, "body": "<h2>The <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adagio_in_G_minor\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">work</a> is under copyright</h2>\n<p>Giazotto died in 1998 so copyright will last until 31 December 2068. Giazotto originally claimed that he transcribed and arranged a work by Albinoni - an 18th century composer whose work would have been in the public domain. However, this is what is legally known as a “lie” and the work is, in fact, an original work by Giazotto; as he subsequently admitted.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "copyright", "music" ]

[ { "answer_id": 71164, "body": "<h2>Repeating a defamatory statement is itself defamatory</h2>\n<p>This is known as the repetition rule and is illustrated in <a href=\"https://www.5rb.com/case/brown-v-bower-another/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Brown v Bower &amp; Another [2017] EWHC 2637 (QB)</a>. In essence, the &quot;local news site&quot; is responsible for the reputational damage suffered by their publication and you are responsible for the damage caused by your amplification of that publication. So if the local news article was seen by a few dozen people locally, the damages might be relatively modest. If your publication caused it to be seen by millions of people and caused nationwide or worldwide damage to the person's reputation so that they are at risk of losing income or opportunities in the future, the damages can be vast.</p>\n<p>How you shared it is important. If you endorsed it, which includes forwarding it without commentary, then it is likely defamatory. If you were more circumspect and said something that shows an open mind to the allegations like &quot;This is an interesting story, I can't wait to see how it plays out&quot;, then it's likely not defamatory.</p>\n<p>Of course, if the allegations are true then you have nothing to worry about; truth is a complete defence to defamation. You can prove that they are true, right? I mean with real evidence like a conviction for fraud. Or, at the very least, pending or actual charges from the police. Or, failing that you have good evidence that you yourself have been scammed specifically by this person. Or that you have had people who have been scammed tell you personally exactly how it happened?</p>\n<p>No? Well, I wouldn't count on a truth defence if I were you.</p>\n", "score": 42 }, { "answer_id": 71159, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Should I be concerned?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Thats not a question about the law, and this site is off topic for actual legal advice questions, but there is an answer which is on-topic, not legal advice and worth saying.</p>\n<p>The person you have described is litigious in nature - they use the courts for their own ends, perhaps even for bullying.</p>\n<p>Should you be concerned?</p>\n<p>Yes - not that the person has any case against you, but because they can cost you time, money and reputation even without a case. All they have to do is make it costly for you to fight a case against them - they can draw out the legal process so you have to retain legal assistance for longer, they can make disparaging remarks and claims about you, and they can withdraw the case at a later date with little negative outcome unless you sue them back.</p>\n<p>Get a lawyer, now, and see what you can do to head this off.</p>\n", "score": 24 }, { "answer_id": 71167, "body": "<p>If the article on the &quot;local news site&quot; was false, or cannot be proved true and if it harmed, or was likely to harm, the reputation of the alleged scammer, it was probably defamatory. Repeating a defamatory statement <strong>can</strong> itself be defamation. Whether it is in fact defamation depends on whether the repetition was done in a way likely to be seen as endorsing the original story, or in a way that contests it, or in a way that neutrally analyzes it without either endorsing or contesting the original story.</p>\n<p>Posting a link to a news story is less likely to be held to be defamation than would repeating the whole story, or its defamatory statements. However, if the link was so distributed that it significantly spread defamatory statements, it might itself constitute defamation.</p>\n<p>In any case, even if the statements can be proved true, or the poster has another clear defense to an accusation of defamation, defending a suit can be costly and troublesome.</p>\n<p>In some jurisdictions there are so-called &quot;anti-SLAPP&quot; laws. These can be invoked when a defamation suit is used to unduly burden speech that is of public value, sch a news reporting or comments on current public issues. (SLAPP stands for &quot;strategic lawsuit against public participation&quot;.) Such laws can be used to have an improper suit dismissed at an early stage, before undue burdens are imposed. Exactly how and when such laws may be invoked varies depending on the jurisdiction, and they do not exist at all in some jurisdictions. One would be wise to consult a lawyer knowledgeable in defamation law to see if a anti-SLAPP law, or some other tactic, could avoid a burdensome suit.</p>\n<p>A threat to sue from a person noted from having sued others with some frequency would usually be grounds for concern.</p>\n", "score": 12 }, { "answer_id": 71173, "body": "<p>Jurisdiction: <a href=\"/questions/tagged/england-and-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\">england-and-wales</a></p>\n<p>I'm posting this to add to the other answers, so I won't go into details on the defence of truth other than to say that in England and Wales this can be found in <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/section/2\" rel=\"noreferrer\">section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013</a>.</p>\n<p>However, that is not the only defence. There are also the <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/section/3\" rel=\"noreferrer\">honest opinion</a> and <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/section/4\" rel=\"noreferrer\">public interest</a> defences. Either of those could be applicable in this case depending on the facts.</p>\n<p>It may also be helpful for you to be aware of the <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statute_of_limitations\" rel=\"noreferrer\">limitation period</a> in your jurisdiction for defamation. In England and Wales it is much shorter than for most other causes of action (which is most commonly 6 years). While not helpful if the claimant issues a claim in time, it can relieve the pressure somewhat once the period has expired.</p>\n<p>A claim must be brought within 1 year of the date on which the defamation ocurred, pursuant to <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/58/section/4A\" rel=\"noreferrer\">section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980</a>. This is subject to the court's discretion to permit defamation cases to proceed outside the limitation period pursuant to <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/58/section/32A\" rel=\"noreferrer\">section 32A</a>.</p>\n<p>In cases of re-publishing, the clock starts running on the date of the <em>first publication</em> as provided for in <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/section/8\" rel=\"noreferrer\">section 8 of the Defamation Act 2013</a>, unless the re-publication is &quot;materially different&quot;, including the level of prominence and extent of the re-publication. So any gap in time between the first publication and your re-publication may work to your advantage.</p>\n", "score": 9 } ]

[ "civil-law", "australia", "defamation", "litigation" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93969, "body": "<h2>Termination is a matter of fact</h2>\n<p>That is, it has either happened, or it hasn’t. Whether it has or hasn’t depends on a multitude of factors including the terms of the contract, the actions of the parties, and communication between them. These factors are so case specific that it is impossible to generalise.</p>\n<p>Further, within a given case, reasonable parties may differ on if a contract has been terminated, which party initiated the termination, and if that termination was lawful. Usually, these cases involve mutual allegations of repudiation by the other party and rightful termination in response by our side. These issues are likely to be the major ones that the court or tribunal will have to determine.</p>\n<p>A claim for damages would need to be pursued as part of the overall case but the deadline for raising them is a procedural matter for the court or tribunal. Failing to raise them as an issue in pre-litigation correspondence would not be a bar to raising them in a claim or counter-claim.</p>\n<p>However, failing to raise them at the earliest opportunity denies the offending party the opportunity to mitigate the damage and, if they can show that there were actions they could have reasonably taken to mitigate but couldn’t because they weren’t informed, then that may reduce or eliminate the damages payable.</p>\n", "score": 5 } ]

[ "california" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93967, "body": "<h2>The UK has <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parliamentary_sovereignty#Recent_developments\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">parliamentary sovereignty</a>, not <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Separation_of_powers\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">separation of powers</a></h2>\n<p>Unlike, say, the United States, where the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive have co-equal power in their respective spheres, in the UK, the judiciary and the executive are subordinate to Parliament.</p>\n<p>The courts have no power to nullify an Act of Parliament for being unconstitutional like they do in jurisdictions where a written constitution gives them such a power like the USA, Canada, or Australia. The purpose of the Declaration of Incompatibility is to advise Parliament that the law they have passed contradicts the HRA and they should think about that and decide if that’s what they really wanted to do.</p>\n<p>That means that the UK Parliament could pass the <em>Arbitrary Bollock Removal Act</em> 2023 (ABRA) tomorrow and it would be valid law.</p>\n<p>The courts can still provide judicial review of the actions of the executive under ABRA but they cannot declare the law a nullity. That is, the Minister’s actions can be scrutinised to ensure they followed the ABRA and other established principles such as procedural fairness and, if they didn’t, declare the executive actions void. However, if they did follow the law, off come your nuts.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "united-kingdom", "human-rights", "judicial-review", "declaration-of-incompatibility" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93965, "body": "<h2>No</h2>\n<p>Let’s assume the most generous interpretation: you came up with a fully fleshed-out idea for a television show - name, characters, plot, scene-setting - the lot. You told this idea over the phone to someone else who made this show incorporating every single part of your idea.</p>\n<p>Here’s the rub: <strong>nobody owns ideas</strong>.</p>\n<p>Unless you had them sign a non-disclosure agreement before you told them (which you didn’t), they are free to use your ideas however they like.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "acknowledgement" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93963, "body": "<ul>\n<li>Some people seem to believe that just because something happens 'in the internet' it is somehow outside normal jurisdictions.<br />\n<strong>Wrong.</strong><br />\nIn may be harder to investigate and prosecute crimes in the internet, but the laws apply all the same. There are some problems when it is unclear 'where in the world' something did happen -- in the jurisdiction of the perpetrator, the victim, or the service provider? But problems of jurisdiction apply e.g. to international fraud cases in the non-web-world as well.</li>\n<li>In many jurisdictions, the informed and voluntary consent makes <em>some</em> things legal which would otherwise be illegal.<br />\nFor instance, if two boxers get into the ring, it is understood that each of them did consent to be hit by the other. But usually two fighters could not legally agree to a fight to the death, because even if there are laws on assisted suicide, they do not apply to a fight.</li>\n<li>Insults, libel, and slander are not on the same level as homicide. There are jurisdictions where they are not prosecuted without the request of the victim. But an insult might also violate other laws, e.g. disturbing the peace. So don't bet on such an app unless you know <em>for sure</em> which jurisdictions are involved.</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "european-union" ]

[ { "answer_id": 92469, "body": "<h2>No</h2>\n<p>CC is set up in a way, that you can not put any item acquired under one license under a more permissive license set in any way without breaching the license terms.</p>\n<p>A work that is CC-BY-NC can not become just CC-BY under the terms of the CC-BY-NC, as the -NC does not allow that part to be dropped as the CC-BY-NC license text demands you can't license the new work in any fashion that allows commercial use.</p>\n<p>It's only allowed to transmit into a more restrictive license scheme (e.g. adding -NC, -ND, or -SA), and never possible to drop a -NC, -ND or -SA.</p>\n<p>There is one exception: if something is already under a Share Alike license, you can not tack on any limitations either! <a href=\"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">A ...-SA license can not be changed to <strong>any</strong> other license type <strong>at all</strong></a>, not CC-BY-NC-SA, not more permissive, not less permissive, not even an equivalent license scheme. The license terms on such a work is permanently fixed if you get it under that license.</p>\n<h2>Which license applies?</h2>\n<p>It is unsure if the author or someone that received the work under a more permissive license than CC-BY-SA/CC-BY-NC did grant <strong>just OAM</strong> a license under CC-BY. In case there is a claim against OAM, it would be the duty of OAM to prove that they had received the work under this license and thus <em>could</em> grant it under CC-BY.</p>\n<p>The diligent thing for someone receiving the work down the line from OAM would be to presume the work to be under the most restrictive license that can be found in the metadata. In case those are incompatible with the proposed use, then the item can't be used.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "creative-commons" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93955, "body": "<h2>One might be enough, 10,000 might not be enough</h2>\n<p>In some cases, no eyewitnesses may be enough.</p>\n<p>The trier of fact (the jury if there is one, the judge if there isn’t) decides what weight to give to the evidence or any part of it (including the testimony of any given eyewitness) and decide if that is enough to meet the prosecution’s burden of beyond reasonable doubt on each of the elements to be proven.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>From the outset, however, you should understand that you are the sole judges of the facts. In respect of all disputes about matters of fact in this case, it will be you and not I who will have to resolve them. In part, that means that it is entirely up to you to decide what evidence is to be accepted and what evidence is to be rejected. For that reason you need to pay careful attention to each witness as their evidence is given. You should not only listen to what the witnesses say but also watch them as they give their evidence. How a witness presents to you and how he or she responds to questioning, especially in cross-examination, may assist you in deciding whether or not you accept what that witness was saying as truthful and reliable. You are entitled to accept part of what a witness says and reject other parts of the evidence.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Recommended instruction to the jury from the <a href=\"https://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/the_jury.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">NSW Criminal Trial Bench Book</a></p>\n", "score": 21 }, { "answer_id": 93948, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Is Charles’s word enough to convict Alice of a crime?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Usually yes unless his is discredited or found unreliable.</p>\n<p>He may be discredited if he has history of being dishonest, especially if convicted for it.</p>\n<p>He may be found unreliable if he is inconsistent about details of what he saw (e.g. tells different stories at different times), if he has had some conflicts with Alice, if he is on Bob's payroll and so on.</p>\n<p>All those are just factors that the trier of fact may/will consider. There can't be an unequivocal yes or no.</p>\n", "score": 15 }, { "answer_id": 93950, "body": "<p>The number of witnesses does not mathematically add up to reasonable doubt or not. It all depends on what the jury finds credible. Dozens of witnesses who hated Alice would not be so credible as one witness who hated David, another suspect, and loved Alice but said that Alice had done it.</p>\n<p>This is because what is required is to convince the jury. <a href=\"https://www.torontodefencelawyers.com/beyond-reasonable-doubt-canadian-criminal-law/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Toronto Defense Lawyers</a> explains it:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The judge/jury does not need to be “absolutely certain” that the defendant is guilty to satisfy the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution need not prove guilt beyond any doubt whatsoever. Moreover, the judge/jury cannot acquit based on an imaginary or frivolous doubt.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>However, the reasonable doubt standard requires more than simply that the jury be convinced that the defendant “probably” committed the crime or “likely” committed the crime.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Just as you would probably believe some things on few witnesses and disbelieve others with more witnesses because you find them less credible, so too with the jurors.</p>\n", "score": 12 }, { "answer_id": 93947, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>How many witnesses’ testimony constitute or transcend reasonable doubt?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Reasonable doubt is assessed based on the totality of the evidence (<em>R. v. McClure</em>, <a href=\"https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2001/2001scc14/2001scc14.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">2001 SCC 14, para. 60</a>). <strong>There is no formula</strong>. See <em>R. v. Lifchus</em>, [1997] 3 SCR 320, <a href=\"https://canlii.ca/t/1fqzt#par36\" rel=\"noreferrer\">para. 36</a>:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is inextricably intertwined with that principle fundamental to all criminal trials, the presumption of innocence;</li>\n<li>the burden of proof rests on the prosecution throughout the trial and never shifts to the accused;</li>\n<li>a reasonable doubt is not a doubt based upon sympathy or prejudice;</li>\n<li>rather, it is based upon reason and common sense;</li>\n<li>it is logically connected to the evidence or absence of evidence;</li>\n<li>it does not involve proof to an absolute certainty; it is not proof beyond any doubt nor is it an imaginary or frivolous doubt; and</li>\n<li>more is required than proof that the accused is probably guilty ‑‑ a jury which concludes only that the accused is probably guilty must acquit.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>As part of that analysis, it is up to the trier of fact (judge or jury, depending on the trial) <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/85118/how-is-a-judge-to-evaluate-a-witnesss-credibility\">to assess each witness's credibility</a>.</p>\n", "score": 6 }, { "answer_id": 93956, "body": "<p>You would need some things to add up for “guilty beyond reasonable doubt”.</p>\n<p>First, did the police see Bob lying on the ground, stabbed in the back, in a way that he couldn’t do himself and that couldn’t be an accident? Without an injured Bob, there is reasonable doubt that a crime happened at all.</p>\n<p>Could Charles by mistaken? If Alice is one of 100 customers to enter Bobs store that day, then it could easily be a person who looks similar to Alice. If Bob, Alice and Charles have been coworkers for years, it is most likely no mistake. Unless Alice has an identical twin.</p>\n<p>Could Charles be lying? With your story, I’d have the very reasonable doubt that Charles might be the attacker, and trying to put the blame on Alice. So your facts wouldn’t be enough.</p>\n<p>Now another witness who saw what happened from a distance and could see it was a person with long hair like Alice and not a bald person like Charles, even though they can’t identify Alice, that would make a difference.</p>\n<p>In the end a jury decides. It is not necessary that there is no other possibility than Alice being the attacker, but just finding it likely or highly probable that she is the attacker is not enough.</p>\n", "score": 6 }, { "answer_id": 93957, "body": "<h2>0 <em>direct</em> witnesses can be enough</h2>\n<p>It is upon the trier of fact to evaluate what happened. A case can be held <strong>entirely</strong> based on evidence with 0 witnesses that actually saw the act to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, all those analysts and investigators, and other experts are to be called to explain the evidence and their significance... as witnesses. Not calling them as (<em>indirect</em>) witnesses means, the evidence should not come in under <a href=\"https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/557/305/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009)</a>.</p>\n<p>Any number of witnesses - be they experts, investigators or direct eyewitness - that can make the finder of fact believe that it is beyond a reasonable doubt is enough. Any number can be 0 eyewitnesses, 0 experts, and the one 1 investigator saying &quot;I met Alice an hour after the incident and she was acting strange when I told her Bob is dead.&quot;</p>\n<h2>A million people agreeing (based on hearsay) might not be</h2>\n<p>Since you need to convince the finder of fact that someone is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, you could have millions of people that all claim Alice did it, maybe because of the news reports, but because nobody of them has more information than the news reporter, who invented half his story, all of their testimony is hearsay and worth nothing. They can not testify. Not even the investigator can testify about things told to them, as established by <a href=\"https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/541/36/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)</a>, overruling <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ohio_v._Roberts\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)</a>.</p>\n", "score": 6 } ]

[ "criminal-law", "england-and-wales" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93958, "body": "<p>According to the linked judgment dated 3 May 2022, the underlying small claim was listed for 30 May that year. The issue is described in paragraph 3 as:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The underlying claim is in relation to a mobile phone which Mr Halborg purchased from the Second Defendant and which he alleges was defective.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>(the Second Defendant is O2)</p>\n<p>As a small claim, we would not expect there to be a published judgment or any media coverage, which accounts for the lack of information on search results.</p>\n<p>As a non-party to the case it is possible to request certain details from the court, including the statement of claim and the text of any orders. There is also the possibility of obtaining a transcript of the proceedings, since there apparently was a hearing and these are routinely recorded. Note that although the linked document says a hearing was meant to happen on 30 May, it's also possible that this was abandoned, rescheduled, etc.</p>\n<p>It would probably be more effective - certainly faster and cheaper - to contact the claimant directly and ask about it, if you are really curious.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "england-and-wales", "legal-research" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93954, "body": "<h2>They have to be <a href=\"https://www.baxterip.com.au/trade-mark-infringement#:%7E:text=Under%20Section%20120%20of%20the,trade%20mark%20is%20registered%20for\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">substantially identical or deceptively similar</a></h2>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/australia\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-australia-tooltip-container\">australia</a></p>\n<p>Substantially identical is a side-by-side comparison noting the similarities and differences.</p>\n<p>If they are not substantially identical, then the deceptively similar test is “ between, on the one hand, the impression based on recollection of one mark that a person of ordinary intelligence and memory would have and, on the other hand, the impressions that such a person would get from looking at the second mark.”</p>\n<p>Are they substantially identical? No.</p>\n<p>Are they deceptively similar? Maybe.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-states", "trademark", "us-federal-government" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93952, "body": "<h2>Consent only applies to audio recordings</h2>\n<p>Written communication (and, usually soundless video recording) is not covered.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-states", "data-protection", "personal-information", "artificial-intelligence", "data-protection-act" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93942, "body": "<p>Almost. Under <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/section/26?timeline=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">section 26</a> Equity Act 2010, the offence of harassment does not include discrimination based on &quot;<em>marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy or maternity</em>&quot;:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>Harassment</strong></p>\n<p>(1)A person (A) harasses another (B) if—</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p>(a)A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>(b)the conduct has the purpose or effect of—</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(i)violating B's dignity, or</p>\n<p>(ii)creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>(2)A also harasses B if—</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p>(a)A engages in unwanted conduct of a sexual nature, and</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>(b)the conduct has the purpose or effect referred to in subsection (1)(b).</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>(3)A also harasses B if—</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p>(a)A or another person engages in unwanted conduct of a sexual nature or that is related to gender reassignment or sex,</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>(b)the conduct has the purpose or effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), and</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>(c)because of B's rejection of or submission to the conduct, A treats B less favourably than A would treat B if B had not rejected or submitted to the conduct.</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>(4)In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), each of the following must be taken into account—</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p>(a)the perception of B;</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>(b)the other circumstances of the case;</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>(c)whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n<p>(5)<strong>The relevant protected characteristics are—</strong></p>\n<p><strong>age;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>disability;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>gender reassignment;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>race;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>religion or belief;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>sex;</strong></p>\n<p><strong>sexual orientation.</strong></p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>However...</p>\n<p>There is also the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 which, at <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1997/40/section/1?timeline=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">section 1</a> and <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1997/40/section/2?timeline=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">section 2</a> creates the offence without a requirement to show any discrimination based on protected characteristics.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 93941, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a></p>\n<p>Harassment is a form of discrimination prohibited by the <a href=\"https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/00_96210_01\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">B.C. Human Rights Code</a>. See British Columbia, &quot;<a href=\"https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/law-crime-and-justice/human-rights/human-rights-protection/what-you-need-to-know.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Human Rights in British Columbia: What You Need to Know</a>&quot;:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Harassment is a form of discrimination. It can be words or actions that\nofend or humiliate you. It is harassment when someone repeatedly says\nor does things to you that are insulting and offensive. The Code protects\nyou when harassment is based on a protected characteristic listed under\n“How am I protected”. There are many types of harassment.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>See also <em>Oger v. Whatcott (No. 7)</em>, <a href=\"https://canlii.ca/t/hzdgk#par52\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">2019 BCHRT 58, para. 52</a> (citations omitted):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>speech which adversely impacts a person in connection with a characteri[s]tic protected by the Code is prohibited in all the social areas which the Code regulates. Sexual and racial harassment are the most obvious examples of this. Whenever people use words in a way that substantively attacks and undermines a person's dignity in connection with their work, housing, or access to public services, because of personal characteristics protected by the Code, they run afoul of human rights law.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "england-and-wales", "legal-terms", "discrimination", "definition", "harassment" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93934, "body": "<p>New Hampshire has published restrictions for persons on probation: <a href=\"https://www.nh.gov/nhdoc/divisions/victim/pandp_offender.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">https://www.nh.gov/nhdoc/divisions/victim/pandp_offender.html</a></p>\n<p>These restriction include agreeing to searches by the Probation-Parole Officer (&quot;PPO&quot;), but do not mention identification to a general peace officer. New Hampshire law allows the police to request the identity of person the officer has reason to suspect is committing or may be about to commit a crime (this is less of a standard than probable cause). Failure to identify is a crime, and a subsequent arrest would require notification of the PPO, though the requirements above state that the PPO must be notified of even mere questioning by a law enforcement officer. The identification requirement applies to everyone.</p>\n<p>I can find no requirement that the identification requires the person to mention that they are on probation.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "police", "identification", "new-hampshire" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93939, "body": "<p>Depends on what terms of service the account holder signed up to.</p>\n<p>For instance, one could run a website at a cloud provider, configure it so that it <em>automatically</em> scales up when the traffic grows, and then mishandle the credentials so that one cannot shut it down quickly. By the time access is restored, there might be quite some bill.</p>\n<p>As it recently made the news, when a business deliberately makes it easier to <em>sign up</em> than to <em>cancel</em>, the <a href=\"https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/06/ftc-takes-action-against-amazon-enrolling-consumers-amazon-prime-without-consent-sabotaging-their\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">FTC</a> may step in. But that was an extreme case.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-states", "internet", "online", "indiana", "credit-card" ]

[ { "answer_id": 43213, "body": "<blockquote>\n <p>What does Enurement mean in a contract?</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>Black's Law Dictionary defines <em>enure</em> as \"<em>To operate or take effect. To serve to the use, benefit, or advantage of a person</em>\".</p>\n\n<p>The clause in your contract means that both entitlements and duties as provided in the agreement affect the parties but may be transfered to their heirs, successors, etc. In other words, that the death of a party does not extinguish the provisions in the contract.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 77076, "body": "<p>Remember there are usually two parties to an employment contract, an employer and employee. An enurement clause in the contract also protects the employee if their employer merges with another entity, a corporation winds up, etc.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "contract-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93902, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-states\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-states-tooltip-container\">united-states</a></p>\n<p>A similar issue came up in my answer to <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/89766/can-a-private-person-deceive-a-defendant-to-obtain-evidence/89791#89791\">Can a private person deceive a defendant to obtain evidence?</a>. I don't think the question itself is a duplicate, so instead I'll just copy the relevant section from my answer with minor edits.</p>\n<p>The short answer is yes, the privilege applies.</p>\n<p>The case of <a href=\"https://casetext.com/case/us-v-tyler-12\" rel=\"noreferrer\">US v. Tyler, 745 F. Supp. 423 (W.D. Mich. 1990)</a> matches your hypothetical almost exactly. The defendant, James Tyler, shared a prison cell with Melvin Deutsch, who said that he was a lawyer, had what appeared to be a law school diploma on the wall of his cell, and was addressed as &quot;counselor&quot; by other inmates; but in fact was not a lawyer. Nevertheless, correspondence between Tyler and Deutsch regarding Tyler's legal issues was held to be privileged and inadmissible.</p>\n<p>Tyler was held to have had a reasonable belief that Deutsch was a lawyer, despite that Deutsch had never been licensed to practice law in any jurisdiction, and that the law school diploma was (presumably) fake. Tyler evidently didn't check on either of those things, and the court did not seem to think that he reasonably should have.</p>\n<p>Also, Tyler apparently did not know the seemingly obvious fact that a convicted felon cannot practice law, let alone while actually in prison. However, this was not felt by the court to be &quot;ingenuous&quot;: &quot;To expect a layperson to be familiar with the internal discipline procedures of the Bar is unreasonable.&quot;</p>\n<p>There is also a discussion of such situations in the following article:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Grace M. Giesel, <em>Upjohn Warnings, The Attorney-client Privilege, And Principles Of Lawyer Ethics: Achieving Harmony</em>, 65 U. Miami L.\nRev. 109 (2015). Available at <a href=\"http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol65/iss1/5\" rel=\"noreferrer\">this link</a></p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>See Section IV.D.2 on page 140:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In addition to applying the honest-and-reasonable-belief analysis in\nthe attorney-client privilege setting to the question of representational\nrelationship, courts have also applied the analysis when the person consulted is not, in fact, a lawyer. The courts addressing this issue have\nstated that the privilege applies to a communication even if the person\nconsulted is not admitted to any bar and has enjoyed no legal training. <strong>If\nthe putative client honestly and reasonably believes that the person consulted is a lawyer, and if the other requirements of the privilege are\nsatisfied, the privilege applies even though the person consulted is, in\nfact, not a lawyer.</strong></p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>See the article for additional citations.</p>\n<p>The article also mentions that certain states make this principle explicit by statute. For instance, the <em>Kentucky Rules of Evidence</em>, Rule 503(a)(3):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>&quot;Lawyer&quot; means a person authorized, <strong>or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized</strong> to engage in the practice of law in any state or nation.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 29 }, { "answer_id": 93926, "body": "<p>Yes, it does, in any reasonable jurisdiction. The argument is as follows.</p>\n<p>I sometimes find it helps me understand the legal reasoning if I reverse the actual practice. So let's suppose that attorney client privilege doesn't apply with a fake lawyer. John Doe is arrested, he doesn't have a lawyer, until someone enters his cell and offers to represent him. After an interviewer, it turns out that the &quot;lawyer&quot; is actually a fake, could use who was put up to the job by dodgy police. They debrief their stooge, and now have information that they could use against Mr. Doe...</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "attorney-client-privilege" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93928, "body": "<h2>You are mistaken: they deny you on your act</h2>\n<p>When you use Tor, your browser is not sending a lot of information. That makes Tor browsers hilariously easy to detect: nobody knows where the real browser is, but it is hilariously easy to block all Tor users for using Tor, or at least those that the server knows are Tor IPs. <strong>Using Tor is an action,</strong> not how you look.</p>\n<p>The closest Brick and mortar equivalent would be &quot;Show me your ID please&quot; and you show them a paper cutout of something that has Sample stamped over it.</p>\n<h2>&quot;No shirt, no shoes, no service&quot; in the <a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-states\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-states-tooltip-container\">united-states</a></h2>\n<p>Yes, most places can deny service based on how you dress or your state of hygine. These two would in most cases not extend to the protections under the <a href=\"https://www.dol.gov/agencies/oasam/civil-rights-center/statutes/civil-rights-act-of-1964\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Civil Rights Act</a>, which protects some characteristics like race and sex, but not visual factors like &quot;being dressed&quot; or &quot;smelling of cow&quot;. There can be a fine line where religious dress code is concerned, but in general and broad strokes, the restaurant can deny you for wearing the wrong clothes.</p>\n<p>Actually, the slogan is much broader than it appears: as long as an establishment's dress code is not violating discrimination law (like the CRA), they can enforce it under their freedom to contract.</p>\n", "score": 10 }, { "answer_id": 93927, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a></p>\n<p>&quot;Looks&quot; are not a protected characteristic in any anti-discrimination regime in Canada. It is not a violation of any provincial or federal Human Rights Code to deny services on the basis of looks <em>per se</em>. Only when this serves to discriminate on the basis of a protected characteristic would this discrimination be prohibited.</p>\n<p>For example, under the <a href=\"https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/h-6/FullText.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Canadian Human Rights Act</a>, these are: &quot;race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, genetic characteristics, disability and conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered.&quot;</p>\n<p>Under the <a href=\"https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/00_96210_01\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">B.C. Human Rights Code</a>, in relation to services, the prohibited grounds of discrimination are: &quot;Indigenous identity, race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or age.&quot;</p>\n<p>Of course, if the way one is being discriminated on the basis of &quot;looks&quot; is to actually result in discrimination on the basis of &quot;race&quot; or &quot;colour,&quot; for example, this would be prohibited discrimination.</p>\n<p>These codes apply no matter whether the prohibited discrimination is due solely to the actions of a person, or mediated by the operation of an algorithm. They are written and applied in a technologically neutral manner.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "internet", "data-protection", "artificial-intelligence" ]

[ { "answer_id": 91673, "body": "<p>Legislatures are free to declare illegal whatever they want (within Constitutional limitations, obviously). A bill of attainder declares a defendant guilty without trial. Targeting a company with laws isn't particularly noteworthy, this is done all the time, usually to the company's benefit.</p>\n<p>Nothing Florida is doing would be considered a bill of attainder. Special conditions that have been set by the state are always available to be re-legislated.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 93916, "body": "<p>At question here is whether Disney was punished by an act of the Florida Legislature. Lets look at basically how this happened. At first the legislature voted to strip Reedy Creek of its special designation. Once they realized that this would shift the burden of bond payment to the local counties to the tune of billions, they repealed the law that stripped Reedy Creek of its special designation. They then passed a law dissolving the Reedy Creek Board that was appointed by Disney. Before that board was seated, Disney held public meetings in accordance with Florida transparency laws and changed their by-laws as to what power the board would have. Again this was done above board just no one seemed to notice. This was signed off on by the former board which was still legally the board for Reedy Creek. Now that we know this, did the legislature make <em>all</em> the boards of special tax districts submit to a board appointed by the Governor to make business decisions? No, just Disney. Also, the Governors own words show that this was a retaliatory action. Disney has an incredibly strong case here and if I had to chose which one to represent...it would easily be Disney.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-states", "attainder" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93912, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a></p>\n<ul>\n<li>Anybody <em>can</em> call the police and file charges. The police will probably ask both sides to make statements for the record. If you are potentially accused of a crime, they will inform you of your right not to testify, which can be scary if you are not familiar with the legal language.<br />\nYou can file charges against the other side at this point, too. Police are familiar with situations where two sides accuse each other.</li>\n<li>Having collected evidence and statements, the police decide if there is enough of a case to present it to the prosecutor's office. That's not yet a determination of guilt, it merely means that they will look into it further. The prosecutor decides if there is enough of a case to bring it to court. (The prosecutor must see a likelihood of success.)</li>\n<li>If the case goes to trial, there will probably be a single judge, no jury. You are not required to have a defense attorney, but you might want to if there are language problems. However, in the German system, the judge is not merely the 'referee' between the prosecution and defense. The judge is supposed to question witnesses to understand what happened, and in many cases the judge will ask the same questions a defender would have asked.</li>\n<li>For minor crimes, there is a procedure called <em>Strafbefehl</em>, which is important to understand. It is a letter with the offer of a sort of 'plea bargain,' which goes into effect unless you <em>refuse</em> it quickly and demand a trial. Doing nothing means you accept.</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "police", "germany", "evidence", "theft" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93880, "body": "<p>Whether a contract relates to copyright vs traditional property rights is a red herring.</p>\n<p>As explained in two existing Q&amp;As (very similar to your question, these were about whether one can chose to trespass instead of accepting a parking-lot contract, or an entrance fee):</p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/92593/overriding-offered-contract-acceptance-methods-with-express-written-declaration/92600#92600\">Overriding offered contract acceptance methods with express written declaration</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/92399/legal-bindingness-validity-of-implicit-presumptively-entered-contracts-for-occup/92400#92400\">Legal bindingness/validity of implicit/presumptively entered contracts for occupancy fees</a></li>\n</ul>\n<p>and this Q&amp;A about the <em>objective</em> rather than <em>subjective</em> analysis of contract formation:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/90788/does-contract-formation-require-subjective-meeting-of-the-minds\">Does contract formation require subjective &quot;meeting of the minds&quot;?</a></li>\n</ul>\n<p>, what matters is whether you've done the thing that constitutes acceptance of the contract, and whether in the circumstances, the conduct that the offeror has deemed to be acceptance is the kind of conduct that can objectively convey acceptance.</p>\n<p>You can refuse contractual obligations by not doing the act that the offeror has said would constitute acceptance.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 93911, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>is it possible to receive code that should have been but still is not actually licensed to you under the GPL</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>This is definitely possible, but in this scenario your question is moot.</p>\n<p>It doesn't matter to you whether the person who provided the code to you</p>\n<p>(a) agreed to the GPL and then violated its terms (breach of contract)</p>\n<p>or</p>\n<p>(b) made copies without agreeing to the GPL (infringement of copyright).</p>\n<p>In neither case was a license under GPL offered to you. You cannot enforce the offender to offer you a license, because you are not a party to the contract requiring them to do so.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-states", "copyright", "licensing" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93898, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a>¹</p>\n<p>The judgment you have read about is <em>South West Terminal Ltd. v Achter Land</em>, <a href=\"https://www.canlii.org/en/sk/skkb/doc/2023/2023skkb116/2023skkb116.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">2023 SKKB 116</a>. <strong>The judge did not hold that &quot;👍&quot; is categorically considered to be binding agreement</strong>. The judge applied the modern approach to contractual interpretation outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada in <em>Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp.</em>, <a href=\"https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2014/2014scc53/2014scc53.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">2014 SCC 53</a> and <em>Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada St. Mary Cathedral v. Aga</em>, <a href=\"https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/18895/index.do\" rel=\"noreferrer\">2021 SCC 22</a>. This requires judges to interpret the text of the contract and indicators of acceptance in light of the surrounding circumstances.</p>\n<p>Regarding interpretation, see <em>Sattva</em>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>a decision-maker must read the contract as a whole, giving the words used their ordinary and grammatical meaning, consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of formation of the contract. Consideration of the surrounding circumstances recognizes that ascertaining contractual intention can be difficult when looking at words on their own, because words alone do not have an immutable or absolute meaning</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Regarding formation, see <em>Aga</em> (internal citations removed):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>[36] For present purposes, it will suffice to focus on the requirement of\nintention to create legal relations. As G. H. L. Fridman explains,\n“the test of agreement for legal purposes is whether parties have\nindicated to the outside world, in the form of the objective\nreasonable bystander, their intention to contract and the terms of such contract”.\nThis requirement can be understood as an aspect of valid offer and\nacceptance, in the sense that a valid offer and acceptance must\nobjectively manifest an intention to be legally bound.</p>\n<p>[37] The test for an intention to create\nlegal relations is objective. The question is not what the parties\nsubjectively had in mind but whether their conduct was such that a\nreasonable person would conclude that they intended to be bound. In answering this question,\ncourts are not limited to the four corners of the purported agreement,\nbut may consider the surrounding circumstances.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>See also <em>Owners, Strata Plan LMS 3905 v. Crystal Square Parking Corp.</em>, <a href=\"https://canlii.ca/t/jb62z#par37\" rel=\"noreferrer\">2020 SCC 29, para. 37</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>the offer, acceptance, consideration and terms may be inferred from the parties’ conduct and from the surrounding circumstances</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The conclusion about the 👍 emoji was case-specific. See paras. <a href=\"https://canlii.ca/t/jxq15#par62\" rel=\"noreferrer\">62-63</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>[62] ... Again, <strong>based on the facts in this case</strong> – the texting of a contract and then the seeking and receipt of approval was consistent with the previous process between SWT and Achter to enter into grain contracts.</p>\n<p>[63] This court readily acknowledges that a 👍 emoji is a non-traditional means to “sign” a document but nevertheless <strong>under these circumstances</strong> this was a valid way to convey the two purposes of a “signature” – to identify the signator (Chris using his unique cell phone number) and as I have found above – to convey Achter’s acceptance of the flax contract.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<hr />\n<p>^{1.&quot;<a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/help/on-topic\">Even if you supply a jurisdiction tag, we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions – while it might not answer your question directly, your question will be here for others who may be from those jurisdictions.</a>&quot;}</p>\n", "score": 40 }, { "answer_id": 93899, "body": "<p>The meaning of a thumbs-up emoji would be evaluated on a case by case basis in the context of the discussion purported to be creating a binding agreement. I suspect that this is also the true statement of Canadian law.</p>\n<p>More generally, body language and gestures and images together with actual words can be considered by a court, in the overall context of an interaction, to determine what was communicated by the parties with each other in order to form a contract. Similarly, slang or non-literal uses of words could form a contract if their meaning is consistent with agreement in the context of the overall discussion.</p>\n<p>These foundational concepts of contract interpretation and formation are shared by essentially all common law countries.</p>\n", "score": 28 } ]

[ "united-states", "contract-law", "california", "washington" ]

[ { "answer_id": 27694, "body": "<p>The first thing you need to know is that if you go to law school, you will hate your life for at least those three years. Law school is not like other graduate school programs. If you do reasonably well, it will almost certainly consume your life. Law school students (and lawyers) experience substantially higher rates of alcoholism, drug abuse and depression. And student debt, of course.</p>\n<p>The second thing you need to know is that the legal jobs that most people seem to dream of are in very short supply. I haven't looked at the latest market research, but I'd be comfortable betting that the vast majority of work that is available is in criminal law and defending businesses.</p>\n<p>Upon graduation, you will probably not be: a lawyer at a large firm, a lawyer at a firm that will pay you more than $100,000, a constitutional lawyer or an environmental lawyer. There are great odds that you will never argue before the Supreme Court, or even your state supreme court. There are really good odds that you will argue in front of a jury no more than six times in your life.</p>\n<p>So don't go in blind.</p>\n<p><strong>Resource 1: Students at nearby law schools.</strong></p>\n<p>My experience is that a powerful majority of law school students go in for the wrong reasons, hate law school, and graduate with more regrets and debt than anything else. I think this is because they usually go in for the wrong reasons: they didn't know what else to do, their mom was a lawyer, they like to argue, their uncle said they should.</p>\n<p>There is only one reason that anyone should go to law school, and that is because they enjoy doing legal work. &quot;Legal work&quot; means two things: research and writing. It does not mean arguing. If you don't like research and writing, you will not like law school, and you will not be a successful lawyer.</p>\n<p>So the first resource you should be looking into is students of nearby law schools. Ask them why they went, if they're glad they did, and what their career prospects are like as a result. If their pre-law experiences and motivations sound like yours, consider whether their law-school and career experiences might be the same, as well.</p>\n<p>If they don't talk you out of this, move on to...</p>\n<p><strong>Resource 2: The career offices at nearby law schools</strong></p>\n<p>Ask for an appointment to talk about where the legal market is headed, how their schools prepare people for it, and how their graduates are doing. If the market is headed in directions that you don't like, think about whether law school is really a smart decision, at least at this point. You are already entering later than other people, but there's also still time to wait. I went in at 34.</p>\n<p>Ask them to put you in touch with recent graduates, as well. They can give you a better idea of what it's like to find a job as an attorney and what it's like to spend three years in law school.</p>\n<p>If they don't talk you out of this, move on to...</p>\n<p><strong>Resource 3: The cesspool of the online pre-law websites</strong></p>\n<p>You'll get more good (and bad) information from the ugly, ugly world of pre-law chat. If you want more information about specific law schools, the admissions process, the implications of any criminal, civil, or academic misconduct on your candidacy, or almost anything else, you should take a look at:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"http://www.top-law-schools.com\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Top-Law-Schools.com</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"https://abovethelaw.com\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Above the Law</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"https://www.reddit.com/r/LawSchool/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Reddit School of Law</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"http://lawschoolnumbers.com\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Law School Numbers</a></li>\n</ul>\n<p>There's more out there. It's all awful. If they don't talk you out of it...</p>\n<p><strong>Resource 4: Your LSAT score</strong></p>\n<p>Do not take your LSAT without preparing. Take a formal LSAT prep course. They can be expensive, but they are worth it. I spent roughly $1,000 on mine and went from the 50th percentile to the 90th. Given my terrible GPA, that was the difference between being rejected by everyone and $120,000 in scholarship funds.</p>\n<p>If you prepare for the LSAT and get a low score (under the 50th percentile) anyway, <strong>DO NOT GO TO LAW SCHOOL.</strong> There are law schools that will take you, but there are decent odds that they are basically not real law schools. The ABA is currently targeting law schools admitting underqualified candidates and revoking their certification.</p>\n<p>If you get a decent score, and you have a decent undergraduate GPA, the odds are good that you'll get into a decent school and perform reasonably well. That does not, however, mean that you'll enjoy yourself. So I recommend that throughout all of this, you also take advantage of....</p>\n<p><strong>Resource 5: Reading about the law</strong></p>\n<p>To get a feel for whether law school will be an enjoyable experience or a painful slog, I recommend starting to read the law now. Start getting a feel for whether the people you'd be spending your education and career with are doing anything you find remotely interesting. Do you enjoy reading <a href=\"https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/slipopinion/17\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Supreme Court decisions</a>? Do you get off on the idea of <a href=\"https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=775083081114007114011079089087000125015041073000033030103116094071025080023085080099019058097123006014049012002031127110007082019050035019082076106097099066028116084015076004017114110068080111127087083113016096121009000088108018009091080006001017027&amp;EXT=pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">writing a really good contract</a>?</p>\n<p>Maybe you can find an area where you might like to carve a niche. But maybe you'd rather carve your eyes out with a spoon. Take a look around to find out:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"http://www.scotusblog.com\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">SCOTUSblog</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"https://www.law.com/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Law.com</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"https://www.law360.com\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Law360</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"http://www.abajournal.com\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">ABA Journal</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"http://volokh.com\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">The Volokh Conspiracy</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"https://balkin.blogspot.com\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Balkinization</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"https://fedsoc.org/commentary/blog-posts\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">FedSoc blog</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"https://www.aclu.org/blog\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">ACLU blog</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">ACS blog</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"https://www.lawfareblog.com\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Lawfare</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"https://www.popehat.com\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Popehat</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">PrawfsBlawg</a></li>\n</ul>\n<p><strong>Bad resources:</strong></p>\n<p>You should not base your decision to go to law school on:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><em>1L</em>, by Scott Turow</li>\n<li><em>Legally Blonde</em></li>\n<li><em>The Paper Chase</em></li>\n<li><em>My Cousin Vinny</em></li>\n<li><em>Law &amp; Order</em></li>\n</ul>\n<p>If you decide to go to law school, however, you should familiarize with all of these, as they are subcultural touchstones.</p>\n<p><strong>A final word</strong></p>\n<p>If this sounds like I'm trying to talk you out of it, it's because I'm guessing that you're a lot like the vast majority of the law students and lawyers I have ever known, and I've known a lot.</p>\n<p>But there is a small group of people who enjoy law school and enjoy the law. I enjoyed the first year of law school, if not the last two, and I really love the legal work that I do. But I came to law school only after about 10 years in a job doing work that was already pretty intensively law-related and having really committed to the idea for reasons that were purely internal and had nothing to do with making anyone happy other than myself.</p>\n<p>If you can get to that point, I'd say go for it. If you can't, I promise you that you can find a more fulfilling way to spend three years of your life.</p>\n", "score": 8 }, { "answer_id": 93871, "body": "<p>Deciding whether to go to law school is a personal choice that depends on your interests, career goals, and financial situation. Law school can provide you with a solid foundation in legal knowledge and critical thinking skills, opening up various career opportunities in the legal field. However, it is essential to consider the time commitment and financial investment required for law school. Research the job market and speak with practicing lawyers to gain insights into the profession. This article from the American Bar Association (ABA) provides valuable information to help you make an informed decision: <a href=\"https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/pre_law_/should-i-go-to-law-school/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Should I Go to Law School</a>?, Also you can check <a href=\"https://www.lawinfoadvice.com/p/law-student-resource.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Law Student Resources</a> from Law Info Advice.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "legal-education" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93864, "body": "<p>It should not surprise you that copyright protects the right to (among other things) make copies. There are limited exceptions that are considered &quot;fair use&quot;, like if you reproduce a limited amount of text for educational, reporting, or review purposes. Giving your friend a copy of a large portion of the text just because they want it would almost certainly violate copyright. Whether the book is available or out-of-print has absolutely no bearing whatsoever on who holds the copyright or whether your actions violate it.</p>\n<p>This is very different from giving your friend the book itself. The book itself is covered under the &quot;first sale doctrine&quot;, meaning that by buying a copy of the book, you buy the right to sell, transfer, or dispose of <em>that particular copy</em>, but it doesn't give you the right to make more copies.</p>\n<p>I will note that in practice, it is vanishingly unlikely that the copyright holder would ever learn of your isolated instance of limited infringement in the first place (especially since it's out of print), much less bring legal action against you for making a single copy that did not affect their bottom line.</p>\n", "score": 26 }, { "answer_id": 93868, "body": "<h2>It depends on the use your friend will make of the copy</h2>\n<p>Any amount of copying is <em>prima facie</em> copyright infringement.</p>\n<p>UK law allows <a href=\"https://www.gov.uk/guidance/exceptions-to-copyright#non-commercial-research-and-private-study\" rel=\"noreferrer\">fair dealing</a> copying for specific use cases. You don’t tell us <em>why</em> your friend wants a copy so we can’t tell if it fits one of the exemptions. If it does, the copying must still be <em>fair</em> - a small portion of the work and not the total work, for example.</p>\n<p>Lending your friend the book is not a problem because there is no copying involved. If they make copes while they have it - see above.</p>\n", "score": 12 }, { "answer_id": 93865, "body": "<p>Copyright law generally reserves to the owner of the copyright the exclusive right to copy the material:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>United States</strong>. <a href=\"https://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">17 U.S.C. § 106</a>: &quot;the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies...&quot;</li>\n<li><strong>Canada</strong>. <a href=\"https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-42/page-2.html#h-102726\" rel=\"noreferrer\"><em>Copyright Act</em>, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 3</a> &quot;copyright... means the sole right to produce or reproduce the work...&quot;</li>\n</ul>\n<p>These are just two examples of domestic legislation giving effect to the countries' commitments as parties to the <a href=\"https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text/283698\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Berne Convention</a> to ensure that &quot;[a]uthors of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall have the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of these works, in any manner or form&quot; (art. 9).</p>\n<p>Many countries also provide a fair-use exception or fair-dealing right, consistent with art. 9(2) of the Berne Convention. For example, see:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/7683/in-the-us-when-is-fair-use-a-defense-to-copyright-infringement\">In the US, when is fair use a defense to copyright infringement?</a></li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 8 }, { "answer_id": 93882, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a></p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/urhg/__53.html\" rel=\"noreferrer\">§ 53</a> of the German copyright law got you and your friend covered. Specifically, the first subparagraph says:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Zulässig sind einzelne Vervielfältigungen eines Werkes durch eine natürliche Person zum privaten Gebrauch auf beliebigen Trägern, sofern sie weder unmittelbar noch mittelbar Erwerbszwecken dienen, soweit nicht zur Vervielfältigung eine offensichtlich rechtswidrig hergestellte oder öffentlich zugänglich gemachte Vorlage verwendet wird. Der zur Vervielfältigung Befugte darf die Vervielfältigungsstücke auch durch einen anderen herstellen lassen, sofern dies unentgeltlich geschieht oder es sich um Vervielfältigungen auf Papier oder einem ähnlichen Träger mittels beliebiger photomechanischer Verfahren oder anderer Verfahren mit ähnlicher Wirkung handelt.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Individual reproductions of a work by a natural person for private use on any medium are permitted, provided they are not used directly or indirectly for commercial purposes, unless a template that was obviously illegally produced or made publicly accessible is used for the reproduction. The person authorized to make copies may also have the copies made by someone else, provided this is done free of charge or the copies are made on paper or a similar medium using any photomechanical process or other process with a similar effect.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>You presumably obtained the book legally. Therefore, you're not violating &quot; unless a template that was obviously illegally produced or made publicly accessible&quot;.</p>\n<p>If you're making copies on paper, your friend can even pay you for it. If you're scanning the pages, your friend must not pay you for your trouble or scan the pages themselves.</p>\n<p>There is no strict definition for what &quot;for private use&quot; means. I learned in law classes that you should stay in the single digits for the number of friends you make copies for.</p>\n", "score": 5 }, { "answer_id": 93863, "body": "<p>Any copying, which includes photographing, xeroxing, scanning or retyping is copyright infringement. Copyright protection exists for books that are out of print. Infringement exists with any amount of copying, though in the US there is the &quot;fair use&quot; defense, which is marginally applicable.</p>\n<p>The difference between you scanning the book, versus lending (or giving) the book to the friend and having the friend do the scanning is that in the former case you violate the law and in the latter case your friend violates the law. There is a third case where nobody violates the law and you lend the friend a copy of the book. Also, borrowing a book from a library (governmental or otherwise) does not change the outcome, because the law prohibits anyone making any unauthorized copy, regardless of the ownership status of the physical original.</p>\n<p>Generally speaking, wherever you are you cannot infringe copyright. Eritrea and Iran are hard cases, since Iran does not enforce copyright from other cases though there is Iran-internal protection of Iranian material; and Eritrea simply does not have any copyright protection.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 93904, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/switzerland\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;switzerland&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;switzerland&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-switzerland-tooltip-container\">switzerland</a></p>\n<p>Published works may be freely shared among &quot;people closely connected to each other, such as relatives or friends&quot;. Copyright owners are compensated collectively through a tax levied on devices and media capable of facilitating such copies.</p>\n<p>This exemption from copyright is stipulated in the Federal Act on Copyright and Related Rights, article 19, which <a href=\"https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/1993/1798_1798_1798/en#tit_2/chap_5\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">writes</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Published works may be used for private use. Private use means:</p>\n<p>a. any personal use of a work or use within a circle of persons closely connected to each other, such as relatives or friends;</p>\n<p>[...]</p>\n<p>This Article does not apply to computer programs.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>(&quot;use&quot; encompasses any use of the work, including making copies for those people)</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "copyright" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93855, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/us\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;us&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;us&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-us-tooltip-container\">us</a><a href=\"/questions/tagged/uk\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;uk&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;uk&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-uk-tooltip-container\">uk</a><a href=\"/questions/tagged/australia\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-australia-tooltip-container\">australia</a></p>\n<p>Yes, this can be charged as a type of negligent homicide, involuntary manslaughter.\nThe degree of culpability might be greater than negligence, since the initial act was a premeditated crime.</p>\n<ul>\n<li>There is no intent to kill</li>\n<li>The act is criminal and malicious</li>\n<li>The consequences are reasonably foreseeable</li>\n</ul>\n<p>The offense would be a type of <strong>constructive manslaughter</strong>, where a crime not intended to kill or cause bodily harm results in death. In the UK this is also known as an <em>unlawful act manslaughter</em>. The perpetrator of a premeditated crime is held responsible not only for the intended consequences, but also for foreseeable incidental ones, albeit at a reduced <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culpability\" rel=\"noreferrer\">degree of culpability</a>.</p>\n<p>This doctrine is established in both civil and common law, and will apply in broadly similar ways, with different local names, usually variations on unintended homicide, in most civil law jurisdictions as well.</p>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/us\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;us&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;us&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-us-tooltip-container\">us</a></p>\n<p>Medical or fire-fighting equipment being among the stolen items is, in many jurisdictions, by itself sufficient to <a href=\"https://www.pumphreylawfirm.com/blog/penalties-for-grand-theft-of-an-emergency-medical-equipment/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">raise the charge to grand theft</a>, which is a felony in common law.</p>\n<p>If Bob actually specializes in this, and a death did occur, the prosecution might charge them with second-degree felony murder, if applicable in their state. That rule is generally applied when the base offense presents danger to human life, but there have been <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ryan_Holle\" rel=\"noreferrer\">cases that stretch it</a>. Burglary is sufficient to apply this rule. Such a charge is less certain to stand up in court and is usually traded down in a plea bargain.</p>\n", "score": 19 }, { "answer_id": 93887, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/france\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;france&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;france&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-france-tooltip-container\">france</a></p>\n<h2>Yes, because it changes the charge</h2>\n<p>Bob's conduct falls under <a href=\"https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000024042647\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">article 221-6 du Code Pénal</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Le fait de causer, dans les conditions et selon les distinctions prévues à l'article 121-3, par maladresse, imprudence, inattention, négligence ou manquement à une obligation de prudence ou de sécurité imposée par la loi ou le règlement, la mort d'autrui constitue un homicide involontaire puni de trois ans d'emprisonnement et de 45 000 euros d'amende.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Causing the death of another under the conditions of article 121-3 by carelessness, imprudence, negligence, or failing to obey a duty of prudence or safety given by the law or local regulation, is involuntary homicide punished by [a maximum of] three years in jail and €45 000 fine.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The theft charge itself and its sentence should not be affected (but that’s likely to be small change compared to the sentence for involuntary homicide anyway).</p>\n<p>There is a reference to <a href=\"https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000006417208\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">article 121-3</a>. That article establishes the general principle of <em>mens rea</em> (no crime without the intention to commit it), but it also introduces narrow exceptions that apply here (basically, strict liability for &quot;reckless endangerement&quot;-type charges).</p>\n<h2>Bob is also civilly liable</h2>\n<p>He had faulty conduct (committed a crime), others suffered damage (deaths by fire, material damage to the factory), and there is a clear causal link between the two.</p>\n<p>Bob’s lawyer might argue to reduce the fraction of damages that Bob is responsible for. After all, the damages only occurred because there was a fire, of which Bob is not responsible. Carol the worker, who started the fire, is responsible at least in part (either as a representative of the company if she acted within her work duties, or personally if she failed to comply with her employer’s safety instructions). Dave the director potentially failed to promptly call the firemen (or establish safety procedures that would have allowed to do so), or skimped on fire retardant materials. If any of those can be criminally charged, there would usually be a joint trial, and the court will decide on a split of responsibility.</p>\n", "score": 6 } ]

[ "negligence", "security", "manslaughter" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93894, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-states\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-states-tooltip-container\">united-states</a></p>\n<h3>Short Answer</h3>\n<p>Generally speaking, you can sue in some court in the state where the company has its headquarters or its organized, or in the state where the events giving rise to the lawsuit occurred (or in any other state to which the defendant fails to object in a timely manner). There is an exception to the general rule when the conduct that forms the basis of the lawsuit was targeted at the plaintiff in the state where the plaintiff now resides.</p>\n<p>Whether you can sue in a true small claims court particularly varies a lot from state to state. Often true small claims courts are not allowed under state law to consider all cases that other courts in the state could consider (e.g. cases against defendants who are not headquartered in that county).</p>\n<p>Even if you can sue in true small claims court in a state where you do not reside, it often makes more sense to sue in a limited jurisdiction court rather than a small claims court in those cases, with or without a lawyer.</p>\n<h3>Long Answer</h3>\n<p><em>Preface On Federal v. State Claims And Removal To Federal Court</em></p>\n<p>In the U.S. claims for a breach of contract and fraudulent billing usually arise solely under state law, although sometimes federal law may apply in specific circumstances.</p>\n<p>This answer assumes that no federal law claims are filed. But the states in which federal law claims could be brought in a federal U.S. District Court, would be the same as the states in which state law claims could be brought in state court.</p>\n<p>The federal courts do not have a small claims court division or limited jurisdiction court division.</p>\n<p>Federal claims can be brought in state court, but the defendant can remove the case to federal court in the same state if this is done, which would make a small claims court forum unavailable.</p>\n<p>If the Plaintiff files only state law claims in state court, the defendant cannot remove the case to federal court on the grounds that the defendant has asserted federal law defenses to the claim or has asserted a counterclaim arising under federal law. But, the defendant could remove the case to federal court if the Plaintiff and Defendant reside in different states and the Defendant shows in good faith that the amount in controversy between them exceeds $75,000.</p>\n<p><em>Issues Presented</em></p>\n<p>There are two issues presented.</p>\n<ol>\n<li><p>Do any courts of a particular state have (personal) jurisdiction over the case?</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Does a small claims court in a state that does have jurisdiction have jurisdiction over the case?</p>\n</li>\n</ol>\n<p><strong>Do any courts of a particular state have jurisdiction over the case?</strong></p>\n<p><em>General Jurisdiction Where The Defendant Resides</em></p>\n<p>A company can always be sued over its conduct anywhere in the world in some court of the state where a company is organized and has its headquarters. This concept is called &quot;general jurisdiction&quot; and while the U.S. Supreme Court has narrowed the number of states where courts have general jurisdiction over a company, this heartland of the concept remains effective. This is usually the state where it is easiest to collect a money judgment in a lawsuit if the person suing wins the case, because the company usually has assets in the state where it has its headquarters.</p>\n<p>Under a case called <em>International Shoe Co. v. Washington</em>, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) until just a few years ago, a state had &quot;general jurisdiction&quot; over a company in every state where it had a regular employee or a brick and mortar place of business.</p>\n<p>But this rule was narrowed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2014 case <em>Daimler AG v. Bauman</em>, to give a state general jurisdiction over a company only in the state where its headquarters (ignoring any headquarters of any subsidiary of the company) are located or under whose law the company was organized. Before this ruling, this narrow scope of general jurisdiction only applied to national banks, and then, only as a result of a Congressionally enacted statute to that effect.</p>\n<p>Just this summer, however, the U.S. Supreme Court created an except to an exception to <em>Daimler AG v. Bauman</em>, in the case of <em><a href=\"https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mallory-v-norfolk-southern-railway-co/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co</a>.</em>, ___ U.S. ___ (2023), holding that in states where a company is registered to do business, if the state has a statute (like the one in Pennsylvania) allowing its residents to sue the business on any claim against a company registered there arising anywhere in the world, that the state has jurisdiction over the case.</p>\n<p>(There is also another case creating a partial exception to the <em>Daimler AG v. Bauman</em> rule in cases that involve fact patterns very different from those in the question, such as product liability lawsuits against car makers.)</p>\n<p><em>Specific Jurisdiction Where The Claim Arises</em></p>\n<p>A company can also always be sued in the state where all of the important events that provide a basis for the lawsuit took place. This concept is called &quot;specific jurisdiction&quot; which is also known as &quot;long arm jurisdiction&quot;. This is usually the state where it is easiest to prove the case because usually witnesses and evidence are more available in this state.</p>\n<p><em>Usually A State Doesn't Have Jurisdiction Because The Plaintiff Resides There</em></p>\n<p>Usually, under U.S. law, unless a specific statute says otherwise, a lawsuit against a company cannot be brought where the person bringing the lawsuit (who is called &quot;the Plaintiff&quot;) resides, unless that state has some other connection to the lawsuit. This would be the most convenient state to sue in for the Plaintiff, especially if the Plaintiff is not hiring a lawyer and will have to appear in person as if often the case in small claims court, and the other relevant states are far away.</p>\n<p>However, if fraud is &quot;targeted&quot; at someone in a particular state, then the courts of the state state at which the conduct is targeted has jurisdiction over the claims that were targeted at that state.</p>\n<p><em>Tag Jurisdiction Over Natural Persons</em></p>\n<p>Another way that a state can have jurisdiction over a defendant is called &quot;tag jurisdiction&quot; which is obtained by physically handing a summons and complaint to the defendant in person in the state as allowed by the U.S. Supreme Court case of <em>Burnham v. Superior Court</em>. This is allowed for natural persons (i.e. human beings) who are defendants, but it isn't allowed as a way to give a state jurisdiction over a defendant who is a company.</p>\n<p><em>Waiver Of In Personam Jurisdiction Defenses</em></p>\n<p>Also, if a Plaintiff sues in a state where the Defendant has a right to object to state's jurisdiction, but the Defendant does not object to the state's jurisdiction in the first substantive document file in that court (usually either an &quot;answer&quot; or a &quot;motion to dismiss&quot;) then any objection to the jurisdiction of that state over the case is automatically waived. So, if the state where the Plaintiff lives doesn't have jurisdiction, but the Plaintiff sues the company there anyway, and that company sued doesn't immediately object, then the court has jurisdiction to proceed because the company's objections to filing the lawsuit in the wrong state are waived.</p>\n<p>Another component of jurisdiction called &quot;subject-matter&quot; jurisdiction, which can't be waived, involves whether a particular court can handle a particular kind of case without regard to whether the case was filed in the right state and isn't an issue in this question. Subject-matter jurisdiction can't be waived involves questions like whether a limited jurisdiction court takes on a case in excess of the dollar amount it is allowed to consider, or grants a kind of judgment it doesn't have the authority to grant, or grants relief in a case brought by someone who hasn't suffered any legal injury which is called lacking &quot;standing&quot; to sue.</p>\n<p>Some waivers of personal jurisdiction defenses are intentional litigation strategy decisions and others are a result of simple carelessness or malpractice by the lawyer involved.</p>\n<p><strong>Does a small claims court in a state that does have jurisdiction have jurisdiction over the case?</strong></p>\n<p><em>What is small claims court?</em></p>\n<p>The term &quot;small claims court&quot; has both a strict and a more general meaning.</p>\n<p>In the strict sense of the word, a small claims court is a state court or division of a state court which can adjudicate only claims up to a specific dollar amount that uses a very simplified procedure and is designed to be used by non-lawyers bringing lawsuit (and often only allows non-lawyers to bring lawsuit in this forum). The maximum dollar amount that can be claimed in small claims court varies. In some states it can be as low as $3,000. In some states it can be as much as $10,000 (maybe more, I haven't checked recently and the dollar amounts get adjusted from time to time for inflation). Not every state has a separate small claims court or small claims court division, but most do. In states that have &quot;justices of the peace&quot;, the small claims court is the justices of the peace court (often presided over by non-lawyer judges). In the rest of this answer I will call these &quot;true small claims courts&quot; The dollar limit on small claims court jurisdiction is typically lower than the dollar limit on limited jurisdiction court claims discussed below. Usually, small claims court has low filing fees.</p>\n<p>Typically in a true small claims court, all proceedings other than the initial summons and complaint (and sometimes a written answer) must be conducted orally, with both the person suing and the person being sued (or a representative of a company) appearing in person in the courtroom. COVID changed this in some states, but probably only a minority of them and in most cases only temporarily.</p>\n<p>In the broader sense of the word, &quot;small claims court&quot; means a court of limited jurisdiction that can only handle claims up to a certain dollar amount (typically somewhere in the range of $10,000 to $50,000), that is used by lawyers and non-lawyers alike to bring lawsuits and has a more formal process than the small claims court in the strict sense discussed above, but has a simpler and faster process than courts of general jurisdiction that handle cases of unlimited dollar amounts. In the rest of this answer I will call these &quot;limited jurisdiction courts.&quot; More of the court process can be conducted by filing documents in limited jurisdiction courts than in small claims court, lawyers can appear in person at trials instead of parties in most cases in limited jurisdiction courts, and limited jurisdiction courts more often, although not always, will allow parties or other witnesses to testify by telephone or videoconferencing. Usually the filing fees in limited jurisdiction courts is higher than in small claims court but lower than in a general jurisdiction court.</p>\n<p><em>Where Can Lawsuits Be Filed In Limited Jurisdiction Courts?</em></p>\n<p>A lawsuit can be commenced in a limited jurisdiction court in any state over which some courts of the state have either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction, as long as the amount in dispute is less than the dollar limit of the jurisdiction of the court.</p>\n<p><em>Where Can Lawsuits Be Filed In True Small Claims Courts?</em></p>\n<p>States vary a great deal over what kind of cases can be commenced in small claims courts.</p>\n<p>Some states allow small claims court cases to be brought in any case up to the dollar amount limit for the court that a limited jurisdiction court could handle.</p>\n<p>But other states impose one or more of the following additional restrictions on bringing cases in small claims court:</p>\n<ol>\n<li><p>Some states only allow small claims court cases to be brought against defendants (i.e. persons or companies that are being sued) that reside or are headquartered in the county where the small claims court is located.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Some states only allow small claims court cases to be brought in cases where both the person bringing the lawsuit and the person being sued reside or have headquarters in the same county.</p>\n</li>\n<li><p>Some states only allow small claims court cases to be brought in cases where the events giving rise to the case occurred in the county where the small claims court is located.</p>\n</li>\n</ol>\n<p><em>Remedies Available</em></p>\n<p>Both small claims courts and limited jurisdiction courts are also typically limited to awarding money judgments for damages, rather than any other kind of remedies - like reforming a contract or entering a declaratory judgment or adjudicating real property title or entering an injunction. Usually only &quot;general jurisdiction courts&quot; are allowed to provide that kind of relief to a party bringing a lawsuit.</p>\n<p>If you win a money judgment in small claims court or in a limited jurisdiction court and you get a judgment. Usually the technical legal process for collecting the judgment is the same as the technical legal process for doing that in general jurisdiction courts.</p>\n<p>If the company sued doesn't have assets in the state where it is sued, and you win in a lawsuit against that company, the judgment entered in the state where you win has to be &quot;domesticated&quot; to the state where the company's assets are located after the judgment is entered (which can be in a state that didn't have jurisdiction to try the case in the first place). This process is basically automatic (you file a certified copy of the judgment with a court of the state where the assets are located) but filing fee has to be paid in the state where the assets are located in which the money judgment is domesticated, and you may have to send a notice to the defendant/judgment debtor by mail that the judgment has been domesticated to that state. Then you have to use the technical court process to collect the judgment in the state where the assets are located.</p>\n<p><em>Appeals</em></p>\n<p>Limited jurisdiction courts are usually &quot;courts of record&quot; which means that a verbatim record of the testimony in trials is kept either with a court reporter or an audiotape, and appeals from a limited jurisdiction court are usually just like appeals from a general jurisdiction court, except that you normally appeal to a single judge of the general jurisdiction court, instead of to a three judge panel of a court of appeals or to state supreme court in a state that doesn't have an intermediate court of appeals. These appeals are usually a little less expensive (due to smaller filing fees) and a little faster, than appeals from a general jurisdiction court to an appellate court.</p>\n<p>A minority of true small claims courts are courts of record and the same appeal process as an appeal from a limited jurisdiction court is used, except that lots of procedural issues like failure to follow the rules of evidence which you are allowed to appeal from in limited jurisdiction courts are not valid grounds for an appeal from a small claims court ruling.</p>\n<p>Most true small claims claims courts, however, are courts not of record. In courts not of record, there is no court reporter or tape recording of the proceedings. In these courts, if either party appeals that do the trial over from scratch in the limited jurisdiction court of record (using small claims court procedures and rules) in what is called a trial <em>de novo</em>, rather than considering what happened in the original true small claims court trial. So, this can end up being slower and more expensive and time consuming if the other side is very litigious and is likely to appeal any unfavorable ruling.</p>\n", "score": 1 }, { "answer_id": 93642, "body": "<h2>Any of the three states plus the Commonwealth potentially have jurisdiction</h2>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/australia\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;australia&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-australia-tooltip-container\">australia</a></p>\n<p>Federal jurisdiction is engaged whenever a civil case arises under a Commonwealth statute or the claim or defense engages a Commonwealth matter. The Australian Consumer Law is Commonwealth legislation and probably applies to Your circumstances. Both Federal and state courts have jurisdiction over Federal matters.</p>\n<p>The most appropriate state court is the one where the event occurred. There are arguments that this is any or all of the three involved states: the registered office of the company, your residence, or where the locus of the contract is.</p>\n<p>As the plaintiff, you get to choose where to bring your action. A small claims court is unlikely to be interested in technical jurisdictional arguments if they prima facie have jurisdiction.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "united-states", "jurisdiction", "small-claims-court" ]

[ { "answer_id": 39151, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Could the acceptance of the pardon then have any bearing on the case\nin the other jurisdiction?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Possibly, but not much. There is very, very little case law on this point since: (1) pardons are rare (especially federal ones), (2) people who are pardoned generally do so because everyone in the criminal justice process in the prior case agrees that the person is reformed and they are usually correct, (3) the statute of limitations has often run on a new prosecution, and (4) many cases where these issues arise, are probably not appealed (either because the neither parties attempts to, or because a defendant is acquitted and there is no appeal), but an appeal is necessary to give rise to binding precedents.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Can the admission of guilt be used in the new case?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The criminal collateral estoppel effects of a pardon flow from the adjudication on the merits which is vacated. Also, comity between sovereigns and public policy mitigate such a rule. The pardon power would not be very interesting if it routinely resulted in a new prosecution that was conducted on a summary basis via a preclusion doctrine such as collateral estoppel.</p>\n<p>In many cases, the statute of limitations will have run on the original crime or there will be no parallel state law crime, but this is not always the case.</p>\n<p>Also, I would disagree with the statement that a pardon always implies an admission of guilt to the crime for which a pardon was granted, even though that statement is often used rhetorically.</p>\n<p>For example, one important use of the pardon power is to commute the sentence of someone who asserts that they are factually innocent but have been convicted of a crime, potentially in a manner that is not subject to further judicial review, and treating that as an admission of guilt doesn't make sense.</p>\n<p>As the Wikipedia entry on <em>Burdick</em> notes in the pertinent part:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Legal scholars have questioned whether that portion of <em>Burdick</em>\n[<em>ed.</em> about admission of guilt] is meaningful or merely <em>dicta</em>.\nPresident Ford made reference to the <em>Burdick</em> decision in his\npost-pardon written statement furnished to the Judiciary Committee of\nthe United States House of Representatives on October 17, 1974.\nHowever, said reference related only to the portion of <em>Burdick</em> that\nsupported the proposition that the Constitution does not limit the\npardon power to cases of convicted offenders or even indicted\noffenders.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>I would read this as <em>dicta</em>, as this portion of the holding was not necessary for the court to reach its conclusion and the fact pattern in <em>Burdick</em> was a typical fact pattern where guilt was not disputed. It didn't raise the concerns present when a pardon is requested based upon a claim of innocence, and granted following a conviction.</p>\n<p>Instead, the holding of <em>Burdick</em> was that there was no pardon because the pardon was rejected (in a manner very similar to a common law disclaimer of a gift), so its holding didn't need to reach the effect of a pardon that is accepted to resolve the case.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Can it be used as &quot;reasonable cause&quot; for various actions?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>This is a bit too vague to know what you are getting at.</p>\n<p>I suppose that a pardon could constitute reasonable cause for some things favorable to a defendant who is pardoned (e.g., potentially in a motion seeking to reopen a termination of parental rights entered on the basis of the conviction).</p>\n<p>I suppose it could also be used in a manner potentially unfavorable to a defendant (e.g. showing a pattern of past conduct that demonstrates modus operandi in connection with a prosecution for a new crime). I don't think it could be used as grounds to deny an occupational or business license for bad character.</p>\n<p>Still, without more clear context it is harder to know what you are really looking for in this regard and I'm not confident that my examples address that.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Does the defendant lose their right to refuse to testify in the new\ncase?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>I haven't reviewed the case law, but my intuition is that if it has never been waived before, it wouldn't be waived by the pardon, but that if it was waived in a previous proceeding resulting in a conviction that was then pardoned, that the prior sworn testimony might be admissible evidence in the new action since it is not hearsay and isn't itself evidence of a prior conviction. The context of the prior testimony might have to be concealed from the jury.</p>\n<p>As noted by @Putvi, the defendant could not claim risk of conviction for the federal crime as a ground for invoking the 5th Amendment if a pardon is accepted (something that is implied in <em>Burdick</em>), but if there was an overlapping state law crime, risk of conviction for the state crime could constitute a grounds upon which to invoke the 5th Amendment.</p>\n<p><em>Burdick</em> does stand for the proposition that a pardon not solicited by the defendant, that is rejected, cannot provide a basis for removing the 5th Amendment protection with respect to a risk of conviction for federal crime.</p>\n<p>I would also be inclined to think that matters disclosed in an application for a pardon might be admissible evidence as a non-hearsay statement of a party-opponent, if the statement was stripped of the pardon application context (which would be unduly prejudicial since it would imply a prior conviction which otherwise wouldn't be admissible).</p>\n", "score": 9 }, { "answer_id": 39149, "body": "<p>The reason a person can be compelled to testify after receiving a pardon is that they are no longer in jeopardy of incriminating themselves. <a href=\"http://time.com/4868418/donald-trump-presidential-pardons-backfire/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">http://time.com/4868418/donald-trump-presidential-pardons-backfire/</a></p>\n\n<p>It would depend on the specific situation, but if you were in jeopardy of incriminating yourself in the state trial, you could plead the fifth, just like the Time.com article's hypothetical about testifying before congress.</p>\n\n<p>You could bring up the pardon in the state court, if the judge allowed it, but that doesn't mean you are guilty just because you accept a pardon.</p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>But Burdick was about a different issue: the ability to turn down a pardon. The language about imputing and confessing guilt was just an aside — what lawyers call dicta. The court meant that, as a practical matter, because pardons make people look guilty, a recipient might not want to accept one. But pardons have no formal, legal effect of declaring guilt.<a href=\"https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec-pardons-presidential-trump-nixon-ford-kardashian-0608-story.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec-pardons-presidential-trump-nixon-ford-kardashian-0608-story.html</a></p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>Whether it made a difference would be up to the jury, in that they would have to decide if it was relevant evidence that aided their deliberations.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "united-states", "pardon", "multiple-jurisdiction" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93809, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a></p>\n<p>The defences of &quot;self-defence&quot; and &quot;defence of another&quot; are available defences to <em>any act</em> that would otherwise constitute &quot;an offence&quot; in Canada. Section 34 simply says: &quot;A person is not guilty of an offence if... [and then goes on to list the elements of the defence].&quot;</p>\n<p>Your question seems to ask about the scope of actions that might be justified or excused by the defence.</p>\n<p>If it wasn't clear before 2012, amendments in 2012 to the self-defence laws in Canada made it absolutely clear that <em>any</em> offence may be justified or excused by self-defence or defence of another. As the Supreme Court describes in <em>R. v. Khill</em>, <a href=\"https://decisions.scc-csc.ca/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/19020/index.do\" rel=\"noreferrer\">2021 SCC 37</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The accused’s response under the new law is also no longer limited to a defensive use of force. <em>It can apply to other classes of offences, including acts that tread upon the rights of innocent third parties, such as theft, breaking and entering or dangerous driving.</em></p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The substantive elements of self-defence and defence of another are described two other Q&amp;As, so I will only state them briefly: (a) reasonable belief of a threat of force; (b) the act constituting the offence is for the purpose of protection; (c) the act committed is reasonable.</p>\n<p>For details see:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/90856/is-it-legal-to-use-force-against-a-person-who-is-trying-to-stop-you-from-rescuin\">Is it legal to use force against a person who is trying to stop you from rescuing another person?</a></li>\n<li><a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/87377/is-self-defense-allowed-when-there-are-objectively-reasonable-grounds-but-it-is/87387#87387\">Is self-defense allowed when there are objectively reasonable grounds but it is actually done subjectively for improper reasons?</a></li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 7 }, { "answer_id": 93817, "body": "<h2>&quot;Shooting down the plane&quot; is unlikely to fall under Notwehr in <a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a></h2>\n<p>In Germany, the fact pattern as described is impossible to achieve and still grant Notwehr. Notwehr is <strong>not</strong> the same as self defense under common law, but that is the best translation. In contrast to the wide latitude given in for example US law, it is <strong>incredibly tightly defined</strong> in Germany.</p>\n<p>In Notwehr, one may under no condition risk the harm or death of <strong>any</strong> person besides the pilot, even <strong>if</strong> they find a way to somehow kill the pilot in self-defense, and you only may use proportional force to the threat. That excessive risk by the wreck of the airplane or killing the passengers can all be treated as separate charges of reckless endangerment or murder (as death was taken willingly into account). In Germany, self-defense does <strong>not</strong> allow Bob to harm or kill those others, and threatening them with his illegal backyard stinger, in turn, allows anybody to defend the passengers by shooting Bob first.</p>\n<p>This hinges on a particularity of the law: You only are allowed to use the <strong>least forceful means that are effective</strong> to stop the crime, and shooting the pilot or plane is most likely not an effective means to stop the plane from crashing into the building (as proffered by OP) in the first place. Or to stop any other crime that could be conducted with a plane. Also, you are only allowed to use lethal force after having given a warning of some sort - which is clearly lacking in this case. As a result, it might be an extreme case of <a href=\"https://www.uni-potsdam.de/de/rechtskunde-online/rechtsgebiete/strafrecht/entschuldigungsgruende/notwehrexzess-33-stgb\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Notwehrexcess</a> (excessive self-defense) to shoot down the plane, especially without warning. Shooting down a plane simply lacks <em>Gebotenheit</em> under German law, which is a crucial part of an analysis of Notwehr.</p>\n<p>Note that while Gebotenheit can be translated with necessity, that is not a good translation at all, even a worse one than to translate Notwehr as self-defense: Gebotenheit does not just cover the <em>need</em> for a specific action, that it is <em>proportional</em> to the danger and that it is <em>is able to have success</em>. Shooting a person armed with a rubber chicken is not geboten as it is neither required nor proportional, and shooting a plane down is unlikely to be geboten as it is unlikely to have the intended success while endangering others.</p>\n<p>To stay with the example of OP: No means of shooting a plane &quot;down&quot; will stop a plane from crashing into a building once it becomes apparent that the pilot can no longer avoid crashing into the building, and likely doing so is a case of <a href=\"https://www.juraforum.de/lexikon/notwehrexzess\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Extensiver Notwehrexzess</a> (extensive excessive self-defense).</p>\n<p>Shooting the plane &quot;down&quot; before it is clear that the plane will crash into the building is an unlawful killing and clearly <em>Extensiver Notwehrexcess</em>, possibly even Mord of the pilot. This is because a pilot might avert a plane to not crash into the occupied building until about two seconds before the catastrophe - and so there was no situation that required Notwehr at all, and you had no right to apply it in the first place.</p>\n<p>Shooting the plane after that point, where the crash has become inevitable and Notwehr would start, doing so does not stop the debris to follow Newton's Laws and crash into the building, and thus shooting the plane &quot;down&quot; is clearly not an effective means to stop the death of people in the building. The act isn't covered by Gebotenheit. However, that might only be Intensiver Notwehrexcess, and the shooting of the plane thus might not be punished.</p>\n<p><strong>However</strong>, that would not excuse any other violations of law that needed to happen to shoot the plane in this way, such as illegal possession of a firearm that is able to destroy the fuselage (most of which are illegal to possess under the Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz (War Weapons Control Act) in the first place)</p>\n<h4>But even the military is not allowed to shoot down a plane:</h4>\n<p>The first organization that for a short time was deemed able to decide to shoot down a plane in Germany was the Einsatzführungskommando der Bundeswehr according to the 2005 of § 14 (3) LuftSiG. <a href=\"https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2006/bvg06-011.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">But that was declared void in 2006</a>, which led to a new version in 2009, <a href=\"https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2013/03/fs20130320_2bvf000105.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">which was then deemed valid in 2013 under BVerfGE v. 20.3.2013 I 1118 - 2 BvF 1/05</a>. This current version of <a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/luftsig/__14.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">§14 (1) LuftSiG</a> does not permit to actually shooting down a plane at all:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(1) Zur Verhinderung des Eintritts eines besonders schweren Unglücksfalles dürfen die Streitkräfte im Luftraum Luftfahrzeuge abdrängen, zur Landung zwingen, den Einsatz von Waffengewalt androhen oder Warnschüsse abgeben.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>In English: To prevent an aircraft disaster, the <strong>armed forces</strong> may force an aircraft out of German territorial airspace, force it to land, threaten the use weapons or give warning shots.</p>\n<p>Note that this law does only handle civilian aircraft, not military enemy incursions in case of war - those are handled as enemy combatants and are fair game to shoot down for the armed forces.</p>\n", "score": 5 }, { "answer_id": 93889, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/france\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;france&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;france&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-france-tooltip-container\">france</a> Yes, but the factual pattern is unlikely to ever happen.</p>\n<h2>Self-defense</h2>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000006417218\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Article 122-5 du Code Pénal</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui, devant une atteinte injustifiée envers elle-même ou autrui, accomplit, dans le même temps, un acte commandé par la nécessité de la légitime défense d'elle-même ou d'autrui, sauf s'il y a disproportion entre les moyens de défense employés et la gravité de l'atteinte.</p>\n<p>N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui, pour interrompre l'exécution d'un crime ou d'un délit contre un bien, accomplit un acte de défense, autre qu'un homicide volontaire, lorsque cet acte est strictement nécessaire au but poursuivi dès lors que les moyens employés sont proportionnés à la gravité de l'infraction.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A person has no criminal liability when he or she is faced by an unjustified attack against himself or herself or another, accomplishes at the same time an act out of the need of legitimate defense or himself, herself or another, unless there is a disproportion between the means of defense and the severity of the attack.</p>\n<p>A person has no criminal liability when he or she accomplishes an act of defense other than voluntary homicide, in order to interrupt a crime or felony against goods, when the act is strictly necessary to the aim of defense and when the means of the act are proportionate to the gravity of the attack.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>It’s a bit complicated but it all checks out:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>unjustified attack: check, assuming the prospective defender knows that the plane pilot intends to crash it into their house</li>\n<li>towards persons: check (if the house is occupied)</li>\n<li>action taken &quot;in the heat of the moment&quot;: check (you don’t shoot the plane pilot <em>after</em> the plane has crashed)</li>\n<li>necessary act: check? (see below)</li>\n<li>proportionate: check (there is no way to stop the plane other than shooting it down)</li>\n</ul>\n<h2>The factual pattern is dubious</h2>\n<p>In the above, the person shooting down the plane</p>\n<ul>\n<li>has the knowledge that the plane is coming for an unjustified attack (how do you know the plane will aim at the house? that it is voluntary and not a distress landing?)</li>\n<li>has enough time to do something weapon-y about it (shooting down planes is, you know, hard)...</li>\n<li>...but not enough time to evacuate the house of its occupants (or ask the police or army to shoot down the plane, or any other means)</li>\n<li>has the necessary material at hand to shoot down the plane. That is almost certainly a violation of some arm control provision. Contrary to popular belief, you can legally have weapons in France and the permit is decently easy to get; but you don’t shoot down a plane with a hunting rifle.</li>\n</ul>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "self-defense", "any-jurisdiction", "defense-of-others" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93859, "body": "<p>We can look at Missouri law as an example. <a href=\"https://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=577.029\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Missouri Statutes §577.029</a> says</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A licensed physician, registered nurse, phlebotomist, or trained\nmedical technician, acting at the request and direction of the law\nenforcement officer under section 577.020, shall, with the consent of\nthe patient or a warrant issued by a court of competent jurisdiction,\nwithdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcohol content of\nthe blood, unless such medical personnel, in his or her good faith\nmedical judgment, believes such procedure would endanger the life or\nhealth of the person in custody. Blood may be withdrawn only by such\nmedical personnel, but such restriction shall not apply to the taking\nof a breath test, a saliva specimen, or a urine specimen. In\nwithdrawing blood for the purpose of determining the alcohol content\nthereof, only a previously unused and sterile needle and sterile\nvessel shall be utilized and the withdrawal shall otherwise be in\nstrict accord with accepted medical practices. Upon the request of\nthe person who is tested, full information concerning the test taken\nat the direction of the law enforcement officer shall be made\navailable to him or her.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>&quot;Shall&quot; means &quot;must&quot; – if there is a warrant (we assume there is no consent). Then the question is, what happens if the phlebotomist (etc) refuses? First, <a href=\"https://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=577.031&amp;bid=29960\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">§577.031</a> immunizes the medical-person from legal liability when they act in compliance with a request from a LEO (a simple request, not necessarily accompanied by a warrant). <a href=\"https://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=577.033&amp;bid=29962\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">§577.033</a> says that being dead, unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusing does not constitute withdrawal of consent (which is implied, by law). No specific penalty is prescribed for refusal to administer a court-ordered blood draw. There is no penalty for complying, there is no prescribed criminal penalty for refusing to comply with a court order (there is the possibility of a finding of contempt of court).</p>\n<p>Not every state is Missouri: I understand that Utah is different.</p>\n", "score": 4 }, { "answer_id": 93858, "body": "<p>As discussed in the article linked in comments by @Michael Hall the nurse in question informs the police officer that they hospital policy is to not draw blood without consent, unless there is a warrant signed by a judge, or the police have arrested the patient in question. As such, when the police bring a DUI suspect in for a blood test for alcohol content, they have made already made an arrest for DUI. Typically, the suspect has already blown a failing score on the breathalyzer and failed field sobriety tests which are grounds enough to affect the arrest and the officer is getting the blood test for additional evidence at this point (while grounds for an arrest are met, the grounds for conviction may not be satisfied. The BAC from a blood test will aide in adding further evidence against the drunk driver)\nAdditionally, the DUI does not always mean the driver is under the influence of Alcohol, and certain drug tests look for chemicals that are byproducts of use and may not be as timely as a blood test. For example, any drug test that requires a hair sample and tests positive for the drugs tested means that you took the drug sometime in a period of months, which fails to show what the breathalyzer does which is recent immediate use.</p>\n<p>Another reason to get the blood test done is that the breathalyzer can give a false positive if you have been using certain products (For example, Mouth Wash uses a strong alcohol to kill germs, but you're not supposed to swallow it. It will still read higher on the breathalyzer test if you blow shortly after using mouthwash correctly. A defense attorney can argue that the breathalyzer will point to this which is enough doubt to let the suspect walk, where as a blood test will show how much alcohol is in the your blood real if done quickly). In this case, the nurse drawling the blood might actually be doing good as if you blew a false positive on your breathalyzer, this could spare you from having to pay an attorney at all.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "medical", "driving" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93888, "body": "<p>You say that &quot;furniture included&quot; was mentioned during the tour, but the verbal representations made during a tour are probably not binding. If there is contemporary record of the representations made on the tour (perhaps an audio recording, a note made the the same day, or an information flyer) then perhaps it carries weight. But, in general, unprovable chit-chat during a tour is not part of the contract.</p>\n<p>Next you say that &quot;it wasn't mentioned in the lease&quot;. I encourage you to read the entire lease closely. Does it ever say that the lease is for an &quot;unfurnished apartment&quot;? or say &quot;as shown&quot;? or make vague reference to &quot;other items at additional cost&quot;?</p>\n<p>The Lease really should have described the apartment in <em>some</em> way, even if it isn't explicitly about furniture at first glance.</p>\n<p>If the lease really didn't mention furniture and/or additional costs in any way, then I think you got the apartment in move-in condition (with furniture) for no additional costs.</p>\n<p>You may well want to talk to neighbors/other tenants, and mention the surprise fees. See if other tenants also encountered this, and if/how it was addressed by them.</p>\n<p>But remember: if you annoy the landlords, they will very likely opt to not-renew the lease when its up, and you'll be looking for a new place again, possibly with a negative recommendation from this landlord.</p>\n<p>Even when you're in the right, consider carefully how much you want to pursue relatively small issues.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "landlord", "fees" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93885, "body": "<p>In summary,</p>\n<ul>\n<li>At the time of writing, Michael Gove has overall ministerial responsibility for making planning regulations, with a good part of the role delegated to Rachel Maclean as Minister of State for Housing.</li>\n<li>The detail of regulatory verbiage is the work of civil service lawyers, based on policy formed within the department as a result of the general political process.</li>\n<li>There are various rules for how these functions arise and get transferred around government, described below.</li>\n</ul>\n<h2>The Secretary of State can make regulations about flag display</h2>\n<p>These pieces of secondary legislation, as their names suggest, are made under the authority of the <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/8/contents\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Town and Country Planning Act 1990</a>. Several sections of the Act empower regulations to be made by &quot;the Secretary of State&quot;, e.g. in s.220(1) we read</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Regulations under this Act shall make provision for restricting or regulating the display of advertisements so far as appears to the Secretary of State to be expedient in the interests of amenity or public safety.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>and the full Parliamentary procedure for making them is spelled out in <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/8/section/333\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">s.333</a>. This comports with the regulatory preambles, e.g. <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/783/introduction/made\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">for the 2007 regulations</a>, saying:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 220, 221, 223(1), 224(3) and 333(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, makes the following Regulations</p>\n</blockquote>\n<h2>&quot;The Secretary of State&quot; means a specific Secretary chosen by the Prime Minister</h2>\n<p>Note that the Act just said &quot;the Secretary of State&quot;, whereas we have just read about a <em>specific</em> Secretary.</p>\n<p>What's going on here is that primary legislation just wants to say &quot;whoever in Cabinet has a job that is most relevant&quot;, since functions get transferred around, departments created or abolished, etc., and nobody really wants to update a zillion Acts every time that happens. Instead, there is a framework pattern where powers will be given to &quot;the Secretary of State&quot; generally, but will be executed by a specific one according to the division of responsibilities in the government of the day. That will sometimes be just a matter of agreement within Cabinet, but at other times be encoded in secondary legislation - a &quot;Transfer of Functions Order&quot;. Those Orders are also needed to handle special situations like -</p>\n<ul>\n<li>transferring property and legal obligations when departments are created, merged, split or abolished</li>\n<li>making amendments to legislation which <em>did</em> happen to mention a specific minister</li>\n<li>ministers who are not a &quot;Secretary of State&quot; as such, but hold another ministerial title, such as &quot;Lord Privy Seal&quot;</li>\n</ul>\n<p>These Orders are made under the <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1975/26/contents\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Ministers of the Crown Act 1975</a>, and are in the form of orders of the King on the advice of the Privy Council - which is to say, that the Prime Minister decides who does which jobs. Historically, this is something of an accident, since the number of Secretaries of State has increased along with the scope of government, and it was convenient to appoint lots of people to the same formal office rather than invent fresh jobs - especially in the days before ministers were paid.</p>\n<p>In any case, flag decisions would currently be made under the authority of the minister responsible for planning affairs, the Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Gove\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Michael Gove</a>. That comes from <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2021/1265/article/4\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">a 2021 order</a> when that position was created, inheriting all functions from the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. Those in turn derive from <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2018/378/article/8\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">a 2018 order</a> taking them from the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, and so on back in time.</p>\n<h2>SoS authority can be exercised by other people who work for him</h2>\n<p>Additionally, the SoS can delegate functions to junior ministers; for example, the <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2021/617/signature/made\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">2021 regulations</a> state that they are</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Signed by authority of the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government<br>\n<em>Christopher Pincher</em><br>Minister of State<br>Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Intra-departmental delegation of functions also requires the agreement of the Prime Minister, although some functions must be performed by the Secretary of State personally. That relates to the so-called &quot;Carltona doctrine&quot;, named for a 1943 court case <em>Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works</em> [1943] 2 All ER 560, which establishes that a minister is generally responsible for his whole department, and that when some function is conferred on the Secretary of State, it usually doesn't mean that he has to do it himself. Most administrative functions are like that, although the actual laying of secondary legislation before Parliament has to be done by a member of Parliament, i.e. a member of the ministerial team. Following the <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chris_Pincher_scandal\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">downfall of Mr Pincher</a>, the junior minister responsible for planning is currently Rachel Maclean, so she would be likely to be taking lead responsibility for putting through planning regulations.</p>\n<p>So all this doesn't mean that Mr Gove personally decides which flags fall into which category, although observers of his career know that we can't rule that out. But he is responsible for the actions of his department, and the secondary legislation would be laid before Parliament in his name and on his instructions.</p>\n<h2>On the making of flags and sausages</h2>\n<p>Regarding &quot;how and on what considerations&quot; these decisions are made, I have no specific knowledge for flag-related policy. But in general, the secondary legislation is written by civil service lawyers on the basis of government policy, and then approved (or at least not disapproved) by Parliament. For example, after Brexit, the EU flag was removed from the list. The mechanism would be that various people who had never heard of the Town and Country Planning Act became upset about flying of the EU flag, and either wrote to ministers or were Cabinet ministers already. Internally to the department, there would have been a mandate to stop the flag being flown, civil servants would figure out the legal steps, and draft the statutory instrument. In the end <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2021/617/regulation/4/made\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">we get\na regulation</a> saying</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In Class H in Schedule 1, in paragraph (b) of column (1) omit the words &quot;the European Union,&quot;.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>even though only planning experts would know or care about &quot;Class H in Schedule 1&quot;. Similar remarks apply to the companion regulation giving prominence to the Union flag over the Scottish flag, which was a political reaction in Westminster to the SNP-led government in Scotland.</p>\n<p>Someone who is upset about a regulation, or just wants it to be different, may be able to challenge it through the political process in the same sort of way. There are also avenues for judicial review, if regulations have been made in a way which is irrational, or exceeding the scope of what the original Act allowed, or other similar reasons - but these are difficult to pursue in court. For example, it is more than three months since the 2021 regulations were made, so it is now too late to mount a judicial challenge.</p>\n", "score": 5 } ]

[ "england-and-wales", "flag" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93834, "body": "<p>If the app (and the service accessed from the app) truly doesn't have any EULA, ToS, or license agreement, to include restrictions on reverse engineering, you can probably create an alternate front end, so long as you aren't using their logos, etc.</p>\n<p>However, their data may be a different beast, depending on the nature of it. For example, extracting data from Twitter would potentially violate Twitter's license on the original text copyright held by the authors in question. Wikipedia explicitly includes redistribution in their license agreement with authors/content creators.</p>\n<p>If all you are extracting and storing is the temperature at a particular weather station, you might have less of a concern. Anything beyond merely factual runs the risk of a copyright infringement as you store the data in your own database.</p>\n", "score": 19 }, { "answer_id": 93843, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/england-and-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container\">england-and-wales</a></p>\n<p>If you know you have no authorisation to access the API then on the face of it this seems to be contrary to <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/18/section/1\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990</a> (and possibly <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/18/section/3\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">s3 Unauthorised acts ... with recklessness as to impairing ... etc</a>, depending).</p>\n<blockquote>\n<ol>\n<li>Unauthorised access to computer material.</li>\n</ol>\n<p>(1) A person is guilty of an offence if—</p>\n<p>(a) he causes a computer to perform any function with intent to secure\naccess to any program or data held in any computer, or to enable\nany such access to be secured;</p>\n<p>(b) the access he intends to secure, or to enable to be secured,\nis unauthorised; and</p>\n<p>(c) he knows at the time when he causes the computer to perform the\nfunction that that is the case.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/computer-misuse-act\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Crown Prosecution Service Guidance for Computer Misuse Act</a>.</p>\n<p>(If the data is &quot;personal data&quot; then there is the offence of the deliberate or reckless obtaining, disclosing, procuring and retention of personal data without the consent of the data controller contrary to <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/section/170/enacted\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">s170 Data Protection Act 2018</a>.)</p>\n<p>[edit]</p>\n<p>There is some discussion in comments about what is authorisation or tantamount to it, implied authorisation, passwords, etc.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/18/section/17\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">s17 Computer Misuse Act - Interpretation</a></p>\n<p>(5)Access of any kind by any person to any program or data held in a\ncomputer is unauthorised if—</p>\n<p>(a)he is not himself entitled to control access of the kind in\nquestion to the program or data; and</p>\n<p>(b)he does not have consent to access by him of the kind in question\nto the program or data from any person who is so entitled [F2but this\nsubsection is subject to section 10.]</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldjudgmt/jd990805/bow.htm\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Judgments -- Regina v. Bow Street Magistrates Court and Allison (A.P.) Ex Parte Government of the United States of America (on Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queens Bench Division)</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Section 17 is an interpretation section. Subsection (2) defines what is meant by access and securing access to any programme or data. It lists four ways in which this may occur or be achieved. Its purpose is clearly to give a specific meaning to the phrase &quot;to secure access&quot;. Subsection (5) is to be read with subsection (2). It deals with the relationship between the widened definition of securing access and the scope of the authority which the relevant person may hold. That is why the subsection refers to &quot;access of any kind&quot; and &quot;access of the kind in question&quot;. Authority to view data may not extend to authority to copy or alter that data. The refinement of the concept of access requires a refinement of the concept of authorisation. The authorisation must be authority to secure access of the kind in question. As part of this refinement, the subsection lays down two cumulative requirements of lack of authority. The first is the requirement that the relevant person be not the person entitled to control the relevant kind of access. The word &quot;control&quot; in this context clearly means authorise and forbid. If the relevant person is so entitled, then it would be unrealistic to treat his access as being unauthorised. The second is that the relevant person does not have the consent to secure the relevant kind of access from a person entitled to control, ie authorise, that access.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Subsection (5) therefore has a plain meaning subsidiary to the other provisions of the Act. It simply identifies the two ways in\nwhich authority may be acquired--by being oneself the person entitled\nto authorise and by being a person who has been authorised by a person\nentitled to authorise. It also makes clear that the authority must\nrelate not simply to the data or programme but also to the actual kind\nof access secured. Similarly, it is plain that it is not using the\nword &quot;control&quot; in a physical sense of the ability to operate or\nmanipulate the computer and that it is not derogating from the\nrequirement that for access to be authorised it must be authorised to\nthe relevant data or relevant programme or part of a programme. It\ndoes not introduce any concept that authority to access one piece of\ndata should be treated as authority to access other pieces of data &quot;of\nthe same kind&quot; notwithstanding that the relevant person did not in\nfact have authority to access that piece of data. Section 1 refers to\nthe intent to secure unauthorised access to any programme or data.\nThese plain words leave no room for any suggestion that the relevant\nperson may say: &quot;Yes, I know that I was not authorised to access that\ndata but I was authorised to access other data of the same kind.**</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The questioner states that &quot;I have discovered a mobile app's backend API through reverse engineering. ... it is not an official API that the public is meant to access. It was made solely for the purpose of that app.&quot;</p>\n<p>It seems to me the questioner knows they are not authorised to access it for their purposes.</p>\n", "score": 9 }, { "answer_id": 93842, "body": "<p>In the US, the relevant law is the <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-48000-computer-fraud\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Computer Fraud and Abuse Act</a>, which makes it a federal crime to access a protected computer system without proper authorization or to exceed the scope of your authorization. So the questions here are</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Is the API sufficiently protected to count as a &quot;protected computer&quot;</li>\n<li>By building an alternate frontend, are you accessing it without authorization.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>From the Justice Department memo I linked,</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A CFAA prosecution may not be brought on the theory that a defendant exceeds authorized access solely by violating an access restriction contained in a contractual agreement or term of service with an Internet service provider or web service available to the general public—including public websites (such as social-media services) that allow for free or paid registration without human intervention.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>So you're probably fine under the CFAA.</p>\n", "score": 6 } ]

[ "copyright", "data" ]

[ { "answer_id": 11710, "body": "<p><a href=\"http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=166ebd06a2eab96e32075c79fe96e986&amp;mc=true&amp;tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title29/29cfrv4_02.tpl#1600\" rel=\"nofollow\">29 CFR</a> 1601.34 states \"These rules and regulations shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose and provisions of title VII, the ADA, and GINA\" (by contrast 29 CFR 1606.4 says \"The exception stated in section 703(e) of title VII, that national origin may be a bona fide occupational qualification, shall be strictly construed\". A \"liberal construal\" of the rules would include as many instances as one could interpret as being prohibited, given the purpose of the underlying legislation. The purpose of title VII is to prevent people from using certain considerations as a basis for employment, so a liberal construal of the act would extend to \"because of a belief that X is the case\", as well as \"because of the fact that X is the case\". In addition, 29 CFR 1607.3 says</p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>The use of any selection procedure which has an adverse impact on the\n hiring, promotion, or other employment or membership opportunities of\n members of any race, sex, or ethnic group will be considered to be\n discriminatory and inconsistent with these guidelines, unless the\n procedure has been validated in accordance with these guidelines, or\n the provisions of section 6 below are satisfied.</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>Firing on the basis of belief that a set of individuals has a protected characteristic obviously has an adverse impact on the protected class, and is accordingly prohibited, even when one or more individuals is not in the protected class.</p>\n\n<p>Switching to state law, in <a href=\"http://law.justia.com/cases/new-jersey/appellate-division-published/2012/a4014-10.html\" rel=\"nofollow\">Cowher v. Carson &amp; Roberts</a> the relevant question is whether there had been religious discrimination against plaintiff, who was not Jewish. The decision rests in part on the finding <a href=\"http://law.justia.com/cases/new-jersey/supreme-court/1993/132-n-j-587.html\" rel=\"nofollow\">Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, 132 N.J. 587</a> that \"it is the harassing conduct that must be severe or pervasive, <em>not its effect on the plaintiff</em> or on the work environment\" – this basically isolates the particulars of the discriminee from the actions of the discriminator. In Cowher, the lower court held that \"plaintiff could not meet the first prong of the Lehmann test because he was not Jewish, and that the allegation that he was perceived to be Jewish was insufficient\". The higher court disagreed. Drawing on case law pertaining to handicaps as a basis of discrimination, the court stated </p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>Distinguishing between actual handicaps and perceived handicaps makes\n no sense. For example, in the case of racial and religious\n discrimination, the Law Against Discrimination cannot reasonably be\n read to prohibit a landlord from refusing to rent to a member of a\n racial or religious minority, but to allow a landlord to refuse to\n rent to a person who is only perceived by the landlord to be such a\n member.</p>\n</blockquote>\n\n<p>The general principle identified by the court is that </p>\n\n<blockquote>\n <p>there is no reasoned basis to hold that the LAD protects those who are\n perceived to be members of one class of persons enumerated by the Act\n and does not protect those who are perceived to be members of a\n different class, as to which the LAD offers its protections in equal\n measure</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 93875, "body": "<p><strong>Would Bob be protected by anti-discrimination laws?</strong></p>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/england-and-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container\">england-and-wales</a></p>\n<p><strong>Yes</strong></p>\n<p>If the employer fires Bob on the basis of him being gay, then the employer would commit direct discrimination even though they are mistaken about Bob's actual sexual orientation.</p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/section/4?timeline=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Section 4</a> Equity Act 2010 establishes sexual orientation as a protected characteristic, and <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/section/13?timeline=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">section 13</a> creates the offence of direct discrimination:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(1) A person (A) [<em>employer</em>] discriminates against another (B) [<em>Bob</em>] if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.</p>\n<p>...</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>There is no requirement for victims to have the relevant protected characteristic to be unlawfully discriminated against - it's the motivation behind the discrimination that makes it unlawful. The supporting <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/notes/division/3/2/2/1\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Explanatory Notes</a> to section 13 states that:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>This definition is broad enough to cover cases where the less favourable treatment is because .... the victim is wrongly thought to have [a protected characteristic].</p>\n<p>...</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The Notes then go on to offer an example of a similar scenario to the OP:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>If an employer rejects a job application form from a white man who he wrongly thinks is black, because the applicant has an African-sounding name, this would constitute direct race <strong>discrimination based on the employer’s mistaken perception.</strong></p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 93881, "body": "<p>In the U.S. most hate crime laws will include the phrase &quot;actual or perceived&quot; when discussing protected classes. As such, the hate crime occurs when someone is victimized in criminal manner because of the offender's belief (whether correct or not) that the victim is a member of a protected class of people and they are committing the crime because of the victim's status as a member of a protected class. While the scenario is not an example of a hate crime, in a scenario where Bob was a victim of a crime due to his perceived status as a gay man when he is in fact a straight man, than his attackers would still be guilty of a hate crime since they perceived Bob to be gay and were motivated by homophobia to attack Bob.</p>\n<p>For a real example, there was a marked rise in hate crimes against members of the Sikh community in the U.S. following the 9/11 attacks. In the Sikh religion, men are forbidden from cutting their hair, which means that many Sikh men have long thick beards and will wear turbans to keep their long head hair in check (I believe it's also done for modesty purposes). This makes them look like a stereotypical Arabic/Mid-East/Muslim stereotype to Americans who are ignorant of the difference, resulting in many Sikh's being the target of hate crimes for the mistaken belief that they were Arabic or Muslim. These crimes were charged as hate crimes when prosecuted despite the fact that they believed their victims were Muslim and/or Arabic, despite the fact that most Sikhs in the U.S. are of Indian decent and the religion is Dharmic and not remotely related to the Abrahamic faiths, let alone to Islam (and in fact, has historically been persecuted during the Mughal Empire period of Indian History, which was Muslim in nature.).</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "discrimination" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93879, "body": "<p>If the residence falls within one of the categories for which a water company can insist on a water meter, then the resident cannot refuse. See House of Commons, &quot;<a href=\"https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-7342/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Water meters: the rights of customers and water companies</a>&quot;.</p>\n<p>That brief says that a water company can insist on installing a meter if the customer:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li>uses an automatic watering device (such as a garden sprinkler);</li>\n<li>automatically fills a swimming pool or pond;</li>\n<li>has a large bath;</li>\n<li>uses a reverse osmosis softening unit;</li>\n<li>has a power shower;</li>\n<li>is the new occupier of a property (provided an unmetered bill has not already been sent to that occupier); or</li>\n<li>lives in an area which has been determined by the Secretary of State to be an area of serious water stress and subject to a metering\nprogramme as part of a plan to maintain secure water supplies.</li>\n</ul>\n</blockquote>\n<p>See also Tom Haynes and Ruth Emery, &quot;<a href=\"https://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/consumer-affairs/water-meters-cheaper-increase-bills-refuse/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">What a water meter could do to your bills – and why you may be forced to have one</a>&quot;, <em>The Telegraph</em> (1 June 2023):</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>If your water supplier has been granted legal powers to fit compulsory water meters, you don't have any right to refuse one. As Andy White, of the Consumer Council for Water, puts it: “It's not possible for a customer to refuse where a water company has approval for compulsory metering from Defra.”</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>If a water company has the statutory right to install a meter, and the customer has no right to refuse, this could be enforced by injunction.</p>\n", "score": 6 } ]

[ "england-and-wales", "water" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93873, "body": "<h2>No* in the <a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-states\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-states-tooltip-container\">united-states</a></h2>\n<p>Waht falls under copyright in the US is described in\n<a href=\"https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/102\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">17 USC §102</a>, and the whole question hinges on the bolded part:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>(a)<em>Copyright protection subsists</em>, in accordance with this title, in <em>original works of authorship</em> <strong>fixed in any tangible medium of expression,</strong> [...]</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The radio transmission itself thus does not fall under copyright, as it is not <em>fixed in a tangible medium</em> while it travels through the air, and it is not a <strong>sound recording</strong> under 17 USC 102 (a)7 either.</p>\n<p>As such, normal discussions on the bands like Alice talking to Bob, does not even create a copyright in the first place. That is not regulated in FCC rules, it falls directly from the copyright law: because the material is not fixed, it is not copyrighted in the first place. That is, if nobody fixed or fixes the transmission, nobody owns them. That doesn't mean the contents are public domain:</p>\n<p><strong>However</strong> the contents of the transmission can be under copyright anyway and transmitting them might be copyright infringement (aka <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pirate_radio\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">&quot;Radio Piracy&quot; or &quot;Pirate Radio&quot;</a>): you could play a recording of a song via amateur radio, which is under copyright, or you could read a book which is under copyright, and that would violate the author's copyrights if you don't have license to do so. But even if you <em>have</em> a license, transmitting does not put the materials into the public domain: it is a fixed expression (replayed on amateur band) and thus copyrighted.</p>\n<p>Nothing in copyright law would turn a transmitted copyrighted material into the public domain - that requires an express release into it.</p>\n<h2>But it's complicated...</h2>\n<p>Now, it gets <em>really</em> complicated if we introduce simultaneously fixing the material. <a href=\"https://artquest.org.uk/artlaw-article/recording-visiting-speakers/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Now, the same rules apply as they do when you record a visiting speaker.</a> Or rather, the same setup as a studio and the musicians using it.</p>\n<h3>Alice creates copyrighted material at home</h3>\n<p>If Alice loops her signal through a recording box somewhere on her side, the material gets fixed while she is sending. That means it is copyrighted material, and Alice has the copyrights in the original recording, as she both creates the material <strong>and</strong> records it.</p>\n<p>Alice also might own the copyright in the script or notes she used, but that's beside the point.</p>\n<h3>Bob creates copyrighted material from afar</h3>\n<p>Let's assume Alice never thought about recording and just airs her material into the night without infringing on other people's copyrights.</p>\n<p>But now let's assume Bob, 3 counties over, is also recording Alice signal, and thus fixing the material. Bob had no creative input besides the recording, but the material is now fixed. Bob had some technical and arguably creative input into that recording by choosing the filter settings on his radio setup, antenna placement, and such.</p>\n<p>Bob for sure does own a copyright in the recording itself, especially in the alterations he made. However, he would <strong>not</strong> gain copyright over the material that Alice introduced, which now became fixed by Bob's action. In a strange fashion, Bob turned Alice's speech into a copyrighted tangible expression, and the recording is in a very strange place:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>Bob owns the &quot;<a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mastering_(audio)\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Master</a>&quot; itself, and the technical changes that he did.</li>\n<li>Alice owns the contents of the recording, as in her voice input and choice of words.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>Distribution of this recording would require <strong>both</strong> Bob's and Alice's consent now, or Fair Use.</p>\n<h3>Alice clawing back the rights!</h3>\n<p>But Alice can circumvent Bob's copyright at any time by simply re-recording her show, and Bob can not claim copyright on that <strong>different</strong> recording - that was <strong>exactly</strong> what <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taylor_Swift_masters_controversy\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Taylor Swift did in 2019.</a></p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "copyright", "amateur-radio" ]

[ { "answer_id": 44596, "body": "<p>Yes, it is legal under US tax law. US tax law is concerned with collecting tax. The questions that tax law asks are</p>\n\n<ol>\n<li>Must the income be declared to the IRS?</li>\n<li>Is the income taxable?</li>\n<li>How much tax is due?</li>\n</ol>\n\n<p>Whether US tax law requires the income to be declared or considers it taxable does not depend on whether it is paid to a US or foreign bank account. This also has no effect on the rate of taxation. US tax law is not concerned with the specific route the money takes to get from your client to you.</p>\n\n<p>If the income is in fact taxable, and you declare it and pay tax accordingly, you will not have violated any US tax law.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-states", "federal-tax-law" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93872, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Is speech over amateur radio constitutionally protected?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Of course.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Could I theoretically sue the FCC for the right to broadcast music on 20 meters, and have a chance of winning on free speech grounds?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>You can certainly sue. I don't know enough about existing jurisprudence to comment on the likelihood of success.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>If the FCC made a rule, at the direction of Congress, prohibiting political speech over amateur radio, would that be enforceable? What if the rule allowed promotion of party X but not party Y?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Of course not.</p>\n<hr />\n<p>The entire concept of regulation of telecommunications is in some tension with the first amendment, but the fact that the judiciary has upheld such regulation does not imply that telecommunications are beyond the reach of the first amendment. Instead, it means that the first amendment permits the regulation. Other regulation could still be found impermissible under the first amendment, as regulation prohibiting political speech or likely would and regulation giving preferential treatment to certain political parties certainly would.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "us-constitution", "freedom-of-speech", "first-amendment", "communications-law", "amateur-radio" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93671, "body": "<p>Usually, the only reason to set up an &quot;ownerless&quot; corporation is to set up a non-profit. Non-profit corporations can have self-perpetuating boards and are very similar to charitable trusts. If it ends up without any board members and has a self-perpetuating board, any person affected by the corporation or a suitable government representative (in the U.S., usually a state attorney general in the place of incorporation) can apply to a court to have new board members appointed.</p>\n<p>In a &quot;for profit&quot; context, this generally doesn't happen because the people investing in the company want to be able to profit from it and/or obtain a return of their investment. So, the question is largely hypothetical in that case.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "international", "corporate-law", "ownership" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93856, "body": "<p>If there is a copyright violation then it is by the user; the service would presumably work the same, and be as useful, for text where the user owns the copyright or has a license to do this. As long as the service doesn't actively encourage copyright violation then it is in the clear.</p>\n<p>The user might be able to claim fair use or fair dealing (depending on the country). The rules vary between countries and are too fact-specific to analyse here; it would depend on things like whether the end user is making money out of it and if the result is used in scholarship. However the fact that only the 100 most-used words are retained would generally count in favour of fair use.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "copyright", "gdpr", "software", "artificial-intelligence" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93847, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/england-and-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container\">england-and-wales</a></p>\n<p>There are two issues here:</p>\n<ol>\n<li>B's &quot;confession&quot; to their lawyer would fall within the definition of legal professional privilege, specifically <a href=\"https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/topics/civil-litigation/legal-professional-privilege-guide#:%7E:text=Litigation%20privilege%20protects%20communications%20between,existing%20or%20reasonably%20contemplated%20litigation\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">litigation privilege</a>:</li>\n</ol>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Litigation privilege protects communications between lawyers or their clients and any third party for the purpose of obtaining advice or information in connection with existing <strong>or reasonably contemplated litigation</strong>.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>So unless B gives their permission, this cannot be disclosed.</p>\n<ol start=\"2\">\n<li>A party's duty for disclosure, under <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part31#31.1\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Part 31</a> Civil Procedure Rules, begins once proceedings have started by a claim being issued under <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part07#7.2\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Rule 7.2(1)</a> <strong>unless</strong> <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part31#31.16\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Rule 31.16</a> applies as <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/54/section/33?timeline=false\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">section 33</a> Supreme Court Act 1981¹ permits disclosure before proceedings have started.</li>\n</ol>\n<p>So unless A makes, and is successful with, a section 33 application there is no legal obligation on B for disclosure that is not protected by legal professionalprivilege.</p>\n<hr />\n<p>¹ Defamation is dealt with as a &quot;media and communications claim&quot; under <a href=\"https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part53#IDA1B1HC\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Rule 53.1(3)</a> in the High Court so the other method of pre-proceedings disclosure at section 52 County Courts Act 1984 does not apply here.</p>\n<hr />\n<p>_{Although tagged <a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-states\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-states-tooltip-container\">united-states</a>, I have answered as per the <a href=\"https://law.stackexchange.com/help/on-topic\">Help Centre</a>: &quot;<em>we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]</em>&quot;}</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 93850, "body": "<p>Client B's confession is a privileged communication.</p>\n<p>In the absence of special circumstances, Lawyer B is legally and ethically obligated to never share it with Lawyer A.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-states", "civil-law", "tort", "attorney-client-privilege" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93848, "body": "<p>Google england law flying flags</p>\n<p>First result <a href=\"https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/flying-flags-a-plain-english-guide/flying-flags-a-plain-english-guide\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Flying flags: a plain English guide - GOV.UK</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>... Some flags require formal consent (permission) from the local\nplanning authority, whereas others like the Union Flag do not. The\ndetailed controls over flag flying are set out in detailed regulations\n(see links below). ...</p>\n<p>All flag flying is subject to some standard conditions</p>\n<p>...</p>\n<p>Subject to compliance with the standard conditions, there are 3\ncategories of flag:</p>\n<p>(a) flags which can be flown without consent of the local planning\nauthority</p>\n<p>(b) flags which do not need consent provided they comply with further\nrestrictions (referred to as “deemed consent” in the Regulations)</p>\n<p>(c) flags which require consent (“express consent”)</p>\n<p>...</p>\n<p>(b) Flags which do not require consent provided they comply with\ncertain restrictions [include for example] ... the Rainbow flag (6 horizontal equal stripes\nof red, orange, yellow, green, blue and violet).</p>\n<p>...</p>\n<p>The regulations governing the flying of flags in England are set out\nin the Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements)\nRegulations 2007 (as amended in 2012 and in 2021).</p>\n<p>These regulations, including relevant amendments to flying of flags,\ncan be viewed on the government legislation website:</p>\n<ul>\n<li><p><a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/783/contents/made\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) Regulations 2007</a></p>\n</li>\n<li><p><a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2012/2372/contents/made\" rel=\"noreferrer\">The Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2012</a></p>\n</li>\n<li><p><a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2021/617/contents/made\" rel=\"noreferrer\">The Town and Country Planning (Control of Advertisements) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2021</a> ...</p>\n</li>\n</ul>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 5 } ]

[ "united-kingdom", "england-and-wales", "police", "prison", "flag" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93774, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a></p>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stpo/__53.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">§53 StPO</a> (1) 1. allows clerics to refuse to testify about things they were told during spiritual care. This does not require the setting to be exactly the Catholic sacrament of confession: it would be enough if a troubled person seeks the cleric to talk to <em>because</em> the cleric is a cleric.</p>\n<p>Sections 2. to 5. list other groups with or without restrictions. Lawyers, notaries, tax advisors, physicians, pharmacists, midwives, drug abuse counselors and similar people, members of parliament, and journalists can refuse to testify about some or all they learned <em>in the course of their protected profession</em>. For many of them, including physicians, the subject can waive the right to secrecy, then they cannot avoid testimony any more.</p>\n<p>The same applies to professional assistants of these people, e.g. the sexton who allows someone in or the clerk who makes an appointment.</p>\n", "score": 21 }, { "answer_id": 93768, "body": "<p>In the <a href=\"/questions/tagged/united-states\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;united-states&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-united-states-tooltip-container\">united-states</a>, that privilege exists, but its availability and parameters vary from one jurisdiction to the next. <em>See</em>, <em>e.g.</em>, <a href=\"https://casetext.com/case/totten-administrator-v-united-states#p107\" rel=\"noreferrer\"><em>Totten, Administrator, v. United States</em>, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875)</a> (“Suits cannot be maintained which would require a disclosure of the confidences of the confessional.”).</p>\n", "score": 14 }, { "answer_id": 93770, "body": "<p>In <a href=\"/questions/tagged/wisconsin\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;wisconsin&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;wisconsin&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-wisconsin-tooltip-container\">wisconsin</a> statute <a href=\"https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/document/statutes/905.06\" rel=\"noreferrer\">905.06</a> says:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Communications to members of the clergy.<br />\n(1)  Definitions. As used in this section:<br />\n(a) A “member of the clergy&quot; is a minister, priest, rabbi, or other similar functionary of a religious organization, or an individual reasonably believed so to be by the person consulting the individual.<br />\n(b) A communication is “confidential&quot; if made privately and not intended for further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the purpose of the communication.<br />\n(2)  General rule of privilege. A person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the person to a member of the clergy in the member's professional character as a spiritual adviser.<br />\n(3)  Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the person, by the person's guardian or conservator, or by the person's personal representative if the person is deceased. The member of the clergy may claim the privilege on behalf of the person. The member of the clergy's authority so to do is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.<br />\n(4)  Exceptions. There is no privilege under this section concerning observations or information that a member of the clergy, as defined in s. 48.981 (1) (cx), is required to report as suspected or threatened child abuse under s. 48.981 (2) (bm) or as a threat of violence in or targeted at a school under s. 175.32.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The exceptions turn out not to be exceptions, however, if a confession is involved. According to <a href=\"https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/document/statutes/48.981(2)(bm)3.\" rel=\"noreferrer\">48.981(2)(bm)(3):</a></p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A member of the clergy is not required to report child abuse information under subd. 1. or 2. that he or she receives solely through confidential communications made to him or her privately or in a confessional setting if he or she is authorized to hear or is accustomed to hearing such communications and, under the disciplines, tenets, or traditions of his or her religion, has a duty or is expected to keep those communications secret. Those disciplines, tenets, or traditions need not be in writing.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/document/statutes/175.32(2)(c)2.\" rel=\"noreferrer\">175.32(2)(c)(2)</a> has similar language.</p>\n<p>So, in Wisconsin, the answer is yes. A confession to a past murder, or any other crime, would be legally privileged by statute.</p>\n<p>A &quot;confession&quot; to a <em>future</em> murder runs into the problem that this would not be considered a valid confession by the Catholic Church - you can't ask to be absolved from a sin you haven't committed yet; if you were truly repentant you wouldn't still be planning to do it. This would likely release the priest from the religious obligation to not tell, and that in turn could at least result in it not being covered by the exceptions to 48.981 and 175.32 (since there's no longer a religious duty to keep it confidential.)</p>\n", "score": 9 }, { "answer_id": 93797, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/england-and-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container\">england-and-wales</a></p>\n<p>Per <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Priest%E2%80%93penitent_privilege_in_England#:%7E:text=The%20doctrine%20of%20priest%E2%80%93penitent,obtained%20from%20a%20professional%20adviser.\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Wikipedia</a>, confession to a priest isn't legally privileged.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The doctrine of priest–penitent privilege does not appear to apply in English law. The orthodox view is that under the law of England and Wales <strong>privileged communication exists only in the context of legal advice obtained from a professional adviser.</strong> A statement of the law on priest–penitent privilege is contained in the nineteenth century case of <a href=\"https://swarb.co.uk/wheeler-v-le-marchant-ca-1881/\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Wheeler v. Le Marchant</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In the first place, the principle protecting confidential communications is of a very limited character. ... There are many communications, which, though absolutely necessary because without them the ordinary business of life cannot be carried on, still are not privileged. ... Communications made to a priest in the confessional on matters perhaps considered by the penitent to be more important than his life or his fortune, are not protected.</p>\n<p>— Sir George Jessel MR, Wheeler v. Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch.D 681[3]</p>\n</blockquote>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 8 }, { "answer_id": 93784, "body": "<h2>Yes, but …</h2>\n<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/new-south-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;new-south-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-new-south-wales-tooltip-container\">new-south-wales</a></p>\n<p><a href=\"https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-1995-025#sec.127\" rel=\"noreferrer\">s127</a> of the uniform Evidence Act allows a member of the clergy to refuse to reveal the contents of or existence of a confession.</p>\n<p>However, unlike a lawyer’s privilege, if the cleric chooses to testify, the evidence is admissible.</p>\n", "score": 6 }, { "answer_id": 93778, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/canada\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;canada&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-canada-tooltip-container\">canada</a></p>\n<h3>The common law only provides privilege to religious communications on a case-by-case basis</h3>\n<p>At common law, there is no categorical privilege for religious communications. Instead, each claim to privilege for a religious communication is dealt with on a case-by-case basis under the &quot;Wigmore test&quot; (from John Henry Wigmore). See <em>R. v. Gruenke</em>, <a href=\"https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1991/1991canlii40/1991canlii40.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">[1991] 3 S.C.R. 263</a>:</p>\n<ol>\n<li>The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed.</li>\n<li>This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.</li>\n<li>The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered.</li>\n<li>The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.</li>\n</ol>\n<p>In recognition of the guarantee of religious freedom in s. 2 of the <a href=\"https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\"><em>Charter</em></a> and the interpretive statement in s. 27 of the <em>Charter</em> that the <em>Charter</em> is to be interpreted &quot;in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians&quot;: &quot;all of the relevant circumstances must be considered and the Wigmore criteria applied in a manner which is sensitive to the fact of Canada's multicultural heritage&quot; (<em>Gruenke</em>, <a href=\"https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1991/1991canlii40/1991canlii40.pdf#page=29\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">p. 291</a>).</p>\n<h3>Two provincial jurisdictions provide statutory privilege</h3>\n<p>The province of Newfoundland and Labrador and the province of Québec both provide a statutory clergy privilege. See Newfoundland and Labrador's <em>Evidence Act</em>, <a href=\"https://www.assembly.nl.ca/Legislation/sr/statutes/e16.htm#8_\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">R.S.N.L. 1990, c. E-16, s. 8</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>A member of the clergy or a priest shall not be compellable to give evidence as to a confession made to him or her in his or her professional capacity.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>And see Québec's <em>Charter of human rights and freedoms</em>, <a href=\"https://www.legisquebec.gouv.qc.ca/en/document/cs/C-12?langCont=en#se:9\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">L.Q., c. c-12, art. 9</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Every person has a right to non-disclosure of confidential\ninformation.</p>\n<p>No person bound to professional secrecy by law and no priest or other\nminister of religion may, even in judicial proceedings, disclose\nconfidential information revealed to him by reason of his position or\nprofession, unless he is authorized to do so by the person who\nconfided such information to him or by an express provision of law.</p>\n<p>The tribunal must, exofficio, ensure that professional secrecy is\nrespected.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 93807, "body": "<p>In <a href=\"/questions/tagged/sweden\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;sweden&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;sweden&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-sweden-tooltip-container\">sweden</a>, yes, it's privileged as priests have a particularly strong confidentiality, often called &quot;absolute confidentiality&quot;. The information received by a priest during a confession or an individual pastoral conversation may not, at all, be used in any other process. The priest may not be called to testify in a trial and is exempt from mandatory reporting laws.</p>\n<p>This is by the <a href=\"https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-dokument/departementsserien-och-promemorior/1998/01/ds-199865/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure</a>, where <a href=\"https://lagen.nu/1942:740#K36P5S1\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Chapter 36, section 5</a> prohibits calling priests as witnesses.</p>\n<p>Before 2000, this would <em>not</em> have applied to Catholic confession as the confidentiality was limited to the Church of Sweden, a Lutheran church that was then the official state church and the confidentiality was stipulated in the <a href=\"https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/kyrkolag-1992300_sfs-1992-300/\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Church Law</a> that applied to the Church of Sweden.</p>\n<p>The restriction is no longer there because Sweden fully separated church and state in 2000. The confidentiality is currently not limited to Christian priests either, the law refers to &quot;a priest in a religious organization or a person of equivalent standing in such an organization&quot; so the confidentiality would apply to priest-equivalent members of registered religious organizations.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 93819, "body": "<h2>Confession in a seal of secrecy is much older than much current law</h2>\n<p>The practice of regular or devotional confession and absolute\nconfidentiality was confirmed and codified from the 13th century in Europe. <em>More recent developments in mandatory reporting and legislation intended to prevent abuse seem to conflict with the 'seal of confession'.</em></p>\n<h2>Confession is unbounded in terms of the scope of the sins that can be confessed and absolved</h2>\n<p>Here is an example statement about confession from the document cited below:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Provided always, That if any Man confess his secret and hidden Sins to the Minister for the unburdening of his Conscience, and to receive spiritual Consolation and Ease of Mind from him: We do not any way bind the said Minister by this our Constitution, but do straitly charge and admonish him [...], that he do not at any time reveal and make known to any Person whatsoever, any Crime or Offence so committed to his Trust and Secrecy (except they be such Crimes as by the Laws of this Realm, his own Life may be called into question for concealing the same)25 under pain of Irregularity...</p>\n</blockquote>\n<h2>European law and practice varies</h2>\n<p>From the <a href=\"https://ecclawsoc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/The-Report-of-the-ELS-Working-Part-on-the-Seal-of-Confession.pdf\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Ecumenical Summary of the Ecclesiastical Law Society's Report of its Working Party on the Seal of Confession</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In\nGermany while there is a criminal law duty to report planned crimes an exception is made for those\nengaged in pastoral care.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In the Nordic and Baltic Churches there are similarities with the Church of\nEngland.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Denmark has an older law imposing secrecy but also a modern law duty to report.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>In\nFinland there is a duty to encourage self-reporting and (as in Germany) a duty to alert the authorities\nof potential future crimes yet maintaining confidentiality.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>For the Roman Catholic Church, having a\nuniversal Canon Law, no Bishops’ Conference has the authority to change the absolute seal of\nconfession. Nevertheless, there are continuing official discussions in the Vatican covering all aspects\nof safeguarding questions and the sacrament of reconciliation. These include the necessity of far\nmore effective training of priests, especially on the question of how to help either a penitent or\nvictim/survivor to move from the confidentiality of their confession to God to seeking professional\nhelp and disclosure to the authorities where appropriate.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The same report furnishes the practice of the Church of England, which operates under Canon Law, which carries legal privileges in England:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>The <em>Guidelines for the Professional Conduct of the Clergy</em> [...] begins by referring to the ministry of reconciliation and then proceed[s] via the formal ministry of absolution to deal with the inviolability of the Seal. It sets\nout the restrictions upon which and where ministers may exercise the ministry [...] It draws the distinction between on the one hand pastoral conversations and on the other hand confessions in the context of this ministry. It states the absolute inviolability of the Seal even after the death of the penitent. It states that if a penitent discloses serious crime (such as abuse) the priest must require the penitent to report that conduct to the police or other statutory authority and if the penitent refuses to do so absolution should be withheld. It makes clear that any disclosure outside the confessional should be dealt with by following established procedures of reporting.</p>\n</blockquote>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 93845, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/england\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;england&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-england-tooltip-container\">england</a></p>\n<p>The Canons of the Church of England, which are part of statute law, protect sacramental confessions within the Church of England:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Provided always, that if any man confess his secret and hidden sins to the minister, for the unburdening of his conscience, and to receive spiritual consolation and ease of mind from him; we do not in any way bind the said minister by this our Constitution, but do straitly charge and admonish him, that he do not at any time reveal and make known to any person whatsoever any crime or offence so committed to his trust and secrecy (except they be such crimes as by the laws of this realm his own life may be called into question for concealing the same), under pain of irregularity.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The effect of that proviso has actually been widened over time, as the perils to the priest's own life have been diminished. There are now no crimes for which the death penalty applies.</p>\n<p>This protection only applies to clergy of the Church of England.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-kingdom", "criminal-law", "religion", "secret" ]

[ { "answer_id": 22049, "body": "<p>The double jeopardy clause would prevent you from being retried by the government that tried you for murder (probably a U.S. state). </p>\n\n<p>But, you could be tried for fraud and obstruction of justice at the state level, and you could be tried for murder if an appropriate federal offense were located, at the federal level. </p>\n\n<p>Often conspiracy to deprive someone of their civil rights is used as a federal offense when there is a state level acquittal, and it isn't impossible to imagine that happening in this case as the victim had a right to the protection of the laws, and the state had a right to enforce the criminal laws, which was deprived in a manner that could be called \"under color of state law.'</p>\n", "score": 16 }, { "answer_id": 28671, "body": "<p>Chicago mobster <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harry_Aleman\" rel=\"noreferrer\">Harry Aleman</a> was acquitted of a murder in his first bench trial because the judge had been paid off. An appeals court later ruled that he could be retried. Double jeopardy did not apply because the first trial was fixed, so he was not in jeopardy.</p>\n\n<p>Wikipedia doesn't say so, but I believe part of what led to that ruling was proof that Aleman knew the judge had been bribed.</p>\n", "score": 16 }, { "answer_id": 93841, "body": "<p>Well, I think it <em>could</em> work. I don't think perjured testimony would be enough to make jeopardy not attach in the same way that bribing a judge would. But it's not the best plan, either.</p>\n<p>So your friends testify that you did it, take a plane ride, and call the judge. What effect do you expect that to have? The jury will never hear about that phone call; it's just hearsay unless your friends come back and testify under oath again (and thus subject themselves to a perjury charge.) So you're stuck with the jury only hearing the original testimony that you did it. Two eyewitnesses could be enough to convict you all by themselves even if there's problems with the physical evidence. And if your plan rests on the police not finding badly-hidden evidence, that may be a problem since even if you invoke the right to a speedy trial it will likely be <em>months</em> between your arrest and your trial.</p>\n<p>If you're acquitted, then once this comes to light, the prosecution is going to look for every possible crime which could apply that they're still allowed to charge you with. Oh, you hid the body (or conspired with your friends to do so)? That's separate from the murder; they're still allowed to go after you for that. In my state that has a maximum sentence of 12 years 6 months. Two counts of conspiracy to commit perjury? Distinct from the murder; up to 6 years each. Placing false evidence? That's another 10 years. Etc. You may not get life like you would with the murder, but you're going away for a long time, unless you've already fled the country.</p>\n<p>In general, I'd say that if you have multiple people willing to lie under oath for you, it's not surprising that you have a nonzero chance of getting away with stuff. It might be better to use such people to just lie and say you have an alibi, or that someone else did it, instead of this convoluted plan.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "united-states", "criminal-law", "double-jeopardy" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93829, "body": "<h2>Are you collecting personal information?</h2>\n<p>A user id, assuming that it is the same per user across time, is personally identifiable information for both COPPA and GDPR, and would need to meet Google’s requirements as well.</p>\n<p>This is true even if there is no obvious way of linking this back to an identifiable person. If the id is instead a session id that is never used more than once, then it is not personal information.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 93830, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>If an error occurs in the app, the app sends a message with the stacktrace and an anonymous user id to the Sentry Cloud.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>There is no such thing as an &quot;an anonymous user id&quot;. It either identifies a user, then it is personal data, or it doesn't, then it's just random byte garbage. Since your app is contacting this cloud service <em>directly</em>, not via your servers as a proxy, you also exposing the customers IP address to a third party.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Is this legal or do I need user consent for this?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p><strong>An IP address is PII, exposing it to a third part needs consent.</strong> Given that your app would be perfectly usable if this feature did not exist, you cannot claim it is absolutely neccessary for the operation (like sending the IP address to your <em>own</em> servers, which is simply how the internet works). If you would send all that to your own servers, strip the user id and ip address and send just the stacktrace devoid of any personal information to a third party, I would say you are safe. But the user id and ip address are PII that you need consent for, before sending them to a third party.</p>\n<p>Normally, this is done in the fine print of the terms of use one has to accept before being able to sign up for an account in the app.</p>\n<p>If you don't have an app with accounts, you could simply let the user <em>chose</em> to do this (or not) at the first app start. That is more user friendly and it established explicit consent to either do it, or not.</p>\n", "score": 2 }, { "answer_id": 93833, "body": "<p>By default, our SDKs are configured not to send any PII data, see: <a href=\"https://docs.sentry.io/platforms/unity/configuration/options/#send-default-pii\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">https://docs.sentry.io/platforms/unity/configuration/options/#send-default-pii</a></p>\n<p>So if you, the developer, don't explicitly turn it on or add other data to the events sent to Sentry, you should be safe.</p>\n", "score": 0 } ]

[ "gdpr", "google", "coppa" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93839, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>the defense generally has the ability to speak to each of the witnesses, correct?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>No.</p>\n<p>The defense is only entitled to see what evidence the witnesses have provided so far, and what they are intending to give at the trial. The prosecutor must pass that info to the defense. This is called <a href=\"https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discovery_(law)\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">discovery</a> (or disclosure).</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-states", "discovery" ]

[ { "answer_id": 81094, "body": "<p>Nothing special other than saying it is required in the contract. For example, such contracts are typical for airplane pilots and flight attendants.</p>\n<p>The hard questions are not what a contract has to say to do it.</p>\n<p>The hard questions, instead, are whether what the contract provides for is allowed by the immigration laws of the countries where the employee is to work, what tax implications the employment relationship has for the employee and the employer, and what choice of law decisions arise from this with regard to labor law (when the law of the company's headquarters applies, and when the laws of a particular place of work applies).</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "employment", "international" ]

[ { "answer_id": 58768, "body": "<p>This clearly meets the first criterion:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>1.) school days at times indicated on the school zone speed limit sign, provided, however, that such times shall be between the hours of seven o'clock A.M. and six o'clock P.M...</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The times are clearly listed on the sign and are within the allowed times (assuming the sign isn't blurry in real-lfe of course). Whether the lights were blinking or not is moot.</p>\n", "score": 6 }, { "answer_id": 58769, "body": "<p><strong>The lights do not need to be flashing from 7 am - 4 pm</strong></p>\n<p>Part 2 says beacons are for &quot;student activities at the school&quot; and implies outside the regular hours, because if it is within the regular hours then part 1 covers it. Say there is a dance or game at 6:30 pm, they can have the public safety authorities activate the lights. You are correct that if you got the ticket outside the posted hours (7a-4p), but when the lights were flashing that you would have a beef- because this particular sign does not have a notice that says speed limit is in effect when the lights are flashing. If it had such notice and the lights were flashing, then you would be out of luck based on part 2.</p>\n<p>It is always in effect 7-4 on school days, lights or no lights, based on part 1 and the sign that states the hours (which are within the hours listed in the law). You don't need to memorize the school calendar, just assume it is Monday-Friday but not obvious days like Dec. 25.</p>\n", "score": 3 } ]

[ "traffic", "speeding" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93815, "body": "<h2>Ducks are ducks, not people.</h2>\n<p>It might surprise you, but even a hypothetical duck that could talk is a type of bird and is considered a waterfowl and wild game but not a person or human. As such, you can not commit any crime such as assault against it. In fact, provided that the lemonade stand owner has a hunting license and this is not in a zone where you can not hunt, such as inside a town, he could have shot the bird without repercussions - because a duck can be hunted. Threatening game birds is not covered by any law.</p>\n<p>Only would the lemonade stand owner have glued the bird to a tree he would have committed a crime, because gluing birds somewhere would be considered animal cruelty in most jurisdictions.</p>\n<p>As the duck is a bird and not a person, it can not commit any crimes, such as harassment.</p>\n<h2>If a duck is a person...</h2>\n<p>Assuming that there is such a place where duck is a slang term for a person, or where ducks are considered people, then the pattern is different:</p>\n<p>Such as duck would indeed perform a repeated action that is very much aimed at annoying the lemonade stand owner. But that is not necessarily legally harassment:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>In Germany, § 238 StGB is aimed at stalking and requires the aim of inciting fear, § 185 StGB is for insulting speech, including harassing speech, § 186 StGB is for defamation, and § 240 StGB for coercion through harassment. A charge under those would be tedious.</li>\n<li>In the United Kingdom, the <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1997/40/section/1\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">English Protection from Harassment Act 1997,</a> does not define harassment as any specific pattern. <a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1997/40/section/8\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Scotland's variant</a> reads a little simpler, and makes harassment for harassment's sake illegal. These laws might be applied to the duck.</li>\n<li>Many of the United States federal laws will simply not apply to the situation. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is about sexual harassment in the workplace, Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 is for schools, and the Fair Housing Act does deal with home purchases and renting. All seem inapplicable.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>If the threat of gluing someone to a tree is a <strong>real</strong> threat under the law depends very much again. In Germany, it might be interpreted as too hilarious to be considered a true threat, but humiliating enough to constitute one of the insult laws, but the lyrics do not offer enough facts to make a proper analysis for this part.</p>\n", "score": 6 }, { "answer_id": 93822, "body": "<p>The song question is a variation of a joke with the punchline being about the proprietor's inability to follow through on the threat made and the duck calling the bluff. In the U.S., generally when one has no ability to follow through with a threat and the threat is so outlandish, most courts would not consider it to constitute a legal threat and would assume the proprietor was being hyperbolic in nature. What's more, the duck returning to clarify the lack of resources to carry out the threat as a sign that not even the duck took it as a threat and he is merely trying to use the legal system to further his harassment of the lemonade stand owner, which most judges in the U.S. do not take kindly to at all (This is called Abuse of Process and generally refers to a pattern of behavior in which one uses the court system to further vex a target and not to actually resolve a legal dispute in a just and equitable manner.).</p>\n<p>On the other side, it would be hard to enforce a harassment charge against the duck, as the business is a lemonade stand and clearly mobile in it's depiction. As such, the proprietor does not own the property where he does business nor does the duck, so he cannot trespass the duck. His legal options are to move to another area (if the duck still follows, the owner would have a stronger case for harassment, as the owner is trying to avoid the unwelcomed behavior) or, failing that, secure a restraining order or injunction (depending on the jurisdiction) against the duck, which requires the duck to not come within a certain distance of the lemonade stand owner or his business or employees.</p>\n<p>Considering the nature of the business, we should also consider the age of the owner, as traditionally the average age of lemonade stand owners is such that the owner might not be above the age of criminal liability (that is, the law prevents the owner from being charged with a crime at all because he is two young.). Typically, in the U.S., the Age of Criminal Liability depends on the jurisdiction. North Carolina has the youngest age, which children 6 years old or older can be charged, and Massachusetts has the highest, with only children 12 years and older being liable for crimes. Federally, this age is 11 years old. 28 states have no statutory age of criminal liability, but this might mean case law in the state would provide an age. So depending on the age of the lemonade stand owner and the location of the state, the cops would be unable to affect an arrest. In this case, the cops would likely remand the owner to the custody of his legal guardian with a recommendation of some time in the time-out chair and/or loss of video game privileges (because that's the corrupting media influence these days, right?) at best.</p>\n", "score": 4 } ]

[ "assault", "harassment", "any-jurisdiction", "law-in-fiction", "hypothetical" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93798, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/england-and-wales\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;england-and-wales&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-england-and-wales-tooltip-container\">england-and-wales</a></p>\n<p>In England, the <a href=\"https://www.gov.uk/guidance/the-highway-code/general-rules-techniques-and-advice-for-all-drivers-and-riders-103-to-158#rule112\" rel=\"noreferrer\">use of a horn when stationary</a> is restricted solely to advise other road users of your presence &quot;<em>at times of danger</em>&quot;. Not spotting that the light has gone green would certainly <strong>not</strong> fit that description.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>Use of audible warning instruments</strong></p>\n<p>99.—(1) Subject to the following paragraphs, no person shall sound, or cause or permit to be sounded, any horn, gong, bell or siren fitted to or carried on a vehicle which is—</p>\n<p>(a) stationary on a road, at any time, other than at times of danger due to another moving vehicle on or near the road...</p>\n<p>_{<Sup><a href=\"https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1986/1078/regulation/99/made\" rel=\"noreferrer\">The Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986</a>}</Sup></p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>The policeman would be well within his rights and duties to provide you with a fixed penalty notice of £30.</p>\n", "score": 6 }, { "answer_id": 93801, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/germany\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;germany&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-germany-tooltip-container\">germany</a></p>\n<p>In Germany, the horn can only be used for two reasons:</p>\n<ul>\n<li>As a signal for overtaking <em>outside of city limits only</em>.</li>\n<li>As a warning signal for imminent danger.</li>\n</ul>\n<p>So, in the situation described in the question, it would be illegal to honk at the police officer, but the fact that they are a police officer is actually irrelevant – it would be illegal to honk in that situation, <em>period</em>.</p>\n", "score": 3 }, { "answer_id": 93827, "body": "<p><a href=\"/questions/tagged/france\" class=\"post-tag\" title=\"show questions tagged &#39;france&#39;\" aria-label=\"show questions tagged &#39;france&#39;\" rel=\"tag\" aria-labelledby=\"tag-france-tooltip-container\">france</a> : Yes, unless</p>\n<ul>\n<li>you are outside a city</li>\n<li>it is daytime</li>\n<li>you can convince the cop or the judge that doing so is a &quot;necessary warning for other road users&quot;. Not my specialty, but barring extraordinary circumstances, I expect that defense to fail.</li>\n</ul>\n<p><a href=\"https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/section_lc/LEGITEXT000006074228/LEGISCTA000006177132\" rel=\"nofollow noreferrer\">Code de la Route, articles R416-1 and R416-2</a>:</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Hors agglomération, l'usage des avertisseurs sonores n'est autorisé que pour donner les avertissements nécessaires aux autres usagers de la route.</p>\n<p>En agglomération, l'usage de l'avertisseur sonore n'est autorisé qu'en cas de danger immédiat.</p>\n<p>(...)</p>\n<p>De nuit, les avertissements doivent être donnés par l'allumage intermittent soit des feux de croisement, soit des feux de route, les signaux sonores ne devant être utilisés qu'en cas d'absolue nécessité.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Outside city limits, klaxon may be used solely to give necessary warning to other road users. <em>[For instance, when driving around a mountainous road, you are supposed to honk when approaching a curve without visibility, so as to warn drivers coming ahead.]</em></p>\n<p>Within city limits, klaxon may be used only in case of immediate danger.</p>\n<p>(...)</p>\n<p>At night, signals must be given by flashing headlights, klaxons must only be used in case of absolute necessity.</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Failing to respect those rules is a second-class contravention (currently set at €35). Technically, those apply to <em>any</em> vehicle, including bikes (even if bike klaxons are much less noisy than car klaxons).</p>\n<p>While <em>in theory</em> it is irrelevant whether there is a cop in the car in front, behind, or sideways of you... I imagine less than 0.1% of wrong klaxon uses are penalized, and all of those occur when a cop was on-site.</p>\n", "score": 2 } ]

[ "united-states", "police" ]

[ { "answer_id": 93794, "body": "<blockquote>\n<p>Could they get in any trouble if they just ignore this?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Generally, a gift is not complete until both the donor and the recipient consent to it. If someone purports to give crypto-currency to someone they have no relationship with, and the recipient does not accept the gift, the transaction is not completed and the recipient is not exposed to civil or criminal liability.</p>\n<p>A person who completely ignored a purported transfer of crypto-currency to them would not have taken acts sufficient to count as acceptance of the gift.</p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>Or if they spend those funds?</p>\n</blockquote>\n<p>Most sanctions and crimes require the person sanctioned to have some knowledge of the facts that make their actions crimes or subject to sanction.</p>\n<p>Ignorance of the law is no excuse, but if the person receiving a small amount of crypto-currency has no knowledge&lt;1&gt; of the facts that would make the transaction a prohibited transaction, this won't generally give rise to sanctions or criminal penalties.</p>\n<p>&lt;1&gt; Note that, in some circumstances, if there are facts that don't give you actual knowledge of the relevant facts that would let you know that conduct was illegal, but do alert you to the fact that the transaction is suspicious, if a further reasonable investigation of the facts would have revealed that the transaction was illegal, you have &quot;inquiry notice&quot; of the facts. When you have inquiry notice of the facts, you are treated as if you knew what you would have discovered if you'd follow up to investigate the suspicious circumstances.</p>\n<p>On the other hand, if someone received crypto-currency and spent it, and then didn't check the box on their tax return asking if they had engaged in any crypto-currency transactions, they would be guilty of intentionally filing an inaccurate tax return and could be sanctioned for that.</p>\n<p>Of course, if the person who received the funds was aware of the entire Tornado Cash situation and knew the facts that would make accepting it and spending it a prohibited transaction (before spending it), then they could be sanctioned.</p>\n", "score": 1 } ]

[ "united-states", "finance", "cryptocurrency", "sanctions" ]