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2. This appeal is against a judgment and order dated 15th December, 2020 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dismissing the application of the Appellant under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Cr.P.C.’). 3. As recorded in the judgment and order impugned, the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. had been filed for quashing of proceedings in Crime Case No.5973/2020 (State v. Rajan Kumar) under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the ‘I.P.C.’), Police Station Shahpur, District Gorakhpur pending in the Court of the Additional 2 Chief Judicial Magistrate, IIIrd District Gorakhpur and also to quash the charge sheet dated 18th January, 2020 and summoning order dated 26th June, 2020. The High Court has, in detail, recorded the arguments of the applicants which are very briefly summarised hereinbelow :- (i) The case lodged was false and baseless; (ii) Charge-Sheet had been submitted without proper investigation and evidence; (iii) No prima facie case was disclosed against the applicants. 4. It is the case of the Appellant that one Arjun Dev and his wife Bela Rani were recorded as Bhumidhar of Plot No. 971M area 918 Aire (hereinafter referred to as the ‘plot in question’) and that they had executed a registered Power of Attorney in favour of the Applicant No.1 Rajan Kumar, who has since died. 5. It is said that on the basis of the said Power of Attorney, the said Rajan Kumar (since deceased) executed sale deeds in favour of the Appellant and his family members on 16th July, 2014, 1st August, 2014, 6th August, 2014 and 23rd July, 2014, pursuant to which, the name of the Appellant and others were mutated in the Revenue records. 6. From the facts, as recorded in the judgment and order under appeal, it appears that during the mutation proceedings, one Smt. Beena Srivastava had filed objections before the Naib Tehsildar but the same were rejected and the property was duly mutated in favour of the Appellant and his family members by an order dated 28th February, 2015. 3 7. Smt. Beena Srivastava filed an Original Suit No. 971 of 2014 for cancellation of the Power of Attorney dated 4th June, 2014 and the sale deeds executed by Rajan Kumar (since deceased) in favour of the Appellant and his family members but that suit was dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by order dated 18th September, 2015. 8. The order dated 18th September, 2015 was challenged in First Appeal No.531 of 2015 before the High Court. That appeal was partly allowed by an order dated 26th November, 2015 with a direction on the Trial Court to return the plaint of the plaintiff for presentation before the appropriate Court. 9. Being aggrieved by the order of the High Court dated 26th November, 2015, Smt. Beena Srivastava, approached this Court by filing Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2848 of 2016 which had been dismissed by an order dated 8th September, 2016. From the judgment and order impugned, it appears that it had been submitted before the High Court that Chandra Prakash Srivastava and Smt. Beena Srivastava had also filed a Contempt Application No. 706 of 2016 which had been dismissed by an order dated 10th February, 2016. Before the High Court, it was submitted that when Beena Srivastava could not get any relief from the Trial Court right upto this Court, she filed a Writ Petition No. 12275 of 2016 which had also been dismissed by an order dated 28th March, 2016. The said Beena Srivastava’s son, Dr. Virat Swaroop Saxena also filed a contempt application which had been dismissed by an order dated 29th July, 2016. 4 10. Pursuant to the order dated 28th March, 2016 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No.12275/2016, the Appellant instituted Original Suit No.608 of 2016 in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Gorakhpur for permanent injunction in respect of the plots in question. It appears that by an order dated 12th April, 2016, temporary injunction had been granted in favour of the Appellant. This is recorded in the judgment and order under appeal. 11. It was the case of the applicants before the High Court, (including Rajan Kumar, since deceased), that having failed to get relief from the courts, Beena Srivastava brought in Ratnesh Mishra, Smt. Afroz Athar and Abdul Gani into the picture to harass the Appellant. We are not really concerned with these allegations for the purpose of this appeal. 12. Suffice it to mention that the judgment and order under appeal records the submission of the applicants that the Power of Attorney holder of Bela Rani, namely, Rajan Kumar (since deceased) had executed the sale deed dated 22nd June, 2017 in favour of the Applicant No.2 (that is, the Appellant before us) after receiving 5 the sale consideration. Later, a supplementary deed was executed on 16.09.2017. On the basis of Sale Deed dated 22nd June, 2017, the name of the Appellant was mutated in the records. Further details of what transpired are not recorded to avoid unnecessary prolixity. Suffice it to mention that the Respondent No.2 filed an FIR in this Court. The relevant extracts from the said FIR, lodged on 16th September, 2017 are reproduced hereinbelow for convenience :- “The applicant has purchased on 21.08.2017 one house with courtyard in which shops are also present from Smt. Afroz wife of Ghani Athar Resident of Moh. Basharpur, Gorakhpur and Virendra Kumar Abrol son of Ram Swarop Abrol Resident of Jail Road Shahpur currently residing at Raghav Nagar Deoria by way of registered Sale Deed in which one shop made by asbestos sheet and one residential Room with Gate at back side is constructed. ………………………. …………………….. …………………….. The said house with boundary wall & shop is registered in the name of Afroz Athar at the Municipal Corporation and she has been paying the applicable house Tax on the same and nobody had interfered in her possession. In the meanwhile, Afroz Athar was in dire need of money and proposed to sell the said Land and house to the applicant. The Applicant purchased the said House No. 239/B with the house and courtyard by way of Sale Deed and as a precautinary measure also got the signatures of the erstwhile owner Virendra Kumar Abrol on the Sale Deed so that no dispute remains in the future. In the meantime, one other person Rajan Kumar son of Late Ramswaroop 77 Geeta Vatika, Shahpur Gorakhpur currently residing at Ragav Nagar Deoria on the basis of a false Power of Attorney of Bela Rani executed a Sale Deed to Randheer Singh son of Late Shiv Shanker House No. 11C Divya Nagar Colony P.S Khorabar, Gorakhpur by connivance whereas Bela Rani had no right to sell the Afroz Athar’s House intact with Boundary wall. On the basis of the same False Sale Deed Randheer Singh and Rajan Kumar in association with the witnesses of the said sale deed Vishal Sharma son of Ram Chandra & Sunil Kumar son of Sh. Rajdev, who are Criminal natured persons, are attempting to trespass the house by breaking open the Lock and today night have also got written their name in my absence. When in the morning the applicant got the knowledge of the same he went to the police station to lodge First Information Report but due to their influence our report could not be lodged and for which the applicant is making this application before you. The above stated Randheer Singh and Rajan Kumar have done this to obtain 6 their benefit & have created a False document and by intention to cause loss to us & to forcibly grab my house and therefore for this reason it is necessary in the interest of justice to registered a case against them. Hence it is prayed that the case be registered ………….” 13. As pointed out by Mr. Sanjeev Agarwal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent No.2, the FIR was challenged in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The said writ petition was disposed of by order dated 5th October, 2017 with the following order: “It is contended that the dispute in respect of the property as to whether the petitioners have any right therein on the basis of conveyance deed executed by power of attorney holder or the first informant has the right is purely civil in nature and does not give rise to any criminal liability. Learned AGA and Sri Sudhanshu Pandey, appearing for complainant-respondent no. 3 opposed the petition. We have gone through the allegations contained in the impugned F.I.R., which, prima-facie, discloses commission of cognizable offence, as such, we are not inclined to interfere in the F.I.R. However, in view of the facts and the allegations made in the FIR, writ petition stands finally disposed of with the direction that the petitioners shall not be arrested in the aforesaid case crime number till submission of police report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. before the Court concerned, subject to their cooperation in the investigation, which will go on and shall be brought to a logical end.” 14. Mr. Agarwal, submitted that the order dated 5th October, 2017 of the High Court disposing of the Writ Petition (Criminal Miscellaneous) No.20919 of 2017 had not been challenged by the Appellants and had, thus, assumed finality. It was not open to the Appellant to reopen the same issues by filing an application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 7 15. The scope of interference by the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is wide as recorded by the High Court by the judgment and order impugned. The High Court itself has said that though inherent power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is very wide, it has to be exercised in exceptional cases. 16. There can be no doubt that the jurisdiction under Section 482 is not exercised for the asking, it is exercised with care in exceptional cases. The scope of interference with an FIR is much more restricted and ordinarily the Court does not interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when there is an alternative remedy available to the applicant. Furthermore, from the tenor of the order of the High Court rejecting the writ petition, it is patently clear that one of the reasons why the High Court did not intervene at that stage was that the Police report had also not been submitted. The Police report has since been submitted and the charge sheet has been filed. It is true that about 12-13 witnesses have been named. However, the said Bela Rani who executed the Power of Attorney has not even been cited as a witness. Apparently, the said Bela Rani was not even examined by the Investigating Authorities. 17. In this appeal, we are not concerned with the underlying civil disputes between the parties which are the subject matter of diverse civil proceedings which are pending between the Appellant and the private respondent in the concerned civil courts. All those civil suits will obviously be decided on their own merits. 8 18. The only question is whether there is any criminal offence disclosed in the FIR so far as the Appellant is concerned. When the High Court passed its order dated 5th October, 2017, Rajan Kumar (since deceased), the executant of the sale deed and the Power of Attorney holder was also an applicant before the Court. Today, there has been a change in situation, in that, criminal proceedings against Rajan Kumar have abated since Rajan Kumar is no longer alive. It is the case of the private respondent that the private respondent purchased property. In the meantime, Rajan Kumar, who is no longer alive, on the basis of a false Power of Attorney of Bela Rani, executed a sale deed in favour of Randheer Singh, i.e., the Appellant herein. There is only a vague averment “by connivance”. The next part of the sentence reads “Bela Rani had no right to sell the aforesaid plot.” 19. As recorded in the judgment and order, the property in question has even been mutated in the name of the Appellant. Of course, mutation records are not a document of title. Whether Bela Rani had title, whether she validly executed a power of attorney, whether any right has accrued to the Appellant, are matters for the civil court to adjudicate. 9 20. There is a further allegation that on the basis of the false sale deed, the Appellant and Rajan Kumar (since deceased) in association with the witnesses of the sale deed who are “criminal natured persons” were attempting to trespass the house by breaking open the lock and had got written their name in the absence of the complainant. 21. It is interesting that a charge sheet was filed, the relevant part whereof is extracted hereinbelow for convenience :- “16. Brief fact of the case : The case was successful on the basis of the plaintiff. Further, the investigation was transferred from police station Shahpur to the Crime Branch. The above investigation was done by me. So for during the investigation the statements of the witness and sec. 420, 467, 468, 471 of IPC has been registered against the accused. The accused is send to the court, punished the accused by summing.” 22. The charge sheet is totally vague. There is not even a whisper in the charge-sheet of what transpired from the investigation against the Appellant herein. 23. Even though an FIR need not contain every detail, an offence has to be made out in the FIR itself. It is the case of the Private Respondents that Bela Rani has no title. Bela Rani executed a false Power of Attorney in favour of Rajan Kumar (since deceased). Alternatively, the Power of Attorney, in itself, was a forged document. 10 24. A fraudulent, fabricated or forged deed could mean a deed which was not actually executed, but a deed which had fraudulently been manufactured by forging the signature of the ostensible executants. It is one thing to say that Bela Rani fraudulently executed a Power of Attorney authorising the sale of property knowing that she had no title to convey the property. It is another thing to say that the Power of Attorney itself was a forged, fraudulent, fabricated or manufactured one, meaning thereby that it had never been executed by Bela Rani. Her signature had been forged. It is impossible to fathom how the investigating authorities could even have been prima facie satisfied that the deed had been forged or fabricated or was fraudulent without even examining the apparent executant Bela Rani, who has not even been cited as a witness. 25. Ms. Deepika Kalia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, competently argued the matter and vehemently tried to persuade this Court not to intervene. She even sought time to produce further documents. However, the charge-sheet speaks for itself and there could be no question of improvement of the charge-sheet read with the FIR, either by adducing documents or by filing affidavit or by making oral submissions. 26. Mr. Chandra Prakash, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant cited certain judgments of this Court in <cite>Mohd. Ibrahim & Others v. State of Bihar [(2009) 8 SCC 751]</cite>; <cite>Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand [(2013) 11 SCC 673]</cite>; <cite>Uma Shankar Gopalika v. State of Bihar & Anr. [(2005) 10 SCC 336]</cite>; <cite>Vesa 11 Holdings Private Limited & Anr. v. State of Kerala & Ors. [(2015) 8 SCC 293]</cite>; <cite>Robert John D’Souza & Ors. v. Stephen V. Gomes & Anr. [(2015 (9) SCC 96]</cite>; and <cite>Kapil Agarwal & Ors. v. Sanjay Sharma & Ors. [(2021) 5 SCC 524]</cite>. 27. In <cite>Mohd. Ibrahim (supra)</cite>, this Court held as under :- “19. To constitute an offence under Section 420, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should have dishonestly induced the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or (i) (ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable security (or anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security). When a sale deed is executed conveying a property 20. claiming ownership thereto, it may be possible for the purchaser under such sale deed to allege that the vendor has cheated him by making a false representation of ownership and fraudulently induced him to part with the sale consideration. But in this case the complaint is not by the purchaser. On the other hand, the purchaser is made a co-accused. It is not the case of the complainant that any of the 21. accused tried to deceive him either by making a false or misleading representation or by any other action or omission, nor is it his case that they offered him any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce him to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. Nor did the complainant allege that the first appellant pretended to be the complainant while executing the sale deeds. Therefore, it cannot be said that the first accused by the act of executing sale deeds in favour of the second accused or the second accused by reason of being the purchaser, or the third, fourth and fifth accused, by reason of being the witness, scribe and stamp vendor in regard to the sale deeds, deceived the complainant in any manner. As the ingredients of cheating as stated in Section 415 22. are not found, it cannot be said that there was an offence punishable under Sections 417, 418, 419 or 420 of the Code. A clarification 12 23. When we say that execution of a sale deed by a person, purporting to convey a property which is not his, as his property, is not making a false document and therefore not forgery, we should not be understood as holding that such an act can never be a criminal offence. If a person sells a property knowing that it does not belong to him, and thereby defrauds the person who purchased the property, the person defrauded, that is, the purchaser, may complain that the vendor committed the fraudulent act of cheating. But a third party who is not the purchaser under the deed may not be able to make such complaint. 24. The term “fraud” is not defined in the Code. The dictionary definition of “fraud” is “deliberate deception, treachery or cheating intended to gain advantage”. Section 17 of the Contract Act, 1872 defines “fraud” with reference to a party to a contract. 27. “dishonestly” which is defined in Section 24 as follows: The term “fraudulently” is mostly used with the term “24. ‘Dishonestly’.—Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person is said to do that thing ‘dishonestly’.” 28 [Ed.: Para 28 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./149/2009 dated 6-10-2009.] . To “defraud” or do something fraudulently is not by itself made an offence under the Penal Code, but various acts when done fraudulently (or fraudulently and dishonestly) are made offences. These include: (i) Fraudulent removal or concealment of property (Sections 206, 421 and 424). (ii) Fraudulent claim to property to prevent seizure (Section 207). (iii) Fraudulent suffering or obtaining a decree (Sections 208 and 210). (iv) Fraudulent possession/delivery of counterfeit coin (Sections 239, 240, 242 and 243). (v) Fraudulent alteration/diminishing weight of coin (Sections 246 to 253). (vi) Fraudulent acts relating to stamps (Sections 255 to 261). (vii) Fraudulent false instrument/weight/measure (Sections 264 to 266). of use (viii) Cheating (Sections 415 to 420). (ix) Fraudulent prevention of debt being available to creditors (Section 422). 13 (x) Fraudulent execution of deed of transfer containing false statement of consideration (Section 423). (xi) Forgery making or executing a false document (Sections 463 to 471 and 474). (xii) Fraudulent cancellation/destruction of valuable security, etc. (Section 477). (xiii) Fraudulently going through marriage ceremony (Section 496). It follows therefore that by merely alleging or showing that a person acted fraudulently, it cannot be assumed that he committed an offence punishable under the Code or any other law, unless that fraudulent act is specified to be an offence under the Code or other law. Section 504 of the Penal Code 29. The allegations in the complaint do not also make out the ingredients of an offence under Section 504 of the Penal Code. Section 504 refers to intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace. The allegation of the complainant is that when he enquired with Accused 1 and 2 about the sale deeds, they asserted that they will obtain possession of land under the sale deeds and he can do whatever he wants. The statement attributed to Appellants 1 and 2, it cannot be said to amount to an “insult with intent to provoke breach of peace”. The statement attributed to the accused, even if it was true, was merely a statement referring to the consequence of execution of the sale deeds by the first appellant in favour of the second appellant. Conclusion 30. The averments in the complaint if assumed to be true, do not make out any offence under Sections 420, 467, 471 and 504 of the Code, but may technically show the ingredients of offences of wrongful restraint under Section 341 and causing hurt under Section 323 IPC.” 28. In <cite>Paramjeet Batra (supra)</cite>, this Court held that :- “12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends 14 upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.” 29. In <cite>Uma Shankar Gopalika (supra)</cite>, this Court found that the complaint, in that case, did not disclose any criminal offence at all, much less any offence under Section 420 or Section 120B IPC. The case was purely a civil dispute between the parties for which remedy lay before the civil Court. 30. In <cite>Vesa Holdings Private Limited (supra)</cite>, this Court held :- “13. It is true that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as also a criminal offence and only because a civil remedy may be available to the complainant that itself cannot be a ground to quash a criminal proceeding. The real test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose the criminal offence of cheating or not. In the present case there is nothing to show that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420 IPC. In our view the complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all. The criminal proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The superior courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of the court and the High Court committed an error in refusing to exercise the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the proceedings.” 31. In <cite>Robert John D’Souza (supra)</cite>, this Court held : “12. As far as the offence of cheating is concerned, the same is defined in Section 415 IPC, for which the punishment is provided under Section 420 IPC. Section 415 reads as under: 15 “415. Cheating.—Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to ‘cheat’. Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section. Illustrations ***” From the above language of the section, one of the essential ingredients for the offence of cheating is deception, but in the present case, from the contents of the complaint it nowhere reflects that the complainant was deceived or he or anyone else was induced to deliver the property by deception. What was done, was so reflected in the resolutions, and sale deeds. 13. In <cite>Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234]</cite> a three-Judge Bench of this Court has laid down the law as to quashment of proceedings under Section 482 CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 695, para 7) “7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.” 15. In <cite>Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal [(2007) 12 SCC 1 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 259]</cite> , this Court in paras 25 and 46 has observed as under: (SCC pp. 10-11 & 16) 16 “25. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2 All ER 401 (HL)] Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. <cite>Lord Salmon in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Humphrys [1977 AC 1 : (1976) 2 WLR 857 : (1976) 2 All ER 497 (HL)]</cite> stressed the importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the Judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that the court's power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved. ****** The court must ensure that criminal 46. prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.” 16. In view of the above discussion and the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that none of the offences for which the appellants are summoned, is made out from the complaint and material on record. We further find that it is nothing but abuse of process of law on the part of the complainant to implicate the appellants in a criminal case after a period of twelve years of execution of registered sale deeds in question, who is neither party to the sale deeds nor a member of the Society. Therefore, we allow the appeal and set aside the orders passed by the High Court and that of the courts below. Accordingly, the order passed by the Magistrate summoning the appellants in the criminal complaint filed by Respondent 1, in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 406, 409 and 420 IPC, also stands quashed.” 17 32. In <cite>Kapil Agarwal (supra)</cite>, this Court observed that Section 482 is designed to achieve the purpose of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted to generate into weapons of harassment. 33. In this case, it appears that criminal proceedings are being taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment against a purchaser. It is reiterated at the cost of repetition that the FIR does not disclose any offence so far as the Appellant is concerned. There is no whisper of how and in what manner, this Appellant is involved in any criminal offence and the charge sheet, the relevant part whereof has been extracted above, is absolutely vague. There can be no doubt that jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should be used sparingly for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses criminal offence or not depends on the nature of the allegation and whether the essential ingredients of a criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. There can be no doubt that a complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have 18 a criminal texture. The High Court has, however, to see whether the dispute of a civil nature has been given colour of criminal offence. In such a situation, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings as held by this Court in <cite>Paramjeet Batra (supra)</cite> extracted above. 34. The given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. Only because a civil remedy is available may not be a ground to quash criminal proceedings. But as observed above, in this case, no criminal offence has been made out in the FIR read with the Charge-Sheet so far as this Appellant is concerned. The other accused Rajan Kumar has died. 35. The appeal is, thus, allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside and the proceedings in Crime Case No.5973/2020 are quashed as against the Appellant. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 933 OF 2021 36. Leave granted. 37. The issues involved in this appeal are identical to the issues involved in Appeal No. 932 of 2021 disposed of earlier today. We may add that in this case, the Appellants are only witnesses to the sale deed and there is not a word anywhere in the FIR about these witnesses except the vague averment that they acted in collusion. 38. For the reasons discussed in Criminal Appeal No. 932 of 2021, this appeal is also allowed and Crime Case No.5973 of 2020 is set aside so far as these Appellants are concerned.

1. 2. The challenge in the present appeal is to an order passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital on 20.7.2020 whereby the petition filed by the appellant under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731 for quashing the charge-sheet as well as the summoning order dated 25.6.2020 was dismissed. The FIR No. 173 in question was lodged by the respondent No. 2 on 11.12.2019 at 23:24 hours in respect of an incident alleged to have occurred on 10.12.2019 at 10:00 hours against the appellants and others. The FIR was lodged for the offences under Sections 452, 1 For short, the ‘Code’ 1 504, 506 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) and 3(1)(e) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 19892. The said FIR, when translated, reads as under: “Respected SHO with respect of registering of FIR, the complainant is presently resident of Gram New Bajeti Patti Chandak Tehsil & District Pithoragarh. I am constructing my house on my Khet No. 6195, 6196 & 6199 but Banshilal, Pyarelal S/o Late Har Lal, Hitesh Verma S/o Sh. Pyarelal, Pawan Verma S/o Banshilal, Uma Verma w/o Pyarelal and their Nepali Domestic help Raju from past 6 months are not allowing the applicant to work on her fields. All the above persons used to abuse the applicant her husband and other family members and use to give death threats and use Caste coloured abuses. On 10.12.2019 at around 10 am, all these persons entered illegally in to four walls of her building and started hurling abuses on myself and my labourers and gave death threats and used castes’ remarks/abuses and took away the construction material such as Cement, Iron, Rod, Bricks. The Applicant is a Scheduled Caste and all of the above person uses castes’ remarks/abuses (used bad language) and said that you are persons of bad caste and that we will not let you live in this mohalla/vicinity. Respect Sir, the applicant and her family has threat to her life from such persons. Thus, it is requested that an FIR may be lodged against such persons and necessary action may be taken against them…..” 3. 4. Pursuant to the FIR filed by Respondent No. 2, Police filed a report disclosing offences under Sections 504, 506 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, cognizance for the same was taken by the Trial Court on 25.6.2020. It is the said order which was challenged along with the charge-sheet before the High Court, which was unsuccessful. On the other hand, on the basis of the statement of Mr. Pawan Verma, an FIR No. 174 at about 23:47 hours was lodged on 2 For short, “the Act”. 2 5. 11.12.2019 in respect of an occurrence which had taken place allegedly at 9:45 hours on 11.12.2019. A charge-sheet in the said matter has been submitted against respondent No. 2 and others. Thereafter, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pithoragarh had taken cognizance for the offences under Sections 323 and 354 IPC against respondent No. 2 and others on 2.7.2020. The Appellant invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court by way of a petition under Section 482 of the Code to challenge the charge- sheet and the order taking cognizance. The Appellant relied upon <cite>Gerige Pentaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.3</cite> wherein the allegation was of abusing the complainant in the name of their caste and this Court quashed the complaint. The attention of the High Court was drawn to another judgment reported as <cite>Ashabai Machindra Adhagale v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.4</cite> wherein this Court refused to quash the FIR on the ground that the caste of the accused was not mentioned in the first information report. The High Court found that both the abovementioned cases dealt with the same issue with regard to applicability of the provisions of the Act. It was observed by the High Court that the appellant had categorically admitted that the informant belonged to Scheduled Caste and that she and her labourers were abused. Therefore, the provisions of the Act were found to be applicable and accordingly, after investigation, charge-sheet has been submitted. The High Court dismissed the petition with the aforesaid findings. 3 4 (2008) 12 SCC 531 (2009) 3 SCC 789 3 6. 7. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the disputes relating to the property are pending before the Civil Court and that, the present FIR has been filed on patently false grounds by respondent No. 2 only to harass the appellant and to abuse the process of law. It is argued that the allegations levelled in the FIR and the subsequent report submitted by the Police after investigations does not disclose any offence under the Act. Furthermore, it is argued that the report neither discloses the caste of the informant nor the allegations are that they were made in public view. Also, the offending words are not purported to be made for the reason that the informant is a person belonging to Scheduled Caste. The learned counsel for the State on the contrary, submitted that during investigations, certain persons have supported the version of the informant. It is argued on behalf of respondent No. 2 that in fact the appellant and his family are encroacher on the informant’s land. Therefore, the appellant was rightly not granted any indulgence by the High Court. Against the backdrop of these facts, it is pertinent to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of enactment of the Act. It is provided as under: “Despite various measures to improve the socio- economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, they remain vulnerable. They are denied number of civil rights. They are subjected to 4 indignities, various offences, humiliations and harassment. They have, in several brutal incidents, been deprived of their life and property. Serious crimes are committed against them for various historical, social and economic reasons. 2. Because of the awareness created amongst the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes through spread of education, etc., they are trying to assert their rights and this is not being taken very kindly by the others. When they assert their rights and resist practices of untouchability against them or demand statutory minimum wages or refuse to do any bonded and forced labour, the vested interests try to cow them down and terrorise them. When the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes try to preserve their self- respect or honour of their women, they become irritants for the dominant and the mighty. Occupation and cultivation of even the Government allotted land by the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes is resented and more often these people become victims of attacks by the vested interests. Of late, there has bene an increase in the disturbing trend of commission of certain atrocities like making the Scheduled Caste persons eat inedible substances like human excreta and attacks on and mass killings of helpless Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and rape of women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Under the circumstances, the existing laws like the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and the normal provisions of the Indian Penal Code have been found to be inadequate to check these crimes. A special Legislation to check and deter crimes against them committed by non-Scheduled Castes and non-Scheduled Tribes has, therefore, become necessary.” 9. The long title of the Act is to prevent the commission of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, to provide for Special Courts and Exclusive Special Courts for the trial of such offences and for the relief and rehabilitation of the victims of such offences and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 5 10. The Act was enacted to improve the social economic conditions of the vulnerable sections of the society as they have been subjected to various offences such as indignities, humiliations and harassment. They have been deprived of life and property as well. The object of the Act is thus to punish the violators who inflict indignities, humiliations and harassment and commit the offence as defined under Section 3 of the Act. The Act is thus intended to punish the acts of the upper caste against the vulnerable section of the society for the reason that they belong to a particular community. 11. It may be stated that the charge-sheet filed is for an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The said section stands substituted by Act No. 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016. The substituted corresponding provision is Section 3(1)(r) which reads as under: “3(1)(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;” 12. 13. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act can be classified as “1) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and 2) in any place within public view”. The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act would indicate the ingredient of intentional insult and intimidation with an intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. 6 All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The object of the Act is to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes as they are denied number of civil rights. Thus, an offence under the Act would be made out when a member of the vulnerable section of the Society is subjected to indignities, humiliations and harassment. The assertion of title over the land by either of the parties is not due to either the indignities, humiliations or harassment. Every citizen has a right to avail their remedies in accordance with law. Therefore, if the appellant or his family members have invoked jurisdiction of the civil court, or that respondent No.2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the civil court, then the parties are availing their remedies in accordance with the procedure established by law. Such action is not for the reason that respondent No.2 is member of Scheduled Caste. 14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as <cite>Swaran Singh & Ors. v. State</cite> through Standing Counsel & Ors.5. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen 5 (2008) 8 SCC 435 7 by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view. The Court held as under: “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.” 15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within 8 public view” is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge-sheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh, it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet. 16. There is a dispute about the possession of the land which is the subject matter of civil dispute between the parties as per respondent No.2 herself. Due to dispute, appellant and others were not permitting respondent No.2 to cultivate the land for the last six months. Since the matter is regarding possession of property pending before the Civil Court, any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. 17. In another judgment reported as <cite>Khuman Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh6</cite>, this Court held that in a case for applicability of Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the fact that the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste would not be enough to inflict enhanced punishment. This Court held that there was nothing to suggest that the offence was committed by the appellant only because the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste. The Court held as under: 6 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1104 9 “15. As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Act. The offence must have been committed against the person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. In the present case, the fact that the deceased was belonging to “Khangar”-Scheduled Caste is not disputed. There is no evidence to show that the offence was committed only on the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.” 18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act is not made out. 19. This Court in a judgment reported as <cite>Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.7</cite> issued certain directions in respect of investigations required to be conducted under the Act. In a review filed by the Union against the said judgment, this Court in a judgment reported as <cite>Union of India v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.8</cite> reviewed the directions issued by this Court and held that if there is a false and unsubstantiated FIR, 7 8 (2018) 6 SCC 454 (2020) 4 SCC 761 10 the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code can be invoked. The Court held as under: “52. There is no presumption that the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes may misuse the provisions of law as a class and it is not resorted to by the members of the upper castes or the members of the elite class. For lodging a false report, it cannot be said that the caste of a person is the cause. It is due to the human failing and not due to the caste factor. Caste is not attributable to such an act. On the other hand, members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes due to backwardness hardly muster the courage to lodge even a first information report, much less, a false one. In case it is found to be false/unsubstantiated, it may be due to the faulty investigation or for other various reasons including human failings irrespective of caste factor. There may be certain cases which may be false that can be a ground for interference by the Court, but the law cannot be changed due to such misuse. In such a situation, it can be taken care of in proceeding under Section 482 CrPC.” 20. Later, while examining the constitutionality of the provisions of the Amending Act (Central Act No. 27 of 2018), this Court in a judgment reported as <cite>Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India & Ors.9</cite> held that proceedings can be quashed under Section 482 of the Code. It was held as under: “12. The Court can, in exceptional cases, exercise power under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the cases to prevent misuse of provisions on settled parameters, as already observed while deciding the review petitions. The legal position is clear, and no argument to the contrary has been raised.” 21. In Gerige Pentaiah, one of the arguments raised was non- disclosure of the caste of the accused but the facts were almost 9 (2020) 4 SCC 727 11 similar as there was civil dispute between parties pending and the allegation was that the accused has called abuses in the name of the caste of the victim. The High Court herein has misread the judgment of this Court in Ashabai Machindra Adhagale as it was not a case about the caste of the victim but the fact that the accused was belonging to upper caste was not mentioned in the FIR. The High Court of Bombay had quashed the proceedings for the reason that the caste of the accused was not mentioned in the FIR, therefore, the offence under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Act is not made out. In an appeal against the decision of the Bombay High Court, this Court held that this will be the matter of investigation as to whether the accused either belongs to or does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Therefore, the High Court erred in law to dismiss the quashing petition relying upon later larger Bench judgment. The appellant had sought quashing of the charge-sheet on the ground that the allegation does not make out an offence under the Act against the appellant merely because respondent No. 2 was a Scheduled Caste since the property dispute was not on account of the fact that respondent No. 2 was a Scheduled Caste. The property disputes between a vulnerable section of the society and a person of upper caste will not disclose any offence under the Act unless, the allegations are on account of the victim being a Scheduled Caste. Still further, the finding that the appellant was aware of the caste of the informant is wholly inconsequential as the 12 22. knowledge does not bar, any person to protect his rights by way of a procedure established by law. 23. This Court in a judgment reported as <cite>Ishwar Pratap Singh & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.10</cite> held that there is no prohibition under the law for quashing the charge-sheet in part. In a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court is required to examine as to whether its intervention is required for prevention of abuse of process of law or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Court held as under: “9. Having regard to the settled legal position on external interference in investigation and the specific facts of this case, we are of the view that the High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to secure the ends of justice. There is no prohibition under law for quashing a charge-sheet in part. A person may be accused of several offences under different penal statutes, as in the instant case. He could be aggrieved of prosecution only on a particular charge or charges, on any ground available to him in law. Under Section 482, all that the High Court is required to examine is whether its intervention is required for implementing orders under the Criminal Procedure Code or for prevention of abuse of process, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. A charge-sheet filed at the dictate of somebody other than the police would amount to abuse of the process of law and hence the High Court ought to have exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 to the extent of the abuse. There is no requirement that the charge-sheet has to be quashed as a whole and not in part. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. The supplementary report filed by the police, at the direction of the Commission, is quashed.” 24. In view of the above facts, we find that the charges against the appellant under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act are not made out. Consequently, the charge-sheet to that extent is quashed. The 10 (2018) 13 SCC 612 13 appeal is disposed of in the above terms. 25. The FIR in respect of other offences will be tried by the competent Court in accordance with law along with the criminal case11, though separately initiated, for the reason that it relates to interparty dispute and is in respect of same subject matter of property, despite of the fact that two different dates of the incident have been provided by the parties.

In the present appeals, the appellants have come to this Court, being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 6th February 2023, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna vide which the judgment and 1 order 17th February 2020 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissing the writ petitions filed by the respondents herein has been reversed. 3. These appeals arise out of the peculiar facts and circumstances. 4. The parties are referred to herein as they are referred to in the original writ petition being CWJC No. 22943 of 2018. 5. The erstwhile Bihar Intermediate Education Council (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Council’) had gone for computerization and in pursuance thereof, the N.I.C.T. Computering System Private Limited was engaged for computerization work on contract basis. 6. The original writ petitioners were initially taken on service by N.I.C.T. and sent to the said Council for computerization work. They continued to work for the Council as employees of the said N.I.C.T. from 1999 to 2005. 7. Since the writ petitioners were working for a period of almost six years, the Council requested the Government to create different posts in the Computer Section of the Council. Accordingly, 63 posts came to be sanctioned in different grades. In the meanwhile, the contract between N.I.C.T. and 2 the Council came to be terminated in the year 2005. However, the respondents, who were earlier employees of the N.I.C.T. came to be appointed against the sanctioned posts by the Chairman of the Council. 8. Subsequently, the Government of Bihar decided to amalgamate Bihar School Education Examination Board along with the said Council. Accordingly, the Bihar Intermediate Education Council (Repeal) Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the “said Act”) was enacted. As per the said Act, the Government of Bihar constituted a Committee of three Secretaries to formulate the scheme for regularization of the services of the employees, who were working in the said Council. 9. A scheme came to be framed for regularization under the Government Resolution dated 12th July 2012. It appears that, in terms of the said scheme, the services of the writ petitioners came to be terminated on 18th August 2017. Being aggrieved thereby, the writ petitioners filed the writ petition being CWJC No.12242 of 2017 before the High Court. The learned Single Judge, vide order dated 18th May 2018 partly allowed the writ petition and directed the State 3 Government to take a decision with regard to absorption of the services of the writ petitioners. Vide order dated 9th October 2018, the claim of the writ petitioners for regularization in service came to be rejected by the Education Department. Being aggrieved thereby, the CWJC No.22943 of 2018 was filed. The learned Single Judge, vide order dated 17th February 2020 dismissed the same. Being aggrieved thereby, a Letters Patent Appeal being No. 180 of 2021 was filed before the High Court by the original writ petitioners. The same was allowed by the Division Bench of the High Court. Hence, the present appeals. 10. We have heard Mr. Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents-employees (writ petitioners). 11. Shri Shyam Divan submits that the reasoning given by the Division Bench of the High Court is totally perfunctory. He submits that the learned Single Judge, by an elaborate well-reasoned order, found that the writ petitioners were not entitled for absorption. He further submits that as per the scheme, four conditions were required to be fulfilled and the 4 writ petitioners did not comply with the said conditions. Finding this, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. He submits that the Division Bench, however, on a ground that, the report of the Committee was signed by only one member and not all the three members, has erroneously reversed the well-reasoned order passed by the learned Single Judge. He further submits that the personal affidavit filed by the Additional Chief Secretary of the State Government dated 6th December 2022 would reveal that the report of the Committee was accepted by the Cabinet of the State of Bihar and as such, the reasoning that, the report was not signed by all the three officers, is totally without substance. 12. Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, on the contrary, submits that the writ petitioners have been continuously working from 1999 till 2017. He submits that the writ petitioners have continuously worked for a period of almost 18 years. He submits that all the writ petitioners complied with all the four conditions, as stipulated in the Scheme of 2012. He further submits that the learned Single Judge, in the first round of litigation, has also found that the writ petitioners 5 complied with all the four conditions. 13. In the peculiar facts and circumstances, we are not inclined to go into the legal issues. At the outset, we may say that we are not satisfied with the manner in which the Division Bench has dealt with the matter in the present litigation. When the Division Bench was considering the well-reasoned order passed by the learned Single Judge, the least that was expected of it was to give reasonings as to why it disagreed with the findings given by the learned Single Judge. 14. Insofar as the finding of the Division Bench that the report was not signed by three members is concerned, it ought to have taken into consideration that much water had flown subsequently, inasmuch as the affidavit of the Additional Chief Secretary dated 6th December 2022 would have shown that the report of the Committee was accepted by the State Government, which was fructified in the scheme dated 12th July 2012, which was published in the gazette notification. As such, the High Court, at the most could have examined the correctness of the scheme as notified in the gazette notification. It appears that the Division Bench 6 found an easy way to deal with the litigation. 15. In any case, if the directions as issued by the Division Bench are to be complied with, it will lead to more than one complications. The Division Bench has granted liberty to the State Government to again start the process and in the meantime directed the writ petitioners to be taken back to work. It has further directed honorary benefits to be calculated and disbursed for the intervening period. 16. We are of the considered view that if the order, as passed by the Division Bench, is permitted to continue, it will give rise to third round of litigation and would not provide any solace to the employees, who have been fighting for justice from 2017. 17. The facts as recorded hereinabove would clearly show that the writ petitioners have been working since 1999 continuously in the said Council, may be initially from 1999 to 2005 they were working as employees of N.I.C.T. However, undisputedly they were working for the Council. 18. Subsequently, on account of the posts being sanctioned by the State for the Council and the contract between the Council and N.I.C.T. being terminated, they were absorbed 7 on the posts so sanctioned by the State Government. Undisputedly, the appointment was issued by the Chairman of the said Council, who was the competent authority. 19. On account of subsequent fortuitous development i.e. the merger of the Council with the Board, the petitioners became surplus and a scheme was required to be evolved for their absorption/regularization. Finally, a scheme was finalized and notified in the Official Gazette on 12th July 2012. 20. Even after the scheme was notified in the year 2012, the writ petitioners were permitted to continue to work till 2017 and only in the year 2017, their services came to be terminated. 21. It could thus be seen that the writ petitioners have been continuously working since 1999 i.e. much before the judgment in the case of <cite>Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Uma Devi (3) and Others1</cite>, was delivered on 10th April 2006. 22. Uprooting the writ petitioners at this stage of life would have devastating effects on them as well as on their families. 1 (2006) 4 SCC 1 8 23. In that view of the matter, we find that, in the present case, taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and without this being treated as a precedent in any manner, a relief needs to be moulded so as to do complete justice. 24. We are, therefore, inclined to exercise our extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and directed thus: “The writ petitioners shall be absorbed on the posts on which they are appointed in the year 2005. They would be permitted to rejoin with effect from 1st May 2023. Though the writ petitioners would be entitled to continuity in service for all the purposes including retiral benefits, they would not be entitled for any backwages for the period during which they were out of employment.” 25. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. 9

There was delay of 2659 and 3017 days in preferring the special leave petitions. Since there was no satisfactory explanation for delay, the petitions were dismissed on the ground of limitation, which order is now subject matter of the instant review petition. We have gone through the grounds raised in the instant review petition and do not find any error apparent on record to justify interference. This review petition is, therefore, dismissed.

1 These proceedings have been initiated under Article 32 of the Constitution by a purchaser, seeking directions in respect of a real estate project called “Sushant Megapolis”, which is being developed by the fifth, sixth and seventh respondents. The reliefs which have been sought, while invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, as noted above, are in the following terms: “i. ii. …a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the Respondent No. 1 & 2 to cancel all the agreements with respondent no.5,6 & 7 and to ensure that all the projects in which money has been taken from the buyers their money is refunded or the same is constructed and handed over in a reasonable period of time; …a writ in the nature of Mandamus appointing a court receiver or form a committee headed by a retired judge of this Hon'ble Court along with other suitable persons from different fields to monitor / handle the projects of Respondent 6 & 7 in which money has been taken from the buyers; Iii. iv. v. vi. 2 …a writ of mandamus, or order or direction to conduct a detailed forensic audit for all the projects launched by respondent no. 5,6 & 7 in its project under the Flagship of "SUSHANT MEGAPOLIS"; …a writ in the nature of mandamus or order or direction to conduct investigation by the CBI-Central Bureau of Investigation of the large scale fraud and cheating done by the officers of respondent no. 1 together with officers and directors of respondent no. 5,6 & 7 as the state agency has completely failed in its duty to investigate the matter; …writ order or direction to direct all investigation agencies such as Serious Fraud Investigation Office, Enforcement Directorate and others to investigate the money siphoned off by the respondent no. 5, 6 & 7. …any other writ, order or direction in favour of the Petitioner and such similarly placed persons, as this Hon'ble court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.” 2 3 1 The above extract would indicate that the primary relief which has been sought is (i) cancellation of all the agreements; (ii) refund of moneys to purchasers; and in the alternative (iii) ensuring that the construction is carried out and that the premises are handed over within a reasonable period of time. Incidental to the above reliefs, the petitioner seeks the constitution of a Committee headed by a former Judge of this Court together with other persons to monitor and handle the projects of the developer in the present case. The petitioner also seeks a forensic audit, an investigation by CBI and by other authorities such as the Serious Fraud Investigation Office and Enforcement Directorate. Mr Manoj V George, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submits that, in another project of the developer which is being implemented at Lucknow, notice was issued on a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution (<cite>Pawan Kumar Kushwaha and Ors. v Lucknow Development Authority and Ors.1) on 20 November 2020 by a two-Judge Bench of this Court</cite> of which one of us was a member. On the above grounds, it has been submitted that it Writ Petition (Civil) No 1001 of 2020 3 would be appropriate for this Court to issue notice and tag the writ petition under Article 32 with the earlier proceedings. 4 On 7 January 2021, a three-Judge Bench of this Court [of which one of us was a member] has dealt with the maintainability of a petition under Article 32 in similar circumstances. In <cite>Shelly Lal v Union of India 2</cite>, this Court declined to entertain the petition. The order of the Court is extracted below: “ ORDER 1 A proposed construction project at NOIDA which did not take off from the drawing board has given rise to proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution by twenty five purchasers of commercial premises. Invoking the jurisdiction under Article 32, the petitioners 2 have sought, inter alia, the following directions: (i) A writ, order or direction to the respondents to protect the interests and investments of customers/buyers in the larger public interest; (ii) A writ, order or direction for the revival of the project failing which the amounts invested by the petitioners be returned with interest at the rate of 18% per annum; and (iii) A court-monitored probe. 3 Having considered the cause which has been espoused by the petitioners through their counsel, Mr Shikhil Suri, we are of the view that the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution would not be warranted in the facts of the present case. Essentially, the writ petition requires the Court to step 4 into the construction project and to ensure that it is duly completed. This would be beyond the remit and competence of the Court under Article 32. Managing a construction project is not within the jurisdiction of the court. 5. Several provisions of law confer statutory rights on purchasers of real estate and invest them with remedies enforceable at law. These include the Consumer Protection Act 1986, the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act 2016 and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016. Parliament has 2 Writ Petition (Civil) No 1390 of 2020 4 enacted a statutory regime to protect the rights of purchasers of real estate and created fora which are entrusted with decision making authority. 6. A decision of a public authority which is entrusted with a public duty is amenable to judicial review. But it is quite another hypothesis to postulate that the decision making authority should be taken over by the court. The latter is impermissible. It would be inappropriate for this Court to assume the jurisdiction to supervise the due completion of a construction project especially in facts such as those presented in the present case. This will inevitably draw the court into the day to day supervision of the project, including financing, permissions and execution – something which lies beyond the ken of judicial review and the competence of the court. The court must confine itself to its core competencies which consist in the adjudication of disputes amenable to the application of legal standards. We, consequently, leave it open to the petitioners to pursue the remedies available in law. [sic 7]The writ petition is disposed of, subject to the 5 aforesaid liberty. 6 [sic 8] Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.” 5 A definitive view on whether it would be appropriate for the Court to entertain a petition under Article 32 seeking prayers similar to those sought in the instant case has been taken in the above terms. The above reasons would ex facie apply to the facts of the present case. The reliefs which have been extracted earlier would involve the Court in an adjudicative process in determining whether (i) all the agreements should be cancelled; (ii) whether money which is paid by the home buyers should be refunded; or in the alternative (iii) whether judicial directions are necessary to ensure that the project is constructed and the premises are handed over within a reasonable time. The writ petition under Article 32 has been filed by a singular home buyer without seeking to represent the entire class of home buyers. The petition proceeds on the implicit assumption that the interest of all the buyers are identical. There is no basis to make such an assumption. All buyers may not seek a cancellation and refund of consideration. Apart from this aspect, the petitioner seeks other reliefs in aid of the primary relief, including the constitution of a Committee presided over by a 5 former Judge of this Court for the purpose of handling the projects of the developer where moneys have been taken from home buyers. Following the earlier view which has been taken on 7 January 2021, we are of the considered opinion that it would be inappropriate to entertain a petition under Article 32 for more than one reason. There are specific statutory provisions holding the field, including among them: (i) (ii) The Consumer Protection Act 19863 and its successor legislation; The Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act 20164; and (iii) The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 20165. Each of these statutory enactments has been made by Parliament with a specific purpose in view. The 1986 Act as well as the subsequent legislation contain provisions for representative consumer complaints. One or more home buyers can consequently seek relief to represent a common grievance for a whole class of purchasers of real estate. The RERA similarly contains specific provisions and remedies for dealing with the grievance of purchasers of real estate. The provisions of the IBC have specifically taken note of the difficulties which are faced by home buyers by providing for remedies within the fold of the statute. Entertaining a petition of this nature will involve the Court in virtually carrying out a day to day supervision of a building project. Appointing a Committee presided over by a former Judge of this Court would not resolve the problem because the Court will have nonetheless to supervise the Committee for the reliefs sought in the petition under Article 32. Insofar as the remedies of a “1986 Act” “RERA” “IBC” 6 7 8 3 4 5 6 criminal investigation are concerned, there is reason for this Court not to entertain a petition directly under Article 32 in the present set of facts. Adequate remedies are available in terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. The statutory procedures which are enunciated have to be invoked. Adequate provisions have been made in the statute to deal with the filing of a complaint and for investigation in accordance with law. Judicial intervention is provided at appropriate stages by competent courts in that regard. In <cite>Devendra Dwivedi v. Union of India and Ors.6, a three-Judge Bench</cite> of this Court [of which one of us was a member] held that, determining “whether recourse to the jurisdiction under Article 32 be entertained in a particular case is a matter for the calibrated exercise of judicial discretion.” It was further held that this remedy cannot be used as a ruse to flood this Court with petitions that must be filed before the competent authorities set up pursuant to the appropriate statutory framework. In view of the statutory framework, both in terms of civil and criminal law and procedure, we are of the view that entertaining a petition under Article 32 would be inappropriate. The Court has no reason to doubt the genuineness of the grievance which has been espoused by the petitioner. However, the issue is whether his recourse to Article 32 is the correct remedy when alternative modalities are available and particularly since the engagement of the Court in a petition of this nature would involve a supervision which does not lie within the province of judicial review. Real estate projects across the country may be facing difficulties. The intervention of the Court cannot be confined to one or a few selected projects. Judicial time is a precious resource which needs to be zealously guarded. We have to always be mindful of the opportunity cost involved in exercising our discretion to admit a petition and to intervene, in terms of diversion of time and resources away from other matters where our intervention would be more apposite and necessary. In certain cases 6 Writ Petition (Criminal) 272 of 2020 in the past, this court has intervened on behalf of home buyers. These include : 7 (i) (ii) Projects of <cite>Amrapali Group (Bikram Chatterji v Union of India7)</cite>; and Unitech matter (<cite>Bhupinder Singh v Unitech Ltd8</cite>). Nothing contained in the present judgment will affect those proceedings or similar cases which have been monitored. In the present case, there is no reason to assume that the petitioner represents a class, apart from the other reasons set out earlier for declining intervention. Hence, on a considered view and for the reasons we have indicated above, we decline to entertain the petition under Article 32. However, in terms of the order dated 7 January 2021, we clarify that this will not come in the way of the petitioner espousing the remedies which are available to him under the relevant statutory provisions. 9 Subject to the aforesaid clarification, the petition shall stand disposed of. The petition is disposed of in terms of the signed reportable judgment. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

1 On 22 February 2023, the Council of Ministers of the Government of Punjab recommended the summoning of the Budget Session of the Sixteenth Punjab Vidhan Sabha on 3 March 2023 under Article 174(1) of the Constitution. 2 On 23 February 2023, the Governor of Punjab addressed a communication to the Chief Minister of the State. The subject of the letter was: WP(C) 302/2023 3 4 2 “Cabinet decision on summoning of the house of the legislature of the State on 3rd March 2023.” The letter of the Governor refers to a prior exchange of correspondence between the Governor and the Chief Minister; the Governor having addressed an earlier communication of 13 February 2023 to which the Chief Minister had responded through a letter dated 14 February 2023 and a ’tweet’ of the same date. In his communication of 13 February 2023 to the Chief Minister, the Governor highlighted his concern on certain specific issues, namely: (i) The basis on which Principals were selected for being sent to Singapore for training; and (ii) The appointment of the Chairman of the Punjab Information and Communication Technology Corporation Limited. The Governor noted that while the Chief Minister had 5 in his previous correspondence underscored the mandate with which he has assumed the office of Chief Minister, in terms of Article 167 of the Constitution, the Chief Minister is bound to furnish full details and information sought by the Governor. 6 Besides the above two issues, the Governor sought a clarification on the following matters: “(a) About two lacs Scheduled Castes students were compelled 3 to discontinue their studies due to non disbursal of scholarship by the Government. (letter No.Spl.Secy.Gov/2022/95 dated 21-07-2022). To remove the illegally appointed Vice Chancellor of PAU vide letter No.5/1/2021-PRB-PAU-2G/6904 dated 23-11-22. Inspite of my detailed letter dated 14-12-2022 you chose to ignore all misdeeds of Sh. Kuldeep Singh Chahal, IPS. You have not only promoted him but also posted him as Commissioner of Jalandhar and that too the orders being issued just before 26th January, knowing very well that Governor is to unfurl the national flag at Jalandhar. I had to instruct the DGP that concerned officer should maintain distance during ceremony. On this issue it seems that this officer was your blue eyed boy and you chose to ignore facts that were brought to your notice by this office. (d) Vide letter dated 4-1-2023 I wrote about the presence of Sh. Naval Aggarwal in meetings of senior officers, where sensitive and confidential matters of security of the country are discussed. I have not received any reply till date. (e) My letters asking for details of advertisements where you were asked for complete details, is also perhaps lying in cold storage.” WP(C) 302/2023 (b) (c) 7 8 Responding to the above communication, the Chief Minister (@ Bhagwant Mann) issued a tweet in the following terms: “Hon’ble Governor Sir, your letter was received through the media..all the subjects mentioned in the letter are all state subjects...I and my government are accountable to 3 crore Punjabis according to the Constitution and not to any Governor appointed by the Central Government. Consider this as my reply.” This was followed by another communication of the Chief Minister dated 14 February 2023, in which he stated thus: WP(C) 302/2023 9 4 “DO No.CMO/CONFI-2023/132 Dated:14.02.2023 Honorable Governor Sahib, I have received your letter No.Spl.Secy.Gov/2023/34 dated 13th February, 2023. All the subjects mentioned in your letter are the subjects of the state government. In this regard, I would like to clarify that according to the Indian Constitution, I and my government are answerable to 3 crore Punjabis. You have asked me, on what basis the principals are selected for training in Singapore. The people of Punjab want to ask, on what basis are the Governors in different states elected by the Central Government in the absence of any specific qualification in the Indian Constitution? Please increase the knowledge of Punjabis by telling this.” In the backdrop of the aforesaid communication by the Chief Minister and his tweet, the Governor while responding to the request of the Cabinet for summoning the Budget Session of the Vidhan Sabha from 3 March 2023 stated that: “ Since your tweet and letter, both are not only patently unconstitutional but extremely derogatory also, therefore, I am compelled to take legal advice on this issue. Only after getting legal advice, I will take decision on your request”. 10 The inaction of the Governor in summoning the Assembly for the Budget Session has led to the invocation of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution by the State of Punjab. WP(C) 302/2023 5 11 The Government of Punjab seeks (a) a declaration that the Governor of Punjab is duty bound to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in matters of summoning or proroguing of the Vidhan Sabha of the State of Punjab; (b) a writ of certiorari quashing the communication of the Governor dated 23 February 2023 stating that a decision on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers for summoning the Vidhan Sabha for its Budget Session would be taken only after obtaining legal advice; and (c) a direction to the Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab to facilitate the issuance of appropriate orders for summoning the Legislative Assembly for its Budget Session at 10 am on 3 March 2023. 12 Since the date for the convening of the Budget Session is barely three days away, the petition was mentioned for urgent orders, on which it was directed to be listed at 3.50 pm today. 13 Dr Abhishek Manu Singhvi, senior counsel has appeared on behalf of the petitioner. Mr Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India appears on behalf of the first respondent. Mr Ajay Pal, counsel has appeared for the second respondent. 14 At the outset, the Solicitor General has placed on the record an order dated 28 February 2023 of the Governor of Punjab. For convenience of reference, the order is extracted below: “In exercise of the powers conferred upon me by virtue of WP(C) 302/2023 6 Clause(1) of Article 174 of the Constitution of India, I, Banwarilal Purohit, Governor of Punjab, hereby summon the Sixteenth Vidhan Sabha of the State of Punjab to meet for its Fourth (Budget) Session at 10.00 am on Friday, the 3rd March 2023 in the Punjab Vidhan Sabha Hall, Vidhan Bhavan, Chandigarh.” 15 In terms of the above order, the Governor of Punjab has summoned the Sixteenth Vidhan Sabha of the State of Punjab to meet for its Fourth (Budget) Session at 10 am on 3 March 2023. 16 With the issuance of the above order by the Governor, the reliefs which have been sought in the petition have been substantially fulfilled. However, before disposing of the petition, there are certain facets which must be highlighted by this Court in the exercise of its constitutional duty. 17 The institution of these proceedings has its genesis in the communications issued by the Governor for the disclosure of information by the State government. Article 167 of the Constitution enunciates the duty of the Chief Minister to furnish information to the Governor. The provision is in the following terms: “167. Duties of Chief Minister as respects the furnishing of information to Governor, etc– It shall be the duty of the Chief Minister of each State– (a) to communicate to the Governor of the State all decisions of the Council of Ministers relating to the administration of the affairs of the State and proposals for legislation; (b) to furnish such information relating to the administration of the WP(C) 302/2023 7 affairs of the State and proposals for legislation as the Governor may call for; and if the Governor so requires, to submit for the consideration of the Council of Ministers any matter on which a decision has been taken by a Minister but which has not been considered by the Council.” (c) 18 19 The Chief Minister has the duty to communicate to the Governor all decisions of the Council of Ministers relating to the administration of the affairs of the State and proposals for legislation. Going beyond the duty to communicate, the Chief Minister has a duty to furnish such information relating to the administration of the affairs of the State and proposals for legislation as the Governor may require. Moreover, if the Governor so requires, the Chief Minister is duty bound to submit for consideration to the Council of Ministers any matter on which the decision is taken by a Minister which has not been considered by the Council of Ministers. The power of the Governor to seek information under Article 167 must be read holistically with reference to their duties as constitutional head under the Constitution. The information that the Governor seeks under Article 167 would enable them to effectively discharge their duties. To illustrate, the Governor has the power to direct reconsideration of bills that are passed in the assembly. For the Governor to make this decision, it is necessary that all the relevant information that would aid them in making the said decision must be made available. Similarly, the governor requires all relevant information to identify if a decision has been taken by a Minister individually without the consideration of the council. The WP(C) 302/2023 8 Governor might be unable to discharge their duty under Article 167(c) if the Chief Minister does not discharge their duty under Article 167(a) and Article 167 (b) by providing the Governor with relevant information as requested. Thus, the Chief Minister is required to discharge their duties under Article 167 to enable the Governor to effectively discharge their duties stipulated in the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were prescient in incorporating the above provisions. They ensure that while on the one hand the administration of the State is entrusted to a democratically elected Chief Minister who heads the Council of Ministers, which in turn, owes collective responsibility to the state legislature, the Governor as a constitutional authority appointed by the President is entrusted with the duty to ensure a just, fair, and honest administration. In this context, it is important to refer to the speech of Dr. BR Ambedkar on Article 167 (draft Article 147) in the Constitution Assembly:1 “A distinction has been made between the functions of the Governor and the duties which the Governor has to perform. My submission is that although the Governor has no functions still, even the constitutional Governor, that he is, has certain duties to perform. His duties, according to me, may be classified in two parts. One is, that he has to retain the Ministry in office. Because the Ministry is to hold office during his pleasure, he has to see whether and when he should exercise his pleasure against the Ministry. The second duty which the Governor has, and must have, is to advise the Ministry, to warn the Ministry, to suggest to the Ministry an alternative and to ask for a reconsideration. I do not think that anybody in this House will question the fact that the Governor should have this duty cast upon him; otherwise, he would be an absolutely unnecessary functionary: no good at all: He is the representative not of a party, he is representative of the people as 1 Dr BR Ambedkar in response to Biswanath Das, Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Proceedings)- Volume VIII (2 June 1949) WP(C) 302/2023 20 9 a whole of the State. It is in the name of the people that he carries on the administration. He must see that the administration is carried on a level which may be regarded as good, efficient, honest administration. Therefore, having regard to these two duties which the Governor has namely, to see that the administration is kept pure, without corruption, impartial, and that the proposals enunciated by the Ministry are not contrary to the wishes of the people, and therefore to advise them, warn them and ask them to reconsider-I ask the House, how is the Governor in a position to carry out his duties unless he has before him certain information? I submit that he cannot discharge the constitutional functions of a Governor which I have just referred to unless he is in a position to obtain the information.” The power to summon, prorogue and dissolve the legislative assembly is enshrined in Article 174 of the Constitution which is extracted below: “174. Sessions of the State Legislature, prorogation and dissolution.– (1) The Governor shall form time to time summon the House or each House of the Legislature of the State to meet at such time and place as he thinks fit, but six months shall not intervene between its last sitting in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next session. (2) The Governor may from time to time– (a) prorogue the House or either House; (b) dissolve the Legislative Assembly.” 21 The decision of a seven-Judge Constitution Bench in <cite>Shamsher Singh vs State of Punjab2</cite> has laid down that the Governor is a constitutional or formal Head of the State and exercises powers and functions on the aid and advice of the Council 2 (1974) 2 SCC 831 WP(C) 302/2023 10 of Ministers. The relevant extracts from the decision make the position of law clear: “28. Under the Cabinet system of Government as embodied in our Constitution the Governor is the constitutional or formal head of the State and he exercises all his powers and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers save in spheres where the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to exercise his functions in his discretion. 32. It is a fundamental principle of English Constitutional law that Ministers must accept responsibility for every executive act. In England the Sovereign never acts on his own responsibility. The power of the Sovereign is conditioned by the practical rule that the Crown must find advisers to bear responsibility for his action. Those advisers must have the confidence of the House of Commons. This rule of English Constitutional law is incorporated in our Constitution. The Indian Constitution envisages a Parliamentary and responsible form of Government at the Centre and in the States and not a Presidential form of Government. The powers of the Governor as the constitutional head are not different. 142. The extraordinary powers of legislation by ordinances, dispensing with enquiries against public servants before dismissal, declaration of emergency and imposition of President's rule by proclamation upon States, are vast powers of profound the power of summoning and significance. proroguing and dissolving the House of the People and returning Bills passed by the Parliament belongs to him. If only we expand the ratio of Sardari Lal and Jayantilal to every function which the various articles of the Constitution confer on the President or the Governor, Parliamentary democracy will become a dope and national elections a numerical exercise in expensive futility. We will be compelled to hold that there are two parallel authorities exercising powers of governance of the country, as in the dyarchy days, except that Whitehall is substituted by Rashtrapati Bhavan and Raj Bhavan. The Cabinet will shrink at Union and State levels in political and administrative authority and, having solemn regard to the gamut of his powers and responsibilities, the Head of State will be reincarnation of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, untroubled by even the British Parliament — a little taller in power than the American President. Such a distortion, by interpretation, it Indeed, even WP(C) 302/2023 11 appears to us, would virtually amount to a subversion of the structure, substance and vitality of our Republic, particularly when we remember that Governors are but appointed functionaries and the President himself is elected on a limited indirect basis. As we have already indicated, the overwhelming catena of authorities of this Court have established over the decades that the cabinet form of Government and the Parliamentary system have been adopted in India and the contrary concept must be rejected as incredibly allergic to our political genius, constitutional creed and culture.” (emphasis supplied) 22 This position was reiterated by a Constitution Bench in <cite>Nabam Rebia v. Dy. Speaker, Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly3</cite>. In view of the constitutional provision and the judgments of this Court, there can be no manner of doubt that the authority which is entrusted to the Governor to summon the House or each House of the Legislature of the State is to be exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Minsters. This is not a constitutional arena in which the Governor is entitled to exercise his own discretion. In the present case, the Governor was not summoning the House for the first time following a general election, but was advised by the Council of Ministers to convene the Budget Session, at the behest of a government which has been duly elected in the general election. Plainly, the Governor was duty bound to do so. 23 While responding to the request by the Council of Ministers for summoning the House, the communication of the Governor dated 23 February 2023 referred to the Cabinet decision. However, the Governor also referred to the tweet of the 3 (2016) 8 SCC 1 WP(C) 302/2023 12 Chief Minister and to his letter dated 14 February 2023 and then proceeded to state that since both the tweet and the letter were “patently unconstitutional” and “extremely derogatory”, he was compelled to take legal advice “on this issue” and that he would decide on the request thereafter. There was no occasion to seek legal advice on whether or not the Budget Session of the Legislative Assembly should be convened. The Governor was plainly bound by the advice tendered to him by the Council of Ministers. 24 Having said this, it would also be necessary to underscore that both the Chief Minister and the Governor are constitutional functionaries who have specified roles and obligations earmarked by the Constitution. The Governor has a right to seek information from the Chief Minister in terms of Article 167(b) on matters relating to the administration of the affairs of the State and proposals for legislation. Once such information is sought, the Chief Minister is duty bound to furnish it. The tone and tenor of the tweet and the letter by the Chief Minister leave much to be desired. Not furnishing the information which was sought by the Governor would be plainly in dereliction of the constitutional duty which is imposed on the Chief Minister in terms of Article 167(b). Yet on the other hand, WP(C) 302/2023 13 the dereliction of the Chief Minister to do so would not furnish a justification for the Governor not to comply with the constitutional obligation to summon the House for its Budget Session in terms of the advice which was tendered by the Council of Ministers. It was after the institution of the petition under Article 32 that the Assembly was summoned. 25 The genesis of the controversy has required the intervention of this Court at two distinct levels: first, to ensure that the constitutional duty of the Governor to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers to summon the Legislative Assembly is fulfilled without delay or demur; and second, to ensure that the obligation of the Chief Minister to furnish information to the Governor in terms of Article 167(b) of the Constitution is fulfilled. There are two equally important aspects for the functioning of a parliamentary democracy. First, the failure of a constitutional authority to fulfill its obligation under a distinct provision of the Constitution does not furnish a justification to another to decline to fulfill its own constitutional obligation. Second, while this Court is cognizant of the importance of free speech and expression and the fundamental value embodied in Article 19(1)(a), it becomes necessary to emphasize that constitutional discourse has to be conducted with a sense of decorum and mature statesmanship. 26 Political differences in a democratic polity have to be worked upon and sorted out with a sense of sobriety and maturity. The dialogue between constitutional functionaries cannot degenerate into a race to the bottom. Unless these principles were to be borne in mind, the realization of constitutional values may WP(C) 302/2023 14 be placed in jeopardy. Such a situation emerged before this Court, leading to the institution of a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution for a direction to the Governor to summon the Legislative Assembly. It is inconceivable that the Budget Session of the Legislative Assembly would not be convened. We can only hope that mature constitutional statesmanship will ensure that such instances do not occur in the future as much as we reiterate our expectation that constitutional functionaries must be cognizant of the public trust in the offices which they occupy. The public trust which is entrusted to them is intended to sub-serve the cause of our citizens and to ensure that the affairs of the nation are conducted with a sense of equanimity so as to accomplish the objects of the Preamble to the Constitution. 27 With these observations, the Petition shall stand disposed of. 28 Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

1. 2. The appellants approached the High Court seeking freedom fighters' pension. The High Court declined the prayer of the appellants. Hence, these appeals. A few similarly situated persons had approached 3. this Court leading to the order dated 25th November, 2013 in Civil Appeal Nos. 10624-10636 of 2013. The Judgment reads as follows :- “1. Leave granted. 2. The appellants, in this batch of appeals, are calling in question the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in Writ Petition No. 2106/2008, WP No. 2107/2008, WP No. 2112/2008, WP No. 2123/2008, WP No. 2144/2008, WP No. 2146/2008, WP No. 2147/2008, WP No. 2148/2008, WP No. 2152/2008, WP No. 2153/2008, WP No. 2156/2008, WP No. 2164/2008, WP No. 2165/2008 dated 14.10.2011. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has affirmed the orders passed 3 by the State Government cancelling the pensionary benefits granted to the appellants, presumably by relying on the report of Justice Palkar Commission. 3. In the appeals so filed, it is specifically averred by the appellants that they are all senior citizens. They also submit that at this ripe age, if they are deprived of the pensionary benefits, they would not be in a position to eke out of their livelihood. They also submit that the freedom fighters pensionary benefit so granted by the State Government ought not to have been withdrawn by passing the order/(s) on subsequent dates. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the State of Maharashtra submits that since the appellants had obtained the freedom fighters pension by producing forged documents, they are not entitled for grant of any pensionary benefits and, therefore, the State Government was justified in withdrawing the pensionary benefits so granted to them earlier. 5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties to the lis. 4 6. In our opinion, keeping in view the age of the appellants and also keeping in view the fact that at this old age, if small benefit that was already granted to them is withdrawn, it may be difficult for them to sustain themselves. In that view of the matter, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court requires to be set aside. 7. Accordingly, we allow these appeals and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. We further direct that the pensionary benefits granted by the State Government will enure only to the benefit of the appellants and not to their legal heirs/representatives. After the bereavement of the appellant(s), the pensionary benefit so granted by the State Government will come to an end. 8. Since we have decided these appeals purely on facts and circumstances of each case, we clarify that this Judgment shall not be treated as a precedent in any other case. 5 9. We quantify the arrears from the date of cancellation of the pensionary benefits till date at Rs.3,000/- each payable to the appellants within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this Court's order. No order as to costs.” 4. Having gone through the pleadings, we are of the view that in the peculiar facts of the case, in the interest of justice and for doing complete justice, a similar treatment is to be meted out to the appellants herein also. Accordingly, these appeals are disposed of in terms of the order as extracted above, making it further clear that the same may not be treated as a precedent. The civil appeals are disposed of in terms of the signed non-reportable Judgment. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand disposed of.

The question involved in the present matter is whether possession of land   has   been   taken   after   passing   of   award   on   21.7.2003   in   land acquisition proceedings initiated vide Notification dated 24.8.2000 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for acquisition of land measuring   189.93   acres   for   the   development   and   utilisation   of   land   for residential, commercial and institutional area in Sector 57 of Gurgaon inter alia  at   village   Tigra.     On   the   date   of   passing   of   award,   according   to appellants,   possession   had   been   obtained   and   handed   over   to   the representative of Haryana Urban Development Authority (for short, ‘HUDA’) vide Rapat No.583.  The compensation has admittedly been collected by the respondent vide cheque no.191045 dated 31.7.2003. 3. The respondent herein filed a writ petition in the year 2015 in the 2 High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh.   He has set up the case that he owned the land measuring two Kanal.  The same was acquired by the issuance of Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the award was also passed. Compensation has been obtained. However, the acquisition has lapsed as per provisions contained in Section 24(2)   of   the   Right   of   Fair   Compensation   and   Transparency   in   Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, ‘the Act of 2013’),   as   the   possession   has   not   been   taken.     He   has   constructed residential houses and shops. 4. The High Court by the impugned judgment and order has held that the two constructed rooms existed admeasuring 15’x12’ and 18’x12’ with boundary   wall   in   Khasra   No.16//23/1/2(2­0).     Though   the   State   has claimed   that   the   possession   had   been   taken,   there   is   no   proof   that  the respondent was physically dispossessed.   The Act of 2013 has come into force on 1.1.2014.  The State may, if needed, acquire the property again for a   public   purpose.     The   development   has   not   been   undertaken   so   far. Owners of such land/property are entitled to compensation under the Act of 2013.  Direction has been issued to Land Acquisition Collector, Gurgaon to determine the total amount to be refunded by the respondent within one month.  Aggrieved by the same, the appeal has been preferred by the State of Haryana.   5. Dr. Monika Gosain, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that possession had been taken.  She has attracted the attention 3 of this Court to the Rapat dated 21.7.2003.  She has further submitted that in several decisions, this Court has held that mode of taking possession is by way of drawing of  panchnama  on the spot.   Admittedly, compensation has been paid to the respondent in the year 2003 itself.  The acquisition has attained finality and encroachment made thereafter is not going to help the respondent. 6. Mr.   Siddharth   Mittal   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   respondent has submitted that there were two rooms in existence, of which possession has not been taken following the law. Paper possession cannot tantamount to taking physical possession.   The physical possession remains with the respondent. As such as mandated by  the provisions contained in Section 24(2)   of   the   Act   of   2013,   the   acquisition   has   lapsed.     He   has   further submitted that ‘the Policy for Return of Un­utilized Land’ has been framed under the provisions of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land  Acquisition, Rehabilitation  and Resettlement (Haryana Amendment) Act, 2017 and notified on 14.9.2018, by the State Government.  He has also submitted that on two sides of land in question in the case of similarly situated   landowners,   the   State   Government   has   already   passed   release orders   on   30.10.2006   and   21.2.2014.     The   respondent   cannot   be discriminated with.  He has also attracted the attention of this Court to the photographs (Annexure R­6) and the site plan (Annexure R­5). 7. The  first  question  to  be  examined   is   whether  possession   had  been taken over by the State Government and handed over to HUDA.  Rapat of 4 possession dated 21.7.2003, clearly shows that possession of total 172.52 acres has been taken over in the presence of landowners and interested persons   by   offering   compensation.     The   award   was   also   announced, possession   was   taken   by   the   Land   Acquisition   Collector,   Urban   Estates, Gurgaon by walking around the land and marking land using Kassi.  Shri Om   Prakash   Kanungo,   Representative   of   Estate   Officer,   Gurgaon   was handed over the possession of the same and the possession was handed over to HUDA.  A watchman was also posted to look after the land and the announcement was also made of taking possession by beating drums.  The panchnama was signed by the Land Acquisition Collector, Watchman, and the concerned Patwari.   8. The   drawing   of  panchnama  of   taking   over   of   possession   is   not disputed.   However,   it   was   submitted   that   since   there   were   two   rooms, possession could not have been taken over in the manner in which it is stated in the aforesaid panchnama. 9. It is a settled proposition of law that when the State acquires the large tract of land and draws the  panchnama  of taking possession, the same is enough for taking possession of the land.  In the instant case not only the panchnama  had been drawn, State has taken the possession by marking the land and a watchman was also posted to look after the land. 10. In  <cite>Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat,  (1976) 1 SCC 700</cite>, it has   been   opined   that   the   act   of   Tahsildar   in   going   to   the   spot   and inspecting   the   land   was   sufficient   to   constitute   a   taking   of   possession. 5 Therefore, it was not open to withdraw the land acquired under Section 48(1) of the Act.  The Court observed: “28. We agree with the conclusion reached by our brother Untwalia, J., as also with the reasoning on which the conclusion is based. But we are writing a separate judgment as we feel that the discussion in the   judgment   of   our   learned   Brother   Untwalia,   J.,   in   regard   to delivery of ‘symbolical’ and ‘actual’ possession under Rules 35, 36, 95   and   96   of   Order   21of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   is   not necessary for the disposal of the present appeals and we do not wish to subscribe to what has been said by our learned Brother Untwalia, J., in that connection, nor do we wish to express our assent with the discussion of the various authorities made by him in his judgment. We think it is enough to state that when the Government proceeds to   take   possession   of   the   land   acquired   by   it   under   the   Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it must take actual possession of the land since all interests in the land are sought to be acquired by it. There can be no question of taking ‘symbolical’ possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor  would  possession  merely  on   paper  be  enough.   What  the  Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land in the Government   is   the   taking   of   actual   possession   of   the   land.   How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature of the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of the land admits of. There can be no hard and fast rule laying down what act would be sufficient to constitute a taking of possession of land. We should not, therefore, be taken as laying down an absolute and inviolable   rule   that   merely   going   on   the   spot   and   making   a declaration by the beat of drum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute a taking of possession of land in every case. But here, in our opinion, since the land was lying fallow and there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tehsildar in going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of determining what part   was   waste   and   arable   and   should,   therefore,   be   taken possession of and determining its extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. It appears that the appellant was not present when this was done by the Tehsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant of the land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It is also not strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement   that   notice   should   be   given   to   the   owner   or   the occupant of the land that possession would be taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where possible, to give such notice before   possession   is   taken   by   the   authorities,   as   that   would eliminate the possibility of any fraudulent or collusive transaction of taking of mere paper possession, without the occupant or the owner ever coming to know of it.” 6 11. In  <cite>Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam (Dead) by LRs.,  (1996) 8 SCC 259</cite>, this Court has held that recording of the memorandum by the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) in the presence of witnesses signed by them would constitute taking possession of the land.  The Court observed:  “9. It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court that one of the   accepted   modes   of   taking   possession   of   the   acquired   land   is recording   of   a   memorandum   or   Panchnama   by   the   LAO   in   the presence   of   witnesses   signed   by   him/them   and   that   would constitute taking possession of the land as it would be impossible to take   physical   possession   of   the   acquired   land.   It   is   common knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person may not cooperate in taking possession of the land.” 12. In <cite>Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal Agarwal, (2011) 5 SCC 394</cite>, this Court has held that if acquisition is of a large tract of land, it is not possible to take possession of each and every parcel of the land and it would   be   sufficient   that   symbolic   possession   is   taken   by   preparing   an appropriate   document   in   the   presence   of   independent   witnesses   and obtaining their signatures.  The Court observed: “37. The principles which can be culled out from the above­noted judgments are: (i) No hard­and­fast rule can be laid down as to what act would constitute taking of possession of the acquired land. (ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the State authority concerned   to   go   to   the   spot   and   prepare   a   panchnama   will ordinarily   be   treated   as   sufficient   to   constitute   taking   of possession. (iii)   If   crop   is   standing   on   the   acquired   land   or building/structure   exists,   mere   going   on   the   spot   by   the authority concerned will, by itself, be not sufficient for taking possession. Ordinarily, in such cases, the authority concerned will   have   to   give   notice   to   the   occupier   of   the building/structure or the person who has cultivated the land 7 and take possession in the presence of independent witnesses and get their signatures on the panchnama. Of course, refusal of the owner of the land or building/structure may not lead to an inference that the possession of the acquired land has not been taken. (iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it will be sufficient   that   symbolic   possession   is   taken   by   preparing appropriate   document   in   the   presence   of   independent witnesses and getting their signatures on such document. (v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency/instrumentality of the State and 80% of the total compensation is deposited in terms   of   Section   17(3­A)   and   substantial   portion   of   the acquired land has been utilised in furtherance of the particular public purpose, then the court may reasonably presume that possession of the acquired land has been taken.” 13. The   question   also   came   for   consideration   in  <cite>State   of   T.N.   v. Mahalakshmi Ammal, (1996) 7 SCC 269</cite>, in which this Court observed that possession would be taken by drawing memorandum.  The Court observed: “9. It is well­settled law that publication of the declaration under Section 6 gives conclusiveness to public purpose. Award was made on 26­9­1986 and for Survey No. 2/11 award was made on 31­8­ 1990. Possession having already been undertaken on 24­11­1981, it stands vested in the State under Section 16 of the Act free from all encumbrances and thereby the Government acquired absolute title to the land. The initial award having been made within two years under Section 11 of the Act, the fact that subsequent award was made on 31­8­1990 does not render the initial award invalid. It is also to be seen that there is stay of dispossession. Once there is stay of dispossession, all further  proceedings necessarily  could not  be proceeded with as laid down by this Court. Therefore, the limitation also does not stand as an impediment as provided in the proviso to Section 11­A of the Act. Equally, even if there is an irregularity in service of notice under Sections 9 and 10, it would be a curable irregularity and on account thereof, award made under Section 11 does not become invalid. Award is only an offer on behalf of the State. If compensation was accepted without protest, it binds such party but subject to Section 28­A. Possession of the acquired land would be taken only by way of a memorandum, Panchnama, which is   a  legally   accepted   norm.   It  would   not  be   possible   to  take  any 8 physical   possession.   Therefore,   subsequent   continuation,   if   any, had by the erstwhile owner is only illegal or unlawful possession which does not bind the Government nor vested under Section 16 divested in the illegal occupant. Considered from this perspective, we hold that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the award.” 14. In  <cite>Balmokand   Khatri   Educational   and   Industrial   Trust,   Amritsar   v. State of Punjab,  (1996) 4 SCC 212</cite>, it has been observed that the normal rule   of   taking   possession   is   drafting   the  panchnama  in   the   presence   of panchas.  This Court observed:   “4. It is seen that the entire gamut of the acquisition proceedings stood completed by 17­4­1976 by which date possession of the land had   been   taken.   No   doubt,   Shri   Parekh   has   contended   that   the appellant still retained their possession. It is now well­settled legal position that it is difficult to take physical possession of the land under   compulsory   acquisition.   The   normal   mode   of   taking possession is drafting the panchnama in the presence of panchas and taking possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries is the accepted mode of taking possession of the land. Subsequent thereto, the   retention   of   possession   would   tantamount   only   to   illegal   or unlawful possession. 5.   Under   these   circumstances,   merely   because   the   appellant retained possession of the acquired land, the acquisition cannot be said to be bad in law. It is then contended by Shri Parekh that the appellant­Institution   is   running   an   educational   institution   and intends to establish a public school and that since other land was available,   the   Government   would   have   acquired   some   other   land leaving the acquired land for the appellant. In the counter­affidavit filed in the High Court, it was stated that apart from the acquired land,   the   appellant   also   owned   482   canals   19   marlas   of   land. Thereby, it is seen that the appellant is not disabled to proceed with the   continuation   of   the   educational   institution   which   it   seeks   to establish. It is then contended that an opportunity may be given to the appellant to make a representation to the State Government. We find that it is not necessary for us to give any such liberty since acquisition process has already been completed.” 9 15. In <cite>P.K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka, (2005) 12 SCC 489</cite>, this Court held   that   if   the   land   was   vacant   and   unoccupied,   taking   symbolical possession would be enough. 16. In  <cite>Sita   Ram   Bhandar   Society,   New   Delhi   v.   Lieutenant   Governor, Government of NCT, Delhi, (2009) 10 SCC 501</cite>, it was observed that mode of taking possession is by way of drawing of  panchnama.   Similar view has been reiterated in <cite>Omprakash Verma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2010) 13 SCC 158</cite>. 17. In  <cite>M. Venkatesh v. Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority, (2015) 17 SCC 1</cite>, again it was reiterated that mode of taking possession is by   drawing   a  panchnama.     It   is   further   held   that   the   mode   of   taking possession adopted by BDA was permissible.  18. In  <cite>State of Madhya Pradesh  v. Narmada  Bachao Andolan,  (2011) 7 SCC 639</cite>, this Court held that it would depend upon the facts that of the individual case whether possession has been taken or not.   We are of the considered opinion that possession has been taken as is apparent from the memorandum dated 21.7.2003 placed on record. 19. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that there were two rooms in existence admeasuring 15’x12’ and 18’x12’ with boundary wall. He   has   taken   us   to   the   site   plan,   in   which,   now   10   shops   are   shown, besides that there are three rooms, one kitchen, and verandah.  Thus, most of these structures have been erected subsequently.  Even if there were two outhouses in existence at the time of issuance of Notification under Section 10 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in the shape of rooms admeasuring 15'x12' and 18'x12' and boundary wall, obviously it was not meant for the residential purposes, but meant for agricultural purposes.  It appears that once possession had been taken after making a trespass upon the land, construction   has   been   raised.     Most   of   these   structures   were   not   in existence as per the finding recorded by the High Court.  Thus, the site plan rather than espousing the cause of the respondent, defeats the same. Once possession had been taken and compensation has been admittedly collected by the respondent, it was not open for him to apply for de­notification of land under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or for its release.   20. The submission raised that land of two other incumbents has been released in 2006 and 2014, is of no avail.  There is no concept of negative equality and the respondent cannot be permitted to take advantage of his wrong.     The   land   had   been   acquired   and   thereafter   respondent   has trespassed upon the land and has raised construction, in completely illegal manner.  He is not entitled to protect it.  Based on such encroachment, he is not entitled to release of the land.   21. It cannot be said that land acquired is unutilised land, as a matter of fact, lot of development has taken place as there is encroachment made, as such,   land   could   not   have   been   utilised   and   by   making   unwarranted interference by the High Court, the acquisition was ordered to be quashed. We are of the opinion that the prayer made by the respondent to apply for releasing   the   land   as   per   the   Notification   dated   14.9.2018,   cannot   be 11 entertained.   The respondent cannot be given such a right as he has not come to the Court with clean hands. He is an encroacher and cannot be said to be entitled to any indulgence. 22. It is apparent that acquisition has attained finality, the award was passed, compensation was collected and possession was taken long back in the year 2003.  Resultantly, we find the impugned judgment and order to be unsustainable, the same is hereby set aside.   The appeal is allowed.   No order as to costs. 

1 This appeal is directed against the order dated 22.5.2012 in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.1679 of 2012, whereby the High Court of Rajasthan (Jaipur Bench) has allowed the criminal miscellaneous petition filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908 and has set aside the order dated 2 24.04.2012 passed by Additional Sessions Judge (Fast – Track), Sikar. 2. A charge sheet No.22 of 2009 dated 20.3.2009 was presented under Sections 302, 201, 342, 120-B IPC against respondent Nos.1 and 2 and three others. Charges have been framed under the aforesaid Sections against the accused persons. Statements of 28 witnesses have been recorded in the trial. The statements of Sawarmal and Chandri have been recorded as PW4 and PW5 respectively. Thereafter, both moved applications before the Sessions Judge under Section 311 of Cr.P.C. for re-recording their statements on the ground that the previous statements were made under the influence of the police. In the applications, the witnesses have stated that respondent Nos.1 and 2 had no role in the incident. 3. The Sessions Judge by the order dated 24.4.2012, dismissed the applications observing that the 28 witnesses had already been examined in the case so far. The witnesses were also cross-examined at length and it cannot be said that they were in any kind of pressure and that the applications were filed with a 3 view to favour the accused persons. Prahlad Jat and Mahavir, the two accused persons, moved the petition before the High Court for quashing the said order and the High Court has allowed the applications of PW4 and PW5. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant, urged that PW4 and PW5 were examined in the Court on different dates in the months of November and December 2010 and in March 2011. Out of total 35 witnesses, 28 witnesses have already been examined and they were cross-examined at length. PWs 4 and 5 filed applications before the trial court for further examination on 27.2.2012 and 26.3.2012 respectively. During police investigation and examination conducted by the prosecution, they had supported the prosecution story. The applications have been filed with an intention to provide assistance to the accused persons which cannot be permitted in law. The applications are highly belated and no reason, whatsoever, has been assigned for the delay. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in setting aside the well-reasoned order of the Sessions Judge. 4 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 submits that the appellant has no locus standi to file this appeal. It is contended that the Sessions Judge has ample power to examine or re-examine any witness under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. to bring on record the best possible evidence to meet the ends of justice. Keeping this principle in mind the High Court has allowed the petition. Learned counsel appearing for the third respondent has supported the case of the appellant. We have carefully considered the arguments of the learned counsel made at the Bar. 6. The appellant is the paternal brother of the deceased and is one of the prosecution witnesses. The evidence of PW4 and PW5 was recorded on different dates in the months of November and December 2010 and in March 2011. Both of them had supported the case of the prosecution. After passage of about 14 months, PW4 and PW5 filed applications under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C., inter alia, praying for their re-examination as witnesses for the reason that the statements recorded earlier were made on the 5 instructions of the police. The Sessions Judge dismissed the application by holding as under: “The charges have already been framed under sections 302, 201, 342, 120 B IPC against the accused persons. Statements of 28 witnesses have already been recorded in the trial. The statements of applicant namely Sawarmal has already been recorded as witness PW4 and the statements of applicant namely Chandri have also already been recorded as witness PW5. Thereafter, the said applications have been filed. Said witnesses have already undergone a lengthy cross examination. During the police investigation and examination conducted by the prosecution, wherein they have supported prosecution story, it cannot be said that at such time, the witnesses were under any pressure. In such circumstances, it is not justified to make the Court as weapon to adjudicate in own favour and the above both applications are without any merit and presented with the intention to provide assistance to the accused persons, due to which, the same are not liable to be admitted. Resultant, the above presented both applications dated 27.02.2012 and 26.03.2012 under section 311 CrPC on behalf of the applicants are not liable to be admitted, the same are dismissed”. therefore, This order of the Sessions Judge has been set aside by the High Court. 6 7. Having regard to the contentions urged, the first question for consideration is whether the appellant has locus standi to challenge the order of the High Court. 8. In Black’s Law Dictionary, the meaning assigned to the term ‘locus standi’ is ‘the right to bring an action or to be heard in a given forum’. One of the meanings assigned to the term ‘locus standi’ in Law Lexicon of Sri P.Ramanatha Aiyar, is ‘a right of appearance in a Court of justice’. The traditional view of locus standi has been that the person who is aggrieved or affected has the standing before the court, that is to say, he only has a right to move the court for seeking justice. The orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi of a person to reach the Court has undergone a sea change with the development of constitutional law in India and the Constitutional Courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with the cases or dislodging the claim of a litigant merely on hyper-technical grounds. It is now well-settled that if the person is found to be not merely a stranger to the case, he cannot be non-suited on the ground of his not having locus standi. 7 9. However, criminal trial is conducted largely by following the procedure laid down in Cr.P.C. Locus standi of the complaint is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. Anyone can set the criminal law in motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. This general principle is founded on a policy that an offence, that is an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force, is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against the society. Therefore, in respect of such offences which are treated against the society, it becomes the duty of the State to punish the offender. In <cite>A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak & Anr. (1984) 2 SCC 500</cite>, a Constitution Bench of this Court has considered this aspect as under:- “In other words, the principle that anyone can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact unless contra-indicated by a statutory provision. This general principle of nearly universal application is founded on a policy that an offence i.e. an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force [See Section 2(n) CrPC] is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an 8 offence against society. The society for its orderly and peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offences is undertaken in the name of the State representing the people which would exclude any element of private vendetta or vengeance. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it, is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary. Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait-jacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception”. 10. In <cite>Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand & Ors. (2001) 5 SCC 407</cite>, this Court has held that doctrine of locus standi is totally foreign to criminal jurisprudence. To punish an offender in the event of commission of an offence is to subserve a social need. Society cannot afford to have a criminal escape his liability since that would bring about a state of social pollution which is neither 9 desired nor warranted and this is irrespective of the concept of locus. 11. In <cite>Arunachalam v. P.S.R. SADHANANTHAM & ANR. (1979) 2 SCC 297</cite>, this Court has considered the competence of a private party, as distinguished from the State to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution against a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. It was held that appellate power vested in the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution is not to be confused with ordinary appellate power exercised by appellate courts and appellate tribunals under specific statutes. Article 136 of the Constitution vests the Supreme Court with a plentitude of plenary, appellate power over all Courts and Tribunals in India. The power is plenary in the sense that there are no words in Article 136 itself qualifying that power. But, the very nature of the power has led the Court to set limits to itself within which it has to exercise such power. The power is vested in the Supreme Court but the right to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction is vested in no one. The exercise of the power of the Supreme Court is not circumscribed by any 10 limitation as to who may invoke it. The Court found that the judgment of acquittal by the High Court has led to serious miscarriage of justice. Therefore, it was held that Supreme Court cannot refrain from doing its duty and abstain from interfering on the ground that a private party and not the State has invoked the Court’s jurisdiction. 12. The accused in <cite>Arunachalam (supra)</cite> had filed a writ petition under Article 32 contending that the Supreme Court has no power to grant special leave to the brother of the deceased. This writ petition was decided by a Constitution Bench in <cite>P.S.R Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam & Anr. (1980) 3 SCC 141</cite>. Rejecting the contention of the petitioner, this Court held as under:- “In express terms, Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal on a party as such but it confers a wide discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in suitable cases. It is residuary power and is extraordinary in its amplitude. But the Constitution makers intended in the very terms of Article 136 that it shall be exercised by the highest judges of the land with scrupulous adherence to judicial principles well established by precedents in our 11 jurisprudence. Article 136 has a composite structure of power-cum-procedure inasmuch as there is an in-built prescription of exercise of judicial discretion and mode of hearing. It is fair to assume that while considering the petition under Article 136 the court will pay attention to the question of liberty, the person who seeks such leave from the court, his motive and his locus standi and the weighty factors which persuade the court to grant special leave. When this conspectus of processual circumstances and criteria play upon the jurisdiction of the court under Article 136, it is reasonable to conclude that the desideratum of fair procedure implied in Article 21 is adequately answered. Though parties promiscuously this jurisdiction, the court parsimoniously invokes the power. Moreover, the court may not, save in special situations, grant leave to one who is not eo nomine a party on the record. Thus, procedural limitations exist and are governed by well-worn rules of guidance”. ‘provoke’ 13. In <cite>Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai & Ors. (2003) 12 SCC 395</cite>, and <cite>Esher Singh v. State of A.P. (2004) 11 SCC 585</cite>, it was held that the Supreme Court can entertain appeals against the judgment of acquittal by the High Court at the instance of interested parties also. The circumstance that Criminal Procedure Code does not provide for an appeal to the High Court against an order of acquittal by a subordinate court at the instance of a 12 private party has no relevance to the question of power of Supreme Court under Article 136. 14. In <cite>Amanullah and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Ors. (2016) 6 SCC 699</cite>, this Court has held that the aggrieved party cannot be left to the mercy of the State to file an appeal. It was held as under :- “19…… Now turning our attention towards the criminal trial, which is conducted, largely, by following the procedure laid down in CrPC. Since, offence is considered to be a wrong committed against the society, the prosecution against the accused person is launched by the State. It is the duty of the State to get the culprit booked for the offence committed by him. The focal point, here, is that if the State fails in this regard and the party having bona fide connection with the cause of action, who is aggrieved by the order of the court cannot be left at the mercy of the State and without any option to approach the appellate court for seeking justice”. 15. It is thus clear that Article 136 does not confer a right to appeal on any party but it confers a discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in suitable cases. The exercise of the power of the court is not circumscribed by any limitation as to 13 who may invoke it. It does not confer a right to appeal, it confers only a right to apply for special leave to appeal. Therefore, there was no bar for the appellant to apply for special leave to appeal as he is an aggrieved person. This Court in exercise of its discretion granted permission to the appellant to file the special leave petition on 03.08.2012 and leave was granted on 24.02.2014. 16. That brings us to the next question as to whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of the Sessions Judge and allowing the application filed by PWs 4 and 5 for their re-examination. For ready reference Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. is as under: “311. Power to summon material witness, or examine person present.- Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case”. 14 17. In order to enable the court to find out the truth and render a just decision, the salutary provisions of Section 311 are enacted whereunder any court by exercising its discretionary authority at any stage of inquiry, trial or other proceeding can summon any person as witness or examine any person in attendance though not summoned as a witness or recall or re-examine any person already examined who are expected to be able to throw light upon the matter in dispute. The object of the provision as a whole is to do justice not only from the point of view of the accused and the prosecution but also from the point of view of an orderly society. This power is to be exercised only for strong and valid reasons and it should be exercised with caution and circumspection. Recall is not a matter of course and the discretion given to the court has to be exercised judicially to prevent failure of justice. Therefore, the reasons for exercising this power should be spelt out in the order. 18. In <cite>Vijay Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr., (2011) 8 SCC 136</cite>, this Court while explaining scope and ambit of Section 311 has held as under:- 15 “Though Section 311 confers vast discretion upon the court and is expressed in the widest possible terms, the discretionary power under the said section can be invoked only for the ends of justice. Discretionary power should be exercised consistently with the provisions of CrPC and the principles of criminal law. The discretionary power conferred under Section 311 has to be exercised judicially for reasons stated by the court and not arbitrarily or capriciously”. 19. In <cite>Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Others, (2006) 3 SCC 374</cite>, this Court has considered the concept underlining under Section 311 as under:- “The object underlying Section 311 of the Code is that there may not be failure of justice on account of mistake of either party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses examined from either side. The determinative factor is whether it is essential to the just decision of the case. The section is not limited only for the benefit of the accused, and it will not be an improper exercise of the powers of the court to summon a witness under the section merely because the evidence supports the case of the prosecution and not that of the accused. The section is a general section which applies to all proceedings, enquiries and trials under the Code and empowers the Magistrate to 16 issue summons to any witness at any stage of such proceedings, trial or enquiry. In Section 311 the significant expression that occurs is “at any stage of any inquiry or trial or other proceeding under this Code”. It is, however, to be borne in mind that whereas the section confers a very wide power on the court on summoning witnesses, the discretion conferred is to be exercised judiciously, as the wider the power the greater is the necessity for application of judicial mind”. 20. In <cite>State (NCT of Delhi) v. Shiv Kumar Yadav & Anr., (2016) 2 SCC 402</cite>, it was held thus:- “…………… Certainly, recall could be permitted if essential for the just decision, but not on such consideration as has been adopted in the present case. Mere observation that recall was necessary “for ensuring fair trial” is not enough unless there are tangible reasons to show how the fair trial suffered without recall. Recall is not a matter of course and the discretion given to the court has to be exercised judiciously to prevent failure of justice and not arbitrarily. While the party is even permitted to correct its bona fide error and may be entitled to further opportunity even when such opportunity may be sought without any fault on the part of the opposite party, plea for recall for advancing justice has to be bona fide and has to be balanced carefully with the other relevant considerations including uncalled for hardship to the witnesses and uncalled for delay in the 17 trial. Having regard to these considerations, there is no ground to justify the recall of witnesses already examined”. 21. The delay in filing the application is one of the important factors which has to explained in the application. In <cite>Umar Mohammad & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, (2007) 14 SCC 711</cite>, this Court has held as under:- “Before parting, however, we may notice that a contention has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that PW 1 who was examined in Court on 5-7-1994 purported to have filed an application on 1-5-1995 stating that five accused persons named therein were innocent. An application filed by him purported to be under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was rejected by the learned trial Judge by order dated 13-5-1995. A revision petition was filed thereagainst and the High Court also rejected the said contention. It is not a case where stricto sensu the provisions of Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could have been invoked. The very fact that such an application was got filed by PW 1 nine months after his deposition is itself pointer to the fact that he had been won over. It is absurd to contend that he, after a period of four years and that too after his examination-in-chief and cross-examination was complete, would file an application on his 18 own will and volition. The said application was, therefore, rightly dismissed”. 22. Coming to the facts of the present case, PWs 4 and 5 were examined between 29.11.2010 and 11.3.2011. They were cross-examined at length during the said period. During the police investigation and in their evidence, they have supported the prosecution story. The Sessions Judge has recorded a finding that they were not under any pressure while recording their evidence. After a passage of 14 months, they have filed the application for their re-examination on the ground that the statements made by them earlier were under pressure. They have not assigned any reasons for the delay in making application. It is obvious that they had been won over. We do not find any reasons to allow such an application. The Sessions Judge, therefore, was justified in rejecting the application. In our view, High Court was not right in setting aside the said order. 23. In the result, the appeal succeeds and it is accordingly allowed. The order of the High Court in S.B. Criminal 19 Miscellaneous Petition No.1679 of 2012, dated 22.5.2012 is hereby set aside. All pending applications also stand disposed of. 24. We find from the records that after the order of the High Court, PWs 4 and 5 were re-examined before the Trial Court. The Trial Court is directed to proceed with the matter without taking into consideration the evidence of PWs 4 and 5 recorded after the order of the High Court.

2 2. These three appeals have been filed against the common judgment dated 27.07.2020 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissing the Civil Writ Petition No.13496 of 2009 which was filed by the appellants in first two appeals. The third appeal, Sandeep Kumar and another is an appeal filed by the two appellants who were intervenors in the Civil Writ Petition No.13496 of 2009. The Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned judgment dismissed the writ petition upholding the promotion orders of all the respondent Nos.4 to 34 as Inspector in the Haryana Police. 3. Brief facts of the case necessary to be noted for deciding these appeals are: The appointment and promotion in Police Force of the State of Haryana are governed by Punjab Police Rules, 1934. In the State of Haryana prior to 2001, 100% posts of Sub-Inspectors of Police used to be filled by way of promotion. Rule 12.3 was amended vide notification dated 24.12.2001 by substituting Rule 12.3 to the following effect: 3 “12.3, Direct appointment of Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors – Except as provided in rules 12.1 and 12.4 direct appointment shall not be made except in the rank of Inspector and Sub Inspector of Police. Such appointment in the rank of Inspector and Sub Inspector may be made up to a maximum of ten percent and fifty percent of posts respectively.” 4. The first direct recruitment on the post of Sub- Inspector was held in the year 2003 in which recruitment all the three writ petitioners, Om Prakash, Sudeep Kumar Singh and Suresh Kumar were recommended for direct recruitment as Sub-Inspector. All the writ petitioners joined in May, 2003 as Sub-Inspector. The private respondents to these appeals who were arrayed as respondent Nos.4 to 34 in the writ petition were promoted to the rank of Sub-Inspector from Assistant Sub-Inspector between June, 2003 and March, 2004, i.e., after the writ petitioners had joined. The respondents were promoted on the post of Inspector by orders dated 27.11.2008, 18.05.2009 and 13.08.2009. The writ petitioners aggrieved by the above mentioned promotion orders filed Civil Writ Petition No.13496 of 2009 praying for following reliefs: 4 “i) Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus summoning the records of the cases. ii) Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 27.11.2008 (Annexure-P-8), order dated 18.05.2009 (Annexure-P-9) and order dated 13.08.2009 (Annexure-P-10) whereby the private respondents have been promoted as Inspectors of Police; iii) Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the confirmation order dated 30.06.2009 (Annexure P-2), order dated 15.06.2009 (Annexure P-3) and also order dated 30.06.2009 (Annexure P-4); iv) Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the Rules 12.2, 12.8 and 13.18 of the Punjab Police Rules being ultra vires of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. v) Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the official respondents to consider and promote the petitioner as Inspector with effect from the date the private respondents were promoted and directing the official respondents to grant all consequential reliefs that flow viz. seniority in the rank of Inspector, fixation of pay, payment of arrears of pay along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum etc. etc. 5 vi) Issue any other suitable writ, order or direction as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case may be issued.” 5. The writ petition was contested both by the State as well as by the private respondents. It was pleaded on behalf of the State that the eligibility for promotion from the post of Sub-Inspector to Inspector is eight years’ service of which five years’ service should be as Sub-Inspector, none of the writ petitioners had to their credit eight years’ service hence they being not eligible were not promoted. The writ petitioners were promoted in the year 2011 when they completed eight years of service to their credit. The State defended the vires of the Rules and contends that the Rules were neither arbitrary nor violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The High Court framed following two issues in the writ petition for consideration: 6 “(i) Whether Rule 13.14(2) prescribes the eligibility criteria for consideration for promotion to the post of Inspector ? (ii) If the Rule 13.14(2) is applicable, whether the conditions of eight years experience is arbitrary and discriminatory and is, therefore, required to be struck down being violative of Article 16 of the Constitution ?” 6. The High Court after considering the submissions of the parties held that Rule 13.14(2) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 prescribes the eligibility criteria for consideration for promotion to the post of Inspector. The High Court also held that requirement of eight years’ experience for promotion to the post of Inspector is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. After recording the conclusion, writ petition was dismissed by the High Court. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, the writ petitioners have filed first two appeals and the last appeal has been filed by the intervenors. 7. We have heard Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel and Shri Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel 7 appearing for the appellants. Shri Gurminder Singh, learned senior counsel, has appeared for the private respondents. Shri Nikhil Goel, learned Additional Advocate General has appeared for the State of Haryana. 8. Learned senior counsel for the appellants submits that the appellants/writ petitioners were senior to the private respondents in the cadre of Sub-Inspector, and they being directly recruited before the respondents could be promoted as Sub-Inspector. They being seniors were entitled to be promoted on the post of Inspector as they have also completed five years’ experience as Sub-Inspector. It is submitted that the High Court has wrongly relied on Rule 13.14 which Rule was not applicable for promotion to the post of Inspector from Sub-Inspector. It is submitted that the applicable Rules for promotion from the rank of Sub-Inspector to Inspector are Rules 13.1, 13.15 and 13.16 of Rules, 1934. Rule 13.14 covers a situation where a Sub- Inspector is being promoted to and in the Selection Grade of Sub-Inspector. The Government of Haryana vide 8 its order dated 29.04.1987 has abolished the Selection Grade in all Groups B,C and D posts. The Sub-Inspector being a Group-C post, there was no question of promotion in Selection Grade of any Sub-Inspector after 29.04.1987. In fact, none of the private respondents were promoted in the Selection Grade so as to claim applicability of Rule 13.14. The selection criteria is contained in sub-rule (1) of Rule 13 and Rule 13.15. Sub-Rule (4) of Rule 13.15 does not deal with eligibility rather it deals with inter-se seniority. The Haryana Police (Non-Gazetted and Other Ranks) Service Rules, 2017 now provide, by Rule 7 read with Appendix B that five years’ service is required as Sub- Inspector for promotion to the post of Inspector. The position in Rules, 2017 clearly defeats the construction placed by the High Court requiring an eight years’ qualifying period. 9. Shri Nikhil Goel, learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Haryana submits that requirement for promotion to the rank of Inspector has 9 always been of eight years’ of service. The said criteria has been followed ever since the State of Haryana was established in 1966 and even after selection grade was abolished in 1987. The requirement of eight years of service for promotion to the post of Inspector is clear from a conjoined reading of Rule 13.14 read with Rule 13.15(4) of Rules, 1934. Rule 13.14 of Rules, 1934 was never challenged in the writ petition but rather it was only the vires of Rule 12.2, 12.8 and 13.18 that were challenged. No reliance can be placed on Rules, 2017 which Rules have been notified after nine years of promotion of private respondents. Rule 13.14 is an integral and inalienable part of the scheme of the Rules governing promotion to the rank of Inspector. Without Rule 13.14, there cannot be any List F and without List F, no promotion can be made to the post of Inspector. The selection grades are in the nature of a promotional scale. Therefore, the criteria provided for promotion to selection grade can be taken as criteria for further promotion. The requirement and 10 rationale of eight years of service for a Sub-Inspector is to discharge the higher responsibility of an Inspector. Rules, 1934 have always been interpreted so by the State and all promotions were affected till new Rules were enforced in 2017. 10. Learned counsel for the private respondents also adopts the submissions raised by Shri Nikhil Goel that impugned judgment of the High Court needs no interference by this Court. 11. Shri P.S. Narasimha, learned senior counsel, has also appeared for the private respondents. He, however, submits that he is not affected by the inter-se dispute between the writ petitioners and the private respondents. He submits that his clients have already been promoted as Deputy Superintendents of Police. 12. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 11 13. From the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and materials on record following two questions arise for consideration in these appeals:- (i) Whether the mode and manner of promotion in selection grade from rank of Sub-Inspector to Inspector as envisaged in Punjab Police Rules, 1934 has become redundant after issuance of Government Order dated 29.04.1987 by State of Haryana withdrawing the grant of selection grade to Group A, B and C employees? (ii) Whether the Rule 13.14 of Punjab Police Rules, 1934, which contemplate promotion to the various selection grades cannot be looked into while considering the promotion of a Sub- Inspector to the rank of Inspector and requirement of having at least eight years’ approved service as an upper subordinate is no longer attracted for promotion of direct recruits Sub-Inspector? 12 14. Before we proceed to consider the respective submissions, we need to look into the statutory rules governing the promotion from the post of Sub-Inspector to Inspector. The statutory rules are Punjab Police Rules, 1934. The appellant’s case is that only applicable rules for promotion from the rank of Sub- Inspector to Inspector are Rules 13.1, 13.15 and 13.16 of the Rules, 1934. We need to notice the aforesaid rules, which are to the following effect:- “13.1. Promotion from one rank to another. - (1) Promotion from one rank to another, and from one grade to another in the same rank shall be made by selection tempered by seniority. Efficiency and honesty shall be the main factors governing Specific qualifications, whether in the nature of training courses passed or practical experience, shall be carefully considered in each case. When the qualifications of two officers are otherwise equal, the senior shall be promoted. This rule does not affect increments within a time-scale. selection. (2) Under the present constitution of the police force no lower subordinate will ordinarily be entrusted with the independent conduct of investigations or the independent charge of a police station or similar unit. It is necessary, therefore, that well-educated constables, 13 having the attributes necessary for bearing the responsibilities of upper subordinate rank, should receive accelerated promotion so as to reach that rank as soon as they have passed the courses prescribed for, and been tested and given practical training in, the ranks of constable and head constable. (3) For the purposes of regulating promotion amongst enrolled police officers six promotion lists - A, B, C, D, E, and F will be maintained. Lists A, B, C and D shall be maintained in each district as prescribed in rules 13.6, 13.7, 13.8 and 13.9 and will regulate promotion to the selection grade of constables and to the ranks of head constables and Assistant Sub- Inspector. List E shall be maintained in the office of Deputy Inspector- General as prescribed in sub-rule 13.10(1) and will regulate promotion to the rank of Sub- Inspector. List F shall be maintained in the office of the Inspector-General as prescribed in sub-rule 13.15(1) and will regulate promotion to the rank of Inspector. Entry in or removal from A, B, C, D or E lists shall be recorded in the order book and in the character roll of the police officer concerned. These lists are nominal rolls of those officers whose admission to them has been authorised. No actual selection shall be made without careful examination of character rolls. 14 Provided that five per cent of such promotions may be made from amongst the members of the Police Force, who achieve outstanding distinction in sports field at All India level or International level if they are otherwise eligible for promotion but for seniority. 13.15. List F - Promotion to Inspectors. - (1) Recommendations on behalf of Sergeants and Sub-Inspectors considered fit for promotion to the rank of Inspector shall be submitted with their annual confidential reports on the 15th April each year to Deputy Inspector- General by Superintendents of Police in Form 13.15(1). Recommendations on behalf of Sergeants and Sub-Inspectors employed in the Government Railway Police will be sent direct to the Inspector-General of Police by the Assistant Inspector-General, Government Railway Police, in the same form and not later than October each year. The Deputy Inspector-General shall decide, after seeing the officers recommended, and in consideration of their records, and his own knowledge of them, whether to endorse the recommendations of Superintendents of Police and forwarded them to the Inspector-General. He will keep a copy of any recommendation so forwarded in the personal file of the officer; if he decides not to endorse a recommendation, he shall retain the original in the officer’s personal file and send a copy of his own order on it to the Superintendent concerned. Deputy Inspector-General shall finally submit recommendations to the Inspector-General as soon as they are satisfied as to the fitness of officers 15 recommended, but in no case later than October each year. (2) Such of the officers recommended as the Inspector-General may consider suitable shall be admitted to promotion list ‘F’ (form 13.15(2) which will, however, not be published. Deputy Inspectors-General shall be informed, and shall in turn inform the Superintendents concerned, of the names of those who have been admitted to the List; similar information will be sent to the Assistant Inspector-General, Government Railway Police. The original personal files of Sub- Inspectors admitted to the list shall be transferred to the Inspector-General after duplicates have been prepared for retention in the office of the Deputy Inspector-General or the Assistant Inspector-General, Government Railway Police, as required by Rule 13.38(1). Copies of all subsequent annual confidential reports prepared in form 13.17 in respect both of Sergeants and Sub-Inspectors admitted to the list will, on return by the Inspector-General in accordance with rule 13.17(1), be recorded by Deputy Inspectors-General or the Assistant Inspector-General, Government Railway Police, with the duplicate personal files of the officers concerned. Copies of all entries ordered to be made in personal files other than annual confidential reports will be forwarded to the Inspector-General as soon as made for record with the original personal files; all such copies shall be attested by the 16 Deputy Inspector-General or the Assistant Inspector General, Government Railway Police, personally. (3) When submitting recommendations for the entry of fresh names in List F, Deputy Inspectors-General and the Assistant Inspector-General, Government Railway Police, will at the same time submit specific recommendations (which need not be accompanied by detailed confidential reports) as to the retention or removal of officers already admitted to the list. On receipt of these recommendations, the Inspector-General will review the Provincial List, and pass orders regarding the retention or exclusion of names, at the same time communicating his decision to the Deputy Inspector-General and the Assistant Inspector-General, Government Railway Police. (4) Sub-Inspectors admitted to List ‘F’ will be placed in that list in order according to their date of permanent promotion to selection grade, and, if the date of permanent promotion to selection grade is the same in the case of two or more Sub-Inspectors admitted to list ‘F’ on one and the same date, then according to date of permanent promotion to the time-scale. Sergeants will be shown in list ‘F’ according to the date of entry in the list. When, however, two or more Sergeants are admitted to list ‘F’ on the same date, their names will be shown in order of seniority among themselves. 17 13.16. Promotion to the rank of Inspector. - (1) Substantive vacancies in the rank of Inspector, save those which are specially designated for the appointment of probationers shall be filled by promotion of officers from list F selected according to the principles laid down in rule 13.1. Sergeants are eligible for promotion in the appointments reserved for European Inspectors. (2) Temporary vacancies in the rank of Inspector shall be filled by the officiating promotion of officers on F list by the authorities empowered by rule 13.4 to make the appointment. Such officiating promotions shall be made in accordance with the principles laid down in sub-rule 13.12(1) in the case of E list, and the second part of that rule shall, mutatis mutandis, govern the scrutiny of the work of F list officers and the removal from that list of the names of those who are found unfit for the rank of inspector. (3) No officer whose name is not on F list shall be appointed to officiate as Inspector without the special sanction of the Inspector-General. When no officer on F list is available in the range for a vacancy which the Deputy Inspector-General is required to fill, application shall be made to the Inspector-General to appoint a man from another range.” 15. On the other hand, the respondents placed reliance on Rule 13.14, which is to the following effect:- 18 “13.14. Promotions to and in the selection grades of Sub-Inspectors. - (1) Promotion to the various selection grades of Sub-Inspectors shall be made by Superintendents of Police and the Assistant Superintendent, Government Railway Police, as vacancies in the sanctioned establishment of such appointments occur in accordance with the principle laid down in Rule 13.1. (2) No Sub-Inspector shall be considered eligible for promotion to a selection grade unless he has at least eight years’ approved service as an upper subordinate, of which at least five shall have been in the rank of Sub- Inspector, and unless he is thoroughly efficient and competent to hold charge of a police station of first class importance. No Sub- Inspector who has been punished by reduction, stoppage of increment, or forfeiture of approved service for increment, shall be eligible for promotion to a selection grade. Exceptions to this rule may be made only with the sanction of the Inspector- General in recognition of distinguished service and exemplary conduct. (3) Sub-Inspectors promoted to the 4th selection grade shall be on probation for one year and may be reverted without formal departmental proceedings during or on the expiry of the period of their probation if they fail to maintain an exemplary standard of conduct and efficiency. Provided that the competent authority may, if it so thinks fit in any case, 19 extend the period of probation by one year in the aggregate and pass such orders at any time during or on the expiry of the extended period of probation as it could have passed during or on the expiry of original period of probation.” 16. We may now notice the Government Order dated 29.04.1987 issued by the State of Haryana, which communicates the decision of the State Government that “the present system of selection grades as it exists for the employees of Groups B, C & D has been discontinued”. The effect of the G.O. dated 29.04.1987 was that there was no entitlement of a Sub-Inspector or any police personnel belonging to Group C to claim selection grade. The statutory Rule 13.1 provides that promotion from one rank to another and from one grade to another in the same rank shall be made by selection tempered by seniority. The use of expression “specific qualifications whether in the nature of training courses passed or practical experience, shall be carefully considered in each case” indicate that qualifications for promotion are not contained in Rule 13.1 and they have to be found out from other part of 20 the Rules. Rule 13.1 governs both promotions, from one rank to another, and from one grade to another. Thus, Rule 13.1 regulates promotion within the grade and from one grade to another. Rule 13.14 contains the heading “promotions to and in the selection grades of Sub- Inspectors”. Rule 13.14(2) provides that no Sub- Inspector shall be considered eligible for promotion to a selection grade unless he has at least eight years’ approved service as an upper subordinate, of which five years shall have been in the rank of Sub-Inspector. Now, coming to Rule 13.15 which deals with “List F- Promotion to Inspectors”, Rule 13.15(1) deals with recommendations on behalf of Sub-Inspectors considered fit for promotion to the rank of Inspector to be submitted with their annual confidential reports on the 15th April each year to Deputy Inspector-General by Superintendents of Police in Form 13.15(1). 17. Rule 13.15(4) provides that Sub-Inspectors admitted to List ‘F’ will be placed in that list in order according to their date of permanent promotion to 21 selection grade. Thus, date of permanent promotion to selection grade is criteria which was required to be followed for promotion to Inspector and as required by Rule 13.14(2) no Sub-Inspector shall be considered eligible for promotion to a selection grade unless he has at least eight years’ approved service as an upper subordinate, of which at least five years shall have been in the rank of Sub-Inspector. 18. Thus, promotion to selection grade of a Sub- Inspector was pre-condition for including the name of a Sub-Inspector in List ‘F’ which is a list from which promotion to Inspector was to be made. Even though scheme of grant of selection grade was done away by the State vide its common order dated 29.04.1987, the exercise of promotion to Inspector from Sub-Inspector even after 29.04.1987 was done on the basis of requirement of Rule 13.14(2), i.e., names of only those Sub-Inspectors were included in List ‘F’ who have eight years of approved service as an upper subordinate to their cadre. The promotion to selection grade was 22 contemplated under the Rules by following eligibility and criteria as laid down in the Rules. The submission of the respondents is that after the State Government withdrew the scheme of selection grade by the Government order dated 29.04.1987 all statutory provisions regarding grant of selection grade became redundant. Even if no selection grade was to be provided to any of the personnel of the Police force after 29.04.1987, the criteria which was adopted for in rank promotion was followed by the State for promotion to the next rank. The Rules contained in Chapter XIII have to be given a conjoint and meaningful reading to advance object and purpose of the Rules. The Rules provided a mode and manner for assessment of an official to move forward by means of a grant of selection grade and thereafter by the next step on the next rank. The criteria in the Rules for assessing a person that he was entitled for grant of selection grade cannot be said to be meaningless with no purpose after withdrawal of the selection grade. The grant of 23 selection grade, in the rank in which Police official was there, is a step for making eligible officer to move to the higher rank. Can the argument be accepted that promotion of Sub-Inspector to Inspector has been on the basis of seniority alone? Whether there shall be no cap of experience when a Sub-Inspector is considered to be promoted to next higher rank in grade, i.e., Inspector? If we accept the submission of the counsel of the respondents that the requirement as contained in Rule 13.14(2) is no longer applicable after withdrawal of selection grade, there will be no requirement of any experience to any Sub-Inspector for becoming an Inspector which was never the intendment of the statutory Rules. For promotion to Sub-Inspector to selection grade eight years’ approved service was contemplated which was with intent that sufficient experience is gained by a Police personnel to be considered for promotion to Inspector who is to man a Police Station and has to discharge other important functions. It is relevant to notice that no amendments 24 in the statutory Rules were made after 29.04.1987 and even after notification was issued dated 24.12.2001 substituting Rule 12.3. The case of the State before the High Court and before this Court is that even after 29.04.1987 till 2017 Rules were enforced, all Sub- Inspectors, including direct and promotees were uniformly dealt with by insisting the requirement of eight years’ approved service as the upper subordinate for the purposes of inclusion of their names in List ‘F’. 19. The selection grades are in the nature of promotional scale, therefore, the criteria provided for promotion to selection grade can very well be taken as criteria for further promotion which is the spirit of the Rules followed uniformly by the State while effecting the promotion. The object and purpose of the Rules and methodology for evaluating the Police personnel to move in the higher rank in the same or to the next rank cannot be lost sight nor can be ignored merely because the scheme was withdrawn on 29.04.1987. 25 No error has been committed by the State in continuing the evaluation of the Sub-Inspectors on the basis of criteria as provided in Rule 13.14 while effecting promotion. 20. This Court has laid down time and again that while construing statutory Rules such construction should be adopted which may give effect to the intention or object of the Rule and no such interpretation be put which may make the Rule ineffective. We may refer to the judgment of this Court in <cite>State of Gujarat and Another vs. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retired) and Others, (2013) 3 SCC 1</cite>, where this Court laid down following in paragraphs 96, 97 and 98: “96. In the process of statutory construction, the court must construe the Act before it bearing in mind the legal maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat which means it is better for a thing to have effect than for it to be made void i.e. a statute must be construed in such a manner so as to make it workable. Viscount Simon, L.C. in <cite>Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd. [1940 AC 1014 : (1940) 3 All ER 549 (HL)]</cite> stated as follows: (AC p. 1022) 26 “… if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result.” 97. Similarly in <cite>Whitney v. IRC [1926 AC 37 (HL)]</cite> it was observed as under: (AC p. 52) “… A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable.” 98. The doctrine of purposive construction may be taken recourse to for the purpose of giving full effect to statutory provisions, and the courts must state what meaning the statute should bear, rather than rendering the statute a nullity, as statutes are meant to be operative and not inept. The courts must refrain from declaring a statute to be unworkable. The rules of interpretation require that construction which carries 27 forward the objectives of the statute, protects interest of the parties and keeps the remedy alive, should be preferred looking into the text and context of the statute. Construction given by the court must promote the object of the statute and serve the purpose for which it has been enacted and not efface its very purpose. “The courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a statute to futility. The provision of the statute must be so construed as to make it effective and operative.” The court must take a pragmatic view and must keep in mind the purpose for which the statute was enacted as the purpose of law itself provides good guidance to courts as they interpret the true meaning of the Act and thus legislative futility must be ruled out. A statute must be construed in such a manner so as to ensure that the Act itself does not become a dead letter and the obvious intention of the legislature does not stand defeated unless it leads to a case of absolute intractability in use. The court must adopt a construction which suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy and “to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico”. The court must give effect to the purpose and object of the Act for the reason that legislature is presumed to have enacted a reasonable 28 statute. (<cite>Vide M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa [AIR 1961 SC 1107]</cite> , <cite>S.P. Jain v. Krishna Mohan Gupta [(1987) 1 SCC 191 : AIR 1987 SC 222]</cite> , <cite>RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. [(1987) 1 SCC 424 : AIR 1987 SC 1023]</cite>, <cite>Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam [(1989) 3 SCC 709 : AIR 1990 SC 123]</cite> , SCC p. 754, para 118, <cite>UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor [(2008) 5 SCC 257 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 263]</cite> and <cite>Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. v. Eastern Metals and Ferro Alloys [(2011) 11 SCC 334]</cite> .)” 21. The principle of construction of statutory Rules as laid down above would apply to the interpretation of Punjab Police Rules, 1934. We are of the opinion that the High Court did not commit any error in construing the Rules in the manner as was construed by the High Court. We endorse the view of the High Court interpreting the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. Chapter XIII of the Rules have to be conjointly and harmoniously construed and when we construe Rules 13.1, 13.14 and 13.15, we do not find any error in State promoting the Sub-Inspectors to Inspectors who have eight years’ approved service to their credit, at least 29 five years being as Sub-Inspectors. Thus, the High Court has rightly upheld the promotion orders of private respondents. No ground is made out to interfere with the judgment of the High Court in these appeals. The appeals are dismissed.

1. These appeals have been filed by the prosecution assailing the judgment of the High Court of Rajasthan dated 3rd January, 2012 acquitting the respondents charged for the offences under Sections 302, 201 read with Section 34 IPC. 2. As per case of the prosecution, on 19th October, 2002 in the morning at 12.30 p.m., the informant Abdul Haq gave a written 1 report   that   in   the   intervening   night   of   18th  and   19th  October, 2002, while he was sleeping in his railway quarter situated at Borkheda Culvert near the railway line, Kota at about 12.05 a.m., one Madan Bheel and Parmanand Bheel came to his quarter and woke  him   up   and   stated   that  the   dead   body   of   one   unknown person   was   lying   beneath   the   culvert   at   916/8.10   km   of   the railway line, Kota (Rajasthan).  Thereupon, he reached there and saw that dead body had injuries on its head, mouth and face.  On inquiry, Smt. Saroti Bai Bheel disclosed that sometime before she woke up for urinating, she saw two­three persons coming by an auto rikshaw, who had placed the said body on the railway line and   had   gone   away.     One   person   who   was   standing   there revealed   that   the   said   dead   body   was   of   Bajranglal,   retired Constable.  From the facts of the report made by informant Abdul Haq, the Police Station Incharge reached at the spot and found an offence under Sections 302, 201 read with Section 34 IPC. This report was sent with Shri Fazlur Rehman, Head Constable for registering a case to Police Station Nayapura, Kota. 3. Crime   No.   679/02   was   registered   by   the   Head   Constable and First Information Report was sent to the Police Station In­ 2 charge.  Thereafter, the investigation was done and charge­sheet was submitted against the respondents Mahesh Kumar, Dinu @ Deendayal and Bhaiya @ Devkaran in the Court of Magistrate. Learned Magistrate handed over the case to the Sessions Court, Kota   from   where   it  was   transferred   to   the   Court  of   Additional Sessions Judge, No. 2, Fast Track, Kota. 4. The prosecution in support thereof produced 25 witnesses and   got   exhibited   Exhibit   P­1   to   P­45   in   its   documentary evidence.     Thereafter,   the   statements   of   the   respondents   were recorded under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In   defence,   DW­1   Rajendra   Singh   was   produced   and   the statements   of   prosecution   witnesses   Pratap   and   Bhupendra recorded under Section 161 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were relied as Exhibit D­1 and D­2. 5. The learned Sessions Judge, based on the material available on record, held all the respondents guilty under Sections 302, 201 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment   for   life   along   with   fine,   which   came   to   be challenged by the respondents in Appeal under Section 374 of 3 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before the Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur. 6. On appraisal of the records, the High Court in its impugned judgment dated 3rd  January, 2012  recorded  a finding  that  the chain of circumstantial evidence produced by the prosecution is very doubtful, contradictory and not reliable at all.  At the same time, it was also observed that most of the prosecution witnesses were declared hostile and many important and relevant witnesses without any reason has not been produced by the prosecution.   7. Dayaram and Gulab, who identified the dead body of the deceased   Bajranglal   and   who   lifted   the   dead   body   from   the railway   track   and   kept   in   side   have   not   been   produced.     The Samdhi   of   deceased   Bajranglal   and   Brijgopal,   father   of   PW­5 Rajeshbai were not produced.  That apart, the witnesses alleging the   reason   for   murder   Surendrasingh,   Ramgopal,   Ramswarup, Girraj  Gupta,  Premchand  and   Shyambabu  were  not  produced. The motive of the incident which is allegedly the illicit relation of Sulochana and respondent­Mahesh, the said Sulochana has not been produced as prosecution witness.  The witnesses of Memos 4 Exhibit P­13, P­15, P­41, etc. Dilipsingh have not been produced. Witness   Hemraj   of   Memos   Exhibit   P­30,   P­35   and   P­36   and witnesses   Manoj,   Vijay   of   Memo   Exhibit   P­41   have   not   been produced.  Fazlur Rahman, Police Head Constable who took the written report Exhibit P­24 and gone to the Police Station and on his written report, FIR was registered, has not been produced. The aunt of Ramesh who along with PW­2 Narendra is alleged to have   gone   to   Rajesh   has   not   been   produced.     The   witness   of Exhibit   P­20   Bharatram,   Rais   Mohammad,   Surendrasingh   and Brijgopal   have   not   been   produced.     The   witness   Balak   @ Mansingh and Imam of the Memo of Arrest of the accused Exhibit P­26, P­27, P­28 and P­32 have not been produced. 8. It has further been observed that the prosecution failed to tender   any   justification   that   all   the   three   respondents   were arrested   on   19th  October,   2002   at   11.30   p.m.   but   why proceedings of the recoveries were undertaken after gap of 3 to 10 days, i.e., on 23rd, 25th, 26th  and 29th  October, 2002.   It has also been pointed out by the High Court that the Investigating Officer in his statement has recorded that no blood marks were found in the auto, which could not establish that the auto as 5 alleged  was  carrying   the   body   of   deceased   to  the   railway   line. PW­1 Madan Bheel and PW­4 Parmanand Bheel were declared hostile   and   PW­5   Smt.   Rajeshbai,   daughter­in­law   of   the deceased, in cross­examination, deposed that whatever she had told earlier with respect to the incident was hearsay and has not supported the prosecution. 9. It   reveals   from   the   record   that   most   of   the   prosecution witnesses   have   been   declared   hostile   and   the   statement   of witnesses produced suffer from serious material contradictions. In the light of statements of prosecution witnesses suffering from material deficiencies, the High Court arrived at the conclusion that   the   circumstantial   evidence   produced   by   the   prosecution appears to be doubtful, contradictory and is not safe to rely upon and acquitted the respondents from charge under Section 302, 201   IPC   and   released   them   from   judicial   custody   under   its impugned judgment dated 3rd January, 2012. 10. It is well settled that in the cases of circumstantial evidence, the   circumstances from  which the   conclusion  of  guilt  is  to  be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all 6 the   facts   so   established   should   be   consistent   only   with   the hypothesis of guilt of the accused.  The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved.   In other words, there must be a complete chain of evidence as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused and none else. 11. The   enunciation   of   law   pertaining   to   circumstantial evidence, its relevance and decisiveness, as a proof of charge of a criminal   offence,   is   amongst   others   traceable   decision   of   this Court   in  <cite>Sharad   Birdhichand   Sarda  Vs.  State   of Maharashtra 1984(4) SCC 116</cite>.  The relevant excerpts from para 153 of the decision is assuredly apposite:­ “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1)   the   circumstances   from   which   the   conclusion   of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances   concerned   “must   or   should”   and   not 7 “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must   be   or   should   be   proved”   as   was   held   by   this Court in <cite>Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. Vs.  State of   Maharashtra [(1973)   2   SCC   793</cite>   where   the observations were made:     accused must be “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the and   not merely may be   guilty   before   a   court   can convict   and   the   mental   distance   between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should  not  be explainable on  any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4)   they   should   exclude   every   possible   hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 12. It has been further relied by this Court in <cite>Sujit Biswas Vs. State of Assam 2013(12) SCC 406</cite> and <cite>Raja alias Rajinder Vs. State of Haryana  2015(11) SCC 43</cite> and has been propounded that while scrutinising the circumstantial evidence, it is the duty of the Court to evaluate it to ensure the chain of events clearly established and completely to rule out any reasonable likelihood 8 of   innocence   of   the   accused.     It   is   true   that   the   underlying principle   whether   the   chain   is   complete   or   not,   indeed   would depend on the facts of each case emanating from the evidence and   there   cannot   be   a   straitjacket   formula   which   can   be   laid down for the purpose.   It is always to be kept in mind that the circumstances adduced when considered collectively, must lead only to the conclusion that there cannot be a person other than the accused who alone is the perpetrator of the crime alleged and the   circumstances   must   establish   the   conclusive   nature consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. 13. On analysis of the overall fact situation, we find that the High Court in its impugned judgment has elaborately considered the   circumstantial   evidence   which   has   been   adduced   by   the prosecution and arrived to the conclusion that many important and   relevant   witnesses   have   not   been   produced   by   the prosecution on which a detailed reference has been made in para 23 of the impugned judgment which we consider it appropriate to quote:­ “23. It has also to be mentioned that in the case many   important   and   relevant   witnesses   the prosecution has not produced.  As has been mentioned 9 above   that   the   dead   body   of   the   deceased   at   which place has been found, that the person who identified it has   the  dead   body   of   Bajranglal   there   has   not   been produced.     Dayaram   and   Gulab   who   lifted   the   dead body   from   the   railway   track   and   kept   in   side   those Dayaram   and   Gulab   also   have   not   been   produced. According   to   P.W.5   Rajeshbhai   Rameshchand   to   her and   her   father   gave   information   of   the   death   of   her father­in­law   Bajranglal,   this   Ramesh   has   not   been produced.     The   Samdhi   of   deceased   Bajranglal   and Brijgopal,   father   of   P.W.   5   Rajeshbai   have   not   been produced who are also the witnesses of Exhibit P.20, P.21 and P.25 Memos.   According to prosecution the witnesses   alleging   the   reason   for   murder Surendrasingh, Ramgopal, Ramswarup, Girraj Gupta, Premchand and Shyambabu have not been produced. The owner of the Auto Rickshaw Sobhagsingh has not been   produced.     The   motive   of   the   incident,   which relation   of   Sulochana   and   Mahesh   has   been   alleged that Sulochana has not been produced.  The witnesses of Memos Exhibit P.13, P.15, P.41 etc.  Dilipsingh has not been produced.  Witness Hemraj of Memos Exhibit P.30, P.35 and P.36 an witness Manoj Vijay of Memo Exhibit   P.41   have   not   been   produced.     That   Fazlur Rahman   Police   Head   Constable   also   has   not   been produced who taking written report Exhibit P.24 had gone to the police station and on this getting written the F.I.R. Exhibit P.44 and taking that had come back to S.H.O. at the site.  P.W.2 Narendra taking with him the aunt of Ramesh is alleged to have gone to Rajesh. This aunt of Ramesh has not been produced.  Witness Madrasi,   Bhoorsingh,   Shambhusingh   Kaushi   etc. shown in the site plan Exhibit P.25 the dead body lying have not been produced.   The witness of Exhibit P.20 Bharatram,   Rais   Mohammad,   Surendrasingh   and Brijgopal have not been produced.  The witness Balak @ Mansingh and Imam of the Memo of arrest of the accused   Exhibit   P.26,   P.27,   P.28   and   P.32   have   not been produced.”       14. After   hearing   learned   counsel   for   the   parties   and   after perusal of the impugned judgment and material of the case on record, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has 10 failed   to   complete   the   chain   of   events   leaving   any   reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with all human probability that the act must have been done only by the respondents. 15. We   find   no   error   being   committed   by   the   High   Court   in arriving   to   the   conclusion   as   aforesaid   noticed   by   us   in   the impugned judgment dated 3rd January, 2012. 16. Consequently, both the appeals are wholly devoid of merit and accordingly dismissed.  17. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.