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37. The said resolution is strenuously contested by the
learned senior counsel for the petitioners. It is urged with
immense vehemence that the resolution smacks of gross
arbitrariness and reveals a sense of hidden base for use of
power of an absolute tyrant and a despot. Mr. Singh
explaining the same would submit that a hospital to remain
compliant has to have the requisite number of doctors and
staff, and to run a medical college constant compliance is
imperative. According to him, when a college is granted
LOP for the first year, 5% margin with regard to absence is
granted and that is why certain categories of leave have not
been mentioned in the resolution, but that does not mean
that the college can grant leave to the doctors at its whim
and fancy. Be that as it may, the absence of faculty
members which has been taken note of by the Medical
Council of India and accepted by the Central Government
cannot be allowed to pale into total insignificance. In this
regard, a submission advanced by the learned senior
counsel for the petitioners requires to be noted. It is urged
by them that the engagement of the faculty members are to
41
be believed as they are paid their salaries by the petitioners
and it is shown in the necessary Income Tax form.
38.
It needs no special emphasis to state that the said
submission cannot be the guiding factor for our analysis.
The issue is the deficiency of the doctors and the absence of
the doctors during the period of inspection. We have
already held that the period in which the assessors
inspected cannot be said to be a period covered under the
Regulations. That apart, as is noticeable, the Hearing
Committee which has been constituted on the basis of the
decision
in <cite>Amma Chandravati Educational and
Charitable Trust (supra)</cite>, has also held that the college is
deficient in bed occupancy at the conditional LOP stage
other facilities have to be specifically verified and in the
absence of satisfaction, the LOP ought not to be granted. | <para>
37. The said resolution is strenuously contested by the
learned senior counsel for the petitioners. It is urged with
immense vehemence that the resolution smacks of gross
arbitrariness and reveals a sense of hidden base for use of
power of an absolute tyrant and a despot. Mr. Singh
explaining the same would submit that a hospital to remain
compliant has to have the requisite number of doctors and
staff, and to run a medical college constant compliance is
imperative. According to him, when a college is granted
LOP for the first year, 5% margin with regard to absence is
granted and that is why certain categories of leave have not
been mentioned in the resolution, but that does not mean
that the college can grant leave to the doctors at its whim
and fancy. Be that as it may, the absence of faculty
members which has been taken note of by the Medical
Council of India and accepted by the Central Government
cannot be allowed to pale into total insignificance. In this
regard, a submission advanced by the learned senior
counsel for the petitioners requires to be noted. It is urged
by them that the engagement of the faculty members are to
41
be believed as they are paid their salaries by the petitioners
and it is shown in the necessary Income Tax form.
</para>
<para>
38.
It needs no special emphasis to state that the said
submission cannot be the guiding factor for our analysis.
The issue is the deficiency of the doctors and the absence of
the doctors during the period of inspection. We have
already held that the period in which the assessors
inspected cannot be said to be a period covered under the
Regulations. That apart, as is noticeable, the Hearing
Committee which has been constituted on the basis of the
decision
in <cite>Amma Chandravati Educational and
Charitable Trust (supra)</cite>, has also held that the college is
deficient in bed occupancy at the conditional LOP stage
other facilities have to be specifically verified and in the
absence of satisfaction, the LOP ought not to be granted.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
39.
In the course of hearing, Mr. Rohatgi, learned senior
counsel for the petitioners has placed heavy reliance on
<cite>Krishna Mohan Medical College and Hospital & Anr v.
Union of India & Anr 15 (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 448 of
2017 decided on 01.09.2017)</cite> and <cite>Dr. Jagat Narain
15 2017 SCC Online SC 1032
42
Subharti Charitable Trust & Anr v. Union of India &
Ors16</cite>.
40.
In <cite>Krishna Mohan Medical College (supra)</cite>, this
Court has held:-
therewith
for
in accordance
“… as the Act and Regulations framed thereunder
have been envisioned to attain the highest
standards of medical education, we direct the
Central Government/MCI to cause a
fresh
inspection of the petitioner college/institution to
be made
the
academic year 2018-19 and lay the report in
respect thereof before this Court within a period
of eight weeks herefrom. A copy of the report,
needless to state, would be furnished to the
petitioner college/institution at the earliest so as
to enable it to avail its remedies, if so advised,
under the Act and the Regulations. The Central
Government/MCI would not encash the bank
petitioner
guarantee
college/institution. For
the
impugned order dated 10.8.2017 stands modified
to this extent only. The direction for a writ, order
or direction to the respondents to permit the
petitioner college/institution to admit students
for the academic year 2017-18, in the facts of the
case, is declined.”
furnished
the
present,
by
the | <para>
39.
In the course of hearing, Mr. Rohatgi, learned senior
counsel for the petitioners has placed heavy reliance on
<cite>Krishna Mohan Medical College and Hospital & Anr v.
Union of India & Anr 15 (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 448 of
2017 decided on 01.09.2017)</cite> and <cite>Dr. Jagat Narain
15 2017 SCC Online SC 1032
42
Subharti Charitable Trust & Anr v. Union of India &
Ors16</cite>.
</para>
<para>
40.
In <cite>Krishna Mohan Medical College (supra)</cite>, this
Court has held:-
therewith
for
in accordance
“… as the Act and Regulations framed thereunder
have been envisioned to attain the highest
standards of medical education, we direct the
Central Government/MCI to cause a
fresh
inspection of the petitioner college/institution to
be made
the
academic year 2018-19 and lay the report in
respect thereof before this Court within a period
of eight weeks herefrom. A copy of the report,
needless to state, would be furnished to the
petitioner college/institution at the earliest so as
to enable it to avail its remedies, if so advised,
under the Act and the Regulations. The Central
Government/MCI would not encash the bank
petitioner
guarantee
college/institution. For
the
impugned order dated 10.8.2017 stands modified
to this extent only. The direction for a writ, order
or direction to the respondents to permit the
petitioner college/institution to admit students
for the academic year 2017-18, in the facts of the
case, is declined.”
furnished
the
present,
by
the
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
41.
In <cite>Dr. Jagat Narain Subharti Charitable Trust
(supra)</cite>, the Court, while granting the benefit for academic
session 2017-2018, opined:-
“Thus, there has been substantial compliance of
the petitioners.
the said
requirement by
16 (2017) 10 SCALE 308
43
Assuming that the notification dated 16.10.2015
applied even to the proposal of the petitioners,
suffice it to observe that failure to furnish
information in the prescribed Form-5 cannot be
held against the petitioners. In any case, that is
not a deficiency relating to infrastructure or
academic matters as such, which may require a
different approach.”
42. The aforesaid decisions speak for themselves and,
therefore, reliance on the same by the petitioners is of no
avail. | <para>
41.
In <cite>Dr. Jagat Narain Subharti Charitable Trust
(supra)</cite>, the Court, while granting the benefit for academic
session 2017-2018, opined:-
“Thus, there has been substantial compliance of
the petitioners.
the said
requirement by
16 (2017) 10 SCALE 308
43
Assuming that the notification dated 16.10.2015
applied even to the proposal of the petitioners,
suffice it to observe that failure to furnish
information in the prescribed Form-5 cannot be
held against the petitioners. In any case, that is
not a deficiency relating to infrastructure or
academic matters as such, which may require a
different approach.”
</para>
<para>
42. The aforesaid decisions speak for themselves and,
therefore, reliance on the same by the petitioners is of no
avail.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
43. Dr. Rajiv Dhawan would submit that this Court should
not exercise appellate jurisdiction which is fundamentally
called an error jurisdiction or rectification of errors. We are
absolutely conscious of the appellate jurisdiction and the
jurisdiction this Court
is required to exercise while
determining the controversy in exercise of power of judicial
review under Article 32 of the Constitution. The principle of
judicial review by the constitutional courts have been
lucidly stated in many an authority of this Court. In <cite>Tata
Cellular v. Union of India17</cite>, dealing with the concept of
Judicial Review, the Court held:-
17 (1994) 6 SCC 651
44
“<icite>Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire County Council
v. Secretary of State
the Environment </icite>
proclaimed:
for
‘Judicial review’ is a great weapon in
the hands of the judges; but the judges
must observe the constitutional limits set
by our parliamentary system upon the
exercise of this beneficial power.”
Commenting upon this Michael Supperstone and
James Goudie in their work Judicial Review
(1992 Edn.) at p. 16 say:
it
has
“If anyone were prompted to dismiss this
sage warning as a mere obiter dictum
from the most radical member of the
higher judiciary of recent times, and
therefore to be treated as an idiosyncratic
aberration,
the
endorsement of the Law Lords generally.
The words of Lord Scarman were echoed
by Lord Bridge of Harwich, speaking on
behalf of the Board when reversing an
interventionist decision of
the New
Zealand Court of Appeal in <icite>Butcher v.
Petrocorp Exploration Ltd. 18-3-1991</icite>.”
received
Observance of judicial restraint is currently the
mood in England. The judicial power of review is
exercised to rein in any unbridled executive
functioning. The restraint has two contemporary
manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial
intervention; the other covers the scope of the
court’s ability to quash an administrative decision
on its merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks
of judicial control over administrative action.
Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not
the merits of the decision in support of which the
application for judicial review is made, but the
decision-making process itself.”
45
44. After so stating, reference was made to the law
enunciated in Chief Constable of the <icite>North Wales Police
v. Evans18</icite> wherein, it has been ruled:-
“Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an
appeal from a decision, but a review of the
manner in which the decision was made.
*
*
*
Judicial review is concerned, not with the
decision, but with the decision-making process.
Unless that restriction on the power of the court
is observed, the court will in my view, under the
guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself
guilty of usurping power.” | <para>
43. Dr. Rajiv Dhawan would submit that this Court should
not exercise appellate jurisdiction which is fundamentally
called an error jurisdiction or rectification of errors. We are
absolutely conscious of the appellate jurisdiction and the
jurisdiction this Court
is required to exercise while
determining the controversy in exercise of power of judicial
review under Article 32 of the Constitution. The principle of
judicial review by the constitutional courts have been
lucidly stated in many an authority of this Court. In <cite>Tata
Cellular v. Union of India17</cite>, dealing with the concept of
Judicial Review, the Court held:-
17 (1994) 6 SCC 651
44
“<icite>Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire County Council
v. Secretary of State
the Environment </icite>
proclaimed:
for
‘Judicial review’ is a great weapon in
the hands of the judges; but the judges
must observe the constitutional limits set
by our parliamentary system upon the
exercise of this beneficial power.”
Commenting upon this Michael Supperstone and
James Goudie in their work Judicial Review
(1992 Edn.) at p. 16 say:
it
has
“If anyone were prompted to dismiss this
sage warning as a mere obiter dictum
from the most radical member of the
higher judiciary of recent times, and
therefore to be treated as an idiosyncratic
aberration,
the
endorsement of the Law Lords generally.
The words of Lord Scarman were echoed
by Lord Bridge of Harwich, speaking on
behalf of the Board when reversing an
interventionist decision of
the New
Zealand Court of Appeal in <icite>Butcher v.
Petrocorp Exploration Ltd. 18-3-1991</icite>.”
received
Observance of judicial restraint is currently the
mood in England. The judicial power of review is
exercised to rein in any unbridled executive
functioning. The restraint has two contemporary
manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial
intervention; the other covers the scope of the
court’s ability to quash an administrative decision
on its merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks
of judicial control over administrative action.
Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not
the merits of the decision in support of which the
application for judicial review is made, but the
decision-making process itself.”
45
</para>
<para>
44. After so stating, reference was made to the law
enunciated in Chief Constable of the <icite>North Wales Police
v. Evans18</icite> wherein, it has been ruled:-
“Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an
appeal from a decision, but a review of the
manner in which the decision was made.
*
*
*
Judicial review is concerned, not with the
decision, but with the decision-making process.
Unless that restriction on the power of the court
is observed, the court will in my view, under the
guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself
guilty of usurping power.”
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
45.
In the said case, the Court also referred to R. v. Panel
on Take-overs and Mergers, ex. P. Datafin plc19 wherein
Sir John Donaldson, M.R. commented:-
“An application for judicial review is not an
appeal.”
46. The three Judge Bench further held:-
“The duty of the court is to confine itself to the
question of legality. Its concern should be:
1. Whether
authority exceeded its powers?
2. Committed an error of law,
a
decision-making
18 (1982) 3 All ER 141
19 (1987) 1 All ER 564
46
3. committed a breach of the rules of
natural justice,
4.
reached a decision which no
reasonable tribunal would have reached
or,
5. abused its powers.” | <para>
45.
In the said case, the Court also referred to R. v. Panel
on Take-overs and Mergers, ex. P. Datafin plc19 wherein
Sir John Donaldson, M.R. commented:-
“An application for judicial review is not an
appeal.”
</para>
<para>
46. The three Judge Bench further held:-
“The duty of the court is to confine itself to the
question of legality. Its concern should be:
1. Whether
authority exceeded its powers?
2. Committed an error of law,
a
decision-making
18 (1982) 3 All ER 141
19 (1987) 1 All ER 564
46
3. committed a breach of the rules of
natural justice,
4.
reached a decision which no
reasonable tribunal would have reached
or,
5. abused its powers.”
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
47. The Court further opined that in the process of judicial
review, it is only concerned with the manner in which the
decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty is to act
fairly. It will vary from case to case. Explicating further, it
ruled:-
“Shortly put, the grounds upon which an
administrative action is subject to control by
judicial review can be classified as under:
Illegality
: This means
(i)
the
decision-maker must
understand
correctly the law that regulates his
decision-making power and must give
effect to it.
(ii)
unreasonableness.
(iii) Procedural impropriety.
Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury
The above are only the broad grounds but it does
not rule out addition of further grounds in course
of time. As a matter of fact, in R. v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department, ex Brind, Lord
Diplock refers specifically to one development,
namely, the possible recognition of the principle
of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be
adopted is that the court should, “consider
whether something has gone wrong of a nature
and degree which requires its intervention”.
47
48. Thereafter, the Court referred to the authorities in <icite>R.
v. Askew 20 and Council of Civil Service Unions v.
Minister for Civil Service21</icite> and further expressed:-
“At this stage, The Supreme Court Practice, 1993,
Vol. 1, pp. 849-850, may be quoted:
“4. Wednesbury principle.— A decision of
a public authority will be liable to be
quashed or otherwise dealt with by an
appropriate order
judicial review
proceedings where the court concludes
that
that no
authority properly directing itself on the
relevant law and acting reasonably could
have reached it. (Associated Provincial
Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury
Corpn., per Lord Greene, M.R.)”
the decision
in
is such
We may hasten to add, though the decision was
rendered in the context of justification of grant of contract
but the principles set out as regards the judicial review are
of extreme significance. | <para>
47. The Court further opined that in the process of judicial
review, it is only concerned with the manner in which the
decisions have been taken. The extent of the duty is to act
fairly. It will vary from case to case. Explicating further, it
ruled:-
“Shortly put, the grounds upon which an
administrative action is subject to control by
judicial review can be classified as under:
Illegality
: This means
(i)
the
decision-maker must
understand
correctly the law that regulates his
decision-making power and must give
effect to it.
(ii)
unreasonableness.
(iii) Procedural impropriety.
Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury
The above are only the broad grounds but it does
not rule out addition of further grounds in course
of time. As a matter of fact, in R. v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department, ex Brind, Lord
Diplock refers specifically to one development,
namely, the possible recognition of the principle
of proportionality. In all these cases the test to be
adopted is that the court should, “consider
whether something has gone wrong of a nature
and degree which requires its intervention”.
47
</para>
<para>
48. Thereafter, the Court referred to the authorities in <icite>R.
v. Askew 20 and Council of Civil Service Unions v.
Minister for Civil Service21</icite> and further expressed:-
“At this stage, The Supreme Court Practice, 1993,
Vol. 1, pp. 849-850, may be quoted:
“4. Wednesbury principle.— A decision of
a public authority will be liable to be
quashed or otherwise dealt with by an
appropriate order
judicial review
proceedings where the court concludes
that
that no
authority properly directing itself on the
relevant law and acting reasonably could
have reached it. (Associated Provincial
Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury
Corpn., per Lord Greene, M.R.)”
the decision
in
is such
We may hasten to add, though the decision was
rendered in the context of justification of grant of contract
but the principles set out as regards the judicial review are
of extreme significance.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
49. Discussing at length, the principle of judicial review in
many a decision, the two Judge Bench in <cite>Reliance
Telecom Ltd. & Another v. Union of India & Another22</cite>,
has held:-
20 (1768) 4 Burr 2186 : 98 ER 139
21 (1985) 1 AC 374 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174
22 (2017) 4 SCC 269
48
“As we find, the decision taken by the Central
Government is based upon certain norms and
parameters. Though criticism has been advanced
that it is perverse and irrational, yet we are
disposed to think that it is a policy decision which
subserves the consumers’ interest. It is extremely
difficult to say that the decision to conduct the
auction in such a manner can be considered to be
mala fide or based on extraneous considerations.”
50. Thus analysed, it is evincible that the exercise of
power of judicial review and the extent to which it has to be
done will vary from case to case. It is necessary to state
with emphasis that it has its own complexity and would
depend upon the factual projection. The broad principles
have been laid down in <cite>Tata Cellular (supra)</cite> and other
decisions make it absolutely clear that judicial review, by no
stretch of imagination, can be equated with the power of
appeal, for while exercising the power under Article 226 or
32 of the Constitution, the constitutional courts do not
exercise such power. The process of adjudication on merit
by re-appreciation of the materials brought on record which
is the duty of the appellate court is not permissible. | <para>
49. Discussing at length, the principle of judicial review in
many a decision, the two Judge Bench in <cite>Reliance
Telecom Ltd. & Another v. Union of India & Another22</cite>,
has held:-
20 (1768) 4 Burr 2186 : 98 ER 139
21 (1985) 1 AC 374 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174
22 (2017) 4 SCC 269
48
“As we find, the decision taken by the Central
Government is based upon certain norms and
parameters. Though criticism has been advanced
that it is perverse and irrational, yet we are
disposed to think that it is a policy decision which
subserves the consumers’ interest. It is extremely
difficult to say that the decision to conduct the
auction in such a manner can be considered to be
mala fide or based on extraneous considerations.”
</para>
<para>
50. Thus analysed, it is evincible that the exercise of
power of judicial review and the extent to which it has to be
done will vary from case to case. It is necessary to state
with emphasis that it has its own complexity and would
depend upon the factual projection. The broad principles
have been laid down in <cite>Tata Cellular (supra)</cite> and other
decisions make it absolutely clear that judicial review, by no
stretch of imagination, can be equated with the power of
appeal, for while exercising the power under Article 226 or
32 of the Constitution, the constitutional courts do not
exercise such power. The process of adjudication on merit
by re-appreciation of the materials brought on record which
is the duty of the appellate court is not permissible.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
51. The duty of the Court in exercise of the power of
judicial review to zealously guard the human rights,
fundamental rights and the citizens’ right of life and liberty
49
as also many non-statutory powers of governmental bodies
as regards their control over property and assets of various
kinds. (See : <cite>Union of India and Anr. v S.B. Vohra23</cite>)
52. What Dr. Dhawan submits basically is that as the
order passed by the Central Government after the order
passed by the High Court of Kerala does not really reflect
any reason, this Court should axe the same treating it as
arbitrary and grant the LOP and that would be within the
power of judicial review. The order passed by the Central
Government has to be appreciated in its entirety. We repeat
at
the cost of repetition
that neither
the Central
Government nor the Hearing Committee is expected to pass
a judgment as a Judge is expected to do. The order must
reflect application of mind and should indicate reasons. We
may reiterate that the order dated 31st May, 2017, was
bereft of reason, but the order impugned, that is the order
dated 14th August, 2017, cannot be said to be sans reason.
Learned senior counsel would contend with all the vigour at
his command that it is not a reasoned one and for the same
23 (2004) 2 SCC 150
50
our attention has been drawn to the penultimate paragraph
of the order. | <para>
51. The duty of the Court in exercise of the power of
judicial review to zealously guard the human rights,
fundamental rights and the citizens’ right of life and liberty
49
as also many non-statutory powers of governmental bodies
as regards their control over property and assets of various
kinds. (See : <cite>Union of India and Anr. v S.B. Vohra23</cite>)
</para>
<para>
52. What Dr. Dhawan submits basically is that as the
order passed by the Central Government after the order
passed by the High Court of Kerala does not really reflect
any reason, this Court should axe the same treating it as
arbitrary and grant the LOP and that would be within the
power of judicial review. The order passed by the Central
Government has to be appreciated in its entirety. We repeat
at
the cost of repetition
that neither
the Central
Government nor the Hearing Committee is expected to pass
a judgment as a Judge is expected to do. The order must
reflect application of mind and should indicate reasons. We
may reiterate that the order dated 31st May, 2017, was
bereft of reason, but the order impugned, that is the order
dated 14th August, 2017, cannot be said to be sans reason.
Learned senior counsel would contend with all the vigour at
his command that it is not a reasoned one and for the same
23 (2004) 2 SCC 150
50
our attention has been drawn to the penultimate paragraph
of the order.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
53. We are of the considered opinion that the order of the
present nature has to be appreciated in entirety and when
we peruse the entire order, we find that substantial reasons
have been ascribed and, therefore, we are compelled to repel
the submissions so assiduously and astutely advanced by
Dr. Dhawan.
54. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the
case, we sum up our conclusions and directions, thus:-
(a) The petitioners are not entitled to Letter Of Permission
(LOP) for the academic session 2017-2018. We direct that
the order passed in the present writ petition shall be
applicable hereafter for the academic session 2017-2018
since the cut off date for admissions to MBBS course for
academic session 2017-2018 is over and the academic
session has commenced. No petition shall be entertained
from any institution/college/society/trust or any party for
grant of LOP for 2017-2018. We say so as the controversy
for grant of LOP for the academic year 2017-2018 should
51
come to an end and cannot become an event that defeats
time. The students who are continuing their studies on the
basis of LOP granted for the academic year 2016-2017
should be allowed to continue their studies in the college
and they shall be permitted to continue till completion of
the course.
(b) The applications submitted for 2017-2018 shall be
treated as applications for 2018-2019 and the petitioners
shall keep the bank guarantee deposited with the Medical
Council of India alive and the MCI shall not encash the
same.
(c) The Medical Council of India shall conduct a fresh
inspection as per the Regulations within a period of two
months. It shall apprise the petitioner-institution with
regard to the deficiencies and afford an opportunity to
comply with the same and, thereafter, proceed to act as
contemplated under the Act.
(d) The inspection shall be carried out for the purpose of
grant of LOP for the academic session 2018-2019.
52
(e) After
the Medical Council of
India sends
its
recommendation to the Central Government, it shall take
the final decision as per law after affording an opportunity
of hearing to the petitioners. Needless to say, it shall take
the assistance of the Hearing Committee as constituted by
the Constitution Bench decision in <cite>Amma Chandravati
Educational and Charitable Trust (supra)</cite> or other
directions given in the said decision.
55. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of. There
shall be no order as to costs. | <para>
53. We are of the considered opinion that the order of the
present nature has to be appreciated in entirety and when
we peruse the entire order, we find that substantial reasons
have been ascribed and, therefore, we are compelled to repel
the submissions so assiduously and astutely advanced by
Dr. Dhawan.
</para>
<para>
54. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the
case, we sum up our conclusions and directions, thus:-
(a) The petitioners are not entitled to Letter Of Permission
(LOP) for the academic session 2017-2018. We direct that
the order passed in the present writ petition shall be
applicable hereafter for the academic session 2017-2018
since the cut off date for admissions to MBBS course for
academic session 2017-2018 is over and the academic
session has commenced. No petition shall be entertained
from any institution/college/society/trust or any party for
grant of LOP for 2017-2018. We say so as the controversy
for grant of LOP for the academic year 2017-2018 should
51
come to an end and cannot become an event that defeats
time. The students who are continuing their studies on the
basis of LOP granted for the academic year 2016-2017
should be allowed to continue their studies in the college
and they shall be permitted to continue till completion of
the course.
(b) The applications submitted for 2017-2018 shall be
treated as applications for 2018-2019 and the petitioners
shall keep the bank guarantee deposited with the Medical
Council of India alive and the MCI shall not encash the
same.
(c) The Medical Council of India shall conduct a fresh
inspection as per the Regulations within a period of two
months. It shall apprise the petitioner-institution with
regard to the deficiencies and afford an opportunity to
comply with the same and, thereafter, proceed to act as
contemplated under the Act.
(d) The inspection shall be carried out for the purpose of
grant of LOP for the academic session 2018-2019.
52
(e) After
the Medical Council of
India sends
its
recommendation to the Central Government, it shall take
the final decision as per law after affording an opportunity
of hearing to the petitioners. Needless to say, it shall take
the assistance of the Hearing Committee as constituted by
the Constitution Bench decision in <cite>Amma Chandravati
Educational and Charitable Trust (supra)</cite> or other
directions given in the said decision.
</para>
<para>
55. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of. There
shall be no order as to costs.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
2.
This appeal is filed against the final judgment
and order dated 09.03.2015 passed by the Delhi
High Court in Execution Petition No.337 of 2014
with EA Nos.69798 of 2014 and EA Nos.199200 of
2015 whereby the High Court has dismissed the
Execution Petition and the accompanying
applications filed by appellant STC herein on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
3.
In order to appreciate the controversy involved
in this appeal, it is necessary to set out the relevant
facts hereinbelow. | <para>
2.
This appeal is filed against the final judgment
and order dated 09.03.2015 passed by the Delhi
High Court in Execution Petition No.337 of 2014
with EA Nos.69798 of 2014 and EA Nos.199200 of
2015 whereby the High Court has dismissed the
Execution Petition and the accompanying
applications filed by appellant STC herein on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
</para>
<para>
3.
In order to appreciate the controversy involved
in this appeal, it is necessary to set out the relevant
facts hereinbelow.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
4.
On 04.04.2005, a tripartite agreement was
entered into between the appellant i.e. State Trading
Corporation a Governmentowned Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as “STC”), respondent No.1
M/s Global Steel Holding Ltd. (hereinafter referred
to as “GSHL”), incorporated in the Isle of Man
Channel Islands, and respondent No. 2 M/s
Global Steel Philippines Inc., incorporated in the
2
Philippines (hereinafter referred to as “GSPI”).
Respondent No. 3 is Mr. Pramod Mittal, the
Chairman of the respondent nos. 1 and 2
companies, i.e. GSHL and GSPI. The agreement was
for purchase and sale of commodities known as
HR Coils and CR Coils.
5. Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel
appeared for the appellant – STC, while the
respondents were represented by Mr. Kapil Sibal,
Senior Advocate along with Mr. Gautam Mittra. | <para>
4.
On 04.04.2005, a tripartite agreement was
entered into between the appellant i.e. State Trading
Corporation a Governmentowned Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as “STC”), respondent No.1
M/s Global Steel Holding Ltd. (hereinafter referred
to as “GSHL”), incorporated in the Isle of Man
Channel Islands, and respondent No. 2 M/s
Global Steel Philippines Inc., incorporated in the
2
Philippines (hereinafter referred to as “GSPI”).
Respondent No. 3 is Mr. Pramod Mittal, the
Chairman of the respondent nos. 1 and 2
companies, i.e. GSHL and GSPI. The agreement was
for purchase and sale of commodities known as
HR Coils and CR Coils.
</para>
<para>
5. Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel
appeared for the appellant – STC, while the
respondents were represented by Mr. Kapil Sibal,
Senior Advocate along with Mr. Gautam Mittra.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
6.
In performance of the agreement, disputes
arose between the parties, particularly with respect
to the nonpayment of outstanding dues to the
appellant STC. The parties, therefore, decided to
settle their disputes by means of conciliation
proceedings with the assistance of two Conciliators.
7.
The parties (STC, GSHL and GSPI) entered into
a Settlement Agreement under Section 73 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short
3
“the Act”) on 15.11.2011.
In terms of the
Settlement Agreement, the GSHL and GSPI agreed
to pay a total amount of US$ 355,818,019.29 with
interest @ 13.25% p.a. by 11.05.2012 as per para
(D) of the Settlement Agreement to the appellant –
STC, and in the manner set out in detail in clauses
A to K of the Settlement Agreement. | <para>
6.
In performance of the agreement, disputes
arose between the parties, particularly with respect
to the nonpayment of outstanding dues to the
appellant STC. The parties, therefore, decided to
settle their disputes by means of conciliation
proceedings with the assistance of two Conciliators.
</para>
<para>
7.
The parties (STC, GSHL and GSPI) entered into
a Settlement Agreement under Section 73 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short
3
“the Act”) on 15.11.2011.
In terms of the
Settlement Agreement, the GSHL and GSPI agreed
to pay a total amount of US$ 355,818,019.29 with
interest @ 13.25% p.a. by 11.05.2012 as per para
(D) of the Settlement Agreement to the appellant –
STC, and in the manner set out in detail in clauses
A to K of the Settlement Agreement.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
8.
The GSHL and GSPI paid some amounts
pursuant to the Settlement Agreement to STC.
However, they failed to ensure full compliance with
the terms of the Settlement Agreement dated
15.11.2011 and committed default in paying full
payment to appellant STC.
9. The parties therefore entered into a Further
Settlement Agreement dated 17.05.2012 through
the intervention of the Conciliators.
10. As per the Further Settlement Agreement
dated 17.05.2012, GSHL and GSPI agreed to pay a
total amount of US $ 347,737,209.68 inclusive of
4
interest at the rate of 13.50 % p.a. (Rs.1605 crores
in Indian currency) by 10.11.2012 in the manner
set out in detail in clauses (i) and (vi) of the
agreement to the appellant STC. Both the
Settlement Agreement and the Further Settlement
Agreement were executed by respondent No. 3 Mr.
Pramod Mittal as Chairman of GSHL and GSPI,
respectively. | <para>
8.
The GSHL and GSPI paid some amounts
pursuant to the Settlement Agreement to STC.
However, they failed to ensure full compliance with
the terms of the Settlement Agreement dated
15.11.2011 and committed default in paying full
payment to appellant STC.
</para>
<para>
9. The parties therefore entered into a Further
Settlement Agreement dated 17.05.2012 through
the intervention of the Conciliators.
10. As per the Further Settlement Agreement
dated 17.05.2012, GSHL and GSPI agreed to pay a
total amount of US $ 347,737,209.68 inclusive of
4
interest at the rate of 13.50 % p.a. (Rs.1605 crores
in Indian currency) by 10.11.2012 in the manner
set out in detail in clauses (i) and (vi) of the
agreement to the appellant STC. Both the
Settlement Agreement and the Further Settlement
Agreement were executed by respondent No. 3 Mr.
Pramod Mittal as Chairman of GSHL and GSPI,
respectively.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
11. As per Clause 12 (iv) of the Further Settlement
Agreement (supra), respondent No. 3 Mr. Pramod
Mittal furnished a Personal Guarantee dated
17.05.2012 wherein he personally guaranteed
payment of the outstanding amount payable by
GSHL and GSPI to the appellant – STC in terms of
the Settlement Agreement dated 15.11.2011
together with interest @ 13.25% p.a. and Further
Settlement Agreement dated 17.05.2012. The said
respondent undertook to pay the outstanding
amount, and stated that the guarantee shall remain
5
valid till the entire outstanding dues of GSHL and
GSPI were fully discharged.
12. Since GSHL and GSPI failed to fulfill their
complete obligations under the Further Settlement
Agreement dated 17.05.2012,
the appellant STC
herein filed an Execution Petition bearing
No.337/2014 in the High Court of Delhi on
30.08.2014 against GSHL (R1), GSPI (R2) and Mr.
Pramod Mittal, Chairman, GSHL(R3) seeking to
execute the Settlement Agreements dated
15.11.2011 and 17.05.2012 against all the
respondents for recovery of the balance outstanding
amounts due and payable. | <para>
11. As per Clause 12 (iv) of the Further Settlement
Agreement (supra), respondent No. 3 Mr. Pramod
Mittal furnished a Personal Guarantee dated
17.05.2012 wherein he personally guaranteed
payment of the outstanding amount payable by
GSHL and GSPI to the appellant – STC in terms of
the Settlement Agreement dated 15.11.2011
together with interest @ 13.25% p.a. and Further
Settlement Agreement dated 17.05.2012. The said
respondent undertook to pay the outstanding
amount, and stated that the guarantee shall remain
5
valid till the entire outstanding dues of GSHL and
GSPI were fully discharged.
</para>
<para>
12. Since GSHL and GSPI failed to fulfill their
complete obligations under the Further Settlement
Agreement dated 17.05.2012,
the appellant STC
herein filed an Execution Petition bearing
No.337/2014 in the High Court of Delhi on
30.08.2014 against GSHL (R1), GSPI (R2) and Mr.
Pramod Mittal, Chairman, GSHL(R3) seeking to
execute the Settlement Agreements dated
15.11.2011 and 17.05.2012 against all the
respondents for recovery of the balance outstanding
amounts due and payable.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
13. The appellant – STC, the decree holder, filed
Execution Applications Nos. 697/2014 and 199
200/2015. Insofar as application No.697/2014 was
concerned, it was filed under Order 21 Rule 11 (2) of
CPC for attachment and sale of all shares and other
assets of the respondent No.1, with a further prayer
6
for issuance of warrants of arrest against the
Directors and Principal Officers of respondent Nos.1
and 2 till realization of entire dues.
14. The Delhi High Court vide order dated
09.03.2015, dismissed the Execution Petition along
with the accompanying applications on the ground
that admittedly none of the judgmentdebtors is
located within the jurisdiction of the Court. The
Registered Offices of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were
outside India. The Execution Petition could be
entertained by a Court within whose jurisdiction the
judgmentdebtors, or their properties were situated.
That since none of them is ordinarily resident within
the jurisdiction of the Court, the Execution Petition
could not be entertained, and was dismissed with
liberty to the decreeholder to approach the
appropriate court for enforcement of the Settlement
Award in accordance with law.
7 | <para>
13. The appellant – STC, the decree holder, filed
Execution Applications Nos. 697/2014 and 199
200/2015. Insofar as application No.697/2014 was
concerned, it was filed under Order 21 Rule 11 (2) of
CPC for attachment and sale of all shares and other
assets of the respondent No.1, with a further prayer
6
for issuance of warrants of arrest against the
Directors and Principal Officers of respondent Nos.1
and 2 till realization of entire dues.
</para>
<para>
14. The Delhi High Court vide order dated
09.03.2015, dismissed the Execution Petition along
with the accompanying applications on the ground
that admittedly none of the judgmentdebtors is
located within the jurisdiction of the Court. The
Registered Offices of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 were
outside India. The Execution Petition could be
entertained by a Court within whose jurisdiction the
judgmentdebtors, or their properties were situated.
That since none of them is ordinarily resident within
the jurisdiction of the Court, the Execution Petition
could not be entertained, and was dismissed with
liberty to the decreeholder to approach the
appropriate court for enforcement of the Settlement
Award in accordance with law.
7
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
15. Aggrieved by the Order dated 09.03.2015
passed by the Delhi High Court, the appellant STC
(Decree Holder) filed the present Special Leave
Petition before this Court.
16. During the pendency of the Special Leave
Petition, various Orders were passed from timeto
time directing the respondents to make payments to
STC. The details and break up of payments offered
and then made by the respondents to the appellant
STC on different dates are mentioned in the
Orders dated 19.08.2015, 21.09.2015, 14.12.2015,
05.2.2016, 06.02.2017, 10.04.2017, 31.07.2017,
22.03.2018,
15.05.2018,
13.08.2018,
and
06.09.2018. | <para>
15. Aggrieved by the Order dated 09.03.2015
passed by the Delhi High Court, the appellant STC
(Decree Holder) filed the present Special Leave
Petition before this Court.
</para>
<para>
16. During the pendency of the Special Leave
Petition, various Orders were passed from timeto
time directing the respondents to make payments to
STC. The details and break up of payments offered
and then made by the respondents to the appellant
STC on different dates are mentioned in the
Orders dated 19.08.2015, 21.09.2015, 14.12.2015,
05.2.2016, 06.02.2017, 10.04.2017, 31.07.2017,
22.03.2018,
15.05.2018,
13.08.2018,
and
06.09.2018.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
17. The Senior Counsel for the respondents, Mr.
Kapil Sibal submitted that an amount of Rs. 810
crores approximately was paid towards the
outstanding liability under the two Settlement
8
Agreements dated 15.11.2011 and 17.05.2012 to
the appellant STC.
18. When the matter was taken up for final
hearing, the Senior Counsel Mr. Kapil Sibal
appearing for the respondents offered to deposit Rs.
800 crores, without prejudice to their right to
prosecute the case, within 4 weeks to show their
bona fides to the Court. | <para>
17. The Senior Counsel for the respondents, Mr.
Kapil Sibal submitted that an amount of Rs. 810
crores approximately was paid towards the
outstanding liability under the two Settlement
8
Agreements dated 15.11.2011 and 17.05.2012 to
the appellant STC.
</para>
<para>
18. When the matter was taken up for final
hearing, the Senior Counsel Mr. Kapil Sibal
appearing for the respondents offered to deposit Rs.
800 crores, without prejudice to their right to
prosecute the case, within 4 weeks to show their
bona fides to the Court.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
19. Accordingly, on 31.10.2018, the following
Order was passed:
“Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel
appearing for respondent No. 2 in SLP (Civil)
No. 14585/2015, during the course of
hearing, states that without prejudice to the
right to prosecute the case, they are
prepared to deposit the sum of Rs.
800,00,00,000/ (Rupees Eight Hundred
Crores) within the period of 4 weeks from
today.
Let them so deposit.
It is made clear that nonpayment of the
amount will be viewed seriously.”
20. That on 29.11.2018, the Senior Counsel for the
respondents brought Demand Drafts for Rs.810
9
crores in favour of the Decree Holder – STC. The
matter was posted for hearing on 04.12.2018.
21. When the matter was taken up for hearing on
04.12.2018, the Demand Drafts for Rs. 800 crores
were directed to be handed over to the Court Master
in a sealed envelope. | <para>
19. Accordingly, on 31.10.2018, the following
Order was passed:
“Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel
appearing for respondent No. 2 in SLP (Civil)
No. 14585/2015, during the course of
hearing, states that without prejudice to the
right to prosecute the case, they are
prepared to deposit the sum of Rs.
800,00,00,000/ (Rupees Eight Hundred
Crores) within the period of 4 weeks from
today.
Let them so deposit.
It is made clear that nonpayment of the
amount will be viewed seriously.”
</para>
<para>
20. That on 29.11.2018, the Senior Counsel for the
respondents brought Demand Drafts for Rs.810
9
crores in favour of the Decree Holder – STC. The
matter was posted for hearing on 04.12.2018.
21. When the matter was taken up for hearing on
04.12.2018, the Demand Drafts for Rs. 800 crores
were directed to be handed over to the Court Master
in a sealed envelope.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
22. With the payment of Rs. 800 crores on
04.12.2018, the respondents have till date
deposited an amount of
Rs.1610 crores
approximately in INR in discharge of their liability.
23. As a consequence, the entire liability of the
respondents till
10.11.2012 would stand
discharged. | <para>
22. With the payment of Rs. 800 crores on
04.12.2018, the respondents have till date
deposited an amount of
Rs.1610 crores
approximately in INR in discharge of their liability.
</para>
<para>
23. As a consequence, the entire liability of the
respondents till
10.11.2012 would stand
discharged.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
24. The issue which now only remains for
resolution is the interest payable from 10.11.2012
onwards. The interest payable on the outstanding
amounts was left to be determined by the Court, by
the senior counsel appearing for both the parties.
10
25. At this juncture, we consider it appropriate to
place on record our appreciation of the valuable
assistance provided by both the senior counsel, Mr.
DA Dave and Mr. Kapil Sibal in enabling the parties
to resolve the disputes. The senior counsel
addressed the myriad legal issues which arose in
the case with clarity, persuasiveness, lucidity and
industry. | <para>
24. The issue which now only remains for
resolution is the interest payable from 10.11.2012
onwards. The interest payable on the outstanding
amounts was left to be determined by the Court, by
the senior counsel appearing for both the parties.
10
</para>
<para>
25. At this juncture, we consider it appropriate to
place on record our appreciation of the valuable
assistance provided by both the senior counsel, Mr.
DA Dave and Mr. Kapil Sibal in enabling the parties
to resolve the disputes. The senior counsel
addressed the myriad legal issues which arose in
the case with clarity, persuasiveness, lucidity and
industry.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
26. Learned senior counsel for the respondents
submitted that even though the question with
respect to payment of interest pendente lite, and the
rate of interest, was not the subjectmatter of the
original proceeding, it was prayed that this Court
may give a quietus to the long pendency of this
litigation by passing appropriate orders.
27. Both the senior counsel prayed that this
Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles
136 and 142 of the Constitution, exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction to determine the amount
11
payable towards interest, and the period within
which it should be paid. | <para>
26. Learned senior counsel for the respondents
submitted that even though the question with
respect to payment of interest pendente lite, and the
rate of interest, was not the subjectmatter of the
original proceeding, it was prayed that this Court
may give a quietus to the long pendency of this
litigation by passing appropriate orders.
</para>
<para>
27. Both the senior counsel prayed that this
Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles
136 and 142 of the Constitution, exercise its
extraordinary jurisdiction to determine the amount
11
payable towards interest, and the period within
which it should be paid.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
28. Having heard the learned senior counsel for
the parties, and on perusal of the record, we are of
the considered opinion that it is not necessary to
decide the various legal issues arising in the case
which were ably presented by both the learned
senior counsel in support of their case on the
question of jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court in
entertaining and deciding the Execution Petition
filed by the appellant.
29. Since the parties have requested for
termination of these proceedings finally in this
appeal itself, and secondly, the outstanding dues
have already been cleared by the respondents
during the pendency of this appeal though late
leaving only a limited controversy alive regarding
payment of interest, we are of the considered
opinion that there is no legal impediment in
12
deciding the issue of payment of interest and its
rate in this appeal finally to give quietus to this
litigation. | <para>
28. Having heard the learned senior counsel for
the parties, and on perusal of the record, we are of
the considered opinion that it is not necessary to
decide the various legal issues arising in the case
which were ably presented by both the learned
senior counsel in support of their case on the
question of jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court in
entertaining and deciding the Execution Petition
filed by the appellant.
</para>
<para>
29. Since the parties have requested for
termination of these proceedings finally in this
appeal itself, and secondly, the outstanding dues
have already been cleared by the respondents
during the pendency of this appeal though late
leaving only a limited controversy alive regarding
payment of interest, we are of the considered
opinion that there is no legal impediment in
12
deciding the issue of payment of interest and its
rate in this appeal finally to give quietus to this
litigation.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
30. Having given our anxious consideration to all
the aforementioned factors, we are of the view that
the respondents are liable to pay Interest on the
principal sum of Rs.1610 crores to the appellant at
rate of 8% per annum payable from 10.11.2012, i.e.
when the entire payment became due.
31. We direct that:
(i)
The Demand Drafts for Rs. 800 crores (Rupees
Eight Hundred Crores) furnished by the
respondents, be handed over to STC Decree
Holder;
(ii)
A lumpsum amount of Rs.600 crores (Rupees
Six Hundred Crores) worked out on the basis
of 8% S.I. per annum (rounded off) be paid by
the respondents to the appellant towards full
and final satisfaction of the amounts due
13
under the Settlement Agreement dated
15.11.2011,
and Further
Settlement
Agreement dated 17.05.2012.
(iii) The amount of Rs.600 crores be paid by the
respondents to STC towards interest in 12
weeks from the date of this Order.
(iv) Upon payment of the said amount by
28.02.2019, all claims arising out of the two
Settlement Agreements (supra), would stand
finally settled, and put a complete closure to
all pending proceedings of any nature
whatsoever, between the parties, wherever filed
and/or pending against each other.
(v)
If, however, the amount of Rs. 600 crores
awarded towards interest is not paid on or
before 28.02.2019, it would amount to
contempt of the Order passed by this Court,
and it would be open to the appellant to take
14
appropriate action against the respondents in
accordance with law for noncompliance.
32.
In light of the foregoing discussion and the
directions, the appeal, along with all pending
applications, stand disposed of.
The contempt
petitions are also disposed of accordingly. | <para>
30. Having given our anxious consideration to all
the aforementioned factors, we are of the view that
the respondents are liable to pay Interest on the
principal sum of Rs.1610 crores to the appellant at
rate of 8% per annum payable from 10.11.2012, i.e.
when the entire payment became due.
</para>
<para>
31. We direct that:
(i)
The Demand Drafts for Rs. 800 crores (Rupees
Eight Hundred Crores) furnished by the
respondents, be handed over to STC Decree
Holder;
(ii)
A lumpsum amount of Rs.600 crores (Rupees
Six Hundred Crores) worked out on the basis
of 8% S.I. per annum (rounded off) be paid by
the respondents to the appellant towards full
and final satisfaction of the amounts due
13
under the Settlement Agreement dated
15.11.2011,
and Further
Settlement
Agreement dated 17.05.2012.
(iii) The amount of Rs.600 crores be paid by the
respondents to STC towards interest in 12
weeks from the date of this Order.
(iv) Upon payment of the said amount by
28.02.2019, all claims arising out of the two
Settlement Agreements (supra), would stand
finally settled, and put a complete closure to
all pending proceedings of any nature
whatsoever, between the parties, wherever filed
and/or pending against each other.
(v)
If, however, the amount of Rs. 600 crores
awarded towards interest is not paid on or
before 28.02.2019, it would amount to
contempt of the Order passed by this Court,
and it would be open to the appellant to take
14
appropriate action against the respondents in
accordance with law for noncompliance.
</para>
<para>
32.
In light of the foregoing discussion and the
directions, the appeal, along with all pending
applications, stand disposed of.
The contempt
petitions are also disposed of accordingly.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
This Appeal under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code, 2016 (IBC) is against an interim order dated 18th August 2021
passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT),
Principal Bench at New Delhi in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.
598 of 2021, filed by the Appellant, whereby the NCLAT issued notice
of the Appeal, but did not restrain the Interim Resolution Professional
(IRP) from proceeding with Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process
(CIRP) of M/s Seya Industries Limited (hereinafter referred to as
“Corporate Debtor”). The NCLAT, however, restrained the IRP from
1
constituting a Committee of Creditors (CoC) till the next date of
hearing. In the meanwhile, the Appellant and the Respondents were
given the opportunity to settle their disputes before the Adjudicating
Authority (NCLT) in terms of Section 12A of the IBC read with Rule 11 of
the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 (NCLT Rules). The
appeal was directed to be listed for hearing on 13th September 2021.
The Appellant is an erstwhile Director of Respondent No. 4, that
2.
is the Corporate Debtor. The Corporate Debtor, a company
incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 has been carrying on
business, inter alia, of manufacture of benzene based Speciality
Chemicals since 1990. It is stated that the Corporate Debtor had
invested about Rs.400 Crores in its existing manufacturing facilities
and had further invested about Rs.900 Crores in an integrated
Greenfield Mega Project for Speciality Chemicals. | <para>
This Appeal under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code, 2016 (IBC) is against an interim order dated 18th August 2021
passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT),
Principal Bench at New Delhi in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.
598 of 2021, filed by the Appellant, whereby the NCLAT issued notice
of the Appeal, but did not restrain the Interim Resolution Professional
(IRP) from proceeding with Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process
(CIRP) of M/s Seya Industries Limited (hereinafter referred to as
“Corporate Debtor”). The NCLAT, however, restrained the IRP from
1
constituting a Committee of Creditors (CoC) till the next date of
hearing. In the meanwhile, the Appellant and the Respondents were
given the opportunity to settle their disputes before the Adjudicating
Authority (NCLT) in terms of Section 12A of the IBC read with Rule 11 of
the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 (NCLT Rules). The
appeal was directed to be listed for hearing on 13th September 2021.
</para>
<para>
The Appellant is an erstwhile Director of Respondent No. 4, that
2.
is the Corporate Debtor. The Corporate Debtor, a company
incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 has been carrying on
business, inter alia, of manufacture of benzene based Speciality
Chemicals since 1990. It is stated that the Corporate Debtor had
invested about Rs.400 Crores in its existing manufacturing facilities
and had further invested about Rs.900 Crores in an integrated
Greenfield Mega Project for Speciality Chemicals.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
3.
According to the Appellant, the Corporate Debtor is the source of
livelihood for about 150 workmen, 40 unskilled workers and 75
employees on its payroll and is engaged with more than 200
Customers/Vendors. It is claimed that the Corporate Debtor has a net
worth of Rs. 972 Crores and fixed assets worth more than Rs.1500
Crores.
4.
In order to expand its chemical manufacturing plant at Tarapur,
Palghar (Maharashtra), the Corporate Debtor raised capital and the
Respondent No.1 - M/s Beacon Trusteeship Limited (hereinafter
referred to as “Beacon Trusteeship”) committed to invest Rs. 100
2
Crores in the said integrated Greenfield Mega Project, in the form of
Rs.20 Crores, towards Compulsorily Convertible Preference Shares
(CCPS) and Rs. 80 Crores, by way of Non-Convertible Debentures
(NCDs). Thereafter the Appellant, the Corporate Debtor and
Respondent-Beacon Trusteeship executed a Debenture Trust Deed
(DTD), inter-alia, recording the terms and conditions of the issue of
said NCDs. The Respondent No. 1 was appointed, the Debenture
Trustee as recorded in the DTD. The DTD laid down the obligations of
the Corporate Debtor towards the NCDs. | <para>
3.
According to the Appellant, the Corporate Debtor is the source of
livelihood for about 150 workmen, 40 unskilled workers and 75
employees on its payroll and is engaged with more than 200
Customers/Vendors. It is claimed that the Corporate Debtor has a net
worth of Rs. 972 Crores and fixed assets worth more than Rs.1500
Crores.
</para>
<para>
4.
In order to expand its chemical manufacturing plant at Tarapur,
Palghar (Maharashtra), the Corporate Debtor raised capital and the
Respondent No.1 - M/s Beacon Trusteeship Limited (hereinafter
referred to as “Beacon Trusteeship”) committed to invest Rs. 100
2
Crores in the said integrated Greenfield Mega Project, in the form of
Rs.20 Crores, towards Compulsorily Convertible Preference Shares
(CCPS) and Rs. 80 Crores, by way of Non-Convertible Debentures
(NCDs). Thereafter the Appellant, the Corporate Debtor and
Respondent-Beacon Trusteeship executed a Debenture Trust Deed
(DTD), inter-alia, recording the terms and conditions of the issue of
said NCDs. The Respondent No. 1 was appointed, the Debenture
Trustee as recorded in the DTD. The DTD laid down the obligations of
the Corporate Debtor towards the NCDs.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
5.
On or about 11th March 2019, Beacon Trusteeship released a sum
of Rs.72,00,00,000/- (INR Seventy Two Crores) toward subscriptions of
360 Series A debentures and 360 Series B Debentures ("First tranche
Debentures"). The aforesaid amount was to be invested in capacity
expansion of the company and hence not available as cashflow. The
service of interest for the first tranche had to be met out of the second
tranche of Rs. 8 Crores to be invested by the Beacon Trusteeship which
would have created the cash flow for the same and the remaining
amount was to be invested for Capex investment. Beacon Trusteeship,
however, defaulted in making payment of the second tranche of Rs. 8
Crores.
In addition to the DTD dated 8th March 2019, the parties entered
6.
into a Supplemental Deed dated 14th March 2019 revising certain
terms set out in DTD including the timelines and schedule for the
Interest Payment Dates.
3 | <para>
5.
On or about 11th March 2019, Beacon Trusteeship released a sum
of Rs.72,00,00,000/- (INR Seventy Two Crores) toward subscriptions of
360 Series A debentures and 360 Series B Debentures ("First tranche
Debentures"). The aforesaid amount was to be invested in capacity
expansion of the company and hence not available as cashflow. The
service of interest for the first tranche had to be met out of the second
tranche of Rs. 8 Crores to be invested by the Beacon Trusteeship which
would have created the cash flow for the same and the remaining
amount was to be invested for Capex investment. Beacon Trusteeship,
however, defaulted in making payment of the second tranche of Rs. 8
Crores.
</para>
<para>
In addition to the DTD dated 8th March 2019, the parties entered
6.
into a Supplemental Deed dated 14th March 2019 revising certain
terms set out in DTD including the timelines and schedule for the
Interest Payment Dates.
3
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
7.
On 31st May 2019, the Corporate Debtor sent an email to the
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, requesting payment of the second tranche of
Rs.8 Crores in terms of the DTD. The Corporate Debtor also issued
notice to the Respondent Nos.1 to 3 to make payment of second
tranche of Rs. 8 Crores.
8.
On 12th September 2019, the Corporate Debtor took recourse to
Arbitration Proceedings against the other Respondents. Beacon
Trusteeship issued a notice to the Corporate Debtor regarding non-
payment of interest amount of Rs.2,18,95,890.41/-. Beacon Trusteeship
also issued an Enforcement Notice accelerating payment of the full
investment amount i.e. Rs.77,94,92,513/- as due on 17th October 2019
on account of non-payment of Rs.2,18,95,890.41/- being interest
coupon amount. | <para>
7.
On 31st May 2019, the Corporate Debtor sent an email to the
Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, requesting payment of the second tranche of
Rs.8 Crores in terms of the DTD. The Corporate Debtor also issued
notice to the Respondent Nos.1 to 3 to make payment of second
tranche of Rs. 8 Crores.
</para>
<para>
8.
On 12th September 2019, the Corporate Debtor took recourse to
Arbitration Proceedings against the other Respondents. Beacon
Trusteeship issued a notice to the Corporate Debtor regarding non-
payment of interest amount of Rs.2,18,95,890.41/-. Beacon Trusteeship
also issued an Enforcement Notice accelerating payment of the full
investment amount i.e. Rs.77,94,92,513/- as due on 17th October 2019
on account of non-payment of Rs.2,18,95,890.41/- being interest
coupon amount.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
On 18th October 2019, the Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 invoked
9.
Clause 6.1 of the share pledge agreement and transferred 26.60 lakh
shares worth Rs 91.78 Crores into the DEMAT Account(s) of the
Respondents.
10.
Between 18th-20th October 2019, the Corporate Debtor initiated
Arbitration Proceedings before the High Court of Bombay. While the
Arbitral Proceedings, to which the Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 had
themselves agreed and consented to, were pending, they filed an
application under Section 7 of the IBC before the National Company
Law Tribunal (NCLT), Mumbai Bench.
4 | <para>
On 18th October 2019, the Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 invoked
9.
Clause 6.1 of the share pledge agreement and transferred 26.60 lakh
shares worth Rs 91.78 Crores into the DEMAT Account(s) of the
Respondents.
</para>
<para>
10.
Between 18th-20th October 2019, the Corporate Debtor initiated
Arbitration Proceedings before the High Court of Bombay. While the
Arbitral Proceedings, to which the Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 had
themselves agreed and consented to, were pending, they filed an
application under Section 7 of the IBC before the National Company
Law Tribunal (NCLT), Mumbai Bench.
4
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
11.
On 15th January 2020, the Corporate Debtor filed its statement
of claim seeking an award aggregating to Rs.848,75,30,000/- for losses
and damages suffered by it.
12. On 26th February 2020, the Respondents filed statement of
defence and counter claim seeking an award for payment of its claim
amounting to Rs.73,56,59,238/-. | <para>
11.
On 15th January 2020, the Corporate Debtor filed its statement
of claim seeking an award aggregating to Rs.848,75,30,000/- for losses
and damages suffered by it.
</para>
<para>
12. On 26th February 2020, the Respondents filed statement of
defence and counter claim seeking an award for payment of its claim
amounting to Rs.73,56,59,238/-.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
13. On 24th March 2021, the Arbitrator passed an interim award in
favour of Beacon Trusteeship and other Respondents and directed the
Corporate Debtor to make payment of Rs.72,06,99,244/- along with
interest.
14. On 21st April 2021, being aggrieved by the order of the
Arbitrator, the Appellant and Corporate Debtor preferred an arbitration
petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
before the High Court of Bombay which is still pending. | <para>
13. On 24th March 2021, the Arbitrator passed an interim award in
favour of Beacon Trusteeship and other Respondents and directed the
Corporate Debtor to make payment of Rs.72,06,99,244/- along with
interest.
</para>
<para>
14. On 21st April 2021, being aggrieved by the order of the
Arbitrator, the Appellant and Corporate Debtor preferred an arbitration
petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
before the High Court of Bombay which is still pending.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
The NCLT, Mumbai Bench heard the matter and reserved its
15.
order on 13th May 2021. On 1st July 2021, the Corporate Debtor and
the Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 filed a joint application before the NCLT,
Mumbai Bench requesting to defer the order as the parties were in the
process of arriving at a settlement and sought time till 10th July 2021.
16. On 12th July 2021, the Corporate Debtor and the Respondents
Nos. 1 to 3 again filed a joint application before the NCLT, Mumbai
Bench seeking further time till 23rd July 2021 for arriving at a
settlement. Thereafter, on 26th July 2021, they again sought time for
5
settlement till 12th August 2021. | <para>
The NCLT, Mumbai Bench heard the matter and reserved its
15.
order on 13th May 2021. On 1st July 2021, the Corporate Debtor and
the Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 filed a joint application before the NCLT,
Mumbai Bench requesting to defer the order as the parties were in the
process of arriving at a settlement and sought time till 10th July 2021.
</para>
<para>
16. On 12th July 2021, the Corporate Debtor and the Respondents
Nos. 1 to 3 again filed a joint application before the NCLT, Mumbai
Bench seeking further time till 23rd July 2021 for arriving at a
settlement. Thereafter, on 26th July 2021, they again sought time for
5
settlement till 12th August 2021.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
17. On 3rd August 2021, the NCLT, Mumbai Bench, rejected the
request of the parties for further deferment of orders for arriving at a
settlement and admitted and allowed the application under Section 7
of the IBC preferred by Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 against Corporate
Debtor.
Being aggrieved by the order dated 3rd August 2021 passed by
18.
the NCLT, Mumbai Bench, admitting and allowing application for
initiating CIRP against the Corporate Debtor, the Appellant who is
Director of the Corporate Debtor filed an appeal being Company
Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 598 of 2022 in the NCLAT, New Delhi. | <para>
17. On 3rd August 2021, the NCLT, Mumbai Bench, rejected the
request of the parties for further deferment of orders for arriving at a
settlement and admitted and allowed the application under Section 7
of the IBC preferred by Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 against Corporate
Debtor.
</para>
<para>
Being aggrieved by the order dated 3rd August 2021 passed by
18.
the NCLT, Mumbai Bench, admitting and allowing application for
initiating CIRP against the Corporate Debtor, the Appellant who is
Director of the Corporate Debtor filed an appeal being Company
Appeal (AT)(Insolvency) No. 598 of 2022 in the NCLAT, New Delhi.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
19. On 8th August 2021, the parties had amicably settled their
disputes and entered into a formal settlement, a copy of which is
annexed to the paper book as annexure A-25.
20. On 10th August 2021, the NCLAT considering the settlement
arrived at between the parties, granted interim stay of publication
under Section 13 of the IBC and further gave liberty to the parties to
adopt procedure under Section 12A of IBC. | <para>
19. On 8th August 2021, the parties had amicably settled their
disputes and entered into a formal settlement, a copy of which is
annexed to the paper book as annexure A-25.
</para>
<para>
20. On 10th August 2021, the NCLAT considering the settlement
arrived at between the parties, granted interim stay of publication
under Section 13 of the IBC and further gave liberty to the parties to
adopt procedure under Section 12A of IBC.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
21. On 12th August 2021, the parties with the consent of the IRP filed
an application under Section 12A of the IBC before the NCLT, Mumbai.
However, the same has not been listed till date.
6
22. On 18th August 2021, the NCLAT stayed the formation of CoC, but
declined to exercise its power under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules to take
on record the settlement and dispose of the matter. Further, the
NCLAT permitted the IRP to issue publication and also handover all
assets and proceed with the CIRP even though the matter had been
settled between the parties. Being dissatisfied by the order dated 18th
August 2021 of the NCLAT, the Appellant has preferred the present
Civil Appeal. | <para>
21. On 12th August 2021, the parties with the consent of the IRP filed
an application under Section 12A of the IBC before the NCLT, Mumbai.
However, the same has not been listed till date.
6
</para>
<para>
22. On 18th August 2021, the NCLAT stayed the formation of CoC, but
declined to exercise its power under Rule 11 of the NCLAT Rules to take
on record the settlement and dispose of the matter. Further, the
NCLAT permitted the IRP to issue publication and also handover all
assets and proceed with the CIRP even though the matter had been
settled between the parties. Being dissatisfied by the order dated 18th
August 2021 of the NCLAT, the Appellant has preferred the present
Civil Appeal.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
Section 12A of the IBC enables the Adjudicating Authority to
23.
allow the withdrawal of an application admitted under Section 7 or
Section 9 or Section 10, on an application made by the applicant with
the approval of 90% voting shares of the Committee of Creditors in
such a manner as may be specified.
Section 12A of the IBC clearly permits withdrawal of an
24.
application under Section 7 of the IBC that has been admitted on an
application made by the applicant. The question of approval of the
Committee of Creditors by the requisite percentage of votes, can only
arise after the Committee of Creditors is constituted. Before the
Committee of Creditors is constituted, there is, in our view, no bar to
withdrawal by the applicant of an application admitted under Section 7
of the IBC. | <para>
Section 12A of the IBC enables the Adjudicating Authority to
23.
allow the withdrawal of an application admitted under Section 7 or
Section 9 or Section 10, on an application made by the applicant with
the approval of 90% voting shares of the Committee of Creditors in
such a manner as may be specified.
</para>
<para>
Section 12A of the IBC clearly permits withdrawal of an
24.
application under Section 7 of the IBC that has been admitted on an
application made by the applicant. The question of approval of the
Committee of Creditors by the requisite percentage of votes, can only
arise after the Committee of Creditors is constituted. Before the
Committee of Creditors is constituted, there is, in our view, no bar to
withdrawal by the applicant of an application admitted under Section 7
of the IBC.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
25.
In exercise of power conferred by Section 469 of the Companies
Act, 2013, the Central Government has made the National Company
Law Tribunal Rules, 2016, hereinafter, referred to as the “NCLT Rules”.
7
Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules reads as :-
“11. Inherent Powers.- Nothing in these rules shall be
deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of
the Tribunal to make such orders as may be necessary for
meeting the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the
process of the Tribunal.”
26.
As stated in its statement of objects and reasons, the object of
the IBC is to consolidate and amend the laws relating to re-
organisation and insolvency resolution of corporate persons,
partnership firms and individuals in a time bound manner for
maximisation of value of assets of such persons, to promote
entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balance of interests of all
stakeholders including alteration in the order of priority of payment of
Government dues and to establish an Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Board of India and matters connected therewith or thereto. | <para>
25.
In exercise of power conferred by Section 469 of the Companies
Act, 2013, the Central Government has made the National Company
Law Tribunal Rules, 2016, hereinafter, referred to as the “NCLT Rules”.
7
Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules reads as :-
“11. Inherent Powers.- Nothing in these rules shall be
deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of
the Tribunal to make such orders as may be necessary for
meeting the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the
process of the Tribunal.”
</para>
<para>
26.
As stated in its statement of objects and reasons, the object of
the IBC is to consolidate and amend the laws relating to re-
organisation and insolvency resolution of corporate persons,
partnership firms and individuals in a time bound manner for
maximisation of value of assets of such persons, to promote
entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balance of interests of all
stakeholders including alteration in the order of priority of payment of
Government dues and to establish an Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Board of India and matters connected therewith or thereto.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
27.
The statement says that an effective legal framework for timely
resolution of insolvency and bankruptcy would support development of
credit markets, encourage entrepreneurship, improve business and
facilitate more investments leading to higher economic growth and
development.
28.
A reading of the statement of objects and reasons with the
statutory Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules enables the NCLT to pass orders for
the ends of justice including order permitting an applicant for CIRP to
withdraw its application and to enable a corporate body to carry on
business with ease, free of any impediment.
8 | <para>
27.
The statement says that an effective legal framework for timely
resolution of insolvency and bankruptcy would support development of
credit markets, encourage entrepreneurship, improve business and
facilitate more investments leading to higher economic growth and
development.
</para>
<para>
28.
A reading of the statement of objects and reasons with the
statutory Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules enables the NCLT to pass orders for
the ends of justice including order permitting an applicant for CIRP to
withdraw its application and to enable a corporate body to carry on
business with ease, free of any impediment.
8
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
29.
Considering the investments made by the Corporate Debtor and
considering the number of people dependant on the Corporate Debtor
for their survival and livelihood, there is no reason why the applicant
for the CIRP, should not be allowed to withdraw its application once its
disputes have been settled.
30.
The settlement cannot be stifled before the constitution of the
Committee of Creditors in anticipation of claims against the Corporate
Debtor from third persons. The withdrawal of an application for CIRP
by the applicant would not prevent any other financial creditor from
taking recourse to a proceeding under IBC. The urgency to abide by
the timelines for completion of the resolution process is not a reason to
stifle the settlement. | <para>
29.
Considering the investments made by the Corporate Debtor and
considering the number of people dependant on the Corporate Debtor
for their survival and livelihood, there is no reason why the applicant
for the CIRP, should not be allowed to withdraw its application once its
disputes have been settled.
</para>
<para>
30.
The settlement cannot be stifled before the constitution of the
Committee of Creditors in anticipation of claims against the Corporate
Debtor from third persons. The withdrawal of an application for CIRP
by the applicant would not prevent any other financial creditor from
taking recourse to a proceeding under IBC. The urgency to abide by
the timelines for completion of the resolution process is not a reason to
stifle the settlement.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
31. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
the Appellant drew our attention to an order dated 25th August 2021,
passed by a Bench of coordinate strength comprising <cite>S. Abdul Nazeer
and Krishna Murari, J.J. in Civil Appeal No. 4993 of 2021</cite>, the relevant
part whereof is extracted hereinbelow:
“(3) We have heard learned counsel for the parties. It is not
in dispute that CoC has not been constituted so far. This
Court in <cite>Swiss Ribbons Private Limited and Anr. v. Union of
India and others- (2019) 4 SCC 17</cite> has held that at any
stage, before a Committee of Creditors is constituted, a
party can approach National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT)
directly and that the Tribunal may, in exercise of its inherent
powers under Rule 11 of NCLT Rules, allow or disallow an
application for withdrawal or settlement. It was held thus:
82. It is clear that once the Code gets triggered by
admission of a creditor's petition under Sections 7 to
9, the proceeding that is before the adjudicating
9
authority, being a collective proceeding, is a
proceeding in rem. Being a proceeding in rem, it is
necessary that the body which is to oversee the
resolution process must be consulted before any
individual corporate debtor is allowed to settle its
claim. A question arises as to what is to happen
before a Committee of Creditors is constituted (as per
the timelines that are specified, a Committee of
Creditors can be appointed at any time within 30
days from the date of appointment of the interim
resolution professional). We make it clear that at any
stage where the Committee of Creditors is not yet
constituted, a party can approach NCLT directly,
which Tribunal may, in exercise of its inherent powers
under Rule 11 of NCLT Rules, 2016, allow or disallow
an application for withdrawal or settlement. This will
be decided after hearing all the parties concerned
and considering all relevant factors on the facts of
each case.”
(emphasis supplied)
(4) In the instant case, as noticed earlier, the applicant-
respondent no.1 had made an application before the
NCLT, Mumbai Bench, under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules for
withdrawal of company petition filed under Section 9 of
the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) on the
ground that the matter has been settled between the
Corporate debtor and the applicant-respondent no.1.
(5) Having heard learned counsel for the parties and
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case,
we are of the view that the applicant-respondent no.1 was
justified in filing the application under Rule 11 of the NCLT
Rules for withdrawal of the company petition on the
ground that the matter has been settled between the
parties.”
32.
The application for settlement under Section 12A of the IBC is
pending before the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT). The NCLAT has
stayed the constitution of the Committee of Creditors. The order
impugned is only an interim order which does not call for interference.
In an appeal under Section 62 of the IBC, there is no question of law
10
which requires determination by this Court. The appeal is, accordingly,
dismissed. The NCLT is directed to take up the settlement application
and decide the same in the light of the observations made above. | <para>
31. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
the Appellant drew our attention to an order dated 25th August 2021,
passed by a Bench of coordinate strength comprising <cite>S. Abdul Nazeer
and Krishna Murari, J.J. in Civil Appeal No. 4993 of 2021</cite>, the relevant
part whereof is extracted hereinbelow:
“(3) We have heard learned counsel for the parties. It is not
in dispute that CoC has not been constituted so far. This
Court in <cite>Swiss Ribbons Private Limited and Anr. v. Union of
India and others- (2019) 4 SCC 17</cite> has held that at any
stage, before a Committee of Creditors is constituted, a
party can approach National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT)
directly and that the Tribunal may, in exercise of its inherent
powers under Rule 11 of NCLT Rules, allow or disallow an
application for withdrawal or settlement. It was held thus:
</para>
<para>
82. It is clear that once the Code gets triggered by
admission of a creditor's petition under Sections 7 to
9, the proceeding that is before the adjudicating
9
authority, being a collective proceeding, is a
proceeding in rem. Being a proceeding in rem, it is
necessary that the body which is to oversee the
resolution process must be consulted before any
individual corporate debtor is allowed to settle its
claim. A question arises as to what is to happen
before a Committee of Creditors is constituted (as per
the timelines that are specified, a Committee of
Creditors can be appointed at any time within 30
days from the date of appointment of the interim
resolution professional). We make it clear that at any
stage where the Committee of Creditors is not yet
constituted, a party can approach NCLT directly,
which Tribunal may, in exercise of its inherent powers
under Rule 11 of NCLT Rules, 2016, allow or disallow
an application for withdrawal or settlement. This will
be decided after hearing all the parties concerned
and considering all relevant factors on the facts of
each case.”
(emphasis supplied)
(4) In the instant case, as noticed earlier, the applicant-
respondent no.1 had made an application before the
NCLT, Mumbai Bench, under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules for
withdrawal of company petition filed under Section 9 of
the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) on the
ground that the matter has been settled between the
Corporate debtor and the applicant-respondent no.1.
(5) Having heard learned counsel for the parties and
having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case,
we are of the view that the applicant-respondent no.1 was
justified in filing the application under Rule 11 of the NCLT
Rules for withdrawal of the company petition on the
ground that the matter has been settled between the
parties.”
</para>
<para>
32.
The application for settlement under Section 12A of the IBC is
pending before the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT). The NCLAT has
stayed the constitution of the Committee of Creditors. The order
impugned is only an interim order which does not call for interference.
In an appeal under Section 62 of the IBC, there is no question of law
10
which requires determination by this Court. The appeal is, accordingly,
dismissed. The NCLT is directed to take up the settlement application
and decide the same in the light of the observations made above.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
2.
This appeal questions the correctness of the judgment and
order dated 09.12.2020 passed by the High Court of Rajasthan,
Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Criminal Misc. (Petition) No. 591 of 2020
whereby the High Court dismissed the petition under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure,19731 for quashing of First
Information Report2 No. 45 of 2005 dated 23.05.2005 registered
1 In short “CrPC”
2 In short “FIR”
1
with Police Station Phulera, District Jaipur under Sections 363
and 366 IPC.
3.
Relevant facts giving rise to this appeal are that one
Prahalad Dan gave a written complaint stating that his minor
daughter had been abducted by the appellant no.1 on
22.05.2005 at about 2.30PM. On the said complaint FIR No. 45
of 2005 was registered at Police Station Phulera, District Jaipur
under Sections 363 and 366 IPC. Investigation was commenced
but the whereabouts of the missing girl could not be traced.
Despite best efforts when the abducted girl and the accused
could not be traced, the investigating officer, after recording the
statements of the complainant and the others, submitted a
chargesheet against the appellant no.1 under the aforesaid
Sections and, further, requested the court to initiate the
proceedings under Section 299 CrPC. | <para>
2.
This appeal questions the correctness of the judgment and
order dated 09.12.2020 passed by the High Court of Rajasthan,
Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Criminal Misc. (Petition) No. 591 of 2020
whereby the High Court dismissed the petition under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure,19731 for quashing of First
Information Report2 No. 45 of 2005 dated 23.05.2005 registered
1 In short “CrPC”
2 In short “FIR”
1
with Police Station Phulera, District Jaipur under Sections 363
and 366 IPC.
</para>
<para>
3.
Relevant facts giving rise to this appeal are that one
Prahalad Dan gave a written complaint stating that his minor
daughter had been abducted by the appellant no.1 on
22.05.2005 at about 2.30PM. On the said complaint FIR No. 45
of 2005 was registered at Police Station Phulera, District Jaipur
under Sections 363 and 366 IPC. Investigation was commenced
but the whereabouts of the missing girl could not be traced.
Despite best efforts when the abducted girl and the accused
could not be traced, the investigating officer, after recording the
statements of the complainant and the others, submitted a
chargesheet against the appellant no.1 under the aforesaid
Sections and, further, requested the court to initiate the
proceedings under Section 299 CrPC.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
4. The investigating officer also submitted chargesheet against
the father of the appellant, namely, Banna Lal under Sections
363, 366 and 120B IPC. On the basis of the said chargesheet
Banna Lal was put to trial and Regular Criminal Case No. 23 of
2010 was registered. The Additional District and Sessions Judge,
2
Sambhar Lake, District Jaipur vide judgement and order dated
03.09.2011 came to the conclusion that the charges could not be
proved against the accused Banna Lal of being involved in any
manner in the alleged abduction of the daughter of the
complainant, but rather he himself made efforts for searching his
son and the abductee. Accordingly, Banna Lal was acquitted of
all the charges.
5.
In the year 2020, the appellant along with the abductee
Seema Parewa filed a petition under Section 482 CrPC before the
Rajasthan High Court which was registered as S.B. Criminal
Misc. Petition No. 591 of 2020 praying for quashing of the FIR
No. 45 of 2005 and all proceedings arising therefrom. In the said
petition it was stated that the appellant and the abductee
(appellant No. 1 and 2 respectively) were well known to each
other and were into deep love affair, which relationship was not
acceptable to the father of the abductee. Under compelling
circumstances, both of them parted from their families in the
year 2005 and later got married on 25.12.2006. It was, further,
stated that report was submitted under Section 173(2) CrPC and
a request for invoking Section 299 CrPC was made by the
3
investigating officer. The matter is still pending before the Trial
Court against the appellant and coercive steps were being taken.
It was, further, stated that almost 15 years have passed, the
appellant and the abductee were living happily married and had
also been blessed with a boy on 27.02.2014. It is further stated
that the abductee was never victimized, abducted nor kidnapped
but on her own volition left her parental home on account of the
unpleasant and disturbing circumstances created by her father.
It is also stated that the abductee was 17 years of age at the time
when she left her home on her own volition and that the
appellant had no role to play in her parting with her family. | <para>
4. The investigating officer also submitted chargesheet against
the father of the appellant, namely, Banna Lal under Sections
363, 366 and 120B IPC. On the basis of the said chargesheet
Banna Lal was put to trial and Regular Criminal Case No. 23 of
2010 was registered. The Additional District and Sessions Judge,
2
Sambhar Lake, District Jaipur vide judgement and order dated
03.09.2011 came to the conclusion that the charges could not be
proved against the accused Banna Lal of being involved in any
manner in the alleged abduction of the daughter of the
complainant, but rather he himself made efforts for searching his
son and the abductee. Accordingly, Banna Lal was acquitted of
all the charges.
</para>
<para>
5.
In the year 2020, the appellant along with the abductee
Seema Parewa filed a petition under Section 482 CrPC before the
Rajasthan High Court which was registered as S.B. Criminal
Misc. Petition No. 591 of 2020 praying for quashing of the FIR
No. 45 of 2005 and all proceedings arising therefrom. In the said
petition it was stated that the appellant and the abductee
(appellant No. 1 and 2 respectively) were well known to each
other and were into deep love affair, which relationship was not
acceptable to the father of the abductee. Under compelling
circumstances, both of them parted from their families in the
year 2005 and later got married on 25.12.2006. It was, further,
stated that report was submitted under Section 173(2) CrPC and
a request for invoking Section 299 CrPC was made by the
3
investigating officer. The matter is still pending before the Trial
Court against the appellant and coercive steps were being taken.
It was, further, stated that almost 15 years have passed, the
appellant and the abductee were living happily married and had
also been blessed with a boy on 27.02.2014. It is further stated
that the abductee was never victimized, abducted nor kidnapped
but on her own volition left her parental home on account of the
unpleasant and disturbing circumstances created by her father.
It is also stated that the abductee was 17 years of age at the time
when she left her home on her own volition and that the
appellant had no role to play in her parting with her family.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
6.
The High Court although records all such facts, appears to
have been swayed with the fact that the abductee was a minor at
the time when she left her home and that the appellant had
evaded the investigation and had been successful in keeping
away from the process of law for several years. The High Court
further proceeded on the assumption that the appellant had
actually kidnapped/abducted the minor daughter of the
complainant.
4
7.
Before this Court, also the abductee has joined the accused
as appellant No.2. Once again similar stand has been taken as
was taken before the High Court. Both the appellants have filed
separate affidavits. Appellant No.2 has specifically stated before
the High Court as also before this Court that she had left her
parental home on her own free volition. The appellants are
married since December 2006 and have been living happily.
They have also been blessed with a son in the year 2014 who
would now be 8 years old. No fruitful purpose would be served
by relegating the matter for conducting the trial as the same
would not be conducive for either of the appellants. It would be a
futile exercise. Kidnapping would necessarily involve enticing or
taking away any minor under eighteen years of age if a female for
the offence under Section 363 IPC. In the present case, the
abductee had clearly stated that she was neither taken away nor
induced and that she had left her home of her own free will.
Section 366 IPC would come into play only where there is a
forceful compulsion of marriage, by kidnapping or by inducing a
woman. This offence also would not be made out once the
appellant no. 2 the abductee has clearly stated that she was in
love with the appellant no.1 and that she left her home on
5
account of the disturbing circumstances at her parental home as
the said relationship was not acceptable to her father and that
she married appellant no.1 on her own free will without any
influence being exercised by appellant no.1.
8.
Considering the overall facts and circumstances of this
case, the ends of justice would be best secured by quashing the
FIR and all consequential proceedings that arise therefrom.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgement and
order dated 09.12.2020 of the High Court of Rajasthan is set
aside and the entire proceedings arising out of the FIR No. 45 of
2005 dated 23.05.2005 registered with Police Station Phulera,
District Jaipur under Sections 363 and 366 IPC and all
consequential proceedings are hereby quashed. | <para>
6.
The High Court although records all such facts, appears to
have been swayed with the fact that the abductee was a minor at
the time when she left her home and that the appellant had
evaded the investigation and had been successful in keeping
away from the process of law for several years. The High Court
further proceeded on the assumption that the appellant had
actually kidnapped/abducted the minor daughter of the
complainant.
4
</para>
<para>
7.
Before this Court, also the abductee has joined the accused
as appellant No.2. Once again similar stand has been taken as
was taken before the High Court. Both the appellants have filed
separate affidavits. Appellant No.2 has specifically stated before
the High Court as also before this Court that she had left her
parental home on her own free volition. The appellants are
married since December 2006 and have been living happily.
They have also been blessed with a son in the year 2014 who
would now be 8 years old. No fruitful purpose would be served
by relegating the matter for conducting the trial as the same
would not be conducive for either of the appellants. It would be a
futile exercise. Kidnapping would necessarily involve enticing or
taking away any minor under eighteen years of age if a female for
the offence under Section 363 IPC. In the present case, the
abductee had clearly stated that she was neither taken away nor
induced and that she had left her home of her own free will.
Section 366 IPC would come into play only where there is a
forceful compulsion of marriage, by kidnapping or by inducing a
woman. This offence also would not be made out once the
appellant no. 2 the abductee has clearly stated that she was in
love with the appellant no.1 and that she left her home on
5
account of the disturbing circumstances at her parental home as
the said relationship was not acceptable to her father and that
she married appellant no.1 on her own free will without any
influence being exercised by appellant no.1.
</para>
<para>
8.
Considering the overall facts and circumstances of this
case, the ends of justice would be best secured by quashing the
FIR and all consequential proceedings that arise therefrom.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgement and
order dated 09.12.2020 of the High Court of Rajasthan is set
aside and the entire proceedings arising out of the FIR No. 45 of
2005 dated 23.05.2005 registered with Police Station Phulera,
District Jaipur under Sections 363 and 366 IPC and all
consequential proceedings are hereby quashed.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
Permission to file the intervention application is granted .
2.
Application for intervention stands allowed.
1
3. We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant.
4.
By means of this Miscellaneous Application, the applicant seeks a
clarification of the order dated 03.08.2022 passed by this Court in Criminal
Appeal No. 1256 of 2022. | <para>
Permission to file the intervention application is granted .
2.
Application for intervention stands allowed.
1
3. We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant.
</para>
<para>
4.
By means of this Miscellaneous Application, the applicant seeks a
clarification of the order dated 03.08.2022 passed by this Court in Criminal
Appeal No. 1256 of 2022.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
5.
The said criminal appeal was directed against an order dated 12.10.2018
passed by Madras High Court allowing the petition under Section 482 filed by
the respondent therein with a direction to hand over all the case filed and
material to the Central Bureau of Investigation to conduct a preliminary enquiry
against the appellant therein and other co-accused. This Court vide final
judgment and order dated 03.08.2022 allowed the appeal and remitted the
matter back to the High Court to consider the same afresh and pass appropriate
orders in accordance with law.
6.
The applicant by means of this application alleging massive fraud by one
IRB Expressway Private Limited apprehending connivance with unknown
officials of State of Maharashtra /MSRDC/MPEL who, according to applicant,
may have conspired to give relief of reduction in contractual payment to the
2
Government undertaking by more than Rs.70 crores on frivolous concocted
grounds. | <para>
5.
The said criminal appeal was directed against an order dated 12.10.2018
passed by Madras High Court allowing the petition under Section 482 filed by
the respondent therein with a direction to hand over all the case filed and
material to the Central Bureau of Investigation to conduct a preliminary enquiry
against the appellant therein and other co-accused. This Court vide final
judgment and order dated 03.08.2022 allowed the appeal and remitted the
matter back to the High Court to consider the same afresh and pass appropriate
orders in accordance with law.
</para>
<para>
6.
The applicant by means of this application alleging massive fraud by one
IRB Expressway Private Limited apprehending connivance with unknown
officials of State of Maharashtra /MSRDC/MPEL who, according to applicant,
may have conspired to give relief of reduction in contractual payment to the
2
Government undertaking by more than Rs.70 crores on frivolous concocted
grounds.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
7.
Apprehending that the order dated 03.08.2022 passed by this Court may
come in the way of applicant who intends to seek the investigation in the matter
through CBI and in abundant caution the application has been filed seeking
clarification of the judgment dated 03.08.2022
8.
A bare perusal of the averments made in the application seeking
clarification goes to show that on having come to know that M/S. IRB
Expressway Private Ltd. (IRB) which is operating in connivance with the
officials of the State of Maharashtra has got a relief of about Rs.70 crores by
falsely claiming exemption due to covid. The applicant had issued a notice
dated 06.03.2023 to IRB giving them an opportunity to disclose the defense
prior to initiating legal action which was duly replied by the said company
denying the allegations with the explanation and supporting correspondence
with officials exchanged in this regard which the applicant has himself brought
on record annexing the said documents to the application. | <para>
7.
Apprehending that the order dated 03.08.2022 passed by this Court may
come in the way of applicant who intends to seek the investigation in the matter
through CBI and in abundant caution the application has been filed seeking
clarification of the judgment dated 03.08.2022
</para>
<para>
8.
A bare perusal of the averments made in the application seeking
clarification goes to show that on having come to know that M/S. IRB
Expressway Private Ltd. (IRB) which is operating in connivance with the
officials of the State of Maharashtra has got a relief of about Rs.70 crores by
falsely claiming exemption due to covid. The applicant had issued a notice
dated 06.03.2023 to IRB giving them an opportunity to disclose the defense
prior to initiating legal action which was duly replied by the said company
denying the allegations with the explanation and supporting correspondence
with officials exchanged in this regard which the applicant has himself brought
on record annexing the said documents to the application.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
9.
Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the order dated 03.08.2022
passed by this Court setting aside directions of the High Court for preliminary
3
enquiry by CBI, may come in his way to seek CBI investigation into the
complaints and allegations and, therefore, the order needs to be clarified.
10. We are really surprised at the manner and the reasons in which this
application has been made. A perusal of Annexure-3, the response of IRB, in
reply to the notice issued by the applicant itself goes to show that reduction in
payment of premium was allowed by the authorities because the Government of
India had ordered complete closure of all Toll Plazas including the one in issue
w.e.f. 26.03.2020 to 19.04.2020 due to covid. | <para>
9.
Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the order dated 03.08.2022
passed by this Court setting aside directions of the High Court for preliminary
3
enquiry by CBI, may come in his way to seek CBI investigation into the
complaints and allegations and, therefore, the order needs to be clarified.
</para>
<para>
10. We are really surprised at the manner and the reasons in which this
application has been made. A perusal of Annexure-3, the response of IRB, in
reply to the notice issued by the applicant itself goes to show that reduction in
payment of premium was allowed by the authorities because the Government of
India had ordered complete closure of all Toll Plazas including the one in issue
w.e.f. 26.03.2020 to 19.04.2020 due to covid.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
11. Office memorandum dated 13.05.2020 issued by the Government in this
regard is also a part of the documents annexed by the applicant himself in the
application invoking the force majeure clause in the agreement between the
parties. In such peculiar factual matrix of the contractual matter between a
different set of parties, in our opinion, the complaint, if any made by the
applicant has to be considered on its own merits and the judgment and order
dated 03.08.2022 passed by this court, in a totally unconnected matter, between
different parties, having no nexus with alleged complaint which the applicant
proposes to make, will have no bearing on the same and thus the order dated
03.08.2022 does not calls for any clarification or modification at the behest of
the present applicant.
4
12.
Further, in any view of the matter, the applicant has no locus to seek
clarification/modification of an order passed in a totally unconnected matter.
13.
The application is totally misconceived and, accordingly, stands
dismissed. | <para>
11. Office memorandum dated 13.05.2020 issued by the Government in this
regard is also a part of the documents annexed by the applicant himself in the
application invoking the force majeure clause in the agreement between the
parties. In such peculiar factual matrix of the contractual matter between a
different set of parties, in our opinion, the complaint, if any made by the
applicant has to be considered on its own merits and the judgment and order
dated 03.08.2022 passed by this court, in a totally unconnected matter, between
different parties, having no nexus with alleged complaint which the applicant
proposes to make, will have no bearing on the same and thus the order dated
03.08.2022 does not calls for any clarification or modification at the behest of
the present applicant.
4
</para>
<para>
12.
Further, in any view of the matter, the applicant has no locus to seek
clarification/modification of an order passed in a totally unconnected matter.
</para>
<para>
13.
The application is totally misconceived and, accordingly, stands
dismissed.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
Appeal from an order of the High Court of Patna dated
9th September, 1948, (Agarwala C.J. and Meredith J.) in
M.J.C. No. 5 of 1948. The appeal was originally filed as
Federal Court Appeal No. 71 of 1948 on a certificate granted
by the Patna High Court under cl. 31 of the Letters Patent
of that High Court that the case was a fit one for appeal to
the Federal Court.
H.P. Sinha (S.C. Sinha, with him) for the appellant.
S.K. Mitra (S. L. Chibber, with him) for the respondent.
1950. November 30. The judgment of the Court was deliv-
ered by FAzL ALl J.
800
FAZL ALI J. --This is an appeal from an order of the
High Court of Judicature at Patna dated the 9th September,
1948, declining to call upon the board of Revenue to state a
case under section 21 (3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944
(Act VI of 1944), with reference to an assessment made under
that Act.
The Bihar Sales Tax Act was passed in 1944, and section
4 of the Act provides that "every dealer whose gross turn-
over during the year immediately preceding the commencement
of the Act exceeded Rs. 5,000 shall be liable to pay tax
under the Act on sales effected after the date so notified."
It is not disputed that, having regard to the definitions of
dealer, goods and sale under the Act, the appellant, who has
been doing contract work on a fairly extensive scale for the
Central Public Works Department and the East Indian Railway,
comes within the category of a dealer mentioned in section
4. Section 7 of the Act provides that "no dealer shall,
while being liable under section 4 to pay tax under the Act,
carry on business as a dealer unless he has been registered
under the Act and possesses a registration certificate". In
pursuance of this provision, the appellant filed an applica-
tion for registration on the 19th December, 1944, and a
certificate of registration was issued to him on the 21st
December, 1944. On the 8th October, 1945, the Sales Tax
Officer issued a notice to the appellant asking him to
produce his accounts on 10th November, 1945, and to show
cause why in addition to the tax to be finally assessed on
him a penalty not exceeding one and a half times the amount
should not be imposed on him under section 10 (5) of the
Act. Section 10 (5), under which the notice purported to
have been issued, runs thus:--
"If upon information which has come into his posses-
sion, the Commissioner is satisfied that any dealer has been
liable to pay tax under this Act in respect of any period
and has nevertheless wilfully failed to apply for registra-
tion, the Commissioner shall, alter giving the dealer a
reasonable opportunity of being heard, assess, to the best
of his judgment, the amount of tax, if any, due from the
dealer in respect of such
801
period and all subsequent periods and the Commissioner may
direct that the dealer shall pay, ’by way of, penalty, in
addition to the amount so assessed, a sum not exceeding one
and a half times that amount." | <para>
Appeal from an order of the High Court of Patna dated
9th September, 1948, (Agarwala C.J. and Meredith J.) in
M.J.C. No. 5 of 1948. The appeal was originally filed as
Federal Court Appeal No. 71 of 1948 on a certificate granted
by the Patna High Court under cl. 31 of the Letters Patent
of that High Court that the case was a fit one for appeal to
the Federal Court.
H.P. Sinha (S.C. Sinha, with him) for the appellant.
S.K. Mitra (S. L. Chibber, with him) for the respondent.
1950. November 30. The judgment of the Court was deliv-
ered by FAzL ALl J.
800
FAZL ALI J. --This is an appeal from an order of the
High Court of Judicature at Patna dated the 9th September,
1948, declining to call upon the board of Revenue to state a
case under section 21 (3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944
(Act VI of 1944), with reference to an assessment made under
that Act.
</para>
<para>
The Bihar Sales Tax Act was passed in 1944, and section
4 of the Act provides that "every dealer whose gross turn-
over during the year immediately preceding the commencement
of the Act exceeded Rs. 5,000 shall be liable to pay tax
under the Act on sales effected after the date so notified."
It is not disputed that, having regard to the definitions of
dealer, goods and sale under the Act, the appellant, who has
been doing contract work on a fairly extensive scale for the
Central Public Works Department and the East Indian Railway,
comes within the category of a dealer mentioned in section
4. Section 7 of the Act provides that "no dealer shall,
while being liable under section 4 to pay tax under the Act,
carry on business as a dealer unless he has been registered
under the Act and possesses a registration certificate". In
pursuance of this provision, the appellant filed an applica-
tion for registration on the 19th December, 1944, and a
certificate of registration was issued to him on the 21st
December, 1944. On the 8th October, 1945, the Sales Tax
Officer issued a notice to the appellant asking him to
produce his accounts on 10th November, 1945, and to show
cause why in addition to the tax to be finally assessed on
him a penalty not exceeding one and a half times the amount
should not be imposed on him under section 10 (5) of the
Act. Section 10 (5), under which the notice purported to
have been issued, runs thus:--
"If upon information which has come into his posses-
sion, the Commissioner is satisfied that any dealer has been
liable to pay tax under this Act in respect of any period
and has nevertheless wilfully failed to apply for registra-
tion, the Commissioner shall, alter giving the dealer a
reasonable opportunity of being heard, assess, to the best
of his judgment, the amount of tax, if any, due from the
dealer in respect of such
801
period and all subsequent periods and the Commissioner may
direct that the dealer shall pay, ’by way of, penalty, in
addition to the amount so assessed, a sum not exceeding one
and a half times that amount."
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
The appellant appeared before the Sales Tax Officer in
response to this notice, but obtained several adjournments
till 16th March, 1046, and ultimately failed to appear.
Thereupon, he was assessed by the Sales Tax Officer, accord-
ing to the best of his judgment, and was ordered to pay Rs.
4,526-13-0 as tax and a penalty amounting to one and a half
times the amount assessed, under section 10 (5) of the Act.
The appellant appealed to the Commissioner against the
assessment and the penalty levied upon him, but his appeal
was dismissed on the 6th June, 1946. He then filed a peti-
tion for revision to the Board of Revenue, against the order
of the Commissioner, but it was dismissed on the 28th May,
1947. He thereupon moved the Board of Revenue to refer to
the High Court certain questions of law arising out of is
order of the 28th May, but Mr. N. Baksi, a Member of the
Board, by his order of the 4th December, 1947, rejected the
petition with the following observations :-
"No case for review of my predecessor’s order made out.
No reference necessary."
Section 21 of the Act provides that if the Board of
Revenue refuses to make a reference to the High Court, the
applicant may apply to the High Court against such refusal,
and the High Court, if it is not satisfied that such
refusal was justified, may require the Board of
Revenue to state a case and refer it to the High Court.
The section also provides that "the High Court upon the
hearing of any such case shall decide the question of law
raised thereby, and shall deliver its judgment thereon
containing the grounds on which such decision is founded,
and shall send to the Board of Revenue a copy of such judg-
ment under the seal of the Court ......... and the Board
shall dispose of the case accordingly." In accordance with
this section, the appellant made an application to the High
Court praying that the Board of Revenue may be called upon
to state a case and refer
802
it to the High Court. Dealing with this application, the
High Court pointed out that the Member of the Board had not
been asked to review his predecessor’s order but only to
state a case, and gave the following directions :--
"The ease must, therefore, go back to the Board of
Revenue for a case to be stated or for a proper ,order
rejecting the application to be passed." | <para>
The appellant appeared before the Sales Tax Officer in
response to this notice, but obtained several adjournments
till 16th March, 1046, and ultimately failed to appear.
Thereupon, he was assessed by the Sales Tax Officer, accord-
ing to the best of his judgment, and was ordered to pay Rs.
4,526-13-0 as tax and a penalty amounting to one and a half
times the amount assessed, under section 10 (5) of the Act.
The appellant appealed to the Commissioner against the
assessment and the penalty levied upon him, but his appeal
was dismissed on the 6th June, 1946. He then filed a peti-
tion for revision to the Board of Revenue, against the order
of the Commissioner, but it was dismissed on the 28th May,
1947. He thereupon moved the Board of Revenue to refer to
the High Court certain questions of law arising out of is
order of the 28th May, but Mr. N. Baksi, a Member of the
Board, by his order of the 4th December, 1947, rejected the
petition with the following observations :-
"No case for review of my predecessor’s order made out.
No reference necessary."
</para>
<para>
Section 21 of the Act provides that if the Board of
Revenue refuses to make a reference to the High Court, the
applicant may apply to the High Court against such refusal,
and the High Court, if it is not satisfied that such
refusal was justified, may require the Board of
Revenue to state a case and refer it to the High Court.
The section also provides that "the High Court upon the
hearing of any such case shall decide the question of law
raised thereby, and shall deliver its judgment thereon
containing the grounds on which such decision is founded,
and shall send to the Board of Revenue a copy of such judg-
ment under the seal of the Court ......... and the Board
shall dispose of the case accordingly." In accordance with
this section, the appellant made an application to the High
Court praying that the Board of Revenue may be called upon
to state a case and refer
802
it to the High Court. Dealing with this application, the
High Court pointed out that the Member of the Board had not
been asked to review his predecessor’s order but only to
state a case, and gave the following directions :--
"The ease must, therefore, go back to the Board of
Revenue for a case to be stated or for a proper ,order
rejecting the application to be passed."
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
The Board then reheard the matter and rejected the
application of the appellant and refused to state a case and
refer it to the High Court. The appellant thereafter made
an application to the High Court for requiring the Board of
Revenue to state a case, but this application was summarily
rejected. He then applied to the High Court for leave to
appeal to the Federal Court, which the High Court granted,
following the decision of a Full Bench of the Lahore High
Court in <cite>Feroze Shah Kaka Khd v. Income-tax Commissioner,
punjab and N.W.F.P., Lahore The High Court</cite> pointed out in
the order granting leave that in the appeal that was taken
to the Privy Council in the Lahore case, an objection had
been raised as to the competency of the appeal, but the
Privy Council, while dismissing the appeal on the merits,
had made the following observation:-"
The objection is a serious one. Admittedly such an appeal
as the present is not authorized by the Income-tax Act
itself. If open at all, it must be justified under clause
"9, Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court, as being an
appeal from a final judgment, decree or order made in the
exercise of original jurisdiction by a Division Bench of the
High Court. And this present appeal was held by the Full
Court to be so justified. Before the Board the question was
not fully argued, and their Lordships accordingly refrain
from expressing any opinion whatever upon it" (2).
The High Court in granting leave to the appellant seems
to have been influenced mainly by the fact that the view of
the Lahore High Court had not been held by the Privy Council
to be wrong. | <para>
The Board then reheard the matter and rejected the
application of the appellant and refused to state a case and
refer it to the High Court. The appellant thereafter made
an application to the High Court for requiring the Board of
Revenue to state a case, but this application was summarily
rejected. He then applied to the High Court for leave to
appeal to the Federal Court, which the High Court granted,
following the decision of a Full Bench of the Lahore High
Court in <cite>Feroze Shah Kaka Khd v. Income-tax Commissioner,
punjab and N.W.F.P., Lahore The High Court</cite> pointed out in
the order granting leave that in the appeal that was taken
to the Privy Council in the Lahore case, an objection had
been raised as to the competency of the appeal, but the
Privy Council, while dismissing the appeal on the merits,
had made the following observation:-"
The objection is a serious one. Admittedly such an appeal
as the present is not authorized by the Income-tax Act
itself. If open at all, it must be justified under clause
"9, Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court, as being an
appeal from a final judgment, decree or order made in the
exercise of original jurisdiction by a Division Bench of the
High Court. And this present appeal was held by the Full
Court to be so justified. Before the Board the question was
not fully argued, and their Lordships accordingly refrain
from expressing any opinion whatever upon it" (2).
</para>
<para>
The High Court in granting leave to the appellant seems
to have been influenced mainly by the fact that the view of
the Lahore High Court had not been held by the Privy Council
to be wrong.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
(1) A.I.R. 1981 Lah. 138. (2) A.I.R. 1933 P. C. 198.
803
At the commencement of the hearing of the appeal in this
Court, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned
counsel for the respondent that this appeals was not compe-
tent, and, on hearing both the parties, we are of the opin-
ion that the objection is wellfounded.
In <cite>Sri Mahanth Harihar Gir v. Commissioner of Income-
tax, Bihar and Orissa</cite> (1) it was held by a special Bench of
the Patna High Court that no appeal lay to His Majesty in
Council under clause 31 of the Letters Patent of the Patna
High Court, from an order of the High Court dismissing an
application under section 66 (3) of the Income-tax Act, (a
provision similar to section 21 of the Act before us) to
direct the Commissioner of Income-tax to state a case. In
that case, the whole law on the subject has been clearly and
exhaustively dealt with, and it has been pointed out that
the view taken by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in
the case cited by the appellant was not supported by sever-
al other High Courts and that the Privy Council also, when
the matter came before it, refrained from expressing any
opinion as to its correctness. In our opinion, the view
expressed in the Patna case is correct. | <para>
(1) A.I.R. 1981 Lah. 138. (2) A.I.R. 1933 P. C. 198.
803
At the commencement of the hearing of the appeal in this
Court, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned
counsel for the respondent that this appeals was not compe-
tent, and, on hearing both the parties, we are of the opin-
ion that the objection is wellfounded.
</para>
<para>
In <cite>Sri Mahanth Harihar Gir v. Commissioner of Income-
tax, Bihar and Orissa</cite> (1) it was held by a special Bench of
the Patna High Court that no appeal lay to His Majesty in
Council under clause 31 of the Letters Patent of the Patna
High Court, from an order of the High Court dismissing an
application under section 66 (3) of the Income-tax Act, (a
provision similar to section 21 of the Act before us) to
direct the Commissioner of Income-tax to state a case. In
that case, the whole law on the subject has been clearly and
exhaustively dealt with, and it has been pointed out that
the view taken by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in
the case cited by the appellant was not supported by sever-
al other High Courts and that the Privy Council also, when
the matter came before it, refrained from expressing any
opinion as to its correctness. In our opinion, the view
expressed in the Patna case is correct.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
Clause 31 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court,
on the strength of which the appellant resists the prelimi-
nary objection raised by the respondent, runs thus :--
"And We do further ordain that any person or persons may
appeal-to Us, Our heirs and successors, in Our or Their
Privy Council, in any matter not being of criminal juris-
diction, from any final judgment, decree, or order of the
said High Court of Judicature at Patna, made on
appeal and from any final judgment, decree on order made in
the exercise of original jurisdiction by Judges of the said
High Court or of any Division Court, from which an appeal
does not lie to the said High Court under the provisions
contained in the 10th clause of these
(1) A.I.R. 1941 Prat. 225.
804
presents: provided, in either case, that the sum or matter
at issue is of the amount or value of not less than ten
thousand rupees, or that such judgment,decree or order
involves, directly or indirectly, some claim, demand or
question to or respecting property amounting to or of the
value of not less than ten thousand rupees; or from any
other final judgment, aecree or order made either on appeal
or otherwise as aforesaid, when the said High Court declares
that the case is a fit one for appeal to Us ...... "
In order to attract the provisions of this clause, it is
necessary to show, firstly, that the order under appeal is a
final order; and secondly, that it was passed in the exer-
cise of the original or appellate jurisdiction of the High
Court. The second requirement clearly follows from the
concluding part of the clause. It seems to us that the order
appealed against in this case, cannot be regarded as a final
order, because it does not of its own force bind or affect
the rights of the parties. All that the High Court is
required to do under section 21 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act
is to decide the question of law raised and send a copy of
its judgment to the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue
then has to dispose of the case in the light of the judgment
of the High Court. It is true that the Board’s order is
based on what is stated by the High Court to be the correct
legal position, but the fact remains that the order of the
High Court standing by itself does not affect the rights of
the parties, and the final order in the matter is the order
which is passed ultimately by the Board of Revenue. This
question has been fully dealt with in <cite>Tata Iron and Steel
Company v. Chief Revenue Authority, Bombay(1)</cite>, where Lord
Atkinson pointed out that the order made by the High Court
was merely advisory and quoted the following observations of
Lord Esher in In re Knight and the Tabernacle Permanent
Building Society(2):
"In the case of Ex parte County Council of Kent, where a
statute provided that a case might be stated
(1) [1892] Q.B. 613 at 617.
805
for the decision of the Court it was held that though the
language might prima facie import that there has to be the
equivalent of a judgment or order, yet when the context was
looked at it appeared that the jurisdiction of the Court
appealed to was only consultative, and that there was noth-
ing which amounted to a judgment or order." | <para>
Clause 31 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court,
on the strength of which the appellant resists the prelimi-
nary objection raised by the respondent, runs thus :--
"And We do further ordain that any person or persons may
appeal-to Us, Our heirs and successors, in Our or Their
Privy Council, in any matter not being of criminal juris-
diction, from any final judgment, decree, or order of the
said High Court of Judicature at Patna, made on
appeal and from any final judgment, decree on order made in
the exercise of original jurisdiction by Judges of the said
High Court or of any Division Court, from which an appeal
does not lie to the said High Court under the provisions
contained in the 10th clause of these
(1) A.I.R. 1941 Prat. 225.
804
presents: provided, in either case, that the sum or matter
at issue is of the amount or value of not less than ten
thousand rupees, or that such judgment,decree or order
involves, directly or indirectly, some claim, demand or
question to or respecting property amounting to or of the
value of not less than ten thousand rupees; or from any
other final judgment, aecree or order made either on appeal
or otherwise as aforesaid, when the said High Court declares
that the case is a fit one for appeal to Us ...... "
</para>
<para>
In order to attract the provisions of this clause, it is
necessary to show, firstly, that the order under appeal is a
final order; and secondly, that it was passed in the exer-
cise of the original or appellate jurisdiction of the High
Court. The second requirement clearly follows from the
concluding part of the clause. It seems to us that the order
appealed against in this case, cannot be regarded as a final
order, because it does not of its own force bind or affect
the rights of the parties. All that the High Court is
required to do under section 21 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act
is to decide the question of law raised and send a copy of
its judgment to the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue
then has to dispose of the case in the light of the judgment
of the High Court. It is true that the Board’s order is
based on what is stated by the High Court to be the correct
legal position, but the fact remains that the order of the
High Court standing by itself does not affect the rights of
the parties, and the final order in the matter is the order
which is passed ultimately by the Board of Revenue. This
question has been fully dealt with in <cite>Tata Iron and Steel
Company v. Chief Revenue Authority, Bombay(1)</cite>, where Lord
Atkinson pointed out that the order made by the High Court
was merely advisory and quoted the following observations of
Lord Esher in In re Knight and the Tabernacle Permanent
Building Society(2):
"In the case of Ex parte County Council of Kent, where a
statute provided that a case might be stated
(1) [1892] Q.B. 613 at 617.
805
for the decision of the Court it was held that though the
language might prima facie import that there has to be the
equivalent of a judgment or order, yet when the context was
looked at it appeared that the jurisdiction of the Court
appealed to was only consultative, and that there was noth-
ing which amounted to a judgment or order."
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
It cannot also be held that the order was passed by the
High Court in this case in the exercise of either original
or appellate jurisdiction. It is not contended that the
matter arose in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction
of the High Court, because there was no appeal before it.
Nor can the matter, properly speaking, be said to have
arisen in the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the
High Court, as was held by the Judges of the Lahore High
Court in the case to which reference was made, because the
proceeding did not commence in the High Court as all origi-
nal suits and proceedings should commence. But the High
Court acquired jurisdiction to deal with the case by virtue
of an express provision of the Bihar Sales Tax Act. The
crux of the matter therefore is that the jurisdiction of the
High Court was only consultative and was neither original
nor appellate.
In this view, the appeal must be dismissed, though on
hearing the parties, it appeared to us that the salestax
authorities including the Commissioner and the Board of
Revenue were in error in imposing a penalty upon the appel-
lant under section 10 15) of the Act which had no applica-
tion to his case, inasmuch as he had been registered as
required by section 7 of the Act.
In the circumstances, while dismissing the appeal, we
make no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed. | <para>
It cannot also be held that the order was passed by the
High Court in this case in the exercise of either original
or appellate jurisdiction. It is not contended that the
matter arose in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction
of the High Court, because there was no appeal before it.
Nor can the matter, properly speaking, be said to have
arisen in the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the
High Court, as was held by the Judges of the Lahore High
Court in the case to which reference was made, because the
proceeding did not commence in the High Court as all origi-
nal suits and proceedings should commence. But the High
Court acquired jurisdiction to deal with the case by virtue
of an express provision of the Bihar Sales Tax Act. The
crux of the matter therefore is that the jurisdiction of the
High Court was only consultative and was neither original
nor appellate.
</para>
<para>
In this view, the appeal must be dismissed, though on
hearing the parties, it appeared to us that the salestax
authorities including the Commissioner and the Board of
Revenue were in error in imposing a penalty upon the appel-
lant under section 10 15) of the Act which had no applica-
tion to his case, inasmuch as he had been registered as
required by section 7 of the Act.
In the circumstances, while dismissing the appeal, we
make no order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
This Special Leave Petition filed by the State of Odisha is against
a final judgment and order dated 2nd November, 2020 passed by the
High Court of Orissa at Cuttack dismissing an application for leave to
appeal being CRLLP No.14 of 2020 filed by the Petitioner State, against a
judgment dated 14th January, 2020 passed by the Sessions Judge,
Bhadrak in S.T. Case No.182/392 of 2014, acquitting the Respondents
from charges under Sections 302/201 read with Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code (IPC).
2.
Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner State
forcefully contended that the High Court committed gross error in
dismissing the application for leave to appeal filed by the Petitioner
1
State on the ground of delay of 41 days, even though, there were
serious charges against the Accused Respondents, including charges of
murder under Section 302 of the IPC. | <para>
This Special Leave Petition filed by the State of Odisha is against
a final judgment and order dated 2nd November, 2020 passed by the
High Court of Orissa at Cuttack dismissing an application for leave to
appeal being CRLLP No.14 of 2020 filed by the Petitioner State, against a
judgment dated 14th January, 2020 passed by the Sessions Judge,
Bhadrak in S.T. Case No.182/392 of 2014, acquitting the Respondents
from charges under Sections 302/201 read with Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code (IPC).
</para>
<para>
2.
Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner State
forcefully contended that the High Court committed gross error in
dismissing the application for leave to appeal filed by the Petitioner
1
State on the ground of delay of 41 days, even though, there were
serious charges against the Accused Respondents, including charges of
murder under Section 302 of the IPC.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
3.
It is true that the appeal has, by the impugned judgment and
order dated 2nd November 2020, been dismissed on the ground of delay
of only 41 days in filing the CRLLP.
4.
In a criminal case involving the serious offence of murder, the
Courts do not ordinarily dismiss an appeal against a judgment and order
of the Trial Court, whether of conviction or of acquittal, on the sole
ground of some delay. This is to prevent miscarriage of justice. | <para>
3.
It is true that the appeal has, by the impugned judgment and
order dated 2nd November 2020, been dismissed on the ground of delay
of only 41 days in filing the CRLLP.
</para>
<para>
4.
In a criminal case involving the serious offence of murder, the
Courts do not ordinarily dismiss an appeal against a judgment and order
of the Trial Court, whether of conviction or of acquittal, on the sole
ground of some delay. This is to prevent miscarriage of justice.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
5.
However, in this case the application of the Petitioner State, for
leave to appeal against the judgment and order of acquittal of the
Respondent Accused, has been rejected on the ground of delay, but
after considering the merits of application for leave to appeal.
6.
We have considered the contentions of the State of Odisha being
the petitioner before us. As per an FIR lodged with the police by one
Gitanjali Tadu, hereinafter referred to as the “Complainant”, her husband
Bijay Kumar Tadu, hereinafter referred to as the “deceased”, had been
working in the Home Guard, Chandabali and deputed at Chandabali
Police Station.
2 | <para>
5.
However, in this case the application of the Petitioner State, for
leave to appeal against the judgment and order of acquittal of the
Respondent Accused, has been rejected on the ground of delay, but
after considering the merits of application for leave to appeal.
</para>
<para>
6.
We have considered the contentions of the State of Odisha being
the petitioner before us. As per an FIR lodged with the police by one
Gitanjali Tadu, hereinafter referred to as the “Complainant”, her husband
Bijay Kumar Tadu, hereinafter referred to as the “deceased”, had been
working in the Home Guard, Chandabali and deputed at Chandabali
Police Station.
2
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
7.
According to the Complainant, the deceased used to move
around with the first accused, Banabihari Mohapatra, who had an
electric sales and repairing shop styled “Raja Electricals” at the Ferry
Ghat area near the Chandabali bus stand.
In the FIR, it is alleged that the first accused came to the
8.
residence of the deceased at around 7.30 a.m. on 23rd June, 2014 and
told the Complainant that the deceased had been lying motionless and
still, not responding to calls. Later his younger son Luja alias Smruti
Ranjan Mohapatra being the second Respondent also came and
informed the complainant that the deceased was lying motionless. | <para>
7.
According to the Complainant, the deceased used to move
around with the first accused, Banabihari Mohapatra, who had an
electric sales and repairing shop styled “Raja Electricals” at the Ferry
Ghat area near the Chandabali bus stand.
</para>
<para>
In the FIR, it is alleged that the first accused came to the
8.
residence of the deceased at around 7.30 a.m. on 23rd June, 2014 and
told the Complainant that the deceased had been lying motionless and
still, not responding to calls. Later his younger son Luja alias Smruti
Ranjan Mohapatra being the second Respondent also came and
informed the complainant that the deceased was lying motionless.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
On hearing this, the Complainant along with her family members
9.
went to the Ferry Ghat near the Chandabali Bus Stand and found her
husband lying dead inside a room which was locked, with a swollen belly
and a deep burn injury on his right foot which was apparently caused by
electric shock. The body of the deceased appeared black and blood was
oozing out from the mouth and nostril of the deceased.
In the FIR, the complainant has alleged that on 22nd June, 2016,
10.
the deceased had left the house to go to the house of a relative. He had
been wearing a gold chain on his neck and two gold rings on his fingers,
and had been carrying Rs.800 for purchase of a new pair of pants and
shirt and Rs.5,000/- for purchase of articles for a marriage.
3 | <para>
On hearing this, the Complainant along with her family members
9.
went to the Ferry Ghat near the Chandabali Bus Stand and found her
husband lying dead inside a room which was locked, with a swollen belly
and a deep burn injury on his right foot which was apparently caused by
electric shock. The body of the deceased appeared black and blood was
oozing out from the mouth and nostril of the deceased.
</para>
<para>
In the FIR, the complainant has alleged that on 22nd June, 2016,
10.
the deceased had left the house to go to the house of a relative. He had
been wearing a gold chain on his neck and two gold rings on his fingers,
and had been carrying Rs.800 for purchase of a new pair of pants and
shirt and Rs.5,000/- for purchase of articles for a marriage.
3
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
11.
On making enquiries the complainant learnt that the deceased
had not visited the house of the relative on that day. The complainant
has alleged that the Accused No.1 Banabihari Mohapatra, his son Luja
alias Smruti Ranjan Mohapatra, being the Accused No.2, and other
accomplices committed murder of her husband by applying electric
shock to him after administering some poisonous substances to him.
The Sessions Judge Bhadrak framed charges against the Accused
12.
Respondents Banabihari Mohapatra and Luja @ Smruti Ranjan
Mohapatra alleging that, together they had intentionally caused the
death of the deceased, thereby committing murder and had caused
disappearance of evidence and thus been guilty of offences under
Sections 302/201 read with Section 34 of the IPC. | <para>
11.
On making enquiries the complainant learnt that the deceased
had not visited the house of the relative on that day. The complainant
has alleged that the Accused No.1 Banabihari Mohapatra, his son Luja
alias Smruti Ranjan Mohapatra, being the Accused No.2, and other
accomplices committed murder of her husband by applying electric
shock to him after administering some poisonous substances to him.
</para>
<para>
The Sessions Judge Bhadrak framed charges against the Accused
12.
Respondents Banabihari Mohapatra and Luja @ Smruti Ranjan
Mohapatra alleging that, together they had intentionally caused the
death of the deceased, thereby committing murder and had caused
disappearance of evidence and thus been guilty of offences under
Sections 302/201 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
13. We have carefully gone through the judgment of the Sessions
Judge, Bhadrak, holding that the prosecution had failed to prove the
charges against the Accused Respondents or either of them under
Section 302, or Section 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC, and
acquitting them under Section 235(1) of the Cr.P.C.
14.
The prosecution appears to have examined 9 witnesses. There
are no eye witnesses to the incident. The deceased had apparently died
in a room held by the Accused Respondent No.1. The Accused
Respondents did not abscond. The Accused Respondents themselves
informed the complainant that the deceased was lying still and
4
motionless, not responding to calls. | <para>
13. We have carefully gone through the judgment of the Sessions
Judge, Bhadrak, holding that the prosecution had failed to prove the
charges against the Accused Respondents or either of them under
Section 302, or Section 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC, and
acquitting them under Section 235(1) of the Cr.P.C.
</para>
<para>
14.
The prosecution appears to have examined 9 witnesses. There
are no eye witnesses to the incident. The deceased had apparently died
in a room held by the Accused Respondent No.1. The Accused
Respondents did not abscond. The Accused Respondents themselves
informed the complainant that the deceased was lying still and
4
motionless, not responding to calls.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
15.
The post mortem Report of the deceased reveals that the cause
of death was electric shock, suffered by the deceased within 24 hours
from the time of examination. On post mortem examination, the Doctor
found food particles including meat in the stomach of the deceased,
and also detected smell of alcohol. The post mortem doctor opined that
the deceased was intoxicated with alcohol and the death was either
accidental, or homicidal, but not suicidal. There is no conclusive
evidence that the death was homicidal.
The complaint lodged by the complainant is apparently based on
16.
Since the Accused Respondents had informed the
suspicion.
complainant that the deceased was lying still and motionless, not
responding to calls and the body of the deceased was found at the
premises of the Accused Respondent No.1, the complainant has
assumed that the Accused Respondents killed the deceased. | <para>
15.
The post mortem Report of the deceased reveals that the cause
of death was electric shock, suffered by the deceased within 24 hours
from the time of examination. On post mortem examination, the Doctor
found food particles including meat in the stomach of the deceased,
and also detected smell of alcohol. The post mortem doctor opined that
the deceased was intoxicated with alcohol and the death was either
accidental, or homicidal, but not suicidal. There is no conclusive
evidence that the death was homicidal.
</para>
<para>
The complaint lodged by the complainant is apparently based on
16.
Since the Accused Respondents had informed the
suspicion.
complainant that the deceased was lying still and motionless, not
responding to calls and the body of the deceased was found at the
premises of the Accused Respondent No.1, the complainant has
assumed that the Accused Respondents killed the deceased.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
17.
In evidence, the complainant said that the Accused Respondent
No.1, Banabihari, had taken a loan of Rs.20,000/- from the deceased
which he had not repaid even though the deceased had asked him to
repay the amount. Significantly, there is no whisper in the FIR, of any
loan taken by the Accused Respondent No.1 from the deceased. The
reference to the alleged loan appears to be an afterthought, in an
attempt to insinuate a motive for killing the deceased.
5
18.
The mere fact that the deceased was lying dead at a room held
by the the Accused Respondent No.1 and that the Accused
Respondents had informed the complainant that the deceased had been
lying motionless and still and not responding to shouts and calls, does
not establish that the Accused Respondents murdered the deceased. At
the cost of repetition it is reiterated that the post mortem report
suggests that the death could have been accidental. | <para>
17.
In evidence, the complainant said that the Accused Respondent
No.1, Banabihari, had taken a loan of Rs.20,000/- from the deceased
which he had not repaid even though the deceased had asked him to
repay the amount. Significantly, there is no whisper in the FIR, of any
loan taken by the Accused Respondent No.1 from the deceased. The
reference to the alleged loan appears to be an afterthought, in an
attempt to insinuate a motive for killing the deceased.
5
</para>
<para>
18.
The mere fact that the deceased was lying dead at a room held
by the the Accused Respondent No.1 and that the Accused
Respondents had informed the complainant that the deceased had been
lying motionless and still and not responding to shouts and calls, does
not establish that the Accused Respondents murdered the deceased. At
the cost of repetition it is reiterated that the post mortem report
suggests that the death could have been accidental.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
19. We have perused the evidence of the nine Prosecution Witnesses,
namely, the first Prosecution Witness Dhanjaya Tadu, younger brother of
the deceased, the second Prosecution Witness Gitanjali Tadu, wife of the
deceased, the third Prosecution Witness, Ajay Sahoo, a Shop Keeper at
the locality where dead body of the deceased was found, the fourth
Prosecution Witness, Smt. Bijayalaxmi Tadu, sister of the deceased, the
fifth Prosecution Witness, Bailochan Bej, a Barber by profession who
knew the complainant and the deceased as also the accused persons
who resided in the Chandabali Police Station area, the sixth Prosecution
Witness, Manmohan Sutar, an auto driver, the seventh Prosecution
Witness, Aswini Kumar Nayak, a cultivator residing at Nayahat in the
Chandabali Police Station area of Bhadrak, the 8th Prosecution Witness,
Dr. Bhisma Parida, being the Doctor who conducted the autopsy/ post
mortem examination of the deceased and the ninth Prosecution Witness
Smt. Kumari Behera, Sub Inspector of Police, who was the Investigating
Officer.
6
20.
Of the nine Prosecution Witnesses, three witnesses namely, the
third Prosecution Witness, Ajay Sahoo, the fifth Prosecution Witness,
Bailochan Bej and the seventh Prosecution Witness, Durga Charan Nayak
were declared hostile by the Prosecution. | <para>
19. We have perused the evidence of the nine Prosecution Witnesses,
namely, the first Prosecution Witness Dhanjaya Tadu, younger brother of
the deceased, the second Prosecution Witness Gitanjali Tadu, wife of the
deceased, the third Prosecution Witness, Ajay Sahoo, a Shop Keeper at
the locality where dead body of the deceased was found, the fourth
Prosecution Witness, Smt. Bijayalaxmi Tadu, sister of the deceased, the
fifth Prosecution Witness, Bailochan Bej, a Barber by profession who
knew the complainant and the deceased as also the accused persons
who resided in the Chandabali Police Station area, the sixth Prosecution
Witness, Manmohan Sutar, an auto driver, the seventh Prosecution
Witness, Aswini Kumar Nayak, a cultivator residing at Nayahat in the
Chandabali Police Station area of Bhadrak, the 8th Prosecution Witness,
Dr. Bhisma Parida, being the Doctor who conducted the autopsy/ post
mortem examination of the deceased and the ninth Prosecution Witness
Smt. Kumari Behera, Sub Inspector of Police, who was the Investigating
Officer.
6
</para>
<para>
20.
Of the nine Prosecution Witnesses, three witnesses namely, the
third Prosecution Witness, Ajay Sahoo, the fifth Prosecution Witness,
Bailochan Bej and the seventh Prosecution Witness, Durga Charan Nayak
were declared hostile by the Prosecution.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
21. The third Prosecution Witness said that he had only seen the police
shifting the dead body of the deceased and knew nothing more about
the case. Nothing has emerged from his cross-examination by the
Public Prosecutor. In his cross-examination by the defence, he said there
was no electric connection in the house from which the body of the
deceased was brought out. He even said that the Accused Respondents
did not own any shop dealing with electric appliances. No credence can
be given to this witness.
The fifth Prosecution Witness, Bailochan Bej, denied knowledge of
22.
the case. He said that the police had not examined him, nor recorded
any statement made by him. In cross-examination by the prosecution,
he only said that he had a saloon at Chandabali Police Station, Bhadrak.
He categorically denied having made the statements attributed to him
by the police. | <para>
21. The third Prosecution Witness said that he had only seen the police
shifting the dead body of the deceased and knew nothing more about
the case. Nothing has emerged from his cross-examination by the
Public Prosecutor. In his cross-examination by the defence, he said there
was no electric connection in the house from which the body of the
deceased was brought out. He even said that the Accused Respondents
did not own any shop dealing with electric appliances. No credence can
be given to this witness.
</para>
<para>
The fifth Prosecution Witness, Bailochan Bej, denied knowledge of
22.
the case. He said that the police had not examined him, nor recorded
any statement made by him. In cross-examination by the prosecution,
he only said that he had a saloon at Chandabali Police Station, Bhadrak.
He categorically denied having made the statements attributed to him
by the police.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
The seventh Prosecution Witness, Durga Charan Nayak only said
23.
that he had seen the body of the deceased in the rented place near the
Chandabali bus stand with bleeding injury on his right leg and blood
oozing from his mouth and nostrils. He said he did not know how the
7
deceased suffered the injury or died. Nothing significant has emerged
from his cross-examination by the Public Prosecutor.
The sixth Prosecution Witness, Manmohan Sutar deposed that he
24.
knew the informant, the deceased as also the Accused Respondents. In
a nutshell, he only confirmed that the dead body was in the shop of the
Accused Respondents in Home Guard uniform. Inquest of the body was
conducted in his presence. He identified his signature in the Inquest
Report. He also said he had noticed a bleeding injury in the right foot of
the deceased and blood oozing from the mouth and nostrils. | <para>
The seventh Prosecution Witness, Durga Charan Nayak only said
23.
that he had seen the body of the deceased in the rented place near the
Chandabali bus stand with bleeding injury on his right leg and blood
oozing from his mouth and nostrils. He said he did not know how the
7
deceased suffered the injury or died. Nothing significant has emerged
from his cross-examination by the Public Prosecutor.
</para>
<para>
The sixth Prosecution Witness, Manmohan Sutar deposed that he
24.
knew the informant, the deceased as also the Accused Respondents. In
a nutshell, he only confirmed that the dead body was in the shop of the
Accused Respondents in Home Guard uniform. Inquest of the body was
conducted in his presence. He identified his signature in the Inquest
Report. He also said he had noticed a bleeding injury in the right foot of
the deceased and blood oozing from the mouth and nostrils.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
25.
All the three witnesses related to the deceased, that is the
second Prosecution Witness, being the wife of the deceased, the first
Prosecution Witness, being the younger brother of the deceased and the
fourth Prosecution Witness, being the sister of the deceased have more
or less reiterated what has been stated in the FIR with embellishments.
There are, however, apparent inconsistencies, inaccuracies and inherent
improbabilities in the statements of these witnesses.
These three witnesses deposed that they suspected that the
26.
accused Respondents had killed the deceased as the deceased was
asking the Accused Respondents to repay Rs.20,000/- which the
deceased had advanced to the Accused Respondents by way of loan.
However, as observed above, there is no whisper of the alleged loan in
the FIR lodged by the complainant wife being the second Prosecution
8
Witness. | <para>
25.
All the three witnesses related to the deceased, that is the
second Prosecution Witness, being the wife of the deceased, the first
Prosecution Witness, being the younger brother of the deceased and the
fourth Prosecution Witness, being the sister of the deceased have more
or less reiterated what has been stated in the FIR with embellishments.
There are, however, apparent inconsistencies, inaccuracies and inherent
improbabilities in the statements of these witnesses.
</para>
<para>
These three witnesses deposed that they suspected that the
26.
accused Respondents had killed the deceased as the deceased was
asking the Accused Respondents to repay Rs.20,000/- which the
deceased had advanced to the Accused Respondents by way of loan.
However, as observed above, there is no whisper of the alleged loan in
the FIR lodged by the complainant wife being the second Prosecution
8
Witness.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
27.
That apart, the first and fourth Prosecution Witnesses have
admitted in cross-examination that they did not have first hand
knowledge of the loan alleged to be advanced by the deceased to the
Accused Respondent No.1. The first Prosecution Witness said that the
complainant (PW2) had told him that the Accused Respondent No.1 had
not repaid loan of Rs.20,000/- to the deceased. The fourth Respondent
said she had heard about the loan from her deceased brother. Though
she said that the loan was given to the Accused Respondent No.1 at the
time of his daughter’s marriage she could not say how long ago the loan
was given. She could not even tell the approximate date or year of
marriage of the Accused Respondent No.1’s daughter.
From the evidence of the first and the second Prosecution
28.
Witnesses it transpires that the deceased had left his house at around
10.00 a.m. on 22nd June 2014, to go to his Aunt’s house in connection
with his Aunt’s daughter’s marriage. He was wearing a gold chain and
two gold rings and carried Rs.800/- with him for buying a pair of trousers
and shirt and Rs.5000/- for articles for the marriage. Enquiries,
however, revealed that he had not gone to his Aunt’s house. It is,
however, difficult to understand why the deceased should have been
wearing his home guard uniform if he were going to visit his Aunt in
connection with the marriage of his Aunt’s daughter. There is evidence
to show that the deceased was found in his home guard uniform. The
9
relevance of the plan of the deceased to go to his Aunt’s house or his
plan to buy clothes etc. is also not clear. This is in no way linked to the
incident of death of the deceased. Prosecution has failed to show a link
between the proposed visit of the deceased to his Aunt’s house with the
guilt, if any, of the Accused Respondents. | <para>
27.
That apart, the first and fourth Prosecution Witnesses have
admitted in cross-examination that they did not have first hand
knowledge of the loan alleged to be advanced by the deceased to the
Accused Respondent No.1. The first Prosecution Witness said that the
complainant (PW2) had told him that the Accused Respondent No.1 had
not repaid loan of Rs.20,000/- to the deceased. The fourth Respondent
said she had heard about the loan from her deceased brother. Though
she said that the loan was given to the Accused Respondent No.1 at the
time of his daughter’s marriage she could not say how long ago the loan
was given. She could not even tell the approximate date or year of
marriage of the Accused Respondent No.1’s daughter.
</para>
<para>
From the evidence of the first and the second Prosecution
28.
Witnesses it transpires that the deceased had left his house at around
10.00 a.m. on 22nd June 2014, to go to his Aunt’s house in connection
with his Aunt’s daughter’s marriage. He was wearing a gold chain and
two gold rings and carried Rs.800/- with him for buying a pair of trousers
and shirt and Rs.5000/- for articles for the marriage. Enquiries,
however, revealed that he had not gone to his Aunt’s house. It is,
however, difficult to understand why the deceased should have been
wearing his home guard uniform if he were going to visit his Aunt in
connection with the marriage of his Aunt’s daughter. There is evidence
to show that the deceased was found in his home guard uniform. The
9
relevance of the plan of the deceased to go to his Aunt’s house or his
plan to buy clothes etc. is also not clear. This is in no way linked to the
incident of death of the deceased. Prosecution has failed to show a link
between the proposed visit of the deceased to his Aunt’s house with the
guilt, if any, of the Accused Respondents.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
29.
The evidence of the first Prosecution Witness Dhanjaya Tadu,
brother of the deceased, that he had found the motor cycle of the
deceased in front of the shop of the accused persons on the evening of
the 22nd June 2014, is difficult to accept. He said he had asked the
second accused about whereabouts of his brother to which the second
accused had expressed ignorance, but on the next day, the second
Accused Respondent and his father informed them that his brother was
lying senseless. It seems rather unnatural that this witness, who was
the brother of the deceased, should have chosen not to make any
inquiry either in the police station or in the neighbourhood, even after
seeing the motor cycle of the deceased in front of the shop, and after
being told his brother was not in the shop. No attempt was made to look
for the deceased even though he did not return home all night.
30.
The eighth Prosecution Witness, Dr. Bhisma Parida, who had at
the time of death of the deceased been posted as Medical Officer at CHC
Chandabali and had conducted the autopsy/post mortem examination of
the deceased at around 1.00 p.m. on 24th June 2014, deposed that the
deceased died due to electrical injury, suffered within 24 hours of the
10
autopsy. The stomach of the deceased was full of food particles
including meat and there was smell of alcohol. The deceased had been
intoxicated with alcohol. The Medical Officer found electrical wounds in
the leg which were sufficient to cause death. He opined that the injuries
sustained by the deceased might have been due to contact with live
electric wire. He opined that the contact was prolonged. The injuries
were ante mortem. This witness was of the opinion that the death may
have been accidental or homicidal, but not suicidal. | <para>
29.
The evidence of the first Prosecution Witness Dhanjaya Tadu,
brother of the deceased, that he had found the motor cycle of the
deceased in front of the shop of the accused persons on the evening of
the 22nd June 2014, is difficult to accept. He said he had asked the
second accused about whereabouts of his brother to which the second
accused had expressed ignorance, but on the next day, the second
Accused Respondent and his father informed them that his brother was
lying senseless. It seems rather unnatural that this witness, who was
the brother of the deceased, should have chosen not to make any
inquiry either in the police station or in the neighbourhood, even after
seeing the motor cycle of the deceased in front of the shop, and after
being told his brother was not in the shop. No attempt was made to look
for the deceased even though he did not return home all night.
</para>
<para>
30.
The eighth Prosecution Witness, Dr. Bhisma Parida, who had at
the time of death of the deceased been posted as Medical Officer at CHC
Chandabali and had conducted the autopsy/post mortem examination of
the deceased at around 1.00 p.m. on 24th June 2014, deposed that the
deceased died due to electrical injury, suffered within 24 hours of the
10
autopsy. The stomach of the deceased was full of food particles
including meat and there was smell of alcohol. The deceased had been
intoxicated with alcohol. The Medical Officer found electrical wounds in
the leg which were sufficient to cause death. He opined that the injuries
sustained by the deceased might have been due to contact with live
electric wire. He opined that the contact was prolonged. The injuries
were ante mortem. This witness was of the opinion that the death may
have been accidental or homicidal, but not suicidal.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
31.
Nothing significant has emerged from the oral evidence of the
ninth Prosecution Witness, Smt. Kumari Behera, the Investigating Officer,
to establish the guilt of the Accused Respondents. She only stated that
the fifth Prosecution Witness had in course of examination stated before
her that the first Accused Respondent and the deceased used one of the
quarters where they regularly took tiffin and they were both present
there on the date of the incident in Court. The fifth Prosecution Witness,
however, denied having made any such statement to the Police and
remained unshaken in cross-examination by the Public Prosecutor. He
only admitted that he had a saloon in the area, but denied knowing the
deceased, the Accused Respondents or the informant. The fifth
Prosecution Witness said that the Police had neither examined him, nor
recorded his statement.
11
32.
In her deposition, the Investigating Officer also said that some
local persons had stated that the first Accused Respondent, Banabhihari
had, out of animosity, killed the deceased by applying electric current.
The oral evidence of the Investigating Officer in this regard is totally
vague and devoid of particulars. The Investigating Officer (PW-9) had
neither named the local persons nor enquired into the source of their
information if any. The local persons have not been examined as
witnesses. | <para>
31.
Nothing significant has emerged from the oral evidence of the
ninth Prosecution Witness, Smt. Kumari Behera, the Investigating Officer,
to establish the guilt of the Accused Respondents. She only stated that
the fifth Prosecution Witness had in course of examination stated before
her that the first Accused Respondent and the deceased used one of the
quarters where they regularly took tiffin and they were both present
there on the date of the incident in Court. The fifth Prosecution Witness,
however, denied having made any such statement to the Police and
remained unshaken in cross-examination by the Public Prosecutor. He
only admitted that he had a saloon in the area, but denied knowing the
deceased, the Accused Respondents or the informant. The fifth
Prosecution Witness said that the Police had neither examined him, nor
recorded his statement.
11
</para>
<para>
32.
In her deposition, the Investigating Officer also said that some
local persons had stated that the first Accused Respondent, Banabhihari
had, out of animosity, killed the deceased by applying electric current.
The oral evidence of the Investigating Officer in this regard is totally
vague and devoid of particulars. The Investigating Officer (PW-9) had
neither named the local persons nor enquired into the source of their
information if any. The local persons have not been examined as
witnesses.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
33.
The Prosecution miserably failed to establish the guilt of the
Accused Respondents. The Trial Court rightly acquitted the Accused
Respondents. There is no infirmity in the judgment of the Trial Court,
that calls for interference
As held by this Court in <cite>Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P.
34.
reported in 2016 (4) SCC 357</cite>, an appeal against acquittal has always
been on an altogether different pedestal from an appeal against
conviction. In an appeal against acquittal, where the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced, the appellate court
would interfere with the order of acquittal only when there is perversity.
In this case, it cannot be said that the reasons given by the High Court
to reverse the conviction of the accused are flimsy, untenable or
bordering on perverse appreciation of evidence.
12 | <para>
33.
The Prosecution miserably failed to establish the guilt of the
Accused Respondents. The Trial Court rightly acquitted the Accused
Respondents. There is no infirmity in the judgment of the Trial Court,
that calls for interference
</para>
<para>
As held by this Court in <cite>Sadhu Saran Singh v. State of U.P.
34.
reported in 2016 (4) SCC 357</cite>, an appeal against acquittal has always
been on an altogether different pedestal from an appeal against
conviction. In an appeal against acquittal, where the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced, the appellate court
would interfere with the order of acquittal only when there is perversity.
In this case, it cannot be said that the reasons given by the High Court
to reverse the conviction of the accused are flimsy, untenable or
bordering on perverse appreciation of evidence.
12
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
35.
Before a case against an accused can be said to be fully
established on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which
the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn must fully be established and the
facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of
guilt of the accused. There has to be a chain of evidence so complete,
as not to leave any reasonable doubt for any conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human
probability, the act must have been done by the Accused.
36.
In <cite>Shanti Devi v. State of Rajasthan</cite> reported in (2012) 12
SCC 158, this Court held that the principles for conviction of the
accused based on circumstantial evidence are:
“10.1. The circumstances from which an inference of
guilt is sought to be proved must be cogently or firmly
established.
10.2. The circumstances should be of a definite
tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the
accused.
10.3. The circumstances taken cumulatively must form
a chain so complete that there is no escape from the
conclusion that within all human probability, the crime
was committed by the accused and none else.
10.4. The circumstantial evidence in order to sustain
conviction must be complete and incapable of
explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the
guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only
be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should
be inconsistent with his innocence.”
13 | <para>
35.
Before a case against an accused can be said to be fully
established on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which
the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn must fully be established and the
facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of
guilt of the accused. There has to be a chain of evidence so complete,
as not to leave any reasonable doubt for any conclusion consistent with
the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human
probability, the act must have been done by the Accused.
</para>
<para>
36.
In <cite>Shanti Devi v. State of Rajasthan</cite> reported in (2012) 12
SCC 158, this Court held that the principles for conviction of the
accused based on circumstantial evidence are:
“10.1. The circumstances from which an inference of
guilt is sought to be proved must be cogently or firmly
established.
10.2. The circumstances should be of a definite
tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the
accused.
10.3. The circumstances taken cumulatively must form
a chain so complete that there is no escape from the
conclusion that within all human probability, the crime
was committed by the accused and none else.
10.4. The circumstantial evidence in order to sustain
conviction must be complete and incapable of
explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the
guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only
be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should
be inconsistent with his innocence.”
13
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
37.
Keeping the above test in mind, we have no iota of doubt that the
Trial Court rightly acquitted the Accused Respondents. There is a
strong possibility that the accused, who was as per the opinion of the
doctor who performed the autopsy, intoxicated with alcohol, might
have accidentally touched a live electrical wire, may be while he was
asleep. The impugned judgment of the High Court dismissing the
appeal on the ground of delay does not call for interference under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
38.
It is well settled by a plethora of judicial pronouncement of this
Court that suspicion, however strong cannot take the place of proof. An
accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. This proposition has been reiterated in <cite>Sujit Biswas
v. State of Assam reported in AIR 2013 SC 3817</cite>.
In <cite>Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in AIR
39.
1973 SC 2773</cite>, this Court observed:-
“Another golden thread which runs through the web of the
administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views
are possible on the evidence adduced in the case one pointing
to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the
view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted.
This principle has a special relevance in cases where in the
guilt of the accused is sought is to be established by
circumstantial evidence.”
14
40.
For the reasons discussed above, we find no ground to interfere
with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court under Article
136 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the Special Leave
Petition is dismissed. Pending application stands disposed of. | <para>
37.
Keeping the above test in mind, we have no iota of doubt that the
Trial Court rightly acquitted the Accused Respondents. There is a
strong possibility that the accused, who was as per the opinion of the
doctor who performed the autopsy, intoxicated with alcohol, might
have accidentally touched a live electrical wire, may be while he was
asleep. The impugned judgment of the High Court dismissing the
appeal on the ground of delay does not call for interference under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
</para>
<para>
38.
It is well settled by a plethora of judicial pronouncement of this
Court that suspicion, however strong cannot take the place of proof. An
accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. This proposition has been reiterated in <cite>Sujit Biswas
v. State of Assam reported in AIR 2013 SC 3817</cite>.
</para>
<para>
In <cite>Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in AIR
39.
1973 SC 2773</cite>, this Court observed:-
“Another golden thread which runs through the web of the
administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views
are possible on the evidence adduced in the case one pointing
to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the
view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted.
This principle has a special relevance in cases where in the
guilt of the accused is sought is to be established by
circumstantial evidence.”
14
40.
For the reasons discussed above, we find no ground to interfere
with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court under Article
136 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the Special Leave
Petition is dismissed. Pending application stands disposed of.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
The question involved in the appeals is with respect to the levy of
education cess, higher education cess, and National Calamity Contingent
Duty (NCCD) on it. The appeals arise out of common judgment. The
High Court has held that duties in question are not part of the exemption
notification. The writ petitions have been dismissed. Hence, the appeals
have been preferred.
3.
The Government of India in order to promote industrial
2
development in the North Eastern Region, announced vide Office
Memorandum dated 24.12.1997, specific fiscal incentives including total
exemption from tax to the new industrial units and substantial
expansion of existing unit in the North Eastern Region for a period of 10
years from the date of commencement of production. Government of
Sikkim vide Notification dated 17.2.2003, notified new industrial policy
whereby all fiscal incentives available to the industries in the North
Eastern Region would be available to the units set up in the State of
Sikkim. | <para>
The question involved in the appeals is with respect to the levy of
education cess, higher education cess, and National Calamity Contingent
Duty (NCCD) on it. The appeals arise out of common judgment. The
High Court has held that duties in question are not part of the exemption
notification. The writ petitions have been dismissed. Hence, the appeals
have been preferred.
3.
</para>
<para>
The Government of India in order to promote industrial
2
development in the North Eastern Region, announced vide Office
Memorandum dated 24.12.1997, specific fiscal incentives including total
exemption from tax to the new industrial units and substantial
expansion of existing unit in the North Eastern Region for a period of 10
years from the date of commencement of production. Government of
Sikkim vide Notification dated 17.2.2003, notified new industrial policy
whereby all fiscal incentives available to the industries in the North
Eastern Region would be available to the units set up in the State of
Sikkim.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
4.
The Central Government issued a Notification dated 9.9.2003,
granting exemption from payment of duty of excise for goods specified in
the notification and cleared from a unit located in the Industrial Growth
Centre or other specified areas within the State of Sikkim. Under the
notification, a manufacturer of specified goods was required to pay excise
duty on the goods cleared from its unit. The manufacturer has to first
utilize the Cenvat Credit for discharging duty liability on final products,
and the remaining amount of duties had to be paid through Personal
Ledger Account (PLA) or Current Account, i.e., in cash. Thus, the
exemption scheme was to discharge the liability on the final product and
then claim or avail the refund or recredit of the duties paid in cash.
3
5.
The Unicorn Industries established a unit in 2006 for
manufacturing “Indian Mouth Freshener” an excisable commodity
covered under Chapter 21 of the First Schedule of Central Excise Tariff
Act, 1985. It was registered under the Central Excise Act. In June 2006,
the appellant had started manufacturing its product. | <para>
4.
The Central Government issued a Notification dated 9.9.2003,
granting exemption from payment of duty of excise for goods specified in
the notification and cleared from a unit located in the Industrial Growth
Centre or other specified areas within the State of Sikkim. Under the
notification, a manufacturer of specified goods was required to pay excise
duty on the goods cleared from its unit. The manufacturer has to first
utilize the Cenvat Credit for discharging duty liability on final products,
and the remaining amount of duties had to be paid through Personal
Ledger Account (PLA) or Current Account, i.e., in cash. Thus, the
exemption scheme was to discharge the liability on the final product and
then claim or avail the refund or recredit of the duties paid in cash.
3
</para>
<para>
5.
The Unicorn Industries established a unit in 2006 for
manufacturing “Indian Mouth Freshener” an excisable commodity
covered under Chapter 21 of the First Schedule of Central Excise Tariff
Act, 1985. It was registered under the Central Excise Act. In June 2006,
the appellant had started manufacturing its product.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
6.
The appellant has submitted that following excise duties were
recovered under diverse names/nomenclature and rates on Indian
Mouth Freshener manufactured and cleared by the appellant:
a. Basic Excise Duty @ 37.5 % ad valorem;
b. National Calamity Contingent Duty (NCCD) @ 23% ad
Valorem (under Section 136 of the Finance Act, 2001);
c. Additional Excise Duty (Pan Masala & Tobacco Products) @
5.5% ad valorem (under Section 85 of the Finance Act, 2005);
and
d. Education Cess @ 2% ad valorem (under Section 91 of the
Finance Act, 2004) aggregating to 68% ad valorem.
7.
As per Notification No.71/2003CE dated 9.9.2003, the appellant
was entitled to refund of the abovesaid duties of excise. The respondents
4
extended benefits and used to grant refund to the appellant as per the
abovementioned notification. The Excise Authorities used to issue a
certificate of reutilization of excise duty for the particular month. The
appellant used to recredit the amount of excise duty. | <para>
6.
The appellant has submitted that following excise duties were
recovered under diverse names/nomenclature and rates on Indian
Mouth Freshener manufactured and cleared by the appellant:
a. Basic Excise Duty @ 37.5 % ad valorem;
b. National Calamity Contingent Duty (NCCD) @ 23% ad
Valorem (under Section 136 of the Finance Act, 2001);
c. Additional Excise Duty (Pan Masala & Tobacco Products) @
5.5% ad valorem (under Section 85 of the Finance Act, 2005);
and
d. Education Cess @ 2% ad valorem (under Section 91 of the
Finance Act, 2004) aggregating to 68% ad valorem.
</para>
<para>
7.
As per Notification No.71/2003CE dated 9.9.2003, the appellant
was entitled to refund of the abovesaid duties of excise. The respondents
4
extended benefits and used to grant refund to the appellant as per the
abovementioned notification. The Excise Authorities used to issue a
certificate of reutilization of excise duty for the particular month. The
appellant used to recredit the amount of excise duty.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
8.
The Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise issued a show cause
notice dated 2.1.2007, requiring the appellant to repay the amount of
NCCD for the period July, 2006 to December, 2006, on the ground that
exemption was not permissible under the notification for the units
located in the State of Sikkim. The appellant filed a writ petition before
the High Court for quashing the abovementioned communication dated
2.1.2007. The High Court disposed of the same with liberty to show
cause to the said communication. The appellant filed its reply. On
4.7.2007, the Commissioner, Central Excise issued show cause notice, it
was submitted that grounds phrased in the response were
unsustainable. The appellant was asked to show cause why amount
should not be recovered under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act
along with the interest and penalty.
9.
Notification No.71/2003CE came to be amended on 25.4.2007 by
Notification No.21/2007, excluding Pan Masala falling under Chapter
XXI of the Tariff from the purview of the notification. Thus, the
5
exemption on Pan Masala came to an end vide Notification No.21/2007
dated 25.4.2007, which was challenged by way of separate Writ Petition
No.22 of 2007. The High Court vide judgment and order dated 11.5.2012
allowed the Writ Petition (C) No.22 of 2007 and held that the appellant
was entitled to exemption from payment of excise duty on manufacture
of Pan Masala for ten years from the date of commencement of
commercial production, i.e., 27.6.2006. | <para>
8.
The Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise issued a show cause
notice dated 2.1.2007, requiring the appellant to repay the amount of
NCCD for the period July, 2006 to December, 2006, on the ground that
exemption was not permissible under the notification for the units
located in the State of Sikkim. The appellant filed a writ petition before
the High Court for quashing the abovementioned communication dated
2.1.2007. The High Court disposed of the same with liberty to show
cause to the said communication. The appellant filed its reply. On
4.7.2007, the Commissioner, Central Excise issued show cause notice, it
was submitted that grounds phrased in the response were
unsustainable. The appellant was asked to show cause why amount
should not be recovered under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act
along with the interest and penalty.
</para>
<para>
9.
Notification No.71/2003CE came to be amended on 25.4.2007 by
Notification No.21/2007, excluding Pan Masala falling under Chapter
XXI of the Tariff from the purview of the notification. Thus, the
5
exemption on Pan Masala came to an end vide Notification No.21/2007
dated 25.4.2007, which was challenged by way of separate Writ Petition
No.22 of 2007. The High Court vide judgment and order dated 11.5.2012
allowed the Writ Petition (C) No.22 of 2007 and held that the appellant
was entitled to exemption from payment of excise duty on manufacture
of Pan Masala for ten years from the date of commencement of
commercial production, i.e., 27.6.2006.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
10. The appellant submitted that 14 separate claims were filed for
refund of additional excise duty and education cess on the ground these
levies are also duties of excise, for which exemption had been granted for
ten years. The appellant filed Writ Petition (C) No.24 of 2007 before the
High Court of Sikkim at Gangtok for quashing Notification No.71/2003
CE, confining the exemption to "under any of the said Acts” mentioned in
paragraph 1 of the notification. The prayer was made for a declaration
that the exemption notification was applicable to NCCD, additional excise
duty (Pan Masala) and education cess and the Notification No.71/2003
CE was repugnant to the Industrial Policy decision declared by Union of
India (respondent no.1) and State of Sikkim (respondent no.4). The
appellant claimed that excise duty exemption would include all levy in
nature of excise duty, levied and collected on goods manufactured in
6
India.
11. Vide Notifications dated 27.3.2008 and 10.6.2008, the benefit of
Cenvat Credit was withdrawn. The appellant challenged the notification
through Writ Petition (C) No.11 of 2008. The High Court was pleased to
allow the said petition vide judgment and order dated 15.11.2010.
12. Akshay Ispat and Ferro Alloys Private Limited, the manufacturer of
Ferro Silicon, an excisable commodity, has filed other appeal. It had
obtained permanent registration under the Central Excise Rules 2002 on
11.3.2004. The Government of India introduced education cess under
Chapter VI of Section 91 of the Finance Act, 2004. The appellant did not
claim the benefit of the education cess for the period August 2004 to
March 2006. After that, it started taking the recredit of the education
cess w.e.f. 1.4.2006. On 12.9.2006, the Superintendent, Central Excise,
sent a communication directing the appellant to pay the education cess
with interest and penalty for August, 2006. The appellant submitted its
reply. After that, show cause notice dated 31.10.2006, was issued to the
appellant regarding default in payment of education cess for August,
2006 and September, 2006 and proceedings were initiated for
infringement under Section 91(3) of the Finance Act, 2004. The
7
appellant sent a reply; however, on 6.12.2006, another show cause
notice was issued. The appellant after that claimed on 19.12.2006
repayment of education cess for the period August, 2004 to March, 2006.
In March 2007, the Government of India introduced secondary and
higher education cess under Section 126 of the Finance Act, 2007.
Section 128(1) of the Finance Act, 2007 indicated how the said cess was
to be calculated. The respondents demanded by issuance of further
notice education cess and secondary and higher education cess. The
appellant filed a writ application in the High Court. By the impugned
judgment, the same has been dismissed. The High Court dismissed the
Writ Petition (C) No.24 of 2007, and another concerning NCCD and
education cess, secondary and higher education cess and held that they
were not included under exemption Notification No.71/2003CE and the
appellant had illegally availed the benefits of the exemption in respect to
it. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petitions, the appeals have been
preferred. | <para>
10. The appellant submitted that 14 separate claims were filed for
refund of additional excise duty and education cess on the ground these
levies are also duties of excise, for which exemption had been granted for
ten years. The appellant filed Writ Petition (C) No.24 of 2007 before the
High Court of Sikkim at Gangtok for quashing Notification No.71/2003
CE, confining the exemption to "under any of the said Acts” mentioned in
paragraph 1 of the notification. The prayer was made for a declaration
that the exemption notification was applicable to NCCD, additional excise
duty (Pan Masala) and education cess and the Notification No.71/2003
CE was repugnant to the Industrial Policy decision declared by Union of
India (respondent no.1) and State of Sikkim (respondent no.4). The
appellant claimed that excise duty exemption would include all levy in
nature of excise duty, levied and collected on goods manufactured in
6
India.
</para>
<para>
11. Vide Notifications dated 27.3.2008 and 10.6.2008, the benefit of
Cenvat Credit was withdrawn. The appellant challenged the notification
through Writ Petition (C) No.11 of 2008. The High Court was pleased to
allow the said petition vide judgment and order dated 15.11.2010.
12. Akshay Ispat and Ferro Alloys Private Limited, the manufacturer of
Ferro Silicon, an excisable commodity, has filed other appeal. It had
obtained permanent registration under the Central Excise Rules 2002 on
11.3.2004. The Government of India introduced education cess under
Chapter VI of Section 91 of the Finance Act, 2004. The appellant did not
claim the benefit of the education cess for the period August 2004 to
March 2006. After that, it started taking the recredit of the education
cess w.e.f. 1.4.2006. On 12.9.2006, the Superintendent, Central Excise,
sent a communication directing the appellant to pay the education cess
with interest and penalty for August, 2006. The appellant submitted its
reply. After that, show cause notice dated 31.10.2006, was issued to the
appellant regarding default in payment of education cess for August,
2006 and September, 2006 and proceedings were initiated for
infringement under Section 91(3) of the Finance Act, 2004. The
7
appellant sent a reply; however, on 6.12.2006, another show cause
notice was issued. The appellant after that claimed on 19.12.2006
repayment of education cess for the period August, 2004 to March, 2006.
In March 2007, the Government of India introduced secondary and
higher education cess under Section 126 of the Finance Act, 2007.
Section 128(1) of the Finance Act, 2007 indicated how the said cess was
to be calculated. The respondents demanded by issuance of further
notice education cess and secondary and higher education cess. The
appellant filed a writ application in the High Court. By the impugned
judgment, the same has been dismissed. The High Court dismissed the
Writ Petition (C) No.24 of 2007, and another concerning NCCD and
education cess, secondary and higher education cess and held that they
were not included under exemption Notification No.71/2003CE and the
appellant had illegally availed the benefits of the exemption in respect to
it. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petitions, the appeals have been
preferred.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted
that NCCD, education cess, and secondary and higher education cess
form part of the excise duty. Hence, the decision of the High Court is
bad in law. Reliance has been placed on <cite>SRD Nutrients Private Limited v.
8
Commissioner of Central Excise, Guwahati, (2018) 1 SCC 105</cite> and the
decision of this Court in <cite>Bajaj Auto Limited v. Union of India & others,
2019 SCC OnLine SC 421</cite>, decided on 27.3.2019. It is submitted that
the education cess was introduced by Sections 91 and 93 of the Finance
Act, 2004 and higher education cess by the Finance Act, 2007 and the
NCCD was imposed under Section 136 of the Finance Act, 2001. The
imposition is in the nature of a duty of excise and in addition to any
other duty of excise chargeable under the Central Excise Act, 1944 (‘the
Act of 1944’). It is further provided that the provisions of the Act of 1944
and Rules made thereunder relating to refunds and exemptions from
duties and imposition of penalty, shall, as far as may be, apply with
respect to the abovementioned duties in question. Reliance has also
been placed on circulars dated 10.8.2004 and 8.4.2011, issued by
Central Board of Excise and Customs, on the subject of education cess
and secondary and higher education cess.
14. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents has submitted
that the decision of the High Court is appropriate and no case for
interference is made out. The benefit of exemption granted, w.e.f.
9.9.2003 from payment of excise duty was withdrawn vide notification
dated 25.4.2007. Tobacco and Tobacco products including cigarettes,
9
cigars and gutkha, were excluded from the benefit of exemption of the
excise duty. The notification dated 25.4.2007 was set aside by the High
Court. The decision of the High Court has been reversed by this Court in
<cite>Union of India v. Unicorn Industries (Civil Appeal No. 7432 of 2019)</cite>,
decided on 19.9.2019. Apart from that, when exemption notifications
were issued, the NCCD, education cess and secondary and higher
education cess were not even imposed, as such, it could not be said that
they were covered under the exemption notification. The duty described
above had been imposed by separate legislation, which was not covered
under the exemption notification. It was an additional duty imposed in
the nature of excise duty. They were not covered under the exemption
notification. As such, the High Court has rightly dismissed the writ
application filed by the appellants. Hence, no case for interference is
made out. | <para>
13. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted
that NCCD, education cess, and secondary and higher education cess
form part of the excise duty. Hence, the decision of the High Court is
bad in law. Reliance has been placed on <cite>SRD Nutrients Private Limited v.
8
Commissioner of Central Excise, Guwahati, (2018) 1 SCC 105</cite> and the
decision of this Court in <cite>Bajaj Auto Limited v. Union of India & others,
2019 SCC OnLine SC 421</cite>, decided on 27.3.2019. It is submitted that
the education cess was introduced by Sections 91 and 93 of the Finance
Act, 2004 and higher education cess by the Finance Act, 2007 and the
NCCD was imposed under Section 136 of the Finance Act, 2001. The
imposition is in the nature of a duty of excise and in addition to any
other duty of excise chargeable under the Central Excise Act, 1944 (‘the
Act of 1944’). It is further provided that the provisions of the Act of 1944
and Rules made thereunder relating to refunds and exemptions from
duties and imposition of penalty, shall, as far as may be, apply with
respect to the abovementioned duties in question. Reliance has also
been placed on circulars dated 10.8.2004 and 8.4.2011, issued by
Central Board of Excise and Customs, on the subject of education cess
and secondary and higher education cess.
</para>
<para>
14. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents has submitted
that the decision of the High Court is appropriate and no case for
interference is made out. The benefit of exemption granted, w.e.f.
9.9.2003 from payment of excise duty was withdrawn vide notification
dated 25.4.2007. Tobacco and Tobacco products including cigarettes,
9
cigars and gutkha, were excluded from the benefit of exemption of the
excise duty. The notification dated 25.4.2007 was set aside by the High
Court. The decision of the High Court has been reversed by this Court in
<cite>Union of India v. Unicorn Industries (Civil Appeal No. 7432 of 2019)</cite>,
decided on 19.9.2019. Apart from that, when exemption notifications
were issued, the NCCD, education cess and secondary and higher
education cess were not even imposed, as such, it could not be said that
they were covered under the exemption notification. The duty described
above had been imposed by separate legislation, which was not covered
under the exemption notification. It was an additional duty imposed in
the nature of excise duty. They were not covered under the exemption
notification. As such, the High Court has rightly dismissed the writ
application filed by the appellants. Hence, no case for interference is
made out.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
15.
It is not disputed that the Government of India took a policy
decision, Ministry of Industry, Department of Industrial Policy and
Promotion vide Office Memorandum dated 24.12.1997, concerning new
industrial policy and concessions in the NorthEastern region. The
decision was taken for converting the Growth Centres and IIDCs into
total taxfree zones for the next ten years. All industrial activities in
10
these zones would be free from income tax and excise duty for ten years
from the commencement of production.
16. The benefit of the said notification was extended to the State of
Sikkim vide notification dated 17.2.2003. Following benefits were
extended to the new and the existing industrial units:
“i) New industrial units and existing industrial units on their
substantial expansion as defined, set up in Growth Center,
Industrial Infrastructure Development Centers (IIDCs) and other
locations like Industrial Estates, Export Processing Zones, Food
Parks, IT Parks, etc., as notified by the Central Government are
entitled to 100% (hundred percent) income tax and excise duty
exemption for a period of 10 years from the date of commencement
of commercial production. Thrust Sector Industries as mentioned
in AnnexureII are entitled to similar concessions in the entire State
of Sikkim without area restrictions.” | <para>
15.
It is not disputed that the Government of India took a policy
decision, Ministry of Industry, Department of Industrial Policy and
Promotion vide Office Memorandum dated 24.12.1997, concerning new
industrial policy and concessions in the NorthEastern region. The
decision was taken for converting the Growth Centres and IIDCs into
total taxfree zones for the next ten years. All industrial activities in
10
these zones would be free from income tax and excise duty for ten years
from the commencement of production.
</para>
<para>
16. The benefit of the said notification was extended to the State of
Sikkim vide notification dated 17.2.2003. Following benefits were
extended to the new and the existing industrial units:
“i) New industrial units and existing industrial units on their
substantial expansion as defined, set up in Growth Center,
Industrial Infrastructure Development Centers (IIDCs) and other
locations like Industrial Estates, Export Processing Zones, Food
Parks, IT Parks, etc., as notified by the Central Government are
entitled to 100% (hundred percent) income tax and excise duty
exemption for a period of 10 years from the date of commencement
of commercial production. Thrust Sector Industries as mentioned
in AnnexureII are entitled to similar concessions in the entire State
of Sikkim without area restrictions.”
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
17. The Government decided to exempt 100 per cent income tax and
excise duty for ten years. In accordance with the policy decision the
Notification No.71/2003 was issued on 9.9.2003 by the Central
Government in exercise of powers conferred by Section 5A(1) of the Act of
1944 read with Section 3(3) of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of
Special Importance) Act, 1957 (‘the Act of 1957’) and Section 3(3) of the
Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textiles Articles) Act, 1978 (‘the
Act of 1978’), exempted goods specified in the First Schedule and the
Second Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, other than goods
specified in Annexure I in the State of Sikkim. The exemption from
11
payment of so much of excise duty or additional duty of excise, as the
case may be, leviable thereon under any of the said Act. The relevant
portion is extracted hereunder:
“Notification No.71/2003 – Central Excise
In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of section 5A
of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944), read with subsection (3)
of section 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special
Importance) Act, 1957 (58 of 1957) and subsection (3) of Section 3
of the Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textiles Articles) Act,
1978 (40 of 1978), the Central Government, being satisfied that it is
necessary in the public interest so to do, hereby exempts the goods
specified in the First Schedule and the Second Schedule to the
Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986), other than goods
specified in Annexure I appended hereto, and cleared from a unit
located in the Industrial Growth Centre or Industrial Infrastructure
Development Centre or Export Promotion Industrial Park or
Industrial Estate or Industrial Area or Commercial Estate or
Scheme Area, as the case may be, in the State of Sikkim, specified
in Annexure – II appended hereto, from so much of the duty of
excise or additional duty of excise, as the case may be, leviable
thereon under any of the said Acts as is equivalent to the amount of
duty paid by the manufacturer of the said goods, other than the
amount of duty paid by utilization of CENVAT credit under the
CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. Section 136 of the Finance Act, 2001 provides imposition of the
NCCD. Section 136 is extracted hereunder:
“136. National Calamity Contingent Duty.(1) In the case of goods
specified in the Seventh Schedule, being goods manufactured or
produced, there shall be levied and collected for the purposes of the
Union, by surcharge, a duty of excise, to be called the National
Calamity Contingent Duty (hereinafter referred to as the National
Calamity Duty), at the rates specified in the said schedule.
(2) The National Calamity Duty chargeable on the goods specified in
the Seventh Schedule shall be in addition to any other duties of
excise chargeable on such goods under the Central Excise Act, 1944
(1 of 1944) or any other law for the time being in force.
(3) The provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) and
12
the rules made thereunder, including those relating to refunds and
exemptions from duties and imposition of penalty, shall, as far as
may be, apply in relation to the levy and collection of the National
Calamity Duty leviable under this section in respect of the goods
specified in the Seventh Schedule as they apply in relation to the
levy and collection of the duties of excise on such goods under that
Act or those rules, as the case may be.”
(emphasis supplied) | <para>
17. The Government decided to exempt 100 per cent income tax and
excise duty for ten years. In accordance with the policy decision the
Notification No.71/2003 was issued on 9.9.2003 by the Central
Government in exercise of powers conferred by Section 5A(1) of the Act of
1944 read with Section 3(3) of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of
Special Importance) Act, 1957 (‘the Act of 1957’) and Section 3(3) of the
Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textiles Articles) Act, 1978 (‘the
Act of 1978’), exempted goods specified in the First Schedule and the
Second Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, other than goods
specified in Annexure I in the State of Sikkim. The exemption from
11
payment of so much of excise duty or additional duty of excise, as the
case may be, leviable thereon under any of the said Act. The relevant
portion is extracted hereunder:
“Notification No.71/2003 – Central Excise
In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of section 5A
of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944), read with subsection (3)
of section 3 of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special
Importance) Act, 1957 (58 of 1957) and subsection (3) of Section 3
of the Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textiles Articles) Act,
1978 (40 of 1978), the Central Government, being satisfied that it is
necessary in the public interest so to do, hereby exempts the goods
specified in the First Schedule and the Second Schedule to the
Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986), other than goods
specified in Annexure I appended hereto, and cleared from a unit
located in the Industrial Growth Centre or Industrial Infrastructure
Development Centre or Export Promotion Industrial Park or
Industrial Estate or Industrial Area or Commercial Estate or
Scheme Area, as the case may be, in the State of Sikkim, specified
in Annexure – II appended hereto, from so much of the duty of
excise or additional duty of excise, as the case may be, leviable
thereon under any of the said Acts as is equivalent to the amount of
duty paid by the manufacturer of the said goods, other than the
amount of duty paid by utilization of CENVAT credit under the
CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002.”
(emphasis supplied)
</para>
<para>
18. Section 136 of the Finance Act, 2001 provides imposition of the
NCCD. Section 136 is extracted hereunder:
“136. National Calamity Contingent Duty.(1) In the case of goods
specified in the Seventh Schedule, being goods manufactured or
produced, there shall be levied and collected for the purposes of the
Union, by surcharge, a duty of excise, to be called the National
Calamity Contingent Duty (hereinafter referred to as the National
Calamity Duty), at the rates specified in the said schedule.
(2) The National Calamity Duty chargeable on the goods specified in
the Seventh Schedule shall be in addition to any other duties of
excise chargeable on such goods under the Central Excise Act, 1944
(1 of 1944) or any other law for the time being in force.
(3) The provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) and
12
the rules made thereunder, including those relating to refunds and
exemptions from duties and imposition of penalty, shall, as far as
may be, apply in relation to the levy and collection of the National
Calamity Duty leviable under this section in respect of the goods
specified in the Seventh Schedule as they apply in relation to the
levy and collection of the duties of excise on such goods under that
Act or those rules, as the case may be.”
(emphasis supplied)
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
19. The education cess came to be imposed vide notification dated
10.9.2004 issued under the Finance Act, 2004. Sections 91 and 93 are
extracted hereunder:
“91. Education Cess(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub
section (11) of Section 2, there shall be levied and collected, in
accordance with the provisions of this Chapter as surcharge for
purposes of the Union, a cess to be called the Education Cess, to
fulfil the commitment of the Government to provide and finance
universalized quality basic education.
(2) The Central Government may, after due appropriation made by
Parliament by law in this behalf, utilize, such sums of money of the
Education Cess levied under subsection (11) of Section 2 and this
Chapter for the purposes specified in subsection (1), as it may
consider necessary.
***
93. Education Cess on Excisable Goods (1) The Education Cess
levied under Section 81, in the case of goods specified in the First
Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986), being
goods manufactured or produced, shall be a duty of excise (in this
section referred to as the Education Cess on excisable goods), at the
rate of two per cent, calculated on the aggregate of all duties of
excise (including special duty of excise or any other duty of excise
but excluding Education Cess on excisable goods) which are levied
and collected by the Central Government in the Ministry of Finance
(Department of Revenue) under the provisions of the Central Excise
Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) or under any other law for the time being in
force.
(2) The Education Cess on excisable goods shall be in addition to
any other duties of excise chargeable on such goods under the
Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) or any other law for the time
being in force.
(3) The provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) and
13
the rules made thereunder, including those relating to refunds and
exemptions from duties and imposition of penalty shall, as far as
may be, apply in relation to the levy and collection of the Education
Cess on excisable goods as they apply in relation to the levy and
collection of the duties of excise on such goods under the Central
Excise Act, 1944 or the rules, as the case may be.”
(emphasis supplied)
20. The Central Government introduced the secondary and higher
education cess at the rate of 1 per cent of the total excise duty under
Sections 126 and 128 of the Finance Act, 2007, which are reproduced
hereunder:
"126. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of subsection (12) of
section 2, there shall be levied and collected, in accordance with the
provisions of this Chapter as surcharge for purposes of the Union, a
cess to be called the Secondary and Higher Education Cess, to fulfil
the commitment of the Government to provide and finance
secondary and higher education.
(2) The Central Government may, after due appropriation made by
Parliament by law in this behalf, utilize, such sums of money of the
Secondary and Higher Education Cess levied under subsection
(12) of section 2 and this Chapter for the purposes specified in
subsection (1) as it may consider necessary.
XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX
128. (1) The Secondary and Higher Education Cess levied under
section 126, in the case of goods specified in the First Schedule to
the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, being goods manufactured or
produced, shall be a duty of excise (in this section referred to as the
Secondary and Higher Education Cess on excisable goods), at the
rate of one per cent., calculated on the aggregate of all duties of
excise (including special duty of excise or any other duty of excise
but excluding Education Cess chargeable under section 93 of the
Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 and Secondary and Higher Education
Cess on excisable goods) which are levied and collected by the
Central Government in the Ministry of Finance (Department of
Revenue), under the provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or
under any other law for the time being in force.
14
(2) The Secondary and Higher Education Cess on excisable goods
shall be in addition to any other duties of excise chargeable on such
goods, under the Central Excise Act, 1944 or any other law for the
time being in force and the Education Cess chargeable under
section 93 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1944.
(3) The provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the rules
made thereunder, including those relating to refunds and
exemptions from duties and imposition of penalty shall, as far as
may be, apply in relation to the levy and collection of the Secondary
and Higher Education Cess on excisable goods as they apply in
relation to the levy and collection of the duties of excise on such
goods under the Central Excise Act, 1944 or the rules made
thereunder, as the case may be." | <para>
19. The education cess came to be imposed vide notification dated
10.9.2004 issued under the Finance Act, 2004. Sections 91 and 93 are
extracted hereunder:
“91. Education Cess(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub
section (11) of Section 2, there shall be levied and collected, in
accordance with the provisions of this Chapter as surcharge for
purposes of the Union, a cess to be called the Education Cess, to
fulfil the commitment of the Government to provide and finance
universalized quality basic education.
(2) The Central Government may, after due appropriation made by
Parliament by law in this behalf, utilize, such sums of money of the
Education Cess levied under subsection (11) of Section 2 and this
Chapter for the purposes specified in subsection (1), as it may
consider necessary.
***
93. Education Cess on Excisable Goods (1) The Education Cess
levied under Section 81, in the case of goods specified in the First
Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986), being
goods manufactured or produced, shall be a duty of excise (in this
section referred to as the Education Cess on excisable goods), at the
rate of two per cent, calculated on the aggregate of all duties of
excise (including special duty of excise or any other duty of excise
but excluding Education Cess on excisable goods) which are levied
and collected by the Central Government in the Ministry of Finance
(Department of Revenue) under the provisions of the Central Excise
Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) or under any other law for the time being in
force.
(2) The Education Cess on excisable goods shall be in addition to
any other duties of excise chargeable on such goods under the
Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) or any other law for the time
being in force.
(3) The provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) and
13
the rules made thereunder, including those relating to refunds and
exemptions from duties and imposition of penalty shall, as far as
may be, apply in relation to the levy and collection of the Education
Cess on excisable goods as they apply in relation to the levy and
collection of the duties of excise on such goods under the Central
Excise Act, 1944 or the rules, as the case may be.”
(emphasis supplied)
</para>
<para>
20. The Central Government introduced the secondary and higher
education cess at the rate of 1 per cent of the total excise duty under
Sections 126 and 128 of the Finance Act, 2007, which are reproduced
hereunder:
"126. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of subsection (12) of
section 2, there shall be levied and collected, in accordance with the
provisions of this Chapter as surcharge for purposes of the Union, a
cess to be called the Secondary and Higher Education Cess, to fulfil
the commitment of the Government to provide and finance
secondary and higher education.
(2) The Central Government may, after due appropriation made by
Parliament by law in this behalf, utilize, such sums of money of the
Secondary and Higher Education Cess levied under subsection
(12) of section 2 and this Chapter for the purposes specified in
subsection (1) as it may consider necessary.
XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX
128. (1) The Secondary and Higher Education Cess levied under
section 126, in the case of goods specified in the First Schedule to
the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, being goods manufactured or
produced, shall be a duty of excise (in this section referred to as the
Secondary and Higher Education Cess on excisable goods), at the
rate of one per cent., calculated on the aggregate of all duties of
excise (including special duty of excise or any other duty of excise
but excluding Education Cess chargeable under section 93 of the
Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 and Secondary and Higher Education
Cess on excisable goods) which are levied and collected by the
Central Government in the Ministry of Finance (Department of
Revenue), under the provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 or
under any other law for the time being in force.
14
(2) The Secondary and Higher Education Cess on excisable goods
shall be in addition to any other duties of excise chargeable on such
goods, under the Central Excise Act, 1944 or any other law for the
time being in force and the Education Cess chargeable under
section 93 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1944.
(3) The provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the rules
made thereunder, including those relating to refunds and
exemptions from duties and imposition of penalty shall, as far as
may be, apply in relation to the levy and collection of the Secondary
and Higher Education Cess on excisable goods as they apply in
relation to the levy and collection of the duties of excise on such
goods under the Central Excise Act, 1944 or the rules made
thereunder, as the case may be."
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
21.
The appellant challenged the exemption Notification No.71/2003
dated 9.9.2003, before the High Court only to the extent that it limits the
exemption only in relation to basic excise duty under the Excise Act,
additional duties under the Act of 1957 and the additional duties under
the Act of 1978. It is submitted that though various Finance Acts
imposed these duties, they were recoverable as excise duty,
notwithstanding their nomenclature. The notification dated 17.2.2003
indicated that 100 per cent income tax and excise duty exemption for ten
years was granted. The exemption should cover the NCCD, education
cess and the secondary and higher education cess imposed by the
notifications issued under Finance Acts of 2001, 2004, and 2007.
22. The main question arising for consideration is when 100 per cent
exemption had been granted for excise duty for a period of 10 years,
15
whether the exemption notification issued for the State of Sikkim on
9.9.2003 shall be confined to the basic excise duty under the Act of
1944, additional duty under the Act of 1957 and additional duty under
the Act of 1978, which were specifically mentioned in the notification
issued on 9.9.2003, or it also include cess/duty imposed by Finance Acts
of 2001, 2004 and 2007. | <para>
21.
The appellant challenged the exemption Notification No.71/2003
dated 9.9.2003, before the High Court only to the extent that it limits the
exemption only in relation to basic excise duty under the Excise Act,
additional duties under the Act of 1957 and the additional duties under
the Act of 1978. It is submitted that though various Finance Acts
imposed these duties, they were recoverable as excise duty,
notwithstanding their nomenclature. The notification dated 17.2.2003
indicated that 100 per cent income tax and excise duty exemption for ten
years was granted. The exemption should cover the NCCD, education
cess and the secondary and higher education cess imposed by the
notifications issued under Finance Acts of 2001, 2004, and 2007.
</para>
<para>
22. The main question arising for consideration is when 100 per cent
exemption had been granted for excise duty for a period of 10 years,
15
whether the exemption notification issued for the State of Sikkim on
9.9.2003 shall be confined to the basic excise duty under the Act of
1944, additional duty under the Act of 1957 and additional duty under
the Act of 1978, which were specifically mentioned in the notification
issued on 9.9.2003, or it also include cess/duty imposed by Finance Acts
of 2001, 2004 and 2007.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
23. The submission raised on behalf of appellant is that the duty and
cess in the nature of excise duty cannot be realized, particularly in view
of the provisions in the Finance Acts of 2001, 2004 and 2007 relating to
refund and exemption, which have made applicable, the provisions of the
Act of 1944 and the Rules made thereunder relating to exemption. As
such, in view of the decisions of Division Bench of this Court in <cite>SRD
Nutrients Private Limited (supra)</cite> and <cite>Bajaj Auto Limited (supra)</cite>, the
decision of the High Court deserves to be set aside.
24.
It is not in dispute that when initial exemption notification was
issued in 1997 for the NorthEastern States, which was later on applied
to the State of Sikkim on 9.9.2003. The benefits from payment of excise
duty and additional excise duty were confined to the basic excise duty
payable under the Acts of 1944, 1957 and 1978. There was no reference
16
made to NCCD imposed under the Finance Act, 2001. Apart from that,
when the notification came to be issued, the education cess and
secondary and higher education cess, which came to be imposed by
Finance Acts of 2004 and 2007, were not in vogue. | <para>
23. The submission raised on behalf of appellant is that the duty and
cess in the nature of excise duty cannot be realized, particularly in view
of the provisions in the Finance Acts of 2001, 2004 and 2007 relating to
refund and exemption, which have made applicable, the provisions of the
Act of 1944 and the Rules made thereunder relating to exemption. As
such, in view of the decisions of Division Bench of this Court in <cite>SRD
Nutrients Private Limited (supra)</cite> and <cite>Bajaj Auto Limited (supra)</cite>, the
decision of the High Court deserves to be set aside.
</para>
<para>
24.
It is not in dispute that when initial exemption notification was
issued in 1997 for the NorthEastern States, which was later on applied
to the State of Sikkim on 9.9.2003. The benefits from payment of excise
duty and additional excise duty were confined to the basic excise duty
payable under the Acts of 1944, 1957 and 1978. There was no reference
16
made to NCCD imposed under the Finance Act, 2001. Apart from that,
when the notification came to be issued, the education cess and
secondary and higher education cess, which came to be imposed by
Finance Acts of 2004 and 2007, were not in vogue.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
25. A Division Bench of this Court in <cite>SRD Nutrients Private Limited
(supra)</cite> has considered the Finance Acts of 2004 and 2007, by which
education and secondary and higher education cess were imposed.
Under the Industrial Policy dated 1.4.2007 for the NorthEastern States,
the notification dated 25.4.2007, issued by the Central Government,
came up for consideration before this Court. The said notification and
the industrial policy, have been dealt with in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the
<cite>SRD Nutrients Private Limited (supra)</cite>, which are extracted hereunder:
“4. Industrial Policy dated 142007 for the NorthEastern States,
including the State of Assam, was announced by the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry (Department of Industrial Policy and
Promotion), Government of India to set up a special package for the
NorthEastern States to accelerate industrial development of the
State. As per this package, new industrial units were entitled to
100% excise duty exemption for a period of ten years from the date
of commencement of commercial production. Pursuant to the said
Industrial Policy, the Central Government issued Notification No.
20/2007Ex. Dated 2542007 granting exemption from duties of
excise levied under the Central Excise Act, 1944 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act”) read with Section 3(3) of the Additional
Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 and
Section 3(3) of the Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles & Textile
Articles) Act, 1978 to goods cleared from the notified areas within
the NorthEastern States. The said Notification provided that the
assessee would be entitled to refund of duty paid other than the
duty paid by way of utilisation of CENVAT credit under the CENVAT
Credit Rules, 2004.
17
5. Reproduction of the first three paragraphs of this Notification
would be sufficient, which are as follows:
“NOTIFICATION No.: 20/2007CE dated 2542007
NorthEast — Exemption to all goods, except as specified,
cleared from Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram,
Manipur, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh or Sikkim from
duty paid other than by utilisation of CENVAT credit.
In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of
Section 5A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944), the
Central Government, being satisfied that it is necessary in the
public interest so to do, hereby exempts the goods specified in
the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of
1986) other than those mentioned in the Annexure and cleared
from a unit located in the States of Assam or Tripura or
Meghalaya or Mizoram or Manipur or Nagaland or Arunachal
Pradesh or Sikkim, as the case may be, from so much of the
duty of excise leviable thereon under the said Act as is
equivalent to the amount of duty paid by the manufacturer of
goods other than the amount of duty paid by utilisation of
CENVAT credit under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
2. In cases where all goods produced by a manufacturer are
eligible for exemption under this Notification, the exemption
contained in this Notification shall be available subject to the
condition that, the manufacturer first utilises whole of the
CENVAT credit available to him on the last day of the month
under consideration for payment of duty on goods cleared
during such month and pays only the balance amount in cash.
3. The exemption contained in this notification shall be given
effect to in the following manner, namely—
(a) the manufacturer shall submit a statement of the duty paid
other than the amount of duty paid by utilisation of CENVAT
credit under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, to the Assistant
Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise,
as the case may be, by the 7th of the next month in which the
duty has been paid other than the amount of duty paid by
utilisation of CENVAT credit under the CENVAT Credit Rules,
2004;
(b) the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise or the Deputy
Commissioner of Central Excise, as the case may be, after
such verification, as may be deemed necessary, shall refund
the amount of duty paid other than the amount of duty paid
18
by utilisation of CENVAT credit under the CENVAT Credit
Rules, 2004, during the month under consideration to the
manufacturer by the 15th of the next month:
Provided that in cases, where the exemption contained in this
Notification is not applicable to some of the goods produced by
a manufacturer, such refund shall not exceed the amount of
duty paid less the amount of the CENVAT credit availed of, in
respect of the duty paid on the inputs used in or in relation to
the manufacture of goods cleared under this Notification;
(c) if there is likely to be any delay in the verification, Assistant
Commissioner of Central Excise or the Deputy Commissioner
of Central Excise, as the case may be, shall refund the amount
on provisional basis by the 15th of the next month to the
month under consideration and thereafter may adjust the
amount of refund by such amount as may be necessary in the
subsequent refunds admissible to the manufacturer.” | <para>
25. A Division Bench of this Court in <cite>SRD Nutrients Private Limited
(supra)</cite> has considered the Finance Acts of 2004 and 2007, by which
education and secondary and higher education cess were imposed.
Under the Industrial Policy dated 1.4.2007 for the NorthEastern States,
the notification dated 25.4.2007, issued by the Central Government,
came up for consideration before this Court. The said notification and
the industrial policy, have been dealt with in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the
<cite>SRD Nutrients Private Limited (supra)</cite>, which are extracted hereunder:
“4. Industrial Policy dated 142007 for the NorthEastern States,
including the State of Assam, was announced by the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry (Department of Industrial Policy and
Promotion), Government of India to set up a special package for the
NorthEastern States to accelerate industrial development of the
State. As per this package, new industrial units were entitled to
100% excise duty exemption for a period of ten years from the date
of commencement of commercial production. Pursuant to the said
Industrial Policy, the Central Government issued Notification No.
20/2007Ex. Dated 2542007 granting exemption from duties of
excise levied under the Central Excise Act, 1944 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act”) read with Section 3(3) of the Additional
Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 and
Section 3(3) of the Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles & Textile
Articles) Act, 1978 to goods cleared from the notified areas within
the NorthEastern States. The said Notification provided that the
assessee would be entitled to refund of duty paid other than the
duty paid by way of utilisation of CENVAT credit under the CENVAT
Credit Rules, 2004.
17
</para>
<para>
5. Reproduction of the first three paragraphs of this Notification
would be sufficient, which are as follows:
“NOTIFICATION No.: 20/2007CE dated 2542007
NorthEast — Exemption to all goods, except as specified,
cleared from Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram,
Manipur, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh or Sikkim from
duty paid other than by utilisation of CENVAT credit.
In exercise of the powers conferred by subsection (1) of
Section 5A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944), the
Central Government, being satisfied that it is necessary in the
public interest so to do, hereby exempts the goods specified in
the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of
1986) other than those mentioned in the Annexure and cleared
from a unit located in the States of Assam or Tripura or
Meghalaya or Mizoram or Manipur or Nagaland or Arunachal
Pradesh or Sikkim, as the case may be, from so much of the
duty of excise leviable thereon under the said Act as is
equivalent to the amount of duty paid by the manufacturer of
goods other than the amount of duty paid by utilisation of
CENVAT credit under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
2. In cases where all goods produced by a manufacturer are
eligible for exemption under this Notification, the exemption
contained in this Notification shall be available subject to the
condition that, the manufacturer first utilises whole of the
CENVAT credit available to him on the last day of the month
under consideration for payment of duty on goods cleared
during such month and pays only the balance amount in cash.
3. The exemption contained in this notification shall be given
effect to in the following manner, namely—
(a) the manufacturer shall submit a statement of the duty paid
other than the amount of duty paid by utilisation of CENVAT
credit under the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, to the Assistant
Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise,
as the case may be, by the 7th of the next month in which the
duty has been paid other than the amount of duty paid by
utilisation of CENVAT credit under the CENVAT Credit Rules,
2004;
(b) the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise or the Deputy
Commissioner of Central Excise, as the case may be, after
such verification, as may be deemed necessary, shall refund
the amount of duty paid other than the amount of duty paid
18
by utilisation of CENVAT credit under the CENVAT Credit
Rules, 2004, during the month under consideration to the
manufacturer by the 15th of the next month:
Provided that in cases, where the exemption contained in this
Notification is not applicable to some of the goods produced by
a manufacturer, such refund shall not exceed the amount of
duty paid less the amount of the CENVAT credit availed of, in
respect of the duty paid on the inputs used in or in relation to
the manufacture of goods cleared under this Notification;
(c) if there is likely to be any delay in the verification, Assistant
Commissioner of Central Excise or the Deputy Commissioner
of Central Excise, as the case may be, shall refund the amount
on provisional basis by the 15th of the next month to the
month under consideration and thereafter may adjust the
amount of refund by such amount as may be necessary in the
subsequent refunds admissible to the manufacturer.”
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
Circulars have also been referred to in the decision of this Court in
<cite>SRD Nutrients Private Limited (supra)</cite>. The same is extracted hereunder:
“17. It is clear from the arguments of the counsel for the parties that
divergent views are expressed by the CESTAT as well as High Courts.
Even one Bench of the same Tribunal has differed from its earlier
Division Bench decision. In this scenario, it becomes important as to
how the Department has viewed the position regarding education
cess and higher education cess which is payable as a surcharge on
the excise duty, once the excise duty is exempted. Two circulars are
relevant in this behalf, one is Circular dated 1082004 which
clarifies that education cess is part of excise duty. In this circular,
certain clarifications are given by the Ministry of Finance
(Department of Revenue), Government of India and the relevant
portion thereof reads as under:
“Subject: Issues relating to imposition of education cess on
excisable goods and on imported goods, as pointed out by the
trade and the field formations—Reg.
The undersigned is directed to state that subsequent to Budget
2004 announcements, a number of representations/references
have been received from the trade as well as from the field
formations pertaining to imposition of education cess on
excisable goods and on imported goods. The points raised and
the clarifications thereon are as follows:
19
Issue (1): Whether education cess on excisable goods is leviable
on goods manufactured prior to imposition of cess but cleared
after imposition of such cess?
Clarification: Education cess on excisable goods is a new levy.
In similar cases, it has been held by the Supreme Court that if
a levy is not there at the time the goods are manufactured or
produced in India, it cannot be levied at the stage of removal of
the said goods. Thus, education cess is not leviable on
excisable goods manufactured prior to imposition of cess but
cleared after imposition of such cess.
Issue (2): Whether goods that are fully exempted from excise
duty/customs duty or are cleared without payment of excise
duty/customs duty (such as clearance under bond or
fulfilment of certain conditions) would be subjected to cess.
Clarification: The education cess is leviable at the rate of two
per cent of the aggregate of all duties of excise/customs
(excluding certain duties of customs like antidumping duty,
safeguard duty, etc.), levied and collected. If goods are fully
exempted from excise duty or customs duty, are chargeable to
NIL duty or are cleared without payment of duty under
specified procedure such as clearance under bond, there is no
collection of duty. Thus, no education cess would be leviable
on such clearances. In this regard, letter D.O. No.
605/54/2004DBK dated 2172004 issued by Member
(Customs) may also be referred to.”
(emphasis in original)”
In the circular dated 10.8.2004, reference has been made to the
notification issued by Member (Customs), wherein it is stated that there
is no collection of excise duty; hence, no education cess would be leviable
on such clearances.
Circular dated 8.4.2011 had been issued by the Central Board of
Excise and Customs with respect to service tax. In case service tax
stands exempted, education cess and secondary and higher education
cess shall not be levied.
20 | <para>
Circulars have also been referred to in the decision of this Court in
<cite>SRD Nutrients Private Limited (supra)</cite>. The same is extracted hereunder:
“17. It is clear from the arguments of the counsel for the parties that
divergent views are expressed by the CESTAT as well as High Courts.
Even one Bench of the same Tribunal has differed from its earlier
Division Bench decision. In this scenario, it becomes important as to
how the Department has viewed the position regarding education
cess and higher education cess which is payable as a surcharge on
the excise duty, once the excise duty is exempted. Two circulars are
relevant in this behalf, one is Circular dated 1082004 which
clarifies that education cess is part of excise duty. In this circular,
certain clarifications are given by the Ministry of Finance
(Department of Revenue), Government of India and the relevant
portion thereof reads as under:
“Subject: Issues relating to imposition of education cess on
excisable goods and on imported goods, as pointed out by the
trade and the field formations—Reg.
The undersigned is directed to state that subsequent to Budget
2004 announcements, a number of representations/references
have been received from the trade as well as from the field
formations pertaining to imposition of education cess on
excisable goods and on imported goods. The points raised and
the clarifications thereon are as follows:
19
Issue (1): Whether education cess on excisable goods is leviable
on goods manufactured prior to imposition of cess but cleared
after imposition of such cess?
Clarification: Education cess on excisable goods is a new levy.
In similar cases, it has been held by the Supreme Court that if
a levy is not there at the time the goods are manufactured or
produced in India, it cannot be levied at the stage of removal of
the said goods. Thus, education cess is not leviable on
excisable goods manufactured prior to imposition of cess but
cleared after imposition of such cess.
Issue (2): Whether goods that are fully exempted from excise
duty/customs duty or are cleared without payment of excise
duty/customs duty (such as clearance under bond or
fulfilment of certain conditions) would be subjected to cess.
Clarification: The education cess is leviable at the rate of two
per cent of the aggregate of all duties of excise/customs
(excluding certain duties of customs like antidumping duty,
safeguard duty, etc.), levied and collected. If goods are fully
exempted from excise duty or customs duty, are chargeable to
NIL duty or are cleared without payment of duty under
specified procedure such as clearance under bond, there is no
collection of duty. Thus, no education cess would be leviable
on such clearances. In this regard, letter D.O. No.
605/54/2004DBK dated 2172004 issued by Member
(Customs) may also be referred to.”
(emphasis in original)”
</para>
<para>
In the circular dated 10.8.2004, reference has been made to the
notification issued by Member (Customs), wherein it is stated that there
is no collection of excise duty; hence, no education cess would be leviable
on such clearances.
Circular dated 8.4.2011 had been issued by the Central Board of
Excise and Customs with respect to service tax. In case service tax
stands exempted, education cess and secondary and higher education
cess shall not be levied.
20
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
26. This Court in <cite>SRD Nutrients Private Limited (supra)</cite> has observed
that the circulars bind department. When there is no excise duty, the
education cess and secondary and higher education cess could not have
been demanded. This Court observed thus:
“21. One aspect that clearly emerges from the reading of these two
circulars is that the Government itself has taken the position that
where whole of excise duty or service tax is exempted, even the
education cess as well as secondary and higher education cess
would not be payable. These circulars are binding on the
Department.
22. Even otherwise, we are of the opinion that it is more rational to
accept the aforesaid position as clarified by the Ministry of Finance
in the aforesaid circulars. Education cess is on excise duty. It
means that those assessees who are required to pay excise duty
have to shell out education cess as well. This education cess is
introduced by Sections 91 to 93 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004. As
per Section 91 thereof, education cess is the surcharge which the
assessee is to pay. Section 93 makes it clear that this education
cess is payable on "excisable goods," i.e., in respect of goods
specified in the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act,
1985. Further, this education cess is to be levied @ 2% and
calculated on the aggregate of all duties of excise which are levied
and collected by the Central Government under the provisions of
the Central Excise Act, 1944 or under any other law for the time
being in force. Subsection (3) of Section 93 provides that the
provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the Rules made
thereunder, including those related to refunds and duties, etc. shall
as far as may be applied in relation to levy and collection of
education cess on excisable goods. A conjoint reading of these
provisions would amply demonstrate that education cess as a
surcharge is levied @ 2% on the duties of excise, which are payable
under the Act. It can, therefore, be clearly inferred that when there
is no excise duty payable, as it is exempted, there would not be any
education cess as well, inasmuch as education cess @ 2% is to be
calculated on the aggregate of duties of excise. There cannot be any
surcharge when basic duty itself is NIL.
24. We are in agreement with the aforesaid reasons accorded by the
Rajasthan High Court since it is in consonance with the legal
principle enunciated by this Court. For this purpose, we may refer
***
21
to the judgment in <cite>CCE v. TELCO (1997) 5 SCC 275</cite>. In that case,
issue pertained to valuation of cess which was levied @ 1/8 per cent
of ad valorem “value” of the Central excise duty. The Court held that
the calculation of 1/8 per cent ad valorem of the motor vehicle for
the purposes of the levy and collection of the automobile cess must
be made that was being calculated since automobile cess was to be
levied and calculated as if it was excise duty. As a fortiori, the
education cess and higher education cess levied @ 2% of the excise
duty would partake the character of excise duty itself.”
27.
In <cite>Bajaj Auto Limited (supra)</cite>, a Division Bench of this Court
considered the question of liability towards NCCD, education cess and
secondary and higher education cess on manufacturing establishment
which is exempted from payment of central excise duty under the Act of
1944. The matter arose from the State of Uttarakhand; an Office
Memorandum dated 7.1.2003 was issued, by which 100 per cent
outright excise duty exemption for ten years was granted from the date of
commencement of the commercial production. Notification dated
10.6.2003 issued under Section 5A has been reproduced in the decision
mentioned above, the same is extracted hereunder:
“GENERAL EXEMPTION NO. 41
Exemption to goods other than specified goods cleared from units
located in the Industrial Growth Centre or Industrial Infrastructure
Development Centre or Export Promotion Industrial Park or
Industrial Estate or Industrial Area or Commercial Estate or
Scheme Area of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh.—In exercise of
the powers conferred by subsection (1) of section 5A of the Central
Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) read with subsection (3) of section 3 of
the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act,
1957 (58 of 1957) and subsection (3) of section 3 of the Additional
Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textiles Articles) Act, 1978 (40 of
1978), the Central Government, being satisfied that it is necessary
in the public interest so to do, hereby exempts the goods specified
in the First Schedule and the Second Schedule to the Central Excise
Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986), other than the goods specified in
22
AnnexureI appended hereto, and cleared from a unit located in the
Industrial Growth Centre or Industrial Infrastructure Development
Centre or Export Promotion Industrial Park or Industrial Estate or
Industrial Area or Commercial Estate or Scheme Area, as the case
may be, specified in [AnnexureII and Annexure III] appended
hereto, from the whole of the duty of excise or additional duty of
excise, as the case may be, leviable thereon under any of the said
Acts.”
The Division Bench has relied upon the decision of <cite>SRD Nutrients
Private Limited (supra)</cite>. The decision of the <cite>Rajasthan High Court in
Banswara Syntex Ltd. v. Union of India, 2007 SCC OnLine Raj. 365</cite>,
which was considered in <cite>SRD Nutrients Private Limited (supra)</cite>, was also
referred to, besides the circular of 2004. This Court has observed thus:
“21. We may notice that the primary reasoning contained in the
impugned order is common for the three cesses, i.e., NCCD;
Education Cess and Secondary & Higher Education Cess. These
were in the nature of surcharges levied in other Acts, which have
not been specifically excluded under the Notification in question.
That reasoning does not prevail, more so because of the judgment in
SRD Nutrients Pvt. Ltd. The question, thus, is whether, even though
the NCCD is in the nature of an excise duty, its incidence being on
the product, rather than on the value of the excise duty, that itself
would make any difference to the applicability of the NCCD to excise
exempt units. | <para>
26. This Court in <cite>SRD Nutrients Private Limited (supra)</cite> has observed
that the circulars bind department. When there is no excise duty, the
education cess and secondary and higher education cess could not have
been demanded. This Court observed thus:
“21. One aspect that clearly emerges from the reading of these two
circulars is that the Government itself has taken the position that
where whole of excise duty or service tax is exempted, even the
education cess as well as secondary and higher education cess
would not be payable. These circulars are binding on the
Department.
22. Even otherwise, we are of the opinion that it is more rational to
accept the aforesaid position as clarified by the Ministry of Finance
in the aforesaid circulars. Education cess is on excise duty. It
means that those assessees who are required to pay excise duty
have to shell out education cess as well. This education cess is
introduced by Sections 91 to 93 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004. As
per Section 91 thereof, education cess is the surcharge which the
assessee is to pay. Section 93 makes it clear that this education
cess is payable on "excisable goods," i.e., in respect of goods
specified in the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act,
1985. Further, this education cess is to be levied @ 2% and
calculated on the aggregate of all duties of excise which are levied
and collected by the Central Government under the provisions of
the Central Excise Act, 1944 or under any other law for the time
being in force. Subsection (3) of Section 93 provides that the
provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the Rules made
thereunder, including those related to refunds and duties, etc. shall
as far as may be applied in relation to levy and collection of
education cess on excisable goods. A conjoint reading of these
provisions would amply demonstrate that education cess as a
surcharge is levied @ 2% on the duties of excise, which are payable
under the Act. It can, therefore, be clearly inferred that when there
is no excise duty payable, as it is exempted, there would not be any
education cess as well, inasmuch as education cess @ 2% is to be
calculated on the aggregate of duties of excise. There cannot be any
surcharge when basic duty itself is NIL.
24. We are in agreement with the aforesaid reasons accorded by the
Rajasthan High Court since it is in consonance with the legal
principle enunciated by this Court. For this purpose, we may refer
***
21
to the judgment in <cite>CCE v. TELCO (1997) 5 SCC 275</cite>. In that case,
issue pertained to valuation of cess which was levied @ 1/8 per cent
of ad valorem “value” of the Central excise duty. The Court held that
the calculation of 1/8 per cent ad valorem of the motor vehicle for
the purposes of the levy and collection of the automobile cess must
be made that was being calculated since automobile cess was to be
levied and calculated as if it was excise duty. As a fortiori, the
education cess and higher education cess levied @ 2% of the excise
duty would partake the character of excise duty itself.”
</para>
<para>
27.
In <cite>Bajaj Auto Limited (supra)</cite>, a Division Bench of this Court
considered the question of liability towards NCCD, education cess and
secondary and higher education cess on manufacturing establishment
which is exempted from payment of central excise duty under the Act of
1944. The matter arose from the State of Uttarakhand; an Office
Memorandum dated 7.1.2003 was issued, by which 100 per cent
outright excise duty exemption for ten years was granted from the date of
commencement of the commercial production. Notification dated
10.6.2003 issued under Section 5A has been reproduced in the decision
mentioned above, the same is extracted hereunder:
“GENERAL EXEMPTION NO. 41
Exemption to goods other than specified goods cleared from units
located in the Industrial Growth Centre or Industrial Infrastructure
Development Centre or Export Promotion Industrial Park or
Industrial Estate or Industrial Area or Commercial Estate or
Scheme Area of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh.—In exercise of
the powers conferred by subsection (1) of section 5A of the Central
Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944) read with subsection (3) of section 3 of
the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act,
1957 (58 of 1957) and subsection (3) of section 3 of the Additional
Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textiles Articles) Act, 1978 (40 of
1978), the Central Government, being satisfied that it is necessary
in the public interest so to do, hereby exempts the goods specified
in the First Schedule and the Second Schedule to the Central Excise
Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986), other than the goods specified in
22
AnnexureI appended hereto, and cleared from a unit located in the
Industrial Growth Centre or Industrial Infrastructure Development
Centre or Export Promotion Industrial Park or Industrial Estate or
Industrial Area or Commercial Estate or Scheme Area, as the case
may be, specified in [AnnexureII and Annexure III] appended
hereto, from the whole of the duty of excise or additional duty of
excise, as the case may be, leviable thereon under any of the said
Acts.”
The Division Bench has relied upon the decision of <cite>SRD Nutrients
Private Limited (supra)</cite>. The decision of the <cite>Rajasthan High Court in
Banswara Syntex Ltd. v. Union of India, 2007 SCC OnLine Raj. 365</cite>,
which was considered in <cite>SRD Nutrients Private Limited (supra)</cite>, was also
referred to, besides the circular of 2004. This Court has observed thus:
“21. We may notice that the primary reasoning contained in the
impugned order is common for the three cesses, i.e., NCCD;
Education Cess and Secondary & Higher Education Cess. These
were in the nature of surcharges levied in other Acts, which have
not been specifically excluded under the Notification in question.
That reasoning does not prevail, more so because of the judgment in
SRD Nutrients Pvt. Ltd. The question, thus, is whether, even though
the NCCD is in the nature of an excise duty, its incidence being on
the product, rather than on the value of the excise duty, that itself
would make any difference to the applicability of the NCCD to excise
exempt units.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
22. On a proper appreciation of the judicial pronouncement in SRD
Nutrients Pvt. Ltd., we are not inclined to take a different view from
the one taken for Education Cess and Secondary & Higher
Education Cess, even while considering the issue of NCCD.
23. We may notice that this Court, in SRD Nutrients Pvt. Ltd. gave
its imprimatur to the view expressed by the Rajasthan High Court
in Banswara Syntex Ltd. The rationale is that while there may be
surcharges under different financial enactments to provide the
Government with revenue for specified purposes, the same have
been notified as leviable in the nature of a particular kind of duty.
In the case of NCCD, it is in the nature of an excise duty. It has to
bear the same character as those respective taxes to which the
surcharge is appended. NCCD will not cease to be an excise duty,
but is the same as an excise duty, even if it is levied on the product.
23
Thus, when NCCD, at the time of collection, takes the character of a
duty on the product, whatever may be the rationale behind it, it is
also subject to the provisions relating to excise duty, applicable to it
in the manner of collection as well as the obligation of the taxpayer
to discharge the duty. Once the excise duty is exempted, NCCD,
levied as an excise duty, cannot partake a different character and,
thus, would be entitled to the benefit of the exemption notification.
The exemption notification also states that the exemption is from
the “whole of the duty of excise or additional duty of excise.” We
may also note that the exemption itself is for a period of ten years
from the date of commercial production of the unit.
24. We are, thus, of the view that the appellant would not be liable
to pay the NCCD.” | <para>
22. On a proper appreciation of the judicial pronouncement in SRD
Nutrients Pvt. Ltd., we are not inclined to take a different view from
the one taken for Education Cess and Secondary & Higher
Education Cess, even while considering the issue of NCCD.
</para>
<para>
23. We may notice that this Court, in SRD Nutrients Pvt. Ltd. gave
its imprimatur to the view expressed by the Rajasthan High Court
in Banswara Syntex Ltd. The rationale is that while there may be
surcharges under different financial enactments to provide the
Government with revenue for specified purposes, the same have
been notified as leviable in the nature of a particular kind of duty.
In the case of NCCD, it is in the nature of an excise duty. It has to
bear the same character as those respective taxes to which the
surcharge is appended. NCCD will not cease to be an excise duty,
but is the same as an excise duty, even if it is levied on the product.
23
Thus, when NCCD, at the time of collection, takes the character of a
duty on the product, whatever may be the rationale behind it, it is
also subject to the provisions relating to excise duty, applicable to it
in the manner of collection as well as the obligation of the taxpayer
to discharge the duty. Once the excise duty is exempted, NCCD,
levied as an excise duty, cannot partake a different character and,
thus, would be entitled to the benefit of the exemption notification.
The exemption notification also states that the exemption is from
the “whole of the duty of excise or additional duty of excise.” We
may also note that the exemption itself is for a period of ten years
from the date of commercial production of the unit.
24. We are, thus, of the view that the appellant would not be liable
to pay the NCCD.”
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
28. The Division Bench of this Court has rendered both the above
decisions. The most unfortunate part is that the binding decision of
larger bench consisting of threeJudges of this <cite>Court in Union of India v.
Modi Rubber Limited, (1986) 4 SCC 66</cite>, dealing with the similar issue,
was not placed for consideration before this Court when the
abovementioned decisions came to be rendered.
29. This Court in <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite> has considered the
similar question in the backdrop of the facts that what is the meaning of
the expression ‘duty of excise’ employed in the notifications dated
1.8.1974 and 1.3.1981, issued by the Government of India under Rule
8(1) of the Central Excise Rules. A question arose whether expression
‘duty of excise’ is limited in its connotation only to basic duty levied
under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 or it also covers special
24
duties of excise levied under the various Finance Bills and Acts,
additional duty of excise levied under the Act of 1957 and other kind of
duty of excise levied under the Central enactments. | <para>
28. The Division Bench of this Court has rendered both the above
decisions. The most unfortunate part is that the binding decision of
larger bench consisting of threeJudges of this <cite>Court in Union of India v.
Modi Rubber Limited, (1986) 4 SCC 66</cite>, dealing with the similar issue,
was not placed for consideration before this Court when the
abovementioned decisions came to be rendered.
</para>
<para>
29. This Court in <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite> has considered the
similar question in the backdrop of the facts that what is the meaning of
the expression ‘duty of excise’ employed in the notifications dated
1.8.1974 and 1.3.1981, issued by the Government of India under Rule
8(1) of the Central Excise Rules. A question arose whether expression
‘duty of excise’ is limited in its connotation only to basic duty levied
under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 or it also covers special
24
duties of excise levied under the various Finance Bills and Acts,
additional duty of excise levied under the Act of 1957 and other kind of
duty of excise levied under the Central enactments.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
30.
In <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite>, the company was the manufacturer
of tyres, which product was subject to a duty of excise under the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The word ‘duty’ under the said Act is defined
in Rule 2(v) to mean “the duty payable under Section 3 of the Act”. The
exemption is dealt with under Rule 8 of Central Excise Rules, exempting
various categories of excisable goods from the whole or any part of the
duty of excise leviable on such goods. The notification dated 1.8.1974,
came up for consideration before this Court in Modi Rubber Limited
(supra), which is extracted hereunder:
“3…..
Notification No. 123/74C.E. dated August 1, 1974
In the exercise of the powers conferred by subrule (1) of Rule 8
of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, the Central Government hereby
exempts tyres for motor vehicles falling under subitem (1) of Item
No.16 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act,
1944 (1 of 1944), from so much of the duty of excise leviable
thereon as is in excess of fiftyfive per cent ad valorem.”
The notification was confined to the exemption of duty of excise
under the Act of 1944 in excess of 55 per cent ad valorem. Subsequently,
the notification dated 1.3.1981, was issued by the Central Government
exempting specified goods from so much of the duty of excise leviable
thereon as is more than the duty specified in the corresponding entry in
25
column 5.
31. This Court in <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite> considered the question
that since 1963, the special duty of excise was levied inter alia on the
manufacture of tyres from year to year up to 1971 by various Finance
Acts passed from time to time. It was discontinued from 1972 to 1978,
and the Finance Act, 1978, again revived it. After that, it continued to be
levied from year to year right up to the period. The special duties of
excise came to be imposed under Section 32 of the Finance Act, 1979,
which came up for consideration before this Court in <cite>Modi Rubber
Limited (supra)</cite>. The same is extracted hereunder:
“32. Special Duties of Excise.— (1) In the case of goods chargeable
with a duty of excise under the Central Excises Act as amended
from time to time, read with any notification for the time being in
force issued by the Central Government in relation to the duty so
chargeable there shall be levied and collected a special duty of
excise equal to five per cent of the amount so chargeable on such
goods.
(2) Subsection (1) shall cease to have effect after the 31st day of
March, 1980, except as respects things done or omitted to be done
before such cesser; and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897,
shall apply upon such cesser as if the said subsection had then
been repealed by a Central Act.
(3) The Special duties of excise referred to in subsection (1) shall
be in addition to any duties of excise chargeable on such goods
under the Central Excises Act or any other law for the time being in
force.
(4) The provisions of the Central Excises Act and the rules made
thereunder, including those relating to refunds and exemptions
from duties, shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to the levy and
collection of the special duties of excise leviable under this section
in respect of any goods as they apply in relation to the levy and
collection of the duties of excise on such goods under that Act or
those rules as the case may be.”
26
(emphasis supplied) | <para>
30.
In <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite>, the company was the manufacturer
of tyres, which product was subject to a duty of excise under the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The word ‘duty’ under the said Act is defined
in Rule 2(v) to mean “the duty payable under Section 3 of the Act”. The
exemption is dealt with under Rule 8 of Central Excise Rules, exempting
various categories of excisable goods from the whole or any part of the
duty of excise leviable on such goods. The notification dated 1.8.1974,
came up for consideration before this Court in Modi Rubber Limited
(supra), which is extracted hereunder:
“3…..
Notification No. 123/74C.E. dated August 1, 1974
In the exercise of the powers conferred by subrule (1) of Rule 8
of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, the Central Government hereby
exempts tyres for motor vehicles falling under subitem (1) of Item
No.16 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act,
1944 (1 of 1944), from so much of the duty of excise leviable
thereon as is in excess of fiftyfive per cent ad valorem.”
The notification was confined to the exemption of duty of excise
under the Act of 1944 in excess of 55 per cent ad valorem. Subsequently,
the notification dated 1.3.1981, was issued by the Central Government
exempting specified goods from so much of the duty of excise leviable
thereon as is more than the duty specified in the corresponding entry in
25
column 5.
</para>
<para>
31. This Court in <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite> considered the question
that since 1963, the special duty of excise was levied inter alia on the
manufacture of tyres from year to year up to 1971 by various Finance
Acts passed from time to time. It was discontinued from 1972 to 1978,
and the Finance Act, 1978, again revived it. After that, it continued to be
levied from year to year right up to the period. The special duties of
excise came to be imposed under Section 32 of the Finance Act, 1979,
which came up for consideration before this Court in <cite>Modi Rubber
Limited (supra)</cite>. The same is extracted hereunder:
“32. Special Duties of Excise.— (1) In the case of goods chargeable
with a duty of excise under the Central Excises Act as amended
from time to time, read with any notification for the time being in
force issued by the Central Government in relation to the duty so
chargeable there shall be levied and collected a special duty of
excise equal to five per cent of the amount so chargeable on such
goods.
(2) Subsection (1) shall cease to have effect after the 31st day of
March, 1980, except as respects things done or omitted to be done
before such cesser; and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897,
shall apply upon such cesser as if the said subsection had then
been repealed by a Central Act.
(3) The Special duties of excise referred to in subsection (1) shall
be in addition to any duties of excise chargeable on such goods
under the Central Excises Act or any other law for the time being in
force.
(4) The provisions of the Central Excises Act and the rules made
thereunder, including those relating to refunds and exemptions
from duties, shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to the levy and
collection of the special duties of excise leviable under this section
in respect of any goods as they apply in relation to the levy and
collection of the duties of excise on such goods under that Act or
those rules as the case may be.”
26
(emphasis supplied)
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
32. The provisions of Section 32 are pari materia
to the
abovementioned provisions of the Finance Act(s) in question. The special
duty under Section 32 of Finance Act, 1979 imposed was in addition to
any duties of excise chargeable on such goods under the provisions of
the Central Excises Act and the Rules made thereunder, with respect to
refunds and exemptions from duties, shall, as far as may be, apply to the
levy and collection of special duties of excise leviable under the
provisions of Section 32 of the Finance Act, 1979.
33. The assessee <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite> claimed that in view of
the notification dated 1.8.1974, assessee was exempted from payment
not only in respect of basic excise duty levied under the Central Excises
and Salt Act, 1944, but also in respect of special duty of excise levied
under the relevant Finance Acts, because the language used in the
notification was not restrictive and it referred generally to ‘duty of excise’
without any qualification, therefore, it covered all duties of excise
whether levied under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 or under
any other Central enactments. The dispute pertained to the period from
November 1979 to October 1982.
27 | <para>
32. The provisions of Section 32 are pari materia
to the
abovementioned provisions of the Finance Act(s) in question. The special
duty under Section 32 of Finance Act, 1979 imposed was in addition to
any duties of excise chargeable on such goods under the provisions of
the Central Excises Act and the Rules made thereunder, with respect to
refunds and exemptions from duties, shall, as far as may be, apply to the
levy and collection of special duties of excise leviable under the
provisions of Section 32 of the Finance Act, 1979.
</para>
<para>
33. The assessee <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite> claimed that in view of
the notification dated 1.8.1974, assessee was exempted from payment
not only in respect of basic excise duty levied under the Central Excises
and Salt Act, 1944, but also in respect of special duty of excise levied
under the relevant Finance Acts, because the language used in the
notification was not restrictive and it referred generally to ‘duty of excise’
without any qualification, therefore, it covered all duties of excise
whether levied under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 or under
any other Central enactments. The dispute pertained to the period from
November 1979 to October 1982.
27
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
34. The Assistant Collector of Excise, in the case of <cite>Modi Rubber
Limited (supra)</cite>, held that exemption granted under the notification dated
1.8.1974, was not available in respect of special duty of excise levied
under the Finance Acts. The assessee thereupon filed a writ petition in
the Delhi High Court, challenging the order of the Assistant Collector of
Excise. The Delhi High Court upheld the claim of the assessee. It took
the view that the expression ‘duty of excise’ included not only basic duty
of excise levied under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, but also
the special duty of excise levied under the various Finance Acts and any
other duties of excise levied under Central enactment. Meanwhile,
Parliament also enacted the Central Excise Laws (Amendment and
Validation) Act, 1982 laying down statutory rules which should guide the
court in interpreting notifications granting exemption from payment of
duty of excise and prescribing the conditions on which a notification
granting exemption from payment of duty of excise can be construed as
applicable to duty of excise levied under any Central law making the
provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the Rules made
thereunder applicable to the levy and collection of duty of excise under
such Central Law.
35. The question arose for consideration before this Court as to what is
28
the real import of the expression ‘duty of excise’ in the notifications dated
1.8.1974 and 1.3.1981 and whether it includes the duties of excise
leviable not only under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, but also
under any other enactment. | <para>
34. The Assistant Collector of Excise, in the case of <cite>Modi Rubber
Limited (supra)</cite>, held that exemption granted under the notification dated
1.8.1974, was not available in respect of special duty of excise levied
under the Finance Acts. The assessee thereupon filed a writ petition in
the Delhi High Court, challenging the order of the Assistant Collector of
Excise. The Delhi High Court upheld the claim of the assessee. It took
the view that the expression ‘duty of excise’ included not only basic duty
of excise levied under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, but also
the special duty of excise levied under the various Finance Acts and any
other duties of excise levied under Central enactment. Meanwhile,
Parliament also enacted the Central Excise Laws (Amendment and
Validation) Act, 1982 laying down statutory rules which should guide the
court in interpreting notifications granting exemption from payment of
duty of excise and prescribing the conditions on which a notification
granting exemption from payment of duty of excise can be construed as
applicable to duty of excise levied under any Central law making the
provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the Rules made
thereunder applicable to the levy and collection of duty of excise under
such Central Law.
</para>
<para>
35. The question arose for consideration before this Court as to what is
28
the real import of the expression ‘duty of excise’ in the notifications dated
1.8.1974 and 1.3.1981 and whether it includes the duties of excise
leviable not only under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, but also
under any other enactment.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
36. This Court in <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite> has considered the
purport of the notifications and the specific provisions mentioned therein
and held that exemption has to be considered in the light of provisions of
Central Excise Rules, 1944, as envisaged under Rule 2(v) of Central
Excise Rules, 1944. It cannot, in the circumstances, bear an extended
meaning to include special excise duty and auxiliary excise duty. This
Court observed thus:
“6. The first question that arises for consideration on these facts is
as to what is the true import of the expression "duty of excise" in
the notifications dated August 1, 1974, and March 1, 1981. It is
only if this expression is held to include duties of excise leviable not
only under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 but also under
any other enactments that the question would arise whether the
Central Laws (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1982 is
constitutionally invalid. We, therefore, asked the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the parties to confine their arguments only to
the first question of interpretation of the expression ‘duty of excise’
in the notifications dated August 1, 1974 and March 1, 1981.
7. Both these notifications, as the opening part shows, are issued
under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and since the
definition of ‘duty’ in Rule 2, clause (v) must necessarily be
projected in Rule 8(1) and the expression “duty of excise” in Rule
8(1) must be read in the light of that definition, the same expression
used in these two notifications issued under Rule 8(1) must also be
interpreted in the same sense, namely, duty of excise payable under
the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the exemption granted
under both these notifications must be regarded as limited only to
29
such duty of excise. But the respondents contended that the
expression ‘duty of excise’ was one of large amplitude and in the
absence of any restrictive or limitative words indicating that it was
intended to refer only to duty of excise leviable under the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944, it must be held to cover all duties of
excise whether leviable under the Central Excises and Salt Act,
1944 or under any other enactment. The respondents sought to
support this contention by pointing out that whenever the Central
Government wanted to confine the exemption granted under a
notification to the duty of excise leviable under the Central Excises
and Salt Act, 1944, the Central Government made its intention
abundantly clear by using appropriate words of limitation such as
“duty of excise leviable ... under Section 3 of the Central Excises
and Salt Act, 1944” or “duty of excise leviable ... under the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944” or “duty of excise leviable ... under the
said Act” as in the Notification No. CER8(2)/55C.E. dated
September 17, 1955, Notification No. 255/77C.E. dated July 20,
1977, Notification No. CER8(1)/55C.E. dated September 2, 1955,
Notification No. CER8(9)/55C.E. dated December 31, 1955,
Notification No. 95/61C.E. dated April 1, 1961, Notification No.
23/55C.E. dated April 29, 1955, and similar other notifications.
But, here said the respondents, no such words of limitation are
used in the two notifications in question and the expression “duty of
excise” must, therefore, be read according to its plain natural
meaning as including all duties of excise, including special duty of
excise and auxiliary duty of excise. Now, it is no doubt true that in
these various notifications referred to above, the Central
Government has, while granting exemption under Rule 8(1), used
specified language indicating that the exemption, total or partial,
granted under each such notification is in respect of excise duty
leviable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. But, merely
because, as a matter of drafting, the Central Government has in
some notifications specifically referred to the excise duty in respect
of which exemption is granted as “duty of excise” leviable under the
Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, it does not follow that in the
absence of such words of specificity, the expression “duty of excise”
standing by itself must be read as referring to all duties of excise. It
is not uncommon to find that the legislature sometimes, with a view
to making its intention clear beyond doubt, uses language ex
abundanti cautela though it may not be strictly necessary and even
without it the same intention can be spelt out as a matter of judicial
construction and this would be more so in case of subordinate
legislation by the executive. The officer drafting a particular piece of
subordinate legislation in the Executive Department may employ
words with a view to leaving no scope for possible doubt as to its
intention or sometimes even for greater completeness, though these
words may not add anything to the meaning and scope of the
subordinate legislation. Here, in the present notifications, the words
duty of excise leviable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944’
30
do not find a place as in the other notifications relied upon by the
respondents. But, that does not necessarily lead to the inference
that the expression “duty of excise’ in these notifications was
intended to refer to all duties of excise including special and
auxiliary duties of excise. The absence of these words does not
absolve us from the obligation to interpret the expression “duty of
excise” in these notifications. We have still to construe this
expression — what is its meaning and import — and that has to be
done, bearing in mind the context in which it occurs. We have
already pointed out that these notifications having been issued
under Rule 8(1), the expression ‘duty of excise’ in these notifications
must bear the same meaning which it has in Rule 8(1) and that
meaning clearly is — excise duty payable under the Central Excises
and Salt Act, 1944 as envisaged in Rule 2 clause (v). It cannot in the
circumstances bear an extended meaning so as to include special
excise duty and auxiliary excise duty.”
37. This Court in <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite> further considered the
question when the notification was issued on 1.8.1974, there was no
special duty of excise leviable on tyres, it came to be introduced in 1978
under various Finance Acts. It was held that the notification could not
be read as comprehending the special duty of excise on the date of the
notification and came to be levied four years later. This Court also laid
down that the presumption is that when the Central Government issues
a notification granting exemption from payment of excise duty under
Rule 8(1) of Rules of 1944, the Central Government would have
considered whether exemption should be granted and if so, to what
extent and can only be with reference to the duty of excise which is then
leviable, not a duty to be imposed in future. This Court in <cite>Modi Rubber
Limited (supra)</cite> strongly repelled the argument that it would cover the
31
duties to be imposed in the future not prevailing at the relevant time
thus:
“8. Moreover, at the date when the first notification was issued,
namely, August 1, 1974, there was no special duty of excise leviable
on tyres. It came to be levied on tyres with effect from the financial
year 1978 under various Finance Acts enacted from year to year. It
is therefore difficult to understand how the expression “duty of
excise” in the notification dated August 1, 1974 could possibly be
read as comprehending special duty of excise which did not exist at
the date of this notification and came to be levied almost four years
later. When special duty of excise was not in existence at the date of
this notification, how could the Central Government, in issuing this
notification, have intended to grant exemption from payment of
special excise duty? The presumption is that when a notification
granting exemption from payment of excise duty is issued by the
Central Government under Rule 8(1), the Central Government
would have applied its mind to the question whether exemption
should be granted and if so, to what extent. And obviously, that can
only be with reference to the duty of excise, which is then leviable.
The Central Government could not be presumed to have projected
its mind into the future and granted exemption in respect of excise
duty which may be levied in the future, without considering the
nature and extent of such duty and the object and purpose for
which such levy may be made and without taking into account the
situation which may be prevailing then. It is only when a new duty
of excise is levied, whether special duty of excise or auxiliary duty of
excise or any other kind of duty of excise, that a question could
arise whether any particular article should be exempted from
payment of such duty of excise and the Central Government would
then have to apply its mind to this question and having regard to
the nature and extent of such duty of excise and the object and
purpose for which it is levied and the economic situation including
supply and demand position then prevailing, decide whether
exemption from payment of such excise duty should be granted and
if so, to what extent. It would be absurd to suggest that by issuing
the notification dated August 1, 1974 the Central Government
intended to grant exemption not only in respect of excise duty then
prevailing but also in respect of all future duties of excise which
may be levied from time to time.” | <para>
36. This Court in <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite> has considered the
purport of the notifications and the specific provisions mentioned therein
and held that exemption has to be considered in the light of provisions of
Central Excise Rules, 1944, as envisaged under Rule 2(v) of Central
Excise Rules, 1944. It cannot, in the circumstances, bear an extended
meaning to include special excise duty and auxiliary excise duty. This
Court observed thus:
“6. The first question that arises for consideration on these facts is
as to what is the true import of the expression "duty of excise" in
the notifications dated August 1, 1974, and March 1, 1981. It is
only if this expression is held to include duties of excise leviable not
only under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 but also under
any other enactments that the question would arise whether the
Central Laws (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1982 is
constitutionally invalid. We, therefore, asked the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the parties to confine their arguments only to
the first question of interpretation of the expression ‘duty of excise’
in the notifications dated August 1, 1974 and March 1, 1981.
7. Both these notifications, as the opening part shows, are issued
under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 and since the
definition of ‘duty’ in Rule 2, clause (v) must necessarily be
projected in Rule 8(1) and the expression “duty of excise” in Rule
8(1) must be read in the light of that definition, the same expression
used in these two notifications issued under Rule 8(1) must also be
interpreted in the same sense, namely, duty of excise payable under
the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the exemption granted
under both these notifications must be regarded as limited only to
29
such duty of excise. But the respondents contended that the
expression ‘duty of excise’ was one of large amplitude and in the
absence of any restrictive or limitative words indicating that it was
intended to refer only to duty of excise leviable under the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944, it must be held to cover all duties of
excise whether leviable under the Central Excises and Salt Act,
1944 or under any other enactment. The respondents sought to
support this contention by pointing out that whenever the Central
Government wanted to confine the exemption granted under a
notification to the duty of excise leviable under the Central Excises
and Salt Act, 1944, the Central Government made its intention
abundantly clear by using appropriate words of limitation such as
“duty of excise leviable ... under Section 3 of the Central Excises
and Salt Act, 1944” or “duty of excise leviable ... under the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944” or “duty of excise leviable ... under the
said Act” as in the Notification No. CER8(2)/55C.E. dated
September 17, 1955, Notification No. 255/77C.E. dated July 20,
1977, Notification No. CER8(1)/55C.E. dated September 2, 1955,
Notification No. CER8(9)/55C.E. dated December 31, 1955,
Notification No. 95/61C.E. dated April 1, 1961, Notification No.
23/55C.E. dated April 29, 1955, and similar other notifications.
But, here said the respondents, no such words of limitation are
used in the two notifications in question and the expression “duty of
excise” must, therefore, be read according to its plain natural
meaning as including all duties of excise, including special duty of
excise and auxiliary duty of excise. Now, it is no doubt true that in
these various notifications referred to above, the Central
Government has, while granting exemption under Rule 8(1), used
specified language indicating that the exemption, total or partial,
granted under each such notification is in respect of excise duty
leviable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. But, merely
because, as a matter of drafting, the Central Government has in
some notifications specifically referred to the excise duty in respect
of which exemption is granted as “duty of excise” leviable under the
Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, it does not follow that in the
absence of such words of specificity, the expression “duty of excise”
standing by itself must be read as referring to all duties of excise. It
is not uncommon to find that the legislature sometimes, with a view
to making its intention clear beyond doubt, uses language ex
abundanti cautela though it may not be strictly necessary and even
without it the same intention can be spelt out as a matter of judicial
construction and this would be more so in case of subordinate
legislation by the executive. The officer drafting a particular piece of
subordinate legislation in the Executive Department may employ
words with a view to leaving no scope for possible doubt as to its
intention or sometimes even for greater completeness, though these
words may not add anything to the meaning and scope of the
subordinate legislation. Here, in the present notifications, the words
duty of excise leviable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944’
30
do not find a place as in the other notifications relied upon by the
respondents. But, that does not necessarily lead to the inference
that the expression “duty of excise’ in these notifications was
intended to refer to all duties of excise including special and
auxiliary duties of excise. The absence of these words does not
absolve us from the obligation to interpret the expression “duty of
excise” in these notifications. We have still to construe this
expression — what is its meaning and import — and that has to be
done, bearing in mind the context in which it occurs. We have
already pointed out that these notifications having been issued
under Rule 8(1), the expression ‘duty of excise’ in these notifications
must bear the same meaning which it has in Rule 8(1) and that
meaning clearly is — excise duty payable under the Central Excises
and Salt Act, 1944 as envisaged in Rule 2 clause (v). It cannot in the
circumstances bear an extended meaning so as to include special
excise duty and auxiliary excise duty.”
</para>
<para>
37. This Court in <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite> further considered the
question when the notification was issued on 1.8.1974, there was no
special duty of excise leviable on tyres, it came to be introduced in 1978
under various Finance Acts. It was held that the notification could not
be read as comprehending the special duty of excise on the date of the
notification and came to be levied four years later. This Court also laid
down that the presumption is that when the Central Government issues
a notification granting exemption from payment of excise duty under
Rule 8(1) of Rules of 1944, the Central Government would have
considered whether exemption should be granted and if so, to what
extent and can only be with reference to the duty of excise which is then
leviable, not a duty to be imposed in future. This Court in <cite>Modi Rubber
Limited (supra)</cite> strongly repelled the argument that it would cover the
31
duties to be imposed in the future not prevailing at the relevant time
thus:
“8. Moreover, at the date when the first notification was issued,
namely, August 1, 1974, there was no special duty of excise leviable
on tyres. It came to be levied on tyres with effect from the financial
year 1978 under various Finance Acts enacted from year to year. It
is therefore difficult to understand how the expression “duty of
excise” in the notification dated August 1, 1974 could possibly be
read as comprehending special duty of excise which did not exist at
the date of this notification and came to be levied almost four years
later. When special duty of excise was not in existence at the date of
this notification, how could the Central Government, in issuing this
notification, have intended to grant exemption from payment of
special excise duty? The presumption is that when a notification
granting exemption from payment of excise duty is issued by the
Central Government under Rule 8(1), the Central Government
would have applied its mind to the question whether exemption
should be granted and if so, to what extent. And obviously, that can
only be with reference to the duty of excise, which is then leviable.
The Central Government could not be presumed to have projected
its mind into the future and granted exemption in respect of excise
duty which may be levied in the future, without considering the
nature and extent of such duty and the object and purpose for
which such levy may be made and without taking into account the
situation which may be prevailing then. It is only when a new duty
of excise is levied, whether special duty of excise or auxiliary duty of
excise or any other kind of duty of excise, that a question could
arise whether any particular article should be exempted from
payment of such duty of excise and the Central Government would
then have to apply its mind to this question and having regard to
the nature and extent of such duty of excise and the object and
purpose for which it is levied and the economic situation including
supply and demand position then prevailing, decide whether
exemption from payment of such excise duty should be granted and
if so, to what extent. It would be absurd to suggest that by issuing
the notification dated August 1, 1974 the Central Government
intended to grant exemption not only in respect of excise duty then
prevailing but also in respect of all future duties of excise which
may be levied from time to time.”
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
38. This Court in <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite> also considered the
32
provisions of Section 32 of the Finance Act, 1979, levying special duty
making applicable to the provisions of the Act of 1944 and the Rules
made thereunder, relating to refunds and exemptions from duties. They
shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to the levy and collection of the
special duty of excise as they apply to the levy and collection of the duty
of excise under the Act of 1944. It was held that reference to the
provisions under section 32 of the Finance Act as to the source of power
under which notifications dated 1.8.1974 and 1.3.1981 were issued, it
could not be held that exemption granted under these two notifications
was extendable to Finance Act, 1979. It was limited only to the duty of
excise payable under the Act of 1944. The expression 'duty of excise' in
these two notifications could not legitimately be construed as
comprehending special duty of excise. Merely reference to the source of
power is not enough to attract the exemption and what exemption has
been granted to be read from the notification issued therein. This Court
has further laid down that in case notification granting exemption issued
under the Central Excise Rules, 1944 without reference to any other
statute, the exemption must be read as limited to the duty of excise
payable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. It cannot cover
such special or another kind of duty of excise. This Court in <cite>Modi
Rubber Limited (supra)</cite> has discussed the provisions of the Finance Act,
33
1979 thus:
“9. We have already pointed out, and this is one of the principal
arguments against the contention of the respondents, that by
reason of the definition of “duty” in clause (v) of Rule 2 which must
be read in Rule 8(1), the expression “duty of excise” in the
notifications dated August 1, 1974 and March 1, 1981 must be
construed as duty of excise payable under the Central Excises and
Salt Act, 1944. The respondents sought to combat this conclusion
by relying on subsection (4) of Section 32 of the Finance Act, 1979
— there being an identical provision in each Finance Act levying
special duty of excise — which provided that the provisions of the
Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the rules made thereunder
including those relating to refunds and exemptions from duties
shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to the levy and collection of
special duty of excise as they apply in relation to the levy and
collection of the duty of excise under the Central Excises and Salt
Act, 1944. It was urged on behalf of the respondents that by reason
of this provision, Rule 8(1) relating to exemption from duty of excise
became applicable in relation to the levy and collection of special
duty of excise and exemption from payment of special duty of excise
could therefore be granted by the Central Government under Rule
8(1) in the same manner in which it could be granted in relation to
the duty of excise payable under the Central Excises and Salt Act,
1944. The argument of the respondents based on this premise was
that the reference to Rule 8(1) as the source of the power under
which the notifications dated August 1, 1974 and March 1, 1981
were issued could not therefore be relied upon as indicating that the
duty of excise from which exemption was granted under these two
notifications was limited only to the duty of excise payable under
the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the expression “duty of
excise” in these two notifications could legitimately be construed as
comprehending special duty of excise. This argument is, in our
opinion, not wellfounded and cannot be sustained. It is obvious
that when a notification granting exemption from duty of excise is
issued by the Central Government in exercise of the power under
Rule 8(1) simpliciter, without anything more, it must, by reason of
the definition of ‘duty’ contained in Rule 2 clause (v) which
according to the well recognised canons of construction would be
projected in Rule 8(1), be read as granting exemption only in respect
of duty of excise payable under the Central Excises and Salt Act,
1944. Undoubtedly, by reason of subsection (4) of Section 32 of the
Finance Act, 1979 and similar provision in the other Finance Acts,
Rule 8(1) would become applicable empowering the Central
Government to grant exemption from payment of special duty of
excise, but when the Central Government exercises this power, it
would be doing so under Rule 8(1) read with subsection (4) of
Section 32 or other similar provision. The reference to the source of
34
power in such a case would not be just to Rule 8(1), since it does
not of its own force and on its own language apply to granting of
exemption in respect of special duty of excise, but the reference
would have to be to Rule 8(1) read with subsection (4) of Section 32
or other similar provision. It is significant to note that during all
these years, whenever exemption is sought to be granted by the
Central Government from payment of special duty of excise or
additional duty of excise, the recital of the source of power in the
notification granting exemption has invariably been to Rule 8(1)
read with the relevant provision of the statute levying special duty of
excise or additional duty of excise, by which the provisions of the
Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the rules made thereunder
including those relating to exemption from duty are made
applicable. Take for example, the Notification bearing No. 63/78
dated August 1, 1978 where exemption is granted in respect of
certain excisable goods “from the whole of the special duty of excise
leviable thereon under subclause (1) of clause 37 of the Finance
Bill, 1978”. The source of the power recited in this notification is
“subrule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 read with
subclause (5) of clause 37 of the Finance Bill, 1978”. So also in the
Notification bearing No. 29/79 dated March 1, 1979 exempting
unmanufactured tobacco “from the whole of the duty of excise
leviable thereon both under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944
and Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act,
1957”, the reference to the source of power mentioned in the
opening part of the notification is “subrule (1) of Rule 8 of the
Central Excise Rules, 1944 read with subsection (3) of Section 3 of
the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act,
1957”. The respondents have in fact produced several notifications
granting exemption in respect of special duty of excise or additional
duty of excise and in each of these notifications, we find that the
source of power is described as subrule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central
Excise Rules, 1944 read with the relevant provision of the statute
levying special duty of excise or additional duty of excise by which
the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the
Rules made thereunder including those relating to exemption from
duty are made applicable. Moreover, the exemption granted under
all these notifications specifically refers to special duty of excise or
additional duty of excise, as the case may be. It is, therefore, clear
that where a notification granting exemption is issued only under
subrule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 without
reference to any other statute making the provisions of the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the Rules made thereunder
applicable to the levy and collection of special, auxiliary or any
other kind of excise duty levied under such statute, the exemption
must be read as limited to the duty of excise payable under the
Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and cannot cover such special,
auxiliary or other kind of duty of excise. The notifications in the
present case were issued under subrule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central
35
Excise Rules, 1944 simpliciter without reference to any other
statute and hence the exemption granted under these two
notifications must be construed as limited only to the duty of excise
payable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.”
This Court in <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite> has also considered
when the exemption is granted under the particular provision; it would
not cover any other kind of duty of excise imposed under separate Acts.
This Court observed thus:
“10. We may incidentally mention that in the appeals a question of
interpretation was also raised in regard to the Notification bearing
No. 249/67 dated November 8, 1967 exempting tyres for tractors
from “so much of the duty leviable thereon under item 16 of the
First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 as is in
excess of 15 per cent”. The argument of the respondents in the
appeals was that the exemption granted under this notification was
not limited to the duty of excise payable under the Central Excises
and Salt Act, 1944 but it also extended to special duty of excise,
additional duty of excise and auxiliary duty of excise leviable under
other enactments. This argument plainly runs counter to the very
language of this notification. It is obvious that the exemption
granted under this notification is in respect of “so much of the duty
leviable thereon under item 16 of the First Schedule to the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944 as is in excess of 15 per cent” and these
words describing the nature and extent of the exemption on their
plain natural construction, clearly indicate that the exemption is in
respect of duty of excise leviable under the Central Excises and Salt
Act, 1944 and does not cover any other kind of duty of excise. No
more discussion is necessary in regard to this question beyond
merely referring to the language of this notification.”
The appeals were allowed, and it was held that exemption was not
available in respect of special duty of excise or additional duty of excise
or auxiliary duty of excise. A threeJudge Bench in <cite>Rita Textiles Private
Limited v. Union of India, 1986 SCC Supp. 557</cite>, has followed the decision
36
of <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite>. The decision in <cite>Modi Rubber Limited
(supra)</cite> squarely covers the issue and is rendered by a Coordinate
Bench.
39. Rule 8 of Central Excise Rules, 1944, authorises the Central
Government to grant an exemption to any excisable goods from the whole
or any part of duty leviable on such goods. Rule 8 is extracted
hereunder:
“8. Power to authorise an exemption from duty in special cases.—(1)
The Central Government may from time to time, by notification in
the official Gazette, exempt (subject to such conditions as may be
specified in the notification) any excisable goods from the whole or
any part of duty leviable on such goods.
(2) The Central Board of Excise and Customs may by special
order in each case exempt from the payment of duty, under
circumstances of an exceptional nature, any excisable goods.”
The word ‘duty’ is defined under Rule 2(v) to mean the duty as
levied under the Act. | <para>
38. This Court in <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite> also considered the
32
provisions of Section 32 of the Finance Act, 1979, levying special duty
making applicable to the provisions of the Act of 1944 and the Rules
made thereunder, relating to refunds and exemptions from duties. They
shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to the levy and collection of the
special duty of excise as they apply to the levy and collection of the duty
of excise under the Act of 1944. It was held that reference to the
provisions under section 32 of the Finance Act as to the source of power
under which notifications dated 1.8.1974 and 1.3.1981 were issued, it
could not be held that exemption granted under these two notifications
was extendable to Finance Act, 1979. It was limited only to the duty of
excise payable under the Act of 1944. The expression 'duty of excise' in
these two notifications could not legitimately be construed as
comprehending special duty of excise. Merely reference to the source of
power is not enough to attract the exemption and what exemption has
been granted to be read from the notification issued therein. This Court
has further laid down that in case notification granting exemption issued
under the Central Excise Rules, 1944 without reference to any other
statute, the exemption must be read as limited to the duty of excise
payable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. It cannot cover
such special or another kind of duty of excise. This Court in <cite>Modi
Rubber Limited (supra)</cite> has discussed the provisions of the Finance Act,
33
1979 thus:
“9. We have already pointed out, and this is one of the principal
arguments against the contention of the respondents, that by
reason of the definition of “duty” in clause (v) of Rule 2 which must
be read in Rule 8(1), the expression “duty of excise” in the
notifications dated August 1, 1974 and March 1, 1981 must be
construed as duty of excise payable under the Central Excises and
Salt Act, 1944. The respondents sought to combat this conclusion
by relying on subsection (4) of Section 32 of the Finance Act, 1979
— there being an identical provision in each Finance Act levying
special duty of excise — which provided that the provisions of the
Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the rules made thereunder
including those relating to refunds and exemptions from duties
shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to the levy and collection of
special duty of excise as they apply in relation to the levy and
collection of the duty of excise under the Central Excises and Salt
Act, 1944. It was urged on behalf of the respondents that by reason
of this provision, Rule 8(1) relating to exemption from duty of excise
became applicable in relation to the levy and collection of special
duty of excise and exemption from payment of special duty of excise
could therefore be granted by the Central Government under Rule
8(1) in the same manner in which it could be granted in relation to
the duty of excise payable under the Central Excises and Salt Act,
1944. The argument of the respondents based on this premise was
that the reference to Rule 8(1) as the source of the power under
which the notifications dated August 1, 1974 and March 1, 1981
were issued could not therefore be relied upon as indicating that the
duty of excise from which exemption was granted under these two
notifications was limited only to the duty of excise payable under
the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the expression “duty of
excise” in these two notifications could legitimately be construed as
comprehending special duty of excise. This argument is, in our
opinion, not wellfounded and cannot be sustained. It is obvious
that when a notification granting exemption from duty of excise is
issued by the Central Government in exercise of the power under
Rule 8(1) simpliciter, without anything more, it must, by reason of
the definition of ‘duty’ contained in Rule 2 clause (v) which
according to the well recognised canons of construction would be
projected in Rule 8(1), be read as granting exemption only in respect
of duty of excise payable under the Central Excises and Salt Act,
1944. Undoubtedly, by reason of subsection (4) of Section 32 of the
Finance Act, 1979 and similar provision in the other Finance Acts,
Rule 8(1) would become applicable empowering the Central
Government to grant exemption from payment of special duty of
excise, but when the Central Government exercises this power, it
would be doing so under Rule 8(1) read with subsection (4) of
Section 32 or other similar provision. The reference to the source of
34
power in such a case would not be just to Rule 8(1), since it does
not of its own force and on its own language apply to granting of
exemption in respect of special duty of excise, but the reference
would have to be to Rule 8(1) read with subsection (4) of Section 32
or other similar provision. It is significant to note that during all
these years, whenever exemption is sought to be granted by the
Central Government from payment of special duty of excise or
additional duty of excise, the recital of the source of power in the
notification granting exemption has invariably been to Rule 8(1)
read with the relevant provision of the statute levying special duty of
excise or additional duty of excise, by which the provisions of the
Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the rules made thereunder
including those relating to exemption from duty are made
applicable. Take for example, the Notification bearing No. 63/78
dated August 1, 1978 where exemption is granted in respect of
certain excisable goods “from the whole of the special duty of excise
leviable thereon under subclause (1) of clause 37 of the Finance
Bill, 1978”. The source of the power recited in this notification is
“subrule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 read with
subclause (5) of clause 37 of the Finance Bill, 1978”. So also in the
Notification bearing No. 29/79 dated March 1, 1979 exempting
unmanufactured tobacco “from the whole of the duty of excise
leviable thereon both under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944
and Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act,
1957”, the reference to the source of power mentioned in the
opening part of the notification is “subrule (1) of Rule 8 of the
Central Excise Rules, 1944 read with subsection (3) of Section 3 of
the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act,
1957”. The respondents have in fact produced several notifications
granting exemption in respect of special duty of excise or additional
duty of excise and in each of these notifications, we find that the
source of power is described as subrule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central
Excise Rules, 1944 read with the relevant provision of the statute
levying special duty of excise or additional duty of excise by which
the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the
Rules made thereunder including those relating to exemption from
duty are made applicable. Moreover, the exemption granted under
all these notifications specifically refers to special duty of excise or
additional duty of excise, as the case may be. It is, therefore, clear
that where a notification granting exemption is issued only under
subrule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 without
reference to any other statute making the provisions of the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the Rules made thereunder
applicable to the levy and collection of special, auxiliary or any
other kind of excise duty levied under such statute, the exemption
must be read as limited to the duty of excise payable under the
Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and cannot cover such special,
auxiliary or other kind of duty of excise. The notifications in the
present case were issued under subrule (1) of Rule 8 of the Central
35
Excise Rules, 1944 simpliciter without reference to any other
statute and hence the exemption granted under these two
notifications must be construed as limited only to the duty of excise
payable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.”
This Court in <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite> has also considered
when the exemption is granted under the particular provision; it would
not cover any other kind of duty of excise imposed under separate Acts.
This Court observed thus:
“10. We may incidentally mention that in the appeals a question of
interpretation was also raised in regard to the Notification bearing
No. 249/67 dated November 8, 1967 exempting tyres for tractors
from “so much of the duty leviable thereon under item 16 of the
First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 as is in
excess of 15 per cent”. The argument of the respondents in the
appeals was that the exemption granted under this notification was
not limited to the duty of excise payable under the Central Excises
and Salt Act, 1944 but it also extended to special duty of excise,
additional duty of excise and auxiliary duty of excise leviable under
other enactments. This argument plainly runs counter to the very
language of this notification. It is obvious that the exemption
granted under this notification is in respect of “so much of the duty
leviable thereon under item 16 of the First Schedule to the Central
Excises and Salt Act, 1944 as is in excess of 15 per cent” and these
words describing the nature and extent of the exemption on their
plain natural construction, clearly indicate that the exemption is in
respect of duty of excise leviable under the Central Excises and Salt
Act, 1944 and does not cover any other kind of duty of excise. No
more discussion is necessary in regard to this question beyond
merely referring to the language of this notification.”
The appeals were allowed, and it was held that exemption was not
available in respect of special duty of excise or additional duty of excise
or auxiliary duty of excise. A threeJudge Bench in <cite>Rita Textiles Private
Limited v. Union of India, 1986 SCC Supp. 557</cite>, has followed the decision
36
of <cite>Modi Rubber Limited (supra)</cite>. The decision in <cite>Modi Rubber Limited
(supra)</cite> squarely covers the issue and is rendered by a Coordinate
Bench.
</para>
<para>
39. Rule 8 of Central Excise Rules, 1944, authorises the Central
Government to grant an exemption to any excisable goods from the whole
or any part of duty leviable on such goods. Rule 8 is extracted
hereunder:
“8. Power to authorise an exemption from duty in special cases.—(1)
The Central Government may from time to time, by notification in
the official Gazette, exempt (subject to such conditions as may be
specified in the notification) any excisable goods from the whole or
any part of duty leviable on such goods.
(2) The Central Board of Excise and Customs may by special
order in each case exempt from the payment of duty, under
circumstances of an exceptional nature, any excisable goods.”
The word ‘duty’ is defined under Rule 2(v) to mean the duty as
levied under the Act.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
40. Notification dated 9.9.2003 issued in the present case makes it
clear that exemption was granted under Section 5A of the Act of 1944,
concerning additional duties under the Act of 1957 and additional duties
of excise under the Act of 1978. It was questioned on the ground that it
provided for limited exemption only under the Acts referred to therein.
There is no reference to the Finance Act, 2001 by which NCCD was
37
imposed, and the Finance Acts of 2004 and 2007 were not in vogue. The
notification was questioned on the ground that it should have included
other duties also. The notification could not have contemplated the
inclusion of education cess and secondary and higher education cess
imposed by the Finance Acts of 2004 and 2007 in the nature of the duty
of excise. The duty on NCCD, education cess and secondary and higher
education cess are in the nature of additional excise duty and it would
not mean that exemption notification dated 9.9.2003 covers them
particularly when there is no reference to the notification issued under
the Finance Act, 2001. There was no question of granting exemption
related to cess was not in vogue at the relevant time imposed later on
vide Section 91 of the Act of 2004 and Section 126 of the Act of 2007.
The provisions of Act of 1944 and the Rules made thereunder shall be
applicable to refund, and the exemption is only a reference to the source
of power to exempt the NCCD, education cess, secondary and higher
education cess. A notification has to be issued for providing exemption
under the said source of power. In the absence of a notification
containing an exemption to such additional duties in the nature of
education cess and secondary and higher education cess, they cannot be
said to have been exempted. The High Court was right in relying upon
the decision of threeJudge Bench of this Court in <cite>Modi Rubber Limited
38
(supra)</cite>, which has been followed by another threeJudge Bench of this
Court in <cite>Rita Textiles Private Limited (supra)</cite>.
41. The Circular of 2004 issued based on the interpretation of the
provisions made by one of the Customs Officers, is of no avail as such
Circular has no force of law and cannot be said to be binding on the
Court. Similarly, the Circular issued by Central Board of Excise and
Customs in 2011, is of no avail as it relates to service tax and has no
force of law and cannot be said to be binding concerning the
interpretation of the provisions by the courts. The reason employed in
<cite>SRD Nutrients Private Limited (supra)</cite> that there was nil excise duty, as
such, additional duty cannot be charged, is also equally unacceptable as
additional duty can always be determined and merely exemption granted
in respect of a particular excise duty, cannot come in the way of
determination of yet another duty based thereupon. The proposition
urged that simply because one kind of duty is exempted, other kinds of
duties automatically fall, cannot be accepted as there is no difficulty in
making the computation of additional duties, which are payable under
NCCD, education cess, secondary and higher education cess. Moreover,
statutory notification must cover specifically the duty exempted. When a
particular kind of duty is exempted, other types of duty or cess imposed
39
by different legislation for a different purpose cannot be said to have
been exempted. | <para>
40. Notification dated 9.9.2003 issued in the present case makes it
clear that exemption was granted under Section 5A of the Act of 1944,
concerning additional duties under the Act of 1957 and additional duties
of excise under the Act of 1978. It was questioned on the ground that it
provided for limited exemption only under the Acts referred to therein.
There is no reference to the Finance Act, 2001 by which NCCD was
37
imposed, and the Finance Acts of 2004 and 2007 were not in vogue. The
notification was questioned on the ground that it should have included
other duties also. The notification could not have contemplated the
inclusion of education cess and secondary and higher education cess
imposed by the Finance Acts of 2004 and 2007 in the nature of the duty
of excise. The duty on NCCD, education cess and secondary and higher
education cess are in the nature of additional excise duty and it would
not mean that exemption notification dated 9.9.2003 covers them
particularly when there is no reference to the notification issued under
the Finance Act, 2001. There was no question of granting exemption
related to cess was not in vogue at the relevant time imposed later on
vide Section 91 of the Act of 2004 and Section 126 of the Act of 2007.
The provisions of Act of 1944 and the Rules made thereunder shall be
applicable to refund, and the exemption is only a reference to the source
of power to exempt the NCCD, education cess, secondary and higher
education cess. A notification has to be issued for providing exemption
under the said source of power. In the absence of a notification
containing an exemption to such additional duties in the nature of
education cess and secondary and higher education cess, they cannot be
said to have been exempted. The High Court was right in relying upon
the decision of threeJudge Bench of this Court in <cite>Modi Rubber Limited
38
(supra)</cite>, which has been followed by another threeJudge Bench of this
Court in <cite>Rita Textiles Private Limited (supra)</cite>.
</para>
<para>
41. The Circular of 2004 issued based on the interpretation of the
provisions made by one of the Customs Officers, is of no avail as such
Circular has no force of law and cannot be said to be binding on the
Court. Similarly, the Circular issued by Central Board of Excise and
Customs in 2011, is of no avail as it relates to service tax and has no
force of law and cannot be said to be binding concerning the
interpretation of the provisions by the courts. The reason employed in
<cite>SRD Nutrients Private Limited (supra)</cite> that there was nil excise duty, as
such, additional duty cannot be charged, is also equally unacceptable as
additional duty can always be determined and merely exemption granted
in respect of a particular excise duty, cannot come in the way of
determination of yet another duty based thereupon. The proposition
urged that simply because one kind of duty is exempted, other kinds of
duties automatically fall, cannot be accepted as there is no difficulty in
making the computation of additional duties, which are payable under
NCCD, education cess, secondary and higher education cess. Moreover,
statutory notification must cover specifically the duty exempted. When a
particular kind of duty is exempted, other types of duty or cess imposed
39
by different legislation for a different purpose cannot be said to have
been exempted.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
42. The decision of larger bench is binding on the smaller bench has
been held by this Court in several decisions such as <cite>Mahanagar Railway
Vendors’ Union v. Union of India & Ors. (1994) Suppl. 1 SCC 609</cite>, <cite>State of
Maharashtra & Ors. v. Mana Adim Jamat Mandal, AIR 2006 SC 3446</cite> and
<cite>State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Ajay Kumar Sharma & Ors. (2016) 15
SCC 289</cite>. The decision rendered in ignorance of a binding precedent
and/or ignorance of a provision has been held to be per incuriam in
<cite>Subhash Chandra & Ors. v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board &
Ors. (2009) 15 SCC 458</cite>, <cite>Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of
Maharashtra (2014) 9 SCC 129</cite>, and <cite>Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra
Community & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2005) 2 SCC 673</cite>. It
was held that a smaller bench could not disagree with the view taken by
a larger bench.
43. Thus, it is clear that before the Division Bench deciding <cite>SRD
Nutrients Private Limited</cite> and <cite>Bajaj Auto Limited (supra)</cite>, the previous
binding decisions of threeJudge Bench in <cite>Modi Rubber (supra)</cite> and <cite>Rita
Textiles Private Limited (supra)</cite> were not placed for consideration. Thus,
40
the decisions in <cite>SRD Nutrients Private Limited</cite> and <cite>Bajaj Auto Limited</cite>
(supra) are clearly per incuriam. The decisions in <cite>Modi Rubber (supra)</cite>
and <cite>Rita Textiles Private Limited (supra)</cite> are binding on us being of Co
ordinate Bench, and we respectfully follow them. We did not find any
ground to take a different view.
44. Resultantly, we have no hesitation in dismissing the appeals. The
judgment and order of the High Court are upheld, and the appeals are
dismissed. No costs. | <para>
42. The decision of larger bench is binding on the smaller bench has
been held by this Court in several decisions such as <cite>Mahanagar Railway
Vendors’ Union v. Union of India & Ors. (1994) Suppl. 1 SCC 609</cite>, <cite>State of
Maharashtra & Ors. v. Mana Adim Jamat Mandal, AIR 2006 SC 3446</cite> and
<cite>State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Ajay Kumar Sharma & Ors. (2016) 15
SCC 289</cite>. The decision rendered in ignorance of a binding precedent
and/or ignorance of a provision has been held to be per incuriam in
<cite>Subhash Chandra & Ors. v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board &
Ors. (2009) 15 SCC 458</cite>, <cite>Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of
Maharashtra (2014) 9 SCC 129</cite>, and <cite>Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra
Community & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2005) 2 SCC 673</cite>. It
was held that a smaller bench could not disagree with the view taken by
a larger bench.
</para>
<para>
43. Thus, it is clear that before the Division Bench deciding <cite>SRD
Nutrients Private Limited</cite> and <cite>Bajaj Auto Limited (supra)</cite>, the previous
binding decisions of threeJudge Bench in <cite>Modi Rubber (supra)</cite> and <cite>Rita
Textiles Private Limited (supra)</cite> were not placed for consideration. Thus,
40
the decisions in <cite>SRD Nutrients Private Limited</cite> and <cite>Bajaj Auto Limited</cite>
(supra) are clearly per incuriam. The decisions in <cite>Modi Rubber (supra)</cite>
and <cite>Rita Textiles Private Limited (supra)</cite> are binding on us being of Co
ordinate Bench, and we respectfully follow them. We did not find any
ground to take a different view.
</para>
<para>
44. Resultantly, we have no hesitation in dismissing the appeals. The
judgment and order of the High Court are upheld, and the appeals are
dismissed. No costs.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
2.
The appellant approached this Court, aggrieved by
the reversal of the decree of nullity granted to him
by the trial court. When the matter came up before
this Court, the parties agreed for a mediation before
the Supreme Court Mediation Center. We are happy to
note that the parties have arrived at an amicable
settlement. The settlement agreement dated
14.05.2018, duly signed by the parties and their
respective counsel and also the learned mediator, is
taken on record and shall form part of this Judgment.
3.
Today, in terms of the settlement, the appellant
has handed over a Demand Draft, bearing No. 172275
dated 09.05.2018, to the tune of Rs. 8,50,000/-
(Rupees Eight Lakhs and Fifty Thousand) in the name
2
of Neeru Mishra, drawn on State Bank of India, which
has been duly acknowledged by the respondent. We
direct the parties to strictly abide by the other
terms of settlement. | <para>
2.
The appellant approached this Court, aggrieved by
the reversal of the decree of nullity granted to him
by the trial court. When the matter came up before
this Court, the parties agreed for a mediation before
the Supreme Court Mediation Center. We are happy to
note that the parties have arrived at an amicable
settlement. The settlement agreement dated
14.05.2018, duly signed by the parties and their
respective counsel and also the learned mediator, is
taken on record and shall form part of this Judgment.
</para>
<para>
3.
Today, in terms of the settlement, the appellant
has handed over a Demand Draft, bearing No. 172275
dated 09.05.2018, to the tune of Rs. 8,50,000/-
(Rupees Eight Lakhs and Fifty Thousand) in the name
2
of Neeru Mishra, drawn on State Bank of India, which
has been duly acknowledged by the respondent. We
direct the parties to strictly abide by the other
terms of settlement.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
Since the parties have settled their disputes, we
4.
do not find it necessary that the parties should
continue with the litigations. Accordingly, the
proceedings in the following cases, as mentioned in
the settlement agreement, are quashed:-
(i) Case No. 3006 of 2012 – Neeru Mishra Vs. Santosh
Mishra & Ors. under Section 417 IPC pending before 7th
ACMM Kanpur Nagar, Uttar Pradesh.
(ii) Case No. 609 of 2013 – Neeru Mishra Vs. Santosh
Mishra & Ors. under Section 406 IPC pending before
4th M. M. Kanpur Nagar, Uttar Pradesh.
(iii)Case No. 1349 of 2013 – State Vs. Santosh Mishra
& Ors. under Sections 498A, 323, 504 IPC and Sections
3 and 4 of D.P. Act, Mahila Thana, Kanpur Nagar,
Uttar Pradesh.
(iv) Case No. 1829 of 2017 – Smt. Neeru Mishra Vs.
Santosh Kumar Mishra under Section 9 of Hindu
3
Marriage Act pending before the Principal Judge,
Family Court, Kanpur Nagar, Uttar Pradesh.
5.
The following cases are dismissed:
(i). Case No. 20013 of 2008 – under Section 482
Cr.P.C. pending before the High Court of Allahabad,
Uttar Pradesh.
(ii) Case No. 2370 of 2009 – under Section 492
Cr.P.C. pending before the Allahabad High Court,
Uttar Pradesh.
(iii) Case No. 32437 of 2008 under Section 482
Cr.P.C. pending in the High Court of Allahabad, Uttar
Pradesh.
(iv) Case No. 8828 of 2009 under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
pending in the High Court of Allahabad, Uttar
Pradesh.
(v) Criminal Revision Case No. 4472 of 2010 under
Section 417 of IPC pending before the High Court of
Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh.
4
(vi) Criminal Revision Case No. 5729 of 2010 under
Section 125 Cr. P.C. pending before High Court of
Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh.
(vii) Criminal Case No. 741 of 2013 under Section 12
D. V. Act pending before the High Court of Allahabad,
Uttar Pradesh. | <para>
Since the parties have settled their disputes, we
4.
do not find it necessary that the parties should
continue with the litigations. Accordingly, the
proceedings in the following cases, as mentioned in
the settlement agreement, are quashed:-
(i) Case No. 3006 of 2012 – Neeru Mishra Vs. Santosh
Mishra & Ors. under Section 417 IPC pending before 7th
ACMM Kanpur Nagar, Uttar Pradesh.
(ii) Case No. 609 of 2013 – Neeru Mishra Vs. Santosh
Mishra & Ors. under Section 406 IPC pending before
4th M. M. Kanpur Nagar, Uttar Pradesh.
(iii)Case No. 1349 of 2013 – State Vs. Santosh Mishra
& Ors. under Sections 498A, 323, 504 IPC and Sections
3 and 4 of D.P. Act, Mahila Thana, Kanpur Nagar,
Uttar Pradesh.
(iv) Case No. 1829 of 2017 – Smt. Neeru Mishra Vs.
Santosh Kumar Mishra under Section 9 of Hindu
3
Marriage Act pending before the Principal Judge,
Family Court, Kanpur Nagar, Uttar Pradesh.
5.
</para>
<para>
The following cases are dismissed:
(i). Case No. 20013 of 2008 – under Section 482
Cr.P.C. pending before the High Court of Allahabad,
Uttar Pradesh.
(ii) Case No. 2370 of 2009 – under Section 492
Cr.P.C. pending before the Allahabad High Court,
Uttar Pradesh.
(iii) Case No. 32437 of 2008 under Section 482
Cr.P.C. pending in the High Court of Allahabad, Uttar
Pradesh.
(iv) Case No. 8828 of 2009 under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
pending in the High Court of Allahabad, Uttar
Pradesh.
(v) Criminal Revision Case No. 4472 of 2010 under
Section 417 of IPC pending before the High Court of
Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh.
4
(vi) Criminal Revision Case No. 5729 of 2010 under
Section 125 Cr. P.C. pending before High Court of
Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh.
(vii) Criminal Case No. 741 of 2013 under Section 12
D. V. Act pending before the High Court of Allahabad,
Uttar Pradesh.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
6.
We record our deep appreciation for the earnest
efforts taken by Ms. Shalini Shishodia, learned
counsel, and also the cooperation extended by the
learned counsel for the parties for reaching an
amicable settlement of the disputes.
7.
In view of the above, this appeal is disposed of.
The appeal is disposed of in terms of the signed
non-reportable Judgment.
Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand disposed of. | <para>
6.
We record our deep appreciation for the earnest
efforts taken by Ms. Shalini Shishodia, learned
counsel, and also the cooperation extended by the
learned counsel for the parties for reaching an
amicable settlement of the disputes.
</para>
<para>
7.
In view of the above, this appeal is disposed of.
</para>
<para>
The appeal is disposed of in terms of the signed
non-reportable Judgment.
Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand disposed of.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
2.
One Vijender Singh along with two others Bhagwan Das and
Manish, was travelling by a motor cycle on 10-12-2002. The said
motor cycle was hit by a truck bearing registration No. RJ-14G-
1556, resulting in the death of both Vijender Singh and Bhagwan
Das. Respondent No.1 is the wife, Respondents 2 to 5 are the
children, Respondent No.6, we are informed, is the mother of the
deceased Vijender Singh. Respondents 1 to 6 herein filed an
application against the appellant herein and others for
compensation. The appellant, admittedly, is the insurer of the
abovementioned truck. A huge claim of Rs.1,86,30,000/-, was
2
made towards compensation on the ground that the deceased
Vijender Singh was earning more than Rs.35,000/- per month. The
Tribunal, by its Judgment dated 06-02-2006, awarded an amount of
Rs.10,00,000-00§ and provided for appropriate deductions for the
amounts, which had already been paid and also gave necessary
directions for safeguarding the interest of the minor children.
3. From the Judgment of the Tribunal it appears that the
claimants based their claim on the facts that the deceased Virender
Singh was the owner of three vehicles (mini buses) and also certain
agricultural land. It appears from the record that no evidence
regarding the amount of income derived from the above mentioned
properties is adduced. The only evidence available is the statement
of the 1st respondent that the deceased used to give her an amount
of Rs.35,000/- per month. She also admitted in her cross
examination that the deceased was not filing any income tax
returns. Therefore, the Tribunal reached a conclusion that the
The petitioners are not entitled to any other compensation and they are held entitled
to receive the following amount of compensation:
1.
Rs.9,60,000.00
2.
10,000.00
25,000.00
3.
4.
5,000.00
On a/c of loss of
dependency from income =
For loss of consortium to
Petitioner No.1
=
For loss of love and
affection to petitioner
No.2 to 6 @ 5000/- each =
For funeral expenses
=
Rs.
Rs.
Rs.
Total
-----------------------
Rs. 10,00,000.00
3
statement of the 1st respondent, that the deceased was earning
more than Rs.35,000/-, cannot be believed. However, the Tribunal
opined as under:
“Thus keeping in view the fact of ownership of two buses
and one bus given on contract and the agriculture land it
can be said that the deceased was earning Rs.3900/-per
month in the capacity of the driver of a bus. Keeping in
view the remaining buses and agriculture land it will be
appropriate to hold the income of the deceased at Rs.7380/-
because in case he would have earned more than the said
amount, he must have filed the income tax return. If the
deceased would remain alive he must have spent 1/3rd upon
himself, therefore it would be appropriate to hold the
monthly dependency at Rs.5000/-.” | <para>
2.
One Vijender Singh along with two others Bhagwan Das and
Manish, was travelling by a motor cycle on 10-12-2002. The said
motor cycle was hit by a truck bearing registration No. RJ-14G-
1556, resulting in the death of both Vijender Singh and Bhagwan
Das. Respondent No.1 is the wife, Respondents 2 to 5 are the
children, Respondent No.6, we are informed, is the mother of the
deceased Vijender Singh. Respondents 1 to 6 herein filed an
application against the appellant herein and others for
compensation. The appellant, admittedly, is the insurer of the
abovementioned truck. A huge claim of Rs.1,86,30,000/-, was
2
made towards compensation on the ground that the deceased
Vijender Singh was earning more than Rs.35,000/- per month. The
Tribunal, by its Judgment dated 06-02-2006, awarded an amount of
Rs.10,00,000-00§ and provided for appropriate deductions for the
amounts, which had already been paid and also gave necessary
directions for safeguarding the interest of the minor children.
</para>
<para>
3. From the Judgment of the Tribunal it appears that the
claimants based their claim on the facts that the deceased Virender
Singh was the owner of three vehicles (mini buses) and also certain
agricultural land. It appears from the record that no evidence
regarding the amount of income derived from the above mentioned
properties is adduced. The only evidence available is the statement
of the 1st respondent that the deceased used to give her an amount
of Rs.35,000/- per month. She also admitted in her cross
examination that the deceased was not filing any income tax
returns. Therefore, the Tribunal reached a conclusion that the
The petitioners are not entitled to any other compensation and they are held entitled
to receive the following amount of compensation:
1.
Rs.9,60,000.00
2.
10,000.00
25,000.00
3.
4.
5,000.00
On a/c of loss of
dependency from income =
For loss of consortium to
Petitioner No.1
=
For loss of love and
affection to petitioner
No.2 to 6 @ 5000/- each =
For funeral expenses
=
Rs.
Rs.
Rs.
Total
-----------------------
Rs. 10,00,000.00
3
statement of the 1st respondent, that the deceased was earning
more than Rs.35,000/-, cannot be believed. However, the Tribunal
opined as under:
“Thus keeping in view the fact of ownership of two buses
and one bus given on contract and the agriculture land it
can be said that the deceased was earning Rs.3900/-per
month in the capacity of the driver of a bus. Keeping in
view the remaining buses and agriculture land it will be
appropriate to hold the income of the deceased at Rs.7380/-
because in case he would have earned more than the said
amount, he must have filed the income tax return. If the
deceased would remain alive he must have spent 1/3rd upon
himself, therefore it would be appropriate to hold the
monthly dependency at Rs.5000/-.”
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |
4.
Aggrieved by the said determination of the compensation
made by the Tribunal, the claimants as well as the appellant herein
carried the matter in Appeal to the High Court of Rajasthan.
Admittedly, the Appeal preferred by the appellant herein was
dismissed, whereas the Appeal preferred by the claimants (S.B.
Civil Misc. Appeal No.1222 of 2006) was partially allowed modifying
the Award of the Tribunal. The High Court by its Judgment dated
30-01-2009 opined that the deceased Vijender Singh’s income
should be taken at Rs.24,000/- per month of which 1/3rd is treated
to be an amount, which the deceased would have spent on himself
and the balance on the claimants. Therefore, the High Court
concluded that the claimants are entitled for a compensation of
Rs.30,72,000/-, and directed:
“However, the rest of the award is confirmed. The
Insurance Company is directed to pay the enhanced amount
along with an interest @ 6% per annum from the date of
the filing of the claim petition i.e. 24.3.03 till the realization
4
to the claimants within a period of two months. The
learned Tribunal is directed to insure that the enhanced
amount of compensation is paid to the claimants within a
period of two months from the date of receipt of the
certified copy of this judgment.”
Hence, the present Appeal.
5.
The learned counsel for the appellant Sri M.K. Dua argued
that the High Court grossly erred in coming to a conclusion that the
income of the deceased should be determined at Rs.24,000/- per
month. Such a determination is without any factual basis or
evidence on record and therefore, contrary to the principle of law
laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, more particularly,
in <cite>State of Haryana & Anr. Vs. Jasbir Kaur & Ors., (2003) 7 SCC
484</cite>, and, therefore, the Judgment under appeal cannot be
sustained. | <para>
4.
Aggrieved by the said determination of the compensation
made by the Tribunal, the claimants as well as the appellant herein
carried the matter in Appeal to the High Court of Rajasthan.
Admittedly, the Appeal preferred by the appellant herein was
dismissed, whereas the Appeal preferred by the claimants (S.B.
Civil Misc. Appeal No.1222 of 2006) was partially allowed modifying
the Award of the Tribunal. The High Court by its Judgment dated
30-01-2009 opined that the deceased Vijender Singh’s income
should be taken at Rs.24,000/- per month of which 1/3rd is treated
to be an amount, which the deceased would have spent on himself
and the balance on the claimants. Therefore, the High Court
concluded that the claimants are entitled for a compensation of
Rs.30,72,000/-, and directed:
“However, the rest of the award is confirmed. The
Insurance Company is directed to pay the enhanced amount
along with an interest @ 6% per annum from the date of
the filing of the claim petition i.e. 24.3.03 till the realization
4
to the claimants within a period of two months. The
learned Tribunal is directed to insure that the enhanced
amount of compensation is paid to the claimants within a
period of two months from the date of receipt of the
certified copy of this judgment.”
Hence, the present Appeal.
</para>
<para>
5.
The learned counsel for the appellant Sri M.K. Dua argued
that the High Court grossly erred in coming to a conclusion that the
income of the deceased should be determined at Rs.24,000/- per
month. Such a determination is without any factual basis or
evidence on record and therefore, contrary to the principle of law
laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, more particularly,
in <cite>State of Haryana & Anr. Vs. Jasbir Kaur & Ors., (2003) 7 SCC
484</cite>, and, therefore, the Judgment under appeal cannot be
sustained.
</para> | You are an intelligent AI model which when given a legal document, chunk the whole document into paragraphs. Ensure that the chunking is done rightly keeping in mind the context, also learn from the example attached. Format for paragraph tagging: Use '<para>' to indicate the beginning of a paragraph, and '</para>' to indicate the end of that paragraph. Given a document, output the whole document as is with chunking it into paragraphs following the format above. Do not summarize or condense the text. |