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CHAPMAN, COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES OF TEXAS, et al. v. HOUSTON WELFARE RIGHTS ORGANIZATION et al. No. 77-719. Argued October 2, 1978 Decided May 14, 1979 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., joined, post, p. 623. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 646. Stewart, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in all but n. 2 of which Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 672. Brennan and Marshall, JJ., filed a separate statement, post, p. 676. David H. Young, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for petitioners in No. 77-719. With him on the brief were John L. Hill, Attorney General, David M. Kendall, First Assistant Attorney General, and Steve Bicker-staff, Assistant Attorney General. Theodore A. Gardner argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner in No. 77-5324. Jeffrey J. Skarda argued the cause for respondents in No. 77-719. With him on the briefs were Henry A. Freedman, Michael B. Trister, and John Williamson. Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney General of New Jersey, argued the cause for respondents in No. 77-5324. With him on the brief were John J. Degnan, Attorney General, and Richard M. Hluchan, Deputy Attorney General. Together with No. 77-5324, Gonzalez, Guardian v. Young, Director, Hudson County Welfare Board, et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in No. 77-719 were filed by Solicitor General McCree and Sara Sun Beale for the United States; and by Robert B. O’Keefe for East Texas Legal Services, Inc. Rornld Y. Amemiya, Attorney General, and Michael A. Lilly and Charleen M. Aina, Deputy Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of Hawaii as amicus curiae in No. 77-719. Mr. Justice BrenNAN and Mr. Justice Marshall do not join footnote 2. Me. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. The United States District Courts have Jurisdiction over civil actions claiming a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution of the United States or by Acts of Congress providing for equal rights or for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote. The question presented by these cases is whether that jurisdiction encompasses a claim that a state welfare regulation is invalid because it conflicts with the Social Security Act. We conclude that it does not. In the Social Security Amendments of 1967, Congress authorized partial federal funding of approved state programs providing emergency assistance for certain needy persons. In February 1976, Julia Gonzalez, the petitioner in No. 77-5324, requested the Hudson County, N. J., Welfare Board to pay her $163 in emergency assistance funds to cover her rent and utility bills. The Board denied her request because petitioner and her children were not “in a state of homelessness” as required by the relevant New Jersey regulations. Petitioner brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging that the emergency payment was “necessary to avoid destitution” within the meaning of § 406 (e)(1) of the federal Social Security Act, and she was therefore entitled to the payment notwithstanding the more stringent New Jersey regulation. In her federal complaint she sought damages of $163 and an injunction commanding the New Jersey Welfare Director to conform his administration of the State’s emergency assistance program to federal statutory standards. In essence, petitioner claimed that the New Jersey officials had deprived her of a right to emergency assistance protected by §406 (e)(1) of the Social Security Act. The District Court held that the complaint stated a claim under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Without deciding whether the “secured by the Constitution” language in § 1343 (3) should be construed to include Supremacy Clause claims, the District Court concluded that it had jurisdiction under both subparagraphs (3) and (4) of § 1343. But in doing so, the court did not explain whether it was § 1983 or § 406 (e) (1) of the Social Security Act that it viewed as the Act of Congress securing “equal rights” or “civil rights.” On the merits, the District Court found no conflict between the state regulation and the federal statute and entered summary judgment for respondents. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not address the merits because it concluded that the District Court should have dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals first noted that § 1983 “is not a jurisdictional statute; it only fashions a remedy.” 560 F. 2d 160, 164 (1977). Nor could jurisdiction be founded on 28 U. S. C. § 1331, the general federal-question jurisdictional statute, since the amount in controversy did not exceed $10,000. The court recognized that when a constitutional claim is of sufficient substance to support federal jurisdiction, a district court has power to consider other claims which might not provide an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. But it concluded that the constitutional claim must involve more than a contention that the Supremacy Clause requires that a federal statute be given effect over conflicting state law. It then went on to hold that the Social Security Act is not an Act of Congress securing either “equal rights” or “civil rights” as those terms are used in § 1343. And those terms, the court concluded, limit the grant of federal jurisdiction conferred by § 1343 even if § 1983 creates a remedy for a broader category of statutory claims. The petitioners in No. 77-719 are Commissioners of the Texas Department of Human Resources, which administers the State’s program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Respondents represent a class of AFDC recipients who share living quarters with a nondependent relative. Under the Texas regulations, the presence in the household of a nondependent person results in a reduction in the level of payments to the beneficiaries even if their level of actual need is unchanged. In a suit brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, respondents claimed that the Texas regulations violate § 402 (a)(7) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a)(7), and the federal regulations promulgated pursuant thereto. The District Court upheld the Texas regulations. While respondents’ appeal was pending, this Court decided Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U. S. 338. On the-authority of that case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Following earlier Fifth Circuit cases, the Court of Appeals concluded that federal jurisdiction was conferred by the language in 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (4) describing actions seeking relief “under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights . . . .” The court reasoned that statutory rights concerning food and shelter are “ ‘rights of an essentially personal nature,’ ” Houston Welfare Rights Org. v. Vowell, 555 F. 2d 1219, 1221 n. 1 (1977); that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides a remedy which may be invoked to protect such rights; and that § 1983 is an Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights within the meaning of that jurisdictional grant. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between that conclusion and the holding of the Third Circuit in No. 77-5324. 434 U. S. 1061. We have previously reserved the jurisdictional question we decide today, see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 533-534, n. 5. We preface our decision with a review of the history of the governing statutes. I Our decision turns on the construction of the two jurisdictional provisions, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1343 (3) and (4), and their interrelationship with 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and the Social Security Act. As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of these statutes in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is the source of both the jurisdictional grant now codified in 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3) and the remedy now authorized by 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Section 1 authorized individual suits in federal court to vindicate the deprivation, under color of state law, “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States.” No authorization was given for suits based on any federal statute. In 1874, Congress enacted the Revised Statutes of the United States. At that time, the remedial and jurisdictional provisions of § 1 were modified and placed in separate sections. The words “and laws,” as now found in § 1983, were included in the remedial provision of Rev. Stat. § 1979, and two quite different formulations of the jurisdictional grant were included in Rev. Stat. §§ 563 and 629. The former granted the district courts jurisdiction of all actions to redress a deprivation under color of state law of any right secured by the Constitution or “by any law of the United States.” The latter defined the jurisdiction of the circuit courts and included the limiting phrase — “by any law providing for equal rights” — which is now found in § 1343 (3). In the Judicial Code of 1911, Congress abolished circuit courts and transferred their authority to the district courts. The Code’s definition of the jurisdiction of the district courts to redress the deprivation of civil rights omitted the broad language referring to “any law of the United States” which had defined district court jurisdiction under § 563, and provided instead for jurisdiction over claims arising under federal laws “providing for equal rights” — the language which had been used to describe circuit court jurisdiction under § 629, and which is now a part of § 1343 (3). No significant change in either the remedial or jurisdictional language has been made since 1911. Subsection 4 of § 1343, providing jurisdiction for claims “under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote,” is of more recent origin. Part III of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, as proposed, authorized the Attorney General to institute suits for injunc-tive relief against conspiracies to deprive citizens of the civil rights specified in 42 U. S. C. § 1985, which includes voting rights. Part III conferred jurisdiction on the United States district courts to entertain proceedings instituted pursuant to this section of the Act. While the substantive authorization of suits by the Attorney General was defeated, the amendment of § 1343, which had been termed a technical amendment to comply with the authority conferred by Part III, was enacted into law. With the exception of this most recent enactment, the legislative history of the provisions at issue in these cases ultimately provides us with little guidance as to the' proper resolution of the question presented here. Section 1 of the 1871 Act was the least controversial provision of that Act; and what little debate did take place as to § 1 centered largely on the question of what protections the Constitution in fact afforded. The relevant changes in the Revised Statutes were adopted virtually without comment, as was the definition of civil rights jurisdiction in the 1911 Code. The latter provision was described as simply merging the existing jurisdiction of the district and circuit courts, a statement which may be read either as reflecting a view that the broader “and laws” language was intended to be preserved in the more limited “equal rights” language or as suggesting that “and laws” was itself originally enacted with reference to laws providing for equal rights, and was never thought to be any broader. Similar ambiguity is found in discussions of the basic policy of the legislation. While there is weight to the claim that Congress, from 1874 onward, intended to create a broad right of action in federal court for deprivations by a State of any federally secured right, it is also clear that the prime focus of Congress in all of the relevant legislation was ensuring a right of action to enforce the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment and the federal laws enacted pursuant thereto. We cannot say that any of these arguments is ultimately right or wrong, or that one policy is more persuasive than others in reflecting the intent of Congress. It may well be that, at least as to § 1343 (3), the Congresses that enacted the 1871 Act and its subsequent amendments never considered the question of federal jurisdiction of claims arising under the broad scope of federal substantive authority that emerged many years later. This does not mean that jurisdiction cannot be found to encompass claims nonexistent in 1871 or 1874, but it cautions us to be hesitant in finding jurisdiction for new claims which do not clearly fit within the terms of the statute. II The statutory language suggests three different approaches to the jurisdictional issue. The first involves a consideration of the words “secured by the Constitution of the United States” as used in § 1343. The second focuses on the remedy authorized by § 1983 and raises the question whether that section is a statute that secures “equal rights” or “civil rights” within the meaning of § 1343. The third approach makes the jurisdictional issue turn on whether the Social Security Act is a statute that secures “equal rights” or “civil rights.” We consider these approaches in turn. 1. The Supremacy Clause Under § 1343 (3), Congress has created federal jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to redress the deprivation under color of state law “of any right, privilege or immunity secured [1] by the Constitution of the United States or [2] by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.” Claimants correctly point out that the first prepositional phrase can be fairly read to describe rights secured by the Supremacy Clause. For even though that Clause is not a source of any federal rights, it does “secure” federal rights by according them priority whenever they come in conflict with state law. In that sense all federal rights, whether created by treaty, by statute, or by regulation, are “secured” by the Supremacy Clause. In Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111, the Court was confronted with an analogous choice between two interpretations of the statute defining the jurisdiction of three-judge district courts. The comprehensive language of that statute, 28 U. S. C. § 2281 (1970 ed.), could have been broadly read to encompass statutory claims secured by the Supremacy Clause or narrowly read to exclude claims that involve no federal constitutional provision except that Clause. After acknowledging that the broader reading was consistent not only with the statutory language but also with the policy of the statute, the Court accepted the more restrictive reading. Its reasoning is persuasive and applicable to the problems confronting us in this case. “This restrictive view of the application of § 2281 is more consistent with a discriminating reading of the statute itself than is the first and more embracing interpretation. The statute requires a three-judge court in order to restrain the enforcement of a state statute 'upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute.’ Since all federal actions to enjoin a state enactment rest ultimately on the Supremacy Clause, the words 'upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute’ would appear to be superfluous unless they are read to exclude some types of such injunctive suits. For a simple provision prohibiting the restraint of the enforcement of any state statute except by a three-judge court would manifestly have sufficed to embrace every such suit whatever its particular constitutional ground. It is thus quite permissible to read the phrase in question as one of limitation, signifying a congressional purpose to confine the three-judge court requirement to injunction suits depending directly upon a substantive provision of the Constitution, leaving cases of conflict with a federal statute (or treaty) to follow their normal course in a single-judge court.” Swift & Co. v. Wickham, supra, at 126-127 (footnotes omitted). Just as the phrase in § 2281 — “upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute” — would have been superfluous unless read as a limitation on three-judge-court jurisdiction, so is it equally clear that the entire reference in § 1343 (3) to rights secured by an Act of Congress would be unnecessary if the earlier reference to constitutional claims embraced those resting solely on the Supremacy Clause. More importantly, the additional language which describes a limited category of Acts of Congress — -those “providing for equal rights of citizens” — plainly negates the notion that jurisdiction over all statutory claims had already been conferred by the preceding reference to constitutional claims. Thus, while we recognize that there is force to claimants’ argument that the remedial purpose of the civil rights legislation supports an expansive interpretation of the phrase “secured by the Constitution,” it would make little sense for Congress to have drafted the statute as it did if it had intended to confer jurisdiction over every conceivable federal claim against a state agent. In order to give meaning to the entire statute as written by Congress, we must conclude that an allegation of incompatibility between federal and state statutes and regulations does not, in itself, give rise to a claim “secured by the Constitution” within the meaning of § 1343 (3). 2. Section 1983 Claimants next argue that the “equal rights” language of § 1343 (3) should not be read literally or, if it is, that § 1983, the source of their asserted cause of action, should be considered an Act of Congress “providing for equal rights” within the meaning of § 1343 (3) or “providing for the protection of civil rights” within § 1343 (4). In support of this position, they point to the common origin of §§ 1983 and 1343 (3) in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and this Court’s recognition that the latter is the jurisdictional counterpart of the former. Since broad language describing statutory claims was used in both provisions during the period between 1874 and 1911 and has been retained in § 1983, and since Congress in the Judicial Code of 1911 purported to be making no changes in the existing law as to jurisdiction in this area, the “equal rights” language of § 1343 (3) must be construed to encompass all statutory claims arising under the broader language of § 1983. Moreover, in view of its origin in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and its function in modern litigation, § 1983 does “provid [e] for the protection of civil rights” within the meaning of § 1343 (4). In practical effect, this argument leads to the same result as claimants’ Supremacy Clause argument: jurisdiction over all challenges to state action based on any federal ground. Although the legislative history does not forbid this result, the words and structure of the statute, as well as portions of the legislative history, support a more limited construction. The common origin of §§ 1983 and 1343 (3) unquestionably implies that their coverage is, or at least originally was, coextensive. It is not, however, necessary in this case to decide whether the two provisions have the same scope. For even if they do, there would still be the question whether the “and laws” language in § 1983 should be narrowly read to conform with the “equal rights” language in § 1343 (3), or, conversely, the latter phrase should be broadly read to parallel the former. And, in all events, whether or not we assume that there is a difference between “any law of the United States” on the one hand and “any Act of Congress providing for equal rights” on the other, the fact is that the more limited language was used when Congress last amended the jurisdictional provision. In order to construe the broad language of § 1983 to cover any statutory claim, and at the same time to construe the language of § 1343 (3) as coextensive with such a cause of action, it would be necessary to ignore entirely Congress’ most recent limiting amendment and the words of the provision as currently in force. We cannot accept claimants’ argument that we should reach this result by holding that § 1983 is an Act of Congress “providing for equal rights” within the meaning of § 1343 (3). Unlike the 1866 and 1870 Acts, § 1 of the Civil Eights Act of 1871 did not provide for any substantive rights — equal or otherwise. As introduced and enacted, it served only to ensure that an individual had a cause of action for violations of the Constitution, which in the Fourteenth Amendment embodied and extended to all individuals as against state action the substantive protections afforded by § 1 of the 1866 Act. No matter how broad the § 1 cause of action may be, the breadth of its coverage does not alter its procedural character. Even if claimants are correct in asserting that § 1983 provides a cause of action for all federal statutory claims, it remains true that one cannot go into court and claim a “violation of § 1983” — -for § 1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything. As Senator Edmunds recognized in the 1871 debate: “All civil suits, as every lawyer understands, which this act authorizes, are not based upon it; they are based upon the right of the citizen. The act only gives a remedy.” Under § 1343 (3), a civil action must be both “authorized by law” and brought to redress the deprivation of rights “secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights.” Section 1983, when properly invoked, satisfies the first requirement: It ensures that the suit will not be dismissed because not “authorized by law.” But it cannot satisfy the second, since by its terms, as well as its history, it does not provide any rights at all. We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the argument that § 1983 is a statute “providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.” Standing alone, § 1983 clearly provides no protection for civil rights since, as we have just concluded, § 1983 does not provide any substantive rights at all. To be sure, it may be argued that § 1983 does in some sense “provid[e] for the protection of civil rights” when it authorizes a cause of action based on the deprivation of civil rights guaranteed by other Acts of Congress. But in such cases, there is no question as to jurisdiction, and no need to invoke § 1983 to meet the “civil rights” requirement of § 1343 (4); the Act of Congress which is the actual substantive basis of the suit clearly suffices to meet the requisite test. It is only when the underlying statute is no t a civil rights Act that § 1983 need be invoked by those in claimants’ position to support jurisdiction. And in such cases, by hypothesis, § 1983 does not “provid[e] for the protection of civil rights.” To construe § 1343 (4), moreover, as encompassing all federal statutory suits, as claimants here propose, would seem plainly inconsistent with the congressional intent in passing that statute. As noted earlier, the provision’s primary purpose was to ensure federal-court jurisdiction oyer suits which the bill authorized the Attorney General to bring against conspiracies to deprive individuals of the civil rights enumerated in 42 U. S. C. § 1985. The statute, of course, is broader than that: It encompasses suits brought by private individuals as well, and thus retained some significance even after the provisions authorizing suit by the Attorney General were defeated. But to the extent that § 1343 (4) was thought to expand existing federal jurisdiction, it was only because it does not require that the claimed deprivation be “under color of any State law.” One would expect that if Congress sought not only to eliminate any state-action requirement but also to allow jurisdiction without respect to the amount in controversy for claims which in fact have nothing to do with “civil rights/’ there would be some indication of such an intent. But there is none, either in the legislative history or in the words of the statute itself. 3. The Social Security Act It follows from what we have said thus far that § 1343 does not confer federal jurisdiction over the claims based on the Social Security Act unless that Act may fairly be characterized as a statute securing “equal rights” within § 1343 (3) or “civil rights” within § 1343 (4). The Social Security Act provisions at issue here authorize federal assistance to participating States in the provision of a wide range of monetary benefits to needy individuals, including emergency assistance and payments necessary to provide food and shelter. Arguably, a statute that is intended to provide at least a minimum level of subsistence for all individuals could be regarded as securing either “equal rights” or “civil rights.” We are persuaded, however, that both of these terms have a more restrictive meaning as used in the jurisdictional statute. The Social Security Act does not deal with the concept of “equality” or with the guarantee of “civil rights,” as those terms are commonly understood. The Congress that enacted § 1343 (3) was primarily concerned with providing jurisdiction for cases dealing with racial equality; the Congress that enacted § 1343 (4) was primarily concerned with providing jurisdiction for actions dealing with the civil rights enumerated in 42 U. S. C. § 1985, and most notably the right to vote. While the words of these statutes are not limited to the precise claims which motivated their passage, it is inappropriate to read the jurisdictional provisions to encompass new claims which fall well outside the common understanding of their terms. Our conclusion that the Social Security Act does not fall within the terms of either § 1343 (3) or (4) is supported by this Court’s construction of similar phrases in the removal statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1443. The removal statute makes reference to “any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens” and “any law providing for equal rights.” In construing these phrases in Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U. S. 780, this Court concluded: “The present language ‘any law providing for . . . equal civil rights’ first appeared in § 641 of the Revised Statutes of 1874. When the Revised Statutes were compiled, the substantive and removal provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were carried forward in separate sections. Hence, Congress could no longer identify the rights for which removal was available by using the language of the original Civil Rights Act — ‘rights secured to them by the first section of this act.’ The new language it chose, however, does not suggest that it intended to limit the scope of removal to rights recognized in statutes existing in 1874. On the contrary, Congress’ choice of the open-ended phrase ‘any law providing for . . . equal civil rights’ was clearly appropriate to permit removal in cases involving ‘a right under’ both existing and future statutes that provided for equal civil rights. “There is no substantial indication, however, that the general language of § 641 of the Revised Statutes was intended to expand the kinds of ‘law’ to which the removal section referred. In spite of the potential breadth of the phrase ‘any law providing for . . . equal civil rights,’ it seems clear that in enacting § 641, Congress intended in that phrase only to include laws comparable in nature to the Civil Rights Act of 1866. . . . “. . . As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has concluded, § 1443 ‘applies only to rights that are granted in terms of equality and not to the whole gamut of constitutional rights . . . .’ ‘When the removal statute speaks of “any law providing for equal rights,” it refers to those laws that are couched in terms of equality, such as the historic and the recent equal rights statutes, as distinguished from laws, of which the due process clause and 42 U. S. C. § 1983 are sufficient examples, that confer equal rights in the sense, vital to our way of life, of bestowing them upon all.’ New York v. Galamison, 342 F. 2d 255, 269, 271. See also Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 585-586; Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U. S. 1, 39-40; City of Greenwood v. Peacock, [384 U. S. 808,] 825.” Id., at 789-790, 792 (footnotes omitted). In accord with Georgia v. Rachel, the Courts of Appeals have consistently held that the Social Security Act is not a statute providing for “equal rights.” See Andrews v. Maher, 525 F. 2d 113 (CA2 1975); Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F. 2d 1090, 1101 (CA2 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Aguayo v. Weinberger, 414 U. S. 1146 (1974). We endorse those holdings, and find that a similar conclusion is warranted with respect to § 1343 (4) as well. See McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F. 2d 246, 249 (CA2 1969). We therefore hold that the District Court did not have jurisdiction in either of these cases. Accordingly, the judgment in No. 77-5324 is affirmed, and the judgment in No. 77-719 is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: “(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States; “(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.” 28 U. S. C. §§ 1343 (3) and (4). Jurisdiction under § 1343 (4), it should be noted, is not limited to actions against state officials or individuals acting under color of state law. § 206, 81 Stat. 893; see 42 U. S. C. § 606 (e) (1). The program is fully described in Quern v. Mandley, 436 U. S. 725. “[Petitioner] resides with her two children in Jersey City, New Jersey. Each month, she receives $235.00 under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC), 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., as well as $157.00 under the Social Security Administration’s disability program for her one retarded son. On February 2, 1976, Gonzalez received and cashed both checks at a neighborhood food market. Upon leaving the store, she was accosted by a robber who stole the cash. The following day she explained her situation to the Hudson County Welfare Board, requesting $163.00 in emergency assistance funds to cover her rent and utility bills.” 560 F. 2d 160, 163 (CA3 1977). “When because of an emergent situation over which they have had no control or opportunity to plan in advance, the eligible unit is in a state of homelessness; and the County Welfare Board determines that the providing of shelter and/or food and/or emergency clothing, and/or minimum essential house furnishings are necessary for health and safety, such needs may be recognized in accordance with the regulations and limitations in the following sections.” N. J. Admin. Code § 10:82-5.12 (1976). Section 406 (e)(1), as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 606 (e)(1), provides: “The term 'emergency assistance to needy families with children' means any of the following, furnished for a period not in excess of 30 days in any 12-month period, in the ease of a needy child under the age of 21 who is (or, within such period as may be specified by the Secretary, has been) living with any of the relatives specified in subsection (a) (1) of this section in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home, but only where such child is without available resources, the payments, care, or services involved are necessary to avoid destitution of such child or to provide living arrangements in a home for such child, and such destitution or need for living arrangements did not arise because such child or relative refused without good cause to accept employment or training for employment— “(A) money payments, payments in kind, or such other payments as the State agency may specify with respect to, or medical care or any other type of remedial care recognized under State law on behalf of, such child or any other member of the household in which he is living, and “(B) such services as may be specified by the Secretary; “but only with respect to a State whose State plan approved under section 602 of this title includes provision for such assistance.” 418 F. Supp. 566, 569 (1976). Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” Article VI, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution provides: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 560 F. 2d, at 169. Section 1331 (a) provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, except that no such sum or value shall be required in any such action brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.” See, e. g., King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309; Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282. 45 CFR, §§ 233.20 (a) (3) (ii) (C), 233.90 (a) (1974). Houston Welfare Rights Org. v. Vowell, 391 F. Supp. 223 (1975). Houston Welfare Rights Org. v. Vowell, 555 F. 2d 1219 (1977). It will be noted that the Court of Appeals did not hold that the Social Security Act was itself an Act of Congress of the kind described in the jurisdictional statute. The first section of “An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes” reads as follows: “That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law* statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and subject to the same -rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of the act of the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, entitled ‘An Act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication’; and the other remedial laws of the United States which are in their nature applicable in such cases.” 17 Stat. 13. “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” Rev. Stat. § 1979. Subparagraph “Twelfth” of § 563 authorized district court jurisdiction “[o]f all suits at law or in equity authorized by law to be brought by any person to redress the deprivation, under color of any law, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law of the United States to persons within the jurisdiction thereof.” Subparagraph “Sixteenth” of § 629 granted the circuit courts original jurisdiction “[o]f all suits authorized by law to be brought by any person to redress the deprivation, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, of any right, privilege, or immunity, secured by the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law providing for equal rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.” 36 Stat. 1087, 1167. See § 24 (14), 36 Stat. 1092. The sections have, of course, been renumbered. H. R. 6127, § 121, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). Ibid. In addition to conferring federal jurisdiction, the bill also provided that such suits should be entertained without regard to exhaustion by the aggrieved party of administrative or other judicial remedies. See H. R. Rep. No. 291, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1957) (“Section 122 amends section 1343 of title 28, United States Code. These amendments are merely technical amendments to the Judicial Code so as to conform it with amendments made to existing law by the preceding section of the bill”). The Act of 1871, known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, was directed at the organized terrorism in the Reconstruction South led by the Klan, and the unwillingness or inability of state officials to control the widespread violence. Section 1 of the Act generated the least concern; it merely added civil remedies to the criminal penalties imposed by the 1866 Civil Rights Act. See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 568 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); id., at App. 68 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger). The focus of the heated debate was on the succeeding sections of the Act, which included provisions imposing criminal and civil penalties for conspiracies to deprive individuals of constitutional rights, and authorizing the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and use armed forces to suppress “insurrection.” §§2-5, 17 Stat. 13; see Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 220 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Thurman). See generally Developments in the Law — Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1153— 1156 (1977). See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 577 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull); Developments, supra n. 25, at 1155. See S. Rep. No. 388, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 15 (1910); H. R. Doc. No. 783, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, p. 19 (1910). This caution is also mandated by the settled rule that the party claiming that a court has power to grant relief in his behalf has the burden of persuasion on the jurisdictional issue, McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U. S. 178, 189, especially when he is proceeding in a court of limited jurisdiction. Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 8, 11. “The argument that the phrase in the statute 'secured by the Constitution’ refers to rights 'created/ rather than ‘protected’ by it, is not persuasive. The preamble of the Constitution, proclaiming the establishment of the Constitution in order to ‘secure the Blessings of Liberty,’ uses the word ‘secure’ in the sense of ‘protect’ or ‘make certain.’ That the phrase was used in this sense in the statute now under consideration was recognized in Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 317, 322, where it was held as a matter of pleading that the particular cause of action set up in the plaintiff’s pleading was in contract and was not to redress deprivation of the ‘right secured to him by that clause of the Constitution’ [the contract clause], to which he had ‘chosen not to resort.’ See, as to other rights protected by the Constitution and hence secured by it, brought within the provisions of R. S. § 5508, Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263; In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U. S. 532; United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383.” Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 526-527 (opinion of Stone, J.). The three-judge court statute, including the language at issue in Swift & Co. v. Wickham, was originally enacted in 1910, 36 Stat. 557, at a time when the Judicial Code of 1911 was under active consideration. When Swift & Co. was decided, § 2281 provided: “An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title.” (Emphasis added.) See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538, 540, 543; Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U. S. 572, 583. The Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27, the forerunner to the Fourteenth Amendment, in its first section declared all persons born in the United States to be citizens and provided that all citizens should have the same rights to make and enforce contracts, to sue, to purchase, lease, sell, or hold property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws as is enjoyed by white citizens. The Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140, which followed the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, was directed at enforcing the declared right of every citizen to vote in all elections without regard to race. Indeed, the view that § 1 of the 1871 Act was “merely carrying out the principles of the civil rights bill [of 1866] which have since become a part of the Constitution” may well explain why it was subject to the least debate of any section of that Act. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 568 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds). See also id., at 429 (remarks of Rep. McHenry). Section 1 of the 1871 Act was modeled after § 2 of the 1866 Act, which provided criminal sanctions for violations of the rights declared by that Act. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 568 (1871). See also 560 F. 2d, at 169. Where the underlying right is based on the Constitution itself, rather than an Act of Congress, § 1343 (3) obviously provides jurisdiction. See H. R. Rep. No. 291, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1957): “Section 1985 of title 42, United States Code, often referred to as the Ku Klux Act, provides a civil remedy in damages to a person damaged as a result of conspiracies to deprive one of certain civil rights. The law presently is comprised of three subsections; the first establishes liability for damages against any person who conspires to interfere with an officer of the United States in the discharge of his duties and as a result thereof injures or deprives another of rights or privileges of a citizen of the United States; the second subsection establishes liability for damages against any person who conspires to intimidate or injure parties, witnesses, or jurors involved in any court matter or who conspires to obstruct the due process of justice in any State court made with the intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws as the result of the conspiracies for injury or deprivation of another’s rights or privileges as a citizen of the United States; the third subsection establishes liability for damages against any person who conspires to deprive another of equal protections of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, or of the right to vote in elections affecting Federal offices if the result is to injure or deprive another of rights and privileges of a citizen of the United States. “The effect of the provisions of the proposed bill on existing law as contained in title 42, United States Code, section 1985 is not to expand the rights presently protected but merely to provide the Attorney General with the right to bring a civil action or other proper proceeding for relief to prevent acts or practices which would give rise to a cause of action under the three existing subsections.” See 103 Cong. Rec. 12559 (1957) (remarks of Sen. Case): “My intent in proposing the idea of leaving in the bill section 122, renumbered as section 121, was to strengthen the so-called right to vote. The section would amend existing law so as to clarify the jurisdiction of the district courts in the entertainment of suits to> recover damages, or to secure equitable or other relief under any act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote. . . . “[T]he addition of a subparagraph 4 in section 1343 is not limited by the clause ‘under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or order of any State or Territory,’ to which the preceding paragraph is subject. “So in that sense the new subparagraph 4, which would be left in Part III, is complementary to, and is perhaps somewhat broader than existing law. So it does not limit the suit to recover damages to a case in which the injury occurs under color of law.” Cf. Gomez v. Florida State Employment Service, 417 F. 2d 569, 580 n. 39 (CA5 1969) (rights secured by the Social Security Act are “rights of an essentially personal nature”). As to § 1343 (4), see Jones v. Alfred, H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 412 n. 1 (Civil Rights Act of 1866); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 554 (Voting Rights Act of 1965). The removal statute was enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 under the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment; §§ 1343 (3) and (4), on the other hand, are based upon the authority of the Fourteenth Amendment which, unlike the Thirteenth Amendment, is not limited to racially based claims of inequality. As a result, while an Act of Congress must in fact deal with equal rights or civil rights to support jurisdiction under § 1343, it need not be stated only in terms of racial equality. Cf. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U. S., at 792.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BLOCK, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, et al. v. NEAL No. 81-1494. Argued January 19, 1983 Decided March 7, 1983 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., concurred in the judgment. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and Margaret E. Clark. Lenny L. Croce argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Neil G. McBride and Dean Hitt Rivkin David M. Madway filed a brief for the National Housing Law Project as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Jan Perkins filed a brief for Oregon Legal Services Corp. as amicus curiae. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized by Title V of the Housing Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 432, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §1471 et seq. (1976 ed., and Supp. V), to extend financial and technical assistance through the Farmers Home Administation (FmHA) to low-income rural residents who seek to obtain housing. Respondent Onilea Neal, the recipient of an FmHA loan for the construction of a prefabricated house, brought this action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680. She alleged that defects discovered after she set up residence were partly attributable to the failure of FmHA employees properly to inspect and supervise construction of her house. This case presents the question whether respondent’s action is barred by 28 U. S. C. § 2680(h), which precludes recovery under the Tort Claims Act for “[a]ny claim arising out of . . . misrepresentation. ” I A The facts described in respondent’s complaint may be summarized as follows. Unable to obtain credit from other sources, Neal applied for a Rural Housing Loan from FmHA pursuant to § 502(a) of the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U. S. C. § 1472(a). FmHA approved her application in June 1977. During the summer of that year, Neal received advice from S. Lain Parkison, the FmHA Supervisor for Roane County, Tenn. On August 8, 1977, Neal contracted with Home Marketing Associates, Inc. (Home Marketing), for the construction of a prefabricated house. The contract required that Home Marketing’s work conform to plans approved by FmHA. It also granted FmHA the right to inspect and test all materials and workmanship and reject any that were defective. At the same time, Neal entered into a deed of trust with FmHA and signed a promissory note providing for repayment of the principal sum of $21,170, plus interest of 8% per annum on the unpaid principal. Home Marketing commenced work on Neal’s house in August 1977 and finished the following month. An FmHA official, Mary Wells, inspected the site on three occasions: soon after construction began, shortly before it was concluded, and after the house was completed. Her inspection reports contained no adverse comments on the construction work. After her third inspection, Wells issued a final report, signed by Neal, which indicated that the construction accorded with the drawings and specifications approved by FmHA. Home Marketing issued a one-year builder’s warranty covering workmanship, materials, and equipment. Neal moved into the house in 1977. During the winter, she discovered that the heat pump in the house was not working properly. She notified FmHA and Home Marketing. An inspection by Parkison, the County FmHA Supervisor, revealed that the heat pump unit was either defective or undersized. On March 22, 1978, FmHA’s State Director and other FmHA officials conducted a complete inspection and identified 13 additional defects in the construction of the house. These included deviations from plans approved by FmHA and from applicable Minimum Property Standards. The inadequacies in materials and workmanship included defects in caulking, bridging, sealing, and plumbing, and extended to all areas of the house, such as the porch, the rear door, the floor, the roof, the exterior paint, and the interior wall finish. Home Marketing refused to comply with FmHA’s request to cure these defects in accordance with the builder’s warranty. In November 1978 respondent asked FmHA to pay for the correction of the heating system and other structural defects. It declined to do so. B The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee dismissed Neal’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Neal v. Bergland, 489 F. Supp. 512 (1980). It found that no contractual duty to supervise the construction of respondent’s home was created either by the Federal Housing Act of 1949 and the regulations promulgated thereunder or by the various agreements between respondent and FmHA. The court concluded that regulations requiring FmHA officials to ensure that the builder adhere to the terms of its construction contract were intended solely to protect the Government’s security interest, and were not intended to make FmHA warrant the quality of construction for the benefit of those receiving rural assistance loans. Id., at 514-515. The District Court also concluded that respondent failed to state a claim against FmHA under applicable tort law. Id., at 515. The Court of Appeals reversed. Neal v. Bergland, 646 F. 2d 1178 (CA6 1981). It agreed with the District Court that FmHA had no contractual obligation to provide Neal with technical assistance or to inspect and supervise construction of her house. Id., at 1181. However, the Court of Appeals found that respondent’s complaint stated a claim for negligence under the principle “that one who undertakes to act, even though gratuitously, is required to act carefully and with the exercise of due care and will be liable for injuries proximately caused by failure to use such care.” Id., at 1181-1182, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §323 (1965). It noted that, subject to express exceptions, the Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §2674, authorizes suit against the Government for the negligence of a federal agency in performing a voluntary undertaking. Ibid. The Court of Appeals then considered the question now before us: whether respondent’s claim “aris[es] out of. . . misrepresentation,” 28 U. S. C. § 2680(h), and is therefore ex-eluded from coverage by the Tort Claims Act. Distinguishing this case from others including United States v. Neustadt, 366 U. S. 696 (1961), the court concluded that respondent’s negligence claim did not fall within this exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity. The Secretary of Agriculture and other Government officials petitioned for certiorari and suggested summary reversal on the ground that the decision below cannot be reconciled with this Court’s decision in Neustadt. We granted the writ, 456 U. S. 988 (1982), and we now affirm. II The question before us is a narrow one. Petitioners argue only that respondent’s claim is a claim of “misrepresentation” within the meaning of § 2680(h). They do not seek review of the threshold determination that respondent’s complaint states a claim for negligence under the Good Samaritan doctrine that is otherwise actionable under 28 U. S. C. §2674. Thus, we need not decide precisely what Neal must prove in order to prevail on her negligence claim, nor even whether such a claim lies. Nor are we called on to consider whether recovery is barred by any other provision of the Tort Claims Act, including the exception for any action “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function.” §2680(a). Finally, we are not asked to determine whether the administrative remedy created by the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U. S. C. § 1479(c) (1976 ed., Supp. V), provides the exclusive remedy against the Government for damages attributable to the negligence of FmHA officials. The scope of the “misrepresentation” exception to the Tort Claims Act was the focus of this Court’s decision in United States v. Neustadt, supra. Neustadt purchased a house in reliance on an appraisal undertaken by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) for mortgage insurance purposes. After he took up residence, cracks appeared in the ceilings and walls of his house. The cracks were caused by structural defects that had not been noticed by the FHA appraiser during the course of his inspection. Neustadt sued the Government under the Tort Claims Act to recover the difference between the fair market value of the property and the purchase price. He alleged that the FHA had negligently inspected and appraised the property, and that he had justifiably relied on the appraisal in paying a higher price for the house than he would otherwise have paid. This Court held that the claim in Neustadt arose out of “misrepresentation” under § 2680(h). We determined initially that § 2680(h) applies to claims arising out of negligent, as well as intentional, misrepresentation. 366 U. S., at 703-706. This Court found that Neustadt’s claim that the Government had breached its “duty to use due care in obtaining and communicating information upon which [the plaintiff] may reasonably be expected to rely in the conduct of his economic affairs,” merely restated the traditional legal definition of “negligent misrepresentation” as would have been understood by Congress when the Tort Claims Act was enacted. Id., at 706-707. Finally, we examined the National Housing Act of 1934, as amended, under which the FHA had conducted its appraisal, and found nothing to indicate “that Congress intended, in a case such as this, to limit or suspend the application of the ‘misrepresentation’ exception of the Tort Claims Act.” Id., at 708-710. We cannot agree with petitioners that this case is controlled by Neustadt. As we recognized in that decision, the essence of an action for misrepresentation, whether negligent or intentional, is the communication of misinformation on which the recipient relies. The gravamen of the action against the Government in Neustadt was that the plaintiff was misled by a “Statement of FHA Appraisal” prepared by the Government. Neustadt alleged no injury that he would have suffered independently of his reliance on the erroneous appraisal. Because the alleged conduct that was the basis of his negligence claim was in essence a negligent misrepresentation, Neustadt’s action was barred under the “misrepresentation” exception. Section 2680(h) thus relieves the Government of tort liability for pecuniary injuries which are wholly attributable to reliance on the Government’s negligent misstatements. As a result, the statutory exception undoubtedly preserves sovereign immunity with respect to a broad range of Government actions. But it does not bar negligence actions which focus not on the Government’s failure to use due care in communicating information, but rather on the Government’s breach of a different duty. In this case, unlike Neustadt, the Government’s misstatements are not essential to plaintiff’s negligence claim. The Court of Appeals found that to prevail under the Good Samaritan doctrine, Neal must show that FmHA officials voluntarily undertook to supervise construction of her house; that the officials failed to use due care in carrying out their supervisory activity; and that she suffered some pecuniary injury proximately caused by FmHA’s failure to use due care. FmHA’s duty to use due care to ensure that the builder adhere to previously approved plans and cure all defects before completing construction is distinct from any duty to use due care in communicating information to respondent. And it certainly does not “appea[r] beyond doubt” that the only damages alleged in the complaint to be caused by FmHA’s conduct were those attributable to Neal’s reliance on FmHA inspection reports. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Neal’s factual allegations would be consistent with proof at trial that Home Marketing would never have turned the house over to Neal in its defective condition if FmHA officials had pointed out defects to the builder while construction was still underway, rejected defective materials and workmanship, or withheld final payment until the builder corrected all defects. Of course, in the absence of the “misrepresentation” exception to the Tort Claims Act, respondent could also have brought a claim for negligent misrepresentation to recover for any injury caused by her misplaced reliance on advice provided by FmHA officials and on the FmHA inspection reports. Common to both the misrepresentation and the negligence claim would be certain factual and legal questions, such as whether FmHA officials used due care in inspecting Neal’s home while it was under construction. But the partial overlap between these two tort actions does not support the conclusion that if one is excepted under the Tort Claims Act, the other must be as well. Neither the language nor history of the Act suggests that when one aspect of the Government’s conduct is not actionable under the “misrepresentation” exception, a claimant is barred from pursuing a distinct claim arising out of other aspects of the Government’s conduct. “ ‘The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced.’” United States v. Aetna Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366, 383 (1949), quoting Anderson v. Hayes Constr. Co., 243 N. Y. 140, 147, 153 N. E. 28, 29-30 (1926) (Cardozo, J.). Any other interpretation would encourage the Government to shield itself completely from tort liability by adding misrepresentations to whatever otherwise actionable torts it commits. We therefore hold that respondent’s claim against the Government for negligence by FmHA officials in supervising construction of her house does not “aris[e] out of . . . misrepresentation” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 2680(h). The Court of Appeals properly concluded that Neal’s claim is not barred by this provision of the Tort Claims Act because Neal does not seek to recover on the basis of misstatements made by FmHA officials. Although FmHA in this case may have undertaken both to supervise construction of Neal’s house and to provide Neal information regarding the progress of construction, Neal’s action is based solely on the former conduct. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. The Chief Justice concurs in the judgment. Regulations then in effect allowed the recipient of an FmHA loan under § 502 of the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U. S. C. § 1472, to obtain new housing in one of three ways. The method undertaken by respondent, known as the “contract method” of financing new construction, involved the performance of work by a builder in accordance with a signed contract approved by FmHA. See 7 CFR § 1804.4(d) (1977). Although the FmHA “will not become a party to a construction contract nor incur any liability thereunder,” ibid., its officials were significantly involved in all phases of the construction of respondent’s house. For example, the FmHA County Supervisor was authorized to assist the borrower in selecting a contractor based on the bids or proposals and the contractor’s qualifications. § 1804.4(d)(6). He reviewed all plans and specifications, § 1804.4(a), and was required to give prior approval of any changes in the plans, § 1804.4(d), or in the contract. § 1804.4(d)(8). He was responsible for making periodic and final inspections. § 1804.4(d)(6)(i)(/). See also §§ 1808.2, 1803.5, 1804.4(g). He also had a responsibility to see that partial payments made to the contractor were properly applied against his bills for material and labor, § 1804.4(d)(7)(iv), and to determine that work was performed in compliance with all the terms and conditions of the contract before making final payment. § 1804.4(d)(7)(vii). Finally, he assisted the borrower with respect to claims arising under the builder’s warranty. § 1804.4(g)(5). The court cited, inter alia, Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61 (1955) (Coast Guard’s failure to maintain the beacon light in a lighthouse); Seaboard Coast Line R. Co. v. United States, 473 F. 2d 714 (CA5 1973) (negligent design and construction of a drainage ditch); and Barron v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 1077 (Haw. 1979) (failure to require a subcontractor to comply with a contract’s safety requirements). The Court of Appeals found that respondent stated a claim against the United States under the common-law Good Samaritan doctrine which is described in § 823 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). However, the court did not expressly find that Tennessee law recognizes this doctrine, see 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b), and would apply it to a private person responsible for similar negligence. See 28 U. S. C. § 2674; Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U. S. 315, 319 (1957); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, supra. Nor did the court describe in any significant detail what respondent must show in order to prevail on her negligence claim. Compare, e. g., Johansen v. United States, 343 U. S. 427 (1952) (Federal Employees’ Compensation Act provides exclusive remedy for civilian employees), with United States v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, 160 (1963) (provision allowing compensation of certain prison inmates for work-related injuries was not exclusive remedy for inmate), and United States v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110, 111 (1954) (receipt of disability payments under the Veterans Act does not bar recovery under the Tort Claims Act). Petitioners do argue at length, however, that neither the Housing Act of 1949 nor subsequent amendments were intended to expand liability beyond that established under the Tort Claims. Act. Brief for Petitioners 22-32. Because we find that respondent’s claim under the Good Samaritan doctrine is not barred by the “misrepresentation” exception to the Tort Claims Act, we do not consider whether the Housing Act provides an alternative basis for respondent’s claim. The Court distinguished negligent misrepresentation from the “many familiar forms of negligent misconduct [which] may be said to involve an element of ‘misrepresentation,’ [only] in the generic sense of that word.” 366 U. S., at 711, n. 26. The “misrepresentation” exception applies only when the action itself falls within the commonly understood definition of a misrepresentation claim, which “ ‘has been identified with the common law action of deceit,’ and has been confined ‘very largely to the invasion of interests of a financial or commercial character, in the course of business dealings.’” Ibid,., quoting W. Prosser, Law of Torts §85, pp. 702-703 (1941 ed.). Thus, the claim in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61 (1955), for damages to a vessel which ran aground due to the Coast Guard’s alleged negligence in maintaining a lighthouse, did not “aris[e] out of. . . misrepresentation” within the meaning of § 2680(h). See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552(3) (1977). Although this negligence claim may include an element of reliance on FmHA’s voluntary undertaking to supervise construction in a competent manner, this element of the claim would constitute “misrepresentation” only in the generic sense of the word. See n. 5, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION et al. v. FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., et al. No. 07-582. Argued November 4, 2008 Decided April 28, 2009 Former Solicitor General Garre argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were former Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Katsas, Eric D. Miller, Thomas M. Bondy, Anne Murphy, Matthew B. Berry, Joseph R. Palmore, Jacob M. Lewis, and Nandan M. Joshi. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Fox Television Stations, Inc., were R. Clark Wadlow, Jennifer Tatel, David S. Petron, and Quin M. Sorenson. Miguel A. Estrada, Andrew S. Tulumello, Matthew D. McGill, Richard Cotton, Susan Weiner, Robert Corn-Revere, Jonathan H. Anschell, Susanna M. Lowy, and Seth P. Waxman filed a brief for respondent NBC Universal, Inc., et al. Andrew Jay Schwartzman and Parul Desai filed a brief for respondent Center for Creative Voices in Media, Inc. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Alliance Defense Fund et al. by Benjamin W. Bull and Glen Lavy; for the American Center for Law and Justice et al. by Jay Alan Sekulow, Stuart J. Roth, Colby M. May, John Tuskey, and Shannon D. Woodruff; for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence by John C. Eastman, David L. Llewellyn, Jr., and Edwin Meese III; for the Decency Enforcement Center for Television by Thomas B. North; for Morality in Media, Inc., by Robin S. Whitehead; for National Religious Broadcasters by Craig L. Parshall, Joseph C. Chautin III, Elise M. Stubbe, and Mark A Balkin; and for the Parents Television Council by Robert R. Sparks, Jr. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the ABC Television Affiliates Association by Wade H. Hargrove, Mark J. Prak, and David Kushner; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Marjorie Heins, Steven R. Shapiro, and Christopher A. Hansen; for the California Broadcasters Association et al. by Kathleen M. Sullivan and Gregg P. Shall; for the Center for Democracy & Technology et al. by John B. Morris, Jr., and Sophia S. Cope; for Former FCC Commissioners and Officials by Timothy K. Lewis, Carl A Solano, and Nancy Winkelman, and by Henry Getter, Newton N. Minow, and Glen O. Robinson, all pro se; for the National Association of Broadcasters et al. by Paul M. Smith, Marsha J. MacBride, Jane E. Mago, and Jerianne Timmerman; for Public Broadcasters by Robert A. Long, Jr., Jonathan D. Blake, and Jonathan L. Marcus; for Time Warner Inc. by Christopher Landau; and for the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression et al. by Robert M. O’Neil and J. Joshua Wheeler. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Academy of Pediatrics et al. by Angela J. Campbell, James N. Horwood, and Tillman L. Lay; and for Free Press et al. by Marvin Ammori. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III-E. Federal law prohibits the broadcasting of “any . . . indecent . . . language,” 18 U. S. C. § 1464, which includes expletives referring to sexual or excretory activity or organs, see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978). This case concerns the adequacy of the Federal Communications Commission’s explanation of its decision that this sometimes forbids the broadcasting of indecent expletives even when the offensive words are not repeated. I. Statutory and Regulatory Background The Communications Act of 1934,48 Stat. 1064,47 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. V), established a system of limited-term broadcast licenses subject to various “conditions” designed “to maintain the control of the United States over all the channels of radio transmission,” § 301 (2000 ed.). Almost 28 years ago we said that “[a] licensed broadcaster is granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations.” CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U. S. 367, 395 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). One of the burdens that licensees shoulder is the indecency ban — the statutory proscription against “utter[ingj any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication,” 18 U. S. C. § 1464 — which Congress has instructed the Commission to enforce between the hours of 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, § 16(a), 106 Stat. 954, note following 47 U. S. C. § 303. Congress has given the Commission various means of enforcing the indecency ban, including civil fines, see § 503(b)(1), and license revocations or the denial of license renewals, see §§ 309(k), 312(a)(6). The Commission first invoked the statutory ban on indecent broadcasts in 1975, declaring a daytime broadcast of George Carlin's “Filthy Words” monologue actionably indecent. In re Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 56 F. C. C. 2d 94. At that time, the Commission announced the definition of indecent speech that it uses to this day, prohibiting “language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.” Id., at 98. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, supra, we upheld the Commission’s order against statutory and constitutional challenge. We rejected the broadcasters’ argument that the statutory proscription applied only to speech appealing to the prurient interest, noting that “the normal definition of ‘indecent’ merely refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of morality.” Id., at 740. And we held that the First Amendment allowed Carlin’s monologue to be banned in light of the “uniquely pervasive presence” of the medium and the fact that broadcast programming is “uniquely accessible to children.” Id., at 748-749. In the ensuing years, the Commission took a cautious, but gradually expanding, approach to enforcing the statutory prohibition against indecent broadcasts. Shortly after Pacifica, 438 U. S. 726, the Commission expressed its “intension] strictly to observe the narrowness of the Pacifica holding,” which “relied in part on the repetitive occurrence of the ‘indecent’ words” contained in Carlin’s monologue. In re Application of WGBH Educ. Foundation, 69 F. C. C. 2d 1250, 1254, ¶ 10 (1978). When the full Commission next considered its indecency standard, however, it repudiated the view that its enforcement power was limited to “deliberate, repetitive use of the seven words actually contained in the George Carlin monologue.” In re Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 FCC Red. 2698, 2699, ¶ 12 (1987). The Commission determined that such a “highly restricted enforcement standard . . . was unduly narrow as a matter of law and inconsistent with [the Commission’s] enforcement responsibilities under Section 1464.” In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pa., 3 FCC Red. 930, ¶ 5 (1987). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld this expanded enforcement standard against constitutional and Administrative Procedure Act challenge. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 852 F. 2d 1332 (1988) (R. Ginsburg, J.), superseded in part by Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F. 3d 654 (1995) (en banc). Although the Commission had expanded its enforcement beyond the “repetitive use of specific words or phrases,” it preserved a distinction between literal and nonliteral (or “expletive”) uses of evocative language. In re Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 FCC Red., at 2699, ¶13. The Commission explained that each literal “description or depiction of sexual or excretory functions must be examined in context to determine whether it is patently offensive,” but that “deliberate and repetitive use ... is a requisite to a finding of indecency” when a complaint focuses solely on the use of nonliteral expletives. Ibid. Over a decade later, the Commission emphasized that the “full context” in which particular materials appear is “critically important,” but that a few “principal” factors guide the inquiry, such as the “explicitness or graphic nature” of the material, the extent to which the material “dwells on or repeats” the offensive material, and the extent to which the material was presented to “pander,” to “titillate,” or to “shock.” In re Industry Guidance on Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U. S. C. §1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999, 8002, ¶ 9, 8003, ¶ 10 (2001) (emphasis deleted). “No single factor,” the Commission said, “generally provides the basis for an indecency finding,” but “where sexual or excretory references have been made once or have been passing or fleeting in nature, this characteristic has tended to weigh against a finding of indecency.” Id., at 8003, ¶ 10,8008, ¶ 17. In 2004, the Commission took one step further by declaring for the first time that a nonliteral (expletive) use of the F- and S-Words could be actionably indecent, even when the word is used only once. The first order to this effect dealt with an NBC broadcast of the Golden Globe Awards, in which the performer Bono commented, “ ‘[T]his is really, really, f***ing brilliant.’ ” In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Red. 4975, 4976, n. 4 (2004) (Golden Globes Order). Although the Commission had received numerous complaints directed at the broadcast, its enforcement bureau had concluded that the material was not indecent because “Bono did not describe, in context, sexual or excretory organs or activities and ... the utterance was fleeting and isolated.” Id., at 4975-4976, ¶ 3. The full Commission reviewed and reversed the staff ruling. The Commission first declared that Bono’s use of the F-Word fell within its indecency definition, even though the word was used as an intensifier rather than a literal descriptor. “[G]iven the core meaning of the ‘F-Word,’” it said, “any use of that word . . . inherently has a sexual connotation.” Id., at 4978, ¶8. The Commission determined, moreover, that the broadcast was “patently offensive” because the F-Word “is one of the most vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English language,” because “[i]ts use invariably invokes a coarse sexual image,” and because Bono’s use of the word was entirely “shocking and gratuitous.” Id., at 4979, ¶ 9. The Commission observed that categorically exempting such language from enforcement actions would “likely lead to more widespread use.” Ibid. Commission action was necessary to “safeguard the well-being of the nation’s children from the most objectionable, most offensive language.” Ibid. The order noted that technological advances have made it far easier to delete (“bleep out”) a “single and gratuitous use of a vulgar expletive,” without adulterating the content of a broadcast. Id., at 4980, ¶ 11. The order acknowledged that “prior Commission and staff action [has] indicated that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the ‘F-Word’ . . . are not indecent or would not be acted upon.” It explicitly ruled that “any such interpretation is no longer good law.” Ibid., ¶ 12. It “clarified]... that the mere fact that specific words or phrases are not sustained or repeated does not mandate a finding that material that is otherwise patently offensive to the broadcast medium is not indecent.” Ibid. Because, however, “existing precedent would have permitted this broadcast,” the Commission determined that “NBC and its affiliates necessarily did not have the requisite notice to justify a penalty.” Id., at 4981-4982, ¶ 15. II. The Present Case This case concerns utterances in two live broadcasts aired by Fox Television Stations, Inc., and its affiliates prior to the Commission’s Golden Globes Order. The first occurred during the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, when the singer Cher exclaimed, “I’ve also had critics for the last 40 years saying that I was on my way out every year. Right. So f*** 'em.” Brief for Petitioners 9. The second involved a segment of the 2008 Billboard Music Awards, during the presentation of an award by Nicole Richie and Paris Hilton, principals in a Fox television series called “The Simple Life.” Ms. Hilton began their interchange by reminding Ms. Richie to “watch the bad language,” but Ms. Richie proceeded to ask the audience, “Why do they even call it ‘The Simple Life?’ Have you ever tried to get cow s*** out of a Prada purse? It’s not so f***ing simple.” Id., at 9-10. Following each of these broadcasts, the Commission received numerous complaints from parents whose children were exposed to the language. On March 15, 2006, the Commission released “Notices of Apparent Liability” for a number of broadcasts that the Commission deemed actionably indecent, including the two described above. In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2,2002 and Mar. 8,2005, 21 FCC Red. 2664 (2006). Multiple parties petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for judicial review of the order, asserting a variety of constitutional and statutory challenges. Since the order had declined to impose sanctions, the Commission had not previously given the broadcasters an opportunity to respond to the indecency charges. It therefore requested and obtained from the Court of Appeals a voluntary remand so that the parties could air their objections. 489 F. 3d 444, 453 (2007). The Commission’s order on remand upheld the indecency findings for the broadcasts described above. See In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002, and Mar. 8, 2005, 21 FCC Red. 13299 (2006) (Remand Order). The order first explained that both broadcasts fell comfortably within the subject-matter scope of the Commission’s indecency test because the 2003 broadcast involved a literal description of excrement and both broadcasts invoked the “F-Word,” which inherently has a sexual connotation. Id., at 13304, ¶ 16,13323, ¶ 58. The order next determined that the broadcasts were patently offensive under community standards for the medium. Both broadcasts, it noted, involved entirely gratuitous uses of “one of the most vulgar, graphic, and explicit words for sexual activity in the English language.” Id., at 13305, ¶ 17, 13324, ¶ 59. It found Ms. Richie’s use of the “F-Word” and her “explicit description of the handling of excrement” to be “vulgar and shocking,” as well as to constitute “pandering,” after Ms. Hilton had playfully warned her to “‘watch the bad language.’” Id., at 13305, ¶ 17. And it found Cher’s statement patently offensive in part because she metaphorically suggested a sexual act as a means of expressing hostility to her critics. Id., at 13324, ¶60. The order relied upon the “‘critically important’ ” context of the utterances, id., at 13304, ¶ 15, noting that they were aired during prime-time awards shows “designed to draw a large nationwide audience that could be expected to include many children interested in seeing their favorite music stars,” id., at 13305, ¶ 18,13324, ¶ 59. Indeed, approximately 2.5 million minors witnessed each of the broadcasts. Id., at 13306, ¶ 18,13326, ¶ 65. The order asserted that both broadcasts under review would have been actionably indecent under the staff rulings and Commission dicta in effect prior to the Golden Globes Order — the 2003 broadcast because it involved a literal description of excrement, rather than a mere expletive, because it used more than one offensive word, and because it was planned, 21 FCC Red., at 13307, ¶ 22; and the 2002 broadcast because Cher used the F-Word not as a mere intensifier, but as a description of the sexual act to express hostility to her critics, id., at 13324, ¶ 60. The order stated, however, that the pre-Golden Globes regime of immunity for isolated indecent expletives rested only upon staff rulings and Commission dicta, and that the Commission itself had never held “that the isolated use of an expletive . . . was not indecent or could not be indecent,” 21 FCC Red., at 13307, ¶ 21. In any event, the order made clear, the Golden Globes Order eliminated any doubt that fleeting expletives could be action-ably indecent, 21 FCC Red., at 13308, ¶ 23, 13325, ¶ 61, and the Commission disavowed the bureau-level decisions and its own dicta that had said otherwise, id., at 13306-13307, ¶¶ 20, 21. Under the new policy, a lack of repetition “weights] against a finding of indecency,” id., at 13325, ¶ 61, but is not a safe harbor. The order explained that the Commission’s prior “strict dichotomy between ‘expletives’ and ‘descriptions or depictions of sexual or excretory functions’ is artificial and does not make sense in light of the fact that an ‘expletive’s’ power to offend derives from its sexual or excretory meaning.” Id., at 13308, ¶ 23. In the Commission’s view, “granting an automatic exemption for ‘isolated or fleeting’ expletives unfairly forces viewers (including children)” to take “ ‘the first blow’ ” and would allow broadcasters “to air expletives at all hours of a day so long as they did so one at a time.” Id., at 13309, ¶ 25. Although the Commission determined that Fox encouraged the offensive language by using suggestive scripting in the 2003 broadcast, and unreasonably failed to take adequate precautions in both broadcasts, id., at 13311-13314, ¶¶ 31-37, the order again declined to impose any forfeiture or other sanction for either of the broadcasts, id., at 13321, ¶ 53, 13326, ¶66. Fox returned to the Second Circuit for review of the Remand Order, and various intervenors including CBS, NBC, and ABC joined the action. The Court of Appeals reversed the agency’s orders, finding the Commission’s reasoning inadequate under the Administrative Procedure Act. 489 F. 3d 444. The majority was “skeptical that the Commission [could] provide a reasoned explanation for its ‘fleeting expletive’ regime that would pass constitutional muster,” but it declined to reach the constitutional question. Id., at 462. Judge Leval dissented, id., at 467. We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. 1255 (2008). III. Analysis A. Governing Principles The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. §551 et seq., which sets forth the full extent of judicial authority to review executive agency action for procedural correctness, see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 545-549 (1978), permits (insofar as relevant here) the setting aside of agency action that is “arbitrary” or “capricious,” 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). Under what we have called this “narrow” standard of review, we insist that an agency “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983). We have made clear, however, that “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency,” ibid., and should “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned,” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U. S. 281, 286 (1974). In overturning the Commission’s judgment, the Court of Appeals here relied in part on Circuit precedent requiring a more substantial explanation for agency action that changes prior policy. The Second Circuit has interpreted the Administrative Procedure Act and our opinion in State Farm as requiring agencies to make clear “ ‘why the original reasons for adopting the [displaced] rule or policy are no longer dis-positive’ ” as well as “ ‘why the new rule effectuates the statute as well as or better than the old rule.’” 489 F. 3d, at 456-457 (quoting New York Council, Assn. of Civilian Technicians v. FLRA, 757 F. 2d 502, 508 (CA2 1985); emphasis deleted). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has similarly indicated that a court’s standard of review is “heightened somewhat” when an agency reverses course. NAACP v. FCC, 682 F. 2d 993, 998 (1982). We find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review. The Act mentions no such heightened standard. And our opinion in State Farm neither held nor implied that every agency action representing a policy change must be justified by reasons more substantial than those required to adopt a policy in the first instance. That case, which involved the rescission of a prior regulation, said only that such action requires “a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance.” 463 U. S., at 42 (emphasis added). Treating failures to act and rescissions of prior action differently for purposes of the standard of review makes good sense, and has basis in the text of the statute, which likewise treats the two separately. It instructs a reviewing court to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” 5 U. S. C. § 706(1), and to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be [among other things]... arbitrary [or] capricious,” § 706(2)(A). The statute makes no distinction, however, between initial agency action and subsequent agency action undoing or revising that action. To be sure, the requirement that an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is changing position. An agency may not, for example, depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that are still on the books. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 696 (1974). And of course the agency must show that there are good reasons for the new policy. But it need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates. This means that the agency need not always provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank slate. Sometimes it must — when, for example, its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 742 (1996). It would be arbitrary or capricious to ignore such matters. In such cases it is not that farther justification is demanded by the mere fact of policy change; but that a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy. In this appeal from the Second Circuit’s setting aside of Commission action for failure to comply with a procedural requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act, the broadcasters’ arguments have repeatedly referred to the First Amendment. If they mean to invite us to apply a more stringent arbitrary-and-eapricious review to agency actions that implicate constitutional liberties, we reject the invitation. The so-called canon of constitutional avoidance is an interpretive tool, counseling that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988). We know of no precedent for applying it to limit the scope of authorized executive action. In the same section authorizing courts to set aside “arbitrary [or] capricious” agency action, the Administrative Procedure Act separately provides for setting aside agency action that is “unlawful,” 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A), which of course includes unconstitutional action. We think that is the only context in which constitutionality bears upon judicial review of authorized agency action. If the Commission’s action here was not arbitrary or capricious in the ordinary sense, it satisfies the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary [or] capricious” standard; its lawfulness under the Constitution is a separate question to be addressed in a constitutional challenge. B. Application to This Case Judged under the above described standards, the Commission’s new enforcement policy and its order finding the broadcasts actionably indecent were neither arbitrary nor capricious. First, the Commission forthrightly acknowledged that its recent actions have broken new ground, taking account of inconsistent “prior Commission and staff action” and explicitly disavowing them as “no longer good law.” Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Red., at 4980, ¶ 12. To be sure, the (superfluous) explanation in its Remand Order of why the Cher broadcast would even have violated its earlier policy may not be entirely convincing. But that unnecessary detour is irrelevant. There is no doubt that the Commission knew it was making a change. That is why it declined to assess penalties; and it relied on the Golden Globes Order as removing any lingering doubt. Remand Order, 21 FCC Red., at 13308, ¶23, 13325, ¶ 61. Moreover, the agency’s reasons for expanding the scope of its enforcement activity were entirely rational. It was certainly reasonable to determine that it made no sense to distinguish between literal and nonliteral uses of offensive words, requiring repetitive use to render only the latter indecent. As the Commission said with regard to expletive use of the F-Word, “the word’s power to insult and offend derives from its sexual meaning.” Id., at 13323, ¶ 58. And the Commission’s decision to look at the patent offensiveness of even isolated uses of sexual and excretory words fits with the context-based approach we sanctioned in Pacifica, 438 U. S., at 750. Even isolated utterances can be made in “pander[ing,] . . . vulgar and shocking” manners, Remand Order, 21 FCC Red., at 13305, ¶ 17, and can constitute harmful '“first blow[s]’” to children, id., at 13309, ¶25. It is surely rational (if not inescapable) to believe that a safe harbor for single words would “likely lead to more widespread use of the offensive language,” Golden Globes Order, supra, at 4979, ¶ 9. When confronting other requests for per se rules governing its enforcement of the indecency prohibition, the Commission has declined to create safe harbors for particular types of broadcasts. See In re Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 FCC Red., at 2699, ¶ 12 (repudiating the view that the Commission’s enforcement power was limited to “deliberate, repetitive use of the seven words actually contained in the George Carlin monologue”); In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pa., 3 FCC Red., at 932, ¶ 17 (“rejecting] an approach that would hold that if a work has merit, it is per se not indecent”). The Commission could rationally decide it needed to step away from its old regime where nonrepetitive use of an expletive was per se nonactionable because that was “at odds with the Commission’s overall enforcement policy.” Remand Order, supra, at 13308, ¶ 23. The fact that technological advances have made it easier for broadcasters to bleep out offending words further supports the Commission’s stepped-up enforcement policy. Golden Globes Order, supra, at 4980, ¶ 11. And the agency’s decision not to impose any forfeiture or other sanction precludes any argument that it is arbitrarily punishing parties without notice of the potential consequences of their action. C. The Court of Appeals’ Reasoning The Court of Appeals found the Commission’s action arbitrary and capricious on three grounds. First, the court criticized the Commission for failing to explain why it had not previously banned fleeting expletives as “harmful 'first blow[s].’ ” 489 F. 3d, at 458. In the majority’s view, without “evidence that suggests a fleeting expletive is harmful [and]... serious enough to warrant government regulation,” the agency could not regulate more broadly. Id., at 461. As explained above, the fact that an agency had a prior stance does not alone prevent it from changing its view or create a higher hurdle for doing so. And it is not the Commission, but Congress that has proscribed “any . . . indecent . .. language.” 18 U. S. C. § 1464. There are some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be marshaled, and the harmful effect of broadcast profanity on children is one of them. One cannot demand a multiyear controlled study, in which some children are intentionally exposed to indecent broadcasts (and insulated from all other indecency), and others are shielded from all indecency. It is one thing to set aside agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act because of failure to adduce empirical data that can readily be obtained. See, e. g., State Farm, 463 U. S., at 46-56 (addressing the costs and benefits of mandatory passive restraints for automobiles). It is something else to insist upon obtaining the unobtainable. Here it suffices to know that children mimic the behavior they observe — or at least the behavior that is presented to them as normal and appropriate. Programming replete with one-word indecent expletives will tend to produce children who use (at least) one-word indecent expletives. Congress has made the determination that indecent material is harmful to children, and has left enforcement of the ban to the Commission. If enforcement had to be supported by empirical data, the ban would effectively be a nullity. The Commission had adduced no quantifiable measure of the harm caused by the language in Pacifica, and we nonetheless held that the “government’s interest in the ‘well-being of its youth’ . . . justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression.” 438 U. S., at 749 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 640, 639 (1968)). If the Constitution itself demands of agencies no more scientifically certain criteria to comply with the First Amendment, neither does the Administrative Procedure Act to comply with the requirement of reasoned decisionmaking. The court’s second objection is that fidelity to the agency’s “first blow” theory of harm would require a categorical ban on all broadcasts of expletives; the Commission’s failure to go to this extreme thus undermined the coherence of its rationale. 489 F. 3d, at 458-459. This objection, however, is not responsive to the Commission’s actual policy under review — the decision to include patently offensive fleeting expletives within the definition of indecency. The Commission’s prior enforcement practice, unchallenged here, already drew distinctions between the offensiveness of particular words based upon the context in which they appeared. Any complaint about the Commission’s failure to ban only some fleeting expletives is better directed at the agency’s context-based system generally rather than its inclusion of isolated expletives. More fundamentally, however, the agency’s decision to consider the patent offensiveness of isolated expletives on a case-by-case basis is not arbitrary or capricious. “Even a prime-time recitation of Geoffrey Chaucer’s Miller’s Tale,” we have explained, “would not be likely to command the attention of many children who are both old enough to understand and young enough to be adversely affected.” Pacifica, supra, at 750, n. 29. The same rationale could support the Commission’s finding that a broadcast of the film Saving Private Ryan was not indecent — a finding to which the broadcasters point as supposed evidence of the Commission’s inconsistency. The frightening suspense and the graphic violence in the movie could well dissuade the most vulnerable from watching and would put parents on notice of potentially objectionable material. See In re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Regarding Their Broadcast on Nov. 11, 2001 of ABC Television Network's Presentation of Film “Saving Private Ryan,” 20 FCC Red. 4507, 4513, ¶ 15 (2005) (noting that the broadcast was not “intended as family entertainment”). The agency’s decision to retain some discretion does not render arbitrary or capricious its regulation of the deliberate and shocking uses of offensive language at the award shows under review — shows that were expected to (and did) draw the attention of millions of children. Finally, the Court of Appeals found unconvincing the agency’s prediction (without any evidence) that a per se exemption for fleeting expletives would lead to increased use of expletives one at a time. 489 F. 3d, at 460. But even in the absence of evidence, the agency’s predictive judgment (which merits deference) makes entire sense. To predict that complete immunity for fleeting expletives, ardently desired by broadcasters, will lead to a substantial increase in fleeting expletives seems to us an exercise in logic rather than clairvoyance. The Court of Appeals was perhaps correct that the Commission’s prior policy had not yet caused broadcasters to “barrag[e] the airwaves with expletives,” ibid. That may have been because its prior permissive policy had been confirmed (save in dicta) only at the staff level. In any event, as the Golden Globes order demonstrated, it did produce more expletives than the Commission (which has the first call in this matter) deemed in conformity with the statute. D. Respondents’ Arguments Respondents press some arguments that the court did not adopt. They claim that the Commission failed to acknowledge its change in enforcement policy. That contention is not tenable in light of the Golden Globes Order’s specific declaration that its prior rulings were no longer good law, 19 FCC Red., at 4980, ¶ 12, and the Remand Order’s disavowal of those staff rulings and Commission dicta as “seriously flawed,” 21 FCC Red., at 13308, ¶ 23. The broadcasters also try to recharacterize the nature of the Commission’s shift, contending that the old policy was not actually a per se rule against liability for isolated expletives and that the new policy is a presumption of indecency for certain words. This description of the prior agency policy conflicts with the broadcasters’ own prior position in this case. See, e.g., Brief in Opposition for Respondent Fox Television Stations, Inc., et al. 4 (“For almost 30 years following Pacifica, the FCC did not consider fleeting, isolated or inadvertent expletives to be indecent”). And we find no basis for the contention that the Commission has now adopted a presumption of indecency; its repeated reliance on context refutes this claim. The broadcasters also make much of the fact that the Commission has gone beyond the scope of authority approved in Pacifica, which it once regarded as the farthest extent of its power. But we have never held that Pacifica represented the outer limits of permissible regulation, so that fleeting expletives may not be forbidden. To the contrary, we explicitly left for another day whether “an occasional expletive” in “a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy” could be prohibited. 438 U. S., at 748-750. By using the narrowness of Pacifica!s holding to require empirical evidence of harm before the Commission regulates more broadly, the broadcasters attempt to turn the sword of Pacifica, which allowed some regulation of broadcast indecency, into an administrative-law shield preventing any regulation beyond what Pacifica sanctioned. Nothing prohibits federal agencies from moving in an incremental manner. Cf. National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 1002 (2005). Finally, the broadcasters claim that the Commission’s repeated appeal to “context” is simply a smokescreen for a standardless regime of unbridled discretion. But we have previously approved Commission regulation based “on a nuisance rationale under which context is all-important,” Pacifica, supra, at 750, and we find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act for mandating anything different. E. The Dissents’ Arguments Justice Breyer purports to “begin with applicable law,” post, at 547, but in fact begins by stacking the deck. He claims that the FCC’s status as an “independent” agency sheltered from political oversight requires courts to be “all the more” vigilant in ensuring “that major policy decisions be based upon articulable reasons.” Ibid. Not so. The independent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the President, and it has often been observed that their freedom from Presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been replaced by increased subservience to congressional direction. See, e. g., In re Sealed Case, 838 F. 2d 476, 507-508 (CADC) (Silbermian, J.), rev’d sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654 (1988); Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2271, n. 93 (2001); Calabresi & Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L. J. 541, 583 (1994); Easterbrook, The State of Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1328, 1341 (1994). Indeed, the precise policy change at issue here was spurred by significant political pressure from Congress. Justice Stevens apparently recognizes this political control by Congress, and indeed sees it as the manifestation of a principal-agency relationship. In his judgment, the FCC is “better viewed as an agent of Congress” than as part of the Executive. Post, at 540 (dissenting opinion). He nonetheless argues that this is a good reason for requiring the FCC to explain “why its prior policy is no longer sound before allowing it to change course.” Post, at 541. Leaving aside the unconstitutionally of a scheme giving the power to enforce laws to agents of Congress, see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 726 (1986), it seems to us that Justice Stevens’ conclusion does not follow from his premise. If the FCC is indeed an agent of Congress, it would seem an adequate explanation of its change of position that Congress made clear its wishes for stricter enforcement, see n. 4, supra. The Administrative Procedure Act, after all, does not apply to Congress and its agencies. Regardless, it is assuredly not “applicable law” that rule-making by independent regulatory agencies is subject to heightened scrutiny. The Administrative Procedure Act, which provides judicial review, makes no distinction between independent and other agencies, neither in its definition of agency, 5 U. S. C. § 701(b)(1), nor in the standards for reviewing agency action, § 706. Nor does any case of ours express or reflect the “heightened scrutiny” Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens would impose. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any closer scrutiny than that we have given to the Environmental Protection Agency, which is not an independent agency. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U. S. 497, 533-535 (2007); Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 481-486 (2001). There is no reason to magnify the separation-of-powers dilemma posed by the headless Fourth Branch, see Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868, 921 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), by letting Article III judges — like jackals stealing the lion’s kill — expropriate some of the power that Congress has wrested from the unitary Executive. Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens rely upon two supposed omissions in the FCC’s analysis that they believe preclude a finding that the agency did not act arbitrarily. Neither of these omissions could undermine the coherence of the rationale the agency gave, but the dissenters’ evaluation of each is flawed in its own right. First, both claim that the Commission failed adequately to explain its consideration of the constitutional issues inherent in its regulation, post, at 553-556 (opinion of Breyer, J.); post, at 542-546 (opinion of Stevens, J.). We are unaware that we have ever before reversed an executive agency, not for violating our cases, but for failure to discuss them adequately. But leave that aside. According to Justice Breyer, the agency said “next to nothing about the relation between the change it made in its prior ‘fleeting expletive’ policy and the First-Amendment-related need to avoid ‘censorship,’ ” post, at 553. The Remand Order does, however, devote four full pages of small-type, single-spaced text (over 1,300 words not counting the footnotes) to explaining why the Commission believes that its indecency-enforcement regime (which includes its change in policy) is consistent with the First Amendment — and therefore not censorship as the term is understood. More specifically, Justice Breyer faults the FCC for “not explaining] why the agency changed its mind about the line that Pacifica draws or its policy’s relation to that line,” post, at 556. But in fact (and as the Commission explained) this Court’s holding in Pacifica, 438 U. S. 726, drew no constitutional line; to the contrary, it expressly declined to express any view on the constitutionality of prohibiting isolated indecency. Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens evidently believe that when an agency has obtained this Court’s determination that a less restrictive rule is constitutional, its successors acquire some special burden to explain why a more restrictive rule is not '^constitutional. We know of no such principle. Second, Justice Breyer looks over the vast field of particular factual scenarios unaddressed by the FCC’s 35-page Remand Order and finds one that is fatal: the plight of the small local broadcaster who cannot afford the new technology that enables the screening of live broadcasts for indecent utterances. Cf. post, at 556-561. The Commission has failed to address the fate of this unfortunate, who will, he believes, be subject to sanction. We doubt, to begin with, that small-town broadcasters run a heightened risk of liability for indecent utterances. In programming that they originate, their down-home local guests probably employ vulgarity less than big-city folks; and small-town stations generally cannot afford or cannot attract foul-mouthed glitteratae from Hollywood. Their main exposure with regard to self-originated programming is live coverage of news and public affairs. But the Remand Order went out of its way to note that the ease at hand did not involve “breaking news coverage,” and that “it may be inequitable to hold a licensee responsible for airing offensive speech during live coverage of a public event,” 21 FCC Red., at 13311, ¶ 33. As for the programming that small stations receive on a network “feed”: This will be cleansed by the expensive technology small stations (by Justice Breyer’s hypothesis) cannot afford. But never mind the detail of whether small broadcasters are uniquely subject to a great risk of punishment for fleeting expletives. The fundamental fallacy of Justice Breyer’s small-broadcaster gloomy scenario is its demonstrably false assumption that the Remand Order makes no provision for the avoidance of unfairness — that the single-utterance prohibition will be invoked uniformly, in all situations. The Remand Order made very clear that this is not the case. It said that in determining “what, if any, remedy is appropriate” the Commission would consider the facts of each individual case, such as the “possibility of human error in using delay equipment,” id., at 13313, ¶ 35. Thus, the fact that the agency believed that Fox (a large broadcaster that used suggestive scripting and a deficient delay system to air a prime-time awards show aimed at millions of children) “fail[ed] to exercise ‘reasonable judgment, responsibility and sensitivity,”’ id., at 13311, ¶33, and n. 91 (quoting Pacifica Foundation, Inc., 2 FCC Red., at 2700, ¶ 18), says little about how the Commission would treat smaller broadcasters who cannot afford screening equipment. Indeed, that they would not be punished for failing to purchase equipment they cannot afford is positively suggested by the Remand Order’s statement that “[hjolding Fox responsible for airing indecent material in this case does not. .. impose undue burdens on broadcasters.” 21 FCC Red., at 13313, ¶ 36. There was, in sum, no need for the Commission to compose a special treatise on local broadcasters. And Justice Breyer can safely defer his concern for those yeomen of the airwaves until we have before us a case that involves one. IV. Constitutionality The Second Circuit did not definitively rule on the constitutionality of the Commission’s orders, but respondents nonetheless ask us to decide their validity under the First Amendment. This Court, however, is one of final review, “not of first view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005). It is conceivable that the Commission’s orders may cause some broadcasters to avoid certain language that is beyond the Commission’s reach under the Constitution. Whether that is so, and, if so, whether it is unconstitutional, will be determined soon enough, perhaps in this very case. Meanwhile, any chilled references to excretory and sexual material “surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern,” Pacifica, 438 U. S., at 743 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J.). We see no reason to abandon our usual procedures in a rush to judgment without a lower court opinion. We decline to address the constitutional questions at this time. The Second Circuit believed that children today “likely hear this language far more often from other sources than they did in the 1970s when the Commission first began sanctioning indecent speech,” and that this cuts against more stringent regulation of broadcasts. 489 F. 3d, at 461. Assuming the premise is true (for this point the Second Circuit did not demand empirical evidence) the conclusion does not necessarily follow. The Commission could reasonably conclude that the pervasiveness of foul language, and the coarsening of public entertainment in other media such as cable, justify more stringent regulation of broadcast programs so as to give conscientious parents a relatively safe haven for their children. In the end, the Second Circuit and the broadcasters quibble with the Commission’s policy choices and not with the explanation it has given. We decline to “substitute [our] judgment for that of the agency,” State Farm, 468 U. S., at 43, and we find the Commission’s orders neither arbitrary nor capricious. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The statutory prohibition applicable to commercial radio and television stations extends by its terms from 6 a.m. to 12 midnight. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held, however, that because “Congress and the Commission [had] backed away from the consequences of their own reasoning,” by allowing some public broadcasters to air indecent speech after 10 p.m., the court was forced “to hold that the section is unconstitutional insofar as it bars the broadcasting of indecent speech between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and midnight.” Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F. 3d 654, 669 (1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U. S. 1043 (1996). Justice Breyer’s contention that State Farm did anything more, post, at 549-552 (dissenting opinion), rests upon his failure to observe the italicized phrase and upon a passage quoted in State Farm from a plurality opinion in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U. S. 800 (1973). That passage referred to “a presumption that [congressional] policies will be carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to.” Id., at 807-808 (opinion of Marshall, J.). But the Atchison plurality made this statement in the context of requiring the agency to provide some explanation for a change, “so that the reviewing court may understand the basis of the agency’s action and so may judge the consistency of that action with the agency’s mandate,” id., at 808. The opinion did not assert the authority of a court to demand explanation sufficient to enable it to weigh (by its own lights) the merits of the agency’s change. Nor did our opinion in State Farm. Justice Bkeyer claims that “[t]he Court has often applied [the doctrine of constitutional avoidance] where an agency’s regulation relies on a plausible but constitutionally suspect interpretation of a statute.” Post, at 566. The cases he cites, however, set aside an agency regulation because, applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to the ambiguous statute under which the agency acted, the Court found the agency’s interpretation of the statute erroneous. See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U. S. 159, 174 (2001); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 507 (1979). But Justice Breyer does not urge that we issue such a holding, evidently agreeing that we should limit our review to what the Court of Appeals decided, see Part IV, infra — which included only the adequacy of the Commission’s rulemaking procedure, and not the statutory question. Rather, Justice Breyer seeks a “remand [that] would do no more than ask the agency to reconsider its policy decision in light of” constitutional concerns. Post, at 566. That strange and novel disposition would be entirely unrelated to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, and would better be termed the doctrine of judicial arm-twisting or appellate review by the wagged finger. A Subcommittee of the FCC’s House Oversight Committee held hearings on the FCC’s broadcast indecency enforcement on January 28, 2004. “Can You Say That on TV?”: An Examination of the FCC’s Enforcement with Respect to Broadcast Indecency, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. Members of the Subcommittee specifically “called on the full Commission to reverse [the staff ruling in the Golden Globes case]” because they perceived a “feeling amongst many Americans that some TV broadcasters are engaged in a race to the bottom, pushing the decency envelope in order to distinguish themselves in the increasingly crowded entertainment field.” Id., at 2 (statement of Rep. Upton); see also, e. g., id., at 17 (statement of Rep. Terry), 19 (statement of Rep. Pitts). They repeatedly expressed disapproval of the FCC’s enforcement policies, see, e. g., id., at 3 (statement of Rep. Upton) (“At some point, we have to ask the FCC: How much is enough? When will it revoke a license?”); id., at 4 (statement of Rep. Markey) (“Today’s hearing will allow us to explore the FCC’s lackluster enforcement record with respect to these violations”). About two weeks later, on February 11, 2004, the same Subcommittee held hearings on a bill increasing the fines for indecency violations. Hearings on H. R. 3717 before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. All five Commissioners were present and were grilled about enforcement shortcomings. See, e. g., id., at 124 (statement of Rep. Terry) (“Chairman Powell, ... it seems like common sense that if we had . . . more frequent enforcement instead of only a few examples of fines ... that would be a deterrent in itself”); id., at 7 (statement of Rep. Dingell) (“I see that apparently ... there is no enforcement of regulations at the FCC”). Certain statements, moreover, indicate that the political pressure applied by Congress had its desired effect. See ibid. (“I think our committee’s work has gotten the attention of FCC Chairman Powell and the Bush Administration. And I’m happy to see the FCC now being brought to a state of apparent alert on these matters”); see also id., at 124 (statement of Michael Copps, FCC Commissioner) (noting “positive” change in other Commissioners’ 'willingness to step up enforcement in light of proposed congressional action). A version of the bill ultimately became law as the Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, 120 Stat. 491. The FCC adopted the change that is the subject of this litigation on March 3,2004, about three weeks after this second hearing. See Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975. Justice Stevens accuses us of equating statements made in a congressional hearing with the intent of Congress. Post, at 541-542, n. 3. In this opinion, we do not. The intent of the full Congress (or at least a majority of each House) is thought relevant to the interpretation of statutes, since they must be passed by the entire Congress. See U. S. Const., Art. I, § 7. It is quite irrelevant, however, to the extrastatutory influence Congress exerts over agencies of the Executive Branch, which is exerted by the congressional committees responsible for oversight and appropriations with respect to the relevant agency. That is a major reason why committee assignments are important, and committee chairmanships powerful. Surely Justice Stevens knows this. The Administrative Procedure Act defines “agency” to mean “each authority of the Government of the United States,” 5 U. S. C. § 551(1), but specifically excludes “the Congress,” § 551(1)(A). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has “interpreted [this] exemption for ‘the Congress’ to mean the entire legislative branch,” Washington Legal Foundation v. United States Sentencing Comm’n, 17 F. 3d 1446, 1449 (1994); see also Ethnic Employees of Library of Congress v. Boorstin, 751 F. 2d 1405, 1416, n. 15 (CADC 1985) (holding that the Library of Congress is not an “agency” under the Act). Justice Stevens criticizes us for “assuming that Pacifica endorsed” the enforcement at issue here. Post, at 542. We do nothing of the sort. We rely on the fact that certain aspects of the agency’s decision mirror the context-based approach Pacifica approved, supra, at 517-518, but that goes to our holding on administrative law, and says nothing about constitutionality. Justice Stevens also argues that heightened deference should be due the FCC’s prior policy because the “FCC’s initial views ... reflect the views of the Congress that delegated the Commission authority to flesh out details not fully defined in the enacting statute.” Post, at 541. We do not believe that the dead hand of a departed congressional oversight Committee should constrain the discretion that the text of a statute confers — but the point is in any event irrelevant in this appeal, which concerns not whether the agency has exceeded its statutory mandate but whether the reasons for its actions are adequate. Justice Breyer posits that the FCC would have been required to give more explanation had it used notice-and-comment rulemaking, which “should lead us to the same conclusion” in this review of the agency’s change through adjudication. Post, at 562. Even assuming the premise, there is no basis for incorporating all of the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment procedural requirements into arbitrary-andeapricious review of adjudicatory decisions. Cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519, 545-549 (1978).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHRISTIANSBURG GARMENT CO. v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION No. 76-1383. Argued November 28-29, 1977 Decided January 23, 1978 William W. Sturges argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was William B. Pofj. Thomas S. Martin argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Abner W. Sibal, Joseph T. Eddins, and Beatrice Rosenberg. Robert J. Hickey, G. Brockwel Heylin, Stephen A. Bokat, Stanley T. Kaleczyc, Jr., and Lawrence B. Kraus filed a brief for the National Chamber Litigation Center as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Charles A. Bane, Thomas D. Barr, Armand, Derfner, Norman Redlich, Robert A. Murphy, Richard T. Seymour, and William E. Caldwell for the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights under Law; and by Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles Stephen Ralston, Melvyn R. Leventhal, and Eric Schnapper for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Kenneth C. McGuiness filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 706 (k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: “In any action or proceeding under this title the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee . ...” The question in this case is under what circumstances an attorney’s fee should be allowed when the defendant is the prevailing party in a Title VII action' — a question about which the federal courts have expressed divergent views. I Two years after Rosa Helm had filed a Title VII charge of racial discrimination against the petitioner Christiansburg Garment Co. (company), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission notified her that its conciliation efforts had failed and that she had the right to sue the company in federal court. She did not do so. Almost two years later, in 1972, Congress enacted amendments to Title VII. Section 14 of these amendments authorized the Commission to sue in its own name to prosecute “charges pending with the Commission” on the effective date of the amendments. Proceeding under this section, the Commission sued the company, alleging that it had engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of the amended Act. The company moved for summary judgment on the ground, inter alia, that the Rosa Helm charge had not been “pending” before the Commission when the 1972 amendments took effect. The District Court agreed, and granted summary judgment in favor of the company. 376 F. Supp. 1067 (WD Va). The company then petitioned for the allowance of attorney’s fees against the Commission pursuant to § 706 (k) of Title VII. Finding that “the Commission’s action in bringing the suit cannot be characterized as unreasonable or meritless/’ the District Court concluded that “an award of attorney’s fees to petitioner is not justified in this case.” A divided Court of Appeals affirmed, 550 F. 2d 949 (CA4), and we granted cer-tiorari to consider an important question of federal law, 432 U. S. 905. II It is the general rule in the United States that in the absence of legislation providing otherwise, litigants must pay their own attorney’s fees. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240. Congress has provided only limited exceptions to this rule “under selected statutes granting or protecting various federal rights.” Id., at 260. Some of these statutes make fee awards mandatory for prevailing plaintiffs; others make awards permissive but limit them to certain parties, usually prevailing plaintiffs. But many of the statutes are more flexible, authorizing the award of attorney’s fees to either plaintiffs or defendants, and entrusting the effectuation of the statutory policy to the discretion of the district courts. Section 706 (k) of Title VII of the Civil Nights Act of 1964 falls into this last category, providing as it does that a district court may in its discretion allow an attorney’s fee to the prevailing party. In Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U. S. 400, the Court considered a substantially identical statute authorizing the award of attorney’s fees under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In that case the plaintiffs had prevailed, and the Court of Appeals had held that they should be awarded their attorney’s fees “only to- the extent that the respondents’ defenses had been advanced 'for purposes of delay and not in good faith.’ ” Id., at 401. We ruled that this “subjective standard” did not properly effectuate the purposes of the counsel-fee provision of Title II. Relying primarily on the intent of Congress to cast a Title II plaintiff in the role of “a 'private attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority,” we held that a prevailing plaintiff under Title II “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Id., at 402. We noted in passing that if the objective of Congress had been to permit the award of attorney’s fees only against defendants who h'ad acted in bad faith, “no new statutory provision would have been necessary,” since even the American common-law rule allows the award of attorney’s fees in those exceptional circumstances. Id., at 402 n. 4. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, the Court made clear that the Piggie Park standard of awarding attorney’s fees to a successful plaintiff is equally applicable in an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 422 U. S., at 415. See also Northcross v. Memphis Board of Education, 412 U. S. 427, 428. It can thus be taken as established, as the parties in this case both acknowledge, that under § 706 (k) of Title VII a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily is to be awarded attorney’s fees in all but special circumstances. Ill The question in the case before us is what standard should inform a district court’s discretion in deciding whether to award attorney’s fees to a successful defendant in a Title VII action. Not surprisingly, the parties in addressing the question in their briefs and oral arguments have taken almost diametrically opposite positions. The company contends that the Piggie Park criterion for a successful plaintiff should apply equally as a guide to the award of attorney’s fees to a successful defendant. Its submission, in short, is that every prevailing defendant in a Title VII action should receive an allowance of attorney’s fees “unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” The respondent Commission, by contrast, argues that the prevailing defendant should receive an award of attorney’s fees only when it is found that the plaintiff’s action was brought in bad faith. We have concluded that neither of these positions is correct. A Relying on what it terms “the plain meaning of the statute,” the company argues that the language of § 706 (k) admits of only one interpretation: “A prevailing defendant is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees on the same basis as a prevailing plaintiff.” But the permissive and discretionary language of the statute does not even invite, let alone require, such a mechanical construction. The terms of § 706 (k) provide no indication whatever of the circumstances under which either a plaintiff or a defendant should be entitled to' attorney’s fees. And a moment’s reflection reveals that there are at least two strong equitable considerations counseling an attorney’s fee award to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff that are wholly absent in the case of a prevailing Title VII defendant. First, as emphasized so forcefully in Piggie Park, the plaintiff is the chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate “a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.” 390 U. S., at 402. Second, when a district court awards counsel fees to a prevailing plaintiff, it is awarding them against a violator of federal law. As the Court of Appeals clearly perceived, “these policy considerations which support the award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff are not present in the case of a prevailing defendant.” 550 F. 2d, at 951. A successful defendant seeking counsel fees under § 706 (k) must rely on quite different equitable considerations. But if the company’s position is untenable, the Commission’s argument also misses the mark. It seems clear, in short, that in enacting § 706 (k) Congress did not intend to permit the award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant only in a situation where the plaintiff was motivated by bad faith in bringing the action. As pointed out in Piggie Park, if that had been the intent of Congress, no statutory provision would have been necessary, for it has long been established that even under the American -common-law rule attorney’s fees may be awarded against a party who has proceeded in bad faith. Furthermore, while it was certainly the policy of Congress that Title VII plaintiffs should vindicate “a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority,” Piggie Park, 390 U. S., at 402, it is equally certain that Congress entrusted the ultimate effectuation of that policy to the adversary judicial process, Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355. A fair adversary process presupposes both a vigorous prosecution and a vigorous defense. It cannot be lightly assumed that in enacting § 706 (k), Congress intended to' distort that process by giving the private plaintiff substantial incentives to sue, while foreclosing to the defendant the possibility of recovering his expenses in resisting even a groundless action unless he can show that it was brought in bad faith. B The sparse legislative history of § 706 (k) reveals little more than the barest outlines of a proper accommodation of the competing considerations we have discussed. The only specific reference to § 706 (k) in the legislative debates indicates that the fee provision was included to “make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit.” During the ¿Senate floor discussions of the almost identical attorney’s fee provision of Title II, however, several Senators explained that its allowance of awards to defendants would serve “to deter the bringing of lawsuits without foundation,” “to discourage frivolous suits,” and “to diminish the likelihood of unjustified suits being brought.” If anything can be gleaned from these fragments of legislative history, it is that while Congress wanted to clear the way for suits to be brought under the Act, it also wanted to protect defendants from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit seems to have drawn the maximum significance from the Senate debates when it concluded: “[From these debates] two purposes for § 706 (k) emerge. First, Congress desired to 'make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a meritorious suit’.... But second, and equally important, Congress intended to 'deter the bringing of lawsuits without foundation’ by providing that the 'prevailing party’ — be it plaintiff or defendant — could obtain legal fees.” Grubbs v. Butz, 179 U. S. App. D. C. 18, 20, 648 F. 2d 973, 975. The first federal appellate court to consider what criteria should govern the award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant was the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F. 2d 359. There a District Court had denied a fee award to a defendant that had successfully resisted a Commission demand for documents, the court finding that the Commission’s action had not been “ 'unfounded, meritless, frivolous or vexatiously brought.’ ” Id., at 363. The Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court had not abused its discretion in denying the award. Id., at 365. A similar standard was adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Carrion v. Yeshiva University, 535 F. 2d 722. In upholding an attorney’s fee award to a successful defendant, that court stated that such awards should be permitted “not routinely, not simply because he succeeds, but only where the action brought is found to be unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious.” Id., at 727. To the extent that abstract words can deal with concrete cases, we think that the concept embodied in the language adopted by these two Courts of Appeals is correct. We would qualify their words only by pointing out that the term “merit-less” is to be understood as meaning groundless or without foundation, rather than simply that the plaintiff has ultimately lost his case, and that the term “vexatious” in no way implies that the plaintiff’s subjective bad faith is a necessary prerequisite to a fee award against him. In sum, a district court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith. In applying these criteria, it is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. No matter how honest one’s belief that he has been the victim of discrimination, no matter how meritorious one’s claim may appear at the outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable. Decisive facts may not emerge until discovery or trial. The law may change or clarify in the midst of litigation. Even when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit. That § 706 (k) allows fee awards only to prevailing private plaintiffs should assure that this statutory provision will not in itself operate as an incentive to the bringing of claims that have little chance of success. To take the further step of assessing attorney’s fees against plaintiffs simply because they do not finally prevail would substantially add to the risks inhering in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII. Hence, a plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent’s attorney’s fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. And, needless to say, if a plaintiff is found to have brought or continued such a claim in had faith, there will be an even stronger basis for charging him with the. attorney’s fees incurred by the defense. IV In denying attorney’s fees to the company in this case, the District Court focused on the standards we have discussed. The court found that “the Commission’s action in bringing the suit cannot be characterized as unreasonable or meritless” because “the basis upon which petitioner prevailed was an issue of first impression requiring judicial resolution” and because the “Commission’s statutory interpretation of § 14 of the 1972 amendments was not frivolous.” The court thus exercised its discretion squarely within the permissible bounds of § 706 (k). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals upholding the decision of the District Court is affirmed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 706 (k) provides in full: “In any action or proceeding under this title the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.” 78 Stat. 261, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (k). Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. The Commission argued that charges as to which no private suit had been brought as of the effective date of the amendments remained "pending” before the Commission so long as the complaint had not been dismissed and the dispute had not been resolved through conciliation. The Commission supported its construction of § 14 with references to the legislative history of the 1972 amendments. The District Court concluded that when Rosa Helm was notified in 1970 that conciliation had failed and that she had a right to sue the company, the Commission had no further action legally open to it, and its authority over the case terminated on that date. Section 14’s reference to “pending” cases was held “to be limited to charges still in the process of negotiation and conciliation” on the effective date of the 1972 amendments. 376 F. Supp., at 1074. The District Court rejected on the merits two additional grounds advanced by the company in support of its motion for summary judgment. The opinion of the District Court dealing with the motion for attorney’s fees is reported at 12 FEP Cases 533. See, e. g., Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. §15; Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1069, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 216 (b); Packers and Stockyards Act, 42 Stat. 165, 7 U. S. C. § 210 (f); Truth in Lending Act, 82 Stat. 157, 15 U. S. C. § 1640 (a); and Merchant Marine Act, 1936, 49 Stat. 2015, 46 U. S. C. § 1227. See, e. g., Privacy Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1897, 5 U. S. C. § 552a (g) (2) (B) (1976 ed.); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 88, 42 U. S. C. §3612 (c). See, e. g., Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1171, 15 U. S. C. § 77ooo (e); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 889, 897, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78i (e), 78r (a); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 86 Stat. 889, 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (d) (1970 ed., Supp. V); Clean Air Act, 84 Stat. 1706, 42 U. S. C. § 1857h-2 (d); Noise Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 1244, 42 U. S. C. § 4911 (d) (1970 ed., Supp. V). “In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000a-3 (b). The propriety under the American common-law rule of awarding attorney’s fees against- a losing party who has acted in bad faith was expressly reaffirmed in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 258-259. Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F. 2d 1040, 1045 (CA4) (finding “special circumstances” justifying no award to prevailing plaintiff); Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F. 2d 722, 727 (CA2); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F. 2d 714, 716 (CA5); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F. 2d 421, 429-430 (CA8). Briefs by amici have also been filed in support of each party. This was the view taken by Judge Widener, dissenting in the Court of Appeals, 550 F. 2d 949, 952 (CA4). At least two other federal courts have expressed the same view. EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F. 2d 439, 456 (CA6); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Industries, 558 F. 2d 742, 744 (CA5). See n. 9, supra. Had Congress provided for attorney’s fee awards only to successful plaintiffs, an argument could have been made that the congressional action had pre-empted the common-law rule, and that, therefore, a successful defendant could not recover attorney’s fees even against a plaintiff who had proceeded in bad faith. Cf. Byram Concretanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Products Co. of New Jersey, 374 F. 2d 649, 651 (CA3). But there is no indication whatever that the purpose of Congress in enacting § 706 (k) in the form’that it did was simply to foreclose such' an argument. Remarks of Senator Humphrey,, 110 Cong. Rec. 12724 (1964). Remarks of Senator Lausche, id.., at 13668. Remarks of Senator Pastore, id., at 14214. Remarks of Senator Humphrey, id., at 6534. At least three other Circuits are in general agreement. See Bolton v. Murray Envelope Corp., 553 F. 2d 881, 884 n. 2 (CA5); Grubbs v. Butz, 179 U. S. App. D. C. 18, 20-21, 548 F. 2d 973, 975-976; Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 F. 2d 1058, 1063-1064 (CA8). See remarks of Senator Miller, 110 Cong. Rec. 14214 (1964), with reference to the parallel attorney’s fee provision in Title II. Initially, the Commission argued that the “costs” assessable against the Government under § 706 (k) did not include attorney’s fees. See, e. g., United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F. 2d 359, 362 (CA3); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F. 2d 1131, 1132-1133 (CA9). But the Courts of Appeals rejected this position and, during the course of appealing this case, the Commission abandoned its contention that it was legally immune to adverse fee awards under § 706 (k). 550 F. 2d, at 951. It has been urged that fee awards against the Commission should rest on a standard different from that governing fee awards against private plaintiffs. One amicus stresses that the Commission, unlike private litigants, needs no inducement to enforce Title VII since it is required by statute to do so. But this distinction between the Commission and private plaintiffs merely explains why Congress drafted § 706 (k) to preclude the recovery of attorney’s fees by the Commission; it does not support a difference in treatment among private and Government plaintiffs when a prevailing defendant seeks to recover his attorney’s fees. Several courts and commentators have also deemed significant the Government’s greater ability to pay adverse fee awards compared to a private litigant. See, e. g., United States Steel Corp. v. United States, supra, at 364 n. 24; Heinsz, Attorney’s Fees for Prevailing Title VII Defendants: Toward a Workable Standard, 8 U. Toledo L. Rev. 259, 290 (1977); Comment, Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964: Standards for Award of Attorney’s Fees to Prevailing Defendants, 1976 Wis. L. Rev. 207, 228. We are informed, however, that such awards must be paid from the Commission’s litigation budget, so that every attorney’s fee assessment against the Commission will inevitably divert resources from the agency’s enforcement of Title VII. See 46 Comp. Gen. 98, 100 (1966); 38 Comp. Gen. 343, 344-345 (1958). The other side of this coin is the fact that many defendants in Title VII claims are small- and moderate-size employers for whom the expense of defending even a frivolous claim may become a strong disincentive to the exercise of their legal rights. In short, there are equitable considerations on both sides of this question. Yet § 706 (k) explicitly provides that “the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.” Hence, although a district court may consider distinctions between the Commission and private plaintiffs in determining the reasonableness of the Commission’s litigation efforts, we find no grounds for applying a different general standard whenever the Commission is the losing plaintiff.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SHAUGHNESSY, DISTRICT DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, v. UNITED STATES ex rel. MEZEI. No. 139. Argued January 7-8, 1953. Decided March 16, 1953. Ross L. Malone, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Cummings, John F. Davis, L. Paul Winings and Maurice A. Roberts. Jack Wasserman argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns an alien immigrant permanently excluded from the United States on security grounds but stranded in his temporary haven on Ellis Island because other countries will not take him back. The issue is whether the Attorney General’s continued exclusion of respondent without a hearing amounts to an unlawful detention, so that courts may admit him temporarily to the United States on bond until arrangements are made for his departure abroad. After a hearing on respondent’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the District Court so held and authorized his temporary admission on $5,000 bond. The Court of Appeals affirmed that action, but directed reconsideration of the terms of the parole. Accordingly, the District Court entered a modified order reducing bond to $3,000 and permitting respondent to travel and reside in Buffalo, New York. Bond was posted and respondent released. Because of resultant serious problems in the enforcement of the immigration laws, we granted certiorari. 344 U. S. 809. Respondent’s present dilemma springs from these circumstances: Though, as the District Court observed, “[t]here is a certain vagueness about [his] history,” respondent seemingly was born in Gibraltar of Hungarian or Rumanian parents and lived in the United States from 1923 to 1948. In May of that year he sailed for Europe, apparently to visit his dying mother in Rumania. Denied entry there, he remained in Hungary for some 19 months, due to “difficulty in securing an exit permit.” Finally, armed with a quota immigration visa issued by the American Consul in Budapest, he proceeded to France and boarded the lie de France in Le Havre bound for New York. Upon arrival on February 9, 1950, he was temporarily excluded from the United States by an immigration inspector acting pursuant to the Passport Act as amended and regulations thereunder. Pending disposition of his case he was received at Ellis Island. After reviewing the evidence, the Attorney General on May 10, 1950, ordered the temporary exclusion to be made permanent without a hearing before a board of special inquiry, on the “basis of information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest.” That determination rested on a finding that respondent’s entry would be prejudicial to the public interest for security reasons. But thus far all attempts to effect respondent’s departure have failed: Twice he shipped out to return whence he came; France and Great Britain refused him permission to land. The State Department has unsuccessfully negotiated with Hungary for his readmission. Respondent personally applied for entry to about a dozen Latin-American countries but all turned him down. So in June 1951 respondent advised the Immigration and Naturalization Service that he would exert no further efforts to depart. In short, respondent sat on Ellis Island because this country shut him out and others were unwilling to take him in. Asserting unlawful confinement on Ellis Island, he sought relief through a series of habeas corpus proceedings. After four unsuccessful efforts on respondent’s part, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on November 9, 1951, sustained the writ. The District Judge, vexed by the problem of “an alien who has no place to go,” did not question the validity of the exclusion order but deemed further “detention” after 21 months excessive and justifiable only by affirmative proof of respondent’s danger to the public safety. When the Government declined to divulge such evidence, even in camera, the District Court directed respondent’s conditional parole on bond. By a divided vote, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Postulating that the power to hold could never be broader than the power to remove or shut out and that to “continue an alien’s confinement beyond that moment when deportation becomes patently impossible is to deprive him of his liberty,” the court found respondent’s “confinement” no longer justifiable as a means of removal elsewhere, thus not authorized by statute, and in violation of due process. Judge Learned Hand, dissenting, took a different view: The Attorney General’s order was one of “exclusion” and not “deportation”; respondent’s transfer from ship to shore on Ellis Island conferred no additional rights; in fact, no alien so situated “can force us to admit him at all.” Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537 (1950); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 (1952). In the exercise of these powers, Congress expressly authorized the President to impose additional restrictions on aliens entering or leaving the United States during periods of international tension and strife. That authorization, originally enacted in the Passport Act of 1918, continues in effect during the present emergency. Under it, the Attorney General, acting for the President, may shut out aliens whose “entry would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States.” And he may exclude without a hearing when the exclusion is based on confidential information the disclosure of which may be prejudicial to the public interest. The Attorney General in this case proceeded in accord with these provisions; he made the necessary determinations. and barred the alien from entering the United States. It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 100-101 (1903); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 49-50 (1950); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 598 (1953). But an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing: “Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” Knauff v. Shaughnessy, supra, at 544; Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 660 (1892). And because the action of the executive officer under such authority is final and conclusive, the Attorney General cannot be compelled to disclose the evidence underlying his determinations in an exclusion case; “it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government.” Knauff v. Shaughnessy, supra, at 543; Ekiu v. United States, supra, at 660. In a case such as this, courts cannot retry the determination of the Attorney General. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, supra, at 546; Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160, 171-172 (1948). Neither respondent’s harborage on Ellis Island nor his prior residence here transforms this into something other than an exclusion proceeding. Concededly, his movements are restrained by authority of the United States, and he may by habeas corpus test the validity of his exclusion. But that is true whether he enjoys temporary refuge on land, Ekiu v. United States, supra, or remains continuously aboard ship. United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U. S. 621, 626 (1888); Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 12 (1908). In sum, harborage at Ellis Island is not an entry into the United States. Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U. S. 228, 230 (1925); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 263 (1905); Ekiu v. United States, supra, at 661. For purposes of the immigration laws, moreover, the legal incidents of an alien’s entry remain unaltered whether he has been here once before or not. He is an entering alien just the same, and may be excluded if unqualified for admission under existing immigration laws. E. g., Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 547-548 (1895); Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U. S. 279 (1932). To be sure, a lawful resident alien may not captiously be deprived of his constitutional rights to procedural due process. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 601 (1953); cf. Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388 (1947). Only the other day we held that under some circumstances temporary absence from our shores cannot constitutionally deprive a returning lawfully resident alien of his right to be heard. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, supra. Chew, an alien seaman admitted by an Act of Congress to permanent residence in the United States, signed articles of maritime employment as chief steward on a vessel of American registry with home port in New York City. Though cleared by the Coast Guard for his voyage, on his return from four months at sea he was “excluded” without a hearing on security grounds. On the facts of that case, including reference to § 307 (d) (2) of the Nationality Act of 1940, we felt justified in “assimilating” his status for constitutional purposes to that of continuously present alien residents entitled to hearings at least before an executive or administrative tribunal. Id., at 596, 599-601. Accordingly, to escape constitutional conflict we held the administrative regulations authorizing exclusion without hearing in certain security cases inapplicable to aliens so protected by the Fifth Amendment. Id., at 600. But respondent’s history here drastically differs from that disclosed in Chew’s case. Unlike Chew who with full security clearance and documentation pursued his vocation for four months aboard an American ship, respondent, apparently without authorization or reentry papers, simply left the United States and remained behind the Iron Curtain for 19 months. Moreover, while § 307 of the 1940 Nationality Act regards maritime service such as Chew’s to be continuous residence for naturalization purposes, that section deems protracted absence such as respondent’s a clear break in an alien’s continuous residence here. In such circumstances, we have no difficulty in holding respondent an entrant alien or “assimilated to [that] status” for constitutional purposes. Id., at 599. That being so, the Attorney General may lawfully exclude respondent without a hearing as authorized by the emergency regulations promulgated pursuant to the Passport Act. Nor need he disclose the evidence upon which that determination rests. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537 (1950). There remains the issue of respondent’s continued exclusion on Ellis Island. Aliens seeking entry from contiguous lands obviously can be turned back at the border without more. Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U. S. 279 (1932). While the Government might keep entrants by sea aboard the vessel pending determination of their admissibility, resulting hardships to the alien and inconvenience to the carrier persuaded Congress to adopt a more generous course. By statute it authorized, in cases such as this, aliens’ temporary removal from ship to shore. But such temporary harborage, an act of legislative grace, bestows no additional rights. Congress meticulously specified that such shelter ashore “shall not be considered a landing” nor relieve the vessel of the duty to transport back the alien if ultimately excluded. And this Court has long considered such temporary arrangements as not affecting an alien’s status; he is treated as if stopped at the border. Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 661-662 (1892); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 263 (1905); Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U. S. 228, 230 (1925). Thus we do not think that respondent’s continued exclusion deprives him of any statutory or constitutional right. It is true that resident aliens temporarily detained pending expeditious consummation of deportation proceedings may be released on bond by the Attorney General whose discretion is subject to judicial review. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524 (1952). By that procedure aliens uprooted from our midst may rejoin the community until the Government effects their leave. An exclusion proceeding grounded on danger to the national security, however, presents different considerations; neither the rationale nor the statutory authority for such release exists. Ordinarily to admit an alien barred from entry on security grounds nullifies the very purpose of the exclusion proceeding; Congress in 1950 declined to include such authority in the statute. That exclusion by the United States plus other nations’ inhospitality results in present hardship cannot be ignored. But, the times being what they are, Congress may well have felt that other countries ought not shift the onus to us; that an alien in respondent’s position is no more ours than theirs. Whatever our individual estimate of that policy and the fears on which it rests, respondent’s right to enter the United States depends on the congressional will, and courts cannot substitute their judgment for the legislative mandate. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 590-591 (1952). Reversed. 101 F. Supp. 66 (1951). 195 F. 2d 964 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1952). 101 F. Supp., at 67. 101 F. Supp., at 67, 70; R. 26-27. 195 F. 2d, at 967, 968. Id., at 970. Section 1 of the Act of May 22, 1918, c. 81, 40 Stat. 559, as amended by the Act of June 21, 1941, c. 210, § 1, 55 Stat. 252, 22 U. S. C. § 223, provides in pertinent part: “When the United States is at war or during the existence of the national emergency proclaimed by the President on May 27, 1941, or as to aliens whenever there exists a state of war between, or among, two or more states, and the President shall find that the interests of the United States require that restrictions and prohibitions in addition to those provided otherwise than by this Act be imposed upon the departure of persons from and their entry into the United States, and shall make public proclamation thereof, it shall, until otherwise ordered by the President or Congress, be unlawful— “(a) For any alien to depart from or enter or attempt to depart from or enter the United States except under such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President shall prescribe; . . . That authorization has been extended to cover the dates relevant in this case. 66 Stat. 54, 96, 137, 330. Pursuant to that authority, Presidential Proclamation No. 2523, 6 Fed. Reg. 5821, as promulgated in 1941 in part provided: “No alien shall be permitted to enter the United States if it appears to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State that such entry would be prejudicial to the interests of the United States as provided in the rules and regulations hereinbefore authorized to be prescribed by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Attorney General.” The Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Attorney General, issued applicable regulations codified as Part 175 of 8 CFR. Section 175.53 defines eleven categories of aliens whose entry is “deemed to be prejudicial to the interests of the United States.” That delegation of authority has been upheld. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537 (1950). The regulations were ratified and confirmed by Presidential Proclamation No. 2850, 14 Fed. Reg. 5173, promulgated August 17, 1949. 8 CFR § 175.57 provides: “§ 175.57 Entry not permitted in special cases, (a) Any alien, even though in possession of a permit to enter, or exempted under §§175.41 to 175.62, inclusive, from obtaining a permit to enter, may be excluded temporarily if at the time he applies for admission at a port of entry it appears that he is or may be excludable under one of the categories set forth in § 175.53. The official excluding the alien shall immediately report the facts to the head of his department, who will communicate such report to the Secretary of State. Any alien so temporarily excluded by an official of the Department of Justice shall not be admitted and shall be excluded and deported unless the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of State, is satisfied that the admission of the alien would not be prejudicial to the interests of the United States. Any alien so temporarily excluded by any other official shall not be admitted and shall be excluded and deported unless the Secretary of State is satisfied that the admission of the alien would not be prejudicial to the interests of the United States. “(b) In the case of an alien temporarily excluded by an official of the Department of Justice on the ground that he is, or may be excludable under one or more of the categories set forth in § 175.53, no hearing by a board of special inquiry shall be held until after the casé is reported to the Attorney General and such a hearing is directed by the Attorney General or his representative. In any special case the alien may be denied a hearing before a board of special inquiry and an appeal from the decision of that board if the Attorney General determines that he is excludable under one of the categories set forth in § 175.53 on the basis of information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest.” See 8 U. S. C. § 210. Of course, neither a reentry permit, issuable upon proof of prior lawful admission to the United States, § 210 (b), nor an immigration visa entitles an otherwise inadmissible alien to entry. §§210 (f), 202 (g). An immigrant is not unaware of this; § 202 (g) directs those facts to be “printed conspicuously upon every immigration visa.” For a recent study of entry procedures with recommendations, see Report of the President’s Commission on Immigration and Naturalization (1953), cc. 10-11. 8 U. S. C. § 707; United States v. Larsen, 165 F. 2d 433 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1947). 8 U. S. C. § 151. 8 U. S. C. §§ 151, 154. 8 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 156. We there noted that “the problem of habeas corpus after unusual delay in deportation hearings is not involved in this case.” 342 U. S., at 546. (Emphasis added.) 8 U. S. C. § 154 permits temporary suspension of deportation of excluded aliens whose testimony is needed on behalf of the United States. Manifestly respondent does not fall within that class. While the essence of that provision is retained in § 237 (d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 202, § 212 (d) (5) of that Act, 66 Stat. 188, vests new and broader discretion in the Attorney General. Cf. 8 U. S. C. §§ 136 (p) (q); 8 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 137-5 (a) (b). Those provisions are not now here. See S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 643-644.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COLE, BOSTON STATE HOSPITAL SUPERINTENDENT, et al. v. RICHARDSON No. 679. Decided March 16, 1970 Robert H. Quinn, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Mark L. Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, and Gregor I. McGregor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, for appellants in No. 679. Messrs. Quinn, Cohen, McGregor, and Walter H. Mayo III, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees in No. 774. Ernest Winsor and John F. Cogan, Jr., for appellee in No. 679 and appellant in No. 774. Together with No. 774, Richardson v. Cole, Boston State Hospital Superintendent, et al., also on appeal from the same court. Per Curiam. The judgment is vacated and the cases are remanded to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts to determine whether these cases have become moot.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ARCADIA, OHIO, et al. v. OHIO POWER CO. et al. No. 89-1283. Argued October 1, 1990 Decided November 27, 1990 Sc ALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except SouteR, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 86. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Rex E. Lee, Gregg D. Ottinger, and John P. Williams. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, as respondent under this Court’s Rule 12.2, in support of petitioners. With him on the joint briefs for this respondent and for the Securities and Exchange Commission urging reversal were Acting Solicitor General Roberts, James A. Feldman, William S. Scherman, Jerome M. Feit, Joseph S. Davies, Timm L. Abendroth, and Daniel L. Goelzer. Edward Berlin argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Ohio Power Co. were Kenneth G. Jaffe, A. Joseph Dowd, John F. DiLorenzo, Jr., and Edward J. Brady. T. D. Kauffelt filed a brief for respondents LCP Chemicals, Inc., et ah Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Public Power Association et al. by Scott Hempling; and for the Indiana Municipal Power Agency by James N. Honvood. James B. Liberman filed a brief for the Registered Holding Co. Group as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns the interpretation of § 318 of the Federal Power Act, as added, 49 Stat. 863, 16 U. S. C. § 825q, entitled “Conflict of jurisdiction,” which governs certain overlapping responsibilities of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the regulation of power companies under the Public Utility Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803. M The Public Utility Act subjects some companies that transmit and distribute electric power to overlapping regulatory jurisdiction of the SEC and FERC, successor to the Federal Power Commission (FPC). Title I, known as the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA), 49 Stat. 803, gives the SEC jurisdiction over certain transactions among registered public utility holding companies and their subsidiaries and affiliates. Title II, the Federal Power Act (FPA), 49 Stat. 838, gives FERC jurisdiction over the transmission and sale at wholesale of electric power in interstate commerce. FERC-regulated electric power companies that are subsidiaries or affiliates of registered public utility holding companies are therefore subject to SEC regulation as well. Respondent Ohio Power Company, part of the American Electric Power system (AEP), is one such company; petitioners are 15 small Ohio villages and cities that are AEP’s wholesale customers. The dispute in this case begins in a series of orders issued by the SEC in the 1970’s, authorizing Ohio Power to establish and capitalize an affiliate, Southern Ohio Coal Company (SOCCO), to secure and develop a reliable source of coal for the whole AEP system. The first order, in 1971, approved the sale and purchase of SOCCO’s stock, and in the course of outlining the conditions of that approval, stated that SOCCO’s charges for coal would be “based on” actual costs. Ohio Power Co., SEC Holding Company Act Release (HCAR) No. 17383 (Dec. 2, 1971). In 1978, the SEC authorized further investment by Ohio Power, and this time its order indicated that the price of coal “will not exceed the cost thereof to the seller.” Ohio Power Co., HCAR No. 20515 (Apr. 24, 1978), 14 S. E. C. Docket 928, 929. In 1979, in the course of another financing approval order, the SEC noted that Ohio Power would pay SOCCO less than the actual cost of coal if Ohio Power’s after-tax capital costs exceeded a certain level. Southern Ohio Coal Co., HCAR No. 21008 (Apr. 17, 1979). The final order in 1980, approving further SOCCO financing, indicated that “[t]he price at which SOC[C]0’s coal will be sold to AEP system companies will not exceed the cost thereof to the seller.” Southern Ohio Coal Co., HCAR No. 21537 (Apr. 25, 1980). In 1982, Ohio Power filed rate increases for its wholesale service. FERC initiated a rate proceeding under §§ 205 and 206 of the FPA, 16 U. S. C. §§824d, 824e, and quickly settled all issues save the reasonableness of Ohio Power’s SOCCO coal costs. Pursuant to §206 of the FPA, FERC disallowed that portion of Ohio Power’s coal costs that did not satisfy FERC’s “comparable market” test. Under this test, utilities that purchase coal from affiliates may recover only the price that they would have incurred had they purchased coal under a comparable coal supply contract with a nonaffili-ated supplier. In Ohio Power’s case, FERC found that Ohio Power had paid approximately 50% more than that market price in 1980, approximately 94% more in 1981, and between 24% and 33% more during the period 1982 through 1986. Accordingly, FERC ordered Ohio Power to establish rates calculated to recover from its customers no more than the comparable market price for coal, and to refund prior overcharges. The agency rejected Ohio Power’s argument that the SEC, by the above-mentioned orders, had “approved” the coal charges by SOCCO, and that § 318 of the FPA ousts FERC of jurisdiction to regulate the same “subject matter” by declaring those charges unreasonable and thus unrecoverable in Ohio Power’s wholesale rates. Ohio Power Co., 39 FERC ¶ 61,098 (1987). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding FERC’s disallowance of the charges to be precluded by §318. Ohio Power Co. v. FERC, 279 U. S. App. D. C. 327, 880 F. 2d 1400 (1989). We granted certiorari. 494 U. S. 1055 (1990). I — I I — I As decided by the Court of Appeals, and as argued here, two questions were presented in this case: (1) whether §318 bars all FERC regulation of a subject matter regulated by the SEC, or only such regulation as actually imposes a conflicting requirement; and (2) if an actual conflict is prerequisite, whether it exists here. In our view, however, there is another question antecedent to these and ultimately dis-positive of the present dispute: whether the SEC and FERC orders before us impose requirements with respect to a subject matter that is within the scope of §318. We believe they do not. Section 318 provides as follows: “Conflict of jurisdiction “If, with respect to the issue, sale, or guaranty of a security, or assumption of obligation or liability in respect of a security, the method of keeping accounts, the filing of reports, or the acquisition or disposition of any security, capital assets, facilities, or any other subject matter, any person is subject both to a requirement of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 or of a rule, regulation, or order thereunder and to a requirement of this chapter or of a rule, regulation, or order thereunder, the requirement of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 shall apply to such person, and such person shall not be subject to the requirement of this chapter, or of any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, with respect to the same subject matter, unless the Securities and Exchange Commission has exempted such person from such requirement of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, in which case the requirements of this chapter shall apply to such person.” (Emphasis added.) Crucial to the outcome of the present case is the lengthy conditional clause that begins this section, setting forth a list of subjects “with respect to [which]” duplicative requirements will trigger the pre-emption rule. More specifically, the key to the outcome is the phrase “or any other subject matter,” which we have italicized in the above passage. The Court of Appeals appears to have assumed that it parallels the other phrases setting forth various objects of the prepositional phrase “with respect to.” We do not think it reasonably bears that interpretation. To begin with, that interpretation renders the preceding enumeration of specific subjects entirely superfluous — in effect adding to that detailed list “or anything else.” Because the other four categories of enumeration are so disparate, the canon of ejusdem generis cannot be invoked to prevent the phrase “or any other subject matter” from swallowing what precedes it, leaving a statute that might as well have read “If, with respect to any subject matter . . . .” Such an interpretation should not be adopted unless the language renders it unavoidable. Here, however, the text not only does not compel that result but positively militates against it. As the Court of Appeals read § 318, the conditional clause lists five separate areas of duplicative requirements. Bracketed numbers inserted into the text would appear as follows: “If, with respect to [1] the issue, sale, or guaranty of a security, or assumption of obligation or liability in respect of a security, [2] the method of keeping accounts, [3] the filing of reports, or [4] the acquisition or disposition of any security, capital assets, facilities, or [5] any other subject matter ...” This reading, however, creates two problems of enumeration: First, it renders the “or” that introduces the fourth category duplicative (“If, with respect to [1], [2], [3], or [4], or [5]”), and second, it produces the peculiar omission of an “or” before the last item listed within the text of the fourth category (“the acquisition or disposition of any security, capital assets, facilities”). In casual conversation, perhaps, such absentminded duplication and omission are possible, but Congress is not presumed to draft its laws that way. The attribution of such imprecision is readily avoided by placing the phrase “or any other subject matter” within the fourth enumeration clause, reading that to embrace “[4] the acquisition or disposition of any security, capital assets, facilities, or any other subject matter.” It is inelegant, perhaps, to refer to “the acquisition or disposition of . . . [a] subject matter,” but that inelegance must be preferred to a reading that introduces both redundancy and omission, and that renders the section’s careful enumeration of subjects superfluous. Moreover, and most importantly, when § 318 is read in this fashion it takes on a shape that gives meaning to what otherwise seems a random listing of specific subject matters (with “any other subject matter” tagged on at the end). So interpreted, it addresses (as its caption promises) the “Conflict of jurisdiction” within four areas of plainly parallel authority granted both to the SEC, under PUHCA, and to the FPC (FERC), under the FPA. The first category, “the issue, sale, or guaranty of a security, or assumption of obligation or liability in respect of a security,” refers to §'204 of the FPA, 16 U. S. C. §824c, which requires all such transactions to be approved by FERC order, and to §6 of PUHCA, 15 U. S. C. § 79f, which in certain cases requires similar approval by the SEC; the second, “the method of keeping accounts,” refers to §301, 16 U. S. C. §825, which authorizes FERC to prescribe accounts and records, and to § 15, 15 U. S. C. § 79o, which similarly authorizes the SEC; the third, “the filing of reports,” refers to §304, 16 U. S. C. §825c, which authorizes FERC to require “periodic or special reports,” and §14, 15 U. S. C. § 79n, which similarly empowers the SEC; and the fourth, “the acquisition or disposition of any security, capital assets, facilities, or any other subject matter” refers to §203, 16 U. S. C. § 824b, which requires all purchases of securities of other public utilities, and all sales of facilities worth more than $50,000, to be approved by FERC order, and to § 9, 15 U. S. C. § 79i, which requires SEC approval of acquisitions of “securities and utility assets and other interests.” The language of § 318 does not track precisely the language of any of these other sections, but the PUHCA and FPA sections making up each of the four sets are not themselves precisely parallel, so that some alternative formulation to bridge the gap would be expected. Our reading is confirmed by longtime understanding and practice. An expert commentary upon the specific topic of overlapping SEC and FPC jurisdiction, written about 10 years after passage of the Public Utility Act, assumed as we have that § 318 implicated only the four FPC sections that we have identified. See Welch, Functions of the Federal Power Commission in Relation to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 14 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 81, 88 (1945). And as far as we have been able to determine, in 50 years of administering the FPA, FERC and its predecessor, the FPC, have never decided an issue under § 318 except in connection with orders promulgated under those four sections. Never before this case has §318 been used as a general conflicts provision, policing the entire regulatory border between the two agencies. It is not necessarily true that § 318 gives the SEC precedence only when the specific sections that we have referred to are the jurisdictional basis for both the FEEC and the SEC action — as they are not, of course, here. But the text of the section, as we have explicated it above, does require that the “same subject matter” as to which the duplicative requirements exist be one of those specifically enumerated, and not some different, more general “other subject matter”— such as what the Court of Appeals relied upon, “[t]he price term of sales contracts between associated companies,” 279 U. S. App. D. C., at 333, 880 F. 2d, at 1406. In the context of the present case, the only enumerated subject matter conceivably pertinent is contained within what we have referred to as the fourth category. To prevail under §318, Ohio Power would have to establish that it has been subjected both to an SEC requirement under PUHCA and to a FERC requirement under the FPA, “with respect to . . . the acquisition or disposition of any security, capital assets, facilities, or any other subject matter.” The acquisition of SOCCO by Ohio Power might fit the quoted description, so that requirements in the SEC orders might qualify; but it is impossible to identify any FERC requirement that is imposed (as §318 demands) “with respect to the same subject matter.” One might say, we suppose, that a FERC rate requirement is imposed “with respect to the disposition” of electric power— though it does some violence to the interpretive rule of ejusdem generis to say that electric power qualifies as an “other subject matter” at the end of a list that includes securities, capital assets, and facilities, see, e. g., Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 588 (1980); id., at 601 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Third National Bank in Nash ville v. Impac Limited, Inc., 432 U. S. 312, 322 (1977). But even if one accepts that FERC’s rate order is a requirement qualifying under § 318, it is still a requirement with respect to a different subject matter from (and not, as §318 requires, “with respect to the same subject matter” as) the acquisition of SOCCO. The combination of SEC requirements with respect to the acquisition of SOCCO and FERC requirements with respect to the disposition of electric power would not bring §318 into play. Ill Our conclusion that §318 has no application to this case does not end review of the FERC order. Remaining to be resolved is the alternative ground relied upon by Judge Mik-va’s concurrence in the Court of Appeals, Ohio Power Co. v. FERC, 279 U. S. App. D. C., at 337, 880 F. 2d, at 1410-namely, the argument that FERC’s decision violates its own regulation, which provides that where the price of fuel purchased from an affiliate “is subject to the jurisdiction of a regulatory body, such cost shall be deemed to be reasonable and includable” in wholesale rates. 18 CFR § 35.14(a)(7) (1990). Also available, and unresolved by the Court of Appeals, is the argument that the FERC-prescribed rate is not “just and reasonable” because it “traps” costs which the Government itself has approved — disregarding a governmental assurance, possibly implicit in the SEC approvals, that Ohio Power will be permitted to recoup the cost of acquiring and operating SOCCO. Cf. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U. S. 953 (1986). We express no view on these questions, and leave them to be resolved by the Court of Appeals. The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The vast majority of these were orders under § 203, in connection with utilities’ requests for approval of merger or of disposition of assets. See Florida Power Corp., 2 FERC ¶61,038, p. 61,092 (1978); Potomac Edison Co., 54 F. P. C. 1465, 1466 (1975); Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 39 F. P. C. 277, 279 (1968); Buckeye Power, Inc., 38 F. P. C. 519, 520 (1967); Buckeye Power, Inc., 38 F. P. C. 253, 259 (1967); Minnesota Power & Light Co., 37 F. P. C. 1059, 1060-1061 (1967); Arkansas Power & Light Co., 35 F. P. C. 341 (1966); Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., 34 F. P. C. 107, 108 (1965); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 34 F. P. C. 17, 20 (1965); Arkansas Power & Light Co., 32 F. P. C. 1537, 1539 (1964); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 32 F. P. C. 1263, 1265 (1964); Kentucky Utilities Co., 32 F. P. C. 622, 623 (1964); South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 29 F. P. C. 1045, 1048 (1963); Philadelphia Electric Co., 28 F. P. C. 1025, 1027 (1962); Arkansas Power & Light Co., 28 F. P. C. 844, 846 (1962); Pennsylvania Electric Co., 27 F. P. C. 81, 84 (1962); Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., 25 F. P. C. 1195, 1196 (1961); Arkansas Power & Light Co., 25 F. P. C. 1151, 1152 (1961); Alabama Power Co., 25 F. P. C. 1018, 1020 (1961); Northern States Power Co., 25 F. P. C. 974, 977 (1961); Central Vermont Public Service Corp., 25 F. P. C. 146, 149 (1961); Northern States Power Co., 24 F. P. C. 457, 460 (1960); Commonwealth Edison Co., 24 F. P. C. 94, 96 (1960); Minnesota Power & Light Co., 23 F. P. C. 868, 869 (1960); Mississippi Valley Public Service Co., 23 F. P. C. 104, 108 (1960); Central Vermont Public Service Corp., 22 F. P. C. 737, 739 (1959); Arkansas Power & Light Co., 22 F. P. C. 457, 458 (1959); Northern States Power Co., 21 F. P. C. 780, 782 (1959); Conowingo Power Co., 21 F. P. C. 511, 513-514 (1959); Philadelphia Electric Power Co., 21 F. P. C. 157, 160 (1959); Wisconsin Michigan Power Co., 20 F. P. C. 358, 360 (1958); Northern States Power Co., 20 F. P. C. 355, 357 (1958); Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., 20 F. P. C. 205, 206-207 (1958); Orange & Rockland Electric Co., 19 F. P. C. 269, 276 (1958); Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 18 F. P. C. 827, 829 (1957); Northern States Power Co., 18 F. P. C. 532, 536-537 (1957); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 18 F. P. C. 525, 528 (1957); Northern States Power Co., 18 F. P. C. 395, 397 (1957); Northern States Power Co., 18 F. P. C. 135, 137 (1957); Kentucky Utilities Co., 18 F. P. C. 44, 46 (1957); Amesbury Electric Light Co., 18 F. P. C. 1 (1957); Nantahala Power & Light Co., 17 F. P. C. 899, 901 (1957); Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., 17 F. P. C. 669, 670 (1957); Northern States Power Co., 17 F. P. C. 639, 641 (1957); Georgia Power & Light Co., 17 F. P. C. 324, 327 (1957); Northern States Power Co., 16 F. P. C. 876, 880 (1956); Scranton Electric Co., 15 F. P. C. 1078, 1081 (1956); St. Joseph Light & Poiver Co., 14 F. P. C. 985 (1955); Frontier Poiver Co., 14 F. P. C. 941, 944 (1955); Carolina Aluminum Co., 14 F. P. C. 829, 830 (1955); Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 14 F. P. C. 821, 822 (1955); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 14 F. P. C. 706, 711 (1955); Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., 14 F. P. C. 639, 641 (1955); Connecticut River Power Co., 14 F. P. C. 501, 503 (1955); Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 13 F. P. C. 1563, 1564 (1954); Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 13 F. P. C. 1334, 1335 (1954); Rockland Light & Power Co., 13 F. P. C. 1300, 1302 (1954); Kentucky Utilities Co., 13 F. P. C. 907, 908 (1954); West Penn Power Co., 13 F. P. C. 866, 868 (1954); Ohio Edison Co., 12 F. P. C. 1437, 1438 (1953); Lake Superior District Power Co., 12 F. P. C. 1434, 1435 (1953); Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 12 F. P. C. 1394, 1395-1396 (1953); Wisconsin Michigan Power Co., 12 F. P. C. 1318, 1319 (1953); Louisiana Power & Light Co., 12 F. P. C. 1168, 1169 (1953); Kansas City Power & Light Co., 11 F. P. C. 1112, 1113 (1952); Kansas Gas & Electric Co., 11 F. P. C. 1114, 1115-1116 (1952); Potomac Light & Power Co., 11 F. P. C. 1069, 1070 (1952); South Penn Power Co., 11 F. P. C. 1070, 1071 (1952); Missouri Public Service Co., 10 F. P. C. 1120, 1122 (1951); Athol Gas & Electric Co., 10 F. P. C. 729, 731 (1951); Pennsylvania Electric Co., 9 F. P. C. 1304, 1306 (1950); Rhode Island Power Transmission Co., 9 F. P. C. 942, 944 (1950); Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 9 F. P. C. 859, 861 (1950); Northwestern Illinois Gas & Electric Co., 9 F. P. C. 862, 863-864 (1950); Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 9 F. P. C. 617, 619 (1950); Potomac Electric Power Co., 8 F. P. C. 997 (1949); Bellows Falls Hydro-Electric Corp., 7 F. P. C. 777, 780 (1948); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 6 F. P. C. 428, 429 (1947); Northern Virginia Power Co., 5 F. P. C. 458, 459 (1946); Central Vermont Public Service Corp., 4 F. P. C. 1001, 1002 (1945); Worcester Suburban Electric Co., 4 F. P. C. 929, 930-931 (1945); Wachusett Electric Co., 4 F. P. C. 920, 921 (1945); California Public Service Co., 4 F. P. C. 812, 814 (1944); Utah Power & Light Co., 4 F. P. C. 791, 792 (1944); Indiana General Service Co., 4 F. P. C. 783, 785 (1944); Empire District Electric Co., 4 F. P. C. 665, 669 (1944); Virginia Electric & Power Co., 4 F. P. C. 51, 53-54 (1944); Eastern Shore Public Service Co., 4 F. P. C. 382, 384 (1943); Otter Tail Power Co., 3 F. P. C. 1054, 1056 (1943); Superior Water, Light & Power Co., 3 F. P. C. 960, 962 (1943); Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co., 3 F. P. C. 883, 885 (1942); Point Pleasant Water & Light Co., 3 F. P. C. 755, 757 (1942); Eastern Shore Public Service Co., 3 F. P. C. 723, 724 (1942); Florida Power Co., 3 F. P. C. 719 (1942); Virginia Public Service Co., 3 F. P. C. 704, 706 (1942); Associated Maryland Electric Power Corp., 3 F. P. C. 646, 652 (1942); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 3 F. P. C. 629, 631 (1942); In re Pennsylvania Electric Co., 3 F. P. C. 544, 546 (1943); In re Pennsylvania Electric Co., 3 F. P. C. 557, 558 (1943); In re Olcott Falls Co., 3 F. P. C. 310, 312 (1942); South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 3 F. P. C. 1007, 1011 (1943); Otter Tail Power Co., 2 F. P. C. 935, 936 (1941); In re Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 2 F. P. C. 122, 123 (1940); Lexington Utilities Co., 1 F. P. C. 787 (1939); In re Evans, 1 F. P. C. 511, 515-518 (1937). A large number of orders discussing § 318 arose under § 204, in connection with requests for approval of securities sales or issuance. See Buckeye Power, Inc., 38 F. P. C., at 259; Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., 34 F. P. C., at 108; Philadelphia Electric Co., 28 F. P. C., at 1027; Utah Power & Light Co., 28 F. P. C. 97, 98-99 (1962); Pacific Power & Light Co., 27 F. P. C. 623, 626 (1962); Northern States Power Co., 25 F. P. C. 974, 977 (1961); Northern States Power Co., 24 F. P. C. 457, 460 (1960); Mississippi Valley Public Service Co., 23 F. P. C., at 108; Holyoke Water Power Co., 21 F. P. C. 676, 678 (1959); Conowingo Power Co., 21 F. P. C., at 513-514; Minnesota Power & Light Co., 21 F. P. C. 214, 215 (1959); Northern States Power Co., 20 F. P. C. 355, 357 (1958); Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., 20 F. P. C., at 207; Orange & Rockland Electric Co., 19 F. P. C., at 275-276; Holyoke Water Power Co., 18 F. P. C. 821, 826 (1957); Northern States Power Co., 18 F. P. C., at 536-537; Kentucky Utilities Co., 18 F. P. C. 44, 46 (1957); Northern States Power Co., 16 F. P. C., at 880; Interstate Power Co., 15 F. P. C. 1355, 1356-1357 (1956); Rockland Light & Power Co., 13 F. P. C., at 1302; Wisconsin River Power Co., 8 F. P. C. 1111, 1112 (1949); In re Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 5 F. P. C. 52, 54 (1946); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 3 F. P. C., at 631; California Electric Power Co., 2 F. P. C. 1099, 1100 (1941); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 2 F. P. C. 1027, 1028 (1941); Otter Tail Power Co., 2 F. P. C. 1022, 1024-1025 (1941); Nevada-California Electric Co., 2 F. P. C. 956, 957 (1941); Otter Tail Power Co., 2 F. P. C., at 937; In re Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 2 F. P. C. 350, 356 (1941); Sierra Pacific Power Co., 2 F. P. C. 839, 841 (1940); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 2 F. P. C. 831, 833 (1940). Only a few orders involved § 301 (accounting requirements) and § 304 (reporting requirements). See Appalachian Power Co., 28 F. P. C. 1199, 1223-1237 (1962); Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 14 F. P. C. 858, 859 (1955); Metropolitan Edison Co., 14 F. P. C. 736, 737 (1955); In re Arkan sas Power & Light Co., 8 F. P. C. 106, 127-128 (1949); Northern Indiana Public Service Co., 4 F. P. C. 1070, 1071 (1946); In re Superior Water, Light & Power Co., 3 F. P. C. 254, 257 (1942). The slight indication in the legislative history that conferees who added the phrase “or any other subject matter” might have intended such a general conflicts provision, cf. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1903, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 75 (1935), is contradicted by the fact that their revision eliminated the word “or” that had previously appeared before “facilities,” rather than the “or” that introduced the fourth category. Compare id., at 63 with S. 2796, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 292 (in House, June 13, 1935), and S. 2796, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 295 (in Senate, May 13,1935). In any case, the legislative history is overborne by the text. The same conclusion would follow if we regarded the action qualifying for § 318 treatment to be, not Ohio Power’s acquisition of SOCCO, but Ohio Power’s acquisition of coal (implicit in its acquisition of SOCCO). It remains impossible to find any FERC requirement imposed “with respect to the same” acquisition. The FERC pricing requirement imposed with respect to the disposition of electric power is still not pre-empted by § 318.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MARCELLO v. BONDS, OFFICER IN CHARGE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE. No. 145. Argued April 21-22, 1955. Decided May 31, 1955. Jack Wasserman and David Carliner argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Robert W. Oinnane argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Olney, Maurice A. Roberts and L. Paul Winings. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner, a native of Tunis, Africa, was ordered deported after a hearing pursuant to § 242 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 209, 8 U. S. C. § 1252 (b). It was found that he had been convicted in 1938 of violation of the Marihuana Tax Act, 26 U. S. C. § 2591, and sentenced to imprisonment for one year. Section 241 (a) (11) of the 1952 immigration law makes such conviction at any time ground for deportation, and § 241 (d) provides that the deportation provisions of § 241 (a) shall apply even though the facts giving rise to the alien’s deportability occurred prior to the date of enactment of the 1952 Act. At the hearing before a special inquiry officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, petitioner did not dispute the fact of his conviction. He did, however, object to the proceedings on the ground that they violated due process and the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237, 5 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. The hearing officer overruled these objections. Petitioner also contended that the ex post jacto clause of the Constitution precluded the retroactive application of the 1952 law to his case. This contention too was rejected by the hearing officer. Petitioner and his counsel were advised of their right to apply to the Attorney General for the discretionary relief of suspension of deportation under § 244 (a) (5) of the Act. At first they declined to do so, but subsequently they moved to reopen the hearing to apply for such relief. The special inquiry officer denied the motion. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the order of deportation. Though no formal application for suspension of deportation under § 244 (a) (5) had been filed, the Board considered whether such relief was merited but exercised its discretion against the remission. Petitioner then brought this action for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the validity of the deportation order on the grounds, inter alia: (1) that the hearing under § 242 (b) of the Act failed to comply with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act in that the special inquiry officer was under the supervision and control of officials in the Immigration Service who performed investigative and prosecuting functions; (2) that § 242 (b) violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it failed to provide for a fair and impartial hearing; (3) that on the date of petitioner’s arrest the Attorney General made a public statement, which “was bound to have great effect upon the special inquiry officer,” to the effect that petitioner was an undesirable citizen for whose deportation the proceedings were “specially designed,” and, further, that in 1952 the Attorney General “prepared a list of 152 persons [including petitioner] whom he desired to deport”; and (4) that the retroactive application of § 241 (a) (11) was unconstitutional as an ex post facto law. The Government’s return to the writ alleged that petitioner’s deportation had been conducted in accordance with the Constitution, laws and regulations of the United States. No evidence was introduced by either side save the official Immigration Service record of petitioner’s deportation proceedings. The District Court held the deportation order valid and discharged the writ. 113 F. Supp. 22. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 212 F. 2d 830. Petitioner pursues his four basic objections in this Court, certiorari having been granted to resolve issues having a significant bearing on the administration of our immigration laws. 348 U. S. 805. Applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act. Petitioner concedes that § 242 (b) of the Immigration Act, authorizing the appointment of a “special inquiry officer” to preside at the deportation proceedings, does not conflict with the Administrative Procedure Act, since § 7 (a) of that Act excepts from its terms officers specially provided for or designated pursuant to other statutes. He insists, however, that there are several significant discrepancies between the Acts, and claims that in cases of variance the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act must govern unless those of the Immigration Act “shall . . . expressly” negate their application. Administrative Procedure Act, § 12. The discrepancies relied on stem from the “separation of functions” provision of § 5 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act. To the extent here material, this section separates investigative and prosecuting functions from those of adjudication, expressly providing that hearing officers shall not be responsible to or under the supervision of those engaged in investigation and prosecution. The section also prohibits the hearing officer from participating or advising in the decision of a case, or one factually related thereto, in which he has performed investigative or prosecuting functions. Section 242 (b) of the Immigration Act, on the other hand, permits the “special inquiry officer” to take the dual role of prosecutor and hearing officer — presenting evidence and interrogating witnesses — and prohibits him only from hearing cases which he has taken some part in investigating or prosecuting (other than in the permitted dual capacity). An alternative method is permitted by § 242 (b), however, under which an additional immigration officer presents the evidence while the special inquiry officer presides. See 8 CFR § 242.53. Special inquiry officers are subject to such supervision as the Attorney General prescribes, 66 Stat. 171, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (b)(4), and at present they are subject to the supervision of district directors of the immigration districts to which they are assigned, as well as higher Service officials, all with enforcement responsibilities of the type proscribed by § 5 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act. Under the allegations here made, the single attack of the petitioner pertains to the supervision of the special inquiry officer by the investigative and prosecuting officials of the Immigration Service. The alternative procedure of § 242 (b) was employed in this case, so the presiding officer did not undertake the functions of prosecutor; and there is no allegation that he engaged in investigative or prosecuting functions in this or any factually related case. For the sake of clarity, however, we shall consider all of the differences in the hearing provisions of the two Acts in determining whether the Administrative Procedure Act is to govern. The applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act to deportation proceedings under the Immigration Act of 1917 was considered by this Court in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1950). We there held, contrary to the prevailing interpretation and practice of the Department of Justice, that deportation hearings were subject to the Act. Six months later, Congress provided in the Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951, 64 Stat. 1048, that proceedings directed toward the exclusion or expulsion of aliens should not be governed by §§ 5, 7 and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The issue here presented is whether the Congress reversed itself in the 1952 Immigration Act and in effect reinstated the Sung case by making the hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act directly applicable to deportation proceedings. A comparison of the pertinent provisions of the two statutes is perhaps the strongest indication that the Congress had no such intention. 1. Section 242 (b) of the Immigration Act begins by enumerating the functions of the special inquiry officer, that he shall administer oaths, receive evidence, etc. A similar though more extensive and detailed provision appears in § 7 (b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, but of course this section makes no mention of functions stemming from the special inquiry officer’s dual role as prosecutor and judge. 2. Section 242 (b) then directs that a determination of deportability be made only upon the record of a proceeding at which the alien had a reasonable opportunity to be present. A similar direction as to the record appears in § 7 (d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, and as to the party’s personal appearance in § 6 (a). 3. Section 242 (b) then deals with matters peculiar to deportation proceedings, which have no direct analogues in the Administrative Procedure Act: safeguards to be established to protect mentally incompetent aliens; the right of the inquiry officer to proceed if the alien deliberately absents himself; the option to pursue the alternative procedure, described above, in which one official prosecutes and another decides. 4. Next in § 242 (b) is the limitation already noted on the special inquiry officer’s sitting in the same case in which he has also engaged in investigative or prosecuting functions. The more restrictive analogue in § 5 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act has also been presented. 5. Section 242 (b) then sets forth various requirements which are to be included in regulations governing deportation proceedings before the special inquiry officer. The first of these gives the alien the right to reasonable notice of the charges against him and of the time and place at which the proceedings shall be held. A similar requirement appears in § 5 (a) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 6. The second provision which § 242 (b) requires to be included in the regulations is the privilege of the alien to be represented by counsel of his own choosing. Section 6 (a) of the Administrative Procedure Act bestows a similar privilege on any person compelled to appear in person before the agency. 7. The regulations under § 242 (b) must also provide that the alien be given a reasonable opportunity to present and examine evidence and to cross-examine witnesses. The same ground is covered in § 7 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 8. The regulations promulgated under § 242 (b) must require that decisions of deportability be based upon reasonable, substantial and probative evidence. To the same effect is § 7 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 9. Finally, in addition to the requirements of § 242 (b), there is the direction of § 101 (b) (4) of the Immigration Act that the special inquiry officer shall be subject to such supervision as the Attorney General shall prescribe. This covers the same question as the portion of § 5 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act dealing with the supervision and control of hearing officers. From the Immigration Act’s detailed coverage of the same subject matter dealt with in the hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, it is clear that Congress was setting up a specialized administrative procedure applicable to deportation hearings, drawing liberally on the analogous provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and adapting them to the particular needs of the deportation process. The same legislators, Senator McCarran and Congressman Walter, sponsored both the Administrative Procedure Act and the Immigration Act, and the framework of the latter indicates clearly that the Administrative Procedure Act was being used as a model. But it was intended only as a model, and when in this very particularized adaptation there was a departure from the Administrative Procedure Act — based on novel features in the deportation process — surely it was the intention of the Congress to have the deviation apply and not the general model. Were the courts to ignore these provisions and look only to the Administrative Procedure Act, the painstaking efforts detailed above would be completely meaningless. Congress could have accomplished as much simply by stating that there should be a hearing to determine the question of deportability. Section 242 (b) expressly states: “The procedure [herein prescribed] shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the deportability of an alien under this section.” That this clear and categorical direction was meant to exclude the application of the Administrative Procedure Act is amply demonstrated by the legislative history of the Immigration Act. The original bills included statements to the effect that the § 242 (b) procedures were to be exclusive, “[notwithstanding any other law, including the [Administrative Procedure Act].” S. 3455, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.; S. 716, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 2379, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. The “notwithstanding” clause was dropped in later versions of the Act and did not appear in the bills reported out of committee or in the statute as finally enacted. S. 2055, 82d Cong.; H. R. 5678, 82d Cong.; S. 2550, 82d Cong. The deletion is nowhere explained, but it is possible that the phrase was considered unnecessary — and perhaps inappropriate as a description — as § 242 (b) became more detailed, encompassing in its particularization the greater part of the Administrative Procedure Act’s hearing provisions. In the Senate Report accompanying the revised bill, it is stated that § 242 (b) sets up special procedures for deportation proceedings, that these are made exclusive, and that the exemption from the Administrative Procedure Act in the Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951 is repealed because it is “no longer necessary.” S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 28. The House Report is to the same effect, stating that the prescribed deportation proceedings shall be the sole and exclusive procedure, “notwithstanding the provisions of any other law.” H. R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 58. Throughout the debates it is made clear that the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply directly, but that its provisions have been specially adapted to meet the needs of the deportation process. See particularly the detailed statement of Senator McCarran, 98 Cong. Rec. 5625-5626, wherein he recognizes a departure from the “dual-examiner provisions” of the Administrative Procedure Act, the very section here in issue. Exemptions from the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act are not lightly to be presumed in view of the statement in § 12 of the Act that modifications must be express, cf. Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U. S. 48. But we cannot ignore the background of the 1952 immigration legislation, its laborious adaptation of the Administrative Procedure Act to the deportation process, the specific points at which deviations from the Administrative Procedure Act were made, the recognition in the legislative history of this adaptive technique and of the particular deviations, and the direction in the statute that the methods therein prescribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for deportation proceedings. Unless we are to require the Congress to employ magical passwords in order to effectuate an exemption from the Administrative Procedure Act, we must hold that the present statute expressly supersedes the hearing provisions of that Act. The Hearing Procedures and Due Process. As noted above, the only complaint which petitioner can urge concerning the hearing procedures in this case is the objection that the special inquiry officer was subject to the supervision and control of officials in the Immigration Service charged with investigative and prosecuting functions. Petitioner would have us hold that the presence of this relationship so strips the hearing of fairness and impartiality as to make the procedure violative of due process. The contention is without substance when considered against the long-standing practice in deportation proceedings, judicially approved in numerous decisions in the federal courts, and against the special considerations applicable to deportation which the Congress may take into account in exercising its particularly broad discretion in immigration matters. The Claim of Prejudgment. Our opinions in the Accardi cases stand for the proposition that the Attorney General cannot, under present regulations, dictate the actions of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260; Shaughnessy v. Accardi, 349 U. S. 280. Petitioner alleges that his case was prejudged within the meaning of these decisions because on’ the day of his arrest for deportation the Attorney General “announced in a public statement both in Washington and in New Orleans that [petitioner] was an undesirable citizen and had been guilty of many crimes, and that the proceedings were specially designed to deport petitioner,” and that “such publicity was bound to have great effect upon the special inquiry officer.” He alleged, further, that “the Attorney General some time in 1952 prepared a list of 152 persons whom he desired to deport, and that [his] name was included on this list.” Considering first the alleged list, it is clear that petitioner has not made out a case of prejudgment. He did not allege that either the inquiry officer or the Board of Immigration Appeals had seen the list, had known of its existence, or had been influenced in their decisions by the inclusion of petitioner’s name thereon. In argument before the Board, petitioner stated through counsel that he had “the feeling — and it’s a feeling that’s based upon evidence which we will supply — that the real basis for the denial of suspension here was the fact that Marcello was one of these hundred whom the Attorney General had named . . . .” No evidence of this was forthcoming. As to petitioner’s charges concerning the Attorney General’s “list,”'the record is completely barren. Nor does petitioner fare better in seeking to base prejudgment on the unfavorable publicity accompanying his arrest. He introduced newspaper clippings into evidence to show the adverse local publicity and alleged that this publicity must have had a “great effect” upon the special inquiry officer. But the record indicates clearly that petitioner’s case could not possibly have been prejudiced in the hearing before the inquiry officer. On the question of petitioner’s deportability, the sole issue decided by him, the hearing officer merely applied the statute to the undisputed facts. Petitioner admitted that he was deportable under the Immigration Act of 1952 if the Act could constitutionally base deportation on his 1938 marihuana conviction. And the hearing officer could be expected in any event to take the law as Congress enacted it. In view of this Court’s decisions on the ex post jacto objection, the only ground of attack, he could do nothing else. Petitioner waived the only issue on which prejudgment was possible when he declined to apply for discretionary relief at the proper time. See 8 CFR § 242.54 (d). The Board of Immigration Appeals considered the availability of discretionary relief, but as to these officials there was not even an allegation by petitioner that they had known of the unfavorable publicity or had been influenced by it. Indeed, there is every indication that the Board had not prejudged the case, since it considered the question of suspending deportation on the merits although not bound to do so in view of petitioner’s waiver below. The Board denied the requested relief, giving reasons. It is not for us in this proceeding to pass on the factors relied on by the Board in reaching its conclusion. It is sufficient to observe that all had basis in the record and that none stemmed from any sort of dictation by the Attorney General. Finally, we note that, even as to his claim relating to adverse publicity, petitioner introduced no evidence other than the newspaper clippings. Surely on this meager showing the district judge was warranted in finding — as he did — that the special inquiry officer, the only official mentioned in petitioner’s pleadings, was not controlled in his decision by superiors in the Department of Justice. The decision of the district judge cannot be set aside as clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we hold that under our Accardi decisions petitioner has failed to make out a case for a new hearing. Ex Post Facto. Petitioner’s last objection stems from the fact that his conviction under the Marihuana Tax Act was not ground for deportation at the time he committed the offense, and that he was not forewarned of all the consequences of his criminal conduct. It is urged that we depart from our recent decisions holding that the prohibition of the ex post facto clause does not apply to deportation, and strike down as unconstitutional the retroactive application of the new grounds for deportation in § 241 (a) (11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. We perceive no special reasons, however, for overturning our precedents on this matter, and adhere to our decisions in Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, and Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580. Affirmed. Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 66 Stat. 204, 8 U. S. C. § 1251 (a)(11). 66 Stat. 208, 8 U. S. C. § 1251 (d). 66 Stat. 204, 8 U. S. C. § 1254 (a)(5). Section 7 (a) of the Administrative Procedure Act directs that, in general, administrative hearings shall be held before hearing officers appointed pursuant to § 11 of the Act. Petitioner introduced clippings appearing in New Orleans newspapers relating to the statement. While the press release of the Attorney General was not put in evidence, it read as follows: . “Attorney General James P. McGranery announced today that Carlos Marcello of Miami, Florida, and Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, has been arrested on a deportation warrant by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. “The arrest in New Orleans was the first major deportation move undertaken since the new Immigration and Nationality Act became effective December 24, 1952. The action was another step in the Attorney General’s program of denaturalization and/or deportation of undesirable persons of foreign birth who are engaged in racketeering or other criminal activities. “Marcello, born February 6, 1910, in Tunis, Africa, entered the United States for permanent residence October 7, 1910, at New Orleans. • “He allegedly is engaged in large-scale slot machine operations and other gambling activities in Louisiana. “The deportation warrant was based on his conviction in 1938 for violation of the Marijuana Act. Such a conviction is a deportable offense under the new Immigration and Nationality Act. “The action follows lengthy investigations by both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. His conviction under the Marijuana Act was one of only two in his checkered career. The other case in which he was convicted was under Louisiana State law, the conviction being for assault and robbery, and on May 13, 1930, he was sentenced to serve a term of 9 to 14 years in the Louisiana State Penitentiary. The Governor of Louisiana gave him a full pardon for this crime July 16, 1935. “Marcello served a year and a day after his conviction under the Marijuana Act."

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION v. AMERICAN TRAILER RENTALS CO. No. 35. Argued November 10, 1964. Decided January 18, 1965. Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Philip A. Loomis, Jr., and David Ferber. Arthur W. Burke, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Mar cien Jenckes argued the cause and filed a brief for the State Mutual Life Assurance Company of America et al., as amici curiae. Mr. Justice Goldberg delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is whether respondent’s attempted corporate rehabilitation under the Bankruptcy Act, materially affecting the rights of widespread public investor creditors, may be conducted under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 905, as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 701 et seq. (1958 ed.), or whether dismissal or, in effect, transfer to proceedings under Chapter X of that Act, 52 Stat. 883, as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 501 et seq. (1958 ed.), is required upon motion by the Securities and Exchange Commission dr any other party in interest, pursuant to § 328 of the Bankruptcy Act, 66 Stat. 432, 11 U. S. C. § 728 (1958 ed.). I. Respondent, American Trailer Rentals Company, was organized in 1958 to engage in the automobile-trailer rental business. The business was financed largely through the sale of trailers to investors and their simul-. taneous lease-back. From 1959 to 1961 hundreds of small investors, scattered.throughout the. entire western part of the United States,, purchased and leased back a total of 5,866 trailers, paying an aggregate price of $3,587,439 (approximately $600 per trailer). Under the usual form of lease-back agreement, the trailer owners were to receive a set 2% of their investment per month for 10 years. The trailers sold to investors and then leased back are of the general utility type that are attached to the rear bumper of automobiles. They were placed by respondent at gasoline stations, the operators of which acted as respondent’s rental agents, without the investors ever having seen them. Respondent had about 700 such service station operators in December 1961, although the number had declined to about 500 by the time the petition for an arrangement was filed a year later. Respondent’s further offering of these sale and leaseback arrangements to the public was halted in' 1961, when the SEC advised respondent that these sale and leaseback arrangements were investment contracts and therefore securities, which could not be sold to the public unless and until a registration statement was filed and became effective under the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq. (1958 ed.). Respondent ‘then filed a registration statement with the SEC pertaining to these sale and lease-back arrangements. This registration statement, however, never became effective, and proceedings were instituted by the SEC to stop distribution of respondent's proposed prospectus on the •grounds that it contained false and misleading statements. See Securities Act of 1933, § 8 (d), 48 Stat. 79, 15 U. S. C. § 77h (d) (1958 ed.). In June. 1963, respondent consented to the entry of an order stopping distribution of this prospectus. See SEC, Securities Act Release No. 4615 (1963). After this attempt to register the sale and lease-back agreements had failed, respondent’s executive vice president and other persons organized a corporation named Capitol Leasing Corporation, which offered respondent’s investor creditors an exchange of its stock for their trailers on the basis of one share of its stock for each $2 the investor creditors had paid for the' trailers. After Capitol had acquired approximately 300 of the 5,866 trailers outstanding in exchange for its stock, the SEC suspended the exemption from registration for small offerings, upon which Capitol had relied in making this offer, on the grounds that there was reasonable cause to believe that the material used in making this offer again contained false and misleading statements. Following this event, respondent filed a petition and a proposed plan of arrangement under Chapter XI of the. Bankruptcy Act. The petition, annexed schedules, and other documents show that respondent had never operated at a profit. For the three years ended September 30, 1961, it had an aggregate income from “gross rentals" of $395,610. In the same period, it made rental payments to investor-trailer owners of $613,021; made payments to gasoline station operators of $118,400; and incurred additional “operating expenses” of $668,698. The $613,021 paid to trailer owners included payments' to investors whose trailers had not yet been obtained and put into the system. In order to make the necessary payments to trailer owners and station operators respondent had not only borrowed money from its officers, directors, and stockholders but also had used funds obtained for purchase of new trailers. Virtually all the trailers were purchased from an affiliate in which respondent’s officers and directors had interests. Many of these trailers proved defective in design or otherwise unsuitable for rental. About a year prior to the filing of respond-' ent’s Chapter XI proceeding, this manufacturing affiliate became' bankrupt, owing respondent approximately $200,000 for trailers that were never manufactured and. an additional amount of approximately, $150,000 for trailers that were manufactured but never delivered. These latter trailers had been mortgaged by the affiliate to a third party who took possession upon the affiliate’s bankruptcy. In addition, in June 1961, some 100 trailers, as to which respondent, although obligated by the leaseback arrangements to do so, did not have insurance coverage, were unbeatable and considered lost. Finally, certain funds received from investors for the purchase of trailers had been, at an earlier period, misappropriated by a member or members of respondent’s management. Respondent’s executive vice president, who estimated this misappropriation loss to be at least $141,000, attributed it “almost completely” to a deceased member of the original management group, but did not feel “qualified to make [the] judgment” that the two remaining members of that group, including one who owned over 15% of respondent’s common stock, could be held liable. At the time of filing its Chapter XI petition, respondent stated its total assets as $685,608, of which $500,000 represented the stated estimated “value” of its trailer-rental system, an intangible asset. It stated in its petition that its trailer-rental system (which then consisted of arrangements with some 500 service station operator agents) “was built by [respondent] at an estimated cost of $500,000,” despite the fact that respondent’s balance sheet in 1961 showed the cost of establishing a system of 700 stations as only $33,750, and that in 1961 respondent had estimated that the cost of establishing an additional 800 rental stations would be only $56,000. The total liabilities were stated at $1,367,890, of which $710,597 was owed to trailer owners under their leasing agreements; $200,677 was owed to the investors who had paid for trailers that had never been manufactured; $71,805 was owed to trade and other general creditors; and $285,277 was owed-to respondent’s officers and directors. Under the proposed plan of arrangement submitted by respondent the investor-trailer owners were to exchange their entire interests (their rights in the trailers as well as the amounts owed them under the rental agreements) for stock of-Capitol on the basis of one share of stock for each $2 of “remaining capital investment in the trailers,” which sum was to be determined by deducting from the original purchase price of the trailers the amount, if any, which the owners had received as rental payments. Respondent’s officers and directors, as well as trade and other general creditors, were to receive one share of stock for each $3.50 of their claims. Respondent, itself, in exchange for transferring to Capitol its trailer-rental system, was to receive 107,000 shares which it would then distribute to its stockholders. Finally, obligations to two banks, totaling $55,558, although clearly unsecured, were to be paid 'in full, presumably because the officers and directors of respondent would otherwise, have been Hable as guarantors of these obHgations. If this plan were approved and all of the investor-trailer owners participated, a total of approximately 866,000 shares of Capitol’s stock would be issued to them, but approximately 81,500 shares would be issued directly to the officers and directors of respondent, 22,400 to. trade and other general creditors, and 107,000 to respondent itself to be distributed to its stockholders. More than 60% of respondent’s stock was held by eight men, seven of whom are officers and directors and the eighth one of the original-promoters of the venture. The SEC then filed a motion, under § 328 of the Bankruptcy Act, to dismiss the Chapter XI proceeding or, in effect, transfer it to Chapter X on the ground that it should have been brought under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act and thus Chapter XI is not available. A referee in bankruptcy to whom, as a special master, the motion was referred, recommended that it be denied on the grounds that the Commission had .not made “a sufficient showing to warrant the granting of the Section 328 motion.” At his hearing on this matter, the District Judge recognized that, in light of the fact that the investor-trailer owners were widely scattered and the nature of their' individual holdings was small, the proposed plan’s issuance of approximately 15% of Capitol’s stock to respondents officers and directors would mean that they, rather than the investor-trailer owners, would have effective control over Capitol, and expressed his “disapproval” of such a result. He also expressed disapproval of preferential treatment of the banks in order to avoid the obligations of the officer and director guarantors. The District Court, however, “accepted and adopted” the referee’s findings and denied the motion without a written opinion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, “since the granting of the motion rests in the discretion of the [district] court, while we think this is a border-line case, it does not appear that the S. E. C. has shown that adequate relief is not obtainable in Chapter XI proceedings or that there has been an abuse of that discretion warranting reversal.” 325 F. 2d 47, 52. We granted certiorari, 376 U. S. 948. II. The background and operative procedures of Chapter X and Chapter XI and the interrelationship between them have been reviewed by this Court in SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U. S. 434, and General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U. S. 462. This background was detailed in United States Realty, supra, as follows: Before passage, in 1934, of § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 Stat. 912, bankruptcy procedures offered no facilities for corporate rehabilitation, which, therefore, was left to equity receiverships, with their attendant paraphernalia of creditors’ and security holders’ committees, and of rival plans of reorganization,. Lack of judicial control of the conditions attending formulation of the plans, inadequate protection of widely scattered security holders, frequent adoption of plans which favored management at the expense of other interests and which afforded the corporation only temporary respite from financial collapse, so often characteristic of equity receivership reorganizations, led to the enactment of § 77B. See S. Doc. No. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 90; H. R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2. As does the present Chapter X, § 77B permitted the adjustment of all interests in the debtor, secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and stockholders. The day preceding the enactment of §.77B, Congress had created the Securities and Exchange Commission as a special agency charged with the function of protecting the investing public, 48 Stat. 885, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78d (1958 ed.). At the urging of, and based on extensive studies by the SEC, § 77B was, in 1938, revised and enacted in changed form as Chapter X. 52 Stat. 883-905. The aims of Chapter X as thus revised were to afford greater protection to creditors and stockholders by providing greater judicial control over the entire proceedings and impartial and expert administrative assistance in corporate reorganizations through appointment of a disinterested trustee and the active participation of the SEC. The trustee in a Chapter X proceeding is required to make a thorough examination and study of the debtor’s financial problems and management, Bankruptcy Act, §§ 167 (3), (5), and then transmit his independent report to the creditors, stockholders, the SEC, and others. Following this, the trustee gives notice to all creditors and stockholders to submit to him proposals for a plan of reorganization. §§167 (5), (6). The trustee then formulates a plan of reorganization which he presents to the court. If the court finds the plan worthy of consideration, it may refer it to the SEC for its opinion and must so refer it where the debtor’s liabilities exceed $3,000,000. § 172. When the proposed plan, after approval by the court, is finally submitted to the debtor’s creditors and stockholders, it is accompanied by the advisory report of the SEC, as well as the opinion of the judge who approved the plan. § 175. As to each class of creditors and stockholders whose rights are affected by the plan, the plan must receive the approval of the holders of two-thirds in amount of each class of creditors’ claims and, if the debtor has not been found to be insolvent, the holders of a majority of each class of stock. § 179. The plan becomes effective upon final confirmation by the court, based on a finding, inter alia, that “the plan is fair and equitable.” §221. As part of the, same Act in which Chapter X was enacted Congress álso, in 1938, enacted Chapter XI. 52 Stat. 905-916. Chapter XI is a statutory variation of the common-law composition of creditors and, unlike the broader scope of Chapter X, is limited to an adjustment of unsecured debts. It was sponsored by the National Association of Credit Men and other groups of creditors’ representatives whose experience had been in representing trade creditors in small and middle-sized commercial failures. See Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 6439 (reintroduced as H. R. 8046 and enacted in 1938), 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 31, 35; 13 J. N. A. Ref. Bankr. 17 (1938). The contrast between the provisions of Chapter X, carefully designed to protect the creditor and stockholder interests involved, and the summary provisions of Chapter XI is quite marked. The formulation of the plan of arrangement, and indeed the entire Chapter XI proceeding, for all practical purposes is.in the hands of the debtor, subject only to the requisite consent of a majority in number and amount of unsecured creditors, § 362, and the ultimate finding by the court that the plan is, inter alia, “for the best interests of the creditors,” § 366. “The process of formulating an arrangement and the solicitation of consent of creditors, sacrifices to speed and economy every safeguard, in the interest of thoroughness and distinterestedness, provided in Chapter X.” United States Realty, supra, at 450-451. The debtor generally remains in possession and operates the business under court supervision, § 342. A trustee is only provided in the very limited situation where á trustee in bankruptcy has previously been appointed, § 332. There is no requirement for a receiver, but the Court “may” appoint one if it finds it to be “necessary,” § 332. The plan of arrangement is proposed by, and only by, the debtor, §§ 306 (1), 323, 357, and creditors have only the choice of accepting or rejecting it. Acceptances may be solicited by the debtor even before filing of the Chapter XI petition and, in fact, must be solicited before court review of the plan, § 336 (4). There are no provisions for an independent study by the court or a trustee, or for advice by them being given to creditors in advance of the acceptance of the arrangement. In short, Chapter XI provides a summary procedure whereby judicial confirmation is obtained on a plan that has been formulated and accepted with only a bare minimum of independent control or supervision. This, of course, is consistent with the basic purpose of Chapter XI: to provide a quick and economical means of facilitating simple compositions among general creditors who have been deemed by Congress to need only the minimal disinterested protection provided by that Chapter. In enacting these two distinct methods of corporate rehabilitations, Congress has made it quite clear that Chapters X and XI are not alternate routes, the choice of which is in the hands of the debtor. Rather, they are legally, mutually exclusive paths to attempted financial rehabilitation. A Chapter X petition may not be filed unless “adequate relief” is not obtainable under Chapter XI, § 146 (2). Likewise, a Chapter XI petition is to be dismissed, or in effect transferred, if the proceedings “should have been brought” under Chapter X_, § 328. III. The SEC here contends that, as an absolute rule, all proceedings for the financial rehabilitation of a corporate debtor which would alter the rights of public investor creditors must be in Chapter X. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that there is no such absolute rule and that the determination of whether proceedings, on the facts of a particular case, should be in Chapter X or in Chapter XI rests in the discretion of the District Court, which discretion should not be reversed unless it is found to have been clearly abused. Both parties rely on United States Realty, supra, and General Stores Corp., supra, for their respective contentions. United States Realty- involved a corporation with publicly owned debentures, publicly owned mortgage certificates, and publicly owned stock, which proposed a plan of arrangement that would have left the debentures’and stock unaffected but would have both extended the time for payment of the publicly held mortgage certificates and reduced their interest rate. The SEC there argued that Chapter X is the exclusive avenue for financial rehabilitation of large corporations with many stockholders. While rejecting this argument as an absolute matter, the Court recognized that “in general . . . the two chapters were specifically devised to afford different procedures, the one [Chapter X] adapted to the reorganization of corporations with complicated debt structures and many stockholders, the other [Chapter XI] to composition of debts of small individual business and corporations with few stockholders . . . .” 310 U. S., at 447. The Court then held that, as the proposed plan of arrangement adversely affected the rights of many, widely scattered public creditors, to wit, the holders of mortgage certificates, the formulation of a plan with the judicial control, statutory SEC participation, and employment of disinterested trustees, assured by Chapter X, would better serve “the public and private interests concerned including those of the debtor,” id., at 455, than would the formulation of a Chapter XI plan under the almost complete control of the debtor. In reaching this result, the Court explored at great length the safeguards of Chapter X and their protection of public investors: “The basic assumption of Chapter X and other acts administered by the Commission is that the investing public dissociated from control or active participation in the management, needs impartial and expert administrative assistance in the ascertainment of facts, in theidetection of fraud, and in the understanding of complex financial problems.” Id., at 448-449, n. 6. Applying these principles, the Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the District Court’s refusal to dismiss a Chapter XI proceeding which the SEC had challenged on the grounds that it should have been brought under Chapter X. It should be noted that, prior to United States Realty, a bill had been introduced in Congress to draw a numerical line that would close Chapter XI to any corporation which had any class of its securities owned by 100 or more creditors or stockholders. See Hearing before Special Subcommittee on Bankruptcy and Reorganization of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 9864, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. In reporting out. the bill, the Subcommittee stated: • “Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the bill, which are eliminated by the last of your committee’s amendments, provided for amendments to chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act which were designed to prevent corporations which are publicly indebted or owned from filing a petition for an arrangement under, chapter XI, rather than a petition for reorganization under chapter X, the chapter specially designed for the reorganization of such corporations, .and to establish a numerical test of such 'public’ indebtedness or ownership. “Your committee believes that, while the amendments proposed by sections 4, .5, 6, and 7 are desirable, the element of emergency requiring their immediate passage has been eliminated by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Securities and Exchange Commission v. U. S. Realty and Improvement Company. That decision was rendered on May 27, 1940, after the introduction of the bill. Since immediate action on these proposals does not appear to be necessary, the last of your committee’s amendments provides for the striking.out of sections 4, 5, 6, and 7. The committee’s conclusion is supported by all of the'witnesses who testified at the. hearings before the committee’s Subcommittee' on Bankruptcy and Reorganization and also by the report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the bill.” H. R. Rep. No. 2372, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 2. In General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, supra, a corporation with over 2,000,000 shares of common stock, held by-over 7,000 shareholders, but with no publicly held debt of any kind, petitioned under Chapter XI for an arrangement of its unsecured debt, consisting of obligations to trade creditors and one private investor. The District Court had held, with the Court of Appeals affirming, that Chapter XI was unavailable as the debtor needed more extensive reorganization than merely a simple arrangement with unsecured creditors. This Court affirmed. In so doing, the Court again rejected the SEC’s argument that, as an absolute matter, Chapter XI is not available where the debtor is publicly owned. The Court stated: “It may well be that in most cases where the debtor’s securities are publicly held c. X will afford the more appropriate remedy. But that is not necessarily so. A large company with publicly held securities may have as much need for .a simple composition of unsecured debts as a smaller company. And there is no reason we can see. why c. XI may not serve that end. The essential difference is not between the small company and the large company but between the needs to be served.” 350 U. S., at 466. The Court pointéd out that the “needs to be served” included such factors as requirements of fairness to public debt holders, need for a trustee’s evaluation of an accounting from management or determination that new management is necessary, and the need to readjust a complicated debt structure requiring more than a simple composition of unsecured debt. Id., at 466-467. IV. ' We agree with the parties that the principles of United States Realty and General Stores apply to and govern the result in this case. We reaffirm the holdings of these cases that there is no absolute rule that Chapter X must be utilized in every case in which the corporate debtor is publicly owned. As this Court has recognized, Congress has drawn no such hard-and-fast line between the two Chapters. The SEC, purporting to bow to these holdings, urges in this case, however, a variation of its absolute-rule argument that, while not requiring Chapter X in all cases in which the debtor is publicly owned, would require the use of Chapter X in 100% of the cases involving the rights of public investor creditors. It argues, in support of this variation of its absolute rule, that to hold otherwise would deprive the investor creditors of Chapter X’s protection of the “fair and equitable” requirement of a plan. As noted above, whereas Chapter X contains the proviso that a plan must be “fair and equitable,” Chapter XI only requires that it be “for the best interests of' the creditors.” The words “fair arid equitable” are “words of art” which mean that senior interests are entitled to full priority over junior ones and, in particular, “that in any plan of corporate reorganization unsecured creditors are entitled to priority over stockholders to the full extent of their debts and that any scaling down of the claims, of creditors without some fair compensating advantage to them which is prior to the rights of stockholders is inadmissible.” United States Realty, supra, at 452. The SEC’s argument, however, is premised on the assertion, for which we can firid no support .in either the language or legislative history of Chapters X and XI, that Congress has deemed it necessary in all cases involving public investor creditors that they have the protection of the “fair and equitable” doctrine. In fact, the requirement that a plan be “fair and equitable” was part of Chapter XI, as well as Chapter X, until 1952, when Congress deleted it from Chapter XI and replaced it with the requirement that the plan be “for the best interests of the creditors.” Congress clearly deemed this latter requirement to be sufficient protection in a proceeding properly in Chapter XI in light of the general philosophy of Chapter XI to expedite “simple” compositions. See S. Rep. No. 1395, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 10, 11-12; H. R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 19, 20-21. There is no indication that in so doing, Congress intended in' any way to change the law on the interrelationship between Chapters X and XI. In fact, the history is just the opposite. In the same Act that deleted the “fair and equitable” requirement from Chapter XI, Congress expressly codified, in § 328, the rule of United States Realty providing for dismissal, or, in effect transfer, of a Chapter XI proceeding if it “should have been brought” in Chapter X. Nothing in this even suggests transfer as an absolute rule to give Chapter X’s “fair and equitable” protection to all cases involving public investors, which presumably if Congress had so intended, it would have so stated. Moreover, as noted above, supra, pp. 608-609, a House subcommittee previously approved the United States Realty holding of a general, but not absolute, rule, and had not reported out a bill that would have drawn an absolute line. The SEC further argues that Chapter X is required in all cases involving public investor creditors, because its right to intervene in a Chapter XI proceeding is limited solely to moving under § 328 for a transfer to Chapter X. We reject this argument. The District Court, in this case, quite properly recognized that th¿ SEC was not so limited in a Chapter XI proceeding, and we hold that, under the statutory scheme, while not charged with express statutory rights and responsibilities as in Chapter X, the SEC is entitled to intervene and be heard in a Chapr ter XI proceeding. We therefore reject the SEC’s variation of its absolute-rule argument, advanced in this case, that would require the use of Chapter X in all cases in which the rights of public investor creditors are involved. The short answer is that, as with the SEC’s original absolute-rule argument, Congress has drawn no such absolute line of demarcation between Chapters X and XI. This does not mean, however, that we disagree with the holding of United States Realty that, although there is no absolute rule requiring that Chapter X be utilized in every case in which the debtor is publicly owned, or even where publicly held debt is adjusted, as a general rule Chapter X is the appropriate proceeding for adjustment of publicly held debt. See SEC v. Canandaigua Enterprises Corp., 339 F. 2d 14 (C. A. 2d Cir.). Not only do we not disagree with this holding, but we expressly reaffirm it. Public investors are, as here, generally widely scattered and are far less likely than trade creditors to be aware of the financial condition and cause of the collapse of the debtor. They are less commonly organized in groups or committees capable of protecting their interests. They do not have the same interest as do trade creditors in continuing the business relations with the debtor. Where debt is publicly held, the SEC is likely, as here, to have become familiar with the debtor’s finances, indicating the desirability of its performing its full Chapter X functions. It seems clear that in enacting Chapter X Congress had the protection of public investors, and not trade creditors, primarily in mind. As noted above, Chapter X is one of many Acts in which the; SEC has the statutory right and responsibility to protect public investors. Finally, again it is clear that Congress was thinking of Chapter XI as primarily concerned with adjustment of the rights of trade creditors when it deemed the “fair and equitable” doctrine to be unnecessary to “simple” compositions in Chapter XI. General Stores indicates the narrow limits within which there are exceptions to this general rule that the rights of public investor creditors are to be adjusted only under Chapter X. “Simple” compositions are still to be effected under Chapter XI. . Such a situation, even where public debt is directly affected may exist, for example, where the public investors are few in number and familiar with the operations of the debtor, or where, although the public investors are greater in number, the adjustment of their debt is relatively minor, consisting, for example, of a short extension of time for payment. On the other hand, General Stores also makes it clear that even though there may be no public debt materially and directly affected, Chapter X is still, the appropriate proceeding where the débtor has widespread public stockholders and the protections of the public and private interests involved afforded by Chapter X are required because, for example,, there is evidence of management misdeeds for which an accounting might be made, there is a need for new management, or the financial condition of the debtor requires more than a simple composition of its unsecured debts. Applying .the above principles, it is obvious that Chapter X is the appropriate proceeding for the attempted rehabilitation of respondent in this case. Here public debts are being adjusted. The investors are many and widespread, not few. in number intimately connected with the debtor, and the adjustment is quite major and certainly not minor. These facts alone would require Chapter X proceedings under the above-stated principles. In addition there is here, as we have previously pointed out, substantial evidence of misappropriation of assets, and not only is there a need for a complete corporate reorganization, but it is obvious that the proposed plan of arrangement is just that. The trailer owners are exchanging their entire interests, including a sale of their trailers, in exchange for stock in a new corporation, in which other creditors of respondent, including respondent’s officers and directors, as well as respondent itself will have substantial interests. Indeed, this is the same complete reorganization, except that the plan here gives the public investor creditors even less than was previously offered, see noté 5, supra, that the SEC previously stopped as a public offering on the grounds that the offering material contained false and misleading information. The Court of Appeals itself recognized, 325 F. 2d, at 53, “that if the stock involved here were nut part of an arrangement, the disclosures made with regard to it’ | in soliciting the trailer owners’ consents to the plan] would be clearly inadequate. No authority has been found which would indicate- that recipients of stock issued in connection with an arrangement are not entitled to as much information as are those persons acquiring stock under ordinary conditions.” We agree. Indeed, the facts of this case aptly demonstrate the need for Chapter X protection as a general rule on the above-stated principles. There is clearly a need for a stúdy by a disinterested trustee to make a thorough examination of respondent’s .financial problems and management and submit á full report to the public-investor creditors. Respondent has never operated profitably, has always been in precarious financial condition, and apparently was hopelessly insolvent, in both the bankruptcy and equity sense, when the arrangement was proposed. At an earlier period, its management apparently misappropriated substantial corporate funds. Most of the trailers were purchased from an affiliated company; a large number of them, although paid for, were either not manufactured or, if manufactured, were not delivered. The affiliated company is bankrupt. Only approximately two-thirds of the $3,587,439 contributed by the public investors for the purchase of trailers was used for that purpose; the balance apparently having been drained off in high commissions taken by the management on the sale of the trailers to the public. Portions of these commissions on new trailer sales were, in turn, used by the management to pay prior purchasers of trailers the rentals which they had been promised.' When respondent filed its petition for an arrangement, its stated liabilities of $1,367,890 were approximately double its stated assets of $685,608;- with even most of the latter ($500,000) representing the alleged “estimated” value of the trailer-rental system, i. e., the debtor’s arrangements with the service station operators. The District Court itself recognized that “there may be in this situation need for new management, and there certainly is some question ... as to whether or not the. management that, is-presently . . . operating it, would continue tó do so for the best interests of the investors.” It did not find, however, that Chapter X was necessary since this need for new management had “not been clearly established yet.” One of the purposes of Chapter X is to give the independent trustee the opportunity to conduct a searching inquiry so as to “clearly establish” whether or not new management is necessary, when there is, as here, a substantial basis for such a belief. See General Stores, supra, at 466. Finally, it is clear that there is need for an independent investigation of possible causes of action against the past and present management of respondent, and it is as true now as when Chapter X was énacted, that “a debtor in possession cannot be expected to investigate itself.” Hearings before House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 176 (my Brother Douglas then testifying as Chairman of the SEC). Respondent, however, contends that Chapter X is not here appropriate as the time and expense involved in such a proceeding would be too great. This is, however, just another way of stating the natural preference of a debtor’s management for the “speed and economy” of Chapter XI, to the “thoroughness and disinterestedness” of Chapter X. In this area, as with other statutes designed, to protect the investing public, Congress has made the determination that the disinterested protection of the public investor outweighs the self-interest “needs” of corporate management for so-called “speed and. economy.” In fact, experience in this area has confirmed the view of Congress that the thoroughness and disinterestedness assured by Chapter X not only result in greater protection for the investing public, but often in greater ultimate savings for all interests, public and private, than do the so-called “speed and economy” of Chapter XI. See Twenty-Eighth Annual Report of the SEC 98 (1963); Twenty-Ninth Annual Report of the SEC 90-91 (1964); Note, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 352, 357-360 (1955). Moreover, the requirements of Chapter X are themselves sufficiently flexible so that the District Court can act to keep expenses within proper bounds and insure expedition in the proceedings. We also reject respondent’s further argument that the time and expense of a Chapter X proceeding would be so great that the ultimate result might be straight bankruptcy liquidation, which, respondent contends, “would mean probable total loss for [the] trailer owners.” In addition to the above answers to respondent’s general-time-and-expense argument, we feel compelled to point out, without indicating any opinion as to the ultimate outcome of the attempted financial rehabilitation in this case, that it must be recognized that Chapters X and XI were not designed to prolong — without good reason and at the expense of the investing public — the corporate life of every debtor suffering from terminal financial ills. See Fidelity Assurance Assn. v. Sims, 318 U. S. 608. Finally, respondent argues that the District Court’s decision that Chapter XI was the appropriate proceeding here should be affirmed on the basis that it was not a clear abuse of discretion. Respondent relies on certain language in the General Stores opinion in support of this contention. However, in making this contention it clearly misreads that opinion and misconceives its holding and import. Nothing in that opinion supports respondent’s view that the issue of whether Chapter X or Chapter XI is required permits open-ended discretion by a district court to decide on a case-by-case basis, without reliance on the principles which we have here reaffirmed, whether in its opinion it would be better for a particular debtor to be in Chapter X or Chapter XI. We agree with the statement of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a recent decision that such open-ended discretion would be bound to result in decisions reflecting the “particular experience and predilections” of the. district judge involved. SEC v. Canandaigua Enterprises Corp., supra, at 19. “The consequence,, particularly in a multijudge district, would be that the substantial rights of the parties would depend on the accident of the calendar — in défiánce of the memorable admonition, ‘It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another/ Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 33 (1921).” Ibid. We therefore also reject this contention of respondent. Applying the above-stated principles, it is clear that in this casé the motion by the SEC to dismiss, or, in effect, to transfer the proceedings to Chapter X, should have been granted. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case remanded to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. “The judge may, upon application of the Securities and Exchange Commission or any party in interest, and upon such notice to the debtor, to the Securities and Exchange Commission, and to such other persons as the judge may direct, if he finds that the proceedings should have been, brought under chapter 10 of this title, enter an order dismissing the proceedings under this chapter, unless, within such time as the judge shall fix, the petition be amended to comply with the requirement of chapter 10 of this title for the filing of a debtor’s petition or a creditors’ petition under such chapter, be filed. Upon the filing of such amended petition, or of such creditors’ petition, and the payment of such additional fees as may be required to comply with section 532 of this title, such amended petition or creditors’ petition shall thereafter, for all purposes of chapter 10 of this title, be deemed to have been originally filed under such chapter.” Respondent was originally one of a group of interrelated companies that'later merged into it; for simplicity we have considered it as one company throughout its history. Although the overwhelming majority of the agreements are of this type, they vary from 2% to 3% per month and from 5 to 10 years. A few provide for a flat 35% of the rental derived from the trailers involved. See Regulation A (17 CFR §230.251 et seq.), promulgated pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, § 3 (a), 48 Stat. 75, 15 U-. S. C. § 77c (a). (1958 ed.). This is, of course, less than the exchange that Capitol had offered some months earlier -under the exemption from registration which had been suspended, since there trailer owners had been offered one share of stock for each $2 that they had paid with no deductions for so-called “return of capital.” See supra, p. 599. Following this hearing, the plan was then modified to provide that respondent’s officers and directors would receive one share of Capitol stock for each $5.50, instead of each $3.50, of their claims, with this stock having limited voting, dividend and liquidation rights for five years, and that the banks would be treated in the same manner as respondent’s other general creditors. Where the debtor’s liabilities are less than ■ the minimal sum of $250,000, a situation clearly not present here, Chapter X permits, but-does not require, the court to appoint a trustee. Originally Chapter XI, as well as Chapter X, required that the plan be “fair and equitable.” That requirement of Chapter XI was changed to the one stated in the text in 1952. See infra, p. 611. This could only occur when the Chapter XI proceeding had been filed by a debtor already in straight bankruptcy proceedings. See §321; 8 Collier, Bankruptcy, 587-588 (1964 ed.). This, of course, also answers respondent’s argument that Congress, by deleting the “fair and equitable” requirement from Chapter XI, has somehow overturned the holding and principles of United States Realty. See also infra, p. 614. This, of course, does not mean that Chapter X’s greater protection for public investor creditors in this regard, as well as protections of greater judicial control, a disinterested trustee, and full statutory SEC participation, is irrelevant in determining whether, as a general rule, Chapter X or Chapter XI would better serve the “public and private interests involved,” cf. General Stores, supra, at 466. See infra, p. 614. While sometimes expressing different rationales for their conclusions it is clear that the courts of appeals have recognized the general rule stated above. See SEC v. Canandaigua Enterprises Corp., supra; SEC v. Crumpton Builders, Inc., 337 F. 2d 907 (C. A. 5th Cir.); SEC v. Liberty Baking Corp., 240 F. 2d 511 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Mecca Temple v. Darrock, 142 F. 2d 869 (C. A. 2d Cir.); cf. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. SEC, 320 F. 2d 940 (C. A. 2d Cir.); SEC v. Wilcox-Gay Corp., 231 F. 2d 859 (C. A. 6th Cir.); In re Transvision, Inc., 217 F. 2d 243 (C. A. 2d Cir.). See also In re Barchris Construction Corp., 223 F. Supp. 229 (D. C. S. D. N. Y.); In re Herold Radio & Electronics Corp., 191 F. Supp. 780 (D. C. S. D. N. Y.). E. g., Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq. (1958 ed.); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq. (1958 ed.). See H. R. Rep. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 21; S. Rep. No. 1395, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 11-12. Cf. United States Realty, supra, at 454. See note 13, supra.’ The court has, for example, a measure of control over the amount of work performed by the trustee, § 167, and must approve the fees of all participants in the proceedings, §§ 241-250. Both Chapters X and XI are designed as vehicles for possible financial rehabilitation. Chapter X explicitly requires that a petition brought under it must be dismissed if it has not been brought in “good faith.” § 141. “Good faith” is defined so as to exclude from Chapter X those cases, inter alia, where “it is unreasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization can be effected.” §146(3). Such a situation would exist where the debtor is so hopelessly insolvent that straight bankruptcy liquidation is the only available expedient. Fidelity Assurance Assn. v. Sims, supra; Goodman v. Michael, 280 F. 2d 106, 108 (C. A. 1st Cir.); 6 Collier, Bankruptcy, ¶6.09 (1964).- Chapter XI has a provision that a plan cannot be-confirmed unless it is “for the best interests of the creditors and is feasible.” § 366 (2). This provision has been construed to preclude' confirmation of a plan of arrangement where the plan would pay the creditors substantially less than they might reasonably expect to realize in liquidation. See In re Bruce Hunt Corp., 163 F. Supp. 939 (D. C. N. D. N. Y.); 9 Collier, Bankruptcy, ¶ 9.17 (1964). Respondent relies on language wherein, after pointing out that it “was the view of two lower courts” that the debtor there “may well need a more thoroughgoing capital readjustment than is possible under c. XI,” 350 U. S., at 468, Mr. Justice Douglas stated, for the Court: “We could reverse them only if their exercise of discretion transcended the allowable bounds. We cannot say that it does. Rather we think that the lower courts took a fair- redding of c. X and the functions it serves and reasonably concluded that this business needed' a more pervasive reorganization than is available under c. XI.” Ibid. It is clear in the context of that case that the discretionary issue there referred to was not discretion to determine the rules governing the issue of whether Chapter X or Chapter XI is appropriate, or whether these rules should be applied in all cases, but rather merely the factual question of whether or not that particular debtor needed a more pervasive reorganization than a simple composition under Chapter XI. Respondent’s further argument that Chapter XI still is appropriate since the plan, despite its clear terms, does not adversely affect the-trailer owners because each of them can remove his trailer at will is also without merit. ' First, as noted above, Chapter X would be required here even if there were no investor-creditors. Second, the argument that the plan is voluntary ignores the fact that the investors were not purchasing trailers but were investing in the corporation. Finally, some trailers were never manufactured, others are missing, and the remainder are scattered at gasoline stations throughout the western part of the United States. It cannot, seriously be contended that this right to find a trailer that was not intended to be purchased makes the plan a completely voluntary one. In so holding, we indicate no opinion as to whether or not a Chapter X reorganization would be appropriate' in this ease. See note 17, supra. We merely hold that all issues relevant to the possible financial rehabilitation of respondent must here be determined within the confines of a Chapter X, rather than a Chapter XI, proceeding. See United States Realty, supra, at 453; 9 Collier, supra, at ¶ 9.17.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CAMP, COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY v. PITTS et al. No. 72-864. Decided March 26, 1973 Per Curiam. In its present posture this case presents a narrow, but substantial, question with respect to the proper procedure to be followed when a reviewing court determines that an administrative agency’s stated justification for informal action does not provide an adequate basis for judicial review. In 1967, respondents submitted an application to the Comptroller of the Currency for a certificate authorizing them to organize a new bank in Hartsville, South Carolina. See 12 U. S. C. §27; 12 CFR §4.2 (1972). On the basis of information received from a national bank examiner and from various interested parties, the Comptroller denied the application and notified respondents of his decision through a brief letter, which stated in part: “ [W] e have concluded that the factors in support of the establishment of a new National Bank in this area are not favorable.” No formal hearings were required by the controlling statute or guaranteed by the applicable regulations, although the latter provided for hearings when requested and when granted at the discretion of the Comptroller. Respondents did not request a formal hearing but asked for reconsideration. That request was granted and a supplemental field examination was conducted, whereupon the Comptroller again denied the application, this time stating in a letter that “we were unable to reach a favorable conclusion as to the need factor,” and explaining that conclusion to some extent. Respondents then brought an action in federal district court seeking review of the Comptroller’s decision. The entire administrative record was placed before the court, and, upon an examination of that record and of the two letters of explanation, the court granted summary judgment against respondents, holding that de novo review was not warranted in the circumstances and finding that “although the Comptroller may have erred, there is substantial basis for his determination, and ... it was neither capricious nor arbitrary.” 329 F. Supp. 1302, 1308. On appeal, the Court of Appeals did not reach the merits. Rather, it held that the Comptroller’s ruling was “unacceptable” because “its basis” was not stated with sufficient clarity to permit judicial review. 463 F. 2d 632, 633. For the present, the Comptroller does not challenge this aspect of the court’s decision. He does, however, seek review here of the procedures that the Court of Appeals specifically ordered to be followed in the District Court on remand. The court held that the case should be remanded “for a trial de novo before the District Court” because “the Comptroller has twice inadequately and inarticulately resolved the [respondents’] presentation.” The court further specified that in the District Court, respondents “will open the trial with proof of their application and compliance with the statutory inquiries, and proffer of any other relevant evidence.” Then, “[testimony may ... be adduced by the Comptroller or intervenors manifesting opposition, if any, to the new bank.” On the basis of the record thus made, the District Court was instructed to make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law in order to determine “whether the [respondents] have shown by a preponderance of evidence that the Comptroller’s ruling is capricious or an abuse of discretion.” 463 F. 2d, at 634. We agree with the Comptroller that the trial procedures thus outlined by the Court of Appeals for the remand in this case are unwarranted under present law. Unquestionably, the Comptroller’s action is subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 701. See Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 156-158 (1970). But it is also clear that neither the National Bank Act nor the APA requires the Comptroller to hold a hearing or to make formal findings on the hearing record when passing on applications for new banking authorities. See 12 U. S. C. §26; 5 U. S. C. § 557. Accordingly, the proper standard for judicial review of the Comptroller’s adjudications is not the “substantial evidence” test which is appropriate when reviewing findings made on a hearing record, 5 U. S. C. § 706 (2) (E). Nor was the reviewing court free to hold a de novo hearing under § 706 (2) (F) and thereafter determine whether the agency action was “unwarranted by the facts.” It is quite plain from our decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402 (1971), that de novo review is appropriate only where there are inadequate factfinding procedures in an adjudicatory proceeding, or where judicial proceedings are brought to enforce certain administrative actions. Id., at 415. Neither situation applies here. The proceeding in the District Court was obviously not brought to enforce the Comptroller’s decision, and the only deficiency suggested in agency action or proceedings is that the Comptroller inadequately explained his decision. As Overton Park demonstrates, however, that failure, if it occurred in this case, is not a deficiency in factfinding procedures such as to warrant the de novo hearing ordered in this case. The appropriate standard for review was, accordingly, whether the Comptroller’s adjudication was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” as specified in 5 U. S. C. § 706 (2) (A). In applying that standard, the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court. Respondents contend that the Court of Appeals did not envision a true de novo review and that, at most, all that was called for was the type of “plenary review” contemplated by Overton Park, supra, at 420. We cannot agree. The present remand instructions require the Comptroller and other parties to make an evidentiary record before the District Court “manifesting opposition, if any, to the new bank.” The respondents were also to be afforded opportunities to support their application with “any other relevant evidence.” These instructions seem to put aside the extensive administrative record already made and presented to the reviewing court. If, as the Court of Appeals held and as the Comptroller does not now contest, there was such failure to explain administrative action as to frustrate effectivé judicial review, the remedy was not to hold a de novo hearing but, as contemplated by Overton Park, to obtain from the agency, either through affidavits or testimony, such additional explanation of the reasons for the agency decision as may prove necessary. We add a caveat, however. Unlike Overton Park, in the present case there was contemporaneous explanation of the agency decision. The explanation may have been curt, but it surely indicated the determinative reason for the final action taken: the finding that a new bank was an uneconomic venture in light of the banking needs and the banking services already available in the surrounding community. The validity of the Comptroller’s action must, therefore,, stand or fall on the propriety of that finding, judged, of course, by the appropriate standard of review. If that finding is not sustainable on the administrative record made, then the Comptroller’s decision must be vacated and the matter remanded to him for further consideration. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80 (1943). It is in this context that the Court of Appeals should determine whether and to what extent, in the light of the administrative record, further explanation is necessary to a proper assessment of the agency’s decision. The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. See 12 CFR § 4.12 (d) (1967). The regulations were amended in 1971, 36 Fed. Reg. 5051. For the present regulation, see 12 CFR §5.4 (1972). The letter reads in part: “On each application we endeavor to develop the need and convenience factors in conjunction with all other banking factors and in this case we were unable to reach a favorable conclusion as to the need factor. The record reflects that this market area is now served by the Peoples Bank with deposits of $7.2MM, The Bank of Harts-ville with deposits of $12.8MM, The First Federal Savings anil Loan Association with deposits of $5.4MM, The Mutual Savings and Loan Association with deposits of $8.2MM and the Sonoco Employees Credit Union with deposits of $6.5MM. The aforementioned are as of December 31, 1968.” Title 12 U. S. C. § 26 contemplates a wide-ranging ex parte investigation; it reads as follows: “Comptroller to determine if association can commence business. “Whenever a certificate is transmitted to the Comptroller of the Currency, as provided in this chapter, and the association transmitting the same notifies the comptroller that all of its capital stock has been duly paid in, and that such association has complied with all the provisions of this chapter required to be complied with before an association shall be authorized to commence the business of banking, the comptroller shall examine into the condition of such association, ascertain especially the amount of money paid in on account of its capital, the name and place of residence of each of its directors, and the amount of the capital stock of which each is the owner in good faith, and generally whether such association has complied with all the provisions of this chapter required to entitle it to engage in the business of banking; and shall cause to be made and attested by the oaths of a majority of the directors, and by the president or cashier of the association, a statement of all the facts necessary to enable the comptroller to determine whether the association is lawfully entitled to commence the business of banking.” (Emphasis added.) As to the APA, its requirement of a written statement of “findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor” (5 U. S. C. § 557 (c)(3)(A)), applies only to rulemaking proceedings (§ 553) and to adjudications “required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing” (§ 554 (a)). By its terms, then, the APA’s requirement of formal findings is not relevant since the National Bank Act plainly does not require agency hearings on applications for new banks.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KLEINDIENST, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. MANDEL et al. No. 71-16. Argued April 18, 1972 Decided June 29, 1972 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BuRger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Powell, and RehNqtjist, JJ., joined. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 770. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BreNNAN, J., joined, post, p. 774. Deputy Solicitor General Friedman argued the cause for appellants. On the briefs were Solicitor General Gris-wold, Assistant Attorney General Mardian, A. Raymond Randolph, Jr., Robert L. Keuch, Edward S. Christen-bury, and Lee B. Anderson. Leonard B. Boudin argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Victor Rabinowitz and David Rosenberg. David Carliner and Melvin L. Wulf filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellees have framed the issue here as follows: “Does appellants’ action in refusing to allow an alien scholar to enter the country to attend academic meetings violate the First Amendment rights of American scholars and students who had invited him?” Expressed in statutory terms, the question is whether §§212 (a) (28) (D) and (G)(v) and § 212 (d) (3) (A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 182, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182 (a)(28)(D) and (G)(v) and § 1182 (d) (3) (A), providing that certain aliens “shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States” unless the Attorney General, in his discretion, upon recommendation by the Secretary of State or a consular officer, waives inadmissibility and approves temporary admission, are unconstitutional as applied here in that they deprive American citizens of freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. The challenged provisions of the statute are: “Section 212(a). Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the following classes of aliens shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from admission into the United States: “(28) Aliens who are, or at any time have been, members of any of the following classes: “(D) Aliens not within any of the other provisions of this paragraph who advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship .... “(G) Aliens who write or publish . . . (v) the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship; . . . “(d) “(3) Except as provided in this subsection, an alien (A) who is applying for a nonimmigrant visa and is known or believed by the consular officer to be ineligible for such visa under one or more of the paragraphs enumerated in subsection (a) . . . may, after approval by the Attorney General of a recommendation by the Secretary of State or by the consular officer that the alien be admitted temporarily despite his inadmissibility, be granted such a visa and may be admitted into the United States temporarily as a nonimmigrant in the discretion of the Attorney General . . . .” Section 212 (d) (6) provides that the Attorney General “shall make a detailed report to the Congress in any case in which he exercises his authority under paragraph (3) of this subsection on behalf of any alien excludable under paragraphs (9), (10), and (28) . . . I Ernest E. Mandel resides in Brussels, Belgium, and is a Belgian citizen. He is a professional journalist and is editor-in-chief of the Belgian Left Socialist weekly La Gauche. He is author of a two-volume work entitled Marxist Economic Theory published in 1969. He asserted in his visa applications that he is not a member of the Communist Party. He has described himself, however, as “a revolutionary Marxist.” He does not dispute, see 325 F. Supp. 620, 624, that he advocates the economic, governmental, and international doctrines of world communism. Mandel was admitted to the United States temporarily in 1962 and again in 1968. On the first visit he came as a working journalist. On the second he accepted invitations to speak at a number of universities and colleges. On each occasion, although apparently he was not then aware of it, his admission followed a finding of ineligibility under § 212 (a) (28), and the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion to admit him temporarily, on recommendation of the Secretary of State, as § 212 (d) (3) (A) permits. On September 8, 1969, Mandel applied to the American Consul in Brussels for a nonimmigrant visa to enter the United States in October for a six-day period, during which he would participate in a conference on Technology and the Third World at Stanford University. He had been invited to Stanford by the Graduate Student Association there. The invitation stated that John Kenneth Galbraith would present the keynote address and that Mandel would be expected to participate in an ensuing panel discussion and to give a major address the following day. The University, through the office of its president, “heartily endorse [d]” the invitation. When Mandel’s intended visit became known, additional invitations for lectures and conference participations came to him from members of the faculties at Princeton, Amherst, Columbia, and Yassar, from groups in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and New York City, and from others. One conference, to be in New York City, was sponsored jointly by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and the Socialist Scholars Conference; Mandel’s assigned subject there was “Revolutionary Strategy in Imperialist Countries.” Mandel then filed a second visa application proposing a more extensive itinerary and a stay of greater duration. On October 23 the Consul at Brussels informed Mandel orally that his application of September 8 had been refused. This was confirmed in writing on October 30. The Consul’s letter advised him of the finding of inadmissibility under § 212 (a) (28) in 1962, the waivers in that year and in 1968, and the current denial of a waiver. It said, however, that another request for waiver was being forwarded to Washington in connection with Mandel’s second application for a visa. The Department of State, by a letter dated November 6 from its Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs to Mandel’s New York attorney, asserted that the earlier waivers had been granted on condition that Mandel conform to his itinerary and limit his activities to the stated purposes of his trip, but that on his 1968 visit he had engaged in activities beyond the stated purposes. For this reason, it was said, a waiver “was not sought in connection with his September visa application.” The Department went on to say, however, that it had now learned that Mandel might not have been • aware in 1968 of the conditions and limitations attached to his visa issuance, and that, in view of this and upon his assurances that he would conform to his stated itinerary and purposes, the Department was reconsidering his case. On December 1 the Consul at Brussels informed Mandel that his visa had been refused. The Department of State in fact had recommended to the Attorney General that Mandel’s ineligibility be waived with respect to his October visa application. The Immigration and Naturalization Service, however, acting on behalf of the Attorney General, see 28 U. S. C. § 510, in a letter dated February 13, 1970, to New York counsel stated that it had determined that Mandel’s 1968 activities while in the United States “went far beyond the stated purposes of his trip, on the basis of which his admission had been authorized and represented a flagrant abuse of the opportunities afforded him to express his views in this country.” The letter concluded that favorable exercise of discretion, provided for under the Act, was not warranted and that Mandel’s temporary admission was not authorized. Mandel’s address to the New York meeting was then delivered by transatlantic telephone. In March Mandel and six of the other appellees instituted the present action against the Attorney General and the Secretary of State. The two remaining appellees soon came into the lawsuit by an amendment to the complaint. All the appellees who joined Mandel in this action are United States citizens and are university professors in various fields of the social sciences. They are persons who invited Mandel to speak at universities and other forums in the United States or who expected to participate in colloquia with him so that, as the complaint alleged, “they may hear his views and engage him in a free and open academic exchange.” Plaintiff-appellees claim that the statutes are unconstitutional on their face and as applied in that they deprive the American plaintiffs of their First and Fifth Amendment rights. Specifically, these plaintiffs claim that the statutes prevent them from hearing and meeting with Mandel in person for discussions, in contravention of the First Amendment; that §212 (a) (28) denies them equal protection by permitting entry of “rightists” but not “leftists” and that the same section deprives them of procedural due process; that § 212 (d) (3) (A) is an unconstitutional delegation of congressional power to the Attorney General because of its broad terms, lack of standards, and lack of prescribed procedures; and that application of the statutes to Mandel was “arbitrary and capricious” because there was no basis in fact for concluding that he was ineligible, and no rational reason or basis in fact for denying him a waiver once he was determined ineligible. Declaratory and injunctive relief was sought. A three-judge district court was duly convened. The case was tried on the pleadings and affidavits with exhibits. Two judges held that, although Mandel had no personal right to enter the United States, citizens of this country have a First Amendment right to have him enter and to hear him explain and seek to defend his views. The court then entered a declaratory judgment that § 212 (a) (28) and § 212 (d) (3) (A) were invalid and void insofar as they had been or might be invoked by the defendants to find Mandel ineligible for admission. The defendants were enjoined from implementing and enforcing those statutes so as to deny Mandel admission as a nonimmigrant visitor. 325 F. Supp. 620 (EDNY 1971). Judge Bartels dissented. Id., at 637. Probable jurisdiction was noted. 404 U. S. 1013 (1972). II Until 1875 alien migration to the United States was unrestricted. The Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477, barred convicts and prostitutes. Seven years later Congress passed the first general immigration statute. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, 22 Stat. 214. Other legislation followed. A general revision of the immigration laws was effected by the Act of Mar. 3, 1903, 32 Stat. 1213. Section 2 of that Act made ineligible for admission “anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States or of all government or of all forms of law.” By the Act of Oct. 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 1012, Congress expanded the provisions for the exclusion of subversive aliens. Title II of the Alien Registration Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 671, amended the 1918 Act to bar aliens who, at any time, had advocated or were members of or affiliated with organizations that advocated violent overthrow of the United States Government. In the years that followed, after extensive investigation and numerous reports by congressional committees, see Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1, 94 n. 37 (1961), Congress passed the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987. This Act dispensed with the requirement of the 1940 Act of a finding in each case, with respect to members of the Communist Party, that the party did in fact advocate violent overthrow of the Government. These provisions were carried forwrard into the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. We thus have almost continuous attention on the part of Congress since 1875 to the problems of immigration and of excludability of certain defined classes of aliens. The pattern generally has been one of increasing control with particular attention, for almost 70 years now, first to anarchists and then to those with communist affiliation or views. III It is clear that Mandel personally, as an unadmitted and nonresident alien, had no constitutional right of entry to this country as a nonimmigrant or otherwise. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 292 (1904); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537, 542 (1950); Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 530-532 (1954); see Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 592 (1952). The appellees concede this. Brief for Appellees 33; Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. Indeed, the American appellees assert that “they sue to enforce their rights, individually and as members of the American public, and assert none on the part of the invited alien.” Brief for Appellees 14. “Dr. Mandel is in a sense made a plaintiff because he is symbolic of the problem.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 22. The case, therefore, comes down to the narrow issue whether the First Amendment confers upon the appellee professors, because they wish to hear, speak, and debate with Mandel in person, the ability to determine that Mandel should be permitted to enter the country or, in other words, to compel the Attorney General to allow Mandel’s admission. IV In a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First Amendment right to “receive information and ideas”: “It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas. 'This freedom [of speech and press] . . . necessarily protects the right to receive . . . Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 143 (1943) . . . .” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969). This was one basis for the decision in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945). The Court there held that a labor organizer’s right to speak and the rights of workers “to hear what he had to say,” id., at 534, were both abridged by a state law requiring organizers to register before soliciting union membership. In a very different situation, Me. Justice White, speaking for a unanimous Court upholding the FCC’s “fairness doctrine” in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 386-390 (1969), said: “It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail .... It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.” Id., at 390. And in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965), the Court held that a statute permitting the Government to hold “communist political propaganda” arriving in the mails from abroad unless the addressee affirmatively requested in writing that it be delivered to him placed an unjustifiable burden on the addressee’s First Amendment right. This Court has recognized that this right is “nowhere more vital” than in our schools and universities. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 487 (1960); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 603 (1967). See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968). In the present case, the District Court majority held: “The concern of the First Amendment is not with a non-resident alien’s individual and personal interest in entering and being heard, but with .the rights , of the citizens of the country to have the alien enter and to hear him explain and seek to defend his views; that, as Garrison [v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64 (1964)] and Red Lion observe, is of the essence of self-government.” 325 F. Supp., at 631. The Government disputes this conclusion on two grounds. First, it argues that exclusion of Mandel, involves no restriction on First Amendment rights at all since what is restricted is “only action — the action of the alien in coming into this country.” Brief for Appellants 29. Principal reliance is placed on Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1 (1965), where the Government’s refusal to validate an American passport for travel to Cuba was upheld. The rights asserted there were those of the passport applicant himself. The Court held that his right to travel and his asserted ancillary right to inform himself about Cuba did not outweigh substantial “foreign policy considerations affecting all citizens” that, with the backdrop of the Cuban missile crisis, were characterized as the “weightiest considerations of national security.” Id., at 13, 16. The rights asserted here, in some contrast, are those of American academics who have invited Man-del to participate with them in colloquia, debates, and discussion in the United States. In light of the Court’s previous decisions concerning the “right to receive information,” we cannot realistically say that the problem facing us disappears entirely or is nonexistent because the mode of regulation bears directly on physical movement. In Thomas the registration requirement on its face concerned only action. In Lamont, too, the face of the regulation dealt only with the Government’s undisputed power to control physical entry of mail into the country. See United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 263 (1967). The Government also suggests that the First Amendment is inapplicable because appellees have free access to Mandel’s ideas through his books and speeches, and because “technological developments,” such as tapes or telephone hook-ups, readily supplant his physical presence. This argument overlooks what may be particular qualities inherent in sustained, face-to-face debate, discussion and questioning. While alternative means of access to Mandel’s ideas might be a relevant factor were we called upon to balance First Amendment rights against governmental regulatory interests — a balance we find unnecessary here in light of the discussion that follows in Part Y — we are loath to hold on this record that existence of other alternatives extinguishes altogether any constitutional interest on the part of the appellees in this particular form of access. V Recognition that First Amendment rights are implicated, however, is not dispositive of our inquiry here. In accord with ancient principles of the international law of nation-states, the Court in The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581, 609 (1889), and in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893), held broadly, as the Government describes it, Brief for Appellants 20, that the power to exclude aliens is “inherent in sovereignty, necessary for maintaining normal international relations and defending the country against foreign encroachments and dangers — a power to be exercised exclusively by the political branches of government . . . Since that time, the Court’s general reaffirmations of this principle have been legion. The Court without exception has sustained Congress’ “plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden.” Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 387 U. S. 118, 123 (1967). “[O] ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over” the admission of aliens. Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 339 (1909). In Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 547 (1895), the first Mr. Justice Harlan said: “The power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come to this country, and to have its declared policy in that regard enforced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial intervention, is settled by our previous adjudications.” Mr. Justice Frankfurter ably articulated this history in Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522 (1954), a deportation case, and we can do no better. After suggesting, at 530, that “much could be said for the view” that due process places some limitations on congresssional power in this area “were we writing on a clean slate,” he continued: “But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power of Congress under review, there is not merely 'a page of history’. . . but a whole volume. Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of government. In the enforcement of these policies, the Executive Branch of the Government must respect the procedural safeguards of due process. . . . But that the formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly embedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government. . . . “We are not prepared to deem ourselves wiser or more sensitive to human rights than our predecessors, especially those who have been most zealous in protecting civil liberties under the Constitution, and must therefore under our constitutional system recognize congressional power in dealing with aliens ....” Id., at 531-532. We are not inclined in the present context to reconsider this line of cases. Indeed, the appellees, in contrast to the amicus, do not ask that we do so. The appellees recognize the force of these many precedents. In seeking to sustain the decision below, they concede that Congress could enact a blanket prohibition against entry of all aliens falling into the class defined by §§ 212 (a) (28) (D) and (G) (v), and that First Amendment rights could not override that decision. Brief for Appellees 16. But they contend that by providing a waiver procedure, Congress clearly intended that persons ineligible under the broad provision of the section would be temporarily admitted when appropriate “for humane reasons and for reasons of public interest.” S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1952). They argue that the Executive’s implementation of this congressional mandate through decision whether to grant a waiver in each individual case must be limited by the First Amendment rights of persons like appellees. Specifically, their position is that the First Amendment rights must prevail, at least where the Gov-eminent advances no justification for failing to grant a waiver. They point to the fact that waivers have been granted in the vast majority of cases. Appellees’ First Amendment argument would prove too much. In almost every instance of an alien excludable under § 212 (a) (28), there are probably those who would wish to meet and speak with him. The ideas of most such aliens might not be so influential as those of Mandel, nor his American audience so numerous, nor the planned discussion forums so impressive. But the First Amendment does not protect only the articulate, the well known, and the popular. Were we to endorse the proposition that governmental power to withhold a waiver must yield whenever a bona fide claim is made that American citizens wish to meet and talk with an alien excludable under §212 (a) (28), one of two unsatisfactory results would necessarily ensue. Either every claim would prevail, in which case the plenary discretionary authority Congress granted the Executive becomes a nullity, or courts in each case would be required to weigh the strength of the audience’s interest against that of the Government in refusing a waiver to the particular alien applicant, according to some as yet undetermined standard. The dangers and the undesirability of making that determination on the basis of factors such as the size of the audience or the probity of the speaker’s ideas are obvious. Indeed, it is for precisely this reason that the waiver decision has, properly, been placed in the hands of the Executive. Appellees seek to soften the impact of this analysis by arguing, as has been noted, that the First Amendment claim should prevail, at least where no justification is advanced for denial of a waiver. Brief for Appellees 26. The Government would have us reach this question, urging a broad decision that Congress has delegated the waiver decision to the Executive in its sole and unfettered discretion, and any reason or no reason may be given. See Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 357-358 (1956) ; Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U. S. 72, 77 (1957); Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U. S. 405, 408 (1960). This record, however, does not require that we do so, for the Attorney General did inform Mandel’s counsel of the reason for refusing him a waiver. And that reason was facially legitimate and bona fide. The Government has chosen not to rely on the letter to counsel either in the District Court or here. The fact remains, however, that the official empowered to make the decision stated that he denied a waiver because he concluded that previous abuses by Mandel made it inappropriate to grant a waiver again. With this, we think the Attorney General validly exercised the plenary power that Congress delegated to the Executive by §§ 212 (a) (28) and (d)(3). In summary, plenary congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been firmly established. In the case of an alien excludable under §212 (a) (28), Congress has delegated conditional exercise of this power to the Executive. We hold that when the Executive exercises this power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant. What First Amendment or other grounds may be available for attacking exercise of discretion for which no justification whatsoever is advanced is a question we neither address nor_ decide in this case. Reversed. Brief for Appellees 1. E. Mandel, Revolutionary Strategy in the Imperialist Countries (1969), reprinted in App. 54r-66. Appellees, while suggesting that §101 (a) (40), defining “world communism,” and § 212 (a) (28) (D) are unacceptably vague, “do not contest the fact that appellants can and do conclude that Dr. Mandel’s Marxist economic philosophy falls within the scope of these vague provisions.” Brief for Appellees 10 n. 8. Entry presumably was claimed as a nonimmigrant alien under § 101 (a) (15) (H) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (15) (H), namely, “an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning (i) who is of distinguished merit and ability and who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform services of an exceptional nature requiring such merit and ability . . . Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissent, post, at 773 n. 4, states that Mandel's noncompliance with the conditions imposed for his 1968 visit “appear merely to have been his speaking at more universities than his visa application indicated.” The letter dated November 6, 1969, from the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs of the Department of State to Mandel’s New York counsel observed: “On his 1968 visit, Mr. Mandel engaged in activities beyond the stated purposes of his trip. For this reason, a waiver of ineligibility was not sought in connection with his September visa application.” Counsel’s affidavit in support of appellees’ motion for the convening of a three-judge court and for the issuance of a preliminary injunction stated: “Mr. Mandel further assured the Consul by letter on November 10, 1969 that he would not appear at any assembly in the United States at which money was solicited for any political cause. This was apparently in response to a charge that he had been present at such a solicitation during his 1968 tour. (See also Exhibit L.) “Of course, just as Mr. Mandel had no prior notice that he was required to adhere to a stated itinerary in 1968, so Mr. Mandel was not aware that he was forbidden from appearing where contributions [were] solicited for political causes. I have been advised by Mr. George Novaek, an American citizen, who coordinated Mr. Mandel’s 1968 tour, that in fact the event in question was a cocktail reception held at the Gotham Art Theatre in New York City on October 19, 1968. Mr. Mandel addressed the gathering on the events in France during May and June. Later that evening posters by French students were auctioned. The money was sent to aid the legal defense of students who had taken part in the spring demonstrations. Mr. Mandel did not participate in the fund raising. (See Ex. L, Oct. 30, 1969 letter.)” The asserted noncompliance by Mandel is therefore broader than mere acceptance of more speaking engagements than his visa application indicated. See, for example, Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 659 (1892); Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U. S. 296, 302 (1902); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 294 (1904); Keller v. United States, 213 U. S. 138, 143-144 (1909); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 40 (1924); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 210 (1953) ; cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 377 (1971). The Government’s brief states : “The Immigration and Naturalization Service reports the following with respect to applications to the Attorney General for waiver of an alien’s ineligibility for admission under Section 212 (a) (28): Total Number of Number Applications for of Waiver of Waivers “Year Section 212 (a) (28) Granted Number of Waivers Denied 1971 6210 6196 14 1970 6193 6189 4 1969 4993 4984 9 1968 4184 4176 8 1967 3860 3852 8” Brief for Appellants 18 n. 24. These cases, however, are only those that, as § 212 (d) (3) (A) provides, come to the Attorney General with a positive recommendation from the Secretary of State or the consular officer. The figures do not include those cases where these officials had refrained from making a positive recommendation.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. AMERICAN BAR ENDOWMENT et al. No. 85-599. Argued April 28, 1986 Decided June 23, 1986 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 119. Powell and O’Con-nor, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of the ease. Albert G. Lauber, Jr., argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Acting Assistant Attorney General Olsen, Gary R. Allen, and Robert S. Pomerance. Francis M. Gregory, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Randolph W. Thrower, Mac Asbill, Jr., and Sheila J. Carpenter Thomas F. Olson and Carl G. Borden filed a brief for the California Farm Bureau Federation as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The first issue in this case is whether income that a tax-exempt charitable organization derives from offering group insurance to its members constitutes “unrelated business income” subject to tax under §§511 through 513 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code), 26 U. S. C. §§511-513. The second issue is whether the organization’s members may claim a charitable deduction for the portion of their premium payments that exceeds the actual cost to the organization of providing insurance. I Respondent American Bar Endowment (ABE) is a corporation exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Code, which, with certain exceptions not relevant here, exempts organizations “organized and operated exclusively for . . . charitable ... or educational purposes.” ABE’s primary purposes are to advance legal research and to promote the administration of justice, and it furthers these goals primarily through the distribution of grants to other charitable and educational groups. All members of the American Bar Association (ABA) are automatically members of ABE. The ABA is exempt from taxation as a “business league” under § 501(c)(6). ABE raises money for its charitable work by providing group insurance policies, underwritten by major insurance companies, to its members. Approximately 20% of ABE’s members participate in the group insurance program, which offers life, health, accident, and disability policies. ABE negotiates premium rates with insurers and chooses which insurers shall provide the policies. It also compiles a list of its own members and solicits them, collects the premiums paid by its members, transmits those premiums to the insurer, maintains files on each policyholder, answers members’ questions concerning insurance policies, and screens claims for benefits. There are two important benefits of purchasing insurance as a group rather than individually. The first is that ABE’s size gives it bargaining power that individuals lack. The second is that the group policy is experience rated. This means that the cost of insurance to the group is based on that group’s claims experience, rather than general actuarial tables. Because ABA members have favorable mortality and morbidity rates, experience rating results in a substantially lower insurance cost. When ABE purchases a group policy for its members, it pays a negotiated premium to the insurance company. If, as is uniformly true, the insurance company’s actual cost of providing insurance to the group is lower than the premium paid in a given year, the insurance company pays a refund of the excess, called a “dividend,” to ABE. Critical to ABE’s fundraising efforts is the fact that ABE requires its members to agree, as a condition of participating in the group insurance program, that they will permit ABE to keep all of the dividends rather than distributing them pro rata to the insured members. It would be possible for ABE to negotiate lower premium rates for its members than the rates it has charged throughout the relevant period, and thus receive a lower dividend. However, ABE prices its policies competitively with other insurance policies offered to the public and to ABE members. 761 F. 2d 1573, 1575 (CAFC 1985). In this way ABE is able to generate large dividends to be used for its charitable purposes. In recent years the total amount of dividends has exceeded 40% of the members’ premium payments. Ibid. ABE advises its insured members that each member’s share of the dividends, less ABE’s administrative costs, constitutes a tax-deductible contribution from the member to ABE. Thus the after-tax cost of ABE’s insurance to its members is less than the cost of a commercial policy with identical coverage and premium rates. In 1980 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) advised ABE that it considered ABE’s insurance plan an “unrelated trade or business” and that the profits thereon were subject to tax under §§ 511-513. Subsequently IRS audited ABE’s tax returns for 1979 and 1980 and assessed a tax deficiency on ABE’s net revenues from the insurance program. ABE paid those taxes, as well as taxes on the 1981 revenues. After exhausting administrative remedies, it brought an action for a refund in the Claims Court, arguing that its revenues from the insurance program were not subject to tax. At approximately the same time, the individual respondents, who were participants in the ABE insurance program but who had not originally deducted any part of the insurance premiums as charitable contributions, brought suit for refunds in the Claims Court as well. The individual respondents argued that they were entitled to charitable deductions for a portion of those premium payments. The two suits were consolidated for trial in the Claims Court. The Claims Court entered judgment for ABE in its suit, finding that ABE’s provision of insurance to its members did not constitute a “trade or business” subject to tax. 4 Cl. Ct. 404 (1984). It found for the Government, however, on the individual respondents’ claims. The court concluded that a taxpayer may claim a charitable contribution for a portion of a payment for goods or services only when he can show that “he bought goods or services for more than their economic value, with the intention that the excess be used to benefit a charitable enterprise,” id., at 415 (citation omitted), and that the individual respondents had not established these facts. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed as to ABE’s taxes. 761 F. 2d, at 1577. As to the individual respondents, however the court reversed and remanded for further factfinding. We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari on both issues, 474 U. S. 1004 (1985), and we now reverse. II We recently discussed the history and structure of the unrelated business income provisions of the Code in United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U. S. 834 (1986). The Code imposes a tax, at ordinary corporate rates, on the income that a tax-exempt organization obtains from an “unrelated trade or business . . . regularly carried on by it.” §§ 512(a)(1), 511(a)(1). An “unrelated trade or business” is “any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related ... to the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose,” § 513(a). The Code thus sets up a three-part test. ABE’s insurance program is taxable if it (1) constitutes a trade or business; (2) is regularly carried on; and (3) is not substantially related to ABE’s tax-exempt purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.513 — 1(a), 26 CFR § 1.513-l(a) (1985); American College of Physicians, supra, at 838-839. ABE concedes that the latter two portions of this test are satisfied. 761 F. 2d, at 1576. Its defense is based solely on the proposition that its insurance program does not constitute a trade or business. A In the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, Congress defined a “trade or business” as “any activity which is carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or the performance of services,” § 513(c). The Secretary of the Treasury has provided further clarification of that definition in Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (b) (1985), which provides: “in general, any activity of [an exempt] organization which is carried on for the production of income and which otherwise possesses the characteristics required to constitute ‘trade or business’ within the meaning of section 162” is a trade or business for purposes of 26 U. S. C. §§ 511-513. ABE’s insurance program falls within the literal language of these definitions. ABE’s activity is both “the sale of goods” and “the performance of services,” and possesses the general characteristics of a trade or business. Certainly the assembling of a group of better-than-average insurance risks, negotiating on their behalf with insurance companies, and administering a group policy are activities that can be — and are — provided by private commercial entities in order to make a profit. ABE itself earns considerable income from its program. Nevertheless, the Claims Court and Court of Appeals concluded that ABE does not carry out its insurance program in order to make a profit. The Claims Court relied on the former Court of Claims holding, in Disabled American Veterans v. United States, 650 F. 2d 1178, 1187 (1981), that an activity is a trade or business only if “operated in a competitive, commercial manner.” See 4 Cl. Ct., at 409. Because ABE does not operate its insurance program in a competitive, commercial manner, the Claims Court decided, that program is not a trade or business. The Court of Appeals adopted this reasoning. 761 F. 2d, at 1577. The Claims Court rested its conclusion on four factors. First, it found that “the program was devised as a means for fundraising and has been so presented and perceived from its inception.” 4 Cl. Ct., at 409. Second, the court found that the program’s phenomenal success in generating dividends for ABE was evidence of noncommercial behavior. The court noted that ABE’s insurance program has provided $81.9 million in dividends in its 28 years of operation, and concluded that such large profits could not be the result of commercial success, but must proceed from the generosity of ABE’s members. Third, and most important, in the court’s view, was the fact that ABE’s members collectively had the power to change ABE’s conduct of the insurance program so as to drastically reduce premiums. That the members had not done so was strong evidence that they sought to further ABE’s charitable purposes by paying higher insurance rates than necessary. Fourth, because ABE did not underwrite insurance or act as a broker, it was not competing with other commercial entities. It appears, then, that the Claims Court viewed ABE as engaging in two separate activities — the provision of insurance and the acceptance of contributions in the form of dividends. If so, the unspoken premise of the Claims Court’s decision is that ABE’s income is not a result of the first activity, but of the second. There is some sense to this reasoning; should ABE sell a product to its members for more than that product’s fair market value, it could argue to the IRS that the members intended to pay excessive prices as a form of contribution, and that some formula should be adopted to separate the income received into taxable profits and nontaxable contributions. Even if we viewed it as appropriate for the federal courts to engage in such a quasi-legislative activity, however, there is no factual basis for the Claims Court’s attempt to do so in this case. B We cannot agree with the Claims Court that the enormous dividends generated by ABE’s insurance program demonstrate that those dividends cannot constitute “profits.” Were ABE’s insurance markedly more expensive than other insurance products available to its members, but ABE nevertheless kept the patronage of those members, we might plausibly conclude that generosity was the reason for the program’s success. The Claims Court did not find, however, that this was the case. ABE prices its insurance to remain competitive with the rest of the market. Id., at 406. Thus ABE’s members never squarely face the decision whether to support ABE or to reduce their own insurance costs. The Claims Court concluded that “such profit margins [as ABE’s] cannot be maintained year after year in a competitive market.” Id., at 410. The court apparently reasoned that ABE’s staggering success would inevitably induce other firms to offer similar programs to ABA members unless that success is the result of charitable intentions rather than price-sensitive purchasing decisions. It is possible, of course, that ABE’s members genuinely intend to support ABE by paying higher premiums than necessary, and would pay those high premiums even if a competing group insurance plan offered very low premiums. But that is by no means the only possible explanation for the market’s failure to provide competition for ABE. Lacking a factual basis for concluding that generosity is at the core of ABE’s success, we can easily view this case as a standard example of monopoly pricing. ABE has a unique asset — its access to the ABA’s members and their highly favorable mortality and morbidity rates — and it has chosen to appropriate for itself all of the profit possible from that asset, rather than sharing any with its members. The argument that ABE’s members could change the insurance program and receive the bulk of the dividends themselves if they so desired is unconvincing. Were ABE to give each member a choice between retaining his pro rata share of dividends or assigning thenrto ABE, the organization would have a strong argument that those dividends constituted a voluntary donation. That, however, is not the case here. ABE requires its members to assign it all dividends as a condition for participating in the insurance program. It is simply incorrect to characterize the assignment of dividends by each member as “voluntary” simply because the members theoretically could band together and attempt to change the policy. Again, the Claims Court put too much weight on an unsupported assumption. It found that the program was “operated with the approval and consent of the ABA membership,” ibid., observing that the program had met with “surprisingly little dissent,” id., at 411, even though there were “ample” opportunities for members to change policies with which they disagreed, ibid. We believe that those facts cannot carry the weight that the Claims Court put on them. Perhaps each member that purchases insurance would, given the option, pay excessive premiums in order to support ABE’s charitable purposes; however, that is not the only possible explanation for the members’ failure to change the program. Any given member might feel that the potential savings in insurance costs are not sufficient to justify the effort required to mount a challenge to ABE’s leadership. Many might not want to “make waves” and upset a program that generates tax-free income for ABE and charitable deductions for their fellow members. The members’ theoretical ability to change the program, therefore, is at best inconclusive. The Claims Court also erred in concluding that ABE’s insurance program did not present the potential for unfair competition. The undisputed purpose of the unrelated business income tax was to prevent tax-exempt organizations from competing unfairly with businesses whose earnings were taxed. H. R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 36 (1950); see United States v. American College of Physicians, 475 U. S., at 838. This case presents an example of precisely the sort of unfair competition that Congress intended to prevent. If ABE’s members may deduct part of their premium payments as a charitable contribution, the effective cost of ABE’s insurance will be lower than the cost of competing policies that do not offer tax benefits. Similarly, if ABE may escape taxes on its earnings, it need not be as profitable as its commercial counterparts in order to receive the same return on its investment. Should a commercial company attempt to displace ABE as the group policyholder, therefore, it would be at a decided disadvantage. The Claims Court failed to find any taxable entities that compete with ABE, and therefore found no danger of unfair competition. It is likely, however, that many of ABE’s members belong to other organizations that offer group insurance policies. Employers, trade associations, and financial services companies frequently offer group insurance policies. Presumably those entities are taxed on their profits, and their policyholders may not deduct any part of the premiums paid. Such entities may therefore find it difficult to compete for the business of any ABE members who are otherwise eligible to participate in these group insurance programs. The only valid argument in ABE’s favor, therefore, is that the insurance program is billed as a fundraising effort. That fact, standing alone, cannot be determinative, or any exempt organization could engage in a tax-free business by “giving away” its product in return for a “contribution” equal to the market value of the product. ABE further contends that it must prevail because the Claims Court found that ABE’s profits represent contributions rather than business income; ABE argues that we may not upset that finding unless it is clearly erroneous. Cf. Carter v. Commissioner, 645 F. 2d 784, 786 (CA9 1981) (question of profit motive for purposes of § 162 is one of fact). The undisputed facts, however, simply will not support the inference that the dividends ABE receives are charitable contributions from its members rather than profits from its insurance program. Moreover, the Claims Court failed to articulate a legal rule that would permit it to split ABE’s activities into the gratuitous provision of a service and the acceptance of voluntary contributions, and we find no such rule in the Code or regulations. Even if we assumed, however, that the court’s failure to attach the label “trade or business” to ABE’s insurance program constitutes a finding of fact, we would be constrained to hold that finding clearly erroneous. Ill Section 170 of the Code provides that a taxpayer may deduct from taxable income any “charitable contribution,” defined as “a contribution or gift to or for the use of” qualifying entities, § 170(c). The individual respondents contend that the excess of their premium payments over the cost to ABE of providing insurance constitutes a contribution or gift to ABE. Many of the considerations supporting our holding that ABE’s earnings from the insurance program are taxable also bear on the question whether ABE’s members may deduct part of their premium payments. The evidence demonstrates, and the Claims Court found, that ABE’s insurance is no more costly to its members than other policies — group or individual — available to them. Thus, as we have recognized, ABE’s members are never faced with the hard choice of supporting a worthwhile charitable endeavor or reducing their own insurance costs. A payment of money generally cannot constitute a charitable contribution if the contributor expects a substantial benefit in return. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 196 (1954); Singer Co. v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 90, 449 F. 2d 413 (1971). However, as the Claims Court recognized, a taxpayer may sometimes receive only a nominal benefit in return for his contribution. Where the size of the payment is clearly out of proportion to the benefit received, it would not serve the purposes of § 170 to deny a deduction altogether. A taxpayer may therefore claim a deduction for the difference between a payment to a charitable organization and the market value of the benefit received in return, on the theory that the payment has the “dual character” of a purchase and a contribution. See, e. g., Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 Cum. Bull. 104 (price of ticket to charity ball deductible to extent it exceeds market value of admission); Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 Cum. Bull. 104, 105 (noting possibility that payment to charitable organization may have “dual character”). In Rev. Rul. 67-246, supra, the IRS set up a two-part test for determining when part of a “dual payment” is deductible. First, the payment is deductible only if and to the extent it exceeds the market value of the benefit received. Second, the excess payment must be “made with the intention of making a gift.” 1967-2 Cum. Bull., at 105. The Tax Court has adopted this test, see Murphy v. Commissioner, 54 T. C. 249, 254 (1970); Arceneaux v. Commissioner, 36 TCM 1461, 1464 (1977); but see Oppewal v. Commissioner, 468 F. 2d 1000, 1002 (CA1 1972) (expressing “dissatisfaction with such subjective tests as the taxpayer’s motives in making a purported charitable contribution” and relying solely on differential between amount of payment and value of benefit). The Claims Court applied that test in this case, and held that respondents Broadfoot, Boynton, and Turner had not established that they could have purchased comparable insurance for less money. Therefore, the court held, they had failed to establish that the value of ABE’s insurance to them was less than the premiums paid. 4 Cl. Ct., at 415-417. Respondent Sherwood demonstrated that there did exist a group insurance program for which he was eligible and which offered lower premiums than ABE’s insurance. However, Sherwood failed to establish that he was aware of that competing program during the years at issue. Sherwood therefore had failed to demonstrate that he met the second part of the above test — that he had intentionally paid more than the market value for ABE’s insurance because he wished to make a gift. The Court of Appeals, in reversing, held that the Claims Court had focused excessively on the taxpayers’ motivation. In the Court of Appeals’ view, the necessary inquiry was whether “the transaction was ... of a business and not a charitable nature,” considering all of the circumstances. 761 F. 2d, at 1582. The Court of Appeals therefore remanded for redetermination under that standard. We hold that the Claims Court applied the proper standard. The sine qua non of a charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property without adequate consideration. The taxpayer, therefore, must at a minimum demonstrate that he purposely contributed money or property in excess of the value of any benefit he received in return. The most logical test of the value of the insurance respondents received is the cost of similar policies. Three of the four individual respondents failed to demonstrate that they could have purchased similar policies for a lower cost, and we must therefore assume that the value of ABE’s insurance to those taxpayers at least equals their premium payments. Had respondent Sherwood known that he could purchase comparable insurance for less money, ABE’s insurance would necessarily have declined in value to him. Because Sherwood did not have that knowledge, however, we again must assume that he valued ABE’s insurance equivalently to those competing policies of which he was aware. Because those policies cost as much as or more than ABE’s, Sherwood has failed to demonstrate that he intentionally gave away more than he received. > l — l We hold that ABE’s insurance program is a “trade or business” for purposes of the unrelated business income tax. We further hold that the individual taxpayers have not established that any portion of their premium payments to ABE constitutes a charitable contribution. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court with instructions to reverse the judgment of the Claims Court with respect to ABE and to affirm the judgment of the Claims Court with respect to the individual taxpayers. It is so ordered. Justice Powell and Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 162 permits a taxpayer to deduct “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.” Undoubtedly due to the desirability of tax deductions, § 162 has spawned a rich and voluminous jurisprudence. The standard test for the existence of a trade or business for purposes of § 162 is whether the activity “was entered into with the dominant hope and intent of realizing a profit.” Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 F. 2d 695, 704 (CA11 1984) (citation omitted). Thus several Courts of Appeals have adopted the “profit motive” test to determine whether an activity constitutes a trade or business for purposes of the unrelated business income tax. See Professional Insurance Agents of Michigan v. Commissioner, 726 F. 2d 1097 (CA6 1984); Carolinas Farm & Power Equipment Dealers v. United States, 699 F. 2d 167 (CA4 1983); Louisiana Credit Union League v. United States, 693 F. 2d 525 (CA5 1982). One obvious consideration is that ABE’s tax-exempt status would make it difficult for private firms to compete, see infra, at 114-115. In addition, as the Claims Court recognized, 4 Cl. Ct. 404, 414 (1984), the provision of group insurance coverage to a particular group may have the characteristics of a natural monopoly. The potential savings in insurance costs might decrease rapidly as the group splits into competing components. Finally, if the cost of assembling information about a particular group and maintaining an accurate list of members is high, the provision of group insurance might be economically feasible only if that cost can be shared among a variety of services performed by the group policyholder. In that ease preexisting groups like the ABA or a trade association would obviously have a considerable advantage over new entrants. The record here is barren of facts concerning these hypotheses, and we express no opinion as to their accuracy. We present them, however, to demonstrate that it is incorrect to assume, as did the courts below, that ABE’s profitability must result from the generosity of its members. The unrelated business income cases cited in n. 1, supra, all concerned group insurance programs offered by trade associations to their members. In each case the Court of Appeals held that those programs constituted a taxable trade or business. The Claims Court distinguished those cases on the grounds that they involved organizations exempt as business leagues under § 501(c)(6) rather than as charities under § 501(c)(3). That distinction, however, is insubstantial. Business leagues engage in fundraising for exempt purposes just as charities do. The taxpayers in those cases could have claimed that the excess dividends constituted tax-exempt membership fees, just as ABE claims that they constitute tax-exempt charitable contributions. Both claims fail for the same reasons.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WAYTE v. UNITED STATES No. 83-1292. Argued November 6, 1984 Decided March 19, 1985 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 614. Mark D. Rosenbaum argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Dan Stormer, Mary Ellen Gale, Dennis M. Perluss, Dan Marmalefsky, Laurence H. Tribe, William G. Smith, and Burt Neubome. Solicitor General Lee argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Trott, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, Mark I. Levy, and John F. De Pue Dennis E. Curtis filed a brief for the Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. David Crump filed a brief for the Legal Foundation of America as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented is whether a passive enforcement policy under which the Government prosecutes only those who report themselves as having violated the law, or who are reported by others, violates the First and Fifth Amendments. I — I On July 2, 1980, pursuant to his authority under § 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 605, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. §453, the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 4771, 3 CFR 82 (1981). This Proclamation directed male citizens and certain male residents born during 1960 to register with the Selective Service System during the week of July 21, 1980. Petitioner fell within that class but did not register. Instead, he wrote several letters to Government officials, including the President, stating that he had not registered and did not intend to do so. Petitioner’s letters were added to a Selective Service file of young men who advised that they had failed to register or who were reported by others as having failed to register. For reasons we discuss, infra, at 612-613, Selective Service adopted a policy of passive enforcement under which it would investigate and prosecute only the cases of nonregistration contained in this file. In furtherance of this policy, Selective Service sent a letter on June 17, 1981, to each reported violator who had not registered and for whom it had an address. The letter explained the duty to register, stated that Selective Service had information that the person was required to register but had not done so, requested that he either comply with the law by filling out an enclosed registration card or explain why he was not subject to registration, and warned that a violation could result in criminal prosecution and specified penalties. Petitioner received a copy of this letter but did not respond. On July 20, 1981, Selective Service transmitted to the Department of Justice, for investigation and potential prosecution, the names of petitioner and 133 other young men identified under its passive enforcement system — all of whom had not registered in response to the Service’s June letter. At two later dates, it referred the names of 152 more young men similarly identified. After screening out the names of those who appeared not to be in the class required to register, the Department of Justice referred the remaining names to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for additional inquiry and to the United States Attorneys for the districts in which the nonregistrants resided. Petitioner’s name was one of those referred. Pursuant to Department of Justice policy, those referred were not immediately prosecuted. Instead, the appropriate United States Attorney was required to notify identified non-registrants by registered mail that, unless they registered within a specified time, prosecution would be considered. In addition, an FBI agent was usually sent to interview the nonregistrant before prosecution was instituted. This effort to persuade nonregistrants to change their minds became known as the “beg” policy. Under it, young men who registered late were not prosecuted, while those who never registered were investigated further by the Government. Pursuant to the “beg” policy, the United States Attorney for the Central District of California sent petitioner a letter on October 15, 1981, urging him to register or face possible prosecution. Again petitioner failed to respond. On December 9, 1981, the Department of Justice instructed all United States Attorneys not to begin seeking indictments against nonregistrants until further notice. On January 7, 1982, the President announced a grace period to afford nonregistrants a further opportunity to register without penalty. This grace period extended until February 28, 1982. Petitioner still did not register. Over the next few months, the Department decided to begin prosecuting those young men who, despite the grace period and “beg” policy, continued to refuse to register. It recognized that under the passive enforcement system those prosecuted were “liable to be vocal proponents of non-registration” or persons “with religious or moral objections.” Memorandum of March 17, 1982, from Lawrence Lippe, Chief, General Litigation and Legal Advice Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, to D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, App. 301. It also recognized that prosecutions would “undoubtedly result in allegations that the [case was] brought in retribution for the nonregistrant’s exercise of his first amendment rights.” Ibid. The Department was advised, however, that Selective Service could not develop a more “active” enforcement system for quite some time. See infra, at 613. Because of this, the Department decided to begin seeking indictments under the passive system without further delay. On May 21, 1982, United States Attorneys were notified to begin prosecution of nonregistrants. On June 28, 1982, FBI agents interviewed petitioner, and he continued to refuse to register. Accordingly, on July 22, 1982, an indictment was returned against him for knowingly and willfully failing to register with the Selective Service in violation of §§3 and 12(a) of the Military Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 605 and 622, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. §§453 and 462(a). This was one of the first indictments returned against any individual under the passive policy. I — I HH Petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground of selective prosecution. He contended that he and the other indicted nonregistrants were “vocal” opponents of the registration program who had been impermissibly targeted (out of an estimated 674,000 nonregistrants) for prosecution on the basis of their exercise of First Amendment rights. After a hearing, the District Court for the Central District of California granted petitioner’s broad request for discovery and directed the Government to produce certain documents and make certain officials available to testify. The Government produced some documents and agreed to make some Government officials available but, citing executive privilege, it withheld other documents and testimony. On October 29, 1982, the District Court ordered the Government to produce the disputed documents and witness. The Government declined to comply and on November 5, 1982, asked the District Court to dismiss the indictment in order to allow an appeal challenging the discovery order. Petitioner asked for dismissal on several grounds, including discriminatory prosecution. On November 15, 1982, the District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the Government had failed to rebut petitioner’s prima facie case of selective prosecution. Following precedents of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the District Court found that in order to establish a prima facie case petitioner had to prove that (i) others similarly situated generally had not been prosecuted for conduct similar to petitioner’s and (ii) the Government’s discriminatory selection was based on impermissible grounds such as race, religion, or exercise of First Amendment rights. 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 (1982). Petitioner satisfied the first requirement, the District Court held, because he had shown that all those prosecuted were “vocal” nonregistrants and because “[t]he inference is strong that the Government could have located non-vocal non-registrants, but chose not to.” Id., at 1381. The District Court found the second requirement satisfied for three reasons. First, the passive enforcement program was “ ‘inherently suspect’ ” because “ ‘it focuse[d] upon the vocal offender . . . [and was] vulnerable to the charge that those chosen for prosecution [were] being punished for their expression of ideas, a constitutionally protected right.’” Ibid., quoting United States v. Steele, 461 F. 2d 1148, 1152 (CA9 1972). Second, the Government’s awareness that a disproportionate number of vocal nonregis-trants would be prosecuted under the passive enforcement system indicated that petitioner was prosecuted because of his exercise of First Amendment rights. 549 F. Supp., at 1382. Finally, the involvement of high Government officials in the prosecution decisions “strongly suggested] impermissible selective prosecution.” Id., at 1383. The District Court then held that the Government had failed to rebut the prima facie case. The Court of Appeals reversed. 710 F. 2d 1385 (CA9 1983). Applying the same test, it found the first requirement satisfied but not the second. The first was satisfied by petitioner’s showing that out of the estimated 674,000 nonregis-trants the 13 indicted had all been vocal nonregistrants. Id., at 1387. As to the second requirement, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had to show that the Government focused its investigation on him because of his protest activities. Ibid. Petitioner’s evidence, however, showed only that the Government was aware that the passive enforcement system would result in prosecutions primarily of two types of men — religious and moral objectors and vocal objectors — and that the Government recognized that the latter type would probably make claims of selective prosecution. Finding no evidence of impermissible governmental motivation, the court held that the District Court’s finding of a prima facie case of selective prosecution was clearly erroneous. Id., at 1388. The Court of Appeals also found two legitimate explanations for the Government’s passive enforcement system: (i) the identities of nonreported nonregistrants were not known, and (ii) nonregistrants who expressed their refusal to register made clear their willful violation of the law. Recognizing both the importance of the question presented and a division in the Circuits, we granted certiorari on the question of selective prosecution. 467 U. S. 1214 (1984). We now affirm. In our criminal justice system, the Government retains “broad discretion” as to whom to prosecute. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U. S. 368, 380, n. 11 (1982); accord, Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U. S. 238, 248 (1980). “[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357, 364 (1978). This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular concern. Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine pros-ecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government’s enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. As we have noted in a slightly different context, however, although prosecutorial discretion is broad, it is not “ ‘unfettered.’ Selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws is ... subject to constitutional constraints.” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 125 (1979) (footnote omitted). In particular, the decision to prosecute may not be “‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,”’ Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra, at 364, quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 456 (1962), including the exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights, see United States v. Goodwin, supra, at 372. It is appropriate to judge selective prosecution claims according to ordinary equal protection standards. See Oyler v. Boles, supra. Under our prior cases, these standards require petitioner to show both that the passive enforcement system had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229 (1976). All petitioner has shown here is that those eventually prosecuted, along with many not prosecuted, reported themselves as having violated the law. He has not shown that the enforcement policy selected nonregistrants for prosecution on the basis of their speech. Indeed, he could not have done so given the way the “beg” policy was carried out. The Government did not prosecute those who reported themselves but later registered. Nor did it prosecute those who protested registration but did not report themselves or were not reported by others. In fact, the Government did not even investigate those who wrote letters to Selective Service criticizing registration unless their letters stated affirmatively that they had refused to comply with the law. Affidavit of Edward A. Frankie, Special Assistant to the Director of Selective Service for Compliance, App. 635. The Government, on the other hand, did prosecute people who reported themselves or were reported by others but who did not publicly protest. These facts demonstrate that the Government treated all reported nonregistrants similarly. It did not subject vocal nonregistrants to any special burden. Indeed, those prosecuted in effect selected themselves for prosecution by refusing to register after being reported and warned by the Government. Even if the passive policy had a discriminatory effect, petitioner has not shown that the Government intended such a result. The evidence he presented demonstrated only that the Government was aware that the passive enforcement policy would result in prosecution of vocal objectors and that they would probably make selective prosecution claims. As we have noted, however: “ ‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than . . . intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, supra, at 279 (footnotes and citations omitted). In the present case, petitioner has not shown that the Government prosecuted him because of his protest activities. Absent such a showing, his claim of selective prosecution fails. I — I <1 Petitioner also challenges the passive enforcement policy directly on First Amendment grounds. In particular, he claims that “[e]ven though the [Government’s passive] enforcement policy did not overtly punish protected speech as such, it inevitably created a content-based regulatory system with a concomitantly disparate, content-based impact on non-registrants.” Brief for Petitioner 23. This Court has held that when, as here, “‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376 (1968). Government regulation is justified “if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” Id., at 377. Accord, Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U. S. 20, 32 (1984); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413 (1974). In the present case, neither the first nor third condition is disputed. There can be no doubt that the passive enforcement policy meets the second condition. Few interests can be more compelling than a nation’s need to ensure its own security. It is well to remember that freedom as we know it has been suppressed in many countries. Unless a society has the capability and will to defend itself from the aggressions of others, constitutional protections of any sort have little meaning. Recognizing this fact, the Framers listed “pro-vid[ing] for the common defence,” U. S. Const., Preamble, as a motivating purpose for the Constitution and granted Congress the power to “provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States,” Art. I, §8, cl. 1. See also The Federalist Nos. 4, 24, and 25. This Court, moreover, has long held that the power “to raise and support armies ... is broad and sweeping,” United States v. O’Brien, supra, at 377; accord, Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 755-758 (1948); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918), and that the “power ... to classify and conscript manpower for military service is ‘beyond question,’” United States v. O’Brien, supra, at 377, quoting Lichter v. United States, supra, at 756; accord, Selective Draft Law Cases, supra. With these principles in mind, the three reasons the Government offers in defense of this particular enforcement policy are sufficiently compelling to satisfy the second O’Brien requirement — as to either those who reported themselves or those who were reported by others. First, by relying on reports of nonregistration, the Government was able to identify and prosecute violators without further delay. Although it still was necessary to investigate those reported to make sure that they were required to register and had not, the Government did not have to search actively for the names of these likely violators. Such a search would have been difficult and costly at that time. Indeed, it would be a costly step in any “active” prosecution system involving thousands of nonregistrants. The passive enforcement program thus promoted prosecutorial efficiency. Second, the letters written to Selective Service provided strong, perhaps conclusive evidence of the nonregistrant’s intent not to comply — one of the elements of the offense. Third, prosecuting visible nonregistrants was thought to be an effective way to promote general deterrence, especially since failing to proceed against publicly known offenders would encourage others to violate the law. The passive enforcement policy also meets the final requirement of the O’Brien test, for it placed no more limitation on speech than was necessary to ensure registration for the national defense. Passive enforcement not only did not subject “vocal” nonregistrants to any special burden, supra, at 609-610, but also was intended to be only an interim enforcement system. Although Selective Service was engaged in developing an active enforcement program when it investigated petitioner, it had by then found no practicable way of obtaining the names and current addresses of likely non-registrants. Eventually, it obtained them by matching state driver’s license records with Social Security files. It took some time, however, to obtain the necessary authorizations and to set up this system. Passive enforcement was the only effective interim solution available to carry out the Government’s compelling interest. We think it important to note as a final matter how far the implications of petitioner’s First Amendment argument would extend. Strictly speaking, his argument does not concern passive enforcement but self-reporting. The concerns he identifies would apply to all nonregistrants who report themselves even if the Selective Service engaged only in active enforcement. For example, a nonregistrant who wrote a letter informing Selective Service of his failure to register could, when prosecuted under an active system, claim that the Selective Service was prosecuting him only because of his “protest.” Just as in this case, he could have some justification for believing that his letter had focused inquiry upon him. Prosecution in either context would equally “burden” his exercise of First Amendment rights. Under the petitioner’s view, then, the Government could not constitutionally prosecute a self-reporter — even in an active enforcement system — unless perhaps it could prove that it would have prosecuted him without his letter. On principle, such a view would allow any criminal to obtain immunity from prosecution simply by reporting himself and claiming that he did so in order to “protest” the law. The First Amendment confers no such immunity from prosecution. y We conclude that the Government’s passive enforcement system together with its “beg” policy violated neither the First nor Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is so ordered. Section 3 provides in pertinent part: “[I]t shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States, and every other male person residing in the United States, who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration at such time or times and place or places, and in such manner, as shall be determined by proclamation of the President and by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder.” The United States requires only that young men register for military service while most other major countries of the world require actual service. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1983-1984 (1983); see Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Service Research Group, 468 U. S. 841, 860, n. 2 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). On August 4, 1980, for example, petitioner wrote to both the President and the Selective Service System. In his letter to the President, he stated: “I decided to obey my conscience rather than your law. I did not register for your draft. I will never register for your draft. Nor will I ever cooperate with yours or any other military system, despite the laws I might break or the consequences which may befall me.” App. 714. In his letter to the Selective Service System, he similarly stated: “I have not registered for the draft. I plan never to register. I realize the possible consequences of my action, and I accept them.” Id., at 716. Six months later, petitioner sent a second letter to Selective Service: “Last August I wrote to inform you of my intention not to register for the draft. Well, I did not register, and still plan never to do so, but thus far I have received no reply to my letter, much less any news about your much-threatened prosecutions. “I must interpret your silence as meaning that you are too busy or disorganized to respond to letters or keep track of us draft-age youth. So I will keep you posted of my whereabouts.” Id., at 710. He also stated that, although he would “be traveling the nation.. . encouraging resistance and spreading the word about peace and disarmament,” he could be reached at his home address in Pasadena, California. Id., at 710-711. The record indicates that only 13 of the 286 young men Selective Service referred to the Department of Justice had been indicted at the time the District Court considered this case. As of March 31, 1984, three more men had been indicted. The approximately 270 not indicted either registered, were found not to be subject to registration requirements, could not be found, or were under continuing investigation. The record does not indicate how many fell into each category. On July 28, 1982, Selective Service stated that 8,365,000 young men had registered out of the estimated 9,039,000 who were required to do so. Selective Service Prosecutions: Oversight Hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 10 (1982). This amounted to a nonregistration rate of approximately 7.5 percent. The District Court also decided various statutory and regulatory claims. In particular, it held that Presidential Proclamation No. 4771 had been improperly promulgated and dismissed the indictment on this ground as well. 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1391 (1982). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed this particular holding and affirmed the District Court’s rejection of the remaining regulatory claims. 710 F. 2d 1385, 1388-1389 (1983). Only the constitutional claim is now at issue. We do not decide the issue the dissent sees as central to this case: “whether Wayte has earned the right to discover Government documents relevant to his claim of selective prosecution.” Post, at 614-615. Even if there were substance to this discovery issue, it was neither raised in the petition for certiorari, briefed on the merits, nor raised at oral argument. Wayte has simply not asserted such a claim before this Court. This term is misleading insofar as it suggests that all those indicted had made public statements opposing registration. In some cases, the only statement made by the nonregistrant prior to indictment was hisjetter to the Government declaring his refusal to register. One judge dissented on the ground that the passive enforcement system represented a “deliberate policy. . . designed to punish only those, who had communicated their violation of the law to others.” 710 F. 2d, at 1389 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). Finding “an enforcement procedure focusing solely upon vocal offenders . . . inherently suspect,” id., at 1390, she would have shifted the burden of persuasion on discriminatory intent to the Government. Compare United States v. Eklund, 733 F. 2d 1287 (CA8 1984) (en banc) (upholding criminal conviction under passive enforcement scheme), cert, pending, No. 83-1959, with United States v. Schmucker, 721 F. 2d 1046 (CA6 1983) (ordering hearing on selective prosecution claim), cert. pending, No. 83-2035. Although the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, does not contain an equal protection clause, it does contain an equal protection component. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499 (1954). “[Our] approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has . . . been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 638, n. 2 (1975). A showing of discriminatory intent is not necessary when the equal protection claim is based on an overtly discriminatory classification. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). No such claim is presented here, for petitioner cannot argue that the passive policy discriminated on its face. The dissent argues that Wayte made a nonfrivolous showing of all three elements of a prima facie case as established in the context of grand jury selection. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U. S. 482, 494-495 (1977). Neither the parties nor the courts below, however, discussed the prima facie ease in these terms. Rather, they used the phrase to refer to whether Wayte had made a showing, which, if unrebutted, would directly establish discriminatory effect and purpose. Even applying standards from the grand jury selection context, however, we believe that Wayte has failed to establish a prima facie case. For example, although the dissent describes the first element as merely whether the individual “is a member of a recognizable, distinct class,” post, at 626, it is clear for reasons we discuss, infra, at this page and 610, that Wayte has not established the first element as actually defined by Castaneda: whether the individual is a member of an “identifiable group” that is “a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as mitten or as applied.” 430 U. S., at 494 (emphasis added). For these same reasons, we believe Wayte has failed to establish the other Castaneda elements, particularly the third. Furthermore, even assuming that Wayte did make out this kind of prima facie ease, the “beg” policy would rebut it. The dissent also argues that Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886), would have been decided differently under the approach we take today. Post, at 630-631. This misunderstanding stems from its belief that “the Government intentionally discriminated in defining the pool of potential proseeutees” in this case. Post, at 630. This premise, however, mistakes the facts. The prosecution pool consisted of all reported nonregistrants, not just “vocal” nonregistrants, and there is no evidence of Government intent to prosecute individuals because of their exercise of First Amendment rights. Petitioner alleges that the passive enforcement policy violated both his right to free speech and his right to petition. Because he does not argue that it burdened each right differently, we view these claims as essentially the same. Although the right to petition and the right to free speech are separate guarantees, they are related and generally subject to the same constitutional analysis. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 911-915 (1982). As an initial matter, we note doubt that petitioner has demonstrated injury to his First Amendment rights. The Government’s “beg” policy removed most, if not all, of any burden passive enforcement placed on free expression. Because of this policy, nonregistrants could protest registration and still avoid any danger of prosecution. By simply registering after they had reported themselves to the Selective Service, nonregistrants satisfied their obligation and could thereafter continue to protest registration. No matter how strong their protest, registration immunized them from prosecution. Strictly speaking, then, the passive enforcement system penalized continued violation of the Military Selective Service Act, not speech. The only right it burdened was the asserted “right” not to register, a “right” without foundation either in the Constitution or the history of our country. See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918). Section 12(a) of the Military Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 622, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462(a), provides that a criminal nonregistrant must “evad[e] or refus[e]” to register. For conviction, the courts have uniformly required the Government to prove that the failure to register was knowing. E. g., United States v. Boucher, 509 F. 2d 991 (CA8 1975); United States v. Rabb, 394 F. 2d 230 (CA3 1968). Neither party contests this requirement here. Selective Service had tried to use Social Security records but found that the addresses there were hopelessly stale. And under the law, 26 U. S. C. § 6103, it could gain no useful access to Internal Revenue Service records — the only other recognized federal source of generally accurate information.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SOUTH BUFFALO RAILWAY CO. v. AHERN et al. No. 179. Argued December 17, 1952. Decided January 19, 1953. Albert R. Connelly argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Joseph W. Marlow. Roy Wiedersum, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for the New York State Workmen’s Compensation Board, appellee. With him on the brief were Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney General, and Wendell P. Brown, Solicitor General. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. Disability awards by the New York Workmen’s Compensation Board to an interstate railroad employee precipitate this attack on § 113 of that state’s Workmen’s Compensation Law as unconstitutionally conflicting with the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. While employed as a switchman by the appellant Railway, Thomas J. Ahern in July 1944 suffered a coronary occlusion as a result of unusual physical exertion in attempting to “throw a stuck switch” in the Railway’s Lackawanna, New York, yards. On January 15, 1945, he filed a claim with the New York Workmen’s Compensation Board, asserting disability caused by injuries sustained in the regular course of his employment. The Railway controverted the claim solely on the grounds that his injuries were not in fact accidental, and that his disability was not causally related to the injuries alleged. A referee, after hearing evidence, resolved these issues in the claimant’s favor and in September 1945 awarded him compensation at the rate of $28 per week from the date of the accident. The Board denied the Railway’s application for review and affirmed the referee’s determination. In 1946 and the year following, the Board entered two further temporary disability awards. A self-insured employer, appellant in accordance with the Board’s orders and without appeal to the courts of the state continued biweekly payments to Ahern until December 20, 1948. On January 3, 1949, Ahern died of his heart condition. At a subsequent hearing held shortly thereafter to determine a final disability award, the widow, appellee here, was requested to file a death claim. At that point appellant for the first time disputed the Board’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proceeding and offered to introduce proof in support. The referee rejected appellant’s proffer and rendered a disability award for the two weeks preceding Ahern’s death. Over appellant’s contention that the claimant was employed “in interstate commerce” so that the applicability of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act deprived the Workmen’s Compensation Board of jurisdiction, the Board denied a petition for review. The Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court upheld the award, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. This decision by the highest court of the state invoked § 113 of New York’s Workmen’s Compensation Law which in relevant part provides that awards “may be made by the board in respect of injuries subject to the admiralty or other federal laws in case the claimant, the employer and the insurance carrier waive their admiralty or interstate commerce rights and remedies . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Appellant’s serious attacks on the constitutionality of the statute as here applied and related problems important to the administration of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act prompted us to note probable jurisdiction of this case. Collision of New York’s statute with the Federal Employers’ Liability Act is the crux of appellant’s constitutional contentions. All agree that the injured employee, had he pursued his federal remedy, would have met the “interstate commerce” requirements of that Act. But we are told that, under the New York Court of Appeals’ decision, § 113 of the state Workmen’s Compensation Law may translate the mere payment and acceptance of a single interlocutory compensation award into an irrevocable agreement by employer and employee to forsake their federal rights and submit their controversy to the state Board, a tribunal not only without jurisdiction but whose rules of liability clash with the uniform scheme intended by Congress in the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. That being so, appellant urges, the New York Court of Appeals’ construction of § 113 unconstitutionally authorizes the Workmen’s Compensation Board to invade a field foreclosed by governing federal legislation. We do not think that the Court of Appeals roved so far afield. Rather than coin sweeping generalities, the court held that New York permitted the Board to render compensatory awards for employees engaged in interstate commerce only if the parties voluntarily had so agreed and “if there has been no overreaching or fraud.” Accordingly, the court scrupulously traced the significant factual elements in this case: Appellant from the outset was represented by able counsel well versed in the nature of its liabilities toward injured employees; it utilized the Board’s administrative machinery at several hearings resulting in at least four separate awards; it made payments for four and a half years in accordance with the Board’s directions, choosing not to contest the authority of the Board; it sought no judicial relief from any award save the last, when the employee’s remedy under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act had lapsed. In view of these facts the court concluded that manifestly the parties had agreed to invoke § 113, a purely “permissive statute,” thereby empowering the Workmen’s Compensation Board to act. And, in effect, appellant’s course of conduct over the years estopped it from now asserting a flaw in the bargain: “we can conceive of no sound reason why the employer should be permitted to urge his Federal rights at this late date.” We do not doubt that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, supplanting a patchwork of state legislation with a nationwide uniform system of liberal remedial rules, displaces any state law trenching on the province of the Act. State legislatures, for example, may not intrude into the federal Act’s interstate commerce perimeter to destroy uniformity by arbitrarily presuming the renunciation of rights which the Act confers, or by compelling parties to elect between their federal remedies and an alternative state compensation plan. Erie R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170 (1917). The New York Court of Appeals, however, manifested meticulous care to avoid collision; it construed § 113 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law as a mere legislative authorization, permitting the Board to effectuate private agreements for compromising a federal controversy by resort to an impartial local umpire — “that is all that section 113 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law purports to accomplish.” The difference between coercion and permission is decisive; New York’s jurisdictional grant, so confined, does not transgress. To be sure, peculiarities of local law may not gnaw at rights rooted in federal legislation. American Railway Express Co. v. Levee, 263 U. S. 19, 21 (1923); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U. S. 22, 24 (1923). Untainted by fraud or overreaching, full and fair compromises of FELA claims do not clash with the policy of the Act. Callen v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 332 U. S. 625 (1948). The validity of such an agreement, however, raises a federal question to be resolved by federal law. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R. Co., 342 U. S. 359 (1952); cf. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239 (1942). And, mindful of the benevolent aims of the Act, we have jealously scrutinized private arrangements for the bartering away of federal rights. Ibid.; Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 338 U. S. 263 (1949); Duncan v. Thompson, 315 U. S. 1 (1942). Here, however, whether motivated by charity, dislike of litigation, or trial strategy, appellant made payments until the statute of limitations barred the employee’s federal claim. Fully advised of its legal rights it submitted the controversy to the Board. The New York Court of Appeals viewed these circumstances as estopping appellant from the assertion of so long delayed a change of heart. No tenet of federal law compels otherwise. Affirmed. See R. 4. R. 33, 37. In its “Notice to the Industrial Commissioner That Claim Will Be Controverted,” appellant additionally reserved “the right to controvert for such other reasons as may later appear.” R. 33. The New York courts attached no significance to that reservation. R. 88-91. The Board found, in part, that appellant “by its conduct and the effect thereof on the rights of the deceased claimant ... is now estopped from pleading the defense of the Federal Employer’s Liability Act.” R. 5. 303 N. Y. 545, 104 N. E. 2d 898 (1952), affirming 277 App. Div. 1067, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 639 (1950). “The provisions of this chapter shall apply to employers and employees engaged in intrastate, and also interstate or foreign commerce, for whom a rule of liability or method of compensation has been or may be established by the congress of the United States, only to the extent that their mutual connection with intrastate work may and shall be clearly separable and distinguishable from interstate or foreign commerce, provided that awards according to the provisions of this chapter may be made by the board in respect of injuries subject to the admiralty or other federal laws in case the claimant, the employer and the insurance carrier waive their admiralty or interstate commerce rights and remedies, and the state insurance fund or other insurance carrier may assume liability for the payment of such awards under this chapter.” McKinney’s N. Y. Laws, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 113. “Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set forth shall, for the purposes of this chapter, be considered as being employed by such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the benefits of this chapter.” 45 U. S. C. § 51. 303 N. Y., at 555, 104 N. E. 2d, at 904. 303 N. Y., at 555, 104 N. E. 2d, at 903. 303 N. Y., at 564, 104 N. E. 2d, at 909. 303 N. Y., at 555, 104 N. E. 2d, at 904. See also Heagney v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 190 F. 2d 976, 978 (1951); Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 F. 2d 757, 759 (1946). We need not now decide whether the systematic solicitation of such agreements would ran afoul of § 5 of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. “Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void . . . .” 45 U. S. C. § 55. See Purvis v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 198 F. 2d 631 (1952).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CALBECK, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION, v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO. et al. No. 532. Argued April 23, 1962. Decided June 4, 1962. Solicitor General Cox argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Orrlck, Bruce J. Terris, Morton Hollander and David L. Rose. Louis V. Nelson argued the cause for Travelers Insurance Co. et al., respondents. With him on the briefs was Ewell Strong. Charles Kohlmeyer, Jr. argued the cause and filed a brief for Avondale Shipyards, Inc., respondent. Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by Raymond H. Kierr and Samuel C. Gainsburgh for Minus Aizen, and by Herman Wright for McGuyer’s widow and children. Together with Donovan, Deputy Commissioner, v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 3 (a) of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act provides that compensation shall be paid only for injuries occurring on navigable waters “and if recovery . . . through workmen’s compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law.” In each of these cases the petitioner is a Deputy Commissioner who based an award of compensation under the Act on findings that the employee was engaged at the time of his injury in the work of completing the construction of a vessel afloat on navigable waters. Before the Longshoremen’s Act was passed, this Court had sustained the validity of a state workmen’s compensation statute as applied to injuries suffered by an employee engaged in the completion of a launched vessel under construction on navigable waters, Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469, but had made clear that state compensation statutes could not, constitutionally, be applied to injuries to employees engaged in repair work on completed vessels on navigable waters. The court below interpreted § 3 (a) as adopting this distinction and so set aside both awards, thus holding that a shipyard worker’s right to compensation under the Act, if his injury is incurred on a vessel, depends not only on whether the vessel is on navigable waters, but also on whether the vessel was under repair rather than under construction. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., v. Donovan, 293 F. 2d 51; Travelers Insurance Co. v. Calbeck, 293 F. 2d 52. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the interpretation of § 3 (a) in the administration of the Act. 368 U. S. 946. We reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgments of the District Courts sustaining the awards. The Court of Appeals’ interpretation of § 3 (a) would, if correct, have the effect of excepting from the Act’s coverage not only the injuries suffered by employees while engaged in ship construction but also any other injuries— even though incurred on navigable waters and so within the reach of Congress — for which a state law could, constitutionally, provide compensation. But the Court of Appeals’ interpretation is incorrect. The history of the Act, and of § 3 (a) in particular, contravenes it; and our decisions construing § 3 (a) have rejected it. Our conclusion is that Congress invoked its constitutional power so as to provide compensation for all injuries sustained by employees on navigable waters whether or not a particular injury might also have been within the constitutional reach of a state workmen’s compensation law7. The Longshoremen’s Act was passed in 1927. The Congress which enacted it would have preferred to leave to state compensation laws the matter of injuries sustained by employees on navigable waters within state boundaries. However, in 1917 this Court had decided in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, that the New York Compensation Act could not, constitutionally, be applied to an injury sustained on a gangplank between a vessel and a wharf. It was held that the matter was outside state cognizance and exclusively within federal maritime jurisdiction, since to hold otherwise would impair the harmony and uniformity which the constitutional grant to the Federal Government of the admiralty power was meant to assure. While the Court acknowledged that "it would be difficult, if not impossible, to define with exactness just how far the general maritime law maybe changed, modified, or affected by state legislation,” 244 U. S., at 216, the opinion appeared to foreclose the application of a state compensation remedy to any maritime injury. The Jensen decision deprived many thousands of employees of the benefits of workmen’s compensation. Congress twice attempted to deal with the situation by legislation expressly allowing state compensation statutes to operate. Act of October 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 395; Act of June 10, 1922, 42 Stat. 634. But this Court struck down both statutes as unconstitutional delegations to the States of the legislative power of Congress, and as tending to defeat the purpose of the Constitution to achieve harmony and uniformity in the maritime law. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149; Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219. Meanwhile the Court handed down a number of decisions which appeared to modify Jensen by permitting States to apply their statutes to some maritime injuries. But we must- candidly acknowledge that the decisions between 1917 and 1926 produced no reliable determinant of valid state law coverage. In Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, decided in 1921, the Court upheld the jurisdiction of a United States District Court to entertain a libel in admiralty for damages for the death of a longshoreman under a state wrongful death statute. The Court reasoned that while the subject was maritime it was “local in character” and that application of the state statute “will not work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, nor interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.” 257 U. S., at 242. Just a month later the Court decided Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, supra, where, as in the cases before us, a shipbuilder’s employee was injured while at work on new construction afloat on navigable waters. He recovered a judgment under a libel in admiralty, although Oregon had a state workmen’s compensation law which made the remedy thereunder exclusive of all other claims against the employer on account of the injury. This Court reversed that judgment, holding that the accident was among those “certain local matters regulation of which [by the States] would work no material prejudice to the general maritime law.” 257 U. S., at 477. No dependable definition of the area — described as “maritime but local,” or “of local concern” — where state laws could apply ever emerged from the many cases which dealt with the matter in this and the lower courts. The surest that could be said was that any particular injury might be within the area of “local concern,” depending upon its peculiar facts. In numerous situations state acts were considered inapplicable because they were thought to work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, particularly in cases of employees engaged in repair work. On the other hand, awards under state compensation acts were sustained in situations wherein the effect on uniformity was often difficult to distinguish from those found to be outside the purview of state laws. Thus, the problem which confronted Congress in 1927 had two facets. One was that the failure of Congress’ attempts to shelter the employees under state compensation laws rendered it certain that for many maritime injuries no compensation remedy was available. The other w^as that the course of judicial decision had created substantial working uncertainty in the administration of compensation. Congress turned to a uniform federal compensation law as an instrument for dealing with both facets. Indeed, the Court in Dawson had invited such consideration, saying: “Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend or revise the maritime law by statutes of general application embodying its will and judgment. This power, we think, would permit enactment of a general employers’ liability law or general provisions for compensating injured employees; but it may not be delegated to the several States.” 264 U. S., at 227. The proposal of a uniform federal compensation act had the unqualified support of both employers and employee representatives. Workmen’s compensation had gained wide acceptance throughout the country and State after State was enacting it. But hard battles were fought in committee and on the floor in both Houses of Congress over the form of the law. The bill introduced in the Senate, S. 3170, became the basis of the law. There emerges from the complete legislative history a congressional desire for a statute which would provide federal compensation for all injuries to employees on navigable waters; in every case, that is, where Jensen might have seemed to preclude state compensation. The statute’s framers adopted this scheme in the Act because they meant to assure the existence of a compensation remedy for every such injury, without leaving employees at the mercy of the uncertainty, expense, and delay of fighting out in litigation whether their particular cases fell within or without state acts under the “local concern” doctrine. The gravity of the problem of uncertainty was emphasized when § 3 of S. 3170 in its original form was under discussion at the Senate Hearings. That version of § 3 provided: “This act shall apply to any employment performed on a place within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, except employment of local concern and of no direct relation to navigation and commerce; but shall not apply to employment as master or member of the crew of a vessel.”- (Emphasis supplied.) The Chairman of the Senate Committee perceived that to create an exemption for “employment of local concern” threatened to perpetuate the very uncertainties of coverage that Congress wished to avoid. The danger was underlined by objections on behalf of two large employer groups. They not only expressed concern about the practical problems created by the line between new construction and repair, Senate Hearings, at 92-93, but also about the broader implications of the wording: “This provision is indefinite. The exception of 'employment of local concern and of no direct relation to navigation and commerce’ is vague and will be the subject of continual litigation. Innumerable claims will become legal questions requiring determination by the courts.” Senate Hearings, at 95. We are not privy to the Committee deliberations at which it was decided to drop the “local concern” language from § 3 and substitute the language now in the statute. We think it a reasonable inference that the Committee concluded that the exemption for “employment of local concern” would defeat the objective of avoiding the uncertainty created by Jensen and its progeny. The action of the House Committee, when S. 3170 as revised in the Senate came before it, discloses similar preoccupations. The House Committee rewrote § 3 to omit both the original “local concern” language and the Senate substitute. A parliamentary obstacle on an unrelated issue led to the House Committee’s finally accepting the Senate version. In sum, it appears that the Longshoremen’s Act was designed to ensure that a compensation remedy existed for all injuries sustained by employees on navigable waters, and to avoid uncertainty as to the source, state or federal, of that remedy. Section 3 (a) should, then, be construed to achieve these purposes. Plainly, the Court of Appeals’ interpretation, fixing the boundaries of federal coverage where the outer limits of state competence had been left by the pre-1927 constitutional decisions, does not achieve them. In the first place, the contours of the “local concern” concept were and have remained necessarily vague and uncertain. There has never been any method of staking them out except litigation in particular cases. In the second place, to conclude that federal coverage extends to the limits of navigable waters, except in those cases where a state compensation remedy “may” constitutionally be provided, would mean that, contrary to the congressional purpose, some injuries to employees on navigable waters might not be compensable under any statute. A vacuum w’ould exist as to any injury which, although occurring within the constitutional domain of “local concern,” was in fact not covered by any state statute. A restriction of federal coverage short of the limits of the maritime jurisdiction could have avoided defeating the objective of assuring a compensation remedy for every injury on navigable waters only if Congress had provided that federal compensation would reach any case not actually covered by a state statute. But in order to have accomplished this result, the statute would have had to withdraw' federal coverage, not wherever a state compensation remedy “may be” validly provided, but only wherever a state compensation remedy “is” validly provided. Even if a court could properly read “may be” as meaning “'is,” such a reading would make federal coverage in the “local concern” area depend on whether or not a state legislature had taken certain action — an intention plainly not to be imputed to a Congress whose recent efforts to leave the matter entirely to the States had twice been struck down as unconstitutional delegations of congressional powrer. Finally, there would have been no imaginable purpose in carving the area of “local concern” out of the federal coverage except to leave the greatest possible number of cases exclusively to the States. The price of such an objective would have included the adoption of whatever seemingly anomalous distinctions the courts might have developed in articulating the contours of “local concern,” as well as the risk of a total failure of compensation in cases within the "local concern” realm for which no state compensation had been provided. And in any event, a congressional purpose to leave the maximum possible business exclusively to the States would negate the Court of Appeals’ reading of the line of demarcation as a static one fixed at pre-1927 constitutional decisions. Such a purpose would require, rather, that federal coverage expand and recede in harness with developments in constitutional interpretation as to the scope of state power to compensate injuries on navigable waters. But that would mean that every litigation raising an issue of federal coverage would raise an issue of constitutional dimension, with all that that implies; and that each and every award of federal compensation would equally be a constitutionally premised denial of state competence in a like situation. We cannot conclude that Congress imposed such a burden on the administration of compensation by thus perpetuating the confusion generated by Jensen. To dispel that confusion was one of the chief purposes of the Longshoremen’s Act. We conclude that Congress used the phrase “if recovery . . . may not validly be provided by State law” in a sense consistent with the delineation of coverage as reaching injuries occurring on navigable waters. By that language Congress reiterated that the Act reached all those cases of injury to employees on navigable waters as to which Jensen, Knickerbocker and Dawson had rendered questionable the availability of a state compensation remedy. Congress brought under the coverage of the Act all such injuries whether or not a particular one was also within the constitutional reach of a state workmen’s compensation law. Our previous decisions under the Act are entirely consistent with our. conclusion. In Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U. S. 244, an employee of a seller of small boats, maritime supplies and outboard motors, hired primarily as a janitor and porter, was drowned when a boat in which he was riding capsized on the James River off Richmond, Virginia. The boat belonged to a customer of his employer and he and a fellow employee were testing one of the employer’s outboard motors for which the boatowner was a prospective purchaser. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had held that the employee’s work was “so local in character” that Virginia could validly have included it under a■ state workmen’s compensation act, and so had set aside an award to the employee’s dependents under the Longshoremen’s Act. This Court reversed. We noted that “it is not doubted that Congress could constitutionally have provided for recovery under a federal statute in this kind of situation. The question is whether Congress has so provided in this statute” in the light of § 3 (a). 314 U. S., at 248. The Court held that § 3 (a) did not exclude coverage under the Act, saying: “There can be no doubt that the purpose of the Act was to provide for federal compensation in the area which the specific decisions referred to [in the Senate Report — Jensen, Knickerbocker, and Dawson — ] placed beyond the reach of the states. The proviso permitting recovery only where compensation ‘may not validly be provided by State law’ cannot be read in a manner that would defeat this purpose.” 314 U. S., at 249-250. We thus held that whatever may be § 3 (a)’s “subtraction from the scope of the Act,” id:, at 249, the Act’s adoption of the Jensen line between admiralty and state jurisdiction as the limit of federal coverage included no exception for matters of “local concern.” In Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U. S. 249, a structural steel worker engaged in dismantling a bridge across a navigable river was cutting and stowing dismantled steel in a barge 'when he fell into the river from the barge and was drowned. His dependents sought compensation under the state act and this Court held that it could be applied. The result was not predicated on the ground that the employment was “maritime but local,” and so outside the coverage of the Longshoremen’s Act. Rather the Court viewed the case as in a “twilight zone” where the applicability of state law was “extremely difficult” to determine, and resolved the doubt, of course, in favor of the constitutionality of the application of state law. At the same time, the Court indicated that compensation might also have been sought under the Longshoremen’s Act and that an award under that Act in the very same circumstances would have been supportable, pointing out that the Act adopts “the Jensen line of demarcation.” 317 U. S., at 256. The conclusion that the Longshoremen’s Act might have applied without regard to whether the situation might be “maritime but local” plainly implies a rejection of any reading of § 3 (a) to exclude coverage in such situation. The issue in Avondale Marine Ways, Inc., v. Henderson, 346 U. S. 366, was whether compensation was available under the Longshoremen’s Act for the death of an employee killed while engaged in the repair of a vessel which was then physically located on land, but on a marine railway. Since a marine railway was considered to be a “dry dock,” the injury satisfied §3 (a)’s requirement that it occur “upon . . . navigable waters,” defined in § 3 as “including any dry dock.” At the same time, since the injury did, in a physical sense, occur on land, there is little doubt that a state compensation act could validly have been applied to it. See State Commission v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263. Nevertheless, this Court affirmed an award of compensation under the Federal Act in a per curiam opinion. The legislative history and our decisions had been read consistently with the views expressed herein by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit before the decisions in the present cases. Judge Hutcheson said for the court in De Bardeleben Coal Corp. v. Henderson, 142 F. 2d 481, 483-484: “Before the Parker case was decided . . . this court, in Continental Casualty Co. v. Lawson, 5 Cir., 64 F. 2d 802, 804, announced the view that the federal compensation laws should be liberally construed to cover1 every case where the injury occurred on navigable waters and where within the rule of [Jensen] . . . the action would have been in- admiralty. In that case we said: “ 'The question whether jurisdiction over a maritime tort could be asserted under the compensation laws of the states, or existed exclusively in admiralty, was an important one when the decisions were rendered in the Rohde . . . and other similar cases . . . but since the passage of this act (the Federal Workmen’s Compensation Act) the importance of that question has largely disappeared. . . . The elaborate provisions of the Act, viewed in the light of prior Congressional legislation as interpreted by the Supreme Court, leaves no room for doubt, as it appears to us, that Congress intended to exercise to the fullest extent all the power and jurisdiction it had over the subject-matter. . . .’ “The Parker case, supra, substantially adopts this view .... As the Parker case pointed out, it is not at all necessary now to redetermine the correctness vel non of the Jensen case or of any of [its] brood .... It is sufficient to say that Congress intended the compensation act to have a coverage co-extensive with the limits of its authority and that the provision ‘if recovery . . . may not validly be provided by State law’ was placed in the act not as a relinquishment of any part of the field which Congress could validly occupy but only to save the act from judicial condemnation, by making it clear that it did not intend to legislate beyond its constitutional powers. ... In the application of the act, therefore, the broadest ground it permits of should be taken. No ground should be yielded to state jurisdiction in cases falling within the principle of the Jensen case merely because the Supreme Court, before the Federal Compensation Law went into effect, did here a little, there a little, chip and whittle Jensen down in the mass of conflicting and contradictory decisions in which it advanced and applied the ‘local concern’ doctrine to save to employees injured on navigable waters, and otherwise remediless, the remedies state compensation laws afforded them. . . . This is what we held in the Lawson case, what the Supreme Court held in the Parker case, supra. . . We turn finally to a question raised only in Donovan v. Avondale Shipyards. The employer contends that the employee accepted benefits under the Louisiana State Compensation Act and that this constitutes an election of remedies which bars prosecution of his claim under the Longshoremen’s Act. Compensation payments may be made under the Louisiana Compensation Act without a prior administrative proceeding. Before the federal claim was filed Avondale made payments to the employee for some two years and three months at the maximum rate provided by the Louisiana statute. The employee accepted the checks which bore a notation on their face that they were payments of compensation under the state act. In addition Avondale advanced a substantial sum to the employee to be credited against future compensation payments. Avondale also paid medical expenses for the employee’s account in excess of the maximum liability imposed by the Louisiana statute. In .the compensation order entered by Deputy Commissioner Donovan under the Longshoremen’s Act the full amount of all payments made by the employer was credited against the award, and no impermissible double recovery is possible. We hold that the acceptance of the payments does not constitute an election of the remedy under state law precluding recovery under the Longshoremen’s Act. Nothing in the statute requires a contrary result. And we agree that the circumstances do not support a finding of a binding election to look solely to the state law for recovery. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Lawson, 149 F. 2d 853; Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. O’Hearne, 192 F. 2d 968; Western Boat Building Co. v. O’Leary, 198 F. 2d 409. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed and the judgments of the District Courts are affirmed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The Act, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, is comprised in 33 U. S. C. §§ 901-950. Section 3 (a), 33 U. S. C. § 903 (a), reads: “(a) Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for the disability or death through workmen’s compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law. No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of— “(1) A master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net; or “(2) An officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof or of any State or foreign government, or of any political subdivision thereof.” In the Calbeck case the employee, Roger McGuyer, was a welder in the employ of the Levingston Shipbuilding Company which owns and operates a shipyard on the navigable Sabine River, between Orange, Texas, and Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana. McGuyer worked both on the repair of completed vessels and on vessels under construction. He was injured while working on an uncompleted drilling barge which had been launched and was floating on the Sabine River while its superstructure was under construction. In the Donovan case the employee, Minus Aizen, was also a welder. His employer was Avondale Marine Ways, Inc., which operated two shipyards near New Orleans. Aizen had worked only on new construction although fellow employees worked both on new construetion and on repair work. He was injured while welding on an oil drilling barge which had been launched and was floating on the navigable waters of the Mississippi River while her construction was being completed. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U. S. 479; Gonsalves v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 266 U. S. 171; Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U. S. 449. See also Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U. S. 222, 230-232. Our use of the term "employees” throughout this opinion excludes those special categories described in subsections (1) and (2) of § 3 (a), see note 1, supra; and assumes that they are employed by an “employer” as defined in §2 (4), 33 U. S. C. § 902 (4), i. e., "an employer any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any dry dock).” The constitutionality of the New York statute in other respects was sustained at the same Term. New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188. The validity of the Washington and Iowa statutes was also upheld. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210. See, e. g., Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U. S. 479; Gonsalves v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 266 U. S. 171; Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U. S. 449. See, e. g., State Commission v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263; Millers’ Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U. S. 59. See 1 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation, §§ 4.10-5.30. Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 3170, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.; Hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on S. 3170, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. Rep. No. 1767, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. See also H. R. Rep. No. 1190, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (accompanying H. R. 12063); Hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on H. R. 9498, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. See S. Rep. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., at 16: “The purpose of this bill is to provide for compensation, in the stead of liability, for a class of employees commonly known as ‘longshoremen.’ These men are mainly employed in loading, unloading, refitting, and repairing ships; but it should be remarked that injuries occurring in loading or unloading are not covered unless they occur on the ship or between the wharf and the ship so as to bring them within the maritime jurisdiction of the United States. There are in the neighborhood of 300,000 men so employed in the entire country. “The committee deems it unnecessary to comment upon the modern change in the relation between employers and employees establishing systems of compensation as distinguished from liability. Nearly every State in the Union has a compensation law through which employees are compensated for injuries occurring in the course of their employment without regard to negligence on the part of the employer or contributory negligence on the part of the employee. If longshoremen could avail themselves of the benefits of State compensation laws, there would be no occasion for this legislation: but, unfortunately, they are excluded from these laws by reason of the character of their employment; and they are not only excluded but the Supreme Court has more than once held that Federal legislation can not, constitutionally, be enacted that will apply State laws to this occupation. (Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149; Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219.) “It thus appears that there is no way of giving to these hardworking men, engaged in a somewhat hazardous employment, the justice involved in the modern principle of compensation without enacting a uniform compensation statute.” To like effect is H. R. Rep. No. 1190, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1, 3: “This bill provides compensation for employees injured ... in certain maritime employments .... The principal wage earners provided for are longshoremen .... Next in importance are the ship repairmen — carpenters, painters, boiler makers, etc. Congressional action is necessary if these wage earners are to be given the benefits of workmen’s compensation owing to the provisions of the Constitution of the United States and the decisions of the Supreme Court thereunder. . . . The committee . . . recommends that this humanitarian legislation be speedily enacted into law so that this class of workers, practically the only class without the benefit of workmen’s compensation, may be afforded this protection, which has come to be almost universally recognized as necessary in the interest of social justice between employer and employee.” H. R. Rep. No. 1767, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., at 20, makes clear that the House was desirous of legislation whereby Congress could “discharge its obligation to the maritime workers placed under their jurisdiction by the Constitution of the United States by providing for them a law whereby they may receive the benefits of workmen’s compensation and thus afford them the same remedies that have been provided by legislation for those killed or injured in the course of their employment in nearly every State in the Union.” The following colloquy occurred between the Chairman, Senator Cummins, and an employer spokesman who was testifying: “The Chairman. That term [employment of local concern] was used in one of the decisions of the Supreme Court, probably, but, in its application, just what does it mean? “Mr. Brown. Unless there is something in connection with admiralty law which qualifies it, I should say it is a very vague thing, and we can not understand what it means. The phrase 'of no direct relation to navigation and commerce’ is another questionable proposition, whether the coverage of this bill might not apply to a man on the docks. Some of my friends seem to think that it would not apply to the man on the docks, that the State laws now apply, and it was said in the same decision [the witness referred to Rohde, supra, but the quoted language is found in Nordenholt, supra, note 7, at 276]: “There is no pertinent Federal statute and application of a local law will not work material prejudice to any characteristic feature of the maritime law. “The Chairman. We certainly can find some language that will describe these people that we intend to protect, but I am not sure whether this is the most accurate language that can be found. “Mr. Brown. I think that is true. I think that you could not only find language that would prescribe the coverage accurately, but I think that language could be devised that would be eminently satisfactory to everybody in [an] act that would incorporate the purposes which are, perhaps, behind this.” Senate Hearings, at 57. Section 3 as redrafted by the House Committee, H. R. Rep. No. 1767, 69th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2, was as follows: "Sec. 3. This act shall apply to any maritime employment performed— “(a) Upon the navigable waters of the United States, including any dry dock; or “ (b) As master or member of a crew of a barge, lighter, tug, dredge, vessel, or other ocean, lake, river, canal, harbor, or floating craft owned by a citizen of the United States.” The House Committee could not obtain a rule from the House Rules Committee until it amended the bill to exclude seamen from coverage. 68 Cong. Rec. 5410, 5412. Rather than rewrite § 3 again the Committee adopted the Senate version. See id., 5403-5404, 5410, 5412, explaining that the effect was to exclude seamen from coverage. The Committee reports, note 10, supra, make no reference to the “local concern” doctrine or the cases applying it. They explain the problem in terms of the limitations on the availability of state remedies imposed by the Court’s decisions in Jensen, Knickerbocker, and Dawson. We attach no significance to Opinion No. 7, September 2, 1927, of the Employees’ Compensation Commission (now the Bureau of Employees’ Compensation) stating that the Commission “will take no action under the longshoremen’s act against an employer engaged only in the construction of vessels who does not comply with the act, nor against any employer engaged in the construction and repair of vessels who secures payment of compensation to employees while employed on repair work on a vessel in a dry dock or on marine ways.” The Department was not foreclosed in the instant cases from changing an interpretation of the statute which was clear error. Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U. S. 180. Section 5 of the Longshoremen’s Act, 33 U. S. C. § 905, which makes liability under the Act “exclusive ... of all other liability . . . to the employee, his legal representative . . . and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages ... at law or in admiralty . . .” is not involved in this case.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KLEPPE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al. v. SIERRA CLUB et al. No. 75-552. Argued April 28, 1976 Decided June 28, 1976 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 415. Deputy Solicitor General Randolph argued the cause for petitioners in No. 75-552. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Taft, Raymond N. Zagone, Herbert Pittle, and Jacques B, Gelin. Francis M. Shea argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With him on the briefs were Peter J. Nickles, Richard M. Merriman, Peyton G. Bowman III, James K. Mitchell, Henry B. Weaver, John E. Nolan, Jr., Richard H. Porter, Frank B. Friedman, Dale A. Wright, Harold L. Talisman, Richard T. Conway, David Booth Beers, Charles A. Case, Jr., David B. Ward, Robert L. Ackerly, Joseph S. Wager, Patrick J. McDonough, Max N. Edwards, James W. McDade, and George J. Miller. Bruce J. Terris argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the briefs were Suellen T. Keiner and Nathalie V. Black. John L. Warden and Jerome H. Simonds filed a brief for Amax, Inc., respondent under this Court’s Rule 21 (4). V. Frank Mendocino, Attorney General, argued the cause for the State of Wyoming as amicus curiae by special leave of the Court. With him on the brief were the Attorneys General and other officials for their respective States as follows: William J. Baxley, Attorney General of Alabama, and Henry H. Caddell, Assistant Attorney General, Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of California, and Nicholas C. Yost, Deputy Attorney General, J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General of Colorado', Carl R. Ajello, Attorney General of Connecticut, Wayne L. Kidwell, Attorney General of Idaho, Richard C. Turner, Attorney General of Iowa, Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland, Henry R. Lord, Deputy Attorney General, and Warren K. Rich, Associate Attorney General, Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Stewart H. Freeman, Assistant Attorney General, A. F. Summer, Attorney General of Mississippi, John C. Dan-forth, Attorney General of Missouri, and Robert M. Lindholm, Assistant Attorney General, Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General of Nebraska, and Harold Mosher, Assistant Attorney General, Tony Anaya, Attorney General of New Mexico, and Douglas W. Fraser, Assistant Attorney General, Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Rufus L. Edmisten, Attorney General of North Carolina, Allen I. Olson, Attorney General of North Dakota, James R. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma, R. A. Ashley, Jr., Attorney General of Tennessee, and William B. Hubbard, Assistant Attorney General, M. Jerome Diamond, Attorney General of Vermont, and Benson D. Scotch, Deputy Attorney General, Slade Gorton, Attorney General of Washington, and Charles B. Roe, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Bronson C. LaFollette, Attorney General of Wisconsin. Together with No. 75-561, American Electric Power System et al. v. Sierra Club et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in both cases were filed by Vernon B. Romney, Attorney General, and William C. Quigley, Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Utah; by William C. Wise and Robert Weinberg for the American Public Power Assn, et al.; by Roberts B. Owen, James R. Atwood, and Robert M. Perry for the Carter Oil Co.; by Ronald A. Zumbrun and Raymond M. Momboisse for the Pacific Legal Foundation; by Gerry Levenberg, Sidney G. Baucom, and Veri R. Topham for the Utah Power & Light Co.; and by Edward Weinberg and John Schwab for the Western Fuels Assn., Inc., et al. George W. Bring filed a brief for the Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., et al. as -amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases. 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. § 4321 et seq. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 102 (2) (C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) requires that all federal agencies include a detailed statement of environmental consequences — known as an environmental impact statement — “in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that officials of the Department of the Interior (Department) and certain other federal agencies must take additional steps under this section, beyond those already taken, before allowing further development of federal coal reserves in a specific area of the country. For the reasons set forth, we reverse. I Respondents, several organizations concerned with the environment, brought this suit in July 1973 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The defendants in the suit, petitioners here, were the officials of the Department and other federal agencies responsible for issuing coal leases, approving mining plans, granting rights-of-way, and taking the other actions necessary to enable private companies and public utilities to develop coal reserves on land owned or controlled by the Federal Government. Citing widespread interest in the reserves of a region identified as the “Northern Great Plains region,” and an alleged threat from coal-related operations to their members’ enjoyment of the region’s environment, respondents claimed that the federal officials could not allow further development without preparing a “comprehensive environmental impact statement” under § 102 (2) (C) on the entire region. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court, on the basis of extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, held that the complaint stated no claim for relief and granted the petitioners’ motions for summary judgment. Respondents appealed. Shortly after oral argument but before issuing an opinion on the merits, the Court of Appeals in January 1975 issued an injunction — over a dissent — against the Department’s approval of four mining plans in the Powder River Coal Basin, which is one small but coal-rich section of the region that concerns respondents. 166 U. S. App. D. C. 200, 509 F. 2d 533. An impact statement had been prepared on these plans, but it had not been before the District Court and was not before the Court of Appeals. In June 1975 the Court of Appeals ruled on the merits and, for reasons discussed below, reversed the District Court and remanded for further proceedings. 169 U. S. App. D. C. 20, 514 F. 2d 856. The court continued its injunction in force. The federal officials petitioned for writ of certiorari on October 9, 1975. On November 7, the Court of Appeals refused to dissolve its injunction, and a week later petitioners moved this Court for a stay. On January 12, 1976, we stayed the injunction and granted the petitions for certiorari. 423 U. S. 1047. We have been informed that shortly thereafter the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) approved the four mining plans in the Powder River Coal Basin that had been stayed by the injunction. II The record and the opinions of the courts below contain extensive facts about coal development and the geographic area involved in this suit. The facts that we consider essential, however, can be stated briefly. The Northern Great Plains region identified in respondents’ complaint encompasses portions of four States — northeastern Wyoming, eastern Montana, western North Dakota, and western South Dakota. There is no dispute about its richness in coal, nor about the waxing interest in developing that coal, nor about the crucial role the federal petitioners will play due to the significant percentage of the coal to which they control access. The Department has initiated, in this decade, three studies in areas either inclusive of or included within this region. The North Central Power Study was addressed to the potential for coordinated development of electric power in an area encompassing all or part of 15 States in the North Central United States. It aborted in 1972 for lack of interest on the part of electric utilities. The Montana-Wyoming Aqueducts Study, intended to recommend the best use of water resources for coal development in southeastern Montana and northeastern Wyoming, was suspended in 1972 with the initiation of the third study, the Northern Great Plains Resources Program (NGPRP). While the record does not reveal the degree of concern with environmental matters in the first two studies, it is clear that the NGPRP was devoted entirely to the environment. It was carried out by an interagency, federal-state task force with public participation, and was designed “to assess the potential social, economic and environmental impacts” from resource development in five States — Montana, Wyoming, South Dakota, North Dakota, and Nebraska. Its primary objective was “to provide an analytical and informational framework for policy and planning decisions at all levels of government” by formulating several “scenarios” showing the probable consequences for the area's environment and culture from the various possible techniques and levels of resource development. The final interim report of the NGPRP was issued August 1, 1975, shortly after the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case. In addition, since 1973 the Department has engaged in a complete review of its coal-leasing program for the entire Nation. On February 17 of that year the Secretary announced the review and announced also that during study a “short-term leasing policy” would prevail, under which new leasing would be restricted to narrowly defined circumstances and even then allowed only when an environmental impact statement had been prepared if required under NEPA. The purpose of the program review was to study the environmental impact of the Department’s entire range of coal-related activities and to develop a planning system to guide the national leasing program. The impact statement, known as the “Coal Programmatic EIS,” went through several drafts before issuing in final form on September 19, 1975 — shortly before the petitions for certiorari were filed in this case. The Coal Programmatic EIS proposed a new leasing program based on a complex planning system called the Energy Minerals Activity Recommendation System (EMARS), and assessed the prospective environmental impact of the new program as well as the alternatives to it. We have been informed by the parties to this litigation that the Secretary is in the process of implementing the new program. Against this factual background, we turn now to consider the issues raised by this case in the status in which it reached this Court. Ill The major issue remains the one with which the suit began: whether NEPA requires petitioners to prepare an environmental impact statement on the entire Northern Great Plains region. Petitioners, arguing the negative, rely squarely upon the facts of the case and the language of § 102 (2) (C) of NEPA. We find their reliance well placed. As noted in the first sentence of this opinion, § 102 (2)(C) requires an impact statement “in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” Since no one has suggested that petitioners have proposed legislation on respondents' region, the controlling phrase in this section of the Act, for this case, is “major Federal actions.” Respondents can prevail only if there has been a report or recommendation on a proposal for major federal action with respect to the Northern Great Plains region. Our statement of the relevant facts shows there has been none; instead, all proposals are for actions of either local or national scope. The local actions are the decisions by the various pe-tioners to issue a lease, approve a mining plan, issue a right-of-way permit, or take other action to allow private activity at some point within the region identified by respondents. Several Courts of Appeals have held that an impact statement must be included in the report or recommendation on a proposal for such action if the private activity to be permitted is one “significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” within the meaning of §102(2)(C). See, e. g., Scientists’ Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 156 U. S. App. D. C. 395, 404-405, 481 F. 2d 1079, 1088-1089 (1973); Davis v. Morton, 469 F. 2d 593 (CA10 1972). The petitioners do not dispute this requirement in this case, and indeed have prepared impact statements on several proposed actions of this type in the Northern Great Plains during the course of this litigation. Similarly, the federal petitioners agreed at oral argument that § 102 (2) (C) required the Coal Programmatic EIS that was prepared in tandem with the new national coal-leasing program and included as part of the final report on the proposal for adoption of that program. Tr. of Oral Arg. 9. Their admission is well made, for the new leasing program is a coherent plan of national scope, and its adoption surely has significant environmental consequences. But there is no evidence in the record of an action or a proposal for an action of regional scope. The District Court, in fact, expressly found that there was no existing or proposed plan or program on the part of the Federal Government for the regional development of the area described in respondents’ complaint. It found also that the three studies initiated by the Department in areas either included within or inclusive of respondents’ region — that is, the Montana-Wyoming Aqueducts Study, the North Central Power Study, and the NGPRP — were not parts of any plan or program to develop or encourage development of the Northern Great Plains. That court found no evidence that the individual coal development projects undertaken or proposed by private industry and public utilities in that part of the country are integrated into a plan or otherwise interrelated. These findings were not disturbed by the Court of Appeals, and they remain fully supported by the record in this Court. Quite apart from the fact that the statutory language requires an impact statement only in the event of a proposed action, respondents’ desire for a regional environmental impact statement cannot be met for practical reasons. In the absence of a proposal for a regional plan of development, there is nothing that could be the subject of the analysis envisioned by the statute for an impact statement. Section 102 (2) (C) requires that an impact statement contain, in essence, a detailed statement of the expected adverse environmental consequences of an action, the resource commitments involved in it, and the alternatives to it. Absent an overall plan for regional development, it is impossible to predict the level of coal-related activity that will occur in the region identified by respondents, and thus impossible to analyze the environmental consequences and the resource commitments involved in, and the alternatives to, such activity. A regional plan would define fairly precisely the scope and limits of the proposed development of the region. Where no such plan exists, any attempt to produce an impact statement would be little more than a study along the lines of the NGPRP, containing estimates of potential development and attendant environmental consequences. There would be no factual predicate for the production of an environmental impact statement of the type envisioned by NEPA. IV A The Court of Appeals, in reversing the District Court, did not find that there was a regional plan or program for development of the Northern Great Plains region. It accepted all of the District Court’s findings of fact, but concluded nevertheless that the petitioners “contemplated” a regional plan or program. The court thought that the North Central Power Study, the Montana-Wyoming Aqueducts Study, and the NGPRP all constituted “attempts to control development” by individual companies on a regional scale. It also concluded that the interim report of the NGPRP, then expected to be released at any time, would provide the petitioners with the information needed to formulate the regional plan they had been “contemplating.” The Court therefore remanded with instructions to the petitioners to inform the District Court of their role in the further development of the region within 30 days after the NGPRP interim report issued; if they decided to control that development, an impact statement would be required. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in both its factual assumptions and its interpretation of NEPA. We think the court was mistaken in concluding, on the record before it, that the petitioners were “contemplating” a regional development plan or program. It considered the several studies undertaken by the petitioners to represent attempts to control development on a regional scale. This conclusion was based on a finding by the District Court that those studies, as well as the new national coal-leasing policy, were “attempts to control development by individual companies in a manner consistent with the policies and procedures of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.” But in context, that finding meant only that the named studies were efforts to gain background environmental information for subsequent application in the decisionmaking with respect to individual coal-related projects. This is the sense in which the District Court spoke of controlling development consistently with NEPA. Indeed, in the same paragraph containing the language relied upon by the Court of Appeals, the District Court expressly found that the studies were not part of a plan or program to develop or encourage development. See supra, at 400-401. Moreover, at the time the Court of Appeals ruled there was no indication in the record that the NGPRP was aimed toward a regional plan or program, and subsequent events have shown that this was not its purpose. The interim report of the study, issued shortly after the Court of Appeals ruled, described the effects of several possible rates of coal development but stated in its preface that the alternatives “are for study and comparison only; they do not represent specific plans or proposals.” All parties agreed in this Court that there still exists no proposal for a regional plan or program of development. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 48. Even had the record justified a finding that a regional program was contemplated by the petitioners, the legal conclusion drawn by the Court of Appeals cannot be squared with the Act. The court recognized that the mere “contemplation” of certain action is not sufficient to require an impact statement. But it believed the statute nevertheless empowers a court to require the preparation of an impact statement to begin at some point prior to the formal recommendation or report on a proposal. The Court of Appeals accordingly devised its own four-part “balancing” test for determining when, during the contemplation of a plan or other type of federal action, an agency must begin a statement. The factors to be considered were identified as the likelihood and imminence of the program’s coming to fruition, the extent to which information is available on the effects of implementing the expected program and on alternatives thereto, the extent to which irretrievable commitments are being made and options precluded “as refinement of the proposal progresses,” and the severity of the environmental effects should the action be implemented. The Court of Appeals thought that as to two of these factors — the availability of information on the effects of any regional development program, and the severity of those effects — the time already was “ripe” for an impact statement. It deemed the record unclear, however, as to the likelihood of the petitioners’ actually producing a plan to control the development, and surmised that irretrievable commitments were being avoided because petitioners had ceased approving most coal-related projects while the NGPRP study was underway. The court also thought that the imminent release of the NGPRP interim report would provide the officials with sufficient information to define their role in development of the region, and it believed that as soon as the NGPRP was completed the petitioners would begin approving individual projects in the region, thus permitting irrevocable commitments of resources. It was for this reason that the court in its remand required the petitioners to report to the District Court their decision on the federal role with respect to the Northern Great Plains as a region within 30 days after issuance of the NGPRP report. The Court’s reasoning and action find no support in the language or legislative history of NEPA. The statute clearly states when an impact statement is required, and mentions nothing about a balancing of factors. Rather, as we noted last Term, under the first sentence of § 102 (2) (C) the moment at which an agency-must have a final statement ready “is the time at which it makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal action.” Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U. S. 289, 320 (1975) (SCRAP II) (emphasis in original). The procedural duty imposed upon agencies by this section is quite precise, and the role of the courts in enforcing that duty is similarly precise. A court has no authority to depart from the statutory language and, by a balancing of court-devised factors, determine a point during the germination process of a potential proposal at which an impact statement should be prepared. Such an assertion of judicial authority would leave the agencies uncertain as to their procedural duties under NEPA, would invite judicial involvement in the day-to-day decisionmaking process of the agencies, and would invite litigation. As the contemplation of a project and the accompanying study thereof do not necessarily result in a proposal for major federal action, it may be assumed that the balancing process devised by the Court of Appeals also would result in the preparation of a good many unnecessary impact statements. B Assuming that the Court of Appeals' theory about “contemplation” of regional action would permit a court to require preproposal preparation of an impact statement, the court's injunction against the Secretary’s approval of the four mining plans in the Powder River Basin nevertheless would have been error. The District Court had found that respondents would not have been entitled to an injunction against any individual projects even if their claim of the need for a regional impact statement had been valid, because they had shown no irreparable harm that would result absent such an injunction and the record disclosed that irreparable harm would result to the intervenors who sought to carry out their business ventures and to the public who depended upon their operations. The Court of Appeals made no finding as to the equities at the time it originally entered the injunction; when it continued the injunction following its decision on the merits, it stated only that the “harm” justifying an injunction “matured” whenever an impact statement is due and not filed. But on the Court of Appeals’ own terms there was in fact no harm. First, the Court of Appeals itself held that no regional impact statement was due at that moment, and it was uncertain whether one ever would be due. Second, there had been filed a comprehensive impact statement on the proposed Powder River Basin mining plans themselves, and its adequacy had not been challenged either before the District Court or the Court of Appeals in this case, or anywhere else. Thus, in simple equitable terms there were no grounds for the injunction: the District Court’s finding of irreparable injury to the intervenors and to the public still stood, and there were — on the Court of Appeals’ own terms — no countervailing equities. y Our discussion thus far has been addressed primarily to the decision of the Court of Appeals. It remains, however, to consider the contention now urged by respondents. They have not attempted to support the Court of Appeals’ decision. Instead, respondents renew an argument they appear to have made to the Court of Appeals, but which that court did not reach. Respondents insist that, even without a comprehensive federal plan for the development of the Northern Great Plains, a “regional” impact statement nevertheless is required on all coal-related projects in the region because they are intimately related. There are two ways to view this contention. First, it amounts to an attack on the sufficiency of the impact statements already prepared by the petitioners on the coal-related projects that they have approved or stand ready to approve. As such, we cannot consider it in this proceeding, for the case was not brought as a challenge to a particular impact statement and there is no impact statement in the record. It also is possible to view the respondents’ argument as an attack upon the decision of the petitioners not to prepare one comprehensive impact statement on all proposed projects in the region. This contention properly is before us, for the petitioners have made it clear they do not intend to prepare such a statement. We begin by stating our general agreement with respondents’ basic premise that § 102 (2) (C) may require a comprehensive impact statement in certain situations where several proposed actions are pending at the same time. NEPA announced a national policy of environmental protection and placed a responsibility upon the Federal Government to further specific environmental goals by “all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy.” § 101 (b), 42 U. S. C. §4331 (b). Section 102 (2)(C) is one of the “action-forcing” provisions intended as a directive to “all agencies to assure consideration of the environmental impact of their actions in decisionmaking.” Conference Report on NEPA, 115 Cong. Rec. 40416 (1969). By requiring an impact statement Congress intended to assure such consideration during the development of a proposal or — as in this case — during the formulation of a position on a proposal submitted by private parties. A comprehensive impact statement may be necessary in some cases for an agency to meet this duty. Thus, when several proposals for coal-related actions that will have cumulative or synergistic environmental impact upon a region are pending concurrently before an agency, their environmental consequences must be considered together. Only through comprehensive consideration of pending proposals can the agency evaluate different courses of action. Agreement to this extent with respondents’ premise, however, does not require acceptance of their conclusion that all proposed coal-related actions in the Northern Great Plains region are so "related” as to require their analysis in a single comprehensive impact statement. Respondents informed us that the Secretary recently adopted an approach to impact statements on coal-related actions that provides: “A. As a general proposition, and as determined by the Secretary, when action is proposed involving coal development such as issuing several coal leases or approving mining plans in the same region, such actions will be covered by a single EIS rather than by multiple statements. In such cases, the region covered will be determined by basin boundaries, drainage areas, areas of common reclamation problems, administrative boundaries, areas of economic interdependence, and other relevant factors.” Brief for Respondents 20a. At another point, the document containing the Secretary’s approach states that a “regional EIS” will be prepared “if a series of proposed actions with interrelated impacts are involved . . . unless a previous EIS has sufficiently analyzed the impacts of the proposed action(s).” Id., at 20a-21a. Thus, the Department has decided to prepare comprehensive impact statements of the type contemplated by §102(2)(C), although it has not deemed it appropriate to prepare such a statement on all proposed actions in the region identified by-respondents. Respondents conceded at oral argument that to prevail they must show that petitioners have acted arbitrarily in refusing to prepare one comprehensive statement on this entire region, and we agree. Tr. of Oral Arg. 67. The determination of the region, if any, with respect to which a comprehensive statement is necessary requires the weighing of a number of relevant factors, including the extent of the interrelationship among proposed actions and practical considerations of feasibility. Resolving these issues requires a high level of technical expertise and is properly left to the informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies. Cf. SCRAP H, 422 U. S., at 325-326. Absent a showing of arbitrary action, we must assume that the agencies have exercised this discretion appropriately. Respondents have made no showing to the contrary. Respondents’ basic argument is that one comprehensive statement on the Northern Great Plains is required because all coal-related activity in that region is “pro-grammatically,” “geographically,” and “environmentally” related. Both the alleged “programmatic” relationship and the alleged “geographic” relationship resolve, ultimately, into an argument that the region is proper for a comprehensive impact statement because the petitioners themselves have approached environmental study in this area on a regional basis. Respondents point primarily to the NGPRP, which they claim — and petitioners deny — focused on the region described in the complaint. The precise region of the NGPRP is unimportant, for its irrelevance to the delineation of an appropriate area for analysis in a comprehensive impact statement has been well stated by the Secretary: “Resource studies [like the NGPRP] are one of many analytical tools employed by the Department to inform itself as to general resource availability, resource need and general environmental considerations so that it can intelligently determine the scope of environmental analysis and review specific actions it may take. Simply put, resource studies are a prelude to informed agency planning, and provide the data base on which the Department may decide to take specific actions for which impact statements are prepared. The scope of environmental impact statements seldom coincide with that of a given resource study, since the statements evolve from specific proposals for federal action while the studies simply provide an educational backdrop.” Affidavit of Oct. 28, 1975, App. 191. As for the alleged “environmental” relationship, respondents contend that the coal-related projects “will produce a wide variety of cumulative environmental impacts” throughout the Northern Great Plains region. They described them as follows: Diminished availability of water, air and water pollution, increases in population and industrial densities, and perhaps even climatic ■changes. Cumulative environmental impacts are, indeed, what require a comprehensive impact statement. But determination of the extent and effect of these factors, and particularly identification of the geographic area within which they may occur, is a task assigned to the special competency of the appropriate agencies. Petitioners dispute respondents’ contentions that the interrelationship of environmental impacts is region-wide and, as respondents’ own submissions indicate, petitioners appear to have determined that the appropriate scope of comprehensive statements should be based on basins, drainage areas, and other factors. See swpra, at 410-411. We cannot say that petitioners’ choices are arbitrary. Even if environmental interrelationships could be shown conclusively to extend across basins and drainage areas, practical considerations of feasibility might well necessitate restricting the scope of comprehensive statements. In sum, respondents’ contention as to the relationships between all proposed coal-related projects in the Northern Great Plains region does not require that petitioners prepare one comprehensive impact statement covering all before proceeding to approve specific pending applications. As we already have determined that there exists no proposal for regionwide action that could require a regional impact statement, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed, and the judgment of the District Court reinstated and affirmed. The case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Respondents asserted jurisdiction under 5 U. S. C. §§ 701-706, 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (a), and 28 U. S. C. § 1361. Prior to ruling on motions for summary judgment, the District Court permitted intervention as defendants by several public utilities, coal mining companies, and natural gas companies, by an Indian tribe, and by an individual rancher. Most of these inter-venors have joined in a separate petition for certiorari in No. 75-561, which is decided together with this case. On the same date the Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court respondents' motion for modification of the injunction to prohibit the Secretary from approving a new mining plan submitted by a coal company, not then a party to the suit, that had been mining coal on leased federal land since 1972. The new mining plan was covered by an impact statement. The Secretary of the Interior approved the plan on November 11. On November 14, the District Court partially enjoined the company from mining under the approved plan. Department of Interior News Release (Oct. 3, 1972), App. 132. NGPRP outline, App. 136. Department of Interior News Release (Feb. 17, 1973), App. 125-127. The petitioners in No. 75-561 have included in their brief a press release by the Secretary announcing the new program, and a detailed description of the program. Pending full operation thereof, the short-term leasing policy remains in effect. In the District Court respondents also contended that petitioners had failed to comply with §§ 102 (2) (A) and (D), 42 U. S. C. §§ 4332 (2) (A) and (D), which require an agency to use a specified approach to decisionmaking and to describe alternatives when a proposal involves unresolved conflicts concerning uses of resources. (Subparagraph (D) was redesignated subparagraph (E) by Pub. L. 94-83, 89 Stat. 424.) The District Court ruled against respondents on the count based on these subparagraphs, and it has dropped out of the case. In an affidavit submitted in support of the application for a stay of the Court of Appeals’ injunction, the Secretary described four impact statements completed by the petitioners on coal-related activity in Montana and Wyoming. One was the multiproject statement on the Powder River Coal Basin that was the subject of that injunction. See supra, at 395-396. Another was on the single mining plan subsequently brought under the injunction as modified by the District Court. See n. 4, swpra. A third covered one leased tract, and apparently was occasioned by an application for approval of a new mining plan on the tract. The fourth, on another single mining plan, has been the subject of litigation, on the merits of which we intimate no view. See Cady v. Morton, 527 F. 2d 786 (CA9 1975). The Secretary’s affidavit in support of the application for a stay of the Court of Appeals’ injunction confirms that the situation regarding regional planning or a regional development program has not changed. See App. 195-196. The legislative history of NEPA fully supports our reading of § 102 (2) (C) as to when an impact statement is required. The bill passed by the House contained no provision comparable to § 102 (2) (C) of the Act. The bill that was reported to and, as amended, passed by the Senate did contain the forerunner of § 102 (2)(C). The committee report made clear that the impact statement was required in conjunction with specific proposals for action. S. Rep. No. 91-296, p. 20 (1969). After the House-Senate Conference, the managers on the part of the House, in a separate statement, explained § 102 (2) (C) in language that tracks the statute on the requirement of a proposal. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-765, p. 8 (1969). See also 115 Cong. Rec. 40420 (1969). Section 102 (2) (C) states that the statement must be a detailed statement on— “(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, "(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, “ (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, “(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and “(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.” (Emphasis added.) In contrast, with both an individual coal-related action and the new national coal-leasing program, an agency deals with specific action of known dimensions. With appropriate allowances for the inexactness of all predictive ventures, the agency can analyze the environmental consequences and describe alternatives as envisioned by §102(2)(C). Of course, since the kind of impact statement required depends upon the kind of “ ‘federal action’ being taken,” Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U. S. 289, 322 (1975), the statement on a proposed mining plan or a lease application may bear little resemblance to the statement on the national coal-leasing program. Nevertheless, in each case the bounds of the analysis are defined, which is not the case with coal development in general in the region identified by respondents. This is not to say that § 102 (2) (C) imposes no duties upon an agency prior to its making a report or recommendation on a proposal for action. The section states that prior to preparing the impact statement the responsible official “shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved.” Thus, the section contemplates a consideration of environmental factors by agencies during the evolution of a report or recommendation on a proposal. But the time at which a court enters the process is when the report or recommendation on the proposal is made, and someone protests either the absence or the adequacy of the final impact statement. This is the point at which an agency’s action has reached sufficient maturity to assure that judicial intervention will not hazard unnecessary disruption. Even had the Court of Appeals determined that a regional impact statement was due at that moment, it still would have erred in enjoining approval of the four mining plans unless it had made a finding that the impact statement covering them inadequately analyzed the environmental impacts of, and the alternatives to, their approval. So long as the statement covering them was adequate, there would have been no reason to enjoin their approval pending preparation of a broader regional statement; that broader statement, when prepared, simply would have taken into consideration the regional environmental effects of the four mining plans once they were in operation, in determining the permissibility of further coal-related operations in the region. See Part V, infra. Petitioners lodged with this Court a copy of the massive six-volume impact statement on the projects in the Powder River Coal Basin, but it is not part of the record. The term “action-forcing” was applied to the provisions of what became § 102 (2) throughout their consideration by the Senate. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 91-296, p. 9 (1969); 115 Cong. Rec. 40416, 40419 (1969). The legislative history of the provision in the Senate, where it originated and where it received the most attention, supports this interpretation. See S. Rep. No. 91-296, supra, at 2, 20-21; 115 Cong. Rec. 29052-29053, 29055, 29058, 40416 (1969). The Conference Report to the House is consistent. See id., at 40923-40928. At some points in their brief respondents appear to seek a comprehensive impact statement covering contemplated projects in the region as well as those that already have been proposed. The statute, however, speaks solely in terms of proposed actions; it does not require an agency to consider the possible environmental impacts of less imminent actions when preparing the impact statement on proposed actions. Should contemplated actions later reach the stage of actual proposals, impact statements on them will take into account the effect of their approval upon the existing environment; and the condition of that environment presumably will reflect earlier proposed actions and their effects. Cf. n. 26, infra. Neither the statute nor its legislative history contemplates that a court should substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the environmental consequences of its actions. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F. 2d 463, 481 (CA2 1971), cert. denied, 407 U. S. 926 (1972). The only role for a court is to insure that the agency has taken a “hard look” at environmental consequences; it cannot “interject itself within the area of. discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.” Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 148 U. S. App. D. C. 5, 16, 458 F. 2d 827, 838 (1972). The document is an “Executive Summary and Decision Document” signed by the Secretary and dated December 16, 1975. The decision as to impact statements is part of the implementation of the new coal-leasing policy based on staff recommendations following release of the Coal Programmatic EIS. See supra, at 397-398. Respondents contend that this document represents a significant shift in Department policy since the start of this litigation, but we disagree. Early in the litigation the Department and three other agencies prepared the comprehensive impact statement on proposed actions in the Powder River Coal Basin, see supra, at 395; its preface — quoted by the District Court — states that it evaluated “the collective impact of the proposed actions and, insofar as now possible, the impacts of potential future coal mining within the geographic area.” Moreover, the Secretary’s consistent position, in affidavits dating back to the District Court, has been that statements might be prepared on regions or “subregions” once the Coal Programmatic EIS was completed. While the affidavits did not, until the application for a stay of the injunction, expressly predicate preparation of such statements upon the pendency of several proposals within the region or subregion, neither are they inconsistent with such predication. On the “programmatic” relationship, respondents also rely on the assertion that all of the projects involve similar methods of mining and converting the region’s coal. Assuming this to be correct, we do not think it significant. They rely also on the North Central Power Study and the Montana-Wyoming Aqueducts Study, but each covered an area different from respondents’ region and, moreover, it is not clear that either was primarily an environmental study. See supra, at 397. For example, respondents assert that coal mines in the region are environmentally interrelated because opening one reduces the supply of water in the region for others. Petitioners contend that the water supply for each aquifer or basin within the region — of which there are many — is independent. Moreover, petitioners state in their reply brief that few active or proposed mines in respondents’ region are located within 50 miles of any other mine, and there are only 30 active or proposed mines in the entire 90,000 square miles of the region. Nor is it necessary that petitioners always complete a comprehensive impact statement on all proposed actions in an appropriate region before approving any of the projects. As petitioners have emphasized, and respondents have not disputed, approval of one lease or mining plan does not commit the Secretary to approval of any others; nor, apparently, do single approvals by the other petitioners commit them to subsequent approvals. Thus, an agency could approve one pending project that is fully covered by an impact statement, then take into consideration the environmental effects of that existing project when preparing the comprehensive statement on the cumulative impact of the remaining proposals. Cf. n. 20, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PENFIELD COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA et al. v. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION. No. 453. Argued January 16, 1947. Decided March 31, 1947. Morris Lavine argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Roger S. Foster argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Washington, Philip Elman, Robert S. Rubin and W. Victor Rodin. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The Securities and Exchange Commission, acting pursuant to its authority under § 20 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, 86, 15 U. S. C. § 77t, issued orders directing an investigation to determine whether Penfield Company had violated the Act in the sale of stock or other securities. In the course of that investigation it directed a subpoena duces tecum to Young, as an officer of Pen-field, requiring him to produce certain books of the corporation covering a four year period ending in April, 1943. See § 19 (b) of the Act. Upon Young’s refusal to appear and produce the books and records, the Commission filed an application with the District Court for an order enforcing the subpoena. After a hearing, the court ordered Young, as an officer of Penfield, to produce them. Young persisted in his non-compliance. The Commission then applied to the District Court for a rule to show cause why Young should not be adjudged in contempt—a proceeding which, as we shall see, was one for civil contempt. The District Court delayed action on the motion until after disposition of a criminal case involving Young, Penfield, and others. When that case was concluded, the court, after hearing, adjudged Young to be in contempt. It refused, however, to grant any coercive relief designed to force Young to produce the documents but instead imposed on him a flat, unconditional fine of $50.00 which he paid. That was on July 2, 1945. On September 24, 1945, the Commission filed a notice of appeal in the District Court and subsequently a statement of points challenging as error the action of the District Court in imposing the $50.00 fine instead of a remedial penalty calculated to make Young produce the documents. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court erred in imposing the fine and directing that Young be ordered imprisoned until he produced the documents. 157 F. 2d 65. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by Penfield Co. and Young. Neither the District Court nor the Circuit Court of Appeals rendered judgment against Penfield. Nor is any relief sought by or against it here. Accordingly the writ is dismissed as to Penfield. First. It is argued that since no application for an allowance of an appeal was made, the Circuit Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain it. If the appeal was in a suit of a civil nature, the filing of the notice of appeal with the District Court was adequate under the Rules of Civil Procedure. It is the nature of the relief asked that is determinative of the nature of the proceeding. Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U. S. 217, 220. This was not a proceeding in which the United States was a party and in which it was seeking to vindicate the public interest. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 445. The contempt proceedings were instituted as a part of the proceedings in which the Commission sought enforcement of a subpoena. The relief which the Commission sought was production of the documents; and the only sanction asked was a penalty designed to compel their production. Where a fine or imprisonment imposed on the contemnor is “intended to be remedial by coercing the defendant to do what he had refused to do,” Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra, p. 442, the remedy is one for civil contempt. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. pp. 258, 303. Then “the punishment is wholly remedial, serves only the purposes of the complainant, and is not intended as a deterrent to offenses against the public.” McCrone v. United States, 307 U. S. 61, 64. One who is fined, unless by a day certain he produces the books, has it in his power to avoid any penalty. And those who are imprisoned until they obey the order, “carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets.” In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461. Fine and imprisonment are then employed not to vindicate the public interest but as coercive sanctions to compel the contemnor to do what the law made it his duty to do. See Doyle v. London Guarantee Co., 204 U. S. 599; Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358; Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U. S. 105; McCrone v. United States, supra. The Act gives the Commission authority to require the production of books and records in the course of its investigations. And in absence of a basis for saying that its demand exceeds lawful limits (Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186), it is entitled to the aid of the court in obtaining them. A refusal of the court to enforce its prior order for the production of the documents denies the Commission that statutory relief. The issue thus raised poses a problem in civil, not criminal, contempt. Where a judgment of contempt is embodied in a single order which contains an admixture of criminal and civil elements, the criminal aspect of the order fixes its character for purposes of procedure on review. Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U. S. 107. But there was no such admixture here. The District Court refused to grant any remedial relief to the Commission. The denial of that relief was the ground of the Commission’s appeal. The order of denial being final, was appealable, Lamb v. Cramer, supra, pp. 220-221, and the right to appeal from it was in no way dependent on an appeal from the imposition of the fine. Second. The question on the merits is two-fold: (1) whether the Circuit Court of Appeals erred in granting the Commission remedial relief by directing that Young be required to produce the documents; and (2) whether that court exceeded its authority in reversing the judgment which imposed the fine and in substituting a term of imprisonment conditioned on continuance of the contempt. As we have already noted, the Act requires the production of documents demanded pursuant to lawful orders of the Commission and lends judicial aid to obtain them. There is no basis in the record before us for saying that the demand of the Commission exceeded lawful limits. There is, however, a suggestion that the District Court was warranted in denying remedial relief since the contempt hearing came after a criminal trial of petitioners in another case, during the course of which many of Penfield’s books and records were examined. The thought apparently is that the Commission had probed enough into Penfield’s affairs. But the District Court did not hold that the Commission’s request had become moot, that the documents produced satisfied its legitimate needs, or that the additional ones sought were irrelevant to its statutory functions. We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that at least in absence of such a finding, the refusal of the District Court to grant the full remedial relief which the Act places behind the orders of the Commission was an abuse of discretion. The records might well disclose other offenses against the Securities Act of 1933 which the Commission administers. The history of this case reveals a long, persistent effort to defeat the investigation. The fact that Young paid the fine and did not appeal indicates that the judgment of contempt may have been an easy victory for him. On the other hand, the dilatory tactics employed suggest that if justice was to be done, coercive sanctions were necessary. When the Circuit Court of Appeals substituted imprisonment for the fine, it put a civil remedy in the place of a criminal punishment. For the imprisonment authorized would be suffered only if the documents were not produced or would continue only so long as Young was recalcitrant. On the other hand, the fine imposed by the District Court, unlike that involved in Fox v. Capital Co., supra, pp. 106-107, was unconditional and not relief of a coercive nature such as the Commission sought. It was solely and exclusively punitive in character. Cf. Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33, 42-43. As already noted, Young did not appeal from the order holding him in contempt and subjecting him to a fine. Young maintains, however, that once the fine was imposed and paid, the jurisdiction of the court was exhausted; that the Circuit Court of Appeals was without authority to substitute another penalty or to add to the one already imposed and satisfied. That argument rests on the statute granting federal courts the power to punish contempts of their authority, Judicial Code § 268, 28 U. S. C. § 385, and the decisions construing it. The statute gives the federal courts power “to punish, by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of the court, contempts of their authority,” including violations of their lawful orders. At least in a criminal contempt proceeding both fine and imprisonment may not be imposed since the statute provides alternative penalties. In re Bradley, 318 U. S. 50. Hence if a fine is imposed on a contemnor and he pays it, the sentence may not thereafter be amended so as to provide for imprisonment. The argument here is that after a fine for criminal contempt is paid, imprisonment may not be added to, or substituted for the fine, as a coercive sanction in a civil contempt proceeding. If that position is sound, then the statutory limitation of “fine or imprisonment” would preclude a court from imposing a fine as a punitive measure and imprisonment as a remedial measure, or vice versa. The dual function of contempt has long been recognized—(1) vindication of the public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct; (2) coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the law requires of him. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra, pp. 441 et seq. United States v. United Mine Workers, supra, p. 302. As stated in Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 327, “The purpose of contempt proceedings is to uphold the power of the court and also to secure to suitors therein the rights by it awarded.” We assume, arguendo, that the statute allowing fine or imprisonment governs civil as well as criminal contempt proceedings. If the statute is so construed, we find in it no barrier to the imposition of both a fine as a punitive exaction and imprisonment as a coercive sanction, or vice versa. That practice has been approved. Kreplik v. Couch Patents Co., 190 F. 565, 571. And see Phillips S. & T. P. Co. v. Amalgamated Assn., 208 F. 335, 340. When the court imposes a fine as a penalty, it is punishing yesterday’s contemptuous conduct. When it adds the coercive sanction of imprisonment, it is announcing the consequences of tomorrow’s contumacious conduct. At least in that situation the offenses are not the same. And the most that the statute forbids is the imposition of both fine and imprisonment for the same offense. Young raises objections that go to the merits of the judgment of contempt. These were considered and determined against him by the District Court. Since he did not appeal from that adverse judgment, he is precluded from renewing the objections at this stage. Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U. S. 415, 421-422; Helvering v. Pfeiffer, 302 U. S. 247, 250-251. There is a difference of view among us whether the portion of the order of the Circuit Court of Appeals which set aside the unconditional fine of $50 imposed on Young is here for review. But if we assume that it is, a majority of the Court is of the opinion that the Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in setting it aside, since the fine was imposed in a civil contempt proceeding. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra. Affirmed. Sec. 22 (b) provides: “In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena issued to any person, any of the said United States courts, within the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides, upon application by the Commission may issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear before the Commission, or one of its examiners designated by it, there to produce documentary evidence if so ordered, or there to give evidence touching the matter in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.” That order was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 143 F. 2d 746. The request of the Commission and the ruling of the court are made clear by the following colloquy: “Mr. Cuthbertson : So far as the punishment which the Court might see fit to impose, that is up to the Court. We are still anxious to get a look at these books and records, so I suggest to the Court, if he be so disposed, whatever punishment the Court might see fit to impose would be in connection with or so long as he refused to produce his books and records for our inspection. “The Court: I don’t think that I am going to be disposed to do anything like that. I sat here for six weeks and listened to books and records. The Government produced people from all over the United States in connection with the Penfield matter. “Mr. Cuthbertson : I might say, your Honor, that we have in mind that these books and records may disclose certain acts other than those charged in the indictment. We don’t propose to go over the same matter that the Court went over in connection with the criminal case. “The Court: The Court can take judicial notice of its own books and records, and in that trial the evidence was clear and definite and positive from all of the Government’s witnesses, that during one period of time this defendant had nothing whatsoever to do with the Penfield Company. Whether that period of time is covered by what the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks or not, I don’t know. “The judgment and sentence of the Court is that the defendant pay a fine of $50, and stand committed until paid.” Section 8 (c) of the Act of February 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936, 940, as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 230, provides: “No appeal intended to bring any judgment or decree before a circuit court of appeals for review' shall be allowed unless application therefor be duly made within three months after the entry of such judgment or decree.” See Alaska Packers Assn. v. Pillsbury, 301 U. S. 174; Georgia Lumber Co. v. Companía, 323 U. S. 334. Rule 73 (a) provides in part: “When an appeal is permitted by law from a district court to a circuit court of appeals and within the time prescribed, a party may appeal from a judgment by filing with the district court a notice of appeal.” Where a Rule of Civil Procedure conflicts with a prior statute, the Rule prevails. 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U. S. C. § 723b. See § 22 (b), supra, note 1. This thus disposes of the further contention that the appeal was not timely under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U. S. C. Supp. II § 682. United States v. Hark, 320 U. S. 531. As will be seen from note 3, supra, the court, immediately prior to rendering its sentence, noted that there was one period during which Young was not connected with Penfield Co. But the court added: “Whether that period of time is covered by what the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks or not, I don’t know.” Some rules governing criminal contempts are, of course, different from those governing civil contempts. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra, pp. 444, 446-449. If those differences are satisfied and if, as in In re Swan, 150 U. S. 637; Matter of Christensen Engineering Co., 194 U. S. 458; In re Merchants’ Stock Co., 223 U. S. 639; Farmers Nat’l Bk. v. Wilkinson, 266 U. S. 503, the criminal penalty and the remedial relief are segregated, no problem of the adequacy of the order for purposes of appellate review is presented. No question is raised here as to the propriety of combining civil and criminal contempt in the same proceeding.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SMILEY v. CITIBANK (SOUTH DAKOTA), N. A. No. 95-860. Argued April 24, 1996 Decided June 3, 1996 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Michael D. Donovan argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Pamela P. Bond, Patrick J. Grannan, Robin B. Howald, and Michael P. Malakoff. Richard B. Kendall argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Michael H. Strub, Jr., Louis R. Cohen, Ronald J. Greene, and Christopher R. Lipsett. Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Bender, Barbara C. Biddle, Jacob M. Lewis, Julie L. Williams, L. Robert Griffin, and Joan M. Bernott. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts et al. by Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Ernest L. Sarason, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Charles F. C. Ruff, Corporation Counsel of the District of Columbia, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Robert A. But-terworth of Florida, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, A. B. Chandler of Kentucky, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeffrey R. Howard of New Hampshire, Deborah T. Poritz of New Jersey, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Jeffrey B. Pine of Rhode Island, Charles W. Burson of Tennessee, Dan Morales of Texas, Jeffrey L. Amestoy of Vermont, Christine Gregoire of Washington, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; for the Bankcard Holders of America by Kennedy P. Richardson; for Consumer Action by James C. Sturdevcmt; and for the National Consumer Law Center et al. by Mark A Chavez and Patricia Sturdevant. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Colorado et al. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Jeffrey S. Sutton, State Solicitor, Carter G. Phillips, and James M. Harris, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Grant Woods of Arizona, Gale A Norton of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Jim Ryan of Illinois, Joseph P. Ma-zurek of Montana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Jan Graham of Utah, and James S. Gilmore III of Virginia; for Affinity Group Marketing et al. by Theodore W. Kheel; for the American Bankers Association et al. by Shirley M. Huf-stedler, L. Richard Fischer, James A. Huizinga, and W. Stephen Smith; for Greenwood Trust Co. et al. by Arthur R. Miller, Alan S. Kaplinsky, and Burt M. Rublin; for the New York Clearing House Association by John L. Warden and Richard J. TJrowsky; and for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice et al. by Ann Miller and Adele P. Kimmel. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Section 30 of the National Bank Act of 1864, Rev. Stat. § 5197, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 85, provides that a national bank may charge its loan customers “interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State... where the bank is located.” In Marquette Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U. S. 299 (1978), we held that this provision authorizes a national bank to charge out-of-state credit-card customers an interest rate allowed by the bank’s home State, even when that rate is higher than what is permitted by the States in which the cardholders reside. The question in this case is whether §85 also authorizes a national bank to charge late-payment fees that are lawful in the bank’s home State but prohibited in the States where the cardholders reside—in other words, whether the statutory term “interest” encompasses late-payment fees. I Petitioner, a resident of California, held two credit cards— a “Classic Card” and a “Preferred Card”—issued by respondent, a national bank located in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The Classic Card agreement provided that respondent would charge petitioner a late fee of $15 for each monthly period in which she failed to make her minimum monthly payment within 25 days of the due date. Under the Preferred Card agreement, respondent would impose a late fee of $6 if the minimum monthly payment was not received within 15 days of its due date; and an additional charge of $15 or 0.65% of the outstanding balance on the Preferred Card, whichever was greater, if the minimum payment was not received by the next minimum monthly payment due date. Petitioner was charged late fees on both cards. These late fees are permitted by South Dakota law, see S. D. Codified Laws §§54-3-1, 54-3-1.1 (1990 and Supp. 1995). Petitioner, however, is of the view that exacting such “unconscionable” late charges from California residents violates California law, and in 1992 brought a class action against respondent on behalf of herself and other California holders of respondent’s credit cards, asserting various statutory and common-law claims. Respondent moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that petitioner’s claims were pre-empted by §85. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially denied respondent’s motion, but the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, issued a writ of mandate directing the Superior Court to either grant the motion or show cause why it should not be required to do so. The Superior Court chose the former course, and the Court of Appeal affirmed its dismissal of the complaint, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1767, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (1994). The Supreme Court of California granted review and affirmed, two justices dissenting. 11 Cal. 4th 138, 900 P. 2d 690 (1995). We granted certiorari. 516 U. S. 1087 (1996). II In light of the two dissents from the opinion of the Supreme Court of California, see 11 Cal. 4th, at 165, 177, 900 P. 2d, at 708, 716 (Arabian, J., dissenting, and George, J., dissenting), and in light of the opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey creating the conflict that has prompted us to take this case, it would be difficult indeed to contend that the word “interest” in the National Bank Act is unambiguous with regard to the point at issue here. It is our practice to defer to the reasonable judgments of agencies with regard to the meaning of ambiguous terms in statutes that they are charged with administering. See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842-845 (1984). As we observed only last Term, that practice extends to the judgments of the Comptroller of the Currency with regard to the meaning of the banking laws. “The Comptroller of the Currency,” we said, “is charged with the enforcement of banking laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of [the rule of deference] with respect to his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws.” NationsBank of N. C., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U. S. 251, 256-257 (1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). On March 3,1995, which was after the California Superior Court’s dismissal of petitioner’s complaint, the Comptroller of the Currency noticed for public comment a proposed regulation dealing with the subject before us, see 60 Fed. Reg. 11924, 11940, and on February 9, 1996, which was after the California Supreme Court’s decision, he adopted the following provision: “The term ‘interest’ as used in 12 U. S. C. § 85 includes any payment compensating a creditor or prospective creditor for an extension of credit, making available of a line of credit, or any default or breach by a borrower of a condition upon which credit was extended. It includes, among other things, the following fees connected with credit extension or availability: numerical periodic rates, late fees, not sufficient funds (NSF) fees, over limit fees, annual fees, cash advance fees, and membership fees. It does not ordinarily include appraisal fees, premiums and commissions attributable to insurance guaranteeing repayment of any extension of credit, finders’ fees, fees for document preparation or notarization, or fees incurred to obtain credit reports.” 61 Fed. Reg. 4869 (to be codified in 12 CFR § 7.4001(a)). Petitioner proposes several reasons why the ordinary rule of deference should not apply to this regulation. First, petitioner points to the fact that this regulation was issued more than 100 years after the enactment of § 85, and seemingly as a result of this and similar litigation in which the Comptroller has participated as amicus curia# on the side of the banks. The 100-year delay makes no difference. To be sure, agency interpretations that are of long standing come before us with a certain credential of reasonableness, since it is rare that error would long persist. But neither antiquity nor contemporaneity with the statute is a condition of validity. We accord deference to agencies under Chevron, not because of a presumption that they drafted the provisions in question, or were present at the hearings, or spoke to the principal sponsors; but rather because of a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows. See Chevron, supra, at 843-844. Nor does it matter that the regulation was prompted by litigation, including this very suit. Of course we deny deference “to agency litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice,” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 212 (1988). The deliberateness of such positions, if not indeed their authoritativeness, is suspect. But we have before us here a full-dress regulation, issued by the Comptroller himself and adopted pursuant to the notice-and-comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act designed to assure due deliberation, see 5 U. S. C. § 553; Thompson v. Clark, 741 F. 2d 401, 409 (CADC 1984). That it was litigation which disclosed the need for the regulation is irrelevant. Second, petitioner contends that the Comptroller’s regulation is not deserving of our deference because “there is no rational basis for distinguishing the various charges [it] has denominated interest. . . from those charges it has denominated ‘non-interest.’” Reply Brief for Petitioner 14. We disagree. As an analytical matter, it seems to us perfectly possible to draw a line, as the regulation does, between (1) “payment compensating a creditor or prospective creditor for an extension of credit, making available of a line of credit, or any default or breach by a borrower of a condition upon which credit was extended,” and (2) all other payments. To be sure, in the broadest sense all payments connected in any way with the loan — including reimbursement of the lender’s costs in processing the application, insuring the loan, and appraising the collateral — can be regarded as “compensating [the] creditor for [the] extension of credit.” But it seems to us quite possible and rational to distinguish, as the regulation does, between those charges that are specifically as signed, to such expenses and those that are assessed for simply making the loan, or for the borrower’s default. In its logic, at least, the line is not “arbitrary [or] capricious,” and thereby disentitled to deference under Chevron, see 467 U. S., at 844. Whether it is “arbitrary [or] capricious” as an interpretation of what the statute means — or perháps even (what Chevron also excludes from deference) “manifestly contrary to the statute” — we will discuss in the next Part of this opinion. Finally, petitioner argues that the regulation is not entitled to deference- because it is inconsistent with positions taken by the Comptroller in the past. Of course the mere fact that an agency interpretation contradicts a prior agency position is not fatal. Sudden and unexplained change, see, e. g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 46-57 (1983), or change that does not take account of legitimate reliance on prior interpretation, see, e. g., United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 411 U. S. 655, 670-675 (1973); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 295 (1974), may be “arbitrary, capricious [or] an abuse of discretion,” 5 U. S. C. § 706(2)(A). But if these pitfalls are avoided, change is not invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency. In any case, we do not think that anything which can accurately be described as a change of official agency position has occurred here. The agency’s Notice of Proposed Rule-making asserted that the new regulation “reflects] current law and [Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)] interpretive letters,” 60 Fed. Reg. 11929 (1995), and the Statement of Basis and Purpose accompanying the final adoption stated that “[t]he final ruling is consistent with OCC interpretive letters in this area . . . and reflects the position the OCC has taken in amicus curiae briefs in litigation pending in many state and Federal courts,” 61 Fed. Reg. 4859 (1996) (citing OCC interpretive letters). Petitioner points only to (1) a June 1964 letter from the Comptroller to the President’s Committee on Consumer Interests, which states that “[c]harges for late payments, credit life insurance, recording fees, documentary stamp are illustrations of charges which are made by some banks which would not properly be characterized as interest,” see App. to Brief for Petitioner 5a; and (2) a 1988 opinion letter from the Deputy Chief Counsel of the OCC stating “it is my position that [under §85] the laws of the states where the banks are located . . . determine whether or not the banks can impose the foregoing fees and charges [including late fees] on Iowa residents,” OCC Interpretive Letter No. 452, reprinted in 1988-1989 Transfer Binder, CCH Fed. Banking L. Rep. ¶ 85,676, p. 78,064 (1988). We doubt whether either of these statements was sufficient in and of itself to establish a binding agency policy — the former, because it was too informal, and the latter because it only purported to represent the position of the Deputy Chief Counsel in response to an inquiry concerning particular banks. Nor can it even be argued that the two statements reflect a prior agency policy, since, in addition to contradicting the regulation before us here, they also contradict one another — the former asserting that “interest” is a nationally uniform concept, and the latter that it is to be determined by reference to state law. What these statements show, if anything, is that there was good reason for the Comptroller to promulgate the new regulation, in order to eliminate uncertainty and confusion. In addition to offering these reasons why 12 CFR § 7.4001(a) in particular is not entitled to deference, petitioner contends that no Comptroller interpretation of § 85 is entitled to deference, because §85 is a provision that preempts state law. She argues that the “presumption against . . . pre-emption” announced in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504, 518 (1992), in effect trumps Chevron, and requires a court to make its own interpretation of § 85 that will avoid (to the extent possible) pre-emption of state law. This argument confuses the question of the substantive (as opposed to pre-emptive) meaning of a statute with the question of whether a statute is pre-emptive. We may assume (without deciding) that the latter question must always be decided de novo by the courts. That is not the question at issue here; there is no doubt that §85 pre-empts state law. In Marquette Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U. S. 299 (1978), we dismissed petitioners’ argument that the “exportation” of interest rates from the bank’s home State would “significantly impair the ability of States to enact effective usury laws” with the observation that “[t]his impairment . . . has always been implicit in the structure of the National Bank Act .... [T]he protection of state usury laws is an issue of legislative policy, and any plea to alter §85 to further that end is better addressed to the wisdom of Congress than to the judgment of this Court.” Id., at 318-319. What is at issue here is simply the meaning of a provision that does not (like the provision in Cipo llone) deal with pre-emption, and hence does not bring into play the considerations petitioner raises. HH HH HH Since we have concluded that the Comptrollers regulation deserves deference, the question before us is not whether it represents the best interpretation of the statute, but whether it represents a reasonable one. The answer is obviously yes. Petitioner argues that the late fees charged by respondent do. not constitute “interest” because they “do not vary based on the payment owed or the time period of delay.” Brief for Petitioner 32-33. We do not think that such a limitation must be read into the statutory term. Most legal dictionaries of the era of the National Bank Act did not place such a limitation upon “interest.” See, e. g., 1 J. Bouvier, A Law Dictionary 652 (6th ed. 1856) (“The compensation which is paid by the borrower to the lender or by the debtor to the creditor for... use [of money]”); 2 A. Burrill, A Law Dictionary and Glossary 90 (2d ed. 1860); 11 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 379 (J. Merrill ed. 1890). But see J. Wharton, Law Lexicon or Dictionary of Jurisprudence 391 (2d Am. ed. 1860). The definition of “interest” that we ourselves set out in Brown v. Hiatts, 15 Wall. 177, 185 (1873), decided shortly after the enactment of the National Bank Act, likewise contained no indication that it was limited to charges expressed as a function of time or of amount owing: “Interest is the compensation allowed by law, or fixed by the parties, for the use or forbearance of money or as damages for its detention.” See also Hollowell v. Southern Building & Loan Assn., 120 N. C. 286, 26 S. E. 781 (1897) (“[A]ny charges made against [the borrower] in excess of the lawful rate of interest, whether called ‘fines,’ ‘charges,’ ‘dues,’ or ‘interest,’ are in fact interest, and usurious”). Petitioner suggests another source for the asserted requirement that the charges be time- and rate-based: What is authorized by § 85, she notes, is the charging of interest “at the rate allowed” by the laws of the bank’s home State. This requires, in her view, that the interest charges be expressed as functions of time and amount owing. It would be surprising to find such a requirement in the Act, if only because it would be so pointless. Any flat charge may, of course, readily be converted to a percentage charge — which was indeed the basis for 19th-century decisions holding that flat charges violated state usury laws establishing maximum “rates.” See, e. g., Craig v. Pleiss, 26 Pa. 271, 272-273 (1856); Hollowell, supra, at 286, 26 S. E., at 781. And there is no apparent reason why home-state-approved percentage charges should be permissible but home-state-approved flat charges unlawful. In any event, common usage at the time of the National Bank Act prevents the conclusion that the Comptroller’s refusal to give the word “rate” the narrow meaning petitioner demands is unreasonable. The 1849 edition of Webster’s gives as one of the definitions of “rate” the “[p]rice or amount stated or fixed on any thing.” N. Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language 910. To illustrate this sense of the word, it provides the following examples: “A king may purchase territory at too dear a rate. The rate of interest is prescribed by law.” Ibid. Cf. 2 Bou-vier, supra, at 421 (defining “rate of exchange” as “the price at which a bill drawn in one country upon another, may be sold in the former”). Finally, petitioner contends that the late fees cannot be “interest” because they are “penalties.” To support that dichotomy, she points to our opinion in Meilink v. Unemployment Reserves Comm’n of Cal., 314 U. S. 564, 570 (1942). But Meilink involved a provision of the Bankruptcy Act that disallowed debts owing to governmental entities “as a penalty,” except for “the amount of the pecuniary loss sustained by the act. . . out of which the penalty . . . arose, with . . . such interest as may have accrued thereon according to law.” Id., at 566. Obviously, this provision uses “interest” to mean only that interest which is exacted as commercial compensation, and not that interest which is exacted as a penalty. A word often takes on a more narrow connotation when it is expressly opposed to another word: “car,” for example, has a broader meaning by itself than it does in a passage speaking of “cars and taxis.” In §85, the term “interest” is not used in contradistinction to “penalty,” and there is no reason why it cannot include interest charges imposed for that purpose. More relevant than Meilink, is our opinion in Citizens’ Nat. Bank of Kansas City v. Donnell, 195 U. S. 369 (1904), which did involve §85 (or, more precisely, its predecessor, Rev. Stat. § 5197). There, a bank argued that a 12% charge on overdrafts did not violate a state law setting an 8% ceiling on interest rates because, inter alia, the overdraft charge “was a penalty because of a failure to pay a debt when due.” Id., at 373-374. We dismissed the argument out of hand: “The suggestions as to the twelve per cent charge on overdrafts do not seem to us to need answer.” Id., at 374. * * * Petitioner devotes much of her brief to the question whether the meaning of “interest” in § 85 can constitutionally be left to be defined by the law of the bank’s home State — a question that is not implicated by the Comptroller’s regulation. Because the regulation is entitled to deference, and because the Comptroller’s interpretation of §85 is not an unreasonable one, the decision of the Supreme Court of California must be affirmed. It is so ordered. By way of common-law claims, petitioner’s complaint alleged breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing; unjust enrichment; fraud and deceit; negligent misrepresentation; and breach of contract. It also alleged violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Ann. § 17200 (West Supp. 1996) (prohibiting unlawful business practices) and Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §1671 (West 1985) (invalidating unreasonable liquidated damages). Sherman v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 143 N. J. 35, 668 A. 2d 1036 (1995). The Supreme Court of Colorado and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit have adopted the same interpretation as the Supreme Court of California. See Copeland v. MBNA America Bank, N. A., 907 P. 2d 87 (Colo. 1995); Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F. 2d 818, 829-831 (CA1 1992) (dictum), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 1052 (1993). In a four-line footnote on the last page of her reply brief, and unpur-sued in oral argument, petitioner raised the point that deferring to the regulation in this case involving antecedent transactions would make the regulation retroactive, in violation of Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U. S. 204, 208-209 (1988). Reply Brief for Petitioner 20, n. 17. There might be substance to this point if the regulation replaced a prior agency interpretation — which, as we have discussed, it did not. Where, however, a court is addressing transactions that occurred at a time when there was no clear agency guidance, it would be absurd to ignore the agency’s current authoritative pronouncement of what the statute means.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HANOVER BANK, EXECUTOR, et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. No. 224. Argued February 27, 1962. Decided May 21, 1962. Theodore Tannenwald, Jr. argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was David Alter. Horace S. Manges was on the petition. Stephen J. Poliak argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer, Meyer Rothwacks, Douglas A. Kahn and Wayne G. Barnett. A brief urging reversal was filed by William Waller, as amicus curiae. Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. Despite the seemingly complex factual composition of the two cases consolidated herein, this opinion deals with a relatively simple question of taxation: The extent to which a taxpayer may deduct, through amortization under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the premium he has paid in purchasing corporate bonds. In 1953, prior to December 1, the petitioners purchased fully taxable utility bonds at a premium above maturity value. The bonds were callable at the option of the issuer at either a general or special call price, and at either price they were callable upon 30 days’ notice. The term “general call price” is used to designate the price at which the issuer may freely and unconditionally redeem all or any portion of the outstanding bonds from its general funds. The lower, “special call price,” is the amount the issuer would pay if the bonds were redeemed with cash from certain specially designated funds. In computing net income, the 1939 Code permits a taxpayer to deduct, through amortization, the premium he has paid in purchasing corporate bonds. Section 125 of the Code, set forth in pertinent part in the margin, provides that the amount of bond premium to be amortized “shall be determined . . . with reference to the amount payable on maturity or on earlier call date.” Pursuant to this Section, the petitioners elected to claim on their 1953 income tax returns a deduction for bond premium amortization computed with reference to the special redemption price and to the 30-day redemption period appearing in the bond indentures. The respondent did not question the petitioners’ use of the 30-day amortization period, but he disallowed the computation based upon the special redemption price and recomputed the amount of bond premium using the higher, general call price. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s orders sustaining the Commissioner’s deficiency determination. 289 F. 2d 69. However, in eases presenting the identical legal issue, the Courts of Appeals for the Third (Evans v. Dudley, 295 F. 2d 713) and Sixth (United States v. Parnell, 272 F. 2d 943, affirming 187 F. Supp. 576) Circuits allowed amortization taken with reference to the special redemption prices. To resolve this conflict, we granted certiorari. 368 U. S. 812. Bond premium is the amount a purchaser pays in buying a bond that exceeds the face or call value of the bond. When a bond sells at a premium, it is generally because the interest it bears exceeds the rate of return on similar securities in the current market. For the right to receive this higher interest rate the purchaser of a bond pays a premium price when making the investment. However, interest is taxable to the recipient, and when a premium has been paid the actual interest received is not a true reflection of the bond’s yield, but represents in part a return of the premium paid. It was to give effect to this principle that Congress in 1942 enacted Section 125 of the 1939 Code, which for the first time provided for amortization of bond premium for tax purposes. By providing that amortization could be taken with reference to the “amount payable on maturity or on earlier call date” (emphasis added), Congress recognized that bonds are generally subject to redemption by the issuer prior to their maturity. In electing to allow amortization with reference to the period the bonds might actually be outstanding, Congress, through the words to which we have lent emphasis, provided that a bondholder could amortize bond premium with reference to any date named in the indenture at which the bond might be called. A bond indenture might contain any number of possible call dates, but we need only to be concerned in this case with the issuer’s right to call the bonds on 30 days’ notice at either a general or special call price. Unquestionably, both general and special redemption provisions have a legitimate, though distinct, business purpose, and both were in widespread use well before the enactment of Section 125. The general call price is employed when the issuer finds that the current rate of interest on marketable securities is substantially lower than what it is paying on an outstanding issue. The issuer may then call the bonds at the general price and, following redemption, may refinance the obligation at the lower, prevailing rate of interest. In contrast, the provision for special funds from which bonds may be redeemed at the special call price, serves an entirely different purpose. Bond indentures normally require the issuer to protect the underlying security of the bonds by maintaining the mortgaged property and by insuring that its value is not impaired. This is done, first, through the maintenance of a special sinking fund, to which the issuer is obligated to make periodic payments, and, secondly, through the maintenance of other special funds, to which are added the proceeds from a sale or destruction of mortgaged property, or from its loss through a taking by eminent domain. Although the issuer normally reserves an alternative to maintaining these special funds with cash, circumstances may dictate that the only attractive option from a business standpoint is the payment of cash and, to prevent the accumulation of this idle money, the indenture provides that the issuer may use it to redeem outstanding bonds at a special call price. It is evident that just as prevailing market conditions may render redemption at the special call price unlikely at a given time, the same or different market conditions may also cause redemption at the general call price equally unlikely, particularly in an expanding industry such as utilities. During the period the petitioners held their bonds, none were called at either price, but the risk incurred that they would be called was present with equal force as to both the general and special call provisions. The market for bonds reflects that risk, and the Section of the Code we are asked to interpret takes cognizance of that market reality. Turning to the specific problem in the instant case, we are asked to determine whether the special price at which the bonds may be redeemed by the issuer from the limited sinking fund account and from the other special funds made available upon the occurrence of certain contingent events (see note 3, supra) is an “amount payable ... on earlier call date” within the meaning of Section 125. For the reasons stated below, we answer this question affirmatively and hold that there is no basis either in the statute, in the legislative history, or in the respondent’s own prior interpretations of the statute, for a distinction between reference to a general or special call price in computing amortizable bond premiums under the 1939 Code. First, we note that the Government has made certain important concessions which lighten considerably the task before us. It does not question the right of the petitioners to amortize bond premium with reference to the 30-day call period, nor does it question amortization to the general call price. In addition, in requesting a rule which will apply to the “generality of cases/’ it professes to have abandoned its argument below which became the rationale of the Second Circuit in holding against the taxpayers, that the statute calls for an analysis into the “likelihood of redemption” before amortization at a special call price will be permitted. Moreover, the Government does not contend that the transactions entered into by the petitioners were a sham without any business purpose except to gain a tax advantage. Rather, the Government’s position in this Court is that before an “earlier call date” is established with reference to the special call price, the taxpayer must show that “there is an ascertainable date on which the issuer will become entitled to redeem [a particular] bond at its option.” The Government asserts that it is not enough that the issuer has the right to call some bonds at the special redemption price. Rather, “[i]t must have the right to call the particular bond for which amortization is claimed, for otherwise that bond has no 'earlier call date.’ ” The Government’s primary reason for urging this interpretation of Section 125 is that the statute has created a tax loophole of major dimension that should be closed short of allowing the deduction sought in this case. While this assertion might have been persuasive in securing enactment of the amendments to the statute made subsequent to the time the transactions involved here took place (see discussion, infra), it may not, of course, have any impact upon our interpretation of the statute under review. We are bound by the meaning of the words used by Congress, taken in light of the pertinent legislative history. In neither do we find support for the Government’s interpretation. This Court was first called upon to construe Section 125 in 1950 in Commissioner v. Korell, 339 U. S. 619. The taxpayer there had purchased bonds at a premium which reflected in large part not a higher yield of interest, but, rather, the attractiveness of the convertible feature of the bonds. The bonds were callable on 30 days’ notice and the taxpayer amortized the premium accordingly. In contesting the deduction thus taken, the Commissioner contended that Section 125, in establishing a deduction for “amortizable bond premium,” did not include premium paid for the conversion privilege. In rejecting this contention, the Court made it clear that Section 125 was not enacted solely to enable a bondholder to amortize “true premium,” but that by “the clear and precise avenue of expression actually adopted by the Congress” (339 U. S., at 625), the legislation was adopted with “no distinctions based upon the inducements for paying the premium.” (Id., at 628.) The decision in Korell led to congressional re-examination of Section 125, and the enactment of Section 217 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 906), which eliminated amortization of bond premiums attributable to a conversion feature. However, response to the Korell decision was specifically limited to the convertible bond situation; no further change was made in the statute which would reflect on its interpretation in the case before us. In 1954, in enacting the successor to Section 125, Section 171 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U. S. C., 1958 ed.), Congress again took cognizance of the tax benefit in question, and determined to eliminate the abuses inherent in permitting amortization with reference to 30-day call periods. Thus Congress further narrowed the loophole by providing that the premium on callable bonds could be amortized to the nearest call date only if such date was more than three years from the date of the original issue of the securities. With particular relevance to the Government’s argument in the instant case, it is worthy of note that Congress understood the operation of the statute to the taxpayer’s advantage, but limited correction of the abuses inherent in it to elimination of the quick write-off. The House Report accompanying H. R. 8300, which was to become the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, stated (H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 26): “Under existing law, a bond premium may be amortized with reference to the amount payable on maturity or on earlier call date, at the election of the taxpayer. In the case of bonds with a very short call feature, such as those providing for call at any time on 30-day notice, the entire premium may be deducted in the year of purchase. “This provision has given rise to tax-avoidance opportunities. Substantial bond issues have been made subject to a 30-day call, permitting the purchaser to take an immediate deduction for the entire premium against ordinary income. Where the call feature is nominal or inoperative this permits a deduction for an unreal loss, since the market value of the bonds ordinarily remains fairly stable over considerable periods. The bonds may then be resold after 6 months subject to long-term capital gain treatment. The writeoff of premium thus affords a gratuitous tax saving, equivalent to the conversion of a corresponding amount of ordinary income into capital gain. This process may be repeated indefinitely. “To curb this type of abuse, your committee’s bill provides that the premium on callable bonds may be amortized to the nearest call date only if such date is more than 3 years from the date of original issue of the securities. This provision will apply only to bonds issued after January 22, 1951, and .acquired after January 22,1954” (Emphasis added.) Not only did Congress fail to make the distinction between general and special call provisions urged by the respondent, but it expressly recognized that deductions could be taken under Section 125 with reference to a call date that was “nominal or inoperative.” It did not remotely imply that a showing of a right to call all or any part of the outstanding bonds was necessary for operation of the statute. Furthermore, the change that it did adopt was to operate prospectively only. Finally, in 1958, by adoption of Section 13 of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1610, Congress eliminated entirely the right to amortize to call date, permitting amortization to be taken only over the period to maturity. Again, the legislative change was prospective only and again no distinction was made with respect to general and special call dates or with respect to a right to call all or a part of the outstanding bonds. Persuasive evidence that we are correct in our interpretation of Section 125, as bolstered by its legislative history and subsequent amendments, may be found in the respondent’s own prior construction of the statute. As is true with the language of the statute itself, the respondent’s regulations contained not the slightest hint of the distinction urged upon us here. The Commissioner defined “earlier call date” in Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.125 (b)-2 (see note 10, supra) as any call date prior to maturity, specified in the bond. The regulations in effect in 1953 give no support to the Government’s present contention that the taxpayer must show an unconditional right in the issuer to call the outstanding bonds at a particular redemption price before amortization with reference to that price would be permitted. Furthermore, although the petitioners are not entitled to rely upon unpublished private rulings which were not issued specifically to them, such rulings do reveal the interpretation put upon the statute by the agency charged with the responsibility of administering the revenue laws. And, because the Commissioner ruled, in letters addressed to taxpayers requesting them, that amortization with reference to a special call price was proper under the statute, we have further evidence that our construction of allowable bond premium amortization is compelled by the language of the statute. A firmly established principle of statutory interpretation is that “the words of statutes — including revenue acts — should be interpreted where possible in their ordinary, everyday senses.” Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U. S. 1, 6. The statute in issue here, in plain and ordinary language, evidences a clear congressional intent to allow amortization with reference to any call date named in the indenture. Under such circumstances we are not at liberty, notwithstanding the apparent tax-saving windfall bestowed upon taxpayers, to add to or alter the words employed to effect a purpose which does not appear on the face of the statute. Moreover, the legislative history, too, is persuasive evidence that the statute, as it appeared in 1953 when these deductions were taken, allowed the deduction refused these taxpayers. Simply stated, an informed Congress enacted Section 125 with full realization of the existence and operation of special call provisions, but chose not to make any distinction between them and general redemption rights. Neither did the Commissioner. Nevertheless, the Government now urges this Court to do what the legislative branch of the Government failed to do or elected not to do. This, of course, is not within our province. The judgments are reversed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the decision of this case. Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. We have before us two eases which originated in the Tax Court: Estate of Gourielli v. Commissioner, 33 T. C. 357, and Goldfarb v. Commissioner, 33 T. C. 568. The cases were consolidated on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and one opinion was filed by that court. Estate of Gourielli v. Commissioner, 289 F. 2d 69. Petitioner Hanover Bank is the executor of the estate of Mr. Gourielli, who passed away since the commencement of this action. The bonds involved in the Gourielli case were Appalachian Electric Power Company, 1981 series, bonds, which decedent and his wife purchased for $117.50 per $100 face value, and which were later sold for $115.50. The bonds in Goldfarb were Arkansas Power & Light Company, 30-year, Eighth Series, bonds, which petitioners purchased at an average price of $110.50 per $100 face amount, and which were later sold at an average price of $105.40. The total purchases in the two cases were $540,000 (Gourielli) and $500,000 (Goldfarb) face amount; the purchase prices were paid in cash in both cases. In addition to a “sinking fund” into which the indenture required Appalachian to deposit during each annual period an amount (in cash or property additions of an equivalent amount) equal to one percent of the bond issue, the special funds in the case of the Appalachian bonds were: (1) a released property and insurance fund, to which deposits were required only upon a loss by casualty or by a release of mortgaged properties securing the bonds; and (2) a maintenance fund, to which deposits were required only when Appalachian failed to expend a stated percentage of its revenues on maintenance or improvements. The special funds in the case of the Arkansas bonds were made up from the same type contributions as above, plus additions made to an eminent domain fund if and when mortgaged property was taken from the company by eminent domain proceedings. Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (26 U. S. C., 1952 ed.): “SEC. 23. DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS INCOME. “In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions: “(v) [as added by § 126 (a), Revenue Act of 1942, c. 619, 56 Stat. 798] Bond Premium Deduction. — In the case of a bondholder, the deduction for amortizable bond premium provided in section 125.” This Section was also added by the Revenue Act of 1942, supra, note 4, § 126 (b). Entitled “Amortizable Bond Premium,” it reads in pertinent part as follows: “(a) GENERAL Rule. — In the case of any bond, as defined in subsection (d), the following rules shall apply to the amortizable bond premium (determined under subsection (b)) on the bond for any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1941: “(b) AmoRtizable Bond Premium.— “(1) Amount of bond premium. — For the purposes of paragraph (2.), the amount of bond premium, in the case of the holder of any bond, shall be determined with reference to the amount of the basis (for determining loss on sale or exchange) of such bond, and with reference to the amount payable on maturity or on earlier call date, with adjustments proper to reflect unamortized bond premium with respect to the bond, for the period prior to the date as of which subsection (a) becomes applicable with respect to the taxpayer with respect to such bond. “(2) Amount amortizable. — The amortizable bond premium of the taxable year shall be the amount of the bond premium attributable to such year. “(3) Method of determination. — The determinations required under paragraphs (1) and (2) shall be made— “(A) in accordance with the method of amortizing bond premium regularly employed by the holder of the bond, if such method is reasonable; “(B) in all other cases, in accordance with regulations prescribing reasonable methods of amortizing bond premium, prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary.” At the time of the deduction in Gourielli, the schedule appearing in the Appalachian bond indenture provided that the bonds could be redeemed at a general call price of 105% or a special call price of 102%. The petitioners’ basis was $117.50 (see supra, note 2) and therefore amortization of premium with reference to the two prices would result in a deduction of $64,831.07 or $83,056.07, respectively. The difference in these amounts, $18,225.00, was the amount disallowed by the respondent. By a similar recomputation with reference to the schedule of redemption prices appearing in the Arkansas bond indenture (105.36 as compared to 101.36), the respondent reduced the deduction in Goldfarb by $27,175.00. The actual tax deficiency in each ease was considerably less ($14,200.92 and $14,708.16, respectively), of course, because disallowance of the larger premium resulted in a corresponding increase in th§ petitioners’ basis which had been adjusted pursuant to Section 113 (b) (1) (H) of the Code when the premium was amortized. This increase in basis resulted in a smaller short-term capital gain (the petitioners held the bonds less than six months) than had been reported by petitioners in their 1953 returns. The decrease in tax due on the capital gain was offset against the amount of amortization disallowed to arrive at the petitioners’ actual tax deficiencies in issue here. In addition to the Third and Sixth Circuits’ cases, the First and Seventh Circuits have also allowed deductions of bond premium amortization taken with reference to special redemption prices. In the First Circuit: Fabreeka Products Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F. 2d 876, vacating and remanding 34 T. C. 290; Sherman v. Commissioner, 34 T. C. 303; and Friedman v. Commissioner, 34 T. C. 456. In the Seventh Circuit: Gallun v. Commissioner, 297 F. 2d 455, reversing 1960 P-H T. C. Memo. Dec. ¶ 60,104; and Maysteel Products, Inc., v. Commissioner, 287 F. 2d 429, reversing 33 T. C. 1021. In each of these eases the taxpayer had purchased bonds at a premium, amortized that premium to the special call price, and thereafter made a distribution of the bonds which entailed a double tax deduction (e. g., a gift to charity). In each case the Court of Appeals allowed the double deduction. Although the precise issue presented in the instant case was not expressly decided in these latter cases, due to the fact that the Commissioner did not choose to challenge the use of the special call price as against the general call price for determining the amount of the premium, the allowance of the amortization to the special redemption price impliedly places the First and Seventh Circuits in accord with the Third and Sixth Circuits. See the authorities collected in Commissioner v. Korell, 339 U. S. 619, 627, n. 10. The Court in Korell, a case also involving an interpretation of Section 125 (see discussion, pp. 682-683, infra), concluded (339 U. S., at 627): “We adopt the view that 'bond premium’ in § 125 means any extra payment, regardless of the reason therefor .. . .” Commissioner v. Korell, 339 U. S. 619, 621. See 1 Hearings before House Committee on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1942, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1942). The House Committee noted the recommendation made in the hearings that the difference between yield and the actual interest rate be treated as a return of capital and not as a capital loss (H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 47): “Under existing law, bond premium is treated as a capital loss sustained by the owner of the bond at the time of disposition or maturity and periodical payments on the bond at the nominal or coupon rate are treated in full as interest. The want of statutory recognition of the sound accounting practice of amortizing premium leads to incorrect tax results which in many instances are so serious that provision should be made for their avoidance.” However, in rejecting the Government’s argument in Korell, supra, that Congress intended to confine the deduction only to premium paid for a higher-than-market interest rate, the Court stated (339 U. S., at 626-627): “At most, [the Commissioner’s] presentation of the legislative materials suggests that Congress may have had the bondholder who was seeking a higher interest rate primarily in mind; but it does not establish that Congress in fact legislated with reference to him exclusively. [Citation omitted.] Congress, and the Treasury in advising Congress, may well have concluded that the best manner of affording him relief and correcting the inequitable treatment of bondholders whose interest receipts were taxable, was to define the scope of the amendment by reference to types of bonds rather than causes of premium payment.” Congress’ intent in this regard was expressly noted by the respondent in enacting Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.125 (b)-2: “Callable and convertible bonds, (a) The fact that a bond is callable . . . does not, in itself, prevent the application of section 125. . . . The earlier call date may be the earliest call date specified in the bond as a day certain, the earliest interest payment date if the bond is callable at such date, the earliest date at which the bond is callable at par, or such other call date, prior to maturity, specified in the bond as may be selected by the taxpayer. . . See generally Evans v. Dudley, 295 F. 2d 713, 715; Estate of Gourielli v. Commissioner, 289 F. 2d 69, 73; Parnell v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 576, 577, aff’d, 272 F. 2d 943. See also Badger, Investment Principles and Practices (5th ed. 1961), 46-47, 114-115, 129; I Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations (5th ed. 1953), 186-188, 247-249. Hence, the occurrence of a redemption at the general call price is dependent upon one set of events — the fluctuation in the interest market; the occurrence of a redemption at the special call price is dependent upon another set of events — deposits in the sinking fund by the issuer over one or more years, takings by governmental agencies through eminent domain, destruction of the property securing the bonds, etc. In either case, the events could happen. In fact, the petitioners point out in their brief here that in recent years more bonds have been called at the special redemption price than at the general price. See also Evans v. Dudley, 295 F. 2d 713, 716. Allowing a 30-day amortization period is in accord with the decision of the Court in Korell where, although the point was not argued by the Government, the taxpayer had amortized the premium with reference to the 30-day period provided in the indenture. In its brief in the instant case the Government states: “. . . [W]e concede that it is now too late to challenge the amortization of the premium on bonds subject to an unlimited right of redemption on 30 days’ notice. Not only has the consistent administrative practice, culminating in a published ruling, been to allow such amortization, but Congress, in narrowing such deductions in the 1954 Code and prohibiting them entirely after 1957, expressly acknowledged that the prior law permitted that treatment. . . . Accordingly, we did not challenge in the lower courts and do not challenge here petitioners’ right to amortization of the premium on the basis of the general right of the issuer to redeem the bonds at any time upon 30 days’ notice.” See also Int. Rev. Rul. 56-398, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 984, where the respondent, in a published ruling, acquiesced in a 30-day amortization period under the 1939 Code. This concession also conforms to the pronouncement in Korell (339 U. S., at 625): “Congress was legislating for the generality of cases.” See also Evans v. Dudley, 295 F. 2d 713, 716; Parnell v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 576, 579, aff’d, 272 F. 2d 943. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated (289 F. 2d 69, 74): “We do not think that ... in § 125 of the Code . . . [Congress] meant to include an amount payable on a call at a ‘special’ price of which there was no real possibility during the period for which the amortization is being taken and the deduction claimed.” And (289 F. 2d, at 72): “. . . [T]he hazard that any significant number of petitioners’ bonds would be called during [the] period was infinitesimal.” In so holding, the Court accepted the Government’s argument below that “[t]he taxpayer is not entitled to compute his amortizable bond premium deduction . . . with reference to the ‘special’ call price ... because... such a call was so contingent and unlikely that there was no realistic call date at the ‘special’ call price . . . .” In contrast, the Government states in its brief here: “. . . [0]ur position is not dependent upon the particular market conditions or the actual probabilities that a right, of redemption will be exercised. . . . [W]e agree with petitioners that the question . . . should not be dependent upon a finding in each case of the actual likelihood' that any particular redemption right will be exercised.” As to the futility in attempting to apply a “likelihood of redemption” standard, see note 12, supra. Cf. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U. S. 361; Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465. The legislation simply provided: “In no case shall the amount of bond premium of a convertible bond include any amount attributable to the conversion features of the bond.” Where, as in the case before us, a question of interpretation of Section 125 is presented lying outside the scope of the 1950 Amendment, Korell retains its full vitality. Thus, it is worth noting that the Government’s “right to call” approach advocated in the case at bar would result in a sub silentio overruling of Korell to the extent that in the latter case the right of the bondholder to exercise his conversion option at any time through the expiration of the notice period of a call defeated completely the issuer’s “right” to call and redeem even a single bond. In the instant case, however, neither party disputes the fact that at least some of the bonds could have been called at the special price and that if the issuer exercised his right so to call them the bondholder would have had no choice but to turn over the bonds and forfeit the premium paid for them. The 1958 Amendment literally permits amortization to an earlier call date but only if it results in a smaller amortization deduction than would amortization to maturity, which, for all practical purposes, effectively eliminates the privilege of calling to an earlier call date. See, e. g., Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U. S. 260, 265-266, n. 5; Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U. S. 180; Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U. S. 455, 467-468. For example, the record in the instant case contains a copy of the following letter to a taxpayer from the respondent’s office (we quote the relevant portion): “Gentlemen: “The Appalachian Electric Power Company 3%% bonds, 1981 Series, are callable in whole or in part through May of 1953 at 105%. They are also callable for sinking fund through funds derived from maintenance or sale of property at any time upon thirty days notice through May 31, 1954 at 102%. You request to be advised whether the above-mentioned ruling of July 30, 1952, means that such bonds may be amortized down to 102% or whether it means that they can only be amortized down to 105% through May of 1953. “Upon the basis of the information on file in this office, it is the opinion of this office that a taxpayer electing to amortize the premium on Appalachian Electric Power Company bonds in accordance with section 125 of the Code may use the regular redemption price of 105% or the special redemption price of 102%. “Very truly yours, [etc.] . . .” In 1956, three years after the deductions in the present case were taken, the Commissioner — -reversing the position he had previously and uniformly adhered to in a series of private rulings — for the first time announced that amortization of bond premium under Section 125 of the 1939 Code was to be limited to premium in excess of a general call price and could not include premium in excess of a lower special call price, except where an actual call was made at the latter price. Int. Rev. Rul. 56-398, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 984. See also Commissioner v. Korell, 339 U. S. 619, 627-628; Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U. S. 109, 111; Old Colony R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U. S. 552, 560. We believe the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was correct when it said in Fabreeka Products Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F. 2d 876, 879: “Granting the government’s proposition that these taxpayers have found a hole in the dike, we believe it one that calls for the application of the Congressional thumb, not the court’s.” See also Evans v. Dudley, 295 F. 2d 713, 715, where the Third Circuit quotes this language from Judge Aldrich’s opinion in Fabreeka Products.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. STANISIC. No. 297. Argued February 25, 1969. Decided May 19, 1969. Joseph J. Connolly argued the cause for petitioner, pro hac vice. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, and Philip R. Monahan. G. Bernard Fedde, by appointment of the Court, 393 U. S. 1010, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Dorothy McCullough Lee. Edward J. Ennis and Melvin L. Wulf filed a brief for the American Civil Litfferties Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves the type of hearing to which an alien crewman is entitled on his claim that he would suffer persecution upon deportation to his native land. The Court of Appeals sustained the respondent crewman’s contention that he must be heard by a special inquiry officer in a proceeding conducted under § 242 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Petitioner, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, argues that respondent’s claim was properly heard and determined by a district director. We brought the case here, 393 U. S. 912 (1968), to resolve the conflict on this score between the decision below and that of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F. 2d 232 (1967). I. Respondent, a national of Yugoslavia, was a crewman aboard the Yugoslav vessel, M/V Sumadija, when it docked at Coos Bay, Oregon, in late December 1964. He requested and was issued a “D-l” conditional landing permit, in accordance with 8 CFR §252.1 (d)(1) and §252 (a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Under these provisions, the Service may allow a non-immigrant alien crewman temporary shore leave for “the period of time (not exceeding twenty-nine days) during which the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived remains in port, if the immigration officer is satisfied that the crewman intends to depart on the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived.” Ibid. On January 6, 1965, while on shore leave, respondent appeared at the Portland, Oregon, office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He claimed that he feared persecution upon return to Yugoslavia, and he flatly stated that he would not return to the M/V Sumadija. On the basis of the latter statement, and in accordance with § 252 (b) of the Act, the District Director revoked respondent’s landing permit. Section 252 (b) provides: “[A]ny immigration officer may, in his discretion, if he determines that an alien . . . does not intend to depart on the vessel or aircraft which brought him, revoke the conditional permit to land which was granted such crewman under the provisions of subsection (a)(1), take such crewman into custody, and require the master or commanding officer of the vessel or aircraft on which the crewman arrived to receive and detain him on board such vessel or aircraft, if practicable, and such crewman shall be deported from the United States at the expense of the transportation line which brought him to the United States. . . . Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the procedure prescribed in section 242 of this Act to [sic] cases falling within the provisions of this subsection.” Section 252 (b) makes no express exception for an alien whose deportation would subject him to persecution. However, § 243 (h) permits the Attorney General to withhold the deportation of any alien to a country in which he would be subject to persecution, and analogously, 8 CFR § 253.1 (e) then provided: “Any alien crewman . . . whose conditional landing permit issued under § 252.1 (d) (1) of this chapter is revoked who alleges that he cannot return to a Communist, Communist-dominated, or Communist-occupied country because of fear of persecution in that country on account of race, religion, or political opinion may be paroled into the United States . . . for the period of time and under the conditions set by the district director having jurisdiction over the area where the alien crewman is located.” Thus, although respondent was admittedly deportable under the terms of § 252 (b), he was not immediately returned to his vessel. On January 7, he was offered the opportunity to present evidence to the District Director in support of his claim of persecution. Respondent presented no evidence to the District Director. Rather, he contended that he had not been given sufficient time to prepare for the hearing, and he also argued that he was entitled to have his claim heard by a special inquiry officer in accordance with the general provisions of § 242 (b). The District Director ruled against respondent and, in the absence of any evidence of probable persecution, ordered him returned to the M/V Sumadija, which was then still in port. Respondent immediately sought relief in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, which, without opinion, temporarily stayed his deportation and referred the matter back to the District Director for a hearing on the merits of respondent’s claim. On January 25, 1965, after a hearing at which respondent was represented by counsel and presented evidence, the District Director held that respondent “has [not] shown that he would be physically persecuted if he were to return to Yugoslavia.” Appendix 22. On respondent’s supplemental pleadings, the District Court held that the District Director’s findings were supported by the record. The court rejected respondent’s claim that he was entitled to a § 242 (b) hearing before a special inquiry officer, relying on the last sentence of § 252 (b), which provides: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to require the procedure prescribed in section 242 of this Act to cases falling within the provisions of this subsection.” Vucinic [and Stanisic] v. Immigration Service, 243 F. Supp. 113 (1965). Respondent did not appeal the District Court’s decision. Instead, in July 1965, he petitioned Congress for a private bill, pending action on which the Service stayed his deportation. Respondent’s effort proved unsuccessful, and on June 21, 1966, the Service ordered him to appear for deportation to Yugoslavia. The following day, respondent reasserted his claim of persecution before the Service, and requested that the matter be heard by a special inquiry officer pursuant to § 242. The Service, and subsequently the District Court, denied relief, both holding that this issue had previously been determined adversely to respondent. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, Stanisic v. Immigration Service, 393 F. 2d 539 (1968), holding that the matter was not res judicata because of a significant change of circumstances: the District Director’s adverse determination in 1965, and the District Court’s unappealed approval thereof, were based on the unstated premise that the M/V Sumadija was still in port; but now the ship had long since sailed, and respondent still had not been deported. The court held that § 252 (b) only authorized respondent’s “summary deportation aboard the vessel on which he arrived or, within a very limited time after that vessel’s departure, aboard another vessel pursuant to arrangements made before . . . [his] vessel departed.” 393 F. 2d, at 542-543. Since neither of these conditions was met, respondent could no longer be deported pursuant to the District Director’s 1965 determination; he was entitled to a de novo hearing before a special inquiry officer under § 242 (b) of the Act. II. At the outset, it is important to recognize the distinction between a determination whether an alien is statutorily deportable — something never contested by respondent — and a determination whether to grant political asylum to an otherwise properly deportable alien. Section 242 (b) provides a generally applicable procedure “for determining the deportability of an alien . . . .” Section 252 (b) provides a specific procedure for the deportation of alien crewmen holding D-l landing permits. Neither of these sections is concerned with the granting of asylum. Relief from persecution, on the other hand, is governed by §§212 (d)(5) and 243 (h). The former section authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to “parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United States . . . .” The latter authorizes the Attorney General “to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.” No statute prescribes by what delegate of the Attorney General, or pursuant to what procedure, relief shall be granted under these provisions. By regulation, the decision to grant parole pursuant to § 212 (d) (5) rests with a district director, 8 CFR §§ 212.5 (a), 253.2; and by regulation, the decision to withhold deportation of most aliens pursuant to § 243 (h) is presently made by a special inquiry officer. 8 CFR §§ 242.8 (a), 242.17 (c). Prior to 1960, no regulation provided relief to an alien crewman whose D-l landing permit was revoked but who claimed that return to his country would subject him to persecution. In Szlajmer v. Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 491 (1960), a district court held that a crewman in this situation was entitled to be heard. The Service responded by promulgating 8 CFR § 253.1 (e), supra, at 67, the regulation which it applied in the case at bar. 8 CFR § 253.1 (e) is a hybrid. The grounds for relief are, for present purposes, identical to those of § 243 (h) of the Act. However, because the Service adheres to the view that a crewman whose D-l permit has been revoked is not “within the United States” in the technical sense of that phrase, see Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U. S. 185 (1958), it terms the relief “parole” into the United States rather than “withholding deportation.” Whatever terminological and conceptual differences may exist, the substance of the relief is the same. The Service could provide that all persecution claims be heard by a district director, and we see no reason why the Service cannot validly provide that the persecution claim of an alien crewman whose D-l landing permit has been revoked be heard by a district director, whether or not the ship has departed. It might be argued, however, that the Service has not done so; that 8 CFR § 253.1 (e) was designed to govern the determination of persecution claims only when § 252 (b) of the Act governed determinations of deportability; and that if departure of the vessel renders § 252 (b) inapplicable (a suggestion we consider and reject in Part III, below), then 8 CFR § 253.1 (e) likewise becomes inapplicable. Section 253.1 (e) applies, however, to “[a]ny alien crewman . . . whose conditional landing permit issued under §252.1 (d)(1) [of 8 CFR] ... is revoked” — precisely respondent’s situation — and makes no reference to the departure, vel non, of the vessel. Granting that this regulation and its successor provision are not free from ambiguity, we find it dispositive that the agency responsible for promulgating and administering the regulation has interpreted it to apply even when the vessel has departed. E. g., Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F. 2d 232 (1967); Glavic v. Beechie, 225 F. Supp. 24 (1963), aff’d, 340 F. 2d 91 (1964). “[T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U. S. 410, 414 (1945). In sum, it is immaterial to the decision in this case whether § 252 (b)’s exception to the § 242 (b) procedure is, or is not, applicable to respondent. These two provisions govern only the revocation of temporary landing permits and the determination of deportability, and we reiterate that respondent does not contest the District Director’s action on either of these scores. These sections do not state who should hear and determine a request for asylum. That is a matter governed by regulation, and under the applicable regulation the respondent received his due. III. We do not rest on this ground alone, however. Both the court below and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F. 2d 232 (1967), assumed that a crewman’s statutory entitlement to a § 242 (b) hearing on his request for asylum was coextensive with his right to a § 242 (b) hearing on his statutory deportability, and the case was argued here primarily on that basis. For the balance of the opinion we thus make, arguendo, the same assumption. We conclude, contrary to the court below, that an alien crewman may properly be deported pursuant to § 252 (b) even after his ship has sailed. A. Section 242 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides a generally applicable administrative procedure pursuant to which a special inquiry officer determines whether an alien is deportable. See nn. 1 and 2, supra. The history of § 252 (b)’s narrow exception to the § 242 (b) deportation procedure is found in the Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., which preceded the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Alien crewmen had traditionally been granted the privilege of temporary admission or shore leave “because of the necessity of freeing international commerce from unnecessary barriers and considerations of comity with other nations . . . .” Id., at 546. A serious problem was created, however, by alien crewmen who deserted their ships and secreted themselves in the United States. The Committee found that: “[T]he temporary ‘shore leave’ admission of alien seamen who remain illegally constitutes one of the most important loopholes in our whole system of restriction and control of the entry of aliens into the United States. The efforts to apprehend these alien seamen for deportation are encumbered by many technicalities invoked in behalf of the alien seamen and create conditions incident to enforcement of the laws which have troubled the authorities for many years.” Id., at 550. To ameliorate this problem, the Committee recommended that: “Authority should be granted to immigration officers in a case where the alien crewman intends to depart on the same vessel on which he arrived, upon a satisfactory finding that an alien is not a bona fide crewman, to revoke the permission to land temporarily, to take the alien into custody, and to require the master of the vessel on which he arrived to detain him and remove him from the country.” Id., at 558. Unlike § 242 (b), § 252 (b) does not prescribe the procedures governing the determination of the crewman’s deportability, nor does it confine that determination to a special inquiry officer. B. As the Court of Appeals noted, the § 252 (b) procedure governs a narrow range of cases only. It is entirely inapplicable to persons other than alien crewmen. It does not apply to an alien crewman who enters the United States illegally without obtaining any landing permit at all, or who enters on a “D-2” permit allowing him to depart on a different vessel. See n. 4, supra. The Service has held § 252 (b) to be inapplicable even to a crewman issued a D-l permit unless formal revocation— as distinguished from actual deportation — -takes place before his vessel leaves American shores. Matter of M-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 127 (1953); 8 CFR § 252.2; see Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration Service, 392 U. S. 206, 207 (1968). Section 252 (b) most plainly governs the situation in which a D-l landing permit is revoked and the alien crewman is immediately returned to the vessel on which he arrived, which, by hypothesis, is still in a United States port. At the time of revocation, the crewman usually has not traveled far from the port, so the burden of transporting him back to the vessel is small; there is a readily identifiable vessel and place to return him to; and during his brief shore leave, which cannot exceed 29 days, the crewman is unlikely to have established significant personal or business relationships in the United States. In short, the crewman’s deportation may be expedited, with minimum hardship and inconvenience to him, to the transportation company responsible for him, and to the Service. That this is not the only situation to which the § 252 (b) procedure applies, however, is evident from the language of § 252 (b) itself and the related provisions of § 254. Section 252 (b) requires that where an alien crewman’s landing permit is revoked his transportation company must detain him aboard the vessel on which he arrived, and deport him. Section 254 (a) imposes a fine on the company and ship’s master, inter alia, for failure to detain or deport the crewman “if required to do so by an immigration officer.” However, § 252 (b)’s requirement is modified by the term, “if practicable”; and § 254 (c) eorrelatively provides: “If the Attorney General finds that deportation of an alien crewman ... on the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived is impracticable or impossible, or would cause undue hardship to such alien crewman, he may cause the alien crewman to be deported from the port of arrival or any other port on another vessel or aircraft of the same transportation line, unless the Attorney General finds this to be impracticable.” These provisions contemplate that an alien crewman whose temporary landing permit is revoked pursuant to § 252 (b) may be deported on a vessel other than the one on which he arrived. The other vessel should preferably be one owned by the transportation company which brought him to the United States, but if this is not feasible, the Attorney General may order him deported by other means, at the company’s expense. The Court of Appeals recognized that an alien crewman might properly be deported on a vessel other than the one which brought him. It noted, however, that § 254 (c) holds the owner of that vessel responsible for all of the expenses of his deportation and further provides that the vessel shall not be granted departure clearance until those expenses are paid or their payment is guaranteed. From this it concluded that “the section contemplates that the alternative arrangement shall be made while the vessel upon which the crewman arrived is still in port . . . 393 F. 2d, at 546. Since arrangements for respondent’s deportation had not been made before the M/V Sumadija departed, the § 254 (c), and hence the § 252 (b), procedures were no longer applicable: with the ship’s departure, respondent became entitled to a hearing pursuant to § 242 (b). We agree that the “clearance” provision of § 254 (c) contemplates that the crewman’s departure on another vessel may sometimes be accomplished or arranged before the vessel that brought him departs. If, however, the crewman’s vessel sails before its owner has .paid or guaranteed the expenses of deportation, the owner’s liability under § 254 (c) is in no way diminished. The Government has merely lost a useful means of compelling payment of costs which may still be collected by other methods. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals itself noted, § 254 (c)’s financial responsibility provision is not limited to instances of deportation pursuant to § 252 (b), but applies to the deportation of alien crewmen in a variety of situations, including those in which a § 242 (b) proceeding has been held, and thus those in which the crewman’s vessel may long since have departed. Strong policies support the conclusion that a properly commenced § 252 (b) proceeding does not automatically abort upon the departure of the crewman’s vessel. If the crewman whose landing permit has been revoked pursuant to § 252 (b) attacks the district director’s action in a federal court, the court would usually stay his deportation pending at least a preliminary hearing. Even courts with dockets less crowded than those of most of our major port cities may not be able to hear the matter for several days or more, during which time the vessel may often have departed according to schedule. It requires little legal talent, moreover, to manufacture a colorable case for a temporary stay out of whole cloth, and to delay proceedings once in the federal courts. The Ninth Circuit’s construction would, thus, encourage frivolous applications and intentional delays designed to assure that the crewman’s vessel departed before the case was heard. Alternatively, it would so dispose federal judges not to grant stays that persons presenting meritorious applications might be deported without the opportunity to be heard. We agree with the court below that § 252 (b) is a provision of limited applicability. But we conclude that the court’s construction would restrict its scope to a degree neither intended by Congress nor supported by the language of the Act, and that it would, as a practical matter, render § 252 (b) useless for the very function it was designed to perform. We hold that an alien crewman whose temporary landing permit is properly revoked pursuant to § 252 (b) does not become entitled to a hearing before a special inquiry officer under § 242 (b) merely because his deportation is not finally arranged or effected when his vessel leaves, and that under these circumstances the Attorney General may provide — as he did in 8 CFR § 253.1 (e), now 8 CFR § 253.1 (f) — that the crewman’s request for political asylum be heard by a district director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. IV. At the time of respondent’s January 1965 hearing before the District Director, § 243 (h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provided: “The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be subject to physical persecution . . . (Emphasis added.) By the Act of October 3, 1965, § 11 (f), 79 Stat. 918, this section was amended by substituting for “physical persecution” the phrase “persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion.” Although 8 CFR § 253.1 (e), the regulation under which respondent’s 1965 hearing was conducted, did not itself contain any restriction to “physical persecution,” it is apparent from the District Director’s findings that he read such a limitation into the regulation. We believe, therefore, that it is appropriate that respondent be given a new hearing before the District Director under the appropriate standard, and we remand the case for that purpose. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. A special inquiry officer is “any immigration officer who the Attorney General deems specially qualified to conduct specified classes of proceedings ...” Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101 (b)(4), 66 Stat. 171, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (b)(4). The special inquiry officer has no enforcement duties. He performs “no functions other than the hearing and decision of issues in exclusion and deportation cases, and occasionally in other adjudicative proceedings.” 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 5.7b, at 5-49 (1967); see generally id., § 5.7. 66 Stat. 209, 8 U. S. C. § 1252 (b): “A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings under this section to determine the deportability of any alien, and shall administer oaths, present and receive evidence, interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien or witnesses, and, as authorized by the Attorney General, shall make determinations, including orders of deportation. ... No special inquiry officer shall conduct a proceeding in any case under this section in which he shall have participated in investigative functions or in which he shall have participated (except as provided in this subsection) in prosecuting functions. Proceedings before a special inquiry officer acting under the provisions of this section shall be in accordance with such regulations, not inconsistent with this Act, as the Attorney General shall prescribe. Such regulations shall include requirements that— “(1) the alien shall be given notice, reasonable under all the circumstances, of the nature of the charges against him and of the time and place at which the proceedings will be held; “ (2) the alien shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose; “(3) the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against him, to present evidence in his own behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Government; and “(4) no decision of deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence. “The procedure so prescribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the deportability of an alien under this section.” A district director is the officer in charge of a district office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He performs a wide range of functions. See 1 C. Gordon •& H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure § 1.9c (1967); 8 CFR § 103.1 (f). Section 252 (a), 66 Stat. 220, 8 U. S. C. § 1282 (a) provides: “No alien crewman shall be permitted to land temporarily in the United States except as provided in this section .... If an immigration officer finds upon examination that an alien crewman is a nonimmigrant . . . and is otherwise admissible and has agreed to accept such permit, he may, in his discretion, grant the crewman a conditional permit to land temporarily pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, subject to revocation in subsequent proceedings as provided in subsection (b), and for a period of time, in any event, not to exceed— “(1) the period of time (not exceeding twenty-nine days) during which the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived remains in port, if the immigration officer is satisfied that the crewman intends to depart on the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived; or “(2) twenty-nine days, if the immigration officer is satisfied that the crewman intends to depart, within the period for which he is permitted to land, on a vessel or aircraft other than the one on which he arrived.” “D-l” and “D-2” landing permits are permits issued pursuant to 8 CFB, §§ 252.1 (d) (1) and 252.1 (d)(2), which implement §§ 252 (a) (1) and 252 (a) (2) of the Act. 26 Fed. Reg. 11797 (December 8, 1961). Effective March 22, 1967, the section was amended and redesignated § 253.1 (f), 32 Fed. Reg. 4341-4342. Because the District Director’s determination was not pursuant to § 242 (b), the District Court had jurisdiction to review his action. See Cheng Fan Kwok v. Immigration Service, 392 U. S. 206 (1968); Stanisic v. Immigration Service, 393 F. 2d 539, 542 (1968); Vucinic [and Stanisic] v. Immigration Service, 243 F. Supp. 113, 115-117 (1965); 5 U. S. C. § 1009. Actually, the ship sailed from the United States on or about January 16, 1965, or between the date on which the District Director revoked respondent’s landing permit (January 6, 1965), and the date on which, after a hearing, he denied respondent’s persecution claim (January 25, 1965). This fact was not in the record before the Court of Appeals. This was not always so. Until 1962, the final determination was made by a regional commissioner of the Service. 8 CFR §243.3 (b)(2) (1958 rev.); see Foti v. Immigration Service, 375 U. S. 217, 230, n. 16 (1963). The only substantial difference is that the regulation, but not the Statute, is limited to Communist-inspired persecution. For this reason, we have no occasion to decide whether or not respondent was “within the United States.” Compare Szlajmer v. Esperdy, 188 F. Supp. 491 (1960), with Kordic v. Esperdy, 386 F. 2d 232 (1967), and Glavic v. Beechie, 225 F. Supp. 24 (1963), aff'd, 340 F. 2d 91 (1964). It may further be noted that §243 (h), by its terms, “authorizes” but does not require the consideration of persecution claims. This is responsive to the language of §252 (b). Permission to land terminates upon the vessel’s departure, and thereafter there is nothing to “revoke.” 8 CFR § 252.2 (d) provides that a “crewman granted a conditional permit to land under section 252 (a)(1) of the Act . . . is required to depart with his vessel from its port of arrival and from each other port in the United States to which it thereafter proceeds coastwise without touching at a foreign port or place; however, he may rejoin his vessel at another port in the United States before it touches at a foreign port or place if he has advance written permission from the master or agent to do so.” In the latter case the crewman may journey some distance from the port at which he arrived. See infra, this page and at 76. 66 Stat. 221, 8 U. S. C. § 1284. This is doubtless an accommodation made in the light of the transportation company’s liability for the expenses of deportation. “All expenses incurred in connection with such deportation, including expenses incurred in transferring an alien crewman from one place in the United States to another under such conditions and safeguards as the Attorney General shall impose, shall be paid by the owner or owners of the vessel or aircraft on which the alien arrived in the United States. The vessel or aircraft on which the alien arrived shall not be granted clearance until such expenses have been paid or their payment guaranteed to the satisfaction of the Attorney General. . . .” § 264 (c). Thus, if and when respondent is deported, the owners of the M/V Sumadija will be responsible for the related expenses incurred by the United States. And, although we do not decide this question, § 254 (c) would appear to allow the Attorney General to require security for the payment of anticipated expenses of deporting an alien crewman, even though no final arrangements have been made before the vessel that brought him departs. See generally 1968 Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts Ann. Rep., Tables C, D, and X (1968). 66 Stat. 214. See supra, at 68; Appendix 18-22 passim. Respondent contends that his 1965 proceeding was infected with various constitutional errors, including the District Director’s alleged bias and his combination of prosecutorial, investigative, and adjudicatory functions. Because that proceeding is not before us, and because we remand for a new hearing, we have no occasion to consider these arguments, except to note that neither § 252 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act nor 8 CFR §253.1 (f), under which respondent will be heard on remand, is unconstitutional on its face. Likewise, it is premature to consider whether, and under what circumstances, an order of deportation might contravene the Protocol and Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the United States acceded on November 1, 1968. See Dept. State Bull., Vol. LIX, No. 1535, p. 538.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIANA et al. v. WHITCOMB, GOVERNOR OF INDIANA, et al. No. 72-1040. Argued October 16, 1973 Decided January 9, 1974 BeeNNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Douglas, Stewaet, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, in which Burger, C. J., and Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, post, p. 451. Sanford Jay Rosen argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Melvin L. Wulf. Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General of Indiana, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Darrel K. Diamond, Assistant Attorney General, and A. Frank Gleaves III, Deputy Attorney General. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a loyalty oath case. The question for decision is whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments are violated by Indiana’s requirement, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-3812 (1969), that “[n]o existing or newly-organized political party or organization shall be permitted on or to have the names of its candidates printed on the ballot used at any election until it has filed an affidavit, by its officers, under oath, that it does not advocate the overthrow of local, state or national government by force or violence . Appellants are the Communist Party of Indiana, a new political party in Indiana, certain of its officers and potential voters, and its candidates for President and Vice President in the 1972 election. Appellees are the Indiana State Election Board and its members. When appellants applied to the Election Board in August 1972 for a place on Indiana’s National Ballot for the 1972 general election without submitting the required oath, the Board, on the advice of the Attorney General of Indiana, rejected the application. Appellants thereupon filed this action in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of § 29-3812, and an injunction requiring that the Election Board place the Party on the ballot. A three-judge court was convened and that court, on September 28, 1972, in an unreported opinion, declared the provision of § 29-3812 that is challenged on this appeal constitutional and issued an order requiring the Election Board to place the Communist Party and its nominees on the National Ballot only “[i]n the event that the Communist Party of Indiana shall submit an affidavit in keeping with this memorandum and order. . . .” The Communist Party submitted an affidavit that, in addition to the statutory language, added the following: “The term advocate as used herein has the meaning given it by the Supreme Court of the United States in Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 at 320, 'the advocacy and teaching of concrete action for the forcible overthrow of the government, and not of principles divorced from action.’ ” The Election Board rejected the affidavit and appellants, on October 3, returned to the District Court, seeking an order directing the Board to accept it. On the same day, the Election Board filed a motion requesting reconsideration of the order of September 28. The District Court, on October 4, denied both motions by order entered that day. Appellants on October 10 filed a notice of appeal to this Court to enable them to seek emergency relief. That effort was abandoned, and appellants then sought leave of the District Court to withdraw the notice of appeal in order that the District Court might act on a motion of appellants, also filed October 10, that the District Court amend its September 28 order to include a determination that § 29-3812 was constitutional “only insofar as it proscribes advocacy directed at promoting unlawful action, as distinguished from advocacy of abstract doctrine.” On October 31, the District Court entered an order granting leave to withdraw the notice of appeal of October 10 but denying the motion to amend the September 28 memorandum. Appellants refiled their notice of appeal on November 29. Appellees moved to dismiss the appeal as juris-dictionally untimely, arguing that the 60-day period for appeal, 28 U. S. C. § 2101 (b), expired on November 27. We postponed consideration of the question of our jurisdiction to the merits. 410 U. S. 981 (1973). We hold that the appeal was timely. Appellees’ motion for reconsideration of October 3 suspended the finality of the judgment of September 28 until the District Court’s denial of the motion on October 4 restored it. Time for appeal thus began to run from October 4 and the notice of appeal filed November 29 was timely. As to the merits, we hold that the loyalty oath requirement of § 29-3812 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court. Loyalty oath cases are not strangers to this Court, see Note, Loyalty Oaths, 77 Yale L. J. 739 (1968), but the constitutional questions presented in earlier cases arising from their use to limit access to the ballot have not had plenary consideration. The District Court decided this case under the pressure of a ballot-printing deadline, and its memorandum opinion states no reasons and cites no authorities to support the court’s holding that “that portion of the statute providing ‘that it does not advocate the overthrow of local, state or national government by force or violence,’ is constitutional and hence enforceable by Indiana.” Appellees do not deny that § 29-3812 exacts a broad oath embracing advocacy of abstract doctrine as well as advocacy of action. Yet this Court has held in many contexts that the First and Fourteenth Amendments render invalid statutes regulating advocacy that are hot limited to- advocacy of action. And, as we have so often emphasized, “[precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963). We most recently summarized the constitutional principles that have evolved in this area in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969). We expressly overruled the earlier holding of Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927), that “without more, ‘advocating’ violent means to effect political and economic change involves such danger to the security of the State that the State may outlaw it.” 395 U. S., at 447. For, we said: “[L]ater decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. As we said in Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290, 297-298 (1961), ‘the mere abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.’ . . . A statute which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps within its condemnation speech which our Constitution has immunized from governmental control. Cf. Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957) . . . .” Id., at 447-448. This principle that “the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action” has been applied not only to statutes that directly forbid or proscribe advocacy, see Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961); Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957); but also to regulatory schemes that determine eligibility for public employment, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U. S. 278 (1961); see also United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); tax exemptions, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958); and moral fitness justifying disbarment, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232 (1957). Appellees argue that the principle should nevertheless not obtain in cases of state regulation of access to the ballot. We perceive no reason to make an exception, and appellees suggest none. Indeed, all of the reasons for application of the principle in the other contexts are equally applicable here. “To be sure, administration of the electoral process is a matter that the Constitution largely entrusts to the States. But, in exercising their powers of supervision over elections and in setting qualifications for voters, the States may not infringe upon basic constitutional protections.” Kusper v. Pontikes, ante, at 57 (footnote omitted). At stake are appellants' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas. “The right to associate with the political party of one's choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom.” Ibid.; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 30 (1968). At stake as well are appellants' interests as party members in casting an effective ballot. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 142-144 (1972). Thus, burdening access to the ballot, rights of association in the political party of one's choice, interests in casting an effective vote and in running for office, not because the Party urges others “to do something, now or in the future . . . [but] . . . merely to believe in something,” Yates v. United States, supra, at 325, is to infringe interests certainly as substantial as those in public employment, tax exemption, or the practice of law. For “the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights . . . Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 562 (1964). “Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, 17 (1964). Appellees argue: “It is fraudulent for a group seeking by violent revolution to overthrow our democratic form of government to disguise itself as a political party and use the very forms of the democracy it seeks to subvert in order to gain support and carry on its nefarious ends.” Brief for Appellees 7. Again, they argue “that the affidavit required under the statute refers to the official actions of the party itself, thus reducing to a minimum any possibility of ‘innocent involvement’ in activities which might be considered advocacy.” Id., at 10. As we understand appellees, this is an argument that, at least for purposes of determining whether to grant a place on the ballot, any group that advocates violent overthrow as abstract doctrine must be regarded as necessarily advocating unlawful action. We reject that proposition. Its acceptance would only return the law to the “thoroughly discredited” regime of Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927), unanimously overruled by the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S., at 447, 449. Reversed. Section 29-3812 reads in pertinent part as follows: “No political party or organization shall be recognized and given a place on or have the names of its candidates printed on the ballot used at any election which advocates the overthrow, by force or violence, of the local, state or national government, or which advocates, or carries on, a program of sedition or of treason, and which is affiliated or cooperates with or has any relation with any foreign government, or any political party or group of individuals of any foreign government. Any political party or organization which is in existence at the time of the passage of this act . . . or which shall have had a ticket on the ballot one or more times prior to any election, and which does not advocate any of the doctrines the advocacy of which is prohibited by this act, shall insert a plank in its platform that it does not advocate any of the doctrines prohibited by this act. No existing or newly-organized political party or organization shall be permitted on or to have the names of its candidates printed on the ballot used at any election until it has filed an affidavit, by its officers, under oath, that it does not advocate the overthrow of local, state or national government by force or violence, and that it is not affiliated with and does not cooperate with nor has any relation with any foreign government, or any political party, organization or group of individuals of any foreign government. The affidavit herein provided for shall be filed with the state election board or the county election board having charge of the printing of the ballot on which such ticket is to appear.” The District Court’s decision of September 28 also decided attacks upon the loyalty oath provision of § 29-3812 made in actions brought by two other new political parties, the American Independent Party and the Indiana Peace and Freedom Party. All three actions challenged, in addition to the “advocacy” provision, the provision of § 29-3812 requiring a party also to file an affidavit that “it is not affiliated with and does not cooperate with nor has any relation with any foreign government, or any political party, organization or group of individuals of any foreign government.” The September 28 memorandum of the three-judge court declared this provision of § 29-3812 unconstitutional. The American Independent Party and the Indiana Peace and Freedom Party then filed affidavits accepted by the Election Board and were placed on the National Ballot for the 1972 elections. On November 11, the Election Board appealed that portion of the order to this Court. We summarily affirmed. Whitcomb v. Communist Party, 410 U. S. 976 (1973). Section 29-3801, Ind. Stat. Ann. (1969), provides for ballot listing of any party that files petitions containing signatures of one-half of one percent “of the total vote of all parties east in the state for secretary of state at the last preceding general election.” The sufficiency of the Communist Party petitions in this respect was challenged by appellees in the District Court but was not discussed in the court’s September 28 memorandum although the issuance of the injunction presupposed a decision adverse to appellees. The motion for reconsideration requested the court to reconsider that result. Appellees also argue that the notice of appeal of November 29 was ineffective because the earlier notice of October 10 divested the District Court of jurisdiction and that that jurisdiction could not have been revested by the granting of leave to withdraw the October 10 notice. But since the October 10 notice was clearly timely, that argument is reduced to an attack on the untimeliness under Supreme Court Rule 13 (1) of the filing of the jurisdictional statement on January 26, 1973. Timely docketing of the jurisdictional statement is not, however, a jurisdictional requisite. Johnson v. Florida, 391 U. S. 596, 598 (1968). Appellees’ brief also invokes § 3 of the Communist Control Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 776, 50 U. S. C. § 842, providing that “[t]he Communist Party of the United States . . . [is] not entitled to any of the rights, privileges, and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States or any political subdivision thereof . . . .” We have difficulty understanding appel-lees’ argument that this statute is applicable to the Communist Party of Indiana or in any way relevant to the issues in this case. The statute was not relied upon by either the Election Board, or the District Court when it denied declaratory relief. In any event, insofar as the argument is that this statute bars the Communist Party of Indiana from maintaining this action, it is rejected. See Communist Party, U. S. A. v. Catherwood, 367 U. S. 389 (1961). Appellants also contend that the requirement is constitutionally precluded as an oath different from that prescribed for a President by Art. II, § 1, and for any other state or federal officer by Art. VI, cl. 3. See Cole v. Richardson, 405 U. S. 676 (1972). In view of our result we need not address those contentions. The only question presented in the jurisdictional statement is whether § 29-3812 is facially valid. Thus, we do not reach the question whether the Election Board’s apparent failure to require the Republican and Democratic Parties, the two major parties in Indiana, to comply with the statute rises to the level of a denial of equal protection of the law as applied, or was within the Board’s “proseeutorial discretion.” We note, however, that the only relevant testimony in the District Court, given by the Board’s clerk, is entirely silent as to the reasons behind the omission. E. g., Usker v. Kelley, 401 U. S. 928 (1971), summarily aff’g 315 F. Supp. 777 (1970); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U. S. 56 (1951), presenting a constitutional challenge to a Maryland statute imposing a loyalty requirement on candidates for municipal office rested on “the narrowing construction tendered by the Attorney General [of Maryland] during oral argument so as to avoid the constitutional issue that was argued.” Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U. S. 54; 58 (1967). And Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583 (1972), was dismissed as insufficiently concrete and mature to permit adjudication, on the authority of Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549 (1947). Cf. Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290, 298 (1961), a prosecution under the Smith Act, 18 U. S. C. § 2385, where we held that the constitutional limitations require that criminal advocacy by the Communist Party be proved by “some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the future which is both sufficiently strong and sufficiently pervasive- to lend color to the otherwise ambiguous theoretical material regarding Communist Party teaching, and to justify the inference that such a call to violence may fairly be imputed to the Party as a whole, and not merely to some narrow segment of it.” See also Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. MINNEAPOLIS-HONEYWELL REGULATOR CO. No. 11. Argued October 15-16, 1952. Decided December 22, 1952. Acting Solicitor General Stern argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Clapp, Daniel M. Friedman, W. T. Kelley and Robert B. Dawkins. Albert R. Connelly argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Will Freeman. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opinion of the Court. The initial question in this case is one of jurisdiction— whether the petition for certiorari was filed within the period allowed by law. We hold that it was not. The cause grows out of a proceeding initiated by petitioner, the Federal Trade Commission, in 1943. At that time, the Commission issued a three-count complaint against respondent. Count I charged a violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act; Count II charged a violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act; Count III dealt with an alleged violation of § 2 (a) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. A protracted administrative proceeding followed. The Commission finally determined against respondent on all three counts, and it issued a cease and desist order, in three parts, covering each of the three violations. Respondent petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to review and set aside this order. The Commission sought enforcement of all parts of its order in a cross-petition. Respondent abandoned completely its attack on Parts I and II of the order. In briefs and in oral argument, respondent made it clear that the legality of Part III was the only contested issue before the Court of Appeals. Neither party briefed or argued any question arising out of Parts I and II. On July 5, 1951, the Court of Appeals announced its decision. The opinion stated that since respondent did not “challenge Parts I and II of the order based on the first two counts of the complaint we shall make no further reference to them.” The court then went .on to hold that Part III of petitioner’s order could not be sustained by substantial evidence and should be reversed. 191 F. 2d 786. On the same day, the court entered its judgment, the pertinent portion reading as follows: “. . . it is ordered and adjudged by this Court that Part III of the decision of the Federal Trade Commission entered in this cause on January 14, 1948, be, and the same is hereby, Reversed, and Count III of the complaint upon which it is based be, and the same is hereby Dismissed.” The Court of Appeals requires petitions for rehearing to be filed “within 15 days after entry of judgment.” The Commission filed no such petition. On August 21, 1951, long after the expiration of this 15-day period, and after a certified copy of said judgment, in lieu of mandate, was issued, the Commission filed a memorandum with the court which reads in part as follows: “On July 5, 1951 the Court entered its opinion and judgment reversing Part III of the decision of the Federal Trade Commission dated January 14, 1948 and dismissing Count III of the complaint upon which it is based. No disposition has been made of the Cross-Petition filed by the Commission for affirmance and enforcement of the entire decision. The Commission takes the position that its Cross-Petition should be in part sustained, i. e., to the extent that the Court should make and enter herein a decree affirming Parts I and II of the Commission’s order to cease and desist and commanding Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company to obey the same and comply therewith. . . . “11. In its briefs filed herein the petitioner abandoned its attack upon Parts I and II of the order and challenged only the validity of Part III of the order (see page 1 of petitioner’s brief dated March 15, 1951). Thus, petitioner concedes the validity of Parts I and II of the order and does not contest the prayer of the Commission’s Cross-Petition and brief with respect to the affirmance and enforcement of Parts I and II of the order.” Clearly, by this memorandum the Commission sought no alteration of the judgment relative to Part III; in fact, it acknowledged the entry of judgment reversing Part III on July 5, 1951. It did not even claim it to be a petition for rehearing. It was submitted that Parts I and II of the order were uncontested, and “In conclusion . . . submitted that the Court should make and enter ... a decree affirming and enforcing Parts I and II of the Commission’s order to cease and desist.” On September 18, 1951, the Court of Appeals issued what it called its “Final Decree.” Again the court “ordered, adjudged and decreed” that Part III of the Commission’s order “is hereby reversed and Count III of the complaint upon which it is based be and the same is hereby dismissed.” The court then went on to affirm Parts I and II, and it entered a judgment providing for their enforcement, after reciting again that there was no contest over this phase of the order. On December 14, 1951, the Commission filed its petition for certiorari. Obviously, the petition was out of time unless the ninety-day filing period began to run anew from the second judgment entered on September 18, 1951. In our order granting certiorari, 342 U. S. 940, we asked counsel to discuss the “timeliness of the application for the writ.” Petitioner refers us to cases which have held that when a court considers on its merits an untimely petition for. a rehearing, or an untimely motion to amend matters of substance in a judgment, the time for appeal may begin to run anew from the date on which the court disposed of the untimely application. Petitioner apparently would equate its memorandum of August 21, 1951, with an untimely petition for a rehearing affecting Part III. But certainly its language and every inference therein is to the contrary. When petitioner filed its memorandum, the time for seeking a rehearing had long since expired. Moreover, the memorandum was labeled neither as a petition for a rehearing nor as a motion to amend the previous judgment, and in no manner did it purport to seek such relief. On the contrary, the Commission indicated that it was quite content to let the Court of Appeals’ decision of July 5 stand undisturbed. Since we cannot treat the memorandum of August 21 as petitioner would have us treat it, we cannot hold that the time for filing a petition for certiorari was enlarged simply because this paper may have prompted the court below to take some further action which had no effect on the merits of the decision that we are now asked to review in the petition for certiorari. Petitioner tells us that the application must be deemed to be in time because “when a court actually changes its judgment, the time to appeal or petition begins to run anew irrespective of whether a petition for rehearing has been filed.” We think petitioner’s interpretation of our decisions is too liberal. While it may be true that the Court of Appeals had the power to supersede the judgment of July 5 with a new one,, it is also true, as that court itself has recognized, that the time within which a losing party must seek review cannot be enlarged just because the lower court in its discretion thinks it should be enlarged. Thus, the mere fact that a judgment previously entered has been reentered or revised in an immaterial way does not toll the time within which review must be sought. Only when the lower court changes matters of substance, or resolves a genuine ambiguity, in a judgment previously rendered should the period within which an appeal must be taken or a petition for certiorari filed begin to run anew. The test is a practical one. The question is whether the lower court, in its second order, has disturbed or revised legal rights and obligations which, by its prior judgment, had been plainly and properly settled with finality. The judgment of September 18, which petitioner now seeks to have us review, does not meet this test. It reiterated, without change, everything which had been decided on July 5. Since the one controversy between the parties related only to the matters which had been adjudicated on July 5, we cannot ascribe any significance, as far as timeliness is concerned, to the later judgment. Petitioner puts great emphasis on the fact that the judgment of September 18 was labeled a “Final Decree” by the Court of Appeals, whereas the word “Final” was missing from the judgment entered on July 5. But we think the question of whether the time for petitioning for certiorari was to be enlarged cannot turn on the adjective which the court below chose to use in the caption of its second judgment. Indeed, the judgment of July 5 was for all purposes final. It put to rest the questions which the parties had litigated in the Court of Appeals. It was neither “tentative, informal nor incomplete.” Consequently, we cannot accept the Commission's view that a decision against it on the time question will constitute an invitation to other litigants to seek piecemeal review in this Court in the future. Thus, while we do not mean to encourage applications for piecemeal review by today’s decision, we do mean to encourage applicants to this Court to take heed of another principle — the principle that litigation must at some definite point be brought to an' end. It is a principle reflected in the statutes which limit our appellate jurisdiction to those cases where review is sought within a prescribed period. Those statutes are not to be applied so as to permit a tolling of their time limitations because some event occurred in the lower court after judgment was rendered which is of no import to the matters to be dealt with on review. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is Dismissed. 28 U. S. C. §2101 (e). 38 Stat. 719, 15 U. S. C. § 45. 38 Stat. 731, 15 ü. S. C. §14. 38 Stat. 730, as amended, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (a). Pfister v. Finance Corp., 317 U. S. 144, 149 (1942); Bowman v. Loperena, 311 U. S. 262, 266 (1940); Wayne United Gas Co. v. Owens-Illinois Co., 300 U. S. 131, 137-138 (1937). Brief for petitioner, p. 43. 28 U. S. C. §452; see Zimmern v. United States, 298 U. S. 167 (1936). See Fine v. Paramount Pictures, 181 F. 2d 300, 304 (1950). Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U. S. 264 (1942); Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U. S. 399 (1923); Credit Co., Ltd. v. Arkansas Central R. Co., 128 U. S. 258 (1888). See Zimmern v. United States, 298 U. S. 167, 169 (1936); compare Department of Banking v. Pink, supra. Compare Federal Power Commission v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U. S. 17 (1952). Compare Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 6 Wall. 153 (1868) (appeal allowed from a second decree, restating most provisions of the first because the first decree, at the time of entry, was only regarded by the parties and the court as tentative); Memphis v. Brown, 94 U. S. 715 (1877) (appeal allowed from second judgment on the ground that the second made material changes in the first). See United States v. Hark, 320 U. S. 531, 533-534 (1944); Hill v. Hawes, 320 U. S. 520, 523 (1944). The suggestion is made that the September 18 judgment injected a new controversy into the litigation — the question of whether the Court of Appeals had the power to affirm and enforce the Commission’s order after it had cross-petitioned for such relief. Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U. S. 470 (1952). But if the respondent had sought to contest that issue, it could have done so from the start, by raising objections to enforcement of all parts of the Commission’s cross-petition. Instead, respondent refused to contest these'parts of the Commission’s order. Having done so, it removed the question involved in the Ruberoid case from this case. See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U. S. 507, 514 (1950). See Matton Steamboat Co. v. Murphy, 319 U. S. 412, 415 (1943).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD CO. et al. No. 223. Argued February 3-4, 1948. Decided March 8, 1948. Frederick Bernays Wiener argued the cause for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission, appellants. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Sonnett, Edward Dumbauld, Daniel W. Knowlton and Edward M. Reidy. William N. Strack and John P. Staley submitted on brief for Swift & Co., appellant. Robert R. Pierce argued the cause for the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. et al., appellees. With him on the brief were Harold H. McLean, Leo P. Day, George H. P. Lacey, Willis T. Pierson, John A. Duncan and Francis R. Cross. Ashley Sellers argued the cause for the Cleveland Union Stock Yards Co., appellee. With him on the brief were Matthew S. Farmer and Carl McFarland. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. This case is properly here on appeal, 28 U. S. C. § 345, from a district court decree enjoining enforcement of a cease and desist order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. 71 F. Supp. 499. The order enjoined required the five railroad appellees to abstain from refusing to deliver interstate shipments of livestock to the sidetrack of Swift & Company’s packing plant at Cleveland, Ohio, and to establish tariffs for such deliveries. Swift’s sidetrack has only one connection with a railroad. That connection is with the main line of the New York Central by way of a spur track, known as “Spur No. 245,” operated by that railroad. One end of this spur owned by the New York Central connects with its main line; the other end of the spur, also owned by the railroad, connects with Swift’s sidetrack and with other private sidetracks. A 1619-foot middle segment of the spur, known as “Track 1619,” is owned by the Cleveland Union Stock Yards Company. Under the terms of a trackage agreement with Stock Yards, New York Central uses Track 1619 for deliveries to Swift’s sidetrack and other private sidetracks connected with Spur No. 245. Thus all interstate railroad shipments to Swift’s siding and to others similarly located can be made only over the segment of track owned by Stock Yards. Because of its interest in Track 1619, Stock Yards was made a party to the proceedings before the Commission and was included in its cease and desist order along with the railroads. So long as Stock Yards continues to own Track 1619, delivery of livestock and other freight by New York Central to Swift and others similarly located depends upon whether and to what extent Stock Yards will grant or has granted New York Central a right to operate over Track 1619. This present case involves the question of whether the railroads, and particularly New York Central, in making deliveries of livestock over Track 1619 to Swift’s sidetrack must comply with certain conditions imposed by Stock Yards in its present agreement with New York Central. Track 1619 was constructed in 1899 on Stock Yards’ property by Stock Yards and New York Central’s predecessor in interest. A contemporaneous written agreement, cancellable on 60-days’ written notice by the railroad, gave the railroad a right to use the track for railroad purposes, provided the use did not interfere with Stock Yards’ business. In 1910, after negotiations with the railroad, Swift built its sidetrack, and the railroad extended its Spur No. 245 by a track which connected Track 1619 with Swift’s siding. The 1899 written trackage agreement was superseded by another in 1924. This one was cancellable by either party on 30-days’ written notice. It provided that the railroad should maintain the tracks at its own expense, and it granted to the railroad “the free and uninterrupted use of any and all tracks or portions thereof belonging to the Industry and located on its land.” From 1910, when Swift’s siding was constructed, to 1924, and for many years thereafter, the railroad continued to deliver all kinds of commodities to Swift and to other packers likewise served only by way of Spur No. 245 and Track 1619. In the early 1930’s Stock Yards concluded that it was losing patronage and fees because of delivery of livestock to Swift at its siding. A large part of Stock Yards’ income comes from fees it charges for unloading and delivering interstate shipments of livestock to pens within its yard. Stock carried over Track 1619 to Swift’s siding and to other private sidings are unloaded at those sidings; as a result Stock Yards loses the fees it would receive if livestock consigned to Swift and to other packers were unloaded at the Stock Yards. With a view toward collecting unloading fees from Swift and other packers served by Spur No. 245, Stock Yards'instituted negotiations with the New York Central which in 1935 resulted in a modification of their 1924 agreement. The old 1924 agreement had unconditionally granted “Railroad, (a) the free and uninterrupted use of any and all tracks . . . .” The 1935 modified agreement also granted New York Central “the free and uninterrupted use” of Stock Yards’ tracks, but added “except for competitive traffic a charge for which use shall be the subject of a separate agreement.” After this 1935 restrictive modification Stock Yards demanded that the railroad adopt one of two courses with regard to livestock, which the parties agreed was the “competitive traffic” the modified agreement was designed to suppress. The railroad must either stop carrying livestock over Track 1619 to Swift and other packers or pay Stock Yards, for use of Track 1619 in carrying livestock to these packers, an amount equivalent to fees Stock Yards would have collected had the livestock consigned to them been unloaded and delivered in the yard. This amount was considered exorbitant by New York Central and the other railroads for whom New York Central performed switching charges, and they therefore refused to pay it. The result was that in 1938 the railroads ceased delivering-livestock to the sidings of Swift and other packers served by Spur No. 245, although they have under agreement with Stock Yards continued to use the spur for delivery of all other kinds of commodity shipments to these sidings. Swift demanded that the railroads deliver livestock to its siding, and in 1941 filed a complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission upon their refusal to make deliveries. After notice and hearing the Commission concluded that the railroad’s refusal to carry livestock to Swift violated several provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. It was found to violate § 3 (1) because of the discrimination against a single commodity, livestock, and because New York Central’s deliveries of livestock to the sidetracks of some of Swift’s nearby competitors, whose sidings were served without using Track 1619, subjected Swift to undue prejudice and gave those competitors an undue preference. The Commission also found that the failure to deliver under the circumstances shown was a violation of § 1 (6) which forbids unreasonable practices affecting the manner and method of delivering freight, and also a violation of § 1 (9) which requires railroads to operate switch connections with private side tracks without discrimination under such conditions as the Commission found to exist here. The Commission’s findings of fact are not challenged. There can be no doubt that those facts found would constitute a violation of the sections referred to if Spur No. 245 were wholly owned by the railroad. Ownership of Track 1619 by Stock Yards and its objection to livestock deliveries is, in fact, the only reason suggested for the railroads’ failure to deliver shipments of livestock to Swift as they do to neighboring packers, and for their failure to provide switching connections for livestock shipments. From what has been said our question is this: Can the non-carrier owner of a segment of railroad track who contracts for an interstate railroad’s use of the segment as part of its line reserve a right to regulate the type of commodities that the railroad may transport over the segment, or would such a reservation be invalid under the Interstate Commerce Act? The Interstate Commerce Act is one of the most comprehensive regulatory plans that Congress has ever undertaken. The first Act, and all amendments to it, have aimed at wiping out discriminations of all types, New York v. United States, 331 U. S. 284, 296, and language of the broadest scope has been used to accomplish all the purposes of the Act. United States v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 323 U. S. 612, 616. It would be strange had this legislation left a way open whereby carriers could engage in discriminations merely by entering into contracts for the use of trackage. In fact this Court has long recognized that the purpose of Congress to prevent certain types of discriminations and prejudicial practices could not be frustrated by contracts, even though the contracts were executed before enactment of the legislation. See Philadelphia, Balt. & Wash. R. Co. v. Schubert, 224 U. S. 603, 613-614; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 483, 485-86. We think the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act plainly empowered the Commission to enter this order against the discriminatory practices found, despite ownership of Track 1619 by Stock Yards. Section 1 (1) (a) makes the Interstate Commerce Act applicable to common carriers “wholly by railroad.” Section 1 (3) (a) defines the term “railroad” as including “all the road in use by any common carrier operating a railroad, whether owned or operated under a contract, agreement, or lease, and also all switches, spurs, tracks . . . .” As one of the many other indications that Congress did not intend its railroad regulatory provisions to depend on who had legal title to transportation instrumentalities, § 1 (3) (a) also provides that the word “transportation” as used in the Act shall broadly include “locomotives . . . and all instrumentalities and facilities of shipment or carriage, irrespective of ownership or of any contract, express or implied, for the use thereof . . . .” It is true, as appel-lees argue, that the above language of § 1 (3) (a) is definitional only. Ellis v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 237 U. S. 434. But it is also true that these definitions by their unambiguous language make all trackage “in use by any common carrier” subject to the regulatory provisions of the Act, even though not owned by the carrier but only used by it under a contract or agreement. Thus Track 1619, though owned by Stock Yards, was subject to the Act because of its use by the New York Central under trackage agreements. It is just as prejudicial to shippers and the public for a railroad that uses a portion of track under lease or contract to discriminate as it is for the discrimination to be inflicted by a railroad that owns its entire track. Practically the only argument suggested to justify discriminatory practices under the circumstances here is that an owner has a right to let others use his land subject to whatsoever conditions the owner chooses to impose. It is even argued that to construe the Interstate Commerce Act as limiting that right would result in depriving an owner of his property without due process of law. But no such broad generalization can be accepted. Property can be used even by its owner only in accordance with law, and conditions its owner places on its use by another are subject to like limitations. Of course it does not deprive an owner of his property without due process of law to deny him the right to enforce conditions upon its use which conflict with the power of Congress to regulate railroads so as to secure equality of treatment of those whom the railroads serve. Here Congress under its constitutional authority has provided that no railroad shall engage in certain types of discriminatory conduct in violation of three provisions of the Act. The Commission found that discriminatory conduct here. The excuse offered by the railroads is that the owner of Track 1619 required them to do the prohibited things. But the command of Congress against discrimination cannot be subordinated to the command of a track owner that a railroad using the track practice discrimination. We hold that the Commission’s order was authorized by statute and that it does not deprive Stock Yards of its property without due process of law. In doing so we do not pass upon any questions in relation to the dedication of Track 1619 to railroad use. Neither do we decide what are the relative financial rights of Stock Yards and New York Central under their contracts, nor whether Stock Yards can cancel the contract with New York Central, nor what would be the duty of New York Central should Stock Yards attempt to terminate its right to use Track 1619. We only hold that Stock Yards’ ownership of Track 1619 does not vest it with power to compel the railroads to operate in a way which violates the Interstate Commerce Act. The Commission’s order is valid and should be enforced. Reversed. The railroad appellees are Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, the Erie Railroad Company, the Wheeling & Lake Erie Railroad Company, the New York Central Railroad Company, and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. Appellees argue that Stock Yards was improperly made a party and that the Commission was without power to include Stock Yards in its cease and desist order. We think §2 of the Elkins Act, 32 Stat. 848, 49 U. S. C. § 42, justified the Commission’s action and find no merit to the contention that we should by interpretation restrict that section’s broad language authorizing inclusion as parties of “all persons interested in or affected by the rate, regulation, or practice under consideration” by the Commission or by a court, and which provides that decrees may be made with reference to such additional parties to the same extent as though they were carriers. In 1938 New York Central ceased to switch livestock carloads of other carriers over Spur No. 245 to Swift’s siding, and it canceled its tariffs for this service. Since that time there has been no specific tariff authority for movement of livestock to Swift’s siding when shipped to Cleveland over lines other than the New York Central. Although New York Central has never canceled its tariff for livestock shipments to Swift’s Cleveland siding from points of origin on its own lines, it has delivered all livestock consigned to Swift’s siding to Stock Yards since 1938. Swift has been forced to pay charges to Stock Yards to obtain possession of livestock unloaded at the yards.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL PARK HOSPITALITY ASSOCIATION v. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR et al. No. 02-196. Argued March 4, 2003 Decided May 27, 2003 Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 812. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 817. Kenneth S. Getter argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Richard B. Katskee and David M. Gossett. Robert R. Gasaway and Ashley C. Parrish filed briefs for Xanterra Parks & Resorts, LLC, respondent under this Court’s Rule 12.6, urging reversal. John P. Elwood argued the cause for the federal respondents. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, and Barbara C. Biddle. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner, a nonprofit trade association that represents concessioners doing business in the national parks, challenges a National Park Service (NPS) regulation that purports to render the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), 92 Stat. 2383, 41 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., inapplicable to concession contracts. We conclude that the controversy is not yet ripe for judicial resolution. I The CDA establishes rules governing disputes arising out of certain Government contracts. The statute provides that these disputes first be submitted to an agency’s contracting officer. §605. A Government contractor dissatisfied with the contracting officer’s decision may seek review either from the United States Court of Federal Claims or from an administrative board in the agency. See §§606, 607(d), 609(a). Either decision may then be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See 28 U. S. C. § 1295; 41 U. S. C. § 607(g). Since 1916 Congress has charged NPS to “promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as national parks,” “conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein,” and “provide for [their] enjoyment [in a way that] will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.” An Act To establish a National Park Service, 39 Stat. 535, 16 U. S. C. § 1. To make visits to national parks more enjoyable for the public, Congress authorized NPS to “grant privileges, leases, and permits for the use of land for the accommodation of visitors.” § 3, 39 Stat. 535. Such “privileges, leases, and permits” have become embodied in national parks concession contracts. The specific rules governing national parks concession contracts have changed over time. In 1998, however, Congress enacted the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of 1998 (1998 Act or Act), Pub. L. 105-391, 112 Stat. 3497 (codified with certain exceptions in 16 U. S. C. §§5951-5966), establishing a new and comprehensive concession management program for national parks. The 1998 Act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to enact regulations implementing the Act’s provisions, § 5965. NPS, to which the Secretary has delegated her authority under the 1998 Act, promptly began a rulemaking proceeding to implement the Act. After notice and comment, final regulations were issued in April 2000. 65 Fed. Reg. 20630 (2000) (codified in 36 CFR pt. 51). The regulations define the term “concession contract” as follows: “A concession contract (or contract) means a binding written agreement between the Director and a conces-sioner .... Concession contracts are not contracts within the meaning of 41 U. S. C. 601 et seq. (the Contract Disputes Act) and are not service or procurement contracts within the meaning of statutes, regulations or policies that apply only to federal service contracts or other types of federal procurement actions.” 36 CFR §51.3 (2002). Through this provision NPS took a position with respect to a longstanding controversy with the Department of Interi- or’s Board of Contract Appeals (IBCA). Beginning in 1989, the IBCA ruled that NPS concession contracts were subject to the CDA, see R & R Enterprises, 89-2 B. C. A., ¶ 21708, pp. 109145-109147 (1989), and subsequent attempts by NPS to convince the IBCA otherwise proved unavailing, National Park Concessions, Inc., 94-3 B. C. A., ¶ 27104, pp. 135096-135098 (1994). II Petitioner challenged the validity of § 51.3 in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Amfac Resorts, L. L. C. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 142 F. Supp. 2d 54, 80-82 (2001). The District Court upheld the regulation, applying the deference principle of Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). The court concluded that the CDA is ambiguous on whether it applies to concession contracts and found NPS’ interpretation of the CDA reasonable. 142 F. Supp. 2d, at 80-82. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, albeit on different grounds. Amfac Resorts, L. L. C. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 282 F. 3d 818, 834-835 (2002). Recognizing that NPS “does not administer the [CDA], and thus may not have interpretative authority over its provisions,” the court placed no reliance on Chevron but simply “agree[d]” with NPS’ reading of the CDA, finding that reading consistent with both the CDA and the 1998 Act. 282 F. 3d, at 835. We granted certiorari to consider whether the CDA applies to contracts between NPS and concession-ers in the national parks. 537 U. S. 1018 (2002). Because petitioner has brought a facial challenge to the regulation and is not litigating any concrete dispute with NPS, we asked the parties to provide supplemental briefing on whether the case is ripe for judicial action. Tr. of Oral Arg. 62. III Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed “to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 148-149 (1967); accord, Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U. S. 726, 732-733 (1998). The ripeness doctrine is “drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction,” Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U. S. 43, 57, n. 18 (1993) (citations omitted), but, even in a case raising only prudential concerns, the question of ripeness may be considered on a court’s own motion. Ibid, (citing Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 138 (1974)). Determining whether administrative action is ripe for judicial review requires us to evaluate (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. Abbott Laboratories, supra, at 149. “Absent [a statutory provision providing for immediate judicial review], a regulation is not ordinarily considered the type of agency action ‘ripe’ for judicial review under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] until the scope of the controversy has been reduced to more manageable proportions, and its factual components fleshed out, by some concrete action applying the regulation to the claimant's situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to harm him. (The major exception, of course, is a substantive rule which as a practical matter requires the plaintiff to adjust his conduct immediately. . . .)” Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 891 (1990). Under the facts now before us, we conclude this case is not ripe. We turn first to the hardship inquiry. The federal respondents concede that, because NPS has no delegated rule-making authority under the CDA, the challenged portion of §51.3 cannot be a legislative regulation with the force of law. See Brief for Federal Respondents 15, n. 6; Supplemental Brief for Federal Respondents 6. They note, though, that “agencies may issue interpretive rules ‘to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it administersBrief for Federal Respondents 15, n. 6 (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U. S. 87, 99 (1995) (emphasis added)), and seek to characterize § 51.3 as such an interpretive rule. We disagree. Unlike in Guernsey Memorial Hospital, where the agency issuing the interpretative guideline was responsible for administering the relevant statutes and regulations, NPS is not empowered to administer the CDA. Rather, the task of applying the CDA rests with agency contracting officers and boards of contract appeals, as well as the Federal Court of Claims, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and, ultimately, this Court. Moreover, under the CDA, any authority regarding the proper arrangement of agency boards belongs to the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy. See 41 U. S. C. § 607(h) (“Pursuant to the authority conferred under the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act [41 U. S. C. §401 et seq.], the Administrator is authorized and directed, as may be necessary or desirable to carry out the provisions of this chapter, to issue guidelines with respect to criteria for the establishment, functions, and procedures of the agency boards .. .”)• Consequently, we consider § 51.3 to be nothing more than a “general statement] of policy” designed to inform the public of NPS’ views on the proper application of the CDA. 5 U. S. C. § 553(b)(3)(A). Viewed in this light, § 51.3 does not create “adverse effects of a strictly legal kind,” which we have previously required for a showing of hardship. Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc., 523 U. S., at 733. Just like the Forest Service plan at issue in Ohio Forestry, § 51.3 “do[es] not command anyone to do anything or to refrain from doing anything; [it] do[es] not grant, withhold, or modify any formal legal license, power, or authority; [it] do[es] not subject anyone to any civil or criminal liability; [and it] create[s] no legal rights or obligations.” Ibid. Moreover, §51.3 does not affect a concessioner’s primary conduct. Toilet Goods Assn., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 158, 164 (1967); Ohio Forestry Assn., supra, at 733-734. Unlike the regulation at issue in Abbott Laboratories, which required drug manufacturers to change the labels, advertisements, and promotional materials they used in marketing prescription drugs on pain of criminal and civil penalties, see 387 U. S., at 152-153, the regulation here leaves a con-cessioner free to conduct its business as it sees fit. See also Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn., Inc., 387 U. S. 167, 171 (1967) (regulations governing conditions for use of color additives in foods, drugs, and cosmetics were “self-executing” and had “an immediate and substantial impact upon the respondents”). We have previously found that challenges to regulations similar to § 51.3 were not ripe for lack of a showing of hardship. In Toilet Goods Assn., for example, the Pood and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a regulation requiring producers of color additives to provide FDA employees with access to all manufacturing facilities, processes, and formu-lae. 387 U. S., at 161-162. We concluded the case was not ripe for judicial review because the impact of the regulation could not “be said to be felt immediately by those subject to it in conducting their day-to-day affairs” and “no irremedia-bl[y] adverse consequences flow[ed] from requiring a later challenge.” Id., at 164. Indeed, the FDA regulation was more onerous than §51.3 because failure to comply with it resulted in the suspension of the producer’s certification and, consequently, could affect production. See id., at 165, and n. 2. Here, by contrast, concessioners suffer no practical harm as a result of §51.3. All the regulation does is announce the position NPS will take with respect to disputes arising out of concession contracts. While it informs the public of NPS’ view that concessioners are not entitled to take advantage of the provisions of the CDA, nothing in the regulation prevents concessioners from following the procedures set forth in the CDA once a dispute over a concession contract actually arises. And it appears that, notwithstanding § 51.3, the IBCA has been quite willing to apply the CDA to certain concession contracts. Watch Hill Concessions, Inc., 01-1 B. C. A., ¶ 31298, pp. 154520-154521 (IBCA 2001) (concluding that concession contract was subject to the CDA despite the contrary language in § 51.3). Petitioner contends that delaying judicial resolution of this issue will result in real harm because the applicability vel non of the CDA is one of the factors a concessioner takes into account when preparing its bid for NPS concession contracts. See Supplemental Brief for Petitioner 4-6. Petitioner’s argument appears to be that mere uncertainty as to the validity of a legal rule constitutes a hardship for purposes of the ripeness analysis. We are not persuaded. If we were to follow petitioner’s logic, courts would soon be overwhelmed with requests for what essentially would be advisory opinions because most business transactions could be priced more accurately if even a small portion of existing legal uncertainties were resolved. In short, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that deferring judicial review will result in real hardship. We consider next whether the issue in this case is fit for review. Although the question presented here is “a purely legal one” and § 51.8 constitutes “final agency action” within the meaning of § 10 of the APA, 5 U. S. C. § 704, Abbott Laboratories, supra, at 149, we nevertheless believe that further factual development would “significantly advance our ability to deal with the legal issues presented,” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 82 (1978); accord, Ohio Forestry Assn., Inc., 523 U. S., at 736-737; Toilet Goods Assn., supra, at 163. While the federal respondents generally argue that NPS was correct to conclude that the CDA does not cover concession contracts, they acknowledge that certain types of concession contracts might come under the broad language of the CDA. Brief for Federal Respondents 33-34. Similarly, while petitioner and respondent Xanterra Parks & Resorts, LLC, present a facial challenge to § 51.3, both rely on specific characteristics of certain types of concession contracts to support their positions. See Brief for Petitioner 21-23, 36; Brief for Respondent Xanterra Parks & Resorts, LLC, 20, 22. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that judicial resolution of the question presented here should await a concrete dispute about a particular concession contract. * * * For the reasons stated above, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it addressed the validity of § 51.3 and remand the case with instructions to dismiss the case with respect to this issue. It is so ordered. Title 41 U. S. C. § 602(a) provides: “Unless otherwise specifically provided herein, this chapter applies to any express or implied contract (including those of the nonappropriated fund activities described in sections 1346 and 1491 of title 28) entered into by an executive agency for— “(1) the procurement of property, other than real property in being; “(2) the procurement of services; “(3) the procurement of construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of real property; or, “(4) the disposal of personal property.” The CDA also provides that a prevailing contractor is entitled to prejudgment interest. § 611. For ease of reference, throughout this opinion we will refer to the second sentence quoted in the text as § 51.3. Petitioner notes that its complaint challenged not only the regulation but also two specific prospectuses issued by NPS in late 2000. Thus, petitioner argues, even if the first challenge is not ripe, the latter two are reviewable under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491(b)(1). See Supplemental Brief for Petitioner 6-8. Petitioner did not seek certiorari review on these issues; accordingly, we decline to consider them. See this Court’s Rule 14.1(a); Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 535-536 (1992). Similarly, Justice Breyer’s reliance on the Tucker Act to show that the hardship requirement of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136 (1967), has been satisfied, see post, at 820-821 (dissenting opinion), is misplaced. The fact that one “congressional statute” authorizes “immediate judicial relief from [certain types of] agency determinations,” post, at 820, says nothing about whether “immediate judicial review” is advisable for challenges brought against other types of agency actions based on a different statute.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS No. 84-1737. Argued January 21, 1986 Decided April 22, 1986 MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. BURGER, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Powell, J., joined, post, p. 850. Albert G. Lauber, Jr., argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Archer, Robert A. Bernstein, and Robert S. Pomerance. John B. Huffaker argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Eleanor N. Ewing and Gerald P. Norton Robert A. Saltzstein and Joseph J. Saunders filed a brief for American Business Press as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Association for the Advancement of Science by John D. Lane; for the American Medical Association et al. by George A. Platz, Frank V. Battle, Jr., J. Timothy Kleespies, and Kathleen R. Curtis; and for the American Society of Association Executives by George D. Webster and Frank M. Northam. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. A tax-exempt organization must pay tax on income that it earns by carrying on a business not “substantially related” to the purposes for which the organization has received its exemption from federal taxation. The question before-this Court is whether respondent, a tax-exempt organization, must pay tax on the profits it earns by selling commercial advertising space in its professional journal, The Annals of Internal Medicine. I Respondent, the American College of Physicians, is an organization exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The purposes of the College, as stated in its articles of incorporation, are to maintain high standards in medical education and medical practice; to encourage research, especially in clinical medicine; and to foster measures for the prevention of disease and for the improvement of public health. App. 16a. The principal facts were stipulated at trial. In furtherance of its exempt purposes, respondent publishes The Annals of Internal Medicine (Annals), a highly regarded monthly medical journal containing scholarly articles relevant to the practice of internal medicine. Each issue of Annals contains advertisements for pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and equipment useful in the practice of internal medicine, as well as notices of positions available in that field. Respondent has a longstanding policy of accepting only advertisements containing information about the use of medical products, and screens proffered advertisements for accuracy and relevance to internal medicine. The advertisements are clustered in two groups, one at the front and one at the back of each issue. In 1975, Annals produced gross advertising income of $1,376,322. After expenses and deductible losses were subtracted, there remained a net income of $153,388. Respondent reported this figure as taxable income and paid taxes on it in the amount of $55,965. Respondent then filed a timely claim with the Internal Revenue Service for refund of these taxes, and when the Government demurred, filed suit in the United States Claims Court. The Claims Court held a trial and concluded that the advertisements in Annals were not substantially related to respondent’s tax-exempt purposes. 3 Cl. Ct. 531 (1983). Rather, after finding various facts regarding the nature of the College’s advertising business, it concluded that any correlation between the advertisements and respondent’s educational purpose was incidental because “the comprehensiveness and content of the advertising package is entirely dependent on each manufacturer’s willingness to pay for space and the imagination of its advertising agency. ” Id., at 535. Accordingly, the court determined that the advertising proceeds were taxable. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. 743 F. 2d 1570 (1984). It held clearly erroneous the trial court’s finding that the advertising was not substantially related to respondent’s tax-exempt purpose. The Court of Appeals believed that the trial court had focused too much on the commercial character of the advertising business and not enough on the actual contribution of the advertisements to the education of the journal’s readers. It held that respondent had established the requisite substantial relation and its entitlement to exemption from taxation. Id., at 1578. We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari, 473 U. S. 904 (1985), and now reverse. I — I I — I The taxation of business income not “substantially related” to the objectives of exempt organizations dates from the Revenue Act of 1950, Ch. 994, 64 Stat. 906 (1950 Act). The statute was enacted in response to perceived abuses of the tax laws by tax-exempt organizations that engaged in profit-making activities. Prior law had required only that the profits garnered by exempt organizations be used in furtherance of tax-exempt purposes, without regard to the source of those profits. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U. S. 578, 581 (1924); C. F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 120 (CA3 1951); Roche’s Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F. 2d 776 (CA2 1938). As a result, tax-exempt organizations were able to carry on full-fledged commercial enterprises in competition with corporations whose profits were fully taxable. See Revenue Revision of 1950: Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means, Vol. I, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 18-19 (1950) (hereinafter cited as 1950 House Hearings) (describing universities’ production of “automobile parts, chinaware, and food products, and the operation of theatres, oil wells, and cotton gins”). Congress perceived a need to restrain the unfair competition fostered by the tax laws. See H. R. Rep. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 36-37 (1950). Nevertheless, Congress did not force exempt organizations to abandon all commercial ventures, nor did it levy a tax only upon businesses that bore no relation at all to the tax-exempt purposes of an organization, as some of the 1950 Act’s proponents had suggested. See, e. g., 1950 House Hearings, at 4, 19, 165. Rather, in the 1950 Act it struck a balance between its two objectives of encouraging benevolent enterprise and restraining unfair competition by imposing a tax on the “unrelated business taxable income” of tax-exempt organizations. 26 U. S. C. § 511(a)(1). “Unrelated business taxable income” was defined as “the gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business . . . regularly carried on by it . . . .” § 512(a)(1). Congress defined an “unrelated trade or business” as “any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related ... to the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption . . . .” § 513(a). Whether respondent’s advertising income is taxable, therefore, depends upon (1) whether the publication of paid advertising is a “trade or business,” (2) whether it is regularly carried on, and (3) whether it is substantially related to respondent’s tax-exempt purposes. Ill A Satisfaction of the first condition is conceded in this case, as it must be, because Congress has declared unambiguously that the publication of paid advertising is a trade or business activity distinct from the publication of accompanying educational articles and editorial comment. In 1967, the Treasury promulgated a regulation interpreting the unrelated business income provision of the 1950 Act. The regulation defined “trade or business” to include not only a complete business enterprise, but also any component activity of a business. Treas. Reg. §1.513-l(b), 26 CFR § 1.513 — 1(b) (1985) (first published at 32 Fed. Reg. 17657 (1967)). This revolutionary approach to the identification of a “trade or business” had a significant effect on advertising, which theretofore had been considered simply a part of a unified publishing business. The new regulation segregated the “trade or business” of selling advertising space from the “trade or business” of publishing a journal, an approach commonly referred to as “fragmenting” the enterprise of publishing into its component parts: “[Activities of soliciting, selling, and publishing commercial advertising do not lose identity as a trade or business even though the advertising is published in an exempt organization periodical which contains editorial matter related to the exempt purposes of the organization.” 26 CFR § 1.513-l(b) (1985). In 1969, Congress responded to widespread criticism of those Treasury regulations by passing the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969 Act). That legislation specifically endorsed the Treasury’s concept of “fragmenting” the publishing enterprise into its component activities, and adopted, in a new § 513(c), much of the language of the regulation that defined advertising as a separate trade or business: “Advertising, etc., activities ... an activity does not lose identity as a trade or business merely because it is carried on . . . within a larger complex of other endeavors which may, or may not, be related to the exempt purposes of the organization.” 26 U. S. C. § 513(c). The statute clearly established advertising as a trade or business, the first prong of the inquiry into the taxation of unrelated business income. The presence of the second condition, that the business be regularly carried on, is also undisputed here. The satisfaction of the third condition, however, that of “substantial relation,” is vigorously contested, and that issue forms the crux of the controversy before us. B According to the Government, Congress and the Treasury established a blanket rule that advertising published by tax-exempt professional journals can never be substantially related to the purposes of those journals and is, therefore, always a taxable business. Respondent,, however, contends that each case must be determined on the basis of the characteristics of the advertisements and journal in question. Each party finds support for its position in the governing statute and regulations issued by the Department of the Treasury. In its 1967 regulations, the Treasury not only addressed the “fragmentation” issue discussed above, but also attempted to clarify the statutory “substantially related” standard found in § 513(a). It provided that the conduct of a tax-exempt business must have a causal relation to the organization’s exempt purpose (other than through the generation of income), and that “the production or distribution of the goods or the performance of the services from which the gross income is derived must contribute importantly to the accomplishment of [the exempt] purposes.” Treas. Reg. § 1.513-l(d)(2), 26 CFR § 1.513-l(d)(2) (1985) (emphasis added). In illustration of its new test for substantial relation, the Treasury provided an example whose interpretation is central to the resolution of the issue before us. Example 7 of Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (d)(4)(iv) involves “Z,” an exempt association formed to advance the interests of a particular profession and drawing its membership from that profession. Z publishes a monthly journal containing articles and other editorial material that contribute importantly to the tax-exempt purpose. Z derives income from advertising products within the field of professional interest of the members: “Following a practice common among taxable magazines which publish advertising, Z requires its advertising to comply with certain general standards of taste, fairness, and accuracy; but within those limits the form, content, and manner of presentation of the advertising messages are governed by the basic objective of the advertisers to promote the sale of the advertised products. While the advertisements contain certain information, the informational function of the advertising is incidental to the controlling aim of stimulating demand for the advertised products and differs in no essential respect from the informational function of any commercial advertising. Like taxable publishers of advertising, Z accepts advertising only from those who are willing to pay its published rates. Although continuing education of its members in matters pertaining to their profession is one of the purposes for which Z is granted exemption, the publication of advertising designed and selected in the manner of ordinary commercial advertising is not an educational activity of the kind contemplated by the exemption statute; it differs fundamentally from such an activity both in its governing objective and in its method. Accordingly, Z’s publication of advertising does not contribute importantly to the accomplishment of its exempt purposes; and the income which it derives from advertising constitutes gross income from unrelated trade or business.” § 1.513 — l(d)(4)(iv), Example 7. The Government contends both that Example 7 creates a per se rule of taxation for journal advertising income and that Congress intended to adopt that rule, together with the remainder of the 1967 regulations, into law in the 1969 Act. We find both of these contentions unpersuasive. Read as a whole, the regulations do not appear to create the type of blanket rule of taxability that the Government urges upon us. On the contrary, the regulations specifically condition tax exemption of business income upon the importance of the business activity’s contribution to the particular exempt purpose at issue, and direct that “[w]hether activities productive of gross income contribute importantly to the accomplishment of any purpose for which an organization is granted an exemption depends in each case upon the facts and circumstances involved,” § 1.513 — 1(d)(2) (emphasis added). Example 7 need not be interpreted as being inconsistent with that general rule. Attributing to the term “example” its ordinary meaning, we believe that Example 7 is best construed as an illustration of one possible application, under given circumstances, of the regulatory standard for determining substantial relation. The interpretative difficulty of Example 7 arises primarily from its failure to distinguish clearly between the statements intended to provide hypothetical facts and those designed to posit the necessary legal consequences of those facts. Just at the point in the lengthy Example at which the facts would appear to end and the analysis to begin, a pivotal statement appears: “the informational function of the advertising is incidental to the controlling aim of stimulating demand for the advertised products.” The Government’s position depends upon reading this statement as a general proposition of law, while respondent would read it as a statement of fact that may be true by hypothesis of “Z” and its journal, but is not true of Annals. We recognize that the language of the Example is amenable to either interpretation. Nevertheless, several considerations lead us to believe that the Treasury did not intend to set out a per se statement of law. First, when the regulations were proposed in early 1967, the Treasury expressed a clear intention to treat all commercial advertising as an unrelated business. See Technical Information Release No. 889, CCH 1967 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. ¶ 6557. When the regulations were issued in final form, however, following much criticism and the addition of Example 7, they included no such statement of intention. 32 Fed. Reg. 17657 (1967). Second, a blanket rule of taxation for advertising in professional journals would contradict the explicit case-by-case requirement articulated in Treas. Reg. § 1.513 — 1(d)(2), and we are reluctant to attribute to the Treasury an intention to depart from its own general principle in the absence of clear support for doing so. Finally, at the time the regulations were issued, the 1950 Act had been interpreted to mean that business activities customarily engaged in by tax-exempt organizations would continue to be considered “substantially related” and untaxed. See Note, The Macaroni Monopoly: The Developing Concept of Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1280, 1291 (1968). A per se rule of taxation for the activity, traditional among tax-exempt journals, of carrying commercial advertising would have been a significant departure from that prevailing view. Thus, in 1967 the idea of a per se rule of taxation for all journal advertising revenue was sufficiently controversial, its effect so substantial, and its statutory authorization so tenuous, that we simply cannot attribute to the Treasury the intent to take that step in the form of an ambiguous example, appended to a subpart of a subsection of a subparagraph of a regulation. It is still possible, of course, that, regardless of what the Treasury actually meant by its 1967 regulations, Congress read those regulations as creating a blanket rule of taxation, and intended to adopt that rule into law in the 1969 Act. The Government appears to embrace this view, which it supports with certain statements in the legislative history of the 1969 Act. For example, the Government cites to a statement in the House Report, discussing the taxation of advertising income of journals published by tax-exempt organizations: “Your committee believes that a business competing with taxpaying organizations should not be granted an unfair competitive advantage by operating tax free unless the business contributes importantly to the exempt function. It has concluded that by that standard, advertising in a journal published by an exempt organization is not related to the organization’s exempt functions, and therefore it believes that this income should be taxed.” H. R. Rep. No. 91-413, pt. 1, p. 50 (1969). Similar views appear in the Senate Report: “Present law. — In December 1967, the Treasury Department promulgated regulations under which the income from advertising and similar activities is treated as ‘unrelated business income’ even though such advertising for example may appear in a periodical related to the educational or other exempt purpose of the organization. “General reasons for change. —The committee agrees with the House that the regulations reached an appropriate result in specifying that when an exempt organization carries on an advertising business in competition with other taxpaying advertising businesses, it should pay a tax on the advertising income. The statutory language on which the regulations are based, however, is sufficiently unclear so that substantial litigation could result from these regulations. For this reason, the committee agrees with the House that the regulations, insofar as they apply to advertising and related activities, should be placed in the tax laws.” S. Rep. No. 91-552, p. 75 (1969). Based on this language, the Government argues that the 1969 Act created a per se rule of taxation for advertising income. The weakness of this otherwise persuasive argument, however, is that the quoted discussion appears in the Reports solely in support of the legislators’ decision to enact § 513(c), the provision approving the fragmentation of “trade or business.” Although § 513(c) was a significant change in the tax law that removed one barrier to the taxation of advertising proceeds, it cannot be construed as a comment upon the two other distinct conditions — “regularly carried on” and “not substantially related” — whose satisfaction is prerequisite to taxation of business income under the 1950 Act. Congress did not incorporate into the 1969 Act the language of the regulation defining “substantial relation,” nor did the statute refer in any other way to the issue of the relation between advertising and exempt functions, even though that issue had been hotly debated at the hearings. See, e. g., Tax Reform, 1969: Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1113, 1118, 1192, 1241 (1969). Thus, we have no reason to conclude from the Committee Reports that Congress resolved the dispute whether, in a specific case, a journal’s carriage of advertising could so advance its educational objectives as to be “substantially related” to those objectives within the meaning of the 1950 Act. It is possible that the Committees’ discussion of advertising reflects merely an erroneous assumption that the “fragmentation” provision of § 513(c), without more, would establish the automatic taxation of journal advertising revenue. Alternatively, the quoted passages could be read to indicate the Committees’ intention affirmatively to endorse what they believed to be existing practice, or even to change the law substantially. The truth is that, other than a general reluctance to consider commercial advertisements generally as substantially related to the purposes of tax-exempt journals, no congressional view of the issue emerges from the quoted excerpts of the Reports. Thus, despite the Reports’ seeming endorsement of a per se rule, we are hesitant to rely on that inconclusive legislative history either to supply a provision not enacted by Congress, see Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U. S. 87, 93 (1959); 1 J. Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation §3.29 (Weinstein rev. 1985), or to define a statutory-term enacted by a prior Congress. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 121 (1978); United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960). Cf. TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 193 (1978). We agree, therefore, with both the Claims Court and the Court of Appeals in their tacit rejection of the Government’s argument that the Treasury and Congress intended to establish a per se rule requiring the taxation of income from all commercial advertisements of all tax-exempt journals without a specific analysis of the circumstances. IV It remains to be determined whether, in this case, the business of selling advertising space is “substantially related”— or, in the words of the regulation, “contributes importantly”— to the purposes for which respondent enjoys an exemption from federal taxation. Respondent has maintained throughout this litigation that the advertising in Annals performs an educational function supplemental to that of the journal’s editorial content. App. 7a. Testimony of respondent’s witnesses at trial tended to show that drug advertising performs a valuable function for doctors by disseminating information on recent developments in drug manufacture and use. Id., at 27a, 38a, 43a. In addition, respondent has contended that the role played by the Food and Drug Administration, in regulating much of the form and content of prescription-drug advertisements, enhances the contribution that such advertisements make to the readers’ education. All of these factors, respondent argues, distinguish the advertising in Annals from standard commercial advertising. Respondent approaches the question of substantial relation from the perspective of the journal’s subscribers; it points to the benefit that they may glean from reading the advertisements and concludes that that benefit is substantial enough to satisfy the statutory test for tax exemption. The Court of Appeals took the same approach. It concluded that the advertisements performed various “essential” functions for physicians, 743 F. 2d, at 1576, and found a substantial relation based entirely upon the medically related content of the advertisements as a group. The Government, on the other hand, looks to the conduct of the tax-exempt organization itself, inquiring whether the publishers of Annals have performed the advertising services in a manner that evinces an intention to use the advertisements for the purpose of contributing to the educational value of the journal. Also approaching the question from the vantage point of the College, the Claims Court emphasized the lack of a comprehensive presentation of the material contained in the advertisements. It commented upon the “hit-or-miss nature of the advertising,” 3 Cl. Ct., at 543, n. 3, and observed that the “differences between ads plainly reflected the advertiser’s marketing strategy rather than their probable importance to the reader.” Id., at 534. “[A]ny educational function [the advertising] may have served was incidental to its purpose of raising revenue.” Id., at 535. We believe that the Claims Court was correct to concentrate its scrutiny upon the conduct of the College rather than upon the educational quality of the advertisements. For all advertisements contain some information, and if a modicum of informative content were enough to supply the important contribution necessary to achieve tax exemption for commercial advertising, it would be the rare advertisement indeed that would fail to meet the test. Yet the statutory and regulatory scheme, even if not creating a per se rule against tax exemption, is clearly antagonistic to the concept of a per se rule for exemption for advertising revenue. Moreover, the statute provides that a tax will be imposed on “any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related,” 26 U. S. C. § 513(a) (emphasis added), directing our focus to the manner in which the tax-exempt organization operates its business. The implication of the statute is confirmed by the regulations, which emphasize the “manner” of designing and selecting the advertisements. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (d)(4)(iv), Example 7, 26 CFR § 1.513-l(d)(4)(iv), Example 7 (1985). Thus, the Claims Court properly directed its attention to the College’s conduct of its advertising business, and it found the following pertinent facts: “The evidence is clear that plaintiff did not use the advertising to provide its readers a comprehensive or systematic presentation of any aspect of the goods or services publicized. Those companies willing to pay for advertising space got it; others did not. Moreover, some of the advertising was for established drugs or devices and was repeated from one month to another, undermining the suggestion that the advertising was principally designed to alert readers of recent developments [citing, as examples, ads for Valium, Insulin and Maalox]. Some ads even concerned matters that had no conceivable relationship to the College’s tax-exempt purposes.” 3 Cl. Ct., at 534 (footnotes omitted). These facts find adequate support in the record. See, e. g., App. 29a-30a, 59a. Considering them in light of the applicable legal standard, we are bound to conclude that the advertising in Annals does not contribute importantly to the journal’s educational purposes. This is not to say that the College could not control its publication of advertisements in such a way as to reflect an intention to contribute importantly to its educational functions. By coordinating the content of the advertisements with the editorial content of the issue, or by publishing only advertisements reflecting new developments in the pharmaceutical market, for example, perhaps the College could satisfy the stringent standards erected by Congress and the Treasury. In this case, however, we have concluded that the Court of Appeals erroneously focused exclusively upon the information that is invariably conveyed by commercial advertising, and consequently failed to give effect to the governing statute and regulations. Its judgment, accordingly, is Reversed. Title 26 U. S. C. § 501(c)(3) exempts from taxation entities “organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes,” with certain restrictions on their activities, including prohibition of political activity. The 1967 Treasury regulations at issue in this case, published in final form at 32 Fed. Reg. 17657 (1967), have not been amended in pertinent part since their promulgation, and references to those regulations herein are to the current version. See, e. g., Moore, Current Problems of Exempt Organizations, 24 Tax L. Rev. 469, 476 (1969); Middleditch & Webster, The new unrelated business income Regs: what they mean; how to cope with them, 28 J. Tax. 174, 178 (1968); Webster, New proposals change definition of unrelated business-income, 27 J. Tax. 42, 43 (1967); Weithom & Liles, Unrelated Business Income Tax: Changes Affecting Journal Advertising Revenues, 45 Taxes 791, 798 (1967). See also Tax Reform, 1969: Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1129, 1184, 1223 (1969). Numerous bills were introduced in the 90th Congress, 1st Session, in an unsuccessful attempt to overturn the regulations, even before they became final. See, e. g., H. R. 8765; H. R. 8766; H. R. 9103; H. R. 9468; H. R. 9661; H. R. 9763; H. R. 10150; H. R. 10997; H. R. 10998; H. R. 11491; H. R. 11492. And several years later, two federal courts struck down the 1967 regulations as exceeding pre-1969 statutory authority, insofar as they required the “fragmentation” of publishing activities. See American College of Physicians v. United States, 209 Ct. Cl. 23, 29, 530 F. 2d 930, 933 (1976); Massachusetts Medical Society v. United States, 514 F. 2d 153, 154 (CA1 1975). Indeed, different excerpts suggest that perhaps the House Committee did not construe the statute as creating a per se rule. In its explanation of § 513(c), the House Report states that “the advertising contained in a publication of an exempt organization may be subject to the tax under section 511 even though the editorial content of the publication may be related to the exempt purposes of the organization.” H. R. Rep. No. 91-413, pt. 2, p. 26 (1969) (emphasis added). This conclusion is consistent with the Treasury’s own approach to analogous problems. See, e. g., Rev. Rui. 82-139,1982-2 Cum. Bull. 108 (advertisements in county bar journal; no per se rule); Rev. Rui. 72-431, 1972-2 Cum. Bull. 281 (exempt organization’s sale of mailing lists to commercial advertisers; no per se rule). Our rejection of the per se rule renders it unnecessary for us to address respondent’s alternative argument that any such rule should apply only to associations organized under § 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MILLINERY CENTER BUILDING CORP. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. No. 255. Argued March 1, 1956. Decided March 26, 1956. Bernard Weiss argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Hilbert P. Zarky argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Holland, Ralph S. Spritzer, A. F. Prescott and Louise Foster. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves an interpretation of § 23 (a)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended, 26 U. S. C. § 23 (a) (1) (A), providing for the deduction from gross income, in computing net income, of all the “ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred . . . in carrying on any trade or business . . . .” The Commissioner determined a deficiency in petitioner’s excess-profits tax for 1945; petitioner sought a redetermination of its liability in the Tax Court, which made the following findings of fact. In April 1924, petitioner leased land in New York City for 21 years, with an option to renew the lease for two further 21-year periods. In accordance with the terms of the lease, it erected a 22-story loft building at a cost of $3,000,000. The lease, as amended in 1935, provided for an annual rental of $118,840. Title to the building was in petitioner, but at the eventual termination of the lease it would vest, without payment, in the lessor, at the lessor’s option. The lessor could also require petitioner to remove the building at that time. Petitioner had the obligation, in case of destruction of the building, to rebuild at its own cost. During the first 21-year period of the lease, petitioner fully depreciated the entire $3,000,000 cost of the building. In April 1945, it exercised its option to renew the lease until April 1966. In May 1945, petitioner entered into an agreement with the owner whereby it purchased the fee and obtained release from the obligations of the renewed lease. The price paid was $2,100,000. The Tax Court aiso found that the value of the land, as unimproved, was $660,000 when purchased by petitioner in 1945. The principal issues raised by petitioner relate to its attempt to deduct $1,440,000 — the difference between the purchase price under the May 1945 agreement and the 1945 value of the unimproved land — as an ordinary and necessary expense of doing business. The Tax Court held that the difference could not be so deducted, that the difference could not be amortized over the remaining term of the cancelled lease, and that no annual depreciation could be taken because the cost of the building had already been fully depreciated and the purchase price could not be separated into purchase price for building and purchase price for land. 21 T. C. 817. Six of the judges of the Tax Court dissented on the ground that “[s]ome part of the purchase price should be allocated to the additional rights in the building acquired in the purchase . . . .” 21 T. C., at 826. On petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded. It affirmed the refusal to permit a deduction under § 23 (a), but reversed the holding that no amount could be added to the asset value of the building for purposes of depreciation. Rejecting petitioner’s argument that it should be allowed to amortize the $1,440,000 over the unexpired term of the cancelled lease, it accepted petitioner’s alternative argument that depreciation over the remaining useful life of the building should be allowed. Stating that “[o]n the present state of the record we cannot determine how much of the $2,100,000 purchase price is properly to be allocated to the land and how much to the building,” it remanded the case to the Tax Court to fix the respective values. 221 F. 2d 322, 324. Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to review the disallowance of its claim for a deduction as a business expense or, alternatively, as amortization over the remaining period of the lease. The Government did not seek review of the allowance of depreciation of that portion of the purchase price allocable to the building over its remaining economic life. Because of the apparent conflict between the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in this case and the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 166 F. 2d 805, we granted certiorari, limited to the questions set forth in the margin. Under the terms of the lease, petitioner had a 21-year lease on the land, with an option to renew, and similar rights in the building which it had constructed. Petitioner introduced evidence to show that the rent it was paying under the lease was greatly in excess of the fair rental value of the land as vacant, unimproved land. Petitioner contends that it already owned the building and that therefore the purchase agreement was entered into for the purpose of avoiding the excessive rentals of the lease. This transaction, it asserts, involved a current business expenditure, and the $1,440,000 in excess of the vacant land value represents what it was willing to pay to avoid this onerous lease. Petitioner’s claim that it “owned” the building is based on a loose and misleading use of “owned.” The only way petitioner could continue to use the building after termination of the initial period of the lease was by renewing the lease, and the lease also circumscribed its control over the building. It could make use of the building for the remainder of its economic life, but only on payment of the stated rent. Petitioner’s evidence with respect to the rental value of the land as unimproved is irrelevant. It was using the land as improved by the building; it was paying rent for the land as improved by the building. Petitioner tendered no evidence that it was paying excessive rent for what it was actually leasing. A complementary feature of the purchase of the lessor’s interests in the land and building was the elimination of the obligation to pay rent on the improved land. The purchase price presumably reflected this situation. Whatever possible merit petitioner’s contention might have were there proof of excessive purchase price can await such a case. The purchase price paid by petitioner represents the cost of acquiring the complete fee to the land and the building, and no deduction as an ordinary and necessary business expense can be taken. Petitioner claims that even if it cannot get a deduction as an ordinary and necessary business ‘expense under § 23 (a) or as a loss under § 23 (f), it should be allowed to amortize the excess of the payment of $2,100,000 above the determined land value of $660,000 over the 21-year remaining term of the extinguished lease. What petitioner acquired in this transaction, however, were both rights with respect to the land and rights with respect to the building. The Tax Court has not yet fixed that amount of the purchase price which is allocable to the acquisition of rights in the land and that which is allocable to the acquisition of rights in the building. These rights are assets with useful lives having no reference to the term of the lease. Successive steps of securing or renewing a lease and then purchasing the reversion should not result in amortization over the term of the lease when the purchase of the whole fee at one time would result in depreciation over the useful life of the asset, if the asset acquired were a wasting asset. Under petitioner’s contention, if the purchase had been consummated in 1944 before the first term of the lease had expired, the whole amount of the purchase price not allocable to the land would be amortized in one year. But it should make no difference whether the lease is about to expire or has just been renewed. In the one case, the value of the reversion is enhanced and the value of the right to receive the rent fixed by the lease is depressed because the lease is near an end. In the other case, the value of the reversion is depressed and the value of the right to receive the fixed rent is enhanced because the lease has many years to run. But although there might possibly be some difference in bargaining power between the two situations, the sum total of the rights purchased is the same in each case. Petitioner has acquired two assets — land and a building — whose use it will have for the remainder of their useful lives, and petitioner therefore cannot amortize the cost allocable to the acquisition of the wasting asset over the term of the extinguished lease. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, leaving to the Tax Court the allocation still to be made. Affirmed. “1. Where a lessee, the owner of a valuable building on leased land, acquires the fee to the land to be relieved of what it considers to be the burdensome terms of a lease, may the lessee deduct the excess of the payment over the determined value of the land at the date of purchase as an ordinary expense of doing business under § 23 (a) of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1939 or under § 23 (f) as a loss on a transaction entered into for profit and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise. “2. In the alternative, may the lessee-petitioner consider the excess payment over the determined value of the land to be in the nature of a prepayment of rent for the remaining term of the extinguished lease and amortize such amount over 21 years?” 350 U. S. 820. Petitioner asserted, but did not argue, the permissibility of the deduction of the $1,440,000 as a loss under § 23 (f). Such an assertion is apparently premised on the assumption that the $1,440,000 represents the sum paid for commutation of the rent payments under an onerous lease, and further discussion of this argument is unnecessary.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TUAN ANH NGUYEN et al. v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE No. 99-2071. Argued January 9, 2001 Decided June 11, 2001 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 73. O’Connor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 74. Martha F. Davis argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Nancy A. Falgout, Steven R. Shapiro, Lucas Guttentag, Julie Goldscheid, and Sherry J. Leiwant. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Ogden, Austin C. Schlick, Michael Jay Singer, and John S. Koppel. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Equality Now et al. by Ogden Northrup Lewis and Jessica Neuwirth; and for the National Women’s Law Center et al. by Nancy Duff Campbell, Joan Entmacher, Dina R. Lassow, and Nancy L. Perkins. Moses Silverman and Kenneth Kimerling filed a brief for the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents a question not resolved by a majority of the Court in a case before us three Terms ago. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U. S. 420 (1998). Title 8 U. S. C. § 1409 governs the acquisition of United States citizenship by persons born to one United States citizen parent and one noncitizen parent when the parents are unmarried and the child is born outside of the United States or its possessions. The statute imposes different requirements for the child’s acquisition of citizenship depending upon whether the citizen parent is the mother or the father. The question before us is whether the statutory distinction is consistent with the equal protection guarantee embedded in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. I Petitioner Tuan Anh Nguyen was born in Saigon, Vietnam, on September 11, 1969, to copetitioner Joseph Boulais and a Vietnamese citizen. Boulais and Nguyen’s mother were not married. Boulais always has been a citizen of the United States, and he was in Vietnam under the employ of a corporation. After he and Nguyen’s mother ended their relationship, Nguyen lived for a time with the family of Boulais’ new Vietnamese girlfriend. In June 1975, Nguyen, then almost six years of age, came to the United States. He became a lawful permanent resident and was raised in Texas by Boulais. In 1992, when Nguyen was 22, he pleaded guilty in a Texas state court to two counts of sexual assault on a child. He was sentenced to eight years in prison on each count. Three years later, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated deportation proceedings against Nguyen as an alien who had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude, as well as an aggravated felony. See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii) (1994 ed., Supp. IV). Though later he would change his position and argue he was a United States citizen, Nguyen testified at his deportation hearing that he was a citizen of Vietnam. The Immigration Judge found him deportable. Nguyen appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals and, in 1998, while the matter was pending, his father obtained an order of parentage from a state court, based on DNA testing. By this time, Nguyen was 28 years old. The Board dismissed Nguyen’s appeal, rejecting his claim to United States citizenship because he had failed to establish compliance with 8 U. S. C. § 1409(a), which sets forth the requirements for one who was born out of wedlock and abroad to a citizen father and a noncitizen mother. Nguyen and Boulais appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that § 1409 violates equal protection by providing different rules for attainment of citizenship by children born abroad and out of wedlock depending upon whether the one parent with American citizenship is the mother or the father. The court rejected the constitutional challenge to § 1409(a). 208 F. 3d 528, 535 (2000). The constitutionality of the distinction between unwed fathers and mothers was argued in Miller, but a majority of the Court did not resolve the issue. Four Justices, in two different opinions, rejected the challenge to the gender-based distinction, two finding the statute consistent with the Fifth Amendment, see 523 U. S., at 423 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J.), and two concluding that the court could not confer citizenship as a remedy even if the statute violated equal protection, see id., at 452 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). Three Justices reached a contrary result, and would have found the statute violative of equal protection. Id., at 460 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); id., at 471 (Breyer, J., joined by Souter and Gins-BURG, JJ., dissenting). Finally, two Justices did not reach the issue as to the father, having determined that the child, the only petitioner in Miller, lacked standing to raise the equal protection rights of his father. Id., at 445 (O’Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Since Miller, the Courts of Appeal have divided over the constitutionality of §1409. Compare 208 F. 3d 528 (CA5 2000) (case below) with Lake v. Reno, 226 F. 3d 141 (CA2 2000), and United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F. 3d 1121 (CA9 1999). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 530 U. S. 1305 (2000). The father is before the Court in this case; and, as all agree he has standing to raise the constitutional claim, we now resolve it. We hold that § 1409(a) is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. II The general requirement for acquisition of citizenship by a child born outside the United States and its outlying possessions and to parents who are married, one of whom is a citizen and the other of whom is an alien, is set forth in 8 U. S. C. § 1401(g). The statute provides that the child is also a citizen if, before the birth, the citizen parent had been physically present in the United States for a total of five years, at least two of which were after the parent turned 14 years of age. As to an individual born under the same circumstances, save that the parents are unwed, § 1409(a) sets forth the following requirements where the father is the citizen parent and the mother is an alien: "(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear and convincing evidence, “(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the person’s birth, “(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support for the person until the person reaches the age of 18 years, and “(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years— “(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person’s residence or domicile, “(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or “(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a competent court.” In addition, § 1409(a) incorporates by reference, as to the citizen parent, the residency requirement of § 1401(g). When the citizen parent of the child born abroad and out of wedlock is the child’s mother, the requirements for the transmittal-of citizenship are described in § 1409(c): “(c) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section, a person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of such person’s birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year.” Section 1409(a) thus imposes a set of requirements on the children of citizen fathers born abroad and out of wedlock to a noncitizen mother that are not imposed under like circumstances when the citizen parent is the mother. All concede the requirements of §§ 1409(a)(3) and (a)(4), relating to a citizen father’s acknowledgment of a child while he is under 18, were not satisfied in this case. We need not discuss § 1409(a)(3), however. It was added in 1986, after Nguyen’s birth; and Nguyen falls within a transitional rule which allows him to elect application of either the current version of the statute, or the pre-1986 version, which contained no parallel to § 1409(a)(3). See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. 3655; note following 8 U. S. C. § 1409; Miller, supra, at 426, n. 3, 432 (opinion of Stevens, J.). And in any event, our ruling respecting § 1409(a)(4) is dispositive of the case. As an individual seeking citizenship under § 1409(a) must meet all of its preconditions, the failure to satisfy § 1409(a)(4) renders Nguyen ineligible for citizenship. rH hH b-H For a gender-based classification to withstand equal protection scrutiny, it must be established “‘at least that the [challenged] classification serves “important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed” are “substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” ’ ” United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 468 U. S. 718, 724 (1982), in turn quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U. S. 142, 150 (1980)). For reasons to follow, we conclude §1409 satisfies this standard. Given that determination, we need not decide whether some lesser degree of scrutiny pertains because the statute implicates Congress’ immigration and naturalization power. See Miller, 523 U. S., at 434, n. 11 (explaining that the statute must be subjected to a standard more deferential to the congressional exercise of the immigration and naturalization power, but that “[ejven if . . . the heightened scrutiny that normally governs gender discrimination claims applied in this context,” the statute would be sustained (citations omitted)). Before considering the important governmental interests advanced by the statute, two observations concerning the operation of the provision are in order. First, a citizen mother expecting a child and living abroad has the right to reenter the United States so the child can be born here and be a 14th Amendment citizen. From one perspective, then, the statute simply ensures equivalence between two expectant mothers who are citizens abroad if one chooses to reenter for the child’s birth and the other chooses not to return, or does not have the means to do so. This equivalence is not a factor if the single citizen parent living abroad is the father. For, unlike the unmarried mother, the unmarried father as a general rule cannot control where the child will be born. Second, although § 1409(a)(4) requires certain conduct to occur before the child of a citizen father, born out of wedlock and abroad, reaches 18 years of age, it imposes no limitations on when an individual who qualifies under the statute can claim citizenship. The statutory treatment of citizenship is identical in this respect whether the citizen parent is the mother or the father. A person born to a citizen parent of either gender may assert citizenship, assuming compliance with statutory preconditions, regardless of his or her age. And while the conditions necessary for a citizen mother to transmit citizenship under § 1409(c) exist at birth, citizen fathers and/or their children have 18 years to satisfy the requirements of § 1409(a)(4). See Miller, supra, at 435 (opinion of Stevens, J.). The statutory distinction relevant in this case, then, is that § 1409(a)(4) requires one of three affirmative steps to be taken if the citizen parent is the father, but not if the citizen parent is the mother: legitimation; a declaration of paternity under oath by the father; or a court order of paternity. Congress’ decision to impose requirements on unmarried fathers that differ from those on unmarried mothers is based on the significant difference between their respective relationships to the potential citizen at the time of birth. Specifically, the imposition of the requirement for a paternal relationship, but not a maternal one, is justified by two important governmental objectives. We discuss each in turn. A The first governmental interest to be served is the importance of assuring that a biological parent-child relationship exists. In the case of the mother, the relation is verifiable from the birth itself. The mother’s status is documented in most instances by the birth certificate or hospital records and the witnesses who attest to her having given birth. In the case of the father, the uncontestable fact is that he need not be present at the birth. If he is present, furthermore, that circumstance is not incontrovertible proof of fatherhood. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U. S. 248, 260, n. 16 (1983) (“ ‘The mother carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the father’s parental claims must be gauged by other measures’ ” (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting))); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U. S. 762, 770 (1977) (“The more serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers’ estates than that required . . . under their mothers’ estates . . Fathers and mothers are not similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological parenthood. The imposition of a different set of rules for making that legal determination with respect to fathers and mothers is neither surprising nor troublesome from a constitutional perspective. Cf. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 439 (1985) (explaining that the Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike”); F S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). Section 1409(a)(4)’s provision of three options for a father seeking to establish paternity — legitimation, paternity oath, and court order of paternity — is designed to ensure an acceptable documentation of paternity. Petitioners argue that the requirement of § 1409(a)(1), that a father provide clear and convincing evidence of parentage, is sufficient to achieve the end of establishing paternity, given the sophistication of modern DNA tests. Brief for Petitioners 21-24. Section 1409(a)(1) does not actually mandate a DNA test, however. The Constitution, moreover, does not require that Congress elect one particular mechanism from among many possible methods of establishing paternity, even if that mechanism arguably might be the most scientifically advanced method. With respect to DNA testing, the expense, reliability, and availability of such testing in various parts of the world may have been of particular concern to Congress. See Miller, supra, at 437 (opinion of Stevens, J.). The requirement of § 1409(a)(4) represents a reasonable conclusion by the legislature that the satisfaction of one of several alternatives will suffice to establish the blood link between father and child required as a predicate to the child’s acquisition of citizenship. Cf. Lehr, supra, at 267-268 (upholding New York statutory requirement that gave mothers of children born out of wedlock notice of an adoption hearing, but only extended that right to fathers ¡ who mailed a postcard to a “putative fathers registry”). Given the proof of motherhood that i^ inherent in birth itself, it is unremarkable that Congress did not require the same affirmative steps of mothers. Finally, to require Congress to speak without reference to the gender of the parent with regard to its objective of ensuring a blood tie between parent and child would be to insist on a hollow neutrality. As Justice Stevens pointed out in Miller, Congress could have required both mothers and fathers to prove parenthood within 30 days or, for that matter, 18 years, of the child’s birth. 523 U. S., at 436. Given that the mother is always present at birth, but that the father need not be, the facially neutral rule would sometimes require fathers to take additional affirmative steps which would not be required of mothers, whose names will appear on the birth certificate as a result of their presence at the birth, and who will have the benefit of witnesses to the birth to call upon. The issue is not the use of gender specific terms instead of neutral ones. Just as neutral terms can mask, discrimination that is unlawful, gender specific terms can mark a permissible distinction. The equal protection question is whether the distinction is lawful. Here, the use of gender specific terms takes into account a biological difference between the parents. The differential treatment is inherent in a sensible statutory scheme, given the unique relationship of the mother to the event of birth. B 1 The second important governmental interest furthered in a substantial manner by § 1409(a)(4) is the determination to ensure that the child and the citizen parent have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop not just a relationship that is recognized, as a formal matter, by the law, but one that consists of the real, everyday ties that provide a connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States. See id., at 438-440 (opinion of Stevens, J.). In the case of a citizen mother and a child born overseas, the opportunity for a meaningful relationship between citizen parent and child inheres in the very event of birth, an event so often critical to our constitutional and statutory understandings of citizenship. The mother knows that the child is in being and is hers and has an initial point of contact with him. There is at least an opportunity for mother and child to develop a real, meaningful relationship. The same opportunity does not result from the event of birth, as a matter of biological inevitability, in the case of the unwed father. Given the 9-month interval between conception and birth, it is not always certain that a father will know that a child was conceived, nor is it always clear that even the mother will be sure of the father’s identity. This fact takes on particular significance in the case of a child born overseas and out of wedlock. One concern in this context has always been with young people, men for the most part, who are on duty with the Armed Forces in foreign countries. See Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics 48, 74 (1999) (reporting that in 1969, the year in which Nguyen was born, there were 3,458,072 active duty military personnel, 39,506 of whom were female); Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics 29 (1970) (noting that 1,041,094 military personnel were stationed in foreign countries in 1969); Department of Defense, Selected Manpower Statistics 49, 76 (1999) (reporting that in 1999 there were 1,385,703 active duty military personnel, 200,287 of whom were female); id., at 33 (noting that 252,763 military personnel were stationed in foreign countries in 1999). When we turn to the conditions which prevail today, we find that the passage of time has produced additional and even more substantial grounds to justify the statutory distinction. The ease of travel and the willingness of Americans to visit foreign countries have resulted in numbers of trips abroad that must be of real concern when we contemplate the prospect of accepting petitioners’ argument, which would mandate, contrary to Congress’ wishes, citizenship by male parentage subject to no condition save the father’s previous length of residence in this country. In 1999 alone, Americans made almost 25 million trips abroad, excluding trips to Canada and Mexico. See U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 1999 Profile of U. S. Travelers to Overseas Destinations 1 (Oct. 2000). Visits to Canada and Mexico add to this figure almost 34 million additional visits. See U. S. Dept, of Commerce, U. S. Resident Travel to Overseas Countries, Historical Visitation 1989-1999, p. 1 (Oct. 2000). And the average American overseas traveler spent 15.1 nights out of the United States in 1999. 1999 Profile of U. S. Travelers to Overseas Destinations, supra, at 4. Principles of equal protection do not require Congress to ignore this reality. To the contrary, these facts demonstrate the critical importance of the Government’s interest in ensuring some opportunity for a tie between citizen father and foreign born child which is a reasonable substitute for the opportunity manifest between mother and child at the time of birth. Indeed, especially in light of the number of Americans who take short sojourns abroad, the prospect that a father might not even know of the conception is a realistic possibility. See Miller, supra, at 489 (opinion of Stevens, J.). Even if a father knows of the fact of conception, moreover, it does not follow that he will be present at the birth of the child. Thus, unlike the case of the mother, there is no assurance that the father and his biological child will ever meet. Without an initial point of contact with the child by a father who knows the child is his own, there is no opportunity for father and child to begin a relationship. Section 1409 takes the unremarkable step of ensuring that such an opportunity, inherent in the event of birth as to the mother-child relationship, exists between father and child before citizenship is conferred upon the latter. The importance of the governmental interest at issue here is too profound to be satisfied merely by conducting a DNA test. The fact of paternity can be established even without the father’s knowledge, not to say his presence. Paternity can be established by taking DNA samples even from a few strands of hair, years after the birth. See Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 497 (2d ed. 2000). Yet scientific proof of biological paternity does nothing, by itself, to ensure contact between father and child during the child’s minority. Congress is well within its authority in refusing, absent proof of at least the opportunity for the development of a relationship between citizen parent and child, to commit this country to embracing a child as a citizen entitled as of birth to the full protection of the United States, to the absolute right to enter its borders, and to full participation in the political process. If citizenship is to be conferred by the unwitting means petitioners urge, so that its acquisition abroad bears little relation to the realities of the child’s own ties and allegiances, it is for Congress, not this Court, to make that determination. Congress has not taken that path but has instead chosen, by means of § 1409, to ensure in the case of father and child the opportunity for a relationship to develop, an opportunity which the event of birth itself provides for the mother and child. It should be unobjectionable for Congress to require some evidence of a minimal opportunity for the development of a relationship with the child in terms the male can fiilfill. While the INS’ brief contains statements indicating the governmental interest we here describe, see Brief for Respondent 38, 41, it suggests other interests as well. Statements from the INS’ brief are not conclusive as to the objects of the statute, however, as we are concerned with the objectives of Congress, not those of the INS. We ascertain the purpose of a statute by drawing logical conclusions from its text, structure, and operation. Petitioners and their amici argue in addition that, rather than fulfilling an important governmental interest, §1409 merely embodies a gender-based stereotype. Although the above discussion should illustrate that, contrary to petitioners’ assertions, § 1409 addresses an undeniable difference in the circumstance of the parents at the time a child is born, it should be noted, furthermore, that the difference does not result from some stereotype, defined as a frame of mind resulting from irrational or uncritical analysis. There is nothing irrational or improper in the recognition that at the moment of birth — a critical event in the statutory scheme and in the whole tradition of citizenship law — the mother’s knowledge of the child and the fact of parenthood have been established in a way not guaranteed in the case of the unwed father. This is not a stereotype. See Virginia, 518 U. S., at 533 (“The heightened review standard our precedent establishes does not make sex a proscribed classification. . . . Physical differences between men and women . . . are enduring”). 2 Having concluded that facilitation of a relationship between parent and child is an important governmental interest, the question remains whether the means Congress chose to further its objective — the imposition of certain additional requirements upon an unwed father — substantially relate to that end. Under this test, the means Congress adopted must be sustained. First, it should be unsurprising that Congress decided to require that an opportunity for a parent-child relationship occur during the formative years of the child’s minority. In furtherance of the desire to ensure some tie between this country and one who seeks citizenship, various other statutory provisions concerning citizenship and naturalization require some act linking the child to the United States to occur before the child reaches 18 years of age. See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1431 (child born abroad to one citizen parent and one noncitizen parent shall become a citizen if, inter alia, the noncitizen parent is naturalized before the child reaches 18 years of age and the child begins to reside in the United States before he or she turns 18); § 1432 (imposing same conditions in the case of a child born abroad to two alien parents who are naturalized). Second, petitioners argue that § 1409(a)(4) is not effective. In particular, petitioners assert that, although a mother will know of her child’s birth, “knowledge that one is a parent, no matter how it is acquired, does not guarantee a relationship with one’s child.” Brief for Petitioners 16. They thus maintain that the imposition of the additional requirements of § 1409(a)(4) only on the children of citizen fathers must reflect a stereotype that women are more likely than men to actually establish a relationship with their children. Id., at 17. This line of argument misconceives the nature of both the governmental interest at issue and the manner in which we examine statutes alleged to violate equal protection. As to the former, Congress would of course be entitled to advance the interest of ensuring an actual, meaningful relationship in every case before citizenship is conferred. Or Congress could excuse compliance with the formal requirements when an actual father-child relationship is proved. It did neither here, perhaps because of the subjectivity, intrusiveness, and difficulties of proof that might attend an inquiry into any particular bond or tie. Instead, Congress enacted an easily administered scheme to promote the different but still substantial interest of ensuring at least an opportunity for a parent-child relationship to develop. Petitioners’ argument confuses the means and ends of the equal protection inquiry; § 1409(a)(4) should not be invalidated because Congress elected to advance an interest that is less demanding to satisfy than some other alternative. Even if one conceives of the interest Congress pursues as the establishment of a real, practical relationship of considerable substance between parent and child in every case,. as opposed simply to ensuring the potential for the relationship to begin, petitioners’ misconception of the nature of the equal protection inquiry is fátal to their argument. A statute meets the equal protection standard we here apply so long as it is “‘“substantially related to the achievement of’”” the governmental objective in question. Virginia, supra, at 533 (quoting Hogan, 458 U. S., at 724, in turn quoting Wengler, 446 U. S., at 150). It is almost axiomatic that a policy which seeks to foster the opportunity for meaningful parent-child bonds to develop has a close and substantial bearing on the governmental interest in the actual formation of that bond. None of our gender-based classification equal protection cases have required that the statute under consideration must be capable of achieving its ultimate objective in every instance. In this difficult context of conferring citizenship on vast numbers of persons, the means adopted by Congress are in substantial furtherance of important governmental objectives. The fit between the means and the important end is “exceedingly persuasive.” See Virginia, supra, at 533. We have explained that an “exceedingly persuasive justification” is established “by showing at least that the classification serves • ‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’ are ‘substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’ ” Hogan, supra, at 724 (citations omitted). Section 1409 meets this standard. C In analyzing § 1409(a)(4), we are mindful that the obligation it imposes with respect to the acquisition of citizenship by the child of a citizen father is minimal. This circumstance shows that Congress has not erected inordinate and unnecessary hurdles to the conferral of citizenship on the children of citizen fathers in furthering its important objectives. Only the least onerous of the three options provided for in § 1409(a)(4) must be satisfied. If the child has been legitimated under the law of the relevant jurisdiction, that will be the end of the matter. See § 1409(a)(4)(A). In the alternative, a father who has not legitimated his child by formal means need only make a written acknowledgment of paternity under oath in order to transmit citizenship to his child, hardly a substantial burden. See § 1409(a)(4)(B). Or, the father could choose to obtain a court order of paternity. See § 1409(a)(4)(C). The statute can be satisfied on the day of birth, or the next day, or for the next 18 years. In this case, the unfortunate, even tragic, circumstance is that Boulais did not pursue, or perhaps did not know of, these simple steps and alternatives. Any omission, however, does not nullify the statutory scheme. Section 1409(a), moreover, is not the sole means by which the child of a citizen father can attain citizenship. An individual who fails to comply with § 1409(a), but who has substantial ties to the United States, can seek citizenship in his or her own right, rather than via reliance on ties to a citizen parent. See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. §§ 1423, 1427. This option now may be foreclosed to Nguyen, but any bar is due to the serious nature of his criminal offenses, not to an equal protection denial or to any supposed rigidity or harshness in the citizenship laws. IV The statutory scheme’s satisfaction of the equal protection scrutiny we apply to gender-based classifications constitutes a sufficient basis for upholding it. It should be noted, however, that, even were we to conclude that the statute did not meet this standard of review, petitioners would face additional obstacles before they could prevail. The INS urges that, irrespective of whether § 1409(a) is constitutional, the Court cannot grant the relief petitioners request: the conferral of citizenship on terms other than those specified by Congress. There may well be “potential problems with fashioning a remedy” were we to find the statute unconstitutional. See Miller, 523 U. S., at 451 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); cf. id., at 445, n. 26 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (declining to address the question whether the Court could confer the sought-after remedy). Two Members of today’s majority said in Miller that this argument was dispositive. See id., at 452-459 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). Petitioners ask us to invalidate and sever §§ 1409(a)(3) and (a)(4), but it must be remembered that severance is based on the assumption that Congress would have intended the result. See id., at 457 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (citing New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144 (1992)). In this regard, it is significant that, although the Immigration and Nationality Act contains a general severability provision, Congress expressly provided with respect to the very sub-chapter of the United States Code at issue and in a provision entitled “Sole procedure” that “[a] person may only be naturalized as a citizen of the United States in the manner and under the conditions prescribed in this subchapter and not otherwise.” 8 U. S. C. § 1421(d); see also Miller, supra, at 457-458 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Section 1421(d) refers to naturalization, which in turn is defined as “conferring of nationality of a state upon a person after birth.” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(23). Citizenship under § 1409(a) is retroactive to the date of birth, but it is a naturalization under § 1421(d) nevertheless. The conditions specified by § 1409(a) for conferral of citizenship, as a matter of definition, must take place after the child is born, in some instances taking as long as 18 years. Section 1409(a), then, is subject to the limitation imposed by § 1421(d). In light of our holding that there is no equal protection violation, we need not rely on this argument. For the same reason, we need not assess the implications of statements in our earlier cases regarding the wide deference afforded to Congress in the exercise of its immigration and naturalization power. See, e. g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U. S. 787, 792-793, and n. 4 (1977) (quoting Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 531 (1954)); 430 U. S., at 792 (quoting Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Stranakan, 214 U. S. 320, 339 (1909)). These arguments would have to be considered, however, were it to be determined that §1409 did not withstand conventional equal protection scrutiny. V To fail to acknowledge even our most basic biological differences — such as the fact that a mother must be present at birth but the father need not be — risks making the guarantee of equal protection superficial, and so disserv-ing it. Mechanistic classification of all our differences as stereotypes would operate to obscure those misconceptions and prejudices that are real. The distinction embodied in the statutory scheme here at issue is not marked by misconception and prejudice, nor does it show disrespect for either class. The difference between men and women in relation to the birth process is a real one, and the principle of equal protection does not forbid Congress to address the problem at hand in a manner specific to each gender. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

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BOEING CO. et al. v. UNITED STATES No. 01-1209. Argued December 9, 2002 Decided March 4, 2003 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined, post, p. 457. Kenneth S. Geller argued the cause for petitioners in No. 01-1209 and respondents in No. 01-1382. With him on the briefs were Charles Rothfeld, David M. Gossett, Alan I. Horowitz, Joel V. Williamson, Wayne S. Kaplan, Roger J. Jones, Patricia Anne Yurchak, Marjorie M. Margolies, and John B. Magee. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States in both cases. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General O’Connor, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, David English Carmack, and Frank P. Cihlar. Together with No. 01-1382, United States v. Boeing Sales Corp. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Caterpillar, Inc., et al. by C. David Swenson; for the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., by Stephen D. Gardner; and for the Tax Executives Institute, Inc., by Fred, F. Murray and Mary L. Fahey. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. This suit concerns tax provisions enacted by Congress in 1971 to provide incentives for domestic manufacturers to increase their exports and in 1984 to limit and modify those incentives. The specific question presented involves the interpretation of a Treasury Regulation (26 CFR § 1.861—8(e)(3) (1979)) promulgated in 1977 that governs the accounting for research and development (R&D) expenses under both statutory schemes. We shall explain the general outlines of the two statutes before we focus on that regulation. The 1971 statute provided special tax treatment for export sales made by an American manufacturer through a subsidiary that qualified as a “domestic international sales corporation” (DISC). The DISC itself is not a taxpayer; a portion of its income is deemed to have been distributed to its shareholders, and the shareholders must pay taxes on that portion, but no tax is payable on the DISC’S retained income until it is actually distributed. See 26 U. S. C. §§ 991-997. Typically, “a DISC is a wholly owned subsidiary of a U. S. corporation.” 1 Senate Finance Committee, Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98th Cong., p. 630, n. 1 (Comm. Print 1984) (hereinafter Committee Print). The statute thus provides an incentive to maximize the DISC’S share — and to minimize the parent’s share — of the parties’ aggregate income from export sales. The DISC statute does not, however, allow the parent simply to assign all of the profits on its export sales to the DISC. Rather, “to avoid granting undue tax advantages,” the statute provides three alternative ways in which the parties may divert a limited portion of taxable income from the parent to the DISC. See 26 U. S. C. §§994(a)(1)-(3). Each of the alternatives assumes that the parent has sold the product to the DISC at a hypothetical “transfer price” that produced a profit for both seller and buyer when the product was resold to the foreign customer. The alternative used by Boeing in this suit limited the DISC’S taxable income to a little over half of the parties’ “combined taxable income” (CTI). Soon after its enactment, the DISC statute became “the subject of an ongoing dispute between the United States and certain other signatories of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)” regarding whether the DISC provisions were impermissible subsidies that violated our treaty obligations. Committee Print 634. “To remove the DISC as a contentious issue and to avoid further disputes over retaliation, the United States made a commitment to the GATT Council on October 1, 1982, to propose legislation that would address the concerns of other GATT members.” Id., at 634-635. This ultimately resulted in the replacement of the DISC provisions in 1984 with the “foreign sales corporation” (FSC) provisions of the Code. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, §§801-805, 98 Stat. 985. Unlike a DISC, an FSC is a foreign corporation, and a portion of its income is taxable by the United States. See ibid.; see also B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders ¶ 17.14 (5th ed. 1987). Whereas a portion of a DISC’S income was tax deferred, a portion of an FSC’s income is exempted from taxation. Compare 26 U. S. C. §§991-997 with 26 U. S. C. §§921, 923 (1988 ed.). Hence, under the FSC regime, as under the DISC regime, it is in the parent’s interest to maximize the FSC’s share of the taxable income generated by export sales. Because the differences between the DISC and FSC regimes for the most part are immaterial to this suit, the analysis in this opinion will focus mainly on the DISC provisions. The Internal Revenue Code gives the taxpayer an election either to capitalize and amortize the costs of R&D over a period of years or to deduct such expenses currently. See 26 U. S. C. § 174. The regulation at issue here, 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979), deals with R&D expenditures for which the taxpayer has taken a current deduction. It tells the taxpaying parent and its DISC “what” must be treated as a cost when calculating CTI, and “how” those costs should be (a) allocated among different products and (b) apportioned between the DISC and its parent. With respect to the “what” question, the Treasury might have adopted a broad approach defining the relevant R&D as including all of the parent’s products, or a narrow approach defining the relevant R&D as all R&D directly related to a particular product being exported. Instead, the regulation includes a list of two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories (examples are “chemicals and allied products” and “transportation equipment”), and it requires that R&D for any product within the same category as the exported product be taken into account. See ibid. The regulation explains that R&D on any product “is an inherently speculative activity” that sometimes contributes unexpected benefits on other products, and “that the gross income derived from successful research and development must bear the cost of unsuccessful research and development.” Ibid. With respect to the two “how” questions, the regulations use gross receipts from sales as the basis both for allocating the costs among the products within the broad R&D categories and also for apportioning those costs between the parent and the DISC. Thus, if the exported product constitutes 20 percent of the parties’ total sales of all products within an R&D category, 20 percent of the R&D cost is allocated to that product. And if export sales represent 70 percent of the total sales of that product, 70 percent of that amount, or 14 percent of the R&D, is apportioned to the DISC. I Petitioners (and cross-respondents) are The Boeing Company and subsidiaries that include a DISC and an FSC. For over 40 years Boeing has been a world leader in commercial aircraft development and a major exporter of commercial aircraft. During the period at issue in this litigation, the dollar volume of its sales amounted to about $64 billion, 67 percent of which were DISC-eligible export sales. The amount that Boeing spent on R&D during that period amounted to approximately $4.6 billion. During the tax years at issue here, Boeing organized its internal operations along product lines (e. g., aircraft models 727, 737, 747, 767, 767) for management and accounting purposes, each of which constituted a separate “program” within the Boeing organization. For those purposes, it divided its R&D expenses into two broad categories: “Blue Sky” and “Company Sponsored Product Development.” The former includes the cost of broad-based research aimed at generally advancing the state of aviation technology and developing alternative designs of new commercial planes. The latter includes product-specific research pertaining to a specific program after the board of directors has given its approval for the production of a new model. With respect to its $1 billion of “Blue Sky” R&D, Boeing’s accounting was essentially consistent with 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979). Its method of accounting for $3.6 billion of “Company Sponsored” R&D gave rise to this litigation. Boeing’s accountants treated all of the Company Sponsored research costs as directly related to a single program, and as totally unrelated to any other program. Thus, for DISC purposes, the cost of Company Sponsored R&D directly related to the 767 model, for example, had no effect on the calculation of the “combined taxable income” produced by export sales of any other models. Moreover, because immense Company Sponsored research costs were routinely incurred while a particular model was being completed and before any sales of that model occurred, those costs effectively “disappeared” in the calculation of the CTI even for the model to which the R&D was most directly related. Almost half of the $3.6 billion of Company Sponsored R&D at issue in this suit was allocated to programs that had no sales in the year in which the research was conducted. That amount (approximately $1.75 billion) was deducted by Boeing currently in the calculation of its taxable income for the years at issue, but never affected the calculation of the CTI derived by Boeing and its DISC from export sales. Pursuant to an audit, the Internal Revenue Service reallocated Boeing’s Company Sponsored R&D costs for the years 1979 to 1987, thereby decreasing the untaxed profits of its export subsidiaries and increasing the parent’s taxable profits from export sales. Boeing paid the additional tax obligation of $419 million and filed this suit seeking a refund. Relying on the decision of the Eighth Circuit in St. Jude Medical, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 F. 3d 1394 (1994), the District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Boeing. It held that 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979) is invalid as applied to DISC and FSC transactions because the regulation’s categorical treatment of R&D conflicted with congressional intent that there be a “direct” relationship between items of gross income and expenses “related thereto,” and with a specific DISC regulation giving the taxpayer the right to group and allocate income and costs by product or product line. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, 258 F. 3d 958 (2001), and we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the Circuits, 535 U. S. 1094 (2002). We now affirm. II Section 861 of the Internal Revenue Code distinguishes between United States and foreign source income for several different purposes. See 26 U. S. C. § 861. The regulation at issue in this suit, 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979), was promulgated pursuant to that general statute. Separate regulations promulgated under the DISC statute, 26 U. S. C. §§ 991-997, incorporate 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979) by specific reference. See § 1.994-1(c)(6)(iii) (citing and incorporating the cost allocation rules of § 1.861-8). Boeing does not claim that its method of accounting for Company Sponsored R&D complied with § 1.861-8(e)(3). Rather, it argues that § 1.861-8(e)(3) is so plainly inconsistent with congressional intent and with other provisions of the DISC regulations that it cannot be validly applied to its computation of CTI for DISC purposes. Boeing argues, in essence, that the statute and certain specific regulations promulgated pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 994 give it an unqualified right to allocate its Company Sponsored R&D expenses to the specific products to which they are “factually related” and to exclude any allocated R&D from being treated as a cost of any other product. The relevant statutory text does not support its argument. As we have already mentioned, the DISC statute gives the taxpayer a choice of three methods of determining the transfer price for an exported good. Boeing elected to use only the second method described in the following text: “Inter-company pricing rules “(a) In general “In the case of a sale of export property to a DISC by a person described in section 482, the taxable income of such DISC and such person shall be based upon a transfer price which would allow such DISC to derive taxable income attributable to such sale (regardless of the sales price actually charged) in an amount which does not exceed the greatest of— “(1) 4 percent of the qualified export receipts on the sale of such property by the DISC plus 10 percent of the export promotion expenses of such DISC attributable to such receipts, “(2) 50 percent of the combined taxable income of such DISC and such person which is attributable to the qualified export receipts on such property derived as the result of a sale by the DISC plus 10 percent of the export promotion expenses of such DISC attributable to such receipts, or “(3) taxable income based upon the sale price actually charged (but subject to the rules provided in section 482). “(b) Rules for commissions, rentals, and marginal costing “The Secretary shall prescribe regulations setting forth “(2) rules for the allocation of expenditures in computing combined taxable income under subsection (a)(2) in those cases where a DISC is seeking to establish or maintain a market for export property.” 26 U. S. C. §§994(a)(1)(3), (b)(2) (emphasis added). The statute does not define the term “combined taxable income,” nor does it specifically mention expenditures for R&D. Congress did grant the Secretary express authority to prescribe regulations for determining the proper allocation of expenditures in computing CTI in certain specific contexts. See, e.g., §§ 994(b)(1)-(2). Yet in promulgating 26 CFR §1.861-8 (1979), the Secretary of the Treasury exercised his rulemaking authority under 26 U. S. C. § 7806(a), which gives the Secretary general authority to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement” of the Internal Revenue Code. See 41 Fed. Reg. 49160 (1976) (“The proposed regulations are to be issued under the authority contained in section 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code”). Even if we regard the challenged regulation as interpretive because it was promulgated under § 7805(a)’s general rulemaking grant rather than pursuant to a specific grant of authority, we must still treat the regulation with deference. See Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner, 499 U. S. 564, 560-561 (1991). The words that we have emphasized in the statutory text do place some limits on the Secretary’s interpretive authority. First, the “does not exceed” phrase places an upper limit on the share of the export profits that can be assigned to a DISC and also gives the taxpayer an unfettered right to select any of the three methods of setting a “transfer price.” Second, the use of the term “combined taxable income” in subsection (a)(2) makes it clear that the taxable income of the domestic parent is a part of the equation that should produce the CTI. As Boeing recognizes, even a charitable contribution to the Seattle Symphony that reduces its domestic earnings from sales of 767’s must be treated as a cost that is not definitely related to any particular category of income and thus must be apportioned among all categories of income, including income from export sales. See Brief for Petitioners in No. 01-1209, p. 8, n. 7. Third, the word “attributable” places a limit on the portion of the domestic parent’s taxable income that can be treated as a part of the CTI. It is this word that provides the statutory basis for Boeing’s position. Under Boeing’s reading of the statute, a calculation of the domestic income “attributable” to the export sale of a 767 may include both the direct and indirect costs of manufacturing and selling 767’s, but it may not include the direct costs of selling anything else. Moreover, if Boeing’s accountants classify a particular cost as directly related to the 767, that classification is conclusive. Thus, while the Secretary asserts that Boeing’s R&D expenses are definitely related to all income in the relevant SIC category, Boeing claims the right to divide its R&D in a way that effectively creates three segments: (1) Blue Sky; (2) Company Sponsored R&D on products that have no sales in the current year; and (3) Company Sponsored R&D on products that are being sold currently. Boeing, like the Secretary, essentially treats Blue Sky R&D as án indirect cost in computing both its domestic taxable income and its CTI. With respect to the second segment, Boeing uses the R&D to reduce its domestic taxable earnings on every product it sells, but eliminates it entirely from the calculation of CTI on any product by charging the R&D costs to programs without any sales. The third segment is used for both domestic and CTI purposes, but with respect to CTI only for the export sales to which it is “factually related.” The Secretary’s classification of all R&D as an indirect cost of all export sales of products in a broadly defined SIC category — in other words, as “attributable” to such sales — is surely not arbitrary. It has the virtue of providing consistent treatment for cost items used in computing the taxpayer’s domestic taxable income and its CTI. Moreover, its allocation of R&D expenditures to all products in a category even when specifically intended to improve only one or a few of those products is no more tenuous than the allocation of a chief executive officer’s salary to every product that a company sells even when he devotes virtually all of his time to the development of an Edsel. On the other hand, even if Boeing’s method of accounting for R&D is fully justified for management purposes, it certainly produces anomalies for tax purposes. Most obvious is the fact that it enabled Boeing to deduct some $1.75 billion of expenditures from its domestic taxable earnings under 26 U. S. C. § 174 and never deduct a penny of those expenditures from its “combined taxable earnings” under the DISC statute. See Brief for Petitioners in No. 01-1209, at 11. Less obvious, but nevertheless significant, is that Boeing’s method assumed that Blue Sky research produces benefits for airplane models that are producing current income and — at the same time — assumed that Company Sponsored research related to a specific product, such as the 727, is not likely to produce benefits for other airplane models, such as the 737 or 767. In all events, the mere use of the word “attributable” in the text of § 994 surely does not qualify the Secretary’s authority to decide whether a particular tax deductible expenditure made by the parent of a DISC is sufficiently related to its export sales to qualify as an indirect cost in the computation of the parties’ CTI. Boeing argues, however, that the text of § 994 should be read in light of § 861, the more general provision dealing with the distinction between domestic and foreign source income. Title 26 U. S. C. § 861(b) contains the following two sentences: “Taxable income from sources within United States “From the items of gross income specified in subsection (a) as being income from sources within the United States there shall be deducted the expenses, losses, and other deductions properly apportioned or allocated thereto and a ratable part of any expenses, losses, or other deductions which cannot definitely be allocated to some item or class of gross income. The remainder, if any, shall be included in full as taxable income from sources within the United States.” (Emphasis added.) Focusing on the emphasized words, Boeing interprets this section as having created a background rule dividing all expenses into two categories: those that can be allocated to specific income and those that cannot. “Ratable” allocation is permissible for the second category, but not for the first, according to Boeing. Moreover, in Boeing’s view, any expense in the first category cannot be ratably apportioned across all classes of income. There are at least two flaws in this argument. First, although the emphasized words authorize ratable apportionment of costs that cannot definitely be allocated to some item or class of income, the sentence as a whole does not prohibit ratable apportionment of expenses that could be, but perhaps in fairness should not be, treated as direct costs. Second, the Secretary has the authority to prescribe regulations determining whether an expense can be properly apportioned to an item of gross income in the calculation of CTI. See 26 U. S. C. § 7805(a). Thus, as in this suit, if the Secretary reasonably determines that Company Sponsored R&D can be properly apportioned on a categorical basis, the italicized portion of § 861 is simply inapplicable. In sum, Boeing’s arguments based on statutory text are plainly insufficient to overcome the deference to which the Secretary’s interpretation is entitled. III Boeing also advances two arguments based on the text of specific DISC regulations. The first resembles its argument based on the text of §861, and the second relies on regulations providing that certain accounting decisions made by the taxpayer shall be controlling. The regulations included in 26 CFR §1.994-1 (1979) set forth intercompany pricing rules for DISCs. They generally describe the three methods of determining a transfer price, noting that the taxpayer may choose the most favorable method, and may group transactions to use one method for some export sales and another method for others. See ibid. With respect to the CTI method used by Boeing, there is a rule, § 1.994 — 1(c)(6), that describes the computation of CTI. The rule broadly defines the CTI of a DISC and its related supplier from a sale of export property as the excess of gross receipts over their total costs “which relate to such gross receipts.” Subdivision (iii) of that rule, on which Boeing relies, provides: “Costs (other than cost of goods sold) which shall be treated as relating to gross receipts from sales of export property are (a) the expenses, losses, and other deductions definitely related, and therefore allocated and apportioned, thereto, and (b) a ratable part of any other expenses, losses, or other deductions which are not definitely related to a class of gross income, determined in a manner consistent with the rules set forth in § 1.861-8.” § 1.994-1(c)(6)(iii) (emphasis added). Boeing interprets the emphasized words as prohibiting a ratable allocation of R&D expenditures that can be “definitely related” to particular export sales. The obvious response to this argument is provided by the final words in the paragraph. Whether such an expense can be “definitely related” is determined by the rules set forth in the very regulation that Boeing challenges, §1.861-8. Moreover, it seems quite clear that the Secretary could reasonably determine that expenditures on 767 research conducted in years before any 767’s were sold were not “definitely related” to any sales, but should be treated as an indirect cost of producing the gross income derived from the sale of all planes in the transportation equipment category. Boeing also argues that the regulations expressly allow it to allocate and apportion R&D expenses to groups of export sales that are based on industry usage rather than SIC categories. The regulations providing the strongest support for this argument are §§ 1.994—1(c)(7)(i) and (ii)(a), which control the grouping of transactions for the purpose of determining the transfer price of sales of export property, and §1.994-1(c)(6)(iv), which governs the grouping of receipts when the CTI method of transfer pricing is used. Treasury Regulation § 1.994-1(c)(7) reads, in part, as follows: “Grouping transactions, (i) Generally, the determinations under this section are to be made on a transaction-by-transaction basis. However, at the annual choice of the taxpayer some or all of these determinations may be made on the basis of groups consisting of products or product lines. “(ii) A determination by a taxpayer as to a product or a product line will be accepted by a district director if such determination conforms to any one of the following standards: (a) A recognized industry or trade usage, or (b) the 2-digit major groups ... of the Standard Industrial Classification .. . .” As we understand the statutory and regulatory scheme, it gives controlling effect to three important choices by the taxpayer. First, the taxpayer may elect to deduct R&D expenses on an annual basis instead of capitalizing and amortizing those costs. See 26 U. S. C. § 174(a)(1). Second, when engaging in export transactions with a DISC, the taxpayer may choose any one of the three methods of determining the transfer price. See § 994(a). Third, the taxpayer may decide how best to group those transactions for purposes of applying the transfer pricing methods. See 26 CFR § 1.994-1(c)(7) (1979). Conceivably, the taxpayer could account for each sale separately, by product lines, or by grouping all of its export sales together. These regulations confirm the finality of the third type of choice (i. e., which groups of sales will be evaluated under one of the three alternative transfer pricing methods), but do not speak to the questions answered by the regulation at issue in this suit — namely, whether or how a particular research cost should be allocated and apportioned. Nor does § 1.994-1(c)(6)(iv) support Boeing’s argument. It provides that a “taxpayer’s choice in accordance with subparagraph (7) of this paragraph as to the grouping of transactions shall be controlling, and costs deductible in a taxable year shall be allocated and apportioned to the items or classes of gross income of such taxable year resulting from such grouping.” The regulation makes clear that if the taxpayer selects the CTI method of transfer pricing (as Boeing did), then the taxpayer may choose to group export receipts according to product lines, two-digit SIC codes, or on a transaction-by-transaction basis. Ibid. The regulation also establishes that there shall be an allocation and apportionment of all relevant costs deducted in the taxable year. Ibid. Notably, however, the regulation simply does not speak to how costs should be allocated among different items or classes of gross income and apportioned between the DISC and its parent once the taxpayer (pursuant to § 1.994-1(c)(6)) groups its gross receipts. Treasury Regulation § 1.861-8(e)(3) fills this gap by providing that R&D expenditures that are related to all income reasonably connected with the taxpayer’s relevant two-digit SIC category or categories are “allocable to all items of gross income as a class . . . related to such product category (or categories).” 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979) (emphasis added). IV Boeing also relies heavily on legislative history, particularly on statements in Reports prepared by the tax-writing committees of the House and the Senate on the DISC statute. Those Reports are virtually identical in terms of their discussion of the DISC provisions. See H. R. Rep., at 58-95; S. Rep., at 90-129. Neither says anything about R&D costs. They both contain statements supporting the proposition that in determining how to calculate income that qualifies for a tax benefit, the expenses to be deducted from gross income are those expenses that are “directly related” to the income. See H. R. Rep., at 74; S. Rep., at 107. Those statements are not, however, inconsistent with the proposition that particular R&D expenses may be factually related to more than one item of income, or with the proposition that the Secretary has broad authority to promulgate regulations determining which expenses are directly or indirectly related to particular items of income. If anything, what little relevant legislative history there is in this suit weighs in favor of the Government’s position in two important respects. First, whereas the DISC transfer price could be set at a level that attributed over half of the CTI to the DISC, when Congress enacted the FSC provisions in 1984, it lowered the maximum allowable share of CTI attributable to an FSC to 23 percent. Compare 26 U.S.C. §994(a)(2) with 26 U.S.C. §926(a)(2) (1988 ed.). This dramatizes the point that even though the purpose of the DISC and FSC statutes was to provide American firms with a tax incentive to increase their exports, Congress did not intend to grant “undue tax advantages” to firms. S. Rep., at 13. Rather, the statutory formulas were designed to place ceilings on the amount of those special tax benefits. See Committee Print 636 (“[T]he income of the foreign sales corporation must be determined according to transfer prices specified in the bill: either actual prices for sales between unrelated, independent parties or, if the sales are between related parties, formula prices which are intended to comply with GATT’s requirement of arm’s-length prices”). Second, the 1977 R&D regulation at issue in this suit had been in effect for seven years when Congress enacted the FSC provisions. Yet Congress did not legislatively override 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979) in enacting the FSC provisions. In fact, although a moratorium was placed on the application of § 1.861-8(e)(3) for purposes of the sourcing of income in 1981, a 1984 conference agreement specified that the moratorium would “not apply for other purposes, such as the computation of combined taxable income of a DISC (or FSC) and its related supplier.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 98-861, p. 1263 (1984). The fact that Congress did not legislatively override 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979) in enacting the FSC provisions in 1984 serves as persuasive evidence that Congress regarded that regulation as a correct implementation of its intent. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580-581 (1978). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. In 1996, the provisions of 26 CFR § 1.861-8 were amended, renumbered, and republished as 26 CFR §1.861-17. See 26 CFR §1.861-17 (2002); see also 60 Fed. Reg. 66503 (1995). To qualify as a DISC, at least 95 percent of a corporation’s gross receipts must arise from qualified export receipts. See 26 U. S. C. § 992(a)(1)(A). In addition, at least 95 percent of the corporation’s assets must be export related. See § 992(a)(1)(B). S. Rep. No. 92-437, p. 13 (1971) (hereinafter S. Rep.). To be more precise, it allowed the DISC “to derive taxable income attributable to [an export sale] in an amount which does not exceed ... 50 percent of the combined taxable income of [the DISC and the parent] plus 10 percent of the export promotion expenses of such DISC attributable to such receipts ....” 26 U. S. C. §994(a)(2). A hypothetical example in both the House and Senate Committee Reports illustrated the computation of a transfer price of $816 based on a DISC’S selling price of $1,000 and the parent’s cost of goods sold of $650. The gross margin of $350 was reduced by $180 (including the DISC’S promotion expenses of $90, the parent’s directly related selling and administrative expenses of $60, and the parent’s prorated indirect expenses of $30), to produce a CTI of $170. Half of that amount ($85) plus 10 percent of the DISC’s promotion expenses ($9) gave the DISC its allowable taxable income of $94, leaving only $76 of income immediately taxable to the parent. The $184 aggregate of the two amounts attributed to the DISC (promotion expenses of $90 plus its $94 share of CTI) subtracted from the $1,000 gross receipt produced the “transfer price” of $816. See S. Rep., at 108, n. 7; H. R. Rep. No. 92-533, p. 74, n. 7 (1971) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.). In 2000, Congress repealed and replaced the FSC provisions with the “extraterritorial income” exclusion of 26 U. S. C. § 114. Two aspects of the 1984 statute that do have special significance to this suit are discussed in Part IV, infra. Treasury Regulation § 1.861-8 (1979) also specifies how other specific items of expense should be treated. See, e. g., 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(2) (1979) (interest fees); § 1.861-8(e)(5) (legal and accounting fees); § 1.861-8(e)(6) (income taxes). The original regulation used two-digit SIC categories. See §1.861-8(e)(3). The current regulation uses narrower three-digit SIC categories, see 26 CFR § 1.861-17(a)(2)(ii) (2002), but the change is not relevant to this suit. Because all of Boeing’s commercial aircraft were “transportation equipment” within the meaning of the Treasury Regulation, it properly allocated all of its Blue Sky research among all of its programs, and then apportioned those costs between the parent and the DISC. However, according to the Government, it erroneously did so on the basis of hours of direct labor rather than sales. See Brief for United States 10. When Boeing charged R&D costs to programs that had no sales in the year the research was conducted, the R&D costs effectively “disappeared” in the sense that they were not accounted for by Boeing in computing its CTI. This assumption, of course, runs contrary to the Secretary’s determination that R&D “is an inherently speculative activity” that sometimes contributes unexpected benefits on other products. 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3)(i)(A) (1979). Treasury Regulation § 1.994 — 1(c)(6), 26 CFR § 1.994-1(c)(6) (1979), provides in part: “Combined taxable income. For purposes of this section, the combined taxable income of a DISC and its related supplier from a sale of export property is the excess of the gross receipts (as defined in section 993(f)) of the DISC from such sale over the total costs of the DISC and related supplier which relate to such gross receipts. Gross receipts from a sale do not include interest with respect to the sale. Combined taxable income under this paragraph shall be determined after taking into account under paragraph (e)(2) of this section all adjustments required by section 482 with respect to transactions to which such section is applicable. In determining the gross receipts of the DISC and the total costs of the DISC and related supplier which relate to such gross receipts, the following rules shall be applied: “(i) Subject to subdivisions (ii) through (v) of this subparagraph, the taxpayer’s method of accounting used in computing taxable income will be accepted for purposes of determining amounts and the taxable year for which items of income and expense (including depreciation) are taken into account. See § 1.991-1(b)(2) with respect to the method of accounting which may be used by a DISC.” In support of its argument that §§ 1.994-1(c) and 1.861-8(e)(3) conflict, Boeing also points to various proposed regulations, including example 1 of proposed regulation §1.861-8(g). See Brief for Petitioners in No. 01-1209, pp. 22-26. Unlike Boeing and the dissent, see post, at 458-459 (opinion of Thomas, J.), we find these proposed regulations to be of little consequence given that they were nothing more than mere proposals. In 1972 — when regulations governing DISCs were first proposed — the Secretary made clear that the proposed regulations were suggestions only and that whatever final regulations were ultimately adopted would govern. See Technical Memorandum accompanying Notice of Proposed Rule-making, 1972 T. M. Lexis 14, pp. *8-*9 (June 29, 1972) (providing that in determining deductible expenses, “the rules of section 861(b) and § 1.861-8 are to be applied in whatever form they ultimately take in a new notice to be prepared”). In 1981, Congress imposed a temporary moratorium on the application of the cost allocation rules of 26 CFR § 1.861-8(e)(3) (1979) solely for the geographic sourcing of income. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-34, §223, 95 Stat. 249. As a result, research expenditures made for research conducted in the United States were allocated against United States source gross income only — not between United States source income and foreign source income. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 98-861, p. 1262 (1984).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. SISSON No. 305. Argued January 20-21, 1970 Decided June 29, 1970 Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Wilson, Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., Beatrice Rosenberg, and Roger A. Pauley. John G. S. Flym argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by William G. Smith for the Los Angeles Selective Service Law Panel; by Norman Leonard for the Lawyers’ Selective Service Panel of San Francisco; by Joseph B. Robison for the American Jewish Congress; by Samuel Rabinove and George Berlstein for the American Jewish Committee; by Herman Schwartz, Marvin M. Karpatkin, and Melvin L. Wulf for the American Humanist Assn, et al.; by Leo Rosen, Edward S. Greenbaum, and Nancy F. Wechsler for the American Ethical Union, and by Frank P. Slaninger, pro se. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. The Government seeks to appeal to this Court a decision by a District Court in Massachusetts holding that appellee Sisson could not be criminally convicted for refusing induction into the Armed Forces. TheJDistrict Court’s opinion was bottomed on what that..court-understood to be Sisson’s rights of conscience as a nonreligious objector to the Vietnam war, but not wars in general, under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The District Court’s primary conclusion, reached after a full trial, was that the Constitution prohibited “the application of the 1967 draft act to Sisson to require him to render combat service in Vietnam” because as a “sincerely conscientious man,” Sisson’s interest in not killing in the Vietnam conflict outweighed “the country’s present need for him to be so employed,” 297 F. Supp. 902, 910 (1969). The District Court characterized its own decision as an arrest of judgment, and the Government seeks review here pursuant to the “arresting judgment” provision of the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3731, an Act that narrowly limits the Government’s right to appeal in criminal cases to certain types of decisions. On October 13, 1969, this Court entered an order postponing further consideration of the question of jurisdiction to the hearing of the case on the merits, 396 U. S. 812 (1969). For reasons that we elaborate in what follows, we conclude that the decision below, depending as it does on facts developed at Sisson’s trial, is not an arrest of judgment but instead is a directed acquittal. As such, it is not a decision that the Government can appeal. Consequently, this appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without our considering the merits of this case. We, of course, intimate no view concerning the correctness of the legal theory by which the District Court evaluated the facts developed at the trial. As a predicate for our conclusion that we have no jurisdiction to entertain the Government’s appeal, a full statement of the proceedings below is desirable. I A single-count indictment charged that Sisson "did unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully fail and neglect and refuse to perform a duty” imposed by the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 and its regulations, in violation of § 12 of the Act, 81 Stat. 105, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), because he failed to obey an order by his local draft board to submit to induction. Prior to trial, Sisson’s attorney moved to dismiss the indictment on three grounds. It was claimed that Sisson’s refusal to submit to induction was justified first, because “the government’s military involvement in Vietnam violates international law”; and, second, because Sisson “reasonably believed the government’s military involvement in Vietnam to be illegal.” As a third ground, Sisson claimed that the Selective Service Act and its regulations were unconstitutional (a) because the procedures followed by local boards lacked due process; and (b) because compulsory conscription during peacetime was unnecessary and stifled fundamental personal liberties. In support of the motion to dismiss, appellee stated: “At the time I refused to submit to induction into the armed forces I believed, as I believe today, that the United States military involvement in Vietnam is illegal under international law as well as under the Constitution and treaties of the United States. I believed then, and still believe, that my participation in that war would violate the spirit and the letter of the Nuremberg Charter. On the basis of my knowledge of that war, I could not participate in it without doing violence to the dictates of my conscience.” At the hearing on appellee’s motion to dismiss, the District Judge said that he had “an open mind” concerning appellee’s first and third grounds. However, the court said there was “nothing to” the second ground, noting that what “the defendant reasonably believes . . . cannot be raised in the way that you propose . . . because that does not appear on the face of the indictment.” (App. 49.) The District Court later amplified this conclusion by saying: “Point 2 is plainly premature because nobody can test the issue as to whether defendant reasonably believes the government’s military involvement in Vietnam is illegal without knowing what he reasonably believed, and what he believed is a question of evidence and not a question which appears on the face of the indictment.” (App. 52.) (Emphasis supplied.) Defense counsel did not dispute the District Court’s analysis, and noted that he had raised the issue in his motion to dismiss only “in the interest of economy,” because “[i]t was not clear at the time I filed the motion that the government would challenge this fact.” (App. 52.) The court expressed doubts concerning the Government’s willingness to concede this fact, and, when asked by the court, the government counsel specifically stated his opposition to the motion to dismiss. The court thereupon found the “second ground” of the motion to dismiss without merit. A short time after this hearing, the District Court issued two written opinions, 294 F. Supp. 511 and 515 (1968), that denied the other grounds of the motion to dismiss. After determining that appellee had the requisite standing to raise the issues involved, the court held that the political question doctrine foreclosed consideration of whether Congress could constitutionally draft for an undeclared war, or could order Sisson to fight in the allegedly “genocidal war.” An order accompanying the second pretrial opinion also dealt with various offers of proof that defense counsel had made in an informal letter to the court, not part of the record. From the order it appears that appellee’s counsel stated he would “offer evidence to show that [Sisson] properly refused to be inducted on the basis of his right of conscience, both statutory and constitutional.” Not understanding the scope of this rather ambiguous offer of proof, the District Court in its order ruled that if Sisson wished to make a conscientious objector claim based on religious objections not to wars in general but to the Vietnam war in particular, Sisson should make his offer of proof initially to the judge “to elicit a ruling whether the First Amendment precludes the Congress from requiring one who has religious conscientious objections to the Vietnam war to respond to the induction order he received. If the Court rules favorably to defendant on the Constitutional issue of law, then both defense and prosecution are entitled to submit to the trier of fact evidence relevant to the question whether defendant indeed is a religious conscientious objector to the Vietnam war.” 294 F. Supp., at 519. At the trial, however, it appears that defense counsel did not try to prove that Sisson should have received a conscientious objector exemption, nor did he request a ruling on the First Amendment issues referred to by the trial court. Instead it seems that the defense strategy was to prove that Sisson believed the Vietnam war to be illegal under domestic and international law, and that this belief was reasonable. If unable to get a direct adjudication of the legality of the war, the defense at least hoped to convince the jury that Sisson lacked the requisite intent to “wilfully” refuse induction. There was evidence submitted at the trial that did bear on the conscientious objector issue, however. When asked why he had refused induction, Sisson emphasized that he thought the war illegal. He also said that he felt the Vietnam war was “immoral,” “illegal,” and “unjust,” and went against “my principles and my best sense of what was right.” The court asked Sisson what the basis for his conclusions was, particularly what Sisson meant when he said the war was immoral. Sisson said that the war violated his feelings about (1) respect for human life, (2) value of man’s freedom, and (3) the scale of destruction and killing consonant with the stated purposes of American intervention. Sisson also stated, in response to the trial judge’s question, that his “moral values come from the same sources [the trial court had] mentioned, religious writings, philosophical beliefs.” The prosecution did not allow Sisson’s testimony to stand without cross-examination. In apparent reliance on the court’s pretrial ruling that Sisson’s beliefs concerning the war were irrelevant to the question of whether his refusal to submit to induction was wilful the government counsel concentrated on showing that Sisson had refused induction deliberately, of his own free will, and knowing the consequences. The prosecution also brought out that Sisson had failed to appeal his I-A classification when it had been issued, and that he had accepted, as an undergraduate, a II-S student classification. In the final arguments to the jury, just as in the opening statements, neither counsel mentioned a religious or nonreligious conscientious objector issue. The defense argued that the key to the case was whether Sisson had “wilfully” refused to submit to induction, and tried to suggest his beliefs about the war were relevant to this. The government lawyer simply pointed out the operative facts of Sisson’s refusal. He also attacked Sisson’s sincerity by pointing out the inconsistency between Sissons’ broad statements that he opposed deferments because they discriminated against the poor, see n. 2, supra, and his willingness to accept a II-S deferment while he was at Harvard College. (See App. 187-188.) The instructions to the jury made no reference to a conscientious objector claim, and the jury was not asked to find whether Sisson was “sincere” in his moral beliefs concerning the war. Instead the trial court told the jury that the crux of the case was whether Sisson’s refusal to submit to induction was “unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully” done, The jury, after deliberating about 20 minutes, brought in a verdict of guilty. After the trial, the defendant made a timely motion under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 34 to arrest the judgment on the ground that the District Court lacked jurisdiction. Pointing to the fact that the District Court had ruled before the trial that the political question doctrine prevented its consideration of defenses requiring an adjudication of the legality of the Vietnam war, the defense argued that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction under Article III and the Due Process Clause to try the defendant for an offense to which the illegality of the war might provide a defense. The District Court, in granting what it termed a motion in arrest of judgment, did not rule on the jurisdictional argument raised in the defense motion. Instead, the court ruled on what it termed defendant’s “older contention” that the indictment did not charge an offense based on defendant’s “never-abandoned” Establishment, Free Exercise, and Due Process Clause arguments relating to conscientious objections to the Vietnam war. The court first stated the facts of the case, in effect making findings essential to its decision. The opinion describes how Sisson’s demeanor on the stand convinced the court of his sincerity. The court stated that “Sisson’s table of ultimate values is moral and ethical. . . [and] reflects quite as real, pervasive, durable, and commendable a marshalling of priorities as a formal religion.” The critical finding for what followed was that: “What another derives from the discipline of a church, Sisson derives from the discipline of conscience. “. . . Sisson bore the burden of proving by objective evidence that he was sincere. He was as genuinely and profoundly governed by his conscience as would have been a martyr obedient to an orthodox religion.” 297 F. Supp., at 905. Building on these findings, the court first held that the Free Exercise and Due Process Clauses “prohibit the application of the 1967 draft act to Sisson to require him to render combat service in Vietnam” because as a “sincerely conscientious man,” Sisson’s interest in not killing in the Vietnam conflict outweighed “the country’s present need for him to be so employed.” The District Court also ruled that § 6 (j) of the Selective Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. §456 (j) (1964 ed., Supp. IV), offends the Establishment Clause because it “unconstitutionally discriminated against atheists, agnostics, and men, like Sisson, who, whether they be religious or not, are motivated in their objection to the draft by profound moral beliefs which constitute the central convictions of their beings.” 297 F. Supp., at 911. II The Government bases its claim that this Court has jurisdiction to review the District Court’s decision exclusively on the “arresting judgment” provision of the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3731 The relevant statutory language provides: “An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases in the following instances: “From a decision arresting a judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the indictment or information, where such decision is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment or information is founded/’ Thus, three requirements must be met for this Court to have jurisdiction under this provision. First, the decision of the District Court must be one “arresting a judgment of conviction.” Second, the arrest of judgment must be for the “insufficiency of the indictment or information.” And third, the decision must be “based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment or information is founded.” Because the District Court’s decision rests on facts not alleged in the indictment but instead inferred by the court from the evidence adduced at trial, we conclude that neither the first nor second requirement is met. A We begin with the first requirement: was the decision below one “arresting a judgment of conviction”? In using that phrase in the Criminal Appeals Act, Congress did not, of course, invent a new procedural classification. Instead, Congress acted against a common-law background that gave the statutory phrase a well-defined and limited meaning. An arrest of judgment was the technical term describing the act of a trial, judge refusing to enter judgment on the verdict because of an error appearing on the face of the record that rendered the judgment invalid. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *393; 3 H. Stephen, New Commentaries on the Laws of England 628 (1st Am. ed. 1845); 2 J. Bishop, New Criminal Procedure § 1285 (2d ed. 1913). For the purpose of this case the critical requirement is that a judgment can be arrested only on the basis of error appearing on the “face of the record,” and not on the basis of proof offered at trial. This requirement can be found in early English common-law cases. In Sutton v. Bishop, 4 Burr. 2283, 2287, 98 Eng. Rep. 191, 193 (K. B. 1769), it was stated: “[T]he Court ought not to arrest judgments upon matters not appearing upon the face of the record; but are to judge upon the record itself.” Once transported to the United States, this essential limitation of arrests of judgment was explicitly acknowledged by this Court. In United States v. Klintock, 5 Wheat. 144, 149 (1820), the Court stated that “judgment can be arrested only for errors apparent on the record.” And later in Bond v. Dustin, 112 U. S. 604 (1884), the Court said, “[A] motion in arrest of judgment can only be maintained for a defect apparent upon the face of the record, and the evidence is no part of the record for this purpose,” id., at 608. See Carter v. Bennett, 15 How. 354, 356-357 (1854); United States v. Norris, 281 U. S. 619 (1930). This venerable requirement of the common law has been preserved under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the courts have uniformly held that in granting a motion in arrest of judgment under Rule 34, a district court must not look beyond the face of the record. E. g., United States v. Zisblatt, 172 F. 2d 740 (C. A. 2d Cir.), appeal dismissed on Government’s motion, 336 U. S. 934 (1949); United States v. Lias, 173 F. 2d 685 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1949); United States v. Bradford, 194 F. 2d 197 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1952). See 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 571 (1969); 5 L. Orfield, Criminal Procedure Under the Federal Rules § 34:7 (1967). Therefore, whether we interpret the statutory phrase “decision arresting a judgment” as speaking “to the law, as it then was [in 1907] ... as it had come down from the past,” or do no more than interpret it as simply imposing the standards of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 34, a decision based on evidence adduced at trial cannot be one arresting judgment. The court below clearly went beyond the “face of the record” in reaching its decision. As noted earlier, the opinion explicitly relies upon the evidence adduced at the trial, including demeanor evidence, for its findings that Sisson was “sincere” and that he was “as genuinely and profoundly governed by his conscience” as a religious conscientious objector. To avoid the inescapable conclusion that the District Court's opinion was not an arrest of judgment, the Government makes two arguments. First, the Government suggests that these factual findings of the District Court, based on the evidence presented at trial, were not essential to its constitutional rulings, but instead only part of “the circumstantial framework” of the opinion below. (Jurisdictional Statement 9; see Brief 8.) This cannot withstand analysis, however, for the factual findings were absolutely essential, under the District Court’s own legal theory, to its disposition of the case. Without a finding that Sisson was sincerely and fundamentally opposed to participation in the Vietnam conflict, the District Court could not have ruled that under the Due Process and Free Exercise Clauses Sisson’s interest in not serving in Vietnam outweighed the Government’s need to draft him for such service. Second, the Government argues that even though the District Court made findings on evidence adduced at trial, the facts relied on were “undisputed.” Adopting the language used by the court below, the Government claims that “in substance the case arises upon an agreed statement of facts.” 297 F. Supp., at 904. The Government then goes on to argue that decisions of this Court have “recognized that a stipulation of facts by the parties in a criminal case” can be relied on by the District Court without affecting the jurisdiction for an appeal, citing United States v. Halseth, 342 U. S. 277 (1952), and United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U. S. 146 (1961). The Government then concludes that it would be exalting form over substance to hold there was no appeal in a case where the Government has not contested the facts, and yet allow an appeal to lie from a motion to dismiss resting upon a stipulation of the parties. Preliminarily, it should be noted that this Court has never held that an appeal lies from a decision which depends, not upon the sufficiency of the indictment alone, but also on a stipulation of the parties. In Halseth the parties did enter into a stipulation for purposes of a motion to dismiss. But the facts in the stipulation were irrelevant to the legal issue of whether the federal anti-lottery statute reached a game not yet in existence. Therefore, neither the District Court in dismissing the indictment, nor this Court in affirming its decision, had to rely on the stipulation. And, for purposes of deciding whether jurisdiction for an appeal under § 3731 existed, the Court obviously did not have to decide — and it did not discuss — whether reliance on a stipulation would make any difference. Insofar as United States v. Fruehauf, supra, the other case cited by the Government, is relevant at all it seems to point away from the Government’s contention. In Fruehauj this Court refused to consider the merits of an appeal under § 3731 from a District Court decision dismissing an indictment on the basis of a “ ‘judicial admission’ culled from a pretrial memorandum” of the Government by the District Judge. Rather than penalizing the Government by dismissing the appeal, however, the Court simply exercised its discretion under 28 U. S. C. § 2106 by setting aside the ruling below, and remanding the case for a new trial on the existing indictment. Not only do the cases cited by the Government fail to establish its contention, but other authority points strongly in the opposite direction. In United States v. Norris, 281 U. S. 619 (1930), this Court said that a “stipulation was ineffective to import an issue as to the sufficiency of the indictment, or an issue of fact upon the question of guilt or innocence,” because of “the rule that nothing can be added to an indictment without the concurrence of the grand jury,” id., at 622. While it is true that Norris is complicated by the fact that the defendant had entered a guilty plea, the Court said that even “[i]f [the stipulation had been] filed before plea and [had been] given effect, such a stipulation would oust the jurisdiction of the court,” id., at 622-623. Norris, together with the policy, often expressed by this Court, that the Criminal Appeals Act should be strictly construed against the Government’s right to appeal, see, e. g., United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 192 (1939), makes it at least very doubtful whether the parties should, on the basis of a stipulation, be able to secure review under the motion-in-arrest provisions of § 3731. We do not decide that issue, however, for there was nothing even approaching a stipulation here. Before the court’s final ruling below, the parties did not in any way, formally or informally, agree on the factual findings made in its opinion. It is relevant to recall that before the trial the government attorney specifically refused to stipulate whether Sisson sincerely believed the war to be illegal, and, if so, whether such a belief was reasonable. Moreover, given that the government attorney cross-examined Sisson, and later pointed out the inconsistency between Sisson’s acceptance of a II-S student deferment and his claim that he disapproved of deferments as unfair, it hardly seems the Government accepted Sisson’s sincerity insofar as it was an issue in the case. Therefore, far from being like a case with a formal stipulation between the parties, the most that can be said is that after the District Court’s decision the Government chose to accept the opinion’s findings of fact. Even assuming reliance on a formal stipulation were permissible, it would still be intolerable to allow direct review whenever the District Court labels its decision a motion in arrest, and the Government merely accepts the lower court’s factual findings made after a trial — for this would mean the parties and the lower court simply could foist jurisdiction upon this Court. B The second statutory requirement, that the decision arresting judgment be “for insufficiency of the indict-meht,” is also not met in this case. Senator Nelson, one of the sponsors of the Criminal Appeals Act, made it plain during the debates that this second element was an important limitation. He said: “The arrest of judgment ... on which an appeal lies, is not a general motion covering all the grounds on which a judgment may be arrested. It is simply for arrest of judgment because of the insufficiency of the indictment — that is, the failure of the indictment to charge a criminal offense.” 41 Cong. Rec. 2756. (Emphasis supplied.) See also 40 Cong. Rec. 9033. Although the District Court’s opinion recites as a conclusion that the indictment in this case did “not charge an offense” for purposes of Rule 34, surely the indictment alleged the necessary elements of an offense. The decision below rests on affirmative defenses which the court thought Sisson could claim because of his beliefs. It has never been thought that an indictment, in order to be sufficient, need anticipate affirmative defenses, United States v. Fargas, 267 F. Supp. 452, 455 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1967) (“Any questions as to the validity of the local board’s refusal to grant conscientious objector exemption are matters of defense . . . [that] [t]here is no necessity for the indictment to negate . . Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, the correctness of the District Court’s constitutional theory that sincere nonreligious objectors to particular wars have a constitutional privilege that bars conviction, the facts essential to Sisson’s claim of this privilege do not appear from any recitals in the indictment. As the District Court itself said before trial, “[W]hat [Sisson] believed is a question of evidence and not a question which appears on the face of the indictment.” (App. 52.) In short, this indictment cannot be taken as insufficient for, on the one hand, it recites the necessary elements of an offense, and on the other hand, it does not allege facts that themselves demonstrate the availability of a constitutional privilege. C The same reason underlying our conclusion that this was not a decision arresting judgment — i.e., that the disposition is bottomed on factual conclusions not found in the indictment but instead made on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial — convinces us that the decision was in fact an acquittal rendered by the trial court after the jury’s verdict of guilty. For purposes of analysis it is helpful to compare this case to one in which a jury was instructed as follows: “If you find defendant Sisson to be sincere, and if you find that he was as genuinely and profoundly governed by conscience as a martyr obedient to an orthodox religion, you must acquit him because the government’s interest in having him serve in Vietnam is outweighed by his interest in obeying the dictates of his conscience. On the other hand, if you do not so find, you must convict if you find that petitioner did wilfully refuse induction.” If a jury had been so instructed, there can be no doubt that its verdict of acquittal could not be appealed under § 3731 no matter how erroneous the constitutional theory underlying the instructions. As Senator Knox said of the bill that was to become the Criminal Appeals Act: “Mark this: It is not proposed to give the Government any appeal under any circumstances when the defendant is acquitted for any error whatever committed by the court. “The Government takes the risks of all the mistakes of its prosecuting officers and of the trial judge in the trial, and it is only proposed to give it an appeal upon questions of law raised by the defendant to defeat the trial and if it defeats the trial. “The defendant gets the benefit of all errors in the trial which are in his favor, and can challenge all errors in the trial which are against him.” 41 Cong. Rec. 2752. Quite apart from the statute, it is, of course, well settled that an acquittal can “not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [the defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution. ... [I]n this country a verdict of acquittal, although not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offence,” United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 671 (1896). There are three differences between the hypothetical case just suggested and the case at hand. First, in this case it was the judge — not the jury — who made the factual determinations. This difference alone does not support a legal distinction, however, for judges, like juries, can acquit defendants, see Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29. Second, the judge in this case made his decision after the jury had brought in a verdict of guilty. Rules 29 (b) and (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, expressly allow a federal judge to acquit a criminal defendant after the jury “returns a verdict of guilty.” And third, in this case the District Judge labeled his post-verdict opinion an arrest of judgment, not an acquittal. This characterization alone, however, neither confers jurisdiction on this Court, see n. 7, supra, nor makes the opinion any less dependent upon evidence adduced at the trial. In short, we see no distinction between what the court below did, and a post-verdict directed acquittal. rH i — I h-i The dissenting opinions of both The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice White suggest that we are too niggardly-in our interpretation of the Criminal Appeals Act, and each contends that the Act should be more broadly construed to give effect to an underlying policy that is said to favor review. This Court has frequently stated that the “exceptional right of appeal given to the Government by the Criminal Appeals Act is strictly limited to the instances specified,” United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 192 (1939), and that such appeals “are something unusual, exceptional, not favored,” Carroll v. United States, 354 U. S. 394, 400 (1957); see United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, 399 (1908); United States v. Dickinson, 213 U. S. 92, 103 (1909); cf. Will v. United States, 389 U. S. 90, 96 (1967). The approach suggested by our Brothers seems inconsistent with these notions. Moreover, the background and legislative history of the Criminal Appeals Act demonstrate the compromise origins of the Act that justify the principle of strict construction this Court has always said should be placed on its provisions. Because the Criminal Appeals Act, now 18 U. S. C. §3731 (1964 ed., Supp. IV), has descended unchanged in substance from the original Criminal Appeals Act, which was enacted on March 2, 1907, 34 Stat. 1246, the crucial focus for this inquiry must be the legislative history of the 1907 Act. A Beginning in 1892 — 15 years before the enactment of the Criminal Appeals Act — the Attorneys General of the United States regularly recommended passage of legislation allowing the Government to appeal in criminal cases. Their primary purpose was perhaps best expressed by Attorney General Miller in his 1892 report: “As the law now stands ... it is in the power of a single district judge, by quashing an indictment, to defeat any criminal prosecution instituted by the Government.” There was no progress, however, until President Theodore Roosevelt, outraged by a decision of Judge Humphrey preventing the prosecution of the Beef Trust, made this proposed reform into a “major political issue,” and demanded the enactment of legislation in his 1906 annual message to Congress. The House, as one commentator has written, “was obedient to the presidential command.” It passed, without debate, a very broad bill giving the Government the same right to appeal legal issues decided adversely to it as had earlier been accorded a criminal defendant. The Senate would not accept any such sweeping change of the traditional common-law rule giving the Government no appeal at all. The substitute bill that the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out narrowed the House bill substantially, and limited the Government's right to appeal to writs of error from decisions (1) quashing an indictment or sustaining a demurrer to an indictment; (2) arresting judgment of conviction because of the insufficiency of the indictment; and (3) sustaining special pleas in bar when the defendant had not been put in jeopardy. Even as narrowed, the bill met opposition on the floor, and the session closed without Senate action. The next session, after the bill was again reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, it was debated for three days on the floor and again met strong opposition. Reflecting the deep concern that the legislation not jeopardize interests of defendants whose cases were appealed by the Government, amendments were adopted requiring the Government to appeal within 30 days and to prosecute its cases with diligence; and allowing defendants whose eases were appealed to be released on their own recognizance in the discretion of the presiding judge. Various Senators were particularly concerned lest there be any possibility that a defendant who had already been through one trial be subjected to another trial after a successful appeal by the Government. In response to this concern, an amendment was then adopted requiring that a verdict in favor of the defendant not be set aside on appeal no matter how erroneous the legal theory upon which it might be based. For these purposes, it was made plain that it made no difference whether the verdict be the result of the jury’s decision or that of the judge. Moreover, as we explore in more detail later, the debates suggest that apart from decisions arresting judgment, there were to be no appeals taken in any case in which jeopardy had attached by the impaneling of the jury. Finally, to limit further the scope of the Act to cases of public importance, the Government’s right to appeal (under all but the special plea in bar provision) was confined to cases in which the ground of the District Court’s decision was the “invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded.” With all these amendments the Senate passed the bill without division on February 13, 1907, but the House, after referring the Senate’s version to its Judiciary Committee, disagreed with the Senate bill and proposed a conference. The conference committee, apart from divesting the courts of appeals of jurisdiction to hear any government appeals, adopted the Senate version of the bill with merely formal changes. Both the Senate and the House approved the bill reported out by the committee and with the President’s signature the Criminal Appeals Act became law. B With this perspective, we now examine the arguments made in opposition to our conclusion. It is argued in dissent that § 3731 “contemplates that an arrest of judgment is appropriate in other than a closed category of cases defined by legal history,” and concludes that “evidence adduced at trial can be considered by a district court as the basis for a motion in arrest of judgment when that evidence is used solely for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of the charging statute as applied,” post, at 314 (dissenting opinion of The Chief Justice). The dissenters propose in effect to create a new procedure — label it a decision arresting judgment — in order to conclude that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal by the Government. The statutory phrase “decision arresting a judgment” is not an empty vessel into which this Court is free to pour a vintage that we think better suits present-day tastes. As we have shown, Congress defined our jurisdiction in the Criminal Appeals Act in terms of procedures existing in 1907. As a matter of interpretation, this Court has no right to give the statutory language a meaning inconsistent with its common-law antecedents, and alien to the limitations that today govern motions in arrest of judgment under Rule 34. Radical reinterpretations of the statutory phrase “decision arresting a judgment” are said to be necessary in order to effectuate a broad policy, found to be underlying the Criminal Appeals Act, that this Court review important legal issues. The axiom that courts should endeavor to give statutory language that meaning that nurtures the policies underlying legislation is one that guides us when circumstances not plainly covered by the terms of a statute are subsumed by the underlying policies to which Congress was committed. Care must be taken, however, to respect the limits up to which Congress was prepared to enact a particular policy, especially when the boundaries of a statute are drawn as a compromise resulting from the countervailing pressures of other policies. Our disagreeing Brothers, in seeking to energize the congressional commitment to review, ignore the subtlety of the compromise that limited our jurisdiction, thereby garnering the votes necessary to enact the Criminal Appeals Act. In this regard, the legislative history reveals a strong current of congressional solicitude for the plight of a criminal defendant exposed to additional expense and anxiety by a government appeal and the incumbent possibility of multiple trials. Criminal appeals by the Government “always threaten to offend the policies behind the double-jeopardy prohibition,” Will v. United States, supra, at 96, even in circumstances where the Constitution itself does not bar retrial. Out of a collision between this policy concern, and the competing policy favoring review, Congress enacted a bill that fully satisfied neither the Government nor the bill’s opponents. For the Criminal Appeals Act, thus born of compromise, manifested a congressional policy to provide review in certain instances but no less a congressional policy to restrict it to the enumerated circumstances. Were we to throw overboard the ballast provided by the statute’s language and legislative history, we would cast ourselves adrift, blind to the risks of collision with other policies that are the buoys marking the safely navigable zone of our jurisdiction. As we have shown, what the District Court did in this case cannot be distinguished from a post-verdict acquittal entered on the ground that the Government did not present evidence sufficient to prove that Sisson was insincere. A primary concern of the bill that emerged into law was that no appeal be taken by the Government from an acquittal no matter how erroneous the legal theory underlying the decision. Moreover, going beyond the present case, the theory of those in disagreement would allow a trial judge to reserve to himself the resolution of disputes concerning facts underlying a claim that in particular circumstances a speech or protest march were privileged under the First Amendment, a practice plainly inconsistent with a criminal defendant’s jury trial rights. C Quite apart from the arresting judgment provision, it is also argued that we have jurisdiction under the “motion in bar” provision of the Criminal Appeals Act. We think it appropriate to address ourselves to this contention, particularly in light of the fact that we asked the parties to brief that issue, even though our holding that the decision below was an acquittal is sufficient to dispose of the case. The case law under the motion-in-bar provision is very confused, and this Court has not settled on a general approach to be taken in interpreting this provision. Even under the most expansive view, however, a motion in bar cannot be granted on the basis of facts that would necessarily be tried with the general issue in the case. In this case, there can be no doubt that the District Court based its findings on evidence presented in the trial of the general issue. As we have shown earlier, the court’s findings were based on Sisson’s testimony and demeanor at the trial itself. Moreover, a defense based on Sisson’s asserted constitutional privilege not to be required to fight in a particular war would, we think, necessarily be part of the “general issue” of a suit over a registrant’s refusal to submit to induction. As The Chief Justice says in his dissenting opinion, “establishing the appropriate classification is actually an element of the Government’s case,” post, at 324, once a defendant raises a defense challenging it. We think a defense to a pre-induction suit based on conscientious objections that require factual determinations is so intertwined with the general issue that it must be tried with the general issue, United States v. Fargas, 267 F. Supp. 462, 455 (1967) (pretrial motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b) (1) on the basis of an affidavit, denied because “the validity of the [conscientious objector] defense which Fargas now raises . .. will require the consideration of factual questions which are embraced in the general issue”); see United States v. Ramos, 413 F. 2d 743, 744 n. 1 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1969) (evidentiary hearing for pretrial motion to dismiss indictment not appropriate means to consider validity of defense based on conscientious objection because “[questions regarding the validity of appellant’s classification should have been raised as a defense at the trial,” citing Fargas with approval). There is, in our view, still another reason no appeal can lie in this case under the motion-in-bar provision. We construe the Criminal Appeals Act as confining the Government’s right to appeal — except for motions in arrest of judgment — to situations in which a jury has not been impaneled, even though there are cases in which a defendant might constitutionally be retried if appeals were allowed after jeopardy had attached. Because the court below rendered its decision here after the trial began, and because that decision was not, as we have shown, an arrest of judgment, we therefore conclude there can be no appeal under the other provisions of § 3731. We reach this conclusion for several reasons. Eirst, although the legislative history is far from clear, we think it was the congressional expectation that except for motions in arrest — which as we have shown could never be based on evidence adduced at trial — the rulings to which the bill related would occur before the trial began. The language of the motion-in-bar provision itself limits appeals to those granted “when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.” We read that limitation to mean exactly what it says — i. e., no appeal from a motion in bar is to be granted after jeopardy attaches. Although the legislative history shows much disagreement and confusion concerning the meaning of the constitutional prohibition against subjecting a defendant to double jeopardy there was little dispute over the then-settled notion that a defendant was put into jeopardy once the jury was sworn. To read this limitation as no more than a restatement of the constitutional prohibition, as suggested by Mr. Justice White, renders it completely superfluous. No Senator thought that Congress had the power under the Constitution to provide for an appeal in circumstances in which that would violate the Constitution. Our conclusion draws strength from the fact that the Government itself has placed exactly this same interpretation on the Act. The Department of Justice, the agency for whose benefit the original bill was enacted, first placed this construction on the statute shortly after the bill was enacted, and has consistently abided by it in the more than 60 years that have since passed. As the Solicitor General stated in his brief: “The Department of Justice has consistently taken the view that the plea in bar section limits the government’s right of appeal to the granting of such pleas before a jury has been sworn. Soon after passage of the original Act, the 1907 Report of the Attorney General urged that the omission in the Act of a governmental right to appeal from post-jeopardy rulings be remedied by revising the Act so as to require counsel for the defendant to raise and argue questions of law prior to the time when jeopardy attached,” Brief 17. Later, after describing the opinion in Zisblatt, supra, in which the Second Circuit certified an appeal to this Court to determine whether the phrase “not been put in jeopardy” merely incorporated the constitutional limitation, or instead should be taken literally, the Government’s brief states: “The then Solicitor General, being of the view that the statute barred appeals from the granting of motions in bar after jeopardy had attached, moved to dismiss the appeal, and the appeal was dismissed (336 U. S. 934). The Department of Justice has thereafter adhered to that position, and the government has never sought to appeal in these circumstances.” This interpretation in our view deserves great weight. In light of (1) the compromise origins of the statute, (2) the concern with which some Senators viewed the retrial of any defendant whose trial terminated after the jury was impaneled, and (3) the interpretation placed on the Act shortly after its passage that has been consistently followed for more than 60 years by the Government, we think that the correct course is to construe the statute to provide a clear, easily administered test: except for decisions arresting judgment, there can be no government appeals from decisions rendered after the trial begins. IV Clarity is to be desired in any statute, but in matters of jurisdiction it is especially important. Otherwise the courts and the parties must expend great energy, not on the merits of dispute settlement, but on simply deciding whether a court has the power to hear a case. When judged in these terms, the Criminal Appeals Act is a failure. Born of compromise, and reflecting no coherent allocation of appellate responsibility, the Criminal Appeals Act proved a most unruly child that has not improved with age. The statute’s roots are grounded in pleading distinctions that existed at common law but which, in most instances, fail to coincide with the procedural categories of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Not only does the statute create uncertainty by its requirement that one analyze the nature of the decision of the District Court in order to determine whether it falls within the class of common-law distinctions for which an appeal is authorized, but it has also engendered confusion over the court to which an appeal-able decision should be brought. The Solicitor General, at oral argument in this case, forthrightly stated that “there are few problems which occur so frequently or present such extreme technical difficulty in the Solicitor General’s office [as] in the proper construction of the Criminal Appeals Act.” We share his dissatisfaction with this statute. Nevertheless, until such time as Congress decides to amend the statute, this Court must abide by the limitations imposed by this awkward and ancient Act. We conclude that the appeal in this case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. R & g0 onW- Mr. Justice Black concurs in the judgment of the Court and Part IIC of the opinion. Mr. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Mr. Justice Black joins only Part IIC of this opinion. Mr. Justice BrenNAN, Mr. Justice Stewart, and Mr. Justice Marshall join the entire opinion. We have today granted certiorari in Gillette v. United States (No. 1170), and Negre v. Larsen (No. 1669, Misc.), in order to consider the “selective” conscientious objector issue that underlies the case now before us but which we cannot reach because of our conclusion that we have no jurisdiction to entertain this direct appeal. Not only did the defense itself avoid advancing any theory or proof that Sisson deserved conscientious objector status, but there are even indications that the defense purposely attempted to keep the issue out of the case. For example, at one point in the trial the Marine officer who called Sisson for induction stated that Sisson had told him at the time that he was refusing induction because of religious belief, and his “conscientious objector status.” (App. 143.) Later, when questioned by his own counsel, Sisson not only denied having the conversation with the officer but also stated that he had never applied for C. 0. status (1) because he could not honestly claim “conscientious objection to war in any form as it is put on the Form 150”; and (2) because he believed “the system of exemptions and deferments [to be] unequal and [to discriminate] against those who do not have education ... or money.” Sisson stated flatly that he therefore “could not accept such deferment.” (App. 147-150.) Among the various offers of proof made by Sisson’s attorney before the trial was one to show that Sisson “reasonably believed the Vietnam war to be illegal,” and that he therefore lacked the requisite intent to “wilfully” refuse induction. In the pretrial order, the trial judge ruled that: “ ‘Wilfully’ as used in the indictment means intentionally, deliberately, voluntarily. If the Government proves defendant intentionally refused to comply with an order of his draft board, in accordance with the statute, to submit to induction, it is not open to defendant to offer as an excuse that he regarded the war as illegal, that is, contrary to either domestic Constitutional law or international law .... [I]n a prosecution for wilfully refusing to obey an induction order, evidence with respect to belief is admissible only to the extent it bears upon the issue of intent, as distinguished from motive or good faith.” 294 F. Supp., at 619. The key instruction was given as follows: “The only question which as a matter of law a Jury has a right to consider is whether the defendant if he failed to perform an act required under the statute and regulations was acting knowingly in the sense of with mental awareness, [and] wilfully in the sense of intentionally and with free choice. “He may have all the views he likes of a political, ethical, religious or legal nature. They may be as reasonable as sometimes dissents of the Supreme Court are reasonable and sometimes the majority Opinions are reasonable, but as long as the law stands as it now stands his motivation, his good faith and the like are not in the least relevant to the question whether he is guilty or not.” (App. 193.) Defendant first submitted a motion in arrest of judgment March 26 — five days after the trial. Two days later he substituted an amended motion in arrest “in lieu of” his original motion. This first amended motion differed only in detail from the original. Both were based on the jurisdictional argument described in the text and neither made any claim based on the Establishment or Free Exercise Clause. The District Court was apparently referring to Sisson's pretrial “offer [of] evidence” with reference to Sisson's “right of conscience.” See supra, at 273; 294 F. Supp., at 519. It does not appear that any contention based on Sisson’s right of conscience was raised at trial, or made in the motion to arrest judgment, see supra, n. 5. Possibly in recognition of this, the District Court noted in its opinion that “[i]t would have been better practice” for Sisson’s attorney to have made “a more detailed reference” in his motion in arrest to his “earlier” arguments. The court stated that “[n]o doubt, defendant will seasonably make his motion in arrest even clearer.” On April 3 — two days after the District Court’s decision— Sisson’s attorney moved to amend his motion in arrest to make the requested grounds conform with those already stated in the opinion. The District Court granted this motion to amend nunc pro tunc as of April 1 — the date of its opinion. Because we conclude that the District Court’s decision was not in fact one arresting judgment, see infra, we have no occasion to decide whether the District Court incorrectly characterized these issues as having been raised by the defendant, and if so, whether the 1966 amendment to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 34, requiring that a motion in arrest of judgment be granted “on motion of a defendant,” precludes a district court from granting such a motion on an issue not raised by the defendant’s motion. For the text, see n. 20, infra. It should be noted that at the conclusion of his opinion,, the District Judge stated that he was granting the motion in arrest because “[i]n the words of Rule 34, the indictment of Sisson ‘does not charge an offense.’ ” He then stated in eonclusory terms that his decision was one “ ‘arresting a judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the indictment . . . [which] is based upon the invalidity .. . of the statute upon which the indictment ... is founded’ ” for purposes of 18 U. S. C. § 3731, and that the Government could therefore take a direct appeal to this Court. The label attached by the District Court to its own opinion does not, of course, decide for us the jurisdictional issue, however. “We must be guided in determining the question of appealability of the trial court’s action not by the name the court gave [its decision] but by what in legal effect it actually was,” United States v. Waters, 84 U. S. App. D. C. 127, 128, 175 F. 2d 340, 341, appeal dismissed on Government’s motion, 335 U. S. 869 (1948); United States v. Zisblatt, 172 F. 2d 740, 742 (C. A. 2d Cir.), appeal dismissed on Government’s motion, 336 U. S. 934 (1949); see United States v. Hark, 320 U. S. 531, 536 (1944); United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251, 254 (1966). Although all three conditions must be met for the Government to appeal a case directly to this Court, as long as the first requirement is met the Government can appeal to a Court of Appeals under a separate provision of §3731 allowing an appeal “[f]rom a decision arresting a judgment of conviction except where a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States is provided It is arguable that the third requirement is not met since the District Court’s decision was not “based upon the invalidity or construction” of 50 U. S. C. App. §462 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV)— the statutory provision “upon which the indictment ... is founded.” As a matter of sound construction, however, “statute upon which the indictment ... is founded” should be read to include the entire statute, and not simply the penalty provisions. See United States v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 252 F. 2d 420 (C. A. 1st Cir.), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 356 U. S. 925 (1958); cf. United States v. Mersky, 361 U. S. 431 (1960); see also Friedenthal, Government Appeals in Federal Criminal Cases, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 71, 75 (1959). In early days the “face of the record” simply included the material found on the “judgment roll.” See United States v. Zisblatt, 172 F. 2d, at 742. In a criminal case today it has been thought to include “no more than the indictment, the plea, the verdict . . . and the sentence.” United States v. Bradford, 194 F. 2d 197, 201 (C. A. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U. S. 979 (1952). This Court first recognized the existence of motions in arrest of judgment in United States v. Cantril, 4 Cranch 167 (1807). Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 34 provides: “The court on motion of a defendant shall arrest judgment if the indictment or information does not charge an offense or if the court was without jurisdiction of the offense charged. The motion in arrest of judgment shall be made within 7 days after verdict or finding of guilty, or after plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-dav period.” United States v. Zisblatt, supra, at 742. United States v. Lias, supra, at 687. None of the cases relied on by the Government even hints that evidence presented at the trial can be the basis for a motion in arrest of judgment. In United States v. Green, 350 U. S. 415 (1956), there was no disagreement between the majority and dissenters on the rule that direct review is impossible if the decision below is based upon facts arising from the trial. Instead the majority and dissent simply disagreed as to whether the District Court’s decision had relied on evidence at the trial. Compare the majority opinion, 350 U. S., at 418 and 421, with the dissent, 350 U. S., at 421. In United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503 (1955), also cited by the Government, the indictment specified that the appellee had made a fraudulent claim against the Disbursing Office of the House of Representatives in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001 which forbids the willful falsification of any material statement “in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.” The District Court arrested judgment on the ground that the House Disbursing Office was not a “department or agency” for purposes of the statute, and on appeal this Court reversed. Neither the District Court nor this Court relied in any way upon the evidence submitted at the trial in determining the scope of the statutory phrase “department or agency” found in 18 U. S. C. § 1001. Finally, the Government refers to United States v. Waters, 84 U. S. App. D. C. 127, 175 F. 2d 340 (1948). In that case the District Court held an indictment did not charge an offense because it alleged only that the appellee was carrying a gun, and not that he was carrying a gun without a license. However, the District Court called its opinion the grant of a motion of acquittal. The United States appealed to the Court of Appeals which held that the decision was a motion in arrest, stating that the “question of appealability” turned not on “the name the [district] court gave [the decision] but by what in legal effect it actually was,” The Court of Appeals then certified the case to this Court, since it felt the motion in arrest involved an “interpretation” of the underlying statute, but the appeal was dismissed on the motion of the United States, 335 U. S. 869 (1948). The factual determinations would also appear essential for the District Court’s alternative ground of decision based on the Establishment Clause. That holding rests necessarily upon the finding that Sisson, though nonreligious, "was as genuinely and profoundly governed by his conscience as would have been a martyr obedient to an orthodox religion.” Without this finding, Sisson would have no standing to assert the underinclusiveness of § 6 (j) of the Act as a defense to his prosecution. Whether factual determinations made only for purposes of deciding questions of standing, particularly if made before trial, would offend the requirements that motions in arrest must be based on errors on the face of the record is an issue inappropriate for decision in this case. Because of our determination that the District Court’s free exercise holding was in effect an acquittal, there is no need to decide whether the alternative Establishment Clause ruling would be appealable if it stood alone. Compare 50 U. S. C. App. §462 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV) with the allegations of the indictment: “That on or about April 17, 1968, at Boston, in the District of Massachusetts, JOHN HEFFRON SISSON, JR., of Lincoln, in the District of Massachusetts did unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully fail and neglect and refuse to perform a duty required of him under and in the execution of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 and the rules, regulations and directions duly made pursuant thereto, particularly 32 Code of Federal Regulations 1632.14, in that he did fail and neglect and refuse to comply with an order of his local draft board to submit to induction into the armed forces of the United States; in violation of Title 50, Appendix, United States Code, Section 462.” This principle would dictate that after this jurisdictional dismissal, Sisson may not be retried. Our conclusion does not, as suggested in dissent, post, at 327 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White),, rest on the fact the District Court “might have” sent the case to the jury on the instruction referred to in the text, but instead on what it did do— i. e., render a legal determination on the basis of facts adduced at the trial relating to the general issue of the case, see, infra, at 301. Neither dissenting opinion explains what “large and critical” difference, post, at 329, exists between its expansive notion of what constitutes a decision arresting judgment and a post-verdict acquittal entered by the judge after the jury has returned a verdict of guilty pursuant to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 29. We think untenable the view of Mr. Justice White that under the principles of this opinion today the “Court should not have had jurisdiction in United States v. Covington,” 395 U. S. 57 (1969), on the ground that the pretrial dismissal in that case “would amount to an acquittal because the judge might have given the case to the jury under instructions that it should acquit if it found the facts necessary to sustain the defendant’s privilege — e. g., that he was not one of the registered marihuana dealers whose conduct was legal under state law,” post, at 327 (emphasis in original). As we note, infra, n. 56, what the District Court did do in Covington was to dismiss an indictment before trial without any evidentiary hearing. Moreover, in disposing of the Government’s contentions on the merits, this Court held that there was no need in that case for a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss (much less a need to submit any factual issue to a jury) because (1) “there is no possibility of any factual dispute with regard to the hazard of incrimination”; and (2) “the Government [had] never alleged the existence of a factual controversy” concerning appellee’s nonwaiver of his privilege against self-incrimination, 395 U. S., at 61. The statute provides, in pertinent part: “An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases in the following instances: “From a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing any indictment or information, or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment or information is founded. “From a decision arresting a judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the indictment or information, where such decision is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment or information is founded. “From the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.” The statute goes on to provide for (1) Government appeals to the courts of appeals for all other decisions (a) setting aside or dismissing indictments, or (b) arresting judgments; (e) granting a pretrial suppression motion; (2) release on bail; (3) transfer of cases from this Court to a court of appeals or vice versa when an appeal has erroneously been taken to the wrong court. 34 Stat. 1246 provided in pertinent part: “. . . That a writ of error may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district or circuit courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases, in the following instances, to wit: “From a decision or judgment quashing, setting aside, or sustaining a demurrer to, any indictment, or any count thereof, where such decision or judgment is based upon the invalidity, or construction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded. “From a decision arresting a judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the indictment, where such decision is based upon the invalidity or construction of the statute upon which the indictment is founded. “From the decision or judgment sustaining a special plea in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.” Between 1907 and the present day, Congress has amended the Act several times. These include a 1948 amendment that brought the procedural vocabulary of the statute into formal conformity with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 62 Stat. 844. Although “special plea in bar” thus became “motion in bar,” and “decision . . . quashing ... or sustaining a demurrer to, any indictment” became “decision . . . dismissing any indictment,” the Reviser’s Notes plainly show that this amendment was not meant to change the Act’s coverage, H. R. Rep. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., A177; see United States v. Apex Distributing Co., 270 F. 2d 747, 755 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1959). A 1942 amendment did increase this Court’s jurisdiction under the Act by including cases involving informations as well as indictments, 56 Stat. 271. Other amendments have (1) abolished review by writ of error and substituted the right of appeal, 45 Stat. 54 (1928); (2) given the courts of appeals jurisdiction for appeals from decisions in the same common-law categories as those originally provided, but which do not involve the construction or validity of the underlying statute, 56 Stat. 271. See the Attorney General’s Annual Reports for 1892, pp. xxiv-xxv; for 1893, p. xxvi; for 1894, p. xxix; for 1899, p. 33; for 1900, p. 40; for 1903, p. vi; for 1905, p. 10; for 1906, p. 4. See generally Kurland, The Mersky Case and the Criminal Appeals Act: A Suggestion for Amendment of the Statute, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 419, 446-449 (1961); F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 114-117 (1928). 1892 Rep. Atty. Gen. xxiv. United States v. Armour & Co., 142 F. 808 (D. C. N. D. Ill. 1906). See Frankfurter & Landis, supra, n. 23, at 117; Kurland, supra, n. 23, at 449. 41 Cong. Rec. 22. Kurland, supra, n. 23, at 450. 40 Cong. Rec. 5408. The text of the House bill appears at 40 Cong. Rec. 5408. It gave the United States the same right of review by writ of error as was then accorded a criminal defendant, but further provided that if on appeal any error were found, the defendant should retain the advantage of any verdict in his favor. With neither debate nor a division, the bill passed the House on April 17, 1906. Ibid. See S. Rep. No. 3922, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906). See 40 Cong. Rec. 9033. Id., at 9122. 41 Cong. Rec. 1865; S. Rep. No. 5650, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. (1907). 41 Cong. Rec. 2190-2197; 2744r-2763; 2818-2825. Id., at 2194. Id., at 2195-2197. See id., at 2749-2762. See id., at 2819. See id., at 2752. When asked whether the substance of his amendment was that there was to be no appeal and retrial after the defendant had been “acquitted by the verdict of a jury,” the sponsor of the amendment, Senator Rayner, stated: “I have in the amendment no such words as 'acquitted by the jury.’ I have nothing to do with the jury. He may be acquitted by a magistrate .... I do not care by what tribunal he is acquitted ...” Id,., at 2749. See infra, at 302-307. See 41 Cong. Rec., at 2822, 2823. Id., at 2834. Id., at 3044-3047. Id., at 3647. See H. R. Rep. No. 8113, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 Cong. Rec. 3994, 4128. It appears that the dissenters have not only “outgrown” the statutory limitations of a “decision arresting a judgment” for purposes of § 3731, but also the limitations of Rule 34. Professor Kurland characterized the statute as “a compromise among several divergent forces. The division in the Senate was primarily between those who wanted limited review and those who wanted none. The division between the House and Senate was between those who wanted complete review and those who wanted limited review.” Kurland, supra, n. 23, at 454. See, e. g., 1907 Rep. Atty. Gen. 4. See infra, at 306. See 396 U. S. 812 (1969). At common law, a special plea in bar was ordinarily used to raise three defenses — autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, and pardon— and there is language in some of our cases that indicates that, apart from these defenses, a plea in bar was not appropriate “to single out for determination in advance of trial matters of defense either on questions of law or fact,” United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141, 151 (1931). There are cases consistent with the narrow common-law definition that indicate, for example, that a defense based upon the statute of limitations could not be raised by a “special plea in bar,” United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601, 610 (1910); United States v. Barber, 219 U. S. 72, 78-79 (1911). On the other hand, it appears the Court accepted jurisdiction under § 3731, in appeals from decisions granting special pleas in bar based on a statute of limitations defense, with no explanation of the apparent inconsistency. See United States v. Goldman, 277 U. S. 229, 236-237 (1928); see also United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U. S. 78 (1915). And, in United States v. Mersky, 361 U. S. 431 (1960), there was no decision of the Court on what was a motion in bar, and the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart indicated disagreement on this issue. Compare 361 U. S., at 441-443 with id., at 455-458. To add to the uncertainty, arguably in United States v. Murdock, supra, and certainly in United States v. Blue, 384 U. S. 251, 253-254 (1966), and United States v. Covington, 395 U. S. 57, 59 n. 2 (1969), the Court took jurisdiction and considered the merits of appeals from district court dismissals based on self-incrimination defenses on the ground that the decisions below had sustained motions in bar for purposes of the Criminal Appeals Act — even though Mur-dock itself stated that this defense is not appropriately raised by a special plea in bar. 284 U. S., at 151. In United States v. Mersky, 361 U. S. 431 (1960), there was no decision of the Court concerning what approach should be taken. Mr. Justice Brennan suggested that the category include any decision that barred reprosecution if upheld, id., at 441-443, while Mr. Justice Stewart thought the provision should be confined to those decisions that would fall within the compass of the common law “special plea in bar,” id., at 455-458. See generally Kurland, supra, n. 23. The dismissal provision of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 12, which Mr. Justice Brennan in his Mersky concurrence saw as having “swept away the old pleas,” 361 U. S., at 442, itself limits a dismissal to those defenses “capable of determination without the trial of the general issue,” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 12 (b)(1). Nowhere does United States v. Covington, su-pra, suggest, as argued in dissent, that there might be jurisdiction under the motion-in-bar provision of § 3731 in circumstances where the parties “tr[ied] facts to the judge that were relevant to the motion, in bar, and separate from the general issue,” post, at 332 (dissenting opinion of Me. Justice White). Our Brother White reaches this conclusion by taking a quotation from Covington out of context, and confusing that opinion’s disposition of the merits of the Government’s appeal with the Court’s jurisdictional holding. In Covington, the District Court, before trial without any eviden-tiary hearing, dismissed an indictment bottomed on the Marihuana Tax Act, 26 U. S. C. § 4744 (a) (1), on the ground that the “privilege against self-incrimination necessarily would provide a complete defense to the prosecution,” id., at 58. The Government appealed, claiming the Court had jurisdiction under both the dismissal and the motion-in-bar provisions of § 3731. The Court found jurisdiction in the alternative under either provision. The only discussion of the motion-in-bar jurisdictional issue, found in a footnote, was as follows: “If the dismissal rested on the ground that the Fifth Amendment privilege would be a defense, then the decision was one 'sustaining a motion in bar.’ See United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931),” 395 U. S., at 59 n. 2. Having thus disposed of the jurisdictional issue, the Court proceeded to the merits of the Government’s appeal and, inter alia, considered “whether such a plea of the privilege [against self-incrimination] may ever justify dismissal of an indictment, and if so whether this is such an instance,” id., at 60. In this context the Court said: “Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 (b)(1) states that: ‘Any defense or objection which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion.’ A defense is thus ‘capable of determination’ if trial of the facts surrounding the commission of the alleged offense would be of no assistance in determining the validity of the defense. Rule 12 (b) (4) allows the District Court in its discretion to postpone determination of the motion to trial, and permits factual hearings prior to trial if necessary to resolve issues of fact peculiar to the motion.” Id., at 60. Taken in full context, the quotation used by MR. Justice White, post, at 332, plainly had reference to a district court’s power under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 12 to dismiss an indictment, and nothing whatsoever to do with the quite distinct issue of the scope of the jurisdictional provisions of § 3731. That the Court was there concerned with only the merits of appeal is clear from what follows. After suggesting that in most circumstances a motion to dismiss an indictment brought under 26 U. S. C. § 4744 would not require any factual inquiry, the Court stated that once a defendant asserted his privilege a trial court should dismiss the indictment without an evidentiary hearing “unless the Government can rebut the presumption [of nonwaiver of the privilege] by showing a need for further factual inquiries.” Id., at 61. In applying that principle to the merits of the case before it, the Court affirmed the District Court’s action below because: (1) “there [was] no possibility of any factual dispute with regard to the hazard of incrimination”; and (2) “the Government has never alleged the existence of a factual controversy” concerning the issue of whether “appellee [had] waived his privilege.” Ibid. The Court in Covington did not say that a defense based on the privilege against self-incrimination where there were facts in dispute could, in all cases, be decided without consideration of the general issue. And, more importantly for present purposes, nowhere does the opinion in Covington even hint that a dismissal requiring a pretrial evidentiary hearing, or a dismissal motion properly deferred to the trial of the general issue would be appealable under the motion-in-bar provision of the Criminal Appeals Act. The Court in Cov-ington had no such jurisdictional issues before it, and the opinion does not discuss such issues. See 40 Cong. Rec. 9033. In this exchange, Senator Spooner said: “I understand this [bill] applies only to questions which arise before the impaneling of the jury.” Senator Nelson agreed that the bill was so limited, and obviously thinking he was saying the same thing, said the bill applied only “[w]here the party has not been put in jeopardy.” After being reminded of the arrest-of-judgment provision, Senator Nelson acknowledged that this was an exception, but obviously trying to minimize the scope of the exception he pointed out that the only motions in arrest of judgment that could be appealed were those granted “for insufficiency of indictment; not for any other ground.” Ibid. See 41 Cong. Rec. 2191 (Sen. Nelson) (“I wish to say further that where a jury has been impaneled and where the defendant has been tried an appeal does not lie”), id., at 2748 (Sen. Patterson) (“[A] motion in arrest of judgment ... is the only one of the three cases in which there can have been a trial .... [I]n the other two cases . . . the motions must ex necessitati be made before jeopardy attaches”); id., at 2752 (Sen. Patterson) (“These proceedings are all defendant’s acts before a verdict to prevent a trial, except the motion in arrest of judgment, which is defendant's act after a verdict against him to defeat a judgment on the verdict”) (emphasis supplied). Without explaining his inconsistency, Senator Patterson later expressed the view that under the proposed bill the Government would have been able to appeal the decision in the famed Chicago Beef Trust Case because the jury’s verdict was based on the “special plea in bar filed” in that case, not on the defendants’ guilt or innocence, id., at 2753. Underlying this conclusion — later disputed by Senator Nelson, see id., at 2757- — was Patterson’s expectation that “in the case of a special plea in bar that went against the Government the defendant had not been in jeopardy on the merits of the case," id., at 2753 (emphasis supplied). Unlike the defendants in the Beef Trust Case — who Patterson understood not to have been tried on the general issue of their guilt or innocence — plainly Sisson has been put “in jeopardy on the merits of the case.” Our Brother White admits as much, by suggesting he could not be retried. Therefore, even under Patterson’s broader reading of the statute, an appeal would not lie in this case. See, e. g., 41 Cong. Rec. 2745-2763. See, e. g., 40 Cong. Rec. 9033; 41 Cong. Rec. 2192; id., at 2751. See 41 Cong. Rec. 2751 (Sen. Knox) (“[I]f I thought there was a single line, or a sentence, or a clause contained in this bill which by any court would be construed to place a man twice in jeopardy, I would vote to cut it out, not because there would be any necessity for cutting it out, as it would be invalid under the Constitution of the United States, but I would vote to cut it out upon the ground that it would not be an artistic and intelligent bill with such a provision within its borders.”) The provision granting an appeal from a decision dismissing or setting aside an indictment does not contain a similar phrase limiting appeals to cases where the defendant has not yet been put in jeopardy, but we agree with the conclusion reached by the Government that the same limitation applies. See n. 57, supra. Brief 19. It should be noted that at the Government’s request a proposed amendment to § 3731 has been introduced in Congress to remove this limitation. The proposed statute, which avoids common-law terminology, would allow an appeal from a decision made after the jury was sworn in all cases where the Double Jeopardy Clause would permit it. See H. R. 14588, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong. Rec. H10274 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1969). See 1907 Rep. Atty. Gen. 4; see also Hearing on Granting Appeals by the United States from Decisions Sustaining Motions to Suppress Evidence, before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 83 Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15, p. 11 (1954). Motions in bar, for example, can only be appealed to this Court irrespective of whether the ease involves the validity or construction of a statute. See supra, nn. 53-54. See, e. g., United States v. Zisblatt, supra; United States v. Brodson, 234 F. 2d 97 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1956). See generally Friedenthal, supra, n. 9, at 83-88. Tr. of Oral Arg. 11.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SKELLY OIL CO. et al. v. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. No. 221. Argued December 9, 1949. — Decided June 5, 1950. Charles L. Black argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were W. P. Z. German, Alvin F. Molony, Hawley C. Kerr, Donald Campbell, Ray S. Fellows, Dan Moody, Walace Hawkins, Earl A. Brown and Raymond M. Myers. Harry D. Turner argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Don Emery, Rayburn L. Foster, George L. Sneed, S. E. Floren, Jr. and Eugene 0. Monnett. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1945, Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Company-sought from the Federal Power Commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity, required by § 7 (c) of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 825, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 717f (c), for the construction and operation of a pipe line to carry natural gas from Texas to Michigan and Wisconsin. A prerequisite for such a certificate is adequate reserves of gas. To obtain these reserves Michigan-Wisconsin entered into an agreement with Phillips Petroleum Company on December 11, 1945, whereby the latter undertook to make available gas from the Hugoton Gas Field, sprawling over Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas, which it produced or purchased from others. Phillips had contracted with petitioners, Skelly Oil Company, Stanolind Oil and Gas Company, and Magnolia Petroleum Company, to purchase gas produced by them in the Hugoton Field for resale to Michigan-Wisconsin. Each contract provided that “in the event Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Company shall fail to secure from the Federal Power Commission on or before [October 1, 1946] a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the construction and operation of its pipe line, Seller [a petitioner] shall have the right to terminate this contract by written notice to Buyer [Phillips] delivered to Buyer at any time after December 1, 1946, but before the issuance of such certificate.” The legal significance of this provision is at the core of this litigation. The Federal Power Commission, in response to the application of Michigan-Wisconsin, on November 30, 1946, ordered that “A certificate of public convenience and necessity be and it is hereby issued to applicant [Michigan-Wisconsin], upon the terms and conditions of this order,” listing among the conditions that there be no transportation or sale of natural gas by means of the sanctioned facilities until all necessary authorizations were obtained from the State of Wisconsin and the communities proposed to be served, that Michigan-Wisconsin should have the approval of the Securities and Exchange Commission for its plan of financing, that the applicant should file for the approval of the Commission a schedule of reasonable rates, and that the sanctioned facilities should not be used for the transportation of gas to Detroit and Ann Arbor except with due regard for the rights and duties of Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, which had intervened before the Federal Power Commission, in its established service for resale in these areas, such rights and duties to be set forth in a supplemental order. It was also provided that Michigan-Wisconsin should have fifteen days from the issue of the supplemental order to notify the Commission whether the certificate “as herein issued is acceptable to it.” Finally, the Commission’s order provided that for purposes of computing the time within which applications for rehearing could be filed, “the date of issuance of this order shall be deemed to be the date of issuance of the opinions, or of the supplemental order referred to herein, whichever may be the later.” 5 F. P. C. 953, 954, 956. News of the Commission’s action was released on November 30, 1946, but the actual content of the order was not made public until December 2, 1946. Petitioners severally, on December 2, 1946, gave notice to Phillips of termination of their contracts on the ground that Michigan-Wisconsin had not received a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Thereupon Michigan-Wisconsin and Phillips brought suit against petitioners in the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. Alleging that a certificate of public convenience and necessity, “within the meaning of said Natural Gas Act and said contracts” had been issued prior to petitioners’ attempt at termination of the contracts, they invoked the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act for a declaration that the contracts were still “in effect and binding upon the parties thereto.” Motions by petitioners to have Michigan-Wisconsin dropped as a party plaintiff were sustained, but motions to dismiss the complaint for want of jurisdiction were denied. The case then went to the merits, and the District Court decreed that the contracts between Phillips and petitioners had not been “effectively terminated and that each of such contracts remain [sic] in full force and effect.” The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, 174 F. 2d 89, and we brought the case here, 338 U. S. 846, because it raises in sharp form the question whether a suit like this “arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States,” 28 U. S. C. § 1331, so as to enable District Courts to give declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act. 48 Stat. 955, as amended, now 28 U. S. C. § 2201. “[T]he operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240. Congress enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend their jurisdiction. When concerned as we are with the power of the inferior federal courts to entertain litigation within the restricted area to which the Constitution and Acts of Congress confine them, “jurisdiction” means the kinds of issues which give right of entrance to federal courts. Jurisdiction in this sense was not altered by the Declaratory Judgment Act. Prior to that Act, a federal court would entertain a suit on a contract only if the plaintiff asked for an immediately enforceable remedy like money damages or an injunction, but such relief could only be given if the requisites of jurisdiction, in the sense of a federal right or diversity, provided foundation for resort to the federal courts. The Declaratory Judgment Act allowed relief to be given by way of recognizing the plaintiff’s right even though no immediate enforcement of it was asked. But the requirements of jurisdiction — the limited subject matters which alone Congress had authorized the District Courts to adjudicate — were not impliedly repealed or modified. See Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 300; Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, 551-52. If Phillips sought damages from petitioners or specific performance of their contracts, it could not bring suit in a United States District Court on the theory that it was asserting a federal right. And for the simple reason that such a suit would “arise” under the State law governing the contracts. Whatever federal claim Phillips may be able to urge would in any event be injected into the case only in anticipation of a defense to be asserted by petitioners. “Not every question of federal law emerging in a suit is proof that a federal law is the basis of the suit.” Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U. S. 109, 115; compare 28 U. S. C. § 1257, with 28 U. S. C. § 1331. Ever since Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U. S. 586, 589, it has been settled doctrine that where a suit is brought in the federal courts “upon the sole ground that the determination of the suit depends upon some question of a Federal nature, it must appear, at the outset, from the declaration or the bill of the party suing, that the suit is of that character.” But “a suggestion of one party, that the other will or may set up a claim under the Constitution or laws of the United States, does not make the suit one arising under that Constitution or those laws.” Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 464. The plaintiff’s claim itself must present a federal question “unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.” Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S. 74, 75-76; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U. S. 149, 152. These decisions reflect the current of jurisdictional legislation since the Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470, first entrusted to the lower federal courts wide jurisdiction in cases “arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties.” U. S. Const. Art. Ill, § 2. “The change is in accordance with the general policy of these acts, manifest upon their face, and often recognized by this court, to contract the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts [which became the District Courts] of the United States.” Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, supra at 462. See also Arkansas v. Kansas & Texas Coal Co., 183 U. S. 185, 188, and Gully v. First National Bank, supra at 112-14. With exceptions not now relevant Congress has narrowed the opportunities for entrance into the federal courts, and this Court has been more careful than in earlier days in enforcing these jurisdictional limitations. See Gully v. First National Bank, supra at 113. To be observant of these restrictions is not to indulge in formalism or sterile technicality. It would turn into the federal courts a vast current of litigation indubitably arising under State law, in the sense that the right to be vindicated was State-created, if a suit for a declaration of rights could be brought into the federal courts merely because an anticipated defense derived from federal law. Not only would this unduly swell the volume of litigation in the District Courts but it would also embarrass those courts — and this Court on potential review — in that matters of local law may often be involved, and the District Courts may either have to decide doubtful questions of State law or hold cases pending disposition of such State issues by State courts. To sanction suits for declaratory relief as within the jurisdiction of the District Courts merely because, as in this case, artful pleading anticipates a defense based on federal law would contravene the whole trend of jurisdictional legislation by Congress, disregard the effective functioning of the federal judicial system and distort the limited procedural purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act. See Developments in the Law — Declaratory Judgments — 1941-1949, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 787, 802-03 (1949). Since the matter in controversy as to which Phillips asked for a declaratory judgment is not one that “arises under the . . . laws ... of the United States” and since as to Skelly and Stanolind jurisdiction cannot be sustained on the score of diversity of citizenship, the proceedings against them should have been dismissed. As to Magnolia, a Texas corporation, a different situation is presented. Since Phillips was a Delaware corporation, there is diversity of citizenship. Magnolia had qualified to do business in Oklahoma and appointed an agent for service of process in accordance with the prevailing Oklahoma statute. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 452 (1937). Magnolia claimed that the subject matter of this proceeding did not arise in Oklahoma within the meaning of its consent to be sued. This contention was rejected below, and we do not reexamine the local law as applied by the lower courts. Under the doctrine of Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, venue was properly laid in Oklahoma; that the declaratory remedy which may be given by the federal courts may not be available in the State courts is immaterial. Therefore, in the case of Magnolia we must reach the merits. They relate to two matters: (1) the clause in the contract with Phillips permitting its termination at any time after December 1, 1946, but before the “issuance” of “a certificate of public convenience and necessity” by the Federal Power Commission; and (2) whether this provision was satisfied by Magnolia’s notice of termination of December 2, 1946, despite the Commission’s order of November 30, 1946. The phraseology “certificate of public convenience and necessity” in the contract is identic with the phrase in § 7 (c) of the Natural Gas Act. The Court of Appeals equated the term of the contract with that in the statute and in effect deemed its problem to be the proper construction of what constitutes the “issuance” of a “certificate of public convenience and necessity” within the meaning of § 7 (c). So viewing the matter, the court held that the order of November 30, 1946, satisfied the requirement of the contract, and that therefore a certificate of public convenience and necessity had been issued within the terminal period of the contract, and that its termination was not timely. It will be recalled that the order of November 30,1946, had three parts: (A) it stated that “A certificate of public convenience and necessity be and it is hereby issued to applicant [Michigan-Wisconsin]”; (B) it imposed certain conditions upon the grant, some of which were to be set forth in a supplemental order; and (C) it said that “For the purpose of computing the time within which applications for rehearing may be filed, the date of issuance of this order shall be deemed to be the date of issuance of the opinions, or of the supplemental order referred to herein, whichever may be the later.” 5 F. P. C. at 954, 956. The course of reasoning by which the Court of Appeals concluded that the order of November 30, 1946, satisfied the statutory requirement for a certificate of public convenience and necessity can be briefly summarized. It relied on the grammatical argument that the Commission used the present tense in its order and subsequently referred to it as an order “issuing a certificate of public convenience and necessity,” e. g., 6 F. P. C. 1, 37; the conditional nature of the order was not deemed to impair its efficacy since § 7 (e) of the Natural Gas Act authorized the Commission “to attach to the issuance of the certificate and to the exercise of the rights granted thereunder such reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and necessity may require”; and the provision of the order connecting the date of the order’s issuance with the time defined for securing a rehearing was thought relevant only to the supplemental order. We are not persuaded now to rest decision on the analysis of the Court of Appeals which led to its conclusion. We need not linger long on the merely grammatical argument of that court; it is given more weight than it can bear. Of course, the Commission has considerable administrative discretion to decide when an order may fairly be deemed to have been “issued.” Section 16 of the Act provides that “Orders of the Commission shall be effective on the date and in the manner which the Commission shall prescribe.” But surely a certificate cannot be said to have been issued for purposes of defining rights and the seeking of reconsideration by an aggrieved person if its substance is merely in the bosom of the Commission. Knowledge of the substance must to some extent be made manifest. Here the content of the order of November 30, 1946, was not made public until December 2,1946, the date of the termination notice. The Commission itself in its rule for computing rehearing time distinguishes between “adoption” of an order and its “issuance.” However, as a matter of usage, the Commission has referred to an order as having “issued” a certificate on a particular date when in fact the date was that of “adoption.” See, e. g., Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 5 F. P. C. 813, 897; cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 5 F. P. C. 824, 901. Finally, the restriction of the Court of Appeals of the rehearing provision of Part C to the supplemental order finds no support on the face of the order of November 30, 1946. There is nothing to indicate that Part C was not to apply to the entire order for purposes of § 19 of the Act, which allows a rehearing by a party aggrieved “within thirty days after the issuance of such order” and makes such rehearing a prerequisite to judicial review. See 6 F. P. C. 323. Since the requirements of the Natural Gas Act for the issuance of “a certificate of public convenience and necessity” may be distributive in scope, varying with the different contexts in which the question must be examined, this is not the occasion to decide that these requirements have a single uniform content. Whether the statutory requirement here was satisfied is not a question of fact, the finding of which by the District Court is to be respected unless clearly erroneous. The District Court merely found that the content of the piece of paper dated November 30, 1946, was that day agreed upon in executive session of the Commission and that that fact was made known. But this leaves untouched the legal significance of this action of the Commission, and the Court ought not now in darkness to pronounce on this question. We are not restricted to disposition of the controversy on so truncated a treatment of the issues that underlie the record. Considering the fact that so to dispose of the case would involve determination of an important problem concerning a regulatory statute with implications of public importance that private litigants naturally enough do not wholly represent and that on these matters neither the courts below nor this Court had the benefit of the experience and illumination of the agency entrusted with the enforcement of the Act, the due administration of justice requires that we should exercise our discretionary power in reviewing cases to “require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.” 28 U. S. C. § 2106; Honeyman v. Hanan, 300 U. S. 14, 25. Accordingly, we think that the proper disposition requires that we vacate the judgment as to Magnolia and remand the case in order that the Court of Appeals either itself or by sending the case back to the District Court can further explore, through ways that may be appropriate, the issues which have been laid bare. See Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U. S. 249. The impact of the litigation both here and below was on the proper construction of § 7 (c). Even though the language of the contract may be identic with that of § 7 (c), this language in the contract may have a scope independent of the proper construction of § 7 (c). The same words, in different settings, may not mean the same thing. Compare opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, with his dissent in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 219. Parties do not necessarily endow statutory language in a contract with the scope of the statute, particularly when the same term may have variant meanings for different applications of the statute. See Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U. S. 481, 483. Of course the statutory meaning in the context of the entire Natural Gas Act may not be irrelevant. In remanding the case we do not mean to foreclose this line of inquiry. In respect to Magnolia, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. As to Skelly and Stanolind, we reverse the judgment with directions that the cause be dismissed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Black agrees with the Court of Appeals and would affirm its judgment. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or disposition of this case. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, with whom Mr. Justice Burton joins, dissenting in part. I concur in that part of the Court’s judgment that directs dismissal of the cause as to Skelly and Stanolind. I have real doubts as to whether there is a federal question here at all, even though interpretation of the contract between private parties requires an interpretation of a federal statute and the action of a federal regulatory body. But the Court finds it unnecessary to reach that question because it holds that the federal question, if any, is not a part of the plaintiff’s claim and that jurisdiction does not, therefore, attach. While this result is not a necessary one, I am not prepared to dissent from it at this time. But I am forced to dissent from the vacation and remand of the cause in respect to Magnolia. I think that, as to this petitioner, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. The Court decides that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Federal Power Commission had issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Company on November 30, 1946, despite the fact that on that date the Commission adopted an order stating that “A certificate of public convenience and necessity be and it is hereby issued to Applicant, upon the terms and conditions of this order, . . . .” This disregard for what the District Court found to be the Commission’s express intention is based upon two alternative grounds. First, it is suggested that while the order issuing the certificate was “adopted” on November 30, it was not “issued” until December 2. Second, it is said that Part C of the November 30 order, which concerned the date of issuance of the order for purposes of applications for rehearing, precludes a finding that a certificate was issued on November 30. Neither of these grounds, in my judgment, supports the Court’s conclusion. As to the first, which was not argued here nor in the Court of Appeals, it is true that the Commission’s rules provide that an order is not to be deemed “issued” until the full text is mimeographed and mailed to the parties to the proceeding. This usually follows within two or three days after the order is “adopted.” The only purpose of the postponement of the date of issuance of the order, so far as we are informed, is to postpone the running of the 30-day period for applications for rehearing until the full text is available to the parties who have standing to ask for rehearing. But the Commission uniformly refers to the date of adoption of the order as the date upon which the certificate of public convenience and necessity was “issued.” It did so in this case, when, on March 12, 1947, it issued a supplemental order referring to its “order of November 30, 1946, issuing a certificate of public convenience and necessity.” Furthermore, the District Court found as a fact that “On November 30, a Saturday, the Commission in executive session made an order granting, with conditions, a certificate of public convenience and necessity to the Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Company. During this session as the members of the Commission came to agreement as to the wording of the order, Mr. Fuquay, the secretary of the Commission, prepared the order in full and exact text. The secretary was directed by the Commission to release the order immediately.” Following adjournment on that day, the secretary sent a telegram to the parties to the proceeding, informing them that the “Commission today . . . adopted Opinion and Order, in Docket No. G-669, issuing certificate, with conditions, to Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Company.” On the same day, releases to the press were made announcing the action taken by the Commission. Skelly, Stanolind and Magnolia were not parties to this proceeding. It may very well be that the date of issuance of the order granting the certificate is December 2 or some later date — for purposes of rehearing upon application of the parties. But I think there is no question that the certificate, as distinguished from the order, was issued on November 30. That is the Commission’s view, as indicated by its supplemental order. The fact that it takes a few days to get its orders mimeographed and the Commission has adopted a rule that, in fairness to the parties, the time for rehearing shall not begin to run until such orders, in full text, are available, does not mean that the issuance of the certificate is also held in abeyance until that time. The second argument requires but short answer. Part C provides that “For the purpose of computing the time within which applications for rehearing may be filed, the date of issuance of this order shall be deemed to be the date of issuance of the opinions, or of the supplemental order referred to herein, whichever may be the later.” The paragraph means just what it says. I do not understand the Court to hold that the Commission cannot thus postpone the running of the time for rehearing. Computation of that time, as I have indicated, has no necessary relation to the date of issuance of the certificate. I think that the Commission intended to and did issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Company on November 30, 1946, whatever the date of its order, for purposes of computation of time for rehearing. The crucial clause of the contract refers to “the issuance of such certificate [of public convenience and necessity].” By their inclusion of a provision dependent upon the action of a federal agency, it is obvious that the parties intended that the contract should be construed with reference to the effective date of agency action under the statutes and the practices of the Commission. The District Court so concluded. I can see no reason, therefore, to remand the cause for further proceedings. In my view, effective agency action was taken on November 30, 1946. As to Magnolia, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Rule 13 (b) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure provides: “In computing any period of time involving the date of the issuance of an order by the Commission, the day of issuance of an order shall be the day the Office of the Secretary mails or delivers copies of the order (full text) to the parties or their attorneys of record, or makes such copies public, whichever be the earlier. . . . The day of issuance of an order may or may not be the day of its adoption by the Commission.” 18 C. F. R. § 1.13 (b). A deposition taken of the' Secretary of the Commission gave light on this point. The Commission’s previous rule on rehearing time is in 18 C. F. R. Cum. Supp. § 50.75. Rule 13 (c) provides: “Orders of the Commission shall be effective as of the dates of issuance unless otherwise specifically provided in the orders.” 18 C. F. R. § 1.13 (c). This provision may be of significance if the effectiveness of a certificate is an issue in proceedings under § 20 or § 21 of the Act. The Court of Appeals did not discuss the bearing of these rules upon this case. The significance of the conditions in qualifying what is formally called a “certificate” in the order of November 30, 1946, is precisely one of those matters upon which Commission practice and experience may shed helpful light. In its conclusions of law, the District Court stated: “The certificate issued by the Commission to Michigan-Wisconsin on November 30, 1946, although containing terms and conditions, was and is a certificate issued under the requirements of the Natural Gas Act and one that is provided for by that act. A consideration of the contracts between plaintiff and defendants, together with the contract between plaintiff and Michigan-Wisconsin, compels a conclusion that such certificate was one within the contemplation of the parties and satisfied the terms of the contracts.” The context suggests that in the second sentence the District Court may still have been focusing upon statutory meaning. See, e. g., Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 5 F. P. C. 813, 897; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 5 F. P. C. 824, 901. The District Court stated as one of its conclusions of law: “The certificate issued by the Commission to Michigan-Wisconsin on November 30, 1946, although containing terms and conditions, was and is a certificate issued under the requirements of the Natural Gas Act and one that is provided for by that act. A consideration of the contracts between plaintiff and defendants, together with the contract between plaintiff and Michigan-Wisconsin, compels a conclusion that such certificate was one within the contemplation of the parties and satisfied the terms of the contracts.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE CORP. v. STATE OIL AND GAS BOARD OF MISSISSIPPI et al. No. 84-1076. Argued October 8, 1985 Decided January 22, 1986 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Powell, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, 'post, p. 425. John Marshall Grower argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Jefferson D. Stewart, R. Wilson Montjoy II, R. V. Loftin, Jr., and Thomas E. Skains. Jerome M. Feit argued the cause for the United States et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, William H. Satterfield, Joseph S. Davies, and John H. Conway. Ed Davis Noble, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Mississippi, argued the cause for appellee State Oil and Gas Board of Mississippi. With him on the brief were Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Attorney General, and R. Lloyd Arnold, Assistant Attorney General. Glenn Gates Taylor argued the cause for appellee Coastal Exploration, Inc. With him on the brief was Kenneth I. Franks. Walker L. Watters and David T. Cobb filed a brief for appellee Getty Oil Co. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America by Harold L. Talisman and John H. Cheatham III; and for Associated Gas Distributors by Frederic Moring. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed-for the State of Texas by Jim Mattox, Attorney General, David R. Richards, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and Larry J. Laurent and Manual Rios, Assistant Attorneys General; and for the National Governors’ Association by Benna Ruth Solomon and Joyce Holmes Benjamin. David Crump filed a brief for the Legal Foundation of America as amicus curiae. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. We are confronted again with the issue of a state regulation requiring an interstate pipeline to purchase gas from all the parties owning interests in a common gas pool. The purchases would be in proportion to the owners’ respective interests in the pool, and would be compelled even though the pipeline has pre-existing contracts with less than all of the pool’s owners. This Court, in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm’n of Kansas, 372 U. S. 84 (1963), struck down, on pre-emption grounds, a virtually identical regulation. In the present case, however, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that the subsequently enacted Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), 92 Stat. 3351, 15 U. S. C. §3301 et seq., effectively nullified Northern Natural by vesting regulatory power in the States over the wellhead sale of gas. The Mississippi Supreme Court went on to hold that the Mississippi regulation did not impermissibly burden interstate commerce. Because of the importance of the issues in the functioning of the interstate market in natural gas, we noted probable jurisdiction. 470 U. S. 1083 (1985). I The Harper Sand gas pool lies in Marion County in southern Mississippi. Harper gas is classified as “high-cost natural gas” under NGPA’s § 107(c)(1), 15 U. S. C. § 3317(c)(1), because it is taken from a depth of more than 15,000 feet. At the time of the proceedings before appellee State Oil and Gas Board of Mississippi, six separate wells drew gas from the pool. A recognized property of a common pool is that, as gas is drawn up through one well, the pressure surrounding that well is reduced and other gas flows towards the area of the producing well. Thus, one well can drain an entire pool, even if the gas in the pool is owned by several different owners. The interests of these other owners often are referred to as “correlative rights.” See, e. g., Miss. Code Ann. § 53-1-1 (1972 and Supp. 1985). Some owners of interests in the Harper Sand pool, such as appellee Getty Oil Co., actually drill and operate gas wells. Others, such as appellee Coastal Exploration, Inc., own smaller working interests in various wells. Normally, these lesser owners rely on the well operators to arrange the sales of their shares of the production, see App. 26, although some nonoperator owners contract directly either with the pipeline that purchases the operator’s gas or with other customers. Appellant Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation (Transco) operates a natural gas pipeline that transports gas from fields in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi for resale to customers throughout the Northeast. Beginning in 1978, Transco entered into 35 long-term contracts with Getty and two other operators, Florida Exploration Co. and Tomlinson Interests, Inc., to purchase gas produced from the Harper Sand pool. In line with prevailing industry practice, the contracts contained “take-or-pay” provisions. These essentially required Transco either to accept currently a certain percentage of the gas each well was capable of producing, or to pay the contract price for that gas with a right to take delivery at some later time, usually limited in duration. Take-or-pay provisions enable sellers to avoid fluctuations in cash flow and are therefore thought to encourage investments in well development. See Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 Va. L. Rev. 63, 77-79 (1982). Transco entered into these contracts during a period of national gas shortage. Transco’s contracts with Getty and Tomlinson obligated it to buy only Getty’s and Tomlinson’s own shares of the gas produced by the wells they operated, while its contracts with Florida Exploration required it to take virtually all the gas Florida Exploration’s wells produced, regardless of its ownership. See App. 107. But demand was sufficiently high that Transco also purchased, on a noncontract basis, the production shares of smaller owners, such as Coastal, in the Getty and Tomlinson wells. Id., at 155. In the spring of 1982, however, consumer demand for gas dropped significantly, and Transco began to have difficulty selling its gas. It therefore announced in May 1982 that it would no longer purchase gas from owners with whom it had not actually contracted. See, e. g., id., at 41-42. Transco refused Coastal’s request that it be allowed to ratify Getty’s contract, and made a counteroffer, which Coastal refused, either to purchase Coastal’s gas at a significantly lower price than it was obligated to pay under its existing contracts or to transport Coastal’s gas to other customers if Coastal arranged such sales. See id., at 66-69. Fifty-five other noncontract owners of Harper gas, however, did accept such offers from Transco. See 457 So. 2d 1298, 1309 (Miss. 1984). Getty and Tomlinson cut back production so that their wells produced only that amount of gas equal to their ownership interests in the maximum flow. The immediate economic effect of the cutback was to deprive Coastal of revenue, because none of its share of the Harper gas was being produced. The ultimate geological effect, however, is that gas will flow from the Getty-Tomlinson areas of the field, which are producing at less than capacity, to the Florida Exploration areas; gas owned by interests that produce through Getty’s and Tomlinson’s wells thus may be siphoned away. Moreover, because of the decrease in pressure, gas left in the ground, such as Coastal’s gas, may become more costly to recover and therefore its value at the wellhead may decline. I — I h — I On July 29, 1982, Coastal filed a petition with appellee State Oil and Gas Board of Mississippi, asking the Board to enforce its Statewide Rule 48, a “ratable-take” requirement. Rule 48 provides: “Each person now or hereafter engaged in the business of purchasing oil or gas from owners, operators, or producers shall purchase without discrimination in favor of one owner, operator, or producer against another in the same common source of supply.” Rule 48 never before had been employed to require a pipeline actually to purchase noncontract gas; rather, its sole purpose appears to have been to prevent drainage, that is, to prevent a buyer from contracting with one seller and then draining a common pool of all its gas. See 457 So. 2d, at 1306. The Gas Board conducted a 3-day evidentiary proceeding. It found Transco in violation of Rule 48, and, by its Order No. 409-82, filed Oct. 13, 1982, ordered Transco to start taking gas “ratably” (i. e., in proportion to the various owners’ shares) from the Harper Sand pool, and to purchase the gas under nondiscriminatory price and take-or-pay conditions. Transco appealed the Gas Board’s ruling to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Miss. In the parts of its opinion relevant to this appeal, the Circuit Court held that the Gas Board’s authority was not preempted by either the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA), eh. 556, 52 Stat. 821, 15 U. S. C. §717 et seq., or the NGPA; that the NGPA effectively overruled Northern Natural; and that the Gas Board’s order did not run afoul of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the Circuit Court’s judgment. 457 So. 2d 1298 (1984). With respect to Transco’s pre-emption claim, the court recognized that, prior to 1978, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and its predecessor, the Federal Power Commission, possessed “plenary authority to regulate the sale and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce.” Id., at 1314. Under the interpretation of that authority in Northern Natural, where a Kansas ratable-take order was ruled invalid because the order “invade[d] the exclusive jurisdiction which the Natural Gas Act has conferred upon the Federal Power Commission,” 372 U. S., at 89, Mississippi’s “authority to enforce Rule 48 requiring ratable taking had been effectively suspended — preempted, if you will, and any orders such as Order No. 409-82 would have been wholly unenforceable.” 457 So. 2d, at 1314. But the court went on to conclude that the enactment of the NGPA in 1978 removed FERC’s jurisdiction over “high-cost” gas (the type produced from the Harper Sand pool). Under § 601(a)(1) of the NGPA, “the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA) and FERC’s jurisdiction under the Act never apply to deregulated gas” (emphasis added), 457 So. 2d, at 1316, and “[t]hat message is decisive of the preemption issue in this case.” Ibid. The court also found no implicit pre-emption of Rule 48. Transco’s compliance with the Rule could not bring it into conflict with any of FERC’s still-existing powers over the gas industry. The court noted that, under Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Public Service Comm’n, 461 U. S. 375, 384 (1983), a federal determination that deregulation was appropriate was entitled to as much weight in determining pre-emption as a federal decision to regulate actively. Although the NGPA stemmed from Congress’ desire to deregulate the gas industry, the court found that “[hjowever consistent a continued proscription on state regulation might have been with the theoretical underpinnings of deregulation, the Congress in NGPA in 1978 did not ban state regulation of deregulated gas.” 457 So. 2d, at 1318. In addressing the Commerce Clause issue, the court relied on the balancing test set out in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970): when a state law “regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Id., at 142. In weighing the benefit against the burden, a reviewing court should consider whether the local interest “could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.” Ibid. The court found that Rule 48 had a legitimate local purpose — the prevention of unfair drainage from commonly owned gas pools. It identified the principal burden on interstate commerce as higher prices for the ultimate consumers of natural gas. But, under Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U. S. 179, 186-187 (1950), higher prices do not render a state regulation impermissible per se under the Commerce Clause. Also, Congress expressed a clear intent in enacting the NGPA that “all reasonable costs of production of natural gas shall be borne ultimately by the consumer. . . . Congress within the scope of its power under the affirmative Commerce Clause has expressly authorized such increases.” 457 So. 2d, at 1321. Transco had identified one other potential burden on interstate commerce: Rule 48 would require it to take more gas from Mississippi’s fields than would otherwise be the case, thereby leading Transco to reduce its purchases from Louisiana and Texas. But the Mississippi court rejected this argument, noting both that Texas and Louisiana had their own ratable-take regulations, which presumably would protect their producers, and that the actual cause of any such effect was Transco’s imprudent entry into take-or-pay contracts, rather than the State’s ratable-take requirement. Transco knew of Rule 48’s existence when it entered into its various contracts and should have foreseen the risk that it would be required to purchase smaller owners’ shares. Moreover, since Transco was permitted to pass along its increased costs, the consumer ultimately would bear this burden, which was “simply one inevitable consequence of the free market policies of the era of deregulation with respect to which Transco is vested by the negative Commerce Clause with no right to complain.” Id., at 1322. Finally, the court rejected Transco’s argument that the State could have served the same local public interest through a ratable-production order rather than through a ratable-take order. It held that it need not even consider whether less burdensome alternatives to the ratable-take order existed, because Transco had failed to meet the threshold requirement of demonstrating an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. Ill If the Gas Board’s action were analyzed under the standard used in Northern Natural, it clearly would be pre-empted. Whether that decision governs this case depends on whether Congress, in enacting the NGPA, altered those characteristics of the federal regulatory scheme which provided the basis in Northern Natural for a finding of pre-emption. In that case this Court considered whether the “comprehensive scheme of federal regulation” that Congress enacted in the NGA pre-empted a Kansas ratable-take order. 372 U. S., at 91. • Northern Natural Gas Company had a take-or-pay contract with Republic Natural Gas Company to purchase all the gas Republic could produce from its wells in the Hugoton Field. Northern also had contracts with other producers to buy their production, but those contracts required it to purchase their gas only to the extent that its requirements could not be satisfied by Republic. Id., at 87. Northern historically had taken ratably from all Hugoton wells, but, starting in 1958, it no longer needed all the gas the wells in the field were capable of producing. It therefore reduced its purchases from the other wells, causing drainage toward Republic’s wells. The Kansas Corporation Commission, which previously had imposed a ratable-production order on the Hugoton producers, then issued a ratable-take order requiring Northern to “take gas from Republic wells in no higher proportion to the allowables than from the wells of the other producers.” Id., at 88. Kansas argued that its order represented a permissible attempt to protect the correlative rights of the other producers. The Court rejected this contention. Section 1(b) of the NGA, 15 U. S. C. § 717(b), provided that the Act’s provisions “shall not apply ... to the production or gathering of natural gas.” But the Court, it was said, “has consistently held that ‘production’ and ‘gathering’ are terms narrowly confined to the physical acts of drawing the gas from the earth and preparing it for the first stages of distribution.” 372 U. S., at 90. Since Kansas’ order was directed not at “a producer but a purchaser of gas from producers,” ibid., Northern, being a purchaser, was not expressly exempted from the Act’s coverage. Although it was “undeniable that a state may adopt reasonable regulations to prevent economic and physical waste of natural gas,” Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U. S., at 185, the Court did not view the ratable-take rule as a permissible conservation measure. Such measures target producers and production, while ratable-take requirements are “aimed directly at interstate purchasers and wholesales for resale.” Northern Natural, 372 U. S., at 94. The Court identified the conflict between Kansas’ rule and the federal regulatory scheme in these terms: Congress had “enacted a comprehensive scheme of federal regulation of ‘all wholesales of natural gas in interstate commerce.’” Id., at 91, quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U. S. 672, 682 (1954). “[UJniformity of regulation” was one of its objectives. 372 U. S., at 91-92. And, it was said: “The danger of interference with the federal regulatory scheme arises because these orders are unmistakably and unambiguously directed at purchasers who take gas in Kansas for resale after transportation in interstate commerce. In effect, these orders shift to the shoulders of interstate purchasers the burden of performing the complex task of balancing the output of thousands of natural gas wells within the State .... Moreover, any readjustment of purchasing patterns which such orders might require of purchasers who previously took un-ratably could seriously impair the Federal Commission’s authority to regulate the intricate relationship between the purchasers’ cost structures and eventual costs to wholesale customers who sell to consumers in other States” (emphasis in original). Id., at 92. Northern Natural’s finding of pre-emption thus rests on two considerations. First, Congress had created a comprehensive regulatory scheme, and ratable-take orders fell within the limits of that scheme rather than within the category of regulatory questions reserved for the States. Second, in the absence of ratable-take requirements, purchasers would choose a different, and presumably less costly, purchasing pattern. By requiring pipelines to follow the more costly pattern, Kansas’ order conflicted with the federal interest in protecting consumers by ensuring low prices. Under the NGA, the Federal Power Commission’s comprehensive regulatory scheme involved “utility-type rate-making” control over prices and supplies. See Haase, The Federal Role in Implementing the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 16 Houston L. Rev. 1067, 1079 (1979). The FPC set price ceilings for sales from producers to pipelines and regulated the prices pipelines could charge their downstream customers. But “[i]n the early 1970’s, it became apparent that the regulatory structure was not working.” Public Service Comm’n of New York v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co., 463 U. S. 319, 330 (1983). The Nation began to experience serious gas shortages. The NGA’s “artificial pricing scheme” was said to be a “major cause” of the imbalance between supply and demand. See S. Rep. No. 95-436, p. 50 (1977) (additional views of Senators Hansen, Hatfield, McClure, Bartlett, Weicker, Domenici, and Laxalt). In response, Congress enacted the NGPA, which “has been justly described as ‘a comprehensive statute to govern future natural gas regulation.’” Mid-Louisiana Gas. Co., 463 U. S., at 332, quoting Note, Legislative History of the Natural Gas Policy Act, 59 Texas L. Rev. 101, 116 (1980). The aim of federal regulation remains to assure adequate supplies of natural gas at fair prices, but the NGPA reflects a congressional belief that a new system of natural gas pricing was needed to balance supply and demand. See S. Rep. No. 95-436, at 10. The new federal role is to “overse[e] a national market price regulatory scheme.” Haase, 16 Houston L. Rev., at 1079; see S. Rep. No. 95-436, at 21 (NGPA implements “a new commodity value pricing approach”). The NGPA therefore does not constitute a federal retreat from a comprehensive gas policy. Indeed, the NGPA in some respects expanded federal control, since it granted FERC jurisdiction over the intrastate market for the first time. See the Act’s §§311 and 312, 15 U. S. C. §§3371 and 3372. Appellees argue, however, that §§601(a)(l)(B)(i) and (ii), 15 U. S. C. §§3431(a)(l)(B)(i) and (ii), stripped FERC of jurisdiction over the Harper Sand pool gas which was the subject of the Gas Board’s Rule 48 order, thereby leaving the State free to regulate Transco’s purchases. Section 601(a)(1)(B) states that “the provisions of [the NGA] and the jurisdiction of the Commission under such Act shall not apply solely by reason of any first sale” of high-cost or new natural gas. Moreover, although FERC retains some control over pipelines’ downstream pricing practices, § 601(c)(2) requires FERC to permit Transco to pass along to its customers the cost of the gas it purchases “except to the extent the Commission determines that the amount paid was excessive due to fraud, abuse, or similar grounds.” According to appel-lees, FERC’s regulation of Transco’s involvement with high-cost gas can now concern itself only with Transco’s sales to its customers; FERC, it is said, cannot interfere with Transco’s purchases of new natural gas from its suppliers. Appellees believe that the Gas Board order concerns only this latter relationship, and therefore is not pre-empted by federal regulation of other aspects of the gas industry. That FERC can no longer step in to regulate directly the prices at which pipelines purchase high-cost gas, however, has little to do with whether state regulations that affect a pipeline’s costs and purchasing patterns impermissibly intrude upon federal concerns. Mississippi’s action directly undermines Congress’ determination that the supply, the demand, and the price of high-cost gas be determined by market forces. To the extent that Congress denied FERC the power to regulate affirmatively particular aspects of the first sale of gas, it did so because it wanted to leave determination of supply and first-sale price to the market. “[A] federal decision to forgo regulation in a given area may imply an authoritative federal determination that the area is best left -unregulated, and in that event would have as much preemptive force as a decision to regulate” (emphasis in original). Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Public Service Comm’n, 461 U. S., at 384. Cf. Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132, 150-151 (1976). The proper question in this case is not whether FERC has affirmative regulatory power over wellhead sales of § 107 gas, but whether Congress, in revising a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme to give market forces a more significant role in determining the supply, the demand, and the price of natural gas, intended to give the States the power it had denied FERC. The answer to the latter question must be in the negative. First, when Congress meant to vest additional regulatory authority in the States it did so explicitly. See §§ 503(c) and 602(a), 15 U. S. C. §§3413(c) and 3432(a). Second, although FERC may now possess less regulatory jurisdiction over the “intricate relationship between the purchasers’ cost structures and eventual costs to wholesale customers who sell to consumers in other States,” Northern Natural, 372 U. S., at 92, than it did under the old regime, that relationship is still a subject of deep federal concern. FERC still must review Transco’s pricing practices, even though its review of Transco’s purchasing behavior has been circumscribed. See App. 148-150, 170. In light of Congress’ intent to move toward a less regulated national natural gas market, its decision to remove jurisdiction from FERC cannot be interpreted as an invitation to the States to impose additional regulations. Mississippi’s order also runs afoul of other concerns identified in Northern Natural. First, it disturbs the uniformity of the federal scheme, since interstate pipelines will be forced to comply with varied state regulations of their purchasing practices. In light of the NGPA’s unification of the interstate and intrastate markets, the contention that Congress meant to permit the States to impose inconsistent regulations is especially unavailing. Second, Mississippi’s order would have the effect of increasing the ultimate price to consumers. Take-or-pay provisions are standard industrywide. See Pierce, 68 Va. L. Rev., at 77-78; H. R. Rep. No. 98-814, pp. 23-25, 133-134 (1984). Pipelines are already committed to purchase gas in excess of market demand. Mississippi’s rule will require Transco to take delivery of noncontract gas; this will lead Transco not to take delivery of contract gas elsewhere, thus triggering take-or-pay provisions. Trans-co’s customers will ultimately bear such increased costs, see App. 161, unless FERC finds that Transco’s purchasing practices are abusive. In fact, FERC is challenging, on grounds of abuse, the automatic passthrough of some of the costs Transco has incurred in its purchases of high-cost gas. See App. 177-178. In any event, the federal scheme is disrupted: if customers are forced to pay higher prices because of Mississippi’s ratable-take requirement, then Mississippi’s rule frustrates the federal goal of ensuring low prices most effectively; if FERC ultimately finds Transco’s practices abusive and refuses to allow a passthrough, then FERC’s and Mississippi’s orders to Transco will be in direct conflict. The change in regulatory perspective embodied in the NGPA rested in significant part on the belief that direct federal price control exacerbated supply and demand problems by preventing the market from making long-term adjustments. Mississippi’s actions threaten to distort the market once again by artificially increasing supply and price. Although, in the long run, producers and pipelines may be able to adjust their selling and purchasing patterns to take account of ratable-take orders, requiring such future adjustments in an industry where long-term contracts are the norm will postpone achievement of Congress’ aims in enacting the NGPA. We therefore conclude that Mississippi’s ratable-take order is pre-empted. IV Because we have concluded that the Gas Board’s order is pre-empted by the NGA and NGPA, we need not reach the question whether, absent federal occupation of the field, Mississippi’s action would nevertheless run afoul of the Commerce Clause. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi is therefore reversed. It is so ordered. Order No. 409-82 directed Transco “forthwith to comply with Statewide Rule 48 of the State Oil and Gas Board of Mississippi in its purchases of gas from the said Harper Sand Gas Pool in Greens Creek and East Mor-gantown Fields, and. . . ratably take and purchase gas without discrimination in favor of one owner, operator or producer against another in the said common source of [sic] pool; and, specifically, in the event it so chooses and elects to take and purchase gas produced from the said common pool, Transco shall ratably take and purchase without discrimination in favor of the operators Getty and Tomlinson against Coastal, the Fairchilds, and Inexco.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 112a. Transco’s other claims, a void-for-vagueness challenge, a Takings Clause argument, and various state-law claims, were rejected with one exception. The court found that, although the Gas Board had the power to order Transco to take ratably from the Harper Sand pool, it lacked the power to prohibit Transco from paying different prices for gas owned by nonparties to its original contracts. Therefore, Transco need pay Coastal only the current market price, rather than the higher price it was paying Getty and Tomlinson under its contracts with them. A ratable-production order in essence allocates pro rata among interest owners the right to produce the amount of gas demanded. For example, if one interest owner owns 75% of the gas in a common pool with 100 units of gas and demand is 60 units, then the majority owner will be permitted to sell only 45 of his units, even though he owns, and is capable of producing, 75 units. The Court noted, 340 U. S., at 185, that it had “upheld numerous kinds of state legislation designed to curb waste of natural resources and to protect the correlative rights of owners through ratable taking, Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210 (1932),” but it is clear from the context of that statement that those challenges had involved claims by gas owners under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, rather than claims of federal pre-emption: “These ends have been held to justify control over production even though the uses to which property may profitably be put are restricted.” Id., at 185-186. On October 31, 1985, FERC issued an initial decision, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 33 FERC ¶63,026, finding that Transeo’s purchases of Harper Sand gas pursuant to the ratable-take order were not imprudent. But the grounds on which the Administrative Law Judge rested his conclusion demonstrate how Mississippi’s action impermissibly interferes with FERC’s regulatory jurisdiction. FERC’s staff had requested the judge to order Transco “to pursue a least-cost purchasing strategy irrespective of Rule k8. ” Id., at 65,073 (emphasis in original). The judge refused: “In my view, Transco is entitled, indeed is required, to follow the decisions of the Mississippi authorities until and unless they be overturned by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Id., at 65,074. Had the judge considered FERC’s claim on the merits, the conflict between the federal and state schemes would be patent. But his belief that he was constrained to find Transco’s practices reasonable because they were undertaken in compliance with Mississippi law is almost as demonstrative of pre-emption. First, Mississippi cannot be permitted to foreclose what would otherwise be more searching federal oversight of purchasing practices. Second, the mere exercise of federal regulatory power, even if it does not result in invalidation of the challenged act, shows continued federal occupation of the field. Since no evidence exists to suggest Congress intended FERC’s power to be circumscribed by state action, Rule 48 is pre-empted. The dissent’s complaint that Congress did not intend to decontrol supply and demand, post, at 433, n. 5, misses the point. Congress clearly intended to eliminate the distortive effects that NGA price control had had on supply and demand. To suggest that Congress was willing to replace this distortion with a distortion on price caused by a State’s decision to require pipelines and, ultimately, interstate consumers, to purchase gas they do not want — the purpose of the order in this case — requires taking an artificially formalistic view of what Congress sought to achieve in the NGPA.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

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LOEFFLER v. FRANK, POSTMASTER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES No. 86-1431. Argued January 11, 1988 Decided June 13, 1988 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, Marshall, Stevens, and Scalia, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 566. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Lisa S. Van Amburg argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Charles A. Rothfeld argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Ayer, John F. Daly, and Stephen E. Alpem. Julius LeVonne Chambers, Gail J. Wright, and Charles Stephen Ralston filed a brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether prejudgment interest may be awarded in a suit against the United States Postal Service brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq. I Petitioner Theodore J. Loeffler was discharged from his position as a rural letter carrier for the United States Postal Service. Petitioner appealed his termination to the Merit Systems Protection Board and, when his discharge was affirmed there, sought administrative relief from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. This, also, was without success. Contending that his discharge resulted from sex discrimination, petitioner subsequently brought this suit against the Postmaster General of the United States in his official capacity, pursuant to § 717 of Title VII, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-16. After a bench trial, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri concluded that petitioner was a victim of discrimination and ordered his reinstatement with backpay. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-26. Relying on a decision of its controlling court, Cross v. USPS, 733 F. 2d 1327, 1332 (CA8 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 470 U. S. 1051 (1985), the District Court refused to award prejudgment interest. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-21. (In Cross, an equally divided Court of Appeals had affirmed the same District Judge’s conclusion that sovereign immunity barred an award of prejudgment interest in a Title VII suit against the Postal Service.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of prejudgment interest. Loeffler v. Carlin, 780 F. 2d 1365, 1370-1371 (1985). Concluding that the District Court’s reliance on Cross was “understandable and proper,” id., at 1370, the court stated: “If the question of prejudgment interest is to be reconsidered, it should be reconsidered by the Court en banc.” Id., at 1371. Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit undertook that en banc reconsideration, and, by a 6-to-5 vote, affirmed the judgment of the District Court. Loeffler v. Tisch, 806 F. 2d 817 (1986). The majority adopted the reasoning of the majority of the original panel in Cross, 733 F. 2d 1327, which concluded that Congress had not waived the sovereign immunity of the Postal Service with regard to prejudgment interest in a Title VII suit. The majority found its conclusion “strongly reinforced” by this Court’s recent decision in Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S. 810 (1986), which the majority interpreted as “holding that Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not waive the Government’s immunity from interest.” 806 F. 2d, at 818. In the majority’s view, Congress’ provision in the 1970 Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U. S. C. § 401(1), that the Postal Service may “sue and be sued” was irrelevant to the question before it, because “a sue-and-be-sued clause does not expand the obligations of a federal entity in a suit brought pursuant to another statute that is itself a waiver of immunity and which constitutes an exclusive remedy.” 806 F. 2d, at 819. The 5-judge dissent adopted the reasoning of the dissent in the Cross panel submission. That dissent had concluded that “limits on prejudgment interest have been imposed solely because of the barrier of sovereign immunity,” 733 F. 2d, at 1332, and that the sue-and-be-sued clause in the Postal Reorganization Act had eliminated that barrier in actions against the Postal Service. The dissent noted this Court’s observation in Shaw: “ ‘The no-interest rule is . . . inapplicable where the Government has cast off the cloak of sovereignty and assumed the status of a private commercial enterprise.’” 806 F. 2d, at 822, quoting Shaw, 478 U. S., at 317, n. 5. In the dissent’s view, the Postal Service fits within this exception and, therefore, “an award of prejudgment interest against the Postal Service under Title VII is not barred by sovereign immunity.” 806 F. 2d, at 823. Because of a conflict with the views of the Eleventh Circuit expressed in Nagy v. USPS, 773 F. 2d 1190 (1985), we granted certiorari to decide whether, in a Title VII suit, prejudgment interest may be awarded against the Postal Service. Sub nom. Loeffler v. Tisch, 483 U. S. 1004 (1987). H > The question of statutory interpretation here presented, involving the interaction of the Postal Reorganization Act and Title VII, lends itself to straightforward resolution. Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, the Federal Government is immune from suit. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941). Congress, however, has waived the sovereign immunity of certain federal entities from the times of their inception by including in the enabling legislation provisions that they may sue and be sued. In FHA v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242, 245 (1940), the Court explained: “[S]uch waivers by Congress of governmental immunity . . . should be liberally construed. . . . Hence, when Congress establishes such an agency, authorizes it to engage in commercial and business transactions with the public, and permits it to ‘sue and be sued,’ it cannot be lightly assumed that restrictions on that authority are to be implied. Rather if the general authority to ‘sue and be sued’ is to be delimited by implied exceptions, it must be clearly shown that certain types of suits are not consistent with the statutory or constitutional scheme, that an implied restriction of the general authority is necessary to avoid grave interference with the performance of a governmental function, or that for other reasons it was plainly the purpose of Congress to use the ‘sue and be sued’ clause in a narrow sense. In the absence of such showing, it must be presumed that when Congress launched a governmental agency into the commercial world and endowed it with authority to ‘sue or be sued,’ that agency is not less amenable to judicial process than a private enterprise under like circumstances would be.” (Footnote omitted.) Accord, Franchise Tax Board of California v. USPS, 467 U. S. 512, 517-518 (1984); Reconstruction Finance Corporation v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S. 81, 84-85 (1941); see also Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U. S. 381 (1939). Encompassed within this liberal-construction rule is the principle “that the words ‘sue and be sued’ normally include the natural and appropriate incidents of legal proceedings.” J. G. Menihan Corp., 312 U. S., at 85. In accord with this approach, this Court has recognized that authorization of suits against federal entities engaged in commercial activities may amount to a waiver of sovereign immunity from awards of interest when such awards are an incident of suit. For example, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 267 U. S. 76 (1925), the Court reviewed a suit brought under § 5 of the Act of September 2,1914, ch. 293, 38 Stat. 711, on insurance claims issued by the Bureau of War Risk Insurance. The Court concluded: “When the United States went into the insurance business, issued policies in familiar form and provided that in case of disagreement it might be sued, it must be assumed to have accepted the ordinary incidents of suits in such business.” 267 U. S., at 79. Accordingly, interest was allowed. Ibid. See also National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers v. Parrish, 229 U. S. 494 (1913) (interest allowed against eleemosynary agency that Congress had authorized “to sue and be sued”). Cf. Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S., at 317, n. 5. When Congress created the Postal Service in 1970, it empowered the Service “to sue and be sued in its official name.” 39 U. S. C. § 401(1). This sue-and-be-sued clause was a part of Congress’ general design that the Postal Service “be run more like a business than had its predecessor, the Post Office Department.” Franchise Tax Board of California v. US PS, 467 U. S., at 520. In Franchise Tax Board, this Court examined, in the context of an order issued by a state administrative agency, the extent to which Congress had waived the sovereign immunity of the Postal Service. After noting that “Congress has ‘launched [the Postal Service] into the commercial world,”’ ibid., the Court held that the sue-and-be-sued clause must be liberally construed and that the Postal Service’s liability must be presumed to be the same as that of any other business. Because the order to the Postal Service to withhold employees’ wages had precisely the same effect on the Service’s ability to operate efficiently as did such orders on other employers subject to the state statute that had been invoked, and because the burden of complying with the order would not impair the Service’s ability to perform its functions, the Court concluded that there was no basis for overcoming the presumption that immunity from the state order had been waived. See id., at 520, and n. 14. Our unanimous view of the Postal Service expressed in Franchise Tax Board is controlling here. By launching “the Postal Service into the commercial world,” and including a sue-and-be-sued clause in its charter, Congress has cast off the Service’s “cloak of sovereignty” and given it the “status of a private commercial enterprise.” Shaw, 478 U. S., at 317, n. 5. It follows that Congress is presumed to have waived any otherwise existing immunity of the Postal Service from interest awards. None of the exceptions to the liberal-construction rule that guides our interpretation of the waiver of the. Postal Service’s immunity operates to overcome this presumption. Subjecting the Service to interest awards would not be inconsistent with the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U. S. C. § 101 et seq., the statutory scheme that created the Postal Service, nor would it pose a threat of “grave interference” with the Service’s operation. FHA v. Burr, 309 U. S., at 245. Finally, we find nothing in the statute or its legislative history to suggest that “it was plainly the purpose of Congress to use the ‘sue and be sued’ clause in a narrow sense,” ibid., with regard to interest awards. To the- contrary, since Congress expressly included several narrow and specific limitations on the operation of the sue-and-be-sued clause, see 39 U. S. C. § 409, none of which is applicable here, the natural inference is that it did not intend other limitations to be implied. Accordingly, we conclude that, at the Postal Service’s inception, Congress waived its immunity from interest awards, authorizing recovery of interest from the Postal Service to the extent that interest is recoverable against a private party as a normal incident of suit.' B Respondent concedes, and apparently all the United States Courts of Appeals that have considered the question agree, that Title YII authorizes prejudgment interest as part of the backpay remedy in suits against private employers. This conclusion surely is correct. The backpay award authorized by § 706(g) of Title VII, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(g), is a manifestation of Congress’ intent to make “persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination.” Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 421 (1975). Prejudgment interest, of course, is “an element of complete compensation.” West Virginia v. United States, 479 U. S. 305, 310 (1987). Thus, since Title VII authorizes interest awards as a normal incident of suits against private parties, and since Congress has waived the Postal Service’s immunity from such awards, it follows that respondent may be subjected to an interest award in this case. Ill A In order to address respondent’s arguments, it is necessary to explain briefly the manner in which Title VII provides a cause of action to federal employees. As originally enacted in 1964, Title VII, by excluding federal entities from its definition of employer, see § 701(b) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b), did not provide a cause of action to federal employees. Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820, 825 (1976). In 1972, Congress amended Title VII by adding its § 717, which brought federal employees, including employees of the Postal Service, within the ambit of Title VII. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 111, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-16. In so doing, Congress intended to provide federal employees with “‘the full rights available in the courts as are granted to individuals in the private sector under Title VIL’ ” Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U. S. 840, 841 (1976), quoting S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 16 (1971). Section 717(a) mandates that all personnel actions affecting federal employees covered by that section “shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(a). Section 717(b) provides a detailed administrative enforcement mechanism, and § 717(c) permits an aggrieved employee to file a civil action in federal district court, provided the employee has met certain requirements regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, in enacting § 717, Congress simultaneously provided federal employees with a cause of action under Title VII and effected a waiver of the Government’s immunity from suit. See Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U. S., at 319. The waiver of sovereign immunity effected by § 717, however, was a limited one. “In making the Government liable as a defendant under Title VII, . . . Congress did not waive the Government’s traditional immunity from interest.” Id., at 323. Based on this background, respondent channels his attack into two principal arguments. First, respondent contends that the waiver of sovereign immunity effected by the “sue- and-be-sued” clause of the ^Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U. S. C. §401(1), has no bearing here, regardless of its scope. In respondent’s view, the only waiver of sovereign immunity relevant to a Title VII suit against the Postal Service is the waiver of sovereign immunity found in Title VII itself. Second, respondent argues that, even if the waiver of sovereign immunity provided by § 401 does control, the cause of action that § 717 affords to a Postal Service employee is distinct from the cause of action afforded a private-sector employee and does not provide a basis for an award of prejudgment interest. We examine these contentions in turn. B In support of his argument that the sue-and-bé-sued clause of the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U. S. C. § 401(1), has no force in this case, respondent initially relies on Congress’ failure, at the time it created the Postal Service in 1970, to extend Postal Service employees a cause of action under Title VII. In respondent’s view, this failure constituted a decision to leave intact what respondent characterizes as the “explicit” decision of the Congress that enacted Title VII in 1964 to preserve the sovereign immunity of federal employers in Title VII suits. But the history of the Postal Reorganization Act discussed in n. 7, supra, with its emphasis on the availability of strong remedies for discrimination in the federal employment context, makes clear that Congress’ failure to extend Title VII protections to Postal Service employees did not reflect an intent to circumscribe the waiver of sovereign immunity effected by the sue-and-be-sued clause, but, rather, was a determination that a Title VII cause of action was unnecessary in light of these alternative remedies. The reason Postal Service employees could not bring an employment discrimination suit under Title VII in 1970 — indeed, the reason that federal employees generally could not do so— stemmed not from the Postal Reorganization Act, but from a restriction in Title VII itself: the exclusion of federal entities from the definition of the term “employer.” The Postal Reorganization Act is utterly silent as to Title VII. We reject the notion that Congress’ silence when it creates a new federal entity, with regard to a cause of action that is generally unavailable to federal employees, can be construed as a limitation on the waiver of that entity’s sovereign immunity effected by the inclusion of a sue-and-be-sued clause. Respondent would find further support for his argument that the sue-and-be-sued clause is irrelevant to this case in the manner in which Congress extended a Title VII cause of action to federal employees in 1972. Specifically, respondent relies on a distinction between causes of action that may be asserted against commercial entities generally, as, for example a state garnishment statute, see Franchise Tax Board of California v. USPS, 467 U. S. 512 (1984), and causes of action, such as § 717 of Title VII, that contain special procedures and limitations applicable only to federal defendants. Respondent contends that while a sue-and-be-sued clause may apply to a suit against a federal entity in the former class of actions, it has no bearing in the latter. We are not persuaded by this argument for two reasons. First, this is an argument for an implied exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity effected by a sue-and-be-sued clause. Yet respondent offers no reason for concluding that Congress intended his implied exception to be added to those that this Court articulated in FHA v. Burr, 309 U. S., at 245, and we see no reason why we should do so. Second, when Congress intends the waiver of sovereign immunity in a new cause of action directed against federal entities to be exclusive, —in effect, to limit the force of “sue- and-be-sued” clauses — it has said so expressly. Congress’ waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States for certain torts of federal employees, in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680, provides an example. Prior to the FTCA’s enactment, certain federal agencies were already suable in tort. Although Congress enacted the FTCA to allow suits against many agencies that previously had been immune from suits in tort, it also wished to “place torts of ‘suable’ agencies of the United States upon precisely the same footing as torts of ‘nonsuable’ agencies.” H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1945). Accordingly, Congress expressly limited the waivers of sovereign immunity that it had previously effected through “sue- and-be-sued” clauses and stated that, in the context of suits for which it provided a cause of action under the FTCA, “sue- and-be-sued” agencies would be subject to suit only to the same limited extent as agencies whose sovereign immunity from tort suits was being waived for the first time: “The authority of any federal agency, to sue and be sued in its own name shall not be construed to authorize suits against such federal agency on claims which are cognizable under section 1346(b) of this title, and the remedies provided by this title in such cases shall be exclusive.” 28 U. S. C. § 2679(a). In contrast, neither the language of § 717 of Title VII nor its legislative history contains an expression that the waiver of sovereign immunity it effected was intended also to narrow the waiver of sovereign immunity of entities subject to sue- and-be-sued clauses. Accordingly, we reject respondent’s contention that 39 U. S. C. §401(1) has no application here. c Respondent next argues that, even if the waiver of sovereign immunity effected by § 401(1) is controlling, an award of prejudgment interest is inappropriate because the statute that provides petitioner with his cause of action, § 717 of Title VII, does not authorize interest awards. Respondent starts from the premise that had Congress expressly stated that prejudgment interest is unavailable in actions under §717, the outcome of this case would be beyond dispute. Therefore, it is claimed, “[t]he fact that the ‘no-interest’ rule is not made explicit in the statute, but rather is a conclusion drawn by this Court in Shaw . . . , does not make the rule any less binding.” Brief for Respondent 16. This argument, in our view, misunderstands both the nature of the remedy § 717 affords and the basis of our holding in Shaw. Without doubt, petitioner’s cause of action in this case is derived from §717. We do not disagree with respondent that, had §717 explicitly stated that the cause of action it provided did not include prejudgment interest, such interest would be unavailable in this case. But Congress made no express statement of that kind. To the contrary, Congress expressly incorporated in §717 provisions of Title VII that allow an interest award. Specifically, § 717(c), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(c), provides that, after pursuing various mandatory administrative remedies, an unsatisfied §717 plaintiff “may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title,” which governs enforcement actions against private employers. Thus, although petitioner’s cause of action under § 717 is circumscribed by mandatory administrative prerequisites that are distinct from the prerequisites for a civil suit brought against a private employer, a § 717 suit, once commenced, is delineated by the same provisions as a suit against a private employer. Most importantly for the purposes of this case, § 717(d) explicitly incorporates § 706(g) of Title VII into the cause of action provided. Section 706(g) allows a court to “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, . . . including]. . . back pay ... , or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(g). This provision thus governs the remedies available in both a Title VII suit brought against a federal employer under § 717 and a Title VII suit brought against a private employer. Cf. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U. S., at 843-848. And, just as this section provides for prejudgment interest in a Title VII suit against a private employer, it provides for prejudgment interest in a Title VII suit brought under § 717. Respondent’s view that Shaw stands for the proposition that § 717 implicitly states that prejudgment interest is unavailable in all suits brought under that section misunderstands the basis of our holding in that case. In Shaw, the Court faced the question whether § 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(k), which provides that a party prevailing against the United States may recover attorney’s fees from the United States, waived the sovereign immunity of the Library of Congress with respect to interest on an attorney’s fees award. Unlike the Postal Service, the Library of Congress was not a “sue-and-be-sued” agency that Congress had “‘launched . . . into the commercial world,’” and thereby broadly waived sovereign immunity. Franchise Tax Board of California v. USPS, 467 U. S., at 520, quoting FHA v. Burr, 309 U. S., at 245. Thus, the starting point for our analysis was the “no-interest rule,” which is to the effect that, absent express consent by Congress, the United States is immune from interest awards. See Shaw, 478 U. S., at 314. The dispositive question was not whether Title VII provided a cause of action that would allow recovery of interest, but, rather, whether Title VII contained an express waiver of the Library of Congress’ immunity from interest. Because no such waiver is contained within Title VII, the no-interest rule barred recovery of interest from the Library of Congress on the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees award. This conclusion had nothing to do with the scope of a § 717 cause of action. The Court expressly noted in Shaw: “The no-interest rule is . . . inapplicable where the Government has cast off the cloak of sovereignty and assumed the status of a private commercial enterprise.” 478 U. S., at 317, n. 5. In creating the Postal Service, Congress did just that, and therefore, the no-interest rule does not apply to it. Thus, the search for an express waiver of immunity from interest within Title VII, which is all that Shaw was about, is unnecessary in this case. As discussed above, §401 of the Postal Reorganization Act provides the waiver of sovereign immunity from interest awards against the Postal Service, and § 717 of Title VII provides the cause of action under which petitioner may recover interest. IV Accordingly, we conclude that interest may be awarded against the Postal Service in a Title VII suit. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Petitioner’s discharge arose from his practice of casing boxholder mail. “Boxholder” mail is third-class mail that does not bear the name and address of a particular individual but is given to the postal carrier in a single bundle for delivery to each current resident or possessor of a rural-delivery mailbox. The District Court explained: “ ‘Casing’ is the practice of inserting the boxholders in each separation of the delivery case in the post office work area prior to delivery, and then inserting the first or second class mail inside the boxholders so that the boxholders form a convenient sleeve for the rest of the pieces of mail and thus make delivery quicker and easier. The alternative to easing the boxholders is to carry them as separate bundles and insert them into each individual post box during delivery.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-28. In 1979, pursuant to directives from Postal Service headquarters in Washington, D. C., all five rural carriers at the Chesterfield, Mo., Post Office, including petitioner, were instructed not to case the boxholders. The rule against casing was openly violated by petitioner and by two female rural carriers. Although all three carriers repeatedly ignored the rule, only petitioner was discharged, while the two female carriers were disciplined mildly or not at all. At the time this suit was filed, William F. Bolger, then Postmaster General, was the named defendant. While the case was pending on appeal, Bolger was succeeded as Postmaster General and as defendant by Paul N. Carlin and, subsequently, by Preston R. Tisch. After oral argument before this Court, Tisch was succeeded by Anthony M. Frank. General Frank has been substituted as respondent pursuant to this Court’s Rule 40.3. In Shaw, the Court held that sovereign immunity bars the payment of interest on attorney’s fees awarded against the Library of Congress under Title VII. The Court’s holding came “against the backdrop of the no-interest rule,” Shaw, 478 U. S., at 319, which provides: “Apart from constitutional requirements, in the absence of specific provision by contract or statute, or ‘express consent ... by Congress,’ interest does not run on a claim against the United States.” United States v. Louisiana, 446 U. S. 253, 264-265 (1980), quoting United States v. N. Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U. S. 654, 659 (1947). Section 409 provides in part: “(b) Unless otherwise provided in this title, the provisions of title 28 relating to service of process, venue, arid limitations of time for bringing action in suits in which the United States, its officers, or employees are parties, . . . shall apply in like manner to suits in which the Postal Service, its officers, or employees are parties. “(c) The provisions of chapter 171 and all other provisions of title 28 relating to tort claims shall apply to tort claims arising out of activities of the Postal Service.” See Brief for Respondent 9. See also Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F. 2d 593, 602 (CA1 1987); Green v. USX Cory., 843 F. 2d 1511, 1530 (CA3 1988); United States v. Gregory, 818 F. 2d 1114, 1118 (CA4), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 847 (1987); Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 727 F. 2d 473, 478 (CA5), cert. denied, 467 U. S. 1243 (1984); EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. Emyloyees Relief Assn., 727 F. 2d 566, 578-579 (CA6 1984); Taylor v. Philips Industries, Inc., 593 F. 2d 783, 787 (CA7 1979); Washington v. Kroger Co., 671 F. 2d 1072, 1078 (CA8 1982); Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F. 2d 1429, 1446 (CA9), modified on other grounds, 742 F. 2d 520 (1984); Nagy v. USPS, 773 F. 2d 1190 (CA11 1985). Cf. EEOC v. County of Erie, 751 F. 2d 79, 82 (CA2 1984) (interest allowed on backpay award under Equal Pay Act); Shaw v. Library of Congress, 241 U. S. App. D. C. 355, 361, 747 F. 2d 1469, 1475 (1984) (interest allowed on Title VII attorney’s fees award), rev’d on other grounds, 478 U. S. 310 (1986). Indeed, to ensure that victims of employment discrimination would be provided complete relief, Congress also gave the courts broad equitable powers. See § 706(g) of Title VII, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(g); see generally Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S., at 418-421. When the Senate was considering its version of the Postal Reorganization Act, Senator Cook proposed a floor amendment “to give postal service employees the equal employment opportunity rights provided by title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that employees in private industry have benefited from since 1964.” 116 Cong. Rec. 22279 (1970). The Senate approved the amendment by a 93-0 vote. See id., at 22279-22280. The Cook amendment was deleted in conference, however, because the conferees were persuaded that the “present law affecting all Federal employees, including employees under the new Postal Service, guarantee® antidis-crimination provisions ... of greater benefit . . . than the provisions of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Id., at 26953 (remarks of Sen. McGee); see also, id., at 26956, 26957 (remarks of Sen. McGee); id., at 27597 (remarks of Rep. Daniels). Senator McGee, who presented the Conference Report to the Senate, “guarantee®” that if the current bill did not “achieve the laudable purpose that the Cook amendment intended,” the Senate would immediately enact appropriate legislation. Id., at 26957 (remarks of Sen. McGee). Respondent also seeks comfort from the concededly technical distinction that this suit, in accordance with the provisions of § 717(c) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(c), named the head of the Postal Service as defendant, while 39 U. S. C. § 401(1) makes the Postal Service amenable to suit “in its official name.” In FHA v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242, 249-250 (1940), however, we found such a distinction between a suit against the head of an agency and a suit against the agency itself irrelevant to the force of a “sue- and-be-sued” clause. In Burr, the “sue-and-be-sued” clause in § 1 of the National Housing Act, 48 Stat. 1246, as amended by § 344 of the Banking Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 722, applied to the Administrator of the Federal Housing Authority acting in his official capacity. The Court concluded that this waiver of sovereign immunity permitted actions against the Authority itself, because under the terms of the Act, all the powers of the Authority were exercised through the Administrator. This case presents the inverse situation: the “sue-and-be-sued” clause authorizes suits against the agency, and the defendant before the Court is the head of the agency acting in his official capacity. However, the same logic applies. Whenever the head of the Postal Service acts in his official capacity, he is acting in the name of the Postal Service. Thus, here, as in Burr, the acts of the named defendant are always chargeable as acts of the person or entity subject to the sue-and-be-sued clause. We therefore are not persuaded by respondent’s procedural distinction.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

WHEELER et al. v. BARRERA et al. No. 73-62. Argued January 16, 1974 Decided June 10, 1974 BlackmuN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burgee, C. J., and BrenNAN, Stewart, Powell, and RehNQUIST, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 428. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 428. Marshall, J., concurred in the result. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 429. Leo Pfeffer argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Harry D. Dingman and James B. Lowe. Thomas M. Sullivan argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Edward L. Fitzgerald and Louis C. DeFeo, Jr. Deputy Solicitor General Friedman argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jaffe, Danny J. Boggs, Morton Hollander, John B. Rhinelander, Harry J. Cher-nock, and William A. Kaplin. Kenneth W. Greenawalt, Melvin L. Wvlf, and Walter Wright filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance‘were filed by William B. Consedine, George E. Reed, Charles M. Whelan, and Alfred L. Scan-lan for the United States Catholic Conference; by William B. Ball and Joseph G. Shelly for the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights et al.; by Nathan Lewin for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs; and by James P. Finnegan, Jr., for Parents Rights, Inc., et al. Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Paul S. Berger, Theodore R. Mann, Larry M. Lavinshy, Henry N. Rapaport, and Joseph B. Robison of the American Jewish Congress et al., and by G. Dennis Sullivan for the Missouri Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 241a et seq., provides for federal funding of special programs for educationally deprived children in both public and private schools. This suit was instituted on behalf of parochial school students who were eligible for Title I benefits and who claimed that the public school authorities in their area, in violation of the Act, failed to provide adequate Title I programs for private school children as compared with those programs provided for public school children. The defendants answered that the extensive aid sought by the plaintiffs exceeded the requirements of Title I and contravened the State's Constitution and state law and public policy. First Amendment rights were also raised by the parties. The District Court, concluding that the State had fulfilled its Title I obligations, denied relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, by a divided vote, reversed. 475 F. 2d 1338 (1973). We granted certiorari to examine serious questions that appeared to be present as to the scope and constitutionality of Title I. 414 U. S. 908 (1973). I Title I is the first federal-aid-to-education program authorizing assistance for private school children as well as for public school children. The Congress, by its statutory declaration of policy, and otherwise, recognized that all children from educationally deprived areas do not necessarily attend the public schools, and that, since the legislative aim was to provide needed assistance to educationally deprived children rather than to specific schools, it was necessary to include eligible private school children among the beneficiaries of the Act. Since the Act was designed to be administered by local public education officials, a number of problems naturally arise in the delivery of services to eligible private school pupils. Under the administrative structure envisioned by the Act, the priihary responsibility for designing and effectuating a Title I program rests with what the Act and the implementing regulations describe as the “local educational agency.” This local agency submits to the “State educational agency” a proposed program designed to meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived children in school attendance areas with high concentrations of children from low-income families. The state agency then must approve the local plan and, in turn, forward the approved proposal to the United States Commissioner of Education, who has the ultimate responsibility for' administering the program and dispensing the appropriated and allocated funds. In order to receive state approval, the proposed plan, among other requirements, must be designed to provide the eligible private school students services that are “comparable in quality, scope, and opportunity for participation to those provided for public school children with needs of equally high priority.” United States Office of Education (USOE) Program Guide No. 44, ¶4.5 (1968), reproduced in Title I ESEA, Participation of Private School Children — A Handbook for State and Local School Officials, U. S. Dept, of Health, Education, and Welfare, Publication No. (OE) 72-62, p.. 41 (1971) (hereinafter referred to as the Handbook). The questions that arise in this case concern the scope of the State’s duty to insure that a program submitted by a local agency under Title I provides “comparable” services for eligible private school children. II Plaintiff-respondents are parents of minor children attending elementary and secondary nonpublic schools in the inner city area of Kansas City, Missouri. They instituted this class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri on behalf of themselves and their children, and others similarly situated, alleging that the defendant-petitioners, the then State Commissioner of Education and the members of the Missouri Board of Education, arbitrarily and illegally were approving Title I programs that deprived eligible nonpublic school children of services comparable to those offered eligible public school children. The complaint sought an injunction restraining continued violations of the Act and an accounting and restoration of some $13,000,000 in Title I funds allegedly misapplied from 1966 to 1969. The District Court initially dismissed the complaint on the alternative grounds of failure to exhaust state remedies and abstention. The Court of Appeals reversed this dismissal and remanded the case for trial. 441 F. 2d 795 (CA8 1971). It observed: “[W]e indicate no opinion on the merits of the alleged noncompliance by the state officials.” Id., at 801. On remand, the District Court found that while most of the Title I funds allocated to public schools in Missouri were used “to employ teachers to instruct in remedial subjects,” the petitioners had refused “to approve any applications allocating money for teachers in parochial schools during regular school hours.” Pet. for Cert. A40. The court did find that petitioners in some instances had approved the use of Title I money “to provide mobile educational services and equipment, visual aids, and educational radio and television in parochial schools. Teachers for after-school classes, weekend classes, and summer school classes, all open to parochial school pupils, have all been approved.” Id., at A40-A41. In what perhaps may be described as something less than full cooperation by both sides, the possibility of providing “comparable” services was apparently frustrated by the fact that many parochial schools would accept only services in the form of assignment of federally funded Title I teachers to teach in those schools during regular school hours. At the same time, the petitioners refused to approve any program providing for on-the-premises instruction on the grounds that it was forbidden under both Missouri law and the First Amendment and, furthermore, that Title I did not require it. Since the larger portion (over 65%) of Title! funds allocated to Missouri has been used to provide personnel for remedial instruction, the effect of this stalemate is that substantially less money per pupil has been expended for eligible students in private schools, and that the services provided in those schools in no sense can be considered “comparable.” Faced with this situation, the District Court recognized that “[t]his head-on conflict . . . has resulted in an undoubtedly inequitable expenditure of Title I funds between educationally deprived children in public and nonpublic schools in some local school districts in the state.” Id., at A41. Nonetheless, the District Court denied relief. It reasoned that since the petitioners were under no statutory obligation to provide on-the-premises nonpublic school instruction, the failure to provide that instruction could not violate the Act. The court further reasoned that since the petitioners apparently had approved all programs “except those requesting salaried teachers in the nonpublic schools,” id., at A43, they had fulfilled their commitment. The court did not directly consider whether programs in effect without on-the-premises private school instruction complied with the comparability requirement despite gross disparity in the services delivered. The Court of Appeals reversed. It traced the legislative history of Title I, examined the language of the statute and the regulations, and noted “that the Act and the regulations require a program for educationally deprived non-public school children that is comparable in quality, scope and opportunity, which may or may not necessarily be equal in dollar expenditures to that provided in the public schools.” 475 F. 2d, at 1344. The court then observed that the Act does not mandate that services take any particular form and that, within the confines of the comparability requirement, the Act left to the state and local agencies the task of designing a program best suited to meet the particularized needs of both the public school children and the nonpublic school children in the area. After reviewing the unique situation existing in Missouri, where funds were grossly malapportioned due to the refusal to employ either dual enrollment or Title I teachers on private school premises, the court concluded that the petitioners were in violation of the comparability requirement: “Thus, we find that when the need of educationally disadvantaged children requires it, Title I authorizes special teaching services, as contemplated within the Act and regulations, to be furnished by the public agency on private as well as public school premises. In other words, we think it clear that the Act demands that if such special services are furnished public school children, then comparable programs, if needed, must be provided the disadvantaged private school child.” Id., at 1353. In response to petitioners’ argument that Missouri law forbids sending public school teachers into private schools, the court held that the state constitutional provision barring use of “public” school funds in private schools had no application to Title I funds. The court reasoned that although the Act was generally to be accommodated to state law, the question whether Title I funds were “public,” within the meaning of the Missouri Constitution, must necessarily be decided by federal law. Id., at 1351— 1353. Finally, the court refused to pass on petitioners’ claim that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment would be violated if Title I, in fact, does require or permit service by public school teachers on private school premises. The reason stated for the court’s refusal was that since no plan had yet been implemented, the court “must refrain from passing upon important constitutional questions on an abstract or hypothetical basis.” Id., at 1354. The dissent argued that although Title I permits the assignment of Title I teachers to nonpublic schools, it does not mandate that assignment, and that if the Act is to be read as embracing such a mandate, it would present substantial First Amendment problems that could not be avoided. Id., at 1358-1359. III In this Court the parties are at odds over two issues: First, whether on this record Title I requires the assignment of publicly employed teachers to provide remedial instruction during regular school hours on the premises of private schools attended by Title I eligible students, and, second, whether that requirement, if it exists, contravenes the First Amendment. We conclude that we cannot reach and decide either issue at this stage of the proceedings. A. Title I requirements. As the case was presented to the District Court, petitioners clearly had failed to meet their statutory commitment to provide comparable services to children in nonpublic schools. The services provided to the class of children represented by respondents were plainly inferior, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the District Court erred in refusing to order relief. But the opinion of the Court of Appeals is not to be read to the effect that petitioners must submit and approve plans that employ the use of Title I teachers on private school premises during regular school hours. The legislative history, the language of the Act, and the regulations clearly reveal the intent of Congress to place plenary responsibility in local and state agencies for the formulation of suitable programs under the Act. There was a pronounced aversion in Congress to “federalization” of local educational decisions. “It is the intention of the proposed legislation not to prescribe the specific types of programs or projects that will be required in school districts. Rather, such matters are left to the discretion and judgment of the local public educational agencies since educational needs and requirements for strengthening educational opportunities for educationally deprived elementary and secondary school pupils will vary from State to State and district to district.” H. R. Rep. No. 143, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1965); S. Rep. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1965). And 20 U. S. C. § 1232a provides, inter alia: “No provision of . . . the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 . . . shall be construed to authorize any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States to exercise any direction, supervision, or control over the curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or personnel of any educational institution, school, or school system ....” Although this concern was directed primarily at the possibility of HEW’s assuming the role of a national school board, it has equal application to the possibility of a federal court’s playing an overly active role in supervising the manner of Title I expenditures. At the outset, we believe that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that federal law governed the question whether on-the-premises private school instruction is permissible under Missouri law. Whatever the case might be if there were no expression of specific congressional intent, Title I evinces a clear intention that state constitutional spending proscriptions not be pre-empted as a condition of accepting federal funds. The key issue, namely, whether federal aid is money “donated to any state fund for public school purposes,” within the meaning of the Missouri Constitution, Art. 9, § 5, is purely a question of state and not federal law. By characterizing the problem as one involving “federal” and not “state” funds, and then concluding that federal law governs, the Court of Appeals, we feel, in effect nullified the Act’s policy of accommodating state law. The correct rule is that the “federal law” under Title I is to the effect that state law should not be disturbed. If it is determined, ultimately, that the petitioners’ position is a correct exposition of Missouri law, Title I requires, not that that law be preempted, but, rather, that it be accommodated by the use of services not proscribed under state law. The question whether Missouri law prohibits the use of Title I funds for on-the-premises private school instruction is still unresolved. See n. 9, supra. Furthermore, in the present posture of this case, it was unnecessary for the federal court even to reach the issue whether on-the-premises parochial school instruction is permissible under state law. The state-law question appeared in the case by way of petitioners’ defense that it could not provide on-the-premises services because it was prohibited by the State’s Constitution. But, as is discussed more fully below, the State is not obligated by Title I to provide on-the-premises instruction. The mandate is to provide “comparable” services. Assuming, arguendo, that state law does prohibit on-the-premises instruction, this would not provide a defense to respondents’ complaint that comparable services are not being provided. The choice of programs is left to the State with the proviso that comparable (not identical) programs are also made available to eligible private school children. If one form of services to parochial school children is rendered unavailable because of state constitutional proscriptions, the solution is to employ an acceptable alternative form. In short, since the illegality under state law of on-the-premises instruction would not provide a defense to respondents’ charge of noncompliance with Title I, there was no reason for the Court of Appeals to reach this issue. By deciding that on-the-premises instruction was not barred by state law, the court in effect issued an advisory opinion. Even apart from traditional policies of abstention and comity, it was unnecessary to decide this question in the current posture of the case. The Court of Appeals properly recognized, as we have noted, that petitioners failed to meet their broad obligation and commitment under the Act to provide comparable programs. “Comparable,” however, does not mean “identical,” and, contrary to the assertions of both sides, we do not read the Court of Appeals’ opinion or, for that matter, the Act itself, as ever requiring that identical services be provided in nonpublic schools. Congress recognized that the needs of educationally deprived children attending nonpublic schools might be different from those of similar children in public schools; it was also recognized that in some States certain programs for private and parochial schools would be legally impossible because of state constitutional restrictions, most notably in the church-state area. See n. 9, supra. Title I was not intended to override these individualized state restrictions. Rather, there was a clear intention that the assistance programs be designed on local levels so as to accommodate the restrictions. Inasmuch as comparable, and not identical, services are required, the mere fact that public school children are provided on-the-premises Title I instruction does not necessarily create an obligation to make identical provision for private school children. Congress expressly-recognized that different and unique problems and needs might make it appropriate to utilize different programs in the private schools. A requirement of identity would run directly counter to this recognition. It was anticipated, to be sure, that one of the options open to the local agency in designing a suitable program for private school children was the provision of on-the-premises instruction, and on remand this is an option open to these petitioners and the local agency. If, however, petitioners choose not to pursue this method, or if it turns out that state law prevents its use, three broad options still remain: First, the State may approve plans that do not utilize on-the-premises private school Title I instruction but, nonetheless, still measure up to the requirement of comparability. Respondents appear to be arguing here that it is impossible to provide “comparable” services if the public schools receive on-the-premises Title I instruction while private school children are reached in an alternative method. In support of their position, respondents argue: “The most effective type of services is that provided by a teacher or other specialist during regular school hours. There is nothing comparable to the services of personnel except the services of personnel.” Brief for Respondents 49. In essence, respondents are asking this Court to hold, as a matter of federal law, that one mode of delivering remedial Title I services is superior to others. To place on this Court, or on any federal court, the responsibility of ruling on the relative merits of various possible Title I programs seriously misreads the clear intent of Congress to leave decisions of that kind to the local and state agencies. It is unthinkable, both in terms of the legislative history and the basic structure of the federal judiciary, that the courts be given the function of measuring the comparative desirability of various pedagogical methods contemplated by the Act. In light of the uncontested statutory proscription in Missouri against dual enrollment, it may well be a significant challenge to these petitioners and the local agencies in their State to devise plans that utilize on-the-premises public school instruction and, at the same time, forgo on-the-premises private school instruction. We cannot say, however, that this is an impossibility; by relying upon “the initiative of school administrators to develop a program that would meet the Federal [comparability] requirements,” Handbook 20, it may well be possible to develop and submit an acceptable plan under Title I. Of course, the cooperation and assistance of the officials of the private school are obviously expected and required in order to design a program that is suitable for the private school. It is clear, however, that the Act places ultimate responsibility and control with the public agency, and the overall program is not to be defeated simply because the private school refuses to participate unless the aid is offered in the particular form it requests. The private school may refuse to participate if the local program does not meet with its approval. But the result of this would then be that the private school’s eligible children, the direct and intended beneficiaries of the Act, would lose. The Act, however, does not give the private school a veto power over the program selected by the local agency. In sum, although it may be difficult, it is not impossible under the Act to devise and implement a legal local Title I program with comparable services despite the use of on-the-premises instruction in the public schools but not in the private schools. On the facts of this case, petitioners have been approving plans that do not meet this requirement, and certainly, if public school children continue to receive on-the-premises Title I instruction, petitioners should not approve plans that fail to make a genuine effort to employ comparable alternative programs that make up for the lack of on-the-premises instruction for the nonpublic school children. A program which provides instruction and equipment to the public school children and the same equipment but no instruction to the private school children cannot, on its face, be comparable. In order to equalize the level and quality of services offered, something must be substituted for the private school children. The alternatives are numerous. Providing nothing to fill the gap, however, is not among the acceptable alternatives. Second, if the State is unwilling or unable to develop a plan which is comparable, while using Title I teachers in public but not in private schools, it may develop and submit an acceptable plan which eliminates the use of on-the-premises instruction in the public schools and, instead, resorts to other means, such as neutral sites or summer programs that are less likely to give rise to the gross disparity present in this case. Third, and undoubtedly least attractive for the educationally deprived children, is nonparticipation in the program. Indeed, under the Act, the Commissioner, subject to judicial review, 20 U. S. C. § 241k, may refuse to provide funds if the State does not make a bona fide effort to formulate programs with comparable services. 20 U. S. C. § 241 j. B. First Amendment. The second major issue is whether the Establishment Clause of the Pirst Amendment prohibits Missouri from sending public school teachers paid with Title I funds into parochial schools to teach remedial courses. The Court of Appeals declined to pass on this significant issue, noting that since no order had been entered requiring on-the-premises parochial school instruction, the matter was not ripe for review. We agree. As has been pointed out above, it is possible for the petitioners to comply with Title I without utilizing on-the-premises parochial school instruction. Moreover, even if, on remand, the state and local agencies do exercise their discretion in favor of such instruction, the range of possibilities is a broad one and the First Amendment implications -may vary according to the precise contours of the plan that is formulated. For example, a program whereby a former parochial school teacher is paid with Title I funds to teach full time in a parochial school undoubtedly would present quite different problems than if a public school teacher, solely under public control, is sent into a parochial school to teach special remedial courses a few hours a week. At this time we intimate no view as to the Establishment Clause effect of any particular program. The task of deciding when the Establishment Clause is implicated in the context of parochial school aid has proved to be a delicate one for the Court. Usually it requires a careful evaluation of the facts of the particular case. See, e. g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971). It would be wholly inappropriate for us to attempt to render an opinion on the First Amendment issue when no specific plan is before us. A federal court does not sit to render a decision on hypothetical facts, and the Court of Appeals was correct in so concluding. The Court of Appeals disposed of the case as follows: “The case is remanded to the district court with directions to enjoin the defendants from further violation of Title I of ESEA, and it is further ordered that the court retain continuing jurisdiction of the litigation for the purpose of requiring, within reasonable time limits, the imposition and application of guidelines which will comport with Title I and its regulations. Such guidelines must provide the lawful means and machinery for effectively assuring educationally disadvantaged non-public school children in Missouri participation in a meaningful program as contemplated within the Act which is comparable in size, scope and opportunity to that provided eligible public school children. Such guidelines shall be incorporated into an appropriate injunctive decree by the district court.” 475 F. 2d, at 1355-1356 (footnotes omitted). We affirm this disposition with the understanding that petitioners will be given the opportunity to submit guidelines insuring that only those projects that comply with the Act’s requirements and this opinion will be approved and submitted to the Commission. It is also to be understood that the District Court’s function is not to decide which method is best, or to order that a specific form of service be provided. Rather, the District Court is simply to assure that the state and local agencies fulfill their part of the Title I contract if they choose to accept Title I funds. Cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974). The comparability mandate is a broad one, and in order to implement the overriding concern with localized control of Title I programs, the District Court should make every effort to defer to the judgment of the petitioners and of the local agency. Under the Act, respondents are entitled to comparable services, and they are, therefore, entitled to relief. As we have stated repeatedly herein, they are not entitled to any particular form of service, and it is the role of the state and local agencies, and not of the federal courts, at least at this stage, to formulate a suitable plan. On this basis, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. T. . , , It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Marshall concurs in the result. "In recognition of the special educational needs of children of low-income families and the impact that concentrations of low-income families have on the ability of local educational agencies to support adequate educational programs, the Congress hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to provide financial assistance (as set forth in the following parts of this subchapter) to local educational agencies serving areas with concentrations of children from low-income families to expand and improve their educational programs by various means (including preschool programs) which contribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs of educationally deprived children.” 20 U. S. C. §241a. The implementing regulations, 45 CFR § 116.1, set forth a number of definitions, some in common with, and others in addition to, the definitions contained in the Act itself, 20 U. S. C. § 244. They draw no distinction between public and nonpublic school children. Specifically: “ ‘Educationally deprived children’ means those children who have need for special educational assistance in order that their level of educational attainment may be raised to that appropriate for children of their age. The term includes children who are handicapped or whose needs for such special educational assistance result from poverty, neglect, delinquency, or cultural or linguistic isolation from the community at large.” 45 CFR § 116.1 (i). In order for a local Title I proposal to be approved and a grant received, the local agency must give “satisfactory assurance that the control of funds provided under this subchapter, and title to property derived therefrom, shall be in a public agency for the uses and purposes provided in this subchapter, and that a public agency will administer such funds and property.” 20 U. S. C. § 241e (a)(3). “[T]he term 'local educational agency’ means a public board of education or other public authority legally constituted within a State for either administrative control or direction of, or to perform a service function for, public elementary or secondary schools in a city, county, township, school district, or other political subdivision of a State, or such combination of school districts or counties as are recognized in a State as an administrative agency for its public elementary or secondary schools. Such term includes any other public institution or agency having administrative control and direction of a public elementary or secondary school. . . .” 20 U. S. C. § 244 (6) (B). See also 45 CFR § 116.1 (r). “The term ‘State educational agency’ means the officer or agency primarily responsible for the State supervision of public elementary and secondary schools.” 20 U. S. C. § 244 (7). See also 45 CFR §116.1 (aa). The regulations state: “Each local education agency shall provide special educational services designed to meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived children residing in its district who are enrolled in private schools. Such educationally deprived children shall be provided genuine opportunities to participate therein consistent with the number of such educationally deprived children and the nature and extent of their educational deprivation.” 45 CFR § 116.19 (a). “The needs of educationally deprived children enrolled in private schools, the number of such children who will participate in the program and the types of special educational services to be provided for them, shall be determined, after consultation with persons knowledgeable of the needs of these private school children, on a basis comparable to that used in providing for the participation in the program by educationally deprived children enrolled in public schools.” 45 CFR § 116.19 (b). The Court of Appeals noted: "The practice in Missouri as a whole in prior years has been to give comparable equipment, materials and supplies to eligible private school children, but to exclude any sharing whatsoever of personnel services. Most Title I public school programs in Missouri involve remedial reading, speech therapy and special mathematics classes, thus the largest proportion of the cost of these projects involves salaries for teachers and teacher aids. After the first two years of Title I, expenditures in Missouri for instructional personnel have run from 65 per cent to 70 per cent of the total grant. The remaining funds are used for equipment and materials, health and counseling services, transportation, and plant maintenance. One difficulty with providing only equipment and materials is that even minimal sharing of expenses for equipment and materials soon reaches a saturation point; in fact, the state guidelines permit only 15 per cent of any appropriation to be spent on equipment and instructional materials. The result of this plan for the deprived private school child has been to create a disparity in expenditures in many school districts ranging from approximately $10 to $85 approved for the educationally disadvantaged private school child to approximately $210 to $275 allocated for the deprived public school child.” 475 F. 2d 1338, 1345. An informal survey conducted by the United States Office of Education revealed that Missouri was the only State which did not use either dual enrollment or on-the-premises private school instruction as a means of providing Title I services. Brief for Respondents 93-95. The Missouri Constitution, Art. 9, § 5, provides: “The proceeds of all certificates of indebtedness due the state school fund, and all moneys, bonds, lands, and other property belonging to or donated to any state fund for public school purposes, and the net proceeds of all sales of lands and other property and effects that may accrue to the state by escheat, shall be paid into the state treasury, and securely invested under the supervision of the state board of education, and sacredly preserved as a public school fund the annual income of which shall he faithfully appropriated for establishing and maintaining free public schools, and for no other uses or purposes whatsoever." (Emphasis supplied.) The Constitution, Art. 9, §8, also provides: “Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township, school district or other municipal corporation, shall ever make an appropriation or pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any religious creed, church or sectarian purpose, or to help to support or sustain any private or public school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other institution of learning controlled by any religious creed, church or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any grant or donation of personal property or real estate ever be made by the state, or any county, city, town, or other municipal corporation, for any religious creed, church, or sectarian purpose whatever.” Finally, the Constitution's Bill of Rights, Art. 1, §7, provides: “That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship.” In Special District v. Wheeler, 408 S. W. 2d 60, 63 (1966), the Supreme Court of Missouri held that “the use of public school moneys to send speech teachers . . . into the parochial schools for speech therapy” was not a use “for the purpose of maintaining free public schools,” within the meaning of Art. 9, § 5, of the State’s Constitution, and therefore was a practice “unlawful and invalid.” That case did not involve federal funds. The question in the present ease is whether Title I grants to the State are “donated ... for public school purposes” and therefore subject to the proscription held to exist in Special District. After' that case was decided by the Missouri court, the State Board of Education promulgated a regulation governing the use of Title I funds in Missouri. It provides: “ 'Special educational services and arrangements, including broadened instructional offerings made available to children in private schools, shall be provided at public facilities. Public school personnel shall not be made available in private facilities. This does not prevent the inclusion in a project of special educational arrangements to provide educational radio and television to students at private schools.’ ” See 475 F. 2d, at 1350. In a formal opinion the Attorney General of Missouri has taken the opposing view, stating: “We do not believe that an appropriation of this type [Title I] converts federal aid into state aid, thereby making it subject to the Missouri constitutional provisions.” The opinion concludes: “It is the opinion of this office that the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 provides that, under certain circumstances and to the extent necessary, public school personnel, paid with federal funds pursuant to this program, may be made available on the premises of private schools to provide certain special services to eligible children and that Missouri law would not prevent public school personnel, paid with federal funds, from providing these services on the premises of a private school.” Op. Atty. Gen. No. 26 (1970). This rather fundamental intrastate legal rift apparently has resulted in the Missouri Attorney General’s nonappearance for the petitioners in the present litigation. There is no Missouri case in point. Cf. State ex rel. School District of Hartington v. Nebraska State Board of Education, 188 Neb. 1, 195 N. W. 2d 161, cert. denied, 409 U. S. 921 (1972). On remand from the Court of Appeals the District Court on May 9, 1973, entered an “Injunction and Judgment Issued in Compliance with Mandate” requiring use of Title I personnel on private school premises during regular school hours if such personnel are also used in public schools during regular school hours. Pet. for Cert. A45-A47. Petitioners appealed from that judgment, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as moot after we granted certiorari. Our grant of certiorari was to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals entered pursuant to the opinion reported at 475 F. 2d 1338. The judgment of the District Court on remand is not presently before us. The Act itself does not mention “comparability.” It requires only that the state agency, in approving a plan, must determine “that, to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for including special educational services and arrangements (such as dual enrollment, educational radio and television, and mobile educational services and equipment) in which such children can participate.” 20 U. S. C. § 241e (a) (2). The regulations, 45 CFR §§116.19 (a) and (b), are the source of the comparability requirement. See n. 6, supra. The ease from this Court primarily cited by the Court of Appeals for the proposition that federal, not state, law should govern, is United States v. 93.970 Acres of Land, 360 U. S. 328 (1959). There, however, this Court said: “We have often held that where essential interests of the Federal Government are concerned, federal law rules unless Congress chooses to make state laws applicable. It is apparent that no such choice has been made here.” Id., at 332-333 (footnotes omitted). In the present case, Congress, in fact, has made this choice, see n. 13, infra, and thus the cited ease is not controlling. During the debates in the House, it was generally understood that state constitutional limitations were to be accommodated. For example, at one point Congressman Goodell raised the possibility that state law would preclude certain forms of services to nonpublic schools. The response from Congressman Perkins, Chairman of the Subcommittee, was: “The gentleman is an able lawyer and he well knows you cannot do anything in this bill that you cannot do under the State law.” Ill Cong. Rec. 5744 (1965). Responding to a later observation by Mr. Goodell that dual enrollment was prohibited by 28 States, Congressman Carey responded: “The prohibition applies to a single type of program. That is why we have a multiplicity of programs in this, so that they can choose one in helping the children who are disadvantaged in any one public school.” Id., at 5758. Congressman Thompson subsequently observed: “Therefore, the provision about providing full assistance under title I is up to the public school district, subject to the laws of the States.” Ibid: See also id., at 5979 (remarks of Cong. Thompson); id., at 5757 (remarks of Cong. Goodell); id., at 5747 (remarks of Cong. Perkins). The Handbook clearly recognizes that state law is to be accommodated: “Many State departments of education found severe restrictions with respect to the kind of services that their respective State constitutions and statutes allowed them to provide to private school students, especially when those' private schools were owned and operated by religious groups. “The following' list illustrates the kind of prohibitions encountered when State constitutions and laws are applied to Title I. The list is not exhaustive. “* Dual enrollment may not be allowed. “* Public school personnel may not perform services on private school premises. “* Equipment may not be loaned for use on private school premises. “* Books may not be loaned for use on private school premises. “* Transportation may not be provided to private school students. “Sometimes such prohibitions exist singly in a given State. Often, the prohibitions exist in combination. “When ESEA was passed in 1965, each State submitted an assurance to the U. S. Office of Education in which the State department of education stated its intention to comply with Title I and its regulations, and the State attorney general declared that the State board of education had the authority, under State law, to perform the duties and functions of Title I as required by the Federal law and its regulations. While State constitutions, laws, and their interpretations limit the options available to provide services to private school students, this fact, in itself, does not relieve the State educational agency of its responsibility to approve only those Title I applications which meet the requirements set forth in the Federal law and regulations. “A number of school officials realized that they could not submit the required assurance because of the restrictions applying to private school students which were operative in their States. The impasse was sucessfully [sic] resolved in one case by a State attorney general’s opinion which held that State restrictions were not applicable to 100 percent federally financed programs. “Other States have proposed legislation which would allow the SEA to administer Title I according to the Federal requirements. Still others have applied the restrictions of the State to Title I and have relied upon the initiative of school administrators to develop a program that would meet the Federal requirements.” Handbook 19-20. HEW’s Office of Education refers to the comparability requirement as follows: “The needs of private school children in the eligible areas may require different services and activities. Those services and activities, however, must be comparable in quality, scope, and opportunity for participation to those provided for public school children with needs of equally high priority. 'Comparability’ of services should be attained in terms of the numbers of educationally deprived children in the project area in both public and private schools and related to their specific needs, which in turn should produce an equitable sharing of Title I resources by both groups of children.” TJSOE Program Guide No. 44, ¶4.5 (1968), in Handbook 41-42. See 45 CFR § 116.18 (a). Title 45 CFR § 116.19 (c) provides: “The opportunities for participation by educationally deprived children in private schools in the program of a local educational agency under Title I of the Act shall be provided through projects of the local educational agency which furnish special educational services that meet the special educational needs of such educationally deprived children rather than the needs of the student body at large or of children in a specified grade.” See also Handbook 1, 10-11. The Handbook 6, referring to the “comparability” definition in n. 14, supra, states: “Basically, what the regulations and guidelines are saying is this: When a group of children in a private school are found to have a need which is similar (not identical) to a need found in a group of public school children, the response to that need with Title I resources should be similar (not identical) in scope, quality, and opportunity for participation for both groups.” The United States, as amicus curiae, states: “Title I is sufficiently flexible to allow local agencies to observe, where possible, state and local restrictions upon aid to private school children (e. g., prohibition against dual enrollment). Accordingly, Title I programs may be provided in a different manner to private and to public school children. For example, remedial services for private school students might be provided outside their regular classroom, while being provided in the regular classroom for public school students. In addition, the content of the services could differ if the 'special educational needs’ required to be met under 20 U. S. C. [§] 241e (a) (1) (A) of the two groups differ.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 10 (footnote omitted). The State, of course, may not utilize the “comparability” provision so as to provide an inferior program. A year after the Act was passed, the House Committee on Education and Labor issued a Supplemental Report stating: “While the committee and the Council have emphasized the importance of adherence to constitutional safeguards, the committee does not expect that such considerations will be simply a device by which only a token communication with private school administrators is extended, or worse yet, by which the projects in which private schoolchildren can participate are inconvenient, awkwardly arranged, or poorly conceived. To the contrary, it is expected that earnest efforts will be made to ascertain from private school administrators an accurate appraisal of underachievement and other special needs of educationally disadvantaged children who do not attend the public schools. Projects for such children should be so designed as to effectively eliminate those factors which preclude the educationally deprived child from gaining full benefit from the regular academic program offerings in the private institution in which he or she may be enrolled.” H. R. Rep. No. 1814, pt. 2, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1966). The Senate Report outlined the circumstances in which this type of service would be appropriate: “It is anticipated, however, that public school teachers will be made available to other than public school facilities only to provide specialized services which contribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs of educationally deprived children (such as therapeutic, remedial or welfare services) and only where such specialized services are not normally provided by the nonpublic school.” S. Rep. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1965). See 45 CFR § 116.19 (e); 111 Cong. Rec. 5747 (1965) (remarks of Congs. Perkins and Carey). “There are no easy solutions to the logistical problems. However, when the legal situation allows several options and good will exists between public and private school representatives, the logistical problem can be solved or reasonably reduced.” Handbook 23. A listing of possible programs suggested to the Senate Committee appears in S. Rep. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 10-11 (1965). Among the examples there listed are teacher aids and instructional secretaries; institutes for training teachers in special skills; supplementary instructional materials; curriculum materials center for disadvantaged children; preschool training programs; remedial programs, especially in reading and mathematics; enrichment programs on Saturday morning and during summer; instructional media centers to provide modern equipment and materials; programs for the early identification and prevention of dropouts; home and school visitors and social workers; supplemental health and food services; classrooms equipped for television and radio instruction; mobile learning centers; educational summer camps; summer school and day camps; shop and library facilities available after regular school hours; work experience programs; Saturday morning special opportunity classes; home oriented bookmobiles; afterschool study centers; and pupil exchange programs.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BLUM, COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, et al. v. YARETSKY et al. No. 80-1952. Argued March 24, 1982 Decided June 25, 1982 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, ante, p. 843. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 1012. Judith A. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Robert Abrams, Attorney General, Shirley Adel-son Siegel, Solicitor General, Andrea G. Iason, Assistant Attorney Generál, and Peter H. Schiff. John E. Kirklin argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Kalman Finkel and David Goldfarb. Toby S. Edelman filed a brief for the National Citizens’ Coalition for Nursing Home Reform as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondents represent a class of Medicaid patients challenging decisions by the nursing homes in which they reside to discharge or transfer patients without notice or an opportunity for a hearing. The question is whether the State may be held responsible for those decisions so as to subject them to the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment. I Congress established the Medicaid program m 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §1396 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), to provide federal financial assist-anee to States that choose to reimburse certain medical costs incurred by the poor. As a participating State, New York provides Medicaid assistance to eligible persons who receive care in private nursing homes, which are designated as either “skilled nursing facilities” (SNF’s) or “health related facilities” (HRF’s). The latter provide less extensive, and generally less expensive, medical care than the former. Nursing homes chosen by Medicaid patients are directly reimbursed by the State for the reasonable cost of health care services, N. Y. Soc. Serv. Law §367-a.l (McKinney Supp. 1981). An individual must meet two conditions to obtain Medicaid assistance. He must satisfy eligibility standards defined in terms of income or resources and he must seek medically necessary services. See 42 U. S. C. § 1396. To assure that the latter condition is satisfied, federal regulations require each nursing home to establish a utilization review committee (URC) of physicians whose functions include periodically assessing whether each patient is receiving the appropriate level of care, and thus whether the patient’s continued stay in the facility is justified. 42 CFR §§ 456.305, 456.406 (1981). If the URC determines that the patient should be discharged or transferred to a different level of care, either more or less intensive, it must notify the state agency responsible for administering Medicaid assistance. 42 CFR §§ 456.337(c), 456.437(d) (1981); 10 NYCRR §§ 416.9(f)(2), (3), 421.13(f)(2), (3) (1980). At the time their complaint was filed, respondents Yaret-sky and Cuevas were patients in the American Nursing Home, an SNF located in New York City. Both were recipients of assistance under the Medicaid program. In December 1975 the nursing home’s URC decided that respondents did not need the care they were receiving and should be transferred to a lower level of care in an HRF. New York City officials, who were then responsible for administering the Medicaid program in the city, were notified of this decision and prepared to reduce or terminate payments to the nursing home for respondents’ care. Following administrative hearings, state social service officials affirmed the decision to discontinue benefits unless respondents accepted a transfer to an HRF providing a reduced level of care. Respondents then commenced this suit, acting individually and on behalf of a class of Medicaid-eligible residents of New York nursing homes. Named as defendants were the Commissioners of the New York Department of Social Services and the Department of Health. Respondents alleged in part that the defendants had not afforded them adequate notice either of URC decisions and the reasons supporting them or of their right to an administrative hearing to challenge those decisions. Respondents maintained that these actions violated their rights under state and federal law and under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought injunctive relief and damages. In January 1978 the District Court certified a class and issued a preliminary injunction, restraining the defendants from reducing or terminating Medicaid benefits without timely written notice to the patients, provided by state or local officials, of the reasons for the URC decision, the defendants’ proposed action,, and the patients’ right to an evi-dentiary hearing and continued benefits pending administrative resolution of the claim. App. 100-101, ¶2. The court’s accompanying opinion relied primarily on existing federal and state regulations. Id., at 112-115. In March 1979 the District Court issued a pretrial order that identified a new claim raised by respondents that a panoply of procedural safeguards should apply to URC decisions transferring a patient to a higher, i. e., more intensive, level of medical care, as well as to decisions recommending transfers to a lower level of care. In addition, respondents claimed that such safeguards were required prior to transfers of any kind initiated by the nursing homes themselves or by the patients’ attending physicians. Id., at 157, 1II(J); 166-167, ¶ II(J). Respondents asserted that all of these transfers deprived patients of interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and were the product of “state action.”. Id., at 167, 1iII(J). In October 1979 the District Court approved a consent judgment incorporating the relief previously awarded by the preliminary injunction and establishing additional substantive and procedural rights applicable to URC-initiated transfers to lower levels of care. Id., at 227-239. The consent judgment left several issues of law to be decided by the District Court. The most important, for our purposes, was “whether there is state action and a constitutional right to a pre-transfer evidentiary hearing in a patient transfer to a higher level of care and/or a patient transfer initiated by the facility or its agents.” Id., at 234-235, ¶VIII(A)(1). Ultimately, the District Court answered’ that question in respondents’ favor, although without elaborating its reasons. Id., at 240. The court permanently enjoined petitioners, as well as all SNF’s and 'HRF’s in the State, from permitting or ordering the discharge of class members, or their transfer to a different level of care, without providing advance written notice and an evidentiary hearing on “the validity and appropriateness of the proposed action.” Id., at 242-243. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed that portion of the District Court’s judgment we have described above. 629 F. 2d 817 (1980). The court held that URC-initiated transfers from a lower level of care to a higher one, and all discharges and transfers initiated by the nursing homes or attending physicians, “involve state action affecting constitutionally protected property and liberty interests.” Id., at 820. The court premised its identification of state action on the fact that state authorities “responded” to the challenged transfers by adjusting the patients’ Medicaid benefits. Ibid. Citing our opinion in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 351 (1974), the court viewed this response as establishing a sufficiently close, “nexus” between the State and either the nursing homes or the URC’s to justify treating their actions as those of the State itself. We granted certiorari to consider the Court of Appeals’ conclusions about the nature of state action. 454 U. S. 815 (1981). We now reverse its judgment. t-H We first address a question raised by petitioners regarding our jurisdiction under Art. III. They contend that respondents, who were threatened with URC-initiated transfers to lower levels of care, are without standing to object either to URC-initiated transfers to higher levels of care or to transfers of any kind initiated by nursing homes or attending physicians. According to petitioners, respondents obtained complete relief in the consent judgment approved by the District Court in October 1979, which afforded substantive and procedural rights to patients who are the subject of URC-initiated transfers to lower levels of care. Since they have not been threatened with transfers of any other kind, they have no standing to object, and the District Court consequently was without Art. Ill jurisdiction to enter its judgment. It is axiomatic that the judicial power conferred by Art. Ill may not be exercised unless the plaintiff shows “that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.” Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979). It is not enough that the conduct of which the plaintiff complains will injure someone. The complaining party must also show that he is within the class of persons who will be concretely affected. Nor does a plaintiff who has been subject to injurious conduct of one kind possess by virtue of that injury the necessary stake in litigating conduct of another kind, although similar, to which he has not been subject. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 166-167 (1972). Respondents appear to recognize these principles, but contend that although the October 1979 consent judgment halted the implementation of adverse URC decisions recommending discharge or transfer to lower levels of care, the URC determinations themselves were left undisturbed. These determinations reflected the judgment of physicians, chosen by the nursing homes, that respondents’ continued stay in their facilities was not medically necessary. Consequently, respondents maintain that they are subject to the serious threat that the nursing home administrators will reach similar conclusions and will themselves initiate patient discharges or transfers without adequate notice or hearings. Petitioners belittle this suggestion, noting that the consent judgment permanently enjoined all New York nursing homes, as well as petitioners, from implementing URC transfers to lower levels of care; this injunction bars the nursing homes from adopting the URC decisions as their own. Petitioners concede, however, that the consent judgment permits the nursing homes and respondents’ attending physicians to decide independently to initiate transfers. We conclude that the threat of facility-initiated discharges or transfers to lower levels of care is sufficiently substantial that respondents have standing to challenge their procedural adequacy. In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of “the primary conception that federal judicial power is to be exercised . . . only at the instance of one who is himself immediately harmed, or immediately threatened with harm, by the challenged action.” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 504 (1961). Of course, “[o]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.” Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 593 (1923), quoted in Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U. S. 289, 298 (1979). “[T]he question becomes whether any perceived threat to respondents is sufficiently real and immediate to show an existing controversy . . . .” O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 496 (1974). Even accepting petitioners’ characterization of the scope of the permanent injunction embodied in the consent judgment, the nursing homes in which respondents reside remain free to determine independently that respondents’ continued stay at current levels of care is not medically necessary. The possibility that they will do so is not “imaginary or speculative.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 42 (1971). In light of similar determinations already made by the committee of physicians chosen by the facilities to make such assessments, the threat is quite realistic. See O’Shea v. Littleton, supra, at 496 (“past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is real and immediate threat of repeated injury”). We cannot conclude, however, that the threat of transfers to higher levels of care, whether initiated by the URC’s, the nursing homes, or attending physicians, is “of sufficient immediacy and reality,” Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, 108 (1969), that respondents have standing to seek an adjudication of the procedures attending such transfers. Nothing in the record available to this Court suggests that any of the individual respondents have been either transferred to more intensive care or threatened with such transfers. It is not inconceivable that respondents will one day confront this eventuality, but assessing the possibility now would “tak[e] us into the area of speculation and conjecture.” O’Shea v. Littleton, supra, at 497. Moreover, the conditions under which such transfers occur are sufficiently different from those which respondents do have standing to challenge that any judicial assessment of their procedural adequacy would be wholly gratuitous and advisory. Transfers to higher levels of care are recommended when the patient’s medical needs cannot be satisfied by the facility in which he or she currently resides. Although respondents contend that all transfers threaten elderly patients with physical or psychological trauma, one may infer that refusal to accept a transfer to a higher level of care could itself be a decision with potentially traumatic consequences. The same cannot be said of discharges or transfers to less intensive care. In addition, transfers to more intensive care typically result in an increase in Medicaid benefits to match the increased cost of medically necessary care. Respondents’ constitutional attack on discharges or transfers to a lower level of care presupposes a deprivation of protected property interests. Finally, since July 1978, petitioners have adhered to a policy permitting Medicaid patients to refuse URC-recommended transfers to higher levels of care without jeopardizing their Medicaid benefits. App. 180, ¶56. No similar policy was in force with respect $o other transfers until the District Court mandated its adoption. We conclude, therefore, that although respondents have standing to challenge facility-initiated discharges and transfers to lower levels of care, the District Court exceeded its authority in adjudicating the procedures governing transfers to higher levels of care. We turn now to the “state action” question presented by petitioners. I — i > — l The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution provides in part that “[n]o State shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Since this Court’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883), “the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States.” Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 13 (1948). “That Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.” Ibid. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345 (1974); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144 (1970). Faithful adherence to the “state action” requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment requires careful attention to the gravamen of the plaintiff’s complaint. In this case, respondents objected to the involuntary discharge or transfer of Medicaid patients by their nursing homes without certain procedural safeguards. They have named as defendants state officials responsible for administering the Medicaid program in New York. These officials are also responsible for regulating nursing homes in the State, including those in which respondents were receiving care. But respondents are not challenging particular state regulations or procedures, and their arguments concede that the decision to discharge or transfer a patient originates not with state officials, but with nursing homes that are privately owned and operated. Their lawsuit, therefore, seeks to hold state officials liable for the actions of private parties, and the injunctive relief they have obtained requires the State to adopt regulations that will prohibit the private conduct of which they complain. A This case is obviously different from those cases in which the defendant is a private party and the question is whether his conduct has sufficiently received the imprimatur of the State so as to make it “state” action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163 (1972); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra. It also differs from other “state action” cases in which the challenged conduct consists of enforcement of state laws or regulations by state officials who are themselves parties in the lawsuit; in such cases the question typically is whether the private motives which triggered the enforcement of those laws can fairly be attributed to the State. See, e. g., Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U. S. 244 (1963). But both these types of cases shed light upon the analysis necessary to resolve the present case. First, although it is apparent that nursing homes in New York are extensively regulated, “[t]he mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S., at 350. The complaining party must also show that “there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id., at 351. The purpose of this requirement is to assure that constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains. The importance of this assurance is evident when, as in this case, the complaining party seeks to hold the State liable for the actions of private parties. Second, although the factual setting of each case will be significant, our precedents indicate that a State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in daw be deemed to be that of the State. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, supra, at 166; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, at 357; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, supra, at 173; Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra, at 170. Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible for those initiatives under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Flagg Bros., supra, at 164-165; Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, at 357. Third, the required nexus may be present if the private entity has exercised powers that are “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.” Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, at 353; see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, supra, at 157-161. B Analyzed in the light of these principles, the Court of Appeals’ finding of state action cannot stand. The court reasoned that state action was present in the discharge or transfer decisions implemented by the nursing homes because the State responded to those decisions by adjusting the patient’s Medicaid benefits. Respondents, however, do not challenge the adjustment of benefits, but the discharge or transfer of patients to lower levels of care without adequate notice or hearings. That the State responds to such actions by adjusting benefits does not render it responsible for those actions. The decisions about which respondents complain are made by physicians and nursing home administrators, all of whom are concededly private parties. There is no suggestion that those decisions were influenced in any degree by the State’s obligation to adjust benefits in conformity with changes in the cost of medically necessary care. Respondents do not rest on the Court of Appeals’ rationale, however. They argue that the State “affiraiatively commands” the summary discharge or transfer of Medicaid patients who are thought to be inappropriately placed in their nursing facilities. Were this characterization accurate, we would have a different question before us. However, our review of the statutes and regulations identified by respondents does not support respondents’ characterization of them. As our earlier summary of the Medicaid program explained, a patient must meet two essehtial conditions in order to obtain financial assistance. He must satisfy eligibility criteria defined in terms of income and resources and he must seek medically necessary services. 42 U. S. C. § 1396. To assure that nursing home services are medically necessary, federal law requires that a physician so certify at the time the Medicaid patient is admitted and periodically thereafter. 42 U. S. C. § 1396b(g)(l) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). New York requires that the physician complete a “long term care placement form” devised by the Department of Health, called the DMS-1. 10 NYCRR §§415.1(a), 420.1(b) (1980). A completed form provides, inter alia, a numerical score corresponding to the physician’s assessment of the patient’s mental and physical health. As petitioners note, however, the physicians, and not the forms, make the decision about whether the patient’s care is medically necessary. A physician can authorize a patient’s admission to a nursing facility despite a “low” score on the form. See 10 NYCRR §§415.1(a)(2), 420.1(b)(2) (1978). We cannot say that the State, by requiring completion of a form, is responsible for the physician’s decision. In any case, respondents’ complaint is about nursing home decisions to discharge or transfer, not to admit, Medicaid patients. But we are not satisfied that the State is responsible for those decisions either. The regulations cited by respondents réquire SNF’s and HRF’s “to make all efforts possible to transfer patients to the appropriate level of care or home as indicated by the patient’s medical condition or needs,” 10 NYCRR §§416.9(d)(1), 421.13(d)(1) (1980). The nursing homes are required to complete patient care assessment forms designed by the State and “provide the receiving facility or provider with a current copy of same at the time of discharge to an alternate level of care facility or home.” 10 NYCRR §§416.9(d)(4), 421.13(d)(4) (1980). These regulations do not require the nursing homes to rely on the forms in making discharge or transfer decisions, nor do they demonstrate that the State is responsible for the decision to discharge or transfer particular patients. Those decisions ultimately turn on medical judgments made by private parties according to professional standards that are not established by the State. This case, therefore, is not unlike Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U. S. 312 (1981), in which the question was whether a public defender acts “under color of” state law within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 when representing an indigent defendant in a state criminal proceeding. Although the public defender was employed by the State and appointed by the State to represent the respondent, we concluded that “[tjhis assignment entailed functions and obligations in no way dependent on state authority.” Id., at 318. The decisions made by the public defender in the course of representing his client were framed in accordance with professional canons of ethics, rather than dictated by any rule of conduct imposed by the State. The same is true of nursing home decisions to discharge or transfer particular patients because the care they are receiving is medically inappropriate. Respondents next point to regulations which, they say, impose a range of penalties on nursing homes that fail to discharge or transfer patients whose continued stay is inappropriate. One regulation excludes from participation in the Medicaid program health care providers who “[fjumished items or services that are substantially in excess of the beneficiary’s needs.” 42 CFR §420.101(a)(2) (1981). The State is also authorized to fine health care providers who violate applicable regulations. 10 NYCRR §414.18 (1978). As we have previously concluded, however, those regulations themselves do not dictate the decision to discharge or transfer in a particular case. Consequently, penalties imposed for violating the regulations add nothing to respondents’ claim of state action. As an alternative position, respondents argue that even if the State does not command the transfers at issue, it reviews and either approves or rejects them on the merits. The regulations cited by respondents will not bear this construction. Although the State requires the nursing homes to complete patient care assessment forms and file them with state Medicaid officials, 10 NYCRR §§415.1(a), 420.1(b) (1978), and although federal law requires that state officials review these assessments, 42 CFR §§456.271, 456.372 (1981), nothing in the regulations authorizes the officials to approve or disapprove decisions either to retain or discharge particular patients, and petitioners specifically disclaim any such responsibility. Instead, the State is obliged to approve or disapprove continued payment of Medicaid benefits after a change in the patient’s need for services. See 42 CFR §435.916 (1981). Adjustments in benefit levels in response to a decision to discharge or transfer a patient does not constitute approval or enforcement of that decision. As we have already concluded, this degree of involvement is too slim a basis on which to predicate a finding of state action in the decision itself. Finally, respondents advance the rather vague generalization that such a relationship exists between the State and the nursing homes it regulates that the State may be considered a joint participant in the homes’ discharge and transfer of Medicaid patients. For this proposition they rely upon Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961). Respondents argue that state subsidization of the operating and capital costs of the facilities, payment of the medical expenses of more than 90% of the patients in the facilities, and the licensing of the facilities by the State, taken together convert the action of the homes into “state” action. But accepting all of these assertions as true, we are nonetheless unable to agree that the State is responsible for the decisions challenged by respondents. As we have previously held, privately owned enterprises providing services that the State would not necessarily provide, even though they are extensively regulated, do not fall within the ambit of Burton. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S., at 357-358. That programs undertaken by the State result in substantial funding of the activities of a private entity is no more persuasive than the fact of regulation of such an entity in demonstrating that the State is responsible for decisions made by the entity in the course of its business. We are also unable to conclude that the nursing homes perform a function that has been “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.” Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., supra, at 353. Respondents’ argument in this regard is premised on their assertion that both the Medicaid statute and the New York Constitution make the State responsible for providing every Medicaid patient with nursing home services. The state constitutional provisions cited by respondents, however, do no more than authorize the legislature to provide funds for the care of the needy. See N. Y. Const., Art. XVII, §§ 1, 3. They do not mandate the provision of any particular care, much less long-term nursing care. Similarly, the Medicaid statute requires that the States provide funding for skilled nursing services as a condition to the receipt of federal moneys. 42 U. S. C. §§ 1396a(a)(13)(B), 1396d(a)(4)(A) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). It does not require that the States provide the services themselves. Even if respondents’ characterization of the State’s duties were correct, however, it would not follow that decisions made in the day-to-day administration of a nursing home are the kind of decisions traditionally and exclusively made by the sovereign for and on behalf of the public. Indeed, respondents make no such claim, nor could they. IV We conclude that respondents have failed to establish “state action” in the nursing homes’ decisions to discharge or transfer Medicaid patients to lower levels of care. Consequently, they have failed to prove that petitioners have violated rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. The contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly Reversed. [For opinion of Justice White concurring in the judgment, see ante, p. 843.] N. Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 365-a.2(b) (McKinney Supp. 1982). Title XIX requires as a condition to the receipt of federal funds that participating States provide financial assistance to eligible persons in need of “skilled nursing facility services.” 42 U. S. C. §§ 1396a(a)(13)(B), 1396d(a)(4)(A) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). Federal assistance is also available to States that choose to reimburse the cost of “intermediate care facility services.” § 1396d(a)(15). See §§ 1396d(c), (f). New York regulations refer to facilities that provide the latter type of care as HRF’s. 10 NYCRR § 414.1(a) (1981). Compare 10 NYCRR §§416.1-416.2 with §§421.1-421.2 (1978). The parties have stipulated that Medicaid reimbursement rates for HRF’s are generally lower than those for SNF’s. See App. 169, ¶ 12. Congress has provided that federal funds supplied to assist in reimbursing nursing home costs will be reduced unless the participating State provides for the periodic review of patient care “to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such care and services and to assure that payments . . . are not in excess of reasonable charges consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care.” 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(30). See §§ 1896b(g)(l)(C), 1396b(i)(4), 1395x00. These committees must be composed of private physicians who are not directly responsible for the patient whose care is being reviewed. 42 CFR §§456.306, 456.406 (1981). Under New York law, the committee members may not be employed by the SNF or HRF and may not have a financial interest in any residential care facility. 10 NYCRR §§ 416.9(b)(2), 421.13(b)(2) (1980). If the committee determines that a discharge or transfer is called for, it must afford the patient’s attending physician an opportunity to present his views, although the committee’s decision ultimately is final. 42 CFR §§ 456.336(f), (h), 456.436(f), (i) (1981). See 10 NYCRR §§ 731.11, 741.14 (1980). The class was defined to include patients “who have been, are or will be threatened or forced to leave their nursing homes and have their Medicaid benefits reduced or terminated as a result of ‘Utilization Review’ committee findings alleging that they are not eligible for the level of nursing home care they receive.” App. 19, ¶ 1. The complaint also named as a plaintiff the New York chapter of the Gray Panthers, an organization that “has among its objectives the development of a health care system for the elderly which provides quality health care to all persons.” Id., at 21, ¶ 5. The complaint also alleged that URC transfers to lower levels of care and corresponding reductions in Medicaid benefits were arbitrary and were caused by improperly constituted URC’s that acted without adequate written criteria and failed to afford adequate notice either to the patients or their attending physicians. Ten individuals, who are also respondents in this Court, later intervened in the suit. Each intervenor was a resident of either an SNF or an HRF and had been the subject of a URC decision recommending transfer to a lower level of care. The intervenors all were afforded administrative hearings resulting in affirmance of petitioners’ decisions to reduce or terminate Medicaid benefits if the intervenors did not follow URC recommendations. The class was defined to include “all persons who are residents in skilled nursing or intermediate care facilities in the State of New York and who, following utilization review recommendations and/or fair hearings, are determined by defendants to be ineligible to receive the level of care at the facilities in which they reside and to be subject to reduction or termination of their Medicaid benefits.” Id., at 45. The court also required the defendants to afford class members access to all pertinent case files and medical records. Id., at 101-102. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld portions of the injunction challenged by petitioners. Yaretsky v. Blum, 592 F. 2d 65 (1979). The pretrial order also redefined the class to include “all residents of skilled nursing and health related nursing facilities in New York State who are recipients of Medicaid benefits.” App. 151. The court modified the injunction by relieving petitioners of obligations that, in the opinion of federal authorities, would render the State ineligible for M.edicaid funding. 629 F. 2d, at 822. The court also reversed the District Court’s holding that state administrators were precluded by due process or state law from rejecting a hearing officer’s recommendation favorable to a patient without reading a verbatim transcript of the hearing and the exhibits. Id., at 822-825. This holding is not before us. Respondents suggest that members of the class they represent have been transferred to higher levels of care as a result of URC decisions. Respondents, however, “must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 502 (1975). Unless these individuals “can thus demonstrate the requisite case or controversy between themselves personally and [petitioners], ‘none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class.’ O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U. S. 488, 494 (1974).” Ibid. “From the beginning of this lawsuit the respondents’ challenge has been to the involuntary discharge or transfer of Medicaid patients from and by their nursing facilities without adequate safeguards .... Thus, the claim before this Court is whether state action attaches to a nursing facility’s summary discharge or transfer of the patient . . . .” Brief for Respondents 21-22 (emphasis in original). A completed DMS-1 form provides a summary of the patient’s medical condition. Five of the eleven questions devoted to this subject require the assignment of numerical values. See 10 NYCRR App. C-l (1978). A range of numerical values to be used in completing these questions are set forth in a second form, called the DMS-9. See ibid,. The dissent’s discussion of the DMS-9 suggests that completion of the DMS-1 form is a purely mechanical exercise that does not require the exercise of independent medical judgment. The dissent’s discussion is incomplete. The other six questions on the DMS-1 ask the physician such questions as whether the patient requires daily supervision by a registered nurse, whether complications would arise without skilled nursing care, whether a program of therapy is necessary, and if so what kind, whether the patient should be considered for different levels of care, and whether the patient is medically qualified for the level of care he or she is receiving. The physician brings to bear his own medical judgment in answering these questions; their placement on the form would be inexplicable if the numerical scores were dispositive. The dissent belittles this fact by noting that the decision to depart from the form in admitting a patient is made by a physician member of the nursing home’s URC, and that such persons are “part and parcel of the statutory cost control process.” Post, at 1022. This signifies nothing more than the fact, disputed by no one, that the State requires utilization review in order to reduce unnecessary Medicaid expenditures. It remains true that physician members of the URC’s are not employed by the State and, more important, render medical judgments concerning the patient’s health needs that the State does not prescribe and for which it is not responsible; We must also emphasize, of course, that we are ultimately concerned with decisions to transfer patients who have already been admitted. Apropos of this relevant issue, the dissent observes, post, at 1023, that once a patient has been admitted, the State requires, as a condition to the disbursement of Medicaid funds, that within five days after admission the nursing home operator assess the patient’s status according to standards contained in the DMS-1 and DMS-9 forms. As the dissent is also aware, post, at 1023, n. 10, a physician member of the URC has the power to determine that the patient needs the level of care he is receiving despite an adverse score on the DMS-1. 10 NYCRR §§ 416.9(a)(2)(i), 421.13(a)(2)(i) (1980). That decision, rendered after consultation with the patient’s attending physician, is purely a medical judgment for which the State, as before, is not responsible. The dissent condemns us for conducting a “cursory” review of the regulations governing utilization review, post, at 1019, and pointedly asks “where ... is the Court’s discussion of the frequent utilization reviews that occur after admission?” Post, at 1024. The dissent, in its headlong dive into the sea of state regulations, forgets that patient transfers to lower levels of care initiated by utilization review committees are simply not part of this case. As we noted earlier, such transfers were the subject of a consent judgment in October 1979. We are concerned only with transfers initiated by the patients’ attending physicians or the nursing home administrators themselves. Therefore, we have focused on regulations that concern decisions which are not the product of URC recommendations. As we explain in the text, those regulations do not demonstrate that the State is responsible for the transfers with which we are concerned. Federal regulations also require SNF’s and HRF’s to obtain from admitting physicians a plan of discharge for each patient. 42 CFR §§ 456.280 (b)(6), 456.380(b)(6) (1981). State regulations require that nursing home staff members assist in the preparation of these plans, which are designed to summarize “the patient’s potential for return to the community, for transfer to another more appropriate setting or for achieving or maintaining the best obtainable level of function in the nursing home.” 10 NYCRR §§ 416.1(k)(2)(ii), 421.3(b)(2) (1976). These requirements hardly make the State responsible for actual decisions to discharge or transfer particular patients. The dissent characterizes as “factually unfounded,” post, at 1014, our conclusion that decisions initiated by nursing homes and physicians to transfer patients to lower levels of care ultimately depend on private judgments about the health needs of the patients. It asserts that different levels of care exist only because of the State’s desire to save money, and that the same interest explains the requirement that nursing homes transfer patients who do not need the care they are receiving. Post, at 1014-1019. We do not suggest otherwise. Transfers to lower levels of care are not mandated by the patients’ health needs. But they occur only after an assessment of those needs. In other words, although “downward” transfers are made possible and encouraged for efficiency reasons, they can occur only after the decision is made that the patient does not need the care he or she is currently receiving. The State is simply not responsible for that decision, although it clearly responds to it. In concrete terms, therefore, ifapar-ticular patient objects to his transfer to a different nursing facility, the “fault” lies not with the State but ultimately with the judgment, made by concededly private parties, that he is receiving expensive care that he does not need. That judgment is a medical one, not a question of accounting. This case, of course, does not involve the “under color of law” requirement of § 1983. Nevertheless, it is clear that the reasoning employed in Polk County is equally applicable to “state action” cases such as this one. Respondents also point to statutes requiring the State periodically to send medical review teams to conduct on-site inspections of all SNF’s and HRF’s. During these inspections, state employees are required to review the appropriateness of each patient’s continued stay in the facility and to report their findings to the nursing home and the agency responsible for administering the Medicaid program in the State. 42 U. S. C. §§ 1396a(a) (26), (31), 1396b(g)(l)(D) (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). See 42 CFR §456.611 (1981). Petitioners concede that these inspections can result in a discharge of transfer directed by state health officials. As they correctly argue, however, transfers of this kind are not the subject of respondents’ complaint and none are presented by the record. As a postscript to their “state action” arguments, respondents suggest that this Court avoid the issue by holding that federal and state statutes and regulations require the procedural safeguards which they seek. The lower courts did not pass on this assertion, and we decline to do so as well.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

PHILPOTT et al. v. ESSEX COUNTY WELFARE BOARD No. 71-5656. Argued December 4, 1972 Decided January 10, 1973 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. George Charles Bruno argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Ronald Reichstein argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Joseph E. Cohen. Solicitor General Griswold, Deputy Solicitor General Friedman, Keith A. Jones, Wilmot R. Hastings, Edwin Yourman, and Arthur Ahraham filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. George F. Kugler, Jr., Attorney General, Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney General, and Joan W. Murphy, Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of New Jersey as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Wilkes, one of the petitioners, applied to respondent, one of New Jersey’s welfare agencies, for financial assistance based upon need by reason of permanent and total disability. As a condition of receiving assistance, a recipient is required by New Jersey law to execute an agreement to reimburse the county welfare board for all payments received thereunder. The purpose apparently is to enable the board to obtain reimbursement out of subsequently discovered or acquired real and personal property of the recipient. Wilkes applied to respondent for such assistance in 1966 and he executed the required agreement. Respondent determined Wilkes’ monthly maintenance needs to be $108; and, finding that he had no other income, respondent fixed the monthly benefits at that amount and began making assistance payments, no later than January 1, 1967. The payments would have been less if Wilkes had been receiving federal disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, and respondent advised him to apply for those federal benefits. In 1968 Wilkes was awarded retroactive disability insurance benefits under § 223 of the Social Security Act, 70 Stat. 815, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 423, covering the period from May 1966 into the summer of 1968. Those benefits, calculated on the basis of $69.60 per month for 20 months and $78.20 per month for six months, amounted to $1,864.20. A check in that amount was deposited in the account which Philpott holds as trustee for Wilkes. Under New Jersey law, we are told, the filing of a notice of such a reimbursement agreement has the same force and effect as a judgment. 59 N. J. 75, 80, 279 A. 2d 806, 809. Respondent sued to reach the bank account under the agreement to reimburse. The trial court held that respondent was barred by the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 624, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 407, from recovering any amount from the account. 104 N. J. Super. 280, 249 A. 2d 639. The Appellate Division affirmed. 109 N. J. Super. 48, 262 A. 2d 227. . The Supreme Court reversed. 59 N. J. 75, 279 A. 2d 806. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted. 406 U. S. 917. On its face, the Social Security Act in § 407 bars the State of New Jersey from reaching the federal disability payments paid to Wilkes. The language is all-inclusive: “[N]one of the moneys paid or payable . . . under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process . . . .” The moneys paid as retroactive benefits were “moneys paid . . . under this subchapter”; and the suit brought was an attempt to subject the money to “levy, attachment ... or other legal process.”. New Jersey argues that if the amount of social security benefits received from the Federal Government had been made monthly, the amount of state welfare benefits could have been reduced by the amount of the federal grant. We see no reason to base an implied exemption from § 407 on that ground. We see no reason why a State, performing its statutory duty to take care of the needy, should be in a preferred position as compared with any other creditor. Indeed, since the Federal Government provides one-half of the funds for assistance under the New Jersey program of disability relief, the State, concededly, on recovery of any sums by way of reimbursement, would have to account to the Federal Government for the latter’s share. The protection afforded by § 407 is to “moneys paid” and we think the analogy to veterans’ benefits exemptions which we reviewed in Porter v. Aetna Casualty Co., 370 U. S. 159, is relevant here. We held in that case that veterans’ benefits deposited in a savings and loan association on behalf of a veteran retained the “quality of moneys” and had not become a permanent investment. Id., at 161-162. In the present case, as in Porter, the funds on deposit were readily withdrawable and retained the quality of “moneys” within the purview of § 407. The Supreme Court of New Jersey referred to cases' where a State which has provided care and maintenance to an incompetent veteran at times is a “creditor” for purposes of 38 U. S. C. § 3101, and at other times is not. But § 407 does not refer to any “claim of creditors”; it imposes a broad bar against the use of any legal process to reach all social security benefits. That is broad enough to include all claimants, including a State. The New Jersey court also relied on 42 U. S. C. § 404, a provision of the Social Security Act which permits the Secretary to recover overpayments óf old age, survivors, or disability insurance benefits. But there has been no overpayment of federal disability benefits here and the Secretary is not seeking any recovery here. And the Solicitor General, speaking for the Secretary, concedes that the pecuniary interest of the United States in the outcome of this case, which would be its aliquot share of any recovery, is not within the ambit of § 404. By reason of the Supremacy Clause the judgment below is Reversed. The payment in controversy is in a bank account under the name of petitioner Philpott in trust for Wilkes. N. J. Stat. Ann. §44:7-14 (a) (Supp. 1972-1973) provides: “Every county welfare board shall require, as a condition to granting assistance in any case, that all or any part of the property, either real or personal, of a person applying for old age assistance, be pledged to said county welfare board as a guaranty for the reimbursement of the funds so granted as old age assistance pursuant to the provisions of this chapter. The county welfare board shall take from each applicant a properly acknowledged agreement to reimburse for all advances granted, and pursuant to such agreement, said applicant shall assign to the welfare board, as collateral security for such advances, all or any part of his personal property as the board shall specify.” Title 42 U. S. C. §407 provides: “The right of any person to any future payment under this sub-chapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency law.” Since respondent did not claim a right to the entire federal payment but only to the amount by which its own payments would have been reduced had the federal benefits been received currently rather than retroactively and because the stipulated facts were ambiguous as to when respondent actually began making assistance payments, the court remanded for a determination of the precise amount of respondent’s claim. Supra, n. 3. See Savoid v. District of Columbia, 110 U. S. App. D. C. 39, 288 F. 2d 851; District of Columbia v. Reilly, 102 U. S. App. D. C. 9, 249 F. 2d 524. See decision below, 59 N. J. 75, 85, 279 A. 2d 806, 812.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. LOCAL UNION NO. 1229, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS. No. 15. Argued October 12, 1953. Decided December 7, 1953. Dominick L. Manoli argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Marvin E. Frankel, George J. Bott, David P. Findling and Samuel M. Singer. Louis Sherman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Philip R. Collins. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue before us is whether the discharge of certain employees by their employer constituted an unfair labor practice, within the meaning of §§8 (a)(1) and 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act, justifying their reinstatement by the National Labor Relations Board. For the reason that their discharge was “for cause” within the meaning of § 10 (c) of that Act, we sustain the Board in not requiring their reinstatement. In 1949, the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company (here called the company) was a North Carolina corporation engaged in interstate commerce. Under a license from the Federal Communications Commission, it operated, at Charlotte, North Carolina, a 50,000-watt radio station, with call letters WBT. It broadcast 10 to 12 hours daily by radio and television. The television service, which it started July 14, 1949, representing an investment of about $500,000, was the only such service in the area. Less than 50% of the station’s programs originated in Charlotte. The others were piped in over leased wires, generally from New York, California or Illinois from several different networks. Its annual gross revenue from broadcasting operations exceeded $100,000 but its television enterprise caused it a monthly loss of about $10,000 during the first four months of that operation, including the period here involved. Its rates for television advertising were geared to the number of receiving sets in the area. Local dealers had large inventories of such sets ready to meet anticipated demands. The company employed 22 technicians. In December 1948, negotiations to settle the terms of their employment after January 31, 1949, were begun between representatives of the company and of the respondent Local Union No. 1229, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, American Federation of Labor (here called the union). The negotiations reached an impasse in January 1949, and the existing contract of employment expired January 31. The technicians, nevertheless, continued to work for the company and their collective-bargaining negotiations were resumed in July, only to break down again July 8. The main point of disagreement arose from the union’s demand for the renewal of a provision that all discharges from employment be subject to arbitration and the company’s counterproposal that such arbitration be limited to the facts material to each discharge, leaving it to the company to determine whether those facts gave adequate cause for discharge. July 9, 1949, the union began daily peaceful picketing of the company’s station. Placards and handbills on the picket line charged the company with unfairness to its technicians and emphasized the company’s refusal to renew the provision for arbitration of discharges. The placards and handbills named the union as the representative of the WBT technicians. The employees did not strike. They confined their respective tours of picketing to their off-duty hours and continued to draw full pay. There was no violence or threat of violence and no one has taken exception to any of the above conduct. But on August 24, 1949, a new procedure made its appearance. Without warning, several of its technicians launched a vitriolic attack on the quality of the company’s television broadcasts. Five thousand handbills were printed over the designation “WBT TECHNICIANS.” These were distributed on the picket line, on the public square two or three blocks from the company’s premises, in barber shops, restaurants and busses. Some were mailed to local businessmen. The handbills made no reference to the union, to a labor controversy or to collective bargaining. They read: “IS CHARLOTTE A SECOND-CLASS CITY? “You might think so from the kind of Television programs being presented by the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co. over WBTV. Have you seen one of their television programs lately? Did you know that all the programs presented over WBTV are on film and may be from one day to five years old. There are no local programs presented by WBTV. You cannot receive the local baseball games, football games or other local events because WBTV does not have the proper equipment to make these pickups. Cities like New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Washington receive such programs nightly. Why doesn’t the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company purchase the needed equipment to bring you the same type of programs enjoyed by other leading American cities? Could it be that they consider Charlotte a second-class community and only entitled to the pictures now being presented to them? “WBT TECHNICIANS” This attack continued until September 3, 1949, when' the company discharged ten of its technicians, whom it charged with sponsoring or distributing these handbills. The company’s letter discharging them tells its side of the story. September 4, the union’s picketing resumed its original tenor and, September 13, the union filed with the Board a charge that the company, by discharging the above-mentioned ten technicians, had engaged in an unfair labor practice. The General Counsel for the Board filed a complaint based on those charges and, after hearing, a trial examiner made detailed findings and a recommendation that all of those discharged be reinstated with back pay. 94 N. L. R. B. 1507, 1527. The Board found that one of the discharged men had neither sponsored nor distributed the “Second-Class City” handbill and ordered his reinstatement with back pay. It then found that the other nine had sponsored or distributed the handbill and held that the company, by discharging them for such conduct, had not engaged in an unfair labor practice. The Board, accordingly, did not order their reinstatement. One member dissented. Id,., at 1507 et seq. Under § 10 (f) of the Taft-Hartley Act, the union petitioned the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for a review of the Board’s order and for such a modification of it as would reinstate all ten of the discharged technicians with back pay. That court remanded the cause to the Board for further consideration and for a finding as to the “unlawfulness” of the conduct of the employees which had led to their discharge. 91 U. S. App. D. C. 333, 202 F. 2d 186. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the case in the administration of the Taft-Hartley Act. 345 U. S. 947. In its essence, the issue is simple. It is whether these employees, whose contracts of employment had expired, were discharged “for cause.” They were discharged solely because, at a critical time in the initiation of the company’s television service, they sponsored or distributed 5,000 handbills making a sharp, public, disparaging attack upon the quality of the company’s product and its business policies, in a manner reasonably calculated to harm the company’s reputation and reduce its income. The attack was made by them expressly as “WBT TECHNICIANS.” It continued ten days without indication of abatement. The Board found that— “It [the handbill] occasioned widespread comment in the community, and caused Respondent to apprehend a loss of advertising revenue due to dissatisfaction with its television broadcasting service. “In short, the employees in this case deliberately undertook to alienate their employer’s customers by impugning the technical quality of his product. As the Trial Examiner found, they did not misrepresent, at least wilfully, the facts they cited to support their disparaging report. And their ultimate purpose — to extract a concession from the employer with respect to the terms of their employment — was lawful. That purpose, however, was undisclosed; the employees purported to speak as experts, in the interest of consumers and the public at large. They did not indicate that they sought to secure any benefit for themselves, as employees, by casting discredit upon their employer.” 94 N. L. R. B., at 1511. The company’s letter shows that it interpreted the handbill as a demonstration of such detrimental-disloyalty as to provide “cause" for its refusal to continue in its employ the perpetrators of the attack. We agree. Section 10 (c) of the Taft-Hartley Act expressly provides that “No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause.” There is no more elemental cause for discharge of an employee than disloyalty to his employer. It is equally elemental that the Taft-Hartley Act seeks to strengthen, rather than to weaken, that cooperation, continuity of service and cordial contractual relation between employer and employee that is born of loyalty to their common enterprise. Congress, while safeguarding, in § 7, the right of employees to engage in “concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,” did not weaken the underlying contractual bonds and loyalties of employer and employee. The conference report that led to the enactment of the law said: “[T]he courts have firmly established the rule that under the existing provisions of section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, employees are not given any right to engage in unlawful or other improper conduct. . . . “. . . Furthermore, in section 10 (c) of the amended act, as proposed in the conference agreement, it is specifically provided that no order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual or the payment to him of any back pay if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause, and this, of course, applies with equal force whether or not the acts constituting the cause for discharge were committed in connection with a concerted activity.” H. R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39. This has been clear since the early days of the Wagner Act. In 1937, Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, said: “The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them. The employer may not, under cover of that right, intimidate or coerce its employees with respect to their self-organization and representation, and, on the other hand, the Board is not entitled to make its authority a pretext for interference with the right of discharge when that right is exercised for other reasons than such intimidation and coercion.” Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1, 45-46. See also, Labor Board v. Fansteel Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 252-258; Auto. Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 245, 260-263. Many cases reaching their final disposition in the Courts of Appeals furnish examples emphasizing the importance of enforcing industrial plant discipline and of maintaining loyalty as well as the rights of concerted activities. The courts have refused to reinstate employees discharged for “cause” consisting of insubordination, disobedience or disloyalty. In such cases, it often has been necessary to identify individual employees, somewhat comparable to the nine discharged in this case, and to recognize that their discharges were for causes which were separable from the concerted activities of others whose acts might come within the protection of § 7. It has been equally important to identify employees, comparable to the tenth man in the instant case, who participated in simultaneous concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection but who refrained from joining the others in separable acts of insubordination, disobedience or disloyalty. In the latter instances, this sometimes led to a further inquiry to determine whether their concerted activities were carried on in such a manner as to come within the protection of § 7. See, e. g., Hoover Co. v. Labor Board, 191 F. 2d 380; Maryland Drydock Co. v. Labor Board, 183 F. 2d 538; Albrecht v. Labor Board, 181 F. 2d 652; Labor Board v. Kelco Corp., 178 F. 2d 578; Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. Labor Board, 176 F. 2d 749; Labor Board v. Reynolds Pen Co., 162 F. 2d 680; Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Labor Board, 159 F. 2d 280; Labor Board v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F. 2d 486; Labor Board v. Draper Corp., 145 F. 2d 199; Labor Board v. Aintree Corp., 135 F. 2d 395; United Biscuit Co. v. Labor Board, 128 F. 2d 771; Labor Board v. Condenser Corp., 128 F. 2d 67; Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Labor Board, 127 F. 2d 109; Conn, Ltd. v. Labor Board, 108 F. 2d 390. The above cases illustrate the responsibility that falls upon the Board to find the facts material to such decisions. The legal principle that insubordination, disobedience or disloyalty is adequate cause for discharge is plain enough. The difficulty arises in determining whether, in fact, the discharges are made because of such a separable cause or because of some other concerted activities engaged in for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection which may not be adequate cause for discharge. Cf. Labor Board v. Peter Cailler Kohler Co., 130 F. 2d 503. In the instant case the Board found that the company’s discharge of the nine offenders resulted from their sponsoring and distributing the “Second-Class City” handbills of August 24 — September 3, issued in their name as the “WBT TECHNICIANS.” Assuming that there had been no pending labor controversy, the conduct of the “WBT TECHNICIANS” from August 24 through September 3 unquestionably would have provided adequate cause for their disciplinary discharge within the meaning of § 10 (c). Their attack.related itself to no labor practice of the company. It made no reference to wages, hours or working conditions. The policies attacked were those of finance and public relations for which management, not technicians, must be responsible. The attack asked for no public sympathy or support. It was a continuing attack, initiated while off duty, upon the very interests which the attackers were being paid to conserve and develop. Nothing could be further from the purpose of the Act than to require an employer to finance such activities. Nothing would contribute less to the Act’s declared purpose of promoting industrial peace and stability. The fortuity of the coexistence of a labor dispute affords these technicians no substantial defense. While they were also union men and leaders in the labor controversy, they took pains to separate those categories. In contrast to their claims on the picket line as to the labor controversy, their handbill of August 24 omitted all reference to it. The handbill diverted attention from the labor controversy. It attacked public policies of the company which had no discernible relation to that controversy. The only connection between the handbill and the labor controversy was an ultimate and undisclosed purpose or motive on the part of some of the sponsors that, by the hoped-for financial pressure, the attack might extract from the company some future concession. A disclosure of that motive might have lost more public support for the employees than it would have gained, for it would have given the handbill more the character of coercion than of collective bargaining. Referring to the attack, the Board said “In our judgment, these tactics, in the circumstances of this case, were hardly less ‘indefensible’ than acts of physical sabotage.” 94 N. L. R. B., at 1511. In any event, the findings of the Board effectively separate the attack from the labor controversy and treat it solely as one made by the company’s technical experts upon the quality of the company’s product. As such, it was as adequate a cause for the discharge of its sponsors as if the labor controversy had not been pending. The technicians, themselves, so handled their attack as thus to bring their discharge under § 10 (c). The Board stated “We ... do not decide whether the disparagement of product involved here would have justified the employer in discharging the employees responsible for it, had it been uttered in the context of a conventional appeal for support of the union in the labor dispute.” Id., at 1512, n. 18. This underscored the Board’s factual conclusion that the attack of August 24 was not part of an appeal for support in the pending dispute. It was a concerted separable attack purporting to be made in the interest of the public rather than in that of the employees. We find no occasion to remand this cause to the Board for further specificity of findings. Even if the attack were to be treated, as the Board has not treated it, as a concerted activity wholly or partly within the scope of those mentioned in § 7, the means used by the technicians in conducting the attack have deprived the attackers of the protection of that section, when read in the light and context of the purpose of the Act. Accordingly, the order of the Court of Appeals remanding the cause to the National Labor Relations Board is set aside, and the cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to dismiss respondent’s petition to modify the order of the Board. It is so ordered. “Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3). “Sec. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer— “(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) §§ 157, 158 (a)(1). “Sec. 10. . . . “(c) ... If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act: Provided, That where an order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay may be required of the employer or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered by him: .... If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall not be of the opinion that the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint. No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause. . . (Emphasis supplied in last sentence.) 61 Stat. 146, 147, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 160 (c). Pursuant to proceedings begun in October 1948, and to an election in May 1949, under the supervision of the Board, the union (by a vote of 12 to 2 of the 14 technicians participating) was chosen as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the company’s technicians. May 9, 1949, the union was so certified by the Board. 94 N. L. R. B. 1507, 1529. “Dear Mr. . . . , “When you and some of our other technicians commenced early in July to picket against this Company, we felt that your action was very ill-considered. We were paying you a salary of . . . per week, to say nothing of other benefits which you receive as an employee of our Company, such as time-and-a-half pay for all work beyond eight hours in any one day, three weeks vacation each year with full pay, unlimited sick leave with full pay, liberal life insurance and hospitalization, for you and your family, and retirement and pension benefits unexcelled anywhere. Yet when we were unable to agree upon the terms of a contract with your Union, you began to denounce us publicly as ‘unfair.’ “And ever since early July while you have been walking up and down the street with placards and literature attacking us, you have continued to hold your job and receive your pay and all the other benefits referred to above. “Even when you began to put out propaganda which contained many untruths about our Company and great deal of personal abuse and slander, we still continued to treat you exactly as before. For it has been our understanding that under our labor laws, you have a very great latitude in trying to make the public believe that your employer is unfair to you. “Now, however, you have turned from trying to persuade the public that we are unfair to you and are trying to persuade the public that we give inferior service to them. While we are struggling to expand into and develop a new field, and incidentally losing large sums of money in the process, you are busy trying to turn customers and the public against us in every possible way, even handing out leaflets on the public streets advertising that our operations are ‘second-class,’ and endeavoring in various ways to hamper and totally destroy our business. Certainly we are not required by law or common sense to keep you in our employment and pay you a substantial salary while you thus do your best to tear down and bankrupt our business. “You are hereby discharged from our employment. Although there is nothing requiring us to do so, and the circumstances certainly do not call for our doing so, we are enclosing a check payable to your order for two weeks’ advance or severance pay. “Very truly yours, “Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company “By: Charles H. Crutchfield “Vice President “Enclosure” Allegations based on the same facts and charging violations of § 8 (a) (3) and (5) of the Tart-Hartley Act do not require discussion here. 61 Stat. 148-149, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 160 (f). The Court of Appeals said: “Protection under § 7 of the Act ... is withdrawn only from those concerted activities which contravene either (a) specific provisions or basic policies of the Act or of related federal statutes, or (b) specific rules of other federal or local law that is not incompatible with the Board’s governing statute. . . . “We think the Board failed to make the finding essential to its conclusion that the concerted activity was unprotected. Sound practice in judicial review of administrative orders precludes this court from determining ‘unlawfulness’ without a prior consideration and finding by the Board.” 91 U. S. App. D. C., at 335, 336, 202 F. 2d, at 188, 189. See note 2, supra. The Act’s declaration of the policy says: “Section 1. . . . “(b) Industrial strife which interferes with the normal flow of commerce and with the full production of articles and commodities for commerce, can be avoided or substantially minimized if employers, employees, and labor organizations each recognize under law one another’s legitimate rights in their relations with each other, and above all recognize under law that neither party has any right in its relations with any other to engage in acts or practices which jeopardize the public health, safety, or interest. “It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.” 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 141 (b). See note 1, supra. National Labor Relations Act of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. “. . . An employee can not work and strike at the same time. He can not continue in his employment and openly or secretly refuse to do his work. He can not collect wages for his employment, and, at the same time, engage in activities to injure or destroy his employer’s business.” Hoover Co. v. Labor Board, 191 F. 2d 380, 389, and see Labor Board v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F. 2d 486, 496; United Biscuit Co. v. Labor Board, 128 F. 2d 771. See Labor Board v. Rockaway News Co., 345 U. S. 71 (discharge, for violation of an obligation to make deliveries, even though crossing a picket line, sustained); Auto. Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 245, 255-263 (arbitrary unannounced interruptions of work, not protected by § 7); Southern S. S. Co. v. Labor Board, 316 U. S. 31 (discharge of seamen, for disobedience on shipboard while away from home port, sustained); Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U. S. 740 (mass picketing, unprotected); Hotel Employees’ Local v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U. S. 437 (violence, while picketing, unprotected); Labor Board v. Sands Manufacturing Co., 306 U. S. 332 (discharge, for repudiation of employee’s agreement, sustained); Labor Board v. Fansteel Corp., 306 U. S. 240 (discharge, for tortious conduct, violence or sit-down strike, sustained); and see Associated Press v. Labor Board, 301 U. S. 103, 132; Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1, 45-46. See also, Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 Ind. L. J. 319 (1951); Recent Cases, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1321 (1953).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

VARTELAS v. HOLDER, ATTORNEY GENERAL No. 10-1211. Argued January 18, 2012 Decided March 28, 2012 Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, G. J., and Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined, post, p. 276. Stephanos Bibas argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were James A. Feldman, Nancy Breg-stein Gordon, Amy Wax, Andrew K. Chow, and Stephen B. Kinnaird. Eric D. Miller argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Verrilli, Assistant Attorney General West, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Donald E. Keener, and John W. Blakeley. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Asian American Justice Center et al. by Nancy Morawetz; for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by David Debold and Jim Walden; and for the National Immigrant Justice Center by Brian J. Murray and Charles Roth. Ira J. Kurzban filed a brief for the American Immigration Lawyers Association as amicus curiae. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. Panagis Vartelas, a native of Greece, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1989. He pleaded guilty to a felony (conspiring to make a counterfeit security) in 1994, and served a prison sentence of four months for that offense. Vartelas traveled to Greece in 2003 to visit his parents. On his return to the United States a week later, he was treated as an inadmissible alien and placed in removal proceedings. Under the law governing at the time of Var-telas’ plea, an alien in his situation could travel abroad for brief periods without jeopardizing his resident alien status. See 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(13) (1988 ed.), as construed in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U. S. 449 (1963). In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 110 Stat. 3009-546. That Act effectively precluded foreign travel by lawful permanent residents who had a conviction like Vartelas’. Under IIRIRA, such aliens, on return from a sojourn abroad, however brief, may be permanently removed from the United States. See 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v); § 1182(a)(2). This case presents a question of retroactivity not addressed by Congress: As to a lawful permanent resident convicted of a crime before the effective date of IIRIRA, which regime governs, the one in force at the time of the conviction, or IIRIRA? If the former, Vartelas’ brief trip abroad would not disturb his lawful permanent resident status. If the latter, he may be denied reentry. We conclude that the relevant provision of IIRIRA, § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), attached a new disability (denial of reentry) in respect to past events (Vartelas’ pre-IIRIRA offense, plea, and conviction). Guided by the deeply rooted presumption against retroactive legislation, we hold that § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) does not apply to Vartelas’ conviction. The impact of Vartelas’ brief travel abroad on his permanent resident status is therefore determined not by IIRIRA, but by the legal regime in force at the time of his conviction. I A Before IIRIRA’s passage, United States immigration law established “two types of proceedings in which aliens can be denied the hospitality of the United States: deportation hearings and exclusion hearings.” Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U. S. 21, 25 (1982). Exclusion hearings were held for certain aliens seeking entry to the United States, and deportation hearings were held for certain aliens who had already entered this country. See ibid. Under this regime, “entry” into the United States was defined as “any coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place.” 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(13) (1988 ed.). The statute, however, provided an exception for lawful permanent residents; aliens lawfully residing here were not regarded as making an “entry” if their “departure to a foreign port or place . . . was not intended or reasonably to be expected by [them] or [their] presence in a foreign port or place . . . was not voluntary.” Ibid. Interpreting this cryptic provision, we held in Fleuti, 374 U. S., at 461-462, that Congress did not intend to exclude aliens long resident in the United States upon their return from “innocent, casual, and brief exeursion[s] . < . outside this country’s borders.” Instead, the Court determined, Congress meant to rank a once-permanent resident as a new entrant only when the foreign excursion “meaningfully interrupted] . . . the alien’s [U. SJ residence.” Id., at 462. Absent such “disruption]” of the alien’s residency, the alien would not be “subject ... to the consequences of an ‘entry’ into the country on his return.” Ibid. In IIRIRA, Congress abolished the distinction between exclusion and deportation procedures and created a uniform proceeding known as “removal.” See 8 U. S. C. §§ 1229, 1229a; Judulang v. Holder, 565 U. S. 42, 46 (2011). Congress made “admission” the key word, and defined admission to mean “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” § 1101(a)(13)(A). This alteration, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined, superseded Fleuti. See In re Collado-Munoz, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1061, 1065-1066 (1998) (en banc). Thus, lawful permanent residents returning post-IIRIRA, like Vartelas, may be required to “ ‘see[k] an admission’ into the United States, without regard to whether the alien’s departure from the United States might previously have been regarded as ‘brief, casual, and innocent’ under the Fleuti doctrine.” Id., at 1066. An alien seeking “admission” to the United States is subject to various requirements, see, e. g., § 1181(a), and cannot gain entry if she is deemed “inadmissible” on any of the numerous grounds set out in the immigration statutes, see § 1182. Under IIRIRA, lawful permanent residents are regarded as seeking admission into the United States if they fall into any of six enumerated categories. § 1101(a)(13)(C). Relevant here, the fifth of these categories covers aliens who “ha[ve] committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2) of this title.” § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v). Offenses in this category include “a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime.” § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). In sum, before IIRIRA, lawful permanent residents who had committed a crime of moral turpitude could, under the Fleuti doctrine, return from brief trips abroad without applying for admission to the United States. Under IIRIRA, such residents are subject to admission procedures, and, potentially, to removal from the United States on grounds of inadmissibility. B Panagis Vartelas, born and raised in Greece, has resided in the United States for over 30 years. Originally admitted on a student visa issued in 1979, Vartelas became a lawful permanent resident in 1989' He currently lives in the New York area and works as a sales manager for a roofing company. In 1992, Vartelas opened an auto body shop in Queens, New York. One of his business partners used the shop’s photocopier to make counterfeit travelers’ checks. Vartelas helped his partner perforate the sheets into individual checks, but Vartelas did not sell the checks or receive any money from the venture. In 1994, he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to make or possess counterfeit securities, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 871. He was sentenced to four months’ incarceration, followed by two years’ supervised release. Vartelas regularly traveled to Greece to visit his aging parents in the years after his 1994 conviction; even after the passage of IIRIRA in 1996, his return to the United States from these visits remained uneventful. In January 2003, however, when Vartelas returned from a week-long trip to Greece, an immigration officer classified him as an alien seeking “admission.” The officer based this classification on Vartelas’ 1994 conviction. See United States ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U. S. 422, 423 (1933) (counterfeiting ranks as a crime of moral turpitude). At Vartelas’ removal proceedings, his initial attorney conceded removability, and requested discretionary relief from removal under the former § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. See 8 U. S. C. § 1182(c) (1994 ed.) (repealed 1996). This attorney twice failed to appear for hearings and once failed to submit a requested brief. Vartelas engaged a new attorney, who continued to concede removability and to request discretionary relief. The Immigration Judge denied the request for relief, and ordered Vartelas removed to Greece. The BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision. In July 2008, Vartelas filed with the BIA a timely motion to reopen the removal proceedings, alleging that his previous attorneys were ineffective for, among other lapses, conceding his removability. He sought to withdraw the concession of removability on the ground that IIRIRA’s new “admission” provision, codified at § 1101.(a)(13), did not reach back to deprive him of lawful resident status based on his pre-IIRIRA conviction. The BIA denied the motion, declaring that Var-íelas had not been prejudiced by his lawyers’ performance, for no legal authority prevented the application of IIRIRA to Varíelas’ pre-IIRIRA conduct. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the BIA’s decision, agreeing that Varíelas had failed to show he was prejudiced by his attorneys’ allegedly ineffective performance. Rejecting Varíelas’ argument that IIRIRA operated prospectively and therefore did not govern his case, the Second Circuit reasoned that he had not relied on the prior legal regime at the time he committed the disqualifying crime. See 620 F. 3d 108, 118-120 (2010). In so ruling, the Second Circuit created a split with two other Circuits. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have held that the new § 1101(a)(13) may not be applied to lawful permanent residents who committed crimes listed in §1182 (among them, crimes of moral turpitude) prior to IIRIRA’s enactment. See Olatunji v. Ashcroft, 387 F. 3d 383 (CA4 2004); Camins v. Gonzales, 500 F. 3d 872 (CA9 2007). We granted certiorari, 564 U. S. 1066 (2011), to resolve the conflict among the Circuits. II As earlier explained, see supra, at 261-263, pre-IIRIRA, a resident alien who once committed a crime of moral turpitude could travel abroad for short durations without jeopardizing his status as a lawful permanent resident. Under IIRIRA, on return from foreign travel, such an alien is treated as a new arrival to our shores, and may be removed from the United States. Varíelas does not question Congress’ authority to restrict reentry in this manner. Nor does he contend that Congress could not do so retroactively. Instead, he invokes the principle against retroactive legislation, under which courts read laws as prospective in application unless Congress has unambiguously instructed retroactivity. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 263 (1994). The presumption against retroactive legislation, the Court recalled in Landgraf, “embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.” Id., at 265. Several provisions, of the Constitution, the Court noted, embrace the doctrine, among them, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id., at 266. Numerous decisions of this Court repeat the classic formulation Justice Story penned for determining when retrospective application of a law would collide with the doctrine. It would do so, Story stated, when such application would “tak[e] away or impai[r] vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creatfe] a new obligation, imposte] a new duty, or attac[h] a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.” Society for Propagation of Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767 (No. 13,156) (CC NH 1814). See, e. g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 321 (2001) (invoking Story’s formulation); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U. S. 939, 947 (1997); Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 283. Vartelas urges that applying IIRIRA to him, rather than the law that existed at the time of his conviction, would attach a “new disability,” effectively a ban on travel outside the United States, “in respect to [events] . . . already past,” i. e., his offense, guilty plea, conviction, and punishment, all occurring prior to the passage of IIRIRA. In evaluating Vartelas’ argument, we note first a matter not disputed by the Government: Congress did not expressly prescribe the temporal reach of the IIRIRA provision in question, 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(13). See Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 280 (Court asks first “whether Congress has expressly prescribed [new § 1101(a)(13)’s] proper reach”); Brief for Respondent 11 (Court’s holding in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 317-320, “compels the conclusion that Congress has not ‘expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach’ ” (quoting Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 280)). Several other provisions of IIRIRA, in contrast to § 1101(a)(13), expressly direct retroactive application, e. g., § 1101(a)(43) (IIRIRA’s amendment of the “aggravated felony” definition applies expressly to “conviction[s]... entered before, on, or after” the statute’s enactment date (internal quotation marks omitted)). See St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 319-320, and n. 43 (setting out further examples). Accordingly, we proceed to the dispositive question whether, as Vartelas maintains, application of IIRIRA’s travel restraint to him “would have retroactive effect” Congress did not authorize. See Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 280. Vartelas presents a firm ease for application of the antiret-roactivity principle. Neither his sentence, nor the immigration law in effect when he was convicted and sentenced, blocked him from occasional visits to his parents in Greece. Current § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), if applied to him, would thus attach “a new disability” to conduct over and done well before the provision’s enactment. Beyond genuine doubt, we note, the restraint § 1101(a) (13)(C)(v) places on lawful permanent residents like Vartelas ranks as a “new disability.” Once able to journey abroad to fulfill religious obligations, attend funerals and weddings of family members, tend to vital financial interests, or respond to family emergencies, permanent residents situated as Var-telas is now face potential banishment. We have several times recognized the severity of that sanction. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. 356, 365-366, 373-374 (2010). It is no answer to say, as the Government suggests, that Vartelas could have avoided any adverse consequences if he simply stayed at home in the United States, his residence for 24 years prior to his 2003 visit'to his parents in Greece. See Brief in Opposition 13 (Vartelas “could have avoided the application of the statute . . . [by] refraining] from departing from the United States (or from returning to the United States).”); post, at 278. Loss of the ability to travel abroad is itself a harsh penalty, made all the more devastating if it means enduring separation from close family members living abroad. See Brief for Asian American Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae 16-23 (describing illustrative cases). We have rejected arguments for retroactivity in similar cases, and in cases in which the loss at stake was less momentous. In Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536 (1884), a pathmarking decision, the Court confronted the “Chinese Restriction Act,” which barred Chinese laborers from reentering the United States without a certificate issued on their departure. The Court held the reentry bar inapplicable to aliens who had left the country prior to the Act’s passage and tried to return afterward without a certificate. The Act’s text, the Court observed, was not “so clear and positive as to leave no room to doubt [retroactive application] was the intention of the legislature.” Id., at 559. In Landgraf, the question was whether an amendment to Title VII’s ban on employment discrimination authorizing compensatory and punitive damages applied to preenactment conduct. The Court held it did not. No doubt the complaint against the employer charged discrimination that violated the Act at the time it occurred. But compensatory and punitive damages were not then available remedies. The later provision for such damages, the Court determined, operated prospectively only, and did not apply to employers whose discriminatory conduct occurred prior to the amendment. See 511 U. S., at 280-286. And in Hughes Aircraft, the Court held that a provision removing an affirmative defense to qui tam suits did not apply to preenactment fraud. As in Landgraf, the provision attached “a new disability” to past wrongful conduct and therefore could not apply retrospectively unless Congress clearly manifested such an intention. Hughes Aircraft, 520 U. S., at 946-950. Most recently, in St. Cyr, the Court took up the case of an alien who had entered a plea to a deportable offense. At the time of the plea, the alien was eligible for discretionary relief from deportation. IIRIRA, enacted after entry of the plea, removed that eligibility. The Court held that the IIRIRA provision in point could not be applied to the alien, for it attached a “new disability” to the guilty plea and Congress had not instructed such a result. 533 U. S., at 321-323. HH 1 — I ⅜ — l The Government, echoed in part by the dissent, argues that no retroactive effect is involved in this case, for the Legislature has not attached any disability to past conduct. Rather, it has made the relevant event the alien’s post-IIRIRA act of returning to the United States. See Brief for Respondent 19-20; post, at 278. We find this argument disingenuous. Vartelas’ return to the United States occasioned his treatment as a new entrant, but the reason for the “new disability” imposed on him was not his lawful foreign travel. It was, indeed, his conviction, pre-IIRIRA, of an offense qualifying as one of moral turpitude. That past misconduct, in other words, not present travel, is the wrongful activity Congress targeted in § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v). The Government observes that lower courts have upheld Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act prosecutions that encompassed preenactment conduct. See Brief for Respondent 18 (citing United States v. Brown, 555 F. 2d 407, 416-417 (CA5 1977), and United States v. Campanale, 518 F. 2d 352, 364-365 (CA9 1975) (per curiam)). But those prosecutions depended on criminal activity, i. e., an act of racketeering occurring after the provision’s effective date. Section 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), in contrast, does not require any showing of criminal conduct postdating IIRIRA’s enactment. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U. S. 30 (2006), featured by the Government and the dissent, Brief for Respondent 17, 36 — 37; post, at 278, is similarly inapposite. That case involved 8 U. S. C. § 1231(a)(5), an IIRIRA addition, which provides that an alien who reenters the United States after having been removed can be removed again under the same removal order. We held that the provision could be applied to an alien who reentered illegally before IIRIRA’s enactment. Explaining the Court’s decision, we said: “[T]he conduct of remaining in the country ... is the predicate action; the statute applies to stop an indefinitely continuing violation .... It is therefore the alien’s choice to continue his illegal presence . . . after the effective date of the new la[w] that subjects him to the new ... legal regime, not a past act that he is helpless to undo.” 548 U. S., at 44 (emphasis added). Vartelas, we have several times stressed, engaged in no criminal activity after IIRIRA’s passage. He simply took a brief trip to Greece, anticipating a return without incident as in past visits to his parents. No “indefinitely continuing” crime occurred; instead, Vartelas was apprehended because of a pre-IIRIRA crime he was “helpless to undo.” Ibid. The Government further refers to lower court decisions in cases involving 18 U. S. C. § 922(g), which prohibits the possession of firearms by convicted felons. Brief for Respondent 18-19 (citing United States v. Pfeifer, 371 F. 3d 430, 436 (CA8 2004), and United States v. Hemmings, 258 F. 3d 587, 594 (CA7 2001)). “[longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 626 (2008), however, target a present danger, i. e., the danger posed by felons who bear arms. See, e. g., Pfeifer, 371 F. 3d, at 436 (hazardous conduct that statute targets “occurred after enactment of the statute”); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 1201, 82 Stat. 236 (noting hazards involved when felons possess firearms). Nor do recidivism sentencing enhancements support the Government’s position. Enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense “ ‘is not to be viewed as . . . [an] additional penalty for the earlier crimes,’ but instead, as a ‘stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because [it is] a repetitive one.’” Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389, 400 (1995) (quoting Gryger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728, 732 (1948)). In Vartelas’ case, however, there is no “aggravated ... repetitive” offense. There is, in contrast, no post-IIRIRA criminal offense at all. Var-telas’ travel abroad and return are “innocent” acts, see Fleuti, 374 U. S., at 462, burdened only because of his pre-IIRIRA offense. In sum, Vartelas’ brief trip abroad post-IIRIRA involved no criminal infraction. IIRIRA disabled him from leaving the United States and returning as a lawful permanent resident. That new disability rested not on any continuing criminal activity, but on a single crime committed years before IIRIRA’s enactment. The antiretroactivity principle instructs against application of the new proscription to render Vartelas a first-time arrival at the country’s gateway. IV The Second Circuit homed in on the words “committed an offense” in § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) in determining that the change IIRIRA wrought had no retroactive effect. 620 F. 3d, at 119-121. It matters not that Vartelas may have relied on the prospect of continuing visits to Greece in deciding to plead guilty, the court reasoned. “[I]t would border on the absurd,” the court observed, “to suggest that Vartelas committed his counterfeiting crime in reliance on the immigration laws.” Id., at 120. This reasoning is doubly flawed. As the Government acknowledges, “th[is] Court has not required a party challenging the application of a statute to show [he relied on prior law] in structuring his conduct.” Brief for Respondent 25-26. In Landgraf, for example, the issue was the retroactivity of compensatory and punitive damages as remedies for employment discrimination. “[C]oncerns of . . . upsetting expectations are attenuated in the case of intentional employment discrimination,” the Court noted, for such discrimination “has been unlawful for more than a generation.” 511 U. S., at 282, n. 35. But “[e]ven when the conduct in question is morally reprehensible or illegal,” the Court added, “a degree of unfairness is inherent whenever the law imposes additional burdens based On conduct that occurred in the past.” Id., at 283, n. 35. And in Hughes Aircraft, the Court found that Congress’ 1986 removal of a defense to a qui tam action did not apply to pre-1986 conduct in light of the presumption against retroac-tivity. 520 U. S., at 941-942. As in Landgraf, the relevant conduct (submitting a false claim) had been unlawful for decades. See 520 U. S., at 947. The operative presumption, after all, is that Congress intends its laws to govern prospectively only. See supra, at 265-266. “It is a strange ‘presumption,’ ” the Third Circuit commented, “that arises only on ... a showing [of] actual reliance.” Ponnapula v. Ashcroft, 373 F. 3d 480, 491 (2004). The essential inquiry, as stated in Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 269-270, is “whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.” That is just what occurred here. In any event, Vartelas likely relied on then-existing immigration law. While the presumption against retroactive application of statutes does not require a showing of detrimental reliance, see Olatunji, 387 F. 3d, at 389-395, reasonable reliance has been noted among the “familiar considerations” animating the presumption, see Landgraf, 511 U. S., at 270 (presumption reflects “familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations”). Although not a necessary predicate for invoking the antiretroactivity principle, the likelihood of reliance on prior .law strengthens the case for reading a newly enacted law prospectively. See Olatunji, 387 F. 3d, at 393 (discussing St. Cyr). St. Cyr is illustrative. That case involved a lawful permanent resident who pleaded guilty to a criminal charge that made him deportable. Under the immigration law in effect when he was convicted, he would have been eligible to apply for a waiver of deportation. But his removal proceeding was commenced after Congress, in IIRIRA, withdrew that dispensation. Disallowance of discretionary waivers, the Court recognized, “attache[d] a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.” 533 U. S., at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted). Aliens like St. Cyr, the Court observed, “almost certainly relied upon th[e] likelihood [of receiving discretionary relief] in deciding [to plead guilty, thereby] forgo[ing] their right to a trial.” Id., at 325. Hence, applying the IIRIRA withdrawal to St. Cyr would have an “obvious and severe retroactive effect.” Ibid. Because Congress made no such intention plain, ibid., n. 55, we held that the prior law, permitting relief from deportation, governed St. Cyr’s ease. As to retroactivity, one might think Vartelas’ case even easier than St. Cyr’s. St. Cyr could seek the Attorney General’s discretionary dispensation. Vartelas, under Fleuti, was free, without seeking an official’s permission, to make trips of short duration to see and assist his parents in Greece. The Second Circuit thought otherwise, compounding its initial misperception (treating reliance as essential to application of the antiretroactivity principle). The deportation provision involved in St Cyr, 8 U. S. C. § 1229b(a)(3), referred to the alien’s “convict[ion]” of a crime, while the statutory words sub judice in Vartelas’ case were “committed an offense,” § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v); see supra, at 272. The practical difference, so far as retroactivity is concerned, escapes from our grasp. Ordinarily, to determine whether there is clear and convincing evidence that an alien has committed a qualifying crime, the immigration officer at the border would check the alien’s records for a conviction. He would not call into session a piepowder court to entertain a plea or conduct a trial. Satisfied that Vartelas’ case is at least as clear as St. Cyr’s for declining to apply a new law retroactively, we hold that Fleuti continues to govern Vartelas’ short-term travel. * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The dissent appears driven, in no small measure, by its dim view of the Court’s opinion in Fleuti. See post, at 280 (“same instinct” operative in Fleuti and this ease). The BIA determined that the Fleuti doctrine no longer held sway because it was rooted in the “no longer existent definition of ‘entry’ in the [Immigration and Nationality] Act.” 211. & N. Dec., at 1065. The Board also noted that “Congress . . . amended the law to expressly preserve some, but not all, of the Fleuti doctrine” when it provided that a lawful permanent resident absent from the United States for less than 180 days would not be regarded- as seeking an admission except in certain enumerated circumstances, among them, prior commission of a crime of moral turpitude. See ibid, (citing 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(ii)). Vartelas does not challenge the ruling in Collado-Munoz. We therefore assume, but do not decide, that IIRIRA’s amendments to § 1101(a)(13)(A) abrogated Fleuti. Although IIRIRA created a uniform removal procedure for both ex-cludable and deportable aliens, the list of criminal offenses that subject aliens to exclusion remains separate from the list of offenses that render an alien deportable. These lists are “sometimes overlapping and sometimes divergent.” Judulang v. Holder, 565 U. S. 42, 46 (2011). Pertinent here, although a single crime involving moral turpitude may render an alien inadmissible, it would not render her deportable. See 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(2) (listing excludable crimes); § 1227(a)(2) (listing deportable crimes). The dissent asserts that Justice Story’s opinion “bearfe] no relation to the presumption against retroactivity.” Post, at 281. That is a bold statement in view of this Court’s many references to Justice Story’s formulation in cases involving the presumption that statutes operate only prospectively in the absence of a clear congressional statement to the contrary. In St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 317-320, we rejected the Government’s contention that Congress directed retroactive application of IIRIRA in its entirety. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 126 (1958) (“Freedom of movement across frontiers . . . may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads.”); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 519-520 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (right to travel, “at home and abroad, is important for . . . business[,] .. . cultural, political, and social activities—for all the commingling which gregarious man enjoys”). The dissent, see post, at 281, notes two statutes of the same genre: laws prohibiting persons convicted of a sex crime against a victim under 16 years of age from working in jobs involving frequent contact with minors, and laws prohibiting a person “who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution” from possessing guns, 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(4). The dissent is correct that these statutes do not operate retroactively. Rather, they address dangers that arise postenactment: sex offenders with a history of child molestation working in close proximity to children, and mentally unstable persons pur-‘ chasing guns. The act of flying to Greece, in contrast, does not render a lawful permanent resident like Varíelas hazardous. Nor is it plausible that Congress’ solution to the problem of dangerous lawful permanent residents would be to pass a law’that would deter such persons from ever leaving the United States. As for student loans, it is unlikely that the provision noted by the dissent, 20 U. S. C. § 1091(r), would raise retroactivity questions in the first place. The statute has a prospective thrust. It concerns “[sjuspension of eligibility” when a student receiving a college loan commits a drug crime. The suspension runs “from the date of th[e] conviction” for specified periods, e. g., two years for a second offense of possession. Moreover, eligibility may be restored before the period of ineligibility ends if the student establishes, under prescribed criteria, his rehabilitation. The deleted defense permitted qui tam defendants to escape liability if the information on which a private plaintiff (relator) relied was already in the Government’s possession. Detrimental reliance was hardly apparent, for the Government, both before and after the statutory change, could bring suit with that information, and “the monetary liability faced by [a False Claims Act] defendant is the same whether the action is brought by the Government or by a qui tam relator.” 520 U. S., at 948. “There can be little doubt,” the Court noted in St Cyr, “that, as a general matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions.” 533 U. S., at 322. Indeed, “[p]reserving [their] right to remain in the United States may be more important to [them] than any potential jail sentence.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. 356, 366-369 (2010) (holding that counsel has a duty under the Sixth Amendment to inform a noncitizen defendant that his plea would make him eligible for deportation). Armed with knowledge that a guilty plea would preclude travel abroad, aliens like Vartelas might endeavor to negotiate a plea to a nonex-' dudable offense — in Vartelas’ case, e. g., possession of counterfeit securities — or exercise a right to trial. After the words “committed an offense,” § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v)’s next words are “identified in section 1182(a)(2).” That section refers to “any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed,” inter alia, “a crime involving moral turpitude.” § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (emphasis added). The entire § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) phrase “committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2),” on straightforward reading, appears to advert to a lawful permanent resident who has been convicted of an offense under § 1182(a)(2) (or admits to one). Piepowder (“dusty feet”) courts were temporary mercantile courts held at trade fairs in Medieval Europe; local merchants and guild members would assemble to hear commercial disputes. These courts provided fast and informal resolution of trade conflicts, settling eases “while the merchants’ feet were still dusty.” Callahan, Medieval Church Norms and Fiduciary Duties in Partnership, 26 Cardozo L. Rev! 215,235, and n. 99 (2004) (quoting H. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition 347 (1983); internal quotation marks omitted).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LEVINSON v. SPECTOR MOTOR SERVICE. No. 22. Argued December 11, 1945. Reargued October 21, 22, 1946. Decided March 31, 1947. Harry L. Yale argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Richard S. Folsom. David Axelrod argued the cause for respondent on the original argument and Roland Rice on the reargument. With them on the briefs were Harry J. Lurie and Maurice P. Golden. Peter T. Beardsley was also on the brief on the reargument. By special leave of Court, Jeter S. Bay argued the cause for the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, as amicus curiae, on the reargument. With him on the brief was William S. Tyson. By special leave of Court, Daniel W. Knowlton argued the cause and filed a brief for the Interstate Commerce Commission, as amicus curiae, on the reargument. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether the Interstate Commerce Commission has the power, under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service with respect to any “checker” or “terminal foreman,” a substantial part of whose activities in that capacity consists of doing, or immediately directing, the work of one or more “loaders” of freight for an interstate motor carrier as such class of work is defined by the Interstate Commerce Commission in Ex parte No. MC-2, 28 M. C. C. 125, 133-134, although the rest of his activities do not affect the safety of operation of any such motor carrier. We hold that the Commission has that power and that § 13 (b) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act therefore expressly excludes any such employee from a right to the increased pay for overtime service prescribed by § 7 of that Act. In this action, brought in the Municipal Court of Chicago, pursuant to § 16 (b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the petitioner recovered judgment against his employer, the respondent, for $487.44 for unpaid overtime compensation for petitioner’s services, as a “checker” or “terminal foreman,” computed in accordance with § 7 of that Act. In addition, the judgment included $487.44, as liquidated damages, and $175 as an attorney’s fee, making a total of $1,149.88 and costs. The defense was that, under § 13 (b) (1), the provisions of § 7 did not apply to the petitioner’s service. On that ground, the judgment was reversed by the Appellate Court of Illinois and the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment, with costs, for the respondent. 323 Ill. App. 505, 56 N. E. 2d 142. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. 389 Ill. 466, 59 N. E. 2d 817. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the question in interpreting the Motor Carrier Act and Fair Labor Standards Act. 326 U. S. 703. It was argued at the October Term, 1945, of this Court and, on January 2, 1946, was restored to the docket for reargument before a full bench at this Term. It was so argued on October 21 and 22, 1946. In addition to the briefs and arguments on behalf of the parties, we have had the benefit of those presented, at our request, on behalf of amici curiae. These were from the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, who supported the position of the petitioner, and, on the other hand, from the Interstate Commerce Commission which claimed that it possessed, under the Motor Carrier Act, the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service with respect to the petitioner. The Solicitor General, also at our request, filed a memorandum. In it he supported the petition for certiorari and took what he has described as “a position somewhat between that of the Commission and that of the Wage and Hour Administrator.” The respondent is a Missouri corporation, licensed in Illinois, and engaged in interstate commerce as a motor carrier of freight. It does not appear whether the respondent is a common carrier, contract carrier or private carrier of property. The result, however, does not turn upon differences between those classifications. The petitioner was employed by the respondent from October 1, 1940, through October 6, 1941, in one or more capacities which he designates generally as those of a “checker” or “terminal foreman.” While the evidence is conflicting as to some of his duties, there is ample to sustain the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois on the basis that a substantial part of his activities consisted of doing, or immediately directing, the work of one or more “loaders” of freight for an interstate motor carrier as that class of work is defined by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Supreme Court of Illinois accepted the Appellate Court’s description of petitioner’s activities. The power of the Commission to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service with respect to such “loaders” has been defined and delimited by it in a series of well-considered decisions, dating from the extension of its jurisdiction, in 1935, so as to include motor carriers. The history of the development of the congressional safety program in interstate commerce, up to and including the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act in 1935 and the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938, tells the story. In comparable fields, Congress previously had prescribed safety equipment, limited maximum hours of service and imposed penalties for violations of its requirements. In those Acts, Congress did not rely upon increases in rates of pay for overtime service to enforce the limitations it set upon hours of service. While a requirement of pay that is higher for overtime service than for regular service tends to deter employers from permitting such service, it tends also to encourage employees to seek it. The requirement of such increased pay is a remedial measure adapted to the needs of an economic and social program rather than a police regulation adapted to the rigid enforcement required in a safety program. Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572, 577-578. By 1935, 40 states had attempted to regulate safety of operation of carriers by motor vehicle. Some had established qualifications and maximum hours of service for drivers and helpers. Increased interstate movements of motor carriers then made necessary the Motor Carrier Act, 1985, approved August 9, 1935, as Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 543. This Act vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission power to establish reasonable requirements with respect to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety of operation and equipment of common and contract carriers by motor vehicle. § 204 (a) (1) (2). Similar, but not identical, language was used as to private carriers of property by motor vehicle. § 204 (a) (3). The Act expressly superseded “any code of fair competition for any industry embracing motor carriers . . . .” § 204 (b). Section 203 (b) listed many types of motor carriers which were exempted in general from the Act but that Section significantly applied to all of them the provisions of § 204 as to qualifications, maximum hours of service, safety of operation and equipment. It is even more significant that in 1942, several years after enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Congress slightly, but expressly, expanded the jurisdiction of the Commission over these subjects of qualifications, maximum hours of service, safety of operation and equipment and thereby restricted, to a corresponding degree, the application of the compulsory overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. In 1940, this Court, in United States v. Amer. Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, recognized the emphasis given by Congress to the clause “qualifications and maximum hours of service” in §§ 204 (a) and 203 (b). That decision reviewed the legislative history of the Act and held “that the meaning of employees in § 204 (a) (1) and (2) is limited to those employees whose activities affect the safety of operation. The Commission has no jurisdiction to regulate the qualifications or hours of service of any others.” Id. at 553. The opinion dealt with employees who devoted themselves exclusively to their respective assignments, such as those of drivers on the one hand or of clerks on the other. It demonstrated that § 204 (a) (1) and (2) related to the former but not to the latter. It did not discuss its relation to employees who, as in the present case, are required to divide their activities between those affecting safety of operation and those not affecting it. In Southland Co. v. Bayley, 319 U. S. 44, this Court applied similar reasoning to an employee of a private carrier of property under § 204 (a) (3). It recognized the Commission’s power to find a need for its action and, having found it, to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service for employees of private motor carriers of property affecting the safety of operation of such carriers. It held that, under § 13 (b) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Commission’s mere possession of that power, whether exercised or not, necessarily excluded all employees, with respect to whom the power existed, from the benefits of the compulsory overtime provisions of § 7 of that Act. The present case involves a comparable situation in that the Commission has found here that it has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service for those doing the work of loaders for common or contract motor carriers or private motor carriers of property, but it has not found it advisable, as yet, to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service for that work. The logic of the situation is that Congress, as a primary consideration, has preserved intact the safety program which it and the Interstate Commerce Commission have been developing for motor carriers since 1936. To do this, Congress has prohibited the overlapping of the jurisdiction of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, with that of the Interstate Commerce Commission as to maximum hours of service. Congress might have done otherwise. It might have permitted both Acts to apply. There is no necessary inconsistency between enforcing rigid maximum hours of service for safety purposes and at the same time, within those limitations, requiring compliance with the increased rates of pay for overtime work done in excess of the limits set in § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Such overlapping, however, has not been authorized by Congress and it remains for us to give full effect to the safety program to which Congress has attached primary importance, even to the corresponding exclusion by Congress of certain employees from the benefits of the compulsory overtime pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. When examined from the point of view of the Motor Carrier Act alone, much light is thrown on the meaning of its § 204 by the interpretation given to it and the applications made of it by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The reports and regulations of that Commission, issued under authority of Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, both before and after the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act, deal so thoroughly and expertly with the safety of operation of interstate motor transportation as to entitle them to especially significant weight in the interpretation of this Act, the enforcement of which has been committed by Congress solely to that Commission. The principal reports and regulations of the Commission, bearing upon the present controversy, are the following: December 23, 1936. 1 M. C. C. 1. Ex parte No. MC-4 established qualifications for drivers of interstate, common or contract carriers by motor vehicle, outlined a long-term safety program and issued regulations as to safety of operation and equipment, constituting Parts, I, II, III and IV of motor carrier safety regulations. December 29, 1937. 3 M. C. C. 665. Ex parte No. MC-2 established maximum hours of service for drivers of interstate, common or contract carriers by motor vehicles, Part V of such regulations. July 9, 1938. 8 M. C. C. 162. Ex parte No. MC-4 modified Part III of such regulations as to safety glass. July 12, 1938. 6 M. C. C. 557. Ex parte No. MC-2, in the light of current experience, modified Part V of the regulations as to maximum hours of service for such drivers. December 3, 1938. 10 M. C. C. 533. Ex parte No. MC-4 adapted the Commission’s general qualifications and regulations to those types of carriers which were exempted from the Motor Carrier Act by §203 (b), but which had remained subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, under § 204, as to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, safety of operation and equipment. January 27, 1939. 11 M. C. C. 203. Ex parte No. MC-2 further modified Part V of regulations as to maximum hours of service of drivers for common and contract carriers by motor vehicle. May 9, 1939. 13 M. C. C. 481. Ex parte No. MC-28 interpreted § 204 (a) as giving the Commission authority to prescribe qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of common, contract and private carriers of property by motor vehicle only as to those employees whose activities affected safety of operation. It said: “Our experience and the study we necessarily made in connection with the administration of the Motor Carrier Act qualify us to prescribe such regulations [i. e., as to drivers], to promote safety of operation. Quite the contrary would be true if we were called upon to prescribe general qualifications for all employees of such carriers.” Id. at 485. Clerks, salesmen and executives were named as not being within the Commission’s jurisdiction. Referring further to its power to prescribe qualifications and maximum hours of service with respect to drivers and others, the Commission said: “That power undoubtedly extends to drivers of such vehicles. It may well be that the activities of some employees other than drivers likewise affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles engaged in interstate and foreign commerce. If common and contract carriers, or private carriers of property, or their employees believe that the activities of employees other than drivers affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles engaged in interstate and foreign commerce, they may file an appropriate petition, asking that a hearing be held and the question determined.” Id. at 488. May 27, 1939. 14 M. C. C. 669. Ex parte No. MC-4. The “Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, Revised,” were found to be “reasonable requirements with respect to qualifications of employees and safety of operation and equipment of common carriers and contract carriers subject to the Motor Carrier Act, 1935, and that said revised regulations should be approved, adopted, and prescribed.” Id. at 683. These revisions strengthened the provisions as to qualifications of drivers, for common and contract carriers, as to eyesight, physical condition, age, and ability to read and speak English. They extended the maximum hours of service regulations to drivers for the “exempt carriers” enumerated in § 203 (b), excepting only those referred to in subparagraph (4a) relating to farmers. June 15, 1939. 16 M. C. C. 497. No. MC-C-189. Upon petition of American Trucking Associations, Incorporated, et al., the Commission reaffirmed its decision of May 9, 1939, in Ex parte No. MC-28, and stated the negative side of the proposition there established. It said that § 204 (a) “does not empower us to prescribe maximum hours of service for employees of motor carriers whose activities do not affect the safety of operation.” Id. at 497. May 1, 1940. 23 M. C. C. 1. Ex parte No. MC-8. Following extended hearings, the Commission made findings that are important here. First, it found, as required by § 204 (a) (3), that “there is need for Federal regulation of private carriers of property to promote safety of operation of motor vehicles used by such carriers in the transportation of property in interstate or foreign commerce.” Id. at 42. With comparatively few exceptions, such as those relating to farm trucks and industry trucks, the Commission then applied to drivers for private carriers of property by motor vehicle in interstate and foreign commerce the same qualifications, maximum hours of service and regulations as to safety of operation and equipment that it previously had prescribed, by its orders in Ex parte No. MC-2, supra, and Ex parte No. MC-4, supra, for drivers of common and contract carriers. Id. at 22, 42. The significance of this action in relation to the present case is that, in considering the classes of work done by drivers for private motor carriers, the Commission found many instances where only a part of the driver's activities related to driving or to other operations affecting safety of transportation. For example, the Commission dealt with drivers of farm trucks. Section 203 (b) (4a) of the Motor Carrier Act exempts farm trucks, for most purposes, from the provisions of that Act. Nevertheless, § 204 retains them within the jurisdiction of the Commission with respect to the qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees whose activities affect the safety of operation of interstate carriers by motor vehicle. The Commission recognized that such drivers have many duties unrelated to those of driving or safety of operation; that farm trucks, to a large extent, do not travel public highways; that the work is not a year-round operation but generally is confined to the harvest season; but that, nevertheless, whenever such a truck is being operated in interstate transportation on the public highway, the hazards involved in such operation are comparable to those faced by drivers who devote their entire time to interstate truck driving of all kinds. With appropriate modifications, the Commission thereupon prescribed for drivers of farm trucks qualifications and maximum hours of service different from, but comparable to, those it had prescribed for drivers of common and contract carrier trucks in general. Instead of its standard minimum requirement of 21 years of age, it set the minimum age requirement for drivers of farm trucks at 18, when the gross weight of the vehicle and load combined did not exceed 10,000 pounds. It declined to approve a minimum age of 16, although that had been accepted by some states. It eliminated the usual physical examinations. It relaxed its rule against transportation of passengers. It eliminated its requirement of keeping a driver’s log showing a written record of the trips and stops made by each driver. It retained, however, its restriction against driving more than 10 hours in any one day and, in place of the prohibition against a total of more than 60 hours on duty in a week, it limited the total hours of driving, as distinguished from other duties, to 50 hours in a week. Ex parte No. MC-3, 23 M. C. C. 1, 27-28, 43. The Commission took comparable action as to industry trucks. It recognized, for example, that a bakery driver-salesman devotes much of his effort and time to selling baked goods rather than to activities affecting the safety of operation of his truck. The Commission, however, did not relinquish jurisdiction over the qualifications of driver-salesmen nor did it refrain from regulating their driving time. It modified its usual rule by providing that, if a driver-salesman “spends more than 50 percent of his time in selling and less than 50 percent in performing such duties as driving, loading, and unloading,” he may be permitted to exceed the usual limit of 60 hours on duty in any week of 168 consecutive hours, provided only that “his hours of driving are limited to a total of not more than 40 in any such week.” Id. at 44, and see 31 (recommending 50 hours). This use by the Commission of a percentage of the driver’s time as a basis for the adjustment of his permissible maximum hours of service is to be distinguished from the suggestion of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, that the entire power of the Commission over safety regulations must be denied as a matter of law whenever, in any given week, an employee has devoted over 50% of his working time to activities not affecting safety, although he may have devoted the rest of his working time to driving a common carrier truck in interstate commerce. It is essential to the Commission’s safety program whenever and wherever hazardous activities are engaged in that affect safety of operation of an interstate motor carrier, that those who engage in them shall be qualified to do so and that maximum hours of service affecting such safety of operation shall be established and enforced. This means retaining and using, rather than relinquishing, the Commission’s jurisdiction over partial-duty drivers and partial-duty loaders, a substantial part of whose activities affects the safety of interstate motor carrier operations, although the rest of their activities may not affect the safety of such operations. Recognizing its potential jurisdiction over others than drivers, the Commission, in that proceeding, invited private carriers of property or their employees who “believe that the activities of employees other than drivers affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles engaged in interstate or foreign commerce” to institute proceedings in order that the question be determined. Id. at 44. March 4, 1941. 28 M. C. C. 125, Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3. In the light of the foregoing experience and hearings, together with the decision of this Court in United States v. Amer. Trucking Assns., supra, the Commission, in this latest and most informative decision, found that the classes of activities which it defined as those of mechanics, loaders and helpers affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles and that, therefore, employees engaging in such classes of activities are subject to the Commission’s power to prescribe their qualifications and maximum hours of service, pursuant to § 204 (a). As related to loaders, the Commission announced the following findings of fact which are significant in the present case: “Findings of fact.— . . . “2. That loaders, as above defined, employed by common and contract carriers and private carriers of property by motor vehicle subject to part II of the Interstate Commerce Act devote a large part of their time to activities which directly affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce. “4. That no employees of common and contract carriers or private carriers of property by motor vehicle, subject to part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, other than drivers and those classes of employees covered by the three preceding findings of fact [mechanics, loaders and helpers], perform duties which directly affect safety of operation.” Ex parte No. MC-2, 28 M. C. C. 125, 138-139. These findings of fact are squarely within the jurisdiction of the Commission. They state affirmatively that, in the opinion of the Commission, the activities of loaders as described by the Commission do affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce. They include also a finding that such loaders “devote a large part of their time to activities which directly affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce.” In the absence of any discussion or classification, on a time basis, of the several activities of loaders described by the Commission, this additional finding amounts to another way of saying that a large part of the loader’s activities affect such safety of operation. There is nothing to indicate that it uses the element of time other than as representative of the continuing work period during all of which the loader is devoting himself to the activities of his job as a loader. It amounts, therefore, merely to a finding as to the character of a large part of the activities of loaders, in accordance with the main purpose of the Commission’s proceeding which was to determine to what extent, if any, the activities of loaders affect safety of operation. This additional finding, however, is material from another point of view. It recognizes tacitly that even a full-duty loader may engage in some activities which do not affect safety of operation. Such “non-safety” activities may make up another “large part” of the loader’s total activities. They may constitute an even larger part of his activities than his safety-affecting activities. In the present case it was shown by the courts below that, in addition to his activities in clerical checking, etc., a “substantial part” of the petitioner’s activities consisted of the very kind of activities of a loader which the Commission has described as directly affecting safety of operation. If it be suggested that significance should be attached to the Commission’s use of the word “large” rather than the lower courts’ use of the word “substantial” in this connection, such significance disappears completely when it is seen that the Commission itself substitutes the word “substantial” for the word “large” in its conclusion of law which is quoted below. While the indefiniteness of the terms “large” or “substantial” is obvious, nevertheless, those are the words which the Commission has chosen to use in dealing with this subject. Arbitrary or sharp lines of distinction do not lend themselves readily to supplying that extra margin of security which is natural in safety engineering. The fundamental test is simply that the employee’s activities affect safety of operation. This is the test prescribed by this Court in United States v. Amer. Trucking Assns., supra. The verb “affect” is itself incapable of exact measurement. Furthermore, we are dealing here not with the final application of the power of the Commission, but rather with the limits of its discretionary power to establish the qualifications and maximum hours of service when and where deemed by it to be needed. In issuing its regulations, the Commission itself can supply whatever definiteness the occasion shall require. From the point of view of the safety program under the Motor Carrier Act, there is no need for a sharply drawn limit to the power of the Commission to make regulations with respect to employees whose activities affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce. Turning to the conclusions of law which were reached by the Commission in the same proceeding we find the following: “Conclusions of law.— . . . “2. That our jurisdiction to prescribe qualifications and maximum hours of service for employees of common and contract carriers and private carriers of property by motor vehicle is limited to those employees who devote a substantial part of their time to activities which directly affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles in the transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce. “3. That we have power, under section 204 (a) of said part II, to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service for the classes of employees covered by findings of fact numbered 1, 2, and 3 above [mechanics, loaders and helpers], and that we have no such power over any other classes of employees, except drivers. “A further hearing will be held to determine what regulations, if any, should be prescribed for those employees, other than drivers, whom we have found subject to our jurisdiction. No order is necessary at this time.” Ex parte No. MC-2, 28 M. C. C. 125, 139. As conclusions of law, these do not have the same claim to finality as do the findings of fact made by the Commission. However, in the light of the Commission’s long record of practical experience with this subject and its responsibility for the administration and enforcement of this law, these conclusions are entitled to special consideration. Conclusion of law No. 2 must be read in close connection with finding of fact No. 2 and conclusion of law No. 3. It is apparent that, in conclusion of law No. 2, the phrase “employees who devote a substantial part of their time to activities which directly affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles” is intended to match the corresponding phrase in finding of fact No. 2 as to loaders who “devote a large part of their time to activities which directly affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles.” This is made still more clear by conclusion of law No. 3 which finds that the Commission has jurisdiction to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service for the loaders included in both paragraphs. Here again there is no classification of the respective activities of loaders on the basis of the time devoted to each activity. The phrase closely follows a discussion of full-duty loaders and its reference to a “substantial part of their time” is but another way of saying a “substantial part of their activities as loaders.” Addressing ourselves to the questions of law presented by the case before us, we reaffirm our position in United States v. Amer. Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, and Southland Co. v. Bayley, 319 U. S. 44. We recognize the Interstate Commerce Commission as the agency charged with the administration and enforcement of the Motor Carrier Act and especially charged with the establishment of qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of common and contract carriers and private carriers of property by motor vehicle in interstate and foreign commerce. We see no reason to question its considered conclusion that the activities of full-duty drivers; mechanics, loaders and helpers, as defined by it, affect safety of operation of the carriers by whom they are employed. In harmony with our reasoning in Southland Co. v. Bayley, supra, and with that of the Interstate Commerce Commission in Ex parte No. MC-3, 23 M. C. C. 1, as to employees of private carriers, and in Ex parte Nos. MC-2 and MC-3, 28 M. C. C. 125, as to mechanics, loaders and helpers in general, we hold that the Commission has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service under § 204 (a) with respect to full-duty employees engaged in doing the work of loaders, although the Commission has not exercised that power affirmatively by establishing qualifications and maximum hours of service with respect to loaders. In harmony with our decision in United States v. Amer. Trucking Assns., supra, and of the Interstate Commerce Commission in Ex parte No. MC-28, 13 M. C. C. 481, we recognize that the Commission has such power over all employees of such carriers whose activities affect safety of operation and that the Commission does not have such power over employees whose activities do not affect safety of operation. In the American Trucking Associations case it was not determined that it was necessary for any employee to devote all, or any precise share, of his working time or of his activities, to a particular class of work in order for such class of work to be held to affect safety of operation. It was assumed, for the purposes of that case, that the employee devoted his entire working time and activities to the single class of work under consideration. It has been noted, however, that the Commission, in defining the class of work, as a whole, of loaders, recognized, in its findings of fact, that that class of work in its nature included duties other than those directly affecting safety of operation. It said: “We conclude that loaders devote a large part of their time to activities which directly affect the safety of operation of motor vehicles operated in interstate or foreign commerce, and hence that we have power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service for such employees under said section 204 (a).” Ex parte No. MC—2, 28 M. C. C. 125, 134, and see 139. This means that the nature of the duties of even a full-duty “loader” is such that it is not essential that more than a “large part” of his time or activities be consumed in activities directly affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles—for example—loading, distributing and making secure heavy or light parcels of freight on board a truck so as to contribute as much as possible to the safety of the trip. On the other hand, it means also that more than half of the time or activities of a full-duty “loader” may be consumed in activities not directly affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles—for example—in placing freight in convenient places in the terminal, checking bills of lading, etc. From the point of view of the Commission and its jurisdiction over safety of operation, this indicates that it is not a question of fundamental concern whether or not it is the larger or the smaller fraction of the employee’s time or activities that is devoted to safety work. It is the character of the activities rather than the proportion of either the employee’s time or of his activities that determines the actual need for the Commission’s power to establish reasonable requirements with respect to qualifications, maximum hours of service, safety of operation and equipment. This line of reasoning is consistent with that applied throughout this case. It results in keeping within the jurisdiction of the Commission’s safety program partial-duty loaders, as well as full-duty loaders, provided only that the class of work done by them affects safety of operation, regardless of whether or not in any particular week they may have devoted more hours and days to activities not affecting safety of operation than they may have devoted to those affecting such safety of operation. The Commission uses similar language in asserting its jurisdiction over mechanics and helpers. This reasoning also resembles that by which the Commission imposes upon a “driver” a maximum total of 60 hours of service “on duty” of any kind, in a “week” of 168 consecutive hours, as well as a maximum of 10 hours, in the aggregate, of driving or operating of a motor vehicle in any period of 24 consecutive hours. Ex parte No. MC-2, 3 M. C. C. 665, 6 M. C. C. 557, 11 M. C. C. 203. For example, the Commission has recognized expressly that, in charter operations, the driver of a chartered bus may be on duty for long hours, but often may spend as little as one-half of that time actually driving. Ex parte No. MC-2, 3 M. C. C. 665, 679. All of these conclusions recognize that an employee who is engaged in a class of work that affects safety of operation is not necessarily engaged during every hour or every day in activities that directly affect safety of operation. While the work of a full-duty driver may affect safety of operation during only that part of the time while he is driving, yet, as a practical matter, it is essential to establish reasonable requirements with respect to his qualifications and activities at all times in order that the safety of operation of his truck may be protected during those particular hours or days when, in the course of his duties as its driver, he does the particular acts that directly affect the safety of its operation. We have set forth the Commission’s record of supervision over this field of safety of operation to demonstrate not only the extent to which the Commission serves Congress in safeguarding the public with respect to qualifications, maximum hours of service, safety of operation and equipment of interstate motor carriers, but to demonstrate the high degree of its competence in this specialized field which justifies reliance upon its findings, conclusions and recommendations. Before examining further the new issue presented by the facts of this case, it is important to recognize that, by virtue of the unique provisions of § 13 (b) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, we are not dealing with an exception to that Act which is to be measured by regulations which Congress has authorized to be made by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor. Instead, we are dealing here with the interpretation of the scope of the safety program of the Interstate Commerce Commission, under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, which in turn is to be interpreted in the light of the regulations made by the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to that Act. Congress, in the Fair Labor Standards Act, does not attempt to impinge upon the scope of the Interstate Commerce Commission safety program. It accepts that program as expressive of a pre-existing congressionally approved project. Section 13 (b) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act thus requires that we interpret the scope of § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act in accordance with the purposes of the Motor Carrier Act and the regulations issued pursuant to it. It is only to the extent that the Interstate Commerce Commission does not have power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to said § 204, that the subsequent Fair Labor Standards Act has been made applicable or its Administrator has been given congressional authority to act. This interpretation puts safety first, as did Congress. It limits the Administrator’s authority to those “employees of motor carriers whose activities do not affect the safety of operation.” No. MC-C-139, 16 M. C. C. 497. Accordingly, we should approach the issue of the partial-duty driver and the partial-duty loader squarely from the point of view of the safety program of the Interstate Commerce Commission, as developed under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, apart from the Fair Labor Standards Act. The principle to be applied is the same in the case of the loader as in that of the driver, although the issue is more obvious when the test of jurisdiction is applied to the driver than when applied to any other class of employees of the motor carrier. This is because the driver’s work more obviously and dramatically affects the safety of operation of the carrier during every moment that he is driving than does the work of the loader who loaded the freight which the driver is transporting. Furthermore, in the case of the driver, the Commission not only has found that it has the power to establish, but it actually has established, tested and revised, a set of qualifications for his service and a maximum limitation on the aggregate number of hours during which he safely may be permitted to drive during any period of 24 consecutive hours. It also has established a maximum limitation on the number of hours during any “week” of 168 consecutive hours during which such a driver safely may be permitted to be “on duty,” even though many of his activities and much of his time while “on duty” may not affect safety of operation of the carrier. In the present case, the issue is whether the Commission has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service with respect to partial-duty loaders comparable to the petitioner. It is not necessary, as a condition precedent, to find that the Commission has exercised, or should exercise, such power by actually establishing qualifications and maximum hours of service with respect to loaders in general, corresponding to those established for drivers in general. The existence of the power is enough. The fact that the Commission has found it necessary to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service which cover not only drivers, but also partial-duty drivers, is an indication that, in the opinion of the Commission, its power, under the Motor Carrier Act, extends to partial-duty as well as to full-duty employees engaged in activities affecting the safety of operation of interstate motor carriers. The principle can be tested by the use of a partial-duty driver as an example. His activities are such that the exclusion of them from the Commission’s safety program would have serious consequences. In the case of the full-duty driver, there is no question as to the power of the Commission to establish reasonable requirements with respect to his qualifications and hours of service. Regulations on these subjects were in effect throughout the period with which this case is concerned. In the class of work referred to by the Commission as that of driver-salesmen of industry trucks, the regulations which have been issued have been mentioned above. These were adapted expressly to drivers who devoted less than 50% of their time to driving. The effect thus given by the Commission to the fact that such employees devote less than one-half of their time to driving is not to exclude such partial-duty drivers from any of its required qualifications. These qualifications include those relating to eyesight, physical condition, age, or ability to read or speak English, etc., which are deemed by it to be important for drivers in general. On the other hand, this fact that certain employees devote a part, rather than all, of their time to driving has brought forth from the Commission an appropriate modification of its safety regulations to fit that fact. The modification takes the form of eliminating the Commission’s limitation on the total maximum hours that the employee can remain on duty in a week of 168 consecutive hours but limiting his hours of actual driving to an aggregate of not more than 50 in any such week. This requirement, established by the agency which is recognized by Congress as the one body authorized to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service applicable to drivers of motor carriers in interstate commerce, is a demonstration that such agency has found it necessary to make active use of its powers of regulation in this field of part-time driving. It follows, as a matter of principle, that, if such power exists with respect to full-duty drivers and partial-duty drivers because they affect the safety of operation of the interstate motor carriers, the power exists also with respect to full-duty loaders and partial-duty loaders because they too affect such safety of operation, although not in precisely the same manner. From a safety standpoint, a partial-duty driver who drives 30 hours continuously and then drives no more during that week creates a greater hazard than the man who drives 10 hours daily for 6 days a week. The hazard of continuous driving is not measured adequately by the total hours during which the driver is employed during the week, nor is it eliminated by a law which entitles him merely to an increased rate of pay for whatever time, above 40 hours per week, he shall work in any one workweek. The loading of any truck load of mixed freight requires that the general qualifications of the loader be adequate, regardless of the proportion of his working time that may have been devoted to this activity or to other activities in that particular week. Similarly, his hours of continuous work during a day of heavy loading may render him unfit for loading the last truck on that day even though, for the entire balance of that week, he may engage in no activities whatever or may engage in only such activities as are unrelated to safety of operation. We have in this case an employee working full time throughout his employment as a “checker” or “terminal foreman.” If he had worked full time as a “loader” as defined by the Commission, he would have been unquestionably within the jurisdiction of the Commission to the extent necessary to exclude him from § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Under the conclusions of law of the Commission in Ex parte No. MC-2, 28 M. C. C. 125, 139, a full-duty “loader” does not have to devote more than a “substantial part” of his time to activities directly affecting safety of operation in order to be subject to the power of the Commission to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service with respect to him. So here it is enough for the purposes of this case that a substantial part of the petitioner’s activities consisted of the doing or immediate direction of the very kind of activities of a loader that are described by the Commission as directly affecting safety of operation. The petitioner’s activities thus affected safety of operation, although it does not appear what fraction of his time was spent in activities affecting safety of operation. As a consequence, he comes within the power of the Commission to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service with respect to him and, by the express terms of § 13 (b) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, he is excluded, automatically, from the benefits of § 7 of that Act. Recognizing that it is the intent of the Fair Labor Standards Act to give full recognition to the safety program of the Motor Carrier Act, this conclusion does not conflict with the meaning or purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act, although it does reduce the scope of application of the compulsory overtime compensation provisions of § 7 of that Act. The contrary position which has been taken as to partial-duty drivers, mechanics, loaders and helpers by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, requires mention. This position no doubt arose from a desire to give wide effect to the Fair Labor Standards Act in an effort to comply with its remedial character. Generally, an expansion of the jurisdiction of the Act does not conflict with jurisdictions established under other Acts of Congress, whereas here every expansion of the jurisdiction of the Act through interpretation of § 13 (b) (1) cuts down the jurisdiction of the Commission under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act. Furthermore, in seeking a practical method of resolving other administrative difficulties such as that of determining the degree of interstate activity or administrative service which should be the measure of the jurisdiction of the Act or of exemption from it, the Administrator has found it practical to fix upon a specific proportion of time devoted to a particular kind of activity and to make that proportion decisive. In some instances, in regulations, he has used 20% as a test of substantiality. In an attempt to resolve the present difficulty in a similar manner, the Administrator at one time proposed that, if an employee in any given week devoted 20% or more of his time to activities not affecting safety of operation, he would be entitled to the benefits of the overtime provisions of § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. He soon abandoned this, but he has attempted to answer the question on a 50% basis in Interpretative Bulletin No. 9, Wage and Hour Division, Office of the Administrator, November, 1943, 1944-1945 WH Man. 520, 523, as follows: “4. . . . “ (b) It should be noted that any truck driver, drivers’ helper, mechanic, or loader employed by a common, contract, or private carrier who spends the greater part of his time during any workweek on nonexempt activities (such as producing, processing, or manufacturing goods, warehouse or clerical work, or other type of work which does not affect safety of operations) is not within the scope of the exemption contained in Section 13 (b) (1). It is the opinion of the Division that Congress did not intend that this exemption should be available as a vehicle to exempt employees who spend most of their time in work other than that which forms the basis of the exemption.” In paragraph 2 of this Bulletin he recognizes the limited legal effect to which this interpretation is entitled, especially insofar as it concerns the meaning of § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act. Such an interpretation conflicts, however, with the Commission’s safety program. It conflicts directly, for example, with the regulation of the Commission as to partial-duty drivers of industry trucks of private carriers in interstate commerce. The fundamental and ever-recurring difficulty with the Administrator’s interpretation of the scope of § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act is that to the extent that he expands the jurisdiction of the Fair Labor Standards Act he must reduce the jurisdiction of the Commission under the Motor Carrier Act, whereas he has no authority to do so. Our conclusion is that, under the Motor Carrier Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service for those employees whose service affects the safety of transportation of common carriers, contract carriers or private carriers of property in interstate and foreign commerce; that such Commission has been charged with the administration and enforcement of that Act; and that in the course of performance of its duties and after extended hearings on the subject, it has found that the work of loaders, as defined by it, affects safety of motor carrier operation. Furthermore, we conclude, upon the findings of the lower courts in this case, that the petitioner was employed by a motor carrier of interstate freight within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act and that, throughout the period at issue, a substantial part of his activities consisted of doing, or immediately directing, the work of one or more loaders as defined by the Interstate Commerce Commission and affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles in interstate or foreign commerce; that, accordingly, the Commission, with respect to him, had power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service; and that, by virtue of § 13 (b) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the provisions of § 7 of that Act as to overtime pay were rendered inapplicable to him. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois therefore is Affirmed. The material parts of § 204 are: “Sec. 204 (a) It shall be the duty of the Commission— "(1) To regulate common carriers by motor vehicle as provided in this part, and to that end the Commission may establish reasonable requirements with respect to continuous and adequate service, transportation of baggage and express, uniform systems of accounts, records, and reports, preservation of records, qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, and safety of operation and equipment. “(2) To regulate contract carriers by motor vehicle as provided in this part, and to that end the Commission may establish reasonable requirements with respect to uniform systems of accounts, records, and reports, preservation of records, qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, and safety of operation and equipment. “(3) To establish for private carriers of property by motor vehicle, if need therefor is found, reasonable requirements to promote safety of operation, and to that end prescribe qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, and standards of equipment. . . .” (Italics supplied.) 49 Stat. 546, 49 U. S. C. § 304 (a) (1), (2) and (3). “(2) Loaders.— . . . “The large carriers, . . . particularly those who have important operations from terminal to terminal, employ men variously called loaders, dockmen, or helpers, and hereinafter called loaders, whose sole duties are to load and unload motor vehicles and transfer freight between motor vehicles and between the vehicles and the warehouse. “The evidence makes it entirely clear that a motor vehicle must be properly loaded to be safely operated on the highways of the country. If more weight is placed on one side of the vehicle than on the other, there is a tendency to tip when rounding curves. If more weight is placed in the rear of the vehicle, the tendency is to raise the front wheels and make safe operation difficult. Further, it is necessary that the load be distributed properly over the axles of the motor vehicle. “Proper loading is not only necessary when heavy machinery, steel, and other like commodities are being transported, but is of importance when normal package freight is handled. If several packing cases weighing from 150 to 200 pounds are loaded on one side of a motor vehicle or at one end thereof, and lighter freight on the other side or at the other end, safe operation is difficult. The great majority, if not all, of the carriers whose operations are of sufficient size or character to justify the employment of loaders handle freight of such weight that proper loading is necessary.” Ex parte No. MC-2, 28 M. C. C. 125, 133-134. Throughout this case it has been recognized that it was within the power of the Commission to establish the qualifications and maximum hours of service for the regular “loaders” who served under the immediate direction of the petitioner. No claim has been made on their behalf to the benefits of § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The present controversy is limited to the status of the petitioner himself. His status is referred to throughout this opinion as that of a “partial-duty loader,” except where he is referred to by his own designation of himself as a “checker” or “terminal foreman.” The term “partial-duty loader” is used in preference to that of “part-time loader,” so as to avoid the implication that time spent in certain activities, rather than the character of those activities, is to be the conclusive factor in deciding whether or not the individual is subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. “Sec. 13. . . . “(b) The provisions of section 7 shall not apply with respect to (1) any employee with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935; . . . .” 52 Stat. 1068, 29 U. S. C. § 213 (b) (1). 5 “Sec. 7. (a) No employer shall, except as otherwise provided in this section, employ any of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce— “(1) for a workweek longer than forty-four hours during the first year from the effective date of this section, “(2) for a workweek longer than forty-two hours during the second year from such date, or “ (3) for a workweek longer than forty hours after the expiration of the second year from such date, unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 52 Stat. 1063, 29 U. S. C. § 207 (a). “Sec. 16. . . . “(b) Any employer who violates the provisions of . . . section 7 of this Act shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of . . . their unpaid overtime compensation, . . . and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. . . . The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” 52 Stat. 1069, 29 U. S. C. § 216 (b). See note 2 for the Commission’s general definition of the work of “loaders.” The Appellate Court of Illinois described the petitioner’s activities as follows: “Plaintiff [petitioner] contends he is a checker, not a loader, and therefore, not within the Commission’s interpretation. We believe that his duties—not the name given his position—are determinative. . . . “Defendant Terminal at 600 West 25th Street, Chicago, is the scene of three phases of motor carrier business—inbound freight, outbound freight and local freight. Trucks carrying freight originating locally and in foreign cities and States, are unloaded by gangs of defendant’s employees. A gang usually consists of 3 or 4 men—a checker, caller, sorter and packer. The checker directs the gang’s operation. Day and night foremen supervise the activities of all the gangs. Incoming freight is unloaded and deposited according to its destination on the dock in various sections at the direction of the checker; likewise under the direction of the checker, it is removed from these sections and loaded on appropriate outgoing trucks. It is loaded according to size and weight; heavy weighted or 'bottom freight’ being distributed in the lower part of the truck and lighter weighted or 'balloon freight’ is placed at the top. This plan is followed in the interest of safety of equipment and of freight. Testimony pertinent to the issue on the merits is that, as checker, plaintiff supervised and directed the unloading and disposition of incoming freight and the collecting and loading of the outgoing freight and that he watched the disposition of the weight of the freight in loading. The dispute in the testimony arises as to the quantity of plaintiff’s activities devoted to these particular duties. Plaintiff says that most of the outbound freight was handled at night, while he worked mostly days; that not much loading was done during his hours, but that, whatever took place, was under his direct charge. The defense testimony is that inbound and outbound freight was equally divided during the day—inbound usually during the night and outbound between 8 a. m. and midnight. “. . . There is no question that some part of plaintiff’s work week was devoted to the direction and supervision of the loading of interstate motor freight carriers. There is no question either that the loaders in his gang were exempted from section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. We think, therefore, that with greater force, plaintiff comes within the exemption for, if the loaders are exempt because the manner in which they work affects the safety of the operation of defendant’s motor vehicles, certainly the duties of plaintiff, who planned and directed the loading, affect that safety. Considering the purpose of the Motor Carriers Act, we believe that the true determinant is whether an employee performs any duties which substantially affect the safety of operation, rather than whether the duties affecting safety are substantial.” Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 323 Ill. App. 505, 507, 508-509, 56 N. E. 2d 142, 143, 144. The Supreme Court of Illinois said: “We think the question of fact to be properly determined in this case is whether or not a substantial part of plaintiff’s work affects safety of operation of motor vehicles, and that this question of fact controls this case. If it be determined from the evidentiary facts that plaintiff, in a substantial part of his work, was engaged in safety of operation of motor vehicles, or the cargo thereof, he would be exempted from the Fair Labor Standards Act, as a matter of law. “. . . under the facts as found by the [Appellate] court, the employee came within the same exemption as loaders, dockmen and helpers.” Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 389 Ill. 466, 473-474, 59 N. E. 2d 817, 820. The Safety Appliance Acts, approved March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 631; March 2, 1903, 32 Stat. 943; April 14, 1910, 36 Stat. 298; and February 28, 1920, 41 Stat. 499; see Title 45, U. S. C.—Railroads, and 49 U. S. C. § 26, all relate to railroads and are enforced by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Hours of Service Act, approved March 4, 1907, 34 Stat. 1415, 45 U. S. C. § 61, requires the Interstate Commerce Commission to enforce maximum hours of service for railroad employees engaged in the movement of trains. It includes also operators, train dispatchers and others having much to do with the safety of train movements although not riding the trains. The Seamen’s Act, approved March 4, 1915, 38 Stat. 1164, see 46 U. S. C. § 673, prescribes maximum hours of service at sea and at anchor for sailors, firemen, oilers and others engaged in sailing or managing vessels. It establishes qualifications for seamen and prescribes crew requirements, safety equipment and sanitary facilities for certain types of vessels. “Sec. 203. . . . “(b) Nothing in this part, except the provisions of section 204 relative to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety of operation or standards of equipment shall be construed to include (1) motor vehicles employed solely in transporting school children and teachers to or from school; or (2) taxicabs, or other motor vehicles performing a bona fide taxicab service, having a capacity of not more than six passengers and not operated on a regular route or between fixed termini; or (3) motor vehicles owned or operated by or on behalf of hotels and used exclusively for the transportation of hotel patrons between hotels and local railroad or other common carrier stations; or (4) motor vehicles operated, under authorization, regulation, and control of the Secretary of the Interior, principally for the purpose of transporting persons in and about the national parks and national monuments; or (4a) motor vehicles controlled and operated by any farmer, and used in the transportation of his agricultural commodities and products thereof, or in the transportation of supplies to his farm; or (4b) motor vehicles controlled and operated by a cooperative association as defined in the Agricultural Marketing Act, approved June 15, 1929, as amended; or (5) trolley busses operated by electric power derived from a fixed overhead wire, furnishing local passenger transportation similar to street-railway service; or (6) motor vehicles used exclusively in carrying livestock, fish (including shell fish), or agricultural commodities (not including manufactured products thereof); or (7) motor vehicles used exclusively in the distribution of newspapers; nor, unless and to the extent that the Commission shall from time to time find that such application is necessary to carry out the policy of Congress enunciated in section 202, shall the provisions of this part, except the provisions of section 204 relative to qualifications and maximum hows of service of employees and safety of operation or standards of equipment apply to: (8) The transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce wholly within a municipality or between contiguous municipalities or within a zone adjacent to and commercially a part of any such municipality or municipalities, except when such transportation is under a common control, management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment to or from a point without such municipality, municipalities, or zone, and provided that the motor carrier engaged in such transportation of passengers over regular or irregular route or routes in interstate commerce is also lawfully engaged in the- intrastate transportation of passengers over the entire length of such interstate route or routes in accordance with the laws of each State having jurisdiction; or (9) the casual, occasional, or reciprocal transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce for compensation by any person not engaged in transportation by motor vehicle as a regular occupation or business.” (Italics supplied.) 49 Stat. 545, 49 U. S. C. § 303 (b). A new § 202 (c) was inserted in the Motor Carrier Act by the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 920, so as to exclude from the Motor Carrier Act certain motor vehicle pickup and delivery service within terminal areas. This exclusión automatically put certain employees, who were engaged in that service, beyond the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to establish their qualifications and maximum hours of service under § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act. The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, thereupon regarded some of them as entitled to the benefits of § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act as to compulsory overtime pay. However, when this new § 202 (c) was amended by the Act of May 16, 1942, 56 Stat. 300, 49 U. S. C. Supp. V, § 302 (c), to include freight forwarders, Congress also added to it a general clause to the effect that “the provisions of section 204 relative to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety of operation and equipment” should apply to the exempted operations. This amendment was an express recognition by Congress of the need for control by the Commission over the qualifications and maximum hours of service of these employees in the interests of public safety, although its provision for that control automatically deprived those employees of their recently acquired private rights to higher overtime pay under § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. In Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S. 572, an employee who served an interstate motor carrier as a rate clerk and performed other incidental duties, none of which were connected with safety of operation, was given judgment for the overtime compensation prescribed by § 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See note 27, infra. Shortly after the Act became effective, the Commission, on its own motion, instituted the Ex parte proceedings listed below. These resulted in many hearings, examiners’ reports and divisional and Commission reports thoroughly and comprehensively covering the subjects investigated. Further comparable investigations directed by the Section of Safety of the Bureau of Motor Carriers of the Interstate Commerce Commission are pending. One of these is to determine what, if any, qualifications and maximum hours of service should be established by the Commission for mechanics, loaders and helpers. Ex parte No. MC-2, Order of July 30, 1936. This related to maximum hours of service of employees engaged in motor carrier transportation and to regulations as to such hours of service pursuant to § 204 (a) (1), (2) and (3). See 3 M. C. C. 665, 666. It dealt with drivers for common and contract carriers. It led to the holding that mechanics, loaders and helpers are within the jurisdiction of the Commission because of their activities affecting the safety of motor carrier transportation. 28 M. C. C. 125. Ex parte No. MC-3, Orders of July 30, 1936, December 23, 1936, and July 12, 1938. This related to qualifications, maximum hours of service of employees, safety of operation and equipment of private carriers of property by motor vehicle. 23 M. C. C. 1, and see 1 M. C. C. 1, 16. Ex parte No. MC-4, Order of August 21, 1936. This related to qualifications of employees, safety of operation and equipment of common and contract motor carriers. It dealt especially with drivers. 1 M. C. C. 1. Ex parte No. MC-28, Order of November 2, 1938. This related to the jurisdiction of the Commission over the establishment of qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of common, contract and private carriers of property by motor vehicle under § 204 (a). The decision limited such jurisdiction to employees affecting safety of operation by motor vehicles. 13 M. C. C. 481. The results of these proceedings are summarized in the text of this opinion in the order in which such results have been announced. See note 9, supra. See Interpretative Bulletin No. 9, Wage and Hour Division, Office of the Administrator, par. 4 (b), November, 1943, 1944-1945 WH Man. 520, 523; discussed at note 24, infra. See note 2, supra, for the Commission’s definition of the work of loaders. Ibid. See Richardson v. James Gibbons Co., 132 F. 2d 627, argued and affirmed with Southland Co. v. Bayley, 319 U. S. 44. In that case the Commission’s power, under §204 (a) (3), was upheld as to an employee who testified that he was employed “twenty-five per cent of the time as a truck driver and seventy-five per cent of the time as a distributor-operator” of liquid asphalt, and whose employer testified that the same employee “was employed approximately thirty per cent of the time in distributing the asphalt and seventy per cent in transporting same.” Id. at 628. Apparently his work was accepted as affecting safety of operation although only 25 to 70% of his time was spent as a driver and the balance of his time was spent in work not affecting safety of operation. Section 13 (b) (1), in this particular, is in sharp contrast with § 13 (a) (1) which provides as follows for the definition and delimitation of that exemption by the Administrator: “Sec. 13. (a) The provisions of sections 6 and 7 shall not apply with respect to (1) any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, professional, or local retailing capacity, or in the capacity of outside salesman (as such terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the Administrator); . . . .” 52 Stat. 1067, 29 U. S. C. §213 (a) (1). See also, §§ 213 (a) (7), 213 (a) (10) and 214. Safety Regulations for Carriers by Motor Vehicle, 49 CFR, Cum. Supp., Part 190—General Definitions; Part 191—Hours of Service; Part 192—Qualifications of Drivers; Part 193—Driving of Motor Vehicles; Part 194—Necessary Parts and Accessories; Part 195—Accident Reports; Part 196—Inspection and Maintenance. See 49 CFR, Cum. Supp., Parts 191 and 192. Discussed at pages 667-668, supra. Ex parte No. MC-3, 23 M. C. C. 1, 31, 44. “. . . no driver salesman employed by a private carrier of property who devotes more than 50 percent of his time to selling and less than 50 percent to such work as driving, loading, unloading, and the like, shall be permitted or required to drive or operate a motor vehicle for more than an aggregate of 50 hours in any week as defined in said § 191.1 (e).” (Such a “week” is defined as “any period of 168 consecutive hours beginning at the time the driver reports for duty, . . . .”) 49 CFR, Cum. Supp., § 191.3 (b). 29 CFR, Cum. Supp., §§ 541.1 (f), 541.3 (a) (4), 541.4 (b), and 541.5 (b). See also, Ralph Knight, Inc. v. Mantel, 135 F. 2d 514. Interpretative Bulletin No. 9, Wage and Hour Division, Office of the Administrator, March, 1942, par. 5 (b), 1943 WH Man. 186, 189. “2. The scope of the exemption provided in Section 13 (b) (1) involves the interpretation not only of the Fair Labor Standards Act but also of Section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935. The Act confers no authority upon the Administrator to extend or restrict the scope of the exemption provided in Section 13 (b) (1) or even to impose legally binding interpretations as to its meaning. This bulletin is merely intended to indicate the course which the Administrator will follow in the performance of his administrative duties until otherwise required by the authoritative rulings of the courts. It is nevertheless to be noted that the Supreme Court has held that the interpretations expressed in bulletins of this Division are entitled to great weight.” See note 22, supra. In 1945, upon the recommendation of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, S. 1349 was introduced proposing many amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act. That Bill, as introduced and as recommended for passage by the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, proposed expressly to expand somewhat the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act without reducing the jurisdiction of the Commission under the Motor Carrier Act, by amending § 13 (b) (1) to read: “Sec. 13. . . . “(b) The provisions of section 7 shall not apply with respect to (1) any employee who during the greater part of any workweek is engaged in work with respect to which the Interstate Commerce Commission has established qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, 1935; ...” Hearings on S. 1349 before the Subcommittee of the Senate on Education and Labor. September 25, 1945, pp. 4, 249, et seq.; Sen. Rep. No. 1012, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 3, 11, 17; Part 2, pp. 5, 135. This Amendment, however, was eliminated on the floor of the Senate, 92 Cong. Rec. 2656, 2657, 3094, 3095, 3096, 3185, before passage of the Bill, April 5, 1946. Furthermore, it was not included in the companion Bill, H. R. No. 4130, as reported to the House of Representatives by the Committee on Labor June 19, 1946, H. R. Rep. No. 2300, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., although it was recommended in the minority report of that Committee. Id. at 7, 15, 19. See also, Hearings before the Committee on Labor of the House of Representatives, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 864, 905. Congress adjourned without taking final action on either Bill, but, when Congress adjourned, neither pending measure contained the proposal. The court said: “. . . We believe that the true determinant is whether an employee performs any duties which substantially affect the safety of operation, rather than whether the duties affecting safety are substantial.” 323 Ill. App. 505, 509. (Emphasis added.) This is also the Commission’s position taken in the brief and at the argument in this cause. See note 16. The Illinois Supreme Court found the test in “a substantial part of plaintiff’s work.” 389 Ill. 466, 473.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

TAYLOR v. STURGELL, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, et al. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT No. 07-371. Argued April 16, 2008 Decided June 12, 2008 Adina H. Rosenbaum argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Brian Wolfman, Scott L. Nelson, and Michael John Pangia. Douglas Hallward-Driemeier argued the cause for the federal respondent. With him on the brief were former Solicitor General Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bucholtz, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Leonard Schaitman, and Robert D. Kamenshine. Catherine E. Stetson argued the cause for respondent Fairchild Corporation. With her on the brief were Christopher T Handman and N. Thomas Connolly. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Association for Justice by John Vail and Kathleen Flynn Peterson; for Civil Procedure and Complex Litigation Professors by David L. Shapiro and John Leubsdorf, both pro se; for the National Security Archive et al. by Meredith Fuchs; and for Lavonna Eddy et al. by James A. Feldman and Gerald S. Hartman. Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General of Utah, and Philip S. Lott and Peggy E. Stone, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of Utah as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Jack R. Bierig filed a brief for the American Dental Association as amicus curiae. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court. “It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.” Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32,40 (1940). Several exceptions, recognized in this Court’s decisions, temper this basic rule. In a class action, for example, a person not named as a party may be bound by a judgment on the merits of the action, if she was adequately represented by a party who actively participated in the litigation. See id., at 41. In this case, we consider for the first time whether there is a “virtual representation” exception to the general rule against precluding nonparties. Adopted by a number of courts, including the courts below in the case now before us, the exception so styled is broader than any we have so far approved. The virtual representation question we examine in this opinion arises in the following context. Petitioner Brent Taylor filed a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act seeking certain documents from the Federal Aviation Administration. Greg Herrick, Taylor’s friend, had previously brought an unsuccessful suit seeking the same records. The two men have no legal relationship, and there is no evidence that Taylor controlled, financed, participated in, or even had notice of Herrick’s earlier suit. Nevertheless, the D. C. Circuit held Taylor’s suit precluded by the judgment against Herrick because, in that court’s assessment, Herrick qualified as Taylor’s “virtual representative.” We disapprove the doctrine of preclusion by “virtual representation,” and hold, based on the record as it now stands, that the judgment against Herrick does not bar Taylor from maintaining this suit. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA or Act) accords “any person” a right to request any records held by a federal agency. 5 U. S. C. § 552(a)(3)(A) (2006 ed.). No reason need be given for a FOIA request, and unless the requested materials fall within one of the Act’s enumerated exemptions, see § 552(a)(3)(E), (b), the agency must “make the records promptly available” to the requester, § 552(a)(3)(A). If an agency refuses to furnish the requested records, the requester may file suit in federal court and obtain an injunction “order[ing] the production of any agency records improperly withheld.” § 552(a)(4)(B). I The courts below held the instant FOIA suit barred by the judgment in earlier litigation seeking the same records. Because the lower courts’ decisions turned on the connection between the two lawsuits, we begin with a full account of each action. A The first suit was filed by Greg Herrick, an antique aircraft enthusiast and the owner of an F-45 airplane, a vintage model manufactured by the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation (FEAC) in the 1930’s. In 1997, seeking information that would help him restore his plane to its original condition, Herrick filed a FOIA request asking the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for copies of any technical documents about the F-45 contained in the agency’s records. To gain a certificate authorizing the manufacture and sale of the F-45, FEAC had submitted to the FAA’s predecessor, the Civil Aeronautics Authority, detailed specifications and other technical data about the plane. Hundreds of pages of documents produced by FEAC in the certification process remain in the FAA’s records. The FAA denied Herrick’s request, however, upon finding that the documents he sought are subject to FOIA’s exemption for “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential,” § 552(b)(4). In an administrative appeal, Herrick urged that FEAC and its successors had waived any trade-secret protection. The FAA thereupon contacted FEAC’s corporate successor, respondent Fairchild Corporation (Fairchild). Because Fairchild objected to release of the documents, the agency adhered to its original decision. Herrick then filed suit in the U. S. District Court for the District of Wyoming. Challenging the FAA’s invocation of the trade-secret exemption, Herrick placed heavy weight on a 1955 letter from FEAC to the Civil Aeronautics Authority. The letter authorized the agency to lend any documents in its files to the public “for use in making repairs or replacement parts for aircraft produced by Fairchild.” Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F. 3d 1184,1193 (CA10 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). This broad authorization, Herrick maintained, showed that the F-45 certification records held by the FAA could not be regarded as “secre[t]” or “confidential” within the meaning of § 552(b)(4). Rejecting Herrick’s argument, the District Court granted summary judgment to the FAA. Herrick v. Garvey, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1328-1329 (Wyo. 2000). The 1955 letter, the court reasoned, did not deprive the F-45 certification documents of trade-secret status, for those documents were never in fact released pursuant to the letter’s blanket authorization. See id., at 1329. The court also stated that even if the 1955 letter had waived trade-secret protection, Fairchild had successfully “reversed” the waiver by objecting to the FAA’s release of the records to Herrick. Ibid. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Herrick that the 1955 letter had stripped the requested documents of trade-secret protection. See Herrick, 298 F. 3d, at 1194. But the Court of Appeals upheld the District Court’s alternative determination — i. e., that Fairchild had restored trade-secret status by objecting to Herrick’s FOIA request. Id., at 1195. On that ground, the appeals court affirmed the entry of summary judgment for the FAA. In so ruling, the Tenth Circuit noted that Herrick had failed to challenge two suppositions underlying the District Court’s decision. First, the District Court assumed trade-secret status could be “restored” to documents that had lost protection. Id., at 1194, n. 10. Second, the District Court also assumed that Fairchild had regained trade-secret status for the documents even though the company claimed that status only “after Herrick had initiated his request” for the F-45 records. Ibid. The Court of Appeals expressed no opinion on the validity of these suppositions. See id., at 1194-1195, n. 10. B The Tenth Circuit’s decision issued on July 24,2002. Less than a month later, on August 22, petitioner Brent Taylor— a friend of Herrick’s and an antique aircraft enthusiast in his own right — submitted a FOIA request seeking the same documents Herrick had unsuccessfully sued to obtain. When the FAA failed to respond, Taylor filed a complaint in the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Like Herrick, Taylor argued that FEAC’s 1955 letter had stripped the records of their trade-secret status. But Taylor also sought to litigate the two issues concerning recapture of protected status that Herrick had failed to raise in his appeal to the Tenth Circuit. After Fairchild intervened as a defendant, the District Court in D. C. concluded that Taylor’s suit was barred by claim preclusion; accordingly, it granted summary judgment to Fairchild and the FAA. The court acknowledged that Taylor was not a party to Herrick’s suit. Relying on the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F. 3d 449 (1996), however, it held that a nonparty may be bound by a judgment if she was “virtually represented” by a party. App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a-31a. The Eighth Circuit’s seven-factor test for virtual representation, adopted by the District Court in Taylor’s case, requires an “identity of interests” between the person to be bound and a party to the judgment. See id., at 31a. See also Tyus, 93 F. 3d, at 455. Six additional factors counsel in favor of virtual representation under the Eighth Circuit’s test, but are not prerequisites: (1) a “close relationship” between the present party and a party to the judgment alleged to be preclusive; (2) “participation in the prior litigation” by the present party; (3) the present party’s “apparent acquiescence” to the preclusive effect of the judgment; (4) “deliberate] maneuvering]” to avoid the effect of the judgment; (5) adequate representation of the present party by a party to the prior adjudication; and (6) a suit raising a “public law” rather than a “private law” issue. App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a (citing Tyus, 93 F. 3d, at 454-456). These factors, the D. C. District Court observed, “constitute a fluid test with imprecise boundaries” and call for “a broad, case-by-case inquiry.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a. The record before the District Court in Taylor’s suit revealed the following facts about the relationship between Taylor and Herrick: Taylor is the president of the Antique Aircraft Association, an organization to which Herrick belongs; the two men are “close associate^],” App. 54; Herrick asked Taylor to help restore Herrick’s F-45, though they had no contract or agreement for Taylor’s participation in the restoration; Taylor was represented by the lawyer who represented Herrick in the earlier litigation; and Herrick apparently gave Taylor documents that Herrick had obtained from the FAA during discovery in his suit. Fairchild and the FAA conceded that Taylor had not participated in Herrick’s suit. App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a. The D. C. District Court determined, however, that Herrick ranked as Taylor’s virtual representative because the facts fit each of the other six indicators on the Eighth Circuit’s list. See id., at 32a-35a. Accordingly, the District Court held Taylor’s suit, seeking the same documents Herrick had requested, barred by the judgment against Herrick. See id., at 35a. The D. C. Circuit affirmed. It observed, first, that other Circuits “vary widely” in their approaches to virtual representation. Taylor v. Blakey, 490 F. 3d 965, 971 (2007). In this regard, the D. C. Circuit contrasted the multifactor balancing test applied by the Eighth Circuit and the D. C. District Court with the Fourth Circuit’s narrower approach, which “treats a party as a virtual representative only if the party is ‘accountable to the nonparties who file a subsequent suit’ and has ‘the tacit approval of the court’ to act on the nonpart[ies’] behalf.” Ibid, (quoting Klugh v. United States, 818 F. 2d 294, 300 (CA4 1987)). Rejecting both of these approaches, the D. C. Circuit announced its own five-factor test. The first two factors— “identity of interests” and “adequate representation” — are necessary but not sufficient for virtual representation. 490 F. 3d, at 971-972. In addition, at least one of three other factors must be established: “a close relationship between the present party and his putative representative,” “substantial participation by the present party in the first case,” or “tactical maneuvering on the part of the present party to avoid preclusion by the prior judgment.” Id., at 972. Applying this test to the record in Taylor’s case, the D. C. Circuit found both of the necessary conditions for virtual representation well met. As to identity of interests, the court emphasized that Taylor and Herrick sought the same result — release of the F-45 documents. Moreover, the D. C. Circuit observed, Herrick owned an F-45 airplane, and therefore had, “if anything, a stronger incentive to litigate” than Taylor, who had only a “general interest in public disclosure and the preservation of antique aircraft heritage.” Id., at 973 (internal quotation marks omitted). Turning to adequacy of representation, the D. C. Circuit acknowledged that some other Circuits regard notice of a prior suit as essential to a determination that a nonparty was adequately represented in that suit. See id., at 973-974 (citing Perez v. Volvo Car Corp., 247 F. 3d 303, 312 (CA1 2001), and Tice v. American Airlines, Inc., 162 F. 3d 966, 973 (CA7 1998)). Disagreeing with these courts, the D. C. Circuit deemed notice an “important” but not an indispensable element in the adequacy inquiry. The court then concluded that Herrick had adequately represented Taylor even though Taylor had received no notice of Herrick’s suit. For this conclusion, the appeals court relied on Herrick’s “strong incentive to litigate” and Taylor’s later engagement of the same attorney, which indicated to the court Taylor’s satisfaction with that attorney’s performance in Herrick’s case. See 490 F. 3d, at 974-975. The D. C. Circuit also found its “close relationship” criterion met, for Herrick had “asked Taylor to assist him in restoring his F-45” and “provided information to Taylor that Herrick had obtained through discovery”; furthermore, Taylor “did not oppose Fairchild’s characterization of Herrick as his ‘close associate.’” Id., at 975. Because the three above-described factors sufficed-to establish virtual representation under the D. C. Circuit’s five-factor test, the appeals court left open the question whether Taylor had engaged in “tactical maneuvering.” See id., at 976 (calling the facts bearing on tactical maneuvering “ambigu[ous]”). We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. 1136 (2008), to resolve the disagreement among the Circuits over the permissibility and scope of preclusion based on “virtual representation.” II The preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is determined by federal common law. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U. S. 497, 507-508 (2001). For judgments in federal-question cases — for example, Herrick’s FOIA suit — federal courts participate in developing “uniform federal rule[s]” of res judicata, which this Court has ultimate authority to determine and declare. Id., at 508. The federal common law of preclusion is, of course, subject to due process limitations. See Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U. S. 793, 797 (1996). Taylor’s case presents an issue of first impression in this sense: Until now, we have never addressed the doctrine of “virtual representation” adopted (in varying forms) by several Circuits and relied upon by the courts below. Our inquiry, however, is guided by well-established precedent regarding the propriety of nonparty preclusion. We review that precedent before taking up directly the issue of virtual representation. A The preclusive effect of a judgment is defined by claim preclusion and issue preclusion, which are collectively referred to as “res judicata.” Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment forecloses “successive litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the earlier suit.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U. S. 742, 748 (2001). Issue preclusion, in contrast, bars “successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,” even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim. Id., at 748-749. By “precluding] parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate,” these two doctrines protect against “the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserv[e] judicial resources, and foste[r] reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147, 153-154 (1979). A person who was not a party to a suit generally has not had a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” the claims and issues settled in that suit. The application of claim and issue preclusion to nonparties thus runs up against the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.” Rickards, 517 U. S., at 798 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indicating the strength of that tradition, we have often repeated the general rule that “one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.” Hansberry, 311 U. S., at 40. See also, e. g., Richards, 517 U. S., at 798; Martin v. Wilks, 490 U. S. 755, 761 (1989); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U. S. 100, 110 (1969). B Though hardly in doubt, the rule against nonparty preclusion is subject to exceptions. For present purposes, the recognized exceptions can be grouped into six categories. First, “[a] person who agrees to be bound by the determination of issues in an action between others is bound in accordance with the terms of his agreement.” 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments §40, p. 390 (1980) (hereinafter Restatement). For example, “if separate actions involving the same transaction are brought by different plaintiffs against the same defendant, all the parties to all the actions may agree that the question of the defendant’s liability will be definitely determined, one way or the other, in a ‘test case.’” D. Shapiro, Civil Procedure: Preclusion in Civil Actions 77-78 (2001) (hereinafter Shapiro). See also California v. Texas, 459 U. S. 1096, 1097 (1983) (dismissing certain defendants from a suit based on a stipulation “that each of said defendants ... will be bound by a final judgment of this Court” on a specified issue). Second, nonparty preclusion may be justified based on a variety of pre-existing “substantive legal relationship[s]” between the person to be bound and a party to the judgment. Shapiro 78. See also Richards, 517 U. S., at 798. Qualifying relationships include, but are not limited to, preceding and succeeding owners of property, bailee and bailor, and assignee and assignor. See 2 Restatement §§43-44, 52, 55. These exceptions originated “as much from the needs of property law as from the values of preclusion by judgment.” 18A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4448, p. 329 (2d ed. 2002) (hereinafter Wright & Miller). Third, we have confirmed that, “in certain limited circumstances,” a nonparty may be bound by a judgment because she was “adequately represented by someone with the same interests who [wa]s a party” to the suit. Richards, 517 U. S., at 798 (internal quotation marks omitted). Representative suits with preclusive effect on nonparties include properly conducted class actions, see Martin, 490 U. S., at 762, n. 2 (citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23), and suits brought by trustees, guardians, and other fiduciaries, see Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U. S. 573,593 (1974). See also 1 Restatement §41. Fourth, a nonparty is bound by a judgment if she “assumed] control” over the litigation in which that judgment was rendered. Montana, 440 U. S., at 154. See also Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, Inc., 365 U. S. 260,262, n. 4 (1961); 1 Restatement § 39. Because such a person has had “the opportunity to present proofs and argument,” he has already “had his day in court” even though he was not a formal party to the litigation. Id., Comment a, at 382. Fifth, a party bound by a judgment may not avoid its preclusive force by relitigating through a proxy. Preclusion is thus in order when a person who did not participate in a litigation later brings suit as the designated representative of a person who was a party to the prior adjudication. See Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611, 620, 623 (1926); 18A Wright & Miller §4454, at 433-434. And although our decisions have not addressed the issue directly, it also seems clear that preclusion is appropriate when a non-party later brings suit as an agent for a party who is bound by a judgment. See id., §4449, at 335. Sixth, in certain circumstances a special statutory scheme may “expressly foreclos[e] successive litigation by non-litigants ... if the scheme is otherwise consistent with due process.” Martin, 490 U. S., at 762, n. 2. Examples of such schemes include bankruptcy and probate proceedings, see ibid., and quo warranto actions or other suits that, “under [the governing] law, [may] be brought only on behalf of the public at large,” Richards, 517 U. S., at 804. Ill Reaching beyond these six established categories, some lower courts have recognized a “virtual representation” exception to the rule against nonparty preclusion. Decisions of these courts, however, have been far from consistent. See 18A Wright & Miller § 4457, at 513 (virtual representation lacks a “clear or coherent theory”; decisions applying it have “an episodic quality”). Some Circuits use the label, but define “virtual representation” so that it is no broader than the recognized exception for adequate representation. See, e. g., Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 193 F. 3d 415, 423,427 (CA6 1999) (en banc). But other courts, including the Eighth, Ninth, and D. C. Circuits, apply multifactor tests for virtual representation that permit non-party preclusion in cases that do not fit within any of the established exceptions. See supra, at 888-891, and n. 3. The D. C. Circuit, the FAA, and Fairchild have presented three arguments in support of an expansive doctrine of virtual representation. We find none of them persuasive. A The D. C. Circuit purported to ground its virtual representation doctrine in this Court’s decisions stating that, in some circumstances, a person may be bound by a judgment if she was adequately represented by a party to the proceeding yielding that judgment. See 490 F. 3d, at 970-971. But the D. C. Circuit’s definition of “adequate representation” strayed from the meaning our decisions have attributed to that term. In Richards, we reviewed a decision by the Alabama Supreme Court holding that a challenge to a tax was barred by a judgment upholding the same tax in a suit filed by different taxpayers. 517 U. S., at 795-797. The plaintiffs in the first suit “did not sue on behalf of a class,” their complaint “did not purport to assert any claim against or on behalf of any nonparties,” and the judgment “did not purport to bind” non-parties. Id., at 801. There was no indication, we emphasized, that the court in the first suit “took care to protect the interests” of absent parties, or that the parties to that litigation “understood their suit to be on behalf of absent [parties].” Id., at 802. In these circumstances, we held, the application of claim preclusion was inconsistent with “the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 797. The D. C. Circuit stated, without elaboration, that it did not “read Richards to hold a nonparty ... adequately represented only if special procedures were followed [to protect the nonparty] or the party to the prior suit understood it was representing the nonparty.” 490 F. 3d, at 971. As the D. C. Circuit saw this case, Herrick adequately represented Taylor for two principal reasons: Herrick had a strong incentive to litigate; and Taylor later hired Herrick’s lawyer, suggesting Taylor’s “satisfaction with the attorney’s performance in the prior case.” Id., at 975. The D. C. Circuit misapprehended Richards. As just recounted, our holding that the Alabama Supreme Court’s application of res judicata to nonparties violated due process turned on the lack of either special procedures to protect the nonparties’ interests or an understanding by the concerned parties that the first suit was brought in a representative capacity. See Richards, 517 U. S., at 801-802. Richards thus established that representation is “adequate” for purposes of nonparty preclusion only if (at a minimum) one of these two circumstances is present. We restated Richards’ core holding in South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Alabama, 526 U. S. 160 (1999). In that case, as in Richards, the Alabama courts had held that a judgment rejecting a challenge to a tax by one group of taxpayers barred a subsequent suit by a different taxpayer. See 526 U. S., at 164-165. In South Central Bell, however, the nonparty had notice of the original suit and engaged one of the lawyers earlier employed by the original plaintiffs. See id., at 167-168. Under the D. C. Circuit’s decision in Taylor’s case, these factors apparently would have sufficed to establish adequate representation. See 490 F. 3d, at 973-975. Yet South Central Bell held that the application of res judicata in that case violated due process. Our inquiry came to an end when we determined that the original plaintiffs had not understood themselves to be acting in a representative capacity and that there had been no special procedures to safeguard the interests of absentees. See 526 U. S., at 168. Our decisions recognizing that a nonparty may be bound by a judgment if she was adequately represented by a party to the earlier suit thus provide no support for the D. C. Circuit’s broad theory of virtual representation. B Fairchild and the FAA do not argue that the D. C. Circuit’s virtual representation doctrine fits within any of the recognized grounds for nonparty preclusion. Rather, they ask us to abandon the attempt to delineate discrete grounds and clear rules altogether. Preclusion is in order, they contend, whenever “the relationship between a party and a non-party is ‘close enough’ to bring the second litigant within the judgment.” Brief for Respondent Fairchild 20. See also Brief for Respondent FAA 22-24. Courts should make the “close enough” determination, they urge, through a “heavily fact-driven” and “equitable” inquiry. Brief for Respondent Fair-child 20. See also Brief for Respondent FAA 22 (“there is no clear test” for nonparty preclusion; rather, an “equitable and fact-intensive” inquiry is demanded (internal quotation marks omitted)). Only this sort of diffuse balancing, Fair-child and the FAA argue, can account for all of the situations in which nonparty preclusion is appropriate. We reject this argument for three reasons. First, our decisions emphasize the fundamental nature of the general rule that a litigant is not bound by a judgment to which she was not a party. See, e. g., Richards, 517 U. S., at 798-799; Martin, 490 U. S., at 761-762. Accordingly, we have endeavored to delineate discrete exceptions that apply in “limited circumstances.” Id., at 762, n. 2. Respondents’ amorphous balancing test is at odds with the constrained approach to nonparty preclusion our decisions advance. Resisting this reading of our precedents, respondents call up three decisions they view as supportive of the approach they espouse. Fairchild quotes our statement in Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U. S. 406, 411 (1943), that privity “turns on the facts of particular cases.” See Brief for Respondent Fair-child 20. That observation, however, scarcely implies that privity is governed by a diffuse balancing test. Fairchild also cites Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of III. Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 334 (1971), which stated that estoppel questions turn on “the trial courts’ sense of justice and equity.” See Brief for Respondent Fairchild 20. This passing statement, however, was not made with non-party preclusion in mind; it appeared in a discussion recognizing district courts’ discretion to limit the use of issue preclusion against persons who were parties to a judgment. See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U. S., at 334. The FAA relies on United States v. Des Moines Valley R. Co., 84 F. 40 (CA8 1897), an opinion we quoted with approval in Schendel, 270 U. S., at 619-620. Des Moines Valley was a quiet title action in which the named plaintiff was the United States. The Government, however, had “no interest in the land” and had “simply permitted [the landowner] to use its name as the nominal plaintiff.” 84 F., at 42. The suit was therefore barred, the appeals court held, by an earlier judgment against the landowner. As the court explained: “[W]here the government lends its name as a plaintiff... to enable one private person to maintain a suit against another,” the government is “subject to the same defenses which exist . . . against the real party in interest.” Id., at 43. Des Moines Valley, the FAA contended at oral argument, demonstrates that it is sometimes appropriate to bind a nonparty in circumstances that do not fit within any of the established grounds for nonparty preclusion. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 31-33. Properly understood, however, Des Moines Valley is simply an application of the fifth basis for nonparty preclusion described above: A party may not use a representative or agent to relitigate an adverse judgment. See swpra, at 895-896. We thus find no support in our precedents for the lax approach to nonparty preclusion advocated by respondents. Our second reason for rejecting a broad doctrine of virtual representation rests on the limitations attending nonparty preclusion based on adequate representation. A party’s representation of a nonparty is “adequate” for preclusion purposes only if, at a minimum: (1) The interests of the non-party and her representative are aligned, see Hansberry, 311 U. S., at 43; and (2) either the party understood herself to be acting in a representative capacity or the original court took care to protect the interests of the nonparty, see Richards, 517 U. S., at 801-802; supra, at 897-898. In addition, adequate representation sometimes requires (3) notice of the original suit to the persons alleged to have been represented, see Richards, 517 U. S., at 801. In the class-action context, these limitations are implemented by the procedural safeguards contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. An expansive doctrine of virtual representation, however, would “recogniz[e], in effect, a common-law kind of class action.” Tice, 162 F. 3d, at 972 (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, virtual representation would authorize preclusion based on identity of interests and some kind of relationship between parties and nonparties, shorn of the procedural protections prescribed in Hansberry, Rickards, and Rule 23. These protections, grounded in due process, could be circumvented were we to approve a virtual representation doctrine that allowed courts to “create de facto class actions at will.” Tice, 162 F. 3d, at 973. Third, a diffuse balancing approach to nonparty preclusion would likely create more headaches than it relieves. Most obviously, it could significantly complicate the task of district courts faced in the first instance with preclusion questions. An all-things-considered balancing approach might spark wide-ranging, time-consuming, and expensive discovery tracking factors potentially relevant under seven- or five-prong tests. And after the relevant facts are established, district judges would be called upon to evaluate them under a standard that provides no firm guidance. See Tyus, 93 F. 3d, at 455 (conceding that “there is no clear test for determining the applicability of” the virtual representation doctrine announced in that case). Preclusion doctrine, it should be recalled, is intended to reduce the burden of litigation on courts and parties. Cf. Montana, 440 U. S., at 153-154. “In this area of the law,” we agree, “ ‘crisp rules with sharp corners’ are preferable to a round-about doctrine of opaque standards.” Bittinger v. Tecumseh Products Co., 123 F. 3d 877, 881 (CA6 1997). c Finally, relying on the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Tyus, 93 F. 3d, at 456, the FAA maintains that nonparty preclusion should apply more broadly in “public law” litigation than in “private law” controversies. To support this position, the FAA offers two arguments. First, the FAA urges, our decision in Richards acknowledges that, in certain cases, the plaintiff has a reduced interest in controlling the litigation “because of the public nature of the right at issue.” Brief for Respondent FAA 28. When a taxpayer challenges “an alleged misuse of public funds” or “other public action,” we observed in Richards, the suit “has only an indirect impact on [the plaintiff’s] interests.” 517 U. S., at 803. In actions of this character, the Court said, “we may assume that the States have wide latitude to establish procedures ... to limit the number of judicial proceedings that may be entertained.” Ibid. Taylor’s FOIA action falls within the category described in Richards, the FAA contends, because “the duty to disclose under FOIA is owed to the public generally.” Brief for Respondent FAA 34. The opening sentence of FOIA, it is true, states that agencies “shall make [information] available to the public.” 5 U. S. C. § 552(a) (2006 ed.). Equally true, we have several times said that FOIA vindicates a “public” interest. E. g., National Archives and Records Admin, v. Favish, 541 U. S. 157, 172 (2004). The Act, however, instructs agencies receiving FOIA requests to make the information available not to the public at large, but rather to the “person” making the request. § 552(a)(3)(A). See also § 552(a)(3)(B) (“In making any record available to a person under this paragraph, an agency shall provide the record in any [readily reproducible] form or format requested by the person . ...” (emphasis added)); Brief for National Security Archive et al. as Amici Curiae 10 (“Government agencies do not systematically make released records available to the general public.”). Thus, in contrast to the public-law litigation contemplated in Richards, a successful FOIA action results in a grant of relief to the individual plaintiff, not a decree benefiting the public at large. Furthermore, we said in Richards only that, for the type of public-law claims there envisioned, States are free to adopt procedures limiting repetitive litigation. See 517 U. S., at 803. In this regard, we referred to instances in which the first judgment foreclosed successive litigation by other plaintiffs because, “under state law, [the suit] could be brought only on behalf of the public at large.” Id., at 804. Richards spoke of state legislation, but it appears equally evident that Congress, in providing for actions vindicating a public interest, may “limit the number of judicial proceedings that may be entertained.” Id., at 803. It hardly follows, however, that this Court should proscribe or confine successive FOIA suits by different requesters. Indeed, Congress’ provision for FOIA suits with no statutory constraint on successive actions counsels against judicial imposition of constraints through extraordinary application of the common law of preclusion. The FAA next argues that “the threat of vexatious litigation is heightened” in public-law cases because “the number of plaintiffs with standing is potentially limitless.” Brief for Respondent FAA 28 (internal quotation marks omitted). FOIA does allow “any person” whose request is denied to resort to federal court for review of the agency’s determination. 5 U. S. C. § 552(a)(3)(A), (4)(B) (2006 ed.). Thus it is theoretically possible that several persons could coordinate to mount a series of repetitive lawsuits. But we are not convinced that this risk justifies departure from the usual rules governing nonparty preclusion. First, stare decisis will allow courts swiftly to dispose of repetitive suits brought in the same circuit. Second, even when stare decisis is not dispositive, “the human tendency not to waste money will deter the bringing of suits based on claims or issues that have already been adversely determined against others.” Shapiro 97. This intuition seems to be borne out by experience: The FAA has not called our attention to any instances of abusive FOIA suits in the Circuits that reject the virtual representation theory respondents advocate here. IV For the foregoing reasons, we disapprove the theory of virtual representation on which the decision below rested. The preclusive effects of a judgment in a federal-question case decided by a federal court should instead be determined according to the established grounds for nonparty preclusion described in this opinion. See Part II-B, supra. Although references to “virtual representation” have proliferated in the lower courts, our decision is unlikely to occasion any great shift in actual practice. Many opinions use the term “virtual representation” in reaching results at least arguably defensible on established grounds. See 18A Wright & Miller §4457, at 535-539, and n. 38 (collecting cases). In these cases, dropping the “virtual representation” label would lead to .clearer analysis with little, if any, change in outcomes. See Tice, 162 F. 3d, at 971 (“[T]he term ‘virtual representation’ has cast more shadows than light on the problem [of nonparty preclusion].”). In some cases, however, lower courts have relied on virtual representation to extend nonparty preclusion beyond the latter doctrine’s proper bounds. We now turn back to Taylor’s action to determine whether his suit is such a case, or whether the result reached by the courts below can be justified on one of the recognized grounds for nonparty preclusion. A It is uncontested that four of the six grounds for nonparty preclusion have no application here: There is no indication that Taylor agreed to be bound by Herrick’s litigation, that Taylor and Herrick have any legal relationship, that Taylor exercised any control over Herrick’s suit, or that this suit implicates any special statutory scheme limiting relitigation. Neither the FA A nor Fairchild contends otherwise. It is equally clear that preclusion cannot be justified on the theory that Taylor was adequately represented in Herrick’s suit. Nothing in the record indicates that Herrick understood himself to be suing on Taylor’s behalf, that Taylor even knew of Herrick’s suit, or that the Wyoming District Court took special care to protect Taylor’s interests. Under our pathmarking precedent, therefore, Herrick’s representation was not “adequate.” See Richards, 517 U. S., at 801-802. That leaves only the fifth category: preclusion because a nonparty to an earlier litigation has brought suit as a representative or agent of a party who is bound by the prior adjudication. Taylor is not Herrick’s legal representative and he has not purported to sue in a representative capacity. He concedes, however, that preclusion would be appropriate if respondents could demonstrate that he is acting as Herrick’s “undisclosed agen[t].” Brief for Petitioner 23, n. 4. See also id., at 24, n. 5. Respondents argue here, as they did below, that Taylor’s suit is a collusive attempt to relitigate Herrick’s action. See Brief for Respondent Fairchild 32, and n. 18; Brief for Respondent FAA 18-19, 33, 39. The D. C. Circuit considered a similar question in addressing the “tactical maneuvering” prong of its virtual representation test. See 490 F. 3d, at 976. The Court of Appeals did not, however, treat the issue as one of agency, and it expressly declined to reach any definitive conclusions due to “the ambiguity of the facts.” Ibid. We therefore remand to give the courts below an opportunity to determine whether Taylor, in pursuing the instant FOIA suit, is acting as Herrick’s agent. Taylor concedes that such a remand is appropriate. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 56-57. We have never defined the showing required to establish that a nonparty to a prior adjudication has become a litigating agent for a party to the earlier case. Because the issue has not been briefed in any detail, we do not discuss the matter elaboratively here. We note, however, that courts should be cautious about finding preclusion on this basis. A mere whiff of “tactical maneuvering” will not suffice; instead, principles of agency law are suggestive. They indicate that preclusion is appropriate only if the putative agent’s conduct of the suit is subject to the control of the party who is bound by the prior adjudication. See 1 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14, p. 60 (1957) (“A principal has the right to control the conduct of the agent with respect to matters entrusted to him.”). B On remand, Fairchild suggests, Taylor should bear the burden of proving he is not acting as Herrick’s agent. When a defendant points to evidence establishing a close relationship between successive litigants, Fairchild maintains, “the burden [should] shif[t] to the second litigant to submit evidence refuting the charge” of agency. Brief for Respondent Fairchild 27-28. Fairchild justifies this proposed burden-shift on the ground that “it is unlikely an opposing party will have access to direct evidence of collusion.” Id., at 28, n. 14. We reject Fairchild’s suggestion. Claim preclusion, like issue preclusion, is an affirmative defense. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c); Blonder-Tongue, 402 U. S., at 350. Ordinarily, it is incumbent on the defendant to plead and prove such a defense, see Jones v. Bock, 549 U. S. 199, 204 (2007), and we have never recognized claim preclusion as an exception to that general rule, see 18 Wright & Miller § 4405, at 83 (“[A] party asserting preclusion must carry the burden of establishing all necessary elements.”). We acknowledge that direct evidence justifying nonparty preclusion is often in the hands of plaintiffs rather than defendants. See, e. g., Montana, 440 U. S., at 155 (listing evidence of control over a prior suit). But “[v]ery often one must plead and prove matters as to which his adversary has superior access to the proof.” 2 K. Broun, McCormick on Evidence §337, p. 475 (6th ed. 2006). In these situations, targeted interrogatories or deposition questions can reduce the information disparity. We see no greater cause here than in other matters of affirmative defense to disturb the traditional allocation of the proof burden. * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Although Fairchild provided documents to the Wyoming District Court and filed an amicus brief in the Tenth Circuit, it was not a party to Herrick’s suit. See Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F. 3d 1184,1188 (CA10 2002); Herrick v. Garvey, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1321,1327 (Wyo. 2000). The D. C. Circuit did not discuss the District Court’s distinction between public-law and private-law claims. The Ninth Circuit applies a five-factor test similar to the D. C. Circuit’s. See Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F. 3d 989, 996 (2005). The Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, like the Fourth Circuit, have constrained the reach of virtual representation by requiring, inter alia, the existence of a legal relationship between the nonparty to be bound and the putative representative. See Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F. 2d 1002, 1008 (CA5 1978); Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 193 F. 3d 415, 424 (CA6 1999) (en banc); EEOC v. Perneo Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F. 3d 1280, 1289 (CA11 2004). The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, has rejected the doctrine of virtual representation altogether. See Perry v. Globe Auto Recycling, Inc., 227 F. 3d 950, 953 (2000). For judgments in diversity cases, federal law incorporates the rules of preclusion applied by the State in which the rendering court sits. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U. S. 497, 508 (2001). These terms have replaced a more confusing lexicon. Claim preclusion describes the rules formerly known as “merger” and “bar,” while issue preclusion encompasses the doctrines once known as “collateral estoppel” and “direct estoppel.” See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465 U. S. 75, 77, n. 1 (1984). The established grounds for nonparty preclusion could be organized differently. See, e. g., 1 & 2 Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§39-62 . (1980) (hereinafter Restatement); D. Shapiro, Civil Procedure: Preclusion in Civil Actions 75-92 (2001); 18A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4448, pp. 327-329 (2d ed. 2002) (hereinafter Wright & Miller). The list that follows is meant only to provide a framework for our consideration of virtual representation, not to establish a definitive taxonomy. The Restatement observes that a nonparty may be bound not only by express or implied agreement, but also through conduct inducing reliance by others. See 2 Restatement § 62. See also 18A Wright & Miller § 4453, at 425-429. We have never had occasion to consider this ground for non-party preclusion, and we express no view on it here. The substantive legal relationships justifying preclusion are sometimes collectively referred to as “privity.” See, e. g., Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U. S. 793, 798 (1996); 2 Restatement § 62, Comment a. The term “privity,” however, has also come to be used more broadly, as a way to express the conclusion that nonparty preclusion is appropriate on any ground. See 18A Wright & Miller §4449, at 351-353, and n. 33 (collecting cases). To ward off confusion, we avoid using the term “privity” in this opinion. Moreover, Coryell interpreted the term “privity” not in the context of res judicata, but as used in a statute governing shipowner liability. See Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U. S. 406, 407-408, and n. 1 (1943). And we made the statement Fairchild quotes in explaining why it was appropriate to defer to the findings of the lower courts, not as a comment on the substantive rules of privity. See id., at 411. The FA A urges that there was no agency relationship between the landowner and the United States because the landowner did not control the U. S. Attorney’s conduct of the suit. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. That point is debatable. See United States v. Des Moines Valley R. Co., 84 F. 40, 42-43 (CA8 1897) (the United States was only a “nominal plaintiff”; it merely “len[t]” its name to the landowner). But even if the FAA is correct about agency, the United States plainly litigated as the landowner’s designated representative. See id., at 42 (“The bill does not attempt to conceal the fact that... its real purpose is to champion the cause of [the landowner] . . . .”). See also Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611, 618-620 (1926) (classifying Des Moines Valley with other cases of preclusion based on representation). Richards suggested that notice is required in some representative suits, e. g., class actions seeking monetary relief. See 517 U. S., at 801 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 40 (1940), Eisen v. Carlisle & Jac quelin, 417 U. S. 156,177 (1974), and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 319 (1950)). But we assumed without deciding that a lack of notice might be overcome in some circumstances. See Richards, 517 U. S., at 801. Nonparty preclusion in such cases ranks under the sixth exception described above: special statutory schemes that expressly limit subsequent suits. See supra, at 895. Our decision in Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147 (1979), also suggests a “control” test for agency. In that case, we held that the United States was barred from bringing a suit because it had controlled a prior unsuccessful action filed by a federal contractor. See id., at 155. We see no reason why preclusion based on a lesser showing would have been appropriate if the order of the two actions had been switched — that is, if the United States had brought the first suit itself, and then sought to relitigate the same claim through the contractor. See Schendel, 270 U. S., at 618 (“[I]f, in legal contemplation, there is identity of parties” when two suits are brought in one order, “there must be like identity” when the order is reversed.).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE v. CARDOZA-FONSECA No. 85-782. Argued October 7, 1986 Decided March 9, 1987 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and O’Connor, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 450. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 452. Powell, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, J., joined, post, p. 455. Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Kuhl, Bruce N. Kuhlik, and David V. Bernal. Dana Marks Keener argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief was Bill Ong Hing. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees by Ralph G. Steinhardt; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Carol Leslie Wolchok, Burt Neuborne, Lucas Guttentag, Jack Novik, and Robert N. Weiner; for the American Immigration Lawyers Association by Ira J. Kurzban; for the International Human Rights Law Group et al. by E. Edward Bruce; and for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights et al. by Richard F. Ziegler, Arthur C. Helton, Samuel Rabinove, Richard T. Foltin, Ruti G. Teitel, Steven M. Freeman, and Richard J. Rubin. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Since 1980, the Immigration and Nationality Act has provided two methods through which an otherwise deportable alien who claims that he will be persecuted if deported can seek relief. Section 243(h) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1253(h), requires the Attorney General to withhold deportation of an alien who demonstrates that his “life or freedom would be threatened” on account of one of the listed factors if he is deported. In INS v. Stevic, 467 U. S. 407 (1984), we held that to qualify for this entitlement to withholding of deportation, an alien must demonstrate that “it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution” in the country to which he would be returned. Id., at 429-430. The Refugee Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 102, also established a second type of broader relief. Section 208(a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1158(a), authorizes the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant asylum to an alien who is unable or unwilling to return to his home country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” § 101(a)(42), 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(42). In Stevie, we rejected an alien’s contention that the § 208(a) “well-founded fear” standard governs applications for withholding of deportation under 1243(h). Similarly, today we reject the Government’s contention that the § 243(h) standard, which requires an alien to show that he is more likely than not to be subject to persecution, governs applications for asylum under § 208(a). Congress used different, broader language to define the term “refugee” as used in § 208(a) than it used to describe the class of aliens who have a right to withholding of deportation under § 243(h). The Act’s establishment of a broad class of refugees who are eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum, and a narrower class of aliens who are given a statutory right not to be deported to the country where they are in danger, mirrors the provisions of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which provided the motivation for the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980. In addition, the legislative history of the 1980 Act makes it perfectly clear that Congress did not intend the class of aliens who qualify as refugees to be coextensive with the class who qualify for § 243(h) relief. I Respondent is a 38-year-old Nicaraguan citizen who entered the United States in 1979 as a visitor. After she remained in the United States longer than permitted, and failed to take advantage of the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) offer of voluntary departure, the INS commenced deportation proceedings against her. Respondent conceded that she was in the country illegally, but requested withholding of deportation pursuant to § 243(h) and asylum as a refugee pursuant to § 208(a). To support her request under § 243(h), respondent attempted to show that if she were returned to Nicaragua her “life or freedom would be threatened” on account of her political views; to support her request under § 208(a), she attempted to show that she had a “well-founded fear of persecution” upon her return. The evidence supporting both claims related primarily to the activities of respondent’s brother who had been tortured and imprisoned because of his political activities in Nicaragua. Both respondent and her brother testified that they believed the Sandinistas knew that the two of them had fled Nicaragua together and that even though she had not been active politically herself, she would be interrogated about her brother’s whereabouts and activities. Respondent also testified that because of her brother’s status, her own political opposition to the Sandinis-tas would be brought to that government’s attention. Based on these facts, respondent claimed that she would be tortured if forced to return. The Immigration Judge applied the same standard in evaluating respondent’s claim for withholding of deportation under § 248(h) as he did in evaluating her application for asylum under § 208(a). He found that she had not established “a clear probability of persecution” and therefore was not entitled to either form of relief. App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed that respondent had “failed to establish that she would suffer persecution within the meaning of section 208(a) or 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.” Id., at 21a. In the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, respondent did not challenge the BIA’s decision that she was not entitled to withholding of deportation under § 243(h), but argued that she was eligible for consideration for asylum under § 208(a), and contended that the Immigration Judge and BIA erred in applying the “more likely than not” standard of proof from § 243(h) to her § 208(a) asylum claim. Instead, she asserted, they should have applied the “well-founded fear” standard, which she considered to be more generous. The court agreed. Relying on both the text and the structure of the Act, the court held that the “well-founded fear” standard which governs asylum proceedings is different, and in fact more generous, than the “clear probability” standard which governs withholding of deportation proceedings. 767 F. 2d 1448, 1452-1453 (1985). Agreeing with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the court interpreted the standard to require asylum applicants to present “ ‘specific facts’ through objective evidence to prove either past persecution or ‘good reason’ to fear future persecution.” Id., at 1453 (citing Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F. 2d 562, 574 (CA7 1984)). The court remanded respondent’s asylum claim to the BIA to evaluate under the proper legal standard. We granted cer-tiorari to resolve a Circuit conflict on this important question. 475 U. S. 1009 (1986). I — I HH The Refugee Act of 1980 established a new statutory procedure for granting asylum to refugees. The 1980 Act added a new § 208(a) to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, reading as follows: “The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such alien’s status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.” 94 Stat. 105, 8 U. S. C. § 1158(a). Under this section, eligibility for asylum depends entirely on the Attorney General’s determination that an alien is a “refugee,” as that term is defined in § 101(a)(42), which was also added to the Act in 1980. That section provides: “The term ‘refugee’ means (A) any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . 94 Stat. 102, 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(42). Thus, the “persecution or well-founded fear of persecution” standard governs the Attorney General’s determination whether an alien is eligible for asylum. In addition to establishing a statutory asylum process, the 1980 Act amended the withholding of deportation provision, § 243(h). See Stevic, 467 U. S., at 421, n. 16. Prior to 1968, the Attorney General had discretion whether to grant withholding of deportation to aliens under § 243(h). In 1968, however, the United States agreed to comply with the substantive provisions of Articles 2 through 34 of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. See 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6259-6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1968); see generally Stevie, supra, at 416-417. Article 33.1 of the Convention, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176 (1954), reprinted in 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6276, which is the counterpart of §243(h) of our statute, imposed a mandatory duty on contracting States not to return an alien to a country where his “life or freedom would be threatened” on account of one of the enumerated reasons. See infra, at 441. Thus, although § 243(h) itself did not constrain the Attorney General’s discretion after 1968, presumably he honored the dictates of the United Nations Convention. In any event, the 1980 Act removed the Attorney General’s discretion in § 243(h) proceedings. In Stevie we considered it significant that in enacting the 1980 Act Congress did not amend the standard of eligibility for relief under § 243(h). While the terms “refugee” and hence “well-founded fear” were made an integral part of the § 208(a) procedure, they continued to play no part in § 243(h). Thus we held that the prior consistent construction of § 243(h) that required an applicant for withholding of deportation to demonstrate a “clear probability of persecution” upon deportation remained in force. Of course, this reasoning, based in large part on the plain language of § 243(h), is of no avail here since § 208(a) expressly provides that the “well-founded fear” standard governs eligibility for asylum. The Government argues, however, that even though the “well-founded fear” standard is applicable, there is no difference between it and the “would be threatened” test of § 243(h). It asks us to hold that the only way an applicant can demonstrate a “well-founded fear of persecution” is to prove a “clear probability of persecution.” The statutory language does not lend itself to this reading. To begin with, the language Congress used to describe the two standards conveys very different meanings. The “would be threatened” language of § 243(h) has no subjective component, but instead requires the alien to establish by objective evidence that it is more likely than not that he or she will be subject to persecution upon deportation. See Stevie, supra. In contrast, the reference to “fear” in the § 208(a) standard obviously makes the eligibility determination turn to some extent on the subjective mental state of the lien. “The linguistic difference between the words ‘well-ounded fear’ and ‘clear probability’ may be as striking as that jetween a subjective and an objective frame of reference. . . We simply cannot conclude that the standards are identi:al.” Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F. 2d 1242, 1250 (CA5 1986), cert. pending, No. 86-388; see also Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F. 2d 60, 64 (CA2 1986); 767 F. 2d, at 1452 (case below). That the fear must be “well-founded” does not alter the obvious focus on the individual’s subjective beliefs, nor does it transform the standard into a “more likely than not” one. One can certainly have a well-founded fear of an event happening when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place. As one leading authority has pointed out: “Let us . . . presume that it is known that in the applicant’s country of origin every tenth adult male person is either put to death or sent to some remote labor camp. ... In such a case it would be only too apparent that anyone who has managed to escape from the country in question will have ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ upon his eventual return.” 1 A. Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law 180 (1966). This ordinary and obvious meaning of the phrase is not to be lightly discounted. See Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 21 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 198-199 (1976). With regard to this very statutory scheme, we have considered ourselves bound to “ ‘assume “that .the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.”’” INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U. S. 183, 189 (1984) (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U. S. 63, 68 (1982), in turn quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962)). The different emphasis of the two standards which is so clear on the face of the statute is significantly highlighted by the fact that the same Congress simultaneously drafted § 208(a) and amended § 243(h). In doing so, Congress chose to maintain the old standard in § 243(h), but to incorporate a different standard in § 208(a). “ ‘[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’” Russello v. United States, supra, at 23 (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F. 2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972)). The contrast between the language used in the two standards, and the fact that Congress used a new standard to define the term “refugee,” certainly indicate that Congress intended the two standards to differ. I — l I — I The message conveyed by the plain language of the Act is confirmed by an examination of its history. Three aspects of that history are particularly compelling: The pre-1980 experience under § 203(a)(7), the only prior statute dealing with asylum; the abundant evidence of an intent to conform the definition of “refugee” and our asylum law to the United Nations Protocol to which the United States has been bound since 1968; and the fact that Congress declined to enact the Senate version of the bill that would have made a refugee ineligible for asylum unless “his deportation or return would be prohibited by § 243(h).” The Practice Under § 203(a)(7). The statutory definition of the term “refugee” contained in § 101(a)(42) applies to two asylum provisions within the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 207, 8 U. S. C. § 1157, governs the admission of refugees who seek admission from foreign countries. Section 208, 8 U. S. C. § 1158, sets out the process by which refugees currently in the United States may be granted asylum. Prior to the 1980 amendments there was no statutory basis for granting asylum to aliens who applied from within the United States. Asylum for aliens applying for admission from foreign countries had, however, been the subject of a previous statutory provision, and Congress’ intent with respect to the changes that it sought to create in that statute are instructive in discerning the meaning of the term “well-founded fear.” Section § 203(a)(7) of the pre-1980 statute authorized the Attorney General to permit “conditional entry” to a certain number of refugees fleeing from Communist-dominated areas or the Middle East “because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion.” 79 Stat. 913, 8 U. S. C. § 1153(a)(7) (1976 ed.). The standard that was applied to aliens seeking admission pursuant to § 203(a)(7) was unquestionably more lenient than the “clear probability” standard applied in § 243(h) proceedings. In Matter of Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 569-570 (1967), for example, the BIA “found no support” for the argument that “an alien deportee is required to do no more than meet the standards applied under section 203(a)(7) of the Act when seeking relief under section 243(h).” Similarly, in Matter of Adamska, 12 I. & N. Dec. 201, 202 (1967), the Board held that an alien’s inability to satisfy § 243(h) was not determinative of her eligibility under the “substantially broader” standards of § 203(a)(7). One of the differences the Board highlighted between the statutes was that § 243(h) requires a showing that the applicant “would be” subject to persecution, while § 203(a)(7) only required a showing that the applicant was unwilling to return “because of persecution or fear of persecution.” 12 I. & N., at 202 (emphasis in original). In sum, it was repeatedly recognized that the standards were significantly different. At first glance one might conclude that this wide practice under the old § 203(a)(7), which spoke of “fear of persecution,” is not probative of the meaning of the term “well-founded fear of persecution” which Congress adopted in 1980. Analysis of the legislative history, however, demonstrates that Congress added the “well-founded” language only because that was the language incorporated by the United Nations Protocol to which Congress sought to conform. See infra, at 436-437. Congress was told that the extant asylum procedure for refugees outside of the United States was acceptable under the Protocol, except for the fact that it made various unacceptable geographic and political distinctions. The legislative history indicates that Congress in no way wished to modify the standard that had been used under § 203(a)(7). Adoption of the INS’s argument that the term “well-founded fear” requires a showing of clear probability of persecution would clearly do violence to Congress’ intent that the standard for admission under §207 be no different than the one previously applied under § 203(a)(7). The United Nations Protocol. If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of “refugee,” and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, to which the United States acceded in 1968. Indeed, the definition of “refugee” that Congress adopted, see supra, at 428, is virtually identical to the one prescribed by Article 1(2) of the Convention which defines a “refugee” as an individual who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” Compare 19 U.S.T. 6225 with 19 U.S.T. 6261. Not only did Congress adopt the Protocol’s standard in the statute, but there were also many statements indicating Congress’ intent that the new statutory definition of “refugee” be interpreted in conformance with the Protocol’s definition. The Conference Committee Report, for example, stated that the definition was accepted “with the understanding that it is based directly upon the language of the Protocol and it is intended that the provision be construed consistent with the Protocol.” S. Rep. No. 96-590, p. 20 (1980); see also H. R. Rep., at 9. It is thus appropriate to consider what the phrase “well-founded fear” means with relation to the Protocol. The origin of the Protocol’s definition of “refugee” is found in the 1946 Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO). See 62 Stat. 3037. The IRO defined a “refugee” as a person who had a “valid objection” to returning to his country of nationality, and specified that “fear, based on reasonable grounds of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, or political opinions ...” constituted a valid objection. See IRO Constitution, Annex 1, Pt. 1, § Cl(a)(i). The term was then incorporated in the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (July 28, 1951). The Committee that drafted the provision explained that “[t]he expression ‘well-founded fear of being the victim of persecution . . .’ means that a person has either been actually a victim of persecution or can show good reason why he fears persecution.” U. N. Rep., at 39. The 1967 Protocol incorporated the “well-founded fear” test, without modification. The standard, as it has been consistently understood by those who drafted it, as well as those drafting the documents that adopted it, certainly does not require an alien to show that it is more likely than not that he will be persecuted in order to be classified as a “refugee.” In interpreting the Protocol’s definition of “refugee” we are further guided by the analysis set forth in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (Geneva, 1979). The Handbook explains that “[i]n general, the applicant’s fear should be considered well founded if he can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued stay-in his country of origin has become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in the definition, or would for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned there.” Id., at Ch. II B(2)(a) §42; see also id., §§37-41. The High Commissioner’s analysis of the United Nations’ standard is consistent with our own examination of the origins of the Protocol’s definition, as well as the conclusions of many scholars who have studied the matter. There is simply no room in the United Nations’ definition for concluding that because an applicant only has a 10% chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no “well-founded fear” of the event happening. See supra, at 431. As we pointed out in Stevic, a moderate interpretation of the “well-founded fear” standard would indicate “that so long as an objective situation is established by the evidence, it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility.” 467 U. S., at 424-425. In Stevic, we dealt with the issue of withholding of deportation, or nonrefoulement, under § 243(h). This provision corresponds to Article 33.1 of the Convention. Significantly though, Article 33.1 does not extend this right to everyone who meets the definition of “refugee.” Rather, it provides that “[n]o Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership or a particular social group or political opinion.” 19 U.S.T., at 6276,189 U.N.T.S., at 176 (emphasis added). Thus, Article 33.1 requires that an applicant satisfy two burdens: first, that he or she be a “refugee,” i. e., prove at least a “well-founded fear of persecution”; second, that the “refugee” show that his or her life or freedom “would be threatened” if deported. Section 243(h)’s imposition of a “would be threatened” requirement is entirely consistent with the United States’ obligations under the Protocol. Section 208(a), by contrast, is a discretionary mechanism which gives the Attorney General the authority to grant the broader relief of asylum to refugees. As such, it does not correspond to Article 33 of the Convention, but instead corresponds to Article 34. See Carvajal-Munoz, 743 F. 2d, at 574, n. 15. That Article provides that the contracting States “shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. ...” Like § 208(a), the provision is prec-atory; it does not require the implementing authority actually to grant asylum to all those who are eligible. Also like § 208(a), an alien must only show that he or she is a “refugee” to establish eligibility for relief. No further showing that he or she “would be” persecuted is required. Thus, as made binding on the United States through the Protocol, Article 34 provides for a precatory, or discretionary, benefit for the entire class of persons who qualify as “refugees,” whereas Article 33.1 provides an entitlement for the subcategory that “would be threatened” with persecution upon their return. This precise distinction between the broad class of refugees and the subcategory entitled to § 243(h) relief is plainly revealed in the 1980 Act. See Stevic, 467 U. S., at 428, n. 22. Congress’ Rejection of S. 64.3. Both the House bill, H. R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), and the Senate bill, S. 643, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), provided that an alien must be a “refugee” within the meaning of the Act in order to be eligible for asylum. The two bills differed, however, in that the House bill authorized the Attorney General, in his discretion, to grant asylum to any refugee, whereas the Senate bill imposed the additional requirement that a refugee could not obtain asylum unless “his deportation or return would be prohibited under section 243(h).” S. Rep., at 26. Although this restriction, if adopted, would have curtailed the Attorney General’s discretion to grant asylum to refugees pursuant to § 208(a), it would not have affected the standard used to determine whether an alien is a “refugee.” Thus, the inclusion of this prohibition in the Senate bill indicates that the Senate recognized that there is a difference between the “well-founded fear” standard and the clear-probability standard. The enactment of the House bill rather than the Senate bill in turn demonstrates that Congress eventually refused to restrict eligibility for asylum only to aliens meeting the stricter standard. “Few principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.” Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 446 U. S. 359, 392-393 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting); cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186, 200 (1974); Russello v. United States, 464 U. S., at 23. IV The INS makes two major arguments to support its contention that we should reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that an applicant can only show a “well-founded fear of persecution” by proving that it is more likely than not that he or she will be persecuted. We reject both of these arguments: the first ignores the structure of the Act; the second misconstrues the federal courts’ role in reviewing an agency’s statutory construction. First, the INS repeatedly argues that the structure of the Act dictates a decision in its favor, since it is anomalous for § 208(a), which affords greater benefits than § 243(h), see n. 6, supra, to have a less stringent standard of eligibility. This argument sorely fails because it does not take into account the fact that an alien who satisfies the applicable standard under § 208(a) does not have a right to remain in the United States; he or she is simply eligible for asylum, if the Attorney General, in his discretion, chooses to grant it. An alien satisfying §243(h)’s stricter standard, in contrast, is automatically entitled to withholding of deportation. In Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (1982), for example, the Board held that the alien was eligible for both asylum and withholding of deportation, but granted him the more limited remedy only, exercising its discretion to deny him asylum. See also Walai v. INS, 552 F. Supp. 998 (SDNY 1982); Mat ter of Shirdel, Interim Decision No. 2958 (BIA Feb. 21, 1984). We do not consider it at all anomalous that out of the entire class of “refugees,” those who can show a clear probability of persecution are entitled to mandatory suspension of deportation and eligible for discretionary asylum, while those who can only show a well-founded fear of persecution are not entitled to anything, but are eligible for the discretionary relief of asylum. There is no basis for the INS’s assertion that the discretionary/mandatory distinction has no practical significance. Decisions such as Matter of Salim, supra, and Matter of Shirdel, swpra, clearly demonstrate the practical import of the distinction. Moreover, the 1980 Act amended § 243(h) for the very purpose of changing it from a discretionary to a mandatory provision. See supra, at 428-429. Congress surely considered the discretionary/mandatory distinction important then, as it did with respect to the very definition of “refugee” involved here. The House Report provides: “The Committee carefully considered arguments that the new definition might expand the numbers of refugees eligible to come to the United States and force substantially greater refugee admissions than the country could absorb. However, merely because an individual or group comes within the definition will not guarantee resettlement in the United States.” H. R. Rep., at 10. This vesting of discretion in the Attorney General is quite typical in the immigration area, see, e. g., INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U. S. 139 (1981). If anything is anomalous, it is that the Government now asks us to restrict its discretion to a narrow class of aliens. Congress has assigned to the Attorney General and his delegates the task of making these hard individualized decisions; although Congress could have crafted a narrower definition, it chose to authorize the Attorney General to determine which, if any, eligible refugees should be denied asylum. The INS’s second principal argument in support of the proposition that the “well-founded fear” and “clear probability” standard are equivalent is that the BIA so construes the two standards. The INS argues that the BIA’s construction of the Refugee Act of 1980 is entitled to substantial deference, even if we conclude that the Court of Appeals’ reading of the statutes is more in keeping with Congress’ intent. This argument is unpersuasive. The question whether Congress intended the two standards to be identical is a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide. Employing traditional tools of statutory construction, we have concluded that Congress did not intend the two standards to be identical. In Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), we explained: “The judiciary is the final authority-on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent. [Citing cases.] If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.” Id., at 843, n. 9 (citations omitted). The narrow legal question whether the two standards are the same is, of course, quite different from the question of interpretation that arises in each case in which the agency is required to apply either or both standards to a particular set of facts. There is obviously some ambiguity in a term like “well-founded fear” which can only be given concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication. In that process of filling “‘any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress,’” the courts must respect the interpretation of the agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for administering the statutory program. See Chevron, supra, at 843, quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199, 231 (1974). But our task today is much narrower, and is well within the province of the Judiciary. We do not attempt to set forth a detailed description of how the “well-founded fear” test should be applied. Instead, we merely hold that the Immigration Judge and the BIA were incorrect in holding that the two standards are identical. Our analysis of the plain language of the Act, its symmetry with the United Nations Protocol, and its legislative history, lead inexorably to the conclusion that to show a “well-founded fear of persecution,” an alien need not prove that it is more likely than not that he or she will be persecuted in his or her home country. We find these ordinary canons of statutory construction compelling, even without regard to the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien. See INS v. Errico, 385 U. S. 214, 225 (1966); Costello v. INS, 376 U. S. 120, 128 (1964); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U. S. 6, 10 (1948). Deportation is always a harsh measure; it is all the more replete with danger when the alien makes a claim that he or she will be subject to death or persecution if forced to return to his or her home country. In enacting the Refugee Act of 1980 Congress sought to “give the United States sufficient flexibility to respond to situations involving political or religious dissidents and detainees throughout the world.” H. R. Rep., at 9. Our holding today increases that flexibility by rejecting the Government’s contention that the Attorney General may not even consider granting asylum to one who fails to satisfy the strict § 243(h) standard. Whether or not a “refugee” is eventually granted asylum is a matter which Congress has left for the Attorney General to decide. But it is clear that Congress did not intend to restrict eligibility for that relief to those who could prove that it is more likely than not that they will be persecuted if deported. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. We explained that the Court of Appeals’ decision had rested “on the mistaken premise that every alien who qualifies as a ‘refugee’ under the statutory definition is also entitled to a withholding of deportation under § 243(h). We find no support for this conclusion in either the language of § 243(h), the structure of the amended Act, or the legislative history.” INS v. Stevic, 467 U. S., at 428. Compare Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F. 2d 60 (CA2 1986); Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F. 2d 1242 (CA5 1986), cert. pending, No. 86-388; Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F. 2d 1448 (CA9 1985) (case below); Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F. 2d 562, 574 (CA7 1984); Youkhanna v. INS, 749 F. 2d 360, 362 (CA6 1984); with Sankar v. INS, 757 F. 2d 532, 533 (CA3 1985). The Third Circuit is the only Circuit to decide since our decision in INS v. Stevic, 467 U. S. 407 (1984), that the standards remain identical. It reached this conclusion, however, not because post-Stevie analysis compelled it, but because it considered itself bound by its pre-Stevie decision in Rejaie v. INS, 691 F. 2d 139 (1982). See Sankar, supra, at 533. We have considered whether this ease has been rendered moot by the recent enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359. While nothing in that Act affects the statutory provisions related to asylum or withholding of deportation, Title II of the 1986 Act creates a mechanism by which certain aliens may obtain legalization of their status. Section 201(a) of the 1986 Act establishes that, with certain exceptions, an alien who has resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status since before January 1, 1982, is entitled to have his or her status adjusted to that of an alien lawfully admitted for temporary residence. An alien who obtains this adjustment of status under the new Act is then eligible for a second adjustment to the status of permanent resident after a waiting period of 18 months. See § 245A(a). An alien who obtains permanent residence status through this route is not, however, eligible for all benefits usually available to permanent residents. For example, aliens who obtain permanent residence through this program are not eligible for certain public welfare benefits for five years after the grant of the new status. See § 245A(H). The record indicates that respondent may well be eligible for eventual adjustment of status if she makes a timely application after the Attorney General establishes the procedures for administering Title II. It would therefore appear that respondent might become a permanent resident by invoking the new procedures even if she is unsuccessful in her pending request for asylum. Nonetheless the possibility of this relief does not render her request for asylum moot. First, the legalization provisions of the 1986 Act are not self-executing, and the procedures for administering the new Act are not yet in place. Even if the benefits were identical, therefore, there is no way of knowing at this time whether respondent will be able to satisfy whatever burden is placed upon her to demonstrate eligibility. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 937 (1983). Second, respondent might be able to obtain permanent residence through the asylum procedure sooner than through the legalization program; if she satisfies certain conditions, she may become eligible for adjustment of status to that of permanent resident 12 months after a grant of asylum. See 8 CFR §§209.1-209.2 (1986). Under Title II of the new Act, by contrast, there is an 18-month waiting period. In light of these factors, we are persuaded that the controversy is not moot. Nor do we believe that the new Act makes it appropriate to exercise our discretion to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The question presented in this case will arise, and has arisen, in hosts of other asylum proceedings brought by aliens who arrived in the United States after January 1, 1982, or who are seeking entry as refugees from other countries. The importance of the legal issue makes it appropriate for us to address the merits now. Prior to the amendments, asylum for aliens who were within the United States had been governed by regulations promulgated by the INS, pursuant to the Attorney General’s broad parole authority. See n. 14, infra. Asylum for applicants who were not within the United States was generally governed by the now-repealed § 203(a)(7) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1163(a)(7) (1976 ed.). See infra, at 433. It is important to note that the Attorney General is not required to grant asylum to everyone who meets the definition of refugee. Instead, a finding that an alien is a refugee does no more than establish that “the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General." § 208(a) (emphasis added). See Stevic, 467 U. S., at 423, n. 18; see also infra, at 441-444. Asylum and withholding of deportation are two distinct forms of relief. First, as we have mentioned, there is no entitlement to asylum; it is only granted to eligible refiigees pursuant to the Attorney General’s discretion. Once granted, however, asylum affords broader benefits. As the BIA explained in the context of an applicant from Afghanistan who was granted § 243(h) relief but was denied asylum: “Section 243(h) relief is ‘country specific’ and accordingly, the applicant here would be presently protected from deportation to Afghanistan pursuant to section 243(h). But that section would not prevent his exclusion and deportation to Pakistan or any other hospitable country under section 237(a) if that country will accept him. In contrast, asylum is a greater form of relief. When granted asylum the alien may be eligible for adjustment of status to that of a lawful permanent resident pursuant to section 209 of the Act, 8 U. S. C. 1169, after residing here one year, subject to numerical limitations and the applicable regulations.” Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N. Dec. 311, 315 (1982). See also Matter of Lam, 18 I. & N. Dec. 15, 18 (BIA 1981). Article 33.1 of the Convention provides: “No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 176 (1954), 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6278, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1968). While the Protocol constrained the Attorney General with respect to § 243(h) between 1968 and 1980, the Protocol does not require the granting of asylum to anyone, and hence does not subject the Attorney General to a similar constraint with respect to his discretion under § 208(a). See infra, at 440-441. As amended, the new § 243(h) provides: “The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U. S. C. § 1253(h)(1) (emphasis added). “The section literally provides for withholding of deportation only if the alien’s life or freedom ‘would’ be threatened in the country to which he would be deported; it does not require withholding if the alien ‘might’ or ‘could’ be subject to persecution.” Stevic, 467 U. S., at 422. The BIA agrees that the term “fear,” as used in this statute, refers to “a subjective condition, an emotion characterized by the anticipation or awareness of danger.” Matter of Acosta, Interim Decision No. 2986, p. 14 (Mar. 1, 1985) (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 831 (16th ed. 1971)). As we have explained, the plain language of this statute appears to settle the question before us. Therefore, we look to the legislative history to determine only whether there is “clearly expressed legislative intention” contrary to that language, which would require us to question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses. See United States v. James, 478 U. S. 597, 606 (1986); Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108 (1980). In this case, far from causing us to question the conclusion that flows from the statutory language, the legislative history adds compelling support to our holding that Congress never intended to restrict eligibility for asylum to aliens who can satisfy § 243(h)’s strict, objective standard. The definition also applies to §209, 8 U. S. C. § 1159, which governs the adjustment of status of refugees after they have been granted asylum. Such a procedure had been authorized by regulation since 1974, see 8 CFR pt. 108 (1976), but it was administered by INS District Directors rather than the BIA. As we noted in Stevie, these “regulations did not explicitly adopt a standard for the exercise of discretion on the application, but did provide that a denial of an asylum application ‘shall not preclude the alien, in a subsequent expulsion hearing, from applying for the benefits of section 243(h) of the Act and of Articles 32 and 33 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.’ 8 CFR § 108.2 (1976).” 467 U. S., at 420, n. 13. In 1979, the regulations were amended to confer jurisdiction over asylum requests on the BIA for the first time. Ibid. See also Matter of Janus and Janek, 12 I. & N. Dec. 866, 876 (BIA 1968). On the District Director level, where § 203(a)(7) claims were generally processed, see n. 14, supra, this distinction was also recognized. In Matter of Ugricic, 14 I. & N. Dec. 384 (1972), a District Director articulated the test under § 203(a)(7) as whether the applicant could prove that “he was persecuted or had good reason to fear persecution.” Id., at 385-386. See S. Rep. No. 96-256, p. 9 (1979) (hereafter S. Rep.) (substantive standard for asylum is not changed); H. R. Rep. No. 96-608, p. 9 (1979) (hereafter H. R. Rep.) (discussing geographic limitations); Hearings before the House Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. R. 2816, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 72 (1979) (remarks of David Martin). The INS argues that Congress intended to perpetuate the standard being used in the informal parole proceedings under the regulations, see n. 14, swpra, not the asylum procedure under § 203(a)(7). Until 1979 the regulations provided no standard, but they were amended in 1979 to provide that the applicant has the “burden of satisfying the immigration judge that he would be subject to persecution.” 8 CFR § 108.3(a) (1980). This standard was identical to the one that was set forth in the regulations for the treatment of applications for withholding of deportation. See 8 CFR §242.17(c) (1980). The argument that Congress intended to adhere to the standard used in the informal parole proceedings cannot be squared with Congress’ use of an entirely different formulation of the standard for defining “refugee” — one much closer to § 203(a)(7), than to § 243(h) (the statute which was the focus of the standard developed in the 1980 regulations). Moreover, to the extent that Congress was ambiguous as to which practice it sought to incorporate, it is far more reasonable to conclude that it sought to continue the practice under § 203(a)(7), a statutory provision, than to adhere to the informal parole practices of the Attorney General, a matter in which Congress had no involvement. The Government relies on the following passage from the Senate Report to support its contention that Congress sought to incorporate the standard from the parole proceedings — not from § 203(a)(7): “[T]he bill establishes an asylum provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act for the first time by improving and clarifying the procedures for determining asylum claims filed by aliens who are physically present in the United States. The substantive standard is not changed.” S. Rep., at 9. The bill that the Senate Committee was discussing indeed made no change in the standards to be applied to applications for asylum from aliens within the United States; the Senate version explicitly incorporated the same standard as used in § 243(h). See infra, at 441-442. But the Senate version was rejected by Congress, and the well-founded fear standard that was adopted mirrored § 203(a)(7), not § 243(h). Justice Powell’s claim that the House Report also sought to incorporate the informal asylum standard is unfounded. Post, at 462-463. As the passage he quotes and the context plainly indicate, the House Report referred to “means of entry” — an issue dealt with under § 203(a)(7), not the asylum regulations. See H. R. Rep., at 10. The Committee’s reference to the Attorney General’s asylum procedures, seven pages later in the text, in a discussion labeled “Asylum,” and not even dealing with the definition of “well-founded fear,” see id., at 17, certainly does nothing to support Justice Powell’s conclusion. Although this evidence concerns application of the term “refugee” to § 207, not § 208, the term is defined in § 101(a)(42), and obviously can have only one meaning. Justice Powell suggests that the definition of “well-founded fear” be interpreted as incorporating the standard from the asylum regulations, rather than the standard from § 203(a)(7), because “[i]t is more natural to speak of ‘preserving’ an interpretation that had governed the same form of relief than one that had applied to a different form of relief,” post, at 462 (emphasis added). Since the definition in § 101(a)(42) applies to all asylum relief — that corresponding to the old § 203(a)(7) as well as that corresponding to the old Attorney General regulations — it is difficult to understand how Justice Powell reasons that it is likely that Congress preserved the “same form of relief” (emphasis added). The question is: the “same” as which? Our answer, based on Congress’ choice of language and the legislative history, is that Congress sought to incorporate the “same” standard as that used in § 203(a)(7). See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-781, p. 19 (1980); H. R. Rep., at 9; S. Rep., at 4. In the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1009, §§2(a), (d), Congress adopted the IRO definition of the term “refugee” and thus used the “fear of persecution” standard. This standard was retained in the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 400 § 2(a), as well as in the Refugee Escapee Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 643 § 15(c)(1). In 1965, when Congress enacted § 203(a)(7) of the Act, it again used the “fear of persecution” standard. The interpretation afforded to the IRO definition is important in understanding the United Nations’ definition since the Committee drafting the United Nations’ definition made it clear that it sought to “assure that the new consolidated convention should afford at least as much protection to refugees as had been provided by previous agreements.” United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems 37 (Feb. 17, 1950) (U. N. Doc. E/1618, E/AC.32/5 (hereafter U. N. Rep.)). In its Manual for Eligibility Officers, the IRO had stated: “Fear of persecution is to be regarded as a valid objection whenever an applicant can make plausible that owing to his religious or political convictions or to his race, he is afraid of discrimination, or persecution, on returning home. Reasonable grounds are to be understood as meaning that the applicant can give a plausible and coherent account of why he fears persecution.” International Refugee Organization, Manual for Eligibility Officers No. 175, ch. IV, Annex 1, Pt. 1, § C19, p. 24 (undated, circulated in 1950). Although the United States has never been party to the 1951 Convention, it is a party to the Protocol, which incorporates the Convention’s definition in relevant part. See 19 U.S.T. 6225, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (1968). We do not suggest, of course, that the explanation in the U. N. Handbook has the force of law or in any way binds the INS with reference to the asylum provisions of § 208(a). Indeed, the Handbook itself disclaims such force, explaining that “the determination of refugee status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol... is incumbent upon the Contracting State in whose territory the refugee finds himself.” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 1 (ii) (Geneva, 1979). Nonetheless, the Handbook provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to conform. It has been widely considered useful in giving content to the obligations that the Protocol establishes. See McMullen v. INS, 658 F. 2d 1312, 1319 (CA9 1981); Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA 1982); Matter of Rodriguez-Palma, 17 I. & N. Dec. 465 (BIA 1980). The Board’s decision in Matter of Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973), is not particularly probative of what the Protocol means and how it interacts with the provisions of the 1980 Act. In Dunar, the Board was faced with the question whether the United States’ accession to the Protocol modified the standard of proof to be applied under § 243(h). The Board, after elaborating on the principle that treaties are not lightly to be read as superseding prior Acts of Congress, id., at 313-314, found no evidence that Congress sought to modify the § 243(h) standard, and therefore construed the provisions as not inherently inconsistent. Even so, the Board recognized some tension between the standards, but was satisfied that they could “be reconciled on a case-by-ease consideration as they arise.” Id., at 321. Whether or not the Board was correct in Dunar, its holding based on a presumption that the two provisions were consistent says little about how the Protocol should be interpreted absent such a presumption, and given Congress’ amendment of the statute to make it conform with the Protocol. See Carvajal-Munoz, 743 F. 2d, at 574 (distinguishing pre-1980 “prediction” about the relation of the standards with post-1980 analysis of Congress’ actual intent). See 1 A. Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law 181 (1966) (“If there is a real chance that he will suffer persecution, that is reason good enough, and his ‘fear’ is ‘well-founded’ ”); G. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law 22-24 (1983) (balance of probability test is inappropriate; more appropriate test is “reasonable chance,” “substantial grounds for thinking,” or “serious possibility”); see generally Cox, “Well-Founded Fear of Being Persecuted”: The Sources and Application of a Criterion of Refugee Status, 10 Brooklyn J. Int’l Law 333 (1984). The 1980 Act made withholding of deportation under §243(h) mandatory in order to comply with Article 33.1. See supra, at 428-429. Section 207(b)(1) of the Senate bill provided: “The Attorney General shall establish a uniform procedure for an alien physically present in the United States, irrespective of his status, to apply for asylum, and the alien shall be granted asylum if he is a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) and his deportation or return would be prohibited under section 243(h) of this Act.” See S. Rep., at 26. The 1980 Act was the culmination of a decade of legislative proposals for reform in the refugee laws. See generally Anker & Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 San Diego L. Rev. 9, 20-64 (1981). On a number of occasions during that period, the Government objected to the “well-founded fear” standard, arguing: “[I]t should be limited by providing that it be a ‘well-founded fear in the opinion of the Attorney General.’ Failure to add ‘in the opinion of the Attorney General’ would make it extremely difficult to administer this section since it would be entirely subjective.” Western Hemisphere Immigration, Hearings on H. R. 981 before Subcommittee No. 1 of the Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 95 (1973) (statement of Hon. Francis Kellogg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State). See also Anker & Posner, supra, at 25; Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 10 Mich. J. L. Ref. 243, 249-252 (1984). In light of this kind of testimony and attention to the issue, it is unrealistic to suggest that Congress did not realize that the “well-founded fear” standard was significantly different from the standard that has continuously been part of § 243(h). There are certain exceptions, not relevant here. See, e. g., § 243(h) (2)(A) (alien himself participated in “the persecution of any person . . .”); § 243(h)(2)(B) (alien was convicted of “serious crime” and “constitutes a danger to the community of the United States”). In view of the INS’s heavy reliance on the principle of deference as described in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), we set forth the relevant text in its entirety: “When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. “ ‘The power of an administrative agency to administer a eongressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.’ Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U. S. 199, 231 (1974). If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency. “We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations “ ‘has been consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations. . . . “ ‘. .. If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.’ United States v. Shimer, 367 U. S. 374, 382, 383 (1961). “Accord, Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, [467 U. S. 691, 699-700 (1984)]. “In light of these well-settled principles it is clear that the Court of Appeals misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the regulations at issue. Once it determined, after its own examination of the legislation, that Congress did not actually have an intent regarding the applicability of the bubble concept to the permit program, the question before it was not whether in its view the concept is ‘inappropriate’ in the general context of a program designed to improve air quality, but whether the Administrator’s view that it is appropriate in the context of this particular program is a reasonable one. Based on the examination of the legislation and its history which follows, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress did not have a specific intention on the applicability of the bubble concept in these cases, and conclude that the EPA’s use of that concept here is a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make.” Id., at 842-845 (citations and footnotes omitted). An additional reason for rejecting the INS’s request for heightened deference to its position is the inconsistency of the positions the BIA has taken through the years. An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency’s earlier interpretation is “entitled to considerably less deference” than a consistently held agency view. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 273 (1981); see also General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 143 (1976). The BIA has answered the question of the relationship between the objective § 243(h) standard and the fear-based standard of §§ 203(a)(7), 208, and the United Nations Protocol in at least three different ways. During the period between 1965, when § 203(a)(7) was enacted, and 1972, the BIA expressly recognized that § 203(a)(7) and § 243(h) prescribed different standards. See swpra, at 433-434. Moreover, although the BIA decided in 1973 that the two standards were not irreconcilably different, see Matter of Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (1973), as of 1981 the INS was still instructing its officials to apply a “good reason” test to requests for asylum from aliens not within the United States. See Dept, of Justice, INS Operating Instructions Regulations TM 101, §208.4, p. 766.9 (Nov. 11, 1981) (explaining that “well-founded fear” is satisfied if applicant “can show good reason why he/she fears persecution”). In 1984, when this case was decided by the BIA, it adhered to the view that the INS now espouses — complete identity of the standards. In 1985, however, the BIA decided to reevaluate its position and issued a comprehensive opinion to explain its latest understanding of the “well-founded fear” standard. Matter of Acosta, Interim Decision No. 2986 (Mar. 1, 1985). In Acosta, the BIA noted a number of similarities between the two standards and concluded that in practical application they are “comparable” or “essentially comparable,” and that the differences between them are not “meaningful,” but the agency never stated that they are identical, equivalent, or interchangeable. On the contrary, the Acosta opinion itself establishes that the two standards differ. In describing the objective component of the asylum standard, the BIA concluded that the alien is not required to establish the likelihood of persecution to any “particular degree of certainty.” Id., at 22. There must be a “real chance” that the alien will become a victim of persecution, ibid., but it is not necessary to show “that persecution ‘is more likely than not’ to occur.” Id., at 25. The Acosta opinion was written after we had decided in Stevie that the § 243(h) standard “requires that an application be supported by evidence establishing that it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution,” 467 U. S., at 429-430. The decision in Acosta and the long pattern of erratic treatment of this issue make it apparent that the BIA has not consistently agreed, and even today does not completely agree, with the INS’s litigation position that the two standards are equivalent. How “meaningful” the differences between the two standards may be is a question that cannot be fully decided in the abstract, but the fact that Congress has prescribed two different standards in the same Act certainly implies that it intended them to have significantly different meanings. We cannot accept the INS’s argument that it is impossible to think about a “well-founded fear” except in “more likely than not” terms. The Board was able to do it for a long time under § 203(a)(7), see Matter of Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564 (1967); Matter of Adamska, 12 I. & N. Dec. 201 (1967), and has apparently had little trouble applying the two separate standards in compliance with the recent Courts of Appeals’ decisions. See, e. g., Matter of Sanchez and Escobar, Interim Decision No. 2996 (Oct. 15, 1985). Justice Powell argues that the Court of Appeals should be reversed for a different reason — that it misinterpreted the BIA’s decision. See post, at 465-468. This issue was not raised in any of the parties’ briefs, and was neither “set forth” nor “fairly included” within the question presented in the petition for certiorari. See this Court’s Rule 20.1. The question presented asked: “Whether an alien’s burden of proving eligibility for asylum pursuant to Section 208 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U. S. C. 1158 (a), is equivalent to his burden of proving eligibility for withholding of deportation pursuant to Section 243 (h) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. 1253 (h).” Pet. for Cert. (I). This question cannot be read as challenging the Court of Appeals’ determination that the BIA in fact required respondent “to demonstrate a clear probability of persecution in order to be declared eligible for asylum.” 767 F. 2d, at 1454. We therefore decline to address the issue. See United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U. S. 56, 60, n. 2 (1981); Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 129.(1954).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LASSITER v. NORTHAMPTON COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS. No. 584. Argued May 18-19, 1959. Decided June 8, 1959. Samuel S. Mitchell argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Herman L. Taylor and James R. Walker, Jr. - I. Beverly Lake argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Malcolm B. Seawell, Attorney General of North Carolina, and Ralph Moody, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of North Carolina, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. This controversy started in a Federal District Court. Appellant, a Negro citizen of North Carolina, sued to have the literacy test for voters prescribed by that State declared unconstitutional and void. A three-judge court was convened. That court noted that the literacy test was part of a provision of the North Carolina Constitution that also included a grandfather clause. It said that the grandfather clause plainly would be unconstitutional under Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347. It noted, however, that the North Carolina statute which enforced the registration requirements contained in the State Constitution had been superseded by a 1957 Act and that the 1957 Act does not contain the grandfather clause or any reference to it. But being uncertain as to the significance, of the 1957 Act and deeming it wise to have all administrative remedies under that Act exhausted before the federal court acted, it stayed its action, retaining jurisdiction for a reasonable time to enable appellant to exhaust her administrative remedies and obtain from the state courts an interpretation of the statute in light of the State Constitution. 152 F. Supp. 295. Thereupon the instant case was commenced. It started as an administrative proceeding. Appellant applied for registration as a voter. Her registration was denied by the registrar becafise she refused to submit to a literacy test as required by the North Carolina statute. She appealed to the -County Board of Elections. On the . de novo hearing before that Board appellant again refused to take the literacy test and she was again denied registration for that reason. She appealed to the Superior Court which sustained the Board against the claim that the requirement of the literacy test violated the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution. Preserving her federal question, she appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court which affirmed the lower court. 248 N. C. 102, 102 S. E. 2d 853. The case came here by appeal, 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2), and we noted probable jurisdiction. 358 U. S. 916. The literacy test is a part of § 4 of Art. VI of the North Carolina Constitution. That test is contained in the first sentence of § 4. The second sentence contains a so-called grandfather clause. The entire § 4 reads as follows: “Every person presenting himself for registration shall be able to read and write any section of the Constitution in the English language. But no male person who was, on January 1, 1867, or at any time prior thereto, entitled to vote under the laws of any state in the United States wherein he then resided, and no lineal descendant of any such person, shall be denied the right to register and vote at any election in this State by reason of his failure to possess the educational qualifications herein prescribed: Provided, he shall have registered in accordance with the terms of this section prior to December 1, 1908. The General Assembly shall provide for the registration of all persons entitled to vote without the educational qualifications herein prescribed, and shall, on or before November 1, 1908, provide for the making of a permanent record of such registration, and all persons so registered shall forever thereafter have the right to vote in all elections by the people in this State, unless disqualified under section 2 of this article.” Originally Art. VI contained in § 5 the following provision: “That this amendment to the Constitution is presented and adopted as one indivisible plan for the regulation of the suffrage, with the intent and purpose to so connect the different parts, and to make them so dependent upon each other, that the whole shall stand or fall together.” But the North Carolina Supreme Court in the instant case held that a 1945 amendment to Article VI freed it of the indivisibility clause. That amendment rephrased § 1 of Art. VI tp read as follows: “Every persen bern in the United States, and every person who has been naturalized, twenty-one years of age, and possessing the qualifications set out in this article, shall be entitled to vote . . . .” That court said that “one of those qualifications’- was the literacy test contained in § 4 of Art. VI; and that the 1945 amendment “had the effect of incorporating and adopting anew the provisions as to the qualifications required of a voter as set out in Article VI, freed of the indivisibility clause of the' 1902 amendment. And the way was made clear for the General Assembly to act.” 248 N. C., at 112, 102 S. E. 2d 860, 861. In 1957 the Legislature rewrote General Statutes § 163-28 as we have noted. Prior to that 1957 amendment § 163-28 perpetuated the grandfather clause contained in § 4 of Art. VI of the Constitution-and § 163-32 established' a procedure for registration to effectuate it. But the 1957 amendment contained a provision that “All laws and clauses of laws in conflict with this Act are hereby repealed.” The federal three-judge court ruled that this 1957 amendment- eliminated the grandfather clause from the statute. 152 F. Supp., at 296. The Attorney General of North Carolina, in an amicus brief, agrees that the grandfather clause contained in Art. VI is in conflict with the Fifteenth Amendment. Appellee .maintains that the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the invalidity of that part of Art. VI does not impair the remainder of Art. VI since the 1945 amendment to Art. VI freed it of its indivisibility clause. Under that view Art. VI would impose the same literacy test as that imposed by the 1.957 statute and neither would be linked with the grandfather clause- which, though present in print, is separable from the rest and void. We so read the opinion of the North Carolina Supreme Court. Appellant argues that that is not the end of the problem presented by the grandfather clause. There is a provision in the General Statutes for permanent registration in some counties. Appellant points out that although the cut-off date in the grandfather clause was December 1, 1908, those who registered before then might still be voting. If they were allowed to vote without taking a literacy test and if appellant were denied the'right to vote unless she passed it, members of the white face would receive preferential privileges of the ballot contrary to the command of the Fifteenth Amendment. That would be analogous to the problem posed in the classic case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, where an ordinance unimpeachable on its face was applied in such a way as to. violate the guarantee of equal protection contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. But this issue of discrimination in the actual operation of the ballot' laws of North Carolina has not been framed in the issues presented for the state court litigation. Cf. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213, 225. So we do not reach it. But we mention it in passing so that it may be clear that nothing we say or do here will prejudice appellant in tendering that issue in the federal proceedings which await the termination of this state court litigation. We come then to the question whether a State may consistently with the Fourteenth and Seventeenth Amendments apply a literacy test to all voters irrespective of race or- color. The Court in Guinn v. United States, supra, at 366, disposed of the question in a few words, “No time need be spent on the question of the validity of the literacy test considered alone since as we have seen its establishment was but the exercise by the State of a lawful power vested in it not subject to our supervision, and indeed, its validity is admitted.” The States have long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised, Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621, 633; Mason v. Missouri, 179 U. S. 328, 335, absent, of course the discrimination which the Constitution condemns. Article I, § 2 of the Constitution in its provision for the election of members of the House of Representatives and the Seventeenth Amendment-in its provision for the election of Senators provide that officials will be chosen “by the People.” Each provision goes on to state that “the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.” ' So while the right of suffrage is established and guaranteed by the Constitution (Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 663-665; Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649, 661-662) it is subject to the imposition of state standards which are not discriminatory and which do not contravene any restriction that Congress, acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, has imposed. See United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, 315. While § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides for apportionment of Representatives among the States according to their respective numbers counting the whole number of persons in each State (except Indians not taxed), speaks of “the right to vote,” the right protected “refers to the right to vote as established by the laws and constitution of the State.” McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 39. We do not suggest that any standards which a State desires to adopt may be required of voters. But there is wide scope for exercise of its jurisdiction. Residence requirements, age, previous criminal record (Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 345-347) are. obvious examples indicating factors which a State may take into consideration in determining the qualifications of voters. The ability to read and write likewise has some relation to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the'ballot. Literacy and illiteracy are neutral on race, creed, color, and sex, as reports around the world show. Literacy and intelligence are obviously not synonymous. Illiterate people may be intelligent voters. Yet in our society where-newspapers, periodicals; books, and other printed, matter canvass and debate campaign issues, a State might conclude that only those who are literate should exercise the franchise. Cf. Franklin v. Harper, 205 Ga. 779, 55 S. E. 2d 221, appeal dismissed 339 U. S. 946. It was said last century in Massachusetts that a literacy test was designed to insure an “independent and intelligent” exercise of the right of suffrage. Stone v. Smith, 159 Mass. 413-414, 34 N. E. 521. North Carolina agrees. We do not sit in judgment on the wisdom of that policy. We cannot say, however, that it is not an allowable one measured by constitutional standards. Of course a literacy test, fair on its face, may be employed to perpetuate that discrimination which the Fifteenth Amendment was designed to uproot. No such influence is charged here. On the other hand, a literacy test may be unconstitutional on its face. In Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, aff’d 336 U. S. 933, the test was the citizen’s ability to “understand and explain” an article of the Federal Constitution. The legislative setting of that provision and the great discretion it vested in the registrar made clear that a literacy requirement was merely a device to make racial discrimination easy. We cannot make the same inference here. The present requirement, applicable to members of all races, is that the prospective voter “be able to read and write any section of the Constitution of North Carolina in the English language.” That seems to us to be one fair way of determining whether a-person is literate, not a calculated scheme to lay springes for the citizen. Certainly we cannot condemn it on its face as a device unrelated to the desire of North Carolina to raise the standards for people of all races who cast the ballot. Affirmed. This Act, passed in 1957, provides in § 163-28 as follows: “Every person presenting himself for registration shall be able to read and write any section of the Constitution of North Carolina in the English language. It shall be the duty of each registrar to administer the provisions of this section.”. Sections 163-28.1, 163-28.2, and 163-28.3 provide the administrative remedies pursued in this case. Note 1, supra. Section 163-32 provided: “Every person claiming the benefit of^ection four of article six of the Constitution of North Carolina, as ratified at the general election on the second day of August, one thousand nine hundred, and who shall be entitled to register upon the permanent record for registration provided for under said section four, shall prior to December first, one thousand nine hundred and eight, apply for registration to the officer charged with the registration of voters as prescribed by law in each regular election to be held in the State for members of the General Assembly, and such persons shall take and subscribe before such officer an oath in the following form, viz.: “I am a citizen of the United States and of the'State of North Carolina; I am — years of age. I was, on the first day of January, A. D. one thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven, or prior to said date, entitled to vote under the constitution and laws of the state of-, in which I then resided (or, I am a lineal descendant of-, who was, on January one, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven, or prior,to that date, entitled to vote under the constitution and laws of the state of---, wherein he then resided.” N. C. Laws 1957, c. 287, pp. 277, 278. Section 163-31.2 provides: “In counties having one or more municipalities with a population in excess of 10,000 and in which a modern loose-leaf and visible registration system has been established as permitted by G. S. 163-43, with a full time registrátioñ as authorized by. G. S. 163-31, such registration shall be a permanent public record of registration and qualification to vote, and the same shall not' thereafter be cancelled and a new registration ordered, either by precinct or countywide, unless such registration has been lost or destroyed by theft, fire or other hazard.” World Illiteracy'at Mid-Century, Unesco (1957). Nineteen States, including North Carolina,, have some sort of literacy requirement as a prerequisite to eligibility for voting. ' Five require that the voter be able to read a section of the State, or Federal Constitution and write his own name. Arizona Rev. Stat. § 16-101; Cal. Election Code § 220; Del. Code Ann., Tit. 15, § 1701; Me. Rev. Stat., c. 3, § 2; Mass. Gen. L. Ann., c. 51, § 1. Five require that the elector be able to read and write a section of the Federal or State Constitution. Ala. Code, 1940, Tit. 17, § 32; N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 55:10-55:12; N. C. Gen. Stat. § 163-28; Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 26, § 61; S. C. Code § 23-62. Alabama also requires that the voter be of “good character” and “embrace the duties and obligations of citizenship” under'the Federal and State Constitutions. Ala. Code, Tit. 17, § 32 (1955 Supp.). Two States require that the voter be able to read and write English. N. Y. Election Code § 150; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 247.131. Wyoming (Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 31-113) and Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-12) require that the voter read a constitutional provision in English, while Virginia (Va. Code § 24-68) requires that the voting application be written in the applicant’s hand before the registrar and without aid, suggestion or memoranda. Washington (Wash. Rev. Code § 29.07.070) has the requirement that the voter be able to read and speak the English language. Georgia requires that the voter read intelligibly and write legibly a section.of the State or "Federal Constitution. If he is. physically unable to do so, he may qualify if he can give a reasonable interpretation of a section read to him. An alternative means of qualifying is provided: if one has good character and understands' the duties and obligations of citizenship under a republican government, and he can answer correctly 20 of 30 questions listed in the statute (e. g., How does the Constitution of Georgia provide that a county site may be changed?, what is treason against the State of Georgia?, who are the solicitor general and the judge of the State Judicial Circuit in which you live?) he is eligible to vote. Geo. Code Ann. §§ 34-117, 34-120. In Louisiana one qualifies if he can read and write English or his mother tongue, is of good character, and understands the duties and obligations of citizenship under a republican form of government. If he cannot read and write, he can qualify if he can give a reasonable interpretation of a section of the State or Federal Constitution when read to him, and if he is attached to the principles of the Federal and State Constitutions. La. Rev. Stat., Tit. 18, § 31. In Mississippi the applicant must be able to read and write a section of the State Constitution and give a reasonable interpretation of it. He must also demonstrate to the registrar a reasonable understanding of the duties and obligations of citizenship under a constitutional form of government. Miss. Code Ann. § 3213.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HAWAII et al. v. OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS et al. No. 07-1372. Argued February 25, 2009 Decided March 31, 2009 Mark J. Bennett, Attorney General of Hawaii, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Lisa M. Ginoza, First Deputy Attorney General, Dorothy Sellers, Solicitor General, William J. Wynhoff, Deputy Attorney General, Seth P. Waxman, Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, and Jonathan G. Cedarbaum. William M. Jay argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioners. With him on the brief were former Solicitor General Garre, Assistant Attorney General Tenpas, then-Deputy Solicitor General Joseffer, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, David C. Shilton, and John Emad Arbab. Kannon K. Shanmugam argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Anna-Rose Mathieson, Kimberly D. Perrotta, Sherry P. Broder, Jon M. Van Dyke, Melody K. MacKenzie, William Meheula, and Hayden Aluli. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Washington et al. by Robert M. McKenna, Attorney General of Washington, Maureen A Hart, Solicitor General, and Jay D. Geek, Deputy Solicitor Genera], and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, Tails J. Coldberg of Alaska, Terry Goddard of Arizona, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Bill McCollum of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Lisa Madigan of Illinois, Steve Carter of Indiana, Tom Miller of Iowa, Steve Six of Kansas, Jack Conway of Kentucky, James D. “Buddy” Caldwell of Louisiana, Douglas F. Gansler of Maryland, Michael A Cox of Michigan, Jim Hood of Mississippi, Jon Bruning of Nebraska, Kelly A Ayotte of New Hampshire, Gary K. King of New Mexico, Roy Cooper of North Carolina, Wayne Stenehjem of North Dakota, Nancy H. Rogers of Ohio, W. A Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Patrick C. Lynch of Rhode Island, Henry D. McMaster of South Carolina, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah, William, H. Sorrell of Vermont, and Bruce A. Salzburg of Wyoming; for the Commissioner of Public Lands for the State of New Mexico by Turner W. Branch; for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence by Anthony T. Caso, John C. Eastman, and Edwin Meese III; for the Grass-root Institute of Hawaii et al. by H. William Burgess and Shannon Lee Goessling; for the Mountain States Legal Foundation by J. Scott Detamore and William Perry Pendley; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation et al. by John H. Findley, Robert H. Thomas, and Ilya Shapiro. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Equal Justice Society et al. by Eric K. Yamamoto; for the National Congress of American Indians by Beth S. Brinkmann, Brian R. Matsui, John E. Echohawk, and 'Kim Jerome Gottschalk; for the Native Hawaiian Legal Corp. et al. by Catherine E. Stetson and Jessica L. Ellsworth; for Abigail Kinoiki Kekaulike Kawananakoa by George W. Van Burén; and for Samuel L. Kealoha, Jr., et al. by Walter R. Schoettle and Emmett E. Lee Loy. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Alaska Federation of Natives, Inc., by David S. Case, Carol II. Daniel, and Riyaz Kanji; for the Asian American Justice Center et al. by Jonathan M. Cohen, Mark A Packman, Karen Narasaki, and Vincent Eng; for Current and Former Hawaii State Officials by Virginia A. Seitz and Sarah O’Rouke Schrup; for the Hawai'i Congressional Delegation by Sri Srinivasan; and for the Sovereign Councils of the Hawaiian Homelands Assembly et al. by Charles Rothfeld, Andrew J. Pincus, and Thomas W. Merrill. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court. This ease presents the question whether Congress stripped the State of Hawaii of its authority to alienate its sovereign territory by passing a joint resolution to apologize for the role that the United States played in overthrowing the Hawaiian monarchy in the late 19th century. Relying on Congress’ joint resolution, the Supreme Court of Hawaii permanently enjoined the State from alienating certain of its lands, pending resolution of native Hawaiians’ land claims that the court described as “unrelinquished.” We reverse. I A In 1893, “[a] so-called Committee of Safety, a group of professionals and businessmen, with the active assistance of John Stevens, the United States Minister to Hawaii, acting with the United States Armed Forces, replaced the [Hawaiian] monarchy with a provisional government.” Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U. S. 495, 504-505 (2000). “That government sought annexation by the United States,” id., at 505, which the United States granted, see Joint Resolution to Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States, No. 55, 30 Stat. 750 (hereinafter Newlands Resolution). Pursuant to the Newlands Resolution, the Republic of Hawaii “cede[d] absolutely and without reserve to the United States of America all rights of sovereignty of whatsoever kind” and further “cede[d] and transfer[red] to the United States the absolute fee and ownership of all public, Government, or Crown lands, public buildings or edifices, ports, harbors, military equipment, and all other public property of every kind and description belonging to the Government of the Hawaiian Islands, together with every right and appurtenance thereunto appertaining” (hereinafter ceded lands). Ibid. The Newlands Resolution further provided that all “property and rights” in the ceded lands “are vested in the United States of America.” Ibid. Two years later, Congress established a government for the Territory of Hawaii. See Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, 31 Stat. 141 (hereinafter Organic Act). The Organic Act reiterated the Newlands Resolution and made clear that the new Territory consisted of the land that the United States acquired in “absolute fee” under that resolution. See §2, ibid. The Organic Act further provided: “[T]he portion of the public domain heretofore known as Crown land is hereby declared to have been, on [the effective date of the Newlands Resolution], and prior thereto, the property of the Hawaiian government, and to be free and clear from any trust of or concerning the same, and from all claim of any nature whatsoever, upon the rents, issues, and profits thereof. It shall be subject to alienation and other uses as may be provided by law.” § 99, id., at 161; see also § 91, id., at 159. In 1959, Congress admitted Hawaii to the Union. See Pub. L. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (hereinafter Admission Act). Under the Admission Act, with exceptions not relevant here, “the United States grant[ed] to the State of Hawaii, effective upon its admission into the Union, the United States’ title to all the public lands and other public property within the boundaries of the State of Hawaii, title to which is held by the United States immediately prior to its admission into the Union.” §5(b), id., at 5. These lands, “together with the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of [these] lands and the income therefrom, shall be held by [the] State as a public trust” to promote various public purposes, including supporting public education, bettering conditions of native Hawaiians, developing home ownership, making public improvements, and providing lands for public use. § 5(f), id., at 6. Hawaii state law also authorizes the State to use or sell the ceded lands, provided that the proceeds are held in trust for the benefit of the citizens of Hawaii. See, e. g., Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 171-45, 171-18 (1993). In 1993, Congress enacted a joint resolution “to acknowledge the historic significance of the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, to express its deep regret to the Native Hawaiian people, and to support the reconciliation efforts of the State of Hawaii and the United Church of Christ with Native Hawaiians.” Joint Resolution to Acknowledge the 100th Anniversary of the January 17, 1893 Overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, Pub. L. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1513 (hereinafter Apology Resolution). In a series of the preambular “whereas” clauses, Congress made various observations about Hawaii’s history. For example, the Apology Resolution states that “the indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their claims ... over their national lands to the United States” and that “the health and well-being of the Native Hawaiian people is intrinsically tied to their deep feelings and attachment to the land.” Id., at 1512. In the same vein, the Apology Resolution’s only substantive section — entitled “Acknowledgement and Apology” — states that Congress: “(1) . . . acknowledges the historical significance of this event which resulted in the suppression of the inherent sovereignty of the Native Hawaiian people; “(2) recognizes and commends efforts of reconciliation initiated by the State of Hawaii and the United Church of Christ with Native Hawaiians; “(3) apologizes to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the people of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17,1893 with the participation of agents and citizens of the United States, and the deprivation of the rights of Native Hawaiians to self-determination; “(4) expresses its commitment to acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, in order to provide a proper foundation for reconciliation between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people; and “(5) urges the President of the United States to also acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii and to support reconciliation efforts between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people.” Id., at 1513. Finally, § 3 of the Apology Resolution states that “[n]othing in this Joint Resolution is intended to serve as a settlement of any claims against the United States.” Id., at 1514. B This suit involves a tract of former crown land on Maui, now known as the “Leiali’i parcel,” that was ceded in “absolute fee” to the United States at annexation and has been held by the State since 1959 as part of the trust established by § 5(f) of the Admission Act. The Housing Finance and Development Corporation (HFDC) — Hawaii's affordable housing agency — received approval to remove the Leiali’i parcel from the §5(f) trust and redevelop it. In order to transfer the Leiali’i parcel out of the public trust, HFDC was required to compensate respondent Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), which was established to receive and manage funds from the use or sale of the ceded lands for the benefit of native Hawaiians. Haw. Const., Art. XII, §§4-6. In this case, however, OHA demanded more than monetary compensation. Relying on the Apology Resolution, respondent OHA demanded that HFDC include a disclaimer preserving any native Hawaiian claims to ownership of lands transferred from the public trust for redevelopment. HFDC declined to include the requested disclaimer because “to do so would place a cloud on title, rendering title insurance unavailable.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 207a. Again relying on the Apology Resolution, respondents then sued the State, its Governor, HFDC (since renamed), and its officials. Respondents sought “to enjoin the defendants from selling or otherwise transferring the Leiali’i parcel to third parties and selling or otherwise transferring to third parties any of the ceded lands in general until a determination of the native Hawaiians’ claims to the ceded lands is made.” Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Housing and Community Development Corporation of Hawaii, 117 Haw. 174, 189, 177 P. 3d 884, 899 (2008). Respondents “alleged that an injunction was proper because, in light of the Apology Resolution, any transfer of ceded lands by the State to third-parties would amount to a breach of trust. . . .” Id., at 188, 177 P. 3d, at 898. The state trial court entered judgment against respondents, but the Supreme Court of Hawaii vacated the lower court’s ruling. Relying on a “plain reading of the Apology Resolution,” which “dictate[d]” its conclusion, id., at 212, 177 R 3d, at 922, the State Supreme Court ordered “an injunction against the defendants from selling or otherwise transferring to third parties (1) the Leiali’i parcel and (2) any other ceded lands from the public lands trust until the claims of the native Hawaiians to the ceded lands have been resolved,” id., at 218, 177 P. 3d, at 928. In doing so, the court rejected petitioners’ argument that “the State has the undoubted and explicit power to sell ceded lands pursuant to the terms of the Admission Act and pursuant to state law.” Id., at 211, 177 P. 3d, at 921 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). We granted certiorari. 554 U. S. 944 (2008). II Before turning to the merits, we first must address our jurisdiction. According to respondents, the Supreme Court of Hawaii “merely held that, in light of the ongoing reconciliation process, the sale of ceded lands would constitute a breach of the State’s fiduciary duty to Native Hawaiians under state law.” Brief for Respondents 17. Because respondents believe that this case does not raise a federal question, they urge us to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Although respondents dwell at length on that argument, see id., at 19-34, we need not tarry long to reject it. This Court has jurisdiction whenever “a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040-1041 (1983). Far from providing a “plain statement” that its decision rested on state law, id., at 1041, the State Supreme Court plainly held that its decision was “dictatefd]” by federal law — in particular, the Apology Resolution, see 117 Haw., at 212, 177 P. 3d, at 922. Indeed, the court explained that the Apology Resolution lies “[a]t the heart of [respondents’] claims,” that respondents’ “current claim for injunctive relief is ... based largely upon the Apology Resolution,” and that respondents’ arguments presuppose that the Apology Resolution “changed the legal landscape and restructured the rights and obligations of the State.” Id., at 189-190, 177 P. 3d, at 899-900 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted that “[t]he primary question before this court on appeal is whether, in light of the Apology Resolution, this court should issue an injunction” against sale of the trust lands, id., at 210, 177 P. 3d, at 920, and it concluded, “[b]ased on a plain reading” of the Apology Resolution, that “Congress has clearly recognized that the native Hawaiian people have unrelinquished claims over the ceded lands,” id., at 191, 177 P. 3d, at 901. Based on these and the remainder of the State Supreme Court’s 77 references to the Apology Resolution, we have no doubt that the decision below rested on federal law. We are therefore satisfied that this Court has jurisdiction. See 28 U. S. C. § 1257. Ill Turning to the merits, we must decide whether the Apology Resolution “strips Hawaii of its sovereign authority to sell, exchange, or transfer,” Pet. for Cert, i, the lands that the United States held in “absolute fee,” 30 Stat. 750, and “grant[ed] to the State of Hawaii, effective upon its admission into the Union,” 73 Stat. 5. We conclude that the Apology Resolution has no such effect. A “We begin, as always, with the text of the statute.” Permanent Mission of India to United Nations v. City of New York, 551 U.S. 193, 197 (2007). The Apology Resolution contains two substantive provisions. See 107 Stat. 1513-1514. Neither justifies the judgment below. The Apology Resolution’s first substantive provision uses six verbs, all of which are conciliatory or precatory. Specifically, Congress “aeknowledge[d] the historical significance” of the Hawaiian monarchy’s overthrow, “recognize[d] and commend[ed] efforts of reconciliation” with native Hawaiians, “apologize[d] to [njative Hawaiians” for the monarchy’s overthrow, “expresse[d] [Congress’] commitment to acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow,” and “urge[d] the President of the United States to also acknowledge the ramifications of the overthrow . .. .” §1. Such terms are not the kind that Congress uses to create substantive rights — especially those that are enforceable against the co-sovereign States. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1981). The Apology Resolution’s second and final substantive provision is a disclaimer, which provides: “Nothing in this Joint Resolution is intended to serve as a settlement of any claims against the United States.” §3. By its terms, §3 speaks only to those who may or may not have “claims against the United States.” The court below, however, held that the only way to save §3 from superfluity is to construe it as a congressional recognition — and preservation — of claims against Hawaii and as “the foundation (or starting point) for reconciliation” between the State and native Hawaiians. 117 Haw., at 192,177 P. 3d, at 902. “We must have regard to all the words used by Congress, and as far as possible give effect to them,” Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 467, 475 (1911), but that maxim is not a judicial license to turn an irrelevant statutory provision into a relevant one. And we know of no justification for turning an express disclaimer of claims against one sovereign into an affirmative recognition of claims against another. Cf. Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 555 U. S. 438, 457 (2009) (“Two wrong claims do not make one that is right”). The Supreme Court of Hawaii erred in reading § 3 as recognizing claims inconsistent with the title held in “absolute fee” by the United States, 30 Stat. 750, and conveyed to the State of Hawaii at statehood. See supra, at 167-168. B Rather than focusing on the operative words of the law, the court below directed its attention to the 37 “whereas” clauses that preface the Apology Resolution. See 107 Stat. 1510-1513. “Based on a plain reading of” the “whereas” clauses, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that “Congress has clearly recognized that the native Hawaiian people have unrelinquished claims over the ceded lands.” 117 Haw., at 191, 177 P. 3d, at 901. That conclusion is wrong for at least three reasons. First, “whereas” clauses like those in the Apology Resolution cannot bear the weight that the lower court placed on them. As we recently explained in a different context, “where the text of a clause itself indicates that it does not have operative effect, such as ‘whereas’ clauses in federal legislation . . . , a court has no license to make it do what it was not designed to do.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 578, n. 3 (2008). See also Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174, 188 (1889) (“[A]s the preamble is no part of the act, and cannot enlarge or confer powers, nor control the words of the act, unless they are doubtful or ambiguous, the necessity of resorting to it to assist in ascertaining the true intent and meaning of the legislature is in itself fatal to the claim set up”). Second, even if the “whereas” clauses had some legal effect, they did not “chang[e] the legal landscape and restructure] the rights and obligations of the State.” 117 Haw., at 190, 177 P. 3d, at 900. As we have emphasized, “repeals by implication are not favored and will not be presumed unless the intention of the legislature to repeal [is] clear and manifest.” National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U. S. 644, 662 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Apology Resolution reveals no indication— much less a “clear and manifest” one — that Congress intended to amend or repeal the State’s rights and obligations under the Admission Act (or any other federal law); nor does the Apology Resolution reveal any evidence that Congress intended sub silentio to “cloud” the title that the United States held in “absolute fee” and transferred to the State in 1959. On that score, we find it telling that even respondent OHA has now abandoned its argument, made below, that “Congress ... enacted the Apology Resolution and thus ... changefd]” the Admission Act. App. 114a; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 31, 37-38. Third, the Apology Resolution would raise grave constitutional concerns if it purported to “cloud” Hawaii’s title to its sovereign lands more than three decades after the State’s admission to the Union. We have emphasized that “Congress cannot, after statehood, reserve or convey submerged lands that have already been bestowed upon a State.” Idaho v. United States, 533 U. S. 262, 280, n. 9 (2001) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also id., at 284 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (“[T]he consequences of admission are instantaneous, and it ignores the uniquely sovereign character of that event... to suggest that subsequent events somehow can diminish what has already been bestowed”). And that proposition applies a fortiori where virtually all of the State’s public lands — not just its submerged ones — are at stake. In light of those concerns, we must not read the Apology Resolution’s nonsubstantive “whereas” clauses to create a retroactive “cloud” on the title that Congress granted to the State of Hawaii in 1959. See, e. g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U. S. 371, 381-382 (2005) (the canon of constitutional avoidance “is a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts”). * * * When a state supreme court incorrectly bases a decision on federal law, the court’s decision improperly prevents the citizens of the State from addressing the issue in question through the processes provided by the State’s constitution. Here, the State Supreme Court incorrectly held that Congress, by adopting the Apology Resolution, took away from the citizens of Hawaii the authority to resolve an issue that is of great importance to the people of the State. Respondents defend that decision by arguing that they have both state-law property rights in the land in question and “broader moral and political claims for compensation for the wrongs of the past.” Brief for Respondents 18. But we have no authority to decide questions of Hawaiian law or to provide redress for past wrongs except as provided for by federal law. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Hawaii is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. “Crown lands” were lands formerly held by the Hawaiian monarchy. “Public” and “Government” lands were other lands held by the Hawaiian government. Respondents argue that the Supreme Court of Hawaii relied on the Apology Resolution “simply to support its factual determination that Native Hawaiians have unresolved claims to the ceded lands.” Brief for Respondents 21. Regardless of its factual determinations, however, the lower court’s legal conclusions were, at the very least, “interwoven with the federal law.” Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040 (1983). See 117 Haw. 174, 217, 218, 177 P. 3d 884, 927, 928 (2008) (“hold[ing]” that respondents' legal claim “arose” only when “the Apology Resolution was signed into law on November 23, 1993”); id, at 211, n. 25, 177 P. 3d, at 921, n. 25 (emphasizing that “our holding is grounded in Hawai'i and federal law”). See also n. 4, infra. The Apology Resolution’s operative provisions thus stand in sharp contrast with those of other “apologies,” which Congress intended to have substantive effect. See, e. g., Civil Liberties Act of 1988,102 Stat. 903,50 U. S. C. App. § 1989 (2000 ed.) (acknowledging and apologizing “for the evacuation, relocation and internment” of Japanese citizens during World War II and providing $20,000 in restitution to each eligible individual); Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, 104 Stat. 920, notes following 42 U. S. C. § 2210 (2000 ed. and Supp. V) (“apologizing] on behalf of the Nation ... for the hardships” endured by those exposed to radiation from above-ground nuclear testing facilities and providing $100,000 in compensation to each eligible individual). The court below held that respondents “prevailed on the merits” by showing that “Congress has clearly recognized that the native Hawaiian people have unrelinquished claims over the ceded lands, which were taken without consent or compensation and which the native Hawaiian people are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to future generations.” 117 Haw., at 212, 177 P. 3d, at 922. And it further held that petitioners failed to show that the State has the “power to sell ceded lands pursuant to the terms of the Admission Act.” Id., at 211, 177 P. 3d, at 921 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Respondents now insist, however, that their claims are “nonjustidable” to the extent that they are grounded on “broader moral and political” bases. Brief for Respondents 18. No matter how respondents characterize their claims, it is undeniable that they have asserted title to the ceded lands throughout this litigation, see id., at 40, n. 15 (conceding the point), and it is undeniable that the Supreme Court of Hawaii relied on those claims in issuing an injunction, which is a legal (and hence justidable) remedy — not a moral, political, or nonjustidable one.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NORMAN et al. v. REED et al. No. 90-1126. Argued October 7, 1991 Decided January 14, 1992 Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 296. Thomas, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. R. Eugene Pincham argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioners in No. 90-1126. Kenneth L. Gillis argued the cause for petitioners in No. 90-1435. On the briefs were Jack O’Malley, Burton Stephen Odelson, and Mathias William Delort. Gregory A. Adamski argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondents Reed et al. was Karen Conti. Messrs. OMalley, Odelson, and Delort filed a brief for Cook County Officers Electoral Board, respondents in No. 90-1126. Together with No. 90-1435, Cook County Officers Electoral Board et al. v. Reed et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois by William T. Barker, Harvey M. Grossman, John A. Powell, Steven R. Shapiro, and Arthur N. Eisenberg; and for the Committee for Party Renewal by Robert E. Tait. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. In these consolidated cases, we review a decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois barring petitioners in No. 90-1126 (petitioners) from appearing under the name of the Harold Washington Party on the November 1990 ballot for Cook County offices. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. I Under Illinois law, citizens organizing a new political party must canvass the electoral area in which they wish to field candidates and persuade voters to sign their nominating petitions. Organizers seeking to field candidates for statewide office must collect the signatures of 25,000 eligible voters, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, § 10-2 (1989), and, if they wish to run candidates solely for offices within a large “political subdivision” like Cook County, they need 25,000 signatures from the subdivision. Ibid. If, however, the subdivision itself comprises large separate districts from which some of its officers are elected, party organizers seeking to fill such offices must collect 25,000 signatures from each district. Ibid. If the organizers collect enough signatures to place their candidates on the ballot, their organization becomes a “new political party” under Illinois law, and if the party succeeds , in gathering 5% of the vote in the next election, it becomes an “established political party,” freed from the signature requirements of § 10-2. Ibid. A political party that has not engaged in a statewide election, however, can be “established” only in a political subdivision where it has fielded candidates. A party is not established in Cook County, for example, merely because it has fared well in Chicago’s municipal elections. The Harold Washington Party (HWP or Party), named after the late mayor of Chicago, has been established in the city of Chicago since 1989. Petitioners were the principal organizers of an effort to expand the Party by establishing it in Cook County, and, as candidates for county office, they sought to run under the Party name in the November 1990 elections. Cook County comprises two electoral districts: the area corresponding to the city of Chicago (city district) and the rest of the county (suburban district). Although some county officials are elected at large by citizens of the entire county, members of the county board of commissioners are elected separately by the citizens of each district to fill county board seats specifically designated for that district. While certain petitioners wished to run for offices filled by election at large, others sought to capture the county board seats representing the city and suburban districts of Cook County. Because the Party had previously engaged solely in Chicago municipal elections, petitioners were obliged to qualify as a “new party” in Cook County in order to run under the Party name. Accordingly, §10-2 required them to obtain 25,000 nominating signatures in order to designate candidates for the at-large offices. And since petitioners wished to field candidates for the county board seats allocated to the separate districts, they also had to collect 25,000 signatures from each district. Petitioners gathered 44,000 signatures on the city-district component of their petition, but only 7,800 on the suburban component. After petitioners filed the petition with the county authorities and presented their slate of candidates for both at-large and district-specific seats, respondent Dorothy Reed and several other interested voters (collectively, Reed) filed objections to the slate with the Cook County Officers Electoral Board (Board or Electoral Board). The Board rejected most of Reed’s claims. First, it dismissed her contention that, because there was already an established political party named the “Harold Washington Party” in the city of Chicago, petitioners could not run under that name for the various county offices. Reed relied on the provision of Illinois law that a “new political party,” which petitioners sought to form, “shall not bear the same name as, nor include the name of any established political party . . . .” Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, § 10-5 (1989). The Board, however, suggested that a literal reading of § 10-5 would effectively forbid a political party established in one political subdivision to expand into others, and held that the provision’s true purpose was “to prevent persons who are not affiliated with a party from ‘latching on’ to the popular party name, thereby promoting voter confusion and denigrating party cohesiveness.” The Board found no such dangers here, as Timothy Evans, the only HWP candidate to run in Chicago’s most recent municipal election, had authorized petitioners to use the Party name. The Board also rejected Reed’s claim that petitioners had failed to gather enough nominating signatures to run as a party for any Cook County office. While the Board found that their failure to gather 25,000 signatures from the suburbs disqualified those who wished to run for the suburban-district commissioner seats, it held that this failure was no reason under §10-2 to disqualify the candidates running under the Party name for city-district and countywide offices. The Board observed that construing the statute to disqualify the entire Cook County slate on this basis would advance no valid state interest and would raise serious constitutional concerns. Finally, the Board rejected Reed’s claim that, under § 10-2, petitioners’ failure to designate Party candidates for any of the judicial seats designated for either the city district, the suburban district, or the county at large disqualified the entire slate of candidates running under the Party name for all county offices. It decided, among other things, that § 10-2 did not apply because the judgeships at issue were not offices of the same “political subdivision” as nonjudicial offices within Cook County. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Cook County affirmed the Board’s ruling on the use of the HWP name, but on grounds different from the Board’s. It ruled that while Evans had no statutory power to authorize the use of the Party name, § 10-2 implicitly confined the scope of § 10-5 to cases where two parties seeking to use the same name coexist in the same political subdivision. Since Cook County and the city of Chicago are separate subdivisions, the Circuit Court found no violation of the Election Code. The Circuit Court nonetheless held that under the plain language of § 10-2, petitioners’ failure to obtain 25,000 signatures for the suburban-district candidates doomed the entire slate, and it alternatively held that petitioners’ failure to list Party candidates for judicial office compelled the same result. For these two independent reasons, the Circuit Court reversed the Board. On review, the Supreme Court of Illinois held in a brief written order that § 10-5 prohibited petitioners from using the HWP name, and that their failure to gather enough signatures for the candidates in the suburban-district races disqualified the entire slate. It expressly declined “to discuss other points raised on the appeal” and thus chose not to address the effect of petitioners’ failure to list candidates for county judgeships. Three of the court’s seven members dissented on the ground that the majority’s construction of Illinois law irrationally and unconstitutionally suppressed the development of new political parties. The majority justices indicated that they would issue an explanatory opinion, but they never have. Petitioners then applied for a stay from Justice Stevens, who, in his capacity as Circuit Justice, ordered the mandate of the Illinois Supreme Court to be “stayed or, if necessary, recalled” pending further review by this Court. Order in No. A-309 (Oct. 22, 1990). On October 25, 1990, the full Court granted petitioners’ application for stay pending the filing and disposition of a petition for certiorari, 498 U. S. 931, thereby effectively reviving the Electoral Board’s decision and permitting petitioners to run under the Party name in the November 6, 1990, Cook County election. According to the undisputed representation of the Board, see Brief for Petitioners in No. 90-1435, p. 10, while none of the HWP candidates was elected, several did receive over 5% of the vote, thus fulfilling, if the election stands, a necessary and apparently sufficient condition for the Party’s qualification as an “established political party” within all or part of Cook County at the next election. In due course, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in No. 90-1126, and the Board, a respondent in that action, filed its own petition in No. 90-1435. We granted each on May 20, 1991. 500 U. S. 931 (1991). II We start with Reed s contention that we should treat the controversy as moot because the election is over. We should not. Even if the issue before us were limited to petitioners’ eligibility to use the Party name on the 1990 ballot, that issue would be worthy of resolution as “ ‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’” Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814, 816 (1969). There would be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a similar, future controversy subject to identical time constraints if we should fail to resolve the constitutional issues that arose in 1990. The matter before us carries a potential of even greater significance, however. As we have noted, the 1990 electoral results would entitle the HWP to enter the next election as an established party in all or part of Cook County, freed from the petition requirements of § 10-2, so long as its candidates were entitled to the places on the ballot that our stay order effectively gave them. This underscores the vitality of the questions posed, even though the election that gave them life is now behind us. III For more than two decades, this Court has recognized the constitutional right of citizens to create and develop new political parties. The right derives from the First and Fourteenth Amendments and advances the constitutional interest of like-minded voters to gather in pursuit of common political ends, thus enlarging the opportunities of all voters to express their own political preferences. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 793-794 (1983); Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173, 184 (1979); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 30-31 (1968). To the degree that a State would thwart this interest by limiting the access of new parties to the ballot, we have called for the demonstration of a corresponding interest sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation, see Anderson, supra, at 789, and we have accordingly required any severe restriction to be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. See Socialist Workers Party, supra, at 184, 186. By such lights we now look to whether §§ 10-2 and 10-5, as construed by the Supreme Court of Illinois, violate petitioners’ right of access to the Cook County ballot. A Reversing the judgment of the Circuit Court, the State Supreme Court held, under §10-5, that the Cook County candidates could not claim to represent the HWP because there already was a party by that name in the city of Chicago. The court gave no reasons for so concluding beyond declaring that “petitioner^’] use of the Harold Washington Party name in their petition . . . violate[d] the provisions of section 10-5,” which, the court noted, “prohibits use of the name of an established political party.” Thus, the issue on review is not whether the Chicago HWP and the Cook County HWP are in some sense “separate parties,” but whether and how candidates running for county office may adopt the name of a party established only in the city. While the Board based its answer to this question on a determination that the city HWP had authorized petitioners to use the Party name, the State Supreme Court’s order seems to exclude the very possibility of authorization, reading the prohibition on the “use of the name of an established political party” so literally as to bar candidates running in one political subdivision from ever using the name of a political party established only in another. As both the dissent below and the opinion of the Board suggest, however, this Draconian construction of the statute would obviously foreclose the development of any political party lacking the resources to run a statewide campaign. Just as obviously, § 10-5, as the State’s highest court apparently construed it, is far broader than necessary to serve the State’s asserted interests. To prevent misrepresentation and electoral confusion, Illinois may, of course, prohibit candidates running for office in one subdivision from adopting the name of a party established in another if they are not in any way affiliated with the party. The State’s interest is particularly strong where, as here, the party and its self-described candidates coexist in the same geographical area. But Illinois could avoid these ills merely by requiring the candidates to get formal permission to use the name from the established party they seek to represent, a simple expedient for fostering an informed electorate without suppressing the growth of small parties. Thus, the State Supreme Court’s inhospitable reading of § 10-5 sweeps broader than necessary to advance electoral order and accordingly violates the First Amendment right of political association. See Anderson, supra, at 793-794; Williams, supra, at 30-34. For her part, when Reed argues that the county Party, led by R. Eugene Pincham, is “different from” the Party established in the city of Chicago under the leadership of Timothy Evans, she may indeed be suggesting that the city Party failed to authorize the Cook County candidates to use the Party name. But Reed offers no support at all for that assumption, which stands at odds with what few relevant facts the record reveals. The Electoral Board found that Timothy Evans, the Party’s most recent mayoral candidate in the city of Chicago, had specifically authorized petitioners' use of the Party name in Cook County. While acknowledging that Evans was not the statutory chairman of the Chicago Party, the Board ruled, and Reed does not dispute, that Evans, “as the only candidate of the Chicago HWP,” was “the only person empowered by the Election Code to act in any official capacity for the HWP.” We have no authoritative ruling on Illinois law to the contrary, and Reed advances no legal argument for the insufficiency of Evans’ authorization. To be sure, it is not ours to say that Illinois law lacks any constitutional procedural mechanism that petitioners might have been required to, but did not, follow before using the Party name. Our review of §10-2 reveals the possibility that Illinois law empowers a newly established party’s candidate or candidates (here, Evans) merely to appoint party “committeemen,” whose authority to “manage and control the affairs” of the party might include an exclusive right to authorize the use of its name outside the party’s original political subdivision. It seems unlikely, however, that the Supreme Court of Illinois had such reasoning in mind. Any limitation on Evans’s power to authorize like-minded candidates to use the Party name would have had to arise under § 10-2, whereas the order below held simply that petitioners’ use of the Party name “violate[d] the provisions of section 10-5.” In any event, it is not this Court’s role to review a state-court decision on the basis of inconclusive and unar-gued theories of state law that the state court itself found unworthy of mention. B As an alternative basis for prohibiting petitioners from running together under the Party name, the Supreme Court of Illinois invoked the statutory requirement of § 10-2 that “[e]ach component of the petition for each district ... be signed by [25,000] qualified voters of the district....” The court apparently held that disqualification of a party’s entire slate of candidates is the appropriate penalty for failing to meet this requirement, and it accordingly treated petitioners’ failure to collect enough signatures for their suburban-district candidates as an adequate ground for disqualifying every candidate running under the HWP name in Cook County. This is not our first time to consider the constitutionality of an Illinois law governing the number of nominating signatures the organizers of a new party must gather to field candidates in local elections. In Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173 (1979), we examined Illinois’s earlier ballot-access scheme, under which party organizers seeking to field candidates in statewide elections were (as they still are) effectively required to gather 25,000 signatures. See §10-2. At that time, the statute separately required those organizing new parties in political subdivisions to collect signatures totaling at least 5% of the number of people voting at the previous election for offices of that subdivision. In the city of Chicago, the subdivision at issue in Socialist Workers Party, the effect of that provision was to require many more than 25,000 signatures. Although this Court recognized the State’s interest in restricting the ballot to parties with demonstrated public support, the Court took the requirement for statewide contests as an indication that the more onerous standard for local contests was not the least restrictive means of advancing that interest. Id., at 186. The Illinois Legislature responded to this ruling by amending its statute to cap the 5% requirement for “any district or political subdivision” at 25,000 signatures. Thus, if organizers of a new party wish to field candidates in a large county without separate districts, and if 5% of the number of voters at the previous county election exceeds 25,000, the party now needs to gather only 25,000 signatures. Under the interpretation of § 10-2 rendered below, however, Illinois law retains the constitutional flaw at issue in Socialist Workers Party by effectively increasing the signature requirement applicable to elections for at least some offices in subdivisions with separate districts. Under that interpretation, the failure of a party’s organizers to obtain 25,000 signatures for each district in which they run candidates disqualifies the party’s candidates in all races within the subdivision. Thus, a prerequisite to establishing a new political party in such multidistrict subdivisions is some multiple of the number of signatures required of new statewide parties. Since petitioners chose to field candidates for the county board seats allocated to the separate districts and, as required by state law, used the “component” (i e., district-specific) form of nominating petition, the State Supreme Court’s construction of §10-2 required petitioners to accumulate 50,000 signatures (25,000 from the city district and another 25,000 from the suburbs) to run any candidates in Cook County elections. The State may not do this in the face of Socialist Workers Party, which forbids it to require petitioners to gather twice as many signatures to field candidates in Cook County as they would need statewide. Reed nonetheless tries to skirt Socialist Workers Party by advancing what she claims to be a state interest, not addressed by the earlier case, in ensuring that the electoral support for new parties in a multidistrict political subdivision extends to every district. Accepting the legitimacy of the interest claimed would not, however, excuse the requirement’s unconstitutional breadth. Illinois might have compelled the organizers of a new party to demonstrate a distribution of support throughout Cook County without at the same time raising the overall quantum of needed support above what the State expects of new parties fielding candidates only for statewide office. The State might, for example, have required some minimum number of signatures from each of the component districts while maintaining the total signature requirement at 25,000. But cf. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814 (1969). While we express no opinion as to the constitutionality of any such requirement, what we have said demonstrates that Illinois has not chosen the most narrowly tailored means of advancing even the interest that Reed suggests. Nor is that the only weakness of Reed’s rationale. Illinois does not require a new party fielding candidates solely for statewide office to apportion its nominating signatures among the various counties or other political subdivisions of the State. See § 10-2; Communist Party of Illinois v. State Bd. of Elections, 518 F. 2d 517 (CA7), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 986 (1975). Organizers of a new party could therefore win access to the statewide ballot, but not the Cook County ballot, by collecting all 25,000 signatures from the county’s city district. But if the State deems it unimportant to ensure that new statewide parties enjoy any distribution of support, it requires elusive logic to demonstrate a serious state interest in demanding such a distribution for new local parties. Thus, as in Socialist Workers Party, the State’s requirements for access to the statewide ballot become criteria in the first instance for judging whether rules of access to local ballots are narrow enough to pass constitutional muster. Reed has adduced no justification for the disparity here. c Up to this point, the positions of petitioners and the Board have coincided. They diverge on only one matter: whether requiring the candidates for the suburban-district commissioner seats to obtain 25,000 nominating signatures from the suburbs unduly burdens their right to run for those seats under the Party name. Although petitioners suggest that their showing of support in the city district should qualify their candidates to represent the Party in all races within Cook County, in the absence of any claim that the division of Cook County into separate districts is itself unconstitutional, our precedents foreclose the argument. According to the Board’s uncontested arithmetic, the 25,000 signature rule requires the support of only slightly more than 2% of suburban voters, see Brief for Respondent Board in No. 90-1126, p. 9, and n. 7, a considerably more lenient restriction than the one we upheld in Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S. 431 (1971) (involving a 5% requirement). Just as the State may not cite the Party’s failure in the suburbs as reason for disqualifying its candidates in urban Cook County, neither may the Party cite its success in the city district as a sufficient condition for running candidates in the suburbs. > These cases present one final issue, which we are unable to resolve. Some of Cook County’s judges are elected by citizens of the entire county, and others by citizens of the separate districts. In responding to Reed’s objection that the HWP had not fielded candidates for any elected judicial offices in Cook County, the Circuit Court held that, under § 10-2, “the exclusion of judicial candidates on the slate was a failure to fulfill the ‘complete slate requirement’ of the Election Code.” The court then overruled the Electoral Board and treated this failure as an alternative ground for invalidating the Party’s entire slate. We decline to consider whether that ruling was constitutional. The Supreme Court of Illinois itself did not address it and therefore did not decide whether, under Illinois law, the Party’s omission of judicial candidates doomed the entire slate. We therefore remand these cases to that court for its prompt resolution of this issue. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263, 277 (1984); see also McCluney v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 454 U. S. 1071, 1073-1074 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The judgment of the State Supreme Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. More precisely, they must collect the signatures of 25,000 voters or 1% of the number of voters at the preceding statewide general election, whichever is less. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 46, § 10-2 (1989). Given the State’s population, the 26,000 signature requirement applies. The statute reads in relevant part: “In the case of a petition to form a new political party within a political subdivision in which officers are to be elected from districts and at-large, such petition shall consist of separate components for each district from which an officer is to be elected. Each component shall be circulated only within a district of the political subdivision and signed only by qualified electors who are residents of such district. Each sheet of such petition must contain a complete list of the names of the candidates of the party for all offices to be filled in the political subdivision at large, but' the sheets comprising each component shall also contain the names of those candidates to be elected from the particular district. Each component of the petition for each district from which an officer is to be elected must be signed by qualified voters of the district equalling in number not less than 5% of the number of voters who voted at the next preceding regular election in such district at which an officer was elected to serve the district. The entire petition, including all components, must be signed by a total of qualified voters of the entire political subdivision equalling in number not less than 5% of the number of voters who voted at the next preceding regular election in such political subdivision at which an officer was elected to serve the political subdivision at large.” The statute caps the 5% requirement for both district and subdivision petitions at 25,000 signatures, the number effectively required on statewide petitions. Cook County and its districts are so large that this cap applies to each. These are the current districts of Cook County. We have learned that in a November 1990 referendum, the voters of Cook County adopted an ordinance providing for the division of the county by 1994 into 17 districts, each of which will send one commissioner to the county board. This Court has been unable to secure any official record of the new ordinance, however. In any event, the parties have not treated this issue as having any bearing on our disposition of these cases, and we do not see how it could have. Reed based her argument on what the parties call the “complete slate requirement” of § 10-2. The parties occasionally use the same term in their discussion of a separate issue, whether petitioners’ failure to collect sufficient signatures in the suburban district voids their entire slate. For clarity, we avoid using the term altogether. The Circuit Court also held that petitioners’ failure to gather 25,000 signatures for the candidates running under the Party name for office in the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District disqualified those candidates, but not the rest of the slate, because the Water Reclamation District was a separate political subdivision from Cook County. This ruling was not appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court and is not before this Court. Three of the four justices in the majority have left the court since the date of the order. Under Illinois practice, if the Board’s decision is appealed, it joins the prevailing party in support of its own decision. As in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780 (1983), “we base our conclusions directly on the First and Fourteenth Amendments and do not engage in a separate Equal Protection Clause analysis. We rely, however, on the analysis in a number of our prior election cases resting on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 786-787, n. 7. Reed did seem to make a version of this argument in her brief to the Illinois Supreme Court. See Brief for Appellees Reed et al. in No. 70833 (Sup. Ct. Ill.), pp. 20-21. Moreover, in the one sentence that it devotes to the topic, the Circuit Court makes a similar observation: “While Timothy C. Evans was the only candidate of the Harold Washington Party, his only power, pursuant to § 10-2 of the Election Code, was the ability to appoint interim committeemen.” See App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 90-1435, p. 19a. Nonetheless, these passages are inadequate to prove that the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the argument, particularly since Reed arguably waived it by not raising it in her original “Objector’s Petition” to the Electoral Board. See App. 14-15. There, she claimed only that petitioners’ use of the Party name violated § 10-5. To an extent, history explains the anomaly. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814 (1969), together with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Communist Party of Illinois v. State Bd. of Elections, 618 F. 2d 517 (1975), left the ballot-access requirements for statewide elections less stringent, for the first time, than the requirements for any local ballot. These were the same legal developments, in fact, that led to the anomaly at issue in Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173 (1979). Yet, as we noted there, an explanation is not the same as a justification. Id., at 187; see also id., at 189 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 190-191 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). “Historical accident, without more, cannot constitute a compelling state interest.” Id., at 187. Among other possibilities, the Supreme Court of Illinois might agree with the Board’s conclusion that the judgeships at issue are not offices of the same “political subdivision” as nonjudicial offices within Cook County. That court might also construe the decision in Anderson v. Schneider, 67 Ill. 2d 166, 366 N. E. 2d 900 (1977), to hold that an omission of judicial candidates should not invalidate the rest of the slate. To restate our conclusion, any rule, whether or not denominated the “complete slate” requirement, see, e. g., post, at 298, 299 (dissenting opinion’s use of the term in this context); App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 90-1435, pp. 23a-24a (Circuit Court’s use of the term in this context), that disqualifies petitioners’ entire slate for failure to collect 25,000 signatures wholly from the suburban district would be unconstitutional for the reasons given in Part III-B above. We express no opinion as to the constitutionality of a “complete slate requirement” that would invalidate petitioners’ slate for their failure to field judicial candidates.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

KWONG HAI CHEW v. COLDING et al. No. 17. Argued October 17, 1952. Decided February 9, 1953. Carl S. Stern argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Blanch Freeman. John F. Davis argued the cause for respondents. With him on a brief for Shaughnessy, respondent, were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Murray, Beatrice Rosenberg and Murry Lee Randall. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. A preliminary consideration that is helpful to the solution of this litigation is whether, under 8 CFR § 175.57 (b), the Attorney General has authority to deny to a lawful permanent resident of the United States, who is an alien continuously residing and physically present therein, the opportunity to be heard in opposition to an order for his “permanent exclusion” and consequent deportation, provided the Attorney General determines that the order is based on information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest. Assuming, as seems to be clear, that the Attorney General does not have such authority, the critical issue then presented is whether he has that authority under the following additional circumstances: the resident alien is a seaman, he currently maintains his residence in the United States and usually is physically present there, however, he is returning from a voyage as a seaman on a vessel of American registry with its home port in the United States, that voyage has included scheduled calls at foreign ports in the Far East, and he is detained on board by order of the Attorney General. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that these additional circumstances do not change the result and that the Attorney General does not have the authority suggested. Petitioner, Kwong Hai Chew, is a Chinese seaman last admitted to the United States in 1945. Thereafter, he married a native American and bought the home in which they reside in New York. Having proved his good moral character for the preceding five years, petitioner secured suspension of his deportation. In 1949, he was admitted to permanent residence in the United States as of January 10, 1945. In World War II, he served with credit in the United States Merchant Marine. He never has had any difficulty with governmental authorities. In April, 1950, he filed a petition for naturalization which is still pending. In November, 1950, he was screened and passed by the Coast Guard for employment as a seaman on a merchant vessel. In the same month he signed articles of employment as chief steward on the S. S. Sir John Franklin, a vessel of American registry with its home port in New York City. The voyage was to include calls at several foreign ports in the Far East. He remained aboard the vessel on this voyage but, at San Francisco, in March, 1951, the immigration inspector ordered him “temporarily excluded,” under 8 CFR § 175.57, as an alien whose entry was deemed prejudicial to the public interest. On the vessel’s arrival in New York, March 29, petitioner’s “temporary exclusion” was continued and he was not permitted to land. March 30, he sought a writ of habeas corpus from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, charging that his detention was arbitrary and capricious and a denial of due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Purporting to act under 8 CFR § 175.57 (b), the Attorney General directed that petitioner be denied a hearing before a Board of Special Inquiry and that his “temporary exclusion be made permanent.” The Attorney General continues to deny petitioner all information as to the nature and cause of any accusations against him and all opportunity to be heard in opposition to the order for his “exclusion.” He is detained at Ellis Island “for safekeeping on behalf of the master of the S. S. ‘Sir John Franklin.’ ” The writ was issued but, after a hearing, it was dismissed by the District Court. 97 F. Supp. 592. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 192 F. 2d 1009. Both courts relied upon Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537. We granted certiorari because of the doubtful applicability of that decision and the importance of the issue in the administration of the Nation’s immigration and naturalization program. 343 U. S. 933. Bail was denied by the District Court. 98 F. Supp. 717. It also was denied by the Court of Appeals, without prejudice to an application to this Court. Applications for bail are pending before the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization and this Court. The issue is petitioner’s detention, without notice of any charge against him and without opportunity to be heard in opposition thereto. Petitioner contends that such detention is not authorized by 8 CFR § 175.57 (b). He contends also that, if that regulation does purport to authorize such detention, the regulation is invalid as an attempt to deprive him of his liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Agreement with petitioner’s first contention makes it unnecessary to reach his second. The case of Knauff v. Shaughnessy, supra, relied upon below, is not in point. It relates to the rights of an alien entrant and does not deal with the question of a resident alien’s right to be heard. For purposes of his constitutional right to due process, we assimilate petitioner’s status to that of an alien continuously residing and physically present in the United States. To simplify the issue, we consider first what would have been his constitutional right to a hearing had he not undertaken his voyage to foreign ports but had remained continuously within the territorial boundaries of the United States. 1. It is well established that if an alien is a lawful permanent resident of the United States and remains physically present there, he is a person within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. He may not be deprived of his life, liberty or property without due process of law. Although it later may be established, as respondents contend, that petitioner can be expelled and deported, yet before his expulsion, he is entitled to notice of the nature of the charge and a hearing at least before an executive or administrative tribunal. Although Congress may prescribe conditions for his expulsion and deportation, not even Congress may expel him without allowing him a fair opportunity to be heard. For example, he is entitled to a fair chance to prove mistaken identity. At the present stage of the instant case, the issue is not one of exclusion, expulsion or deportation. It is one of legislative construction and of procedural due process. This being recognized, we interpret this regulation as making no attempt to question a resident alien’s constitutional right to due process. Section 175.57 (b) uses the term “excludable” in designating the aliens to which it applies. That term relates naturally to entrant aliens and to those assimilated to their status. The regulation nowhere refers to the expulsion of aliens, which is the term that would apply naturally to aliens who are lawful permanent residents physically present within the United States. Accordingly, we find no language in the regulation that would have required its application to petitioner had he remained continuously and physically within the United States. It thus seems clear that the Attorney General would not have had the authority to deny to petitioner a hearing in opposition to such an order as was here made, provided petitioner had remained within the United States. The regulation before us was issued by the Secretary of State and concurred in by the Attorney General, pursuant to Presidential Proclamations No. 2523, 3 CFR, 1943 Cum. Supp., 270, and No. 2850, 3 CFR, 1949 Supp., 41. The latter proclamation issued August 17, 1949, also “ratified and confirmed” the regulation. Those proclamations, in turn, depend upon § 1 of the Act of May 22, 1918, 40 Stat. 559, as amended, June 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 252, 22 U. S. C. § 223. It is not questioned that the regulation, as above interpreted, comes within these authorizations, or that such authorizations have been extended to include the dates material in this case. 66 Stat. 163, 333. We find nothing in the statute or the proclamations which calls for, permits or sustains a broader interpretation of 8 CFR § 175.57 (b) than we have given to it. The wording also now reflects congressional intent because substantially the same language was inserted by Congress in the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1008. See note 1, supra. 2. Petitioner’s final contention is that if an alien is a lawful permanent resident of the United States and also is a seaman who has gone outside of the United States on a vessel of American registry, with its home port in the United States, and, upon completion of such voyage, has returned on such vessel to the United States and is still on board, he is still, from a constitutional point of view, a person entitled to procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment. We do not regard the constitutional status which petitioner indisputably enjoyed prior to his voyage as terminated by that voyage. From a constitutional point of view, he is entitled to due process without regard to whether or not, for immigration purposes, he is to be treated as an entrant alien, and we do not now reach the question whether he is to be so treated. Section 175.57 (b)’s authorization of the denial of hearings raises no constitutional conflict if limited to “excludable” aliens who are not within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. The assimilation of petitioner, for constitutional purposes, to the status of a continuous resident physically present in the United States also accords with the Nation’s immigration and naturalization program. For example, for purposes of naturalization, such an assimilation was expressly prescribed in the Nationality Act of 1940: “Sec. 307. (a) No person . . . shall be naturalized unless such petitioner, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing petition for naturalization has resided continuously within the United States for at least five years .... “(d) The following shall be regarded as residence within the United States within the meaning of this chapter: “(2) Continuous service by a seaman on a vessel or vessels whose home port is in the United States and which are of American registry or American owned, if rendered subsequent to the applicant’s lawful entry into the United States for permanent residence and immediately preceding the date of naturalization.” 54 Stat. 1142-1143, 8 U. S. C. § 707. See also, § 325, 54 Stat. 1150, as amended, 64 Stat. 1015, 8 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 725. While it may be that a resident alien’s ultimate right to remain in the United States is subject to alteration by statute or authorized regulation because of a voyage undertaken by him to foreign ports, it does not follow that he is thereby deprived of his constitutional right to procedural due process. His status as a person within the meaning and protection of the Fifth Amendment cannot be capriciously taken from him. Where neither Congress, the President, the Secretary of State nor the Attorney General has inescapably said so, we are not ready to assume that any of them has attempted to deprive such a person of a fair hearing. This preservation of petitioner’s right to due process does not leave an unprotected spot in the Nation’s armor. Before petitioner’s admission to permanent residence, he was required to satisfy the Attorney General and Congress of his suitability for that status. Before receiving clearance for his foreign cruise, he was screened and approved by the Coast Guard. Before acceptance of his petition for naturalization, as well as before final action thereon, assurance is necessary that he is not a security risk. See 8 U. S. C., c. 11, Subchapter III — Nationality Through Naturalization, §§ 701-747, as amended. We do not reach the issue as to what would be the constitutional status of 8 CFR § 175.57 (b) if it were interpreted as denying to petitioner all opportunity for a hearing. Also, we do not reach the issue as to what will be the authority of the Attorney General to order the deportation of petitioner after giving him reasonable notice of the charges against him and allowing him a hearing sufficient to meet the requirements of procedural due process. For the reasons stated, we conclude that the detention of petitioner, without notice of the charges against him and without opportunity to be heard in opposition to them, is not authorized by 8 CFR § 175.57 (b). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court. Mr. Justice Minton dissents. “§ 175.57 Entry not permitted in special cases. . . . “(b) In the case of an alien temporarily excluded by an official of the Department of Justice on the ground that he is, or may be excludable under one or more of the categories set forth in § 175.53, no hearing by a board of special inquiry shall be held until after the case is reported to the Attorney General and such a hearing is directed by the Attorney General or his representative. In any special case the alien may be denied a hearing before a board of special inquiry and an appeal from the decision of that board if the Attorney General determines that he is excludable under one of the categories set forth in § 175.53 on the basis of information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest.” The categories set forth in § 175.53 as a basis for exclusion are those defined “to be prejudicial to the public interest.” They include, for example, membership in “a political organization associated with or carrying out policies of any foreign government opposed to the measures adopted by the Government of the United States in the public interest . . .” or being “engaged in organizing, teaching, advo-eating, or directing any rebellion, insurrection, or violent uprising against the United States.” 8 CFR. For statutory language similar to that in 8 CFR § 175.57, see § 5 of the Act of October 16, 1918, as amended by the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1008, 8 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 137-4, referring to aliens who are “excludable” under § 137. The Government, in the instant case, relies upon 8 CFR § 175.57, rather than upon 8 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 137-4. “Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress favors the suspension of deportation in the case of each alien hereinafter named, in which case the Attorney General has suspended deportation for more than six months. “A-6665545, Chew, Kwong Hai, or Harry Kwong (Hai Chew). “Agreed to July 20, 1949.” 63 Stat. 1240, 1242. For the effect of the above action, see § 19 (c) of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, as amended, 62 Stat. 1206, 8 U. S. C. (Supp. Y) §155 (c): “(c) In the case of any alien . . . who is deportable under any law of the United States and who has proved good moral character for the preceding five years, the Attorney General may . . . suspend deportation of such alien if he is not ineligible for naturalization or if ineligible, such ineligibility is solely by reason of his race, if he finds (a) that such deportation would result in serious economic detriment to a citizen or legally resident alien who is the spouse, parent, or minor child of such deportable alien; or (b) that such alien has resided continuously in the United States for seven years or more and is residing in the United States upon the effective date of this Act. If the deportation of any alien is suspended under the provisions of this subsection for more than six months, a complete and detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be reported to the Congress with the reasons for such suspension. ... If during the session of the Congress at which a ease is reported, or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following the session at which a case is reported, the Congress passes a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it favors the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings. . . . Deportation proceedings shall not be canceled in the case of any alien who was not legally admitted for permanent residence at the time of his last entry into the United States, unless such alien pays ... a fee of $18 .... [In the instant case this was paid.] Upon the cancellation of such proceedings in any case in which fee has been paid the Commissioner shall record the alien’s admission for permanent residence as of the date of his last entry into the United States . . . .” 8 CFR § 175.41 (q) states that for the purposes of §§ 175.41 to 175.62 “The term ‘an alien who is a lawful permanent resident of the United States’ means an alien who has been lawfully admitted into the continental United States, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, or Hawaii for permanent residence therein and who has since such admission maintained his domicile in the United States: . . . .” For the nature and significance of such clearance, see Executive Order No. 10173, of October 18, 1950, especially §§ 6.10-1 to 6.10-9, now published, as amended, in 33 CFR, 1951 Cum. Pocket Supp. That order was issued pursuant to the Act of June 15, 1917, as amended by the Magnuson Act of August 9, 1950, 64 Stat. 427-428, 50 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 191. It has now been implemented by regulations effective December 27, 1950, published, as amended, in 33 CFR, 1951 Cum. Pocket Supp., §§ 121.01-125.37. See also, Parker v. Lester, 98 F. Supp. 300, 191 F. 2d 1020. Section 6.10-1, as it existed at the date of petitioner’s clearance, provided: “Issuance of documents and employment of persons aboard vessels. No person shall be issued a document required for employment on a merchant vessel of the United States nor shall any licensed officer or certificated man be employed on a merchant vessel of the United States if the Commandant is satisfied that the character and habits of life of such person are such as to authorize the belief that the presence of the individual on board would be inimical to the security of the United States: . . . .” 15 Fed. Reg. 7007. Later regulations have published detailed security provisions as to who may be employed on merchant vessels of the United States of 100 gross tons and upward, whether engaged in foreign or other trade. 33 CFR, 1951 Cum. Pocket Supp., §§ 121.13-121.16. In this opinion “exclusion” means preventing someone from entering the United States who is actually outside of the United States or is treated as being so. “Expulsion” means forcing someone out of the United States who is actually within the United States or is treated as being so. “Deportation” means the moving of someone away from the United States, after his exclusion or expulsion. “. . . The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the first time to these shores. But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders. Such rights include those protected by the First and the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. None of these provisions acknowledges any distinction between citizens and resident aliens. They extend their inalienable privileges to all 'persons’ and guard against any encroachiiient on those rights by federal or state authority.” Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 161 (concurring opinion). “The alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society. Mere lawful presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives him certain rights; they become more extensive and secure when he makes preliminary declaration of intention to become a citizen, and they expand to those of full citizenship upon naturalization. During his probationary residence, this Court has steadily enlarged his right against Executive deportation except upon full and fair hearing. . . . And, at least since 1886, we have extended to the person and property of resident aliens important constitutional guaranties — such as the due process of law of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763, 770-771. The latter case also comments that “in extending constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it was the alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power to act.” Id., at 771. That ease related to nonresident enemy aliens who had never been in the United States, rather than to a lawful permanent resident in the position of petitioner. There is no lack of physical presence for jurisdictional purposes in the instant case. “. . . But this court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. One of these principles is that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be heard, before such officers, in respect of the matters upon which that liberty depends — not necessarily an opportunity upon a regular, set occasion, and according to the forms of judicial procedure, but one that will secure the prompt, vigorous action contemplated by Congress, and at the same time be appropriate to the nature of the case upon which such officers are required to act. Therefore, it is not competent for the Secretary of the Treasury or any executive officer, at any time within the year limited by the statute, arbitrarily to cause an alien, who has entered the country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although alleged to be illegally here, to be taken into custody and deported without giving him all opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United States. No such arbitrary power can exist where the principles involved in due process of law are recognized.” The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 100-101. “. . . It was under compulsion of the Constitution that this Court long ago held that an antecedent deportation statute must provide a hearing at least for aliens who had not entered clandestinely and who had been here some time even if illegally.” Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 49-50. See also Johnson v. Eisentrager, supra, at 770-771; Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524, 538. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, recognizing the right to expel and deport resident aliens. “When the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one, one before a tribunal which meets at least currently prevailing standards of impartiality.” Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, supra, at 50; Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454, 457-458, 464. It is to be noted that the cases generally cited in this field in relation to the exclusion, expulsion or deportability of resident aliens deal only with that ultimate issue, and not with the right of the resident alien to a hearing sufficient to satisfy procedural due process. The reports show that there were hearings and that in some cases the Court considered whether the hearings had been fair. E. g., United States v. Smith, 289 U. S. 422, 424; United States v. Corsi, 287 U. S. 129, 131; United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U. S. 398, 400; Quon Quon Poy v. Johnson, 273 U. S. 352, 358; Lewis v. Frick, 233 U. S. 291, 293; Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S. 78, 83; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 729. The preceding subsection, 175.57 (a), uses the additional word “deported” but only to supplement “excluded”: “Any alien so temporarily excluded by an official of the Department of Justice shall not be admitted and shall be excluded and deported unless the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of State, is satisfied that the admission of the alien would not be prejudicial to the interests of the United States.” 8 CFR. This provision survives in a modified form in § 330 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 251. Section 330 (b) includes a savings clause affecting those who applied for naturalization before September 23, 1950. Section 405 (a) also contains a general savings clause. 66 Stat. 280. Existing statutory and administrative provisions for “Exclusion Without Hearing” are discussed in the Report of the President’s Commission on Immigration and Naturalization entitled “Whom We Shall Welcome” dated January 1, 1953, at pages 228-231. The discussion treats the provisions as applicable to entrant and reentrant aliens but does not even suggest that they are applicable to aliens lawfully admitted to permanent residence and physically present within the United States. The report discusses the harshness of the “reentry doctrine” and recommends its modification at pages 199— 200. It does not, however, even suggest that the reentry doctrine attempts to limit the constitutional right to a hearing which resident aliens, in the status of petitioner, may have under the Fifth Amendment. The instances of hardship which the report cites appear to have been disclosed at hearings held on the issue of the alien’s right to reenter. See note 2, supra. See note 3, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

THORPE v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF DURHAM. No. 712. Argued March 21, 1967. Decided April 17, 1967. James M. Nabrit III argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jack Greenberg, Charles Stephen -Ralston,■ Charles H. Jones, Jr., and Michael Meltsner. ' , . Daniel K. Edwards argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was William Y. Manson. Per Curiam. ' In -November. 1964, the petitioner became a tenant in McDougald Terrace, a federally assisted, low-rent public housing project owned and managed by the Housing - Authority of the City of Durham, North Carolina. The lease provided for a tenancy from month to month, and gave both the tenant and the Authority the right to. terminate by giving notice at least 15 days before the end .of any monthly term. On August 10, 1965, the petitioner was elected president of a McDougald Terrace tenants’ organization. The next day the Authority gave her notice of termination of her tenancy as of August 31. • The notice did not give any reasons for the cancellation, and the Authority declined to accede to the petitioner’s demands for an explanation. The petitioner refused to' vacate the premises, and the Authority thereupon brought a summary ejectment action in the Justice of the Peace Court in Durham. The Authority there obtained a judgment of eviction, which- was affirmed on appeal by the Superior Court of Durham County and the Supreme Court of North Carolina.. We granted certiorari. 385 U. S. 967. Th<? petitioner has remained in possession of her apartment pursuant to a stay granted by the North Carolina Supreme Court. The petitioner contends that she was constitutionally entitled to notice setting forth the reasons for the termination of her lease, and a hearing fhereon. She also suggests that her eviction was invalid because it allegedly was based on her participation in constitutionally protected associational activities. We find it unnecessary to reach the large issues stirred by these claims, because of a significant development that has occurred since we granted the writ of certiorari. On February 7, 1967, the Department of Housing and Urban Development issued a directive to local'housing authorities. After reciting the fact that dissatisfaction had been expressed with eviction procedures in loW-rent housing projects and that suits had been brought to challenge evictions in which the local authority had not given any reason for its action, the circular stated: “Since this is a federally assisted program, we believe it is essential that no tenant, be given notice to vacate without being told by the Local Authority, in a private conference or other appropriate manner, the reasons for the eviction, and given an opportunity to'make such reply or explanation as he may wish.” The circular goes on to require local authorities to keep future records of evictions, the reasons therefor, and summaries of any conferences held with tenants in connection with evictions. While the directive provides that certain records shall. - be kept commencing with the date of its issuance, them'is no suggestion that the basic procedure it prescribes is not to be followed in all eviction proceedings that have not become final. If this procedure were accorded to the petitioner, her case would assume a posture quite different from the one now presented. Compare Wabash R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 273 U. S. 126, 131; Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600, 607; Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601. The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is accordingly vacated, and the case remanded for such further proceedings as may be appropriate in the light of the February 7 circular of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. /É ⅛ so ordered. 267 N. C. 431, 148 S. E. 2d 290. In the Superior Court proceedings, it was stipulated' and agreed: “that if Mr. C. S. Oldham, the'Executive Director of the Housing Authority of the City of Durham, were present and duly sworn and were testifying,' he would testify that whatever reason there may have been, if any, for giving notice to Joyce C. Thorpe of the termination of her lease, it was not for the reason that she was elected president of any group organized in McDougald Terrace, and specifically it was not for the reason- that she was elected president of any group organized in McDougald Terrace on August 10, 1965 . . . .” ' The text of the circular is as follows: “SUBJECT: Terminations of Tenancy in Low-Rent Projects “Within the past year increasing dissatisfaction has been expressed with eviction practices in public low-rent housing projects. During that period a number of suits have been filed throughout the United States generally challenging the right of á Local Authority to evict a tenant without advising him of the reasons for such eviction. “Since this is a federally assisted program, we believe it is essential that no tenant be given notice to vacate without, being told by the Local Authority, in a private conference or other appropriate manner, the reasons for the eviction, and given an opportunity to make such reply or explanation as he. may wish. “In addition to informing the tenant of the reason(s) for any proposed eviction action, from this date each Local Authority shall maintain a written record of every eviction from its federally assisted public housing. Such records are to be available for review from time to time by HUD representatives and shall contain the following information: “1. Name of tenant and identification of unit occupied. “2. Date of notice to vacate. “3. Specific reason (s) for notice to vacate. For example, if a tenant is being evicted because of undesirable actions, the record should detail the actions which resulted in the determination that eviction should be instituted. “4. Date and method of notifying tenant with summary of any conferences with tenant, including names of conference participants. “5/Date and description of final action taken. “The Circular on the above subject from the PHA Commissioner, dated May 31, 1966, is superseded by this Circular. “[s] Don Hummel “Assistant Secretary for Renewal “and Housing Assistance” The superseded circular of May 31, 1966, státed that the federal authorities “strongly urge, as a matter of good social policy, that Local Authorities in a private conference inform any tenants who are given [eviction] notices of the reasons for this action.” Although the circular does not specify the authority under which it is issued, federal authorities are given general statutory power to make “such- rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out” federal programs for assistance to low-rent housing projects. United States Housing Act. of 1937, § 8, 50 Stat. 891, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1408. The legal effect of the circular, the extent to which it binds local housing authorities, and whether it is in fact applicable to the petitioner are questions we do not now decide.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CHANDLER v. ROUDEBUSH, ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, et al. No. 74-1599. Argued March 2, 1976 Decided June 1, 1976 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Joel L. Selig argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Paul R. Dimond, J. Harold Flan-nery, and Stuart P. Herman. Assistant Attorney General Lee argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor Gen eral Bork, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Kenneth S. Geller, and Robert E. Kopp. Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles Stephen Ralston, Melvyn Leventhal, and Eric Schnapper filed a brief for the N. A. A. C. P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1972 Congress extended the protection of Title VII of the Civil Nights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), to employees of the Federal Government. A principal goal of the amending legislation, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, was to eradicate “ 'entrenched discrimination in the Federal service/ ” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 547, by strengthening internal safeguards and by according “[a]ggrieved [federal] employees or applicants . . . the full rights available in the courts as are granted to individuals in the private sector under title VII.” The issue presented by this case is whether the 1972 Act gives federal employees the same right to a trial de novo of employment discrimination claims as “private sector” employees enjoy under Title VII. I The petitioner, Mrs. Jewell Chandler, is a Negro. In 1972 she was employed as a claims examiner by the Veterans’ Administration. In August of that year she applied for a promotion to the position of supervisory claims examiner. Following a selection procedure she was designated as one of three finalists for the position. The promotion was awarded to a Filipino-American male. The petitioner subsequently filed a complaint with the Veterans’ Administration alleging that she had been denied the promotion because of unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex and race. After an administrative hearing on the claim, the presiding complaints examiner submitted proposed findings to the effect that the petitioner had been discriminated against on the basis of sex but not race and recommended that she be given a retroactive promotion to the position for which she had applied. The agency rejected the proposed finding of sex discrimination as not “substantiated by the evidence,” and accordingly granted no relief. The petitioner filed a timely appeal to the Civil Service Commission Board of Appeals and Review, which affirmed the agency’s decision. Within 30 days after receiving notice of the Commission’s decision, the petitioner brought the present suit in a Federal District Court under § 717 (c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as added by § 11 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 111, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-16 (c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). After moving unsuccessfully for summary judgment, she initiated discovery proceedings by filing notice of two depositions and a request for the production of documents. The respondents moved for an order prohibiting discovery on the ground that the judicial action authorized by § 717 (c) is limited to a review of the administrative record. The petitioner opposed the motion, asserting that she had a right under §717 (c) to a plenary judicial trial de novo. The District Court adopted the holding of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247, rev’d sub nom. Hackley v. Roudebush, 171 U. S. App. D. C. 376, 520 F. 2d 108, that a “trial de novo is not required [under §717 (c)] in all cases” and that review of the administrative record is sufficient if “an absence of discrimination is affirmatively established by the clear weight of the evidence in the record . . . 360 F. Supp., at 1252. Applying this standard of review* the District Court determined that “the absence of discrimination is firmly established by the clear weight of the administrative record” and granted summary judgment in favor of the respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, agreeing with the District Court’s ruling that § 717 (c) contemplates not a trial de novo but the “intermediate scope of inquiry expounded in Hackley v. Johnson Chandler v. Johnson, 515 F. 2d 251, 255 (CA9). We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits concerning the nature of the judicial proceeding provided by § 717 (c). 423 U. S. 821. II We begin with the language of the statute. Section 717 (c), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16 (c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), states that within 30 days after notice of final adverse administrative action on a federal employee’s diserimin ition complaint by either the employing agency or the Civil Service Commission (in the event a permissive appeal is taken), or after 180 days of delay by the agen3y or the Commission, the employee “may file a civil action as provided in section 706, in which civil action the head of the department agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant.” Section 717 (d), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16 (d) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), goes on to specify that “[t]he provisions of section 706 (f) through (k), as applicable, shall govern civil actions brought hereunder.” Section 706 (f) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), authorizes the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to bring “civil actions” on behalf of private sector employees in federal district court. Alternatively, §706 (f)(1) authorizes an individual employee to sue on his own behalf if a specified period of delay has elapsed or if the EEOC has declined to represent him on the basis of its initial determination that “there is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true . . . .” § 706 (b), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Sections 706 (f) through (k), 42 U. S. C. §§2000e-5(f) through (k) (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), provide specific rules and guidelines for private-sector “civil actions.” It is well established that § 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 accords private-sector employees the right to de novo consideration of their Title VII claims. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, 798-799; Norman v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 414 F. 2d 73, 75 n. 2 (CA8). The “employee’s statutory right to a trial de novo under Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] . . . ,” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., supra, at 38, embodies a congressional decision to “vest federal courts with plenary powers to enforce the [substantive] requirements [of Title VII] . . . Id., at 47. The 1972 amendments to the 1964 Act added language to § 706 which reflects the de novo character of the private sector “civil action” even more clearly than did the 1964 version. Section 706 (f)(4), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (f)(4) (1970 ed., Supp. IV), for instance, requires the chief judge of the district in which a “civil action” is pending to “immediately . . . designate a judge in such district to hear and determine the case.” The judge so designated must “assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date . . . .” §706 (f)(5). If the case has not been “scheduled ... for trial within one hundred and twenty days after issue has been joined,” then the designated judge may appoint a special master to hear it. Ibid. And, as under the 1964 version, if the district court “finds” that the respondent has intentionally committed an unlawful employment practice, then the court may order appropriate relief. § 706 (g), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (g) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The terminology employed by Congress — “assign the case for hearing,” “scheduled ... for trial,” “finds” — indicates clearly that the “civil action” to which private-sector employees are entitled under the amended version of Title VII is to be a trial de novo. Since federal-sector employees are entitled by § 717 (c) to “file a civil action as provided in section 706 [42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (1970 ed., Supp. IV)]” and since the civil action provided in § 706 is a trial de novo, it would seem to follow syllogistically that federal employees are entitled to a trial de novo of their employment discrimination claims. The Court of Appeals, however, held that a contrary result was indicated by the words “as applicable” in § 717 (d) and by the legislative history of § 717, and in support of that position the respondents further argue that routine de novo trials of federal employees’ claims would clash with the 1972 Act’s delegation of enforcement responsibilities to the Civil Service Commission and would contravene this Court’s view that “de novo review is generally not to be presumed.” Consolo v. FMC, 383 U. S. 607, 619 n. 17. A. The Meaning of the Phrase “As Applicable” The opinion of the District Court for the District of Columbia in Hackley v. Johnson, relied on by the Court of Appeals here, expressed the view that the phrase “as applicable” in § 717 (d) evidences a congressional intent to restrict or qualify the right to a de novo proceeding granted by § 717 (c). 360 F. Supp., at 1252 n. 9. A careful reading of § 717 (d) and the provisions to which it refers indicates, however, that the phrase was intended merely to reflect the fact that certain provisions in §§ 706 (f) through (k) pertain to aspects of the Title VII enforcement scheme that have no possible relevance to judicial proceedings involving federal employees. Section 717 (d) states that “[t]he provisions of section 706 (f) through (k), as applicable, shall govern civil actions brought hereunder." Sections 706 (f) through (k) set forth specific procedures and guidelines to be followed in private-sector “civil actions." Several of these procedures could not possibly apply to civil actions involving federal employees. Section 706 (f)(1), for instance, provides that in the private sector the EEOC “may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision” and that the Attorney General of the United States may bring a civil action for employment discrimination against a state government, agency, or political subdivision. The individual complainant retains the right to intervene in suits brought by the EEOC or the Attorney General. In the case of a “civil action” maintained by an individual complainant against a private or state governmental employer, the EEOC or the Attorney General, respectively, may be permitted to intervene “upon certification that the case is of general public importance.” These provisions, allowing suits and permissive intervention by the EEOG or the Attorney General, could have no possible application to “civil actions” under § 717 (c), because the individual federal employee or job applicant is the only party who can institute and maintain a “civil action” under that subsection. Similarly, the provision in § 706 (f) (2) permitting the EEOC or the Attorney General to “bring an action for appropriate temporary or preliminary relief pending final disposition” of a charge where the EEOC has “conclude [d] on the basis of a preliminary investigation that prompt judicial action is necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act” could not possibly apply without modification to “civil actions” involving federal employees, because the EEOC is given no general responsibility for investigating or prosecuting the complaints of federal employees. The most natural reading of the phrase “as applicable” in § 717 (d) is that it merely reflects the inapplicability of provisions in §§ 706 (f) through (k) detailing the enforcement responsibilities of the EEOC and the Attorney General. We cannot, therefore, agree with the view expressed, by the District Court in Hackley v. Johnson, supra, and relied on by the Court of Appeals here, that Congress used the words “as applicable" to voice its intent to disallow trials de novo by aggrieved federal employees who have received prior administrative hearings. As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held in reversing Hackley v. Johnson, supra, such an interpretation of the phrase “as applicable” would require a strained and unnatural reading of §§706 (f) through (k). Hackley v. Roudebush, 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 389, 620 F. 2d, at 121. This Court pointed out in Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U. S. 364, 370, that “ ‘the plain, obvious and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect would discover.’ ” To read the phrase “as applicable” in § 717 (d) as obliquely qualifying the federal employee’s right to a trial de novo under § 717 (c) rather than as merely reflecting the inapplicability to § 717 (c) actions of provisions relating to the enforcement responsibilities of the EEOC or the Attorney General would violate this elementary canon of construction. B. Legislative History The legislative history of the 1972 amendments reinforces the plain meaning of the statute and confirms that Congress intended to accord federal employees the same right to a trial de novo as is enjoyed by private-sector employees and employees of state governments and political subdivisions under the amended Civil Rights Act of 1964. Two themes dominated the debates, proposals, and committee reports which preceded the enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. The first was the inadequacy of the individually instituted and maintained trial de novo as an enforcement technique in the private sector under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The second was federal employees’ lack of adequate internal safeguards against employment discrimination and Congress’ perception of their lack of access to the courts to raise claims of job discrimination. In 1971, the House Committee on Education and Labor and the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare reported out bills designed to remedy these deficiencies. The proposed bills, H. R. 1746 and S. 2515, gave the EEOC cease-and-desist powers in the private sector while retaining the private-sector complainant’s preexisting right to a trial de novo in certain instances. The grant of cease-and-desist power to the EEOC provoked strong dissenting statements in both committee reports. While nearly all members of both committees agreed that the EEOC should be given enforcement powers in the private sector, there was sharp disagreement over whether the EEOC should be given the power merely to institute de novo suits in federal trial courts on behalf of employees or the power actually to adjudicate discrimination controversies subject only to review on a substantial-evidence basis in the federal courts of appeals. The dissenting members of the two committees favored the trial de novo approach. As Senator Dominick put it in a minority statement in the Senate Report: “The issue is no longer whether we need enforcement powers for Title VII, but rather what form and scope of enforcement is needed to best protect the rights of all parties involved. To accomplish this end the Senate is given two types of enforcement machinery to choose from — vesting EEOC with cease and desist powers or giving EEOC the authority to sue directly in Federal Courts. “... Determination of employment civil rights deserves and requires non-partisan judgment. This judgment is best afforded by Federal court judges who, shielded from political influence by life tenure, are more likely to withstand political pressures and render their decisions in a climate tempered by judicial reflection and supported by historical judicial independence.” In response to these criticisms and in justification of their contrary position, the majority members of the two committees set forth in considerable detail their reasons for choosing the approach of agency adjudication with appellate court review. The House committee majority thought that the EEOC was “better equipped to handle the complicated issues involved in employment discrimination cases” and “better suited to rapid resolution of such complex issues than are Courts.” In addition, the majority thought that an administrative tribunal would offer procedural advantages in that it would be “less subject to technical rules governing such matters as pleadings and motion practice . . . and . . . less constrained by formal rules of evidence ... .” The Senate Report spelled out in even greater detail the perceived differences between “enforcement by district court trials rather than through agency hearings followed by appellate court review,” stressing the delays that would be occasioned by court trials and the need for administrative expertise in recognizing and remedying complex forms of employment discrimination. The Report stated that the committee had given “full and careful consideration” to an “alternative measure providing for court enforcement for title VII” but that that proposal had been rejected in favor of the administrative agency approach. It was against this backdrop of focused debate on the issue of administrative agency versus wholly judicial enforcement machinery in the area of discrimination in private employment that the two committees proposed extending to a federal employee the right to file a “civil action” if “aggrieved” by his employing agency’s action in dealing with his complaint of discrimination. The fact that the federal employee, prior to filing such a “civil action,” would have enjoyed the benefit of improved internal safeguards, including “appropriate procedures for an impartial [agency] adjudication of the complain [t],” might well have provided a rationale for reposing primary adjudicative authority in the appropriate federal agency rather than in the district courts. But the two committees clearly chose to permit de novo judicial trial of such complaints rather than mere judicial review of employing agency determinations: In both the House and Senate Committee Bills, the sections which accorded an aggrieved federal employee the right to file a “civil action” following adverse agency action referred not to the substantial-evidence review provisions applicable to EEOC cease-and-desist orders but rather to other provisions which retained the private-sector employee’s right to a trial de novo in specified circumstances. It is inconceivable that the two congressional committees, which were keenly aware of the consequences of vesting in an administrative agency rather than in the federal courts the primary adjudicative responsibility, did not act in a knowing and deliberate manner in thus equating a federal employee’s “civil action” with private-sector plenary trials and in eschewing any reference to the private-sector provisions of the proposed legislation which provided for agency adjudication subject only to review on a substantial-evidence basis in the federal courts of appeals. In short, the bills reported out of the Senate and House committees and the accompanying Reports reveal a thorough and meticulous consideration of the question whether an administrative agency or a court should be given primary adjudicative responsibility for particular categories of Title VII complaints and an unambiguous choice to grant federal employees the right to plenary trials in the federal district courts. The House Committee Bill was opposed on the floor of the House on the ground that it placed primary adjudicative responsibility over private-sector Title VII complaints in an agency which was also responsible for prosecuting such complaints. Opponents contended that such a commingling of functions would bias the agency's adjudications. This argument prevailed, and H. R. 1746 was amended on the floor by H. R. 9247, which granted the EEOC the right to file private-sector “civil actions” in district court but not the power to issue cease- and desist orders. The amendment changed H. R. 1746 in one other important respect: It deleted the provisions extending Title VII to federal employees. As amended, H. R. 1746 passed the House. The Senate Committee Bill, like its House counterpart, was strongly opposed on the floor. As in the House, controversy centered on whether agency adjudication with limited appellate judicial review in the federal appellate courts should be the technique by which the EEOC would enforce Title VII in the private sector. Early in the four-week Senate floor debate which preceded passage of S. 2515, Senator Dominick introduced an amendment which would replace the EEOC’s cease- and desist authority with a right to institute de novo proceedings in the federal district courts on behalf of private-sector employees. This amendment conformed to the dissenting views he had expressed in the Senate Report. The principal aim of the amendment was to separate prosecutorial from adjudicative functions in private-sector Title VII proceedings. A central theme of Senator Dominick’s argument, stressed repeatedly in the floor debate, was that the Committee Bill already contemplated the resolution of federal employees’ claims through district court and not agency adjudication. Speaking of the Senate committee’s deliberations, Senator Dominick stated that when the committee had “examined the Federal employee situation” he had “pointed out again that we were creating an agency czar in the EEOC which could determine personnel policies in all the other Federal agencies of the Government. I doubted the wisdom of creating such an omnipotent agency. After some discussion on this ... we were able to work out an agreement whereby a Federal employee who feels he is discriminated against can go through his agency, and if he is still dissatisfied, he is empowered to bring suit in Federal court or through the existing Civil Service Board of Appeals and Beviews to Federal court. So on two of the major groups of employees covered by this legislation; namely, State and local employees on the one hand, and Federal employees on the other, the committee itself agreed to grievance remedy procedures through the Federal district courts; yet with the private employee they say, ‘No, you cannot have that. We will have an agency that can do it all by itself.’ That is discrimination in and of itself, right within the bill; and it strikes me that one of the first things we have to do is at least to put employees holding their jobs, be they government or private employees, on the same plane so that they have the same rights, so that they have the same opportunities, and so that they have the same equality within their jobs, to make sure that they are not being discriminated against and have the enforcement, investigatory procedure carried out the same way. “As I said earlier, it seems wrong to me to say to an aggrieved employee, ‘Certainly we will hear your case. We will do the investigating. We will bring the charges. We will do everything else, but you will not get a decision for over 2 years.’ That is not justice. This is not equal employment opportunity. But if we have the investigator saying that this is a legitimate complaint, and that it will be brought to the district court and will get priority treatment there, we can get the matter decided in half the time it would take in any other way. “It strikes me that this is right on principle. It is right in terms of administrative procedures. It conforms to what we did with State and local employees and with Federal employees.” Senator Dominick reiterated the theme of remedial disparity throughout the floor debates, arguing for equal treatment of private-sector and federal-sector complainants: Since the latter were entitled to plenary adjudication of their claims by a federal district court, rather than mere appellate review on a substantial-evidence basis following agency adjudication, he contended, the former should be treated similarly. Senator Dominick’s amendment was eventually adopted and S. 2515, as amended, passed the Senate. The House had already passed the amended version of H. R. 1746, which differed from the amended Senate Committee Bill in that it did not apply to federal employees. The bills accordingly went to a conference committee, which adopted the Senate Committee Bill’s provision extending Title VII to federal employees. The conference bill was enacted by the Senate and the House. Since the federal employee provisions of the Senate bill were eventually adopted by the conference committee and passed by Congress, the legislative history of that bill is the most helpful on the issue presented here. The sequence of debate, amendment, and Senate passage of S. 2515 shows unmistakably that the Senate decided to provide both private- and federal-sector employees the adjudicative mechanism which the Senate committee had advocated for federal-, but not private-sector, employees. No changes were made or even proposed with respect to the committee’s choice to allow federal employees judicial trials rather than “substantial evidence” review of administrative dispositions of their discrimination claims. On the contrary, it was the federal-sector de novo procedure which served as the model for Senator Dominick’s proposed alteration of private-sector enforcement provisions. The passage of the Dominick amendment and the subsequent approval of S. 2515 by the Senate achieved the parity which Senator Dominick had advocated — judicial trial de novo for private as well as federal employees. The Court of Appeals held that “the district judge faced with a demand for a trial de novo is entitled to determine, at a pretrial conference or otherwise, why the plaintiff believes that a trial de novo is necessary,” 515 F. 2d, at 255, and concluded that the petitioner had presented “nothing before the district court to indicate that a useful purpose would be served by having a trial de novo.”' Ibid. This approach substantially parallels the holding in Hackley v. Johnson: “The trial de novo is not required in all cases. The District Court is required by the Act to examine the administrative record with utmost care. If it determines that an absence of discrimination is affirmatively established by the clear weight of the evidence in the record, no new trial is required. If this exacting standard is not met, the Court shall, in its discretion, as appropriate, remand, take testimony to supplement the administrative record, or grant the plaintiff relief on the administrative record.” 360 F. Supp., at 1252. Nothing in the legislative history indicates that the federal-sector “civil action” was to have this chameleon-like character, providing fragmentary de novo consideration of discrimination claims where “appropriate,” ibid., and otherwise providing record review. On the contrary, the options which Congress considered were entirely straightforward. It faced a choice between record review of agency action based on traditional appellate standards and trial de novo of Title VII claims. The Senate committee selected trial de novo as the proper means for resolving the claims of federal employees. The Senate broadened the category of claims entitled to trial de novo to include those of private-sector employees, and the Senate’s decision to treat private- and federal-sector employees alike in this respect was ratified by the Congress as a whole. C. Presumption Against De Novo Review Given the clear expression of congressional intent, as revealed in both the plain language of § 717 and the legislative history of the 1972 amendments, we find unpersuasive the respondents’ reliance on decisions by this Court indicating that “de novo review is generally not to be presumed.” Consolo v. FMC, 383 U. S., at 619 n. 17; United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U. S. 709, 715. Consolo involved review of agency action under provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act giving “a reviewing court authority to 'set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion . . . [or] (5) unsupported by substantial evidence 383 U. S., at 619. In this context, the Court observed: “We do not read the opinion below as asserting that the Court of Appeals, in a direct review proceeding, may conduct a de novo review of the equities of a reparation award. We find nothing in the Shipping Act, the Hobbs Act, or the Administrative Procedure Act that would authorize a de novo review in these circumstances, and in the absence of specific statutory authorization, a de novo review is generally not to be presumed.” Id., at 619 n. 17. Here, by contrast, there is a “specific statutory authorization” of á district court “civil action,” which both the plain language of the Statute and the legislative history reveal to be a trial de novo. The respondents’ contention that administrative dispositions of federal employee discrimination complaints would, unlike arbitral decisions under collective-bargaining agreements or preliminary EEOC findings of “no reasonable cause,” typically furnish an adequate basis for “substantial evidence” review cannot overcome the clear import of the statutory language and the legislative history. The Congress was aware of the fact that federal employees would have the benefit of “appropriate procedures for an impartial [agency] adjudication of the complain [t],” and yet chose to give employees who had been through those procedures the right to file a de novo “civil action” equivalent to that enjoyed by private-sector employees. It may well be, as the respondents have argued, that routine trials de novo in the federal courts will tend ultimately to defeat, rather than to advance, the basic purposes of the statutory scheme. But Congress has made the choice, and it is not for us to disturb it. Since the Court of Appeals in this case erroneously concluded that § 717 (c) does not accord a federal employee the same right to a trial de novo as private-sector employees enjoy under Title VII, its judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 16 (1971) (hereinafter cited as Senate Report). The Veterans’ Administration accepted the examiner’s proposed finding of no race discrimination. The District Court in Hackley had held that even if that “exacting standard” were not met, a full trial de novo would not necessarily be required. Rather a district court could, “in its discretion, as appropriate, remand, take testimony to supplement the administrative record, or grant the plaintiff relief on the administrative record.” 360 F. Supp., at 1252. Four Courts of Appeals have held that §717 (c) gives federal employees the right to a trial de novo in the district court. Abrams v. Johnson, 534 F. 2d 1226 (CA6); Caro v. Schultz, 521 F. 2d 1084 (CA7); Hackley v. Roudebush, 171 U. S. App. D. C. 376, 520 F. 2d 108; Sperling v. United States, 515 F. 2d 465 (CA3). Three other Courts of Appeals have held that federal employees are not generally entitled to trials de novo. Haire v. Calloway, 526 F. 2d 246 (CA8); Chandler v. Johnson, 515 F. 2d 251 (CA9) (opinion below); Salone v. United States, 511 F. 2d 902 (CA10). The Attorney General of the United States is given responsibility for instituting Title VII civil actions on behalf of employees of state governments, governmental agencies, or political subdivisions. §706 (f)(1), 42 U. 8. C. §2000e-5 (f)(1) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, 78 Stat. 259. See Hackley v. Roudebush, 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 387-388, 520 F. 2d, at 119-120. As stated in the Senate Report: “The most striking deficiency of the 1964 Act is that the EEOC does not have the authority to issue judicially enforceable orders to back up its findings of discrimination. In prohibiting discrimination in employment based on race, religion, color, sex or national origin, the 1964 Act limited the Commission’s enforcement authority to ‘informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion.’ “As a consequence, unless the Department of Justice concludes that a pattern or practice of resistance to Title VII is involved, the burden of obtaining enforceable relief rests upon each individual victim of discrimination, who must go into court as a private party, with the delay and expense that entails, in order to secure the rights promised him under the law. Thus, those persons whose economic disadvantage was a prime reason for enactment of equal employment opportunity provisions find that their only recourse in the face of unyielding discrimination is one that is time consuming, burdensome, and all too often, financially prohibitive.” Senate Report 4. The Senate Report stated: “The testimony before the Labor Subcommittee reflected a general lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the complaint procedure on the part of Federal employees. Complaints have indicated skepticism regarding the Commission’s record in obtaining just resolutions of complaints and adequate remedies. This has, in turn, discouraged persons from filing complaints with the Commission for fear that doing so will only result in antagonizing their supervisors and impairing any future hope of advancement.” Id., at 14. “The testimony of the Civil Service Commission notwithstanding, the committee found that an aggrieved Federal employee does not have access to the courts. In many cases, the employee must overcome a U. S. Government defense of sovereign immunity or failure to exhaust administrative remedies with no certainty as to the steps required to exhaust such remedies. Moreover, the remedial authority of the Commission and the courts has also been in doubt.” Id., at 16. Under both committee bills, the private-sector employee could bring a civil action within 60 days after the EEOC gave notice that it had dismissed the charge of employment discrimination or that 180 days had elapsed from the filing of the charge without the EEOC having issued a complaint or having entered into an acceptable conciliation agreement. H. R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., §8 (j) (1971) (hereinafter cited as H. R. 1746 or House Committee Bill); S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., §4 (a) (1971) (hereinafter cited as S. 2515 or Senate Committee Bill). Representatives Ashbrook and Landgrebe did not favor granting the EEOC any enforcement authority. H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 70 (1971) (hereinafter cited as House Report). Senate Report 85. Similar minority views were expressed in the Report of the House committee. House Report 58-63. Id., at 10-11. Senate Report 18. Id., at 17-19. Id., at 17. House Report 26. The House Committee Bill, supra, n. 10, provided in relevant part that a federal employee, if aggrieved by final administrative disposition of his complaint, “may file a civil action as provided in section 715 . . . .” § 11. Section 715 of the proposed bill preserved the private-sector employee’s right to institute a trial de novo in certain limited circumstances. § 8 (j). See n. 10, supra. The Senate Committee Bill, supra, n. 10, provided in relevant part that a federal employee, if aggrieved by final administrative disposition of his complaint or by failure to take action on his complaint, “may file a civil action as provided in section 706 (q) ....” § 11. Section 706 (q) of the proposed bill preserved the private-sector employee’s right to a trial de novo in specified instances. § 4 (a). See n. 10, supra. The House and Senate Reports as well as the Committee Bills themselves evince a detailed awareness of the interaction in the private sector of the new cease-and-desist remedy and the preexisting right to a trial de novo. See House Committee Bill §8 (j); House Report 12; Senate Committee Bill § 4 (a); Senate Report 24. The respondents argue that because private-sector employees enjoyed only a conditional right to plenary trials under the Senate Committee Bill and because the committee intended to give aggrieved federal employees the same "rights ... in the courts as are granted to individuals in the private sector under title VII,” Senate Report 16, it follows that the Senate committee intended federal employees to have trials de novo only in circumstances analogous to those where private-sector employees would enjoy the same right — i. e., where the responsible agency had dismissed the charge without a hearing or where a sufficient period of delay had elapsed from the filing of the charge. This argument overlooks the fact that the provision in the Senate Committee Bill creating a federal employee’s right to bring a “civil action” contained no reference to the substantial-evidence review provisions in the draft legislation but referred only to the provisions which pertained to private-sector trials de novo. E. g., 117 Cong. Rec. 31958-31959 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Martin); id., at 31969-31970 (remarks of Rep. Railsback); id., at 31972-31973 (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn); id., at 32091-32092 (remarks of Rep. Ford); id., at 32106 (remarks of Rep. Broomfield) ; id., at 32107-32108 (remarks of Rep. Shoup); id., at 32109-32110 (remarks of Rep. Fisher). Id., at 32111-32112. H. R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., §3 (c) (1971). See id.; S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-681, pp. 20-21 (1972) (hereinafter referred to as Conference Report). 117 Cong. Rec. 32113 (1971). E. g., 118 Cong. Rec. 311-312 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id., at 595 (remarks of Sen. Tower); id., at 731-732 (remarks of Sen. Saxbe); id., at 732 (remarks of Sen. Brock); id., at 735 (remarks of Sen. Williams); id., at 928-929 (remarks of Sen. Món-dale) ; id., at 930 (remarks of Sen. Javits); id., at 931-932 (remarks of Sen. Allen); id., at 933 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond); id., at 943-944 (remarks of Sen. Tahnadge); id., at 944 (remarks of Sen. Chiles); id., at 1384 (remarks of Sen. Weicker). Id., at 591-592. See Senate Report 86-87. 118 Cong. Rec. 592-593 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Dominick). Id., at 594. Id., at 595, 942, 943, 3389, 3809, 3967. Id., at 3979-3980. Id., at 4944. Conference Report 1,10-11, 20-21. See Hackley v. Roudebush, 171 U. S. App. D. C., at 413, 520 F. 2d, at 145; Sperling v. United States, 515 F. 2d, at 473. The respondents argue that a statement in the floor debate by Senator Williams and a statement purportedly made in that debate by Senator Cranston indicate that Congress did not intend to give federal employees the right to plenary judicial trials but only the right to record review of agency proceedings. Near the close of the debate on S. 2515 Senator Williams spoke as follows: “Finally, written expressly into the law is a provision enabling an aggrieved Federal employee to file an action in U. S. District Court for a review of the administrative proceeding record after a final order by his agency or by the Civil Service Commission, if he is dissatisfied with that decision. Previously, there have been unrealistically high barriers which prevented or discouraged a Federal employee from taking a case to court. This will no longer be the case. There is no reason why a Federal employee should not have the same private right of action enjoyed by individuals in the ;private sector, and I believe that the committee has acted wisely in this regard.” 118 Cong. Rec. 4922 (1972) (emphasis added). Senator Williams had an expanded version of this statement printed in the Congressional Record. Id., at 4923. Despite the fact that Senator Williams was one of the original sponsors of S. 2515 and its floor manager, we decline to give controlling weight to the quoted statement for three reasons. First, it is self-contradictory: While characterizing the federal-sector “civil action” as a “review of the administrative proceeding record,” Senator Williams stated in the same breath that “[t]here is no reason why a Federal employee should not have the same private right of action enjoyed by individuals in the private sector ...” Yet the private right of action enjoyed by individuals in the private sector was to be a trial de novo under the pending bill. Second, the federal-sector provision before the Senate was precisely that which the Senate committee had proposed. Indeed, Senator Williams specifically applauded the committee for having “acted wisely in this regard.” Yet the committee clearly chose to grant federal-sector employees the right to a trial de novo and omitted any reference to the record review provisions it advocated for private-sector cease-and-desist orders. The committee’s unambiguous and unaltered treatment of federal-sector “civil actions” is more probative of congressional intent than the casual remark of a single Senator in the floor debate. Cf. United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 585; Sperling v. United States, supra, at 480. Finally, as Senator Williams himself acknowledged earlier in the debate, Senator Dominick rather than he was “[t]he principal architect of . . . changes dealing with the civil service area . . . .” 118 Cong. Rec. 595 (1972). That statement was made immediately after Senator Dominick’s discussion of the Senate committee’s decision to grant federal employees the right to bring “civil actions” in district court rather than the right to have administrative adjudication of their claims with substantial-evidence review in the courts. Id., at 594. The other statement relied on by the respondents was purportedly made by Senator Cranston during the final portion of the floor debate. The daily edition of the Congressional Record shows Senator Cranston as having made the following statement: "For the first time, [my Federal EEO amendment would] permit Federal employees to sue the Federal Government in discrimination cases — under the theory of Federal sovereign immunity, courts have not generally allowed such suits — and to bring suit either prior to or after CSC review of the agency EEO decision in the case. As with other cases brought under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Federal district court review would be based on the agency and/or CSC record and would not be a trial de novo.” 118 Cong. Rec. S2287 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1972) (emphasis added). Approximately a year after the debate and 10 months after the enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Senator Cranston informed the Senate that "the word 'not’ was misplaced” in the daily edition and that when "set forth ... in the correct manner” the italicized portion of the statement would read “review would not be based on the agency and/or CSC record and would be a trial de novo.” 119 Cong. Rec. S 1219 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1973). The language was so corrected, see 118 Cong. Rec. 4929. We agree with the respondents that this belated correction is not probative. But we cannot agree with their further argument and the view of the Eighth Circuit, Haire v. Calloway, 526 F. 2d, at 248 n. 4, that the uncorrected version, as originally printed in the daily edition of the Congressional Record, is probative. As with Senator Williams’ remark, the uncorrected statement is self-contradictory: Senator Cranston first equated federal- and private-sector “civil actions” and then went on to characterize a federal-sector suit as “not ... a trial de novo.” Yet the private-sector suit was to be a trial de novo. And, as with Senator Williams’ remark, the Senate committee’s decision to equate federal-sector "civil actions” with private-sector trials de novo is more probative of congressional intent than a fleeting remark in the floor debate. United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U. S. 709, involved review of agency action under the Wunderlich Act, which provided that a governmental decision on a question of fact arising under a “disputes” clause of a Government contract should be final and conclusive “ ‘unless the same is fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence.’ ” Id., at 714. ¡The Court held that this language indicated that Congress intended to limit review to the administrative record and observed that even “in cases where Congress has simply provided for review, without setting forth the standards to be used or the procedures to be followed, this Court has held that consideration is to be confined to the administrative record and that no de novo proceeding may be held.” Id., at 715. Here Congress has not “simply provided for review" but has affirmatively chosen to grant federal employees the right to maintain a trial de novo. In most instances, of course, where Congress intends review to be confined to the administrative record, it so indicates, either expressly or by use of a term like “substantial evidence,” which has “become a term of art to describe the basis on which an administrative record is to be judged by a reviewing court.” Ibid. E. g., 5 U. S. C. § 706 (scope-of-review provision of Administrative Procedure Act); 12 U. S. C. § 1848 (scope-of-review provision applicable to certain orders of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System); 15 U. S. C. §21 (c) (seope-of-review provision applicable to certain orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Trade Commission); 21 U. S. C. § 371 (f) (3) (scope-of-review provision applicable to certain orders of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare). House Report 26. The goal may have been to compensate for the perceived fact that “[t]he Civil Service Commission’s primary responsibility over all personnel matters in the Government . . . create [s] a built-in conflict of interest for examining the Government’s equal employment opportunity program for structural defects which may result in a lack of true equal employment opportunity.” Senate Report 15. Prior administrative findings made with respect to an employment discrimination claim may, of course, be admitted as evidence at a federal-sector trial de novo. See Fed. Rule Evid. 803 (8)(C). Cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36, 60 n. 21. Moreover, it can be expected that, in the light of the prior administrative proceedings, many potential issues can be eliminated by stipulation or in the course of pretrial proceedings in the District Court.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BETH ISRAEL HOSPITAL v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD No. 77-152. Argued April 24. 1978 Decided June 22, 1978 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, White, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., post, p. 508, and Powell, J., post, p. 509, filed opinions concurring in the judgment, in which Burger, C. J. and Rehnquist, J., joined. Louis Chandler argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Robert Chandler. Norton J. Come argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, John S. Irving, and Carl L. Taylor. Laurence Gold argued the cause for intervenor Massachusetts Hospital Workers’ Union Local 880, Service Employees’ International Union. With him on the brief were Lester Asher, J. Albert Woll, and George Kaufmann. Bichard Dorn filed a brief for the National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, RWDSU, AFL-CIO, as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U. S. C. §§ 151 to 168, was further amended in 1974 to extend its coverage and protection to employees of nonprofit health-care institutions. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395. Petitioner is a Boston nonprofit hospital whose employees are covered by the amended Act. This case presents the question whether the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit erred in ordering enforcement of that part of an order of the National Labor Relations Board based on the Board’s finding that petitioner, in violation of §§ 8 (a)(1) and (3), 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (a)(1) and (3), interfered with its employees’ rights guaranteed by § 7 of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 157, by issuing and enforcing a rule that prohibits employees from soliciting union support and distributing union literature during nonworking time in the hospital cafeteria and coffeeshop used primarily by employees but also used by patients and visitors. In 1970, prior to the advent of any union organizational activity at the hospital, petitioner announced a rule barring solicitation and distribution of literature in any area to which patients or visitors have access. Petitioner permitted these activities only in certain employee locker rooms and certain adjacent restrooms. App. 59. In July 1974, however, as a result of a proceeding instituted against it before the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission, petitioner announced a rule permitting solicitation in the cafeteria on a one-to-one basis while maintaining the total ban on distribution. Id., at 67. On March 6, 1975, shortly after the NLRB acquired jurisdiction, petitioner reinstated its previous rule limiting employee solicitation and distribution to certain employee locker rooms and restrooms. Id., at 70. That rule provides: “There is to be no soliciting of the general public (patients, visitors) on Hospital property. Soliciting and the distribution of literature to B. I. employees may be done by other B. I. employees, when neither individual is on his or her working time, in employee-only areas— employee locker rooms and certain adjacent rest rooms. Elsewhere within the Hospital, including patient-care and all other work areas, and areas open to the public such as lobbies, cafeteria and coffee shop, corridors, elevators, gift shop, etc., there is to be no solicitation nor distribution of literature. “Solicitation or distribution of literature on Hospital property by non-employees is expressly prohibited at all times. “Consistent with our long-standing practices, the annual appeal campaigns of the United Fund and of the Combined Jewish Philanthropies for voluntary charitable gifts will continue to be carried out by the Hospital.” Id., at 70-71. Upon a charge filed by the union, the Board issued a complaint and the matter was tried before an Administrative Law Judge. The Board affirmed the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge that petitioner's issuance and maintenance of the rules violated § 8 (a) (1) and the disciplining of an employee for an infraction of them violated §8 (a)(3). 223 N. L. R. B. 1193 (1976). The Administrative Law Judge found that there were few places in which employees’ § 7 rights effectively could be exercised, that petitioner had not offered any convincing evidence that the rule was necessary to prevent disruptions in patient care, and that, on balance, the rule was an unjustified infringement of § 7 rights. See 223 N. L. R. B., at 1198. The Board issued an order, paragraph 1 of which broadly required petitioner to cease and desist from interfering with “concerted union activities” and “exercise of [employees’] rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act,” and paragraph 2 (b) of which required petitioner to “[r]escind its written rule prohibiting distribution of union literature and union solicitation in its cafeteria and coffeeshop.” 223 N. L. R. B., at 1199, as modified, id., at 1193. The Court of Appeals accepted as settled law that rules restricting employee solicitation during nonworking time, and distribution during nonworking time in nonworking areas are presumptively invalid in the absence of special circumstances to justify them, 554 F. 2d 477, 480 (1977), and held that, since “[i]n this case, the application of the employer’s no-solicitation, no-distribution rules to the cafeteria and coffee shop banned concerted activities in non-working areas during non-working time . . . [t]he burden, therefore, was on the hospital to show that special circumstances justified its curtailment of protected activities in these two places.” Ibid. After review of the record, the court held that “the Board did not err in finding that the hospital had not justified its no-solicitation, no-distribution rule as it related to the cafeteria and coffee shop.” Id., at 481. The court refused to enforce paragraph 1 of the Board’s order, however, on the ground that no proclivity to violate the Act had been shown to support that broad cease-and-desist order. It also enforced paragraph 2 (b) only after adding to the order the clarifying words “that part of” so that petitioner was required to “[rjescind that part of its written rule prohibiting distribution [of union literature and union solicitation in its cafeteria and coffeeshop],” id., at 482 (emphasis in original), to make clear that the validity of the rules as applied to areas outside the cafeteria and coffee-shop remained open. The Board has not sought review of the Court of Appeals’ rulings in these respects. The narrow question for decision, therefore, is whether the Court of Appeals erred in enforcing the Board’s order requiring petitioner to rescind the rules as applied to the hospital’s eating facilities. Because of a suggested conflict among Courts of Appeals as to the validity of restrictions upon solicitation and distribution in patient-access areas of the hospital, such as petitioner’s cafeteria and coffeeshop, we granted certiorari. 434 U. S. 1033 (1978). We affirm. I Although petitioner employs approximately 2,200 regular employees, only a fraction of them have access to many of the areas in which solicitation is permitted. Solicitation and distribution are not permitted in all locker areas. Rather, of the total number of locker areas only six separate and scattered locker areas containing 613 lockers are accessible to all employees for these purposes. Moreover, most of these rooms are divided and restricted on the basis of sex, and in any event are not generally used even by petitioner to communicate messages to employees. The cafeteria, on the other hand, is a common gathering room for employees. A 3-day survey conducted by petitioner revealed that 77% of the cafeteria’s patrons were employees while only 9% were visitors and 1.56% patients. The cafeteria is also equipped with vending machines used by employees for snacks during coffeebreaks and other nonworking time. Petitioner itself has recognized that the cafeteria is a natural gathering place for employees on nonworking time, for it has used and permitted use of the cafeteria for solicitation and distribution to employees for purposes other than union activity. For example, petitioner maintains an official bulletin board in the cafeteria for communicating certain messages to employees. On occasion it has set up special tables in or near the cafeteria entrance to aid solicitation of contributions for the United Way or United Fund charities, the Jewish Philanthropies Organization Drive, the Israel Emergency Fund, and to recruit members for the credit union. When petitioner embarked upon an intensive cost-reduction program, styled “Save a Buck a Day” or “BAD,” it used the cafeteria to post banners and distribute informational literature touting the program to employees, and, significantly, generally did not use the locker rooms and restrooms for this purpose. In addition to these official uses, petitioner maintains an unofficial bulletin board in the cafeteria for the employees’ use, a rack and small table which display commercial literature, such as travel brochures, and information of interest only to employees, such as carpool openings. “[T]here are relatively few places where employees can congregate or meet on hospital grounds or in the nearby vicinity for the purpose of discussing nonwork related matters other than in the cafeteria; secondly, the area in the neighborhood of the hospital is congested and provides no ready access to employees”; 223 N. L. R. B., at 1198 (opinion of Administrative Law Judge). Petitioner, moreover, has adopted the policy of refusing to make available to unions the names and addresses of employees unless ordered to do so by the Board. App. 33. Petitioner has also made antiunion statements in a newsletter distributed to employees with their paychecks at their work stations. On October 25, 1974, Ann Schunior, a medical technician in the Department of Medicine, was distributing the union newsletter As We See It by circulating from table to table. She approached only persons she thought were employees, and if not sure of their employee status, inquired whether they were, explaining that she was distributing literature for employees. Petitioner’s general director witnessed this activity, advised Schunior that she was violating the hospital’s no-distribution rule, and demanded that she cease the distribution. A written warning notice was issued to Schunior the same day advising that she had been in flagrant violation of the hospital’s rules and that further violations would result in dismissal. 223 N. L. R. B., at 1195-1196. The publication As We See It was objectionable to petitioner because certain issues were said to contain remarks which disparaged the hospital’s ability to provide adequate patient care, primarily because of under-staffing. Id., at 1196. II A We have long accepted the Board’s view that the right of employees to self-organize and bargain collectively established by § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 157, necessarily encompasses the right effectively to communicate with one another regarding self-organization at the jobsite. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793 (1945), articulated the broad legal principle which must govern the Board's enforcement of this right in the myriad factual situations in which it is sought to be exercised: “[The Board must adjust] the undisputed right of self-organization assured to employees under the Wagner Act and the equally undisputed right of employers to maintain discipline in their establishments. Like so many others, these rights are not unlimited in the sense that they can be exercised without regard to any duty which the existence of rights in others may place upon employer or employee.” Id., at 797-798. That principle was further developed in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105 (1956), where the Court stated: “Accommodation between [employee-organization rights and employer-property rights] must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other.” Id., at 112. Based on its experience in enforcing the Act, the Board developed legal rules applying the principle of accommodation. The effect of these rules is to make particular restrictions on employee solicitation and distribution presumptively lawful or unlawful under §8 (a)(1) subject to the introduction of evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption. Thus, the Board has held that restrictions on employee solicitation during nonworking time, and on distribution during nonworking time in non working areas, are violative of § 8 (a)(1) unless the employer justifies them by a showing of special circumstances which make the rule necessary to maintain production or discipline. In the case of retail marketing establishments, including public restaurants, however, the Board has held that solicitation and distribution may be prohibited on the selling floor at all times. Republic Aviation Corp., supra, sustained the Board’s general approach to adjudication of §8 (a)(1) charges. There we held that the Board is free to adopt, in light of its experience, a rule that, absent special circumstances, a particular employer restriction is presumptively an unreasonable interference with § 7 rights constituting an unfair labor practice under § 8 (a) (Í), without the necessity of proving the underlying generic facts which persuaded it to reach that conclusion. The validity of such a rule (<[l]ike a statutory presumption or one established by regulation, . . . perhaps in varying degree, depends upon the rationality between what is proved and what is inferred.” Republic Aviation, supra, at 804-805 (footnote omitted). The Board here relied on, and petitioner challenges, the fashioning of a similar presumption applicable to hospitals. B Although, prior to the 1974 amendments, the Board had considered the validity of no-solicitation and no-distribution rules in the context of proprietary hospitals, no clear rule emerged from its decisions. In Summit Nursing & Convalescent Home, Inc., 196 N. L. R. B. 769 (1972), enf. denied, 472 F. 2d 1380 (CA6 1973), a divided panel, reversing the Administrative Law Judge, held unlawful a rule prohibiting solicitation or distribution “at any time in the patient or public area within the [nursing] home, or in the nurses’ stations.” Another divided panel, in Cuyan Valley Hospital, Inc., 198 N. L. R. B. 107 (1972), affirming the Trial Examiner, held lawful a rule prohibiting “soliciting in working areas during working hours.” In Guyan Valley the Trial Examiner noted that the employer’s rule did not interfere with “solicitation ... in the waiting room, the employees’ dining room, and the parking lot.” Id., at 111. The Board apparently relied upon this fact to distinguish it from Summit Nursing, supra. See 198 N. L. R. B., at 107 n. 2. Finally, in Bellaire General Hospital, 203 N. L. R. B. 1105 (1973), the panel which had split in Summit Nursing, unanimously held unlawful a rule prohibiting solicitation and distribution “by employees while off duty or during working hours.” 203 N. L. R. B., at 1108. This series of somewhat inconclusive decisions was the background against which, after the 1974 amendments, the full Board considered development of a rule establishing the permissible reach of employer rules prohibiting solicitation and distribution in all health-care institutions. In a unanimous opinion, in St. John’s Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc., 222 N. L. R. B. 1150 (1976), the Board concluded that the special characteristics of hospitals justify a rule different from that which the Board generally applies to other employers. On the basis of evidence and aided by the briefs amici curiae filed by the American Hospital Association and District 1199 of the National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, the Board found: “that the primary function of a hospital is patient care and that a tranquil atmosphere is essential to the carrying out of that function. In order to provide this atmosphere, hospitals may be justified in imposing somewhat more stringent prohibitions on solicitation than are generally permitted. For example, a hospital may be warranted in prohibiting solicitation even on nonworking time in strictly patient care areas, such as the patients’ rooms, operating rooms, and places where patients receive treatment, such as x-ray and therapy areas. Solicitation at any time in those areas might be unsettling to the patients — particularly those who are seriously ill and thus need quiet and peace of mind.” Ibid, (emphasis added). The Board concluded that prohibiting solicitation in such situations was justified and required striking the balance against employees’ interests in organizational activity. The Board determined, however, that the balance should be struck against the prohibition in areas other than immediate patient-care areas such as lounges and cafeterias absent a showing, that disruption to patient care would necessarily result if solicitation and distribution were permitted in those areas. The Board concluded, on a record devoid of evidence which contradicted that assessment, that the possibility of disruption to patient care in those areas must be deemed remote. Ill Petitioner challenges the qualified extension of the rule affirmed in Republic Aviation to hospitals on several grounds: First, it argues that the Board’s decision conflicts with the congressional policy evinced in the 1974 hospital amendments that the “self-organizational activities of health care employees not be allowed to ‘disrupt the continuity of patient care.’ ” Brief for Petitioner 10. Second, it argues that the basis for that rule, the principle of limited judicial review of agency action, is inapposite here because the Board is acting outside of its area of expertise. Third, it argues that the Board's decision is unsupported by evidence and is irrational. Finally, it argues that it is irrational to distinguish between the non-employee-access cafeteria involved here and the public-access restaurants in which the Board has upheld solicitation bans. A Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, nothing in the legislative history of the 1974 amendments indicates a congressional policy inconsistent with the Board’s general approach to enforcement of § 7 self-organizational rights in the hospital context. First, there is no reason to believe, as petitioner asserts, that Congress intended either to prohibit solicitation entirely in the health-care industry or to limit it to the extent the Board had required at the time the 1974 amendments were enacted. In extending coverage of the Act to nonprofit hospitals, Congress enacted special provisions for strike notice and mediation, applicable solely to the health-care industry, intended to avoid disruptions of patient care caused by strikes. It is significant that, although, as indicated, supra, at 494, at the time the 1974 amendments were enacted, the Board had spoken with neither clarity nor one voice on the issue, Congress did not enact any special provision regarding solicitation and distribution in particular or disruption of patient care in general other than through strikes. We can only infer, therefore, that Congress was satisfied to rely on the Board to continue to exercise the responsibility to strike the appropriate balance between the interests of hospital employees, patients, and employers. Second, nothing in the legislative history supports petitioner’s argument that the particular approach to enforcement of § 7 rights in the hospital context adopted by the Board is inconsistent with congressional policy. The elimination of the nonprofit-hospital exemption reflected Congress’ judgment that hospital care would be improved by extending the protection of the Act to nonprofit health-care employees. Congress found that wages were low and working conditions poor in the health-care industry, and that as a result, employee morale was low and employment turnover high. Congress determined that the extension of organizational and collective-bargaining rights would ameliorate these conditions and elevate the standard of patient care. Congress also found that “the exemption . . . had resulted in numerous instances of recognition strikes and picketing. Coverage under the Act should completely eliminate the need for such activity, since the procedures of the Act will be available to resolve organizational and recognition disputes.” S. Rep. No. 93-766, p. 3 (1974). It is true, as petitioner argues, that Congress felt that “the needs of patients in health care institutions required special consideration in the Act . . . ,” ibid., and that among the witnesses before the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, “[t]here was a recognized concern for the need to avoid disruption of patient care wherever possible.” Id., at 6. But these statements do not support petitioner’s further contention that congressional policy establishes that the very fact that hospitals are involved justifies, without more, a restrictive no-solicitation rule the validity of which must be sustained unless the Board proves that patient care will not be disrupted. To begin with, the congressional statements quoted, when placed in context, offer no support for such an argument. Moreover, Congress addressed its concern for the unique problems presented by labor disputes in the health-care industry by adding specific strike-notice and mediation provisions designed to avert interruption in the delivery of critical health-care services; none expresses a policy in favor of curtailing self-organizational rights. Indeed, although Congress recognized that strikes could cause complete disruption of patient care and enacted provisions designed to forestall them, it apparently felt that extension of the right to strike was sufficiently important to fulfillment of its goals to permit strikes despite that result. If Congress was willing to countenance the total, albeit temporary, disruption of patient care caused by strikes in order to achieve harmonious employer-employee relations and long-term improved health care, we cannot say it necessarily regarded appropriately regulated solicitation and distribution in areas such as the cafeteria as undesirable without evidence of a substantial threat of harm to patients. In light of Congress’ express finding that improvements in health care would result from the right to organize, and that unionism is necessary to overcome the poor working conditions retarding the delivery of quality health care, we therefore cannot say that the Board’s policy — which requires that absent such a showing solicitation and distribution be permitted in the hospital except in areas where patient care is likely to be disrupted — is an impermissible construction of the Act’s policies as applied to the health-care industry by the 1974 amendments. Even if the legislative history arguably pointed toward a contrary view, the Board’s construction of the statute’s policies would be entitled to considerable deference. NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U. S. 335, 350 (1978); NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U. S. 251, 266-267 (1975). B Petitioner disputes the applicability of the principle of limited judicial review of Board action generally and of the principle announced in Republic Aviation, regarding the Board’s authority to fashion generalized rules in light of its experience, in particular, to the Board’s decision involving hospitals. Arguing that the Board’s conclusion regarding the likelihood of disruption to patient care which solicitation in a patient-access cafeteria would produce is essentially a medical judgment outside of the Board’s area of expertise, it contends that the Board’s decision is not entitled to deference. Rather, since it, not the Board, is responsible for establishing hospital policies to ensure the well-being of its patients, the Board may not set aside such a policy without specifically disproving the hospital’s judgment that solicitation and distribution in the cafeteria would disrupt patient care. Brief for Petitioner 18. We think that this argument fundamentally misconceives the institutional role of the Board. It is the Board on which Congress conferred the authority to develop and apply fundamental national labor policy. Because it is to the Board that Congress entrusted the task of “applying the Act’s general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations of events which might be charged as violative of its terms,” Republic Aviation, 324 U. S., at 798, that body, if it is to accomplish the task which Congress set for it, necessarily must have authority to formulate rules to fill the interstices of the broad statutory provisions. It is true that the Board is not expert in the delivery of health-care services, but neither is it in pharmacology, chemical manufacturing, lumbering, shipping, or any of a host of varied and specialized business enterprises over which the Act confers jurisdiction. But the Board is expert in federal national labor relations policy, and it is in the Board, not petitioner, that the 1974 amendments vested responsibility for developing that policy in the health-care industry. It is not surprising or unnatural that petitioner’s assessment of the need for a particular practice might overcompensate its goals, and give too little weight to employee organizational interests. Here, as in many other contexts of labor policy, “[t]he ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting legitimate interests. The function of striking that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review.” NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U. S. 87, 96 (1957). The judicial role is narrow: The rule which the Board adopts is judicially reviewable for consistency with the Act, and for rationality, but if it satisfies those criteria, the Board’s application of the rule, if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, must be enforced. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U. S. 221, 235-236 (1963); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 194 (1941). C Petitioner’s contention that the Board’s decision is unsupported by evidence and irrational is without merit. Notwithstanding petitioner’s challenge, the Board’s conclusion that “the possibility of any disruption in patient care resulting from solicitation or distribution of literature is remote,” St. John’s Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc., 222 N. L. R. B., at 1151, as applied to petitioner’s cafeteria, is fully supported by the record. The Board had before it evidence that patients’ meals are provided in their rooms. A patient is not allowed to visit the cafeteria unless his doctor certifies that he is well enough to do so. Thus, patient use of the cafeteria is voluntary, random, and infrequent. It is of critical significance that only 1.56% of the cafeteria’s patrons are patients. Patients who frequent the cafeteria would not expect to receive special attention or primary care there and any unusually sensitive to seeing union literature distributed or overhearing discussions about unionism, readily could avoid the cafeteria without interfering with the hospital’s program of care. Especially telling is the fact that petitioner, under compulsion of the Massachusetts Labor Commission, permitted limited union solicitation in the cafeteria for a significant period, apparently without untoward effects, and that petitioner, who logically is in the best position to offer evidence on the point, was unable to introduce any evidence to show that solicitation or distribution was or would be harmful. There was also cogent evidence that petitioner itself recognized that at least some solicitation and distribution would not upset patients and undermine its function of providing quality medical care. It thus appears that petitioner’s rule was more restrictive than necessary to avert that result. Petitioner had permitted use of the cafeteria for other types of solicitation, including fund drives, which, if not to be equated with union solicitation in terms of potential for generating controversy, at least indicates that the hospital regarded the cafeteria as sufficiently commodious to admit solicitation and distribution without disruption. While in other contexts, it has been recognized that organizational activity can result in behavior which, as petitioner argues and we agree, would be undesirable in the hospital’s cafeteria, the Board has not foreclosed the hospital from imposing less restrictive means of regulating organizational activity more nearly directed toward the harm to be avoided. The Board was, of course, free to draw an inference from these facts in light of its experience, the validity of which “depends upon the rationality between what is proved and what is inferred.” Republic Aviation, 324 U. S., at 805 (footnote omitted). It cannot fairly be said that the inference drawn by the Board regarding the likelihood of disruption of patient care in light of this evidence was irrational. Similarly, it is the Board upon whom the duty falls in the first instance to determine the relative strength of the conflicting interests and to balance their weight. As the Court noted in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507, 522 (1976), “[t]he locus of [the] accommodation [between the legitimate interests of both] may fall at differing points along the spectrum depending on the nature and strength of the respective § 7 rights and private property rights asserted in any given context.” Here, the employees' interests are at their strongest, for unlike the interests involved in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S., at 113, “[the] activity was carried on by employees already rightfully on the employer’s property.” Hudgens, 424 U. S., at 521-522, n. 10. “[T]he employer’s management interests rather than his property interests [are] involved. . . . This difference is 'one of substance.’ ” Ibid. (citations omitted). On the other hand, in the context of health-care facilities, the importance of the employer’s interest in protecting patients from disturbance cannot be gainsaid. While outside of the health-care context, the availability of alternative means of communication is not, with respect to employee organizational activity, a necessary inquiry, see Babcock & Wilcox, supra, at 112-113, it may be that the importance of the employer’s interest here demands use of a more finely calibrated scale. For example, the availability of one part of a health-care facility for organizational activity might be regarded as a factor required to be considered in evaluating the permissibility of restrictions in other areas of the same facility. That consideration is inapposite here, however, where the only areas in which organizational rights are permitted is not conducive to their exercise. Moreover, the area in which organizational rights are sought here is a “natural gathering are [a]” for employees, 554 F. 2d, at 481, and one in which the risk of harm to patients is relatively low as compared to potential alternative locations within the facility. On the basis of the record before it, we cannot say that the Board, in evaluating the relative strength of the competing interests, failed to consider any factor appropriately to be taken into account. Cf. Babcock <fc Wilcox, supra. D Petitioner’s argument that it is irrational to hold, as the Board has, on the one hand, that a rule prohibiting solicitation in the dining area of a public restaurant is lawful because solicitation has the tendency to upset patrons, while one prohibiting like activity in a hospital's cafeteria is unlawful absent evidence that nonemployee patrons would be upset, on the other, has only superficial appeal. That argument wholly fails to consider that the Board concluded that these rules struck the appropriate balance between organizational and employer rights in the particular industry to1 which each is applicable. In the retail marketing and restaurant industries, the primary purpose of the operation is to serve customers, and this is done on the selling floor of a store or in the dining area of a restaurant. Employee solicitation in these areas, if disruptive, necessarily would directly and substantially interfere with the employer’s business. On the other hand, it would be an unusual store or restaurant which did not have stockrooms, kitchens, and other nonpublic areas, and in those areas employee solicitation of nonworking employees must be permitted. In that context, the Board concluded that, on balance, employees’ organizational interests do not outweigh the employer’s interests in prohibiting solicitation on the selling floor. In the hospital context the situation is quite different. The main function of the hospital is patient care and therapy and those functions are largely performed in areas such as operating rooms, patients’ rooms, and patients’ lounges. The Board does not prohibit rules forbidding organizational activity in these areas. On the other hand, a hospital cafeteria, 77 % of whose patrons are employees, and which is a natural gathering place for employees, functions more as an employee-service area than a patient-care area. While it is true that the fact of access by visitors and patients renders the analogy to areas such as stockrooms in retail operations less than complete, it cannot be said that when the primary function and use of the cafeteria, the availability of alternative areas of the facility in which § 7 rights effectively could be exercised, and the remoteness of interference with patient care are considered, it was irrational to strike the balance in favor of § 7 rights in the hospital cafeteria and against them in public restaurants. The Board’s explanation of the consistent principle underlying the different results in each situation cannot fairly be challenged. St. John’s Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc., 222 N. L. R. B., at 1150-1151, n. 3. IV In summary, we reject as without merit petitioner’s contention that, in enacting the 1974 health-care amendments, Congress intended the Board to apply different principles regarding no-solicitation and no-distribution rules to hospitals because of their patient-care functions. We therefore hold that the Board’s general approach of requiring health-care facilities to permit employee solicitation and distribution during nonworking time in nonworking areas, where the facility has not justified the prohibitions as necessary to avoid disruption of health-care operations or disturbance of patients, is consistent with the Act. We hold further that, with respect to the application of that principle to petitioner’s cafeteria, the Board was appropriately sensitive to the importance of petitioner’s interest in maintaining a tranquil environment for patients. Insofar as petitioner’s challenge is to the substan-tiality of the evidence supporting the Board’s conclusions, this Court’s review is, of course, limited. “Whether on the record as a whole there is substantial evidence to support agency findings is a question which Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals. This Court will intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the standard appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474, 491 (1951). We cannot say that the Court of Appeals’ assessment of the record either “misapprehended” or “grossly misapplied” that standard. The Court of Appeals did note, however, that the Board’s guidelines are still in flux and are far from self-defining, concluding, and we agree: “[T]he Board [bears] a heavy continuing responsibility to review its policies concerning organizational activities in various parts of hospitals. Hospitals carry on a public function of the utmost seriousness and importance. They give rise to unique considerations that do not apply in the industrial settings with which the Board is more familiar. The Board should stand ready to revise its rulings if future experience demonstrates that the well-being of patients is in fact jeopardized.” 554 F. 2d, at 481. The authority of the Board to modify its construction of the Act in light of its cumulative experience is, of course, clear. NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U. S., at 351; NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U. S., at 265-267. Affirmed. Coverage was achieved by deleting from the definition of “employer” in §2 (2) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (2), the provision that an employer shall not include “any corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual . . . .” Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136. The July 1974 rule was in effect at the time the complaint was filed. Prior to the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge, however, the Board amended its complaint to encompass the March 6, 1975, policy which prohibited all solicitation and distribution in the cafeteria. The charges leading to the complaint were filed by Massachusetts Hospital Workers’ Union, Local 880, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO. Petitioner’s application of the rules to other areas not devoted to immediate patient care has since been litigated before the Board in another case. Beth Israel Hospital, 228 N. L. R. B. 1495, 95 LRRM 1087 (1977). The Court of Appeals in this case, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Lutheran Hosp. v. NLRB, 564 F. 2d 208 (1977), cert. pending, No. 77-1289, have enforced Board orders protecting solicitation and distribution in cafeterias and coffeeshops. In Lutheran Hospital, the order enforced extended beyond cafeterias to all areas other than “immediate patient care areas.” The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, St. John’s Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc. v. NLRB, 557 F. 2d 1368 (1977), together with the Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and Sixth Circuits, have denied enforcement to similar Board orders applicable to cafeterias as well as to other patient-access areas. Baylor Univ. Medical Center v. NLRB, 188 U. S. App. D. C. 109, 578 F. 2d 351 (1978); NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 576 F. 2d 107 (CA6 1978). This number is exclusive of house staff, attending physicians, students, and employees of Harvard University who work at the hospital. App. 28. There are four categories of locker rooms. The first, in which there are a total of 613 lockers, are areas in which any employee may engage in solicitation and distribution. The second, in which there are a total of 470 lockers, are areas in which, for security reasons, only the employees to whom the lockers have been assigned have access. The other two categories which comprise the remainder of the hospital’s lockers are off limits to solicitation and distribution because they are located in working areas or in areas in which patients or the general public have access. 223 N. L. R. B. 1193, 1197 (1976); App. 127-134. During the pendency of this litigation, the coffeeshop was dismantled, and the space added to the cafeteria. We recently reiterated this principle in Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U. S. 539 (1972): “[Section 7] organization rights are not viable in a vacuum; their effectiveness depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages and disadvantages of organization from others. Early in the history of the administration of the Act the Board recognized the importance of freedom of communication to the free exercise of organization rights.” Id., at 542-543 (citation omitted). The Board’s solicitation rule was first announced in Peyton Packing Co., 49 N. L. R. B. 828, 843 (1943). The Board’s decision in LeTourneau Co. of Ga., 54 N. L. R. B. 1253 (1944), which applied the presumption to a no-distribution rule enforced against employee organizers distributing literature in the employer’s parking lot, was affirmed with Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793 (1945), without separate discussion. In Stoddard Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N. L. R. B. 615 (1962), however, the Board established the distinction between distribution and solicitation, limiting the presumption as applicable to distribution only in nonworking areas. For purposes of that rule, the Board considers the distribution of signature cards to be solicitation and not distribution. See id., at 620 n. 6. See Marriott Corp. (Children’s Inn), 223 N. L. R. B. 978 (1976); Bankers Club, Inc., 218 N. L. R. B. 22 (1975); McDonald’s Corp., 205 N. L. R. B. 404 (1973); Marshall Field & Co., 98 N. L. R. B. 88 (1952), enf’d, 200 F. 2d 375 (CA7 1953); Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 77 N. L. R. B. 1262 (1948); May Dept. Stores Co., 59 N. L. R. B. 976 (1944), enf’d as modified, 154 F. 2d 533 (CA8 1946). Section 1 (b) of the 1974 Act, 88 Stat. 395, amended § 2 of the NLRA by adding a definition of “health care institution” to which the special provisions would be applicable. Section 1 (d), 88 Stat. 396, amended the notice provisions of § 8 (d) of the NLRA by requiring, with respect to health-care institutions, 90-day notice of termination or expiration of a contract, 60-day notice to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) of contract termination or expiration, and 30-day notice to FMCS with respect to initial contract negotiation disputes arising after recognition, and by requiring that the health-care institution and the labor organization participate in mediation at the direction of the FMCS. Section 1 (e), 88 Stat. 396, added a new §8 (g) to the NLRA, requiring labor organizations to give a 10-day written notice to the health-care institution and to FMCS before engaging in picketing, strikes, or other concerted refusals to work. Section 2 of the 1974 Act added a new §213 to the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U. S. C. § 183 (1970 ed., Supp. V), which authorizes upon certain conditions the constitution of a Special Board of Inquiry to investigate and report concerning the labor dispute. For a more detailed explanation of these provisions, see Vernon, Labor Relations in the Health Care Field under the 1974 Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 70 Nw. U. L. Rev. 202 (1975). See Id., at 203-204. See, e. g., the remarks of Senator Cranston, the floor manager of the bill: “During the last 2% years, hospital wage increases have lagged far behind those received by workers in other industries. . . . “Today, hospital workers are still notoriously underpaid. . . . “The long hours worked and the small monetary reward received by hospital workers result in a constant turnover with a consequent threat to the maintenance of an adequate standard of medical care. This was emphasized over and over again by many of the witnesses. Turnover rates for employees in several hospitals that were studied were reported by witnesses to be as high as 1,200 to 1,500 [percent] a year. “Mr. President, both management and union witnesses reported lower turnover after unionization than before. . . . [T]he turnover rates at the two hospitals which had been 1,200 to 1,500 percent a year before unionization dropped to 24 to 30 percent a year after unionization. Indeed it has been convincingly argued that when hospital employees are unionized . . . the result is better job stability and security than is possible without such collective bargaining arrangements. This will also mean a better job done in terms of the quality of patient care provided. “Mr. President, I urge all those who want improved health care and increased stability for labor-management relations in health care institutions to support this bill.” 120 Cong. Rec. 12936-12938 (1974). See ibid.; id., at 16899-16900 (remarks of Rep. Thompson). The statements in full are as follows: “In the Committee’s deliberations on this measure, it was recognized that the needs of patients in health care institutions required special consideration in the Act including a provision requiring hospitals to have sufficient notice of any strike or picketing to allow for appropriate arrangements to be made for the continuance of patient care in the event of a work stoppage.” S. Rep. No. 93-766, p. 3 (1974). “PRIORITY CASE HANDLING “Many of the witnesses before the Committee, including both employee and employer witnesses, stressed the uniqueness of health care institutions. There was a recognized concern for the need to avoid disruption of patient care wherever possible. “It was this sensitivity to the need for continuity of patient care that led the Committee to adopt amendments with regard to notice requirements and other procedures related to potential strikes and picketing. “Because of the need for continuity of patient care, the Committee expects the NLRB to give special attention and priority to all charges of employer, employee and labor organization unfair practices involving health care institutions consistent with [existing priorities].” Id., at 6-7. See n. 12, supra. See § 10 (e), NLRA, 29 U. S. C. § 160 (e); Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706 (2) (E) (1976 ed.); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474 (1951). Cf. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 411, 439, 478 F. 2d 615, 643 (1973). Evidence that petitioner adopted a less restrictive approach to behavior in the cafeteria which would be at least as disquieting to patients as union solicitation further supports the Board’s conclusion that the risk of harm to patients is not so great as to justify an unlimited restriction. Petitioner advised its professional staff of complaints voiced by patients and visitors based on overheard clinical discussions about named patients in such places as the cafeteria line. Petitioner warned that the “effect [of this on patients] can be devastating . . . App. 136, and that “[p]atients and visitors [have been] horrified to overhear — in . . . cafeteria lines . . .— what is to the engrossed clinician innocuous professional discussion.” Id., at 138. This kind of discussion, far more unsettling than talk of wages and working conditions, was not banned from the cafeteria; rather, petitioner merely required staff to “restrict the voicing of your clinical discussions to include none other than your intended audience.” Ibid. Compare Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 77 N. L. R. B. 1262 (1948), in which, explaining its decision to uphold a ban on solicitation in a department store restaurant, the Board noted: “[I]n some of the stores the restaurant consists of a counter, in which restaurant employees on duty, other employees off duty, union organizers, and customers are in close contact with each other. Under these circumstances, union solicitation in the restaurants is as apt to disrupt the Respondent’s business as is such solicitation carried on in any other portion of the store in which customers are present.” Id., at 1263-1264. See, e. g., McDonald’s Corp., 205 N. L. R. B., at 407 n. 18 (opinion of Administrative Law Judge) (“Some solicitation might result in a pleasant and informative chat between the employees on their nonwork time in working areas. On the other hand, it might lead to a bitter exchange of insults or worse . . .”). Por example, a rule forbidding any distribution to or solicitation of nonemployees would do much to prevent potentially upsetting literature from being read by patients. Petitioner, in fact, has such a rule, see supra, at 486-487, and it has not been shown that organizational activity by Schunior or anyone else actually resulted in distribution to nonemployees. This rule could be readily enforced at petitioner’s hospital, moreover, since employees are required to wear name tags — and many do — and since security guards monitor the cafeteria. Secondly, the Board may determine that a rule requiring face-to-face distribution rather than leaving literature on a table accessible to all is a justified accommodation of § 7 rights with petitioner’s legitimate desire to avoid having potentially upsetting literature read by patients. The requirement that decisions be supported by evidence on the record “does not go beyond the necessity for the production of evidential facts, however, and compel evidence as to the results which may flow from such facts. . . . An administrative agency with power after hearings to determine on the evidence in adversary proceedings whether violations of statutory commands have occurred may infer within the limits of the inquiry from the proven facts such conclusions as reasonably may be based upon the facts proven. One of the purposes which lead to the creation of such boards is to have decisions based upon evidential facts under the particular statute made by experienced officials with an adequate appreciation of the complexities of the subject which is entrusted to their administration.” Republic Aviation, 324 U. S., at 800. (Citations omitted.) See cases cited n. 11, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. v. CATHOLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, INC., et al. No. 91-1826. Argued January 11, 1993 Decided June 18, 1993 Soutek, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 67. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 77. Ronald J. Mann argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Mahoney, and Michael Jay Singer. Ralph Santiago Abascal argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Peter A. Schey, and Carlos R. Holguin. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the city of Chicago et al. by Lawrence Rosenthal, John Payton, O. Peter Sherwood, Leonard J. Koerner, and Stephen J. McGrath; for the American Bar Association by J. Michael McWilliams, Ira Kurzban, Robert A Williams, and Carol L. Wolchok; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Lucas Guttentag, Steven R. Shapiro, John A Powell, and Carolyn P Blum; and for Church World Service et al. by Steven L. Mayer. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. This petition joins two separate suits, each challenging a different regulation issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in administering the alien legalization program created by Title II of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. In each instance, a District Court struck down the regulation challenged and issued a remedial order directing the INS to accept legalization applications beyond the statutory deadline; the Court of Appeals consolidated the INS’s appeals from these orders, and affirmed the District Courts’ judgments. We are now asked to consider whether the District Courts had jurisdiction to hear the challenges, and whether their remedial orders were permitted by law. We find the record insufficient to decide all jurisdictional issues and accordingly vacate and remand for new jurisdictional determinations and, if appropriate, remedial orders limited in accordance with the views expressed here. I On November 6, 1986, the President signed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359, Title II of which established a scheme under which certain aliens unlawfully present in the United States could apply, first, for the status of a temporary resident and then, after a 1-year wait, for permission to reside permanently. An applicant for temporary resident status must have resided continuously in the United States in an unlawful status since at least January 1, 1982, 8 U. S. C. § 1255a(a)(2)(A); must have been physically present in the United States continuously since November 6,1986, the date the Reform Act was enacted, § 1255a(a)(3)(A); and must have been otherwise admissible as an immigrant, § 1255a(a)(4). The applicant must also have applied during the 12-month period beginning on May 5, 1987. § 1255a(a)(l). The two separate suits joined before us challenge regulations addressing, respectively, the first two of these four requirements. The first, Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc. (CSS), et al., focuses on an INS interpretation of 8 U. S. C. § 1255a(a)(3), the Reform Act’s requirement that applicants for temporary residence prove “continuous physical presence” in the United States since November 6,1986. To mitigate this requirement, the Reform Act provides that “brief, casual, and innocent absences from the United States” will not break the required continuity. § 1255a(a)(3)(B). In a telex sent to its regional offices on November 14, 1986, however, the INS treated the exception narrowly, stating that it would consider an absence “brief, casual, and innocent” only if the alien had obtained INS permission, known as “advance parole,” before leaving the United States; aliens who left without it would be “ineligible for legalization.” App. 186. The INS later softened this limitation somewhat by regulations issued on May 1, 1987, forgiving a failure to get advance parole for absences between November 6, 1986, and May 1, 1987. But the later regulation confirmed that any absences without advance parole on or after May 1, 1987, would not be considered “brief, casual, and innocent” and would therefore be taken to have broken the required continuity. See 8 CFR §245a.l(g) (1992) (“Brief, casual, and innocent means a departure authorized by [the INS] (advance parole) subsequent to May 1, 1987 of not more than thirty (30) days for legitimate emergency or humanitarian purposes”). The CSS plaintiffs challenged the advance parole regulation as an impermissible construction of the Reform Act. After certifying the case as a class action, the District Court eventually defined a class comprising “persons prima facie eligible for legalization under [8 U. S. C. § 1255a] who departed and reentered the United States without INS authorization (i. e. ‘advance parole’) after the enactment of the [Reform Act] following what they assert to have been a brief, casual and innocent absence from the United States.” No. Civ. S-86-1343 LKK (ED Cal., May 3, 1988) (App. 50). On April 22, 1988, 12 days before the end of the legalization program’s 12-month application period, the District Court granted partial summary judgment invalidating the regulation and declaring that “brief, casual, and innocent” absences did not require prior INS approval. No. Civ. S-86-1343 LKK (ED Cal., Apr. 22, 1988) (Record, Doc. No. 161); see Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1149 (ED Cal. 1988) (explaining the basis of the April 22 order). No appeal was taken by the INS (by which initials we will refer to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Attorney General collectively), and after further briefing on remedial issues the District Court issued an order on June 10, 1988, requiring the INS to extend the application period to November 30, 1988 for class members who “knew of [the INS’s] unlawful regulation and thereby concluded that they were ineligible for legalization and by reason of that conclusion did not file an application.” No. Civ. S-86-1343 LKK (ED Cal., June 10, 1988) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a). Two further remedial orders issued on August 11,1988, provided, respectively, an alternative remedy if the extension of the application period should be invalidated on appeal, and further specific relief for any class members who had been detained or apprehended by the INS or who were in deportation proceedings. No. Civ. S-86-1343 LKK (ED Cal.) (Record, Doc. Nos. 187,189). The INS appealed all three of the remedial orders. The second of the two lawsuits, styled INS v. League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) et al., goes to the INS’s interpretation of 8 U. S. C. § 1255a(a)(2)(A), the Reform Act’s “continuous unlawful residence” requirement. The Act provides that certain brief trips abroad will not break an alien’s continuous unlawful residence (just as certain brief absences from the United States would not violate the “continuous physical presence” requirement). See § 1255a(g)(2)(A). Under an INS regulation, however, an alien would fail the “continuous unlawful residence” requirement if he had gone abroad and reentered the United States by presenting “facially valid” documentation to immigration authorities. 8 CFR § 245a.2(b)(8) (1992). On the INS’s reasoning, an alien’s use of such documentation made his subsequent presence “lawful” for purposes of § 1255a(a)(2)(A), thereby breaking the continuity of his unlawful residence. Thus, an alien who had originally entered the United States under a valid nonimmigrant visa, but had become an unlawful resident by violating the terms of that visa in a way known to the Government before January 1,1982, was eligible for relief under the Reform Act. If, however, the same alien left the United States briefly and then used the same visa to get back in (a facially valid visa that had in fact become invalid after his earlier violation of its terms), he rendered himself ineligible. In July 1987, the LULAC plaintiffs brought suit challenging the reentry regulation as inconsistent both with the Act and the equal protection limitation derived from Fifth Amendment due process. With this suit still pending, on November 17, 1987, some seven months into the Reform Act’s 12-month application period, the INS modified its reentry policy by issuing two new regulations. The first, codified at 8 CFR § 245a.2(b)(9) (1992), specifically acknowledged the eligibility of an alien who “reentered the United States as a nonimmigrant... in order to return to an unrelinquished unlawful residence,” so long as he “would be otherwise eligible for legalization and . . . was present in the United States in an unlawful status prior to January 1,1982.” 52 Fed. Reg. 43845 (1987). The second, codified at 8 CFR §245a.2(b)(10) (1992), qualified this expansion of eligibility by obliging such an alien to obtain a waiver of a statutory provision requiring exclusion of aliens who enter the United States by fraud. Ibid. Although the LULAC plaintiffs then amended their complaint, they pressed their claim that 8 CFR § 245a.2(b)(8) (1992), the reentry regulation originally challenged, had been invalid prior to its modification. As to that claim, the District Court certified the case as a class action, with a class including “all persons who qualify for legalization but who were deemed ineligible for legalization under the original [reentry] policy, who learned of their ineligibility following promulgation of the policy and who, relying upon information that they were ineligible, did not apply for legalization before the May 4,1988 deadline.” No. 87-4757-WDK (JRx) (CD Cal., July 15, 1988) (App. 216). On July 15, 1988, 10 weeks after the end of the 12-month application period, the District Court held the regulation invalid, while reserving the question of remedy. Ibid. (App. 224-225). Again, the INS took no appeal. The LULAC plaintiffs then sought a remedial order extending the application period for class members to November 30, 1988, and compelling the INS to publicize the modified policy and the extended application period. They argued that the INS had effectively truncated the 12-month application period by enforcing the invalid regulation, by publicizing the regulation so as to dissuade potential applicants, and by failing to give sufficient publicity to its change in policy. On August 12, 1988, the District Court granted the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief. No. 87-4757-WDK (JRx) (CD Cal., Aug. 12, 1988) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a). The INS appealed this remedial order. In its appeals in both CSS and LULAC, the INS raised two challenges to the orders of the respective District Courts. First, it argued that the restrictive judicial review provisions of the Reform Act barred district court jurisdiction over the claim in each case. It contended, second, that each District Court erred in ordering an extension of the 12-month application period, the 12-month limit being, it maintained, a substantive statutory restriction on relief beyond the power of a court to alter. The Ninth Circuit eventually consolidated the two appeals. After holding them pending this Court’s disposition of McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479 (1991), it rendered a decision in February 1992, affirming the District Courts. Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 956 F. 2d 914 (1992). We were prompted to grant certiorari, 505 U. S. 1203 (1992), by the importance of the issues, and by a conflict between Circuits on the jurisdictional issue, see Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 292 U. S. App. D. C. 150, 156-162, 948 F. 2d 742, 748-754 (1991) (holding that the Reform Act precluded district court jurisdiction over a claim that INS regulations were inconsistent with the Act), cert, pending, No. 91-1924. We now vacate and remand. II The Reform Act not only sets the qualifications for obtaining temporary resident status, but also provides an exclusive scheme for administrative and judicial review of “determination[s] respecting ... application^] for adjustment of status” under the Title II legalization program. 8 U. S. C. § 1255a(f)(l). Section 1255a(f)(3)(A) directs the Attorney General to “establish an appellate authority to provide for a single level of administrative appellate review” of such deter-initiations. Section 1255a(f)(4)(A) provides that a denial of adjustment of status is subject to review by a court “only in the judicial review of an order of deportation under [8 U. S. C. § 1105a]”; under § 1105a, this review takes place in the courts of appeals. Section 1255a(f)(l) closes the circle by explicitly rendering the scheme exclusive: “There shall be no administrative or judicial review of a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status under this section except in accordance with this subsection.” Under this scheme, an alien denied adjustment of status by the INS in the first instance may appeal to the Associate Commissioner for Examinations, the “appellate authority” designated by the Attorney General pursuant to § 1255a(f)(3)(A). See 8 CFR §§ 103.1(f)(l)(xxvii), 245a.2(p) (1992). Although the Associate Commissioner’s decision is the final agency action on the application, an adverse decision does not trigger deportation proceedings. On the contrary, because the Reform Act generally allows the INS to use information in a legalization application only to make a determination on the application, see 8 U. S. C. § 1255a(c)(5), an alien whose appeal has been rejected by the Associate Commissioner stands (except for a latent right to judicial review of that rejection) in the same position he did before he applied: he is residing in the United States in an unlawful status, but the Government has not found out about him yet. We call the right to judicial review “latent” because § 1255a(f)(4)(A) allows judicial review of a denial of adjustment of status only on appeal of “an order of deportation.” Hence, the alien must first either surrender to the INS for deportation or wait for the INS to catch him and commence a deportation proceeding, and then suffer a final adverse decision in that proceeding, before having an opportunity to challenge the INS’s denial of his application in court. The INS takes these provisions to preclude the District Courts from exercising jurisdiction over the claims in both the CSS and LULAC cases, reasoning that the regulations it adopted to elaborate the qualifications for temporary resident status are “determination^] respecting an application for adjustment of status” within the meaning of § 1255a(f)(1); because the claims in CSS and LULAC attack the validity of those regulations, they are subject to the limitations contained in § 1255a(f), foreclosing all jurisdiction in the district courts, and granting it to the courts of appeals only on review of a deportation order. The INS recognizes, however, that this reasoning is out of line with our decision in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., supra, where we construed a virtually identical set of provisions governing judicial review within a separate legalization program for agricultural workers created by Title III of the Reform Act. There, as here, the critical language was “a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status.” We said that “the reference to ‘a determination’ describes a single act rather than a group of decisions or a practice or procedure employed in making decisions.” Id., at 492. We noted that the provision permitting judicial review only in the context of a deportation proceeding also defined its scope by reference to a single act: “‘judicial review of such a denial.’” Ibid. (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 U. S. C. § 1160(e)(3)); see § 1255a(f)(4)(A) (using identical language). We therefore decided that the language setting the limits of the jurisdictional bar “describes the denial of an individual application,” 498 U. S., at 492, and thus “applies only to review of denials of individual.. . applications.” Id., at 494. The INS gives us no reason to reverse course, and we reject its argument that § 1255a(f)(1) precludes district court jurisdiction over an action challenging the legality of a regulation without referring to or relying on the denial of any individual application. Section 1255a(f)(l), however, is not the only jurisdictional hurdle in the way of the CSS and LULAC plaintiffs, whose claims still must satisfy the jurisdictional and justiciability requirements that apply in the absence of a specific congressional directive. To be sure, a statutory source of jurisdiction is not lacking, since 28 U. S. C. § 1331, generally granting federal-question jurisdiction, “confer[s] jurisdiction on federal courts to review agency action.” Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99, 105 (1977). Neither is it fatal that the Reform Act is silent about the type of judicial review those plaintiffs seek. We customarily refuse to treat such silence “as a denial of authority to [an] aggrieved person to seek appropriate relief in the federal courts,” Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 309 (1944), and this custom has been “reinforced by the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, which embodies the basic presumption of judicial review to one ‘suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.’ ” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967) (quoting 5 U. S. C. § 702). As we said in Abbott Laboratories, however, the presumption of available judicial review is subject to an implicit limitation: “injunctive and declaratory judgment remedies,” what the respondents seek here, “are discretionary, and courts traditionally have been reluctant to apply them to administrative determinations unless these arise in the context of a controversy ‘ripe’ for judicial resolution,” 387 U. S., at 148, that is to say, unless the effects of the administrative action challenged have been “felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties,” id., at 148-149. In some cases, the promulgation of a regulation will itself affect parties concretely enough to satisfy this requirement, as it did in Abbott Laboratories itself. There, for example, as well as in Gardner v. Toilet Goods Assn., Inc., 387 U. S. 167 (1967), the promulgation of the challenged regulations presented plaintiffs with the immediate dilemma to choose between complying with newly imposed, disadvantageous restrictions and risking serious penalties for violation. Abbott Laboratories, supra, at 152-153; Gardner, supra, at 171-172. But that will not be so in every case. In Toilet Goods Assn., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 158 (1967), for example, we held that a challenge to another regulation, the impact of which could not “be said to be felt immediately by those subject to it in conducting their day-to-day affairs,” id., at 164, would not be ripe before the regulation’s application to the plaintiffs in some more acute fashion, since “no irremediably] adverse consequences flow[ed] from requiring a later challenge,” ibid. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 891 (1990) (a controversy concerning a regulation is not ordinarily ripe for review under the Administrative Procedure Act until the regulation has been applied to the claimant’s situation by some concrete action). The regulations challenged here fall on the latter side of the line. They impose no penalties for violating any newly imposed restriction, but limit access to a benefit created by the Reform Act but not automatically bestowed on eligible aliens. Rather, the Act requires each alien desiring the benefit to take further affirmative steps, and to satisfy criteria beyond those addressed by the disputed regulations. It delegates to the INS the task of determining on a case-by-case basis whether each applicant has met all of the Act’s conditions, not merely those interpreted by the regulations in question. In these circumstances, the promulgation of the challenged regulations did not itself give each CSS and LTJLAC class member a ripe claim; a class member’s claim would ripen only once he took the affirmative steps that he could take before the INS blocked his path by applying the regulation to him. Ordinarily, of course, that barrier would appear when the INS formally denied the alien’s application on the ground that the regulation rendered him ineligible for legalization. A plaintiff who sought to rely on the denial of his application to satisfy the ripeness requirement, however, would then still find himself at least temporarily barred by the Reform Act’s exclusive review provisions, since he would be seeking “judicial review of a determination respecting an application.” 8 U. S. C. § 1255a(f)(l). The ripeness doctrine and the Reform Act’s jurisdictional provisions would thus dovetail neatly, and not necessarily by mere coincidence. Congress may well have assumed that, in the ordinary case, the courts would not hear a challenge to regulations specifying limits to eligibility before those regulations were actually applied to an individual, whose challenge to the denial of an individual application would proceed within the Reform Act’s limited scheme. The CSS and LULAC plaintiffs do not argue that this limited scheme would afford them inadequate review of a determination based on the regulations they challenge, presumably because they would be able to obtain such review on appeal from a deportation order, if they become subject to such an order; their situation is thus different from that of the “17 unsuccessful individual SAW applicants” in McNary, 498 U. S., at 487, whose procedural objections, we concluded, could receive no practical judicial review within the scheme established by 8 U. S. C. § 1160(e), id., at 496-497. This is not the end of the matter, however, because the plaintiffs have called our attention to an INS policy that may well have placed some of them outside the scope of § 1255a(f)(l). The INS has issued a manual detailing procedures for its offices to follow in implementing the Reform Act’s legalization programs and instructing INS employees called “Legalization Assistants” to review certain applications in the presence of the applicants before accepting them for filing. See Procedures Manual for the Legalization and Special Agricultural Worker Programs of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (Legalization Manual or Manual). According to the Manual, “[mjinor correctable deficiencies such as incomplete responses or typographical errors may be corrected by the [Legalization Assistant].” Id., at IV-6. “[I]f the applicant is statutorily ineligible,” however, the Manual provides that “the application will be rejected by the [Legalization Assistant].” Ibid, (emphasis added). Because this prefiling rejection of applications occurs at the front desk of an INS office, it has come to be called “front-desking. ” While the regulations challenged in CSS and LULAC were in force, Legalization Assistants who applied both the regulations and the Manual’s instructions may well have “front-desked” the applications of class members who disclosed the circumstances of their trips outside the United States, and affidavits on file in the LULAC case represent that they did exactly that. See n. 26, infra. As respondents argue, see Brief for Respondents 17, n. 23, a class member whose application was “front-desked” would have felt the effects of the “advance parole” or “facially valid document” regulation in a particularly concrete manner, for his application for legalization would have been blocked then and there; his challenge to the regulation should not fail for lack of ripeness. Front-desking would also have a further, and untoward, consequence for jurisdictional purposes, for it would effectively exclude an applicant from access even to the limited administrative and judicial review procedures established by the Reform Act. He would have no formal denial to appeal to the Associate Commissioner for Examinations, nor would he have an opportunity to build an administrative record on which judicial review might be based. Hence, to construe §1255a(f)(l) to bar district court jurisdiction over his challenge, we would have to impute to Congress an intent to preclude judicial review of the legality of INS action entirely under those circumstances. As we stated recently in McNary, however, there is a “well-settled presumption favoring interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review of administrative action,” 498 U. S., at 496; and we will accordingly find an intent to preclude such review only if presented with “‘clear and convincing evidence/ ” Abbott Laboratories, 387 U. S., at 141 (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369 U. S. 367, 379-380 (1962)). See generally Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 670-673 (1986) (discussing the presumption in favor of judicial review). There is no such clear and convincing evidence in the statute before us. Although the phrase “a determination respecting an application for adjustment of status” could conceivably encompass a Legalization Assistant’s refusal to accept the application for filing at the front desk of a Legalization Office, nothing in the statute suggests, let alone demonstrates, that Congress was using “determination” in such an extended and informal sense. Indeed, at least one related statutory provision suggests just the opposite. Section 1255a(f)(3)(B) limits administrative appellate review to “the administrative record established at the time of the determination on the application”; because there obviously can be no administrative record in the case of a front-desked application, the term “determination” is best read to exclude front-desking. Thus, just as we avoided an interpretation of 8 U. S. C. § 1160(e) in McNary that would have amounted to “the practical equivalent of a total denial of judicial review of generic constitutional and statutory claims,” McNary, supra, at 497, so here we avoid an interpretation of §1255a(f)(1) that would bar front-desked applicants from ever obtaining judicial review of the regulations that rendered them ineligible for legalization. Unfortunately, however, neither the CSS record nor the LULAC record contains evidence that particular class members were actually subjected to front-desking. None of the named individual plaintiffs in either case alleges that he or she was front-desked, and while a number of affidavits in the LULAC record contain the testimony of immigration attorneys and employees of interested organizations that the INS has “refused,” “rejected,” or “den[ied] individuals the right to file” applications, the testimony is limited to such general assertions; none of the affiants refers to any specific incident that we can identify as an instance of frontdesking. This lack of evidence precludes us from resolving the jurisdictional issue here, because, on the facts before us, the front-desking of a particular class member is not only sufficient to make his legal claims ripe, but necessary to do so. As the case has been presented to us, there seems to be no reliable way of determining whether a particular class member, had he applied at all (which, we assume, he did not), would have applied in a manner that would have subjected him to front-desking. As of October 16, 1987, the INS had certified 977 Qualified Designated Entities which could have aided class members in preparing applications that would not have been front-desked, see 52 Fed. Reg. 44812 (1987); n. 21, swpra, and there is no prior history of application behavior on the basis of which we could predict who would have applied without Qualified Designated Entity assistance and therefore been front-desked. Hence, we cannot say that the mere existence of a front-desking policy involved a “concrete application” of the invalid regulations to those class members who were not actually front-desked. Because only those class members (if any) who were front-desked have ripe claims over which the District Courts should exercise jurisdiction, we must vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand with directions to remand to the respective District Courts for proceedings to determine which class members were front-desked. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 amended the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. Section 201(a)(1) of the Reform Act created the alien legalization program at issue in this case by adding §245A to the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U. S. C. § 1255a. For the sake of convenience, we will refer to the sections of the Act as they have been codified. The Reform Act requires the 12-month period to “begi[n] on a date (not later than 180 days after November 6, 1986) designated by the Attorney General.” 8 U. S. C. § 1255a(a)(l)(A). The Attorney General set the period to begin on May 5, 1987, the latest date the Reform Act authorized him to designate. See 8 CFR § 245a.2(a)(l) (1992). A separate provision of the Act requires “[a]n alien who, at any time during the first 11 months of the 12-month period ..., is the subject of an order to show cause [why he should not be deported]” to “make application . . . not later than the end of the 30-day period beginning either on the first day of such 12-month period or on the date of the issuance of such order, whichever day is later.” § 1255a(a)(l)(B); see § 1255a(e)(l) (providing further relief for certain aliens “apprehended before the beginning of the application period”). The CSS lawsuit originally challenged various aspects of the INS’s administration of both the legalization program created by Title II of the Reform Act and the "Special Agricultural Workers” (SAW) legalization program created by Part A of Title III of the Reform Act (codified at 8 U. S. C. § 1160). The challenge to the SAW program eventually took its own procedural course, and was resolved by a district court order that neither party appealed. No. Civ. S-86-1343 LKK (ED Cal., Aug. 11,1988) (App. 3, Record, Doc. No. 188). With respect to the Title II challenge, the District Court originally certified a broad class comprising all persons believed by the Government to be deportable aliens who could establish a prima facie claim for adjustment of status to temporary resident under 8 U. S. C. § 1255a. No. Civ. S-86-1343 LKK (ED Cal., Nov. 24, 1986) (App. 15). After further proceedings, the District Court narrowed the class definition to that set out in the text. The District Court chose November 30,1988, to coincide with the deadline for legalization applications under the Reform Act’s SAW program. See No. Civ. S-86-1343 LKK (ED Cal., June 10, 1988) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a). The order also required the INS to identify all class members whose applications had been denied or recommended for denial on the basis of the advance parole regulation, and to “rescind such denials ... and readjudicate such applications in a manner consistent with the court’s order.” No. Civ. S-86-1343 LKK (ED Cal., June 10, 1988) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a). The INS did not appeal this part of the order. See Brief for Petitioners 11, n. 11. The latter order required the INS to provide apprehended and detained aliens, and those in deportation proceedings, with “a reasonable opportunity, of not less than thirty (30) days, to submit an application [for legalization].” See n. 2, supra (describing the Act’s provisions regarding such aliens); n. 12, infra (describing the LULAC court’s relief for such aliens in INS v. League of United Latin American Citizens). The CSS plaintiffs cross-appealed, challenging the District Court’s denial of their request for an injunction ordering the INS to permit class members outside the United States to enter the United States so that they could file applications for adjustment of status. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s denial, see Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 956 F. 2d 914, 923 (CA9 1992), and the plaintiffs did not petition this Court for review of the Court of Appeals’ judgment; thus, the issues presented by the cross-appeal are not before us. This regulation expresses the INS policy in signally cryptic form, stating that an alien’s eligibility “shall not be affected by entries to the United States subsequent to January 1, 1982 that were not documented on Service Form 1-94, Arrival-Departure Record.” By negative implication, an alien would be rendered ineligible by an entry that was documented on an 1-94 form. An entry is documented on an 1-94 form when it occurs through a normal, official port of entry, at which an alien must present some valid-looking document (for example, a nonimmigrant visa) to get into the United States. See 8 CFR § 235.1(f) (1992). Under the INS policy, an alien who reentered by presenting such a “facially valid” document broke the continuity of his unlawful residence, whereas an alien who reentered the United States by crossing a desolate portion of the border, thus avoiding inspection altogether, maintained that continuity. The INS first announced its intention to modify its policy in a statement issued by then-INS Commissioner Alan Nelson on October 8, 1987, see Record, Addendum to Doc. No. 8; however, it did not issue the new regulations until November 17 following. The LULAC plaintiffs also challenged the modified policy, claiming that aliens should not have to comply with the requirement of 8 CFR § 245a.2(b)(10) (1992) to obtain a waiver of excludability for having fraudulently procured entry into the United States. With respect to this challenge, the District Court certified a second class comprising persons adversely affected by the modified policy. See No. 87-4757-WDK (JRx) (CD Cal., July 15, 1988) (App. 216). However, the District Court ultimately rejected the challenge to the modified policy, see ibid. (App. 234), and the LULAC plaintiffs did not appeal the grant of summary judgment to the INS on this issue. As in the CSS case, this date was chosen to coincide with the deadline for legalization applications under the Reform Act’s SAW program. No. 87-4757-WDK (JRx) (CD Cal., Aug. 12, 1988) (App. to Pet. for Cert. 50a); see n. 5, supra. The order also required the INS to give those illegal aliens apprehended by INS enforcement officials “adequate time” to apply for legalization. App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a; see n. 2, supra (describing the Act’s provisions regarding such aliens); n. 6, supra (describing the CSS court’s relief for such aliens). While the appeals were pending in the Ninth Circuit, the orders of the District Courts were each subject to a stay order. Under the terms of each stay order, the INS was obliged to grant a stay of deportation and temporary work authorization to any class member whose application made a prima facie showing of eligibility for legalization, but was not obliged to process the applications. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a-64a. Because the Court of Appeals has stayed its mandate pending this Court’s disposition of the case, see Nos. 88-15046, 88-15127, 88-15128, 88-6447 (CA9, May 1, 1992) (staying the mandate); Nos. 88-15046, 88-16127, 88-16128, 88-6447 (CA9, Sept. 17, 1992) (denying the INS’s motion to dissolve the stay and issue its mandate), the INS is still operating under these stay orders. By March 1992, it had received some 300,000 applications for temporary resident status under the stay orders. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a. The INS may also use the information to enforce a provision penalizing the filing of fraudulent applications, and to prepare statistical reports to Congress. § 1255a(c)(5)(A). This description excludes the alien who was already in deportation proceedings before he applied for legalization under § 1255a. Once his application is denied, however, such an alien must also continue with deportation proceedings as if he had never applied, and may obtain further review of the denial of his application only upon review of a final order of deportation entered against him. See 8 U. S. C. § 1255a(f)(4)(A). The Act’s provisions regarding aliens who have been issued an order to show cause before applying are described at n. 2, supra; the provisions of the District Court orders regarding such aliens are described at nn. 6 and 12, supra. Although aliens have no explicit statutory right to force the INS to commence a deportation proceeding, the INS has represented that “any alien who wishes to challenge an adverse determination on his legalization application may secure review by surrendering for deportation at any INS district office.” Reply Brief for Petitioners 9-10 (footnote omitted). The single difference between the two sets of provisions is the addition, in the provisions now before us, of a further specific jurisdictional bar: “No denial of adjustment of status under this section based on a late filing of an application for such adjustment may be reviewed by a court of the United States or of any State or reviewed in any administrative proceeding of the United States Government.” 8 U. S. C. § 1255a(f)(2). As the INS appears to concede, see Brief for Petitioners 19, the claims at issue in this case do not fall within the scope of this bar. We have noted that ripeness doctrine is drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction. See, e. g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 114 (1976) (per curiam); Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583, 588 (1972). Even when a ripeness question in a particular case is prudential, we may raise it on our own motion, and “cannot be bound by the wishes of the parties.” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 138 (1974). Although the issue of ripeness is not explicitly addressed in the questions presented in the INS’s petition, it is fairly included and both parties have touched on it in them briefs before this Court. See Brief for Petitioners 20; Brief for Respondents 17, n. 23. Justice O’Connor contends that “if the court can make a firm prediction that the plaintiff will apply for the benefit, and that the agency will deny the application by virtue of the [challenged] rule[,] then there may well be a justiciable controversy that the court may find prudent to resolve.” Post, at 69. Even if this is true, however, we do not see how such a “firm prediction” could be made in this case. As for the prediction that the plaintiffs “will apply for the benefit,” we are now considering only the cases of those plaintiffs who, in fact, failed to file timely applications. As for the prediction that “the agency will deny the application by virtue of the [challenged] rule,” we reemphasize that in this case, access to the benefit in question is conditioned on several nontrivial rules other than the two challenged. This circumstance makes it much more difficult to predict firmly that the INS would deny a particular application “by virtue of the [challenged] rule,” and not by virtue of some other, unchallenged rule that it determined barred an adjustment of status. Similarly distinguishable is our decision in Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656 (1993), the factual and legal setting of which Justice Stevens appears to equate with that of the present cases, see post, at 81-82. In Associated General Contractors, the plaintiff association alleged that “many of its members regularly bid on and perform construction work for the [defendant city],” 508 U. S., at 659 (internal quotation marks omitted), thus providing a historical basis for the further unchallenged allegation that the members “would have . . . bid on . . . designated set aside contracts but for the restrictions imposed by the [challenged] ordinance,” ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff in these cases can point to no similar history of application behavior to support a claim that “she would have applied .. . but for the invalid regulations,” post, at 85; and we think the mere fact that she may have heard of the invalid regulations through a Qualified Designated Entity, a private attorney, or “word of mouth,” post, at 80, insufficient proof of this counterfactual. Further, we defined the “injury in fact” in Associated General Contractors as “the inability to compete on an equal footing in the bidding process, not the loss of a contract,” 508 U. S., at 666; thus, whether the association’s members would have been awarded contracts but for the challenged ordinance was not immediately relevant. Here, the plaintiffs seek, not an equal opportunity to compete for adjustments of status, but the adjustments of status themselves. Under this circumstance, it becomes important to know whether they would be eligible for the adjustments but for the challenged regulations. Justice O’Connor maintains that the plaintiffs’ actions are now ripe because they have amended their complaints to seek the additional remedy of extending the application period, and the application period is now over. Post, at 71-72. We do not see how these facts establish ripeness. In both cases before us, the plaintiffs’ underlying claim is that an INS regulation implementing the Reform Act is invalid. Because the Act requires each alien desiring legalization to take certain affirmative steps, and because the Act’s conditions extend beyond those addressed by the challenged regulations, one cannot know whether the challenged regulation actually makes a concrete difference to a particular alien until one knows that he will take those affirmative steps and will satisfy the other conditions. Neither the fact that the application period is now over, nor the fact that the plaintiffs would now like the period to be extended, tells us anything about the willingness of the class members to take the required affirmative steps, or about their satisfaction of the Reform Act’s other conditions. The end of the application period may mean that the plaintiffs no longer have an opportunity to take the steps that could make their claims ripe; but this fact is significant only for those plaintiffs who can claim that the Government prevented them from filing a timely application. See infra, at 61-64 (discussing the INS’s “front-desking” practice). Justice O’Connor’s ripeness analysis encounters one further difficulty. In her view, the plaintiffs' claims are ripe because “[i]t is certain that an alien who now applies to the INS for legalization will be denied that benefit because the period has closed.” Post, at 72 (emphasis in original). In these circumstances, she suggests, it would make no sense to require “the would-be beneficiary [to] make the wholly futile gesture of submitting an application.” Ibid. But a plaintiff who, to establish ripeness, relies on the certainty that his application would be denied on grounds of untimeliness, must confront § 1255a(f)(2), which flatly bars all “court[s] of the United States” from reviewing “denials] of adjustment of status ... based on a late filing of an application for such adjustment.” We would almost certainly interpret this provision to bar such reliance, since otherwise plaintiffs could always entangle the INS in litigation over application timing claims simply by suing without filing an application, a result we believe § 1255a(f)(2) was intended to foreclose in the ordinary case. Under the Manual’s procedures, only those applications that were not prepared with the assistance of a “Qualified Designated Entity” (the Reform Act’s designation for private organizations that serve as intermediaries between applicants and the INS, see 8 U. S. C. § 1255a(c)(l)) are subject to review by Legalization Assistants. The applications that were prepared with the help of Qualified Designated Entities skip this step. See Legalization Manual, at IV-5, IV-6. There is no evidence in the record indicating how many CSS and LULAC class members were assisted by Qualified Designated Entities in preparing their applications. The INS forwards a different interpretation of the policy set forth in the Legalization Manual. According to the INS, the Manual reflects a policy, motivated by “charitable concern,” of “informing] aliens of [the INS’s] view that their applications are deficient before it accepts the filing fee, so that they can make an informed choice about whether to pay the fee if they are not going to receive immediate relief.” Reply Brief for Petitioners 9 (emphasis omitted). The “rejection” policy, argues the INS, did not really bar applicants from filing applications; another sentence in the Manual proves that the door remains open, for it provides that “[i]f an applicant whose application has been rejected by the [Legalization Assistant] insists on filing, the application will be routed through a fee clerk to an adjudicator with a routing slip from the [Legalization Assistant] stating the noted deficiency(ies).” Legalization Manual, at IV-6. We cannot find, in either of the two sentences the parties point to, the policy now articulated by the INS. The first sentence does not say that applicants will be informed; it says that applications will be rejected. The second sentence contains no hint that the Legalization Assistant should tell the applicant that he has a right to file an application despite the “rejection,” or that he should file an application if he wants to preserve his rights. Rather, it seems to provide little more than a procedure for dealing with the pesky applicant who “won’t take ‘no’ for an answer.” Neither of the sentences preserves a realistic path to judicial review. In its reply brief in this Court, see Reply Brief for Petitioners 14, the INS argues that those individuals who were front-desked fall outside the classes defined by the District Courts, since the CSS class included only those who “knew of [INS’s] unlawful regulation and thereby concluded that they were ineligible for legalization and by reason of that conclusion did not file an application,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a, and the LULAC class included only those “who learned of their ineligibility following promulgation of the policy and who, relying upon information that they were ineligible, did not apply for legalization before the May 4, 1988 deadline,” App. 216. The language in CSS that the INS points to, however, is not the class definition, which is much broader, see supra, at 48-49; rather, it is part of the requirements class members must meet to obtain one of the forms of relief ordered by the District Court. We understand the LULAC class definition to use the word “apply” to mean “have an application accepted for filing by the INS,” as under this reading the definition encompasses all those whom the INS refuses to treat as having timely applied (which is the refusal that lies at the heart of the parties’ dispute), and as the definition then includes those who “learned of their ineligibility” by being front-desked, since it would be odd to exclude those who learned of their ineligibility in the most direct way possible from this description. As we note below, however, see n. 29, infra, we believe that the word “applied” as used in § 1255a(a)(l)(A) has a broader meaning than that given to the word in the LULAC class definition. The Reform Act limits judicial review to “the administrative record established at the time of the review by the appellate authority.” 8 U. S. C. § 1255a(f)(4)(B). In addition, an INS regulation provides that a legalization application may not “be filed or reopened before an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals during exclusion or deportation proceedings.” 8 CFR § 103.3(a)(3)(iii) (1992). In LULAC, the one named individual plaintiff who represents the subclass challenging the INS’s original “facially-valid document” policy never attempted to file an application, because he was advised by an attorney over the telephone that he was ineligible. See LULAC, First Amended Complaint 11-12 (Record, Doc. No. 56) (describing plaintiff John Doe). In CSS, none of the named plaintiffs challenging the “advance parole” regulation allege that they attempted to file applications. See CSS Sixth Amended Complaint 12-18 (Record, Doc. No. 140). See App. 204 (affidavit of Pilar Cuen) (legalization counselor states that “INS has refused applications for legalization because our clients entered after January 1, 1982 with a non-immigrant visa and an 1-94 was issued at the time of reentry”); App. 209 (affidavit of Joanne T. Stark) (immigration lawyer in private practice states that she is “aware that the Service has discouraged application in the past by [LULAC class members] or has rejected applications made”); Record, Doc. No. 16, Exh. H, p. 135 (affidavit of Isabel Garcia Gallegos) (immigration attorney states that “the legalization offices in Southern Arizona [have] rejected, and otherwise, discouraged individuals who had, in fact entered the United States with an 1-94 after January 1, 1982”); App. 200 (affidavit of Marc Van Der Hout) (immigration attorney states that “[i]t has been the practice of the San Francisco District legalization office to deny individuals the right to file an application for legalization under the [Reform Act] if the individual had been in unlawful status prior to January 1,1982, departed the United States post January 1, 1982, and re-entered on a non-immigrant visa”). Only one affiant refers to a specific incident. He recounts: “[I]n August [1987] I was at the San Francisco legalization office when an individual came in seeking to apply for legalization. She was met at the reception desk by a clerk and when she explained the facts of her case, [that she had departed and re-entered the United States after January 1, 1982, on a non-immigrant visa], she was told that she did not qualify for legalization and could not file.” App. 200-201 (affidavit of Marc Van Der Hout). The significance of this incident is unclear, however, since there is no way of telling whether this individual was a LULAC class member (that is, whether she would otherwise have been eligible for legalization), nor whether she had a completed application ready for filing and payment in hand. The record reveals relatively little about the application of the frontdesking policy and surrounding circumstances. Although we think it unlikely, we cannot rule out the possibility that further facts would allow class members who were not front-desked to demonstrate that the frontdesking policy was nevertheless a substantial cause of their failure to apply, so that they can be said to have had the “advanced parole” or “facially valid document” regulation applied to them in a sufficiently concrete manner to satisfy ripeness concerns. Although we do not reach the question of remedy on this disposition of the case, we note that, by definition, each CSS and LULAC class member who was front-desked presented at an INS office to an INS employee an application that under the terms of the Reform Act (as opposed to the terms of the invalid regulation) entitled him to an adjustment of status. Under any reasonable interpretation of the word, such an individual “applied” for an adjustment of status within the 12-month period under § 1255a(a)(l)(A). Because that individual timely applied, the INS need only readjudicate the application, and grant the individual the relief to which he is entitled. Since there is no statutory deadline for processing the applications, and since a front-desked individual need not await a deportation order before obtaining judicial review, there is no reason to think that a district court would lack the power to order such relief.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES et al. v. BENMAR TRANSPORT & LEASING CORP. et al. No. 78-1602. Decided October 15, 1979 Per Curiam. This case is here on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission authorizing respondent Consolidated Truck Service, Inc., to begin contract carrier service in competition with respondent Benmar Transport & Leasing Corp. The order, issued October 5, 1977, was defective because it lacked the statutorily required finding that it was consistent “ 'with the public interest and with the national transportation policy' [§ 210] of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 310 [now 49 U. S. C. § 10930 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. II)].” Benmar Transport & Leasing Corp. v. ICC, 582 F. 2d 246, 248 (1978). The case was argued in the Court of Appeals on July 17, 1978, and decided August 16, 1978. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals refused to consider two subsequent Commission orders that remedied the defect. The first of these orders, issued with the consent of all interested parties almost six months before oral argument in the Court of Appeals, reopened the administrative proceedings and made the finding required by 49 U. S. C. § 310. The second, issued on April 18, 1978, denied respondent Benmar’s petition for administrative review of the former order. This denial became the Commission’s final administrative order and had the effect of reaffirming its earlier decision to grant Consolidated’s application for a contract carrier permit. Although the question briefed by the parties in the Court of Appeals was whether the order of April 18, 1978, was supported by the evidence, the Court of Appeals declined to examine the question on the ground that the only order properly before it was the defective order of October 5, 1977. It thus vacated the order and remanded the case for further proceedings. We grant the petition of the United States and the Commission and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U. S. 532 (1970), this Court held that the Commission’s broad powers to “reverse, change, or modify” its decisions “are plainly adequate to add to the findings or firm them up as the Commission deems desirable, absent any collision or interference with the District Court.” Id., at 541. (The applicable statute then provided for review of orders of the Commission by a three-judge District Court, rather than by the Court of Appeals.) Here the Commission’s action did not interfere in any manner with the proceedings in the Court of Appeals, and the Commission acted before that court was ready to hear arguments on the merits and before it received the record. All parties concurred in the Commission’s decision to reopen the proceedings and to hold judicial review in abeyance pending the Commission’s final disposition of Ben-mar’s petition for administrative review. The position of the parties — both those who prevailed and those who lost before the Commission — is convincingly demonstrated by the fact that no party has filed a brief in support of the decision reached by the Court of Appeals. As the Court said in American Farm Lines, supra, “[t]he concept ‘of an indivisible jurisdiction which must be all in one tribunal or all in the other may fit’ some statutory schemes, . . . but it does not fit this one.” 397 U. S., at 541. After the abolition of the “forms of action” in the early common law, it was said that “[t]he forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves.” F. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law 2 (1936). Orderly rules of procedure are necessary in order that appellate review may be had of agency findings, but empty formalities devoid of either substantive or procedural benefit have no place in the normal scheme for administrative review unless Congress chooses to place them there. Here Congress has quite clearly not chosen to impose such virtually meaningless requirements as the Court of Appeals insisted upon. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with the spirit which animated American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, supra, and is therefore Reversed. The dissenting opinion makes the bald statement that “[t]he ICC simply ignored the time limits established by the Court of Appeals and thereby prevented judicial review altogether. The Court of Appeals was not ready to hear argument and had not received the record solely because the ICC did not deign to comply with the scheduling orders of the court.” The opinion of the Court of Appeals, Benmar Transport & Leasing Corp. v. ICC, 582 F. 2d 246 (1978), lends no support to this statement. Respondent Benmar petitioned the court to set aside the Commission’s order but consented along with other interested parties to the reopening of the Commission proceedings before the record had been filed with the Court of Appeals or oral argument heard by that court. After the Commission completed these proceedings, it issued its final order of April 18,11978 — an order which was reviewable by the Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2341-2349. The Court of Appeals thus was not deprived of its jurisdiction over this dispute. Rather, for no apparent reason other than to insist that the parties comply with an “empty formality,” the Court of Appeals stated in its opinion that “when an agency seeks to reconsider its action, it should move the court to remand or to hold the case in abeyance pending reconsideration by the agency.” 582 F. 2d, at 248. If such action were necessary in order to avoid genuine interference “in any manner with the proceedings in the Court of Appeals,” supra, at 5, we would have a different case. But since we conclude that there was no such interference, the mere fact that application for reopening was not made to the Court of Appeals was not fatal when all interested parties consented to such reopening. See American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U. S. 532 (1970).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NORWOOD et al. v. HARRISON et al. No. 72-77. Argued February 20-21, 1973 — Decided June 25, 1973 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Douglas and Brennan, JJ., concurred in the result. Melvyn R. Leventhal argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles Stephen Ralston, Norman J. Chach-kin, and Anthony G. Amsterdam. William A. Attain, First Assistant Attorney General of Mississippi, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were A. F. Summer, Attorney General, and Heber Ladner, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General. Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Pottinger, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Harriet S. Shapiro, Brian K. Landsberg, and Thomas M. Keeling filed a memorandum for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. A three-judge District Court sustained the validity of a Mississippi statutory program under which textbooks are purchased by the State and lent to students in both public and private schools, without reference to whether any participating private school has racially discriminatory policies. 340 F. Supp. 1003 (ND Miss. 1972). We noted probable jurisdiction, 409 U. S. 839. I Appellants, who are parents of four schoolchildren in Tunica County, Mississippi, filed a class action on behalf of students throughout Mississippi to enjoin in part the enforcement of the Mississippi textbook lending program. The complaint alleged that certain of the private schools excluded students on the basis of race and that, by supplying textbooks to students attending such private schools, appellees, acting for the State, have provided direct state aid to racially segregated education. It was also alleged that the textbook aid program thereby impeded the process of fully desegregating public schools, in violation of appellants’ constitutional rights. Private schools in Mississippi have experienced a marked growth in recent years. As recently as the 1963-1964 school year, there were only 17 private schools other than Catholic schools; the total enrollment was 2,362 students. In these nonpublic schools 916 students were Negro, and 192 of these were enrolled in special schools for retarded, orphaned, or abandoned children. By September 1970, the number of private non-Catholic schools had increased to 155 with a student population estimated at 42,000, virtually all white. Ap-pellees do not challenge the statement, which is fully documented in appellants’ brief, that “the creation and enlargement of these [private] academies occurred simultaneously with major events in the desegregation of public schools . ...” This case does not raise any question as to the right of citizens to maintain private schools with admission limited to students of particular national origins, race, or religion or of the authority of a State to allow such schools. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925). The narrow issue before us, rather, is a particular form of tangible assistance the State provides to students in private schools in common with all other students by lending textbooks under the State’s 33-year-old program for providing free textbooks to all the children of the State. The program dates back to a 1940 appeal for improved educational facilities by the Governor of Mississippi to the state legislature. The legislature then established a state textbook purchasing board and authorized it to select, purchase, and distribute free textbooks for all schoolchildren through the first eight grades. In 1942, the program was extended to cover all high school students, and, as codified, the statutory authorization remains substantially unchanged. Miss. Code Ann. § 6634 et seq. (1942). Administration of the textbook program is vested in the Mississippi Textbook Purchasing Board, whose members include the Governor, the State Superintendent of Education, and three experienced educators appointed by the Governor for four-year terms. Id., §§ 6634, 6641. The Board employs a full-time administrator as its Executive Secretary. Textbooks may be purchased only “for use in those courses set up in the state course of study adopted by the State Board of Education, or courses established by special acts of the Legislature.” Id., § 6646. For each course of study, there is a "rating committee” composed of appointed members, id., § 6641 (l)(d), and only those books approved by the relevant rating committee may be purchased from publishers at a price which cannot “be higher than the lowest prices at which the same books are being sold anywhere in the United States.” Id., §6646 (1). The books are kept at a central book repository in Jackson. Id., § 6641 (1) (f). Appellees send to each school district, and, in recent years, to each private school requisition forms listing approved textbooks available from the State for free distribution to students. The local school district or the private school sends a requisition form to the Purchasing Board for approval by the Executive Secretary, who in turn forwards the approved form to the Jackson book repository where the order is routinely filled and the requested books shipped directly to the school district or the private school. The District Court found that “34,000 students are presently receiving state-owned textbooks while attending 107 all-white, nonsectarian private schools which have been formed throughout the state since the inception of public school desegregation.” 340 F. Supp., at 1011. During the 1970-1971 school year, these schools held 173,424 books, for which Mississippi paid $490,239. The annual expenditure for replacements or new texts is approximately $6 per pupil, or a total of approximately $207,000 for the students enrolled in the participating private segregated academies, exclusive of mailing costs which are borne by the State as well. In dismissing the complaint the District Court stressed, first, that the statutory scheme was not motivated by a desire to further racial segregation in the public schools, having been enacted first in 1940, long before this Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), and consequently, long before there was any occasion to have a policy or reason to foster the development of racially segregated private academies. Second, the District Court took note that providing textbooks to private sectarian schools had been approved by this Court in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968), and that “[t]he essential inquiry, therefore, is whether we should apply a more stringent standard for determining what constitutes state aid to a school in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban against denial of the equal protection of the law than the Supreme Court has applied in First Amendment cases.” 340 F. Supp., at 1011. The District Court held no more stringent standard should apply on the facts of this case, since, as in Allen, the books were provided to the students and not to the schools. Finally, the District Court concluded that the textbook loans did not interfere with or impede the State’s acknowledged duty to establish a unitary school system under this Court's holding in Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 437 (1968), since “[depriving any segment of school children of state-owned textbooks at this point in time is not necessary for the establishment or maintenance of state-wide unitary schools. Indeed, the public schools which plaintiffs acknowledge were fully established as unitary schools throughout the state no later than 1970-71, continue to attract 90% of the state's educable children. There is no showing that any child enrolled in private school, if deprived of free textbooks, would withdraw from private school and subsequently enroll in the public schools.'' 340 F. Supp., at 1013. II In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), the Court held that a State’s role in the education of its citizens must yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education for their children in a privately operated school of the parents’ choice. In the 1971 Term we reaffirmed the vitality of Pierce, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (1972), and there has been no suggestion in the present case that we alter our view of Pierce. Yet the Court’s holding in Pierce is not without limits. As Mr. Justice White observed in his concurring opinion in Yoder, Pierce “held simply that while a State may posit [educational] standards, it may not pre-empt the educational process by requiring children to attend public schools.” Id., at 239. Appellees fail to recognize the limited scope of Pierce when they urge that the right of parents to send their children to private schools under that holding is at stake in this case. The suggestion is made that the rights of parents under Pierce would be undermined were the lending of free textbooks denied to those who attend private schools — in other words, that schoolchildren who attend private schools might be deprived of the equal protection of the laws were they invidiously classified under the state textbook loan program simply because their parents had exercised the constitutionally protected choice to send the children to private schools. We do not see the issue in appellees’ terms. In Pierce, the Court affirmed the right of private schools to exist and to operate; it said nothing of any supposed right of private or parochial schools to share with public schools in state largesse, on an equal basis or otherwise. It has never been held that if private schools are not given some share of public funds allocated for education that such schools are isolated into a classification violative of the Equal Protection Clause. It is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to say that such schools must, as a matter of equal protection, receive state aid. The appellees intimate that the State must provide assistance to private schools equivalent to that which it provides to public schools without regard to whether the private schools discriminate on racial grounds. Clearly, the State need not. Even as to church-sponsored schools whose policies are nondiscriminatory, any absolute right to equal aid was negated, at least by implication, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971). The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment strictly confine state aid to sectarian education. Even assuming, therefore, that the Equal Protection Clause might require state aid to be granted to private nonsectarian schools in some circumstances — health care or textbooks, for example — a State could rationally conclude as a matter of legislative policy that constitutional neutrality as to sectarian schools might best be achieved by withholding all state assistance. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). In the same way, a State's special interest in elevating the quality of education in both public and private schools does not mean that the State must grant aid to private schools without regard to constitutionally mandated standards forbidding state-supported discrimination. That the Constitution may compel toleration of private discrimination in some circumstances does not mean that it requires state support for such discrimination. Ill The District Court’s holding therefore raises the question whether and on what terms a State may — as a matter of legislative policy- — provide tangible assistance to students attending private schools. Appellants assert, not only that the private schools are in fact racially discriminatory, but also that aid to them in any form is in derogation of the State’s obligation not to support discrimination in education. This Court has consistently affirmed decisions enjoining state tuition grants to students attending racially discriminatory private schools. A textbook lending program is not legally distinguishable from the forms of state assistance foreclosed by the prior cases. Free textbooks, like tuition grants directed to private school students, are a form of financial assistance inuring to the benefit of the private schools themselves. An inescapable educational cost for students in both public and private schools is the expense of providing all necessary-learning materials. When, as here, that necessary expense is borne by the State, the economic consequence is to give aid to the enterprise; if the school engages in discriminatory practices the State by tangible aid in the form of textbooks thereby gives support to such discrimination. Racial discrimination in state-operated schools is barred by the Constitution and “[i]t is also axiomatic that a state may not induce, encourage or promote private persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.” Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458, 475-476 (MD Ala. 1967). We do not suggest that a State violates its constitutional duty merely because it has provided any form of state service that benefits private schools said to be racially discriminatory. Textbooks are a basic educational tool and, like tuition grants, they are provided only in connection with schools; they are to be distinguished from generalized services government might provide to schools in common with others. Moreover, the textbooks provided to private school students by the State in this case are a form of assistance readily available from sources entirely independent of the State — unlike, for example, “such necessities of life as electricity, water, and police and fire protection.” Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 173 (1972). The State has neither an absolute nor operating monopoly on the procurement of school textbooks; anyone can purchase them on the open market. The District Court laid great stress on the absence of a showing by appellants that “any child enrolled in private school, if deprived of free textbooks, would withdraw from private school and subsequently enroll in the public schools.” 340 F. Supp., at 1013. We can accept this factual assertion; we cannot and do not know, on this record at least, whether state textbook assistance is the determinative factor in the enrollment of any students in any of the private schools in Mississippi. We do not agree with the District Court in its analysis of the legal consequences of this uncertainty, for the Constitution does not permit the State to aid discrimination even when there is no precise causal relationship between state financial aid to a private school and the continued well-being of that school. A State may not grant the type of tangible financial aid here involved if that aid has a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination. “[Decisions on the constitutionality of state involvement in private discrimination do not turn on whether the state aid adds up to 51 percent or adds up to only 49 per cent of the support of the segregated institution.” Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm’n, 275 F. Supp. 833, 854 (ED La. 1967). The recurring theme of appellees’ argument is a sympathetic one — that the State’s textbook loan program is extended to students who attend racially segregated private schools only because the State sincerely wishes to foster quality education for all Mississippi children, and, to that end, has taken steps to insure that no sub-group of schoolchildren will be deprived of an important educational tool merely because their parents have chosen to enroll them in segregated private schools. We need not assume that the State’s textbook aid to private schools has been motivated by other than a sincere interest in the educational welfare of all Mississippi children. But good intentions as to one valid objective do not serve to negate the State’s involvement in violation of a constitutional duty. “The existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible effect.” Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451, 462 (1972). The Equal Protection Clause would be a sterile promise if state involvement in possible private activity could be shielded altogether from constitutional scrutiny simply because its ultimate end was not discrimination but some higher goal. The District Court offered as further support for its holding the finding that Mississippi’s public schools “were fully established as unitary schools throughout the state no later than 1970-71 [and] continue to attract 90% of the state’s educable children.” 340 F. Supp., at 1013. We note, however, that overall statewide attendance figures do not fully and accurately reflect the impact of private schools in particular school districts. In any event, the constitutional infirmity of the Mississippi textbook program is that it significantly aids the organization and continuation of a separate system of private schools which, under the District Court holding, may discriminate if they so desire. A State’s constitutional obligation requires it to steer clear, not only of operating the old dual system of racially segregated schools, but also of giving significant aid to institutions that practice racial or other invidious discrimination. That the State’s public schools are now fully unitary, as the District Court found, is irrelevant. IV Appellees and the District Court also placed great reliance on our decisions in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), and Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968). In Everson, we held that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment did not prohibit New Jersey from “spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and other schools.” 330 U. S., at 17. Allen, following Everson, sustained a New York law requiring school textbooks to be lent free of charge to all students, including those in attendance at parochial schools, in specified grades. Neither Allen nor Everson is dispositive of the issue before us in this case. Religious schools “pursue two goals, religious instruction and secular education.” Board of Education v. Allen, supra, at 245. And, where carefully limited so as to avoid the prohibitions of the “effect” and “entanglement” tests, States may assist church-related schools in performing their secular functions, Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, post, at 774, 775; Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, post, at 481, not only because the States have a substantial interest in the quality of education being provided by private schools, see Cochran v. Louisiana Board of Education, 281 U. S. 370, 375 (1930), but more importantly because assistance properly confined to the secular functions of sectarian schools does not substantially promote the readily identifiable religious mission of those schools and it does not interfere with the free exercise rights of others. Like a sectarian school, a private school — even one that discriminates — fulfills an important educational function; however, the difference is that in the context of this case the legitimate educational function cannot be isolated from discriminatory practices — if such in fact exist. Under Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), discriminatory treatment exerts a pervasive influence on the entire educational process. The private school that closes its doors to defined groups of students on the basis of constitutionally suspect criteria manifests, by its own actions, that its educational processes are based on private belief that segregation is desirable in education. There is no reason to discriminate against students for reasons wholly unrelated to individual merit unless the artificial barriers are considered an essential part of the educational message to be communicated to the students who are admitted. Such private bias is not barred by the Constitution, nor does it invoke any sanction of laws, but neither can it call on the Constitution for material aid from the State. Our decisions under the Establishment Clause reflect the “internal tension in the First Amendment between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause,” Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 677 (1971). This does not mean, as we have already suggested, that a State is constitutionally obligated to provide even “neutral” services to sectarian schools. But the transcendent value of free religious exercise in our constitutional scheme leaves room for “play in the joints” to the extent of cautiously delineated secular governmental assistance to religious schools, despite the fact that such assistance touches on the conflicting values of the Establishment Clause by indirectly benefiting the religious schools and their sponsors. In contrast, although the Constitution does not proscribe private bias, it places no value on discrimination as it does on the values inherent in the Free Exercise Clause. Invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections. And even some private discrimination is subject to special remedial legislation in certain circumstances under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment; Congress has made such discrimination unlawful in other significant contexts. However narrow may be the channel of permissible state aid to sectarian schools, Nyquist, supra; Levitt, supra, it permits a greater degree of state assistance than may be given to private schools which engage in discriminatory practices that would be unlawful in a public school system. Y At oral argument, appellees expressed concern over the process of determining the scope of relief to be granted should appellants prevail on the merits. That aspect of the case presents problems but the procedural details need not be fully resolved here. The District Court’s assumption that textbook loans were permissible, even to racially discriminating private schools, obviated any necessity for that court to determine whether some of the private schools could properly be classified as “racially discriminatory” and how that determination might best be made. We construe the complaint as contemplating an individual determination as to each private school in Mississippi whose students now receive textbooks under the State’s textbook loan program; relief on an assumption that all private schools were discriminating, thus foreclosing individualized consideration, would not be appropriate. The proper injunctive relief can be granted without implying a finding that all the private schools alleged to be receiving textbook aid are in fact practicing restrictive admission policies. Private schools are not fungible and the fact that some or even most may practice discrimination does not warrant blanket condemnation. The District Court can appropriately direct the appellees to submit for approval a certification procedure under which any school seeking textbooks for its pupils may apply for participation on behalf of pupils. The certification by the school to the Mississippi Textbook Purchasing Board should, among other factors, affirmatively declare its admission policies and practices, state the number of its racially and religiously identifiable minority students and such other relevant data as is consistent with this opinion. The State’s certification of eligibility would, of course, be subject to judicial review. This school-by-school determination may be cumbersome but no more so than the State’s process of ascertaining compliance with educational standards. No presumptions flow from mere allegations; no one can be required, consistent with due process, to prove the absence of violation of law. The judgment of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Me. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan concur in the result. App. 40-41. Brief for Appellants 8-9. See Norwood v. Harrison, 340 F. Supp. 1003, 1007 (ND Miss. 1972). The regulation for distribution of state-owned textbooks from 1940 through 1970 provided as follows: “For the distribution of free textbooks the local control will be placed in the hands of the County Superintendent of Education. All requisitions for books shall be made through him and all shipments of books shall be invoiced through him. At his discretion he may set up certain regulations governing the distribution of books within the county, such regulations not to conflict with the regulations adopted by the State Textbook Board or provisions of the Free Textbook Act.” This regulation was revised on October 14, 1970, to read as follows: “Public Schools. The administration of the textbook program in the public schools shall be the responsibility of the administrative heads of the county units, consolidated districts, and municipal separate districts set up by the Legislature. All textbook transactions between the public schools and the State shall be carried on through them. It shall be the duty of these local custodians to render all reports required by the State; to place orders for textbooks for the pupils in their schools .... “Private Schools. Private and parochial school programs shall be the responsibility of the State Textbook Board. All textbook transactions will be carried out between the Board and the administrative heads of these schools. Their duties shall be the same as outlined above for public schools.” The variation in the figures as to schools and students is accounted for by the District Court’s omission of particular kinds of schools in making the findings. The earlier and higher figures are found in the briefs and are not disputed. Brown v. South Carolina Board of Education, 296 F. Supp. 199 (SC), aff’d per curiam, 393 U. S. 222 (1968); Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm’n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (ED La. 1967), aff’d per curiam, 389 U. S. 571 (1968). See Wallace v. United States, 389 U. S. 215 (1967), aff’g Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458, 475 (MD Ala.). Mississippi’s tuition grant programs were invalidated in Coffey v. State Educational Finance Comm’n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (SD Miss. 1969); Coffey v. State Educational Finance Comm’n, SD Miss., CA No. 2906, decided Sept. 2,1970 (unreported). The latter case involved a statute which provided for tuition loans rather than tuition grants. See Green v. Connolly, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (DC), aff’d sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U. S. 997 (1971). Appellees misperceive the “child benefit” theory of our cases decided under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. See, e. g., Cochran v. Louisiana Board of Education, 281 U. S. 370 (1930), and Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968). In those cases the Court observed that the direct financial benefit of textbook loans to students is “to parents and children, not to schools,” id,, at 244, in the sense that parents and children — not schools— would in most instances be required to procure their textbooks if the State did not. But the Court has never denied that “free books make it more likely that some children choose to attend a sectarian school,” ibid., just as in other cases involving aid to sectarian schools we have acknowledged that the various forms of state assistance “surely aid these [religious] institutions ... in the sense that religious bodies would otherwise have been forced to find other sources from which to finance these services.” Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 679 (1971). Plainly, religion benefits indirectly from governmental aid to parents and children; nevertheless, “[t]hat religion may indirectly benefit from governmental aid . . . does not convert that aid into an impermissible establishment of religion.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 664 (1971) (opinion of White, J.). The leeway for indirect aid to sectarian schools has no place in defining the permissible scope of state aid to private racially discriminatory schools. “State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds, or property cannot be squared with the [Fourteenth] Amendment’s command that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 19 (1958). Thus Mr. Justice White, the author of the Court’s opinion in Allen, supra, and a dissenter in Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, noted there that in his view, legislation providing assistance to any sectarian school which restricted entry on racial or religious grounds would, to that extent, be unconstitutional. Lemon, supra, at 671 n. 2. See Part IV, infra. Accord, Griffin v. State Board of Education, 296 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (ED Va. 1969), superseding Griffin v. State Board of Education, 239 F. Supp. 560 (ED Va. 1965); Brown v. South Carolina Board of Education, supra. In Tunica County, for example, where appellants reside, in response to Green v. Connally, supra, and Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U. S. 19 (1969), all white children were withdrawn from public schools and placed in a private academy housed in local church facilities and staffed by the principal and 17 high school teachers of the county system, who resigned in mid-year to accept jobs at the new academy. See United States v. Tunica County School District, 323 F. Supp. 1019 (ND Miss. 1970), aff’d, 440 F. 2d 377 (CA5 1971). As of the time of the filing of this lawsuit, the successor Tunica Institute of Learning enrolled 495 students, all white, and would not attest to an open enrollment policy. Similar histories of Holmes County, Canton Municipal Separate School District, Jackson Municipal Separate School District, Amite County, Indianola Municipal Separate School District, and Grenada Municipal Separate School District are recited, without challenge by appellees, in Brief for Appellants 14r-19. See, e. g., Griffin v. Breekenridge, 403 U. S. 88 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 (1968); 42 U. S. C. § 2000a et seq. (barring discrimination in public accommodations); 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (barring discrimination in private employment); 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et seq. (barring discrimination in private housing transactions).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MARSHALL v. BRUCKER, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY. No. 41, Misc. Decided March 10, 1958. Petitioner pro se. Solicitor General Rankin for respondent. ’ Per Curiam. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for appropriate relief in the light of Harmon v. Brucker and Abramowitz v. Brucker, 355 U. S. 579, decided March 3, 1958.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HALL et ux. v. UNITED STATES No. 10-875. Argued November 29, 2011 Decided May 14, 2012 Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Kagan, JJ., joined, post, p. 524. Susan M. Freeman argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Lawrence A. Fasten and Clifford B. Altfeld. Pratik A. Shah argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Verrilli, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General DiCicco, Deputy Solicitor General Stewart, Bruce R. Ellisen, and Patrick J. Urda Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Donald W. Dawes et al. by G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., Collin O’Connor Udell, and Matthew J. Delude; and for Neil E. Harl et al. by Joseph A. Peiffer. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court. Under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code, farmer debtors .may treat- certain claims owed to a governmental unit resulting from the disposition of farm assets as discharge-able, unsecured liabilities. 11 U. S. C. § 1222(a)(2)(A). One such claim is for “any tax . . . incurred by the estate.” § 503(b)(l)(B)(i). The question presented is whether a federal income tax liability resulting from individual debtors' sale of a farm during the pendency of a Chapter 12 bankruptcy is “incurred by the estate” and thus dischargeable. We hold that it is not. I A In 1986, Congress enacted Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code, §1201 et seq., to allow farmer debtors with regular annual income to adjust their debts. Chapter 12 was modeled on Chapter 13, § 1301 et seq., which permits individual debtors with regular annual income to preserve existing assets subject to a “court-approved plan under which they pay creditors out of their future income.” Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U. S. 505, 508 (2010). Chapter 12 debtors similarly file a plan of reorganization. § 1221. To be confirmed, the plan must provide for the full payment of priority claims. § 1222(a)(2). In the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPÁ), § 1003, 119 Stat. 186, Congress created an exception to that requirement: “Contents of plan “(a) The plan shall— “(2) provide for the full payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled to priority under section 507, unless— “(A) the claim is a claim owed to a governmental unit that arises as a result of the sale, transfer, exchange, or other disposition of any farm asset used in the debtor’s farming operation, in which case the claim shall be treated as an unsecured claim that is not entitled to priority under section 507, but the debt shall be treated in such manner only if the debtor receives a discharge.” 11 U.S. c: §1222. Under § 1222(a)(2)(A), certain governmental claims resulting from the disposition of farm assets are downgraded to general, unsecured claims that are dischargeable after less than full payment. See § 1228(a). The claims are stripped of their priority status. That exception, however, applies only to claims in the plan that are “entitled to priority under section 507” in the first place. Section 507 lists 10 categories of such claims. Two pertain to taxes: One category, § 507(a)(8), covers prepetition taxes, and is inapplicable in this case. The other, § 507(a)(2), covers “administrative expenses allowed under section 503(b),” which in turn includes “any tax . . . incurred by the estate.” §503(b)(l)(B)(i). Thus, for postpetition taxes to be entitled to priority under §507 and eligible for the § 1222(a)(2)(A) exception, the taxes must be “incurred by the estate.” B Petitioners Lynwood and Brenda Hall petitioned for bankruptcy under Chapter 12 and sold their farm shortly thereafter. Petitioners initially proposed a plan of reorganization under which they would pay off outstanding liabilities with proceeds from the sale. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) objected, asserting a federal income tax of $29,000 on the capital gains from the farm sale. Petitioners amended their proposal to treat the income tax as a general, unsecured claim to be paid to the extent funds were available, with the unpaid balance discharged. Again the IRS objected. Taxes on income from a postpetition farm sale, the IRS argued, remain the debtors’ independent responsibility because they are neither collectible nor dis-chargeable in bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court sustained the objection. The court reasoned that because a Chapter 12 estate is not a separate taxable entity under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), see 26 U. S. C. §§1398, 1399, it cannot “incur” taxes for purposes of 11 U. S. C. § 503(b). The District Court reversed, expressing doubt that IRC provisions are relevant to interpreting § 503(b). Based on its reading of legislative history, the District Court determined that Congress intended § 1222(a)(2)(A) to extend to petitioners’ postpetition taxes. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 617 F. 3d 1161 (2010). The Court of Appeals held that the Chapter 12 estate does not “incur” the postpetition federal income taxes for purposes of § 503(b) because it is not a separate taxable entity under the IRC, and noted that Congress repeatedly has indicated the relevance of the IRC’s taxable entity provisions to the Bankruptcy Code. Although “sympathetic” to the view that the postpetition tax liabilities should be dischargeable, the Court of Appeals held that “the opérative language simply failed to make its way into the statute.” Id., at 1167. The Court of Appeals concluded that because the taxes do not qualify under § 503(b), they are not priority claims in the plan eligible for the § 1222(a) (2)(A) exception. Judge Paez dissented, siding with a sister Circuit that had concluded that Congress intended § 1222(a)(2)(A) to extend to such postpetition federal income taxes. We granted certiorari to resolve the split of authority. 564 U. S. 1003 (2011). II A Our resolution of this case turns on the meaning of a phrase in § 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code: “incurred by the estate.” The parties agree that § 1222(a)(2)(A) applies only to priority claims collectible in the bankruptcy plan and that postpetition federal income taxes so qualify only if they constitute a “tax . . . incurred by the estate.” § 503(b)(1)(B)(i). The phrase “incurred by the estate” bears a plain and natural reading. See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U. S. 397, 403 (2011) (“When a statute does not define a term, we typically ‘give the phrase its ordinary meaning’”). To “incur,” one must “suffer or bring on oneself (a liability or expense).” Black’s Law Dictionary 836 (9th ed. 2009); see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1146 (1976) (“to .. . become liable or subject to: bring down upon oneself”); Random House Dictionary 722 (1966) (“to become liable or subject to through one’s own action; bring upon oneself”). A tax “incurred by the estate” is a tax for which the estate itself is liable. As the IRC makes clear, only certain estates are liable for federal income taxes. Title 26 U. S. C. §§ 1398 and 1399 address taxation in bankruptcy and define the division of responsibilities for the payment of taxes between the estate and the debtor on a chapter-by-chapter basis. Section 1398 provides that when an individual debtor files for Chapter 7 or 11 bankruptcy, the estate shall be liable for taxes. In such cases, the trustee files a separate return on the estate’s behalf and “[t]he tax” on “the taxable income of the estate . . . shall be paid by the trustee.” § 1398(e)(1); see also § 6012(b)(4) (“Returns of... an estate of an individual under chapter 7 or 11 ... shall be made by the fiduciary thereof”). Section 1399 provides that “[ejxcept in any case to which section 1398 applies, no separate taxable entity shall result from the commencement of a [bankruptcy] case.” In Chapter 12 and 13 cases, then, there is no separately taxable estate. The debtor — not the trustee — is generally liable for taxes and files the only tax return. See In re Lindsey, 142 B. R. 447, 448 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Okla. 1992) (“It is clear that, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 1398 and 1399, the standing Chapter 12 trustee neither files a return nor pays federal income tax”); cf. infra, at 621-522 (discussing special trustee duties in corporate-debtor cases). These provisions suffice to resolve this case: Chapter 12 estates are not taxable entities. Petitioners, not the estate itself, are required to file the tax return and are liable for the taxes resulting from their postpetition farm sale. The postpetition federal income tax liability is not “incurred by the estate” and thus is neither collectible nor dischargeable in the Chapter 12 plan. B Our reading of “incurred by the estate” as informed by the IRC’s separate taxable entity rules draws support from a related provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 346, and its longstanding interplay with 26 U. S. C. §§ 1398 and 1399. That relationship illustrates that from the inception of the current Bankruptcy Code, Congress has specified on a chapter-by-chapter basis which estates are separately taxable and therefore liable for taxes. That relationship also refutes the dissent’s suggestion that applying such rules is an incongruous importation of “tax law” unconnected to “bankruptcy principles (as Congress understood them).” Post, at 631 (opinion of Breyer, J.). And it reinforces the reasonableness of our view that whether an estate “incurs” taxes under § 503(b) turns on such chapter-by-chapter distinctions. In the original Bankruptcy Code, Congress included a provision, §346, that set out a chapter-specific division of tax liabilities between the estate and the debtor. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2565. Section 346(b)(1) provided that in an individual-debtor Chapter 7 or 11 bankruptcy, “any income of the estate may be taxed under a State or local law imposing a tax . . . only to the estate, and may not be taxed to such individual.” 92 Stat. 2565 (emphasis added); see also 11 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶TX12.03[5][b][i], p. TX12-21 (16th ed. 2011) (hereinafter Collier) (Section 346(b) “provided that in a case under chapter 7 [or] 11... the estate of an individual is a taxable entity”). Section 346(d) provided, meanwhile, that in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, “any income of the estate or the debtor may be taxed under a State- or local law imposing a tax . . . only to the debtor, and may not be taxed to the estate ” 92 Stat. 2566 (emphasis added). Congress thus established that the estate in an individual-debtor Chapter 7 or 11 bankruptcy is a separate taxable entity; the estate in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy is not. Although §346 concerned state or local taxes, Congress applied its framework to federal taxes two years later. In the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 3397, Congress enacted 26 U. S. C. §§1398 and 1399. Section 1398 of the IRC, much like § 346(b) in the Bankruptcy Code, established that the estate is separately taxable in individual-debtor Chapter 7 or 11 cases. Section 1399 of the IRC, much like § 346(d) in the Bankruptcy Code, clarified that the estate is not separately taxable in Chapter 13 (and now Chapter 12) cases. In 2005, Congress in BAPCPA amended § 346 and crystallized the connection between- the Bankruptcy Code and the IRC. Section 346 now expressly aligns its assignment of state or local taxes with the rules for federal taxes, providing in relevant part: “(a) Whenever the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 provides that a separate taxable estate or entity is created in a case concerning a debtor under this title, and the income ... of such estate shall be taxed to or claimed by the estate, a separate taxable estate is also created for purposes of any State and local law imposing a tax on or measured by income and such income .. . shall be taxed to or claimed by the estate and may not be taxed to or claimed by the debtor.... “(b) Whenever the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 provides that no separate taxable estate shall be created in a case concerning a debtor under this title, and the income ... of an estate shall be taxed to or claimed by the debtor, such income . .. shall be taxed to or claimed by the debtor under a State or local law imposing a tax on or measured by income and may not be taxed to or claimed by the estate” (Emphasis added.) Thus, whenever the estate is separately taxable under federal income tax law, that “is also” the case under state or local income tax law, § 346(a), and vice versa, § 346(b). And given that the Bankruptcy Code instructs that the assignment of state or local tax liabilities shall turn on the IRC’s separate taxable entity rules, there is parity in turning to such rules in assigning federal tax liabilities. In the same Act, Congress added § 1222(a)(2)(A). Section 1222(a)(2)(A) carves out an exception to the ordinary priority classification scheme. But § 1222(a)(2)(A) did not purport to redefine which claims are otherwise entitled to priority, much less alter the underlying division of tax liability between the estate and the debtor in Chapter 12 cases. “We assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation,” Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 32 (1990), and the existing law at the enactment of § 1222(a) (2)(A) indicated that an estate’s liability for taxes turned on chapter-by-chapter separate taxable entity rules. C The statutory structure further reinforces our holding that petitioners’ postpetition income taxes are not “incurred by the estate.” As a leading bankruptcy treatise and lower courts recognize, “[b]ecause chapter 12 was modeled on chapter 13, and because so many of the provisions are identical, chapter 13 cases construing provisions corresponding to chapter 12 provisions may be relied on as authority in chapter 12 cases.” 8 Collier ¶1200.01[5], at 1200-10; In re Lopez, 372 B. R. 40, 45, n. 13 (Bkrtcy. App. Panel CA9 2007); Justice v. Valley Nat. Bank, 849 F. 2d 1078, 1083 (CA8 1988). We agree. Section 1322(a)(2), like § 1222(a)(2), requires full payment of “all claims entitled to priority under section 507” under the plan. Both provisions cross-reference the same section of the Code, § 507, and in turn, the same subsection, § 503(b). Both are treated alike by IRC §§1398 and 1399. Whether postpetition taxes qualify under § 503(b) in Chapter 13 thus sheds light on whether they so qualify in petitioners’ Chapter 12 case. Bankruptcy courts and commentators have reasoned that postpetition income taxes are not “incurred by the estate” under § 503(b) because “a tax on postpetition income of the debtor or of the chapter 13 estate is not a liability of the chapter 13 estate; it is a liability of the debtor alone.” 8 Collier ¶ 1305.02[1], at 1305-5 and 1305-6. For over a decade, the Government has likewise hewed to the position that “since post-petition tax liabilities are, in Chapter 13 cases, incurred by the debtor, rather than the bankruptcy estate, .characterizing such liabilities as administrative expenses is inconsistent with section 503.” IRS Chief Counsel Advice No. 200113027, p. 6 (Mar. 30, 2001), 2001 WL 307746; see also Internal Revenue Manual §5.9.10.9.2(3) (2006) (hereinafter IRM); IRS Litigation Guideline Memorandum GL-26, p. 9 (Dec. 16,1996), 1996 WL 33107107. We see no reason to depart from those established understandings. To “ ‘hold the Chapter 13 estate liable for [a] tax when it does not exist as a taxable entity defies common sense as well as Congress’ intent.’” In re Whall, 391 B. R. 1, 4 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Mass. 2008). The same holds true for a Chapter 12 estate. A provision in Chapter 13 confirms that postpetition income taxes fall outside § 503(b). Section 1305(a)(1) provides that “[a] proof of claim may be filed by any entity that holds a claim against the debtor ... for taxes that become payable to a governmental unit while the ease is pending.” (Emphasis added.) That provision gives holders of postpetition claims the option of collecting postpetition taxes within the bankruptcy case — an option that the Government would never need to invoke if postpetition tax liabilities were already collectible inside the bankruptcy. Accordingly, lest we render §1305 “‘inoperative or superfluous,’” Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U. S. 88, 101 (2004), it is clear that postpetition income taxes are not automatically collectible in a Chapter 13 plan and, a fortiori, are not administrative' expenses under § 503(b). It follows that postpetition income taxes are not automatically collectible in petitioners’ Chapter 12 plan. Because both chapters cross-reference § 503(b) in an identical manner, see §§ 1222(a)(2), 1322(a)(2), we are cognizant that any conflicting reading of § 503(b) here could disrupt settled Chapter 13 practices. See Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U. S. 213, 221 (1998) (the Court “'will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure’ ”). Chapter 13 filings outnumber Chapter 12 filings six hundredfold. See U. S. Bankruptcy Courts — Cases Commenced During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2011 (Table P-2) (estimating 676 and 417,503 annual Chapter 12 and 13 filings, respectively), http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/Bankruptcy Statistics.aspx (as visited May 14, 2012, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Yet adopting petitioners’ reading of § 503(b) would mean that, in every Chapter 13 case, the Government could ignore § 1305 and expect priority payment of postpetition income taxes in every plan. At bottom, “identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning.” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S. 224, 232 (2007). Absent any indication that Congress intended a conflict between two closely related chapters, we .decline to create one. Ill Petitioners and the-dissent advance several arguments for why the postpetition income taxes at issue should be consid-' ered “incurred by the estate,” notwithstanding the IRC’s separate taxable entity rules. But none provides sufficient reason to overcome the statute’s plain language, context, and structure. Petitioners primarily argue that “incurred by the estate” has a temporal meaning. Petitioners emphasize that the estate only comes into existence after a bankruptcy petition is filed. Thus, they reason, taxes “incurred by the estate” refers to all taxes “incurred postpetition,” regardless of whether the estate is liable for the tax and regardless of the chapter under which a case is filed. Although all taxes “incurred by the estate” are necessarily incurred postpetition, not all taxes incurred postpetition are “incurred by the estate.” That an estate cannot incur liability until it exists does not mean that every liability that arises after that point automatically becomes the estate’s liability. And there is no textual basis to focus on when the liability is incurred, as opposed to whether the liability is incurred “by the estate.” Alternatively, petitioners contend that a tax should be considered “incurred by the estate” so long as it is payable out of estate assets. Income from postpetition sales of farm assets is considered property of the estate. See § 1207(a). Petitioners argue that even if the debtor — and not the estate — is liable for a tax, the tax is still “incurred by the estate” because the funds the debtor uses to pay the tax are property of the estate. But that too strains the text beyond what it can bear. To concede that someone other than the estate is liable for filing the return and paying the tax, and yet maintain that the estate is the one that has “incurred” the tax, defies the ordinary meaning of “incur” as bringing a liability upon oneself. The dissent, echoing both of these points, urges that we “simply . . . consider the debtor and estate as merged.” Post, at 534. “The English language,” the dissent reasons, “permits this reading” and “do[es] not require” our reading. Post, at 531. But any reading of “tax . . . incurred by the estate” that is contingent on merging the debtor and estate— despite Congress’ longstanding efforts to distinguish between when tax liabilities are borne by the debtor or borne by the estate — is not a natural construction of the statute as written. Moreover, these alternative readings create a conflict between § 503(b) and § 346(b). Petitioners consider postpetition state or local income taxes, like federal income taxes, to be “incurred by the estate” under § 503(b). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5. But § 346(b) requires that such taxes be borne by the Chapter 12 debtor, not the estate. It is implausible to maintain that taxes are “incurred by the estate” when § 346(b) specifically prohibits such taxes from being “taxed to or claimed by the estate.” To buttress their counterintuitive readings of the text, petitioners and the dissent suggest that there is a long history of treating postpetition taxes as administrative expenses entitled to priority. Both point to two legislative Reports accompanying the 1978 enactment of §503. But; neither snippet from which they quote is inconsistent with today’s holding, and we have cautioned against “allowing ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language.” Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U. S. 562, 572 (2011). Petitioners also point to cases suggesting that postpetition taxes were treated as administrative expenses. E. g., United States v. Noland, 517 U. S. 535, 543 (1996) (corporate Chapter 11 debtor); Nicholas v. United States, 384 U. S. 678, 687-688 (1966) (corporate Chapter XI case under predecessor Bankruptcy Act). But those cases involve corporate debtors and are therefore inapposite. Among estates that are not separately taxable, those involving corporate debtors have long been singled out by Congress for special responsibilities. See H. R. Rep., at 277 (even “[i]f the estate is not a separate taxable entity,” administrative responsibility can “var[y] according to the nature of the debtor”). Although estates of corporate debtors are not separate taxable entities under 26 U. S. C. §§ 1398 and 1399, the IRC requires a trustee that “has possession of or holds title to all or substantially all the property or business of a corporation” to “make the return of income for such . corporation.” § 6012(b)(3). In effect, Congress provided that the trustee in a corporate-debtor case may shoulder responsibility that parallels that borne by the trustee of a separate taxable entity. In any event, petitioners do not deny that neither the separate taxable entity provisions nor the special provisions for corporate debtors apply to them. Finally, petitioners and the dissent contend that the purpose of 11 U. S. C. § 1222(a)(2)(A) was to provide debtors with robust relief from tax debts, relying on statements by a single Senator on unenacted bills introduced in years preceding the enactment. See Brief for Petitioners 23-36. They argue that deeming § 1222(a)(2)(A) inapplicable to their post-petition income taxes would undermine that purpose and confine the exception to prepetition taxes. But we need not resolve here what other claims, if any, are covered by § 1222(a)(2)(A). Whatever the 2005 Congress’ intent with respect to § 1222(a)(2)(A), that provision merely carved out an exception to the pre-existing priority classification scheme. The exception could only apply to claims “entitled to priority under section 507” in the first place. That pre-existing scheme was in turn premised on antecedent, decades-old understandings about the scope of § 503(b) and the division of tax liabilities between estates and debtors. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U. S. 410, 419 (1992) (“When Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does not write ‘on a clean slate’”). If Congress wished to alter these background norms, it needed to enact a provision to enable post-petition income taxes to be collected in the Chapter 12 plan in the first place. The dissent concludes otherwise by an inverted analysis. Rather than demonstrate that such claims were treated as § 507 priority claims in the first place, the dissent begins with the single Senator’s stated purpose for the exception to that priority scheme. Post, at 529-530. It then reasons backwards from there, and in the process upsets background norms in both Chapters 12 and 13. Certainly, there may be compelling policy reasons for treating postpetition income tax liabilities as dischargeable. But if Congress intended that result, it did not so provide in the statute. Given the statute’s plain language, context, and structure, it is not for us to rewrite the statute, particularly in this complex terrain of interconnected provisions and exceptions enacted over nearly three decades. Petitioners’ position threatens ripple effects beyond this individual case for debtors in Chapter 13 and the broader bankruptcy scheme that we need not invite. As the Court of Appeals noted, “Congress is entirely free to change the law by amending the text.” 617 F. 3d, at 1167. ‡ ⅜ ⅜ We hold that the federal income tax liability resulting from petitioners’ postpetition farm sale is not “incurred by the estate” under § 503(b) and thus is neither collectible nor dis-chargeable in the Chapter 12 plan. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. It is so ordered. Compare In re Dawes, 652 F. 3d 1236 (CA10 2011), and 617 F. 3d 1161 (CA9 2010) (ease below), with Knvdsen v. IRS, 581 F. 3d 696 (CA8 2009) (postpetition federal taxes are eligible for the § 1222(a)(2)(A) exception and thus dischargeable). Because we hold that the postpetition federal income taxes at issue are not collectible in the plan because they are not “incurred by the estate,” we need not address the Government’s broader alternative argument that Chapter 12 plans are exclusively limited to prepetition claims. For those of us for whom it is relevant, the legislative history confirms that Congress viewed § 346 as defining which estates were separate taxable entities. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 275 (1977) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.) (“A threshold issue to be considered when a debtor files a petition under title 11 is whether the estate created . . . should be treated as a separate taxable entity”); id., at 334 (“Subsection (d) indicates that the estate in a chapter 13 case is not a separate taxable entity”); accord, S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 45 (1978) (hereinafter S. Rep.); H. R. Rep., at 335 (noting “the creation of the estate of an individual under chapters 7 or 11 of title 11 as a separate taxable entity”); accord, S. Rep., at 46. The Reports also tie separate taxable entity status to the responsibility to file returns and pay taxes. See H. R. Rep., at 277 (“If the estate is a separate taxable entity, then the representative of the estate is responsible for filing any income tax returns and paying any taxes due by the estate”); id,., at 278 (“When the estate is not a separate taxable entity, then taxation of the debtor should be conducted on the same basis as if no petition were filed”). A dispute over Committee jurisdiction led to the insertion of “State or local” before each mention of “law imposing a tax.” Compare H. R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 346 (1977), with § 346, 92 Stat. 2565. Nonetheless, the House Report underscored that the policy behind § 346 applied equally to federal taxes: “[T]here is a strong bankruptcy policy that these provisions apply equally to Federal, State, and local taxes. However, in order to avoid any possible jurisdictional conflict with the Ways and Means Committee over the applicability of these provisions to Federal taxes, H. R. 8200 has been amended to make the sections inapplicable to Federal taxes. The amendment . . . will obviate the need for a sequential referral of the bill to Ways and Means, which will be considering these provisions and other bankruptcy-related tax law later in this Congress.” H. R. Rep., at 275. See, e.g., In re Maxfield, No. 04-60355, 2009 WL 2105953, *5-*6 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ND Ind., Feb. 19, 2009); In re Jagours, 236 B. R. 616, 620 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Tex. 1999); In re Whall, 391 B. R. 1, 5-6 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Mass. 2008); In re Brown, No. 05-41071, 2006 WL 3370867, *3 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Mass., Nov. 20,2006); In re Gyulafia, 65 B. R. 913,916 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Kan. 1986). The dissent suggests that Chapter 12 can be distinguished from Chapter IS because Chapter 12 bankruptcies tend to be longer, such that the treatment of taxes is more “important.” Post, at 535. As a practical matter, it is not clear that Chapter 12 bankruptcies are substantially longer. Compare Brief for Neil E. Harl et al. as Amici Curiae 33 (median Chapter 12 case duration is under 8 months) with TV. of Oral Arg. 49 (“on average we’re talking about 4 months in a chapter 13 ease”). In any event, there is no indication that Congress intended any difference in duration — if it anticipated a difference at all — to flip the characterization of postpetition income taxes from one chapter to the other. Nor does the absence of a § 1305 equivalent in Chapter 12 justify shoehorning postpetition taxes into § 503(b), as the dissent argues. That Chapter 12 lacks a provision allowing such taxes to be brought inside the plan only clarifies that such taxes fall outside of the plan. The dissent alternatively suggests that it “do[es] not see the serious harm in treating the relevant taxes as ‘administrative expenses’ in both Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 cases.” Post, at 536. The “harm” is to settled understandings in Chapter 13 to the contrary. The “harm” is also to § 1305; to avoid rendering § 1305 a nullity, the dissent recasts the provision as applicable not to all “taxes that become payable ... while the ease is pending,” but only those payable “after the Chapter 13 Plan is confirmed.” Ibid. The dissent does not claim, however, that this was Congress’ intent for § 1305, as Congress’ choice of words would be exceedingly overbroad if it were. And the dissent’s novel reading contravenes ample Chapter 13 authority recognizing no such limitation on §1305’s scope. E. g., 8 Collier ¶1305.02 (citing cases). IRS manuals dating back to 1998 indicate that the Government did not view postpetition federal income taxes as collectible in an individual debt- or’s Chapter 12 plan, even when that view was adverse to its interests. See IRM §25.17.12.9.3 (2004); id., §25.17.12.9.3(1) (2002); id., §5.9, ch. 10.8(4) (1999); id., §5.9, ch. 10.8(4) (1998). Until the enactment of 11 U. S. C. § 1222(a)(2)(A), treating such taxes as priority claims in the plan would have assured the Government of full payment before or at the time of the plan. The House Report stated — after noting that, in addition to prepetition taxes; “certain other taxes are entitled to priority” — that “[t]axes arising from the operation of the estate after bankruptcy are entitled to priority as administrative expenses.” H. R. Rep., at 193. That is still true. Many taxes arising after bankruptcy, as in individual-debtor Chapter 7 or 11 eases, remain entitled to priority as administrative expenses. The Senate Report, meanwhile, stated: “In general, administrative expenses include taxes which the trustee incurs in administering the debtor’s estate, including taxes on capital gains from sales of property by the trustee and taxes on income earned by the estate during the case.” S. Rep., at 66 (emphasis added). That likewise remains true. Administrative expenses still include income taxes that “the trustee,” as opposed to the debtor, has incurred — again, as in individual-debtor Chapter 7 or 11 eases. The original §346 established that the estate of a corporate debtor is not a separate taxable entity, but nonetheless provided that “the trustee shall make any [State or local] tax return otherwise required ... to be filed by or on behalf of such . . . corporation.” §§346(c)(l)-(2), 92 Stat. 2566. The current §346 similarly states, in the same provision deeming the debtor taxable when there is no separate taxable estate, that “[t]he trustee shall make such tax returns of income of corporations .... The estate shall be liable for any [State or local] tax imposed on such corporation.” § 346(b). The dissent opines that employment taxes must be administrative expenses “incurred by the estate” because, in its view, they “do not fit easily” within the category of administrative expenses under § 503(b)(l)(A)(i), notwithstanding the Government’s contrary representations on both points. Post, at 535. Because employment ta'xes are not at issue in this case, we offer no opinion on either question.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SUMMERS et al. v. EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE et al. No. 07-463. Argued October 8, 2008 Decided March 3, 2009 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 501. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 501. Then-Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were former Solicitors General Clement and Garre, Assistant Attorney General Tenpas, Malcolm L. Stewart, Katherine W Hazard, and Marc L. Kesselman. Matt G. Kenna argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Scott L. Nelson. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Forest & Paper Association et al. by Thomas R. Lundquist, Steven P. Quarles, J. Michael Klise, Duane J. Desiderio, Thomas J. Ward, William R. Murray, and Douglas T. Nelson; for Douglas Timber Operators et al. by Caroline C. Lobdell; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by M. Reed Hopper and Damien M. Schiff. A brief of amicus curiae urging affirmance was filed for the State of California ex rel. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General of California, by Mr. Brown, pro se, J. Matthew Rodriguez, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth Alex, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Sally Magnani Knox, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Raissa S. Lerner, Deputy Attorney General. Amanda C. Letter filed a brief for Law Professors as amici curiae. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondents are a group of organizations dedicated to protecting the environment. (We will refer to them collectively as “Earth Island.”) They Seek to prevent the United States Forest Service from enforcing regulations that exempt small fire-rehabilitation and timber-salvage projects from the notice, comment, and appeal process used by the Forest Service for more significant land management decisions. We must determine whether respondents have standing to challenge the regulations in the absence of a live dispute over a concrete application of those regulations. I In 1992, Congress enacted the Forest Service Decision-making and Appeals Reform Act (Appeals Reform Act or Act), Pub. L. 102-381, Tit. Ill, §322, 106 Stat. 1419, note following 16 U. S. C. § 1612. Among other things, this required the Forest Service to establish a notice, comment, and appeal process for “proposed actions of the Forest Service concerning projects and activities implementing land and resource management plans developed under the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974.” Ibid. The Forest Service’s regulations implementing the Act provided that certain of its procedures would not be applied to projects that the Service considered categorically excluded from the requirement to file an environmental impact statement (EIS) or environmental assessment (EA). 36 CFR §§ 215.4(a) (notice and comment), 215.12(f) (appeal) (2008). Later amendments to the Forest Service’s manual of implementing procedures, adopted by rule after notice and comment, provided that fire-rehabilitation activities on areas of less than 4,200 acres, and salvage-timber sales of 250 acres or less, did not cause a significant environmental impact and thus would be categorically exempt from the requirement to file an EIS or EA. 68 Fed. Reg. 33824 (2003) (Forest Service Handbook (FSH) 1909.15, ch. 30, §31.2(11)); 68 Fed. Reg. 44607 (FSH 1909.15, ch. 30, §31.2(13)). This had the effect of excluding these projects from the notice, comment, and appeal process. In the summer of 2002, fire burned a significant area of the Sequoia National Forest. In September 2003, the Service issued a decision memo approving the Burnt Ridge Project, a salvage sale of timber on 238 acres damaged by that fire. Pursuant to its categorical exclusion of salvage sales of less than 250 acres, the Forest Service did not provide notice in a form consistent with the Appeals Reform Act, did not provide a period of public comment, and did not make an appeal process available. In December 2003, respondents filed a complaint in the Eastern District of California, challenging the failure of the Forest Service to apply to the Burnt Ridge Project § 215.4(a) of its regulations implementing the Appeals Reform Act (requiring prior notice and comment), and §215.12(f) of the regulations (setting forth an appeal procedure). The complaint also challenged six other Forest Service regulations implementing the Act that were not applied to the Burnt Ridge Project. They are irrelevant to this appeal. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction against the Burnt Ridge salvage-timber sale. Soon thereafter, the parties settled their dispute over the Burnt Ridge Project and the District Court concluded that “the Burnt Ridge timber sale is not at issue in this case.” Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly, 376 F. Supp. 2d 994, 999 (ED Cal. 2005). The Government argued that, with the Burnt Ridge dispute settled, and with no other project before the court in which respondents were threatened with injury in fact, respondents lacked standing to challenge the regulations; and that absent a concrete dispute over a particular project a challenge to the regulations would not be ripe. The District Court proceeded, however, to adjudicate the merits of Earth Island’s challenges. It invalidated five of the regulations (including §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f)), id., at 1011, and entered a nationwide injunction against their application, Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, No. CIV F-03-6386 JKS, 2005 WL 5280466, *2 (Sept. 20, 2005). The Ninth Circuit held that Earth Island’s challenges to regulations not at issue in the Burnt Ridge Project were not ripe for adjudication because there was “not a sufficient ‘case or controversy’” before the court to sustain a facial challenge. Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F. 3d 687, 696 (2007) (amended opinion). It affirmed, however, the District Court’s determination that §§ 215.4(a) and 215.12(f), which were applicable to the Burnt Ridge Project, were contrary to law, and upheld the nationwide injunction against their application. The Government sought review of the question whether Earth Island could challenge the regulations at issue in the Burnt Ridge Project, and if so whether a nationwide injunction was appropriate relief. We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. 1162 (2008). II In limiting the judicial power to “Cases” and “Controversies,” Article III of the Constitution restricts it to the traditional role of Anglo-American courts, which is to redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to persons caused by private or official violation of law. Except when necessary in the execution of that function, courts have no charter to review and revise legislative and executive action. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 559-560 (1992); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 111-112 (1983). This limitation “is founded in concern about the proper — and properly limited — role of the courts in a democratic society.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975). See United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 179 (1974). The doctrine of standing is one of several doctrines that reflect this fundamental limitation. It requires federal courts to satisfy themselves that “the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction.” Warth, supra, at 498-499. He bears the burden of showing that he has standing for each type of relief sought. See Lyons, supra, at 105. To seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that he is under threat of suffering “injury in fact” that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; it must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and it must be likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury. Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 180-181 (2000). This requirement assures that “there is a real need to exercise the power of judicial review in order to protect the interests of the complaining party,” Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 221 (1974). Where that need does not exist, allowing courts to oversee legislative or executive action “would significantly alter the allocation of power . . . away from a democratic form of government,” Richardson, supra, at 188 (Powell, J., concurring). The regulations under challenge here neither require nor forbid any action on the part of respondents. The standards and procedures that they prescribe for Forest Service appeals govern only the conduct of Forest Service officials engaged in project planning. “[Wjhen the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.” Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 562. Here, respondents can demonstrate standing only if application of the regulations by the Government will affect them in the manner described above. It is common ground that the respondent organizations can assert the standing of their members. To establish the concrete and particularized injury that standing requires, respondents point to their members’ recreational interests in the national forests. While generalized harm to the forest or the environment will not alone support standing, if that harm in fact affects the recreational or even the mere esthetic interests of the plaintiff, that will suffice. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 734-736 (1972). Affidavits submitted to the District Court alleged that organization member Ara Marderosian had repeatedly visited the Burnt Ridge site, that he had imminent plans to do so again, and that his interests in viewing the flora and fauna of the area would be harmed if the Burnt Ridge Project went forward without incorporation of the ideas he would have suggested if the Forest Service had provided him an opportunity to comment. The Government concedes this was sufficient to establish Article III standing with respect to Burnt Ridge. Brief for Petitioners 28. Marderosian’s threatened injury with regard to that project was originally one of the bases for the present suit. After the District Court had issued a preliminary injunction, however, the parties settled their differences on that score. Marderosian’s injury in fact with regard to that project has been remedied, and it is, as the District Court pronounced, “not at issue in this case.” 376 F. Supp. 2d, at 999. We know of no precedent for the proposition that when a plaintiff has sued to challenge the lawfulness of certain action or threatened action but has settled that suit, he retains standing to challenge the basis for that action (here, the regulation in the abstract), apart from any concrete application that threatens imminent harm to his interests. Such a holding would fly in the face of Article Ill’s injury-in-fact requirement. See Lyons, supra, at 111. Respondents have identified no other application of the invalidated regulations that threatens imminent and concrete harm to the interests of their members. The only other affidavit relied on was that of Jim Bensman. He asserted, first, that he had suffered injury in the past from development on Forest Service land. That does not suffice for several reasons: because it was not tied to application of the challenged regulations, because it does not identify any particular site, and because it relates to past injury rather than imminent future injury that is sought to be enjoined. Bensman’s affidavit further asserts that he has visited many national forests and plans to visit several unnamed national forests in the future. Respondents describe this as a mere failure to “provide the name of each timber sale that affected [Bensman’s] interests,” Brief for Respondents 44. It is much more (or much less) than that. It is a failure to allege that any particular timber sale or other project claimed to be unlawfully subject to the regulations will impede a specific and concrete plan of Bensman’s to enjoy the national forests. The national forests occupy more than 190 million acres, an area larger than Texas. See Meet the Forest Service, http://www.fs.fed.us/aboutus/meetfs.shtml (as visited Feb. 27, 2009, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). There may be a chance, but is hardly a likelihood, that Bensman’s wanderings will bring him to a parcel about to be affected by a project unlawfully subject to the regulations. Indeed, without further specification it is impossible to tell which projects are (in respondents’ view) unlawfully subject to the regulations. The allegations here present a weaker likelihood of concrete harm than that which we found insufficient in Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, where a plaintiff who alleged that he had been injured by an improper police chokehold sought injunctive relief barring use of the hold in the future. We said it was “no more than conjecture” that Lyons would be subjected to that chokehold upon a later encounter. Id., at 108. Here we are asked to assume not only that Bensman will stumble across a project tract unlawfully subject to the regulations, but also that the tract is about to be developed by the Forest Service in a way that harms his recreational interests, and that he would have commented on the project but for the regulation. Accepting an intention to visit the national forests as adequate to confer standing to challenge any Government action affecting any portion of those forests would be tantamount to eliminating the requirement of concrete, particularized injury in fact. The Bensman affidavit does refer specifically to a series of projects in the Allegheny National Forest that are subject to the challenged regulations. It does not assert, however, any firm intention to visit their locations, saying only that Bensman “ Vant[s] to’” go there. Brief for Petitioners 6. This vague desire to return is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of imminent injury: “Such ‘some day’ intentions— without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be — do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.” Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S., at 564. Respondents argue that they have standing to bring their challenge because they have suffered procedural injury, namely, that they have been denied the ability to file comments on some Forest Service actions and will continue to be so denied. But deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation— a procedural right in vacuo — is insufficient to create Article III standing. Only a “person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redress-ability and immediacy.” Id., at 572, n. 7 (emphasis added). Respondents alleged such injury in their challenge to the Burnt Ridge Project, claiming that but for the allegedly unlawful abridged procedures they would have been able to oppose the project that threatened to impinge on their concrete plans to observe nature in that specific area. But Burnt Ridge is now off the table. It makes no difference that the procedural right has been accorded by Congress. That can loosen the strictures of the redressability prong of our standing inquiry — so that standing existed with regard to the Burnt Ridge Project, for example, despite the possibility that Earth Island’s allegedly guaranteed right to comment would not be successful in persuading the Forest Service to avoid impairment of Earth Island’s concrete interests. See ibid. Unlike redressability, however, the requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute. “[I]t would exceed [Article Ill’s] limitations if, at the behest of Congress and in the absence of any showing of concrete injury, we were to entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public’s nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the laws.... [T]he party bringing suit must show that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way.” Id., at 580-581 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Ill The dissent proposes a hitherto unheard-of test for organizational standing: whether, accepting the organization’s self-description of the activities of its members, there is a statistical probability that some of those members are threatened with concrete injury. Since, for example, the Sierra Club asserts in its pleadings that it has more than “ ‘700,000 members nationwide, including thousands of members in California’ who ‘use and enjoy the Sequoia National Forest,’ ” post, at 502 (opinion of Breyer, J.), it is probable (according to the dissent) that some (unidentified) members have planned to visit some (unidentified) small parcels affected by the Forest Service’s procedures and will suffer (unidentified) concrete harm as a result. This novel approach to the law of organizational standing would make a mockery of our prior cases, which have required plaintiff-organizations to make specific allegations establishing that at least one identified member had suffered or would suffer harm. In Defenders of Wildlife, supra, at 563, we held that the organization lacked standing because it failed to “submit affidavits . . . showing, through specific facts . . . that one or more of [its] members would ... be ‘directly’ affected” by the allegedly illegal activity. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, involved the same Sierra Club that is a party in the present case, and a project in the Sequoia National Forest. The principal difference from the present case is that the challenged project was truly massive, involving the construction of motels, restaurants, swimming pools, parking lots, and other structures on 80 acres of the Forest, plus ski lifts, ski trails, and a 20-mile access highway. We did not engage in an assessment of statistical probabilities that one of the Sierra Club’s members would be adversely affected, but held that the Sierra Club lacked standing. We said: “The Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its members would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by the Disney development. Nowhere in the pleadings or affidavits did the Club state that its members use Mineral King for any purpose, much less that they use it in any way that would be significantly affected by the proposed actions of the respondents.” Id., at 735. And in FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 235 (1990), we noted that the affidavit provided by the city to establish standing would be insufficient because it did not name the individuals who were harmed by the challenged license-revocation program. This requirement of naming the affected members has never been dispensed with in light of statistical probabilities, but only where all the members of the organization are affected by the challenged activity. See, e. g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 459 (1958) (all organization members affected by release of membership lists). A major problem with the dissent’s approach is that it accepts the organizations’ self-descriptions of their membership, on the simple ground that “no one denies” them, post, at 506. But it is well established that the court has an independent obligation to assure that standing exists, regardless of whether it is challenged by any of the parties. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534, 541 (1986). Without individual affidavits, how is the court to assure itself that the Sierra Club, for example, has “ ‘thousands of members’ ” who “ ‘use and enjoy the Sequoia National Forest’ ”? And, because to establish standing plaintiffs must show that they “use the area affected by the challenged activity and not an area roughly in the vicinity of” a project site, Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S., at 566 (internal quotation marks omitted), how is the court to assure itself that some of these members plan to make use of the specific sites upon which projects may take place? Or that these same individuals will find their recreation burdened by the Forest Service’s use of the challenged procedures? While it is certainly possible — perhaps even likely — that one individual will meet all of these criteria, that speculation does not suffice. “Standing,” we have said, “is not ‘an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable’ . . . [but] requires ... a factual showing of perceptible harm.” Ibid. In part because of the difficulty of verifying the facts upon which such probabilistic standing depends, the Court has required plaintiffs claiming an organizational standing to identify members who have suffered the requisite harm — surely not a difficult task here, when so many thousands are alleged to have been harmed. The dissent would have us replace the requirement of “ ‘imminent’ ” harm, which it acknowledges our cases establish, see post, at 505, with the requirement of “ ‘a realistic threat’ that reoccurrence of the challenged activity would cause [the plaintiff] harm ‘in the reasonably near future,’” ibid. That language is taken, of course, from an opinion that did not find standing, so the seeming expansiveness of the test made not a bit of difference. The problem for the dissent is that the timely affidavits no more meet that requirement than they meet the usual formulation. They fail to establish that the affiants’ members will ever visit one of the small parcels at issue. The dissent insists, however, that we should also have considered the late-filed affidavits. It invokes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d) (West 2008 rev. ed.), which says that “[t]he court may permit supplementation even though the original pleading is defective in stating a claim or defense.” So also does Rule 21 permit joinder of parties “at any time.” But the latter no more permits joinder of parties, than the former permits the supplementation of the record, in the circumstances here: after the trial is over, judgment has been entered, and a notice of appeal has been filed. The dissent cites no instance in which “supplementation” has been permitted to resurrect and alter the outcome in a case that has gone to judgment, and indeed after notice of appeal had been filed. If Rule 15(b) allows additional facts to be inserted into the record after appeal has been filed, we are at the threshold of a brave new world of trial practice in which Rule 60 has been swallowed whole by Rule 15(b). * * * Since we have resolved this case on the ground of standing, we need not reach the Government’s contention that plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the regulations are ripe for review under the Administrative Procedure Act. We likewise do not reach the question whether, if respondents prevailed, a nationwide injunction would be appropriate. And we do not disturb the dismissal of respondents’ challenge to the remaining regulations, which has not been appealed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part. It is so ordered. After the District Court had entered judgment, and after the Government had filed its notice of appeal, respondents submitted additional affidavits to the District Court. We do not consider these. If respondents had not met the challenge to their standing at the time of judgment, they could not remedy the defect retroactively.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

AARON v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION No. 79-66. Argued February 25, 1980 Decided June 2, 1980 Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, JJ., joined. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 702. Blackmun, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., joined, post, p. 703. Barry M. Fallick argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Ralph C. Ferrara argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, Stephen M. Shapiro, Paul Gonson, and Jacob H. Stillman Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by John M. Cannon for the Mid-America Legal Foundation; by Kenneth J. Bidkin and Louis A. Craco for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants; and by Milton F. Freeman, Werner Kronstein, and Richard 0. Scribner for the Securities Industry Association. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) is required to establish scienter as an element of a civil enforcement action to enjoin violations of § 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), and Commission Rule 10b-5 promulgated under that section of the 1934 Act. I When the events giving rise to this enforcement proceeding occurred, the petitioner was a managerial employee at E. L. Aaron & Co. (the firm), a registered broker-dealer with its principal office in New York City. Among other responsibilities at the firm, the petitioner was charged with supervising the sales made by its registered representatives and maintaining the so-called “due diligence” files for those securities in which the firm served as a market maker. One such security was the common stock of Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment Corp. (Lawn-A-Mat), a company engaged in the business of selling lawn-care franchises and supplying its franchisees with products and equipment. Between November 1974 and September 1975, two registered representatives of the firm, Norman Schreiber and Donald Jacobson, conducted a sales campaign in which they repeatedly made false and misleading statements in an effort to solicit orders for the purchase of Lawn-A-Mat common stock. During the course of this promotion, Schreiber and Jacobson informed prospective investors that Lawn-A-Mat was planning or in the process of manufacturing a new type of small car and tractor, and that the car would be marketed within six weeks. Lawn-A-Mat, however, had no such plans. The two registered representatives also made projections of substantial increases in the price of Lawn-A-Mat common stock and optimistic statements concerning the company’s financial condition. These projections and statements were without basis in fact, since Lawn-A-Mat was losing money during the relevant period. Upon receiving several complaints from prospective investors, an officer of Lawn-A-Mat informed Schreiber and Jacobson that their statements were false and misleading and requested them to cease making such statements. This request went unheeded, Thereafter, Milton Kean, an attorney representing Lawn-A-Mat, communicated with the petitioner twice by telephone. In these conversations, Kean informed the petitioner that Schreiber and Jacobson were making false and misleading statements and described the substance of what they were saying. The petitioner, in addition to being so informed by Kean, had reason to know that the statements were false, since he knew that the reports in Lawn-A-Mat’s due diligence file indicated a deteriorating financial condition and revealed no plans for manufacturing a new car and tractor. Although assuring Kean that the misrepresentations would cease, the petitioner took no affirmative steps to prevent their recurrence. The petitioner’s only response to the telephone calls was to inform Jacobson of Kean’s complaint and to direct him to communicate with Kean. Otherwise, the petitioner did nothing to prevent the two registered representatives under his direct supervision from continuing to make false and misleading statements in promoting Lawn-A-Mat common stock. In February 1976, the Commission filed a complaint in the District Court for the Southern District of New York against the petitioner and seven other defendants in connection with the offer and sale of Lawn-A-Mat common stock. In seeking preliminary and final injunctive relief pursuant to § 20 (b) of the 1933 Act and § 21 (d) of the 1934 Act, the Commission alleged that the petitioner had violated and aided and abetted violations of three provisions — § 17 (a) of the 1933 Act, § 10 (b) of the 1934 Act, and Commission Rule 10b-5 promulgated under that section of the 1934 Act. The gravamen of the charges against the petitioner was that he knew or had reason to know that the employees under his supervision were engaged in fraudulent practices, but failed to take adequate steps to prevent those practices from continuing. Before commencement of the trial, all the defendants except the petitioner consented to the entry of permanent injunctions against them. Following a bench trial, the District Court found that the petitioner had violated and aided and abetted violations of § 17 (a), § 10 (b), and Rule 10b-5 during the Lawn-A-Mat sales campaign and enjoined him from future violations of these provisions. The District Court’s finding of past violations was based upon its factual finding that the petitioner had intentionally failed to discharge his supervisory responsibility to stop Schreiber and Jacobson from making statements to prospective investors that the petitioner knew to be false and misleading. Although noting that negligence alone might suffice to establish a violation of the relevant provisions in a Commission enforcement action, the District Court concluded that the fact that the petitioner “intentionally failed to terminate the false and misleading statements made by Schreiber and Jacobson, knowing them to be fraudulent, is sufficient to establish his scienter under the securities laws.” As to the remedy, even though the firm had since gone bankrupt and the petitioner was no longer working for a broker-dealer, the District Court reasoned that injunctive relief was warranted in light of “the nature and extent of the violations . . . , the [petitioner’s] failure to recognize the wrongful nature of his conduct and the likelihood of the [petitioner’s] repeating his violative conduct.” The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment. 605 F. 2d 612. Declining to reach the question whether the petitioner’s conduct would support a finding of scienter, the Court of Appeals held instead that when the Commission is seeking injunctive relief, “proof of negligence alone will suffice” to establish a violation of § 17 (a), § 10 (b), and Rule 10b-5. Id., at 619. With regard to § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5, the Court of Appeals noted that this Court’s opinion in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, which held that an allegation of scienter is necessary to state a private cause of action for damages under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5, had expressly reserved the question whether scienter must be alleged in a suit for injunctive relief brought by the Commission. Id., at 194, n. 12. The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the scienter requirement of Hochf elder does not apply to Commission enforcement proceedings was said to find support in the language of § 10 (b), the legislative history of the 1934 Act, the relationship between § 10 (b) and the overall enforcement scheme of the securities laws, and the “compelling distinctions between private damage actions and government injunction actions.” For its holding that sci-enter is not a necessary element in a Commission injunctive action to enforce § 17 (a), the Court of Appeals relied on its earlier decision in SEC v. Coven, 581 F. 2d 1020 (1978). There that court had noted that the language of § 17 (a) contains nothing to suggest a requirement of intent and that, in enacting § 17 (a), Congress had considered a scienter requirement, but instead “opted for liability without willfulness, intent to defraud, or the like.” Id., at 1027-1028. Finally, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s holding that, under all the facts and circumstances of this case, the Commission was entitled to injunctive relief. 605 F. 2d, at 623-624. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the federal courts as to whether the Commission is required to establish scienter — an intent on the part of the defendant to deceive, manipulate, or defraud — as an element of a Commission enforcement action to enjoin violations of § 17 (a), § 10 (b), and Rule 10b-5. 444 U. S. 914. II The two substantive statutory provisions at issue here are § 17 (a) of the 1933 Act, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 IT. S. C. § 77q (a), and § 10 (b) of the 1934 Act, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b). Section 17 (a), which applies only to sellers, provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly— “(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or “(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or “(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.” Section 10 (b), which applies to both buyers and sellers, makes it “unlawful for any person ... [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . ., any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.” Pursuant to its rulemaking power under this section, the Commission promulgated Rule 1 Ob-5, which now provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, “(a) To employ any device, scheme, artifice to defraud, “(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or “(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 17 CFR § 240.1Ob-5 (1979). The civil enforcement mechanism for these provisions consists of both express and implied remedies. One express remedy is a suit by the Commission for injunctive relief. Section 20 (b) of the 1933 Act, 48 Stat. 86, as amended, as set forth in 15 U. S. C. § 77t (b), provides: “Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the provisions of this subchapter [e. g., § 17 (a)], or of any rule or regulation prescribed under authority thereof, it may in its discretion, bring an action in any district court of the United States ... to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond.” Similarly, § 21 (d) of the 1934 Act, 48 Stat. 900, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78u (d), authorizes the Commission to seek injunctive relief whenever it appears that a person “is engaged or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting” a violation of the 1934 Act (e. g., § 10 (b)), or regulations promulgated thereto (e. g., Rule 10b-5), and requires a district court “upon a proper showing” to grant injunctive relief. Another facet of civil enforcement is a private cause of action for money damages. This remedy, unlike the Commission injunctive action, is not expressly authorized by statute, but rather has been judicially implied. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S., at 196-197. Although this Court has repeatedly assumed the existence of an implied cause of action under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 730; Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128, 150-154; Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S. 6, 13, n. 9, it has not had occasion to address the question whether a private cause of action exists under § 17 (a). See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, supra, at 733, n. 6. The issue here is whether the Commission in seeking injunc-tive relief either under § 20 (b) for violations of § 17 (a), or under § 21 (d) for violations of § 10 (b) or Rule 10b-5, is required to establish scienter. Resolution of that issue could depend upon (1) the substantive provisions of -§ 17 (a), § 10 (b), and Rule 10b-5, or (2) the statutory provisions authorizing injunctive relief “upon a proper showing,” § 20 (b) and §21 (d). We turn to an examination of each to determine the extent to which they may require proof of scienter. A In determining whether scienter is a necessary element of a violation of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5, we do not write on a clean slate. Rather, the starting point for our inquiry is Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, supra, a case in which the Court concluded that a private cause of action for damages will not lie under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of an allegation of scienter. Although the issue presented in the present case was expressly reserved in Hochfelder, supra, at 193, n. 12, we nonetheless must be guided by the reasoning of that decision. The conclusion in Hochfelder that allegations of simple negligence could not sustain a private cause of action for damages under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 rested on several grounds. The most important was the plain meaning of the language of § 10 (b). It was the view of the Court that the terms “manipulative,” “device,” and “contrivance” — whether given their commonly accepted meaning or read as terms of art — quite clearly evinced a congressional intent to proscribe only “knowing or intentional misconduct.” 425 U. S., at 197-199. This meaning, in fact, was thought to be so unambiguous as to suggest that “further inquiry may be unnecessary.” Id., at 201. The Court in Hochfelder nonetheless found additional support for its holding in both the legislative history of § 10 (b) and the structure of the civil liability provisions in the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The legislative history, though “bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress’ intent,” contained “no indication . . . that § 10 (b) was intended to proscribe conduct not involving scienter.” Id., at 201-202. Rather, as the Court noted, a spokesman for the drafters of the predecessor of § 10 (b) described its function as a “ ‘catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices.’ ” Id., at 202. This description, as well as various passages in the Committee Reports concerning the evils to which the 1934 Act was directed, evidenced a purpose to proscribe only knowing or intentional misconduct. Moreover, with regard to the structure of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the Court observed that in each instance in which Congress had expressly created civil liability, it had specified the standard of liability. To premise civil liability under § 10 (b) on merely negligent conduct, the Court concluded, would run counter to the fact that wherever Congress intended to accomplish that result, it said so expressly and subjected such actions to significant procedural restraints not applicable to § 10 (b). Id., at 206-211. Finally, since the Commission’s rulemaking power was necessarily limited by the ambit of its statutory authority, the Court reasoned that Rule 10b-5 must likewise be restricted to conduct involving scienter. In our view, the rationale of Hochfelder ineluctably leads to the conclusion that scienter is an element of a violation of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5, regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought. Two of the three factors relied upon in Hochfelder — the language of § 10 (b) and its legislative history — are applicable whenever a violation of § 10 (b) or Rule 10b-5 is alleged, whether in a private cause of action for damages or in a Commission injunctive action under § 21 (d). In fact, since Hochfelder involved an implied cause of action that was not within the contemplation of the Congress that enacted § 10 (b), id., at 196, it would be quite anomalous in a case like the present one, involving as it does the express remedy Congress created for § 10 (b) violations, not to attach at least as much significance to the fact that the statutory language and its legislative history support a scienter requirement. The Commission argues that Hochfelder, which involved a private cause of action for damages, is not a proper guide in construing § 10 (b) in the present context of a Commission enforcement action for injunctive relief. We are urged instead to look to SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U. S. 180. That case involved a suit by the Commission for injunc-tive relief to enforce the prohibition in § 206 (2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-6, against any act or practice of an investment adviser that “operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client.” The injunction sought in Capital Gains was to compel disclosure of a practice known as “scalping,” whereby an investment adviser purchases shares of a given security for his own account shortly before recommending the security to investors as a long-term investment, and then promptly sells the shares at a profit upon the rise in their market value following the recommendation. The issue in Capital Gains was whether in an action for injunctive relief for violations of § 206 (2) the Commission must prove that the defendant acted with an intent to defraud. The Court held that a showing of intent was not required. This conclusion rested upon the fact that the legislative history revealed that the “Investment Advisers Act of 1940 . . . reflects a congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship/ as well as a congressional intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviser — consciously or unconsciously — to render advice which was not disinterested.” 375 U. S., at 191-192 (footnote omitted). To require proof of intent, the Court reasoned, would run counter to the expressed intent of Congress. The Court added that its conclusion was “not in derogation of the common law of fraud.” Id., at 192. Although recognizing that intent to defraud was a necessary element at common law to recover money damages for fraud in an arm’s-length transaction, the Court emphasized that the Commission’s action was not a suit for damages, but rather a suit for an injunction in which the relief sought was the “mild prophylactic” of requiring a fiduciary to disclose his transactions in stocks he was recommending to his clients. Id., at 193. The Court observed that it was not necessary in a suit for “equitable or prophylactic relief” to establish intent, for “[f)raud has a broader meaning in equity [than at law] and intention to defraud or to misrepresent is not a necessary element.” Ibid., quoting W. De Funiak, Handbook of Modern Equity 235 (2d ed. 1956). Moreover, it was not necessary, the Court said, in a suit against a fiduciary such as an investment adviser, to establish all the elements of fraud that would be required in a suit against a party to an arm’s-length transaction. Finally, the Court took cognizance of a “growing recognition by common-law courts that the doctrines of fraud and deceit which developed around transactions involving land and other tangible items of wealth are ill-suited to the sale of such intangibles as advice and securities, and that, accordingly, the doctrines must be adapted to the merchandise in issue.” 375 U. S., at 194. Unwilling to assume that Congress was unaware of these developments at common law, the Court concluded that they “reinforce [d]” its holding that Congress had not sought to require a showing of intent in actions to enjoin violations of §206 (2). Id., at 195. The Commission argues that the emphasis in Capital Gains upon the distinction between fraud at law and in equity should guide a construction of § 10 (b) in this suit for injunctive relief. We cannot, however, draw such guidance from Capital Gains for several reasons. First, wholly apart from its discussion of the judicial treatment of “fraud” at law and in equity, the Court in Capital Gains found strong support in the legislative history for its conclusion that the Commission need not demonstrate intent to enjoin practices in violation of § 206 (2). By contrast, as the Court in Hochfelder noted, the legislative history of § 10 (b) points towards a scienter requirement. Second, it is quite clear that the language in question in Capital Gains, “any . .. practice . .. which operates as a fraud or deceit,” (emphasis added) focuses not on the intent of the investment adviser, but rather on the effect of a particular practice. Again, by contrast, the Court in Hoch-felder found that the language of § 10 (b) — particularly the terms “manipulative,” “device,” and “contrivance” — clearly refers to “knowing or intentional misconduct.” Finally, insofar as Capital Gains involved a statutory provision regulating the special fiduciary relationship between an investment adviser and his client, the Court there was dealing with a situation in which intent to defraud would not have been required even in a common-law action for money damages. Section 10 (b), unlike the provision at issue in Capital Gains, applies with equal force to both fiduciary and nonfidueiary transactions in securities. It is our view, in sum, that the controlling precedent here is not Capital Gains, but rather Hochf elder. Accordingly, we conclude that scienter is a necessary element of a violation of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. B In determining whether proof of scienter is a necessary element of a violation of § 17 (a), there is less precedential authority in this Court to guide us. But the controlling principles are well settled. Though cognizant that “Congress intended securities legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed ‘not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes,'” Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S., at 151, quoting, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U. S., at 195, the Court has also noted that “generalized references to the ‘remedial purposes’ ” of the securities laws “will not justify reading a provision ‘more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit.’ ” Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 578, quoting, SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 116. Thus, if the language of a provision of the securities laws is sufficiently clear in its context and not at odds with the legislative history, it is unnecessary “to examine the additional considerations of ‘policy’ . . . that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the statute.” Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S., at 214, n. 33. The language of § 17 (a) strongly suggests that Congress contemplated a scienter requirement under § 17 (a)(1), but not under § 17 (a)(2) or § 17 (a)(3). The language of § 17 (a)(1), which makes it unlawful “to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” plainly evinces an intent on the part of Congress to proscribe only knowing or intentional misconduct. Even if it be assumed that the term “defraud” is ambiguous, given its varied meanings at law and in equity, the terms “device,” “scheme,” and “artifice” all connote knowing or intentional practices. Indeed, the term “device,” which also appears in § 10 (b), figured prominently in the Court's conclusion in Hochfelder that the plain meaning of § 10 (b) embraces a scienter requirement. Id., at 199. By contrast, the language of § 17 (a)(2), which prohibits any person from obtaining money or property “by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact,” is devoid of any suggestion whatsoever of a scienter requirement. As a well-known commentator has noted, “[t]here is nothing on the face of Clause (2) itself which smacks of scienter or intent to defraud.” 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1442 (2d ed. 1961). In fact, this Court in Hochfelder pointed out that the similar language of Rule 10b-5 (b) “could be read as proscribing . . . any type of material misstatement or omission . . . that has the effect of defrauding investors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional or not.” 425 U. S., at 212. Finally, the language of § 17 (a) (3), under which it is unlawful for any person “to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate q,s a fraud or deceit,” (emphasis added) quite plainly focuses upon the effect of particular conduct on members of the investing public, rather than upon the culpability of the person responsible. This reading follows directly from Capital Gains, which attributed to a similarly worded provision in § 206 (2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 a meaning that does not require a “showing [of] deliberate dishonesty as a condition precedent to protecting investors.” 375 U. S., at 200. It is our view, in sum, that the language of § 17 (a) required scienter under § 17 (a)(1), but not under § 17 (a)(2) or § 17 (a) (3). Although the parties have urged the Court to adopt a uniform culpability requirement for the three subparagraphs of § 17 (a), the language of the section is simply not amenable to such an interpretation. This is not the first time that this Court has had occasion to emphasize the distinctions among the three subparagraphs of § 17 (a). In United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 774, the Court noted that each sub-paragraph of § 17 (a) “proscribes a distinct category of misconduct. Each succeeding prohibition is meant to cover additional kinds of illegalities — not to narrow the reach of the prior sections.” (Footnote omitted.) Indeed, since Congress drafted § 17 (a) in such a manner as to compel the conclusion that scienter is required under one subparagraph but not under the other two, it would take a very clear expression in the legislative history of congressional intent to the contrary to justify the conclusion that the statute does not mean what it so plainly seems to say. We find no such expression of congressional intent in the legislative history. The provisions ultimately enacted as § 17 (a) had their genesis in § 13 of identical bills introduced simultaneously in the House and Senate in 1933. H. R. 4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 29, 1933); S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 29, 1933) , As originally drafted, § 13 would have made it unlawful for any person “willfully to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud or to obtain money or property by means of any false pretense, representation, or promise, or to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business . . . which operates or would operate as a fraud upon the purchaser.” Hearings on these bills were conducted by both the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee and the Senate Banking and Currency Committee. The House and Senate Committees reported out different versions of § 13. The Senate Committee expanded its ambit by including protection against the intentionally fraudulent practices of a “dummy,” a person holding legal or nominal title but under a moral or legal obligation to act for someone else. As amended by the Senate Committee, § 13 made it unlawful for any person “willfully to employ any device, scheme, or artifice or to employ any 'dummy’, or to act as any such 'dummy', with the intent to defraud or to obtain money or property by means of any false pretense, representation, or promise, or to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business . . . which operates or would operate as a fraud upon the purchaser. . . ,” See S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 27, 1933); S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 4-5 (1933). The House Committee retained the original version of § 13, except that the word “willfully” was deleted from the beginning of the provision. See H. R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., § 16 (a) (May 4, 1933). It also rejected a suggestion that the first clause, “to employ any device, scheme, or artifice,” be modified by the phrase, “with intent to defraud.” See ibid.; Federal Securities Act: Hearings on H. R. 4314 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 146 (1933). The House and Senate each adopted the version of the provision as reported out by its Committee. The Conference Committee then adopted the House version with a minor modification not relevant here, see H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 12, 27 (1933), and it was later enacted into law as § 17 (a) of the 1933 Act. The Commission argues that the deliberate elimination of the language of intent reveals that Congress considered and rejected a scienter requirement under all three clauses of § 17 (a). This argument, however, rests entirely on inference, for the Conference Report sheds no light on what the Conference Committee meant to do about the question of scienter under § 17 (a). The legislative history thus gives rise to the equally plausible inference that the Conference Committee concluded that (1) in light of the plain meaning of § 17 (a)(1), the language of intent — “willfully” and “with intent to defraud” — was simply redundant, and (2) with regard to §17 (a)(2) and §17 (a)(3), a “willful[ness]” requirement was not to be included. It seems clear, therefore, that the legislative history, albeit ambiguous, may be read ill a manner entirely consistent with the plain meaning of § 17 (a). In the absence of a conflict between reasonably plain meaning and legislative history, the words of the statute must prevail. C There remains to be determined whether the provisions authorizing injunctive relief, § 20 (b) of the 1933 Act and § 21 (d) of the 1934 Act, modify the substantive provisions at issue in this case so far as scienter is concerned. The language and legislative history of § 20 (b) and § 21 (d) both indicate that Congress intended neither to add to nor to detract from the requisite showing of scienter under the substantive provisions at issue. Sections 20 (b) and 21 (d) provide that the Commission may seek injunctive relief whenever it appears that a person “is engaged or [is] about to engage in any acts or practices” constituting a violation of the 1933 or 1934 Acts or regulations promulgated thereunder and that, “upon a proper showing,” a district court shall grant the injunction. The elements of “a proper showing” thus include, at a minimum, proof that a person is engaged in or is about to engage in a substantive violation of either one of the Acts or of the regulations promulgated thereunder. Accordingly, when scienter is an element of the substantive violation sought to be enjoined, it must be proved before an injunction may issue. But with respect to those provisions such as § 17 (a) (2) and § 17 (a) (3), which may be violated even in the absence of scienter, nothing on the face of § 20 (b) or § 21 (d) purports to impose an independent requirement of scienter. And there is nothing in the legislative history of either provision to suggest a contrary legislative intent. This is not to say, however, that scienter has no bearing at all on whether a district court should enjoin a person violating or about to violate § 17 (a) (2) or § 17 (a) (3). In cases where the Commission is seeking to enjoin a person “about to engage in any acts or practices which . . . mil constitute” a violation of those provisions, the Commission must establish a sufficient evidentiary predicate to show that such future violation may occur. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Securities, Inc., 574 F. 2d 90, 98-100 (CA2 1978) (Friendly, J.); 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation, at 1976. An important factor in this regard is the degree of intentional wrongdoing evident in a defendant’s past conduct. See SEC v. Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250, 1273-1275 (DC 1978). Moreover, as the Commission recognizes, a district court may consider scienter or lack of it as one of the aggravating or mitigating factors to be taken into account in exercising its equitable discretion in deciding whether or not to grant injunctive relief. And the proper exercise of equitable discretion is necessary to ensure a “nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs.” Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329. Ill For the reasons stated in this opinion, we hold that the Commission is required to establish scienter as an element of a civil enforcement action to enjoin violations of § 17 (a)(1) of the 1933 Act, § 10 (b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated under that section of the 1934 Act. We further hold that the Commission need not establish scienter as an element of an action to enjoin violations of § 17 (a) (2) and § 17 (a) (3) of the 1933 Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed the issuance of the injunction in this case in the misapprehension that it was not necessary to find scienter in order to support an injunction under any of the provisions in question. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Commission also charged the petitioner and three other defendants with violations of the registration provisions of §§ 5 (a), (c) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77e (a), (c). The District Court found that the petitioner had violated these provisions and enjoined him from future violations. The Court of Appeals affirmed this holding, and the petitioner has not challenged this portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision. The opinion of the District Court is reported in CCH Fed. See. L. Rep. ¶ 96,043 (1977). The Court of Appeals observed that its previous decisions had required scienter in private damages actions under § 10 (b) even before this Court’s decision in the Hochfelder case, but also had “uniformly . . . held that the language and history of the section [did] not require a showing of scienter in an injunction enforcement action brought by the Commission.” 605 F. 2d, at 620-621. This distinction had been premised on the fact that the two types of suits under § 10 (b) advance different goals: actions for damages are designed to provide compensation to individual investors, whereas suits for injunctive relief serve to provide maximum protection for the investing public. In the present case, the Court of Appeals, relying on its reasoning in previous cases, concluded that “[i]n view of the policy considerations underlying the securities acts, . . . the increased effectiveness of government enforcement actions predicated on a showing of negligence alone outweigh [s] the danger of potential harm to those enjoined from violating the securities laws.” Id., at 621. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals gave any indication of which subsection or subsections of § 17 (a) of the 1933 Act the petitioner had violated. The term “scienter” is used throughout this opinion, as it was in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 194, n. 12, to refer to “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” We have no occasion here to address the question, reserved in Hochfelder, ibid., whether, under some circumstances, scienter may also include reckless behavior. Compare, e. g., the present case, and SEC v. Coven, 581 F. 2d 1020 (CA2 1978) (scienter not required in Commission enforcement action under §§17 (a) (1) — (3)), with Steadman v. SEC, 603 F. 2d 1126 (CA5 1979) (scienter required in Commission disciplinary action under § 17 (a) (1), but not under §§ 17 (a) (2)-(3)), and with SEC v. Cenco Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193 (ND Ill. 1977) (scienter required in Commission enforcement action under §§ 17 (a)(l)-(3)). Compare, e. g., the present case, and SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F. 2d 535 (CA1 1976) (scienter not required in Commission enforcement action under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5), with SEC v. Blatt, 583 F. 2d 1325 (CA5 1978) (scienter required in Commission enforcement action under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5). The Court in Hochfelder also found support for its conclusion as to the scope of Rule 10b-5 in the fact that the administrative history revealed that “when the Commission adopted the Rule it was intended to apply only to activities that involved scienter.” 425 U. S., at 212. The third factor — the structure of civil liability provisions in the 1933 and 1934 Acts — obviously has no applicability in a case involving injunc-tive relief. It is evident, however, that the third factor was not determinative in Hochfelder. Rather, the Court in Hochfelder clearly indicated that the language of the statute, which is applicable here, was sufficient, standing alone, to support the Court’s conclusion that scienter is required in a private damages action under § 10 (b). Id., at 201. The statutory provision authorizing injunctive relief involved in the Capital Gains case was § 209 (e) of the Investment Advisors Act, 15 U. S. C. § 80b-9 (e), which provides in relevant part: “Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person has engaged, is engaged, or is about to engage in any act or practice constituting a violation of any provision of this subchapter, or of any rule, regulation, or order hereunder, ... it may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district court of the United States ... to enjoin such acts or practices and to enforce compliance with this subchapter or any rule, regulation, or order hereunder. Upon a showing that such person has engaged, is engaged, or is about to engage in any such act or practice, . . . a permanent or temporary injunction or decree or restraining order shall be granted without bond.” The Commission finds further support for its interpretation of § 10 (b) as not requiring proof of scienter in injunctive proceedings in the fact that Congress was expressly informed of the Commission’s interpretation on two occasions when significant amendments to the securities laws were enacted — the Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 — and on each occasion Congress left the administrative interpretation undisturbed. See S. Rep. No. 94475, p. 76 (1975); H. R. Rep. No. 95-640, p. 10 (1977). But, since the legislative consideration of those statutes was addressed principally to matters other than that at issue here, it is our view that the failure of Congress to overturn the Commission’s interpretation falls far short of providing a basis to support a construction of § 10 (b) so clearly at odds with its plain meaning and legislative history. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 119-121. The Court in Capital Gains concluded: “Thus, even if we were to agree with the courts below that Congress had intended, in effect, to codify the common law of fraud in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, it would be logical to conclude that Congress codified the common law ‘remedially’ as the courts had adapted it to the prevention of fraudulent securities transactions by fiduciaries, not 'technically’ as it has traditionally been applied in damage suits between parties to arm’s-length transactions involving land and ordinary chattels.” 375 U. S., at 195 (emphasis added). Webster’s International Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) defines (1) “device” as “[t]hat which is devised, or formed by design; a contrivance; an. invention; project; scheme; often, a scheme to deceive; a stratagem; an artifice,” (2) “scheme” as “[a] plan or program of something to be done; an enterprise; a project; as, a business scheme[, or a] crafty, unethical project,” and (3) “artifice” as a “[c]rafty device; trickery; also, an artful stratagem or trick; artfulness; ingeniousness.” In addition, the Court in Hochfelder noted that the term “to employ,” which appears in both § 10 (b) and §17 (a)(1), is “supportive of the view that Congress did not intend § 10 (b) to embrace negligent conduct.” 425 U. S., at 199, n. 20. During the House hearings, H. R. 5480 was substituted for H. R. 4314. See H. R. 5480,73d Cong., 1st Sess. (May 4, 1933). The House Committee also renumbered § 13 as § 16 (a), divided the provision into three subparagraphs, and modified the language of the second subparagraph in a manner not relevant here. See H. R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., § 16 (a) (May 4, 1933). Although explaining that the “dummy” provision in the Senate bill was deleted from § 13 because it was substituted in modified form elsewhere in the statute, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 27 (1933), the Conference Report contained no explanation of why the Conference Committee acquiesced in the decision of the House to delete the word “willfully” from § 13. That the Committee failed to explain why it followed the House bill in this regard is not in itself significant, since the Conference Report, by its own terms, purported to discuss only the “differences between the House bill and the substitute agreed upon by the conferees.” Id., at 24. The deletion of the word “willfully” was common to both the House bill and the Conference substitute. The Commission, in further support of its view that scienter is not required under any of the subparagraphs of § 17 (a), points out that § 17 (a) was patterned upon New York’s Martin Act, N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 352-353 (Consol. 1921), and that the New York Court of Appeals had construed the Martin Act as not requiring a showing of scienter as a predicate for injunctive relief by the New York Attorney General. People v. Federated Radio Corp., 244 N. Y. 33, 154 N. E. 655 (1926). But, in the absence of any indication that Congress was even aware of the Federated Radio decision, much less that it approved of that decision, it cannot fairly be inferred that Congress intended to adopt not only the language of the Martin Act, but also a state judicial interpretation of that statute at odds with the plain meaning of the language Congress enacted as § 17 (a)(1). Since the language and legislative history of § 17(a) are dispositive, we have no occasion to address the “policy” arguments advanced by the parties. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S., at 214, n. 33.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A., et al. v. CATHERWOOD, INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER. No. 495. Argued May 4, 1961. Decided June 12, 1961. John J. Abt argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Julius L. Sackman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney-General of New York, Paxton Blair, Solicitor General, and Samuel Stern, Assistant Attorney General. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. We here review the upholding by the New York Court of Appeals of the action of the New York State Industrial Commissioner terminating petitioners’ registration and liability to state taxation as employers under the New York State Unemployment Insurance Law. N. Y. Labor Law, §§ 511-512, 517-518, 570, 577, 581. This determination was effected under what was conceived to be the compulsion of a federal statute, the Communist Control Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 775, 50 U. S. C. §§ 841-844, which provides, in pertinent part: “Section 2. The Congress hereby finds and declares that the Communist Party of the United States, although purportedly a political party, is in fact an instrumentality of a conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the United States .... Therefore the Communist Party should be outlawed. “Section 3. The Communist Party of the United States, or any successors of such party regardless of the assumed name, whose object or purpose is to overthrow the Government of the United States, or the government of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein by force and violence, are not entitled to any of the rights, privileges, and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under the jurisdiction of the laws of the United States or any political subdivision thereof; and whatever rights, privileges, and immunities which have heretofore been granted to said party or any subsidiary organization by reason of the laws of the United States or any political subdivision thereof, are hereby terminated: Provided, however, That nothing in this section shall be construed as amending the Internal Security Act of 1950, as amended.” (Emphasis supplied.) New York has an “experience rating” scheme whereby employers with consistent records of high employment levels are taxed at a lower rate than would otherwise obtain. Under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U. S. C. §§ 3301-3308, an employer is entitled to a federal tax credit for the amount paid in state unemployment taxes. If the state taxing structure allows for a reduction in tax rate to employers with good employment records under a federally certified “experience rating” system, the federal tax is nevertheless reduced by the highest rate imposed by the State, so that the employer retains the full benefit of his experience rating reduction. Thus, before the termination of their New York registration the combined federal and state tax rate of the petitioner, Communist Party, U. S. A., was 1%, and that of the petitioner, Communist Party of New York State, was, according to its representations, 1.1%. The effect of the registration termination as to both was to increase the rate to 3%, the rate provided in the federal statute. We granted certiorari, 364 U. S. 918, to consider the petitioners’ claims that New York has mistakenly construed the Communist Control Act of 1954 to require termination of their status as employers under the New York statute, and, contrariwise,, that both § 3 of the Communist Control Act, so construed, and New York’s termination of registration infringed the Constitution of the United States. We must reject at the outset respondent’s contention that the Court of Appeals’ decision rested on a determination, based on judicial notice which was not displaced by any proof, that petitioners were not employers within the meaning of § 512 of the New York Labor Law, but a criminal conspiracy. It is entirely clear that the Industrial Commissioner and the Unemployment Insurance Referee, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, and the Court of Appeals all based their determination squarely on what they conceived to be the compulsion of the Communist Control Act. The Court of Appeals’ amended remittitur, which states that the questions of the construction and constitutionality of the Communist Control Act “were presented and necessarily passed upon,” puts the matter beyond doubt. Following the familiar rule that decision of Constitutional questions should be avoided wherever fairly possible, we turn at once to the federal statute which this Court has not heretofore had occasion to construe. Apart from unrevealing random remarks during the course of debate in the two Houses, there is no legislative history which in any way serves to give content to the vague terminology of § 3 of the Communist Control Act. The statute contains no definition, and neither committee reports nor authoritative spokesmen attempt to give any definition, of the clause “rights, privileges, and immunities attendant upon legal bodies created under the jurisdiction of the United States or any political subdivision thereof.” Respondent would have us construe this language to mean that wherever a situation advantageous to the petitioners occurs by reference to the statutory or common law of a State or any other government in the United States, this is to be considered a “right,” “privilege,” or “immunity,” and must be deemed to be withheld by the Act. On this basis New York has reasoned that liability to taxation as an employer, though not a privilege in the ordinary sense of the term, is nonetheless a recognition of the common-law contractual capacity to employ, and as such is advantageous to petitioners; and further, that an employer whose employees are unable to benefit from state and federal unemployment insurance programs will be disadvantaged in finding and keeping employees. Therefore it was thought that the Communist Control Act required termination of the registration of petitioners as employers. This interpretation, raising as it does novel constitutional questions, the answers to which are not necessarily controlled by decisions of this Court in connection with other legislation dealing with the Communist Party, must, we think, be rejected. Not only does the language of the statute fall far short of compelling such an interpretation, but there are good indications that the particular result of barring petitioners as employers under state and federal unemployment insurance systems was not within the contemplation of this Act. The Internal Revenue Service has continued to collect taxes from petitioners under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, and Congress in 1956 has dealt in terms with a like matter, excluding from federal old-age, survivors and disability benefits, 42 U. S. C., c. 7, subchapter II, employment with any organization required to register by the Subversive Activities Control Board and removing from the coverage of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U. S. C., c. 21, any such organization, thus tying the exclusion to the administrative fact findings and determinations required by the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987; see Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, ante, p. 1. In face of these considerations we should hesitate long before attributing to Congress a purpose to effectuate the similar exclusion in this instance by legislative fiat. Our reluctance to accept a state interpretation which would have that effect is fortified both by the difficult constitutional questions that would result and by the undesirability of having conflicting state and federal administrative interpretations of a federal statute establishing this “coordinated and dual system” (Buckstaff Co. v. McKinley, 308 U. S. 358, 364) of employment insurance. We hold that the Communist Control Act of 1954 does not require exclusion of the petitioners from New York’s unemployment compensation system. Since the New York Court of Appeals’ decision unmistakably rested on the contrary premise, its judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result. The basic federal rate was increased to 3.1% by Public Law 86-778, § 523 (c), 74 Stat. 924, 982, effective 1961. 26 U. S. C. § 3301. Petitioners argue that the Act on its face and as applied violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Art. I, § 9, cl. 3 of the Federal Constitution, which provides that “no Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.” Petitioners also contingently assert a Fourteenth Amendment claim, see note 6, infra. The Referee, in reviewing the administrative action of the Commissioner, stated that “the Commissioner’s representatives . . . urge that Congress has effectively outlawed the Communist Party and thus, by force of law, the Referee is bound to find that . . . there could not have been any valid employment . . . .” (R. 5.) This contention the Referee accepted, holding that “Congress effectively terminated the right of the Parties to enter into contracts of employment . . . .” (R. 7.) The Board affirmed the Referee’s conclusions of law. (R. 2.) See 8 N. Y. 2d 77, at 83, 168 N. E. 2d 242, at 245, for the opinion of Chief Judge Desmond, with whom Judge Dye concurred, and 8 N. Y. 2d, at 90-91, 168 N. E. 2d, at 248-249, for the opinion of Judge Van Voorhis, with whom Judge Burke concurred. Two judges of the court dissented, and one judge did not participate. Petitioners also argue that if the administrative action rested upon some state procedural ground, as respondent contends, then that action violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We do not reach this contention. The Solicitor General, in a letter to the Clerk of this Court responding to a certification by the Court to the Attorney General of the United States that the constitutionality of a federal statute had been drawn into question in this case, stated that “[t]here is no need to file a brief describing the practice of federal agencies in interpreting the statute [The Communist Control Act of 1954], for this information is already set forth in the opinion of Judge Fuld in the New York Court of Appeals.” The dissenting opinion of Judge Fuld states that “the federal authorities, admittedly aware of the Industrial Commissioner’s position, have taken one diametrically opposed and continue to recognize the Communist Party as an employer subject to the Federal act.” 42 U. S. C. § 410 (a) (17) and 26 U. S. C. § 3121 (b) (17), Act of August 1, 1956, § 121 (c) and (d), 70 Stat. 839. No similar exclusion, however, has been made from the coverage of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U. S. C., c. 23, which imposes the federal tax against which the state taxes involved in this case are credited. See p. 391, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. No. 28. Argued October 15-16, 1953. Decided March 15, 1954. Willard W. Gatchell argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Stern, Assistant Attorney General Burger, Murray L. Schwartz, Paul A. Sweeney, Hubert H. Margolies, Herman Marcuse and Joseph B. Hobbs. John W. Davis argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Randall J. LeBoeuf, Jr., Lauman Martin, Taggart Whipple and Chauncey P. Williams, Jr. Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of New York, as amicus curiae, setting forth the views of the State of New York upon questions of title to water rights in the Niagara River. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. The most significant issue raised by this case is whether the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 has abolished private proprietary rights, existing under state law, to use waters of a navigable stream for power purposes. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it has not. We agree also that in computing a federal licensee’s amortization reserve, required by § 10 (d) of that Act, as amended, the Federal Power Commission was not justified in disallowing the expenses paid or incurred by the licensee in this ease for the use of such rights. March 2, 1921, Niagara Falls Power Company, a New York corporation, predecessor in interest of Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, a New York corporation, respondent herein, secured from the Federal Power Commission the federal license with which we are concerned. It was the first such license issued under the Federal Water Power Act of 1920. Its term was 50 years. It authorized the diversion of water for power purposes from the Niagara River, above the Falls, and the return of it below the Falls, all in New York. The daily diversion, in the aggregate, could not exceed 19,500 cubic feet per second (c.f. s.). Section 10 (d) of the Act requires each licensee, after 20 years of operation under such a license, to establish and maintain amortization reserves out of any surplus thereafter earned and accumulated in excess of a reasonable return upon the licensee’s net investment. Section 14 makes such net investment, plus severance damages, a principal measure of the price the Government is to pay when and if it takes over all or part of the property. In 1942, the Commission expressly held that § 14 applied to this licensee. In 1947, Article 11 of the license was amended so as to specify a 6% rate of return and to require 50% of the licensee’s surplus earnings to be paid into its amortization reserves. As so amended, the article read: “After the first twenty (20) years of operation of the project under this license, namely after March 1, 1941, six (6) per cent per annum shall be the specified rate of return on the net investment in the project for determining surplus earnings in accordance with the provisions of Section 10 (d) of the Act for the establishment and maintenance of amortization reserves to be held until termination of the license, or in the discretion of the Commission, to be applied from time to time in reduction of the net investment in the project, and one-half of all surplus earnings in excess of six (6) per cent per annum received in any calendar year shall be paid into and held in such amortization reserves.” In 1948, the Commission began this proceeding to determine the licensee’s amortization reserve liability. It was the Commission’s first such effort under § 10 (d). In 1949, pursuant to a revised staff report, the Commission directed the holder of this license to show cause why one-half of its surplus earnings from March 2, 1941, through December 31, 1946, in the amount of $994,521.33, should not be set aside in an amortization reserve, and why a like proportion of its subsequent surplus earnings should not be set aside annually upon a comparable basis. In 1950, the Commission’s presiding examiner recommended that the licensee’s initial reserve be $914,432.04, and the Commission approved that figure in preference to $515,432.04 proposed by the licensee. One Commissioner filed a concurring statement and one dissented. 9 F. P. C. 228. However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, one judge dissenting, upheld the licensee and remanded the case to the Commission with instructions to modify its order accordingly. 91 U. S. App. D. C. 395, 202 F. 2d 190. The decision turned primarily upon the court’s conclusion that neither the Federal Water Power Act nor the issuance of a license thereunder had abolished the licensee’s private proprietary rights to use the waters of Niagara River for power purposes. That issue was inescapable because the Commission, in computing the licensee’s required amortization reserve, had found that certain annual payments and discounts made by the licensee for its use of private water rights, existing under state law, along the Niagara River, were not allowable expenses for the reason that the Commission considered those rights no longer existent. The Court of Appeals held precisely the contrary and we granted certiorari because of the important bearing of the. decision upon the Federal Water Power Act. 345 U. S. 955. The immediate issue thus presented is whether the licensee’s amortization reserve under § 10 (d), for the period from March 2, 1941, through December 31, 1946, should be $914,432.04 or $515,432.04. That difference of $399,000 is one-half of the $798,000 which the Commission believes should be included in the surplus earnings of the licensee for the period. It consists of— 1. $577,500 paid by the licensee, at the rate of $99,000 a year, for its use, for power purposes, of 730 c. f. s. of the “International Paper water rights,” and 2. $220,500 allowed by the licensee as a discount, at the rate of $37,800 a year, on certain sales of electric power in consideration of permission to use, for power purposes, 262.6 c. f. s. of the “Pettebone-Cataract water rights.” The Court of Appeals held that although respondent’s predecessor, in 1921, had received a federal license for this project, it nevertheless was justified in continuing to meet the financial obligations which it had assumed in return for permission to use water rights originally granted and still existing under the law of New York. That court, accordingly, approved each of the foregoing items of expense and fixed the licensee’s initial amortization reserve at $515,432.04. It was not questioned in the Court of Appeals or here that the licensee originally had acquired, in return for the above-stated payments and discounts, some kind or degree of private proprietary rights under the law of New York to use water from the Niagara River for power purposes. Accordingly, we do not consider it necessary to review here the intricate transactions which resulted in the above-described payments and discounts. We accept the conclusion of the Court of Appeals “that the International Paper and Pettebone-Cataract water rights are valid under the law of New York.” 91 U. S. App. D. C., at 406, 202 F. 2d, at 202. For further recognition of these water rights under state law, see Water Power & Control Commission v. Niagara Falls Power Co., 262 App. Div. 460, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 371, aff’d, 289 N. Y. 353, 45 N. E. 2d 907; Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Duryea, 185 Misc. 696, 57 N. Y. S. 2d 777. Neither is it necessary for us to discuss the licensee’s expenses in 1947 or thereafter. They must be treated in the same way as those above mentioned, except to note that the discounts allowed in return for the Pettebone-Cataract water rights ceased with the licensee’s purchase of those rights in 1947. See 91 U. S. App. D. C., at 400-401, 202 F. 2d, at 196. We are not required to determine the nature of the rights claimed by respondent except to recognize that they are usufructuary rights to use the water for the generation of power, as distinguished from claims to the legal ownership of the running water itself. They are rights to use the force of the fall of the water, coupled with an obligation to return the water to the river under specified conditions. The rights under consideration originally were attached to riparian lands above and below the Falls. However, they long have been separated from such lands and, thus separated, they have been transferred or leased to respondent. Under the law of New York, they constitute a form of real estate known as corporeal heredita-ments. The Commission does not now contest the purchase prices which have been paid for any of these rights. The Commission’s present objection is limited to respondent’s deduction, in the computation of its amortization reserves, of the annual payments and discounts it has made and which it proposes to make for the use of such rights. The Commission contends (1) that Congress not only may constitutionally abolish such local water rights without compensation but that it already has done so, and (2) that, although the licensee’s contested expenditures may be lawful, or even obligatory, between the parties, they must be disallowed in computing the licensee’s amortization reserve under § 10 (d). We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that, even though respondent’s water rights are of a kind that is within the scope of the Government’s dominant servitude, the Government has not exercised its power to abolish them. While we recognize the dominant servitude, in favor of the United States, under which private persons hold physical properties obstructing navigable waters of the United States and all rights to use the waters of those streams, we recognize also that the exercise of that servitude, without making allowances for preexisting rights under state law, requires clear authorization. A classic example of such a clear authorization appears in United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U. S. 53. The Act of March 3, 1909, there authorized the exercise of the dominant right of the United States to take all of a navigable river’s flow for purposes of interstate commerce. It did so in explicit terms. It said: “Sec. 11. . . . the ownership in fee simple absolute by the United States of all lands and property of every kind and description north of the present Saint Marys Falls Ship Canal throughout its entire length and lying between said ship canal and the international boundary line at Sault Sainte Marie, in the State of Michigan, is necessary for the purposes of navigation of said waters and the waters connected therewith. “The Secretary of War is hereby directed to take proceedings immediately for the acquisition by condemnation or otherwise of all of said lands and property of every kind and description, in fee simple absolute. . . . “Every permit, license, or authority of every kind, nature, and description heretofore issued or granted by the United States, or any official thereof, to the Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company . . . shall cease and determine and become null and void on January first, nineteen hundred and eleven . . . 35 Stat. 820, 821. In that case the Government took the entire flow of the stream exclusively for purposes of interstate commerce. The Court accordingly recognized the Government’s absolute right, within the bed of the stream, to use all of the waters flowing in the stream, for purposes of interstate commerce, without compensating anyone for the use of those waters. That decision is not applicable here. The issue here is whether the much more general and regulatory language of the Federal Water Power Act shall be given the same drastic effect as was required there by the language of the Act of March 3, 1909. We find nothing in the Federal Water Power Act justifying such an interpretation. Neither it, nor the license issued under it, expressly abolishes any existing proprietary rights to use waters of the Niagara River. Unlike the statute in the Chandler-Dunbar case, the Federal Water Power Act mentions no specific properties. It makes no express assertion of the paramount right of the Government to use the flow of the Niagara or of any other navigable stream to the exclusion of existing users. On the contrary, the plan of the Act is one of reasonable regulation of the use of navigable waters, coupled with encouragement of their development as power projects by private parties. The Act— “discloses both a vigorous determination of Congress to make progress with the development of the long idle water power resources of the Nation and a determination to avoid unconstitutional invasion of the jurisdiction of the States. . . . “The Act leaves to the States their traditional jurisdiction subject to the admittedly superior right of the Federal Government, through Congress, to regulate interstate and foreign commerce . . . .” First Iowa Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission, 328 U. S. 152, 171. The Act treats usufructuary water rights like other property rights. While leaving the way open for the exercise of the federal servitude and of federal rights of purchase or condemnation, there is no purpose expressed to seize, abolish or eliminate water rights without compensation merely by force of the Act itself. The references in the Act to preexisting water rights carry a natural implication that those rights are to survive, at least until taken over by purchase or otherwise. Riparian water rights, like other real property rights, are determined by state law. Title to them is acquired in conformity with that law. The Federal Water Power Act merely imposes upon their owners the additional obligation of using them in compliance with that Act. The legislative history of the Act discloses no substantial support for the drastic policy which the Commission seeks to read into it. To convert this Act from a regulatory Act to one automatically abolishing preexisting water rights on a nationwide scale calls for a convincing explanation of that purpose. We find none. In fact, the legislative history points the other way. Representative William L. La Follette, of Washington, a member of the House Special Committee on Water Power which reported substantially the same bill as that which in 1920 became the Federal Water Power Act, said of it in 1918: “This bill is not based on either the Government’s ownership or its sovereign authority, but on the hypothesis that we as representatives of the States have authority to act for the States in matters of this character and pass laws for the general good, by the establishment of a limited trusteeship or commission composed of officials of the Government, to carry out and administer this law in such a way as not to infringe any of the rights of the States nor to impede or restrict navigation, but rather to benefit it. . . . Under this bill we only allow the commission a supervisory power over those functions entirely within the State’s jurisdiction for the period covered by any license, the State having exercised its rights in advance of issue.” 56 Cong. Rec. 9110. Shortly thereafter he added: “If we put in this language [of §9 (b)], which is practically taken from that Supreme Court decision [United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316], as to the property rights of the States as to the bed and the banks and to the diversion of the water, then it is sure that we have not infringed any of the rights of the States in that respect, or any of their rules of property .... We are earnestly trying not to infringe the rights of the States.” Id., at 9810. In 1930, this Court passed upon the basic question now before us when it came here in a different connection. In Ford & Son v. Little Falls Co., 280 U. S. 369, Mr. Justice Stone, writing for a unanimous Court, held that a riparian owner of a right to use water for power purposes in the navigable Mohawk River, in New York State, was entitled to an injunction against the uncompensated destruction of that right by a subsequent licensee under the Federal Water Power Act. The New York Supreme Court had granted such an injunction and awarded damages. This Court affirmed that decision, although the federal license then before the Court had authorized the licensee to raise the navigable waters of the Hudson River to such an extent that they would destroy the value of the riparian owner’s right, under state law, to use the fall of tributary waters of the Mohawk for power purposes. It was thus held that the Federal Water Power Act had not abolished the complainant’s private proprietary water rights, existing under New York law, to use navigable waters for power purposes. “[E]ven though the rights which the respondents [the riparian owners] here assert be deemed subordinate to the power of the national government to control navigation, the present legislation does not purport to authorize a licensee of the Commission to impair such rights recognized by state law without compensation.” Id., at 377. After quoting from §§10 (c) (liability for damages caused by the licensed project), 27 (saving clause as to proprietary rights under state law), 21 (condemnation rights) and 6 (licensee’s acceptance of the conditions of the Act), the Court added: “While these sections are consistent with the recognition that state laws affecting the distribution or use of water in navigable waters and the rights derived from those laws may be subordinate to the power of the national government to regulate commerce upon them, they nevertheless so restrict the operation of the entire act that the powers conferred by it on the Commission do not extend to the impairment of the operation of those laws or to the extinguishment of rights acquired under them without remuneration. We think the interest here asserted by the respondents, so far as the laws of the state are concerned, is a vested right acquired under those laws and so is one expressly saved by § 27 from destruction or appropriation by licensees without compensation, and that it is one which petitioner [the licensee], by acceptance of the license under the provisions of § 6, must be deemed to have agreed to recognize and protect.” Id., at 378-379. Parallel reasoning has been applied in a case involving a conflict between a licensee and the holder of state-recognized rights to use water from a navigable stream for irrigation purposes. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U. S. 725, 734. See also, as to state-created water rights for power purposes, Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro, 335 U. S. 359, 372; Pike Rapids Power Co. v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., 99 F. 2d 902; United States v. Central Stockholders’ Corp., 52 F. 2d 322; Rank v. Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773, 793; Great Northern R. Co. v. Washington Electric Co., 197 Wash. 627, 86 P. 2d 208. In First Iowa Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission, 328 U. S. 152, at 175-176, § 27 of the Act was discussed in relation to conditions controlling the approval of projects. The language there used is applicable to proprietary water rights for power purposes as well as those for other proprietary uses. To any extent that statements in Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 F. 606, cited in the First Iowa case, indicate a different interpretation, they are not controlling. Respondent’s private property rights are rooted in state law, subject to the paramount rights of the State and Nation. In the instant case, both the State and the Nation have made limited assertions of their superior rights. New York has done so through its rental charges and the Nation through its license. Neither, however, has laid claim to such an exclusive right to the waters as eliminates the limited use which respondent here seeks to make of them. The findings of the Commission and the action of the Court of Appeals disclose no sufficient additional circumstances demonstrating the unreasonableness of the expenses in question. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is Affirmed. Me. Justice Reed withdrew from the consideration and decision of this case. Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. [For dissenting opinion, see p. 258.] The Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1063, as amended, is now Part I of the Federal Power Act, 49 Stat. 838, 16 U. S. C. §§ 791a-825r. “Sec. 10. All licenses issued under this Part shall be on the following conditions: “(d) That after the first twenty years of operation, out of surplus earned thereafter, if any, accumulated in excess of a specified reasonable rate of return upon the net investment of a licensee in any project or projects under license, the licensee shall establish and maintain amortization reserves, which reserves shall, in the discretion of the Commission, be held until the termination of the license or be applied from time to time in reduction of the net investment. Such specified rate of return and the proportion of such surplus earnings to be paid into and held in such reserves shall be set forth in the license. . . .” 49 Stat. 842, 843, 16 U. S. C. § 803 (d). This limit soon was increased to 19, 725 e. f. s., 6 F. P. C. 184, 185, and later to 20,000 c. f. s., see 9 F. P. C. 228, 244, n. 28. The Treaty between the United States and Great Britain relating to boundary waters between the United States and Canada, proclaimed May 13, 1910, limited the diversion from the United States side to 20,000 and from the Canadian side to 36,000 c. f. s. 36 Stat. 2448, 2450. As to additional emergency and temporary diversions, see 55 Stat. 1276, 1380; 1 U. S. Treaties and Other International Agreements 694. 49 Stat. 844-845, 16 U. S. C. § 807. See also, § 16 as to compensation to be paid for temporary use of the property by the Government, 41 Stat. 1072, 16 U. S. C. § 809; § 20 as to rate fixing, 41 Stat. 1073-1074, 16 U. S. C. § 813; and § 26 as to a purchase by the Government at a judicial sale, 41 Stat. 1076, 16 U. S. C. § 820. “Net investment” is defined in § 3 as follows: "(13) 'net investment’ in a project means the actual legitimate original cost thereof as defined and interpreted in the 'classification of investment in road and equipment of steam roads, issue of 1914, Interstate Commerce Commission,’ plus similar costs of additions thereto and betterments thereof, minus the sum of the following items properly allocated thereto, if and to the extent that such items have been accumulated during the period of the license from earnings in excess of a fair return on such investment: (a) Unappropriated surplus, (b) aggregate credit balances of current depreciation accounts, and (c) aggregate appropriations of surplus or income held in amortization, sinking fund, or similar reserves, or expended for additions or betterments or used for the purposes for which such reserves were created. . . .” 49 Stat. 839, 16 U. S. C. §796 (13). In the instant case the Commission explains that— “Section 10 (d) is part of a larger pattern of fairness set up by the act to induce water-power development. Licensees are assured a 'fair return,’ but the public is safeguarded against profiteering by a licensee through profits beyond a fair return. At the end of the license period and upon 'recapture’ by the Federal Government, earnings throughout the license period are to be tested against a fair return standard set up in section 3 (13).” 9 F. P. C., at 248. This resulted from the decision that the “fair value” provisions of §23 (a), 49 Stat. 846, 16 U. S. C. §816, applied to licenses to use water rights previously held under permits from the Federal Government, whereas this licensee’s prior water rights, if any, arise under the law of New York. In re Niagara Falls Power Co., 3 F. P. C. 206, aff’d by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 137 F. 2d 787. A proceeding seeking the Commission’s approval of a further amendment to Article 11 was consolidated with the show-cause proceedings in the instant case. In response, the Commission, in 1950, ordered that article amended to read: “After the first 20 years of operation of the project under this license, 6 percent per annum shall be the specified rate of return on the net investment in the project for determining surplus earnings and for the establishment and maintenance of amortization reserves, pursuant to section 10 (d) of the act; one-half of all earnings in excess of 6 percent per annum shall be paid into such amortization reserves and such amortization reserves shall be established, maintained and disposed of in accordance with the terms of the act and such rules, regulations and orders of the Commission as may be adopted pursuant thereto.” 9 F. P. C., at 259. Under the above amendment, the method of setting aside the amortization reserves may be prescribed by the Commission. 9 F. P. C., at 232-233, 239. Per curiam. Kimbrough Stone, Circuit Judge, retired, from the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation; Wilbur K. Miller, Circuit Judge. Dissenting, Bazelon, Circuit Judge. For computations, see Appendix, infra, p. 257. Respondent’s corporate history and the devolution of the title to the International Paper and the Pettebone-Cataract water rights are described by the Court of Appeals in 91 U. S. App. D. C. 395, at 398-402, 402-407, 202 F. 2d 190, at 194-197, 198-202. See also, Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 137 F. 2d 787. For a detailed examination of the facts and issues of the instant case, see Schwartz, Niagara Mohawk v. FPC: Have Private Water Rights Been Destroyed by the Federal Power Act?, 102 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 31. “. . . While the right to its use, as it flows along in a body, may become a property right, yet the water itself, the corpus of the stream, never becomes or, in the nature of things, can become, the subject of fixed appropriation or exclusive dominion, in the sense that property in the water itself can be acquired, or become the subject of transmission from one to another. Neither sovereign nor subject can acquire anything more than a mere usufructuary right therein, and in this case the state never acquired, or could acquire, the ownership of the aggregated drops that comprised the mass of flowing water in the lake and outlet, though it could and did acquire the right to its use.” Sweet v. Syracuse, 129 N. Y. 316, 335, 27 N. E. 1081, 1084. A riparian owner in New York has a right to use the waters of an abutting stream as part of his estate. United Paper Board Co. v. Iroquois Pulp & Paper Co., 226 N. Y. 38, 123 N. E. 200; Waterford Electric Light Co. v. New York, 208 App. Div. 273, 203 N. Y. S. 858, aff’d without opinion, 239 N. Y. 629, 147 N. E. 225. Recovery by the International Paper Company for the deprivation of its use of the instant water rights in 1917 was authorized by this Court in 1931. Referring to the 730 c. f. s. now before us, Mr. Justice Holmes said for the Court: “From this canal the petitioner, the International Paper Company, was entitled, by conveyance and lease, to draw and was drawing 730 cubic feet per second, — a right that by the law of New York was a corporeal hereditament and real estate.” International Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 399, 405. The Government was obliged to pay for taking those diversionary rights by condemnation and they are the ones for which respondent is now paying an annual rental of $99,000. The deprivation, therefore, was not an exercise of the Government’s dominant servitude, but was a compensable taking by condemnation of the paper company’s recognized right to use the water. “[T]he Government took the property that the petitioner owned as fully as the Power Company owned the residue of the water power in the canal.” Id,., at 408. See also, Van Etten v. City of New York, 226 N. Y. 483, 124 N. E. 201, and People ex rel. Niagara Falls Hydraulic Power Co. v. Smith, 70 App. Div. 543, 546, 75 N. Y. S. 1100, 1101, aff’d without opinion, 175 N. Y. 469, 67 N. E. 1088. The existence of the Pettebone-Cataract water rights, under the law of New York prior to the Federal Water Power Act, is recognized by the courts of that state. Hydraulic Power Co. v. Pettibone Cataract Paper Co., 112 Misc. 528, 183 N. Y. Supp. 373, aff’d, 198 App. Div. 644, 191 N. Y. Supp. 12. Furthermore, Article 13 of the license recognizes at least the possibility of the survival of these rights after the issuance of the license. It provides that in the event the United States or a new licensee shall take over the project “Such taking over of the project shall also be subject to the rights, if any, of Pettebone-Cataract Paper Company and Cataract City Milling Company to withdraw water at a rate not exceeding 265 cubic feet per second from the Hydraulic Canal or Basin of Licensee, and to the rights, if any, of International Paper Company. (Italics supplied.)” 6 F. P. C. 184, 185. In 1947, the licensee secured the approval of the New York Public Service Commission, and of the Securities & Exchange Commission .(under § 12 (d) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 824, 15 U. S. C. § 791 (d)), of its purchase of the Pettebone-Cataract rights from the licensee’s parent corporation for $728,415.48. Having thus completed their purchase, the licensee petitioned the Commission to amend Article 13 by striking from it the above italicized reference to these rights. The Commission declined and, accordingly, the original reference to the Pettebone-Cataract rights, as well as that to the rights of the International Paper Company, remains in the license. The Commission’s denial of the requested amendment was on the ground that its consent to the omission of the original equivocal reference to the rights “might be construed as recognizing other alleged water rights claimed by another company.” 6 F. P. C., at 188. The Commission took the position that the rights in question had no existence after the enactment of the Federal Water Power Act and it now regards itself as controlled by that reasoning. 9 F. P. C., at 252, 258-259. Its action, however, was not considered by the Court of Appeals to be dispositive of the issue and it is not binding upon us. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U. S. 499; United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 312 U. S. 592; United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U. S. 377. See also, United States v. Kansas City Ins. Co., 339 U. S. 799. It was in this connection that the Court pointed out the inconceivability of private ownership in the running water of navigable streams as distinguished from private proprietary rights to the use of such water for power and other purposes. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U. S., at 69-70. Chapman v. Federal Power Commission, 345 U. S. 153, 167-168; First Iowa Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission, 328 U. S. 152, 180-181. The Act was dedicated to “encouraging private enterprise and the investment of private capital” in power projects on a basis consistent with the public interest. H. R. Rep. No. 61, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3. The bill was to provide “a method by which the water powers of the country, wherever located, can be developed by public or private agencies under conditions which will give the necessary security to the capital invested and at the same time protect and preserve every legitimate public interest.” Statement of David F. Houston, Secretary of Agriculture. Id., at 5. Section 14 even provides: “nor shall the values allowed for water rights, rights-of-way, lands, or interest in lands [used in computing a licensee’s net investment] be in excess of the actual reasonable cost thereof at the time of acquisition by the licensee: . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) 49 Stat. 844-845, 16 U. S. C. § 807. In §3 (11) “project” is said to include “all water-rights . . . necessary or appropriate in the maintenance and operation of such unit,” 49 Stat. 838, 839; §4 (b) empowers the Commission, in determining the original cost of a project and the net investment in it, to require licensees to show “the price paid for water rights” as well as for lands, 49 Stat. 839; § 9 (b) requires an applicant for a license to submit evidence of whatever compliance he has made with the requirements of state law with respect to “the appropriation, diversion, and use of water for power purposes,” 41 Stat. 1068; § 14 requires, when taking over a licensed project, that the “values allowed for water rights” shall not be “in excess of the actual reasonable cost thereof at the time of acquisition by the licensee” (Commissioner Smith emphasized the significance of this clause, 9 F. P. C., at 261), 49 Stat. 844-845; § 23 (b) recognizes the application of state laws to projects where interstate or foreign commerce, public lands and reservations are not affected, 49 Stat. 846; § 27 provides that “nothing herein contained shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired therein,” 41 Stat. 1077. See 16 U. S. C. §§ 796-821. In 1917, the Senate Committee on Commerce said: “[T]he bill is so framed as to protect and maintain the constitutional power and control of the Federal Government over navigable streams, as well as the sovereignty of the States and the rights of riparian proprietors over and in the beds and waters of those streams, and allow the full exercise and enjoyment of the latter, subject to the paramount authority of Congress to regulate the same for navigation purposes.” S. Sep. No. 179, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, as to S. 1419. For a history of the congressional debates and hearings, see Kerwin, Federal Water-Power Legislation (1926). The Court refrained from determining whether § 21 of the Act, as to eminent domain, gave the licensee a further right to condemn and thus pay for the preexisting rights. Id., at 379. Claims of the State of New York, in its own favor, suggested in its brief or oral argument as amicus curiae, are not before us.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NEW ENGLAND POWER CO. v. NEW HAMPSHIRE et al. No. 80-1208. Argued December 7, 1981 Decided February 24, 1982 Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Samuel Huntington argued the cause for appellant in No. 80-1208. With him on the briefs were John F. Sherman III, Edward Berlin, Carmen D. Legato, and J. Phillip Jordan. Donald K. Stem, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for appellants in Nos. 80-1471 and 80-1610. With him on the brief for appellants in No. 80-1471 were Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General, Thomas R. Kiley, First Assistant Attorney General, and Joan C. Stod- dard, E. Michael Sloman, and Alan Sherr, Assistant Attorneys General. Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General of Rhode Island, and John R. McDermott filed a brief for appellants in No. 80-1610. Gregory H. Smith, Attorney General of New Hampshire, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Peter C. Scott, Assistant Attorney General. Together with No. 80-1471, Massachusetts et al. v. New Hampshire et al.; and No. 80-1610, Roberts, Attorney General of Rhode Island, et al. v. New Hampshire et al., also on appeal from the same court. Briefs of amid curiae urging reversal were filed by Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Stuart A. Smith, and Jerome M. Feit for the United States et al.; by Robert L. Baum and Ronald D. Jones for the Edison Electric Institute; by Joseph D. Alvaini for the New England Legal Foundation et al.; by James R. McIntosh and Allan B. Taylor for the New England Power Pool Executive Committee; and by Robert C. McDiarmid for the Unaffiliated Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Customers of New England Power Co. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. These three consolidated appeals present the question whether a state can constitutionally prohibit the exportation of hydroelectric energy produced within its borders by a federally licensed facility, or otherwise reserve for its own citizens the “economic benefit” of such hydroelectric power. I Appellant New England Power Co. is a public utility which generates and transmits electricity at wholesale. It sells 75% of its power in Massachusetts and much of the remainder in Rhode Island; less than 6% of New Hampshire’s population is serviced by New England Power’s wholesale customers. New England Power owns and operates six hydroelectric generating stations on the Connecticut River, consisting of 27 generating units. Twenty-one of these units—with a capacity of 419.8 megawatts, or about 10% of New England Power’s total generating capacity—are located within the State of New Hampshire. The units are licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission pursuant to Part I of the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1063, as amended, 16 U. S. C. §§ 791a-823 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). Since hydroelectric facilities operate without significant fuel consumption, these units can produce electricity at substantially lower cost than most other generating sources. New England Power is a member of the New England Power Pool, whose utility-members own over 98% of the total generation capacity, and virtually all of the transmission facilities, in the six-state region. The objectives of the Power Pool, as described in the agreement among its members, are to assure the reliability of the region’s bulk power supply and to attain “maximum practicable economy” through, inter alia, “joint planning, central dispatching . . . and coordinated construction, operation and maintenance of electric generation and transmission facilities owned or controlled by the Participants . . . .” New England Power Pool Agreement §4.1, App. 31a. All member-owned generating facilities are placed under the control of the Power Pool’s Dispatch Center. A computer calculates the cost of generation for each generating unit and assigns each unit an operating schedule that will minimize the cost of the region’s total power supply. Power generated at the various units, including New England Power’s Connecticut River hydroelectric stations, flows freely through the Pool’s regional transmission network, or “grid.” The energy is dispatched to members’ customers as their power needs arise, without regard to generating source. The Pool bills each member the amount it would have cost the utility to meet its customers’ load using only its own generating sources, minus that member’s share of the savings resulting from the centralized dispatch system. A New Hampshire statute, enacted in 1913, provides: “No corporation engaged in the generation of electrical energy by water power shall engage in the business of transmitting or conveying the same beyond the confines of the state, unless it shall first file notice of its intention so to do with the public utilities commission and obtain an order of said commission permitting it to engage in such business.” N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §374:35 (1966). The statute empowers the New Hampshire Commission to prohibit the exportation of such electrical energy when it determines that the energy “is reasonably required for use within this state and that the public good requires that it be delivered for such use.” Ibid. Since 1926, New England Power or a predecessor company periodically applied for and obtained approval from the New Hampshire Commission to transmit electricity produced at the Connecticut River plants to points outside New Hampshire. However, on September 19, 1980, after an investigation and hearings, the Commission withdrew the authority formerly granted New England Power to export its hydroelectric energy, and ordered the company to “make arrangements to sell the previously exported hydroelectric energy to persons, utilities and municipalities within the State of New Hampshire . . . .” In its report accompanying the order, the Commission found that New Hampshire’s population and energy needs were increasing rapidly; that, primarily because of its low “generating mix” of hydroelectric energy, the Public Service Company of New Hampshire, the State’s largest electric utility, had generating costs about 25% higher than those of New England Power; and that if New England Power’s hydroelectric energy were sold exclusively in New Hampshire, New Hampshire customers could save approximately $25 million a year. The Commission therefore concluded that New England Power’s hydroelectric energy was “required for use within the State” of New Hampshire, and that discontinuation of its exportation would serve the “public good.” App. to Juris. Statement in No. 80-1208, pp. 25-39. The Commission did not, however, order New England Power to sever its connections with the Power Pool. So long as the electricity produced at New England Power’s hydroelectric plants continues to flow through the Pool’s regional transmission network, it will be impossible to contain that electricity within the State of New Hampshire in any physical sense. Although the precise contours of the Commission’s order are unclear, it appears to require that New England Power sell electricity to New Hampshire utilities in an amount equal to the output of its in-state hydroelectric facilities, at special rates adjusted to reflect the entire savings attributable to the low-cost hydroelectric generation. New England Power, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and Dennis J. Roberts II, Attorney General of Rhode Island, appealed the Commission’s order to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. They contended that the order was pre-empted by Parts I and II of the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. §§791a-824k (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), and imposed impermissible burdens on interstate commerce. The court rejected these arguments, concluding that the “saving clause” of § 201(b) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. §824(b) (1976 ed., Supp. IV), granted New Hampshire authority to restrict the interstate transportation of hydroelectric power generated within the State. Appeal of New England Power Co., 120 N. H. 866, 870-877, 424 A. 2d 807, 814 (1980). The court further held that the New Hampshire Commission’s order did not interfere with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s exclusive regulatory authority over rates charged for interstate sales of electricity at wholesale. It thus remanded the case to permit the parties to “develop the mechanics of implemention” of the New Hampshire Commission’s order, and mandated that New England Power “make appropriate adjustments and filings with the appropriate federal and State administrative agencies to enable New Hampshire to regain the benefit of its hydroelectric power.” Id., at 878-879, 424 A. 2d, at 815. We noted probable jurisdiction, 451 U. S. 981 (1981), and we reverse. M h-H The Supreme Court of New Hampshire recognized that, absent authorizing federal legislation, it would be “questionable” whether a state could constitutionally restrict interstate trade in hydroelectric power. 120 N. H., at 876, 424 A. 2d, at 814. Our cases consistently have held that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, precludes a state from mandating that its residents be given a preferred right of access, over out-of-state consumers, to natural resources located within its borders or to the products derived therefrom. E. g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322 (1979); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229 (1911). Only recently, in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 627 (1978), we reiterated that “[tjhese cases stand for the basic principle that a ‘State is without power to prevent privately owned articles of trade from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy local demands or because they are needed by the people of the State’ ” (quoting Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1, 10 (1928)). The order of the New Hampshire Commission, prohibiting New England Power from selling its hydroelectric energy outside the State of New Hampshire, is precisely the sort of protectionist regulation that the Commerce Clause declares off-limits to the states. The Commission has made clear that its order is designed to gain an economic advantage for New Hampshire citizens at the expense of New England Power’s customers in neighboring states. Moreover, it cannot be disputed that the Commission’s “exportation ban” places direct and substantial burdens on transactions in interstate commerce. See Public Utilities Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U. S. 83 (1927). Such state-imposed burdens cannot be squared with the Commerce Clause when they serve only to advance “simple economic protectionism.” Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, at 624. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire nevertheless upheld the order of the New Hampshire Commission on the ground that § 201(b) of the Federal Power Act expressly permits the State to prohibit the exportation of hydroelectric power produced within its borders. It is indeed well settled that Congress may use its powers under the Commerce Clause to “[confer] upon the States an ability to restrict the flow of interstate commerce that they would not otherwise enjoy.” Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U. S. 27, 44 (1980). See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U. S. 761, 769 (1945). The dispositive question, however, is whether Congress in fact has authorized the states to impose restrictions of the sort at issue here. Ill The national concern for planning, development, and comprehensive utilization of the country’s water resources was very early expressed by Congress under its Commerce Clause powers. The Federal Water Power Act, now Part I of the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. §§791a-823 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), was enacted in 1920. The potential of water power as a source of electric energy led Congress to exercise its constitutional authority over navigable streams to regulate and encourage development of hydroelectric power generation “to meet the needs of an expanding economy.” FPC v. Union Electric Co., 381 U. S. 90. 99 (1965). In 1935, Congress enacted Part II of the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. §§ 824-824k (1976 ed. and Supp. IV), which delegated to the Federal Power Commission, now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, exclusive authority to regulate the transmission and sale at wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce, without regard to the source of production. United States v. Public Utilities Comm’n of California, 345 U. S. 295 (1953). The 1935 enactment was a “direct result” of this Court’s holding in Public Utilities Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., supra, that the states lacked power to regulate the rates governing interstate sales of electricity for resale. United States v. Public Utilities Comm’n of California, supra, at 311. Part II of the Act was intended to “fill the gap” created by Attleboro by establishing exclusive federal jurisdiction over such sales. 345 U. S., at 307-311. Section 201(b) of the Act provides, inter alia, that the provisions of Part II “shall not. . . deprive a State or State commission of its lawful authority now exercised over the exportation of hydroelectric energy which is transmitted across a State line.” However, this provision is in no sense an affirmative grant of power to the states to burden interstate commerce “in a manner which would otherwise not be permissible.” Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, supra, at 769. In § 201(b), Congress did no more than leave standing whatever valid state laws then existed relating to the exportation of hydroelectric energy; by its plain terms, § 201(b) simply saves from pre-emption under Part II of the Federal Power Act such state authority as was otherwise “lawful.” The legislative history of the Act likewise indicates that Congress intended only that its legislation “tak[e] no authority from State commissions.” H. R. Rep. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1935) (emphasis added). Nothing in the legislative history or language of the statute evinces a congressional intent “to alter the limits of state power otherwise imposed by the Commerce Clause,” United States v. Public Utilities Comm’n of California, supra, at 304, or to modify the earlier holdings of this Court concerning the limits of state authority to restrain interstate trade. E. g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229 (1911). Rather, Congress’ concern was simply “to define the extent of the federal legislation’s pre-emptive effect on state law.” Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., supra, at 49. To support its argument to the contrary, New Hampshire relies on a single statement made on the floor of the House of Representatives during the debates preceding enactment of Part II. Congressman Rogers of New Hampshire stated: “[T]he Senate bill as originally drawn would deprive certain States, I think five in all, of certain rights which they have over the exportation of hydroelectric energy which is transmitted across the State line. This situation has been taken care of by the House committee, and I hope when you come to it, section 201 of part II, that you will grant us the privilege to continue, as we have been for 22 years, to exercise our State right over the exportation of hydroelectric energy transmitted across State lines but produced up there in the granite hills of old New Hampshire.” 79 Cong. Rec. 10527 (1935). From this expression of “hope,” New Hampshire concludes that Congress specifically intended to preserve the very statute at issue here. Reliance on such isolated fragments of legislative history in divining the intent of Congress is an exercise fraught with hazards, and “a step to be taken cautiously. ” Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1, 26 (1977); United States v. Public Utilities Comm’n of California, supra, at 319-321 (Jackson, J., concurring). However, even were we to accord significant weight to Congressman Rogers’ statement, it would not support New Hampshire’s contention that § 201(b) was intended to permit states to regulate free from Commerce Clause restraint. Congressman Rogers simply urged his colleagues not to “deprive” the State of New Hampshire of “rights” it already possessed — i. e., to ensure that the Act itself would not be read as pre-empting otherwise valid state legislation. To be sure, some Members of Congress may have thought that no further protection of state authority was needed. Indeed, given that the Commerce Clause — independently of the Federal Power Act — restricts the ability of the states to regulate matters affecting interstate trade in hydroelectric energy, § 201(b) may in fact save little in the way of “lawful” state authority. But when Congress has not “expressly stated its intent and policy” to sustain state legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause, Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 427, 431 (1946), we have no authority to rewrite its legislation based on mere speculation as to what Congress “probably had in mind.” See United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n of California, 345 U. S., at 319 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also id., at 311. We must construe § 201(b) as it is written, and as its legislative history indicates it was intended — as a standard “nonpre-emption” clause. > We conclude, therefore, that New Hampshire has sought to restrict the flow of privately owned and produced electricity in interstate commerce, in a manner inconsistent with the Commerce Clause. Section 201(b) of the Federal Power Act does not provide an affirmative grant of authority to the State to do so. For these reasons, the judgment of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered. Testimony before the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission in these cases indicated that the savings have been substantial. For example, in 1979, the savings attributable to the Power Pool’s centralized dispatch system were reported at over $44 million. App. 35a, 56a. See generally Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of Electric Power Regulation, Power Pooling in the United States 15-23, 39-41, 69-79 (1981), for a description of efficiencies attributable to pooling arrangements. The order reads: “ORDERED, that the permission granted New England Power Company (NEPCO) to transmit hydroelectric energy from within the boundaries of the State to outside the State is hereby withdrawn as of thirty (30) days from the date of this Order; and it is “FURTHER ORDERED, that NEPCO make arrangements to sell the previously exported hydroelectric energy to persons, utilities and municipalities within the State of New Hampshire within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order; and it is “FURTHER ORDERED, that upon the completion of both units at Seabrook the Commission will again re-examine the issue of exportation.” For example, the Commission’s staff economist testified at the hearings that New England Power could “allocate the benefits of low-cost hydroelectric power to New Hampshire through billing mechanisms” pursuant to which the power would be sold in New Hampshire at “economic cost”— i. e., the cost of producing the power, including depreciation, plus a return on invested capital. App. 38a-39a. The economist’s analysis of the benefits which would ensue from restricting the “exportation” of hydroelectric energy in this manner — upon which the New Hampshire Commission relied heavily in its report — was based on the assumption that New England Power would simply enter into new unit power contracts with New Hampshire utilities for an amount of kilowatt hours equal to New England Power’s average hydroelectric generation over the course of a number of years. 3 Tr. of Hearings before the N. H. Public Utilities Comm’n in DE 79-223, pp. 23-24, 1-35. Although the record is not entirely clear on this point, it appears that the “economic benefit,” or "savings,” attributable to New England Power's hydroelectric facilities is currently reflected in the company’s general wholesale rates, and thus shared pro rata by its customers in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire. App. 15a-18a. See also Brief for Appellant in No. 80-1208, p. 7. The court also dismissed several arguments advanced only by appellants Massachusetts and Roberts — that § 201(b), as so interpreted, exceeded Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and violated both the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, and the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution. The parties inform us that the New Hampshire Commission has refrained from acting on remand pending this Court’s disposition of the appeals. We find no merit in New Hampshire’s attempt to distinguish these cases on the ground that it “owns” the Connecticut River, the source of New England Power’s hydroelectricity. Whatever the extent of the State’s proprietary interest in the river, the pre-eminent authority to regulate the flow of navigable waters resides with the Federal Government, United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U. S. 222 (1956), which has licensed New England Power to operate its Connecticut River hydroelectric plants pursuant to a determination that those facilities are “best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce,” 16 U. S. C. § 803(a). New Hampshire’s purported “ownership” of the Connecticut River therefore provides no justification for restricting or conditioning the use of these federally licensed units. See First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U. S. 152 (1946). Moreover, New Hampshire has done more than regulate use of the resource it assertedly owns; it has restricted the sale of electric energy, a product entirely distinct from the river waters used to produce it. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165, 179-181 (1932). This product is manufactured by a private corporation using privately owned facilities. Thus, New Hampshire’s reliance on Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429 (1980)—holding that a state may confine to its residents the sale of products it produces — is misplaced. Indeed, had Congress intended § 201(b) to confer upon the states powers which they would have lacked in the absence of the federal legislation, it would have been anomalous to speak in terms of “authority now exercised.” This language plainly assumes the prior existence of valid state authority; in addition, it appears to limit the saving effect of the provision to those few States in which the authority was in fact “exercised” in 1935. On the other hand, it would not have been at all unusual had Congress taken care that the 1935 enactment not displace state authority in the area, without consideration of the scope of that authority or the extent to which it might be constrained by other provisions of federal law. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304, 329, n. 22 (1981). We need not speculate here as to the precise contours of § 201(b)’s saving effect. Even were we to conclude that Congress intended §201(b) to override restraints placed on state regulatory power by the Commerce Clause, there would remain a substantial question whether the order of the New Hampshire Commission was entitled to protection under that provision. Section 201(b) seeks to protect only state regulation relating to the “exportation” of hydroelectric power. However, New England Power cannot terminate its out-of-state transmission of hydroelectricity without substantial alterations in the regional transmission- system to which its hydroelectric facilities are connected — alterations which the New Hampshire Commission did not appear to contemplate would be made. Appeal of New England Power Co., 120 N. H. 866, 876-877, 424 A. 2d 807, 814 (1980). The operative effect of the Commission’s order would be to compel New England Power to enter into new wholesale contracts with New Hampshire utilities, at rates fixed by the New Hampshire Commission to reflect the “economic cost” of the company’s hydroelectric production. See supra, at 336, and n. 3. Appellants argue that such state regulation is incompatible with Part II of the Federal Power Act — which vests in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission exclusive ratemaking jurisdiction over “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,” 16 U. S. C. §§ 824(b), 824d-824f (1976 ed. and Supp. IV) — and conflicts directly with § 205(b) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. § 824d(b), which prohibits utilities from maintaining “any unreasonable difference in rates ... as between localities” with respect to sales subject to federal jurisdiction. Given our holding that the New Hampshire Commission’s order violates the Commerce Clause, we need not decide this issue.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION et al. v. NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK COMMITTEE et al. No. 81-1506. Argued November 1, 1982 Decided December 13, 1982 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Charles N. Steele argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Richard B. Bader, Miriam Aguiar, and Jeffrey H. Bowman. Richard H. Mansfield III argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were George D. Webster, Edith D. Hakola, and Richard J. Clair J. Albert Woll, Laurence Gold, and Margaret E. McCormick filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging reversal. H. Richard Mayberry, Jr., filed a brief for the Public Service Research Council et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. The question in the case ultimately comes down to whether respondent National Right to Work Committee (NRWC or respondent) limited its solicitation of funds to “members” within the meaning of 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(4)(C). In April 1977, petitioner Federal Election Commission (Commission) determined that there was probable cause to believe that NRWC had violated the above-cited provisions of the Act by soliciting contributions from persons who were not its “members.” Shortly thereafter, respondent filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the Commission. One month later, the Commission filed an enforcement proceeding against respondent in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking to establish respondent’s violation of 2 U. S. C. §441b. The actions were consolidated in the latter court, which granted summary judgment in favor of the Commission on the basis of stipulated facts. 501 F. Supp. 422 (1980). The judgment of the District Court was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 214 U. S. App. D. C. 215, 665 F. 2d 371 (1981), and we granted certiorari. 456 U. S. 914 (1982). Respondent NRWC is a nonprofit corporation without capital stock organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Given the central role of the congressional use of the word “member” in this litigation, it is useful to set forth respondent’s organizational history in some detail. In 1975, respondent’s predecessor and another corporation merged; the articles of merger filed in the District of Columbia by the successor corporation stated that NRWC “shall not have members.” A similar statement is contained in the articles of incorporation of NRWC that are presently filed in Virginia. Likewise, respondent’s bylaws make no reference to members or to membership in the corporation. The stated purpose of NRWC, according to its Virginia articles of incorporation, is “[t]o help make the public aware of the fact that American citizens are being required, against their will, to join and pay dues to labor organizations in order to earn a living.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a. In pursuance of this objective, NRWC regularly mails messages to millions of individuals and businesses whose names have found their way onto commercially available mailing lists that the organization has purchased or rented. The letters do not mention membership in NRWC, but seek donations to help NRWC publicize its opposition to compulsory unionism and frequently contain a questionnaire that the recipient is requested to answer and return. In late 1975, in order to comply with § 441b, NRWC established a separate segregated fund, see §441b(b)(4)(C), “to receive and make contributions on behalf of federal candidates.” The fund was denominated the “Employees Rights Campaign Committee” (ERCC); its operation was completely subsidized from the NRWC treasury, which paid all the expenses of establishing and administering the fund, and of soliciting contributions. During part of 1976, NRWC sent letters to some 267,000 individuals, who had at one time contributed to it, soliciting contributions to ERCC. As a result of these solicitations, the fund received some $77,000 in contributions. In October 1976, another lobbying group, the Committee for an Effective Congress, filed a complaint against ERCC with the Commission, alleging violation of 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(4). The complaint asserted that NRWC had violated this section of the Act by using corporate funds to solicit contributions to ERCC from persons who were not NRWC’s stockholders, executive or administrative personnel, or their families. NRWC did not deny these assertions, but took the position that the recipients of its solicitation letters were “members” of NRWC within the proviso set forth in § 441b(b)(4)(C). The Commission found probable cause to believe that a violation had occurred, and after completing the investigative procedures set out in the statute and unsuccessfully attempting to resolve the matter through conciliation, see 2 U. S. C. §437g (1976 ed., Supp. V), it authorized the filing of a civil enforcement suit. This litigation followed. Essential to the proper resolution of the case is the interpretation of § 441b(b)(4)(C)’s statement that the prohibition against corporate solicitation contained in § 441b(b)(4)(A) shall not prevent “a . . . corporation without capital stock . . . from soliciting contributions to [a separate segregated fund established by a corporation without capital stock] from members of such. . . corporation . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The Court of Appeals rejected the Commission’s contentions regarding the meaning of “member,” and went on to hold that the term “embraces at least those individuals whom NRWC describes as its active and supporting members.” 214 U. S. App. D. C., at 220, 665 F. 2d, at 376. The opinion of the Court of Appeals indicates that this construction was reached at least in part because of concern for the constitutional implications of any narrower construction. Id., at 218-220, 665 F. 2d, at 374-376. As explained below, we reject this construction. The statutory purpose of §441b, as outlined above, is to prohibit contributions or expenditures by corporations or labor organizations in connection with federal elections. 2 U. S. C. §441b(a). The section, however, permits some participation of unions and corporations in the federal electoral process by allowing them to establish and pay the administrative expenses of “separate segregated fund[s],” which may be “utilized for political purposes.” 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(2)(C). The Act restricts the operations of such segregated funds, however, by making it unlawful for a corporation to solicit contributions to a fund established by it from persons other than its “stockholders and their families and its executive or administrative personnel and their families.” 2 U. S. C. § 441b(b)(4)(A). Finally, and of most relevance here, the section just quoted has its own proviso, which states in pertinent part that “[t]his paragraph shall not prevent a . . . corporation without capital stock, or a separate segregated fund established by a . . . corporation without capital stock, from soliciting contributions to such a fund from members” of the sponsoring corporation. 2 U. S. C. § 441b(b)(4)(C). The effect of this proviso is to limit solicitation by nonprofit corporations to those persons attached in some way to it by its corporate structure. Ibid. The Court of Appeals, as we have noted, construed the term “member” in § 441b to embrace “at least those individuals whom NRWC describes as its active and supporting members.” 214 U. S. App. D. C., at 220, 665 F. 2d, at 376. The two categories of members recognized by NRWC were described in the following terms by the Court of Appeals: “NRWC attracts members by publicizing its position on issues relating to compulsory unionism through advertisements, personal contacts, and, primarily, letters. These letters describe the purpose of NRWC, urge the recipient to assist NRWC (by, for example, writing to legislators), request financial support, and ask the recipient to respond to a questionnaire that will determine whether that person shares a similar political philosophy. A person who, through his response, evidences an intention to support NRWC in promoting voluntary unionism qualifies as a member. A person who responds without contributing financially is considered a supporting member; a person who responds and also contributes is considered an active member. NRWC sends an acknowledgement and a membership card to both classes. In the regular course of operations, NRWC’s members receive newsletters, action alerts, and responses to individual requests for information. They respond to issue surveys and are asked to communicate with their elected representatives when appropriate. See Joint App., vol. II, at 387 et seq.” Id., at 217, n. 1, 665 F. 2d, at 373, n. 1. In respondent’s view, both categories satisfy the membership requirement of § 441b(b)(4)(C). The Commission, however, insists that these standards of “membership” are too fluid and insubstantial to come within the statutory term “member,” and argues further that they do not comply with the Commission’s regulation defining the term: “(e) ‘Members’ means all persons who are currently satisfying the requirements for membership in a membership organization, trade association, cooperative, or corporation without capital stock .... A person is not considered a member under this definition if the only requirement for membership is a contribution to a separate segregated fund.” Federal Election Commission Regulations, 11 CFR § 114.1(e) (1982). The Commission also contends that NRWC’s Virginia articles of incorporation, filed by respondent, which state that respondent has no members, are dispositive. While we do not feel sufficiently informed at this time to attempt an exegesis of the statutory meaning of the word “members” beyond that necessary to decide this case, we find it relatively easy to dispose of these arguments that respondent’s solicitation was limited to its “members,” since in our view this would virtually excise from the statute the restriction of solicitation to “members.” Section 441b(b)(4)(C) was one of several amendments to the Act enacted in 1976. The entire legislative history of the subsection appears to be the floor statement of Senator Allen who introduced the provision in the Senate and explained the purpose of his amendment in this language: “Mr. President, all this amendment does is to cure an omission in the bill. It would allow corporations that do not have stock but have a membership organization, such as a cooperative or other corporations without capital stock and, hence, without stockholders, to set up separate segregated political funds as to which it can solicit contributions from its membership; since it does not have any stockholders to solicit, it should be allowed to solicit its members. That is all that the amendment provides. It does cover an omission in the bill that I believe all agree should be filled.” 122 Cong. Rec. 7198 (1976). This statement suggests that “members” of nonstock corporations were to be defined, at least in part, by analogy to stockholders of business corporations and members of labor unions. The analogy to stockholders and union members suggests that some relatively enduring and independently significant financial or organizational attachment is required to be a “member” under § 441b(b)(4)(C). The Court of Appeals’ determination that NRWC’s “members” include anyone who has responded to one of the corporation’s essentially random mass mailings would, we think, open the door to all but unlimited corporate solicitation and thereby render meaningless the statutory limitation to “members.” We also assume, since there is no body of federal law of corporations, see Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 477 (1979), that Congress intended at least some reference to the laws of the various States dealing with nonprofit corporations. In an analogous situation, where Congress had authorized state taxation of “real property” of subsidiaries of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Court said: “We think the congressional purpose can best be accomplished by application of settled state rules as to what constitutes ‘real property,’ so long as it is plain, as it is here, that the state rules do not effect a discrimination against the Government, or patently run counter to the terms of the Act.” RFC v. Beaver County, 328 U. S. 204, 210 (1946). Like property, the structure and powers of nonprofit corporations are defined principally by state law; as in the case of property, state law provides some guidance in deciding whether NRWC’s solicitation was confined to its “members.” Most States apparently permit nonprofit corporations to have “members” similar to shareholders in a business corporation, although state statutes generally do not seem to require this form of organization, see, e. g., ALI-ABA, Model Nonprofit Corporation Act §11 (1964); in many States the board of directors of a nonprofit corporation may be an autonomous, self-perpetuating body. Given the wide variety of treatment of the subject of membership in state incorporation laws, and the focus of the Commission’s regulation on the corporation’s own standards, we think it was entirely permissible for the Commission in this case to look to NRWC’s corporate charter under the laws of Virginia and the bylaws adopted in accordance with that charter. Applying the statutory language as we interpret it to the facts of this case, we think Congress did not intend to allow the 267,000 individuals solicited by NRWC during 1976 to come within the exclusion for “members” in 2 U. S. C. § 441b(b)(4)(C). Although membership cards are ultimately sent to those who either contribute or respond in some other way to respondent’s mailings, the solicitation letters themselves make no reference to members. Members play no part in the operation or administration of the corporation; they elect no corporate officials, and indeed there are apparently no membership meetings. There is no indication that NRWC’s asserted members exercise any control over the expenditure of their contributions. Moreover, as previously noted, NRWC’s own articles of incorporation and other publicly filed documents explicitly disclaimed the existence of members. We think that under these circumstances, those solicited were insufficiently attached to the corporate structure of NRWC to qualify as “members” under the statutory proviso. Unlike the Court of Appeals, we do not think this construction of the statute raises any insurmountable constitutional difficulties. The Court of Appeals expressed the view that the sort of solicitations involved here would neither corrupt officials nor coerce members of the corporation holding minority political views, the two goals which it believed Congress had in mind in enacting the statutory provisions at issue. That being so, the Court of Appeals apparently thought, and respondent argues here, that the term “members” must be given an elastic definition in order to prevent impermissible interference with the constitutional rights enunciated in cases such as NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963), and Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620 (1980). Similarly, respondent places considerable reliance on our statement in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25 (1976): “The Court’s decisions involving associational freedoms establish that the right of association is a ‘basic constitutional freedom,’ Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S., at 57, that is ‘closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society.’ Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 486 (1960). See, e. g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 522-523 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, [357 U. S.], at 460-461; NAACP v. Button, supra, at 452 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In view of the fundamental nature of the right to associate, governmental ‘action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.’ NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 460-461.” Under this standard, respondent asserts, the Act’s restriction of its solicitation cannot be upheld. While we fully subscribe to the views stated in Buckley, in the very next sentence to the passage quoted by the respondent, the Court went on to say: “Yet, it is clear that ‘[n]either the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute.’ CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 567 (1973).” Ibid. In this case, we conclude that the associational rights asserted by respondent may be and are overborne by the interests Congress has sought to protect in enacting § 441b. To place respondent’s constitutional claims in proper perspective, we repeat language used in Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 13: “The constitutional power of Congress to regulate federal elections is well established and is not questioned by any of the parties in this case.” The first purpose of §441b, petitioners state, is to ensure that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form of organization should not be converted into political “war chests” which could be used to incur political debts from legislators who are aided by the contributions. See United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567, 579 (1957). The second purpose of the provisions, petitioners argue, is to protect the individuals who have paid money into a corporation or union for purposes other than the support of candidates from having that money used to support political candidates to whom they may be opposed. See United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106, 113 (1948). We agree with petitioners that these purposes are sufficient to justify the regulation at issue. Speaking of corporate involvement in electoral politics, we recently said: “The overriding concern behind the enactment of statutes such as the Federal Corrupt Practices Act was the problem of corruption of elected representatives through the creation of political debts. The importance of the governmental interest in preventing this occurrence has never been doubted.” First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 788, n. 26 (1978) (citations omitted). Likewise, in Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 26-27, we specifically affirmed the importance of preventing both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption. These interests directly implicate “the integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the individual citizen for the successful functioning of that process.” United States v. Automobile Workers, supra, at 570. We are also convinced that the statutory prohibitions and exceptions we have considered are sufficiently tailored to these purposes to avoid undue restriction on the associational interests asserted by respondent. The history of the movement to regulate the political contributions and expenditures of corporations and labor unions is set forth in great detail in United States v. Automobile Workers, supra, at 570-584, and we need only summarize the development here. Seventy-five years ago Congress first made financial contributions to federal candidates by corporations illegal by enacting the Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. Within the next few years Congress went further and required financial disclosure by federal candidates following election, Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822, and the following year required pre-election disclosure as well. Act of Aug. 19, 1911, ch. 33, 37 Stat. 25. The Federal Corrupt Practices Act, passed in 1925, extended the prohibition against corporate contributions to include “anything of value,” and made acceptance of a corporate contribution as well as the giving of such a contribution a crime. 43 Stat. 1070. The first restrictions on union contributions were contained in the second Hatch Act, 54 Stat. 767, and later, in the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, § 9, 57 Stat. 167, union contributions in connection with federal elections were prohibited altogether. These prohibitions on union political activity were extended and strengthened in the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136, which broadened the earlier prohibition against contributions to “expenditures” as well. Congress codified most of these provisions in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 3, and enacted later amendments in 1974, 88 Stat. 1263, in 1976, 90 Stat. 475, and in 1980, 93 Stat. 1339. Section 441b(b)(4)(C) is, as its legislative history indicates, merely a refinement of this gradual development of the federal election statute. This careful legislative adjustment of the federal electoral laws, in a “cautious advance, step by step,” NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 46 (1937), to account for the particular legal and economic attributes of corporations and labor organizations warrants considerable deference, see Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57, 64, 67 (1981). As we discuss below, it also reflects a permissible assessment of the dangers posed by those entities to the electoral process. In order to prevent both actual and apparent corruption, Congress aimed a part of its regulatory scheme at corporations. The statute reflects a legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful regulation. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632, 652 (1950). While §441b restricts the solicitation of corporations and labor unions without great financial resources, as well as those more fortunately situated, we accept Congress’ judgment that it is the potential for such influence that demands regulation. Nor will we second-guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared. As we said in California Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U. S. 182, 201 (1981), the “differing structures and purposes” of different entities “may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process.” To accept the view that a solicitation limited only to those who have in the past proved “philosophically compatible” to the views of the corporation must be permitted under the statute in order for the prohibition to be constitutional would ignore the teachings of our earlier decisions. The governmental interest in preventing both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption of elected representatives has long been recognized, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, at 788, n. 26, and there is no reason why it may not in this case be accomplished by treating unions, corporations, and similar organizations differently from individuals. California Medical Assn. v. FEC, supra, at 201. Respondent also asserts a claim of unconstitutional vagueness, relying on such additional cases as Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1926); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958); and Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147 (1959). We think the vagueness claim is adequately answered by the language quoted earlier from CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 567 (1973). There may be more than one way under the statute to go about determining who are “members” of a nonprofit corporation, and the statute may leave room for uncertainty at the periphery of its exception for solicitation of “members.” However, on this record we are satisfied that NRWC’s activities extended in large part, if not in toto, to people who would not be members under any reasonable interpretation of the statute. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601 (1973). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered. As will appear from the following discussion, the phrasing of this question is but the tip of the statutory iceberg. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (Act) makes it “unlawful for . . . any corporation ... to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with” certain federal elections. 90 Stat. 490, 2 U. S. C. § 441b(a). The term “contribution” is defined broadly, 2 U. S. C. § 441b(b)(2)(C), to include any sort of transfer of money or services to various political entities, but excluded from that definition is “the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a . . . corporation without capital stock.” The Act goes on to make it unlawful, except as thereinafter provided, “for a corporation, or a separate segregated fund established by a corporation, to solicit contributions to such a fund from any person other than its stockholders and their families and its executive or administrative personnel and their families . . . .” 2 U. S. C. §441b(b)(4)(A). Finally, 2 U. S. C. § 441b(b)(4)(C) states that the prohibition just quoted “shall not prevent a . . . corporation without capital stock, or a separate segregated fund established by a . . . corporation without capital stock, from soliciting contributions to such a fund from members of such . . . corporation without capital stock.” The Commission is an independent administrative agency vested with exclusive jurisdiction over civil enforcement of the Act. See 2 U. S. C. §§437c(b)(l) and 437d(a) and (e) (1976 ed., Supp. V). The relief awarded the Commission by the District Court included a declaratory judgment that 2 U. S. C. § 441b(b)(4) is not unconstitutional, an order that NRWC refund to contributors the funds it had obtained from unlawful solicitations, and an order that the corporation pay a $10,000 civil penalty. App. to Pet. for Cert. 54a. The separate segregated fund may be completely controlled by the sponsoring corporation or union, whose officers may decide which political candidates contributions to the fund will be spent to assist. The “fund must be separate from the sponsoring union [or corporation] only in the sense that there must be a strict segregation of its monies” from the corporation’s other assets. Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U. S. 385, 414-417 (1972). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 28, n. 31 (1976). One commentator has stated: “The license provided by the statutes in this respect is further enhanced by their loose use of the term ‘member.’ The New York statute and the Model Act, for example, offer no meaningful definition of ‘member’ at all, but instead provide that a corporation’s articles or bylaws may designate anybody or nobody as members, or may designate different classes of members, and may freely specify the rights, if any, of the corporation’s members or classes of members. The California Act is a bit more carefully drawn in this regard, defining a member, essentially, as anyone entitled to vote in elections either for the corporation’s board of directors or for certain fundamental corporate changes.” Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497, 578 (1981) (footnote omitted). We assume, as have the parties and courts below, that ERCC satisfies the statutory requirements of a “separate segregated fund” and that NRWC is a corporation covered by §441b. Our decision in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978), is entirely consistent with our conclusion here. Bellotti struck down a prohibition against corporate expenditures and contributions in connection with state referenda. Id., at 768. The Court explicitly stated that its decision did not involve “the constitutionality of laws prohibiting or limiting corporate contributions to political candidates or committees, or other means of influencing candidate elections.” Id., at 788, n. 26 (emphasis added). In addition, following its citation of Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U. S. 385 (1972); United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U. S. 567 (1957); and United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106 (1948), the Court specifically pointed out that in elections of candidates to public office, unlike in referenda on issues of general public interest, there may well be a threat of real or apparent corruption. As discussed in text, Congress has relied on just this threat in enacting § 441b. We also reject as meritless NRWC’s claim that the Commission’s actions prior to and during conciliation were so misleading and arbitrary as to constitute a deprivation of due process. We leave open for consideration upon remand, inter alia, the propriety of the Commission’s imposition of a $10,000 civil penalty against respondent.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. NATIONAL LEAD CO. et al. No. 63. Argued December 12, 1956. Decided February 25, 1957. Earl W. Kintner argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Hansen, Charles H. Weston and Robert B. Dawkins. Eugene Z. Du Bose argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Mr. Du Bose for the National Lead Co., Thomas J. McDowell for the Sherwin-Williams Co., 'and Nathan S. Blumberg for the Eagle-Picher Co. et al., respondents. Also on the brief were John B. Henrich, Jr., Richard Serviss, Robert A. Sturges and John T. Van Keuls of counsel. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. The sole question involved in this proceeding under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act concerns the power of the Commission in framing an order pursuant to its finding that respondents had conspired to adopt and use a zone delivered pricing system in their sale of lead pigments. In its general cease and desist order prohibiting concert of action among respondents in the further use of such system, the Commission inserted a provision directing each respondent individually to cease and desist from adopting the same or a similar system of pricing for the purpose or with the effect of “matching” the prices of competitors. The respondents assert that this is beyond the power of the Commission, and the Court of Appeals agreed, 227 F. 2d 825, striking that provision from the Commission’s order. We granted certiorari, 351 U. S. 961, because of the importance of the question in the administration of the Act. We restore the stricken provision of the Commission order, permitting it to stand with the interpretations placed upon it in this opinion. I. The original proceeding under § 5 of the Act was commenced in 1944. The order was entered on a second amended complaint filed in 1946. After protracted hearings, the Commission entered its findings which the Court of Appeals has held to be supported by substantial evidence. The findings material here are as follows: The pricing practice of the industry as to the sale of white lead in oil prior to 1933 is not shown in the record. However, National Lead had as early as 1910 sold this pigment on the basis of territorial differentials involving free freight to specified towns. The differentials added to the base price were generally uniform for some 589 cities listed in National Lead’s pricing system in 1933. The charge to purchasers outside the listed cities was the base price plus actual freight to the nearest listed city. In the sales of dry white lead and lead oxides it appears that by the sales practice prior to 1933 there was a uniform delivered price in the case of the white lead, while the purchasers of lead oxides paid the freight charge in addition to the base price. Beginning in July 1933, the industry held a series of meetings in Chicago for the ostensible purpose of drafting a code of fair competition to govern it under the National Industrial Recovery Act. These meetings resulted in an understanding and agreement among those attending, including respondents, to sell lead pigments “on the basis of flat delivered prices to customers within designated zones, with uniform differentials applicable as between such zones . . . .” 49 E. T. C. 840. Four zoning systems were established covering the various lead pigments. As an example, the system for white lead in oil and “keg” products consisted of 12 geographical zones, one known as a par zone. The remaining zones in this system were known as premium zones, the price in each being determined by adding a set premium to the par zone price. These premiums varied from $.125 per cwt. in two of the zones to a high of $1 per cwt. in the premium zone covering the State of New Mexico. The zones were highly artificial and zone boundaries led to bizarre results at times, with purchasers located near the plants of respondents being charged higher prices than those located at a distance from the plants. The industry, including respondents, not only agreed to sell at the same zone delivered prices in identical geographical zones but also adopted uniform discounts, terms of sale, and differentials with respect to certain of their products. A further agreement was to sell white lead in oil on the basis of consignment contracts. The Commission stated that “nowhere in the code, nor in any preliminary draft of a code produced at the meetings of any of the committees, is there any reference to the use of zones or to territorial differences in the prices of lead pigments, or to the use of agency or consignment contracts or arrangements in the sale of white lead-in-oil.” Id., at 839. The Commission added that “with certain exceptions, the respondents have followed the pricing practices and have adhered to the terms and conditions for the sale of lead pigments agreed upon in 1933 and 1934 as herein found from 1934 to the present time.” Id., at 849. The respondents admit that they are bound by these findings and we see no reason to disturb them. II. The Commission entered an order prohibiting respondents from entering into or carrying out any “planned common course of action,” agreement, or conspiracy to sell at prices determined pursuant to a “zone delivered price system,” or any other system resulting in identical prices at the points of sale. The order also included a provision, to which respondents strenuously object, directing each of them to cease and desist from “quoting or selling lead pigments at prices calculated or determined in whole or in part pursuant to or in accordance with a zone delivered price system for the purpose or with the effect of systematically matching the delivered price quotations or the delivered prices of other sellers of lead pigments and thereby preventing purchasers from finding any advantage in price in dealing with one or more sellers as against another.” Id., at 873-874. The Commission, in an accompanying opinion, stated that in all cases where it found violations of the law, “it is the Commission’s duty to determine to the best of its ability the remedy necessary to suppress such activity and to take every precaution to preclude its revival.” Id., at 884. In this case, the opinion pointed out, the respondents cooperatively revised the pricing practices in the industry by establishing a “uniform zone pricing system.” Detailed discussions were carried on which resulted not only in an agreement, but “maps showing the boundaries of the zones to be observed . . . were distributed” by the individual respondents. Id., at 884. Each respondent has “since that time . . . followed the pricing system and adhered to the zone boundaries so discussed and shown on these maps.” Ibid. Discussing the complaint, the Commission in its opinion further noted that charges were included against each respondent as to its individual use of and adherence'to the zone system of selling “ ‘for the purpose and with the effect of enabling the respondents to match exactly their offers to sell lead pigments to any prospective purchaser at any destination, thereby eliminating competition between and among themselves.’... It was the adherence by each of them to this system of pricing that made the combination work. . . . Unless and until each of the respondents is prohibited from so adhering to the system and from so using the zones, the evils springing from the combination, one of which is to eliminate price competition, may well continue indefinitely. Unless the respondents, representing practically the entire economic power in the industry, are deprived of the device which made their combination effective, an order merely prohibiting the combination may well be a useless gesture.” Id., at 884-885. In its view, the Commission added, the “prohibition is necessary, not because it is unlawful in all circumstances for an individual seller, acting independently, to sell its products on a delivered price basis in specified territories, but to make the order fully effective against the trade restraining conspiracy in which each of the respondents [defendants] participated.” Id., at 884. When and if competition is restored and the individual prohibition is no longer necessary, the Commission expressed its intention, upon application, to vacate the latter provision of its order. III. At the beginning we must understand the limits of the contested portion of the order. First, it is temporary. Though its life expectancy is not definite, it is clear that the Commission was creating a breathing spell during which independent pricing might be established without the hang-over of the long-existing pattern of collusion. Second, the order is directed solely at the use of a zone delivered pricing system and no other. This system is a pricing method based on geographic divisions or zones, the boundaries of which are entirely drawn by the seller. His delivered price is the same throughout a particular geographic zone so drawn up by him. Customarily the delivered price is different between zones, though as here, widely separated zones, geographically, might have the same delivered price. It is well to mention here that while this Court has passed upon the validity of basing point systems of sales, Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U. S. 726 (1945), it has not decided the validity of the zone pricing plan used here. Third, zone delivered pricing per se is not banned by the order. The Commission might have made the order more specific by entering a flat prohibition of the use for a definite period of the device found to be “the very cornerstone of the . . . conspiracy,” i. e., zone pricing. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U. S. 386, 428 (1945), where the corporate defendants were enjoined from “forming or joining any such trade association” for a period of five years. But the Commission chose the more flexible sanction, i. e., the limited use of zone delivered pricing. However, it concluded that the future use should be temporarily restricted for the protection of the public. And so, delivered zone pricing violates the order only when two conditions are present: (1) identical prices with competitors (2) resulting from zone delivered pricing. Considering these conditions with the mechanics of the zone plan, we see that the only way prices can be systematically identical is for the zones of competitors to be so drawn as to be in whole or in part identical and for zone prices to be the same in those zones which coincide or overlap. Respondents contend that the cease and desist order, as written, excludes the benefits of § 2 (b) of the Clayton Act. While § 2 (b) “does not concern itself with pricing systems . . . [but] only [with] the seller’s 'lower’ price and [with] that only to the extent that it is made 'in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor,’ ” Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746, 753 (1945), this section is read into every Commission order. Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U. S. 470, 476 (1952). Since § 2 (b) must, therefore, be read into this order, the respondents are afforded all of the benefits of that section. IV. It is the contention of respondents that the contested paragraph of the order effectively bans the noncollusive, individual use of zone pricing, a lawful, competitive sales method, and is therefore beyond the authority of the Commission. Respondents further assert that even if the Commission had such authority its exercise here was entirely improper, unnecessary, and would, in fact, hamper competition in the industry. They stress that the complaint did not include a charge that the individual use of zone pricing was unlawful; that it came into the case after the Trial Examiner had filed his recommended decision and order; and that respondents were denied the opportunity of rebutting the charge by evidence showing zone pricing to be “a logical, economical, and competitive method of doing business.” The insertion of the objectionable paragraph, they contend, violates due process in that they had no opportunity to defend. Since § 2 (b) is read into every Commission order and since it would allow respondents to rebut the charge, their contention is completely answered and we shall not deal with it further. It goes without saying that the requirements of a fair hearing include notice of the claims of the opposing party and an opportunity to meet them. Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1 (1938). The record indicates that the respondents were afforded those safeguards. The emphasis that there was no charge, no evidence, no finding to support the inclusion of the objectionable provision in the order is misplaced. Its insertion was nothing more than a mode of implementation, selected by the Commission, to enforce its findings of violations of the Act. Moreover, the record is replete with evidence that counsel supporting the complaint would seek the use of such a method of enforcement. As far back as in early 1947, while the case was before the Examiner, the issue concerning the effect of the zone pricing system used by respondents was before the Commission on motions to dismiss. Admittedly Count II of the complaint dealt with the use of the zone system itself. The Commission overruled the motions to dismiss, adopting the view of counsel supporting the complaint that its allegations were directed against the effects of the alleged system or method, i. e., the zone pricing plan, and “not against individual instances" of discrimination in pricing. Furthermore, in May 1948, almost five years before the decree was entered, counsel supporting the complaint filed written exceptions to the recommended decision of the Examiner on the ground, among others, that it did not include a provision similar to the one objected to here. If respondents thought rebuttal evidence necessary, the record is bare of any effort on their part to offer it. Nor was any request made to reopen the case for that purpose after it reached the Commission. We pass on to respondents’ major contention questioning the power of the Commission. As the Court has said many times before, the Commission may exercise only the powers granted it by the Act. Federal Trade Commission v. Western Meat Co., 272 U. S. 554, 559 (1926). The relevant sections empower the Commission to prevent the use of unfair methods of competition and authorize it, after finding an unfair method present, to enter an order requiring the offender “to cease and desist” from using such unfair method. The Court has held that the Commission is clothed with wide discretion in determining the type of order that is necessary to bring an end to the unfair practices found to exist. In Jacob Siegel Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 327 U. S. 608 (1946), the Court named the Commission “the expert body to determine what remedy is necessary to eliminate the unfair or deceptive trade practices which have been disclosed. It has wide latitude for judgment and the courts will not interfere except where the remedy selected has no reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to exist.” Id., at 612-613. Thereafter, in Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683, 726 (1948), the Court pointed out that the Congress, in passing the Act, “felt that courts needed the assistance of men trained to combat monopolistic practices in the framing of judicial decrees in antitrust litigation.” In the light of this, the Court reasoned, it should not “lightly modify” the orders of the Commission. Again, in Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co., supra, at 473, we said that “if the Commission is to attain the objectives Congress envisioned, it cannot be required to confine its road block to the narrow lane the transgressor has traveled; it must be allowed effectively to close all roads to the prohibited goal, so that its order may not be by-passed with impunity.” We pointed out there that Congress had placed the primary responsibility for fashioning orders upon the Commission. These cases narrow the issue to the question: Does the remedy selected have a “reasonable relation to the unlawful practices found to exist”? We believe that it does. First, the simplicity of operation of the plan lends itself to unlawful manipulation; second, it had been used in the industry for almost a quarter of a century; and, third, its originator and chief beneficiary had been previously adjudged a violator of the antitrust laws. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U. S. 319 (1947). The respondents were found to have plainly disregarded the law. In this respect the Commission correctly considered the circumstances under which the illegal acts occurred. Those in utter disregard of law, as here, “call for repression by sterner measures than where the steps could reasonably have been thought permissible.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U. S. 76, 89-90 (1950). Respondents made no appeal here from some of the findings as to their guilt. Having lost the battle on the facts, they hope to win the war on the type of decree. They fight for the right to continue to use individually the very same weapon with which they carried on their unlawful enterprise. The Commission concluded that this must not be permitted. It was “not obliged to assume, contrary to common experience, that a violator of the antitrust laws will relinquish the fruits of his violation more completely than [it] requires . . . International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392, 400 (1947). Although the zone plan might be used for some lawful purposes, decrees often suppress a lawful device when it is used to carry out an unlawful purpose. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U. S. 436 (1940); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707 (1944). In such instances the Court is obliged not only to suppress the unlawful practice but to take such reasonable action as is calculated to preclude the revival of the illegal practices. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, supra, at 461; Local 167, I. B. T. v. United States, 291 U. S. 293 (1934). See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., supra; United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, 188 (1944). We therefore conclude that, under the circumstances here, the Commission was justified in its determination that it was necessary to include some restraint in its order against the individual corporations in order to prevent a continuance of the unfair competitive practices found to exist. Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Education Society, 302 U. S. 112, 120 (1937). We shall now examine the restraint imposed. Respondents point out that in only one other case in the long history of the Commission has a similar order been entered. They say our restoration of the contested paragraph will effectively prevent competition. In its supplemental memorandum, see note 5, supra, the Commission has clearly stated its understanding of the scope and effect of the order. It is our conclusion that the order was not intended to and does not prohibit or interfere with independent delivered zone pricing per se. Nor does it prohibit the practice of the absorption of actual freight as such in order to foster competition. Furthermore, as we have said, there is read into the order the provision of § 2 (b) of the Clayton Act as to the right of a seller in good faith to meet the lower price of a competitor. This is not to say that a seller may plead this section in defense of the use of an entire pricing system. The section is designed to protect competitors in individual transactions. Respondents pose hypothetical situations which they say may rise up to plague them. However, “we think it would not be good judicial administration,” as our late Brother Jackson said in International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392, 401 (1947), to strike the contested paragraph of the order to meet such conjectures. The Commission has reserved jurisdiction to meet just such contingencies. As actual situations arise they can be presented to the Commission in evidentiary form rather than as fantasies. And, we might add, if there is a burden that cannot be made lighter after application to the Commission, then respondents must remember that those caught violating the Act must expect some fencing in. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., supra, at 187. Reversed. 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45. The three principal lead pigments are dry white lead, white lead in oil, and the lead oxides, red lead and litharge. Dry white lead is a fine white powder used as a pigment in paints. White lead in oil is white lead with linseed oil added and is sold for use as the basic ingredient in exterior house paint. Lead oxides and litharge are sold to electric storage battery manufacturers as the basic raw material for battery plates. Red lead is also the basic ingredient in red lead paint commonly used as a protective coating for iron and steel structures. The par zone includes a number of northeastern and midwestern States. However, some cities located within these States are excluded from the par zone. On the other hand, the San Francisco area is a par zone, as is the City of St. Louis, though both are located in States not included in par zone areas. For a detailed discussion and maps of the operation of the zone pricing system, see the findings, 49 F. T. C. 840-870. Our discussion of the zone delivered pricing system should in no way be construed as our approval of its use. We do not reach that question. At oral argument, counsel for the Federal Trade Commission was requested by the Court to submit a statement on behalf of the Commission setting forth its view as to the scope of the disputed paragraph of the cease and desist order. In response, the Commission supplied its interpretation which coincides with that set out here. 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U. S. C. § 13 (b). We need not discuss the full scope of the powers of the Federal Trade Commission, nor their relative breadth in comparison with those of a court of equity. As this Court said in May Dept. Stores Co. v. Labor Board, 326 U. S. 376, 390 (1945), "The test ... is whether the Board might have reasonably concluded . . . that such an order was necessary . . . .”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DIXON, SECRETARY OF STATE OF ILLINOIS v. LOVE No. 75-1513. Argued March 1-2, 1977 Decided May 16, 1977 Patricia Rosen, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were William J. Scott, Attorney General, and Paul J. Bargiel, Stephen R. Swofford, and Mary Stafford, Assistant Attorneys General. James 0. Latturner argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Alan M. Freedman, Richard J. Hess, and Allen L. Ray. Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is whether Illinois has provided constitutionally adequate procedures for suspending or revoking the license of a driver who repeatedly has been convicted of traffic offenses. The statute and administrative regulations provide for an initial summary decision based on official records, with a full administrative hearing available only after the suspension or revocation has taken effect. I The case centers on § 6-206 of the Illinois Driver Licensing Law (c. 6 of the Illinois Vehicle Code). The section is entitled “Discretionary authority to suspend or revoke license or permit.” It empowers the Secretary of State to act “without preliminary hearing upon a showing by his records or other sufficient evidence” that a driver’s conduct falls into any one of 18 enumerated categories. Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 95%, § 6-206 (a) (1975). Pursuant to his rulemaking authority under this law, § 6-211 (a), the Secretary has adopted administrative regulations that further define the bases and procedures for discretionary suspensions. These regulations generally provide for an initial summary determination based on the individual’s driving record. The Secretary has established a comprehensive system of assigning “points” for various kinds of traffic offenses, depending on severity, to provide an objective means of evaluating driving records. One of the statutorily enumerated circumstances justifying license suspension or revocation is conviction of three moving traffic offenses within a 12-month period. § 6-206 (a) (2). This is one of the instances where the Secretary, by regulation, has provided a method for determining the sanction according to the driver’s accumulated “points.” Another circumstance, specified in the statute, supporting suspension or revocation is where a licensee “[h]as been repeatedly involved as a driver in motor vehicle collisions or has been repeatedly convicted of offenses against laws and ordinances regulating the movement of traffic, to a degree which indicates lack of ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the safe operation of a motor vehicle or disrespect for the traffic laws and the safety of other persons upon the highway.” § 6-206 (a)(3). Here again the Secretary has limited his broad statutory discretion by an administrative regulation. This regulation allows suspension or revocation, where sufficient points have been accumulated to warrant a second suspension within a 5-year period. The regulation concludes flatly: “A person who has been suspended thrice within a 10 year period shall be revoked.” Section 6-206 (c)(1) requires the Secretary “immediately” to provide written notice of a discretionary suspension or revocation under this statute, but no prior hearing is required. Within 20 days of his receiving a written request from the licensee, the Secretary must schedule a full evidentiary hearing for a date “as early as practical” in either Sangamon County or Cook County, as the licensee may specify. § 2-118 (a). The final decision of the Secretary after such hearing is subject to judicial review in the Illinois courts. § 2-118 (e). In addition, a person whose license is suspended or revoked may obtain a restricted permit for commercial use or in case of hardship. §§ 6-206 (c) (2) and (3). II Appellee Love, a resident of Chicago, is employed as a truck-driver. His license was suspended in November 1969, under § 6-206 (a) (2), for three convictions within a 12-month period. He was then convicted of a charge of driving while his license was suspended, and consequently another suspension was imposed in March 1970 pursuant to § 6-303 (b). Appellee received no further citation until August 1974, when he was arrested twice for speeding. He was convicted of both charges and then received a third speeding citation in February 1975. On March 27, he was notified by letter that he would lose his driving privileges if convicted of a third offense. On March 31 appellee was convicted of the third speeding charge. On June 3, appellee received a notice that his license was revoked effective June 6. The stated authority for the revocation was § 6-206 (a) (3); the explanation, following the language of the statute, was: “This action has been taken as a result of: Your having been repeatedly convicted of offenses against laws and ordinances regulating the movement of traffic, to a degree which indicates disrespect for the traffic laws.” App. 13. Appellee, then aged 25, made no request for an administrative hearing. Instead, he filed this purported class action on June 5 against the Illinois Secretary of State in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. His complaint sought a declaratory judgment that § 6-206 (a) (3) was unconstitutional, an injunction against enforcement of the statute, and damages. Appellee’s application for a temporary restraining order was granted on condition that he apply for a hardship driving permit. He applied for that permit on June 10, and it was issued on July 25. A three-judge District Court was convened to consider appellee’s claim that the Illinois statute was unconstitutional. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held that a license cannot constitutionally be suspended or revoked under § 6-206 (a)(3) until after a hearing is held to determine whether the licensee meets the statutory criteria of “lack of ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the safe operation of a motor vehicle or disrespect for the traffic laws and the safety of other persons upon the highway.” The court regarded such a prior hearing as mandated by this Court’s decision in Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971). Accordingly, the court granted judgment for appellee and enjoined the Secretary of State from enforcing § 6-206 (a)(3). The Secretary appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction sub nom. Howlett v. Love, 429 U. S. 813 (1976). Ill It is clear that the Due Process Clause applies to the deprivation of a driver’s license by the State: “Suspension of issued licenses . . . involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S., at 539. It is equally clear that a licensee in Illinois eventually can obtain all the safeguards procedural due process could be thought to require before a discretionary suspension or revocation becomes final. Appellee does not challenge the adequacy of the administrative hearing, noted above, available under § 2-118. The only question is one of timing. This case thus presents an issue similar to that considered only last Term in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 333 (1976), namely, “the extent to which due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of some type of property interest even if such a hearing is provided thereafter.” We may analyze the present case, too, in terms of the factors considered in Eldridge: “[Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id., at 335. The private interest affected by the decision here is the granted license to operate a motor vehicle. Unlike the social security recipients in Eldridge, who at least could obtain retroactive payments if their claims were subsequently sustained, a licensee is not made entirely whole if his suspension or revocation is later vacated. On the other hand, a driver’s license may not be so vital and essential as are social insurance payments on which the recipient may depend for his very subsistence. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 264 (1970). The Illinois statute includes special provisions for hardship and for holders of commercial licenses, who are those most likely to be affected by the deprival of driving privileges. See n. 7, supra. We therefore conclude that the nature of the private interest here is not so great as to require us “to depart from the ordinary principle, established by our decisions, that something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 343. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1974). Moreover, the risk of an erroneous deprivation in the absence of a prior hearing is not great. Under the Secretary’s regulations, suspension and revocation decisions are largely automatic. Of course, there is the possibility of clerical error, but written objection will bring a matter of that kind to the Secretary’s attention. In this case appellee had the opportunity for a full judicial hearing in connection with each of the traffic convictions on which the Secretary’s decision was based. Appellee has not challenged the validity of those convictions or the adequacy of his procedural rights at the time they were determined. Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, 47. Since appellee does not dispute the factual basis for the Secretary’s decision, he is really asserting the right to appear in person only to argue that the Secretary should show leniency and depart from his own regulations. Such an appearance might make the licensee feel that he has received more personal attention, but it would not serve to protect any substantive rights. We conclude that requiring additional procedures would be unlikely to have significant value in reducing the number of erroneous deprivations. Finally, the substantial public interest in administrative efficiency would be impeded by the availability of a pretermination hearing in every case. Giving licensees the choice thus automatically to obtain a delay in the effectiveness of a suspension or revocation would encourage drivers routinely to request full administrative hearings. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S., at 347. Far more substantial than the administrative burden, however, is the important public interest in safety on the roads and highways, and in the prompt removal of a safety hazard. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 657, 671 (1971) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). This factor fully distinguishes Bell v. Burson, supra, where the “only purpose” of the Georgia statute there under consideration was “to obtain security from which to pay any judgments against the licensee resulting from the accident.” 402 U. S., at 540. In contrast, the Illinois statute at issue in the instant case is designed to keep off the roads those drivers who are unable or unwilling to respect traffic rules and the safety of others. We conclude that the public interests present under the circumstances of this case are sufficiently visible and weighty for the State to make its summary initial decision effective without a predecision administrative hearing. The present case is a good illustration of the fact that procedural due process in the administrative setting does not always require application of the judicial model. When a governmental official is given the power to make discretionary decisions under a broad statutory standard, case-by-case decisionmaking may not be the best way to assure fairness. Here the Secretary commendably sought to define the statutory standard narrowly by the use of his rulemaking authority. The decision to use objective rules in this case provides drivers with more precise notice of what conduct will be sanctioned and promotes equality of treatment among similarly situated drivers. The approach taken by the District Court would have the contrary result of reducing the fairness of the system, by requiring a necessarily subjective inquiry in each case as to a driver’s “disrespect” or “lack of ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care.” The second count of appellee’s complaint challenged § 6-206 (a) (3) on the grounds of vagueness and inadequacy of standards. The three-judge court did not reach the issue. App. 22. We regard the claim, in the light of Love’s record, as frivolous. The judgment of the District Court is reversed. It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 6-211 (a): “The Secretary of State shall administer the provisions of this Chapter and may make and enforce rules and regulations relating to its administration.” Rule 6-206 (a) (1975) provides in part: “The Secretary of State is authorized to exercise discretionary authority to suspend or revoke the license or permit of any person without a preliminary hearing, or to decline to suspend or revoke such driving privileges. In making a determination of the action to be taken, the Secretary of State shall take into consideration the severity of the offense and conviction, the number of offenses and convictions, and prior suspensions or revocations on the abstract of the driver’s record. The Secretary may also take into consideration the points accumulated by the driver and noted on his driving record. “For the purpose of this Rule and its companion rules, a conviction is the final adjudication of ‘guilty’ by a court of competent jurisdiction, either after a bench trial, trial by jury, plea of guilty, order of forfeiture, or default, as reported to the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State is not authorized to consider or inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the conviction.” The statute authorizes suspension or revocation where a licensee “[h]as been convicted of not less than 3 offenses against traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles with the exception of those offenses excluded under the provisions of Section 6-204 (2), committed within any 12 month period so as to indicate the disrespect for traffic laws and a disregard for the safety of other persons on the highways; conviction upon 3 charges of violation of Section 11-601 of this Act committed within a period of 12 months shall be deemed grounds for the revocation or suspension of a license or permit under this Section, provided that no such revocation or suspension shall be entered more than 6 months subsequent to the date of conviction of the 3rd offense.” 111. Rev. Stat. c. 95%, §6-206 (a) (2) (1975). Rule 6-206 (a)2 (1975) provides: “A person who has been convicted of three (3) or more offenses against traffic regulations, governing the movement of vehicles, with the exception of those offenses excluded under provisions of Section 6-204 (2) and whose violations have occurred within a twelve (12) month period may be suspended as follows: “Number of points Action 20 to 44 Suspension up to 2 months 45 to 74 Suspension up to 3 months 75 to 89 Suspension up to 6 months 90 to 99 Suspension up to 9 months 100 to 109 Suspension up to 12 months Over 110 Revocation for not less than 12 months. “A person who has accumulated sufficient points to warrant a second suspension within a 10-year period may be either suspended or revoked, depending on the number of points. In the event of a second suspension in the 10-year period, the length of suspension, determined by the point total, is doubled to arrive at the type and duration of action.” Rule 6-206 (a)3 (1975) provides: “A person repeatedly involved in collisions or convictions to a degree which indicates the lack of ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the safe operation of a motor vehicle, or whose record indicates disrespect for traffic laws and the safety of other persons on the highway, and who has accumulated sufficient points to warrant a second suspension within a 5 year period, may either be suspended or revoked by the Secretary of State, based upon the number of points in his record. A person who has been suspended thrice within a 10 year period shall be revoked.” Section 6-206 (c) (1): “Upon suspending or revoking the license or permit of any person as authorized in this Section, the Secretary of State shall immediately notify such person in writing of the order revoking or suspending the license or permit. Such notice to be deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the last known address of such person.” The statutory provision regarding commercial licenses provides that a suspension shall not deny “a person’s license to drive a commercial vehicle only as an occupation . . . unless 5 offenses were committed, at least 2 of which occurred while operating a commercial vehicle in connection with his regular occupation.” The statute places the burden on the commercial driver whose license is suspended to submit an affidavit to the Secretary within 25 days, setting forth facts establishing his eligibility for relief under this section. A commercial driver may obtain the same relief by requesting an administrative hearing in lieu of submitting an affidavit. In any event, the driver must return his license to the Secretary and in its place is issued a permit to drive only a commercial vehicle in his regular occupation. § 6-206 (c) (2). Any driver whose license is suspended or revoked, in order to “relieve undue hardship,” may apply for a restricted permit to drive between his residence and his place of employment “or within other proper limits.” §6-206 (c) (3). Appellee’s March speeding conviction was his third within a 12-month period, and thus § 6-206 (a) (2) authorized suspension of his license. That suspension, however, would have been appellee’s third within a 10-year period. The Secretary therefore proceeded directly under Rule 6-206 (a) 3, which makes revocation mandatory under such circumstances. The District Court treated this procedure as functionally equivalent to suspension under § 6-206 (a) (2), followed by mandatory revocation under Rule 6-206 (a)3. See App. 20 n. 2. The class was never certified. Appellee also contends that a prior hearing would avoid erroneous deprivation of a license where the commercial driver or hardship exceptions are applicable. See n. 7, supra. It is clear, however, that these statutory provisions contemplate relief only after the initial decision to suspend or revoke is made, and the licensee has the burden of demonstrating his eligibility for the relief. An initial suspension or revocation, therefore, is not “erroneous” even if the licensee subsequently qualifies for relief as a commercial driver or hardship case. Since Bell v. Burson was decided, courts have sustained suspension or revocation of driving privileges, without prior hearing, where earlier convictions were on the record. See, e. g., Cox v. Hjelle, 207 N. W. 2d 266, 269-270 (N. D. 1973); Stauffer v. Weedlun, 188 Neb. 105, 195 N. W. 2d 218, appeal dismissed, 409 U. S. 972 (1972); Horodner v. Fisher, 38 N. Y. 2d 680, 345 N. E. 2d 571, appeal dismissed, 429 U. S. 802 (1976); Wright v. Malloy, 373 F. Supp. 1011, 1018-1019 (Vt.), summarily aff’d, 419 U. S. 987 (1974); Scott v. Hill, 407 F. Supp. 301, 304 (ED Va. 1076). See K. Davis, Discretionary Justice, c. Ill, 52-96 (1969). The promulgation of rules may be of particular value when it is necessary for administrative decisions to be made summarily. See Freedman, Summary Action by Administrative Agencies, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 44-49 (1972).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

JIMMY SWAGGART MINISTRIES v. BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF CALIFORNIA No. 88-1374. Argued October 31, 1989 Decided January 17, 1990 O’CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Michael W. McConnell argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Charles R. Ajalat, Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., and Jesse H. Choper. Richard E. Nielsen, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, and Neal J. Gobar, Deputy Attorney General. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Association for Public Justice by Bradley P. Jacob; for the Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability et al. by Samuel E. Ericsson, Michael J. Woodruff, and Forest D. Montgomery; for the International Society for Krishna Consciousness of California, Inc., by David M. Liberman, Robert C. Moest, and Barry A. Fisher; for the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U. S. A. by Douglas Laycock; and for the National Taxpayers Union by Gale A. Norton. Steven R. Shapiro filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon and Charles Rothfeld; and for the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., by James M. McCabe and Donald T. Ridley. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the question whether the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit a State from imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the distribution of religious materials by a religious organization. t — i California’s Sales and Use Tax Law requires retailers to pay a sales tax “[f ]or the privilege of selling tangible personal property at retail.” Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §6051 (West 1987). A “sale” includes any transfer of title or possession of tangible personal property for consideration. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. § 6006(a) (West Supp. 1989). The use tax, as a complement to the sales tax, reaches out-of-state purchases by residents of the State. It is “imposed on the storage, use, or other consumption in this state of tangible personal property purchased from any retailer,” § 6201, at the same rate as the sales tax (6 percent). Although the use tax is imposed on the purchaser, § 6202, it is generally collected by the retailer at the time the sale is made. §§6202-6206. Neither the State Constitution nor the State Sales and Use Tax Law exempts religious organizations from the sales and use tax, apart from a limited exemption for the serving of meals by religious organizations, §6363.5. During the tax period in question (1974 to 1981), appellant Jimmy Swaggart Ministries was a religious organization incorporated as a Louisiana nonprofit corporation and recognized as such by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, 26 U. S. C. § 501(c)(3) (1982 ed.), and by the California State Controller pursuant to the Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Laws of the State of California. Appellant’s constitution and bylaws provide that it “is called for the purpose of establishing and maintaining an evangelistic outreach for the worship of Almighty God.” App. 107. This outreach is to be performed “by all available means, both at home and in foreign lands,” and “shall specifically include evangelistic crusades; missionary endeavors; radio broadcasting (as owner, broadcaster, and placement agency); television broadcasting (both as owner and broadcaster); and audio production and reproduction of music; audio production and reproduction of preaching; audio production and reproduction of teaching; writing, printing and publishing; and, any and all other individual or mass media methods that presently exist or may be devised in the future to proclaim the good news of Jesus Christ.” Id., at 107-108. From 1974 to 1981, appellant conducted numerous “evangelistic crusades” in auditoriums and arenas across the country in cooperation with local churches. Id., at 61. During this period, appellant held 23 crusades in California — each lasting 1 to 3 days, with one crusade lasting 6 days — for a total of 52 days. Id., at 19-20. At the crusades, appellant conducted religious services that included preaching and singing. Some of these services were recorded for later sale or broadcast. Appellant also sold religious books, tapes, records, and other religious and nonreligious merchandise at the crusades. Appellant also published a monthly magazine, “The Evangelist,” which was sold nationwide by subscription. The magazine contained articles of a religious nature as well as advertisements for appellant’s religious books, tapes, and records. The magazine included an order form listing the various items for sale in the particular issue and their unit price, with spaces for purchasers to fill in the quantity desired and the total price. Appellant also offered its items for sale through radio, television, and cable television broadcasts, including broadcasts through local California stations. In 1980, appellee Board of Equalization of the State of California (Board) informed appellant that religious materials were not exempt from the sales tax and requested appellant to register as a seller to facilitate reporting and payment of the tax. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §§6066-6074 (West 1987 and Supp. 1989) (tax registration requirements). Appellant responded that it was exempt from such taxes under the First Amendment. In 1981, the Board audited appellant and advised appellant that it should register as a seller and report and pay sales tax on all sales made at its California crusades. The Board also opined that appellant had a sufficient nexus with the State of California to require appellant to collect and report use tax on its mail-order sales to California purchasers. Based on the Board’s review of appellant’s records, the parties stipulated “that [appellant] sold for use in California tangible personal property for the period April 1, 1974, through December 31, 1981, measured by payment to [appellant] of $1,702,942.00 for mail order sales from Baton Rouge, Louisiana and $240,560.00 for crusade merchandise sales in California.” App. 58. These figures represented the sales and use in California of merchandise with specific religious content— Bibles, Bible study manuals, printed sermons and collections of sermons, audiocassette tapes of sermons, religious books and pamphlets, and religious music in the form of songbooks, tapes, and records. See App. to Juris. Statement B-l to B-3. Based on the sales figures for appellant’s religious materials, the Board notified appellant that it owed sales and use taxes of $118,294.54, plus interest of $36,021.11, and a penalty of $11,829.45, for a total amount due of $166,145.10. App. 8. Appellant did not contest the Board’s assessment of tax liability for the sale and use of certain nonreligious merchandise, including such items as “T-shirts with JSM logo, mugs, bowls, plates, replicas of crown of thorns, ark of the covenant, Roman coin, candlesticks, Bible stand, pen and pencil sets, prints of religious scenes, bud vase, and communion cups.” Id., at 59-60. Appellant filed a petition for redetermination with the Board, reiterating its view that the tax on religious materials violated the First Amendment. Following a hearing and an appeal to the Board, the Board deleted the penalty but otherwise redetermined the matter without adjustment in the amount of $118,294.54 in taxes owing, plus $65,043.55 in interest. Pursuant to state procedural law, appellant paid the amount and filed a petition for redetermination and refund with the Board. See Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §6902 (West 1987). The Board denied appellant’s petition, and appellant brought suit in state court, seeking a refund of the tax paid. The trial court entered judgment for the Board, ruling that appellant was not entitled to a refund of any tax. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1269, 250 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1988), and the California Supreme Court denied discretionary review. We noted probable jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §1257(2) (1982 ed.) (amended in 1988), 490 U. S. 1018 (1989), and now affirm. » — I 1 — 1 Appellant’s central contention is that the State’s imposition of sales and use tax liability on its sale of religious materials contravenes the First Amendment’s command, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, to “make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Appellant challenges the Sales and Use Tax Law under both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. A The Free Exercise Clause, we have noted, “withdraws from legislative power, state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority.” Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 222-223 (1963). Indeed, “[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 220 (1972). Our cases have established that “[t]he free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation óf a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden.” Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U. S. 680, 699 (1989) (citations omitted). Appellant relies almost exclusively on our decisions in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943), and Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573, 576 (1944), for the proposition that a State may not impose a sales or use tax on the evangelical distribution of religious material by a religious organization. Appellant contends that the State’s imposition of use and sales tax liability on it burdens its evangelical distribution of religious materials in a manner identical to the manner in which the evangelists in Murdock and Follett were burdened. We reject appellant’s expansive reading of Murdock and Follett as contrary to the decisions themselves. In Mur-dock, we considered the constitutionality of a city ordinance requiring all persons canvassing or soliciting within the city to procure a license by paying a flat fee. Reversing the convictions of Jehovah’s Witnesses convicted under the ordinance of soliciting and distributing religious literature without a license, we explained: “The hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary evangelism . . . [and] has been a potent force in various religious movements down through the years. This form of evangelism is utilized today on a large scale by various religious sects whose colporteurs carry the Gospel to thousands upon thousands of homes and seek through personal visitations to win adherents to their faith. It is more than preaching; it is more than distribution of religious literature. It is a combination of both. Its purpose is as evangelical as the revival meeting. This form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching in the pulpits.” 319 U. S., at 108-109 (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, we held that “spreading one’s religious beliefs or preaching the Gospel through distribution of religious literature and through personal visitations is an age-old type of evangelism with as high a claim to constitutional protection as the more orthodox types.” Id., at 110; see also Jones v. Opelika, 319 U. S. 103 (1943); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943). We extended Murdock the following Term by invalidating, as applied to “one who earns his livelihood as an evangelist or preacher in his home town,” an ordinance (similar to that involved in Murdock) that required all booksellers to pay a flat fee to procure a license to sell books. Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S., at 576. Reaffirming our observation in Murdock that “‘the power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment,’” 321 U. S., at 577 (quoting Murdock, supra, at 112), we reasoned that “[t]he protection of the First Amendment is not restricted to orthodox religious practices any more than it is to the expression of orthodox economic views. He who makes a profession of evangelism is not in a less preferred position than the casual worker.” 321 U. .S., at 577. Our decisions in these cases, however, resulted from the particular nature of the challenged taxes — flat license taxes that operated as a prior restraint on the exercise of religious liberty. In Murdock, for instance, we emphasized that the tax at issue was “a license tax — a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights,” 319 U. S., at 113, and cautioned that “[w]e do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free from all financial burdens of government. ... We have here something quite different, for example, from a tax on the income of one who engages in religious activities or a tax on property used or employed in connection with those activities.” Id., at 112 (citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 250 (1936)); see also 319 U. S., at 115 (“This tax is not a charge for the enjoyment of a privilege or benefit bestowed by the state”). In Follett, we reiterated that a preacher is not “free from all financial burdens of government, including taxes on income or property” and, “like other citizens, may be subject to general taxation.” 321 U. S., at 578 (emphasis added). Significantly, we noted in both cases that a primary vice of the ordinances at issue was that they operated as prior restraints of constitutionally protected conduct: “In all of these cases [in which license taxes have been invalidated] the issuance of the permit or license is dependent on the payment of a license tax. And the" license tax is fixed in amount and unrelated to the scope of the activities of petitioners or to their realized revenues. It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It is a flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the First Amendment. Accordingly, it restrains in advance those constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.” Murdock, supra, at 113-114 (emphasis added). See also follett, supra, at 577 (“The exaction of a tax as a condition to the exercise of the great liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment is as obnoxious as the imposition of a censorship or a previous restraint”) (citations omitted). Thus, although Murdock and Follett establish that appellant’s form of religious exercise has “as high a claim to constitutional protection as the more orthodox types,” Murdock, supra, at 110, those cases are of no further help to appellant. Our concern in Murdock and Follett — that a flat license tax would act as a precondition to the free exercise of religious beliefs — is simply not present where a tax applies to all sales and uses of tangible personal property in the State. Our reading of Murdock and Follett is confirmed by our decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575 (1983), where we considered a newspaper’s First Amendment challenge to a state use tax on ink and paper products used in the production of periodic publications. In the course of striking down the tax, we rejected the newspaper’s suggestion, premised on Murdock and Follett, that a generally applicable sales tax could not be applied to publications. Construing those cases as involving “a flat tax, unrelated to the receipts or income of the speaker or to the expenses of administering a valid regulatory scheme, as a condition of the right to speak,” 460 U. S., at 587, n. 9 (emphasis in original), we noted: “By imposing the tax as a condition of engaging in protected activity, the defendants in those cases imposed a form of prior restraint on speech, rendering the tax highly susceptible to constitutional challenge. In that regard, the cases cited by Star Tribune do not resemble a generally applicable sales tax. Indeed, our cases have consistently recognized that nondiscriminatory taxes on the receipts or income of newspapers would be permissible.” Ibid, (citations omitted). Accord, Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U. S. 221, 229 (1987) (“[A] genuinely nondiscriminatory tax on the receipts of newspapers would be constitutionally permissible”). We also note that just last Term a plurality of the Court rejected the precise argument appellant now makes. In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S. 1 (1989), Justice Brennan, writing for three Justices, held that a state sales tax exemption for religious publications violated the Establishment Clause. Id., at 14-21 (plurality opinion). In so concluding, the plurality further held that the Free Exercise Clause did not prevent the State from withdrawing its exemption, noting that “[t]o the extent that our opinions in Murdock and Follett might be read ... to suggest that the States and the Federal Government may never tax the sale of religious or other publications, we reject those dicta.” Id., at 24. Justice White, concurring in the judgment, con-eluded that the exemption violated the Free Press Clause because the content of a publication determined its tax-exempt status. Id., at 24-25. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred in the plurality’s holding that the tax exemption at issue in that case contravened the Establishment Clause, but reserved the question whether “the Free Exercise Clause requires a tax exemption for the sale of religious literature by a religious organization; in other words, defining the ultimate scope of Follett and Murdock may be left for another day.” Id., at 28. In this case, of course, California has not chosen to create a tax exemption for religious materials, and we therefore have no need to revisit the Establishment Clause question presented in Texas Monthly. We do, however, decide the free exercise question left open by Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Texas Monthly by limiting Murdock and Follett to apply only where a flat license tax operates as a prior restraint on the free exercise of religious beliefs. As such, Murdock and Follett plainly do not support appellant’s free exercise claim. California’s generally applicable sales and use tax is not a flat tax, represents only a small fraction of any retail sale, and applies neutrally to all retail sales of tangible personal property made in California. California imposes its sales and use tax even if the seller or the purchaser is charitable, religious, nonprofit, or state or local governmental in nature. See Union League Club v. Johnson, 18 Cal. 2d 275, 278, 115 P. 2d 425, 426 (1941); People v. Imperial County, 76 Cal. App. 2d 572, 576-577, 173 P. 2d 352, 354 (1946); Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn. v. State Board of Equalization, 209 Cal. App. 2d 780, 796-797, 26 Cal. Rptr. 348, 357-358 (1962). Thus, the sales and use tax is not a tax on the right to disseminate religious information, ideas, or beliefs per se; rather, it is a tax on the privilege of making retail sales of tangible personal property and on the storage, uáe, or other consumption of tangible personal property in California. For example, California treats the sale of a Bible by a religious organization just as it would treat the sale of a Bible by a bookstore; as long as both are in-state retail sales of tangible personal property, they are both subject to the tax regardless of the motivation for the sale or the purchase. There is no danger that appellant’s religious activity is being singled out for special and burdensome treatment. Moreover, our concern in Murdock and Follett that flat license taxes operate as a precondition to the exercise of evangelistic activity is not present in this case, because the registration requirement, see Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. §§6066-6074 (West 1987 and Supp. 1989), and the tax itself do not act as prior restraints — no fee is charged for registering, the tax is due regardless of preregistration, and the tax is not imposed as a precondition of disseminating the message. Thus, unlike the license tax in Murdock, which was “in no way apportioned” to the “realized revenues” of the itinerant preachers forced to pay the tax, 319 U. S., at 113-114; see also Texas Monthly, supra, at 22, the tax at issue in this case is akin to a generally applicable income or property tax, which Murdock and Follett specifically state may constitutionally be imposed on religious activity. In addition to appellant’s misplaced reliance on Murdock and Follett, appellant’s free exercise claim is also in significant tension with the Court’s decision last Term in Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U. S. 680 (1989), holding that the Government’s disallowance of a tax deduction for religious “auditing” and “training” services did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id., at 694-700. The Court reasoned that “[a]ny burden imposed on auditing or training . . . derives solely from the fact that, as a result of the deduction denial, adherents have less money to gain access to such sessions. This burden is no different from that imposed by any public tax or fee; indeed, the burden imposed by the denial of the ‘contribution or gift’ deduction would seem to pale by comparison to the overall federal income tax burden on an adherent.” Id., at 699. There is no evidence in this case that collection and payment of the tax violates appellant’s sincere religious beliefs. California’s nondiscriminatory Sales and Use Tax Law requires only that appellant collect the tax from its California purchasers and remit the tax money to the State. The only burden on appellant is the claimed reduction in income resulting from the presumably lower demand for appellant’s wares (caused by the marginally higher price) and from the costs associated with administering the tax. As the Court made clear in Hernandez, however, to the extent that imposition of a generally applicable tax merely decreases the amount of money appellant has to spend on its religious activities, any such burden is not constitutionally significant. See ibid.; Texas Monthly, 489 U. S., at 19-20 (plurality opinion); see also Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 603-604 (1983). Appellant contends that the availability of a deduction (at issue in Hernandez) and the imposition of a tax (at issue here) are distinguishable, but in both cases adherents base their claim for an exemption on the argument that an “incrementally larger tax burden interferes with their religious activities.” 490 U. S., at 700. It is precisely this argument — rather than one applicable only to deductions — that the Court rejected in Hernandez. At bottom, though we do not doubt the economic cost to appellant of complying with a generally applicable sales and use tax, such a tax is no different from other generally applicable laws and regulations — such as health and safety regulations — to which appellant must adhere. Finally, because appellant’s religious beliefs do not forbid payment of the sales and use tax, appellant’s reliance on Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), and its progeny is fnisplaced, because in no sense has the State “ ‘conditioned] receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or . . . denie[d] such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs,’” Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Florida, 480 U. S. 136, 141 (1987) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707, 717-718 (1981)). Appellant has never . alleged that the mere act of paying the tax, by itself, violates its sincere religious beliefs. We therefore conclude that the collection and payment of the generally applicable tax in this case imposes no constitutionally significant burden on appellant’s religious practices or beliefs. The Free Exercise Clause accordingly does not require the State to grant appellant an exemption from its generally applicable sales and use tax. Although it is of course possible to imagine that a more onerous tax rate, even if generally applicable, might effectively choke off an adherent’s religious practices, cf. Murdock, supra, at 115 (the burden of a flat tax could render itinerant evangelism “crushed and closed out by the sheer weight of the toll or tribute which is exacted town by town”), we face no such situation in this case. Accordingly, we intimate no views as to whether such a generally applicable tax. might violate the Free Exercise Clause. B Appellant also contends that application of the sales and use tax to its sale of religious materials violates the Establishment Clause because it fosters “‘an excessive government entanglement with religion,’” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York City, 397 U. S. 664, 674 (1970)). Appellant alleges, for example, that the present controversy has featured on-site inspections of appellant’s evangelistic crusades, lengthy on-site audits, examinations of appellant’s books and records, threats of criminal prosecution, and layers of administrative and judicial proceedings. The Establishment Clause prohibits “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.” Walz, swpra, at 668. The “excessive entanglement” prong of the tripartite purpose-effect-entanglement Lemon test, see Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612-613, requires examination of “the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority,” id., at 615; see also Walz, 397 U. S., at 695 (separate opinion of Harlan, J.) (warning of “programs, whose very nature is apt to entangle the state in details of administration”). Indeed, in Walz we held that a tax exemption for “religious organizations for religious properties used solely for religious worship,” as part of a general exemption for nonprofit institutions, id., at 666-667, did not violate the Establishment Clause. In upholding the tax exemption, we specifically noted that taxation of religious properties would cause at least as much administrative entanglement between government and religious authorities as did the exemption: “Either course, taxation of churches or exemption, occasions some degree of involvement with religion. Elimination of exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of these legal processes. “Granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford an indirect economic benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet a lesser, involvement than taxing them. In analyzing either alternative the questions are whether the involvement is excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement.” Id., at 674-675. The issue presented, therefore, is whether the imposition of sales and use tax liability in this ease on appellant results in “excessive” involvement between appellant and the State and “continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement.” At the outset, it is undeniable that a generally applicable tax has a secular purpose and neither advances nor inhibits religion, for the very essence of such a tax is that it is neutral and nondiscriminatory on questions of religious belief. Thus, whatever the precise contours of the Establishment Clause, see County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union of Pittsburgh, 492 U. S. 573, 589-594 (1989) (tracing evolution of Establishment Clause doctrine); cf. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589, 615-618 (1988) (applying but noting criticism of the entanglement prong of the Lemon test), its undisputed core values are not even remotely called into question by the generally applicable tax in this case. Even applying the “excessive entanglement” prong of the Lemon test, however, we hold that California’s imposition of sales and use tax liability on appellant threatens no excessive entanglement between church and state. First, we note that the evidence of administrative entanglement in this case is thin. Appellant alleges that collection and payment of the sales and use tax impose severe accounting burdens on it. The Court of Appeal, however, expressly found that the record did not support appellant’s factual assertions, noting that appellant “had a sophisticated accounting staff and had recently computerized its accounting and that [appellant] in its own books and for purposes of obtaining a federal income tax exemption segregated ‘retail sales’ and ‘donations.’” 204 Cal. App. 3d, at 1289, 250 Cal. Rptr., at 905. Second, even assuming that the tax imposes substantial administrative burdens on appellant, such administrative and recordkeeping burdens do not rise to a constitutionally significant level. Collection and payment of the tax will of course require some contact between appellant and the State, but we have held that generally applicable administrative and recordkeeping regulations may be imposed on religious organization -without running afoul of the Establishment Clause. See Hernandez, 490 U. S., at 696-697 (“[R]outine regulatory interaction [such as application of neutral tax laws] which involves no inquiries into religious doctrine, ... no delegation of state power to a religious body, . . . and no ‘detailed monitoring and close administrative contact’ between secular and religious bodies, . . . does not of itself violate the nonentan-glement command”); Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U. S. 290, 305-306 (1985) (“The Establishment Clause does not exempt religious organizations from such secular governmental activity as fire inspections and building and zoning regulations, Lemon, swpra, at 614, and the recordkeeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, while perhaps more burdensome in terms of paperwork, are not significantly more intrusive into religious affairs”). To be sure, we noted in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation that the recordkeeping requirements at issue in that case “applied] only to commercial activities undertaken with a ‘business purpose,’ and would therefore have no impact on petitioners’ own evangelical activities,” 471 U. S., at 305, but that recognition did not bear on whether the generally applicable regulation was nevertheless “the kind of government surveillance the Court has previously held to pose an intolerable risk of government entanglement with religion,” ibid. The fact that appellant must bear the cost of collecting and remitting a generally applicable sales and use tax — even if the financial burden of such costs may vary from religion to religion — does not enmesh government in religious affairs. Contrary to appellant’s contentions, the statutory scheme requires neither the involvement of state employees in, nor on-site continuing inspection of, appellant’s day-to-day operations. There is no “official and continuing surveillance,” Walz, supra, at 675, by government auditors. The sorts of government entanglement that we have found to violate the Establishment Clause have been far more invasive than the level of contact created by the administration of neutral tax laws. Cf. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U. S. 402, 414 (1985); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116, 126-127 (1982). Most significantly, the imposition of the sales and use tax without an exemption for appellant does not require the State to inquire into the religious content of the items sold or the religious motivation for selling or purchasing the items, because the materials are subject to the tax regardless of content or motive. From the State’s point of view, the critical question is not whether the materials are religious, but whether there is a sale or a use, a question which involves only a secular determination. Thus, this case stands on firmer ground than Hernandez, because appellant offers the items at a stated price, thereby relieving the State of the need to place a monetary value on appellant’s religious items. Compare Hernandez, 490 U. S., at 697-698 (where no comparable good or service is sold in the marketplace, Internal Revenue Service looks to cost of providing the good or service), with id., at 706 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“It becomes impossible ... to compute the ‘contribution’ portion of a payment to charity where what is received in return is not merely an intangible, but an intangible (or, for that matter a tangible) that is not bought and sold except in donative contexts”). Although appellant asserts that donations often accompany payments made for the religious items and that items are sometimes given away without payment (or only nominal payment), it is plain that, in the first case, appellant’s use of “order forms” and “price lists” renders illusory any difficulty in separating the two portions and that, in the second case, the question is only whether any particular transfer constitutes a “sale.” Ironically, appellant’s theory, under which government may not tax “religious core” activities but may tax “nonreligious” activities, would require government to do precisely what appellant asserts the Religion Clauses prohibit: “determine which expenditures are religious and which are secular.” Lemon, 403 U. S., at 621-622. Accordingly, because we find no excessive entanglement between government and religion in this case, we hold that the imposition of sales and use tax liability on appellant does not violate the Establishment Clause. III Appellant also contends that the State’s imposition of use tax liability on it violates the Commerce and Due Process Clauses because, as an out-of-state distributor, it had an insufficient “nexus” to the State. See National Geographic Society v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U. S. 551, 554 (1977); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753, 756-760 (1967). We decline to reach the merits of this claim, however, because the courts below ruled that the claim was procedurally barred. California law provides that an administrative claim for a tax refund “shall state the specific grounds upon which the claim is founded,” Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code Ann. § 6904(a) (West Supp. 1989), and that refund suits will be entertained only if “a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed” with the Board, § 6932. Suit may thereafter be brought only “on the grounds set forth in the claim.” §6933. Thus, under state law, “[t]he claim for refund delineates and restricts the issues to be considered in a taxpayer’s refund action. The trial court and [appellate] court are without jurisdiction to consider grounds not set forth in the claim.” Atari, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 170 Cal. App. 3d 665, 672, 216 Cal. Rptr. 267, 271 (1985) (citations omitted). This rule serves a legitimate state interest in requiring parties to exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding to court, for “[s]uch a rule prevents having an overworked court consider issues and remedies available through administrative channels.” Id., at 673, 216 Cal. Rptr., at 272. The record in this case makes clear that appellant, in its refund claim before the Board, failed even to cite the Commerce Clause or the Due Process Clause, much less articulate legal arguments contesting the nexus issue. See App. 34 (incorporating petition for redetermination, which in turn raised only First Amendment arguments, see id., at 11-16). The Board’s hearing officer specifically noted, in forwarding his decision to the Board, that appellant’s “[c]ounsel does not argue nexus,” id., at 22, and indeed the parties stipulated before the trial court that appellant’s request for a refund was based on its First Amendment claim, id., at 59. Accordingly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeal declined to rule on the nexus issue on the ground that appellant had failed to raise it in its refund claim before the Board. 204 Cal. App. 3d, at 1290-1292, 250 Cal. Rptr., at 905-906; App. 213. This unambiguous application of state procedural law makes it unnecessary for us to review the asserted claim. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1041-1042 (1983); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 512, n. 7 (1978). Appellant nevertheless urges that the state procedural ground relied upon by the courts below is inadequate because the procedural rule is not “‘strictly or regularly followed.’” Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U. S. 255, 263 (1982) (quoting Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 146, 149 (1964)). Appellant asserts that state courts in California retain the authority to hear claims “involving important questions of public policy” notwithstanding the parties’ failure to raise those claims before an administrative agency. See Lindeleaf v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 41 Cal. 3d 861, 870-871, 718 P. 2d 106, 112 (1986); Hale v. Morgan, 22 Cal. 3d 388, 394, 584 P. 2d 512, 516 (1978). Appellant observes, for example, that although the Court of Appeal in this case found appellant’s nexus claim to be procedurally barred, it ignored the procedural bar and ruled on the merits of appellant’s Ninth and Tenth Amendment arguments, see 204 Cal. App. 3d, at 1292-1293, 250 Cal. Rptr., at 907-908, even though those arguments were likewise not raised in appellant’s refund claim, see id., at 1292, n. 19, 250 Cal. Rptr., at 907, n. 19. The Court of Appeal, however, specifically rejected appellant’s claim that the nexus issue raised “important questions of public policy,” noting that the issue instead “raise[d] factual questions, the determination of which is not a matter of ‘public policy’ but a matter of evidence.” Id., at 1292, 250 Cal. Rptr, at 907. Even if the Court of Appeal erred as a matter of state law in declining to rule on appellant’s nexus claim, appellant has failed to substantiate any claim that the California courts in general apply this exception in an irregular, arbitrary, or inconsistent manner. Accordingly, we conclude that appellant’s Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause argument is not properly before us. We thus express no opinion on the merits of the claim. The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is affirmed. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

HANNA MINING CO. et al. v. DISTRICT 2, MARINE ENGINEERS BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION, AFL-CIO, et al. No. 7. Argued October 12, 1965. Decided December 6, 1965. John H. Hanninen argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Lucian Y. Ray. Lee Pressman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was David Scribner. Acting Solicitor General Spritzer, Arnold Ordman, Dominick L. Manoli, Norton J. Come and Laurence S. Gold filed a brief for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. The present controversy once again brings before the Court the troublesome question of where lies the line between permissible and federally preempted state regulation of union activities. I. Petitioners (“Hanna”) are four corporations whose integrated fleet of Great Lakes vessels carries cargo in interstate and foreign commerce and is operated by one of the four, the Hanna Mining Company. The respondent District 2, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association (“MEBA”) represented the licensed marine engineers in Hanna’s fleet under a collective bargaining agreement terminating on July 15,1962. According to Hanna, while negotiations for a new contract continued during August 1962, a majority of the marine engineers informed Hanna by written petitions that they did not wish to be represented by MEBA. Hanna then declined to negotiate further until MEBA’s majority status was established by a secret ballot. Without acquiescing in this proposal or questioning any of the employee signatures on the petitions, MEBA responded on September 12, 1962, by picketing one of Hanna’s ships unloading at a dock in Duluth, Minnesota, with signs giving the ship’s name, stating that Hanna unfairly refused to negotiate with MEBA, and indicating that no dispute existed with any other employer. Because of the continued picketing, dock workers refused day after day to unload the ship. From September 12 until shipping ended for the winter, MEBA similarly picketed Hanna ships at other Great Lakes ports, including Superior, Wisconsin. Hanna turned first to the National Labor Relations Board. On September 12, it petitioned the Regional Director at Cleveland, Ohio, to hold a representation election among Hanna’s engineers to prove or disprove MEBA’s majority status. The petition was dismissed at the end of September on the stated ground that the engineers were “supervisors” under §2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act,' and automatically excluded from the Act’s definition of “employees” under § 2 (3), so election proceedings under § 9 were not warranted; giving the same reason, the Board in November declined to overturn this decision. As a second measure, Hanna on September 15, 1962, filed charges with the Regional Director in Minneapolis, Minnesota, alleging that MEBA had violated § 8 (b) (4) (B) of the Act, by inducing work stoppages among dockers at Duluth through improper secondary pressure. In October, the Regional Director dismissed the charges and the General Counsel sustained the dismissal in December, stating that MEBA’s conduct at Duluth and at other sites investigated did not exceed the bounds of lawful picketing under the Board’s standards. Hanna’s third and last appeal to the Board came on September 27, 1962, when it filed charges with the Regional Director in Cleveland, Ohio, accusing MEBA of organizational or recognitional picketing improper under § 8 (b)(7) of the Act. The Regional Director dismissed the charge in October and in the next two months the General Counsel affirmed the dismissal because in seeking to represent “supervisors” rather than “employees” MEBA fell outside the section. Winter brought an end to both shipping and picketing for several months but when the navigation season opened in the spring of 1963 MEBA pickets once more appeared. After picketing occurred at Superior, Wisconsin, Hanna filed suit on June 24, 1963, in a Wisconsin circuit court. The complaint and affidavits alleged that MEBA was picketing Hanna’s vessels at the docks of the Great Northern Railway Company at Superior in the same manner as the 1962 picketing and with the same improper aim of forcing its representation on unwilling engineers; Hanna stated that workers of other employers were refusing to render service to Hanna’s vessels and it prayed for injunctive relief against further picketing of the vessels and the docks where they berthed and against any other attempt of MEBA to impose representation on Hanna engineers. The Circuit Court dismissed the suit in July for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. In April 1964 the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the decision. 23 Wis. 2d 433,127 N. W. 2d 393. While agreeing that the picketing could be deemed illegal under Wisconsin law, that court held that the picketing arguably violated §§ 8 (b) (4) (B) and 8 (b) (7) of the federal labor Act and so fell within the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction marked out in San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236. In light of other language in Garmon the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the General Counsel’s dismissal of charges under §§ 8 (b)(4)(B) and 8 (b)(7) did not foreclose the possibility of a preempting violation, even assuming the 1963 picketing in Superior mirrored the 1962 picketing in Duluth. We invited the views of the United States, 379 U. S. 942, granted certiorari, 380 U. S. 941, and now reverse and remand. I — I t — l The ground rules for preemption in labor law, emerging from our Garmon decision, should first be briefly summarized: in general, a State may not regulate conduct arguably “protected by § 7, or prohibited by § 8” of the National Labor Relations Act, see 359 U. S., at 244-246; and the legislative purpose may further dictate that certain activity “neither protected nor prohibited” be deemed privileged against state regulation, cf. 359 U. S., at 245. For the reasons that follow, we believe the Board's decision that Hanna engineers are supervisors removes from this case most of the opportunities for preemption. When in 1947 the National Labor Relations Act was amended to exclude supervisory workers from the critical definition of “employees,” § 2 (3), it followed that many provisions of the Act employing that pivotal term would cease to operate where supervisors were the focus of concern. Most obviously, § 7 no longer bestows upon supervisory employees the rights to engage in self-organization, collective bargaining, and other concerted activities under the umbrella of § 8 of the Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (1964 ed.). See Labor Board v. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F. 2d 571. Accordingly, activity designed to secure organization or recognition of supervisors cannot be protected by § 7 of the Act, arguably or otherwise. Compare Labor Board v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U. S. 274, 279. Correspondingly, the situations in which that same activity can be prohibited by the Act, even arguably, are fewer than would be the case if employees were being organized or seeking recognition. There can be no breach of §8 (b)(7), curtailing organizational or recognitional picketing, because there cannot exist the forbidden objective of requiring representation of “employees” by the picketing organization. Nor could one even advance the argument unsuccessfully urged in Drivers Local Union that § 8 (b) (1)(A), 61 Stat. 141, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b)(1)(A) (1964 ed.), condemns the picketing as restraint or coercion of employees exercising their § 7 right not to organize or bargain collectively. Even though such efforts to unionize supervisors are not protected by the Act, or in the respects immediately relevant prohibited by it, the question arises whether Congress nonetheless desired that in their peaceful facets these efforts remain free from state regulation as well as Board authority. Compare Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U. S. 252, 258-260. Arguing that the States are indeed powerless in this respect, MEBA pitches its case chiefly on the 1947 amendment of the “employee” definition and on the concurrent enactment of § 14 (a) of the Act, 61 Stat. 151, 29 U. S. C. § 164 (a) (1964 ed.), which provides in relevant part that “[n]othing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization . . . It is contended that the amendment and this section signify a federal policy of laissez faire toward supervisors ousting state as well as Board authority and, more particularly, that to allow the Wisconsin injunction would obliterate the opportunity for supervisor unions that Congress expressly reserved. This broad argument fails utterly in light of the legislative history, for the Committee reports reveal that Congress’ propelling intention was to relieve employers from any compulsion under the Act and under state law to countenance or bargain with any union of supervisory employees. Whether the legislators fully realized that their method of achieving this result incidentally freed supervisors’ unions from certain limitations under the newly enacted § 8 (b) is not wholly clear, but certainly Congress made no considered decision generally to exclude state limitations on supervisory organizing. As to the portion of § 14 (a) quoted above, some legislative history suggests that it was not meant to immunize any conduct at all but only to make it “clear that the amendments to the act do not prohibit supervisors from joining unions . . . .” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 28; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 60 (“[T]he first part of this provision [§ 14 (a)] was included presumably out of an abundance of caution.”). However, even assuming that § 14 (a) itself intended also to make it clear that state law could not prohibit supervisors from joining unions, the section would have no application to the present facts; for picketing by a minority union to extract recognition by force of such pressures is decidedly not a sine qua non of collective bargaining, as indeed its limitation by § 8 (b)(7) in nonsupervisor situations attests. The remaining question in this phase of the case is whether the supervisory status of Hanna's engineers has been settled “with unclouded legal significance,” Garmon, 359 U. S., at 246, so as to preclude arguable application of the Act in the respects discussed. We hold that the Board’s statement accompanying its refusal to order a representation election does resolve the question with the clarity necessary to avoid preemption. While MEBA does not contend that the Board erred in its determination, an abstract difficulty arises from the lack of a statutory channel for judicial review of such a Board decision. Compare Hotel Employees v. Leedom, 358 U. S. 99 (equity action to obtain election). However, the usual deference to Board expertise in applying statutory terms to particular facts assures that its decision would in any event be respected in a high percentage of instances, and so diminished a risk of interference with federal labor policy does not justify use of the preemption doctrine to thwart state regulation bound to be legitimate on this score in almost all cases. III. A further basis for preemption, urged by MEBA and adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, is that the picketing at Superior exerted secondary pressure arguably violating § 8 (b)(4)(B). The argument appears to be that a state injunction banishing the pickets inevitably impinges upon the Board’s authority to regulate facets of the picketing that might exceed “primary” picketing and violate § 8 (b) (4) (B) — facets never specified by MEBA but presumably those that ignore the Board’s limitations on time, location, and manner of common situs picketing. See Sailors’ Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock), 92 N. L. R. B. 547. However, as will appear, no arguable violation exists if Hanna’s proof lives up to its allegations; further, even assuming a violation, federal interests normally justifying preemption are absent from this case. Hanna’s claim that there is no arguable violation rests, of course, on the finding made by the Regional Director and the General Counsel in declining to issue a complaint under § 8 (b)(4)(B) with respect to MEBA’s 1962 picketing. The Wisconsin' Supreme Court refused to credit this finding because of this Court’s comment in Garmon that the “refusal of the General Counsel to file a charge” is one of those dispositions “which does not define the nature of the activity with unclouded legal significance.” 359 U. S., at 245-246. This language allows more than one interpretation, but we take it not to apply to those refusals of the General Counsel which are illuminated by explanations that do squarely define the nature of the activity. The General Counsel has statutory “final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints,” § 3 (d) of the Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 139, 29 U. S. C. § 153 (d) (1964 ed.), and his pronouncements in this context are entitled to great weight. The usual inability of the charging party to contest the General Counsel’s adverse decision in the courts, see Hourihan v. Labor Board, 91 U. S. App. D. C. 316, 201 F. 2d 187, does to be sure create a slight risk if state courts may proceed on this basis, but in the context of this case we believe the risk is too minimal to deserve recognition. Even taking the General Counsel’s ruling at face value, MEBA stresses that the § 8 (b)(4)(B) charge by Hanna concerned picketing in Duluth in September 1962 while the picketing before the Wisconsin court occurred at Superior in spring 1963. Yet Hanna accompanied the 1962 charge with information as to the 1962 picketing in several ports including Superior. The Regional Director is said to have conducted an investigation in Superior as well as in Duluth, and the General Counsel’s letter on the § 8 (b)(4)(B) charge appeared to state that activity at the sites other than Duluth also did not violate the Act. See n. 7, supra. And while some months intervened between the fall 1962 picketing at Superior and its resumption at that port in spring 1963, Hanna has offered to prove that the picketing remained the same in all significant respects including the picket signs employed, the location of the pickets, and the pickets’ general behavior. If this proof is furnished, the chance that the picketing sought to be enjoined conceals a § 8 (b) (4)(B) violation seems remote indeed. Additionally, even if a §8 (b)(4)(B) violation were present, central interests served by the Garmon doctrine are not endangered by a state injunction when, in an instance such as this, the Board has established that the workers sought to be organized are outside the regime of the Act. Cf. Ineres S. S. Co. v. Maritime Workers, 372 U. S. 24. Most importantly, the Board’s decision on the supervisory question determines, as we have already shown, that none of the conduct is arguably protected nor does it fall in some middle range impliedly withdrawn from state control. Consequently, there is wholly absent the greatest threat against which the Garmon doctrine guards, a State’s prohibition of activity that the Act indicates must remain unhampered. Nor is this a case in which the presence of arguably prohibited activity may permit the Board to afford complete protection to the legitimate interests advanced by the State. Since Hanna as the primary employer is present at the picketed situs, the primary picketing proviso of §8 (b)(4)(B) severely inhibits the Board’s use of that section to reach the volatile core of the conduct, the impact on secondary employers that follows from the mere presence of the pickets at a common situs. Section 8 (b) (7) which might provide full relief is rendered inapplicable by the supervisor ruling. Thus, so far as Garmon may proceed on the view that the opportunity belongs to the Board wherever it and the State offer duplicate relief, it has limited application to the present facts. In concluding that the Act does not preempt the State’s authority to quench the picketing said to have occurred in this case, we do not retreat from Garmon, Rather, we consider that neither the terms nor the policies of that decision justify its extension to the present facts, an extension producing untoward results noted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court itself. 23 Wis. 2d 433, 446, 127 N. W. 2d 393, 399. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The remaining respondents are officers, agents, and representatives of MEBA, and what is said of it in this opinion applies equally to them. National Labor Relations Act, as amended, § 2 (11), 61 Stat. 138, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (11) (1964 ed.), gives a functional definition of the term “supervisor.” National Labor Relations Act, as amended, §2 (3), 61 Stat. 137, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (3) (1964 ed.), provides in relevant part that the “term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include . . . any individual employed as a supervisor National Labor Relations Act, as amended, § 9, 61 Stat. 143, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (1964 ed.), pertinently provides in subsection (c) that petitions may be entertained and elections ordered to determine “the representative defined in subsection (a) of this section”; and subsection (a) pertinently provides that “[Representatives designated or selected ... by the majority of the employees in a unit . . . shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit” for collective bargaining purposes. In relevant part the Board’s letter stated that as the “appeal makes no affirmative claim that a majority of the 'employees’ as distinguished from 'supervisors’ are sought to be represented in an appropriate unit and as a unit of supervisors is otherwise inappropriate, no question concerning representation in an appropriate unit exists.” While this pronouncement could be clearer, the parties do not dispute that it affirms or refuses to disturb the Regional Director’s explicit finding. National Labor Relations Act, as amended, §8 (b)(4)(B), 73 Stat. 542, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b)(4)(B) (1964 ed.), provides in relevant part that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents: “ (4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to . . . transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services . . . where ... an object thereof is— “(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease . . . handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless . . . certified .... Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.” The letter from the General Counsel's office stated in part: “[T]he evidence revealed that the picketing by MEBA at the common situs herein conformed to Moore Dry Dock standards . . . . Furthermore, MEBA's activity at other sites did not evince an unlawful object on the part of the Union inconsistent with the ostensibly primary object of the picketing at the situs of the dispute.” National Labor Relations Act, as amended, §8 (b)(7), 73 Stat. 544, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (7) (1964 ed.), provides, excluding portions and exceptions not here relevant, that it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to picket any employer with an object of forcing “an -employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organization” as their bargaining agent unless such labor organization is certified or seeks certification. A second, clarifying letter from the General Counsel’s office stated in part: “Our disposition of this case was predicated solelj' on our conclusion that the supervisory status of the licensed engineers precluded a finding that the Union’s picketing and other activity was for an object proscribed by Section 8 (b) (7) of the Act.” See Vogt, Inc. v. International Brotherhood, 270 Wis. 321a, 74 N. W. 2d 749, aff’d sub nom. Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U. S. 284. National Labor Relations Act, as amended, § 7, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 157 (1964 eel.), provides that “employees” shall have the right to engage in, or in general to refrain from, the mentioned activities. Summarizing the impact of the new measure on supervisory personnel, the Senate Report stated: “[T]he bill does not prevent anyone from organizing nor does it prohibit any employer from recognizing a union of foremen. It merely relieves employers who are subject to the national act free from any compulsion by this National Board or any local agency to accord to the front line of management the anomalous status of employees.” S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5. See also H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 13-17. By contrast, sometimes offensive conduct may be restrained by a state remedy that has no impact at all on related activity arguably within the Board’s exclusive province. See, e. g., Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U. S. 131, upholding a state injunction against violence but setting it aside so far as it reached peaceful picketing. Aside from the §14 (a) line of argument already answered, we do not find at all apposite Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U. S. 252, holding a State powerless to award damages against a striking union for requesting a secondary employer to cease business with the struck employer. While in Morton preemption was premised on the fact that the secondary pressure did not come within the ban fixed by § 8 (b) (4) (B) and adopted by § 303 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, as amended, 73 Stat. 545, 29 U. S. C. § 187 (a) (1964 ed.), the conduct there occurred in the context of a peaceful economic strike by employees, a sphere in which the federal interest is especially pervasive. By contrast the present case, involving secondary pressure wielded to impose representation on unwilling supervisors, finds itself at that far comer of labor law where, as we have shown, federal occupation is at a minimum and state power at a peak. Hattiesburg Unions v. Broome Co., 377 U. S. 126, cited to us by MEBA, may illustrate this concern. There, the union’s organizational picketing at a common situs was enjoined by the State because its objective violated state law. In urging that the picketing’s possible violation of § 8 (b) (4) (B) preempted state authority, the Solicitor General suggested that it may also have been “lawful picketing” outside the State’s reach so far as not prohibited by the section. Memorandum, p. 6, n. 7. See also Michelman, State Power To Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 652-653 (1961) (citations omitted): “[A] state generally may not enjoin conduct thought to be a federal unfair labor practice. The reason is that, despite the state court’s contrary belief, the conduct may, as a matter of federal law, be privileged.” In Marine Engineers v. Interlake Co., 370 U. S. 173, we overturned a state ban on picketing arguably violating § 8 (b) (4) (B); and to the counterargument that the picketing group was not a “labor organization” subject to § 8 (b), we pointed out that this decision was for the Board. Unlike the present case, in Interlake the § 8 (b) (4)(B) remedy had not been tried; but quite apart from that consideration, had the Board held the union a “labor organization” and also held those being organized to be “employees” — another point not recently decided by the Board — complete relief against the picketing might well have been available under § 8 (b) (7). See 370 U. S., at 182-183.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ANDRUS, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al. v. SIERRA CLUB et al. No. 78-625. Argued April 18, 1979 — Decided June 11, 1979 BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Assistant Attorney General Harmon argued the cause for petitioners. On the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Acting Assistant Attorney General Sagalkin, Deputy Solicitor General Barnett, Peter R. Steenland, Jr., Raymond N. Zagone, and Dirk D. Snel. James Hillson Cohen argued the cause and filed briefs for respondents. Ronald A. Zumbrun, Robert K. Best, and Raymond M. Momboisse filed a brief for the Pacific Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Roberts B. Owen and Charles H. Montange for the National Wildlife Federation et ah; and by Mitchell Rogovin and David R. Boyd for the Wilderness Society. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The question for decision is whether § 102 (2) (C) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2)(C), requires federal agencies to prepare environmental impact statements (EIS’s) to accompany appropriation requests. We hold that it does not. I NEPA sets forth its purposes in bold strokes: “The purposes of this Act are: To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation_” 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. § 4321. Congress recognized, however, that these desired goals could be incorporated, into the everyday functioning of the Federal Government only with great difficulty. See S. Rep. No. 91-296, p. 19 (1969). NEPA therefore contains “action-forcing procedures which will help to insure that the policies [of the Act] are implemented.” Ibid. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390, 409 (1976). Section 102 (2)(C) of the Act sets out one of these procedures: “The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible . . . (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall— “(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on- — • “(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, “(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, “(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, “(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and “(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.” 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C) (emphasis supplied). The thrust of § 102 (2) (C) is thus that environmental concerns be integrated into the very process of agency decision-making. The “detailed statement” it requires is the outward sign that environmental values and consequences have been considered during the planning stage of agency actions. If environmental concerns are not interwoven into the fabric of agency planning, the “action-forcing” characteristics of § 102 (2)(C) would be lost. “In the past, environmental factors have frequently been ignored and omitted from consideration in the early stages of planning .... As a result, unless the results of planning are radically revised at the policy level— and this often means the Congress — environmental enhancement opportunities may be foregone and unnecessary degradation incurred.” S. Rep. No. 91-296, supra, at 20. For this reason the regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) require federal agencies to “integrate the NEPA process with other planning at the earliest possible time to insure that planning and decisions reflect environmental values . . . .” 43 Fed. Reg. 55992 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1501.2). In 1974, respondents, three organizations with interests in the preservation of the environment, brought suit in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia alleging that § 102 (2) (C) requires federal agencies to prepare EIS’s to accompany their appropriation requests. Respondents named as defendants the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of'the Office of Mangement and Budget (OMB), and alleged that proposed curtailments in the budget of the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS), 80 Stat. 927, 16 U. S. C. § 668dd, would “cut back significantly the operations, maintenance, and staffing of units within the System.” Complaint ¶ 17. The System is administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior, and consists of more than 350 refuges encompassing more than 30 million acres in 49 States. The primary purpose of the NWRS is to provide a national program “for the restoration, preservation, development and management of wildlife and wildlands habitat; for the protection and preservation of endangered or threatened species and their habitat; and for the management of wildlife and wildlands to obtain the maximum benefits from these resources.” 50 CFR § 25.11 (b) (1978). Respondents alleged that the proposed budget curtailments would significantly affect the quality of the human environment, and hence should have been accompanied by an EIS prepared both by the Fish and Wildlife Service and by OMB. The District Court agreed with respondents’ contentions. Relying on provisions of the then applicable CEQ guidelines, and on the Department of the Interior’s Manual, the District Court held that “appropriation requests are 'proposals for legislation’ within the meaning of NEPA,” and also that “annual proposals for financing the Refuge System are major Federal actions which clearly have a significant effect on the environment.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187, 1188, 1189 (1975). The District Court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment, and provided declaratory and injunctive relief. It stated that the Department of the Interior and OMB were required “to prepare, consider, and disseminate environmental impact statements on annual proposals for financing the National Wildlife Refuge System.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 61a. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit modified the holding of the District Court. The Court of Appeals was apprehensive because “[a] rule requiring preparation of an EIS on the annual budget request for virtually every ongoing program would trivialize NEPA.” 189 U. S. App. D. C. 117, 125, 581 F. 2d 895, 903 (1978). Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that § 102 (2) (C) required the preparation of an EIS only when an appropriation request accompanies “a 'proposal’ for taking new action which significantly changes the status quo,” or when “the request for budget approval and appropriations is one that ushers in a considered programmatic course following a programmatic review.” 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903. Section 102 (2) (C) would thus have no application to “a routine request for budget approval and appropriations for continuance and management of an ongoing program.” 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903. The Court of Appeals held, however, that there was no need for injunctive relief because the Fish and Wildlife Service had completed during the pendency of the appeal a “Programmatic EIS” that adequately evaluated the environmental consequences for the NWRS of various budgetary alternatives. Id., at 126, 581 F. 2d, at 904. See United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Final Environmental Statement: Operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System (Nov. 1976). We granted certiorari, 439 U. S. 1065 (1979), and we now reverse. II NEPA requires EIS’s to be included in recommendations or reports on both “proposals for legislation . . . significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” and “proposals for . . . major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C). See CEQ regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 56001 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1506.8 (a)). Petitioners argue, however, that the requirements of § 102 (2)(C) have no application to the budget process. The contrary holding of the Court of Appeals rests on two alternative interpretations of § 102 (2)(C). The first is that appropriation requests which are the result of “an agency’s painstaking review of an ongoing program,” 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903, are “proposals for legislation” within the meaning of § 102 (2) (C). The second is that appropriation requests which are the reflection of “new” agency initiatives constituting “major Federal actions” under NEPA, are themselves “proposals for . . . major Federal actions” for purposes of § 102 (2)(C). We hold that neither interpretation is correct. A We note initially that NEPA makes no distinction between “proposals for legislation” that are the result of “painstaking review,” and those that are merely “routine.” When Congress has thus spoken “in the plainest of words,” TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194 (1978), we will ordinarily decline to fracture the clear language of a statute, even for the purpose of fashioning from the resulting fragments a rule that “accords with ‘common sense and the public weal.’ ” Id., at 195. Therefore, either all appropriation requests constitute “proposals for legislation,” or none does. There is no direct evidence in the legislative history of NEPA that enlightens whether Congress intended the phrase “proposals for legislation” to include requests for appropriations. At the time of the Court of Appeals’ decision, however, CEQ guidelines provided that § 102 (2) (C) applied to “[recommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation including requests for appropriations.” 40 CFR § 1500.5 (a)(1) (1977). At that time CEQ’s guidelines were advisory in nature, and were for the purpose of assisting federal agencies in complying with NEPA. § 1500.1 (a). In 1977, however, President Carter, in order to create a single set of uniform, mandatory regulations, ordered CEQ, “after consultation with affected agencies,” to “[i]ssue regulations to Federal agencies for the implementation of the procedural provisions” of NEPA. Exec. Order No. 11991, 3 CFR 124 (1978). The President ordered the heads of federal agencies to “comply with the regulations issued by the Council .. . .” Ibid. CEQ has since issued these regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55978-56007 (1978), and they reverse CEQ’s prior interpretation of § 102 (2)(C). The regulations provide specifically that “ ' [1] egislation’ includes a bill or legislative proposal to Congress . . . but does not include requests for appropriations.” 43 Fed. Reg. 56004 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1508.17). (Emphasis supplied.) CEQ explained this reversal by noting that, on the basis of “traditional concepts relating to appropriations and the budget cycle, considerations of timing and confidentiality, and other factors,... the Council in its experience found that preparation of EISs is ill-suited to the budget preparation process.” 43 Fed. Reg., at 55989. CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference. See Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 417 U. S. 1301, 1309-1310 (1974) (Douglas, J., in chambers). The Council was created by NEPA, and charged in that statute with the responsibility “to review and appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal Government in the light of the policy set forth in . . . this Act . . . , and to , make recommendations to the President with respect thereto.” 83 Stat. 855, 42 U. S. C. § 4344 (3). It is true that in the past we have been somewhat less inclined to defer to “administrative guidelines” when they have “conflicted with earlier pronouncements of the agency.” General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 143 (1976). But CEQ’s reversal of interpretation occurred during the detailed and comprehensive process, ordered by the President, of transforming advisory guidelines into mandatory regulations applicable to all federal agencies. See American Trucking Assns. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 387 U. S. 397, 416 (1967). A mandatory requirement that every federal agency submit EIS’s with its appropriation requests raises wholly different and more serious issues “of fair and prudent administration,” ibid., than does nonbinding advice. This is particularly true in light of the Court of Appeals’ correct observation that “ [a] rule requiring preparation of an EIS on the annual budget request for virtually every ongoing program would trivialize NEPA.” 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903. The Court of Appeals accurately noted that such an interpretation of NEPA would be a “reductio ad absurdum .... It would be absurd to require an EIS on every decision on the management of federal land, such as fluctuation in the number of forest fire spotters.” Id., at 124, 581 F. 2d, at 902. Even respondents do not now contend that NEPA should be construed so that all appropriation requests constitute “proposals for legislation.” Brief for Respondents 13 n. 6, 55-61. CEQ’s interpretation of the phrase “proposals for legislation” is consistent with the traditional distinction which Congress has drawn between “legislation” and “appropriation.” The rules of both Houses “prohibit ‘legislation’ from being added to an appropriation bill.” L. Fisher, Budget Concepts and Terminology: The Appropriations Phase, in 1 Studies in Taxation, Public Finance and Related Subjects — A Compendium 437 (Fund for Public Policy Research 1977). See Standing Rules of the United States Senate, Rule 16 (4) (“No amendment which proposes general legislation shall be received to any general appropriation bill Rules of the House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Rule XXI (2) (1979); 7 C. Cannon, Precedents of the House of Representatives §§ 1172,1410,1443,1445,1448,1459, 1463, 1470, 1472 (1936). The distinction is maintained “to assure that program and financial matters are considered independently of one another. This division of labor is intended to enable the Appropriations Committees to concentrate on financial issues and to prevent them from trespassing on substantive legislation.” House Budget Committee, Congressional Control of Expenditures 19 (Comm. Print 1977). House and Senate rules thus require a “previous choice of policy . . . before any item of appropriations might be included in a general appropriations bill.” United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U. S. 153, 164 n. 5 (1953). Since appropriations therefore “have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized programs,” TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S., at 190, and since the “action-forcing” provisions of NEPA are directed precisely at the processes of “planning and . . . decisionmak-ing,” 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2) (A), which are associated with underlying legislation, we conclude that the distinction made by CEQ’s regulations is correct and that “proposals for legislation” do not include appropriation requests. B The Court of Appeals’ alternative interpretation of NEPA is that appropriation requests constitute “proposals for . . . major Federal actions.” But this interpretation distorts the language of the Act, since appropriation requests do not “propose” federal actions at all; they instead fund actions already proposed. Section 102 (2) (C) is thus best interpreted as applying to those recommendations or reports that actually propose programmatic actions, rather than to those which merely suggest how such actions may be funded. Any other result would create unnecessary redundancy. For example, if the mere funding of otherwise unaltered agency programs were construed to constitute major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, the resulting EIS’s would merely recapitulate the EIS’s that should have accompanied the initial proposals of the programs. And if an agency program were to be expanded or revised in a manner that constituted major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, an EIS would'have been required to accompany the underlying programmatic decision. An additional EIS at the appropriation stage would add nothing. Even if changes in agency programs occur because of budgetary decisions, an EIS at the appropriation stage would only be repetitive. For example, respondents allege in their complaint that OMB required the Fish and Wildlife Service to decrease its appropriation request for the NWRS, and that this decrease would alter the operation of the NWRS in a manner that would significantly affect the quality of the human environment. See n. 9, supra. But since the Fish and Wildlife Service could respond to OMB’s budgetary curtailments in a variety of ways, see United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Final Environmental Statement: Operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System (Nov. 1976), it is impossible to predict whether or how any particular budget cut will in fact significantly affect the quality of the human environment. OMB’s determination to cut the Service’s budget is not a programmatic proposal, and therefore requiring OMB to include an EIS in its budgetary cuts would be premature. See Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. SCRAP, 422 U. S. 289, 320 (1975). And since an EIS must be prepared if any of the revisions the Fish and Wildlife Service proposes in its ongoing programs in response to OMB’s budget cuts would significantly affect the quality of the human environment, requiring the Fish and Wildlife Service to include an EIS with its revised appropriation request would merely be redundant. Moroever, this redundancy would have the deleterious effect of circumventing and eliminating the careful distinction Congress has maintained between appropriation and legislation. It would flood House and Senate Appropriations Committees with EIS’s focused on the policy issues raised by underlying authorization legislation, thereby dismantling the “division of labor” so deliberately created by congressional rules. C We conclude therefore, for the reasons given above, that appropriation requests constitute neither “proposals for legislation” nor “proposals for . . . major Federal actions,” and that therefore the procedural requirements of § 102 (2) (C) have no application to such requests. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. So ordered. Section 101 (b) articulates these purposes with even greater particularity : “In order to carry out the policy set forth in this Act, it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may— “(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations; “ (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings ; “(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences; “(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice; “(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life’s amenities; and “(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.” 83 Stat. 852, 42 U. S. C. §4331 (b). Of course, an EIS need not be promulgated unless an agency’s planning ripens into a “recommendation or report on proposals for legislation [or] other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U. S. C. § 4332 (2) (C). See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U. S. 390 (1976). Moreover, although NEPA requires compliance “to the fullest extent possible,” we have held that the duty to prepare an EIS must yield before “a clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority.” Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assn., 426 U. S. 776, 788 (1976). CEQ regulations state that “[t]he primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in [NEPA] are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government. ... An environmental impact statement is more than a disclosure document. It shall be used by Federal officials in conjunction with other relevant material to plan actions and make decisions.” 43 Fed. Reg. 55994 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1502.1). In Exec. Order No. 11991, President Carter required the CEQ to issue regulations that included procedures “for the early preparation of environmental impact statements.” 3 CFR 124 (1978). As a consequence, CEQ regulations provide: “An agency shall commence preparation of an environmental impact statement as close as possible to the time the agency is developing or is presented with a proposal ... so that preparation can be completed in time for the final statement to be included in any recommendation or report on the proposal. The statement shall be prepared early enough so that it can serve practically as an important contribution to the decisionmaldng process and will not be used to rationalize or justify decisions already made. . . . For instance: “(a) For projects directly undertaken by Federal agencies the environmental impact statement shall be prepared at the feasibility analysis (go-no go) stage and may be supplemented at a later stage if necessary. . . .” 43 Fed. Reg. 55995 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1502.5). Respondents are the Sierra Club, the National Parks and Conservation Association, and the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. CEQ regulations define an “environmental impact statement” to mean “a detailed written statement as required by See. 102 (2) (C) of [NEPA].” 43 Fed. Reg. 56004 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1508.11). See United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Final Environmental Statement: Operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System 1-8 to 1-9 (Nov. 1976). The System is administered according to the provisions of several statutes. The most significant of these are the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 401, as amended, 72 Stat. 563, 16 U. S. C. § 661 et seq.; the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 1119,16 U. S. C. § 742a et seq.; the Migratory Bird Conservation Act, ch. 257, 45 Stat. 1222, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 715 et seq.; and the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 884, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq. Respondents brought suit on behalf of themselves, claiming that they had organizational interests in monitoring and publicizing the management of the NWRS, and on behalf of their members, alleging that the latter used the NWRS for recreational and other purposes and would be affected by the proposed budget curtailments. Respondents alleged that OMB had “significantly reduced the Interior Department’s request for appropriations for the operation of the National Wildlife Refuge System during fiscal year 1974 and during other years without preparing or considering the environmental-impact statement required by NEPA.” Complaint ¶ 25. Respondents also contended that § 102 (2) (B) of NEPA required OMB to develop procedures to assure consideration of environmental factors in the budget process. Section 102 (2) (B) requires all federal agencies to "identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality established by title II of this Act, which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations.” 83 Stat. 853, 42 U. S. C. §4332 (2) (B). At that time, CEQ was authorized by Exec. Order No. 11514, § 3 (h), to issue nonbinding “guidelines to Federal agencies for the preparation of detailed statements on proposals for legislation and other Federal actions affecting the environment.” 3 CFR 904 (1966-1970 Comp.). These guidelines stated that the “major Federal actions” to which § 102 (2) (C) applied included “[recommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation including requests for appropriations.” 40 CFR § 1500.5 (a) (1) (1974). See § 1500.3. At that time the Department of the Interior’s Manual, following CEQ’s proposed guidelines, provided: “The following criteria are to be used in deciding whether a proposed action requires the preparation of an environmental statement: “A. Types of Federal actions to be considered include, but are not limited to: “(1) Recommendations or favorable reports to the Congress relating to legislation, including appropriations.” Department of the Interior Manual, §516.5, 36 Fed. Reg. 19344 (1971). Without additional discussion, the District Court also stated that the Director of OMB was required “to develop formal methods and procedures which will, with respect to [OMB]’s own administrative actions and proposals, identify those agency actions requiring environmental statements to be prepared, considered, and disseminated.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a. See n. 9, supra. Respondents do not now challenge this holding. The Court of Appeals also affirmed what it took to be the District Court’s declaratory relief requiring OMB “to adopt procedures and appropriate regulations to comply with the obligations NEPA imposes on the budget process . . . 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 127, 581 F. 2d, at 905. See n. 12, supra. CEQ had taken this position from the first draft of its guidelines. CEQ was required by President Nixon to issue guidelines on March 5, 1970. See Exec. Order No. 11514, 3 CPR 902 (1966-1967 Comp.). On April 30, 1970, CEQ promulgated interim guidelines which provided that “major Federal actions” included “[r]ecommendations or reports relating to legislation and appropriations.” Council on Environmental Quality, First Annual Report: Environmental Quality 288 (1970). On April 23, 1971, the guidelines were revised to state that “major Federal actions” included “[recommendations or favorable reports relating to legislation including that for appropriations.” 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971). On August 1, 1973, the guidelines were once again revised, this time to the form noted by the Court of Appeals. 38 Fed. Reg. 20551 (1973). Relying on the CEQ guidelines, two prior decisions by Courts of Appeals have both interpreted “proposals for legislation” to include appropriation requests. See Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F. 2d 1164, 1181 (CA6 1972); Scientists’ Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 156 U. S. App. D. C. 395, 404, 481 F. 2d 1079, 1088 (1973). These regulations become effective July 30, 1979. 43 Fed. Reg. 55978 (1978). The CEQ also noted that “[n]othing in the Council’s determination, however, relieves agencies of responsibility to prepare statements when otherwise required on the underlying program or other actions.” Id., at 55989. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 directs the Comptroller General of the United States, “in cooperation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, [to] develop, establish, maintain, and publish standard terminology, definitions, classifications, and codes for Federal fiscal, budgetary, and program-related data and information.” 88 Stat. 327, 31 U. S. C. § 1152 (a) (1). Pursuant to this statutory authority, the Comptroller General has published definitions distinguishing “authorizing legislation” from “appropriation.” Authorizing legislation is defined in the following manner: “Basic substantive legislation enacted by Congress which sets up or continues the legal operation of a Federal program or agency either indefinitely or for a specific period of time or sanctions a particular type of obligation or expenditure within a program. Such legislation is normally a prerequisite for subsequent appropriations or other kinds of budget authority to be contained in appropriations acts. It may limit the amount of budget authority to be provided subsequently or may authorize the appropriation of 'such sums as may be necessary.’ ” Comptroller General of the United States, Terms Used in the Budgetary Process 4 (1977). Appropriation, on the other hand, is defined as: “An authorization by an act of the Congress that permits Federal agencies to incur obligations and to make payments out of the Treasury for specified purposes. An appropriation usually follows .enactment of authorizing legislation. . . . Appropriations do not represent cash actually set aside in the Treasury for purposes specified in the appropriation act; they represent limitations of amounts which agencies may obligate during the time period specified in the respective appropriations acts.” Id., at 3. Congressional enactments employ this distinction between appropriation and legislation. For example, the Budget and Accounting Act requires the President to include in the proposed budget he submits to Congress “with respect to each- proposal in the Budget for new or additional legislation which would create or expand any function, activity, or authority, in addition to those functions, activities, and authorities then existing or as then being administered and operated, a tabulation showing— “(A) the amount proposed in the Budget for appropriation and for expenditure in the ensuing fiscal year on account of such proposal; and “(B) the estimated appropriation required on account of such proposal in each of the four fiscal years, immediately following that ensuing fiscal year, during which such proposal is to be in effect . . . .” As added, 84 Stat. 1169, 31 U. S. C. § 11 (a) (12) (emphasis supplied). See also 18 TJ. S. C. § 1913; 22 U. S. C. § 2394 (c). The Executive Branch also recognizes the distinction between appropriation and legislation. For example, OMB distinguishes its function “[t]o supervise and control the administration of the budget” from its task of assisting “the President by clearing and coordinating departmental advice on proposed legislation.” Requiring Confirmation of Future Appointments of the Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, H. R. Rep. No. 93-697, p. 18 (1973). See Neustadt, Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance, 48 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 641 (1954). OMB Circular No. A-19 (1972) establishes OMB’s procedures for “legislative coordination and clearance,” whereas OMB Circular No. A-ll (1978) sets out OMB’s guidelines for the “Preparation and Submission of Budget Estimates.” OMB Circular No. A-19, §6 (a), requires each federal agency to “prepare and submit to OMB annually its proposed legislative program for the next session of Congress. These programs must be submitted at the same time as the initial submissions of an agency’s annual budget request as required by OMB Circular A-ll.” OMB Circular A-ll, § 13.2, on the other hand, provides: “If, in addition to the regular appropriation requests, it appears probable that proposals for new legislation may require a further budget request or result in a change in revenues or outlays, a tentative forecast of the supplemental estimate will be set forth separately. . . . Such proposed supplemental must be consistent with items appearing in the agency’s legislative program as required by OMB Circular No. A-19 . . . .” L. Deschler, Procedure in the U. S. House of Representatives §26-1.2 (1977) states that “[¡language in an appropriation bill changing existing law is legislation and not in order.” Conversely, “ [restrictions against the inclusion of appropriations in legislative bills are provided for by House rule . . . .” Id., §25-3.1. CEQ regulations define “major Federal action” in the following manner: “ 'Major Federal action’ includes actions with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility. Major reinforces but does not have a meaning independent of significantly .... Actions include the circumstance where the responsible oifi-cials fail to act and that failure to act is reviewable by courts or administrative tribunals under the Administrative Procedure Act or other applicable law as agency action. “(a) Actions include new and continuing activities, including projects and programs entirely or partly financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved by federal agencies; new or revised agency rules, regulations, plans, policies, or procedures; and legislative proposals .... “(b) Federal actions tend to fall within one of the following categories: “(1) Adoption of official policy, such as rules, regulations, and interpretations adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. 651 et seq.; treaties and international conventions or agreements; formal documents establishing an agency's policies which will result in or substantially alter agency programs. “(2) Adoption of formal plans, such as official documents prepared or approved by federal agencies which guide or prescribe alternative uses of federal resources, upon which future agency actions will be based. “(3) Adoption of programs, such as a group of concerted actions to implement a specific policy or plan; systematic and connected agency decisions allocating agency resources to implement a specific statutory program or executive directive. “(4) Approval of specific projects, such as construction or management activities located in a defined geographic area. Projects include actions approved by permit or other regulatory decision as well as federal and federally assisted activities.” 43 Fed. Reg. 56004-56005 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1508.18). “[M]ajor Federal actions” include the “expansion or revision of ongoing programs.” S. Rep. No. 91-296, p. 20 (1969). For example, if an agency were to seek an appropriation to initiate a major new program that would significantly affect the quality of the human environment, or if it were to decline to ask for funding so as to terminate a program with a similar effect, the agency would have been required to include EIS’s in the recommendations or reports on the proposed underlying programmatic decisions. The Court of Appeals held that EIS’s need be included in appropriation requests for “major Federal actions” only if major changes that would significantly affect the quality of the human environment are proposed in the underlying programs for which funding is sought. See 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 125, 581 F. 2d, at 903. But an appropriation request applies not only to major changes in a federal program, but also to the entire program it is designed to fund. Without appropriations, the underlying program would cease to exist. Therefore, if the existence vel non of that program is a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, the Court of Appeals’ alternative interpretation of NEPA would require an EIS to be included in the concomitant appropriation request. It is important to note that CEQ regulations provide that the adjective “major” in the phrase “major Federal actions” “reinforces but does not have a meaning independent of [the adverb] significantly” in the phrase “significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 43 Fed. Reg. 56004 (1978) (to be codified at 40 CFR § 1508.18). See n. 20, supra. As a consequence, the Court of Appeals’ holding that certain appropriation requests are “proposals for . . . major Federal actions” is operationally identical to its holding that certain appropriation requests constitute “proposals for legislation.” Both holdings would require EIS’s to accompany funding requests for every federal program that significantly affects the quality of the human environment. Thus, not only do both holdings run the same dangers of “trivializing” NEPA, but also the same “traditional concepts relating to appropriations and the budget cycle, considerations of timing and confidentiality,” 43 Fed. Reg. 55989 (1978), which led CEQ to distinguish “appropriations” from “legislation,” would require appropriations to be distinguished from “proposals for . . . major Federal actions.” Because we conclude that § 102 (2) (C) has no application to appropriation requests, it is clear that the Court of Appeals was incorrect in requiring OMB “to adopt procedures and appropriate regulations to comply with the obligations NEPA imposes on the budget process 189 U. S. App. D. C., at 127, 581 F. 2d, at 905. See n. 14, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

GITLITZ et al. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE No. 99-1295. Argued October 2, 2000 Decided January 9, 2001 Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connoe, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 220. Darrell D. Hallett argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were John M. Colvin and Robert J. Chicoine. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Junghans, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Teresa E. McLaughlin, and Edward T Perelmuter Richard M. Lipton and Theodore R. Bots filed a brief for the Real Estate Roundtable as amicus curiae urging reversal. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed tax deficiencies against petitioners David and Louise Gitlitz and Philip and Eleanor Winn because they used nontaxed discharge of indebtedness to increase their bases in S corporation stock and to deduct suspended losses. In this case we must answer two questions. First, we must decide whether the Internal Revenue Code (Code) permits taxpayers to increase bases in their S corporation stock by the amount of an S corporation’s discharge of indebtedness excluded from gross income. And, second, if the Code permits such an increase, we must decide whether the increase occurs before or after taxpayers are required to reduce the S corporation’s tax attributes. I David Gitlitz and Philip Winn were shareholders of P. D. W. & A., Inc., a corporation that had elected to be taxed under Subchapter S of the Code, 26 U. S. C. §§ 1361-1379 (1994 ed. and Supp. III). Subchapter S allows shareholders of qualified corporations to elect a “pass-through” taxation system under which income is subjected to only one level of taxation. See Bufferd v. Commissioner, 506 U. S. 523, 525 (1993). The corporation’s profits pass through directly to its shareholders on a pro rata basis and are reported on the shareholders’ individual tax returns. See § 1366(a)(1)(A). To prevent double taxation of income upon distribution from the corporation to the shareholders, § 1367(a)(1)(A).permits shareholders to increase their corporate bases by items of income identified in § 1366(a) (1994 ed. and Supp. III). Corporate losses and deductions are passed through in a similar manner, see § 1366(a)(1)(A), and the shareholders’ bases in the S corporation’s stock and debt are decreased accordingly, see §§ 1367(a)(2)(B), 1367(b)(2)(A). However, a shareholder cannot take corporate losses and deductions into account on his personal tax return to the extent that such items exceed his basis in the stock and debt of the S corporation. See § 1366(d)(1) (Supp. III). If those items exceed the basis, the excess is “suspended” until the shareholder’s basis becomes large enough to permit the deduction. See §§ 1366(d)(1), (2) (1994 ed. and Supp. III). In 1991, P. D. W. & A. realized $2,021,296 of discharged indebtedness. At the time, the corporation was insolvent in the amount of $2,181,748. Because it was insolvent even after the discharge of indebtedness was added to its balance sheet, P. D. W. & A. excluded the entire discharge of indebtedness amount from gross income under 26 U. S. C. §§ 108(a) and 108(d)(7)(A). On their tax returns, Gitlitz and Winn increased their bases in P. D. W. & A. stock by their pro rata share (50 percent each) of the amount of the corporation’s discharge of indebtedness. Petitioners’ theory was that the discharge of indebtedness was an “item of income” subject to pass-through under § 1366(a)(1)(A). They used their increased bases to deduct on their personal tax returns corporate losses and deductions, including losses and deductions from previous years that had been suspended under § 1366(d). Gitlitz and Winn each had losses (including suspended losses and operating losses) that totaled $1,010,648. With the upward basis adjustments of $1,010,648 each, Gitlitz and Winn were each able to deduct the full amount of their pro rata share of P. D. W. & A.’s losses. The Commissioner determined that petitioners could not use P. D. W. & A.’s discharge of indebtedness to increase their bases in the stock and denied petitioners’ loss deductions. Petitioners petitioned the Tax Court to review the deficiency determinations. The Tax Court, in its initial opinion, granted relief to petitioners and held that the discharge of indebtedness was an “item of income” and therefore could support a basis increase. See Winn v. Commissioner, 73 TCM 3167 (1997), ¶ 97,286 RIA Memo withdrawn and reissued, 75 TCM 1840 (1998), ¶ 98,071 RIA Memo TC. In light of the Tax Court’s decision in Nelson v. Commis sioner, 110 T. C. 114 (1998), aff’d, 182 E 3d 1152 (CA10 1999), however, the Tax Court granted the Commissioner’s motion for reconsideration and held that shareholders may not use an S corporation’s untaxed discharge of indebtedness to increase their bases in corporate stock. See Winn v. Commissioner, 75 TCM 1840 (1998), ¶ 98,071 RIA Memo TC. The Court of Appeals affirmed. See 182 F. 3d 1143 (CA10 1999). It assumed that excluded discharge of indebtedness is an item of income subject to pass-through to shareholders pursuant to § 1366(a)(1)(A), id., at 1148, 1151, n. 7, but held that the discharge of indebtedness amount first had to be used to reduce certain tax attributes of the S corporation under § 108(b), and that only the leftover amount could be used to increase basis. The Court of Appeals explained that, because the tax attribute to be reduced (in this case the corporation’s net operating loss) was equal to the amount of discharged debt, the entire amount of discharged debt was absorbed by the reduction at the corporate level, and nothing remained of the discharge of indebtedness to be passed through to the shareholders under § 1366(a)(1)(A). Id., at 1151. Because Courts of Appeals have disagreed on how to treat discharge of indebtedness of an insolvent S corporation, compare Gaudiano v. Commissioner, 216 F. 3d 524, 535 (CA6 2000) (holding that tax attributes are reduced before excluded discharged debt income is passed through to shareholders), cert. pending, No. 00-459; Witzel v. Commissioner, 200 F. 3d 496, 498 (CA7 2000) (same), cert. pending, No. 99-1693; and 182 F. 3d, at 1150 (case below), with United States v. Farley, 202 F. 3d 198, 206 (CA3 2000) (holding that excluded discharged debt income is passed through to shareholders before tax attributes are reduced), cert. pending, No. 99-1675 [Reporter’s Note: See post, p. 1111]; see also Pugh v. Commissioner, 213 F. 3d 1324, 1330 (CA11 2000) (holding that excluded discharged debt income is subject to pass-through and can increase basis), cert. pending, No. 00-242, we granted certiorari. 529 U. S. 1097 (2000). I Before we can reach the issue addressed by the Court of Appeals — whether the increase in the taxpayers’ corporate bases occurs before or after the taxpayers are required to reduce the S corporation’s tax attributes — we must address the argument raised by the Commissioner. The Commissioner argues that the discharge of indebtedness of an insolvent S corporation is not an “item of income” and thus never passes through to shareholders. Under a plain reading of the statute, we reject this argument and conclude that excluded discharged debt is indeed an “item of income,” which passes through to the shareholders and increases their bases in the stock of the S corporation. Section 61(a)(12) states that discharge of indebtedness generally is included in gross income. Section 108(a)(1) provides an express exception to this general rule: “Gross income does not include any amount which (but for this subsection) would be includible in gross income by reason of the discharge ... of indebtedness of the taxpayer if— “(B) the discharge occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent.” The Commissioner contends that this exclusion from gross income alters the character of the discharge of indebtedness so that it is no longer an “item of income.” However, the text and structure of the statute do not support the Commissioner’s theory. Section 108(a) simply does not say that discharge of indebtedness ceases to be an item of income when the S corporation is insolvent. Instead it provides only that discharge of indebtedness ceases to be included in gross income. Not all items of income are included in gross income, see § 1366(a)(1) (providing that “items of income,” including “tax-exempt” income, are passed through to shareholders), so mere exclusion of an amount from gross income does not imply that the amount ceases to be an item of income. Moreover, §§ 101 through 136 employ the same construction to exclude various items from gross income: “Gross income does not include . . . .” The consequence of reading this language in the manner suggested by the Commissioner would be to exempt all items in these sections from pass-through under § 1366. However, not even the Commissioner encourages us to reach this sweeping conclusion. Instead the Commissioner asserts that discharge of indebtedness is unique among the types of items excluded from gross income because no economic outlay is required of the taxpayer receiving discharge of indebtedness. But the Commissioner is unable to identify language in the statute that makes this distinction relevant, and we certainly find none. On the contrary, the statute makes clear that §108(a)’s exclusion does not alter the character of discharge of indebtedness as an item of income. Specifically, § 108(e)(1) reads: “Except as otherwise provided in this section, there shall be no insolvency exception from the general rule that gross income includes income from the discharge of indebtedness.” This provision presumes that discharge of indebtedness is always “income,” and that the only question for purposes of § 108 is whether it is includible in gross income. If discharge of indebtedness of insolvent entities were not actually “income,” there would be no need to provide an exception to its inclusion in gross income; quite simply, if discharge of indebtedness of an insolvent entity were not “income,” it would necessarily not be included in gross income. Notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, the Commissioner argues, generally, that excluded discharge of indebtedness is not income and, specifically, that it is not “tax-exempt income” under § 1366(a)(1)(A). First, the Commissioner argues that § 108 merely codified the “judicial insolvency exception,” and that, under this exception, discharge of indebtedness of an insolvent taxpayer was not considered income. The insolvency exception was a rule that the discharge of indebtedness of an insolvent taxpayer was not taxable income. See, e. g., Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F. 2d 95 (CA5 1934); Astoria Marine Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T. C. 798 (1949). But the exception has since been limited by § 108(e). Section 108(e) precludes us from relying on any understanding of the judicial insolvency exception that was not codified in § 108. And as explained above, the language and logic of §108 clearly establish that, although discharge of indebtedness of an insolvent taxpayer is not included in gross income, it is nevertheless income. The Commissioner also relies on a Treasury Regulation to support his theory that no income is realized from the discharge of the debt of an insolvent: “Proceedings under Bankruptcy Act. “(1) Income is not realized by a taxpayer by virtue of the discharge, under section 14 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U. S. C. 32), of his indebtedness as the result of an adjudication in bankruptcy, or by virtue of an agreement among his creditors not consummated under any provision of the Bankruptcy Act, if immediately thereafter the taxpayer’s liabilities exceed the value of his assets.” 26 CFR § 1.61-12(b) (2000). Even if this regulation could be read (countertextually) to apply outside the bankruptcy context, it merely states that “[i]ncome is not realized.” The regulation says nothing about whether discharge of indebtedness is income subject to pass-through under § 1366. Second, the Commissioner argues that excluded discharge of indebtedness is not “tax-exempt” income under § 1366(a)(1)(A), but rather “tax-deferred” income. According to the Commissioner, because the taxpayer is required to reduce tax attributes that could have provided future tax benefits, the taxpayer will pay taxes on future income that otherwise would have been absorbed by the forfeited tax attributes. Implicit in the Commissioner’s labeling of such income as “tax-deferred,” however, is the erroneous assumption that § 1366(a)(1)(A) does not include “tax-deferred” income. Section 1366 applies to “items of income.” This section expressly includes “tax-exempt” income, but this inclusion does not mean that the statute must therefore exclude “tax-deferred” income. The section is worded broadly enough to include any item of income, even tax-deferred income, that “could affect the liability for tax of any shareholder.” § 1366(a)(1)(A). Thus, none of the Commissioner’s contentions alters our conclusion that discharge of indebtedness of an insolvent S corporation is an item of income for purposes of § 1366(a)(1)(A). III Having concluded that excluded discharge of indebtedness is . an “item of income” and is therefore subject to pass-through to shareholders under § 1366, we must resolve the sequencing question addressed by the Court of Appeals— whether pass-through is performed before or after the reduction of the S corporation’s tax attributes under § 108(b). Section 108(b)(1) provides that “[t]he amount excluded from gross income under [§ 108(a)] shall be applied to reduce the tax attributes of the taxpayer as provided [in this section].” Section 108(b)(2) then lists the various tax attributes to be reduced in the order of reduction. The first tax attribute to be reduced, and the one at issue in this case, is the net operating loss. See § 108(b)(2)(A). Section 108(d)(7)(B) specifies that, for purposes of attribute reduction, the shareholders’ suspended losses for the taxable year of discharge are to be treated as the S corporation’s net operating loss. If tax attribute reduction is performed before the discharge of indebtedness is passed through to the shareholders (as the Court of Appeals held), the shareholders’ losses that exceed basis are treated as the corporation’s net operating loss and are then reduced by the amount of the discharged debt. In this case, no suspended losses would remain that would permit petitioners to take deductions. If, however, attribute reduction is performed after the discharged debt income is passed through (as petitioners argue), then the shareholders would be able to deduct their losses (up to the amount of the increase in basis caused by the discharged debt). Any suspended losses remaining then will be treated as the S corporation’s net operating loss and will be reduced by the amount of the discharged debt. Therefore, the sequence of the steps of pass-through and attribute reduction determines whether petitioners here were deficient when they increased their bases by the discharged debt amount and deducted their losses. The sequencing question is expressly addressed in the statute. Section 108(b)(4)(A) directs that the attribute reductions “shall be made after the determination of the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year of the discharge.” (Emphases added.) See also § 1017(a) (applying the same sequencing when § 108 attribute reduction affects basis of corporate property). In order to determine the “tax imposed,” an S corporation shareholder must adjust his basis in his corporate stock and pass through all items of income and loss. See §§ 1866,1367 (1994 ed. and Supp. III). Consequently, the attribute reduction must be made after the basis adjustment and pass-through. In the case of petitioners, they must pass through the discharged debt, increase corporate bases, and then deduct their losses, all before any attribute reduction could occur. Because their basis increase is equal to their losses, petitioners have no suspended losses remaining. They, therefore, have no net operating losses to reduce. Although the Commissioner has now abandoned the reasoning of the Court of Appeals below, we address the primary arguments made in the Courts of Appeals against petitioners’ reading of the sequencing provision. First, one court has expressed the concern that, if the discharge of indebtedness is passed through to the shareholder before the tax attributes are reduced, then there can never be any discharge of indebtedness remaining “at the corporate level,” § 108(d)(7)(A), by which to reduce tax attributes. Gaudino, 216 F. 3d, at 533. This concern presumes that tax attributes can be reduced only if the discharge of indebtedness itself remains at the corporate level. The statute, however, does not impose this restriction. Section 108(b)(1) requires only that the tax attributes be reduced by “[t]he amount excluded from gross income” (emphasis added), and that amount is not altered by the mere pass-through of the income to the shareholder. Second, courts have discussed the policy concern that, if shareholders were permitted to pass through the discharge of indebtedness before reducing any tax attributes, the shareholders would wrongly experience a “double windfall”: They would be exempted from paying taxes on the full amount of the discharge of indebtedness, and they would be able to increase basis and deduct their previously suspended losses. See, e.g., 182 F. 3d, at 1147-1148. Because the Code’s plain text permits the taxpayers here to receive these benefits, we need not address this policy concern. * * * The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is reversed. It is so ordered. Each man filed a joint tax return with his wife. Section 1366(a)(1) provides: “In determining the tax under this chapter of a shareholder for the shareholder’s taxable year in which the taxable year of the S corporation ends . . . , there shall be taken into account the shareholder’s pro rata share of the corporation’s— “(A) items of income (including tax-exempt income), loss, deduction, or credit the separate treatment of which could affect the liability for tax of any shareholder ....” In Nelson, the Tax Court held that excluded discharge of indebtedness does not pass through to an S corporation’s shareholders because § 108 is an exception to normal S corporation pass-through rules. Specifically, the court held that, because § 108(d)(7)(A) requires that “subsections (a) [and (b) of § 108] shall be applied at the corporate level” in the case of an S corporation, it precludes any pass-through of the discharge of indebtedness to the shareholder level. See Nelson, 110 T. C., at 121-124. Section 108(b)(1) reads: “The amount excluded from gross income under [§ 108(a)(1)] shall be applied to reduce the tax attributes of the taxpayer ....” The Commissioner has altered his arguments throughout the course of this litigation. According to the Tax Court, during the first iteration of this case the Commissioner made several arguments but then settled on a “final” one — that the discharge of indebtedness of the insolvent S corporation was not an “item of income,” see 73 TCM 3167 (1997), ¶ 97,286 RIA Memo TC. In the Court of Appeals, the Commissioner argued instead that, because any pass-through of excluded discharge of indebtedness to petitioners took place after any reduction of tax attributes and by then the income would have been fully absorbed by the tax attributes, no discharged debt remained to flowthrough to petitioners. The Commissioner relegated to a footnote his argument that discharge of indebtedness is not an “item of income.” See Brief for Appellee in Nos. 98-9009 and 98-9010 (CA10), p. 33, n. 14. The Commissioner also contends, as does the dissent, that because § 108(d)(7)(A) mandates that the discharged debt amount be determined and applied to reduce tax attributes “at the corporate level,” rather than at the shareholder level, the discharged debt, even if it is some type of income, simply cannot pass through to shareholders. In other words, the Commissioner contends' that § 108(d)(7)(A) excepts excluded discharged debt from the general pass-through provisions for S corporations. However, § 108(d)(7)(A) merely directs that the exclusion from gross income and the tax attribute reduction be made at the corporate level. Section 108(d)(7)(A) does not state or imply that the debt discharge provisions shall apply only “at the corporate level.” The very purpose of Subchap-ter S is to tax at the shareholder level, not the corporate level. Income is determined at the S corporation level, see § 1863(b), not in order to tax the corporation, see § 1363(a) (exempting an S corporation from income tax), but solely to pass through to the S corporation’s shareholders the corporation’s income. Thus, the controlling provision states that, in determining a shareholder’s liability, “there shall be taken into account the shareholder’s pro rata share of the corporation’s . . . items of income (including tax-exempt income)_” § 1366(a)(1). Nothing in § 108(d)(7)(A) suspends the operation of these ordinary pass-through rules. Under this scenario, the shareholders’ losses would be reduced by the discharge of indebtedness. However, it is unclear precisely what would happen to the discharge of indebtedness. The Court of Appeals below stated that the discharged debt would be “absorbed” by the reduction to the extent of the net operating loss and that therefore only the excess excluded discharged debt would remain to pass through to the shareholders. 182 F. 3d 1143, 1149 (CA10 1999). In contrast, another Court of Appeals suggested, albeit in dictum, that the full amount of the discharge might still pass through to the shareholder and be used to increase basis; the discharged debt amount would reduce the net operating loss but would not be absorbed by it. Witzel v. Commissioner, 200 F. 3d 496, 498 (CA7 2000). We need not resolve this issue because we conclude that the discharge of indebtedness passes through before any attribute reduction takes place. The Commissioner has abandoned his argument related to the sequencing issue before this Court. This abandonment is particularly odd given that the sequencing issue predominated in the Commissioner’s argument to the Court of Appeals. Notwithstanding the Commissioner’s attempt at oral argument to distance himself from the reasoning of the Court of Appeals on this issue — the Commissioner represented to us that the Court of Appeals developed its reading of the statute sua sponte, Tr. of Oral Arg. 22-24, 27 — it is apparent from the Commissioner’s brief in the Court of Appeals that the Commissioner supplied the very sequencing theory that the Court of Appeals adopted. Compare, e. g., Brief for Appellee in Nos. 98-9009 and 98-9010 (CA10), p. 28 (“First, the discharge of indebtedness income that is excluded under Section 108(a) at the corporate level is temporarily set aside and has no tax consequences .... Second, PDW & A computes its tax attributes, i. e., taxpayers’ suspended losses. Third, the excluded discharge of indebtness income is applied against and eliminates the suspended losses. Because the excluded income is applied against — and offset by — the suspended losses, no item of income flows through to taxpayers under Section 1366(a), and no upward basis adjustment is made under Section 1367(a)” (citations omitted)), with, e. g., 182 F. 3d, at 1151 (“PDW & A first must compute its discharge of indebtedness income and set this figure aside temporarily. The corporation then must calculate its net operating loss tax attribute.... Finally, the corporation must apply the excluded discharged debt to reduce its tax attributes. In this case, the net operating loss tax attribute fully absorbs the corporation’s excluded- discharge of indebtedness income. Thus, there are no items of income to pass through to Gitlitz and Winn”). Similar to this argument is the contention that, in cases such as this one in which the shareholders’ suspended losses are fully deducted before attribute reduction could take place, no net operating loss remains and no attribute reduction can occur, thus rendering § 108(b) inoperative. However, there will be other cases in which § 108(b) will be inoperative. In particular, if a taxpayer has no tax attributes at all, there will be no reduction. Certainly the statute does not condition the exclusion under § 108(a) on the ability of the taxpayer to reduce attributes under § 108(b). Likewise, in the case of shareholders similarly situated to petitioners in this case, there is also the possibility that other attributes, see §§ 108(b)(2)(B)-(G), could be reduced. The benefit at issue in this ease arises in part because § 108(d)(7)(A) permits the exclusion of discharge of indebtedness income from gross income for an insolvent S corporation even when the S corporation shareholder is personally solvent. We are aware of no other instance in which § 108 directly benefits a solvent entity. However, the result is required by statute. Between 1982 and 1984, §108 provided that the exclusion from gross income and the reduction in tax attributes occurred at the shareholder level. See Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-354, § 3(e), 96 Stat. 1689. This provision, which paralleled the current taxation of partnerships at the partner level, see 26 U. S. C. § 108(d)(6), prevented solvent shareholders from benefiting as a result of their S corporation’s insolvency. In 1984, however, Congress amended the Code to provide that §108 be applied “at the corporate level.” Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, § 721(b), 98 Stat. 966. It is as a direct result of this amendment that the solvent petitioners in this case are able to benefit from § 108’s exclusion.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION et al. v. ITT WORLD COMMUNICATIONS, INC., et al. No. 83-371. Argued March 21, 1984 Decided April 30, 1984 Powell, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Albert J. Lauber, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, Leonard Schaitman, Frank A. Rosenfeld, Bruce E. Fein, Daniel M. Armstrong, and C. Grey Pash, Jr. Grant S. Lewis argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were John S. Kinzey, Charles C. Platt, Howard A. White, and Susan I. Littman. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. The Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U. S. C. § 552b, mandates that federal agencies hold their meetings in public. This case requires us to consider whether the Act applies to informal international conferences attended by members of the Federal Communications Commission. We also must decide whether the District Court may exercise jurisdiction over a suit that challenges agency conduct as ultra vires after the agency has addressed that challenge in an order reviewable only by the Court of Appeals. I Members of petitioner Federal Communications Commission (FCC) participate with their European and Canadian counterparts in what is referred to as the Consultative Process. This is a series of conferences intended to facilitate joint planning of telecommunications facilities through an exchange of information on regulatory policies. At the time of the conferences at issue in the present case, only three American corporations — respondents ITT World Communications, Inc. (ITT), and RCA Global Communications, Inc., and Western Union International — provided overseas record telecommunications services. Although the FCC had approved entry into the market by other competitors, European regulators had been reluctant to do so. The FCC therefore added the topic of new carriers and services to the agenda of the Consultative Process, in the hope that exchange of information might persuade the European nations to cooperate with the FCC’s policy of encouraging competition in the provision of telecommunications services. Respondents, opposing the entry of new competitors, initiated this litigation. First, respondents filed a rulemaking petition with the FCC concerning the Consultative Process meetings. The petition requested that the FCC disclaim any intent to negotiate with foreign governments or to bind it to agreements at the meetings, arguing that such negotiations were ultra vires the agency’s authority. Further, the petition contended that the Sunshine Act required the Consultative Process sessions, as “meetings” of the FCC, to be held in public. See 5 U. S. C. §552b(b). The FCC denied the rulemaking petition, and respondents filed an appeal in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Respondent ITT then filed suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The complaint, like respondents’ rule-making petition, contended (i) that the agency’s negotiations with foreign officials at the Consultative Process were ultra vires the agency’s authority and (ii) that future meetings of the Consultative Process must conform to the requirements of the Sunshine Act. The District Court dismissed the ultra vires count on jurisdictional grounds, but ordered the FCC to comply with the Sunshine Act. Respondent ITT appealed, and the Commission cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit considered on consolidated appeal the District Court’s judgment and the FCC’s denial of the rulemaking petition. The District Court judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. 226 U. S. App. D. C. 67, 699 F. 2d 1219 (1983). The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s ruling that the Sunshine Act applied to meetings of the Consultative Process. It reversed the District Court’s dismissal of the ultra vires count, however. Noting that exclusive jurisdiction for review of final agency action lay in the Court of Appeals, that court held that the District Court nonetheless could entertain under 5 U. S. C. §703 a suit that alleged that FCC participation in the Consultative Process should be enjoined as ultra vires the agency’s authority. The case was remanded for consideration of the merits of respondents’ ultra vires claim. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the FCC erroneously had denied respondents’ rulemaking petition. Consistent with its affirmance of the District Court, the Court of Appeals held that the FCC had erred in concluding that the Sunshine Act did not apply to the Consultative Process sessions. Further, the court found the record “patently inadequate” to support the FCC’s conclusion that attendance at sessions of the Consultative Process was within the scope of its authority. 226 U. S. App. D. C., at 95, 699 F. 2d, at 1247. Although remanding to the FCC, the court suggested that the agency stay consideration of the rulemaking petition, as the District Court’s action upon respondents’ complaint might moot the question of rulemaking. We granted certiorari, to decide whether the District Court could exercise jurisdiction over the ultra vires claim and whether the Sunshine Act applies to sessions of the Consultative Process. 464 U. S. 932 (1983). We reverse. HH HH We consider initially the jurisdiction of the District Court to enjoin FCC action as ultra vires. Exclusive jurisdiction for review of final FCC orders, such as the FCC’s denial of respondents’ rulemaking petition, lies in the Court of Appeals. 28 U. S. C. §2842(1); 47 U. S. C. § 402(a). Litigants may not evade these provisions by requesting the District Court to enjoin action that is the outcome of the agency’s order. See Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U. S. 62, 69 (1970); Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U. S. 411, 419-422 (1965). Yet that is what respondents have sought to do in this case. In substance, the complaint filed in the District Court raised the same issues and sought to enforce the same restrictions upon agency conduct as did the petition for rulemaking that was denied by the FCC. See supra, at 465-466. The appropriate procedure for obtaining judicial review of the agency’s disposition of these issues was appeal to the Court of Appeals as provided by statute. The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes an action for review of final agency action in the District Court to the extent that other statutory procedures for review are inadequate. 5 U. S. C. §§703, 704. Respondents contend that these provisions confer jurisdiction in the present suit because the record developed upon consideration of the rule-making petition by the agency does not enable the Court of Appeals fairly to evaluate their ultra vires claim. If, however, the Court of Appeals finds that the administrative record is inadequate, it may remand to the agency, see Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 593-594 (1980), or in some circumstances refer the case to a special master, see 28 U. S. C. § 2347(b)(3). Indeed, in the present case, the Court of Appeals has remanded the case to the agency for further proceedings. We conclude that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over respondents’ ultra vires claim. HH H-i The Sunshine Act, 5 U. S. C. §552b(b), requires that “meetings of an agency” be open to the public. Section 552b(a)(2) defines “meetings” as “the deliberations of at least the number of individual agency members required to take action on behalf of the agency where such deliberations determine or result in the joint conduct or disposition of official agency business.” Under these provisions, the Sunshine Act does not require that Consultative Process sessions be held in public, as the participation by FCC members in these sessions constitutes neither a “meeting” as defined by §552b(a)(2) nor a meeting “of the agency” as provided by § 552b(b). A Congress in drafting the Act’s definition of “meeting” recognized that the administrative process cannot be conducted entirely in the public eye. “[I]nformal background discussions [that] clarify issues and expose varying views” are a necessary part of an agency’s work. See S. Rep. No. 94-354, p. 19 (1975). The Act’s procedural requirements effectively would prevent such discussions and thereby impair normal agency operations without achieving significant public benefit. Section 552b(a)(2) therefore limits the Act’s application to meetings “where at least a quorum of the agency’s members . . . conduct or dispose of official agency business.” S. Rep. No. 94-354, at 2. Three Commissioners, the number who attended the Consultative Process sessions, did not constitute a quorum of the seven-member Commission. The three members were, however, a quorum of the Telecommunications Committee. That Committee is a “subdivision . . . authorized to act on behalf of the agency.” The Commission had delegated to the Committee, pursuant to § 5(d)(1) of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1068, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 155(d)(1), the power to approve applications for common carrier certification. See 47 CFR §0.215 (1983). The Sunshine Act applies to such a subdivision as well as to an entire agency. §552b(a)(l). It does not appear, however, that the Telecommunications Committee engaged at these sessions in “deliberations [that] determine or result in the joint conduct or disposition of official agency business.” This statutory language contemplates discussions that “effectively predetermine official actions.” See S. Rep. No. 94-354, at 19; accord, id., at 18. Such discussions must be “sufficiently focused on discrete proposals or issues as to cause or be likely to cause the individual participating members to form reasonably firm positions regarding matters pending or likely to arise before the agency.” R. Berg & S. Klitzman, An Interpretive Guide to the Government in the Sunshine Act 9 (1978) (hereinafter Interpretive Guide). On the cross-motions for summary judgment, however, respondent ITT alleged neither that the Committee formally acted upon applications for certification at the Consultative Process sessions nor that those sessions resulted in firm positions on particular matters pending or likely to arise before the Committee. Rather, the sessions provided general background information to the Commissioners and permitted them to engage with their foreign counterparts in an exchange of views by which decisions already reached by the Commission could be implemented. As we have noted, Congress did not intend the Sunshine Act to encompass such discussions. The Court of Appeals did not reach a contrary result by finding that the Commissioners were deliberating upon matters within their formally delegated authority. Rather, that court inferred from the members’ attendance at the sessions an undisclosed authority, not formally delegated, to engage in discussions on behalf of the Commission. The court then concluded that these discussions were deliberations that resulted in the conduct of official agency business, as the discussions “play[ed] an integral role in the Commission’s policymaking processes.” 226 U. S. App. D. C., at 89, 699 F. 2d, at 1241. We view the Act differently. It applies only where a subdivision of the agency deliberates upon matters that are within that subdivision’s formally delegated authority to take official action for the agency. Under the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, any group of members who exchange views or gathered information on agency business apparently could be viewed as a “subdivision. . . authorized to act on behalf of the agency.” The term “subdivision” itself indicates agency members who have been authorized to exercise formally delegated authority. See Interpretive Guide, at 2-3. Moreover, the more expansive view of the term “subdivision” adopted by the Court of Appeals would require public attendance at a host of informal conversations of the type Congress understood to be necessary for the effective conduct of agency business. In any event, it is clear that the Sunshine Act does not extend to deliberations of a quorum of the subdivision upon matters not within the subdivision’s formally delegated authority. Such deliberations lawfully could not “determine or result in the joint conduct or disposition of official agency business” within the meaning of the Act. As the Telecommunications Committee at the Consultative Process sessions did not consider or act upon applications for common carrier certification — its only formally delegated authority— we conclude that the sessions were not “meetings” within the meaning of the Sunshine Act. B The Consultative Process was not convened by the FCC, and its procedures were not subject to the FCC’s unilateral control. The sessions of the Consultative Process therefore are not meetings “of an agency” within the meaning of § 552b(b). The Act prescribes procedures for the agency to follow when it holds meetings and particularly when it chooses to close a meeting. See n. 6, supra. These provisions presuppose that the Act applies only to meetings that the agency has the power to conduct according to these procedures. And application of the Act to meetings not under agency control would restrict the types of meetings that agency members could attend. It is apparent that Congress, in enacting requirements for the agency’s conduct of its own meetings, did not contemplate as well such a broad substantive restraint upon agency processes. See S. Rep. No. 94-354, at 1. IV For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Section 552b(b) provides: “Members [of a federal agency] shall not jointly conduct or dispose of agency business other than in accordance with this section. Except as provided in subsection (c), every portion of every meeting of an agency shall be open to public observation.” Subsection (c) contains exceptions, that are not relevant to the present case. Section 552b(a)(2) defines “meeting” as “the deliberations of at least the number of individual agency members required to take action on behalf of the agency where such deliberations determine or result in the joint conduct or disposition of official agency business.” Section 552b(a)(l) defines the term “agency” to include “any agency . . . headed by a collegial body composed of two or more individual members . . . and any subdivision thereof authorized to act on behalf of the agency.” The District Court had jurisdiction over the Sunshine Act claim under 5 ü. S. C. § 552b(h)(l). Title 5 U. S. C. §703 provides in part: “The form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action ... in a court of competent jurisdiction.” The Court of Appeals accepted respondents’ contention that review in the Court of Appeals was inadequate to vindicate respondents’ claims. See infra, at 469. The finding of the Court of Appeals that the administrative record was inadequate to support the FCC’s denial of a petition for rulemaking on the issue of the scope of the FCC’s authority to negotiate is not before the Court. ITT urges that the ultra vires claim, unlike the petition for rulemaking, focuses on past rather than future agency conduct. It is true that the complaint in the District Court sought, in addition to prospective relief, a declaration that the Commission had violated the Administrative Procedure Act. See App. 71. But the gravamen of both the judicial complaint and the petition for rulemaking was to require the agency to conduct future sessions on the terms that ITT proposed. Indeed, it seems questionable whether a complaint that sought only a declaration that past conduct was unlawful would present to the District Court a case or controversy over which it could exercise subject-matter jurisdiction. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937). In any event, even if the question of the lawfulness of the agency’s past conduct were the central element of respondent ITT’s judicial complaint, the District Court under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should have dismissed the complaint, as respondents could have challenged the agency’s past conduct by motion before the agency for a declaratory ruling, 47 CFR § 1.2 (1983). See Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U. S. 411, 421, 426 (1965); Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U. S. 570, 574, 577 (1952). Meetings within the scope of the Act must be held in public unless one of the Act’s exemptions is applicable. § 552b(b). The agency must announce, at least a week before the meeting, its time, place, and subject matter and whether it will be open or closed. § 552b(e)(l). For closed meetings, the agency’s counsel must publicly certify that one of the Act’s exemptions permits closure. § 552b(f )(1). Most closed meetings must be transcribed or recorded. Ibid. The evolution of the statutory language reflects the congressional intent precisely to define the limited scope of the statute’s requirements. See generally H. R. Rep. No. 94-880, pt. 2, p. 14 (1976). For example, the Senate substituted the term “deliberations” for the previously proposed terms — “assembly or simultaneous communication,” H. R. 11656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., §552b(a)(2) (1976), or “gathering,” S. 5, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., §201(a) (1975) — in order to “exclude many discussions which are informal in nature.” S. Rep. No. 94-354, p. 10 (1975); see id., at 18. Similarly, earlier versions of the Act had applied to any agency discussions that “coneer[n] the joint conduct or disposition of agency business,” H. R. 11656, supra, § 552b(a)(2). The Act now applies only to deliberations that “determine or result in” the conduct of “official agency business.” The intent of the revision clearly was to permit preliminary discussion among agency members. See 122 Cong. Rec. 28474 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Fascell). Since the Consultative Process sessions at issue here, held in October 1979, the Commission’s membership has been reduced to five. Pub. L. 97-253, § 501(b), 96 Stat. 805 (effective July 1, 1983). Common carriers “in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio” or “radio transmission of energy,” 47 U. S. C. § 153(h), must obtain from the Commission a certificate of public convenience or necessity before undertaking construction or operation of additional communications lines. 47 U. S. C. § 214. Permits must be obtained also for construction of radio broadcasting stations. 47 U. S. C. § 319. The Office of the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States prepared the Interpretive Guide at Congress’ request, § 552b(g), and after extensive consultation with the affected agencies. See Interpretive Guide, at v. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment 6-11, 46-50, and Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment 23-27, in Civ. No. 80-0428 (Dist. Ct. DC). This point is made by the memorandum amicus curiae submitted to the Court by the American Bar Association: “The . . . decision [of the Court of Appeals] places . . . agencies in an untenable position. [Ujnder the court's decision, [agency] members may not meet with persons from outside the agency to discuss any matter within the official concern of the agency without complying with the provisions of the Sunshine Act. Such a result would have a pronounced (and deleterious) effect on the interaction between the agencies and the public . . . .” Memorandum, at 5-6. Ultra vires action by a subdivision would be of no legal effect.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ALLIED STORES OF OHIO, INC., v. BOWERS, TAX COMMISSIONER OF OHIO. No. 10. Argued November 12, 1958. Decided February 24, 1959. Carlton S. Dargusch, Sr. argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Carlton S. Dargusch, Jr. and Jack H. Bertsch. William Sazbe, Attorney General of Ohio, and John M. Tobin, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause and filed a brief for appellee. Mr. Justice Whittaker delivered the opinion of the Court. The principal question presented is whether an Ohio statute that exempts from ad valorem taxation “merchandise or agricultural products belonging to a nonresident ... if held in a storage warehouse for storage only” denies to appellant, a resident of the State, the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The facts are stipulated. So far as pertinent, they are that appellant, Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc., an Ohio corporation, owns and operates a department store in each of four Ohio cities. It also maintains in each of those cities a private warehouse where it stores stocks of merchandise of the kinds sold in its stores. As needed, merchandise is transferred from the warehouse to the store, and when merchandise is sold by sample in the store — usually a heavy or bulky article — it is delivered from the warehouse directly to the customer. Title 57, Page’s Ohio Rev. Code Ann., 1953, § 5709.01, provides, inter alia, that “All personal property located and used in business in this state [shall be] subject to taxation, regardless of the residence of the owners thereof. . . .” (Emphasis added.) During the tax year involved another Ohio statute, Title 57, Page’s Ohio Rev. Code Ann., 1953, § 5701.08 (A), provided, in pertinent part, that: “As used in Title LVII of the Revised Code: “(A) Personal property is 'used’ within the meaning of 'used in business’ . . . when stored or kept on hand as material, parts, products, or merchandise; but merchandise or agricultural products belonging to a nonresident of this state is not used in business in this state if held in a storage warehouse for storage only. ...” (We have added the italics, and, as was done by the Supreme Court of Ohio, we will refer to the italicized portion as the “proviso.”) Acting under those statutes, appellee, as Tax Commissioner of Ohio, proposed the assessment of an ad valorem tax against appellant based on the average value of the merchandise that it had stored in its four Ohio warehouses during the tax year ending January 31, 1954. Appellant petitioned the Board of Tax Appeals of Ohio for a redeter-mination, contending that the property stored in its four warehouses in the tax year involved was “merchandise . . . held in a storage warehouse for storage only/' within the meaning of § 5701.08 (A), and that because the section exempted nonresidents, but taxed residents, on stocks of merchandise so held, it denied to appellant, a resident of Ohio, the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The Board of Tax Appeals upheld the tax, and so did the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that appellant lacked standing to raise the constitutional question presented and affirmed the judgment. 166 Ohio St. 116, 140 N. E. 2d 411. The case comes here on Allied’s appeal. The first and preliminary question thus is whether the Supreme Court of Ohio correctly held that appellant lacked standing to prosecute the constitutional question sought to be presented. It is settled that “[wjhether a pleading sets up a sufficient right of action or defense, grounded on the Constitution or a law of the United States, is necessarily a question of federal law; and where a case coming from a state court presents that question, this Court must determine for itself the sufficiency of the allegations displaying the right or defense, and is not concluded by the view taken of them by the state court.” First National Bank v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 341, 346; Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 318. In reaching its conclusion, the Ohio court said “In our opinion, it is not necessary to consider the constitutional question raised by the taxpayer in the instant case because, if its contention with regard to that question is sound, it necessarily leads to the conclusion that the entire proviso in subdivision (A) of Section 5701.08, which read, ‘but merchandise or agricultural products belonging to a nonresident of this state is not used in business in this state if held in a storage warehouse for storage only,’ was void and should be stricken. That being so, it is apparent that any of taxpayer’s ‘merchandise . . . held in a storage warehouse for storage only’ would be taxable because described by the preceding words remaining in the statute and reading, ‘stored . . . as . . . merchandise.’ ” But the court did not hold that the proviso was invalid, nor did it strike it from the statute. Instead, it held that the proviso expressed the valid legislative purpose to exempt the merchandise and agricultural products of nonresidents when held in a storage warehouse for storage only and that the court was powerless to strike it. In this, the court was following its prior decisions on the question. General Cigar Co. v. Peck, 159 Ohio St. 152, 111 N. E. 2d 265 (1953), and B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 202, 118 N. E. 2d 525 (1954), had so held. In the latter case the court had answered a contention that the proviso was invalid for undue preference of nonresidents by saying “such an argument should be addressed to the General Assembly and not to this court.” 161 Ohio St., at 210, 118 N. E. 2d, at 530. Those interpretations, for present purposes, became a part of the proviso. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562, 566. The proviso is the basis of appellant’s claim of denial of the equal protection of the laws. With the proviso thus validly remaining in the statute it is quite immaterial that appellant’s claim necessarily would fall if it were out. It follows that appellant does have standing to prosecute its constitutional claim. This brings us to the merits. Does the proviso exempting “merchandise or agricultural products belonging to a nonresident ... if held in a storage warehouse for storage only” deny to appellant, a resident of the State, the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment? The applicable principles have been often stated and are entirely familiar. The States have a very wide discretion in the laying of their taxes. When dealing with their proper domestic concerns, and not trenching upon the prerogatives of the National Government or violating the guaranties of the Federal Constitution, the States have the attribute of sovereign powers in devising their fiscal systems to ensure revenue and foster their local interests. Of course, the States, in the exercise of their taxing power, are subject to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But that clause imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to reasonable schemes of state taxation. The State may impose different specific taxes upon different trades and professions and may vary the rate of excise upon various products. It is not required to resort to close distinctions or to maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with reference to composition, use or value. Bell’s Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 237; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 293; Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 121; Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 573; Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 353; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245, 255; Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 179; Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 142; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146, 159; State Board of Tax Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 537. “To hold otherwise would be to subject the essential taxing power of the State to an intolerable supervision, hostile to the basic principles of our Government and wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to assure.” Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, supra, 281 U. S., at 159. But there is a point beyond which the State cannot go without violating the Equal Protection Clause. The State must proceed upon a rational basis and may not resort to a classification that is palpably arbitrary. The rule often has been stated to be that the classification “must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.” Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415; Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 37; Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U. S. 71, 85; Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230, 240; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146, 160. “If the selection or classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no denial of the equal protection of the law.” Brown- Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 573. State Board of Tax Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 537. That a statute may discriminate in favor of a certain class does not render it arbitrary if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, or difference in state policy. American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89; Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 142. Coming directly to the concrete problem now before us, it has repeatedly been held and appears to be entirely settled that a statute which encourages the location within the State of needed and useful industries by exempting them, though not also others, from its taxes is not arbitrary and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell’s Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra, 134 U. S., at 237; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S., at 159; Williams v. Baltimore, 289 U. S. 36; Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 439 (dissenting opinion). Similarly, it has long been settled that a classification, though discriminatory, is not arbitrary nor viola-tive of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78; Quong Wing v. Kirken-dall, 223 U. S. 59; Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 357; State Board of Tax Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283 U. S., at 537. In the light of the law thus well settled, how stands appellant’s case? We cannot assume that state legislative enactments were adopted arbitrarily or without good reason to further some legitimate policy of the State. What were the special reasons, motives or policies of the Ohio Legislature for adopting the questioned proviso we do not know with certainty, nor is it important that we should, Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 126, for a state legislature need not explicitly declare its purpose. But it is obvious that it may reasonably have been the purpose and policy of the State Legislature, in adopting the proviso, to encourage the construction or leasing and operation of warehouses in Ohio by nonresidents with the attendant benefits to the State’s economy, or to stimulate the market for merchandise and agricultural products produced in Ohio by enabling nonresidents to purchase and hold them in the State for storage only, free from taxes, in anticipation of future needs. Other similar purposes reasonably may be conceived. Therefore, we cannot say that the discrimination of the proviso which exempted only the “merchandise or agricultural products belonging to a nonresident ... if held in a storage warehouse for storage only” was not founded upon a reasonable distinction, or difference in state policy, or that no state of facts reasonably can be conceived to sustain it. For those reasons, it cannot be said, in the light of the settled law as shown by the cases cited, that the questioned proviso was invidious or palpably arbitrary and denied appellant the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellant heavily relies on Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562. We think that case is not apposite. There Ohio statutes exempted from taxation certain accounts receivable owned by residents of the State but taxed those owned by nonresidents. The statutes, on their face admittedly discriminatory against nonresidents, themselves declared their purpose. That purpose was to proffer to other States a scheme of “reciprocity” for taxing accounts receivable. Ohio argued that the reciprocal character of its statutes eliminated the discriminatory effects against nonresidents, but this Court held that it did not. Having themselves specifically declared their purpose, the Ohio statutes left no room to conceive of any other purpose for their existence. And the declared purpose having been found arbitrarily discriminatory against nonresidents, the Court could hardly escape the conclusion that “the inequality [was] not because of the slightest difference in Ohio’s relation to the decisive transaction, but solely because of the different residence of the owner.” 337 U. S., at 572. As we have shown, that is not the situation here. Here the discrimination against residents is not invidious nor palpably arbitrary because, as shown, it rests not upon the “different residence of the owner,” but upon a state of facts that reasonably can be conceived to constitute a distinction, or difference in state policy, which the State is not prohibited from separately classifying for purposes of taxation by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. , „ , , „ , Affirmed. Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The unitalicized portion of the statute was enacted in 1931, 114 Ohio Laws 714, 716. The italicized clause was added by the Ohio Legislature at its next session in 1933, 115 Ohio Laws 548, 553. In September 1955 the section was amended by deleting the italicized clause and inserting the following: “and merchandise or agricultural products shipped from outside of this state and held in this state in a warehouse or a place of storage for storage only and for shipment outside of this state are not used in business in this state.” 126 Ohio Laws 78. The Ohio taxing date is January 1, Title 57, Page’s Ohio Rev. Code Ann., 1953, § 5711.03. Why the assessment involved was for the year ended January 31, instead of January 1, 1954, is not explained in the record or the briefs. A merchant’s personal property is valued for tax purposes “by taking the amount in value on hand, as nearly as possible, in each month of the next preceding year in which he has been engaged in business, adding together such amounts, and dividing the aggregate amount by the number of months that he has been in business during such year.” Title 57, Page’s Ohio Rev. Code Ann., 1953, § 5711.15. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a foreign corporation, although authorized to do and doing a local business in Ohio, is a nonresident within the meaning of the proviso here in question. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 202, 204, 118 N. E. 2d 525, 527. The stated purpose was to proffer to other States a right to tax accounts receivable owned by residents of Ohio that derived from sales of Ohio goods negotiated and consummated in such other States in exchange for a claimed Ohio right to tax the accounts receivable owned by residents of other States that derived from sales of their goods negotiated and consummated in Ohio. “The effect,” this Court said, “[was] that intangibles of nonresident owners [were] assigned a situs within the taxing reach of Ohio while those of its residents [were] assigned a situs without. [Thus], [t]he exempted intangibles of residents [were] offered up to the taxing power of other states which may embrace this doctrine of a tax situs separate from residence, [but] no other state [ever] sought to take advantage of the ‘reciprocity’ proffer.” Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, supra, at 573-574.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MILLER, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES OF ILLINOIS, et al. v. YOUAKIM et al. No. 77-742. Argued October 30, 1978 Decided February 22, 1979 Marshall, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except Stevens, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Paul J. Bargiel, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were William J. Scott, Attorney General, and Imelda R. Terrazino, Assistant Attorney General. Robert E. Lehrer argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Patrick A. Keenan, Robert P. Bums, and James D. Weill. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General McCree for the United States; and by Michael B. Trister and Marian Wright Edelman for the American Orthopsychiatric Assn, et al. Mr. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. At issue in this appeal is whether Illinois may exclude from its Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Foster Care program children who reside with relatives. The Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Foster Care program (AFDC-FC) authorizes federal financial subsidies for the care and support of children removed from their homes and made wards of the State pursuant to a judicial determination that the children’s homes were not conducive to their welfare. §§408 (a)(1), (2) of the Social Security Act of 1935 (Act), as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 608 (a)(1), (2). To qualify for Foster Care assistance, these children must be placed in a “foster family home or child-care institution.” §408 (a) (3), 42 U. S. C. § 608 (a)(3). The basic AFDC program, already in existence when the Foster Care program was enacted in 1961, provides aid to eligible children who live with a parent or with a relative specified in § 406 (a) of the Act. In administering these programs, Illinois distinguishes between related and unrelated foster parents. Children placed in unrelated foster homes may participate in the AFDC-FC program. But those who are placed in the homes of relatives listed in § 406 (a), and who are entitled to basic AFDC benefits, cannot receive AFDC-FC assistance because the State defines the term “foster family home” as a facility for children unrelated to the operator. Foster children living with relatives may participate only in Illinois’ basic AFDC program, which provides lower monthly payments than the Foster Care program. The specific question presented here is whether Illinois has correctly interpreted the federal standards for AFDC-FC eligibility set forth in § 408 (a) of the Act to exclude children who, because of placement with related rather than unrelated foster parents, qualify for assistance under the basic AFDC program. I Appellees are four foster children, their older sister (Linda Youakim), and her husband (Marcel Youakim). In 1969, Illinois removed the children from their mother’s home and made them wards of the State following a judicial determination of neglect. The Department of Children and Family-Services (Department), which became responsible for the children, placed them in unrelated foster care facilities until 1972. During this period, they each received full AFDC-FC benefits of $105 a month. In 1972, the Department decided to place two of the children with the Youakims, who were under no legal obligation to accept or support them. The Department investigated the Youakim home and approved it as meeting the licensing standards established for unrelated foster family homes, as required by state law. Despite this approval, the State refused to make Foster Care payments on behalf of the children because they were related to Linda Youakim. The exclusion of foster children living with related caretakers from Illinois’ AFDC-FC program reflects the State’s view that the home of a relative covered under basic AFDC is not a “foster family home” within the meaning of § 408 (a)(3), the federal AFDC-FC eligibility provision at issue here. Interpreting that provision, Illinois defines a “foster family home” as “a facility for child care in residences of families who receive no more than 8 children unrelated to them . . . for the purpose of providing family care and training for the children on a full-time basis. . . .” Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 23, §2212.17 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added). Homes that do not meet the definition may not be licensed, and under state law, only licensed facilities are entitled to Foster Care payments. Although Illinois refused to make Foster Care payments, it did provide each child basic AFDC benefits of approximately $63 a month, substantially less than the applicable $105 AFDC-FC rate. The Youakims, however, believed that these payments were insufficient to provide proper support, and declined to accept the other two children. These children remain in unrelated foster care facilities and continue to receive AFDC-FC benefits. In 1973, the Youakims and the four foster children brought a class action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for themselves and persons similarly situated, challenging Illinois’ distinction between related and unrelated foster parents as violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge District Court certified the class, but granted summary judgment for the state officials on the constitutional claim. 374 F. Supp. 1204 (ND Ill. 1974). While the direct appeal from the summary judgment was pending in this Court, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) issued a formal interpretation of the scope of the federal AFDC-FC program, providing in pertinent part: “When a child has been removed from his home by judicial determination and is placed in foster care under the various conditions specified in Section 408 of the Social Security Act and 45 CFR 233.110, the foster care rate of payment prevails regardless of whether or not the foster home is operated by a relative.” HEW Program Instruction APA-PI-75-9 (Oct. 25, 1974). In light of this administrative interpretation, we vacated the judgment and directed the District Court to consider whether the Illinois foster care scheme is inconsistent with the Social Security Act and therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. Youakim v. Miller, 425 U. S. 231 (1976) (per curiam). On remand, the District Court granted summary judgment for appellees, holding that the State’s denial of AFDC-FC benefits and services to otherwise eligible foster children who live with relatives conflicts with §§401 and 408 of the Social Security Act. 431 F. Supp. 40, 45 (ND Ill. 1976). It found that under the “plain words” of § 408, dependent children adjudged to be wards of the State, removed from their homes, and placed in approved foster homes are entitled to AFDC-FC benefits, regardless of whether their foster parent is a relative. 431 F. Supp., at 44-45. In so ruling, the court relied on HEW’s interpretive ruling and on the national policy embodied in § 401 of the Act to “encourag[e] the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives.” 431 F. Supp., at 44. Since the State had approved the Youakim home as meeting the licensing standards for unrelated foster homes, the District Court concluded that the requirements of § 408 had been satisfied. 431 F. Supp., at 43-44. The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 562 F. 2d 483 (CA7 1977). It held that the statutory definition of “foster family home” in the last sentence of § 408 does not exclude relatives’ homes, and found no “implied legislative intent” to create such an exclusion. 562 F. 2d, at 487; see id., at 486 n. 4. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that any home approved as meeting the State’s licensing standards is a “foster family home” within the meaning of § 408. 562 F. 2d, at 486, 490. We noted probable jurisdiction, 434 U. S. 1060 (1978), and now affirm. II A participating State may not deny assistance to persons who meet eligibility standards defined in the Social Security Act unless Congress clearly has indicated that the standards are permissive. See, e. g., Burns v. Alcala, 420 U. S. 575, 580 (1975); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598 (1972) ; Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282, 286 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968). Congress has specified that programs, like AFDC-FC, which employ the term “dependent child” to define eligibility must be available for “all eligible individuals.” §402 (a) (10), 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (10) ; see Quern v. Mandley, 436 U. S. 725, 740-743, and n. 18 (1978). Section 408 (e) reinforces this general rule by requiring States to provide Foster Care benefits to “any” child who satisfies the federal eligibility criteria of § 408 (a). Thus, if foster care in related homes is encompassed within § 408, Illinois may not deny AFDC-FC benefits when it places an eligible child in the care of a relative. In arguing that related foster care does not fall within § 408’s definition of “foster family home,” appellants submit that Congress enacted the Foster Care program solely for the benefit of children not otherwise eligible for categorical assistance. We disagree. The purpose of the AFDC-FC program was not simply to duplicate the AFDC program for a different class of beneficiaries. As the language and legislative history of § 408 demonstrate, the Foster Care program was designed to meet the particular needs of all eligible neglected children, whether they are placed with related or unrelated foster parents. A Section 408 (a), in defining “dependent child,” establishes four conditions of AFDC-FC eligibility. First, the child must have been removed from the home of a parent or other relative specified in § 406 (a), the basic AFDC eligibility provision, “as a result of a judicial determination to the effect that continuation therein would be contrary to the welfare of such child.” § 408 (a) (1), 42 U. S. C. § 608 (a) (1). Second, the State must remain responsible for the placement and care of the child. § 408 (a) (2), 42 U. S. C. § 608 (a) (2). Third, the child must be placed in "a foster family home or child-care institution.” § 408 (a) (3), 42 U. S. C. § 608 (a) (3). Fourth, the child must have been eligible for categorical assistance under the State’s plan prior to initiation of the removal proceedings. § 408 (a)(4), 42 U. S. C. § 608 (a)(4). The dispute in this case centers on the meaning of “foster family home” as used in the third eligibility requirement, § 408 (a)(3) of the Act. The statute itself defines this phrase in sweeping language: “[T]he term ‘foster family home’ means a foster family home for children which is licensed by the State in which it is situated or has been approved, by the agency of such State responsible for licensing homes of this type, as meeting the standards established for such licensing.” § 408, 42 U. S. C. § 608 (last sentence). Congress manifestly did not limit the term to encompass only the homes of nonrelated caretakers. Rather, any home that a State approves as meeting its licensing standards falls within the ambit of this definitional provision. That Congress intended no distinction between related and unrelated foster homes is further demonstrated by the AFDC-FC definition of “aid to families with dependent children,” which includes foster care for eligible children who live “in the foster family home of any individual.” §408 (b)(1), 42 U. S. C. §608 (b)(1) (emphasis added). Far from excluding related caretakers, the statute uses the broadest possible language when it refers to the homes of foster parents. Appellants concede that these provisions do not explicitly bar from the Foster Care program children living with related foster parents. Juris. Statement 11; Brief for Appellants 22; Reply Brief for Appellants 5; 562 F. 2d, at 486, and n. 4. Nevertheless, they infer from two isolated passages of § 408 a congressional intent to except relatives’ homes from the definition of “foster family home.” Appellants first rely on the definition of dependent children in §§408 (a)(1) and (3). These provisions state in relevant part: “(a) the term ‘dependent child’ shall, notwithstanding section [406 (a) — the basic AFDC eligibility provision], also include a child (1) who would meet the requirements of such section [406 (a) ] except for his removal. . . from the home of a relative (specified in such section [406 (a)]) as a result of a judicial determination to the effect that continuation therein would be contrary to the welfare of such child . . . , [and] (3) who has been placed in a foster family home.” (Emphasis added.) Appellants construe the “notwithstanding” language of § 408 (a)(1) in conjunction with §408 (a) (3) as creating a class of AFDC-FC beneficiaries distinct from the dependent children covered under basic AFDC. In their view, “notwithstanding § 406 (a)” means that the Foster Care definition of “dependent child” both suspends the basic AFDC requirement that the child reside with a parent or close relative, and precludes a foster child who meets that requirement from participating in the AFDC-FC program. Under appellants’ construction, §§ 408 (a) (1) and (3) would read: For the purpose of Foster Care aid, a “dependent child” shall only include a child who would meet the requirements of § 406 (a) except that he has been both removed from the home of a parent or relative specified in § 406 (a) and placed in a nonrelative’s home. The difficulty with this strained interpretation is that § 408 (a)(1) does not use the word “only.” It states that a dependent child shall “also” include a child removed from the home of a parent or relative. Thus, there is no basis for construing language that unquestionably expands the scope of the term “dependent child” as implicitly contracting the definition to exclude a child who meets the eligibility criteria of § 406 (a). Because §408 (a)(1) does not have the preclusive meaning urged by appellants, it cannot implicitly modify the phrase “foster family home” in § 408 (a) (3) to denote solely unrelated homes. We think it clear that neither § 408 (a)(1) nor § 408 (a) (3) embodies a congressional intent to constrict the broad statutory definition of “foster family home.” Appellants next maintain that interpreting AFDC-FC to encompass foster care by relatives would render meaningless another provision of the program. Section 408 (f)(1) of the Act obligates States to ensure that “services are provided which are designed to improve the conditions in the home from which [the foster child] was removed or to otherwise make possible his being placed in the home of a relative specified in section [406 (a) ].” 42 U. S. C. § 608 (f)(1) (emphasis added). According to appellants, if related homes were “foster family homes,” it would be unnecessary to réquire States to- make the home of a relative suitable for placement when the foster child already lives in a relative’s home. By ignoring the critical word “or,” appellants misconstrue the import of this provision. To be sure, § 408 (f) expresses a preference for the return of children to their original home or their transfer to the care of a relative. Congress, however, expressed this preference in the alternative. When a child is placed in related foster care, the State obviously can satisfy §408 (f)(1) by working toward his ultimate return to the home from which he was removed, in this case the mother’s home. Thus, §408 (f)(1) is fully consonant with including in the AFDC-FC program foster children placed with relatives. Had Congress intended to exclude related foster parents from the definition of “foster family home,” it presumably would have done so explicitly, just as it restricted the definition of “child-care institution.” Instead, the statute plainly states that a foster family home is the home of any individual licensed or approved by the State as meeting its licensing requirements, and we are unpersuaded that the provisions on which appellants rely implicitly limit that expansive definition. B The legislative history and structure of the Act fortify our conclusion that the language of § 408 should be given its full scope. The Foster Care program was enacted in the aftermath of HEW's declaration that States could no longer discontinue basic AFDC assistance due to unsuitable home conditions “while the child continues to reside in the home.” State Letter No. 452, Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Jan. 17, 1961) (hereinafter Flemming Ruling). In directing States “either to improve the home conditions” or “make arrangements for the child elsewhere,” ibid., the Ruling prompted Congress to encourage state protection of neglected children. Accordingly, Congress designed a program carefully tailored to the needs of children whose “home environments . . . are clearly contrary to the [ir] best interests,” and it offered the States financial subsidies to implement the plan. Neither the legislative history nor the structure of the Act indicates that Congress intended to differentiate among neglected children based on their relationship to their foster parents. Indeed, such a distinction would conflict in several respects with the overriding goal of providing the best available care for all dependent children removed from their homes because they were neglected. See S. Rep. No. 165, p. 6; 107 Cong. Rec. 6388 (1961) (remarks of Sen. Byrd). Although a fundamental purpose of the Foster Care program was to facilitate removal of children from their homes, Congress also took steps to “safeguard” intact family units from unnecessary upheaval. See S. Rep. No. 165, p. 7; 107 Cong. Rec. 6388 (1961) (remarks of Sen. Byrd). To ensure that children would be removed only from homes demonstrably inimical to their welfare, Congress required participating States to obtain “a judicial determination . . . that continuation in the home was contrary to the welfare of the child.” S. Rep. No. 165, p. 7; see 108 Cong. Rec. 12693 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Eugene McCarthy); § 408 (a)(1). Protecting the integrity of established family units by mandating judicial approval of a State’s decision to remove a child obviously is a goal that embraces all neglected children, regardless of who the ultimate caretaker may be. Yet under appellants’ construction of § 408, the State would have no obligation to justify its removal of a dependent child if he were placed with relatives, since the child could not be eligible for Foster Care benefits. But the same child, placed in unrelated facilities, would be entitled under the Foster Care program to a judicial determination of neglect. The rights of allegedly abused children and their guardians would thus depend on the happenstance of where they are placed, which is normally determined after a court has found removal necessary. We are reluctant to attribute such an anomalous intent to Congress, particularly in the absence of any indication that it meant to protect from unnecessary removal only those dependent children placed with strangers. Congress was also concerned with assuring that States place neglected children in substitute homes determined appropriate for foster care. See S. Rep. No. 165, pp. 6-7. To deter indiscriminate foster placements, Congress required that States establish licensing standards for every foster home, § 408 (definition of “foster family home”), and supervise the placement of foster children. § 408 (a) (2); see 45 CFR §§ 220.19 (a), 233.110 (a)(2)(i) (1977). The legislative materials at no point suggest that Congress intended to subject some foster homes, but not others, to minimum standards of quality, as could result if § 408 excluded relatives’ homes from the definition of “foster family home.” Indeed, in authorizing an approval procedure as an alternative to actual licensing of “foster family homes,” Congress evinced its understanding that children placed in related foster homes are entitled to Foster Care benefits. At the time the AFDC-FC program was enacted in 1961, many States exempted relatives’ homes from the licensing requirements imposed on all other types of settings in which foster children could be placed. It is therefore likely that Congress, by including an approval procedure, meant to encompass foster homes not subject to State licensing requirements, in particular, related foster homes. The specific services offered by the AFDC-FC program further indicate that Congress did not intend to distinguish between related and unrelated foster caretakers. Congress attached considerable significance to the unique needs and special problems of abused children who are removed from their homes by court order, distinguishing them as a class from other dependent children: “The conditions which make it necessary to remove [neglected] children from unsuitable homes often result in needs for special psychiatric and medical care of the children. . . . “These are the most underprivileged children and often have special problems. . . .” 108 Cong. Fee. 12692-12693 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Eugene McCarthy). Section 408 embodies Congress’ recognition of the peculiar status of neglected children in requiring that States continually supervise the care of these children, §408 (a)(2), develop a plan tailored to the needs of each foster child “to assure that he receives proper care,” §408 (f)(1), and periodically review both the necessity of retaining the child in foster care and the appropriateness of the care being provided. See ibid.; 45 CFR §§ 220.19 (b), (c), 233.110 (a)(2) (ii) (1977). Additionally, the States must work to improve the conditions in the foster child’s original home or to transfer him to a relative when feasible, §408 (f)(1); see supra, at 137. This procedure comports with Congress’ preference for care of dependent children by relatives, a policy underlying the categorical assistance program since its inception in 1935. See S. Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 16-17 (1935); H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 10-12 (1935); Burns v. Alcala, 420 U. S., at 581-582; §401, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 601, supra, at 132-133. We do not believe that Congress, when it extended assistance to foster children, meant to depart from this fundamental principle. Congress envisioned a remedial environment to correct the enduring effects of past neglect and abuse. There is nothing to indicate that it intended to discriminate between potential beneficiaries, equally in need of the program, on the basis of their relationship to their foster parents. That Congress had no such intent is also evidenced by the 1967 amendments to the Act, which increased the federal matching payments for AFDC-FC to exceed the federal share of basic AFDC payments. The increase reflects Congress’ recognition that state-supervised care and programs designed to meet the special needs of neglected children cost more than basic AFDC care. The legislative history of the amendment reveals no basis for distinguishing between related and unrelated foster homes. Rather, it discloses a generalized concern for the plight of all dependent children who should be sheltered from their current home environments but are forced to remain in such homes because of the States’ inability to finance substitute care. S. Rep. No. 744, pp. 163-165; H. R. Rep. No. 544, pp. 100-101. Significantly, the Committee Reports suggest that increasing federal matching payments would encourage relatives “not legally responsible for support” to undertake the care of foster children “in order to obtain the best possible environment for the child.” S. Rep. No. 744, p. 164; H. R. Rep. No. 544, p. 101. The amendments are therefore described, without qualification, as providing “more favorable Federal matching ... for foster care for children removed from an unsuitable home by court order.” S. Rep. No. 744, p. 4; H. R. Rep. No. 544, p. 4. C Our interpretation of the statute and its legislative history is buttressed by HEW Program Instruction APA-PI-75-9, which requires States to provide AFDC-FC benefits “regardless of whether the . . . foster family home in which a child is placed is operated by a relative.” In reaching this conclusion, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare reasoned: “A non-legally liable relative has no financial responsibility towards the child placed with him and the income and resources of such a relative are not factors in determining entitlement to a foster care payment. It must be noted, too, that the 1967 amendments to the Social Security Act liberalized Federal financial participation in the cost of foster care, recognizing foster family care is more costly than care in the child’s own home.” HEW Program Instruction APA-PI-75-9. We noted in vacating the original three-judge District Court decision in this case that “[t]he interpretation of a statute by an agency charged with its enforcement is a substantial factor to be considered in construing the statute.” Youakim v. Miller, 425 U. S., at 235-236, citing New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U. S. 405, 421 (1973) ; Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94, 121 (1973); Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617, 626-627 (1971). Administrative interpretations are especially persuasive where, as here, the agency participated in developing the provision. Adams v. United States, 319 U. S. 312, 314-315 (1943); United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 549 (1940). HEW’s Program Instruction is fully supported by the statute, its legislative history, and the common-sense observation that all dependent foster children are similarly in need of the protections and monetary benefits afforded by the AFDC-FC program. III We think it clear that Congress designed the AFDC-FC program to include foster children placed with relatives. The overriding purpose of § 408 was to assure that the most appropriate substitute care be given to those dependent children so mistreated that a court has ordered them removed from their homes. The need for additional AFDC-FC resources — both monetary and service related — to provide a proper remedial environment for such foster children arises from the status of the child as a subject of prior neglect, not from the status of the foster parent. Appellants attribute to Congress an intent to differentiate among children who are equally neglected and abused, based on a living arrangement bearing no relationship to the special needs that the AFDC-FC program was created to meet. Absent clear support in the statutory language or legislative history, we decline to make such an unreasonable attribution. Accordingly, we hold that the AFDC-FC program encompasses foster children who, pursuant to a judicial determination of neglect, have been placed in related homes that meet a State’s licensing requirements for foster homes. The judgment below is Affirmed. MR. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Section 408 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 608, sets forth the provisions governing the Foster Care program: “Payment to States for foster home care of dependent children; definitions “Effective for the period beginning May 1, 1961— “(a) the term ‘dependent child’ shall, notwithstanding section 606 (a) of this title, also include a child (1) who would meet the requirements of such section 606 (a) or of section 607 of this title except for his removal after April 30, 1961, from the home of a relative (specified in such section 606 (a)) as a result of a judicial determination to the effect that continuation therein would be contrary to the welfare of such child, (2) whose placement and care are the responsibility of (A) the State or local agency administering the State plan approved under section 602 of this title . . . , (3) who has been placed in a foster family home or childcare institution as a result of such determination, and (4) who (A) received aid under such State plan in or for the month in which court proceedings leading to such determination were initiated, or (B) (i) would have received such aid in or for such month if application had been made therefor, or (ii) in the case of a child who had been living with a relative specified in section 606 (a) of this title within 6 months prior to the month in which such proceedings were initiated, would have received such aid in or for such month if in such month he had been living with (and removed from the home of) such a relative and application had been made therefor; “(b) the term ‘aid to families with dependent children’ shall, notwithstanding section 606 (b) of this title, include also foster care in behalf of a child described in paragraph (a) of this section— “(1) in the foster family home of any individual, whether the payment therefor is made to such individual or to a public or nonprofit private child-placement or child-care agency, or “(2) in a child-care institution, whether the payment therefor is made to such institution or to a public or nonprofit private child-placement or child-care agency .... “(c) the number of individuals counted under clause (A) of section 603 (a) (1) of this title for any month shall include individuals . . . with respect to whom expenditures were made in such month .... “but only with respect to a State whose State plan approved under section 602 of this title— “(e) includes aid for any child described in paragraph (a) of this section, and “(f) includes provision for (1) development of a plan for each such child (including periodic review of the necessity for the child’s being in a foster family home or child-care institution) to assure that he receives proper care and that services are provided which are designed to improve the conditions in the home from which he was removed or to otherwise make possible his being placed in the home of a relative specified in section 606 (a) of this title .... “For purposes of this section, the term ‘foster family home’ means a foster family home for children which is licensed by the State in which it is situated or has been approved, by the agency of such State responsible for licensing homes of this type, as meeting the standards established for such licensing; and the term ‘child-care institution’ means a nonprofit private child-care institution which is licensed by the State in which it is situated or has been approved, by the agency of such State responsible for licensing or approval of institutions of this type, as meeting the standards established for such licensing.” The eligibility requirements of the AFDC-FC program are contained in the statutory definition of “dependent child,” § 408 (a). See n. 1, supra. The eligibility criteria for the basic AFDC program are set forth in its statutory definition of “dependent child,” § 406 (a) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a): “When used in this part— “(a) The term 'dependent' child’ means a needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father,, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) under the age of twenty-one and (as determined by the State in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) a student regularly attending a school, college, or university, or regularly attending a course of vocational or technical training designed to fit him for gainful employment.” Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 23, §2212.17 (Supp. 1978). See infra, at 130-131. Illinois, like most other States, has consistently authorized substantially greater AFDC-FC payments than basic AFDC benefits. See 25 Soc. Sec. Bull., No. 2, Tables 10, 14, pp. 28, 30 (Feb. 1962); U. S. Dept. of HEW, Public Assistance Statistics: April 1977, Tables A, B, 4, 6, 7 (Sept. 1977) : infra, at 130, 131. See Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, § 705-7 (1) (f) (1975); Ill. Ann. Stat, ch. 23, § 5005 (Supp. 1978), as amended, Pub. Act 80-1124, 1977 Ill. Laws 3367; Pub. Act 80-1364, Ill. Legis. Serv. 713 (West 1978). See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 23, § 10-2 (Supp. 1978). Ch. 23, §§ 4-1.2 and 2217 (Supp. 1978); Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, Child Welfare Manual 2.8.2 (1976) (hereinafter DCFS Welfare Manual). The DCFS Welfare Manual recently has been revised to conform to the decisions below. The Agency documented its approval in two “Relative Home Placement Agreements” which were identical, both in form and in obligations imposed, to those used for unrelated foster care placements, except that the term “foster” was sometimes crossed out, two references were made to the familial relationship among appellees, and the usual promise of AFDC-FC benefits was deleted. See 431 F. Supp. 40, 43-44, and nn. 4, 5 (ND Ill. 1976); App. 20-23. Similarly, the phrase “facility for child care/’ which is used to define “foster family home,” includes “any person, group of persons, agency, association or organization, whether established for gain or otherwise, who or which receives or arranges for care or placement of one or more children, unrelated to the operator of the facility . . . .” Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 23, § 2212.05 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added). See §§2213-2215; DCFS Welfare Manual 2.8.2. See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 23, § 5005 (Supp. 1978). As an exception to this benefit differential, the State has authorized special supplemental payments, upon an adequate showing of need by related foster parents, to bring basic AFDC related foster care assistance up to $105 per month. Brief for Appellants 5; 374 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (ND Ill. 1974). Since September 1, 1974, the Youakims have received these need-based payments for their foster children. This Court previously held that receipt of the supplemental benefits does not render the case moot. Youakim v. Miller, 425 U. S. 231, 236 n. 2 (1976) (per curiam). The District Court had pendent jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3) to consider this statutory issue. See Youakim v. Miller, supra, at 236; Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528 (1974). It appears that every other court to consider the issue has also concluded that dependent children who have been removed from their homes by judicial order and placed by a State in relatives’ homes are entitled to AFDC-FC benefits. See Jones v. Davis, Civ. No. 76-805 (Ore., Apr. 8, 1977), appeal docketed, CA9, No. 77-2254; Alston v. Department of Health and Social Services, [1974-1976 Transfer Binder] CCH Poverty L. Rep. ¶ 22,336 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Jan. 21, 1976); Thompson v. Department of Health and Social Services, [1974M976 Transfer Binder] CCH Poverty L. Rep. ¶ 22,303 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Jan. 9, 1976); Taylor v. Dumpson, 79 Misc. 2d 379, 362 N. Y. S. 2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1974), vacated as moot, 37 N. Y. 2d 765, 337 N. E. 2d 600 (1975); Clampett v. Madigan, [1972-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Poverty L. Rep. ¶ 17,979 (SD, May 24, 1973); Jackson v. Ohio Dept. of Public Welfare, Civ. No. C72-182 (ND Ohio, Apr. 17, 1972); Sockwell v. Maloney, 431 F. Supp. 1006, 1008, and n. 3 (Conn. 1976) (dicta), aff’d, 554 F. 2d 1236 (CA2 1977) (per curiam). In contrast to the broad definition of “foster family home/’ the term “child-care institution” is explicitly qualified to exempt private institutions operated for profit and public institutions. § 408, 42 U. S. C. § 608 (last sentence). See S. Rep. No. 165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 6-7 (1961) (hereinafter S. Rep. No. 165); S. Rep. No. 1589, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 12-13 (1962) ; Hearings on the Public Assistance Act of 1962 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 65 (1962) (memorandum from HEW Secretary Ribicoff to Sen. Byrd); Hearings on the Public Welfare Amendments of 1962 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 294-297, 305-307 (1962). S. Rep. No. 165, pp. 6-7. This precaution reflected Congress’ awareness of the events that had culminated in the Flemming Ruling. In the years preceding the Ruling, there was considerable concern that States were using suitability rules intrusively to impose various moral and social standards on parents of dependent children. See King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 321-327 (1968). For example, by threatening to discontinue basic AFDC aid or to initiate neglect proceedings, States had coerced many welfare mothers into “voluntarily” placing their children with relatives, although a court might not have ordered removal had formal proceedings been initiated. See ibid.; W. Bell, Aid to Dependent Children 124-136 (1965). § 408, 42 U. S. C. § 608 (last sentence). Colo. Rev. Stat. §§22-12-2, 22-12-3 (1953); Fla. Stat. §409.05 (1961); Idaho Code §§39-1201, 39-1202 (1961); IE. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, §§ 2304, 2310, 2314 (1961); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 2372, 237.3, 237.8 (1949) ; Md. Ann. Code, Art. 88A, §§20, 21 (1957); Mo. Ann. Stat. §210.211 (1952 and Supp. 1961); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 10-520, 10-521 (1957); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 170:1-170:3 (1964); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 11, §§ 801, 802 (Purdon 1939 and Supp. 1964); R. I. Gen. Laws §§ 40-14r-2, 40-14-11 (1956); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 33, §§ 501, 502 (1959); Wis. Stat. §48.62 (1957). Despite the broad language of §408 and the clear legislative goals behind the AFDC-FC program, appellants maintain that as a policy matter, relatives’ homes should not constitute “foster family homes.” They contend that permitting AFDC-FC assistance for foster children who live with relatives would create a “financial incentive” for relatives to refrain from caring for needy children until the children are removed from their homes by court order. Brief for Appellants 26. Even if this were true, “issue [s] of legislative policy . . . [are] better addressed to the wisdom of Congress than to the judgment of this Court.” Marquette Nat. Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U. S. 299, 319 (1978). Furthermore, we view the inclusion of related foster homes in § 408 as fully consistent with Congress' determination that homes of parents and relatives provide the most suitable environment for children. Congress evidently believed that encouraging relatives to care for these “most underprivileged children,” 108 Cong. Rec. 12693 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Eugene McCarthy), whatever the cost, was worth the price. Indeed, if the State’s interpretation of the statute were correct, relatives would have an incentive to refuse to accept foster children altogether. Concerned relatives might subordinate their interests in supervising the well-being of youngsters they love to ensure that these children receive the greater cash benefits and services available only to foster children placed in unrelated homes. Similarly, the availability of significantly more financial assistance under AFDC-FC might motivate child-placement authorities to refrain from placing foster children with relatives even when these homes are best suited to the needs of the child. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. 90-248, §205 (b), 81 Stat. 892, § 403 (a) (1) (B) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 603 (a) (1) (B); see S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 286 (1967) (hereinafter S. Rep. No. 744). These amendments also require all States that participate in the basic AFDC program to establish a Foster Care program. 81 Stat. 892, adding § 402 (a) (20) of the Act, 42 U. S. C. §602 (a) (20). See S. Rep. No. 744, pp. 163-164; H. R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 100-101 (1967) (hereinafter H. R. Rep. No. 544). Nor does the Illinois system indicate why such a distinction should be made. Since a related foster parent is subject to the same state-imposed responsibilities as a nonrelated foster parent, their costs must be equivalent. Relying on General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 142-143 (1976), appellants maintain that the Program Instruction conflicts with an earlier HEW pronouncement and therefore deserves little weight. They refer to an inconsistent interpretation of § 408 sent to Illinois authorities in 1971 by a regional HEW official, which stated that foster children placed in related homes are not eligible for Poster Care benefits under the federal program. However, this correspondence was not approved by HEW’s General Counsel or by any departmental official in the national office. See letter from HEW’s Assistant General Counsel to Illinois Special Assistant Attorney General Richard Ryan (Dec. 22, 1976), App. to Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae la. Since the letter did not reflect an official position, we take the Program Instruction to be the agency’s first and only national interpretation concerning § 408’s coverage of foster care by relatives. Appellants’ reliance on General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, supra, is therefore misplaced, and we are bound by the “principle that the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong.” Bed Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 381 (1969) (footnote omitted); see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U. S. 234, 251 (1978); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 11-12 (1965); Udall v. Tollman, 380 U. S. 1, 16-18 (1965). Illinois recognizes as much by providing special grants to some foster children placed with relatives which are not available to other basic AFDC recipients. See n. 12, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASSN., INC. v. UNITED STATES et al. No. 72-948. Argued December 3, 1973 Decided March 4, 1974 Douglas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and Stewart, White, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, •post, p. 352. Blackmun and Powell, JJ., took no part in the decision of the case. Stuart F. Feldstein argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Stephen A. Gold. Edward R. Korman argued the cause for the United States et al. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Kauper, John W. Pettit, and Joseph A. Marino. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Harold J. Cohen, F. Mark Garlinghouse, and Lloyd D. Young for the American Telephone & Telegraph Co., and by John B. Summers for the National Association of Broadcasters. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. The Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 1952, Tit. 5, 65 Stat. 290, 31 U. S. C. § 483a, provides in relevant part: “It is the sense of the Congress that any work, service .. . benefit, . . . license, ... or similar thing of value or utility performed, furnished, provided, granted ... by any Federal agency ... to or for any person (including . . . corporations ...)... shall be self-sustaining to the full extent possible, and the head of each Federal agency is authorized by regulation ... to prescribe therefor . . . such fee, charge, or price, if any, as he shall determine ... to be fair and equitable taking into consideration direct and indirect cost to the Government, value to the recipient, public policy or interest served, and other pertinent facts . ...” Petitioner is a trade association representing community antenna television (CATV) systems which transmit TV programs by cable. The Federal Communications Commission is authorized to regulate these CATV outlets, as the Court held in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U. S. 157. The power to regulate, though not in the form of granting licenses, extends to the promulgation of regulations requiring the compulsory origination of programs by CATV. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U. S. 649. These CATV’s, however, are not under the exclusive oversight of the Commission. Local governments and even some States provide permits or franchises to CATV’s, including rights of way for the cables used. Some communities in return for their permits require the CATV to pay an annual percentage fee as a gross receipts tax. The Commission in 1964 established only nominal filing fees that produced revenues which approximated 25% of the Commission’s annual appropriation. See 21 F. C. C. 2d 502, 503. See also Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. United States, 335 F. 2d 304. The Bureau of the Budget urged higher fee schedules; and so did the committees of the Congress. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-316, pp. 7-8, and H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-649, p. 6, where it was stated: “The committee of conference is agreed that the fee structure for the Commission should be adjusted to fully support all its activities so the taxpayers will not be required to bear any part of the load in view of the profits regulated by this agency.” The Commission, after notice and hearing, revised existing fees for licensees and for the first time imposed fees upon CATV's. It first estimated its direct and indirect costs for CATV regulation which were $1,145,400 or 4.6% of its total budget request for that year. Filing fees were retained; and there was added an annual fee for each cable television system at the rate of 30 cents for each subscriber. The Commission, finding that subscription rates clustered at about $5 a month, concluded that the 30-cent fee would typically amount to only about one-half of 1% of a CATV system’s gross revenues from subscription. The fees would produce, it said, $1,145,000 annually, and it concluded that the 30-cent fee would approximate the “value to the recipient” used in the Act, 23 F. C. C. 2d 880; 28 F. C. C. 2d 139. Petitioner obtained review of the decision in the Court of Appeals, which approved the Commission’s action, 464 F. 2d 1313. The case is here on a petition for certiorari which we granted, 411 U. S. 981, because of an apparent conflict between the decision in this case and the decision in New England Power Co. v. FPC, 151 U. S. App. D. C. 371, 467 F. 2d 425, of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Taxation is a legislative function, and Congress, which is the sole organ for levying taxes, may act arbitrarily and disregard benefits bestowed by the Government on a taxpayer and go solely on ability to pay, based on property or income. A fee, however, is incident to a voluntary act, e. g., a request that a public agency permit an applicant to practice law or medicine or construct a house or run a broadcast station. The public agency performing those services normally may exact a fee for a grant which, presumably, bestows a benefit on the applicant, not shared by other members of society. It would be such a sharp break with our traditions to conclude that Congress had bestowed on a federal agency the taxing power that we read 31 U. S. C. § 483a narrowly as authorizing not a “tax” but a “fee.” A “fee” connotes a “benefit” and the Act by its use of the standard “value to the recipient” carries that connotation. The addition of “public policy or interest served, and other pertinent facts,” ij read literally, carries an agency far from its customary orbit and puts it in search of revenue in the manner of an Appropriations Committee of the House. The lawmaker may, in light of the “public policy or interest served,” make the assessment heavy if the lawmaker wants to discourage the activity; or it may make the levy slight if a bounty is to be bestowed; or the lawmaker may make a substantial levy to keep entrepreneurs from exploiting a semipublic cause for their own personal aggrandizement. Such assessments are in the nature of “taxes” which under our constitutional regime are traditionally levied by Congress. There is no doubt that the main function of the Commission is to safeguard the public interest in the broadcasting activities of members of the industry. If assessments are made by the Commission against members of the industry which are sufficient to recoup costs to the Commission for its oversight, the CATV's and other broadcasters would be paying not only for benefits they received but for the protective services rendered the public by the Commission. The fixing of such assessments, it is argued, is the levying of taxes. The Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said in Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 529: “The Constitution provides that 'All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives/ Art. I, § 1. And the Congress is authorized 'To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution' its general powers. Art. I, § 8, par. 18. The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.” Congress, of course, does delegate powers to agencies, setting standards to guide their determination. Thus, in Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, Congress enacted a flexible tariff law which authorized the imposition of customs duties on articles imported which equaled the difference between the cost of producing them in a foreign country and of selling them here and the cost of producing and selling like or similar articles in the United States. Provision was made for the investigation and determination of these differences by the Tariff Commission which reported to the President who increased or decreased the duty accordingly. The Court in sustaining that system said: “If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” Id., at 409. Whether the present Act meets the requirement of Schechter and Hampton is a question we do not reach. But the hurdles revealed in those decisions lead us to read the Act narrowly to avoid constitutional problems. The phrase “value to the recipient” is, we believe, the measure of the authorized fee. The words “public policy or interest served, and other pertinent facts” would not seem relevant to the present case, whatever may be their ultimate reach. The backbone of CATV is individual enterprise and ingenuity, not governmental largesse. The regulatory regime placed by Congress and the courts over CATV was not designed to make entrepreneurs rich but to serve the public interest by “mak[ing] available ... to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communications service.” 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 151. While those who operate CATV's may receive special benefits, we cannot be sure that the Commission used the correct standard in setting the fee. It is not enough to figure the total cost (direct and indirect) to the Commission for operating a CATV unit of supervision and then to contrive a formula that reimburses the Commission for that amount. Certainly some of the costs inured to the benefit of the public, unless the entire regulatory scheme is a failure, which we refuse to assume. The philosophy of § 483a was stated by Congressman Sidney Yates of the House Committee on Appropriations. While he spoke of TV and radio broadcasters, what he said is germane to the CATV problem: “I think it is only fair that in exchange for the franchise that the Government gives the broadcasting company and the protection which the Government affords to such broadcasting company to assure its freedom from interference in the operation of its broadcasting facilities in the particular point of the spectrum which it occupies, ... it should pay some of the costs of the hearings. It is perfectly proper that the franchised company make a profit, and there has been much profit making. Such companies should assume a greater share of the costs, because regulation is necesary.” 97 Cong. Rec. 4809. That congressional aim can be achieved within the framework of “value to the recipient” as contrasted to the public policy or interest that is also served. The result is that we reverse the Court of Appeals so that the case can be remanded to the Federal Communications Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the decision of this case. [For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall, see post, p. 352.] The Committee Report, H. R. Rep. No. 384, 82d Cong, 1st Sess., 2-3, makes the following comment on this measure: “The Committee is concerned that the Government is not receiving full return from many of the services which it renders to special beneficiaries. Many fees for such services are specifically fixed by law, and in some cases, it is specifically provided that no fees shall be charged. In other cases, however, no fees are charged even though the charging of fees is not prohibited; and in still others, fees are charged upon the basis of formulae prescribed in law, but the application of the formulae needs to be re-examined to bring the actual charges into line with present-day costs and other related considerations. “It is understood that other committees of the Congress have interested themselves in this matter and that studies now are under way which may result in further legislation to require that adequate consideration be received for such services. However, such studies are necessarily time-consuming and the required legislation may not be enacted for a considerable period. Accordingly, the Committee has inserted language in the bill (Title V, page 60) which would authorize and encourage the charging or increasing of fees to the extent permitted under present basic laws, but which would in no way conflict with studies now under way to effect changes in such basic laws. “It is estimated that in 1952 the Government will receive more than $300,000,000 in fees from sources of the type here under consideration. It seems entirely possible that many of these fees could be raised, and that fees could be charged for other services of similar types in cases where no charge is now made, to the extent that the Government might realize upwards of $50,000,000 additional revenue. “The bill would provide authority for Government agencies to make charges for these services in cases where no charge is made at present, and to revise charges where present charges are too low, except in cases where the charge is specifically fixed by law or the law specifically provides that no charge shall be made. It is not the Committee’s intention in including this provision to disturb existing practices with respect to charges for postal services, sales of power, or the interest on loans by the Government.” The most recent CATV rules adopted by the Commission (37 Fed. Reg. 3280) require a CATV to receive a certificate of compliance from the Commission, 47 CFR §76.11 (b), and require it to obtain from the appropriate local government authority a certificate containing prescribed recitations and provisions. 47 CFR § 76.31. The new rules also limit the franchise fees that may be imposed on CATV’s by the localities where they operate. 47 CFR § 76.31. Included in the new rules are restrictions on telephone companies on whose poles the CATV cable is usually strung. See 47 CFR §§ 63.54-63.57, 64.601-64.602. And see General Telephone Co. v. United States, 449 F. 2d 846, 851; Report of Jan. 14, 1974, Cabinet Committee on Cable Communications (known as the Whitehead Report). By Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, of the Constitution it is the Congress that has the “Power to lay and collect Taxes.” Mr. Chief Justice Marshall is credited with the statement that “the power to tax is the power to destroy,” to which Mr. Justice Holmes replied, “The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.” Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 223 (dissenting opinion).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LINDAHL v. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT No. 83-5954. Argued December 3, 1984 Decided March 20, 1985 Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 800. John Murcko, by appointment of the Court, 469 U. S. 811, argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Getter, David M. Cohen, William G. Ranter, and Robert A. Reutershan Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Burt Neubome; for the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, by Stuart A. Kirsch and Mark D. Roth; and for the National Association of Retired Federal Employees by Irving Kator, Joseph B. Scott, James H. Heller, and Michael J. Kator. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for Willard Bronger et al. by Max G. Brittain, Jr.; and for Margaret Cheeseman et al. by Edith U. Fierst. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) “determine[s] questions of disability and dependency” in administering the Federal Government’s provision of annuities to retired employees and their dependents. 5 U. S. C. § 8347(c). Subject to administrative review by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), § 8347(d)(1), OPM’s “decisions . . . concerning these matters are final and conclusive and are not subject to review,” § 8347(c). This case presents two questions of substantial importance to the administration of the Government’s retirement annuity program. The first is whether § 8347(c) bars judicial review altogether of an MSPB judgment affirming the denial by OPM of a disability retirement claim, or bars review only of factual determinations while permitting review for alleged errors of law and procedure. If judicial review is available to the latter, limited extent, a second question arises: whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction directly to review MSPB decisions in such cases, or whether an applicant whose appeal is rejected by the MSPB must instead file a Tucker Act claim in the United States Claims Court or a United States district court, from which an appeal could then be taken to the Federal Circuit. i — i b> These questions implicate a host of overlapping statutory schemes, which we review before turning to the case at hand. The Civil Service Retirement Act (Retirement Act). Government employees who are covered by the Retirement Act are required to contribute a portion of their salaries to the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund. 5 U. S. C. §§ 8334(a), (b). The amount of retirement annuity is based on the employee’s average pay and years of federal service. § 8339. The Retirement Act provides for several types of annuities; at issue here are disability retirement annuities. Pursuant to § 8337, a covered employee who has completed at least five years of federal civilian service is eligible for an immediate annuity if found “disabled,” whether he is retired on his own application (“voluntary” retirement) or on the application of his employing agency (“involuntary” retirement). § 8337(a). Although the Retirement Act at no time has contained a general judicial review provision, this Court concluded almost 50 years ago that a retired employee may secure judicial review of an agency denial of his annuity claim by invoking the district courts’ Tucker Act jurisdiction to entertain monetary claims against the United States. Dismuke v. United States, 297 U. S. 167 (1936). The Court reasoned: “[I]n the absence of compelling language, resort to the courts to assert a right which the statute creates will be deemed to be curtailed only so far as authority to decide is given to the administrative officer. ... If he is authorized to determine questions of fact his decision must be accepted unless he exceeds his authority by making a determination which is arbitrary or capricious or unsupported by evidence ... , or by failing to follow a procedure which satisfies elementary standards of fairness and reasonableness essential to the due conduct of the proceeding which Congress has authorized . . . Id., at 172. The civil service laws later were amended to incorporate a finality provision limiting judicial review of dependency and disability determinations. See ch. 84, § 12(d) (3), 62 Stat. 56. As originally enacted, the finality provision provided: “Questions of dependency and disability arising under this section shall be determined by the Civil Service Commission and its decisions with respect to such matters shall be final and conclusive and shall not be subject to review. The Commission may order or direct at any time such medical or other examinations as it shall deem necessary to determine the facts relative to the nature and degree of disability . . . .” Ibid, (emphasis added). This provision has undergone several revisions since 1948; as now codified at 5 U. S. C. § 8347(c), the relevant language provides that determinations “concerning these matters are final and conclusive and are not subject to review.” The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA). This legislation comprehensively overhauled the civil service system. Several of the CSRA’s provisions bear on this case. First, Congress abolished the Civil Service Commission and created the OPM, which is now responsible for administering the Retirement Act. CSRA §§201, 906, 92 Stat. 1118, 1224; see 5 U. S. C. § 8347(a). Second, Congress created the MSPB, and directed that one of the Board’s duties would be to review OPM’s decisions in Retirement Act cases “under procedures prescribed by the Board.” CSRA § 906, 92 Stat. 1225; see 5 U. S. C. § 8347(d)(1). Third, Congress created a new framework for evaluating adverse personnel actions against “employees” and “applicants for employment”: it established exacting standards for review of such actions by the MSPB, provided that “employees” and “applicants for employment” could obtain judicial review of MSPB decisions, and specified the standards for judicial review of such actions. CSRA §205, 92 Stat. 1138, 5 U. S. C. §§ 7701, 7703 (1976 ed., Supp. V). Finally, Congress provided generally that jurisdiction over “a final order or final decision of the Board” would be in the Court of Claims, pursuant to the Tucker Act, or in the regional courts of appeals, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2342. See CSRA §205, 92 Stat. 1143, 5 U. S. C. §7703(b)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. V). Public Law 96-500 (“the 1980 amendment”). Congress revisited the finality language of 5 U. S. C. §8347 in 1980, and enacted legislation providing that one subclass of Retirement Act applicants would enjoy the enhanced administrative and judicial review provisions of the recently enacted CSRA: “In the case of any individual found by [OPM] to be disabled in whole or in part on the basis of the individual’s mental condition, and that finding was made pursuant to an application by an agency for purposes of disability retirement under section 8337(a) of this title, the [MSPB review] procedures under section 7701 of this title shall apply and the decision of the Board shall be subject to judicial review under section 7703 of this title.” Pub. L. 96-500, 94 Stat. 2696, as codified in 5 U. S. C. § 8347(d)(2). The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA). In the FCIA, Congress combined the appellate portions of the Court of Claims’ Tucker Act jurisdiction with certain elements of the regional courts of appeals’ jurisdiction, and vested jurisdiction over these matters in a new United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. FCIA § 127, 96 Stat. 37, 28 U. S. C. § 1295. Whereas the Court of Claims and the regional courts of appeals formerly shared jurisdiction over appeals from the MSPB, the Federal Circuit now has exclusive jurisdiction “of an appeal from a final order or final decision” of the Board pursuant to, inter alia, 5 U. S. C. § 7703(b)(1). 28 U. S. C. § 1295(a)(9); see FCIA §144, 96 Stat. 45. B Until his retirement, the petitioner Wayne Lindahl served as a civilian security guard at the Mare Island Naval Shipyard in Vallejo, Cal. Lindahl suffers from acute and chronic bronchitis, allegedly aggravated in part by his exposure over the years to chemical irritants at Mare Island. In September 1979, the Department of the Navy informed Lindahl that he would be retired “because your physical condition has disabled you to such an extent that you are unable to perform the full range of duties required of your position as a Police Officer.” App. 10. Lindahl agreed with the Navy’s assessment and chose not to contest his separation. Both before and after his retirement, Lindahl took steps to apply for a disability retirement annuity. OPM denied Lindahl’s claim several months after he had been retired on the ground that the evidence “fails to establish that you have a disability severe enough to prevent useful, efficient, and safe performance of the essential duties of the position from which you are seeking retirement.” Id., at 21. Pursuant to 5 U. S. C. § 8347(d), Lindahl appealed this decision to the MSPB. The Board sustained OPM’s denial, finding that Lindahl had not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that he was disabled within the meaning of the Retirement Act. App. 40. Lindahl then filed a complaint in the Court of Claims, invoking that court’s jurisdiction under 5 U. S. C. §7703 and the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491. App. 42-44. He charged that the MSPB had violated the CSRA and MSPB regulations by placing the burden of proving disability on him rather than requiring the agency to disprove disability. ¶ 14, App. 43. He also alleged that the Navy had dismissed him while he was attempting to obtain disability retirement benefits, in violation of regulations requiring an agency that initiates a disability retirement action to retain the employee pending OPM’s resolution of the employee’s disability status. ¶ 16, App. 44. After Congress enacted the FCIA in 1982, Lindahl’s case was transferred to the Federal Circuit. The OPM moved to dismiss, arguing in the alternative (1) that judicial review of legal and procedural questions, as well as of factual determinations, is altogether barred in Retirement Act cases by 5 U. S. C. § 8347(c); and (2) that the jurisdictional provisions of §7703 are limited to “employees,” that retired employees are no longer “employees,” and that the Federal Circuit therefore lacks direct jurisdiction of appeals from MSPB decisions in Retirement Act cases. The MSPB intervened as an amicus curiae in support of Lindahl’s re-viewability and jurisdictional contentions. The Federal Circuit sitting en banc dismissed Lindahl’s appeal as barred by § 8347(c). 718 F. 2d 391 (1983). The court concluded that the plain words of the subsection, along with the structure of the civil service laws and the import of the 1980 amendment, overcome the usual presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action. The court acknowledged that courts for almost 30 years had interpreted § 8347(c) to permit judicial review of alleged legal and procedural errors, but concluded that “those cases . . . would have to be viewed as wrongly decided and overruled.” Id., at 396. The court also rejected Lindahl’s argument that the legislative history of the 1980 amendment indicated Congress’ intention to preserve limited judicial review in Retirement Act cases. Two judges filed qualified concurring opinions. Id., at 400 (Nichols, J.), 405 (Nies, J.). Four others dissented, arguing, inter alia, that the legislative history of the 1980 amendment demonstrates Congress’ awareness of the previous judicial construction of § 8347(c) and its intention to preserve judicial review to the extent previously recognized. Id., at 405 (Davis, J., joined by Friedman, Kashiwa, and Smith, JJ.), 407 (Smith, J., joined by Friedman, Davis, and Kashiwa, JJ.). We granted certiorari. 467 U. S. 1251 (1984). We reverse. II We have often noted that “only upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 141 (1967). See also Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U. S. 560, 568 (1975). The Court previously has applied just such a presumption in Retirement Act cases, albeit prior to the enactment of § 8347(c). See Dismuke v. United States, 297 U. S., at 172 (judicial review presumed available “in the absence of compelling [statutory] language” to the contrary). Of course, the “clear and convincing evidence” standard has never turned on a talismanic test. Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 346-346 (1984). Rather, the question whether a statute precludes judicial review “is determined not only from its express language, but also from the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of the administrative action involved.” Id., at 345. The Federal Circuit reasoned that § 8347(c), except as qualified by § 8347(d)(2), plainly precludes any judicial review of OPM decisions in voluntary disability retirement cases: “[i]t is difficult to conceive of a more clear-cut statement of congressional intent to preclude review than one in which the concept of finality is thrice repeated in a single sentence.” 718 F. 2d, at 393. We do not share the Federal Circuit’s certainty with respect to the plain import of the statutory language. To begin with, while § 8347(c) plausibly can be read as imposing an absolute bar to judicial review, it also quite naturally can be read as precluding review only of OPM’s factual determinations about “questions of disability and dependency.” Under this reading of §8347(c)’s language, the factual “question” whether an applicant is disabled is quite distinct from questions of what laws and procedures the OPM must apply in administering the Retirement Act. In addition, the application of § 8347(c) as completely pre-clusive is problematic when a disability applicant, as here, challenges not only OPM’s determinations but also the standards and procedures used by the MSPB in reviewing those determinations. Section 8347(c) speaks of the preclusive effect of OPM determinations, but says nothing one way or the other about the finality of MSPB judgments. Finally, our hesitation regarding the “plain meaning” of § 8347(c) is compounded by the fact that, when Congress intends to bar judicial review altogether, it typically employs language far more unambiguous and comprehensive than that set forth in §8347. Congress’ failure to use similar language in § 8347(c) therefore reinforces the possibility that the finality bar may extend only to OPM’s factual determinations “with respect to” disability and dependency questions. Until Congress’ 1980 amendment of §8347, this was precisely the interpretation adopted by courts in reviewing disability retirement decisions by the OPM and its predecessor, the Civil Service Commission. Under the “Scroggins” standard, so-called after Scroggins v. United States, 184 Ct. Cl. 530, 397 F. 2d 295, cert. denied, 393 U. S. 952 (1968), courts acknowledged that § 8347(c) imposes “a special and unusual restriction on judicial examination, and under it courts are not as free to review Commission retirement decisions as they would be if the finality’ clause were not there.” 184 Ct. Cl., at 533-534, 397 F. 2d, at 297. Accordingly, courts emphasized that they could not weigh the evidence or even apply the traditional substantial-evidence standard for reviewing disability determinations. Id., at 534, 397 F. 2d, at 297. Courts also held, however, that § 8347(c)’s finality language did not prevent them from reviewing Commission decisions to determine whether there had been '“a substantial departure from important procedural rights, a misconstruction of the governing legislation, or some like error “going to the heart of the administrative determination.”’” Ibid. The Federal Circuit nevertheless believed that Congress’ revision of § 8347 in 1980 “provide[s] compelling evidence of its intent to preclude judicial review of MSPB decisions on voluntary disability retirement claims.” 718 F. 2d, at 394. Again employing a “plain words” analysis, the court reasoned that the addition of § 8347(d)(2) — providing for MSPB review of involuntary mental disability retirement decisions pursuant to the standards of § 7701 and for judicial review of such decisions pursuant to the standards of § 7703 — demonstrates that Congress intended all other types of disability retirement decisions to be unreviewable. “To hold that judicial review of all § 8347(d)(1) decisions had all along been available under §7703, would be to render superfluous Congress’ action in § 8347(d)(2), making judicial review available for particular claims under §7703.” Id., at 399. Again we cannot agree that the meaning of the 1980 amendment is “plain” on its face. The Scroggins standard allows only for review of legal and procedural errors. The 1980 amendment added § 8347(d)(2), which provides special safeguards in cases of involuntary mental disability retirements. That subsection incorporates § 7703, which provides, inter alia, for a substantial-evidence standard of review of the factual bases of OPM’s decisions. Given the much more deferential Scroggins standard of review, there would be nothing “superfluous” about an amendment providing for the full measure of judicial review pursuant to § 7703 in one subclass of retirement cases. There is certainly nothing on the face of the 1980 amendment suggesting that Congress intended to discard Scroggins review generally while expanding upon it in a particular category of cases. Absent more compelling indicia of congressional intent — whether from the overall statutory structure or from the legislative history— we thus believe in these circumstances that “ ‘[t]he mere fact that some acts are made reviewable should not suffice to support an implication of exclusion as to others.’” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S., at 141 (citation omitted). Moreover, the fact that Congress amended § 8347 in 1980 without explicitly repealing the established Scroggins doctrine itself gives rise to a presumption that Congress intended to embody Scroggins in the amended version of §8347. We need not rely on the bare force of this presumption here, however, because the legislative history of the 1980 amendment demonstrates that Congress was indeed well aware of the Scroggins standard, amended § 8347 on its understanding that Scroggins applied to judicial review of disability retirement decisions generally, and intended that Scroggins review continue except to the extent augmented by the more exacting standards of § 8347(d)(2). The 1980 amendment to § 8347 grew out of investigations and oversight hearings conducted by the Subcommittee on Compensation and Employee Benefits of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. In a 1978 Report, the Subcommittee found that several Government agencies had used involuntary mental disability retirements as a disciplinary tool against unpopular employees and that the finality language of § 8347(c) had worked a “devastating effect” on the ability of courts to scrutinize the evidentiary underpinnings of such dismissals. Forced Retirement/Psychiatric Fitness for Duty Exams, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 15 (Comm. Print 1978) (Subcommittee Report). The Subcommittee emphasized its understanding that § 8347(c) did not “eliminate the constitutional right of appeal of the courts in the case of official ‘arbitrary and capricious conduct.’” Ibid. Citing numerous Court of Claims cases, including Scroggins, the Subcommittee stated that under the judicial construction of § 8347(c) a retired employee could obtain judicial relief if he could “show one of the three following conditions: there has been a substantial departure from important procedural rights, a misconstruction of governing legislation, and an error going to the heart of the administrative determinations.” Subcommittee Report, at 15. The Subcommittee criticized this construction “as imposing an almost impossible heavy burden of proof” on retired employees, ibid., and accordingly called for the outright repeal of the preclusion language of § 8347(c), id., at 20. These recommendations were embodied in legislation introduced the following year by Representative Spellman, the Subcommittee’s Chair. H. R. 2510, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). In hearings on the proposed bill, representatives from OPM noted that outright repeal of §8347(c)’s finality provision would result in full judicial review of all OPM disability and dependency decisions, and objected that such broad review was unwarranted and unnecessary: under § 8347(c) as it had long been interpreted, “if there are questions of proper procedure or constitutional issues, these questions may be raised in the Federal court system. Only the questions [sic] of disability itself, which is a question of medical fact, is actually barred from judicial review by section 8347(c). “We believe that these protections are adequate. . . . The courts already may review questions of procedure as distinguished from questions of fact concerning the disability itself, and employees are, therefore, not entirely precluded from obtaining judicial review.” Hearing on H. R. 2510 before the Subcommittee on Compensation and Employee Benefits of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1979) (Subcommittee Hearing) (statement of Gary Nelson, Associate Director, Compensation Group, OPM). Thereafter, the full Committee adopted an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H. R. 2510 that limited full judicial review “to cases involving agency-filed applications for disability retirement based on an employee’s mental condition.” H. R. Rep. No. 96-1080, p. 2 (1980). The Director of OPM, Alan K. Campbell, then wrote the Chairman of the Committee to inform him that, in light of the elimination of the “sweeping” judicial review originally proposed, OPM was now prepared to support the measure: “We believe that it is reasonable and proper to restrict expanded judicial review to involuntary disability retirements. An employee who voluntarily applies for disability retirement seeks to establish title to a benefit granted by law; the Office of Personnel Management is the administrative agency charged under the law with the managerial function of adjudicating disability retirement claims. It is appropriate, therefore, that OPM decisions on voluntary applications be conclusive, reviewable only to determine whether there has been a substantial procedural error, misconstruction of governing legislation, or some like error going to the heart of the administrative determination.” Letter from Alan K. Campbell to Rep. James M. Hanley (May 14, 1980), reprinted in H. R. Rep. No. 96-1080, at 8 (emphasis added). Director Campbell made these identical representations to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, see Letter from Alan K. Campbell to Sen. Abraham A. Ribicoff (Sept. 25, 1980), reprinted in S. Rep. No. 96-1004, pp. 4-5 (1980); his letter was cited in the Senate Report as providing “further reinforce[ment]” for and an “endorsement” of the Committee’s position on the proper scope of the amendment, id., at 3. Notwithstanding that this history strongly suggests that Congress restricted the scope of its revision of §8347 precisely on the understanding that limited judicial review already was available in disability retirement cases, the respondent seizes upon isolated passages in the legislative history in support of its argument that Congress in fact was under the impression in 1980 that § 8347(c) barred review altogether. See also post, at 804-808 (White, J., dissenting). There were, to be sure, references throughout the legislative proceedings to the “present bar to judicial review of disability determinations”; the purpose of the amendment frequently was characterized as being “to remove the ban to judicial review of certain disability retirement determinations.” These assertions, however, typically were supported by detailed analyses of and quotations from the Scroggins line of cases. Because these cases hold that the “bar” extends only to review of the factual elements of disability determinations, statements in which Scroggins was cited cannot serve to indicate that Congress believed there was an absolute bar to judicial review. Rather, the conclusion was that “expanded judicial review [of] involuntary disability retirements” was necessary under the provisions of 5 U. S. C. §7703. The Scroggins standard, it was contended, was “so narrow” that it prevented effective judicial review; “a more thorough review would reveal the evidentiary weakness” of many involuntary mental disability retirements. If Congress had intended by the 1980 amendment not only to expand judicial review in mental disability cases beyond the established Scroggins standard but to abolish the standard in all other cases as well, there would presumably be some indication in the legislative history to this effect. There is none. Nor, despite Congress’ explicit consideration of the Scroggins interpretation of § 8347, did Congress amend the wording of the finality clause other than to provide for more expansive review in mental disability cases. “Given that the sole purpose of the amendment was to expand judicial protection of employees through review of factual findings in a certain subset of cases, it hardly follows that Congress negatively implied its intent to strip employees of Scroggins-type review in other cases. ” Turner v. OPM, 228 U. S. App. D. C. 94, 98, 707 F. 2d 1499, 1503 (1983). The Federal Circuit nevertheless concluded that the references to Scroggins were made by only “some congressmen,” and that the “comments of a few congressmen” are unreliable indicia of congressional intent. 718 F. 2d, at 399-400. The Scroggins standard was discussed, not just by “a few congressmen,” but by the sponsor of the legislation, the Subcommittee from which it originated, and the House and Senate Committees responsible for its consideration. Similarly, it is contended that the testimony and correspondence of OPM Director Campbell and other agency officials “could not express the intent of Congress.” Id., at 399; see also Brief for Respondent 48-49. Yet while Congress’ understanding of the enactment is of course our touchstone, in discerning what it was that Congress understood “we necessarily attach ‘great weight’ to agency representations to Congress when the administrators ‘participated in drafting and directly made known their views to Congress in committee hearings.’” United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U. S. 16, 31 (1982), quoting Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 192 (1969). Here the Director and other representatives of OPM described the Scroggins standard in detail to both responsible Committees, and relied on the existence of that standard in successfully proposing narrower alternatives to the proposed legislation. The Federal Circuit also reasoned, however, that most of the Scroggins line of cases involved involuntary retirements for alleged mental disabilities, and that none was addressed to voluntary disability retirement claims. 718 F. 2d, at 395. The Scroggins standard was never restricted solely to involuntary mental disability retirements, however, and the legislative history quite clearly indicates that Congress’ understanding was thát the Scroggins standard applied to disability retirement claims generally. Finally, it is suggested that prior to 1980 the Scroggins standard was little more than ill-considered dicta in that (1) it “had resulted in virtually no reversals of the decisions reached in the administrative process,” 718 F. 2d, at 399; (2) courts invoking Scroggins had never “considered] the matter in any depth,” Brief for Respondent 42; and (3) the Scroggins standard was wrong from the outset and “[w]hat did not properly exist cannot be expanded,” 718 F. 2d, at 399. See also post, at 802, n. 2 (White, J., dissenting) (“The so-called Scroggins doctrine apparently is the product of frequent repetition of the Scroggins court’s dictum”). Each of these assertions is either erroneous or misses the mark. That courts applying Scroggins had almost never reversed agency decisions is a testament to Scroggins’ narrow compass, not to its insubstantiality. A fair reading of the cases demonstrates that the courts carefully articulated the standard to begin with, and reaffirmed its vitality only after measured reconsideration. And whether or not Scroggins was correctly decided is largely inapposite to the question at hand. “For the relevant inquiry is not whether Congress correctly perceived the then state of the law, but rather what its perception of the state of the law was.” Brown v. GSA, 425 U. S. 820, 828 (1976). The Federal Circuit therefore erred in concluding that § 8347, as amended, altogether bars judicial review of MSPB decisions in retirement disability cases. Accordingly, while the factual underpinnings of § 8347 disability determinations may not be judicially reviewed, such review is available to determine whether “there has been a substantial departure from important procedural rights, a misconstruction of the governing legislation, or some like error ‘going to the heart of the administrative determination.”’ Scroggins v. United States, 184 Ct. Cl., at 534, 397 F. 2d, at 297. 1 — 1 > — I I — I The respondent contends that, even if Scroggins review is available, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has no jurisdiction directly to review MSPB disability retirement decisions except as provided in § 8347(d)(2). Instead, the respondent argues, retirees such as Lindahl whose administrative appeals are rejected by the MSPB must file a Tucker Act suit in a district court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1346(a)(2) or in the Claims Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1491(a), after which the judgment can be appealed to the Federal Circuit pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1295(a)(2) or (a)(3), respectively. In other words, the respondent contends that most retirees may not obtain direct Federal Circuit review of MSPB decisions, but must instead surmount a two-step judicial review process — with a trial court initially conducting the nonevidentiary Scroggins review, followed by the Federal Circuit conducting the identical review all over again. In addition to making no apparent sense as a matter of sound judicial administration, this argument does not accord with the jurisdictional framework established by the CSRA and the FCIA. Title 28 U. S. C. § 1295(a) provides: “The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... (9) of an appeal from a final order or final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, pursuant to sections 7703(b)(1) and 7703(d) of title 5.” Title 5 U. S. C. § 7703(b)(1) in turn provides that, except for discrimination cases covered by subsection (b)(2), “a petition to review a final order or final decision of the Board shall be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit” (emphasis added). Sections 1295(a)(9) and 7703(b)(1) together appear to provide for exclusive jurisdiction over MSPB decisions in the Federal Circuit, and do not admit any exceptions for disability retirement claims. The respondent argues, however, that § 7703(b)(1) can only properly be understood by reference to § 7703(a)(1), which provides that “[a]ny employee or applicant for employment” may obtain judicial review of MSPB decisions and orders. Contending that former employees are not “employees” within the meaning of § 7703(a)(1), the respondent advances two grounds in support of its argument that the jurisdictional grant of § 7703(b)(1) is limited to appeals authorized by § 7703(a)(1). First, it seems to assert that § 7703(a)(1) is itself the operative jurisdictional grant, because it repeatedly contends that § 7703(b)(1) “appears to be nothing more than a venue provision.” Brief for Respondent 22; see also id., at 29. This argument wholly misperceives the statutory framework. Section 7703(a)(1) creates a right of review for “employee[s]” and “applicants for employment,” but is not addressed to subject-matter jurisdiction at all. Section 7703(b)(1) confers the operative grant of jurisdiction — the “power to adjudicate” — and is not in any sense a “venue” provision. The fact that § 7703(a)(1) provides one action for review under the jurisdiction of § 7703(b)(1) does not preclude the possibility of other actions for review that similarly would fall within the jurisdictional perimeters of § 7703(b)(1). Second, the respondent contends that the CSRA, which initially enacted § 7703(b)(1), was addressed primarily to adverse actions against employees and applicants for employment and that Congress did not intend, in either the CSRA or the PCIA, to extend the direct review mechanism beyond MSPB decisions involving such matters. There is no question that Congress’ primary focus in the CSRA was on adverse actions, and there are numerous references throughout the legislative history to §7703 as a mechanism for review of adverse actions. These legislative references, combined with the proximity of § 7703(a)(1) and § 7703(b)(1), might be read as limiting the latter to the terms of the former. But as numerous lower courts have noted, “[i]n the process of drafting a comprehensive scheme of reform Congress failed to address specifically how the mechanics of the [CSRA] would function in certain situations,” and the judicial task therefore is to “ ‘look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’” Meyer v. Department of HHS, 229 Ct. Cl. 151, 153-154, 666 F. 2d 540, 542 (1981), quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 11 (1962). When construing these arguably ambiguous provisions, our duty is “to remain faithful to the central congressional purposes underlying the enactment of the CSRA.” Devine v. White, 225 U. S. App. D. C. 179, 183, 697 F. 2d 421, 425 (1983). A review of the policies and purposes of the CSRA and FCIA demonstrates that the terms of § 7703(b)(1) and 28 U. S. C. § 1295(a)(9) should not be limited by an implied jurisdictional restriction for disability retirement cases. As originally enacted by Congress in the CSRA, § 7703(b) (1) provided that jurisdiction over appeals from MSPB final decisions would rest either in the Court of Claims, pursuant to the Tucker Act, or in the regional courts of appeals, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2342(6) (1976 ed., Supp. V). See 5 U. S. C. §7703(b)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. V). The House version of the bill had provided for jurisdiction in either the Court of Claims or the district courts, but the Conference Committee substituted review in the courts of appeals because it believed “the traditional appellate mechanism for reviewing final decisions and orders of Federal administrative agencies” would best promote efficient review of MSPB actions. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1717, p. 143 (1978). See also S. Rep. No. 95-969, p. 62 (1978). And although most of the detailed discussion of judicial review was addressed to adverse actions, it was emphasized that § 7703(b)(1)’s “traditional appellate mechanism” would apply to “adverse actions, such as removals, and other appealable actions taken by an agency.” Id., at 51 (emphasis added). Section 7703 was described as governing “judicial review of all final orders or decisions of the Board.” Id., at 62. Moreover, the Senate Report explicitly identified certain nonadverse action appeals that would not be encompassed by § 7703(b)(1); it emphasized, for example, that “Board decisions and orders (other than those involving discrimination complaints and determinations concerning life and health insurance) [shall] be reviewable” under the jurisdiction conferred by that subsection. Id., at 63 (emphasis added). Life and health insurance cases are not adverse action matters, and they continue to be reviewed under separate jurisdictional grants set forth at 5 U. S. C. § 8715 and § 8912. We believe the inference is strong, given that disability retirement decisions were not included in this enumeration of exceptions, that Congress did not intend for such decisions to fall outside the all-encompassing provisions of § 7703(b)(1). In the FCIA, Congress amended § 7703(b)(1) to combine portions of the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and the regional courts of appeals into one centralized court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Court of Claims previously had exercised its jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1491 both as an appellate tribunal and as a trial court. As explained by the Senate Report, the purpose of the FCIA was to consolidate the “government claims ease[s] and all other appellate matters that are now considered by the . . . Court of Claims” pursuant to its § 1491 Tucker Act jurisdiction with civil service appeals considered by the regional courts of appeals. S. Rep. No. 97-275, p. 6 (1981) (emphasis added). The result, both Houses emphasized, would be that the new Federal Circuit would have “jurisdiction of any appeal from a final order or final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board.” Id., at 21 (emphasis added). See also H. R. Rep. No. 97-312, p. 18 (1981) (Federal Circuit to have jurisdiction “over all appeals from the Merit Systems Protection Board”). The FCIA also created a new Claims Court that would continue to exercise general Tucker Act jurisdiction; that court would “inheri[t]” the Court of Claims’ “trial jurisdiction” under § 1491. S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 7; H. R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 24. With the exception of changing the name of the relevant court, however, Congress did not amend the language of § 1491, under which the Court of Claims previously had exercised both trial and appellate functions. The result is that the appellate jurisdiction of the new Federal Circuit appears to overlap with the residuary trial jurisdiction of the Claims Court. For example, although neither party has addressed the import of this language, there remains in § 1491(a)(2) an explicit reference to the Claims Court’s authority to “issue orders directing restoration to office or position, placement in appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of applicable records.” Similarly, the legislative history of the FCIA contains references to military and civilian pay disputes being channeled to the Federal Circuit, see H. R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 19; S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 6, as well as to such disputes remaining as part of the Claims Court’s jurisdiction, H. R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 24. In light of this ambiguity and the apparent jurisdictional overlap, we must resort to a functional analysis of the role of these different courts and to a consideration of Congress’ broader purposes. See supra, at 793-794. It seems clear to us that Congress in the FCIA intended to channel those Tucker Act cases in which the Court of Claims performed an appellate function — such as traditional review of agency action based on the agency record — into the Federal Circuit, and to leave cases requiring de novo factfinding in the Claims Court and district courts. Congress in the CSRA had explicitly provided for the “traditional appellate mechanism” for review of MSPB decisions, H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1717, at 143, and we have interpreted similar jurisdictional grants precisely so as to carry out Congress’ intent to promote the “sound policies]” of placing agency review in the courts of appeals. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, ante, at 745; see also Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578, 593 (1980). Review of an MSPB order involving a disability retirement claim not only is explicitly encompassed in the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction, but also makes logical sense given that the court considers only legal and procedural questions and does not review the factual bases of the administrative decision. A contrary conclusion would result in exactly the sort of “duplicative, wasteful and inefficient” judicial review that Congress in the CSRA and the FCIA intended to eradicate. The CSRA and the FCIA quite clearly demonstrate that Congress intended to abolish the needless practice of reviewing civil service actions on the same criteria at two judicial levels. The Senate Report on the FCIA, for example, emphasized that direct appeal to the Federal Circuit would “improv[e] the administration of the [judicial] system by reducing the number of decision-making entities.” S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 3. Similarly, the Senate Report on the CSRA emphasized that trial-level review of agency action was “appropriate” only where “additional fact-finding” was necessary, and that in all other cases direct appellate review would “merely eliminat[e] an unnecessary layer of judicial review.” S. Rep. No. 95-969, at 52, 63. The respondent has skillfully parsed the legislative history and culled every possible nuance and ambiguity, but it has failed to advance a single argument why Congress would have intended to depart from the plain jurisdictional language in cases of disability retirement appeals and to require instead that such appeals be reviewed for legal and procedural error first by the Claims Court or a district court, and then all over again by the Federal Circuit. That Congress could not have intended such a wasteful exercise is reinforced by § 8347(d)(2), which explicitly provides that one subclass of disability retirement cases — those involving involuntary dismissals based on an individual’s alleged mental disability— are appealable directly from the MSPB to the Federal Circuit. We can discern no reason why Congress would have intended that mental disability cases, which permit for evi-dentiary review, be channeled to an appellate forum, while intending that other retirement cases, which permit only for Scroggins review, be channeled to a trial forum for nonevidentiary review and then to the Federal Circuit for performance of the identical review. Moreover, as Judge Nichols suggested in his concurrence below, 718 F. 2d, at 400, there frequently will be disputes — as in this case — as to whether an employee’s retirement was involuntary or voluntary, and accordingly as to whether the appeal might properly be characterized as an adverse action rather than as a simple disability retirement matter. See n. 38, infra. In the absence of any indication in the legislative history or persuasive functional argument to the contrary, we cannot assume that Congress intended to create such a bizarre jurisdictional patchwork. Accordingly, we conclude that MSPB decisions concerning retirement disability claims are reviewable in the first instance by the Federal Circuit pursuant to the jurisdictional grants in 5 U. S. C. § 7703(b)(1) and 28 U. S. C. § 1295(a)(9). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Ch. 95, 41 Stat. 614, as amended, 5 U. S. C. § 8301 et sea. An employee is “disabled” within the meaning of the Retirement Act if he is “unable, because of disease or injury, to render useful and efficient service in [his] position and is not qualified for reassignment ... to a vacant position which is in the agency at the same grade or level and in which [he] would be able to render useful and efficient service.” 5 U. S. C. § 8337(a). The finality language originally applied only to survivorship benefits, but was extended to disability retirement claims by the Civil Service Retirement Act Amendments of 1956, § 401, 70 Stat. 743; the only relevant legislative history states that “[t]he bill makes no change in the existing general administrative provisions.” S. Rep. No. 2642, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1956). Subsequent amendments prior to 1980, see infra, at 774-775, were solely of a technical nature. Pub. L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 et seq. In the MSPB review proceeding, the appellant is entitled to an evi-dentiary hearing, to a transcript, and to the presence of an attorney or other representative. Attorney’s fees may be awarded in certain circumstances. The agency generally bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that its decision was correct. 5 U. S. C. §§ 7701(a), (c), (g). A court may set aside the MSPB’s decision if it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; obtained without following applicable procedures; or “unsupported by substantial evidence” in the record. § 7703(c). Pub. L. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 et seq. The day after the Navy informed Lindahl of his impending retirement, he submitted a physician’s statement to the Navy on a form that is used to accompany an application for retirement benefits, 1 MSPB Record 83-84, but he did not file a formal application with the OPM until four days after his removal became final, App. 17-19. The Board also stated that “a conclusion by the agency that an employee is not fit to continue satisfactory duty performance is not dispositive of the issue of whether he is totally disabled under 5 U. S. C. 8331(6) so as to be eligible for a disability annuity under 5 U. S. C. 8337 from OPM.” Id,., at 34. Lindahl argued that, since the Navy instituted the retirement action against him, the adverse action procedures set forth in 5 U. S. C. § 7701 required that the OPM demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was disabled. § 7701(c)(1)(B). Lindahl similarly contended that MSPB’s regulations were properly interpreted to place the burden of proof on the OPM. See 5 CFR §§ 1201.3(a)(6), 1201.56(a) (1984). Cf. Chavez v. OPM, 6 M. S. P. B. 343, 348-349 (1981) (appeals in retirement cases are subject to § 7701 procedures). Lindahl claimed that, since the Navy had initiated his separation on grounds of his disability, see App. 10-15, it was required under applicable personnel regulations to retain him in an active-duty status pending decision by the OPM on the Navy’s proposed disability separation. See FPM Supplement 831-1, Subch. S10 — 10(a)(6) (1978), reprinted in App. to Brief for Petitioner 22a. We express no views on the merits of Lindahl’s allegations or his construction of the pertinent statutes and regulations. Lindahl’s complaint also alleged that the disability denial was not supported by substantial evidence. ¶ 15, App. 43. Lindahl has not pursued this allegation on appeal, and in any event it is barred by 5 U. S. C. § 8347(c). Prior to the FCIA’s vesting of review over MSPB decisions in the Federal Circuit, the regional Courts of Appeals had divided over the effect of the 1980 amendment on the proper construction of § 8847(c). Some had held that the amended §8347 continues only to bar factual scrutiny of disability determinations while permitting review for legal and procedural errors. See, e. g., Pitzak v. OPM, 710 F. 2d 1476,1478-1479 (CA101983); Turner v. OPM, 228 U. S. App. D. C. 94, 97-99, 707 F. 2d 1499,1502-1504 (1983); McCard v. MSPB, 702 F. 2d 978, 980-983 (CA11 1983); Parodi v. MSPB, 702 F. 2d 743, 745-748 (CA9 1982). Others had held that it altogether bars review. See, e. g., Chase v. Director, OPM, 695 F. 2d 790, 791 (CA4 1982); Campbell v. OPM, 694 F. 2d 305, 307-308 (CA3 1982); Morgan v. OPM, 675 F. 2d 196, 198-201 (CA8 1982). But see Lancellotti v. OPM, 704 F. 2d 91, 96-98 (CA31983) (reading § 8347(c) to permit review for alleged legal error, and grounding jurisdiction on 28 U. S. C. § 2342(6) (1976 ed., Supp. V)). This reading is reinforced by the third sentence of § 8347(c), which provides that the OPM may take appropriate steps “to determine the facts concerning disability or dependency of an individual.” The juxtaposition of the finality language with the language concerning OPM’s determinations of “the facts” of disability arguably suggests that the finality language does not extend to procedural or legal questions. See, e. g., 5 U. S. C. § 8128(b) (compensation for work injuries) (“The action of the Secretary [of Labor] or his designee in allowing or denying a payment under this subchapter is — (1) final and conclusive for all purposes and with respect to all questions of law and fact; and (2) not subject to review by another official of the United States or by a court by mandamus or otherwise”). See also 38 U. S. C. § 211(a) (veterans’ benefits) (“[T]he decisions of the Administrator on any question of law or fact under any law administered by the Veterans’ Administration providing benefits for veterans and their dependents or survivors shall be final and conclusive and no other official or any court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision by an action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise”). See also Fitzgerald v. United States, 224 Ct. Cl. 215, 220, 623 F. 2d 696, 699 (1980); Polos v. United States, 223 Ct. Cl. 547, 559-560, n. 9, 621 F. 2d 385, 391, n. 9 (1980); Fancher v. United States, 218 Ct. Cl. 504, 509-510, 588 F. 2d 803, 806 (1978); Allen v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 524, 529-530, 571 F. 2d 14, 17-18 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Polos v. United States, supra; McFarland v. United States, 207 Ct. C1. 38, 46-47, 517 F. 2d 938, 942-943 (1975), cert, denied, 423 U. S. 1049 (1976); Lech v. United States, 187 Ct. Cl. 471, 476, 409 F. 2d 252, 255 (1969); McGlasson v. United States, 184 Ct. Cl. 542, 548-549, 397 F. 2d 303, 307 (1968); Gaines v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 497, 502, cert. denied, 371 U. S. 936 (1962); Smith v. Dulles, 99 U. S. App. D. C. 6, 9, 236 F. 2d 739, 742, cert. denied, 352 U. S. 955 (1956); Matricciana v. Hampton, 416 F. Supp. 288, 289 (Md. 1976); Cantrell v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 851, 853 (WDSC 1965), aff’d, 356 F. 2d 915 (CA4 1966). “Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it reenacts a statute without change, see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 414 n. 8 (1975); NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U. S. 361, 366 (1951); National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140, 147 (1920); 2A C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §49.09 and cases cited (4th ed. 1973). So too, where, as here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580-581 (1978). See also Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 601-602 (1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 381-382 (1982). The Subcommittee analyzed three Court of Claims cases: Gaines v. United States, supra; McGlasson v. United States, supra; and Scroggins v. United States, 184 Ct. Cl. 530, 397 F. 2d 295, cert. denied, 393 U. S. 952 (1968). See Subcommittee Report, at 15. See also id., at 19-20. OPM continued to oppose provisions in H. R. 2510 that would have provided for de novo district court review of MSPB decisions in cases involving involuntary mental disability retirements. See Letter from Alan K. Campbell to Rep. James M. Hanley (May 14, 1980), reprinted in H. R. Rep. No. 96-1080, p. 8 (1980). The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs successfully proposed that the bill be amended to provide for review in the Court of Claims or the regional courts of appeals pursuant to the standards of 5 U. S. C. § 7703. See S. Rep. No. 96-1004, pp. 2-3 (1980). See generally infra, at 798-799, and n. 36. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 96-1080, at 3. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 96-1004, at 1. See also Subcommittee Report, at 1; Subcommittee Hearing, at 4, 11; H. R. Rep. No. 96-1080, at 2-4; S. Rep. No. 96-1004, at 3-4; 126 Cong. Rec. 14815-14817 (1980) (remarks of Reps. Spellman, Rudd, and Corcoran). See, e. g., Subcommittee Report, at 14-16,19-20; Subcommittee Hearing, at 11-12, 20-21, 28; H. R. Rep. No. 96-1080, at 4. See also Subcommittee Report, at 15; Subcommittee Hearing, at 4; H. R. Rep. No. 96-1080, at 8; S. Rep. No. 96-1004, at 4-5; 126 Cong. Rec. 14817-14818 (1980) (Letter from OPM Director Campbell to Rep. James M. Hanley (May 14, 1980), inserted by Rep. Derwinski) (all discussing availability of review for legal and procedural errors). H. R. Rep. No. 96-1080, at 3. Subcommittee Report, at 20; Subcommittee Hearing, at 28 (prepared statement of National Federation of Federal Employees). Largely tracking the respondent’s arguments, the dissent consists almost entirely of a patchwork of isolated words and phrases wrenched out of context. At times the dissent’s demands appear circular: it dismisses outright all references to Scroggins in the legislative history on the ground that Congress might not have understood Scroggins “as a decision holding review available”; in virtually the same breath, it rejects all references to the availability of limited judicial review on the ground that those references “nowhere mentio[n] Scroggins.” Post, at 805, n. 4, 808. The dissent also points to statements during floor debates to the effect that federal employees lacked “access to the courts” and that OPM wished to limit the amendment to “[procedural review,” reasoning that if “[procedural review” already was available the amendment “would have made little or no sense.” Post, at 806, n. 5, 806. As discussed in text, the legislative history as a whole demonstrates that the desired “access” concerned access for evidentiary review. See swpra, at 783-786. Similarly, it was made quite clear during the floor debates that OPM’s proposed “[procedural review” would consist of appellate scrutiny on a substantial-evidence basis — which was not available under Scroggins and thus not superfluous. See, e. g., 126 Cong. Rec. 14816-14817 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Corcoran). The House rejected OPM’s alternative and instead called for full de novo review of disability findings; the Senate successfully proposed to eliminate de novo review in favor of the substantial-evidence standard. See n. 36, infra. The dissent would sweep aside this entire legislative history on the basis of some random statements taken out of context. Notwithstanding that the Subcommittee Report spelled out the current availability of Scroggins review, for example, the dissent seizes upon one statement by the Subcommittee's Associate Counsel expressing skepticism of OPM's position, and it concludes that the Subcommittee thereby “changed its position on the effect of § 8347(c)” after issuing the Report. Post, at 809; see also post, at 807. The dissent omits to mention that, during the same testimony, the Associate Counsel also (1) observed that under the subsection “ ‘courts are not as free to review Commission retirement decisions as they would be if the finality clause were not there,’ ” (2) criticized the subsection as “so confining that even in a case like [Scroggins] the employee could not be sustained,” and (3) complained that under the Scroggins doctrine “people went to court in ... an almost impossible legal situation.” Subcommittee Hearing, at 11-12, 18 (emphasis added), quoting McFarland v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl., at 46, 517 F. 2d, at 942. It is difficult, to say the least, to square such testimony with the dissent’s view that it demonstrates Congress’ belief that § 8347(c) stood as an “absolute preclusion of judicial review” — let alone that the Subcommittee “changed its position on the effect of § 8347(c).” Post, at 804, 809 (emphasis added). Similarly, the dissent dismisses the relevance of OPM’s repeated assurances that limited review already was available and Congress’ narrowing of the amendment in response to these representations. The dissent thinks it unclear whether OPM’s references were to “judicial review at all,” reasoning that “for all that appears” the agency’s assurances “may have been referring to the review of OPM decisions available in the MSPB.” Post, at 808-809. This reasoning is curious given that OPM’s representations (1) separately discussed the availability of full de novo review from the MSPB, and (2) were explicitly addressed to the questions of whether and to what extent “judicial review” should be “expanded” beyond current practice. See, e. g., Letter from Alan K. Campbell to Rep. James M. Hanley (May 14, 1980), reprinted in H. R. Rep. No. 96-1080, at 8 (emphasis added). Courts had exercised Scroggins review in several physical disability cases. See, e. g., Polos v. United States, 223 Ct. Cl., at 558-563, 621 F. 2d, at 390-393; Allen v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl., at 529-533, 571 F. 2d, at 17-19; Lech v. United States, 187 Ct. Cl., at 476, 409 F. 2d, at 255. Moreover, courts had never cast the Scroggins standard in terms of the circumstances of the retirement claim, but rather in terms of judicial authority under the Retirement Act to exercise limited review over disability retirement claims generally. See n. 14, supra. See, e. g., Subcommittee Report, at 15; Subcommittee Hearing, at 4; H. R. Rep. No. 96-1080, at 8; S. Rep. No. 96-1004, at 4-5; 126 Cong. Rec. 14817-14818 (1980). Courts did not advance the standard as dicta, but instead invoked it as authority for exercising jurisdiction to review agency decisions in disability retirement cases. After conducting such review, courts almost always concluded that the alleged error of law or procedure did not warrant reversal. See cases cited in n. 14, supra. But see Polos v. United States, supra, at 564-565, 621 F. 2d, at 391-392 (remanding case to OPM after finding errors of law); Allen v. United States, supra, at 533, 571 F. 2d, at 19 (reversing Civil Service Commission denial of annuity). See cases cited in n. 14, supra. Prior to the 1980 amendment, the Government had argued before the Court of Claims that Scroggins was erroneously decided, but after further consideration the court rejected the Government’s contention and reaffirmed the Scroggins interpretation of § 8347(c). Fancher v. United States, 218 Ct. Cl., at 510, n. 3, 588 F. 2d, at 806, n. 3. The reliance by the respondent and the dissent on United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U. S. 201 (1982), is inapposite. See post, at 801, n. 1. Erika held that the Medicare statute bars judicial review of certain administrative decisions concerning reimbursement to health care providers. Although there was no explicit statutory bar to judicial review of such decisions, we concluded that “[i]n the context of the statute’s precisely drawn provisions” the omission of a review provision “provides persuasive evidence that Congress deliberately intended to foreclose further review of such claims.” 456 U. S., at 208. The instant case, on the other hand, involves an ambiguous preclusion provision and the interplay of several statutes that are hardly “precise.” See infra, at 793-794. More significantly, we found in Erika that the legislative history “confirm[ed]” Congress’ intent absolutely to preclude review and “explain[ed] its logic.” 456 U. S., at 208. In this case, on the other hand, the legislative history compels exactly the opposite conclusion. Title 5 U. S. C. § 7703(b)(2) provides that cases of discrimination shall be filed in either a district court or the Claims Court, depending on which antidiscrimination statute is at issue; the plaintiff is guaranteed the right to a de novo trial in such cases, § 7703(c). Section 7703(d), the other jurisdictional provision referred to in 28 U. S. C. § 1295(a)(9), provides that a petition by the Director of the OPM to review an adverse MSPB decision may be filed in the Federal Circuit, and sets forth the circumstances in which the Director may seek such review. Venue provisions come into play only after jurisdiction has been established and concern “the place where judicial authority may be exercised”; rather than relating to the power of a court, venue “relates to the convenience of litigants and as such is subject to their disposition.” Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 168 (1939). Compare, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (grant of general federal-question jurisdiction to district courts) with § 1391 (venue for exercise of such jurisdiction). See generally 15 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3801 (1976). See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 95-969, pp. 62-63 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, pp. 22-23 (1978). See also S. Rep. No. 95-969, at 29 (“Action by the Merit Systems Protection Board, following any hearing or adjudication on any matter falling within its jurisdiction, constitutes final agency action for the purposes of judicial review”) (emphasis added). From 1925 until the Court of Claims was abolished by the FCIA, the court’s trial function was performed by a “Trial Division” consisting of commissioners appointed by the Court of Claims Article III judges; in any matter requiring de novo factfinding a commissioner presided over the trial and made findings of fact and recommendations of law which were then reviewed by the “Appellate Division,” consisting of the judges themselves. In those matters not requiring factfinding, a case typically was routed directly to a panel of the court, which conducted review comparable to that of an appellate court. For further discussion of this bifurcation, see Cowen, Nichols, & Bennett, The United States Court of Claims: A History, Part II, pp. 90-95, 131-133 (1978, published in 216 Ct. Cl.); Bar Association of the District of Columbia, Manual for Practice in the United States Court of Claims 5-8, 71-73 (1976); H. R. Rep. No. 97-312, p. 24 (1981); S. Rep. No. 97-275, pp. 7-8 (1981). This functional bifurcation of the Court of Claims’ Tucker Act jurisdiction was repeatedly emphasized. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 17-19, 24 (“[T]he Claims Court essentially will have the same jurisdiction that the Court of Claims now exercises through its Trial Division under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491, together with the authority to enter final judgment”).; S. Rep. No. 97-275, at 2 (Claims Court the “new article I trial forum”), 22. Vaughn, Civil Service Discipline and Application of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 339, 369. The two-stage process of reviewing personnel actions first in a trial court and then in an appellate court, with both courts employing the same standards in reviewing the administrative record, had been criticized as “serv[ing] no visible purpose,” contributing to “over-crowded dockets in all courts,” and impeding the ability of courts “to give, efficiently and expeditiously, the most appropriate kind of relief.” Adams v. Laird, 136 U. S. App. D. C. 388, 392, n. 2, 420 F. 2d 230, 234, n. 2 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 1039 (1970); Scott v. Macy, 131 U. S. App. D. C. 93, 96, n. 6, 402 F. 2d 644, 647, n. 6 (1968); Connelly v. Nitze, 130 U. S. App. D. C. 351, 352, n. 1, 401 F. 2d 416, 417, n. 1 (1968). See also R. Vaughn, Principles of Civil Service Law § 5.4(1) (1976) (discussing uncertain and overlapping jurisdictional bases for judicial review of civil service matters); Johnson & Stoll, Judicial Review of Federal Employee Dismissals and Other Adverse Actions, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 178, 188-197 (1972); Vaughn, The Opinions of the Merit Systems Protection Board: A Study in Administrative Adjudication, 34 Admin. L. Rev. 25, 29, nn. 29-30 (1982); Developments in the Law — Public Employment, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1611, 1642-1643 (1984). The original House version of the 1980 amendment had provided for review of MSPB decisions in such eases by the district courts or the Court of Claims. The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs successfully proposed to amend the legislation to incorporate the traditional appellate review model, reasoning that “[sjince full de novo review is now provided before the Merit Systems Protection Board, it would be cumbersome and inappropriate to provide for a second de novo review in the United States district court.” S. Rep. No. 96-1004, at 3. Cf. Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U. S. 193, 197 (1980) (“Absent a far clearer expression of congressional intent, we are unwilling to read the Act as creating such a seemingly irrational bifurcated system”). Lindahl and various amici have argued that a retired federal employee should be considered in at least some circumstances to be an “employee” within the meaning of 5 U. S. C. § 7701 and § 7703(a)(1), and accordingly offer additional jurisdictional analyses based on the asserted applicability of these provisions. The respondent has devoted much of its briefing to an effort at demonstrating that §§ 7701 and 7703(a)(1) do not apply “to any retirement actions.” Brief for Respondent 24 (emphasis in original). The Federal Circuit in Bronger v. OPM, 740 F. 2d 1552, 1554-1556 (1984), has held that a retired employee filing for an annuity may in at least some circumstances be considered an “employee” within the meaning of § 7703(a)(1). See also Chavez v. OPM, 6 M. S. P. B., at 348 (retired employee considered an “employee” for purposes of § 7701 administrative review procedures over OPM disability retirement denial). Our resolution of the instant case does not require that we consider whether and under what circumstances a retired employee filing for a disability annuity may ever be considered an “employee” for purposes of § 7701 or § 7703(a)(1), and we express no views on that issue.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FRANKLIN, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, et al. v. MASSACHUSETTS et al. No. 91-1502. Argued April 21, 1992 Decided June 26, 1992 O’Connor, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined, the opinion of the Court with respect to Part IV, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White, Blackmun, Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and White and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Blackmun, Kennedy, and Sou-TEK, JJ., joined, post, p. 807. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 823. Deputy Solicitor General Roberts argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Edwin S. Kneed-ler, Michael Jay Singer, and Mark B. Stern. Dwight Golann, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the briefs were Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, Steve Ber-enson, Assistant Attorney General, and John P. Driscoll, Jr., Edward P. Leibensperger, and Neil P. Motenko, Special Assistant Attorneys General. Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Jerry Boone, Solicitor General, and Sanford M. Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel E. Lwngren, Attorney General of California, Thomas D. Bair, and Robert S. Rifkind filed a brief for the State of New York et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, James M. Johnson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and J. Lawrence Coniff filed a brief for the State of Washington as amicus curiae. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III. As one season follows another, the decennial census has again generated a number of reapportionment controversies. This decade, as a result of the 1990 census and reapportionment, Massachusetts lost a seat in the House of Representatives. Appellees Massachusetts and two of its registered voters brought this action against the President, the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), Census Bureau officials, and the Clerk of the House of Representatives, challenging, among other things, the method used for counting federal employees serving overseas. In particular, the appellants’ allocation of 922,819 overseas military personnel to the State designated in their personnel files as their “home of record” altered the relative state populations enough to shift a Representative from Massachusetts to Washington. A three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that the decision to allocate military personnel serving overseas to their “homes of record” was arbitrary and capricious under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 701 et seq. As a remedy, the District Court directed the Secretary to eliminate the overseas federal employees from the apportionment counts, directed the President to recalculate the number of Representatives per State and transmit the new calculation to Congress, and directed the Clerk of the House of Representatives to inform the States of the change. The federal officials appealed. We noted probable jurisdiction, stayed the District Court’s order, and ordered expedited briefing and argument. 503 U. S. 442 (1992). We now reverse. I Article I, §2, cl. 3, of the Constitution provides that Representatives “shall be apportioned among the several States ... according to their respective Numbers,” which requires, by virtue of §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, “counting the whole number of persons in each State.” The number of persons in each State is to be calculated by “actual Enumeration,” conducted every 10 years, “in such Manner as [Congress] shall by Law direct.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §2, cl. 3. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention included the periodic census requirement in order to ensure that entrenched interests in Congress did not stall or thwart needed reapportionment. See 1M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 571, 578-588 (rev. ed. 1966). Their effort was only partially successful, as the congressional battles over the method for calculating the reapportionment still caused delays. After just such a 10-year stalemate after the 1920 census, Congress reformed the reapportionment process to make it virtually self-executing, so that the number of Representatives per State would be determined by the Secretary of Commerce and the President without any action by Congress. See S. Rep. No. 2, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1929) (“The need for legislation of this type is confessed by the record of the past nine years during which Congress has refused to translate the 1920 census into a new apportionment. ... As a result, great American constituencies have been robbed of their rightful share of representation . . .”); Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U. S. 442, 451-452, and n. 25 (1992). Under the automatic reapportionment statute, the Secretary of Commerce takes the census “in such form and content as [s]he may determine.” 13 U. S. C. § 141(a). The Secretary is permitted to delegate her authority for establishing census procedures to the Bureau of the Census. See §§ 2,4. “The tabulation of total population by States ... as required for the apportionment of Representatives in Congress . . . shall be compléted within 9 months after the census date and reported by the Secretary to the President of the United States.” § 141(b). After receiving the Secretary's report, the President “shall transmit to the Congress a statement showing the whole number of persons in each State ... as ascertained under the ... decennial census of the population, and the number of Representatives to which each State would be entitled under an apportionment of the then existing number of Representatives by the method known as the method of equal proportions ” 2 U. S. C. § 2a(a). “Each State shall be entitled ... to the number of Representatives shown” in the President’s statement, and the Clerk of the House of Representatives must “send to the executive of each State a certificate of the number of Representatives to which such State is entitled.” § 2a(b). With the one-time exception in 1900 of counting overseas servicemen at their family home, the Census Bureau did not allocate federal personnel stationed overseas to particular States for reapportionment purposes until 1970. App. 175, 177. The 1970 census, taken during the Vietnam War, allocated members of the Armed Forces stationed overseas to their “home of record,” using Defense Department personnel records. Id., at 179. “Home of record” is the State declared by the person upon entry into military service, and determines where he or she will be moved after military service is complete. Id., at 149. Because the Bureau found that military personnel were likely to designate a “home of record” with low or no income taxes instead of their true home State — even though home of record does not determine state taxation — -the Bureau did not allocate overseas employees to particular States in the 1980 census. App. 180. Initially, the Bureau took the position that overseas federal employees would not be included in the 1990 state enumerations either. There were, however, stirrings in Congress in favor of including overseas federal employees, especially overseas military, in the state population counts. Several bills requiring the Secretary to include overseas military were introduced but not passed in the 100th and 101st Congresses. See H. R. 3814, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H. R. 4234, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H. R. 3815, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H. R. 4720, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); S. 2103,100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H. R. 1468,101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H. R. 2661, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H. R. 3016,101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 290,101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). In July 1989, nine months before the census taking was to begin, then-Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher agreed to allocate overseas federal employees to their home States for purposes of congressional apportionment. App. 182. His decision memorandum cites both the growing congressional support for including overseas employees and the Department of Defense’s belief that “its employees should not be excluded from apportionment counts because of temporary and involuntary, residence overseas.” Id., at 120. Another factor explaining the Secretary’s shift was that the Department of Defense, the largest federal overseas employer, planned to poll its employees to determine, among other things, which State they considered their permanent home. Id., at 184. In December 1989, however, the Defense Department canceled its plans to conduct the survey due to a lack of funds. Ibid. As an alternative, the Defense Department suggested that it could provide data on its employees’ last six months of residence in the United States, information that would be more complete and up-to-date than the home of record data already in the personnel files. This possibility also failed to materialize when the Defense Department informed the Census Bureau that it was not able to assemble the information after all. Ibid. In the meantime, two more bills were introduced in Congress, but not passed, which would have required the Census Bureau to apportion members of the overseas military to their home States using the “home of record” data already in their personnel files. See H. R. 4903, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. 2675, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). In July 1990, six months before the census count was due to be reported to the President, the Census Bureau decided to allocate the Department of Defense’s overseas employees to the States based on their “home of record.” App. 185. It chose the home of record designation over other data available, including legal residence and last duty station, because home of record most closely resembled the Census Bureau’s standard measure of state affiliation — “usual residence.” 3 Record 925. Legal residence was thought less accurate because the choice of legal residence may have been affected by state taxation. Indeed, the Congressional Research Service found that in 1990 “the nine States with either no income taxes, or those which tax only interest and dividend income, have approximately 9 percent more of the overseas military personnel claiming the States for tax purposes, than those same States receive using home of record” Congressional Research Service Report, App. 151, n. 13. For similar reasons, last duty station was rejected because it would provide only a work address, and the employee’s last home address might have been in a different State, as with those, for example, who worked in the District of Columbia but lived in Virginia or Maryland. 3 Record 925. Residence at a “last duty station” may also have been of a very short duration and may not have reflected the more enduring tie of usual residence. App. 150. Those military personnel for whom home of record information was not available were allocated based on legal residence or last duty station, in that order. Id., at 186. The Census Bureau invited 40 other federal agencies with overseas employees to submit counts of their employees as well. Of those, only 30 actually submitted counts, and only 20 agencies included dependents in their enumeration. Four of the agencies could not provide a home State for all of their overseas employees. Ibid. Appellees challenged the decision to allocate federal overseas employees, and the method used to do so, as inconsistent with the APA and with the constitutional requirement that the apportionment of Representatives be determined by an “actual Enumeration” of persons “in each State.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §2, cl. 3; U. S. Const., Arndt. 14, §2. Appel-lees focused their attack on the Secretary’s decision to use “home of record” data for military personnel. The District Court, finding that it had jurisdiction to address the merits of the claims, was “skeptical” of the merits of appellees’ constitutional claims, speculating that “[tjhere would appear to be nothing inherently unconstitutional in a properly supported decision to include overseas federal employees in apportionment counts.” Commonwealth v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 230, 266 (Mass. 1992). The District Court nonetheless held that, on the administrative record before it, the Secretary’s decision to allocate the employees and to use home of record data was arbitrary and capricious under the standards of the APA. Id., at 264-266. Appellees raise claims under both the APA and the Constitution. We address first the statutory basis for our jurisdiction under the APA. See Blum v. Bacon, 457 U. S. 132, 137 (1982); Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 295 (1905). The APA sets forth the procedures by which federal agencies are accountable to the public and their actions subject to review by the courts. The Secretary’s report to the President is an unusual candidate for “agency action” within the meaning of the APA, because it is not promulgated to the public in the Federal Register, no official administrative record is generated, and its effect on reapportionment is felt only after the President makes the necessary calculations and reports the result to the Congress. Contrast 2 U. S. C. §441a(e) (requiring Secretary to publish each year in the Federal Register an estimate of the voting age population). Only after the President reports to Congress do the States have an entitlement to a particular number of Representatives. See §2a(b) (“Each State shall be entitled ... to the number of Representatives shown in the [President’s] statement”). The APA provides for judicial review of “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U. S. C. §704. At issue in this case is whether the “final” action that appellees have challenged is that of an “agency” such that the federal courts may exercise their powers of review under the APA. We hold that the final action complained of is that of the President, and the President is not an agency within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, there is no final agency action that may be reviewed under the APA standards. To determine when an agency action is final, we have looked to, among other things, whether its impact “is suffi-eiently direct and immediate” and has a “direct effect on ... day-to-day business.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 152 (1967). An agency action is not final if it is only “the ruling of a subordinate official,” or “tentative.” Id., at 151. The core question is whether the agency has completed its decisionmaking process, and whether the result of that process is one that will directly affect the parties. In this case, the action that creates an entitlement to a particular number of Representatives and has a direct effect on the reapportionment is the President’s statement to Congress, not the Secretary’s report to the President. Unlike other statutes that expressly require the President to transmit an agency’s report directly to Congress, §2a does not. Compare, e. g., 20 U. S. C. § 1017(d) (“The President shall transmit each such report [of the National Advisory Council on Continuing Education] to the Congress with his comments and recommendations”); 30 U. S. C. § 1315(c) (similar language); 42 U. S. C. § 3015(f) (similar language); 42 U. S. C. § 6633(b)(2) (similar language). After receiving the Secretary’s report, the President is to “transmit to the Congress a statement showing the whole number of persons in each State ... as ascertained under the ... decennial census of the population.” 2 U. S. C. §2a(a). Section 2a does not expressly require the President to use the data in the Secretary’s report, but, rather, the data from the “decennial census.” There is no statute forbidding amendment of the “decennial census” itself after the Secretary submits the report to the President. For potential litigants, therefore, the “decennial census” still presents a moving target, even after the Secretary reports to the President. In this case, the Department of Commerce, in its press release issued the day the Secretary submitted the report to the President, was explicit that the data presented to the President was still subject to correction. See United States Department of Commerce News, Bureau of Census, 1990 Census Population for the United States is 249,632,692: Reapportionment Will Shift 19 Seats in the U. S. House of Representatives 2 (Dec. 26,1990) (“The population counts set forth herein are subject to possible correction for undercount and overcount. The United States Department of Commerce is considering whether to correct these counts and will publish corrected counts, if any, not later than July 15, 1991”). Moreover, there is no statute that rules out an instruction by the President to the Secretary to reform the census, even after the data are submitted to him. It is not until the President submits the information to Congress that the target stops moving, because only then are the States entitled by § 2a to a particular number of Representatives. Because the Secretary’s report to the President carries no direct consequences for the reapportionment, it serves more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination. It is, like “the ruling of a subordinate official,” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, supra, at 151, not final and therefore not subject to review. Cf. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U. S. 103, 109 (1948); United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U. S. 371, 379 (1940). The statutory structure in this ease differs from that at issue in Japan Wkaling Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U. S. 221 (1986), in which we held that the Secretary of Commerce’s certification to the President that another country was endangering fisheries was “final agency action.” Id., at 231, n. 4. In that case, the Secretary’s certification to the President under 22 U. S. C. § 1978(a)(1) automatically triggered sanctions by the Secretary of State under 16 U. S. C. § 1821(e)(2)(B), regardless of any discretionary action the President himself decided to take. Japan Whaling, supra, at 226. Under 13 U. S. G. § 141(a), by contrast, the Secretary’s report to the President has no direct effect on reapportionment until the President takes affirmative steps to calculate and transmit the apportionment to Congress. Appellees claim that because the President exercises no discretion in calculating the numbers of Representatives, his “role in the statutory scheme was intended to have no substantive content,” and the final action is the Secretary’s, not the President’s. Brief for Appellees 86. They cite the Senate Report for the bill that became 2 U. S. G. § 2a, which states that the President is to report “upon a problem in mathematics which is standard, and for which rigid specifications are provided by Congress itself, and to which there can be but one mathematical answer.” S. Rep. No. 2, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., at 4-5. The admittedly ministerial nature of the apportionment calculation itself does not answer the question whether the apportionment is foreordained by the time the Secretary gives her report to the President. To reiterate, §2a does not curtail the President’s authority to direct the Secretary in making policy judgments that result in “the decennial census”; he is not expressly required to adhere to the policy decisions reflected in the Secretary’s report. Because it is the President’s personal transmittal of the report to Congress that settles the apportionment, until he acts there is no determinate agency action to challenge. The President, not the Secretary, takes the final action that affects the States. Indeed, it is clear that Congress thought it was important to involve a constitutional officer in the apportionment process. Congress originally considered a bill requiring the Secretary to report the apportionment calculation directly to Congress. See S. Rep. No. 1446, 70th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1929). The bill was later amended to require the participation of the President: “Another objection to the previous bill was that the Secretary of Commerce should not be intrusted with the final responsibility for making so important a report to Congress. The new and pending bill recognizes this objection to the extent that the President is substituted for the Secretary of Commerce so that this function may be served by a constitutional officer. This makes for greater permanence, which is one of the major virtues to be desired in such a statute.” S. Rep. No. 2, supra, at 5. It is hard to imagine a purpose for involving the President if he is to be prevented from exercising his accustomed supervisory powers over his executive officers. Certainly no purpose to alter the President’s usual superintendent role is evident from the text of the statute. As enacted, 2 U. S. C. § 2a provides that the Secretary cannot act alone; she must send her results to the President, who makes the calculations and sends the final apportionment to Congress. That the final act is that of the President is important to the integrity of the process and bolsters our conclusion that his duties are not merely ceremonial or ministerial. Thus, we can only review the APA claims here if the President, not the Secretary of Commerce, is an “agency” within the meaning of the Act. The APA defines “agency” as “each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not include— (A) the Congress; (B) the courts of the United States; (C) the governments of the territories or possessions of the United States; (D) the government of the District of Columbia.” 5 U. S. C. §§ 701(b)(1), 551(1). The President is not explicitly excluded from the APA’s purview, but he is not explicitly included, either. Out of respect for the separation of powers and the unique constitutional position of the President, we find that textual silence is not enough to subject the President to the provisions of the APA. We would require an express statement by Congress before assuming it intended the President’s performance of his statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Cf. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 748, n. 27 (1982) (Court would require an explicit statement by Congress before assuming Congress had created a damages action against the President). As the APA does not expressly allow review of the President’s actions, we must presume that his actions are not subject to its requirements. Although the President’s actions may still be reviewed for constitutionality, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935), we hold that they are not reviewable for abuse of discretion under the APA, see Armstrong v. Bush, 288 U. S. App. D. C. 38, 45, 924 F. 2d 282, 289 (1991). The District Court erred in proceeding to determine the merits of the APA claims. Ill Although the reapportionment determination is not subject to review under the standards of the APA, that does not dispose of appellees’ constitutional claims. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 603-605 (1988). Constitutional challenges to apportionment are justiciable. See Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U. S. 442 (1992). We first address standing. To invoke the constitutional power of the federal courts to adjudicate a ease or controversy under Article III, appellees here must allege and prove an injury “fairly traceable to the [appellants’] allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984). To determine whether appellees sufficiently allege and prove causation requires separating out- appellees’ claims: Appellees claim both that the Secretary erred in deciding to allocate overseas employees to various States and that the Secretary erred in using inaccurate data to do so. Appellees have shown that Massachusetts would have had an additional Representative if overseas employees had not been allocated at all. App. 183. They have neither alleged nor shown, however, that Massachusetts would have had an additional Representative if the allocation had been done using some other source of “more accurate” data. Consequently, even if appellees have standing to challenge the Secretary’s decision to allocate, they do not have standing to challenge the accuracy of the data used in making that allocation. We need, then, review only the decision to include overseas federal employees in the state population counts, not the Secretary’s choice of information sources. The thornier standing question is whether the injury is redressable by the relief sought. Tracking the statutory progress of the census data from the Census Bureau, through the President, and to the States, the District Court entered an injunction against the Secretary of Commerce, the President, and the Clerk of the House. 785 F. Supp., at 268. While injunctive relief against executive officials like the Secretary of Commerce is within the courts’ power, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra, the District Court’s grant of injunctive relief against the President himself is extraordinary, and should have raised judicial eyebrows. We have left open the question whether the President might be subject to a judicial injunction requiring the performance of a purely “ministerial” duty, Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475, 498-499 (1867), and we have held that the President may be subject to a subpoena to provide information relevant to an ongoing criminal prosecution, United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974), but in general “this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.” Mississippi v. Johnson, supra, at 501. At the threshold, the District Court should have evaluated whether injunctive relief against the President was available, and, if not, whether appellees’ injuries were nonetheless redressable. For purposes of establishing standing, however, we need not decide whether injunctive relief against the President was appropriate, because we conclude that the injury alleged is likely to be redressed by declaratory relief against the Secretary alone. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 75, n. 20 (1978); Allen v. Wright, supra, at 752. The Secretary certainly has an interest in defending her policy determinations concerning the census; even though she cannot herself change the reapportionment, she has an interest in litigating its accuracy. And, as the Solicitor General has not contended to the contrary, we may assume it is substantially likely that the President and other executive and congressional officials would abide by an authoritative interpretation of the census statute and constitutional provision by the District Court, even though they would not be directly bound by such a determination. IV On the merits, appellees argue that the Secretary’s allocation of overseas federal employees to the States violated the command of Article I, § 2, cl. 3, that the number of Representatives per State be determined by an “actual Enumeration” of “their respective Numbers,” that is, a count of the persons “in” each State. Appellees point out that the first census conducted in 1790 required that persons be allocated to their place of “usual residence.” Brief for Appellees 77. See Act of Mar. 1,1790, §5,1 Stat. 103. Because the interpretations of the Constitution by the First Congress are persuasive, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 723-724 (1986), ap-pellees argue that the Secretary should have allocated the overseas employees’ to their overseas stations, because those were their usual residences. The appellants respond, on the other hand, that the allocation of employees temporarily stationed overseas to their home States is fully compatible with the standard of "usual residence” used in the early censuses. We review the dispute to the extent of determining whether the Secretary’s interpretation is consistent with the constitutional language and the constitutional goal of equal representation. See Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U, S., at 459. “Usual residence” was the gloss given the constitutional phrase “in each State” by the first enumeration Act and has been used by the Census Bureau ever since to allocate persons to their home States. App. 173-174. The term can mean more than mere physical presence, and has been used broadly enough to include some element of allegiance or enduring tie to a place. The first enumeration Act itself provided that “every person occasionally absent at the time of the enumeration [shall be counted] as belonging to that place in which he usually resides in the United States.” Act of Mar. 1, 1790, § 5, 1 Stat. 103. The Act placed no limit on the duration of the absence, which, considering the modes of transportation available at the time, may have been quite lengthy. For example, during the 36-week enumeration period of the 1790 census, President George Washington spent 16 weeks traveling through the States, 15 weeks at the seat of Government, and only 10 weeks at his home in Mount Vernon. He was, however, counted as a resident of Virginia. T. Clemence, Place of Abode, reproduced in App. 83. The first enumeration Act uses other words as well to describe the required tie to the State: “usual place of abode,” “inhabitant,” “usual resident].” Act of Mar. 1, 1790, § 5, 1 Stat. 103. The first draft of Article I, § 2, also used the word “inhabitant,” which was omitted by the Committee of Style in the final provision. 2 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 566, 590. In the related context of congressional residence qualifications, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 2, James Madison interpreted the constitutional term “inhabitant” to include “persons absent occasionally for a considerable time on public or private business.” 2 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 217. This understanding was applied in 1824, when a question was raised about the residency qualifications of would-be Representative John Forsyth, of Georgia. Mr. Forsyth had been living in Spain during his election, serving as minister plenipotentiary from the United States. His qualification for office was challenged on the ground that he was not “an inhabitant of the State in which he [was] chosen.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §2, el. 2. The House Committee of Elections disagreed, reporting: “There is nothing in Mr. Forsyth’s case which disqualifies him from holding a seat in this House. The capacity in which he acted, excludes the idea that, by the performance of his duty abroad, he ceased to be an inhabitant of the United States; and, if so, inasmuch as he had no inhabitancy in any other part of the Union than Georgia, he must be considered as in the same situation as before the acceptance of the appointment.” M. Clarke & D. Hall, Cases of Contested Elections in Congress 497-498 (1834). Representative Bailey, supporting the qualification of Mr. Forsyth, pointed out that if “the mere living in a place constituted inhabitancy,” it would “exclude sitting members of this House.” Id., at 497 (emphasis deleted). Up to the present day, “usual residence” has continued to hold broad connotations. For example, up until 1950, college students were counted as belonging to the State where their parents resided, not to the State where they attended school. *App. 219. Even today, high school students away at boarding school are allocated to their parents’ home State, not the location of the school. Id., at 220. Members of Congress may choose whether to be counted in the Washington, D. C., area or in their home States. Id., at 218. Those persons who are institutionalized in out-of-state hospitals or jails for short terms are also counted in their home States. Id., at 225. In this ease, the Secretary of Commerce made a judgment, consonant with, though not dictated by, the text and history of the Constitution, that many federal employees temporarily stationed overseas had retained their ties to the States and could and should be counted toward their States' representation in Congress: “Many, if not most, of these military overseas consider themselves to be usual residents of the United States, even though they are temporarily assigned overseas.” Id., at 120. The Secretary’s judgment does not hamper the underlying constitutional goal of equal representation, but, assuming that employees temporarily stationed abroad have indeed retained their ties to their home States, actually promotes equality. If some persons sharing in Washington’s fate had not been properly counted, the votes of all those who reside in Washington State would not have been weighted equally to votes of those who reside in other States. Certainly, appellees have not demonstrated that eliminating overseas employees entirely from the state counts will make representation in Congress more equal. Cf. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 730-731 (1983) (parties challenging state apportionment legislation bear burden of proving disparate representation). We conclude that appel-lees’ constitutional challenge fails on the merits. The District Court’s judgment is Reversed. Justice Stevens suggests that the “decennial census” is a single count, determined solely by the Secretary, that is used for many purposes other than reapportionment of Representatives. Therefore, he reasons, it cannot be within the control of the President. However, the President may be involved in the policymaking tasks of his Cabinet members, whether or not his involvement is explicitly required by statute. The question here is whether the census count is final before the President acts. It seems clear that it is not. The tabulations used for purposes of state redistricting, which include counts of persons in each state district, are not required by statute to be completed until April 1, months after the President’s report to Congress. 13 U. S. C. § 141(c). While appellants asserted below that the courts have no subject-matter jurisdiction over this case because it involves a “political question,” we recently rejected a similar argument in Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U. S., at 456-459, and appellants now concede the issue. Brief for Appellants 21. As submitted to the Committee of Style, the provision read: “[T]he Legislature shall... regulate the number of representatives by the number of inhabitants.” 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 566 (rev. ed. 1966). After its return by the Committee, it had a more familiar ring: “Representatives ... shall be apportioned among the several states ... according to their respective numbers.” Id., at 590.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. VERMONT et al. No. 509. Argued April 21, 1964. Decided June 1, 1964. Daniel M. Friedman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer and Joseph Kovner. Charles E. Gibson, Jr., Attorney General of Vermont, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves a conflict between two liens upon the property of a solvent Vermont taxpayer — a federal tax lien arising under the provisions of 26 U. S. C. §§ 6321 and 6322 and an antecedent state tax lien based on a Vermont law worded in terms virtually identical to the provisions of those federal statutes. On October 21, 1958, the State of Vermont made an assessment and demand on Cutting & Trimming, Inc., for withheld state income taxes of $1,628.15. The applicable Vermont statute, modeled on the comparable federal enactments, provides that if an employer required to withhold a tax fails to pay the same after demand, “the amount, including interest after such demand, together witty any costs that may accrue in addition thereto, shall be a lien in favor of the state of Vermont upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such employer,” and that “[s]uch lien shall arise at the time the assessment and demand is made by the commissioner of taxes and shall continue until the liability for such sum, with interest and costs, is satisfied or becomes unenforceable.” More than three months later, on February 9, 1959, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue made an assessment against Cutting & Trimming of $5,365.96 for taxes due under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. Under §§ 6321 and 6322, this amount became “a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person,” which arose “at the time the assessment is made and shall continue until the liability for the amount so assessed is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time.” On May 21, 1959, the State instituted suit in a state court against Cutting & Trimming, joining as a defendant Chittenden Trust Company, a Burlington bank which, as the result of a writ served on May 25, disclosed that it had in hand sums owing to Cutting & Trimming. On October 23, 1959, judgment was entered against Cutting & Trimming and against Chittenden Trust Company. In 1961, the United States brought the present action in the Federal District Court for Vermont to foreclose the federal lien against the property of Cutting & Trimming held by the Trust Company. Vermont’s answer alleged that the state assessment of October 21, 1958, gave its lien priority over the federal lien. On cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court held that the state lien had priority, and directed the Trust Company to apply the moneys which it held first to the payment of principal and interest on that lien, and to pay any balance to the United States. 206 F. Supp. 951. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that, under this Court’s decision in United States v. New Britain, 347 U. S. 81, “[i]t would seem that if the general federal tax lien under §§ 6321 and 6322 is thus sufficiently 'choate’ to prevail over a later specific local tax lien, a general state tax lien under an almost identically worded statute must also be 'choate’ enough to prime a later and equally general federal tax lien,” 317 F. 2d 446, 452. Accordingly, the appellate court applied “the ‘cardinal rule’ laid down by Chief Justice Marshall in Rankin & Schatzell v. Scott, 12 Wheat. (25 U. S.) 177, 179 (1827): ‘The principle is believed to be universal that a prior lien gives a prior claim, which is entitled to prior satisfaction, out of the subject it binds ....’” Id., at 450. Because of the importance of the question in the administration of the state and federal revenue laws, we granted certiorari. 375 U. S. 940. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Both parties urge that decision here is governed by United States v. New Britain, 347 U. S. 81. In that case, involving conflicting municipal and federal statutory liens, the Court held that “the priority of each statutory lien contested here must depend on the time it attached to the property in question and became choate.” Id., at 86. In determining the ehoateness of the liens involved, the Court “accept[ed] the [state court’s] holding as to the specificity of the City’s liens since they attached to specific pieces of real property for the taxes assessed and water rent due,” but it went on to stress that “liens may also be perfected in the sense that there is nothing more to be done to have a choate lien — when the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are established. The federal tax liens are general and, in the sense above indicated, perfected.” Id., at 84. Vermont’s claim for the priority of its lien over the later federal lien is based on the fact that its lien is as completely “perfected” as was the federal lien in New Britain. Opposing this claim, the United States urges that different standards of choateness apply to federal and state liens, even where, as here, they are based on statutes identical in every material respect. The argument, in short, is that an antecedent state lien, in order to obtain priority over a federal lien based on §§ 6321 and 6322, cannot, like the federal lien, attach to all of the taxpayer’s property, but must rather, like the municipal liens in New Britain, attach to specifically identified portions of that property. The requirement that a competing lien must be choate in order to take priority over a later federal tax lien stems from the decision in United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U. S. 47. There, an attachment lien which gave no right to proceed against the attached property unless judgment was obtained within three years or within an extension provided by the statute was held junior to a federal tax lien which had arisen after the date of the attachment but prior to the date of judgment on the ground that “[n]umerous contingencies might arise that would prevent the attachment lien from ever becoming perfected by a judgment awarded and recorded. Thus the attachment lien is contingent or inchoate— merely a lis pendens notice that a right to perfect a lien exists.” Id., at 50. The Security Trust rationale has since been applied in a case where a federal tax lien arose prior to judgment on a garnishment lien, United States v. Liverpool & London Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 215, and comparable defects have been held to require the according of priority to the federal lien in a series of cases involving competing mechanics’ liens. In addition to setting out the specific ground of decision, however, the Security Trust opinion went on to state: “In cases involving a kindred matter, i. e., the federal priority under R. S. § 3466, it has never been held sufficient to defeat the federal priority merely to show a lien effective to protect the lienor against others than the Government, but contingent upon taking subsequent steps for enforcing it. . . . If the purpose of the federal tax lien statute to insure prompt and certain collection of taxes due the United States from tax delinquents is to be fulfilled, a similar rule must prevail here.” 340 U. S., at 51. Relying on this statement, the United States urges us to read Security Trust as establishing the proposition that federal tax liens are entitled to priority, not only over “a lis pendens notice that a right to perfect a lien exists,” but over any antecedent lien which is not sufficiently perfected to prevail against the explicit priority which R. S. § 3466 gives to claims of the United States in situations involving insolvency. More particularly, it is suggested that the state liens at issue here did not meet the standards of “specificity” until Vermont attached the funds held by the Chittenden Trust Company, at which time the federal tax lien had already come into existence. This argument fails to discriminate between the standards applicable under the federal tax lien provisions and those applicable to an insolvent debtor under R. S. § 3466. Section 3466 on its face permits no exception whatsoever from the statutory command that “[wjhenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent . . . debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied.” The statute applies to all the insolvent’s debts to the Government, whether or not arising from taxes, and whether or not secured by a lien. In United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U. S. 361, without questioning that the lienor was identified, the amount of the lien certain or the property subject to the lien definite, this Court accorded priority to subsequently arising claims of the United States against an insolvent debtor on the ground that: “In claims of this type, 'specificity’ requires that the lien be attached to certain property by reducing it to possfession, on the theory that the United States has no claim against property no longer in the possession of the debtor. . . . The taxpayer had not been divested by the Town of either title or possession. The Town, therefore, had only a general, unperfected lien.” Id., at 366. The state tax commissioner’s assessment and demand in the present case clearly did not meet that standard, nor, so far as that goes, did the writ of attachment served on the Chittenden Trust Company. But the New Britain case, 347 U. S. 81, in which “[t]he taxpayer had not been divested by the Town of either title or possession,” makes quite clear that different standards apply where the United States’ claim is based on a tax lien arising under §§ 6321 and 6322. “When the debtor is insolvent, Congress has expressly given priority to the payment of indebtedness owing the United States, whether secured by liens or otherwise, by § 3466 of the Revised Statutes, 31 U. S. C. . . . § 191. In that circumstance, where all the property of the debtor is involved, Congress has protected the federal revenues by imposing an absolute priority [citing United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U. S. 361; United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, 323 U. S. 353]. Where the debtor is not insolvent, Congress has failed to expressly provide for federal priority . . . although the United States is free to pursue the whole of the debtor’s property wherever situated.” United States v. New Britain, 347 U. S. 81, 85. It is undisputed that the State’s lien here meets the test laid down in New Britain that “the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are established.” 347 U. S., at 84. Moreover, unlike those cases in which the Security Trust rationale was applied to subordinate liens on the ground that judgment had not been obtained prior to the time the federal lien arose, it is as true of Vermont’s lien here as it was of the federal lien in New Britain that “The assessment is given the force of a judgment, and if the amount assessed is not paid when due, administrative officials may seize the debtor’s property to satisfy the debt.” Bull v. United States, 295 U. S. 247, 260. For these reasons, we hold that this antecedent state lien arising under a statute modeled after §§ 6321 and 6322 is sufficiently choate to obtain priority over the later federal lien arising under those provisions. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. 26 U. S. C. § 6321 provides: “If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.” 26 U. S. C. §6322 provides: “Unless another date is specifically fixed by law, the lien imposed by section 6321 shall arise at the time the assessment is made and shall continue until the liability for the amount so assessed is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time.” 32 V. S. A. § 5765. See note 1, supra. Notice of the federal lien was filed on June 2, 1959, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 6323, which provides: “(a) Invalidity of lien without notice. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), the lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed by the Secretary or his delegate— . . . .” No claim is made here that Vermont’s lien comes within any of the four classifications to which § 6323 accords priority until notice of the federal tax lien has been filed. Consequently, we put to one side such cases as United States v. Pioneer American Ins. Co., 374 U. S. 84, United States v. Ball Construction Co., 355 U. S. 587, and United States v. Scovil, 348 U. S, 218, which are concerned with the federal standards to be applied in determining whether the security interests envisaged in that provision have in fact been created. See also United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U. S. 361, 363-365. See also United States v. Acri, 348 U. S. 211 (attachment lien). United States v. Hulley, 358 U. S. 66; United States v. Vorreiter, 355 U. S. 15; United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U. S. 1010; United States v. Colotta, 350 U. S. 808. Revised Statutes §3466 provides: “Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority hereby established shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed.” See also Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U. S. 362, 375-376; United States v. Waddill Co., 323 U. S. 353, 359-360. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly reserved the question whether the priority given the United States by R. S. § 3466 can be overcome even by a prior specific and perfected lien. United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U. S. 361, 365; Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U. S. 362, 370; United States v. Waddill Co., 323 U. S. 353, 355-356; United States v. Texas, 314 U. S. 480, 484-486; New York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290, 294; Spokane County v. United States, 279 U. S. 80, 95. See also Crest Finance Co. v. United States, 368 U. S. 347. See notes 4 and 5, supra, and accompanying text. See 317 F. 2d, at 448, n. 2. The municipal liens accorded priority in New Britain were also characterized as summarily enforceable. See Brief for the United States, No. 92, 1953 Term, p. 27, n. 13.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. YESHIVA UNIVERSITY No. 78-857. Argued October 10, 1979 Decided February 20, 1980 Powell, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Bueger, C. J., and Stewart, RehNquist, and SteveNS, JJ., joined. BreNNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 691. Norton J. Come argued the cause for petitioner in No. 78-857. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Stephen M. Shapiro, John S. Irving, Robert E. Allen, Linda Sher, and David 8. Fish-back. Ronald H. Shechtman argued the cause for petitioner in No. 78-997. With him on the brief was Murray A. Gordon. Marvin E. Frankel argued the cause for respondent in both cases. With him on the brief were Saul G. Kramer, Mark L. Goldstein, and Gerald A. Bodner. Together with No. 78-997, Yeshiva University Faculty Assn. v. Yeshiva University, also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Woodley B. Osborne, Victor J. Stone, and Robert A. Goldstein for the American Association of University Professors; and by Donald H. Wollett and Robert H. Chanin for the National Education Association. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Estelle A. Fish-bein, Fred Vinson, Daniel Riesel, and David Sive for Johns Hopkins University et al.; and by Kenneth C. McGuiness, Robert E. Williams, and Daniel R. Levinson for the National Society of Professional Engineers. Lawrence A. Poltrock filed a brief in No. 78-857 for the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. Supervisors and managerial employees are excluded from the categories of employees entitled to the benefits of collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act. The question presented is whether the full-time faculty of Yeshiva University fall within those exclusions. I Yeshiva is a private university which conducts a broad range of arts and sciences programs at its five undergraduate and eight graduate schools in New York City. On October 30, 1974, the Yeshiva University Faculty Association (Union) filed a representation petition with the National Labor Relations Board (Board). The Union sought certification as bargaining agent for the full-time faculty members at 10 of the 13 schools. The University opposed the petition on the ground that all of its faculty members are managerial or supervisory personnel and hence not employees within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (Act). A Board-appointed hearing officer held hearings over a period of five months, generating a voluminous record. The evidence at the hearings showed that a central administrative hierarchy serves all of the University’s schools. Ultimate authority is vested in a Board of Trustees, whose members (other than the President) hold no administrative positions at the University. The President sits on the Board of Trustees and serves as chief executive officer, assisted by four Vice Presidents who oversee, respectively, medical affairs and science, student affairs, business affairs, and academic affairs. An Executive Council of Deans and administrators makes recommendations to the President on a wide variety of matters. University-wide policies are formulated by the central administration with the approval of the Board of Trustees, and include general guidelines dealing with teaching loads, salary scales, tenure, sabbaticals, retirement, and fringe benefits. The budget for each school is drafted by its Dean or Director, subject to approval by the President after consultation with a committee of administrators. The faculty participate in University-wide governance through their representatives on an elected student-faculty advisory council. The only University-wide faculty body is the Faculty Review Committee, composed of elected representatives who adjust grievances by informal negotiation and also may make formal recommendations to the Dean of the affected school or to the President. Such recommendations are purely advisory. The individual schools within the University are substantially autonomous. Each is headed by a Dean or Director, and faculty members at each school meet formally and informally to discuss and decide matters of institutional and professional concern. At four schools, formal meetings are convened regularly pursuant to written bylaws. The remaining faculties meet when convened by the Dean or Director. Most of the schools also have faculty committees concerned with special areas of educational policy. Faculty welfare committees negotiate with administrators concerning salary and conditions of employment. Through these meetings and committees, the faculty at each school effectively determine its curriculum, grading system, admission and matriculation standards, academic calendars, and course schedules. Faculty power at Yeshiva’s schools extends beyond strictly academic concerns. The faculty at each school make recommendations to the Dean or Director in every case of faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination and promotion. Although the final decision is reached by the central administration on the advice of the Dean or Director, the overwhelming majority of faculty recommendations are implemented. Even when financial problems in the early 1970’s restricted Yeshiva’s budget, faculty recommendations still largely controlled personnel decisions made within the constraints imposed by the administration. Indeed, the faculty of one school recently drew up new and binding policies expanding their own role in these matters. In addition, some faculties make final decisions regarding the admission, expulsion, and graduation of individual students. Others have decided questions involving teaching loads, student absence policies, tuition and enrollment levels, and in one case the location of a school. II A three-member panel of the Board granted the Union’s petition in December 1975, and directed an election in a bargaining unit consisting of all full-time faculty members at the affected schools. 221 N. L. R. B. 1053. The unit included Assistant Deans, senior professors, and department chairmen, as well as associate professors, assistant professors, and instructors. Deans and Directors were excluded. The Board summarily rejected the University’s contention that its entire faculty are managerial, viewing the claim as a request for reconsideration of previous Board decisions on the issue. Instead of making findings of fact as to Yeshiva, the Board referred generally to the record and found no “significan [t]” difference between this faculty and others it had considered. The Board concluded that the faculty are professional employees entitled to the protection of the Act because “faculty participation in collegial decision making is on a collective rather than individual basis, it is exercised in the faculty’s own interest rather than fin the interest of the employer,’ and final authority rests with the board of trustees.” Id., at 1054 (footnote omitted). The Union won the election and was certified by the Board. The University refused to bargain, reasserting its view that the faculty are managerial. In the subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding, the Board refused to reconsider its holding in the representation proceeding and ordered the University ,to bargain with the Union. 231 N. L. R. B. 597 (1977). When the University still refused to sit down at the negotiating table, the Board sought enforcement in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which denied the petition. 582 F. 2d 686 (1978). Since the Board had made no findings of fact, the court examined the record and related the circumstances in considerable detail. It agreed that the faculty are professional employees under § 2 (12) of the Act. 29 U. S. C. § 152 (12). But the court found that the Board had ignored “the extensive control of Yeshiva’s faculty” over academic and personnel decisions as well as the “crucial role of the full-time faculty in determining other central policies of the institution.” 582 F. 2d, at 698. The court concluded that such power is not an exercise of individual professional expertise. Rather, the faculty are, “in effect, substantially and pervasively operating the enterprise.” Ibid. Accordingly, the court held that the faculty are endowed with “managerial status” sufficient to remove them from the coverage of the Act. We granted certiorari, 440 U. S. 906 (1979), and now affirm. Ill There is no evidence that Congress has considered whether a university faculty may organize for collective bargaining under the Act. Indeed, when the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts were approved, it was thought that congressional power did not extend to university faculties because they were employed by nonprofit institutions which did not “affect corn-merce.” See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 504-505 (1979). Moreover, the authority structure of a university does not fit neatly within the statutory scheme we are asked to interpret. The Board itself has noted that the concept of collegiality “does not square with the traditional authority structures with which th[e] Act was designed to cope in the typical organizations of the commercial world.” Adelphi University, 195 N. L. R. B. 639, 648 (1972). The Act was intended to accommodate the type of management-employee relations that prevail in the pyramidal hierarchies of private industry. Ibid. In contrast, authority in the typical “mature” private university is divided between a central administration and one or more collegial bodies. See J. Baldridge, Power and Conflict in the University 114 (1971). This system of “shared authority” evolved from the medieval model of collegial decisionmaking in which guilds of scholars were responsible only to themselves. See N. Fehl, The Idea of a University in East and West 36-46 (1962); D. Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought 164-168 (1962). At early universities, the faculty were the school. Although faculties have been subject to external control in the United States since colonial times, J. Brubacher & W. Rudy, Higher Education in Transition: A History of American Colleges and Universities, 1636-1976, pp. 25-30 (3d ed. 1976), traditions of collegiality continue to play a significant role at many universities, including Yeshiva. For these reasons, the Board has recognized that principles developed for use in the industrial setting cannot be “imposed blindly on the academic world.” Syracuse University, 204 N. L. R. B. 641, 643 (1973). The absence of explicit congressional direction, of course, does not preclude the Board from reaching any particular type of employment. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U. S. Ill, 124—131 (1944). Acting under its responsibility for adapting the broad provisions of the Act to differing workplaces, the Board asserted jurisdiction over a university for the first time in 1970. Cornell University, 183 N. L. R. B. 329 (1970). Within a year it had approved the formation of bargaining units composed of faculty members. C. W. Post Center, 189 N. L. R. B. 904 (1971). The Board reasoned that faculty members are “professional employees” within the meaning of § 2 (12) of the Act and therefore are entitled to the benefits of collective bargaining. 189 N. L. R. B., at 905; 29 U. S. C. § 152 (12). Yeshiva does not contend that its faculty are not professionals under the statute. But professionals, like other employees, may be exempted from coverage under the Act’s ex-elusion for “supervisors” who use independent judgment in overseeing other employees in the interest of the employer, or under the judicially implied exclusion for “managerial employees” who are involved in developing and enforcing employer policy. Both exemptions grow out of the same concern: That an employer is entitled to the undivided loyalty of its representatives. Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, 416 U. S. 653, 661-662 (1974); see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267, 281-282 (1974). Because the Court of Appeals found the faculty to be managerial employees, it did not decide the question of their supervisory status. In view of our agreement with that court’s application of the managerial exclusion, we also need not resolve that issue of statutory interpretation. IV Managerial employees are defined as those who “ 'formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer.’ ” NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., supra, at 288 (quoting Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N. L. R. B. 320, 323, n. 4 (1947)). These employees are “much higher in the managerial structure” than those explicitly mentioned by Congress, which “regarded [them] as so clearly outside the Act that no specific exclusionary provision was thought necessary.” 416 U. S., at 283. Managerial employees must exercise discretion within, or even independently of, established employer policy and must be aligned with management. See id., at 286-287 (citing cases). Although the Board has established no firm criteria for determining when an employee is so aligned, normally an employee may be excluded as managerial only if he represents management interests by taking or recommending discretionary actions that effectively control or implement employer policy. The Board does not contend that the Yeshiva faculty’s decisionmaking is too insignificant to be deemed managerial. Nor does it suggest that the role of the faculty is merely advisory and thus not managerial. Instead, it contends that the managerial exclusion cannot be applied in a straightforward fashion to professional employees because those employees often appear to be exercising managerial authority when they are merely performing routine job duties. The status of such employees, in the Board's view, must be determined by reference to the “alignment with management” criterion. The Board argues that the Yeshiva faculty are not aligned with management because they are expected to exercise “independent professional judgment” while participating in academic governance, and because they are neither “expected to conform to management policies [nor] judged according to their effectiveness in carrying out those policies.” Because of this independence, the Board contends there is no danger of divided loyalty and no need for the managerial exclusion. In its view, union pressure cannot divert the faculty from adhering to the interests of the university, because the university itself expects its faculty to pursue professional values rather than institutional interests. The Board concludes that application of the managerial exclusion to such employees would frustrate the national labor policy in favor of collective bargaining. This “independent professional judgment” test was not applied in the decision we are asked to uphold. The Board's opinion relies exclusively on its previous faculty decisions for both legal and factual analysis. 221 N. L. R. B., at 1054. But those decisions only dimly foreshadow the reasoning now proffered to the Court. Without explanation, the Board initially announced two different rationales for faculty cases, then quickly transformed them into a litany to be repeated in case after case: (i) faculty authority .is collective, (ii) it is exercised in the faculty’s own interest rather than in the interest of the university, and (iii) final authority rests with the board of trustees. Northeastern University, 218 N. L. R. B. 247, 250 (1975); University of Miami, 213 N. L. R. B. 634, 634 (1974); see Tusculum College, 199 N. L. R. B. 28, 30 (1972). In their arguments in this case, the Board’s lawyers have abandoned the first and third branches of this analysis, which in any event were flatly inconsistent with its precedents, and have transformed the second into a theory that does not appear clearly in any Board opinion. V The controlling consideration in this case is that the faculty of Yeshiva University exercise authority which in any other context unquestionably would be managerial. Their authority in academic matters is absolute. They decide what courses will be offered, when they will be scheduled, and to whom they will be taught. They debate and determine teaching methods, grading policies, and matriculation standards. They effectively decide which students will be admitted, retained, and graduated. On occasion their views have determined the size of the student body, the tuition to be charged, and the location of a school. When one considers the function of a university, it is difficult to imagine decisions more managerial than these. To the extent the industrial analogy applies, the faculty determines within each school the product to be produced, the terms upon which it will be offered, and the customers who will be served. The Board nevertheless insists that these decisions are not managerial because they require the exercise of independent professional judgment. We are not persuaded by this argument. There may be some tension between the Act’s exclusion of managerial employees and its inclusion of professionals, since most professionals in managerial positions continue to draw on their special skills and training. But we have been directed to no authority suggesting that that tension can be resolved by reference to the “independent professional judgment” criterion proposed in this case. Outside the university context, the Board routinely has applied the managerial and supervisory exclusions to professionals in executive positions without inquiring whether their decisions were based on management policy rather than professional expertise. Indeed, the Board has twice implicitly rejected the contention that decisions based on professional judgment cannot be managerial. Since the Board does not suggest that the “independent professional judgment” test is to be limited to university faculty, its new approach would overrule sub silentio this body of Board precedent and could result in the indiscriminate recharacterization as covered employees of professionals working in supervisory and managerial capacities. Moreover, the Board’s approach would undermine the goal it purports to serve: To ensure that employees who exercise discretionary authority on behalf of the employer will not divide their loyalty between employer and union. In arguing that a faculty member exercising independent judgment acts primarily in his own interest and therefore does not represent the interest of his employer, the Board assumes that the professional interests of the faculty and the interests of the institution are distinct, separable entities with which a faculty member could not simultaneously be aligned. The Court of Appeals found no justification for this distinction, and we perceive none. In fact, the faculty’s professional interests — as applied to governance at a university like Yeshiva — cannot be separated from those of the institution. In such a university, the predominant policy normally is to operate a quality institution of higher learning that will accomplish broadly defined educational goals within the limits of its financial resources. The "business” of a university is education, and its vitality ultimately must depend on academic policies that largely are formulated and generally are implemented by faculty governance decisions. See K. Mortimer & T. McConnell, Sharing Authority Effectively 23-24 (1978). Faculty members enhance their own standing and fulfill their professional mission by ensuring that the university’s objectives are met. But there can be no doubt that the quest for academic excellence and institutional distinction is a “policy” to which the administration expects the faculty to adhere, whether it be defined as a professional or an institutional goal. It is fruitless to ask whether an employee is “expected to conform” to one goal or another when the two are essentially the same. See NLRB v. Scott Paper Co., 440 F. 2d 625, 630 (CA1 1971) (tractor owner-operators); Deaton Truck Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 337 F. 2d 697, 699 (CA5 1964) (same), cert. denied, 381 U. S. 903 (1965). The problem of divided loyalty is particularly acute for a university like Yeshiva, which depends on the professional judgment of its faculty to formulate and apply crucial policies constrained only by necessarily general institutional goals. The university requires faculty participation in governance because professional expertise is indispensable to the formulation and implementation of academic policy. It may appear, as the Board contends, that the professor performing governance functions is less “accountable” for departures from institutional policy than a middle-level industrial manager whose discretion is more confined. Moreover, traditional systems of collegiality and tenure insulate the professor from some of the sanctions applied to an industrial manager who fails to adhere to company policy. But the analogy of the university to industry need not, and indeed cannot, be complete. It is clear that Yeshiva and like universities must rely on their faculties to participate in the making and implementation of their policies. The large measure of independence enjoyed by faculty members can only increase the danger that divided loyalty will lead to those harms that the Board traditionally has sought to prevent. We certainly are not suggesting an application of the managerial exclusion that would sweep all professionals outside the Act in derogation of Congress’ expressed intent to protect them. The Board has recognized that employees whose deci-sionmaking is limited to the routine discharge of professional duties in projects to which they have been assigned cannot be excluded from coverage even if union membership arguably may involve some divided loyalty. Only if an employee’s activities fall outside the scope of the duties routinely performed by similarly .situated professionals will he be found aligned with management. We think these decisions accurately capture the intent of Congress, and that they provide an appropriate starting point for analysis in cases involving professionals alleged to be managerial. VI Finally, the Board contends that the deference due its expertise in these matters requires us to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. The question we decide today is a mixed one of fact and law. But the Board’s opinion may be searcheddn vain for relevant findings of fact. The absence of factual analysis apparently reflects the Board’s view that the managerial status of particular faculties may be decided on the basis of conclusory rationales rather than examination of the facts of each case. The Court of Appeals took a different view, and determined that the faculty of Yeshiva University, “in effect, substantially and pervasively operat[e] the enterprise.” 582 F. 2d, at 698. We find no reason to reject this conclusion. As our decisions consistently show, we accord great respect to the expertise of the Board when its conclusions are rationally based on articulated facts and consistent with the Act. Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U. S. 483, 501 (1978). In this case, we hold that the Board’s decision satisfies neither criterion. Affirmed. 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U. S. C. § 151 et seq.; see 29 U. S. C. §§ 152 (3), 152 (11), 164 (a); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267 (1974). The schools involved are Yeshiva College, Stern College for Women, Teacher’s Institute for Women, Erna Michael College, Yeshiva Program, James Striar School of General Jewish Studies, Belfer Graduate School of Sciences, Ferkauf Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Wurzweiler School of Social Work, and Bernard Revel Graduate School. The Union did not seek to represent the faculty of the medical school, the graduate school of medical sciences, the Yeshiva High School, or any of the theological programs affiliated with the University. A law school has been opened since the time of the hearings, but it does not figure in this case. At Yeshiva College, budget requests prepared by the senior professor in each subject area receive the “perfunctory” approval of the Dean “99 percent” of the time and have never been rejected by the central administration. App. 298-299. A council of elected department chairmen at Ferkauf approves the school’s budget allocations when discretionary funds are available. Id., at 626-627. All of these professors were included in the bargaining unit approved by the Board. For example, the Deans at Yeshiva and Erna Michael Colleges regard faculty actions as binding. Id., at 248-249, 312-313. Administrators testified that no academic initiative of either faculty had been vetoed since at least 1968. Id., at 250, 313. When the Stern College faculty disagreed with the Dean’s decision to delete the education major, the major was rein-stituted. Id., at 191. The Director of the Teacher’s Institute for Women testified that “the faculty is the school,” id, at 379, while the Director of the James Striar School described his position as the “executive arm of the faculty,” which had overruled him on occasion, id., at 360-361. All decisions regarding academic matters at the Yeshiva Program and Bernard Revel are made by faculty consensus. Id., at 574, 583-586. The “internal operation of [Wurzweiler] has been heavily governed by faculty decisions,” according to its Dean. Id., at 502. One Dean estimated that 98% of faculty hiring recommendations were ultimately given effect. Id., at 624. Others could not recall an instance when a faculty recommendation had been overruled. Id., at 193-194. At Stem College, the Dean in six years has never overturned a promotion decision. Ibid. The President has accepted all decisions of the Yeshiva College faculty as to promotions and sabbaticals, including decisions opposed by the Dean. Id., at 268-270. At Erna Michael, the Dean has never hired a full-time faculty member without the consent of the affected senior professor, id., at 333-335, and the Director of Teacher’s Institute for Women stated baldly that no teacher had ever been hired if “there was the slightest objection, even on one faculty member’s part.” Id., at 388. The faculty at both these schools have overridden recommendations made by the deans. No promotion or grant of tenure has ever been made at Ferkauf over faculty opposition. Id., at 620, 633. The Dean of Belfer testified that he had no right to override faculty decisions on tenure and nonrenewal. Id., at 419. The Director of Teacher’s Institute for Women once recommended that the school move to Brooklyn to attract students. The faculty rejected the proposal and the school remained in Manhattan. Id., at 379-380. “Full-time faculty” were defined as those “appointed to the University in the titles of professor, associate professor, assistant professor, instructor, or any adjunct or visiting thereof, department chairmen, division chairmen, senior faculty and assistant deans, but excluding . . . part-time faculty; lecturers; principal investigators; deans, acting deans and directors; [and others not relevant to this action].” 221 N. L. R. B., at 1057. The term “faculty” in this opinion refers to the members of this unit as defined by the Board. Identical language had been employed in at least two other Board decisions. See infra, at 684M385. In this case, it was not supported by a single citation to the record. MR. Justice BreNNAN’s dissent relies on this language, post, at 696, and adds that a faculty’s “primary concerns are academic and relate solely to its own professional reputation,” post, at 701. The view that faculty governance authority “is exercised in the faculty’s own interest” rather than that of the University assumes a lack of responsibility that certainly is not reflected in this record. See also S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1935) (dispute between employer and college professor would not be covered); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 36 (1947) (listing professional employees covered by new statutory provision without mentioning teachers); S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 11, 19 (1947) (same). See the inaugural address of Williams College President Paul Ansel Chadbourne, quoted in Kahn, The NLRB and Higher Education: The Failure of Policymaking Through Adjudication, 21 UCLA L. Rev. 63, 70, n. 16 (1973) (‘"Professors are sometimes spoken of as working for the college. They are the college’ ”) (emphasis in original); Davis, Unions and Higher Education: Another View, 49 Ed. Record 139, 143 (1968) (“The president ... is not the faculty’s master. He is as much the faculty’s administrator as he is the board [of trustees’] ”); n. 4, supra. The Board has suggested that Congress tacitly approved the formation of faculty units in 1974, when the Act was amended to eliminate the exemption accorded to nonprofit hospitals. Although Congress appears to have agreed that nonprofit institutions “affect commerce” under modem economic conditions, H. R. Rep. No. 93-1051, p. 4 (1974); 120 Cong. Rec. 12938 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams), there is nothing to suggest that Congress considered the status of university faculties. The Act provides broadly that “employees” have organizational and other rights. 29 U. S. C. § 157. Section 2 (3) defines “employee” in general terms, 29 U. S. C. §152(3); §2(12) defines “professional employee” in some detail, 29 U. S. C. § 152 (12); and § 9 (b) (1) prohibits the Board from creating a bargaining unit that includes both professional and nonprofessional employees unless a majority of the professionals vote for inclusion, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (b) (1). An employee may be excluded if he has authority over any one of 12 enumerated personnel actions, including hiring and firing. 29 U. S. C. §§ 152 (3), 152 (11), 164 (a). The Board has held repeatedly that professionals may be excluded as supervisors. E. g., University of Vermont, 223 N. L. R. B. 423, 426 (1976); Presbyterian Medical Center, 218 N. L. R. B. 1266, 1267-1269 (1975). NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U. S. 267 (1974). The Board never has doubted that the managerial exclusion may be applied to professionals in a proper case. E. g., Sutter Community Hospitals of Sacramento, 227 N. L. R. B. 181, 193 (1976); see General Dynamics Corp., 213 N. L. R. B. 841, 857-858 (1974); Westinghouse Electric Corp., 113 N. L. R. B. 337, 339 (1955). B. g., Sutter Community Hospitals of Sacramento, supra, at 193; Bell Aerospace, 219 N. L. R. B. 384, 385-386 (1975) (on remand); General Dynamics Corp., supra, at 857; see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., supra, at 274, 286-289. The Board has found decisions of far less significance to the employer to be managerial when the affected employees were aligned with management. Swift & Co., 115 N. L. R. B. 752, 753 (1956) (procurement drivers who made purchases for employers); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 112 N. L. R. B. 571, 573 (1955) (production schedulers); Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co., 106 N. L. R. B. 194, 196 (1953) (lecturers who indoctrinated new employees); Western Electric Co., 100 N. L. R. B. 420, 423 (1952) (personnel investigators who made hiring recommendations); American Locomotive Co., 92 N. L. R. B. 115, 116-117 (1950) (buyers who made substantial purchases on employer's behalf). The Union does argue that the faculty's authority is merely advisory. But the fact that the administration holds a rarely exercised veto power does not diminish the faculty's effective power in policymaking and implementation. See nn. 4, 5, supra. The statutory definition of “supervisor” expressly contemplates that those employees who “effectively . . . recommend” the enumerated actions are to be excluded as supervisory. 29 U. S. C. § 152 (11). Consistent with the concern for divided loyalty, the relevant consideration is effective recommendation or control rather than final authority. That rationale applies with equal force to the managerial exclusion. Two cases simply announced that faculty authority is neither managerial nor supervisory because it is exercised collectively. C. W. Post Center, 189 N. L. R. B. 904, 905 (1971); Fordham University, 193 N. L. R. B. 134, 135 (1971). The Board later acknowledged that “a genuine system of collegiality would tend to confound us,” but held that the modem university departs from that system because “ultimate authority” is vested in a board of trustees which neither attempts to convert the faculty into managerial entities nor advises them to advocate management interests. Adelphi University, 195 N. L. R. B. 639, 648 (1972). See Fairleigh Dickinson University, 227 N. L. R. B. 239, 241 (1976). Citing these three factors, the Board concludes in each case that faculty are professional employees. It has never explained the reasoning connecting the premise with the conclusion, although an argument similar to that made by its lawyers in this case appears in one concurring opinion. Northeastern University, 218 N. L. R. B., at 257 (opinion of Member Kennedy). Although the Board has preserved the points in footnotes to its brief, it no longer contends that “collective authority” and “lack of ultimate authority” are legal rationales. They are now said to be facts which, respectively, “fortif[y]” the Board’s view that faculty members act in their own interest, and contradict the premise that the university is a “self-governing communit[y] of scholars.” Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 78-857, p. 11, n. 8. Cf. n. 8, supra. The “collective authority” branch has never been applied to supervisors who work through committees. E. g., Florida Southern College, 196 N. L. R. B. 888, 889 (1972). Nor was it thought to bar managerial status for employees who owned enough stock to give them, as a group, a substantial voice in the employer’s affairs. See Sida of Hawaii, Inc., 191 N. L. R. B. 194, 195 (1971); Red and White Airway Cab Co., 123 N. L. R. B. 83, 85 (1959); Brookings Plywood Corp., 98 N. L. R. B. 794, 798-799 (1952). Ultimate authority, the third branch, has never been thought to be a prerequisite to supervisory or managerial status. Indeed, it could not be since every corporation vests that power in its board of directors. We do not, of course, substitute counsel’s post hoc rationale for the reasoning supplied by the Board itself. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 196 (1947). Because the first and third branches of the Board’s analysis are insupportable, the Board’s only colorable theory is the “interest of the employer” branch. The argument presented to us is an expanded and considerably refined version of that notion. The record shows that faculty members at Yeshiva also play a predominant role in faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination and promotion. See supra, at 677, and n. 5. These decisions clearly have both managerial and supervisory characteristics. Since we do not reach the question of supervisory status, we need not rely primarily on these features of 'faculty authority. The Board has cited no case directly applying an “independent professional judgment” standard. On the related question of accountability for implementation of management policies, it cites only NLRB v. Fullerton Publishing Co., 283 F. 2d 545, 550 (CA9 1960), which held that a news editor “responsibly directed” his department so as to fall within the definition of a supervisor, 29 U. S. C. §152(11). The court looked in part to accountability in rejecting the claim that the editor merely relayed assignments and thus was not “responsible” for directing employees as required by the statute. The case did not involve the managerial exclusion and has no application to the issues before us. See eases cited in nn. 13 and 14, supra. A strict “conformity to management policy” test ignores the dual nature of the managerial role, since managers by definition not only conform to established policies but also exercise their own judgment within the range of those policies. See Bell Aerospace, 219 N. L. R. B., at 385 (quoting Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 140 N. L. R. B. 569, 571 (1963)). University of Chicago Library, 205 N. L. R. B. 220, 221-222, 229 (1973), enf’d, 506 F. 2d 1402 (CA7 1974) (reversing an Administrative Law Judge’s decision which had been premised on the “professional judgment” rationale); Sutter Community Hospitals of Sacramento, 227 N. L. R. B., at 193 (excluding as managerial a clinical specialist who used interdisciplinary professional skills to run a hospital department). At Yeshiva, administrative concerns with scarce resources and University-wide balance have led to occasional vetoes of faculty action. But such infrequent administrative reversals in no way detract from the institution’s primary concern with the academic responsibilities entrusted to the faculty. The suggestion that faculty interests depart from those of the institution with respect to salary and benefits is even less meritorious. The same is true of every supervisory or managerial employee. Indeed, there is arguably a greater community of interest on this point in the university than in industry, because the nature and quality of a university depend so heavily on the faculty attracted to the institution. B. Richman & R. Farmer, Leadership, Goals, and Power in Higher Education 258 (1974); see D. Bornheimer, G. Burns, & G. Dumke, The Faculty in Higher Education 174-175 (1973). See American Association for Higher Education, Faculty Participation in Academic Governance 22-24 (1967); Bornheimer, Burns, & Dumke, supra, at 149-150; Kadish, The Theory of the Profession and Its Predicament, 58 A. A. U. P. Bull. 120, 121 (1972). The extent to which Yeshiva faculty recommendations are implemented is no “mere coincidence,” as Mr. Justice BrenNAN’s dissent suggests. Post, at 701. Rather this is an inevitable characteristic of the governance structure adopted by universities like Yeshiva. The dissent concludes, citing several secondary authorities, that the modern university has undergone changes that have shifted “the task of operating the university enterprise” from faculty to administration. Post, at 703. The shift, if it exists, is neither universal nor complete. See K. Mortimer & T. McConnell, Sharing Authority Effectively 27-28, 158— 162, 164-165 (1978). In any event, our decision must be based on the record before us. Nor can we decide this case by weighing the probable benefits and burdens of faculty collective bargaining. See -post, at 702-705. That, after all, is a matter for Congress, not this Court. For this reason, architects and engineers functioning as project captains for work performed by teams of professionals are deemed employees despite substantial planning responsibility and authority to direct and evaluate team members. See General Dynamics Corp., 213 N. L. R. B., at 857-858; Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons, Inc., 192 N. L. R. B. 1049, 1051 (1971); Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, 192 N. L. R. B. 920, 921 (1971). See also Doctors’ Hospital of Modesto, Inc., 183 N. L. R. B. 950, 951-952 (1970), enf'd, 489 F. 2d 772 (CA9 1973) (nurses); National Broadcasting Co., 160 N. L. R. B. 1440, 1441 (1966) (broadcast newswriters). In the health-care context, the Board asks in each case whether the decisions alleged to be managerial or supervisory are “incidental to” or “in addition to” the treatment of patients, a test Congress expressly approved in 1974. S. Rep. No. 93-766, p. 6 (1974). We recognize that this is a starting point only, and that other factors not present here may enter into the analysis in other contexts. It is plain, for example, that professors may not be excluded merely because they determine the content of their own courses, evaluate their own students, and supervise their own research. There thus may be institutions of higher learning unlike Yeshiva where the faculty are entirely or predominantly nonmanagerial. There also may be faculty members at Yeshiva and like universities who properly could be included in a bargaining unit. It may be that a rational line could be drawn between tenured and untenured faculty members, depending upon how a faculty is structured and operates. But we express no opinion on these questions, for it is clear that the unit approved by the Board was far too broad.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SAS INSTITUTE INC., Petitioner v. Andrei IANCU, as Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office, et al. No. 16-969. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Nov. 27, 2017. Decided April 24, 2018. Gregory A. Castanias, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Jonathan C. Bond, Washington, DC, for Respondents. Michael Kanovitz, Matthew V. Topic, Loevy & Loevy, Chicago, IL, for Respondent ComplementSoft, LLC. John A. Marlott, Jones Day, Chicago, IL, David B. Cochran, Jones Day, Cleveland, OH, Gregory A. Castanias, Jones Day, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Nathan K. Kelley, Solicitor, Thomas W. Krause, Deputy Solicitor, Joseph G. Piccolo, Robert J. McManus, Associate Solicitors, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, Jeffrey B. Wall, Acting Solicitor General, Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Jonathan C. Bond, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Mark R. Freeman, Joshua M. Salzman, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Federal Respondent. Justice GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court. A few years ago Congress created "inter partes review." The new procedure allows private parties to challenge previously issued patent claims in an adversarial process before the Patent Office that mimics civil litigation. Recently, the Court upheld the inter partes review statute against a constitutional challenge. Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, --- U.S. ----, ----, 138 S.Ct. 1365, ----, --- L.Ed.2d ----, ante, p. --- -. Now we take up a question concerning the statute's operation. When the Patent Office initiates an inter partes review, must it resolve all of the claims in the case, or may it choose to limit its review to only some of them? The statute, we find, supplies a clear answer: the Patent Office must "issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner." 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (emphasis added). In this context, as in so many others, "any" means "every." The agency cannot curate the claims at issue but must decide them all. "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," Congress long ago created a patent system granting inventors rights over the manufacture, sale, and use of their inventions. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ; see 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). To win a patent, an applicant must (among other things) file "claims" that describe the invention and establish to the satisfaction of the Patent Office the invention's novelty and nonobviousness. See §§ 102, 103, 112(b), 131; Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2136-2137, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016). Sometimes, though, bad patents slip through. Maybe the invention wasn't novel, or maybe it was obvious all along, and the patent owner shouldn't enjoy the special privileges it has received. To remedy these sorts of problems, Congress has long permitted parties to challenge the validity of patent claims in federal court. See §§ 282(b)(2)-(3). More recently, Congress has supplemented litigation with various administrative remedies. The first of these was ex parte reexamination. Anyone, including the Director of the Patent Office, can seek ex parte reexamination of a patent claim. §§ 302, 303(a). Once instituted, though, an ex parte reexamination follows essentially the same inquisitorial process between patent owner and examiner as the initial Patent Office examination. § 305. Later, Congress supplemented ex parte reexamination with inter partes reexamination. Inter partes reexamination (since repealed) provided a slightly more adversarial process, allowing a third party challenger to submit comments throughout the proceeding. § 314(b)(2) (2006 ed.) (repealed). But otherwise it too followed a more or less inquisitorial course led by the Patent Office. § 314(a). Apparently unsatisfied with this approach, in 2011 Congress repealed inter partes reexamination and replaced it with inter partes review. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311 - 319 (2012 ed.). The new inter partes review regime looks a good deal more like civil litigation. At its outset, a party must file "a petition to institute an inter partes review of [a] patent." § 311(a). The petition "may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of [the] patent" on the ground that the claims are obvious or not novel. § 311(b) ; see §§ 102 and 103. In doing so, the petition must identify "each claim challenged," the grounds for the challenge, and the evidence supporting the challenge. § 312(a)(3). The patent owner, in turn, may respond with "a preliminary response to the petition" explaining "why no inter partes review should be instituted." § 313. With the parties' submissions before him, the Director then decides "whether to institute an inter partes review ... pursuant to [the] petition." § 314(b). (In practice, the agency's Patent Trial and Appeal Board exercises this authority on behalf of the Director, see 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2017).) Before instituting review, the Director must determine, based on the parties' papers, "that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition." 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). Once the Director institutes an inter partes review, the matter proceeds before the Board with many of the usual trappings of litigation. The parties conduct discovery and join issue in briefing and at an oral hearing. §§ 316(a)(5), (6), (8), (10), (13). During the course of the case, the patent owner may seek to amend its patent or to cancel one or more of its claims. § 316(d). The parties may also settle their differences and seek to end the review. § 317. But "[i]f an inter partes review is instituted and not dismissed," at the end of the litigation the Board "shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner." § 318(a). Our case arose when SAS sought an inter partes review of ComplementSoft's software patent. In its petition, SAS alleged that all 16 of the patent's claims were unpatentable for various reasons. The Director (in truth the Board acting on the Director's behalf) concluded that SAS was likely to succeed with respect to at least one of the claims and that an inter partes review was therefore warranted. But instead of instituting review on all of the claims challenged in the petition, the Director instituted review on only some (claims 1 and 3-10) and denied review on the rest. The Director did all this on the strength of a Patent Office regulation that purported to recognize a power of "partial institution," claiming that "[w]hen instituting inter partes review, the [Director] may authorize the review to proceed on all or some of the challenged claims and on all or some or the grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim." 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). At the end of litigation, the Board issued a final written decision finding claims 1, 3, and 5-10 to be unpatentable while upholding claim 4. But the Board's decision did not address the remaining claims on which the Director had refused review. That last fact led SAS to seek review in the Federal Circuit. There SAS argued that 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) required the Board to decide the patentability of every claim SAS challenged in its petition, not just some. For its part, the Federal Circuit rejected SAS's argument over a vigorous dissent by Judge Newman. SAS Institute, Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341 (2016). We granted certiorari to decide the question ourselves. 581 U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 2160, 198 L.Ed.2d 230 (2017). We find that the plain text of § 318(a) supplies a ready answer. It directs that "[i]f an inter partes review is instituted and not dismissed under this chapter, the [Board] shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner ...." § 318(a) (emphasis added). This directive is both mandatory and comprehensive. The word "shall" generally imposes a nondiscretionary duty. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35, 118 S.Ct. 956, 140 L.Ed.2d 62 (1998). And the word "any" naturally carries "an expansive meaning." United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5, 117 S.Ct. 1032, 137 L.Ed.2d 132 (1997). When used (as here) with a "singular noun in affirmative contexts," the word "any" ordinarily "refer[s] to a member of a particular group or class without distinction or limitation" and in this way "impl[ies] every member of the class or group." Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed., Mar. 2016), www.oed.com/view/Entry/8973 (OED) (emphasis added) (all Internet materials as last visited Apr. 20, 2018). So when § 318(a) says the Board's final written decision "shall" resolve the patentability of "any patent claim challenged by the petitioner," it means the Board must address every claim the petitioner has challenged. That would seem to make this an easy case. Where a statute's language carries a plain meaning, the duty of an administrative agency is to follow its commands as written, not to supplant those commands with others it may prefer. Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369, 66 S.Ct. 637, 90 L.Ed. 718 (1946). Because SAS challenged all 16 claims of ComplementSoft's patent, the Board in its final written decision had to address the patentability of all 16 claims. Much as in the civil litigation system it mimics, in an inter partes review the petitioner is master of its complaint and normally entitled to judgment on all of the claims it raises, not just those the decisionmaker might wish to address. The Director replies that things are not quite as simple as they seem. Maybe the Board has to decide every claim challenged by the petitioner in an inter partes review. But, he says, that doesn't mean every challenged claim gains admission to the review process. In the Director's view, he retains discretion to decide which claims make it into an inter partes review and which don't. The trouble is, nothing in the statute says anything like that. The Director's claimed "partial institution" power appears nowhere in the text of § 318, or anywhere else in the statute for that matter. And what can be found in the statutory text and context strongly counsels against the Director's view. Start where the statute does. In its very first provision, the statute says that a party may seek inter partes review by filing "a petition to institute an inter partes review." § 311(a). This language doesn't authorize the Director to start proceedings on his own initiative. Nor does it contemplate a petition that asks the Director to initiate whatever kind of inter partes review he might choose. Instead, the statute envisions that a petitioner will seek an inter partes review of a particular kind-one guided by a petition describing "each claim challenged" and "the grounds on which the challenge to each claim is based." § 312(a)(3). From the outset, we see that Congress chose to structure a process in which it's the petitioner, not the Director, who gets to define the contours of the proceeding. And "[j]ust as Congress' choice of words is presumed to be deliberate" and deserving of judicial respect, "so too are its structural choices." University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 353, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013). It's telling, too, to compare this structure with what came before. In the ex parte reexamination statute, Congress embraced an inquisitorial approach, authorizing the Director to investigate a question of patentability "[o]n his own initiative, and at any time." § 303(a). If Congress had wanted to give the Director similar authority over the institution of inter partes review, it knew exactly how to do so-it could have simply borrowed from the statute next door. But rather than create (another) agency-led, inquisitorial process for reconsidering patents, Congress opted for a party-directed, adversarial process. Congress's choice to depart from the model of a closely related statute is a choice neither we nor the agency may disregard. See Nassar, supra, at 353-354, 133 S.Ct. 2517. More confirmation comes as we move to the point of institution. Here the statute says the Director must decide "whether to institute an inter partes review ... pursuant to a petition." § 314(b). The Director, we see, is given only the choice "whether" to institute an inter partes review. That language indicates a binary choice-either institute review or don't. And by using the term "pursuant to," Congress told the Director what he must say yes or no to: an inter partes review that proceeds "[i]n accordance with" or "in conformance to" the petition. OED, www.oed.com/view/Entry/155073. Nothing suggests the Director enjoys a license to depart from the petition and institute a different inter partes review of his own design. To this the Director replies by pointing to another part of § 314. Section 314(a) provides that the Director may not authorize an inter partes review unless he determines "there is a reasonable likelihood" the petitioner will prevail on "at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition." The Director argues that this language requires him to "evaluate claims individually" and so must allow him to institute review on a claim-by-claim basis as well. Brief for Federal Respondent 28. But this language, if anything, suggests just the opposite. Section 314(a) does not require the Director to evaluate every claim individually. Instead, it simply requires him to decide whether the petitioner is likely to succeed on "at least 1" claim. Once that single claim threshold is satisfied, it doesn't matter whether the petitioner is likely to prevail on any additional claims; the Director need not even consider any other claim before instituting review. Rather than contemplate claim-by-claim institution, then, the language anticipates a regime where a reasonable prospect of success on a single claim justifies review of all. Here again we know that if Congress wanted to adopt the Director's approach it knew exactly how to do so. The ex parte reexamination statute allows the Director to assess whether a request raises "a substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim" and (if so) to institute reexamination limited to "resolution of the question ." § 304 (emphasis added). In other words, that statute allows the Director to institute proceedings on a claim-by-claim and ground-by-ground basis. But Congress didn't choose to pursue that known and readily available approach here. And its choice to try something new must be given effect rather than disregarded in favor of the comfort of what came before. See Nassar, supra, at 353-354, 133 S.Ct. 2517. Faced with this difficulty, the Director tries another tack. He points to the fact that § 314(a) doesn't require him to institute an inter partes review even after he finds the "reasonable likelihood" threshold met with respect to one claim. Whether to institute proceedings upon such a finding, he says, remains a matter left to his discretion. See Cuozzo, 579 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2140. But while § 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question whether to institute review, it doesn't follow that the statute affords him discretion regarding what claims that review will encompass. The text says only that the Director can decide "whether" to institute the requested review-not "whether and to what extent " review should proceed. § 314(b). The rest of the statute confirms, too, that the petitioner's petition, not the Director's discretion, is supposed to guide the life of the litigation. For example, § 316(a)(8) tells the Director to adopt regulations ensuring that, "after an inter partes review has been instituted," the patent owner will file "a response to the petition." Surely it would have made little sense for Congress to insist on a response to the petition if, in truth, the Director enjoyed the discretion to limit the claims under review. What's the point, after all, of answering claims that aren't in the proceeding? If Congress had meant to afford the Director the power he asserts, we would have expected it to instruct him to adopt regulations requiring the patent owner to file a response to the Director's institution notice or to the claims on which the Director instituted review . Yet we have nothing like that here. And then and again there is § 318(a). At the end of the proceeding, § 318(a) categorically commands the Board to address in its final written decision "any patent claim challenged by the petitioner." In all these ways, the statute tells us that the petitioner's contentions, not the Director's discretion, define the scope of the litigation all the way from institution through to conclusion. The Director says we can find at least some hint of the discretion he seeks by comparing § 314(a) and § 318(a). He notes that, when addressing whether to institute review at the beginning of the litigation, § 314(a) says he must focus on the claims found "in the petition"; but when addressing what claims the Board must address at the end of the litigation, § 318(a) says it must resolve the claims challenged "by the petitioner." According to the Director, this (slight) linguistic discrepancy means the claims the Board must address in its final decision are not necessarily the same as those identified in the petition. And the only possible explanation for this arrangement, the Director submits, is that he must enjoy the (admittedly implicit) power to institute an inter partes review that covers fewer than all of the claims challenged in the petition. We just don't see it. Whatever differences they might display, § 314(a) and § 318(a) both focus on the petitioner's contentions and, given that, it's difficult to see how they might be read to give the Director power to decide what claims are at issue. Particularly when there's a much simpler and sounder explanation for the statute's wording. As we've seen, a patent owner may move to "[c]ancel any challenged patent claim" during the course of an inter partes review, effectively conceding one part of a petitioner's challenge. § 316(d)(1)(A). Naturally, then, the claims challenged "in the petition" will not always survive to the end of the case; some may drop out thanks to the patent owner's actions. And in that light it is plain enough why Congress provided that only claims still challenged "by the petitioner" at the litigation's end must be addressed in the Board's final written decision. The statute's own winnowing mechanism fully explains why Congress adopted slightly different language in § 314(a) and § 318(a). We need not and will not invent an atextual explanation for Congress's drafting choices when the statute's own terms supply an answer. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) ("[A]s long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute"). Moving past the statute's text and context, the Director attempts a policy argument. He tells us that partial institution is efficient because it permits the Board to focus on the most promising challenges and avoid spending time and resources on others. Brief for Federal Respondent 35-36; see also post, at 1360 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting); post, at 1363 - 1364 (BREYER, J., dissenting). SAS responds that all patent challenges usually end up being litigated somewhere, and that partial institution creates inefficiency by requiring the parties to litigate in two places instead of one-the Board for claims the Director chooses to entertain and a federal court for claims he refuses. Indeed, SAS notes, the government itself once took the same view, arguing that partial institution " 'undermine[s] the Congressional efficiency goal' " for this very reason. Brief for Petitioner 30. Each side offers plausible reasons why its approach might make for the more efficient policy. But who should win that debate isn't our call to make. Policy arguments are properly addressed to Congress, not this Court. It is Congress's job to enact policy and it is this Court's job to follow the policy Congress has prescribed. And whatever its virtues or vices, Congress's prescribed policy here is clear: the petitioner in an inter partes review is entitled to a decision on all the claims it has challenged. That leaves the Director to suggest that, however this Court might read the statute, he should win anyway because of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Even though the statute says nothing about his asserted "partial institution" power, the Director says the statute is at least ambiguous on the propriety of the practice and so we should leave the matter to his judgment. For its part, SAS replies that we might use this case as an opportunity to abandon Chevron and embrace the " 'impressive body' " of pre-Chevron law recognizing that " 'the meaning of a statutory term' " is properly a matter for " 'judicial [rather than] administrative judgment.' " Brief for Petitioner 41 (quoting Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (C.A.2 1976) (Friendly, J.)). But whether Chevron should remain is a question we may leave for another day. Even under Chevron, we owe an agency's interpretation of the law no deference unless, after "employing traditional tools of statutory construction," we find ourselves unable to discern Congress's meaning. 467 U.S., at 843, n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778. And after applying traditional tools of interpretation here, we are left with no uncertainty that could warrant deference. The statutory provisions before us deliver unmistakable commands. The statute hinges inter partes review on the filing of a petition challenging specific patent claims; it makes the petition the centerpiece of the proceeding both before and after institution; and it requires the Board's final written decision to address every claim the petitioner presents for review. There is no room in this scheme for a wholly unmentioned "partial institution" power that lets the Director select only some challenged claims for decision. The Director may (today) think his approach makes for better policy, but policy considerations cannot create an ambiguity when the words on the page are clear. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116-117, 98 S.Ct. 1702, 56 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978). Neither may we defer to an agency official's preferences because we imagine some "hypothetical reasonable legislator" would have favored that approach. Post, at 1364 (BREYER, J., dissenting). Our duty is to give effect to the text that 535 actual legislators (plus one President) enacted into law. At this point, only one final question remains to resolve. Even if the statute forbids his partial institution practice, the Director suggests we lack the power to say so. By way of support, he points to § 314(d) and our decision in Cuozzo, 579 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 195 L.Ed.2d 423. Section 314(d) says that the "determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable." In Cuozzo , we held that this provision prevented courts from entertaining an argument that the Director erred in instituting an inter partes review of certain patent claims. Id., at ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2139-2142. The Director reads these authorities as foreclosing judicial review of any legal question bearing on the institution of inter partes review-including whether the statute permits his "partial institution" practice. But this reading overreads both the statute and our precedent. As Cuozzo recognized, we begin with "the 'strong presumption' in favor of judicial review." Id., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2140. To overcome that presumption, Cuozzo explained, this Court's precedents require "clear and convincing indications" that Congress meant to foreclose review. Id., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2140 (internal quotation marks omitted). Given the strength of this presumption and the statute's text, Cuozzo concluded that § 314(d) precludes judicial review only of the Director's "initial determination" under § 314(a) that "there is a 'reasonable likelihood' that the claims are unpatentable on the grounds asserted" and review is therefore justified. Id., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2140 ; see id., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2142 (review unavailable "where a patent holder merely challenges the Patent Office's 'determin[ation] that the information presented in the petition ... shows that there is a reasonable likelihood' of success 'with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged' "); ibid. (claim that a "petition was not pleaded 'with particularity' under § 312 is little more than a challenge to the Patent Office's conclusion, under § 314(a), that the 'information presented in the petition' warranted review"). In fact, Cuozzo proceeded to emphasize that § 314(d) does not "enable the agency to act outside its statutory limits." Id., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2141. If a party believes the Patent Office has engaged in " 'shenanigans' " by exceeding its statutory bounds, judicial review remains available consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act, which directs courts to set aside agency action "not in accordance with law" or "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations." Ibid. ; 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (C). And that, of course, is exactly the sort of question we are called upon to decide today. SAS does not seek to challenge the Director's conclusion that it showed a "reasonable likelihood" of success sufficient to warrant "institut [ing] an inter partes review." 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a), (d). No doubt SAS remains very pleased with the Director's judgment on that score. Instead, SAS contends that the Director exceeded his statutory authority by limiting the review to fewer than all of the claims SAS challenged. And nothing in § 314(d) or Cuozzo withdraws our power to ensure that an inter partes review proceeds in accordance with the law's demands. Because everything in the statute before us confirms that SAS is entitled to a final written decision addressing all of the claims it has challenged and nothing suggests we lack the power to say so, the judgment of the Federal Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice BREYER, Justice SOTOMAYOR, and Justice KAGAN join, dissenting. Given the Court's wooden reading of 35 U.S.C. § 318(a), and with "no mandate to institute [inter partes] review" at all, Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2140, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016), the Patent Trial and Appeal Board could simply deny a petition containing challenges having no "reasonable likelihood" of success, § 314(a). Simultaneously, the Board might note that one or more specified claims warrant reexamination, while others challenged in the petition do not. Petitioners would then be free to file new or amended petitions shorn of challenges the Board finds unworthy of inter partes review. Why should the statute be read to preclude the Board's more rational way to weed out insubstantial challenges? For the reasons stated by Justice BREYER, the Court's opinion offers no persuasive answer to that question, and no cause to believe Congress wanted the Board to spend its time so uselessly. Justice BREYER, with whom Justice GINSBURG and Justice SOTOMAYOR join, and with whom Justice KAGAN joins except as to Part III-A, dissenting. This case requires us to engage in a typical judicial exercise, construing a statute that is technical, unclear, and constitutes a minor procedural part of a larger administrative scheme. I would follow an interpretive technique that judges often use in such cases. Initially, using "traditional tools of statutory construction," INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987), I would look to see whether the relevant statutory phrase is ambiguous or leaves a gap that Congress implicitly delegated authority to the agency to fill. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). If so, I would look to see whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable. Id., at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Because I believe there is such a gap and because the Patent Office's interpretation of the ambiguous phrase is reasonable, I would conclude that the Patent Office's interpretation is lawful. I The majority sets out the statutory framework that establishes "inter partes review." See ante, at 1353 - 1354; 35 U.S.C. §§ 311 - 319. An example will help the reader keep that framework in mind. Suppose the Patent Office issues a patent containing, say, 16 different claims. A challenger, believing the patent is invalid, seeks to invoke the inter partes review procedure. The statutory chapter entitled "Inter partes review" explains just how this is to be done. See §§ 311 - 319. First, the challenger files a petition requesting "cancel[lation]" of one or more of the patent claims as "unpatentable" because "prior art" shows, for example, that they are not "novel." § 311(b) ; see §§ 102, 103. That petition must detail the grounds for the challenge and the supporting evidence, along with providing certain technical information. § 312. Second, the patent owner may file a "preliminary response" to the petition. § 313. Third, the Director of the Patent Office will decide whether to "institute" inter partes review. § 314. The statute specifies that the Director "may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director determines ... that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition." § 314(a). Thus, in my example, if the Director determines that none of the 16 challenges in the petition has likely merit, he cannot institute an inter partes review. Even if there is one potentially meritorious challenge, we have said that the statute contains "no mandate to institute review," so the Director still has discretion to deny a petition. Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2140, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016). We have also held that the Director's decision whether to institute review is normally not reviewable. Id., at ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2141-2142. The Director, by regulation, has delegated the power to institute review to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2017). And the Director has further provided by regulation that where a petition challenges several patent claims (say, all 16 claims in my example), "the Board may authorize the review to proceed on all or some of the challenged claims." § 42.108(a) (emphasis added). Thus, where some, but not all, of the challenges have likely merit (say, 1 of the 16 has likely merit and the others are close to frivolous), the Board is free to conduct inter partes review only as to the challenge with likely merit. Fourth, the statute next describes the relation of a petition for review and an instituted review to other proceedings involving the challenged patent. § 315. Fifth, the statute describes what happens once the Board begins its inter partes review, including how the Board is to take evidence and make its decisions, § 316, and the nature and effect of settlements, § 317. Sixth, the statute sets forth the section primarily at issue here, which describes what happens at the end of the process. It says: "Final Written Decision. If an inter partes review is instituted and not dismissed under this chapter, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner and any new claim added under section 316(d)." § 318(a) (emphasis added). Finally, the chapter says that a "party dissatisfied with the final written decision ... may appeal the decision" to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. § 319 ; see § 141(c). Thus, going through this process, if a petitioner files a petition challenging 16 claims and the Board finds that the challenges to 15 of the claims are frivolous, the Board may then, as it interprets the statute, begin and proceed through the inter partes review process as to the remaining claim, number 16, but not in respect to the other 15 claims. Eventually the Board will produce a "final written decision" as to the patentability of claim number 16, which decision the challenger (or the patentee) can appeal to the Federal Circuit. II Now let us return to the question at hand, the meaning of the phrase "any patent claim challenged by the petitioner" in § 318(a). Do those words unambiguously refer, as the majority believes, to "any patent claim challenged by the petitioner" in the petitioner's original petition ? The words "in the petitioner's original petition" do not appear in the statute. And the words that do appear, "any patent claim challenged by the petitioner," could be modified by using different words that similarly do not appear, for example, the words "in the inter partes review proceeding." But without added words, the phrase "challenged by the petitioner" does not tell us whether the relevant challenge is one made in the initial petition or only one made in the inter partes review proceeding itself. And, linguistically speaking, there is as much reason to fill that gap with reference to the claims still being challenged in the proceeding itself as there is to fill it with reference to claims that were initially challenged in the petition but which the Board weeded out before the inter partes review proceeding began. Which reading we give the statute makes a difference. The first reading, the majority's reading, means that in my example, the Board must consider and write a final, and appealable, see § 319, decision in respect to the challenges to all 16 claims, including the 15 frivolous challenges. The second reading requires the Board to write a final, appealable decision only in respect to the challenge to the claim (number 16 in my example) that survived the Board's initial screening, namely, in my example, the one challenge in respect to which the Board found a "reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail." § 314(a). I cannot find much in the statutory context to support the majority's claim that the statutory words "claim challenged by the petitioner" refer unambiguously to claims challenged initially in the petition. After all, the majority agrees that they do not refer to claims that initially were challenged in the petition but were later settled or withdrawn. Ante, at 1357 - 1358; see § 316(d)(1)(A) (allowing the patent owner to cancel a challenged patent claim during inter partes review); § 317 (addressing settlement). The majority says that weeded-out challenges, unlike settled matters or canceled claims, involve claims that are still being "challenged 'by the petitioner' at the litigation's end." Ante, at 1357 - 1358. But weeded-out challenges are the same as settled matters and canceled claims in this respect. The petitioner cannot continue to challenge a claim once that challenge is weeded out by the Board at the institution phase. He cannot pursue it before the Board in the inter partes review, and normally he cannot pursue it in a court of appeals. See Cuozzo, 579 U.S., at ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2141-2142. The petitioner might bring a totally separate case in court in which he challenges the claim, but that is a different matter that is not the subject of this statutory chapter. Nor does the chapter's structure help fill the statutory gap. I concede that if we examine the "final written decision" section, § 318(a), just after reading the three initial sections of the statute, §§ 311, 312, and 313, we may be tempted to believe that the words "any patent claim challenged" in § 318(a) must refer to the claims challenged in the petition, just as the words "each claim challenged" in § 312(a)(3) unmistakably do. But once we look at the whole statute, this temptation disappears. The first section, § 311, describing the inter partes review process, does not use the word "challenge." The next section, § 312, describes the requirements for the initial petition, which is filed before any inter partes proceeding has been instituted. It is about the petition, so it is not surprising that it refers to the claims challenged in the petition. The next section, § 313, concerns the preliminary response, which is similarly filed before the inter partes review proceeding has been instituted and is thus similarly focused on the petition, although it does not use the word "challenged." The very next section, however, § 314, along with part of § 315, describes preliminary screening and the institution of the inter partes review proceeding. The remainder of § 315, and the following sections, §§ 316 and 317, then describe how that proceeding, once instituted, will be conducted (and provide for settlements). Only then does § 318 appear. That statutory provision tells the Board that, at the conclusion of the inter partes review proceeding, it must "issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner." § 318(a). And in this context, a context about the inter partes review proceeding itself, it is more than reasonable to think that the phrase "patent claim challenged by the petitioner" refers to challenges made in the proceeding, not challenges made in the petition but never made a part of the proceeding. I am not helped by examining, as the majority examines, what Congress might have done had it used other language. Ante, at 1355 - 1357. The majority points out that had Congress meant anything other than "challenged in the petition," it might have said so more clearly. Ibid. But similarly, if Congress had meant "challenged in the petition," it might have used the words "in the petition." After all, it used those very words only four sections earlier. See § 314(a) (referring to "claims challenged in the petition"). This argument, like many such arguments, is a wash. Neither am I helped by analogizing the inter partes review proceeding to civil litigation. Cf. ante, at 1353 - 1354, 1354 - 1355. That is because, as this Court said in Cuozzo, inter partes review is a "hybrid proceeding." 579 U.S., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2144. It has some adversarial characteristics, but "in other significant respects, inter partes review is less like a judicial proceeding and more like a specialized agency proceeding." Id., at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2143. Its purposes are not limited to "helping resolve concrete patent-related disputes among parties," but extend to "reexamin[ing] ... an earlier administrative grant of a patent" and "protect[ing] the public's 'paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies ... are kept within their legitimate scope.' " Ibid. (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816, 65 S.Ct. 993, 89 L.Ed. 1381 (1945) ; ellipsis in original); see also Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene's Energy Group, LLC, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 138 S.Ct. 1365, 1374 - 1375, --- L.Ed.2d ----, 2018 WL 1914662 (2018). Finally, I would turn to the likely purposes of the statutory provision. As the majority points out, § 314(a) makes clear that the "Director" (now his delegate, the Board) is to determine whether there is a "reasonable likelihood" of success as to at least one of the claims the petition challenges. If not, he cannot initiate an inter partes review proceeding. If so, § 314(a)"invests the Director with discretion on the question whether to institute review." Ante, at 1356 (emphasis deleted); Cuozzo, supra, at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2140. As I have said, Patent Office regulations allow the Board to proceed with inter partes review of some of the claims a petitioner challenges (say, only those where there is a reasonable likelihood of success), but not of others. 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a). The majority points out that it does not follow from § 314(a) that the statute affords the Director discretion regarding what claims that review will encompass . The text says only that the Director can decide "whether" to institute the requested review, not "whether and to what extent" review should proceed. Ante, at 1356 (emphasis deleted). That is certainly so. But I think that when we, as judges, face a difficult text, it is often helpful to ask not just "whether" or "what" but also "why." Why, asks the Patent Office, would Congress have intended to require the Board to proceed with an inter partes review, take evidence, and hear argument in respect to challenges to claims that the Board had previously determined had no "reasonable likelihood" of success? The statute would seem to give the Director discretion to achieve the opposite, namely, to avoid wasting the Board's time and effort reviewing challenges that it has already decided have no "reasonable likelihood of success." In my example, why make the Board do further work on the challenges to claims 1 through 15, which the Board has already decided are near frivolous? More than that, to read § 318(a) as requiring a "final written decision" in respect to those 15 perhaps frivolous challenges would seem to lead to judicial review of the Board's decision about those frivolous challenges. After all, § 319 of the statute says that a "party dissatisfied with the final written decision of the [Board] under section 318(a)," the provision before us, "may appeal the decision" to the Federal Circuit. And the majority's interpretation is anomalous in that it is difficult to imagine why Congress, with one hand, would make the agency's weeding-out decision nonreviewable, see Cuozzo, supra, at ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct. at 2141-2142, yet at the same time would make the decision reviewable via the requirement that the Board issue a "final written" appealable "decision" with respect to that weeded-out challenge. III I end up where I began. Section 318(a) contains a gap just after the words "challenged by the petitioner." Considerations of context, structure, and purpose do not close the gap. And under Chevron, "where a statute leaves a 'gap' or is 'ambigu[ous],' we typically interpret it as granting the agency leeway to enact rules that are reasonable in light of the text, nature, and purpose of the statute." Cuozzo, supra, at ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2142 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) ; alteration in original). A In referring to Chevron, I do not mean that courts are to treat that case like a rigid, black-letter rule of law, instructing them always to allow agencies leeway to fill every gap in every statutory provision. See Mead Corp., supra, at 229-231, 121 S.Ct. 2164. Rather, I understand Chevron as a rule of thumb, guiding courts in an effort to respect that leeway which Congress intended the agencies to have. I recognize that Congress does not always consider such matters, but if not, courts can often implement a more general, virtually omnipresent congressional purpose-namely, the creation of a well-functioning statutory scheme-by using a canon-like, judicially created construct, the hypothetical reasonable legislator, and asking what such legislators would likely have intended had Congress considered the question of delegating gap-filling authority to the agency. B To answer this question, we have previously held that a "statute's complexity, the vast number of claims that it engenders, and the consequent need for agency expertise and administrative experience" normally "lead us to read [a] statute as delegating to the Agency considerable authority to fill in, through interpretation, matters of detail related to its administration." Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 225, 122 S.Ct. 1265, 152 L.Ed.2d 330 (2002). These considerations all favor such a reading here. Indeed, the question before us is one of agency administration in respect to detailed matters that an agency working with the statute is particularly likely to understand. In addition, the agency filled the gap here through the exercise of rulemaking authority explicitly given it by Congress to issue regulations "setting forth the standards for the showing of sufficient grounds to institute a review" and "establishing and governing inter partes review." §§ 316(a)(2), (4); Cuozzo, 579 U.S., at ---- - ----, 136 S.Ct., at 2142-2143 ; cf. Mead Corp., supra, at 227, 121 S.Ct. 2164. Thus, there is a gap, the agency possesses gap-filling authority, and it filled the gap with a regulation that, for reasons I have stated, is a reasonable exercise of that authority. * * * I consequently would affirm the judgment of the Federal Circuit. And, with respect, I dissent from the Court's contrary conclusion. Justice GINSBURG suggests the Director might yet avoid this command by refusing to review a petition he thinks too broad while signaling his willingness to entertain one more tailored to his sympathies. Post, at 1360 (dissenting opinion). We have no occasion today to consider whether this stratagem is consistent with the statute's demands. See Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2141, 195 L.Ed.2d 423 (2016) (noting that courts may invalidate " 'shenanigans' " by the Director that are "outside [his] statutory limits"); CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 328, 81 S.Ct. 1611, 6 L.Ed.2d 869 (1961) (questioning an agency's "power to do indirectly what it cannot do directly"). But even assuming (without granting) the law would tolerate this tactic, it would show only that a lawful means exists for the Director to achieve his policy aims-not that he "should be allowed to improvise on the powers granted by Congress" by devising an extralegal path to the same goal. Id., at 330, 81 S.Ct. 1611. That an agency's improvisation might be thought by some more expedient than what the law allows, post, at 1360, does nothing to commend it either, for lawful ends do not justify unlawful means.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ASHLAND OIL, INC. v. CARYL, TAX COMMISSIONER OF WEST VIRGINIA No. 88-421. Decided June 28, 1990 Per Curiam. Appellant Ashland Oil, Inc., a Kentucky corporation, is an integrated oil company that maintains business locations worldwide, including in West Virginia. During the years at issue here, West Virginia imposed a gross receipts tax on persons selling tangible property at wholesale. W. Va. Code § ll-13-2c (1983). Local manufacturers were exempt from the tax. §11-13-2. The West Virginia Tax Department conducted a detailed audit of Ashland’s tax returns for fiscal years ending September 1975 and 1976 and assessed a deficiency in tax payments of $181,313.22 for wholesale sales with West Virginia destinations. Ashland filed a timely petition for reassessment, primarily contending that the tax was unconstitutional as applied because there was an insufficient connection between its in-state activities and the transactions sought to be taxed. Juris. Statement 38a. After the State Tax Commissioner rejected Ashland’s petition, Ashland appealed to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. While the appeal was pending, this Court decided Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U. S. 638 (1984), which invalidated the West Virginia tax scheme that had also been applied against Ashland as discriminatory against interstate commerce. The State Circuit Court granted Ashland summary judgment on the basis of our decision in Armco. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Armco did not apply retroactively, and remanded for further proceedings. Relying on its state-law criteria for retroactivity, see Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 266 S. E. 879 (1979), which it considered to “follow closely the analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97, 106 — [1]07 . . . (1971),” Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Rose, 177 W. Va. 20, 23, n. 6, 350 S. E. 2d 531, 534, n. 6 (1986), the court determined that Armco “represented a reversal of prior precedent, and that retroactive application of the Armco rule would cause severe hardship.” Id., at 25, 350 S. E. 2d, at 536. Accordingly, the court held that the State was not precluded from collecting the gross receipts taxes due for the fiscal years preceding the date of decision in Armco. Id., at 25-26, 350 S. E. 2d, at 536-537. We dismissed Ashland’s appeal of this decision for want of a final judgment. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Rose, 481 U. S. 1025 (1987). On remand, the Circuit Court rejected Ashland’s remaining claim, and the State Supreme Court of Appeals denied Ash-land’s request for review. In its appeal to this Court, Ashland contends, among other claims, that the State Supreme Court of Appeals erred in determining that Armco applied prospectively only. Because “[t]he determination whether a constitutional decision of this Court is retroactive ... is a matter of federal law,” American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U. S. 167, 177 (1990), we must examine the state court’s determination that Armco is not retroactive in light of our nonretroactivity doctrine. Applying the view of retroactivity delineated by either the dissent or the plurality in American Trucking Assns., we must reverse the state court’s decision. Under the reasoning of the dissent in American Trucking Assns., Armco applies retroactively to the taxes assessed against Ashland because constitutional decisions apply retroactively to all cases on direct review. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, supra, at 212 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Under the approach of the plurality in American Trucking Assns., the same result obtains, because Armco fails to satisfy the first prong of the plurality’s test for determining nonretroactivity. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97, 106-107 (1971), quoted in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, supra, at 179 (plurality opinion). The first prong of the Chevron Oil test requires that “the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.” 404 U. S., at 106-107 (citation omitted). In Armco, an Ohio corporation contested the applicability of West Virginia’s wholesale tax on its in-state sales of steel and wire rope. In ruling that the tax violated the Commerce Clause, the Court relied on Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U. S. 318, 332, n. 12 (1977), which held that a State “may not discriminate between transactions on the basis of some interstate element.” On its face, West Virginia’s statutory scheme had just such a discriminatory effect, as it “provides that two companies selling tangible property at wholesale in West Virginia will be treated differently depending on whether the taxpayer conducts manufacturing in the State or out of it.” Armco, supra, at 642. The Court next considered the argument that the State’s wholesale tax exemption did not discriminate against out-of-state taxpayers because it served as compensation for the imposition of a heavy manufacturing tax on in-state taxpayers. In Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725 (1981), we held that a tax on an out-of-state event may be considered a nondiscriminatory compensation for a tax on an in-state event when the State “is attempting to impose a tax on a substantially equivalent event to assure uniform treatment of goods and materials to be consumed in the State.” Id., at 759. Applying this test to the West Virginia tax scheme, the Court determined that “manufacturing and wholesaling are not ‘substantially equivalent events’ such that the heavy-tax on in-state manufacturers can be said to compensate for the admittedly lighter burden placed on wholesalers from out of State.” Armco, supra, at 643. The Court distinguished Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U. S. 199 (1961), and Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U. S. 117 (1941), two cases that predated the compensatory tax doctrine enunciated in Boston Stock Exchange and Maryland v. Louisiana. Armco, supra, at 643, n. 7. Finally, the Court rejected the argument that Armco should be required to prove the tax had actual discriminatory impact. Instead, the Court asserted that the “internal consistency” test, enunciated in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U. S. 159, 169 (1983), was applicable “where the allegation is that a tax on its face discriminates against interstate commerce.” Armco, supra, at 644. Armco unquestionably contributed to the development of our dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See, e. g., Judson & Duffy, An Opportunity Missed: Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, A Retreat from Economic Reality in Analysis of State Taxes, 87 W. Va. L. Rev. 723, 740-743 (1985) (suggesting that Armco’s invalidation of a facially discriminatory tax statute signaled a retreat from the economically realistic approach adopted by Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274 (1977), and a return to a more formalistic analysis); Lathrop, Armco — A Narrow and Puzzling Test for Discriminatory State Taxes Under the Commerce Clause, 63 Taxes 551, 558-559 (1985). In adopting the internal consistency test, Armco extended that doctrine beyond the context in which it had originated. See 467 U. S., at 648 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, Armco neither overturned established precedent nor decided “an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.” Chevron Oil, supra, at 106. To be sure, Armco paved the way for Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U. S. 232 (1987), which arguably “overturn[ed] a lengthy list of settled decisions” and “revolutionize^] the law of state taxation,” id., at 257 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), by extending the internal consistency test. Armco itself, however, was not revolutionary. See American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266, 303 (1987) (O’Con-nor, J., dissenting) (“At most, Armco may be read for the proposition that a tax that is facially discriminatory is unconstitutional if it is not ‘internally consistent’”). Because Armco did not overrule clear past precedent nor decide a wholly new issue of first impression, it does not meet the first prong of the Chevron Oil test. Armco thus applies retroactively under either the rule advocated by the plurality or the rule advocated by the dissent in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith. Accordingly, the State Supreme Court of Appeals erred in declining to apply Armco retroactively to determine the constitutionality of the State’s imposition of taxes on Ashland for the years at issue. The motion of the Committee on State Taxation of the Council of State Chambers of Commerce for leave to file a brief as ami-cus curiae is granted. We reverse the judgment of the State Circuit Court and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Court’s dismissal for want of a substantial federal question of Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Rose, 459 U. S. 807 (1982), a case raising a nearly identical challenge to the state tax, see 467 U. S., at 644, n. 7, a year prior to deciding Armco, does not amount to the “overruling [of] clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied.” Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97, 106 (1971). The Court gives less deference to summary dispositions, see, e. g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. S. 380, 390, n. 9 (1979), and it is unlikely that West Virginia relied upon the 1982 dismissal of Columbia Gas, given that the statute struck down in Armco had been in effect for more than 50 years.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

DAYTON v. DULLES, SECRETARY OF STATE. No. 621. Argued April 10, 1958. Decided June 16, 1958. Harry I. Rand argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Doub, Samuel D. Slade and B. Jenkins Middleton. Nathan H. David for the Federation of American Scientists and Sanford H. Bolz for the American Jewish Congress filed a brief, as amici curiae, urging that the judgment below be set aside. Mr. Justice Douglas delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner, a native-born citizen, is a physicist who has been connected with various federal projects and who has been associated as a teacher with several of our universities. In March 1954 he applied for a passport to enable him to travel to India in order to accept a position as research physicist at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, affiliated with the University of Bombay. In April 1954 the Director of the Passport Office advised him that his application was denied because the Department of State “feels that it would be contrary to the best interest of the United States to provide you passport facilities at this time.” Petitioner conferred with an officer of the Passport Office and as a result of that conversation executed an affidavit which covered the wide range of matters inquired into and which stated in part: “I am not now and I have never been a member of the Communist Party. “With the possible exception of a casual and brief association with the work of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee for. a few months in 1941 and in 1942 (all as related below); I am not now and have never been a member of any of the organizations designated on the Attorney General’s list (which I have carefully examined). “I am not now engaged and I have never engaged in any activities which, so far as I know or at any time knew, support or supported the Communist movement. “I wish to go abroad for the sole purpose of engaging in experimental research in physics at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in Bombay. I am not going abroad to engage in any activities which, so far as I know of can imagine, will in any way advance the Communist movement.” The Director of the Passport Office wrote petitioner’s lawyer in reply that the Department had given careful consideration to the affidavit and added, “in view of certain factors of Mr. Dayton’s case which I am not at liberty to discuss with him, the Department must adhere to its previous decision that it would be contrary to the best interests of the United States to provide Mr. Dayton with passport facilities at this time.” Later the Director wrote again, saying: “In arriving at its decision to refuse passport facilities to Mr. Dayton, the Department took into consideration his connection with the Science for Victory Committee and his association at that time with various communists. However, the determining factor in the case was Mr. Dayton’s association with persons suspected of being part of the Rosenberg espionage ring and his alleged presence at an apartment in New York which was allegedly used for microfilming material obtained for the use of a foreign government.” Thereupon petitioner; pursuant to the Passport Regulations of the Secretary of State, as amended, 22 CFR § 51.1 et seq., filed a petition of appeal, with the Board of Passport Appeals. He also requested, pursuant to the Regulations, information from the Board of particulars concerning three items: (1) petitioner’s alleged “association with various communists”; (2) his “association with persons suspected of being part of the Rosenberg espionage ring”; and (3) his “alleged presence at an apartment in New York which was allegedly used for microfilming material obtained for the use of a foreign government.” The Board’s reply contained some, but very little, of the information requested; and it stated: “The file contains information indicating that the applicant was present at 65 Morton Street, New York City in the summer of 1949 (July or August) and at Apartment 61, 65 Morton Street, New York City, during the month of January 1950. The applicant’s relationship, if any (past or present), with the following-named persons is considered pertinent to the Board’s review and consideration of the case: Marcel Scherer, Rose Segure, Sandra Collins, Frank Collins, Bernard Peters, Kurt Fritz, Karl Sitte, Louis S. Weiss, Alfred Sarant, and William Perl.” A hearing was held at which witnesses for petitioner and for the State Department testified. Pursuant to the Regulations the Board announced, over petitioner’s protest, that it would consider “a confidential file composed of investigative reports from Government agencies” which petitioner would not be allowed to examine. Later petitioner was advised by the Acting Secretary of State that the Board had submitted its recommendation and that the Secretary, after “a review of the entire record and on the basis of all the evidence, including that contained in confidential reports of investigation,” had denied the application. The denial was rested specifically upon § 51.135 of the Regulations. Petitioner then brought suit in the District Court for declaratory relief. The District Court entered summary judgment for the Secretary. The Court of Appeals reversed, 99 U. S. App. D. C. 47, 237 F. 2d 43, and remanded the case to the Secretary for reconsideration in the light of its earlier decision in Boudin v. Dulles, 98 U. S. App. D. C. 305, 235 F. 2d 532. On remand the Secretary without further hearing denied the application under § 51.135 (c), saying that “the issuance of a passport would be contrary to the national interest.” The Secretary at this time filed a document called “Decision and Findings” which is reproduced as an Appendix to this opinion. The District Court again granted summary judgment for the Secretary, 146 F. Supp. 876; and the Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote, 102 U. S. App. D. C. 372, 254 F. 2d 71. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari. 355 U. S. 911. The question most discussed in the briefs and on oral argument is whether the hearing accorded petitioner satisfied the requirements of due process. A majority of the Court thinks we need not reach that constitutional question, since on their face these findings show only a denial of a passport for reasons which we have today held to be impermissible. Kent v. Dulles, ante, p. 116. Whether there are undisclosed grounds adequate to sustain the Secretary’s action is not here for decision. Reversed. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT. Decision and Findings op the SecRetary op State in the Case op Weldon Bruce Dayton I have examined the files of the Department of State concerning the passport application of Weldon Bruce Dayton, including the proceedings in the Passport Office and before the Board of Passport Appeals, including confidential security information, and have found and concluded as follows: I. a. I find that applicant was active in the Science for Victory Committee while at the University of California during 1943-44, serving as Chairman of the organization during much of that period. As Chairman he associated with Frank and Sandra Collins, and Rose Segure, who had been instrumental in organizing the said organization. This finding is based on information contained in the open record, including applicant’s own statements. b. Confidential information contained in the files of the Department of State, constituting a part of the record considered by the Passport Office, the Board of Passport Appeals, and myself, indicates that the above-named organization was conceived and organized by Communist Party officials as a front for propaganda and espionage activities; and that Frank and Sandra Collins and Rose Segure were members of the Communist Party at the time of their association with applicant and the Science for Victory Committee. II. a. I find that during the period 1946-1950, at Ithaca, New York, applicant maintained a close association and relationship with one Alfred Sarant. At applicant’s invitation, Sarant and his wife lived in applicant’s home for a period of eight months in 1947-1948, pending the completion of the Sarant home next door to applicant’s home. Thereafter Dayton and Sarant were neighbors until July, 1950. On approximately July 18, 1950, Sarant became the subject of intensive interrogation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Approximately a week after the interrogation had begun Sarant departed from Ithaca and subsequently entered Mexico with applicant’s wife. This finding is based on information contained in the open record, including applicant’s own statements. b. Confidential information contained in the files of the Department of State, constituting a part of the record considered by the Passport Office, the Board of Passport Appeals, and myself, establishes with respect to Alfred Sarant that he was an active member of the Communist Party; that he admitted said membership during the years 1943 and 1944; and that he was involved in the espionage apparatus of Julius Rosenberg. III. a. I find that the applicant was present during 1949 and 1950, on more than one occasion, in the apartment building at 65 Morton Street, New York City, in which Alfred Sarant was lessee of apartment 6-1. This finding is based on information contained in the open record. b. Confidential information contained in the files of the Department of State, constituting a part of the record considered by the Passport Office, the Board of Passport Appeals, and myself, indicates that Sarant’s apartment at 65 Morton Street, New York City, was used by Julius Rosenberg and other members of his spy ring for the microfilming of classified United States Government documents which were ultimately transferred to a foreign power. IV. a. I find that since 1938 the applicant, an experienced physicist, has maintained a close association and relationship with one Bernard Peters; that Peters was responsible for the applicant’s offer of employment at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Bombay, India; and that one of the primary stated purposes of the applicant’s proposed travel abroad is to work in close collaboration with Peters at the Tata Institute. This finding is based on information contained in the open record, including applicant’s own statements. b. Confidential information contained in the files of the Department of State, constituting a part of the record considered by the Passport Office, the Board of Passport Appeals, and myself, indicates that Bernard Peters, who recently renounced his American citizenship, has held membership in the Communist Party outside of the United States; has engaged in numerous Communist activities both in this country and abroad; and is suspected of being a Communist espionage agent. Y. I have reason to believe, on the balance of all the evidence, that the applicant is going abroad to engage in activities which will advance the Communist movement for the purpose, knowingly and wilfully of advancing that movement. I have reached this conclusion on the basis of the foregoing findings together with the confidential information relating thereto, as well as other confidential information contained in the files of the Department of State, the disclosure of which might prejudice the conduct of United States foreign relations. I have also taken into consideration the serious doubts as to applicant’s general credibility raised by the applicant’s denial in the face of convincing contrary evidence, including the oral testimony of three apparently disinterested witnesses of ever having been present at 65 Morton Street. The passport application of Weldon Bruce Dayton is therefore denied under Section 51.135 (c) of the Passport Regulations (22 CFR §51.135 (c)), and because the issuance of a passport would be contrary to the national interest. VI. The confidential information referred to in paragraphs I (b), II (b), III (b) and IV (b) above relates to the internal security of the United States. The substance of this confidential information was disclosed to the applicant during the consideration of his passport application. To disclose publicly the sources and details of this information would, in my judgment, be detrimental to our national interest by compromising investigative sources and methods and seriously interfering with the ability of this Department and the Executive Branch to obtain reliable information affecting our internal security. Moreover, it would have an adverse effect upon our. ability to obtain and utilize information from sources abroad and interfere with our established relationships in the security and intelligence area; and might, with respect to information referred to in paragraph V, prejudice the interest of United States foreign relations. Date: October 4, 1956. The Passport Regulations of the Secretary of State, as amended, 22 CFR § 51.142, provide: “At any stage of the proceedings in the Passport Division or before the Board, if it is deemed necessary, the applicant may be required, as a part of his application, to subscribe, under oath or affirmation, to a statement with respect to present or past membership in the Communist Party. If applicant states that he is a Communist, refusal of a passport in his ease will be without further proceedings.” § 51.138. “In the event of a decision adverse to the applicant, he shall be entitled to appeal his case to the Board of Passport Appeals provided for in § 51.139.” § 51.139. “There is hereby established within the Department of State a Board of Passport Appeals, hereinafter referred to as the Board, composed of not less than three officers of the Department to be designated by the Secretary of State. The Board shall act on all appeals under § 51.138. The Board shall adopt and make public its own rules of procedure, to be approved by the Secretary, which shall provide that its duties in any case may be performed by a panel of not less than three members acting by majority determination. The rules shall accord applicant the right to a hearing and to be represented by counsel, and shall accord applicant and each witness the right to inspect the transcript of his own testimony.” § 51.162. “The purpose of the hearing is to permit applicant to present all information relevant and material to the decision in his ease. Applicant may, at the time of filing his petition, address a request in writing to the Board for such additional information or explanation as may be necessary to the preparation of his case. In conformity with the relevant laws and regulations, the Board shall pass promptly and finally upon all such requests and shall advise applicant of its decision. The Board shall take whatever action it deems necessary to insure the applicant of a full and fair consideration of his case.” Section 51.163 of the Regulations provides: “The Passport file and any other pertinent Government files shall be considered as part of the evidence in each case without testimony or other formality as to admissibility. Such files may not be examined by the applicant, except the applicant may examine his application or any paper which he has submitted in connection with his application or appeal. The applicant may appear and testify in his own behalf, be represented by counsel subject to the provisions of § 51.161, present witnesses and offer other evidence in his own behalf. The applicant and all witnesses may be cross-examined by any member of the Board or its counsel. If any witness whom the applicant wishes to call is unable to appear personally, the Board may, in its discretion, accept an affidavit by him or order evidence to be taken by deposition. Such depositions may be taken before any person designated by the Board and such designee is hereby authorized to administer oaths or affirmations for the purpose of the depositions. The Board shall conduct the hearing proceedings in such manner as to protect from disclosure information affecting the national security or tending to disclose or compromise investigative sources or methods.” Note 4, supra. The Regulations in providing for that contingency state: § 51.170. “In determining whether there is a preponderance of evidence supporting the denial of a passport the Board shall consider the entire record, including the transcript of the hearing and such confidential information as it may have in its possession. The Board shall take into consideration the inability of the applicant to meet information of which he has not been advised, specifically or in detail, or to attack the credibility of confidential informants.” That section provides: “In order to promote the national interest by assuring that persons who support the world Communist movement of which the Communist Party is an integral unit may not, through use of United States passports, further the purposes of that movement, no passport, except one limited for direct and immediate return to the United States, shall be issued to: “(a) Persons who are members of the Communist Party or who have recently terminated such membership under such circumstances as to warrant the conclusion — not otherwise rebutted by the evidence — that they continue to act in furtherance of the interests and under the discipline of the Communist Party; “ (b) Persons, regardless of the formal state of their affiliation with the Communist Party, who engage in activities which support the Communist movement under such circumstances as to warrant the conclusion — not otherwise rebutted by the evidence — that they have engaged in such activities as a result of direction, domination, or control exercised over them by the Communist movement; “(e) Persons, regardless of the formal state of their affiliation with the Communist Party, as to whom there is reason to believe, on the balance of all the evidence, that they are going abroad to engage in activities which will advance the Communist movement for the purpose, knowingly and wilfully of advancing that movement.” Note 7, supra.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. DEAN FOODS CO. et al. No. 970. Argued March 28, 1966. Decided June 13, 1966. Solicitor General Marshall argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Turner, Richard A. Posner, Howard E. Shapiro and James Mcl. Henderson. Hammond E. Chaffetz argued the cause for respondents and filed a brief for respondent Dean Foods Co. L. Edward Hart, John Paul Stevens and Edward I. Rothschild filed a brief for respondent Bowfund Corp. Mr. Justice Clark delivered the opinion of the Court. At issue here is the power of the Court of Appeals under the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651 (a) (1964 ed.), to temporarily enjoin the consummation of a merger that is under attack before the Federal Trade Commission as violative of § 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U. S. C. § 18 (1964 ed.). This case arose on the application of the Commission for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction against respondents Dean Foods Company and Bowman Dairy Company to maintain the status quo until the Commission determined the legality of their merger. The Commission alléged that it had issued a complaint against respondents under § 7 of the Clayton Act and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 52 Stat. 111, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1964 ed.), and that from the facts underlying the complaint “it is probable that the Federal Trade Commission will enter an order finding a violation of these laws.” The petition stated that there was a “compelling” need for preliminary relief since the “acquisition itself will split Bowman in two — Dean will acquire fixed assets, receivables and good will; Bowman will retain all cash, government and other marketable securities, and some real estate investments” for distribution to its stockholders. In addition, it was alleged that Dean planned to dispose of most of Bowman’s retail milk routes, certain of its plants and equipment, and to consolidate the remaining assets. The Coihmission thus argued that if the merger were allowed to be completed, “Bowman as an entity will no longer exist,” and that it “will be ‘extremely difficult and very probably impossible’ ” to restore Bowman as “a viable independent” company if the merger were subsequently ruled illegal. In other words, consummation of the agreement would “prevent the Commission from devising, or render it extremely difficult for the Commission to devise, any effective remedy after its decision on the merits.” As grounds for issuance of an extraordinary writ, the Commission asserted that the Court of Appeals “will, in effect, be deprived of its appellate jurisdiction [over final Commission orders] and of the opportunity to enter a meaningful final order of its own in respect to this acquisition, since the res in custodia legis — Bowman—will have vanished.” The Court of Appeals entered a temporary restraining order against respondents, as prayed. On the hearing for a preliminary injunction, however, it dissolved the temporary restraining order and dismissed the petition for the reasons that “no cease and desist order has been entered by the Commission relative to the subject matter in the case at bar and ... we now hold that the Commission did not have authority to institute this proceeding in this court . . . .” In its final judgment the Court of Appeals supported its refusal to grant relief at the request of the Commission by reference to the fact that: “in the 84th Congress and in the 89th Congress bills sponsored by the said Commission were introduced, which bills if enacted into law would have conferred upon the Commission such authority as it is attempting to exercise in the case now before this court, but that said measures were not enacted into law and Congress has not provided otherwise for bestowing this authority upon said Commission.” 356 F. 2d 481, 482. A few hours after the Court of Appeals entered its order on January 19, 1966, the contract was closed and Dean acquired legal title to Bowman’s operating assets. Upon application by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Commission, Mr. Justice Clark, after consulting the other members of this Court, entered a preliminary injunction on January 24, 1966, restraining respondents from making any material changes with respect to Bowman’s corporate structure or the assets purchased. This order provided that Dean might sell Bowman’s retail home delivery routes upon terms and conditions acceptable to the Commission, but that any milk supplied by Dean to the purchasers of the routes must continue to be delivered under the Bowman label and from former Bowman plants. We granted certiorari on February 18, 1966, 383 U. S. 901, and expedited consideration of this case. We conclude that the Court of Appeals erred and reverse its judgment. I. Since the case comes to us from a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds we must take the allegations of the Commission’s application for a preliminary injunction as true. We need not detail the facts further than to say that Dean and Bowman were substantial competitors in the sale of packaged milk in the Chicago area, one of the largest markets in the United States for packaged milk. On November 2, 1965, attorneys for Dean and Bowman met with, representatives of the Commission to discuss a proposal by Dean to purchase all of Bowman’s plants and equipment, the Bowman name, all customer and supplier lists together with the benefit of their relationships, and various other assets, all of which were situated in the Chicago area. Bowman would consequently cease doing a dairy business there. It was emphasized that the inquiry was merely to ascertain the views of the staff of the Commission and not to secure a formal advisory opinion. After investigation, on December 3, 1965, the Commission’s staff advised Dean’s counsel that it believed the acquisition would raise serious questions under the antitrust laws, and that on the basis of existing information the staff would recommend that the Commission issue a complaint against the acquisition if consummated. After further meetings, Dean’s counsel informed the Commission’s staff on December 14, 1965, that the agreement had been signed. A week later the Commission issued a formal complaint charging that the agreement violated § 7 of the Clayton Act and § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. It appears that at the time of the merger Dean was the third or fourth largest distributor of packaged milk in the Chicago area; Bowman was at least the second largest in that market; and together they enjoyed approximately 23% of the sales of packaged milk in the same area, while the four largest dairy companies had a 43% share thereof. Affidavits attached to the Commission’s application alleged that between 1954 and 1965 the number of packaged milk sellers in the Chicago market had declined from 107 to 57, and that in the four months prior to the filing of the complaint four more firms had been eliminated by acquisitions. From these statistics it was concluded that the effect of Dean’s acquisition of Bowman would be to substantially lessen competition. We place in the margin the Commission’s summation of its complaint. II. The All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1651 (a), empowers the federal courts to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” The exercise of this power “is in the nature of appellate jurisdiction” where directed to an inferior court, Ex parte Crane, 5 Pet. 190, 193 (1832) (Marshall, C. J.), and extends to the potential jurisdiction of the appellate court where an appeal is not then pending but may be later perfected. Cf. Ex parte Bradstreet, 7 Pet. 634 (1833) (Marshall, C. J.). These holdings by Chief Justice Marshall are elaborated in a long line of cases, including McClellan v. Carland, 217 U. S. 268 (1910), where Mr. Justice Day held: “ [w]e think it the true rule that where a case is within the appellate jurisdiction of the higher court a writ . . .may issue in aid of the appellate jurisdiction which might otherwise be defeated . . . .” At 280. And in Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U. S. 21 (1943), Chief Justice Stone stated that the authority of the appellate court “is not confined to the issuance of writs in aid of a jurisdiction already acquired by appeal but extends to those cases which are within its appellate jurisdiction although no appeal has been perfected.” At 25. Likewise, decisions of this Court “have recognized a limited judicial power to preserve the court’s jurisdiction or maintain the status quo by injunction pending review of an agency’s action through the prescribed statutory channels. . . . Such power has been deemed merely incidental to the courts’ jurisdiction to review final agency action . . . .” Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U. S. 658, 671, n. 22 (1963). There the Court cited such authority as Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 316 U. S. 4 (1942); West India Fruit & S. S. Co. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 170 F. 2d 775 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1948); and Board of Governors v. Transamerica Corp., 184 F. 2d 311 (C. A. 9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 883 (1950). Section 11 (c) of the Clayton Act, as amended, 73 Stat. 243, 15 U. S. C. § 21 (c), gives exclusive jurisdiction to review final orders by the Commission against illegal mergers, on application of “[a]ny person required by such order ... to cease and desist from any such violation,” to the courts of appeals “for any circuit within which such violation occurred or within which such person resides or carries on business.” This grant includes the traditional power to issue injunctions to preserve the status quo while administrative proceedings are in progress and prevent impairment of the effective exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Cf. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 294 U. S. 648, 675 (1935). A recent case involving a similar statutory proceeding is dispositive of this issue. Whitney Nat. Bank v. New Orleans Bank, 379 U. S. 411 (1965), raised the question whether holding companies were “lawfully entitled” to operate subsidiary banks within Louisiana, a question we held should be determined in the first instance by the Federal Reserve Board. We further concluded that the Board should reconsider its initial approval of such a plan in light of an intervening Louisiana statute, and so gave the parties, who had sought review of the Board’s order before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, an opportunity to move that the case be remanded to the Board. It was noted that the Court of Appeals had authority “to issue such orders as will protect its jurisdiction pending final determination of the matter,” at 415, and that § 1651 (a) empowered it to stay “the order of approval of the Federal Reserve Board pending final disposition of the review proceeding.” At 425. In response to the argument that the stay would not be sufficient because the Comptroller of Currency nonetheless intended to issue a certificate to the bank, we stated that if “the Court of Appeals should find it necessary to take direct action to maintain the status quo and prevent the opening of the bank, it has ample power to do so” by an injunction against the applicants before the Federal Reserve Board themselves. At 426. Such action would be analogous to the relief requested here by the Commission. These decisions furnish ample precedent to support jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to issue a preliminary injunction preventing the consummation of this agreement upon a showing that an effective remedial order, once the merger was implemented, would otherwise be virtually impossible, thus rendering the enforcement of any final decree of divestiture futile. III. Dean and Bowman insist, however, that as a creature of statute the Commission may exercise only those functions delegated to it by Congress, and that Congress has failed to give the Commission express statutory authority to request preliminary relief under the All Writs Act. But the Commission is a governmental agency to which Congress has entrusted, inter alia, the enforcement of the Clayton Act, granting it the power to order divestiture in appropriate cases. At the same time, Congress has given the courts of appeals jurisdiction to review final Commission action. It would stultify congressional purpose to say that the Commission did not have the incidental power to ask the courts of appeals to exercise their authority derived from the All Writs Act. Indeed, the opinions in Arrow Transp. Co. and Whitney Nat. Bank necessarily recognized the standing of administrative agencies to seek such preliminary relief to ensure effective judicial review. Both decisions referred to Board of Governors v. Transamerica Corp., supra, where the Court.of Appeals stayed a merger on application by the Federal Reserve Board. See also Public Utilities Comm’n v. Capital Transit Co., 94 U. S. App. D. C. 140, 214 F. 2d 242 (1954), and West India Fruit & S. S. Co. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 170 F. 2d 775, 779 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1948). There is no explicit statutory authority for the Commission to appear in judicial review proceedings, but no one has contended it cannot appear in the courts of appeals to defend its orders. Nor has it ever been asserted that the Commission could not bring contempt actions in the appropriate court of appeals when the court’s enforcement orders were violated, though it has no statutory authority in this respect. Such ancillary powers have always been treated as essential to the effective discharge of the Commission’s responsibilities. It must be remembered that the courts of appeals derive their power to grant preliminary relief here not from the Clayton Act, but from the All Writs Act and its predecessors dating back to the first Judiciary Act of 1789. Congress has never restricted the power which the courts of appeals may exercise under that Act. Nor has it withdrawn from the Commission its inherent standing as a suitor to seek preliminary relief in courts of appropriate jurisdiction. In the absence of explicit direction from Congress we have no basis to say that an agency charged with protecting the public interest cannot request that a court of appeals, having jurisdiction to review administrative orders, exercise its express authority under the All Writs Act to issue such temporary injunctions as may be necessary to protect its own jurisdiction. Respondents point — as did the Court of Appeals— to the fact that the Commission sought authority from the Eighty-fourth through the Eighty-ninth Congresses to grant preliminary injunctions itself or to proceed in the district court as the Department of Justice can under the Clayton Act. Both former Chairman Gwynne and Chairman Dixon appeared in support of the measures, and referred to Federal Trade Comm’n v. International Paper Co., 241 F. 2d 372 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1956), which held the Commission had no standing to seek preliminary-injunctions from the courts of appeals. In addition, several Congressmen made statements regarding the need for statutory amendment. However, no proposal was put before the Congress relating to the authority of the Commission to secure preliminary relief before the courts of appeals in accordance with § 1651 (a). The proposals concerned only the power of the Commission itself to issue preliminary relief or to proceed in the district courts for that purpose. Congress neither enacted nor rejected these proposals; it simply did not act on them. Even if it had, the legislation as proposed would have had no effect whatever on the power that Congress granted the courts by the All Writs Act. We cannot infer from the fact that Congress took no action at all on the request of the Corn-mission to grant it or a district court power to enjoin a merger that Congress thereby expressed an intent to circumscribe traditional judicial remedies, Cf. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 316 U. S. 4, 11 (1942). The decision in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1950), is apposite. Following an adverse decision in Eisler v. Clark, 77 F. Supp. 610 (D. D. C. 1948), the Department of Justice asked Congress for legislation exempting the Immigration Service from the Administrative Procedure Act. 60 Stat. 237, 5 U. S. C. § 1001 (1964 ed.). As was the case here, the appropriate committees of both Houses reported the proposal favorably but Congress adjourned without taking any action. The Department nonetheless insisted in Wong Yang Sung that hearings in deportation cases did not have to conform to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. In his discussion of legislative history, Mr. Justice Jackson wrote for a unanimous Court that “we will not draw the inference, urged by petitioner, that an agency admits that it is acting upon a wrong construction by seeking ratification from Congress. Public policy requires that agencies feel free to ask legislation which will terminate or avoid adverse contentions and litigations.” At p. 47. This Court has consistently refused to construe such requests by government agencies and the resulting nonaction of the Congress as affirmative evidence of no authority. Thus, in United States v. du Pont & Co., 353 U. S. 586 (1957), Mr. Justice Brennan held: “During the 35 years before this action was' brought [in 1949], the Government did not invoke § 7 against vertical acquisitions. The Federal Trade Commission has said that the section did not apply to vertical acquisitions. See F. T. C., Report on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions, 168 (1955), H. R. Doc. No. 169, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. Also, the House Committee considering the 1950 revision of § 7 stated that '. . . it has been thought by some that this legislation [the 1914 Act] applies only to the so-called horizontal mergers. . . .’ H. R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11. The House Report adds, however, that the 1950 amendment was purposed ‘. . . to make it clear that the bill applies to all types of mergers and acquisitions, vertical and conglomerate as well as horizontal . . . .’ (Emphasis added.) “This Court has the duty to reconcile administrative interpretations with the broad antitrust policies laid down by Congress. . . . The failure of the Commission to act is not a binding administrative interpretation that Congress did not intend vertical acquisitions to come within the purview of the [1914] Act.” At p. 590. Despite the representations of the Commission that the 1914 Act did not apply to vertical mergers, its sponsorship of legislation to so enlarge its coverage, and the passage of the 1950 Act by the Congress for this purpose, this Court nonetheless held that the 1914 Act included vertical mergers from its very inception, and thus required du Pont to divest its interest in General Motors stock, which had been acquired in 1915. It is therefore clear that the “proceedings” in the Congress with reference to the authority of the Commission itself to issue or apply to the district courts for the issuance of preliminary injunctions in merger cases have no relevance whatever to the question before us. In short, Congress gave no attention to the exercise of judicial power by the courts of appeals under the All Writs Act, leaving that power intact and the standing of the Commission to invoke it • undiminished. We thus hold that the Commission has standing to seek preliminary relief from the Court of Appeals under the circumstances alleged. As stated earlier, we must take the allegations of the Commission as true, and so do not pass upon whether a preliminary injunction should be issued. That is for the Court of Appeals to decide on remand, as it would decide any application to it for relief under the All Writs Act. Reversed and remanded. Since consummation of the merger all assets of Bowman, with the exception of cash and marketable securities which were exempted from the purchase agreement, have been transferred to Dean. Bowman has ceased dairy operations and now acts as an investment fund, having received and invested the proceeds of the sale. The Federal Trade Commission alleged: “(a) Actual or potential competition in the sale and distribution of packaged milk in the Chicago Area will be eliminated or prevented; “(b) Dean, a major competitive factor in the sale and distribution of packaged milk in the Chicago Area, will eliminate Bowman, another major competitive factor in the sale and distribution of packaged milk in the Chicago Area; “(c) Concentration in the sale and distribution of packaged milk in the Chicago Area will be increased and deconcentration will be prevented; “(d) The restraining influence on non-competitive behavior in the sale and distribution of packaged milk in the Chicago Area, which existed by reason of the independent operation of Bowman, will be eliminated; “(e) The acquisition will contribute to the over-all trend toward concentration in the sale and distribution of packaged milk in the United States . . . thereby tending to bring about the adverse competitive effects described [elsewhere in the complaint]; “(f) The emergence or growth of smaller packaged milk companies in the Chicago Area will be retarded, discouraged or prevented; “(g) The members of the consuming public, in the Chicago Area and throughout the United States, will be denied the benefits of free and open competition in the sale and distribution of packaged milk.” Of course, the courts of appeals have traditionally framed § 1651 (a) writs in the form of compulsory injunctions aimed at private parties. E. g., Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, 118 U. S. App. D. C. 80, 331 F. 2d 1000, cert. denied, 377 U. S. 978 (1964). See Recent Cases, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1539, 1542(1964). For the proposition that the Commission must have express statutory authority to seek injunctions in the courts of appeals two cases are cited. The first, Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), has no relevance to our problem. And the other, Federal Trade Comm’n v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U. S. 619, 623-625 (1927), even though apposite, has been repudiated. It held that in fashioning a final decree the Commission “exercises only the administrative functions delegated to it by the Act,” and, therefore, could not order divestiture of laboratories acquired through a stock purchase. This view was rejected in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 296, 312-313, nn. 17-18 (1963), the Court holding that “the power to order divestiture need not be explicitly included in the powers of an administrative agency to be part of its arsenal of authority,” citing Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U. S. 115 (1962). Such a holding would especially interfere with the functions Congress has given the Commission in the merger field. As The Chief Justice stated in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294 (1962), the Congress “sought to assure the Federal Trade Commission and the courts the power to brake this force [business concentration] at its outset and before it gathered momentum.” At 317-318. But without standing to secure injunctive relief, and thereby safeguard its ability to order an effective divestiture of acquired properties, the Commission’s efforts would bq frustrated. As Mr. Justice Douglas said in United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, 186 (1944): “The acquisition of a competing theatre terminates at once its competition. . . . And where businesses have been merged or purchased and closed out it is commonly impossible to turn back the - clock.” Here the plan of merger itself contemplates the sale of the acquired home delivery milk routes and certain milk plants. In addition, Bowman has retained its cash and securities, with the intention ultimately to distribute them to its stockholders. If consummation of the merger is not restrained, the restoration of Bowman as an effective and viable competitor will obviously be impossible by the time a final order is entered. This is not unusual. Administrative experience shows that the Commission’s inability to unscramble merged assets frequently prevents entry of an effective order of divestiture. E. g., Ekco Products Co., Trade Reg. Rep. ¶16,879 (1964) (1963-1965 Transfer Binder), aff’d, 347 F. 2d 745 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1965); Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F. T. C. 944, order modified per stipulation (C. A. 5th Cir. 1965) (Docket No. 18,815). Cf. Public Utilities Comm’n v. Capital Transit Co., 94 U. S. App. D. C. 140, 214 F. 2d 242, 245 (1954), where the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit gave as one of its reasons for granting an injunction the fact that “the moving party in the litigation was the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, a governmental agency clothed by Congress with special responsibility in the matters involved.” E. g., H. R. 9424 and S. 3341 and 3424, 84th Cong., 2d Seas. (1956); H. R. 49 and 1574, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. No. 15, p. 35 (1956); Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 198, S. 721, S. 722 and S. 3479, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 42-45 (1958) (testimony of Chairman Gwynne). Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. No. 5, pp. 85-86 (1961) (testimony of Chairman Dixon). They also directed attention to the denial of injunctive relief in Federal Trade Comm’n v. Farm Journal, Inc. (C. A. 3d Cir. 1955) (unreported). Both men failed to mention the contrary decision in Board of Governors v. Transamerica Corp., 184 F. 2d 311 (C. A. 9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 883 (1950). In Ekco Products Co., Trade Reg. Rep. ¶16,879 (1964) (1963-1965 Transfer Binder), aff’d, 347 F. 2d 745 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1965), Commissioner Elman stated that the question of the Commission’s ability to obtain a preliminary injunction under the All Writs Act “has not been authoritatively answered.” At 21,905, n. 10. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 198, S. 721, S. 722 and S. 3479, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 156-157 (1958) (testimony of Congressman Celler). Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. No. 5, pp. 42-45 (1961) (statement of Congressman Patman). Cf. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 120 (1940), where it was said that to give weight to the nonaction of Congress was to “venture into speculative unrealities.” Cf. United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 348-349 (1963).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. SECURITY TRUST & SAVINGS BANK, EXECUTOR, et al. Nos. 10, 11, 12 and 13. Argued October 16, 1950. Decided November 13, 1950. Helen Goodner argued the cause for the United States. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Caudle, Ellis N. Slack and Hilbert P. Zarky. Thomas M. Hamilton submitted on the record for respondents. Me. Justice Minton delivered the opinion of the Court. The question presented here is whether a tax lien of the United States is prior in right to an attachment lien where the federal tax lien was recorded subsequent to the date of the attachment lien but prior to the date the attaching creditor obtained judgment. On October 17, 1946, Wilton M. Morrison sued George and Genell Styliano on an unsecured note. Pursuant to §§ 537 and 542 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, Morrison procured the attachment of four parcels of real estate owned by the Stylianos in San Diego County. On April 24, 1947, Morrison obtained judgment and it was recorded in the office of the Recorder of San Diego County on May 2, 1947. Meanwhile, on December 3, 5, and 10, 1946, the United States had filed notices of federal tax liens in the same office. Subsequently, four suits were brought in the Superior Court of San Diego County involving the four parcels of land upon which Morrison had procured the attachment. Morrison and the United States were made parties defendant in each of these suits. The first suit was brought to quiet title to one of the parcels of real estate. The Stylianos had sold this parcel to the plaintiffs of the suit, who paid the balance of the purchase price into court. The other three suits were to foreclose separate mortgages on the other three parcels. The Superior Court ordered the balance of the purchase price and any surplus remaining from the foreclosure sales after the mortgagees received payment in full to be applied first in payment of Morrison’s judgment lien, and secondly in payment of any federal tax liens. The District Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District affirmed. 93 Cal. App. 2d 608, 209 P. 2d 657. The Supreme Court of California declined to hear the case, and we granted certiorari. 339 U. S. 947. The four cases were consolidated below for purposes of appeal, and Morrison’s claims of priority were treated as a single issue. They are treated here in the same manner. Section 537 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides that a plaintiff may have the property of the defendant attached at any time “as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered.” Section 542a provides: “The lien of the attachment on real property attaches and becomes effective upon the recording of a copy of the writ, together with a description of the property attached, and a notice that it is attached with the county recorder of the county wherein said real property is situate .... The attachment whether heretofore levied or hereafter to be levied shall be a lien upon all real property attached for a period of three years after the date of levy unless sooner released or discharged either as provided in this chapter, or by dismissal of the action, or by the filing with the recorder of an abstract of the judgment in the action.” The effect of a lien in relation to a provision of federal law for the collection of debts owing the United States is always a federal question. Hence, although a state court’s classification of a lien as specific and perfected is entitled to weight, it is subject to reexamination by this Court. On the other hand, if the state court itself describes the lien as inchoate, this classification is “practically conclusive.” Illinois v. Campbell, 329 U. S. 362, 371. The Supreme Court of California has so described its attachment lien in the case of Puissegur v. Yarbrough, 29 Cal. 2d 409, 412, 175 P. 2d 830, 831, by stating that, “The attaching creditor obtains only a potential right or a contingent lien . . . .” Examination of the California statute shows that the above is an apt description. The attachment lien gives the attachment creditor no right to proceed against the property unless he gets a judgment within three years or within such extension as the statute provides. Numerous contingencies might arise that would prevent the attachment lien from ever becoming perfected by a judgment awarded and recorded. Thus the attachment lien is contingent or inchoate&wkey;merely a lis pendens notice that a right to perfect a lien exists. Nor can the doctrine of relation back — which by process of judicial reasoning merges the attachment lien in the judgment and relates the judgment lien back to the date of attachment — operate to destroy the realities of the situation. When the tax liens of the United States were recorded, Morrison did not have a judgment lien. He had a mere “caveat of a more perfect lien to come.” New York v. Maclay, 288 U. S. 290, 294. The liens asserted by the United States stem from 53 Stat. 448, 449, 26 U. S. C. §§ 3670, 3671, 3672. Section 3670 provides: “If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount (including any interest, penalty, additional amount, or addition to such tax, together with any costs that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.” Section 3671 provides that the lien arises when the assessment lists are received by the Collector unless some other date is specified by law. Section 3672 provides that the lien shall not be valid against mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers or judgment creditors, until notice thereof has been filed in the office provided by the law of the state for such filing — in this case, the office of the Recorder of San Diego County. In cases involving a kindred matter, i. e., the federal priority under R. S. § 3466, it has never been held sufficient to defeat the federal priority merely to show a lien effective to protect the lienor against others than the Government, but contingent upon taking subsequent steps for enforcing it. Illinois v. Campbell, supra, 374. If the purpose of the federal tax lien statute to insure prompt and certain collection of taxes due the United States from tax delinquents is to be fulfilled, a similar rule must prevail here. Accordingly, we hold that the tax liens of the United States are superior to the inchoate attachment lien of Morrison, and the judgment of the District Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District is reversed. Reversed. Deering’s Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Ann., 1941, §§ 537 and 542. Notice of a further lien in the sum of $412.18 was filed on January 22, 1948, but as to this the Government does not claim priority. The Government also disclaims any priority over the mortgages foreclosed in these proceedings. Morrison died while the case was pending on appeal to the District Court of Appeal, and the Security Trust and Savings Bank as executor of his last will and testament was substituted. R. S. § 3466. “Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority hereby established shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BISHOP v. WOOD et al. No. 74-1303. Argued March 1, 1976 Decided June 10, 1976 See 498 F. 2d 1341. SteveNS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which B.URGEr, C. J., and Stewart, Powell, and Rehnqtjist, JJ., joined. BreN-NAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 350. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BreN-nan, Marshall, and BlackmüN, JJ., joined, post, p. 355. Blacic-muh, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BrenNAN, J., joined, post, p. 361. Norman B. Smith argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. Charles E. Burgin argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Stephen J. Poliak and Richard M. Sharp filed a brief for the Coalition of American Public Employees as amicus curiae urging reversal. Mr. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Acting on the recommendation of the Chief of Police, the City Manager of Marion, N. C., terminated petitioner's employment as a policeman without affording him a hearing to determine the sufficiency of the cause for his discharge. Petitioner brought suit contending that since a city ordinance classified him as a “permanent employee,” he had a constitutional right to a pretermin-ation hearing. During pretrial discovery petitioner was advised that his dismissal was based on a failure to follow certain orders, poor attendance at police training classes, causing low morale, and conduct unsuited to an officer. Petitioner and several other police officers filed affidavits essentially denying the truth of these charges. The District Court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted certiorari, 423 U. S. 890. The questions for us to decide are (1) whether petitioner’s employment status was a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) assuming that the explanation for his discharge was false, whether that false explanation deprived him of an interest in liberty protected by that Clause. I Petitioner was employed by the city of Marion as a probationary policeman on June 9, 1969. After six months he became a permanent employee. He was dismissed on March 31, 1972. He claims that he had either an express or an implied right to continued employment. A city ordinance provides that a permanent employee may be discharged if he fails to perform work up to the standard of his classification, or if he is negligent, inefficient, or unfit to perform his duties. Petitioner first contends that even though the ordinance does not expressly so provide, it should be read to prohibit discharge for any other reason, and therefore to confer tenure on all permanent employees. In addition, he contends that his period of service, together with his “permanent” classification, gave him a sufficient expectancy of continued employment to constitute a protected property interest. A property interest in employment can, of course, be created by ordinance, or by an implied contract. In either case, however, the sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be decided by reference to state law. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that an enforceable expectation of continued public employment in that State can exist only if the employer, by statute or contract, has actually granted some form of guarantee. Still v. Lance, 279 N. C. 254, 182 S. E. 2d 403 (1971). Whether such a guarantee has been given can be determined only by an examination of the particular statute or ordinance in question. On its face the ordinance on which petitioner relies may fairly be read as conferring such a guarantee. However, such a reading is not the only possible interpretation; the ordinance may also be construed as granting no right to continued employment but merely conditioning an employee’s removal on compliance with certain specified procedures. We do not have any authoritative interpretation of this ordinance by a North Carolina state court. We do, however, have the opinion of the United States District Judge who, of course, sits in North Carolina and practiced law there for many years. Based on his understanding of state law, he concluded that petitioner “held his position at the will and pleasure of the city.” This construction of North Carolina law was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, albeit by an equally divided court. In comparable circumstances, this Court has accepted the interpretation of state law in which the District Court and the Court of Appeals have concurred even if an examination of the state-law issue without such guidance might have justified a different conclusion. In this case, as the District Court construed the ordinance, the City Manager's determination of the adequacy of the grounds for discharge is not subject to judicial review; the employee is merely given certain procedural rights which the District Court found not to have been violated in this case. The District Court's reading of the ordinance is tenable; it derives some support from a decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court, Still v. Lance, supra; and it was accepted by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. These reasons are sufficient to foreclose our independent examination of the state-law issue. Under that view of the law, petitioner’s discharge did not deprive him of a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. II Petitioner’s claim that he has been deprived of liberty has two components. He contends that the reasons given for his discharge are so serious as to constitute a stigma that may severely damage his reputation in the community; in addition, he claims that those reasons were false. In our appraisal of petitioner’s claim we must accept his version of the facts since the District Court granted summary judgment against him. His evidence established that he was a competent police officer; that he was respected by his peers; that he made more arrests than any other officer on the force; that although he had been criticized for engaging in high-speed pursuits, he had promptly heeded such criticism; and that he had a reasonable explanation for his imperfect attendance at police training sessions. We must therefore assume that his discharge was a mistake and based on incorrect information. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, we recognized that the nonretention of an untenured college teacher might make him somewhat less attractive to other employers, but nevertheless concluded that it would stretch the concept too far “to suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty’ when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before to seek another.” Id., at 575. This same conclusion applies to the discharge of a public employee whose position is terminable at the will of the employer when there is no public disclosure of the reasons for the discharge. In this case the asserted reasons for the City Manager’s decision were communicated orally to the petitioner in private and also were stated in writing in,answer to interrogatories after this litigation commenced. Since the former communication was not made public, it cannot properly form the basis for a claim that petitioner’s interest in his “good name, reputation, honor, or integrity” was thereby impaired. And since the latter communication was made in the course of a judicial proceeding which did not commence until after petitioner had suffered the injury for which he seeks redress, it surely cannot provide retroactive support for his claim. A contrary evaluation of either explanation would penalize forthright and truthful communication between employer and employee in the former instance, and between litigants in the latter. Petitioner argues, however, that the reasons given for his discharge were false. Even so, the reasons stated to him in private had no different impact on his reputation than if they had been true. And the answers to his interrogatories, whether true or false, did not cause the discharge. The truth or falsity of the City Manager’s statement determines whether or not his decision to discharge the petitioner was correct or prudent, but neither enhances nor diminishes petitioner’s claim that his constitutionally protected interest in liberty has been impaired. A contrary evaluation of his contention would enable every discharged employee to assert a constitutional claim merely by alleging that his former supervisor made a mistake. The federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies. We must accept the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-to-day administration of our affairs. The United States Constitution cannot feasibly be construed to require federal judicial review for every such error. In the absence of any claim that the public employer was motivated by a desire to curtail or to penalize the exercise of an employee’s constitutionally protected rights, we must presume that official action was regular and, if erroneous, can best be corrected in other ways. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions. The judgment is affirmed. So ordered. He relied on 42 U. S. C. § 1983, invoking federal jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3). He sought reinstatement and back-pay. The defendants were the then City Manager, Chief of Police, and the city of Marion, Since the city is not a “person” within the meaning of the statute, it was not a proper defendant. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 187-192. 377 F. Supp. 501 (WD3STC 1973). A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting, 498 F. 2d 1341 (CA4 1974); then, after granting a rehearing en banc, the court affirmed without opinion by an equally divided court. “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of fife, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U. S. Const., Arndt. 14. Article II, § 6, of the Personnel Ordinance of the city of Marion, reads as follows: “Dismissal. A permanent employee whose work is not satisfactory over a period of time shall be notified in what way his work is deficient and what he must do if his work is to be satisfactory. If a permanent employee fails to perform work up to the standard of the classification held, or continues to be negligent, inefficient, or unfit to perform his duties, he may be dismissed by the City Manager. Any discharged employee shall be given written notice of his discharge setting forth the effective date and reasons for his discharge if he shall request such a notice.” In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 601, the Court said that a “person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' interest for due process purposes if there are . . . rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a hearing.” “Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577. This is not the construction which six Members of this Court placed on the federal regulations involved in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134. In that case the Court concluded that because the employee could only be discharged for cause, he had a property interest which was entitled to constitutional protection. In this case, a holding that as a matter of state law the employee “held his position at the will and pleasure of the city” necessarily establishes that he had no property interest. The Court’s evaluation of the federal regulations involved in Arnett sheds no light on the problem presented by this case. “Under the law in North Carolina, nothing else appearing, a contract of employment which contains no provision for the duration or termination of employment is terminable at the will of either party irrespective of the quality of performance by the other party. By statute, G. S. § 115-142 (b), a county board of education in North Carolina may terminate the employment of a teacher at the end of the school year without filing charges or giving its reasons for such termination, or granting the teacher an opportunity to be heard. Still v. Lance, 279 N. C. 254, 182 S. E. 2d 403 (1971). “It is clear from Article II, Section 6, of the City’s Personnel Ordinance, that the dismissal of an employee does not require a notice or a hearing. Upon request of the discharged employee, he shall be given written notice of his discharge setting forth the effective date and the reasons for the discharge. It thus appears that both the city ordinance and the state law have been complied with. “It further appears that the plaintiff held his position at the will and pleasure of the city.” 377 F. Supp., at 504. See United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U. S. 522. In Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 486-487, the Court stated: “The precise issue of state law involved, i. e., whether the temporary receiver under § 977-b of the New York Civil Practice Act is vested with title by virtue of his appointment, is one which has not been decided by the New York courts. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals faced this question and answered it in the negative. In dealing with issues of state law that enter into judgments of federal courts, we are hesitant to overrule decisions by federal courts skilled in the law of particular states unless their conclusions are shown to be unreasonable.” In Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629-630, the Court stated: “Petitioner makes an extended argument to the effect that Duke Power Co. [v. State Board, 129 N. J. L. 449, 30 A. 2d 416, 131 N. J. L. 275, 36 A. 2d 201,] is not a controlling precedent on the local law question on which the decision below turned. On such questions we pay great deference to the views of the judges of those courts ‘who are familiar with the intricacies and trends of local law and practice.’ Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U. S. 232, 237. We are unable to say that the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals erred in applying to this case the rule of Duke Power Co. v. State Board, which involved closely analogous facts.” And in MacGregor v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 315 U. S. 280, 281, the Court stated: “No decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan, or of any other court of that State, construing the relevant Michigan law has been brought to our attention. In the absence of such guidance, we shall leave undisturbed the interpretation placed upon purely local law by a Michigan federal judge of long experience and by three circuit judges whose circuit includes Michigan.” In granting summary judgment for respondents, the District Court was required to resolve all genuine disputes as to material facts in favor of petitioner. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56 (c); Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 139-140. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 437, and the discussion of the interest in reputation allied to employment in Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693. Indeed, the impact on petitioner’s constitutionally protected interest in liberty is no greater even if we assume that the City Manager deliberately lied. Such fact might conceivably provide the basis for a state-law claim, the validity of which would be entirely unaffected by our analysis of the federal constitutional question. The cumulative impression created by the three dissenting opinions is that this holding represents a significant retreat from settled practice in the federal courts. The fact of the matter, however, is that the instances in which the federal judiciary has required a state agency to reinstate a discharged employee for failure to provide a pretermination hearing are extremely rare. The reason is clear. For unless we were to adopt Mr. Justice BreNNAN’s remarkably innovative suggestion that we develop a federal common law of property rights, or his equally far-reaching view that almost every discharge implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest, the ultimate control of state personnel relationships is, and will remain, with the States; they may grant or withhold tenure at their unfettered discretion. In this case, whether we accept or reject the construction of the ordinance adopted by the two lower courts, the power to change or clarify that ordinance will remain in the hands of the City Council of the city of Marion.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CROWN, CORK & SEAL CO., INC. v. PARKER No. 82-118. Argued April 18, 1983 Decided June 13, 1983 Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Rehnquist and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 354. George D. Solter argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Richard J. Magid. Norris C. Ramsey argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were James L. Foster, William L. Robinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Norman J. Chachkin. Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Thomas R. Bagby filed a brief for the Equal Employment Advisory Council as amicus curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Solicitor General • Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, David A. Strauss, and Phillip B, Sklover for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; and by James W. Witherspoon and James E. Elliott for Jack Williams et al. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court. The question that confronts us in this case is whether the filing of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations, and thus permits all members of the putative class to file individual actions in the event that class certification is denied, provided, of course, that those actions are instituted within the time that remains on the limitations period. Respondent Theodore Parker, a Negro male, was discharged from his employment with petitioner Crown, Cork &- Seal Company, Inc., in July 1977. In October of that year, he filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that he had been harassed and then discharged on account of his race. On November 9, 1978, the EEOC issued a Determination Letter finding no reasonable cause to believe respondent’s discrimination charge was true, and, pursuant to § 706(f) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act), 78 Stat. 260, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f), sent respondent a Notice of Right to Sue. App. 5A, 7A. Two months earlier, while respondent’s charge was pending before the EEOC, two other Negro males formerly employed by petitioner filed a class action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Pendleton v. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Civ. No. M-78-1734. The complaint in that action alleged that petitioner had discriminated against its Negro employees with respect to hiring, discharges, job assignments, promotions, disciplinary actions, and other terms and conditions of employment, in violation of Title VII of the Act, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. The named plaintiffs purported to represent a class of “black persons who have been, continue to be and who in the future will be denied equal employment opportunities by defendant on the grounds of race or color.” App. to Brief for Petitioner 2a. It is undisputed that respondent was a member of the asserted class. In May 1979, the named plaintiffs in Pendleton moved for class certification. Nearly a year and a half later, on September 4,1980, the District Court denied that motion. App. to Brief for Petitioner 7a. The court ruled that the named plaintiffs’ claims were not typical of those of the class, that the named plaintiffs would not be adequate representatives, and that the class was not so numerous as to make joinder impracticable. Thereafter, Pendleton proceeded as an individual action on behalf of its named plaintiffs. On October 27,1980, within 90 days after the denial of class certification but almost two years after receiving his Notice of Right to Sue, respondent filed the present Title VII action in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that his discharge was racially motivated. Respondent moved to consolidate his action with the pending Pendleton ease, but petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that the two cases were at substantially different stages of preparation. The motion to consolidate was denied. The District Court then granted summary judgment for petitioner, ruling that respondent had failed to file his action within 90 days of receiving his Notice of Right to Sue, as required by the Act’s § 706(f)(1), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(f )(1). 514 F. Supp. 122 (1981). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. 677 F. 2d 391 (1982). Relying on American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538 (1974), the Court of Appeals held that the filing of the Pendleton class action had tolled Title VII’s statute of limitations for all members of the putative class. Because the Pendleton suit was instituted before respondent received his Notice, and because respondent had filed his action within 90 days after the denial of class certification, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was timely. Two other Courts of Appeals have held that the tolling rule of American Pipe applies only to putative class members who seek to intervene after denial of class certification, and not to those who, like respondent, file individual actions. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 459 U. S. 986 (1982). II A American Pipe was a federal antitrust suit brought by the State of Utah on behalf of itself and a class of other public bodies and agencies. The suit was filed with only 11 days left to run on the applicable statute of limitations. The District Court eventually ruled that the suit could not proceed as a class action, and eight days after this ruling a number of putative class members moved to intervene. This Court ruled that the motions to intervene were not time-barred. The Court reasoned that unless the filing of a class action tolled the statute of limitations, potential class members would be induced to file motions to intervene or to join in order to protect themselves against the possibility that certification would be denied. 414 U. S., at 553. The principal purposes of the class-action procedure — promotion of efficiency and economy of litigation — would thereby be frustrated. Ibid. To protect the policies behind the class-action procedure, the Court held that “the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.” Id., at 554. Petitioner asserts that the rule of American Pipe was limited to intervenors, and does not toll the statute of limitations for class members who file actions of their own. Petitioner relies on the Court’s statement in American Pipe that “the commencement of the original class suit tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate for class action status.” Id., at 553 (emphasis added). While American Pipe concerned only intervenors, we conclude that the holding of that case is not to be read so narrowly. The filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitations “as to all asserted members of the class,” id., at 554, not just as to intervenors. The American Pipe Court recognized that unless the statute of limitations was tolled by the filing of the class action, class members would not be able to rely on the existence of the suit to protect their rights. Only by intervening or taking other action prior to the running of the statute of limitations would they be able to ensure that their rights would not be lost in the event that class certification was denied. Much the same inefficiencies would ensue if American Pipe’s tolling rule were limited to permitting putative class members to intervene after the denial of class certification. There are many reasons why a class member, after the denial of class certification, might prefer to bring an individual suit rather than intervene. The forum in which the class action is pending might be an inconvenient one, for example, or the class member might not wish to share control over the litigation with other plaintiffs once the economies of a class action were no longer available. Moreover, permission to intervene might be refused for reasons wholly unrelated to the merits of the claim. A putative class member who fears that class certification may be denied would have every incentive to file a separate action prior to the expiration of his own period of limitations. The result would be a needless multiplicity of actions — precisely the situation that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the tolling rule of American Pipe were designed to avoid. B Failure to apply American Pipe to class members filing separate actions also would be inconsistent with the Court’s reliance on American Pipe in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156 (1974). In Eisen, the Court held that Rule 23(c)(2) required individual notice to absent class members, so that each class member could decide whether to “opt out” of the class and thereby preserve his right to pursue his own lawsuit. 417 U. S., at 176. The named plaintiff in Eisen argued that such notice would be fruitless because the statute of limitations had long since run on the claims of absent class members. This argument, said the Court, was “disposed of by our recent decision in American Pipe . . . which established that commencement of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations as to all members of the class.” Id., at 176, n. 13. If American Pipe’s tolling rule applies only to intervenors, this reference to American Pipe is misplaced and makes no sense. Eisen’s notice requirement was intended to inform the class member that he could “preserve his opportunity to press his claim separately” by opting out of the class. 417 U. S., at 176 (emphasis added). But a class member would be unable to “press his claim separately” if the limitations period had expired while the class action was pending. The Eisen Court recognized this difficulty, but concluded that the right to opt out and press a separate claim remained meaningful because the filing of the class action tolled the statute of limitations under the rule of American Pipe. 417 U. S., at 176, n. 13. If American Pipe were limited to intervenors, it would not serve the purpose assigned to it by Eisen; no class member would opt out simply to intervene. Thus, the Eisen Court necessarily read American Pipe as we read it today, to apply to class members who choose to file separate suits. C The Court noted in American Pipe that a tolling rule for class actions is not inconsistent with the purposes served by statutes of limitations. 414 U. S., at 554. Limitations periods are intended to put defendants on notice of adverse claims and to prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights, see Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U. S. 250, 256-257 (1980); American Pipe, 414 U. S., at 561 (concurring opinion); Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U. S. 424, 428 (1965), but these ends are met when a class action is commenced. Class members who do not file suit while the class action is pending cannot be accused of sleeping on their rights; Rule 23 both permits and encourages class members to rely on the named plaintiffs to press their claims. And a class complaint “notifies the defendants not only of the substantive claims being brought against them, but also of the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who may participate in the judgment.” American Pipe, 414 U. S., at 555; see United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 395 (1977). The defendant will be aware of the need to preserve evidence and witnesses respecting the claims of all the members of the class. Tolling the statute of limitations thus creates no potential for unfair surprise, regardless of the method class members choose to enforce their rights upon denial of class certification. Restricting the rule of American Pipe to intervenors might reduce the number of individual lawsuits filed against a particular defendant but, as discussed above, this decrease in litigation would be counterbalanced by an increase in protective filings in all class actions. Moreover, although a defendant may prefer not to defend against multiple actions in multiple forums once a class has been decertified, this is not an interest that statutes of limitations are designed to protect. Cf. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U. S. 463, 467 (1962). Other avenues exist by which the burdens of multiple lawsuits may be avoided; the defendant may seek consolidation in appropriate cases, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 42(a); 28 U. S. C. § 1404 (change of venue), and multidistrict proceedings may be available if suits have been brought in different jurisdictions, see 28 U. S. C. § 1407. H — < l-H H-I We conclude, as did the Court m American Pipe, that the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to eon-tinue as a class action.” 414 U. S., at 554. Once the statute of limitations has been tolled, it remains tolled for all members of the putative class until class certification is denied. At that point, class members may choose to file their own suits or to intervene as plaintiffs in the pending action. In this case, respondent clearly would have been a party in Pendleton if that suit had been permitted to continue as a class action. The filing of the Pendleton action thus tolled the statute of limitations for respondent and other members of the Pendleton class. Since respondent did not receive his Notice of Right to Sue until after the Pendleton action was filed, he retained a full 90 days in which to bring suit after class certification was denied. Respondent’s suit was thus timely filed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. The named plaintiffs in Pendleton later settled their claims, and their action was dismissed with prejudice. Respondent Parker, as permitted by United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 392-395 (1977), then intervened in that lawsuit for the limited purpose of appealing the denial of class certification. He failed, however, to take a timely appeal. See Pavlak v. Church, 681 F. 2d 617 (CA9 1982), cert. pending, No. 82-650; Stull v. Bayard, 561 F. 2d 429, 433 (CA2 1977), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1035 (1978); Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F. 2d 774, 783 (CA2 1977). Petitioner also argues that American Pipe does not apply in Title VII actions, because the time limit contained in § 706(f)(1), 42 U. S. C. §2000e-5(f)(1), is jurisdictional and may not be tolled. This argument is foreclosed by the Court’s decisions in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 398 (1982), and Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U. S. 807, 811, and n. 9 (1980). Putative class members frequently are not entitled to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), and permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) may be denied in the discretion of the District Court. American Pipe, 414 U. S., at 559-560; id., at 562 (concurring opinion); see Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 524-525 (1947). In exercising its discretion the district court considers “whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(b), and a court could conclude that undue delay or prejudice would result if many class members were brought in as plaintiffs upon the denial of class certification. Thus, permissive intervention well may be an uncertain prospect for members of a proposed class. Several Members of the Court have indicated that American Pipe’s tolling rule can apply to class members who file individual suits, as well as to those who seek to intervene. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U. S. 454, 474-475 (1975) (MARSHALL, J., joined by Douglas and Brennan, 33., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“In American Pipe we held that initiation of a timely class action tolled the running of the limitation period as to individual members of the class, enabling them to institute separate actions after the District Court found class action an inappropriate mechanism for the litigation”); United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S., at 402 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and White, J., dissenting) (“Under American Pipe, the filing of a class action complaint tolls the statute of limitations until the District Court makes a decision regarding class status. If class status is denied,... the statute of limitations begins to run again as to class members excluded from the class. In order to protect their rights, such individuals must seek to intervene in the individual action (or possibly file an action of their own) before the time remaining in the limitations period expires”). Petitioner’s complaints about the burden of defending multiple suits ring particularly hollow in this case, since petitioner opposed respondent’s efforts to consolidate his action with Pendleton.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

JEFFERSON et al. v. HACKNEY, COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC WELFARE, et al. No. 70-5064. Argued February 22, 1972 Decided May 30, 1972 Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Burger, C. J., and White, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., joined. Stewart, J., filed a statement joining in Part III of the Court’s opinion, -post, p. 551. Douglas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 551. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, and in Part I of which Stewart, J., joined, post, p. 558. Steven J. Cole argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were Henry A. Freedman, Ed J. Polk, Edward V. Sparer, and Carl Rachlin. Pat Bailey, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Crawford C. Martin, Attorney General, Nola White, First Assistant Attorney General, Alfred Walker, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and J. C. Davis, Assistant Attorney General. Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, and Elizabeth Palmer and Jerold A. Prod, Deputy Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of California as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Solicitor General Griswold, by invitation of the Court, filed a memorandum for the United States as amicus curiae. Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellants in this case challenge certain computation procedures that the State of Texas uses in its federally assisted welfare program. Believing that neither the Constitution nor the federal welfare statute prohibits the State from adopting these policies, we affirm the judgment of the three-judge court below upholding the state procedures. I Appellants are Texas recipients of Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC). They brought two class actions, which were consolidated in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking in-junctive and declaratory relief against state welfare officials. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2281. The Texas State Constitution provides a ceiling on the amount the State can spend on welfare assistance grants. In order to allocate this fixed pool of welfare money among the numerous individuals with acknowledged need, the State has adopted a system of percentage grants. Under this system, the State first computes the monetary needs of individuals eligible for relief under each of the federally aided categorical assistance programs. Then, since the constitutional ceiling on welfare is insufficient to bring each recipient up to this full standard of need, the State applies a percentage reduction factor in order to arrive at a reduced standard of need in each category that the State can guarantee. Appellants challenge the constitutionality of applying a lower percentage reduction factor to AFDC than to the other categorical assistance programs. They claim a violation of equal protection because the proportion of AFDC recipients who are black or Mexican-American is higher than the proportion of the aged, blind, or disabled welfare recipients who fall within these minority groups. Appellants claim that the distinction between the programs is not rationally related to the purposes of the Social Security Act, and violates the Fourteenth Amendment for that reason as well. In their original complaint, appellants also argued that any percentage-reduction system violated § 402 (a) (23) of the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended, 81 Stat. 898, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (23), which required each State to make certain cost-of-living adjustments to its standard of need. The three-judge court rejected appellants’ constitutional arguments, finding that the Texas system is neither racially discriminatory nor unconstitutionally arbitrary. The court did, however, accept the statutory claim that Texas’ percentage reductions in the AFDC program violate the congressional command of §402 (a) (23). 304 F. Supp. 1332 (ND Tex. 1969). Subsequent to that judgment, this Court decided Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970). Rosado held that, although § 402 (a) (23) required States to make cost-of-living adjustments in their standard-of-need calculations, it did not prohibit use of percentage-reduction systems that limited the amount of welfare assistance actually paid. 397 U. S., at 413. This Court then vacated and remanded the first Jefferson judgment for further proceedings consistent with Rosado. 397 U. S. 821 (1970). On remand, the District Court entered a new judgment, denying all relief. Then, in a motion to amend the judgment, appellants raised a new statutory claim. They argued for the first time that although a percentage-reduction system may be consistent with the statute, the specific procedures that Texas uses for computing that reduction violate the congressional enactment. The District Court rejected this argument and denied without opinion appellants’ motion to amend the judgment. This appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 then followed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 404 U. S. 820 (1971). II Appellants’ statutory argument relates to the method that the State uses to compute the percentage reduction when the recipient also has some outside income. Texas, like many other States, first applies the percentage-reduction factor to the recipient’s standard of need, thus arriving at a reduced standard of need that the State can guarantee for each recipient within the present budgetary restraints. After computing this reduced standard of need, the State then subtracts any nonexempt income in order to arrive at the level of benefits that the recipient needs in order to reach his reduced standard of need. This is the amount of welfare the recipient is given. Under an alternative system used by other States, the order of computation is reversed. First, the outside income is subtracted from the standard of need, in order to determine the recipient’s “unmet need.” Then, the percentage-reduction factor is applied to the unmet need, in order to determine the welfare benefits payable. The two systems of accounting for outside income yield different results. Under the Texas system all welfare recipients with the same needs have the same amount of money available each month, whether or not they have outside income. Since the outside income is applied dollar for dollar to the reduced standard of need, which the welfare department would otherwise pay in full, it does not result in a net improvement in the financial position of the recipient. Under the alternative system, on the other hand, any welfare recipient who also has outside income is in a better financial position because of it. The reason is that the percentage-reduction factor there is applied to the “unmet need,” after the income has been subtracted. Thus, in effect, the income-earning recipient is able to “keep” all his income, while he receives only a percentage of the remainder of his standard of need. Each of the two systems has certain advantages. Appellants note that under the alternative system there is a financial incentive for welfare recipients to obtain outside income. The Texas computation method eliminates any such financial incentive, so long as the outside income remains less than the recipient’s reduced standard of need. However, since Texas’ pool of available welfare funds is fixed, any increase in benefits paid to the working poor would have to be offset by reductions elsewhere. Thus, if Texas were to switch to the alternative system of recognizing outside income, it would be forced to lower its percentage-reduction factor, in order to keep down its welfare budget. Lowering the percentage would result in less money for those who need the welfare benefits the most — those with no outside income — and the State has been unwilling to do this. Striking the proper balance between these competing policy considerations is, of course, not the function of this Court. “There is no question that States have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each State is free to set its own standard of need and to determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the program.” King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 318-319 (1968) (footnotes omitted). So long as the State’s actions are not in violation of any specific provision of the Constitution or the Social Security Act, appellants’ policy arguments must be addressed to a different forum. Appellants assert, however, that the Texas computation procedures are contrary to § 402 (a) (23): “(a) A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must “(23) provide that by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the State to determine the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since such amounts were established, and any máximums that the State imposes on the amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately adjusted.” Recognizing that this statutory language, by its terms, hardly provides much support for their theory, appellants seek to rely on what they perceive to have been the broad congressional purpose in enacting the provision. In Rosado v. Wyman, supra, the Court reviewed the history of this section and rejected the argument that it had worked any radical shift in the AFDC program. Id., at 414 and n. 17. AFDC has long been referred to as a “scheme of cooperative federalism,” King v. Smith, 392 U. S., at 316, and the Rosado Court dismissed as “adventuresome” any interpretation of § 402 (a) (23) that would deprive the States of their traditional discretion to set the levels of payments. 397 U. S., at 414-415 and n. 17. Instead, the statute was meant to require the States to make cost-of-living adjustments to their standards of need, thereby serving “two broad purposes”: “First, to require States to face up realistically to the magnitude of the public assistance requirement and lay bare the extent to which their programs fall short of fulfilling actual need; second, to prod the States to apportion their payments on a more equitable basis,” Id., at 412-413. Texas has complied with these two requirements. Effective May 1, 1969, the standard of need for AFDC recipients was raised 11% to reflect the rise in the cost of living, and the State shifted from a maximum-grant system to its present percentage-reduction system. In this way, the State has fairly recognized and exposed the precise level of unmet need, and by using a percentage-reduction system it has attempted to apportion the State’s limited benefits more equitably. Although Texas has thus responded to the “two broad purposes” of §402 (a) (23), appellants argue that Congress also intended that statute to increase the total number of recipients of AFDC, so that more people would qualify for the subsidiary benefits that are dependent on receipt of AFDC cash assistance. The Texas computation procedures are thought objectionable since they do not increase the welfare rolls to quite the same extent as would the alternative method of recognizing outside income. We do not agree that Congress intended § 402 (a) (23) to invalidate any state computation procedures that do not absolutely maximize individual eligibility for subsidiary benefits. The cost-of-living increase that Congress mandated would, of course, generally tend to increase eligibility, but there is nothing in the legislative history indicating that this was part of the statutory purpose. Indeed, at the same time Congress enacted § 402 (a) (23) it included another section designed to induce States to reduce the number of individuals eligible for the AFDC program. Thus, what little legislative history there is on the point, see Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S., at 409-412, tends to undercut appellants’ theory. See Lampton v. Bonin, 304 F. Supp. 1384, 1391-1392 (ED La. 1969) (Cassibry, J., dissenting). See generally Note, 58 Geo. L. J. 591 (1970). Appellants also argue that the Texas system should be held invalid because the alternative computation method results in greater work incentives for welfare recipients. The history and purpose of the Social Security Act do indicate Congress’ desire to help those on welfare become self-sustaining. Indeed, Congress has specifically mandated certain work incentives in §402 (a)(8). There is no dispute here, however, about Texas’ compliance with these very detailed provisions for work incentives. Neither their inclusion in the Act nor the language used by Congress in other sections of the Act supports the inference that Congress mandated the States to change their income-computation procedures in other, completely unmentioned areas. Nor are appellants aided by their reference to Social Security Act §402 (a) (10), 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (10), which provides that AFDC benefits must “be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.” That section was enacted at a time when persons whom the State had determined to be eligible for the payment of benefits were placed on waiting lists, because of the shortage of state funds. The statute. was intended to prevent the States from denying benefits, even temporarily, to a person who has been found fully qualified for aid. See H. R. Rep. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 48, 148 (1949); 95 Cong. Rec. 13934 (remarks of Rep. Forand). Section 402 (a) (10) also prohibits a State from creating certain exceptions to standards specifically enunciated in the federal Act. See, e. g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971). It does not, however, enact by implication a generalized federal criterion to which States must adhere in their computation of standards of need, income, and benefits. Such an interpretation would be an intrusion into an area in which Congress has given the States broad discretion, and we cannot accept appellants’ invitation to change this longstanding statutory scheme simply for policy consideration reasons of which we are not the arbiter. I — I h — I H-t We turn, then, to appellants'" claim that the Texas system of percentage reductions violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellants believe that once the State has computed a standard of need for each recipient, it is arbitrary and discriminatory to provide only 75% of that standard to AFDC recipients, while paying 100% of recognized need to the aged, and 95% to the disabled and the blind. They argue that if the State adopts a percentage-reduction system, it must apply the same percentage to each of its welfare programs. This claim was properly rejected by the court below. It is clear from the statutory framework that, although the four categories of public assistance found in the Social Security Act have certain common elements, the States were intended by Congress to keep their AFDC plans separate from plans under the other titles of the Act. A State is free to participate in one, several, or all of the categorical assistance programs, as it chooses. It is true that each of the programs is intended to assist the needy, but it does not follow that there is only one constitutionally permissible way for the State to approach this important goal. This Court emphasized only recently, in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970), that in “the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.” A legislature may address a problem “one step at a time,” or even “select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.” Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483, 489 (1955). So long as its judgments are rational, and not invidious, the legislature’s efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not subject to a constitutional strait jacket. The very complexity of the problems suggests that there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them. The standard of judicial review is not altered because of appellants’ unproved allegations of racial discrimination. The three-judge court found that the “payment by Texas of a lesser percentage of unmet needs to the recipients of the AFDC than to the recipients of other welfare programs is not the result of racial or ethnic prejudice and is not violative of the federal Civil Rights Act or the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.” The District Court obviously gave careful consideration to this issue, and we are cited by its opinion to a number of subsidiary facts to support its principal finding quoted above. There has never been a reduction in the amount of money appropriated by the legislature to the AFDC program, and between 1943 and the date of the opinion below there had been five increases in the amount of money appropriated by the legislature for the program, two of them having occurred since 1959. The overall percentage increase in appropriation for the programs between 1943 and the time of the District Court’s hearing in this case was 410% for AFDC, as opposed to 211% for OAA and 200% for AB. The court further concluded: “The depositions of Welfare officials conclusively establish that the defendants did not know the racial make-up of the various welfare assistance categories prior to or at the time when the orders here under attack were issued.” Appellants in their brief in effect abandon any effort to show that these findings of fact were clearly erroneous, and we hold they were not. Appellants are thus left with their naked statistical argument: that there is a larger percentage of Negroes and Mexican-Americans in AFDC than in the other programs, and that the AFDC is funded at 75% whereas the other programs are funded at 95% and 100% of recognized need. As the statistics cited in the footnote demonstrate, the number of minority members in all categories is substantial. The basic outlines of eligibility for the various categorical grants are established by Congress, not by the States; given the heterogeneity of the Nation’s population, it would be only an infrequent coincidence that the racial composition of each grant class was identical to that of the others. The acceptance of appellants’ constitutional theory would render suspect each difference in treatment among the grant classes, however lacking in racial motivation and however otherwise rational the treatment might be. Few legislative efforts to deal with the difficult problems posed by current welfare programs could survive such scrutiny, and we do not find it required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Applying the traditional standard of review under that amendment, we cannot say that Texas’ decision to provide somewhat lower welfare benefits for AFDC recipients is invidious or irrational. Since budgetary constraints do not allow the payment of the full standard of need for all welfare recipients, the State may have concluded that the aged and infirm are the least able of the categorical grant recipients to bear the hardships of an inadequate standard of living. While different policy judgments are of course possible, it is not irrational for the State to believe that the young are more adaptable than the sick and elderly, especially because the latter have less hope of improving their situation in the years remaining to them. Whether or not one agrees with this state determination, there is nothing in the Constitution that forbids it. Similarly, we cannot accept the argument in Mr. Justice Marshall’s dissent that the Social Security Act itself requires equal percentages for each categorical assistance program. The dissent concedes that a State might simply refuse to participate in the AFDC program, while continuing to receive federal money for the other categorical programs. See post, at 577. Nevertheless, it is argued that Congress intended to prohibit any middle ground — once the State does participate in a program it must do so on the same basis as it participates in every other program. Such an all-or-nothing policy judgment may well be defensible, and the dissenters may be correct that nothing in the statute expressly rejects it. But neither does anything in the statute approve or require it. In conclusion, we re-emphasize what the Court said in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 487: “We do not decide today that the [state law] is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives that [the State] might ideally espouse, or that a more just and humane system could not be devised. Conflicting claims of morality and intelligence are raised by opponents and proponents of almost every measure, certainly including the one before us. But the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court. . . . [T]he Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients.” Affirmed. Mr. Justice Stewart joins in Part III of the Court’s opinion. Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan concurs, dissenting. I would read the Act more generously than does the Court'. It is stipulated that 87% of those receiving AFDC aid are blacks or Chicanos. I would therefore read the Act -against the background of rank discrimination against the blacks and the Chicanos and in light of the fact that Chicanos in Texas fare even more poorly than the blacks. See L. Grebler, J. Moore, & R. Guzman, The Mexican-American People, pts. 2 and 3 (1970) ; J. Burma, Mexican-Americans in the United States 143-199 (1970); Schwartz, State Discrimination Against Mexican Aliens, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1091 (1970); U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Mexican American (1968); U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Mexican Americans and the Administration of Justice in the Southwest (1970). In Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 413, we said that in administering such a program a State “may not obscure the actual standard of need.” Texas does precisely that by manipulating a mathematical formula. In Rosado, we described how some States establish upper limits or máximums of aid, while others, like Texas, “curtail the payments of benefits by a system of 'ratable reductions’ whereby all recipients will receive a fixed percentage of the standard of need.” Id., at 409. Then in footnote 13 we described what that meant: “A 'ratable reduction’ represents a fixed percentage of the standard of need that will be paid to all recipients. In the event that there is some income that is first deducted, the ratable reduction is applied to the amount by which the individual or family income falls short of need.” Id., at 409 n. 13 (emphasis added). If Texas first deducted outside income and then made its ratable reduction, the welfare recipient would receive a somewhat more generous payment, as the opinion of the Court illustrates in footnote 6 of its opinion. Not only does the Texas system avoid this generous approach, but it also impermissibly constricts the standard of need in conflict with Rosado, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, and Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282. Under Texas’ method of computation, a family — otherwise eligible for AFDC benefits but with nonexempt income greater than the level of benefits and less than the standard of need — is denied both AFDC cash benefits and other noncash benefits such as medicaid. It seems inconceivable that Congress could have intended that noncash benefits be denied those with incomes less than the standard of need solely because that income was earned rather than from categorical assistance. Yet this is precisely the result sanctioned by the Court today because eligibility for these programs is tied to the receipt of cash benefits. One of the stated purposes of the AFDC program is “to help such parents or relatives [of needy dependent children] to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal independence.” 42 U. S. C. § 601 (emphasis added). The Senate Finance Committee has stated, “A key element in any program for work and training for assistance recipients is an incentive for people to take employment.” S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 157 (1967) (emphasis added). The majority acknowledges that “[t]he history and purpose of the Social Security Act . . . indicate Congress' desire to help those on welfare become self-sustaining.” Ante, at 544. But it nonetheless ignores the explicit congressional policy in favor of work incentives and upholds a system which provides penalties and disincentives for those who seek employment. The California Supreme Court in Villa v. Hall, 6 Cal. 3d 227, 490 P. 2d 1148, struck down the system this Court approves today, where California used a statutory maximum of payments rather than a ratable reduction. The California Supreme Court quite properly said that what the State was attempting was inconsistent with Rosado. Moreover, it had an additional reason: “The conclusion that the Social Security Act requires outside income to be subtracted from standards of need rather than from statutory máximums or ratable reductions is also founded on a strong public policy of encouraging welfare recipients to become constantly more self-supporting. Yet deducting income from statutory máximums makes gainful employment significantly less attractive to the recipient. This follows because all nonexempt income will be offset directly against the amount of the grant and not against the standard of need to determine actual need; for every nonexempt dollar earned, the amount of aid will therefore be decreased one dollar. Since the grant is always less than the standard of need, in many instances the system adopted by the Welfare Reform Act will result in an individual’s need not being met even after adding both exempt and nonexempt income to the AFDC payment. Such recipients will be forced to exist below the bare minimum necessary for adequate care, even though they have commenced, by obtaining employment, to break free from the debilitating ‘welfare syndrome.’ The practice thus conflicts with the stated federal policy to provide incentives to obtain and maintain an employment status.” Id., at 235-236, 490 P. 2d, at 1153-1154. Moreover, Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282, calls for a reversal in the present case. It is conceded that plaintiff Maria T. Davilla and 2,470 other families are denied aid in Texas by reason of its new formula, see 304 F. Supp. 1332, 1343, despite the fact that their income is below the standard of need and that of those receiving AFDC aid only 75% of their needs is met. Under § 402 (a) (10) of the Social Security Act (which governs AFDC) “aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.” 42 U. S. C. §602 (a) (10). In Townsend children 18 through 20 years of age who attended high school or vocational training were eligible for AFDC benefits but such children in college were not eligible. We held that “a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.” 404 U. S., at 286. What Texas does here is to exclude large numbers of AFDC beneficiaries by application of a state eligibility test that is narrower than the one we approved in Rosado. "While a State has some discretion in its use of federal funds, it may not manipulate by its own formula groups of “needy” claimants. The decision to participate or not in the federal program is left to the States. Townsend v. Swank, supra, at 290-291. When, as here, federal and state funds are in short supply, the problem is not to lop off some categories of those in “need” but to design a way of managing the system of “need” so as not to raise equal protection questions. Id., at 291. Section 402 (a) (10) of the Social Security Act provides that AFDC shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals. The House Report in commenting on it said: “Shortage of funds in aid to dependent children has sometimes, as in old-age assistance, resulted in a decision not to take more applications or to keep eligible families on waiting lists until enough recipients could be removed from the assistance rolls to make a place for them. . . . [T]his difference in treatment accorded to eligible people results in undue hardship on needy persons and is inappropriate in a program financed from Federal funds.” H. R. Rep; No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 48 (1949). As the Court said in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S., at 481, “So long as some aid is provided to all eligible families and all eligible children, the statute itself is not violated.” It is violated here because nearly 2,500 families that satisfy the requirements of “need” are denied any relief. Mr. Justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, and with whom Mr. Justice Stewart joins as to Part I only, dissenting. Appellants, recipients of Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) in Texas, brought this action to challenge two distinct aspects of the Texas AFDC program. First, appellants challenge the manner in which Texas arrives at the amount it will pay to persons who are needy. Second, they urge that Texas acts illegally in providing more money for persons receiving aid under other social welfare legislation than for persons receiving AFDC aid. The Court rejects both claims. I dissent. Before proceeding to explain why I disagree with the Court, I would like to illustrate what the disputes in this case are all about. If a State is unable or unwilling to establish a level of AFDC payments to meet all the needs of all recipients, federal law permits the State to use a percentage-reduction factor as a method of reducing payments in a somewhat equitable manner. Texas has adopted a system in which the percentage-reduction factor is applied against the standard of need before outside income is deducted. Appellants contend that federal law requires the State to deduct outside income before the percentage-reduction factor is applied. While describing the differences between the two alternatives is a Herculean task, the figures themselves are not difficult to comprehend. Footnote 6 of the Court’s opinion, for example, demonstrates that the Texas system provides less aid to a family with outside income than the alternative system. It is also immediately obvious that under the Texas system, as soon as the family’s income reaches $150, it no longer receives anything from the State, whereas under the alternative, a family earning the same $150 would continue to receive some state funds. Hence, the Texas method of computation contracts the class of families eligible to receive state aid. Appellants contend that the characteristics of the Texas system are inconsistent with federal legislation and that only the alternative system comports with the intent of Congress. I agree. Appellants also claim that the percentage-reduction factor employed by Texas is illegal, irrespective of the method of computing payments, because it is lower than the factor used in other social welfare programs that have participants with identical standards of need. I also agree with appellants on this point, but for slightly different reasons from those they have urged. I A. In considering the question whether Texas’ method of computing eligibility for AFDC payments comports with the federal statute, 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., it is important to keep in mind the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo: “When [federal] money is spent to promote the general welfare, the concept of welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress, not the states.” Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 645 (1937). Mr. Justice Harlan reiterated this point in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 422-423 (1970), when he stated that irrespective of the policies that a State might wish to pursue by utilizing AFDC money in one way or another, the ultimate question to be answered in each case is whether the action of the State comports with the requirements of federal law. The Court concludes in the instant case that there is no general congressional policy violated by Texas’ choice between the alternative methods of applying a percentage-reduction factor to its determined standard of need, and also that no specific statutory provision prohibits Texas from choosing one alternative rather than the other. In concluding that the legislative history is inconclusive and that “what little legislative history there is on the point . . . tends to undercut appellants’ theory,” the Court has, in my opinion, taken only a superficial look into the history of the statute and has ignored the intent of Congress in various sections of the AFDC legislation as interpreted by this Court in prior cases. B. I begin by considering the impact of § 402 (a) (23) of the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended, 81 Stat. 898, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (23), on appellants’ argument. That section provides that “(a) A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must “(23) provide that by July 1, 1969, the amounts used by the State to determine the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living costs since such amounts were established, and any máximums that the State imposes on the amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately adjusted.” Consideration of this section must, of. course, begin with Rosado v. Wyman, supra, where we examined the derivation of this section in great detail. The relevant facts in Rosado are concisely stated in 397 U. S., at 416. New York State had changed its AFDC program so that it no longer determined need on an individualized basis, but instead substituted a system fixing maximum family allowances based on the number of individuals per family. The result was a drastic reduction in overall payments. New York State welfare recipients brought the suit in Rosado, claiming that by changing its AFDC system from an individualized-grant program to a maximum-grant program, New York had violated § 402 (a) (23). Despite our recognition that “[t]he background of § 402 (a) (23) reveals little except that we have before us a child born of the silent union of legislative compromise,” 397 U. S., at 412, we determined to discover what Congress had in mind in adding the section to the pre-existing AFDC legislation. We concluded that two general purposes could be ascribed to the section: “First, to require States to face up realistically to the magnitude of the public assistance requirement and lay bare the extent to which their programs fall short of fulfilling actual need; second, to prod the States to apportion their payments on a more equitable basis.” 397 U. S., at 412-413. These conclusions led us to reject the holding of the District Court, 304 F. Supp. 1354, 1377, that Congress intended to prevent any reduction whatever in AFDC payments, and to reject the argument of the welfare recipients that if payments could be reduced § 402 (a) (23) would be meaningless. We decided that “a State may, after recomputing its standard of need, pare down payments to accommodate budgetary realities by reducing the percent of benefits paid or switching to a percent reduction system, but it may not obscure the actual standard of need.” 397 U. S., at 413 (emphasis in original). Far from emasculating the statute, our reading recognized that the statute had at least three specific salutary effects, and that these were the effects that Congress intended in enacting the legislation: “It has the effect of requiring the States to recognize and accept the responsibility for those additional individuals whose income falls short of the standard of need as computed in light of economic realities and to place them among those eligible for the care and training provisions. Secondly, while it leaves the States free to effect downward adjustments in the level of benefits paid, it accomplishes within that framework the goal, however modest, of forcing a State to accept the political consequence of such a cutback and bringing to light the true extent to which actual assistance falls short of the minimum acceptable. Lastly, by imposing on those States that desire to maintain 'máximums’ the requirement of an appropriate adjustment, Congress has introduced an incentive to abandon a flat 'maximum’ system, thereby encouraging those States desirous of containing their welfare budget to shift to a percentage system that will more equitably apportion those funds in fact allocated for welfare and also more accurately reflect the real measure of public assistance being given.” Id., at 413-414. Thus, it is clear that we based our decision in Rosado, a decision that interpreted § 402 (a) (23) to permit a decrease in actual AFDC payments, largely on the conclusion that Congress wanted, not to bar decreases, but to accomplish other objectives. The fact is that the Court today undermines each of those objectives and destroys the premise on which Rosado was decided. One specific congressional goal we saw in § 402 (a) (23) was that “ [Recalculation of need may serve to render eligible for benefits families which may appear under unadjusted standards marginally to have attained self-sufficiency, but which in fact are unable to subsist at the present cost of living.” Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Rosado v. Wyman, No. 540, O. T. 1969, p. 8. In other words, we read the section as expressing Congress’ willingness to permit reductions in actual payments in return for the addition of more families to the rolls of AFDC recipients. Accord, Lampton v. Bonin, 304 F. Supp. 1384 (ED La. 1969), vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rosado, 397 U. S. 663 (1970); Alvarado v. Schmidt, 317 F. Supp. 1027 (WD Wis. 1970). As I have pointed out above, the Texas system limits the number of AFDC recipients and eliminates marginal cases. This is directly contrary to the intent of Congress as we saw it in Rosado. A second legislative aim that we saw in the section was to force States to realize the political consequences of reducing welfare payments. It must be clear that the Texas system of administering AFDC payments effectively undermines this aim by enabling the State to maintain a constant percentage reduction factor so that the system on its face appears to contain no reductions in payments. Welfare reductions are surreptitiously accomplished by eliminating those persons who have marginal income from eligibility for AFDC payments. While the congressional intent may not be totally emasculated by this system, it is certainly not well served. The third and final purpose that we found that Congress had specifically in mind in enacting § 402 (a) (23) was to provide an incentive to States to abandon a flat “maximum” system. Even though Texas does not now use such a system, the Court’s approval of the system that Texas does use will effectively remove the incentive from the statute. A State that uses a fiat maximum system was required by §402 (a) (23) to adjust the máximums upward to reflect a rise in the cost of living. Since a State that uses a percentage-reduction system may avoid the strains cost-of-living adjustments place on the budget simply by lowering the percentage that it chooses to pay, the statute encouraged abandonment of flat máximums in favor of the more equitable percentage reductions. The Court undermines the incentive by offering States a way to circumvent the cost-of-living adjustments under the flat maximum system. In order to maintain the máximums without increasing expenditures, States could, under the Court’s opinion, begin to use the maximum to determine AFDC eligibility rather than the standard of need. The result of this approach would be to reduce the number of persons eligible for assistance and to reduce the grants of anyone with any outside income. Rather than serve as an incentive to States to change to a percentage-reduction system, as Congress intended, § 402 (a) (23) may now be a powerful incentive to States to maintain or revert to maximum grants. The manner in which the incentive that Rosado saw in § 402 (a) (23) is stifled can be illustrated by another look at the family having an income of $100 and a need of $200. Footnote 6 of the Court’s opinion demonstrates that under the Texas percentage-reduction system, even if the family had no income, the maximum amount of aid that the family could obtain would be $150. Let us assume that Texas maintained a maximum grant system and that prior to the enactment of §402 (a) (23), the maximum grant for a family with $200 need was $100. We assumed in Rosado that the following computation would be made. Need . $200 Income . $100 Unmet Need. $100 Maximum Grant. $100 Total Family Funds. $200 Section 402 (a) (23) required an increase in the standard of need and the level of maximum grants to reflect the rise in the cost of living. Assuming that a 20% increase was mandated by the rise in living costs, it is obvious that if the number of families remained stable and if income were stable, the costs of AFDC to the State would increase by 20%. There was an incentive to change to a percentage-reduction system to avoid this. Until recently, no one thought that the State could change to the following system in order to reflect the rise in the cost of living: New Need. $240 New Maximum Grant m i — i to o Family Income. m i — i o o State Aid. $ 20 To state it more simply, the maximum grant is similar to, and designed to serve the same purposes as, the percentage-reduction factor. If the percentage-reduction factor can be applied to need before income is subtracted, it is impossible to see why income could not be set off against maximum grants. True, Texas did not choose this alternative, but it is available under today’s decision. A State can, by changing the manner in which it sets off income, absorb an increase in máximums and end up paying less. Where is the incentive now to adopt percentage-reduction systems? This illustration is much more than mere speculation as to what might happen under today’s decision. The illustration represents what at least one State — California — has already done, or tried to do. Only very recently, the California Supreme Court struck down the State’s AFDC scheme for noncompliance with the federal statute. Villa v. Hall, 6 Cal. 3d 227, 490 P. 2d 1148 (1971). The California Supreme Court, having been referred to the District Court opinion in the instant case as support for California’s system, took the position that neither the California nor the Texas system could stand in light of Rosado. I agree. Indeed, the United States in its Memorandum as Amicus Curiae in this case (p. 5) concedes that if Rosado represents “a binding construction of the Act, appellants are thus entitled to prevail.” The Government proceeds to argue that the question presented here was not before us in Rosado. Ibid. I must agree with appellants that the Government’s argument is disingenuous, at best. See Brief for Appellants 80. The question of what § 402(a) (23) means was most certainly before us in Rosado. It was, in fact, all that was before us. In that case we rejected the broad construction that the District Court had given the section, but we endeavored as best we could to extract some meaning from its muddled history. The United States seeks here to have us do what we explicitly said we would not do in Rosado, i. e., interpret the section in such a way that it is nothing more than a “meaningless exercise in 'bookkeeping.’ ” 397 U. S., at 413. If we were not making a “binding construction” of the statute in Rosado, it is impossible for me to ascertain what we were doing. Hence, I agree with the Government that appellants are entitled tó prevail. Surprisingly enough, the Court makes even shorter shrift of Rosado than does the Government. In a footnote, the Court states that widened eligibility and the other effects that Rosado said were intended by Congress when it enacted § 402 (a) (23) were merely possible effects of the statute, not necessary ones. I submit that this cavalier treatment of Rosado is completely unwarranted. Rosado was not an easy case. The absence of a clear legislative history forced us to examine the “muted strains” of the congressional voice and to struggle to “discern the theme in the cacophony of political understanding.” 397 U. S., at 412. Unlike the Court in this case, which simply looks to see if the legislative history is distorted enough to be ignored, the Court in Rosado carefully scrutinized every aspect of the history in order to perceive the congressional intent. That was a difficult task, but not an impossible one. The balance that we saw Congress striking in reducing payments while increasing eligibility has already been described. We relied on this balance to decide Rosado. We were not merely speculating as to the intent of Congress; we were holding that there was a specific intent that was binding in that case. That decision, in my view, is also binding here. This is my first disagreement with the majority. C. The second provision in the AFDC legislation that I believe is relevant is § 402 (a) (8) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 81 Stat. 881, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a)(8), which was added to the AFDC statute along with § 402 (a) (23) in 1968. The purpose of this section is to encourage AFDC recipients to seek private employment and to end their need for public assistance. H. R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). To accomplish this objective the statute provides that all of the earned income of each dependent child receiving AFDC aid who is a full- or part-time student, and a portion of the earned income of certain other relatives, will be disregarded in the State’s determination of need. We only recently had occasion to consider the effect of this provision in Engelman v. Amos, 404 U. S. 23 (1971). In Engelman we considered a New Jersey scheme for administering AFDC funds that established income ceilings for families. When the families’ incomes exceeded the ceilings they no longer were eligible for AFDC aid. The District Court analogized Engelman to Rosado v. Wyman, supra, and determined that the State’s system was inconsistent with the federal Act. 333 F. Supp. 1109. The District Court recognized that the 1968 amendments to the AFDC legislation were designed to increase eligibility for AFDC aid, not to decrease it. Because the District Court viewed § 402 (a) (8) as requiring a State to disregard certain kinds of income in determining eligibility for aid, the District Court struck down the New Jersey scheme, in effect holding that New Jersey could not evade the income disregard by imposing an income ceiling not contemplated by Congress. Families that exceeded the State’s income ceilings were still entitled to AFDC aid so long as their income, excluding income covered by § 402 (a) (8), did not exceed the State’s standard of need. The effect of the decision was to increase the class of persons eligible for AFDC aid. We affirmed the decision without even hearing argument. Both “the New Jersey and the Texas provisions . . . appear to have been animated by the same desire . . . .” Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae 11. Both seek to limit the number of AFDC recipients, and both violate the federal statute. Indeed, the very purpose of § 402 (a) (8) — to encourage people to work by permitting them to continue to draw AFDC funds — shows that Congress wanted as many needy people as possible to be part of the program. The Texas scheme certainly does not violate § 402 (a) (8) in the way that the New Jersey scheme did, for as far as we know, Texas excludes income as required by the statute when computing eligibility. But, as the opinion of the Court indicates, the Texas system has a fault not found in New Jersey: i. e., Texas discourages recipients from earning outside income. This is why I believe that Texas violates the spirit of the federal statute. It might be argued that Congress only sought to encourage certain AFDC recipients to earn income and only in a certain amount — the persons and amounts specified in §402 (a)(8). This argument might be persuasive but for one fact — Congress never had any idea that a State would attempt to employ a system such as that used by Texas. Nowhere in the legislative history is there any mention of such a system. See, e. g., House Committee on Ways and Means, Section-By-Section Analysis of H. R. 5710, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1967). Congress was, in fact, informed by HEW that a different standard from that used by Texas was required. See Hearings on H. R. 12080 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 255-265 (testimony of Wilbur Cohen). Until very recently, every indication by HEW was that the Texas system would be unlawful. In light of the state of ignorance in which Congress found itself, it is not surprising that there is no specific rejection of the Texas system in the 1968 amendments. But § 402 (a) (8) and everything in the legislative history certainly indicate that Congress had a strong desire to encourage AFDC recipients to work. Because the Texas program is inconsistent with this desire, I believe it is illegal. This is the second reason for my disagreement with the Court. D. Another section of the statute that must be examined is § 402 (a) (10) of the Social Security Act, 64 Stat. 550, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §602 (a) (10), which requires that a state AFDC plan shall “provide . . . that all individuals wishing to make application for aid to families with dependent children shall have opportunity to do so, and that aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.” The Court states that the primary purpose of this section was to outlaw the use of waiting lists as a means of minimizing a State’s welfare expenditures. There is clearly support for this view, as the Court noted in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 481 n. 12 (1970). Before the Court in Dandridge was the question whether maximum-grant limitations were inconsistent with the federal statute. The Court upheld the máximums, but said in the course of so doing: “So long as some aid is provided to all eligible families and all eligible children, the statute itself is not violated.” Id., at 481. This is plainly dictum, but I believe that it is well-considered dictum that should be followed in this case. It must be remembered that Dandridge and Rosado were decided on the same day. Thus, the Court assumed in Dandridge that the 1968 amendments to the AFDC legislation expanded the list of eligible recipients in the manner suggested in Rosado. The Court was also aware in Dandridge that § 402 (a) (7) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 53 Stat. 1379, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a)(7), had been part of the AFDC statute since 1939. That section provides that “except as may be otherwise provided [in § 402 (a) (8), discussed, supra] . . . the State agency shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid to families with dependent children . . . .” The Court assumed, therefore, that in offering aid a State would first set a standard of need and then examine the income levels of applicants for aid. Anyone whose income was less than the standard of need would be eligible for assistance, or so the Court assumed. Dandridge, of course, established that the aid that might be forthcoming did not have to equal need and that large families could get proportionately less aid than small families. Just as in Rosado, the Court in Dandridge viewed the intent of Congress to be to aid as many needy people as possible, rather than to offer as much aid as possible to a lesser number of people. In light of this, I believe that today’s decision violates the spirit of Dandridge, as well as the holding of Rosado. Moreover, in my view, § 402 (a)(7) tells the States how to compute eligibility, and that section does not allow for the Texas scheme. Despite the position of the Government in this case, I find support for my reading of § 402 (a)(7) in HEW’s own regulations, especially 45 CFR §§ 233.20 (a)(2), 233.20 (a)(3)(h), which indicate to me that income is to be subtracted from the standard of need before any determination is made as to how much aid the State will give. Because I believe the Texas system violates § 402 (a) (7), it seems to me that eligible persons are being denied aid in violation of § 402 (a) (10), which requires that aid be furnished to all eligible persons promptly. For me, this case is no different from King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968) (striking down substitute-father regulation) or Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971) (striking down restriction on receipt of aid by college students). The state procedure denies eligible persons aid, and, regardless of the State’s purposes, the procedure cannot stand in conflict with the federal statute. I disagree with the Court a third time. E. The last portion of the federal statute that I believe should be considered is that portion dealing with the social services that are available to AFDC recipients. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. §§ 602 (a) (14), (15) (assistance in family planning and child-welfare services; assistance in entering the work force and reducing the incidence of births out of wedlock); 42 U. S. C. §§ 602 (a)(19), 632 (employment training programs); 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (10) (medical assistance). Congress keyed all of these provisions to persons or families that were receiving aid. By limiting the number of such persons and families receiving aid, Texas has also limited the availability of these social services. At least one other court has concluded that “. . . Congress’s major concern was the provision of family counseling and rehabilitation services, work incentives, and family planning programs to reduce out-of-wedlock births, for all persons in the family, in order to promote self-support and child development and to strengthen family life. ... By making those with marginal incomes eligible for AFDC by raising the standard of need, more persons would be eligible for such services, which Congress considered vital to cut down in the long run the numbers dependent on welfare.” (Citation omitted.) Lampton v. Bonin, 304 F. Supp., at 1389. We suggested the same thing in Rosado, 397 U. S., at 413. While the Court recognizes that the Texas system deprives persons with an “unmet need” of an opportunity to utilize these services (n. 10) and thus relegates these persons to perpetual dependence on welfare, the realization is apparently a source of no concern. But it was a source of tremendous concern to Congress. The value of medical assistance alone to an average Texas AFDC family is in the range of $50-$60 per month. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae 7 n. 5. Since needy families are rendered more needy by Texas’ system, their ability to escape the confines of the welfare rolls is substantially impaired. At the same time, the goals of Congress as described in the preceding quotation are also impaired. There is no reason, nor any justification, for reading the statute this way. Since I believe that Congress intended that as many needy persons as possible be permitted to avail themselves of the various services provided or improved in the 1968 amendments, I again disagree with the conclusions of the Court. F. In concluding my analysis of this aspect of Texas’ percentage-reduction system, I add one final note. Thüs far I have confined myself to examining the specific provisions of the AFDC legislation. In attempting to focus on each section individually in order to determine its role in the statutory scheme, something of the general flavor of the overall legislation is undoubtedly lost. That flavor, it seems to me, is to assist needy families to maintain strong family bonds and to assist needy individuals to realize their potential as unique human beings by providing them with the basic necessities of life, along with incentives and training to encourage them to work to help themselves. The Texas system negates the salutary aspects of the legislation by deterring the needy from working, by depriving the needy of social services, and by excluding some needy from any AFDC aid whatsoever. There is no conceivable reason to permit Texas to subvert the aims of Congress in this way. r-1 I — 1 Appellants also challenge the percentage-reduction figure itself. It is agreed that Texas has established an identical standard of need for the four social welfare programs that it administers — Old Age Assistance (OAA), Aid to the Blind (AB), Aid for the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD), and AFDC. But Texas provides 100% of recognized need to the aged and 95% to the disabled and the blind, while it provides only 75% to AFDC recipients. It is this disparity to which appellants also object. A. Appellants base their primary attack on the Fourteenth Amendment; they argue that the percentage distinctions between the other welfare programs and AFDC reflect a racially discriminatory motive on the part of Texas officials. Thus, they argue that there is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. I believe that it is unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue that appellants raise, and, therefore, I offer no opinion on its ultimate merits. I do wish to make it clear, however, that I do not subscribe in any way to the manner in which the Court treats the issue. If I were to face this question, I would certainly have more difficulty with it than either the District Court had or than this Court seems to have. The record contains numerous statements by state officials to the effect that AFDC is funded at a lower level than the other programs because it is not a politically popular program. There is also evidence of a stigma that seemingly attaches to AFDC recipients and no others. This Court noted in King v. Smith, 392 U. S., at 322, that AFDC recipients were often frowned upon by the community. The evidence also shows that 87% of the AFDC recipients in Texas are either Negro or Mexican-American. Yet, both the District Court and this Court have little difficulty in concluding that the fact that AFDC is politically unpopular and the fact that AFDC recipients are disfavored by the State and its citizens, have nothing whatsoever to do with the racial makeup of the program. This conclusion is neither so apparent, nor so correct in my view. Moreover, because I find that each one of the State’s reasons for treating AFDC differently from the other programs dissolves under close scrutiny, as is demonstrated, infra, I am not at all certain who should bear the burden of proof on the question of racial discrimination. Nor am I sure that the “traditional” standard of review would govern the case as the Court holds. In Dandridge v. Williams, supra, on which the Court relies for the proposition that strict scrutiny of the State’s action is not required, the Court never faced a question of possible racial discrimination. Percentages themselves are certainly not conclusive, but at some point a showing that state action has a devastating impact on the lives of minority racial groups must be relevant. The Court reasons backwards to conclude that because appellants have not proved racial discrimination, a less strict standard of review is necessarily tolerated. In my view, the first question that must be asked is what is the standard of review and the second question is whether racial discrimination has been proved under the standard. It seems almost too plain for argument that the standard of review determines in large measure whether or not something has been proved. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 149 (1971); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). These are all complex problems, and I do not propose to resolve any of them here. It is sufficient for me to note that I believe that the constitutional issue raised by appellants need not be reached, and that in choosing to reach it, the Court has so greatly oversimplified the issue as to distort it. B. Appellants also challenge the distinction between programs under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, ... be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Only last Term in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), we had occasion to strike down under Title VII of the 1964 Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e, employment practices that had a particularly harsh impact on one minority racial group and that could not be justified by business necessity. We indicated in that case that “good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups.” Id., at 432. We said, in fact, that “Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.” Ibid, (emphasis in original). That decision even placed the burden on the employer “of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.” Ibid. There has been a paucity of litigation under Title VI, and I am not prepared at this point to say whether or not a similar analysis to that used in Origgs should be used in Title VI cases. This is a question of first impression in this Court, and I do not think we have to reach it in this case. I include this section only to make plain that I do not necessarily reject the argument made by appellants; I simply do not reach it. C. This brings me to what I believe disposes of the question presented: the disparity between the various social welfare programs is not permissible under the federal statutory framework. The four.social welfare programs offered by Texas are funded in part by the Federal Government. Each program is governed by a separate statute: OAA, 42 U. S. C. § 301 et seq.; AFDC, 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seq.; AB, 42 U. S. C. § 1201 et seq.; APTD, 42 U. S. C. § 1351 et seq. No State is compelled to participate in any program, and any State that wants to participate can choose to do so in one, several, or all of the programs. There is no doubt that States are free to choose whether or not to participate in these programs, and it is also clear that each State has considerable freedom to allocate what it wants to one or more programs by establishing different standards of need to compute eligibility for aid. King v. Smith, 392 U. S., at 318-319. It is also true, however, that the basic aims of the four programs are identical. Indeed, when Congress first enacted the programs in 1935, it viewed them all as necessary to provide aid to families unable to obtain income from private employment. The beneficiaries of the various programs shared the basic characteristics of need and dependence. H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 3. While the programs as they now exist go well beyond merely furnishing financial assistance as they did originally, they still maintain similar goals. Moreover, all four programs were simultaneously amended in 1956 to provide for social and rehabilitative services to enable all needy individuals to attain the maximum economic and personal independence of which they were capable. Each program now requires a State to describe, in its plan for each social welfare program it administers, the services it offers to accomplish this objective. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 302 (a) (11); 602 (a) (14); 1202 (a) (12); 1352 (a) (11). Congress has given the States authority to set different standards of need for different programs. But where, as here, the State concludes that the standard of need is the same for recipients of aid under the four distinct statutes, it is my opinion that Congress required that the State treat all recipients equally with respect to actual aid. In other words, as I read the federal statutes, they are designed to accomplish the same objectives, albeit for persons disadvantaged by different circumstances. States clearly have the freedom to make a bona fide determination that blind persons have a greater need than dependent children, that adults have a higher standard of need than children, that the aged have more need than the blind, and so forth. But, in this case, Texas made an independent determination of need, and it determined that the need of all recipients was equal. In this circumstance, I find nothing in the federal statute to enable a State to favor one group of recipients by satisfying more of its need, while at the same time denying an equally great need of another group. The purposes and objectives of the statutes are the same, those eligible for aid are suffering equally, and Congress intended that once a State chose to participate in the programs similarly situated persons would be treated similarly. Everything in this record indicates that the recipients of the various forms of aid are identically situated. Although the District Court accepted the State’s contentions that there are differences between AFDC children and other recipients which warranted different treatment under the federal statutes, I find each of the reasons offered totally unpersuasive. First, Texas argues that AFDC children can be employed, whereas recipients of other benefits cannot be. Assuming arguendo that this is true, it is an argument that falls of its own weight. Whatever income the children earn is subtracted from need, or it is excluded from consideration under § 402 (a) (8) to encourage self-help. Thus, income is already reflected in the computation of payments, or it is excluded in order that a specific legislative goal may be furthered. Thus, income is irrelevant in any explanation of the differences between the percentage reductions applied to the various programs. It .should also be noted that a recipient’s income is also taken into consideration in programs other than AFDC. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 302 (a) (10) (A); 1202 (a)(8); 1352 (a)(8). Second, the State maintains that AFDC families can secure help from legally responsible relatives more easily than recipients under other programs. Assuming again for purposes of discussion that this is true, it should be plain that any support from any relatives is subtracted from the State’s grant. Moreover, appellants properly point out that recipients of aid in non-AFDC programs often have a source of aid unavailable to AFDC recipients — the federal old age insurance, 42 U. S. C. § 201 et seq. Thus, there is no substance to this argument. Third, Texas points to the likelihood of future employment for AFDC recipients, a likelihood that it says is nonexistent for older persons and others who receive aid. Federal law provides that a State may only consider income that is currently available in allocating funds. 45 CFR § 233.20 (a) (3) (ii). This contention is therefore irrelevant. The State makes only two other arguments. One has already been rejected. Texas urges that the purposes of the federal programs differ, but the history belies this contention. The other is that the numbers of AFDC recipients is rising and this program should therefore bear the burden of monetary limitations. The obvious problem with this argument is that one fundamental purpose of AFDC aid is to enable people to escape the welfare rolls. But, under the Texas system, the aid is presently insufficient, people are unable to escape from dependency, and the rolls become larger. Had Texas not funded AFDC at a lower level than other programs, it is possible that the number of recipients would not have grown so large. The State's argument is a self-fulfilling prophecy on which it cannot rely to penalize AFDC recipients. Furthermore, there is nothing in the federal legislation to indicate that aid is to be reduced in a program merely because the number of beneficiaries of that program increases at a more rapid rate than in other programs. On the contrary, Congress has indicated that increased eligibility for AFDC is desirable, see 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (23); Rosado v. Wyman, supra. It would be extreme irony if AFDC recipients were penalized by a State because their numbers grew in accordance with congressional intent. The conclusion that I draw from the statutes is that Congress intended equal treatment for all persons similarly situated. Congress left to the States the determination of who was similarly situated by permitting States to determine levels of need. Since Texas has decided that AFDC recipients have precisely the same need as recipients of other social welfare benefits, it is my opinion that the federal legislation requires equal treatment for all. This conclusion finds support in the legislative history of the 1950 amendments to the social welfare legislation. In those amendments Congress made clear its intent to put AFDC recipients on a par with recipients of other welfare aid. “Today more than 1.1 million children under 18 years of age are receiving aid to dependent children through the State-Federal program because one or both of their parents are dead, absent from the home, or incapacitated. These children, regardless of the State in which they now live, will someday find their place in the productive activities of the Nation and, should the necessity arise, will take part in defending our Nation. Many of these children will be seriously handicapped as adults because in childhood they are not receiving proper and sufficient food, clothing, medical attention, and the other bare necessities of life. The national interest requires that the Federal Government provide for dependent children at least on a par with its contributions toward the support of the needy aged and blind.” S. Doc. No. 208, 80th Gong., 2d Sess., 105 (emphasis added). Congress recognized that “families with dependent children need as much in assistance payments as do aged and blind persons.” Id., at 106. It concluded that sound national policy was “for the States to provide payments for aid to dependent children comparable to those for the needy aged and blind.” Ibid. It is evident that Congress rejected the notion that where AFDC recipients had the same need as other welfare beneficiaries, they should get less money. As Senator Benton said on the floor of the Senate: “There seems no reasonable basis for such inequitable treatment of mothers and of children by the Federal Government. “All of us with children know that it costs as much if not more to rear children in health, decency, and self-respect than to maintain an adult. It is surely no less important to make this investment in our future citizens than it is to provide decently for those who have retired. . . .” 96 Cong. Rec. 8813-8814. In the 1950 amendments, Congress increased the federal funding of AFDC so that its beneficiaries would receive treatment equivalent to that received by beneficiaries of the other federal-state social welfare legislation. Where the needs of the people receiving aid under the various programs differed, Congress recognized that the amount of aid forthcoming should also differ. But where need was determined by the State to be equal for all recipients, Congress intended that all should receive an equal amount of aid. S. Doc. No. 208, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 108. There is absolutely no indication in any subsequent congressional action that the intent of Congress has changed. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for formulation of relief consistent with this opinion. Originally, the Texas Constitution prohibited all welfare programs. Section 51 of Art. Ill of the Constitution provided that the legislature “shall have no power to make any grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporations whatsoever . . . However, beginning in 1933, exceptions to this rule were added to the state constitution in § 51-a, which now allows participation in the federal welfare programs, but limits state financing to the sum of $80,000,000. The legislature cannot exceed this welfare budget without a state constitutional amendment. Old Age Assistance (OAA), 42 U. S. C. §301 et seq.; Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 42 U. S. C. §601 et seq.; Aid to the Blind (AB), 42 U. S. C. § 1201 et seq.; Aid for the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD), 42 U. S. C. § 1351 et seq. At the present time these factors are: OAA — 100%; AB — 95%; APTD — 95%; and AFDC — 75%. At the time this suit was instituted the AFDC percentage was 50%, but it was raised to 75% following a recent amendment of § 51-a. See n. 1, supra. Nineteen of the 26 States that use a percentage-reduction system follow the Texas procedure of accounting for outside income. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae 8, 15-16. A certain portion of earned income must be exempted as a work incentive. See 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (8). Assuming two identical families, each with a standard of need of $200,. and outside, nonexempt would produce these results: income of $100, the two systems Texas System $ 200 (need) X .75 (% reduction factor) $ 150 (reduced need) —100 (outside income) $ 50 (benefits payable) Alternative System $ 200 (need) —100 (outside income) $ 100 (unmet need) X .75 (% reduction factor) $ 75 (benefits payable) Assuming two families with identical standards of need, but only one with outside income, the alternative system leaves more money in the hands of the family with outside income: Outside Income $ 200 (need) —100 (outside income) $ 100 (unmet need) X .75 (% reduction factor) $ 75 (benefits payable) TOTAL INCOME (outside income plus benefits payable) = $175 No Outside Income $ 200 (need) — 0 (outside income) $ 200 (unmet need) X .75 (% reduction factor) $ 150 (benefits payable) TOTAL INCOME (outside income plus benefits payable) = $150 Under the Texas system, once the income rises above the reduced standard of need the individual no longer receives any cash assistance. He then would have a financial incentive, since his income would be rising above the maximum he could expect from the welfare system. For a general review of the statutory scheme, see Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, 407-412 (1970). Certain care-and-training provisions of the Social Security Act are available only to those who receive money payments under the categorical assistance programs. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 602 (a) (14), (15); 42 U. S. C. §§ 602 (a) (19), 632; 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (10). Under the Texas computation procedures, those whose income exceeds their reduced standard of need receive no cash benefits and thus do not qualify for these subsidiary benefits, although they do have “unmet need” qualifying them for aid under the alternative computation procedure. The Court in Rosado recognized this as one of several effects attributable to §402 (a) (23). 397 U. S., at 413. See also id., at 409 n. 13. The Court did not, however, hold that each one of these effects was intended by Congress. In fact, the Rosado holding as to the “two broad purposes” of Congress was stated above, and the Texas system is perfectly consistent with it. The Court mentioned widened eligibility simply as one of several possible effects that might follow from the statute as so construed. Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, Tit. II, §208, 81 Stat. 894, repealed 83 Stat. 45. See n. 7, supra. Appellants’ reliance on language from Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 480-481 (1970), is misplaced. The Court there explicitly failed to reach the State’s argument that the purpose of § 402 (a) (10) was primarily to prevent the use of waiting lists. Id., at 481 n. 12. Each categorical assistance program is embodied in a separate title of the Social Security Act, see n. 2, swpra, and requires a state plan independent of the plans under the other titles. In 1962, however, Congress enacted 42 U. S. C. §§ 1381-1385, which for the first time enabled States to combine their plans, but only for the non-AFDC programs. Thus, while Congress has now enabled States to adopt a common plan for the other programs, it considered AFDC sufficiently different so as to require an independent plan. Since the original opinion below, there has been an additional increase. Following a constitutional amendment, see n. 3, supra, the appropriation has risen from $6,150,000 to $23,100,000. In James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137 (1971), it was contended that a California referendum requirement violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it imposed a mandatory referendum in the case of an ordinance authorizing low income housing, while referenda with respect to other types of ordinances had to be initiated by the action of private individuals. The Court responded: “But of course a lawmaking procedure that 'disadvantages’ a particular group does not always deny equal protection. Under any such holding, presumably a State would not be able to require referendums on any subject unless referendums were required on all, because they would always disadvantage some group. And this Court would be required to analyze governmental structures to determine whether a gubernatorial veto provision or a filibuster rule is likely to ‘disadvantage’ any of the diverse and shifting groups that make up the American people.” Id., at 142. Just as the State’s actions here do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, we conclude that they do not violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d et seq. The Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in federally financed programs. We have, however, upheld the findings of nondiscriminatory purpose in the percentage reductions used by Texas, and have concluded that the variation in percentages is rationally related to the purposes of the separate welfare programs. The Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), is therefore inapposite. In Griggs, the employment tests having racially discriminatory effects were found not to be job-related, and for that reason were impermissible under the specific language of Title YII of the Civil Rights Act. Since the Texas procedure challenged here is related to the purposes of the welfare programs, it is not proscribed by Title VI simply because of variances in the racial composition of the different categorical programs. Mr. Justice Marshall’s dissent cites the 1950 amendments to the Social Security Act as support for its novel statutory theory that States must provide equal aid levels in each welfare category. The 1950 amendments included “a revised method of determining the Federal share of assistance costs,” 95 Cong. Rec. 13932, so that the Federal Government would pay a substantially equal percentage of matching funds to state plans in each of the categorical assistance programs. See S. Doc. No. 208, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 101. But this revision of the grant-in-aid formula in § 403 of the Act was not accompanied by any corresponding amendment of § 402, the section of the Act dealing with congressional limitations on state AFDC programs. Indeed, proponents of the 1950 amendments explicitly recognized and endorsed the longstanding policy that the Federal Government sets only minimum AFDC standards, while leaving the States “wide discretion both in determining policies and in setting standards of need.” S. Doc. No. 208, supra, at 101. The enactment of a modified grant-in-aid formula hardly suggests Congress’ intent to engage in “extensive alteration of the basic underlying structure of an established program.” Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S., at 414 n. 17. The Court’s acknowledgment that “[t]he Texas computation method eliminates any . . . financial incentive [for welfare recipients to obtain outside income], so long as the[ir] outside income remains less than the[ir] . . . reduced standard of need,” ante, at 541, understates the effect of the Texas system on the recipients. The Texas system not only fails to provide an incentive for those on the welfare rolls to break the cycle of poverty by obtaining employment, but — in certain cases — it also penalizes those who seek employment. The family with nonexempt income equal to Texas’ level of benefits stands in much the same cash position as the AFDC recipient, but solely because that family has earned that last marginal dollar that makes it no longer eligible for categorical assistance it also is denied medical assistance, social services, and training. The Solicitor General tells us that the value of the medical services alone is worth $50-$60 per month to the average Texas AFDC family. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae 7 n. 5. Eligibility for family development services is keyed to the “recei[pt] [of] aid to families with dependent children,” 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (14); so, too, with employment assistance, id,., at § 602 (a) (15) (A) (“receiving aid under the plan”); protection against child’s neglect or abuse, id., at § 602 (a) (16) (“receiving aid”); plans to establish paternity and secure support, id., at § 602 (a) (17) (A) (i) and (ii) (“receiving aid,” “receiving such aid”); work incentive programs, id., at § 602 (a) (19) (A) (i) (“receiving aid to families with dependent children”); and medical assistance plans, id., at § 1396a (a) (10) (“individuals receiving aid or assistance”). Would Congress have tied needy families’ eligibility for these programs to the receipt of cash benefits had it foreseen that this Court would disregard the statutory mandate “that aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals”? 42 U. S. C. §602 (a) (10). The rationale which the Court uses to reach this result is at odds with time-honored rules of statutory interpretation. First, the Court gives but a grudging interpretation to the recital in § 401 of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 601, that one of Congress’ purposes was to encourage welfare recipients to become self-supporting. The Court in effect disregards the rule that recitals embody “the general purposes which . . . Congress undertook to achieve.” Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 297. And see Coosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U. S. 550, 563; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386. Second, the Court attributes to Congress the purpose of providing work incentives, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (8), while at the same time allowing the imposition of penalties and disincentives for obtaining employment. The Court departs from the principle that “[i]n the exposition of statutes,” various sections of the same act “are supposed to have the same object,” Kohlsaat v. Murphy, 96 U. S. 153, 159-160, and holds instead that Congress was working at cross-purposes in different subsections of § 402, 42 U. S. C. § 602. Finally, by giving the Social Security Act a miserly interpretation, the Court disregards the canon that remedial legislation, such as the Social Security Act, is to be interpreted liberally to effectuate its purposes. E. g., Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U. S. 54, 65. The percentages of need that will be met by Texas under the various heads are as follows: Old Age Assistance. 100% Aid to the Blind. 95% Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled. 95% Aid to Families with Dependent Children. 75% When this action was instituted, Texas’ AFDC percentage level of benefits was only 50% of the standard of need. During the course of this litigation, Texas increased the AFDC level of benefits to 75% of need. To the same effect is our recent decision in Engelman v. Amos, 404 U. S. 23 (1971), aff’g sub nom. X v. McCorkle, 333 F. Supp. 1109 (NJ 1970). There, relying on Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397, the District Court held inconsistent with the Social Security Act — and thus unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause — a state provision which denied AFDC cash payments and ancillary benefits to those whose nonexempt income was less than the standard of need established by the State. We unanimously affirmed that decision. To be sure, Engelman dealt with federal provisions different from those presently in issue (42 U. S. C. § 602 (a) (8) (A) (ii); 45 CFR § 233.20 (a) (3) (ii),), but that does not distinguish the case. Rather, it merely emphasizes that which — until today — was the broad scheme of the Social Security Act: those whose nonexempt income was below the standard of need established by the State and who met the other nonfinaneial criteria for eligibility were to receive benefits. See 42 U. S. C. §602 (a) (10). To be sure, “[t]here is no question that States have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each State is free to set its own standard of need and to determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the program.” King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 318-319 (footnotes omitted). Accommodation of a State’s limited financial resources, however, is to be made in setting the level of benefits and not by gerrymandering the standard of need. Rosado v. Wyman, supra, at 413. Here, the “reduced standard of need” which the majority recognizes to be the consequence of the Texas computation procedures, ante, at 543 n. 10, violates § 402 (a) (23) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §602 (a) (23), and our decision in Rosado. Section 402 (a) (23) mandated an upward revision of the standard of need, and the “reduced standard of need” Texas applies to certain of its needy violates this requirement. 45 CFR §233.10 (a) (1) (ii) provides: “The groups selected for inclusion in the plan and the eligibility conditions imposed must not exclude individuals or groups on an arbitrary or unreasonable basis, and must not result in inequitable treatment of individuals or groups in the light of the provisions and purposes of the public assistance titles of the Social Security Act.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS, INC., et al. v. LEE, SUPERINTENDENT OF PORT AUTHORITY POLICE No. 91-155. Argued March 25, 1992 Decided June 26, 1992 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 685. Kennedy, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in Part I of which Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, JJ., joined, post, p. 693. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 709. Barry A. Fisher argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were David Grosz, Robert C. Moest, David M. Liberman, Jay Alan Sekulow, and Jeremiah S. Gutman. Arthur P. Berg argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Philip Maurer, Arnold D. Kolikoff, and Milton H. Packter. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Airports Association Council International-North America by Michael M. Conway; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Steven R. Shapiro, John A Powell, and Arthur N. Eisenherg; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Marsha S. Berzon, Walter Kamiat, and Laurence Gold; for the American Jewish Congress et al. by Bradley P. Jacob and Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.; for the American Newspaper Publishers Association et al. by Robert C. Bernius, Alice Neff Lucan, René P. Milam, Richard A Bernstein, Barbara Wartelle Wall, John C. Fontaine, Cristina L. Mendoza, George Freeman, and Carol D. Melamed; for the American Tract Society et al. by James Matthew Henderson, Sr., Mark N. Troobnick, Thomas Patrick Monaghan, and Charles E. Rice; for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson; for the Free Congress Foundation by Wendell R. Bird and David J. Myers; for Multimedia Newspaper Co. et al. by Carl F. Muller and Wallace K Lightsey; for Project Vote et al. by Robert Plotkin and Elliot M. Mincberg; and for the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers by Benjamin L. Brown, Analeslie Muncy, Robert J. Alfton, Frank B. Gummey III, Frederick S. Dean, Neal M. Janey, Victor J. Kaleta, Robert J. Mangier, Neal E. McNeill, Robert J. Watson, and Iris J. Jones. CHIEF Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. In this ease we consider whether an airport terminal operated by a public authority is a public forum and whether a regulation prohibiting solicitation in the interior of an airport terminal violates the First Amendment. The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute. Petitioner International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON), is a not-for-profit religious corporation whose members perform a ritual known as sankirtan. The ritual consists of “ ‘going into public places, disseminating religious literature and soliciting funds to support the religion.’ ” 925 F. 2d 576, 577 (CA2 1991). The primary purpose of this ritual is raising funds for the movement. Ibid. Respondent Walter Lee, now deceased, was the police superintendent of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and was charged with enforcing the regulation at issue. The Port Authority owns and operates three major airports in the greater New York City area: John P. Kennedy International Airport (Kennedy), La Guardia Airport (La Guardia), and Newark International Airport (Newark). The three airports collectively form one of the world’s busiest metropolitan airport complexes. They serve approximately 8% of this country’s domestic airline market and more than 50% of the trans-Atlantic market. By decade’s end they are expected to serve at least 110 million passengers annually. Id., at 578. The airports are funded by user fees and operated to make a regulated profit. Id., at 581. Most space at the three airports is leased to commercial airlines, which bear primary responsibility for the leasehold. The Port Authority retains control over unleased portions, including La Guardia’s Central Terminal Building, portions of Kennedy’s International Arrivals Building, and Newark’s North Terminal Building (we refer to these areas collectively as the "terminals”). The terminals are generally accessible to the general public and contain various commercial establishments such as restaurants, snack stands, bars, newsstands, and stores of various types. Id., at 578. Virtually all who visit the terminals do so for purposes related to air travel. These visitors principally include passengers, those meeting or seeing off passengers, flight crews, and terminal employees. Ibid. The Port Authority has adopted a regulation forbidding within the terminals the repetitive solicitation of money or distribution of literature. The regulation states: “1, The following conduct is prohibited within the interior areas of buildings or structures at an air terminal if conducted by a person.to or with passers-by in a continuous or repetitive manner: “(a) The sale or distribution of any merchandise, including but not limited to jewelry, food stuffs, candles, flowers, badges and clothing. “(b) The sale or distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets, books or any other printed or written material. “(c) The solicitation and receipt of funds.” Id., at 578-579. The regulation governs only the terminals; the Port Authority permits solicitation and distribution on the sidewalks outside the terminal buildings. The regulation effectively prohibits ISKCON from performing sankirtan in the terminals. As a result, ISKCON brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, alleging that the regulation worked to deprive its members of rights guaranteed under the First Amendment. The District Court analyzed the claim under the “traditional public forum” doctrine. It concluded that the terminals were akin to public streets, 721 F. Supp. 572, 577 (SONY 1989), the quintessential traditional public fora. This conclusion in turn meant that the Port Authority’s terminal regulation could be sustained only if it was narrowly tailored to support a compelling state interest. Id., at 579. In the absence of any argument that the blanket prohibition constituted such narrow tailoring, the District Court granted ISKCON summary judgment. Ibid. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. 925 F. 2d 576 (1991). Relying on our recent decision in United States v. Kokinda, 497 U. S. 720 (1990), a divided panel concluded that the terminals are not public fora. As a result, the restrictions were required only to satisfy a standard of reasonableness. The Court of Appeals then concluded that, presented with the issue, this Court would find that the ban on solicitation was reasonable, but the ban on distribution was not. ISKCON and one of its members, also a petitioner here, sought certiorari respecting the Court of Appeals’ decision that the terminals are not public fora and upholding the solicitation ban. Respondent cross-petitioned respecting the court’s holding striking down the distribution ban. We granted both petitions, 502 U. S. 1022 (1992), to resolve whether airport terminals are public fora, a question on which the Circuits have split and on which we once before granted certiorari but ultimately failed to reach. Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U. S. 569 (1987). It is uncontested that the solicitation at issue in this case is a form of speech protected under the First Amendment. Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981); Kokinda, supra, at 725 (citing Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 629 (1980)); Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 788-789 (1988). But it is also well settled that the government need not permit all forms of speech on property that it owns and controls. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U. S. 114, 129 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976). Where the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather than acting as lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its action will not be subjected to the heightened review to which its actions as a lawmaker may be subject. Kokinda, supra, at 725 (plurality opinion) (citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 896 (1961)). Thus, we have upheld a ban on political advertisements in city-operated transit vehicles, Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U. S. 298 (1974), even though the city permitted other types of advertising on those vehicles. Similarly, we have permitted a school district to limit access to an internal mail system used to communicate with teachers employed by the district. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37 (1983). These cases reflect, either implicitly or explicitly, a “forum based” approach for assessing restrictions that the government seeks to place on the use of its property. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 800 (1985). Under this approach, regulation of speech on government property that has traditionally been available for public expression is subject to the highest scrutiny. Such regulations survive only if they are narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state interest. Perry, 460 U. S., at 45. The second category of public property is the designated public forum, whether of a limited or unlimited character— property that the State has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public. Ibid. Regulation of such property is subject to the same limitations as that governing a traditional public forum. Id., at 46. Finally, there is all remaining public property. Limitations on expressive activity conducted on this last category of property must survive only a much more limited review. The challenged regulation need only be reasonable, as long as the regulation is not an effort to suppress the speaker’s activity due to disagreement with the speaker’s view. Ibid. The parties do not disagree that this is the proper framework. Rather, they disagree whether the airport terminals are public fora or nonpublie fora. They also disagree whether the regulation survives the “reasonableness” review governing nonpublic fora, should that prove the appropriate category. Like the Court of Appeals, we conclude that the terminals áre nonpublie fora and that the regulation reasonably limits solicitation. The suggestion that the government has a high burden in justifying speech restrictions relating to traditional public fora made its first appearance in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515, 516 (1939). Justice Roberts, concluding that individuals have a right to use “streets and parks for communication of views,” reasoned that such a right flowed from the fact that “streets and parks ... have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” We confirmed this observation in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 481 (1988), where we held that a residential street was a public forum. Our recent cases provide additional guidance on the characteristics of a public forum. In Cornelius we noted that a traditional public forum is property that has as “a principal purpose . . . the free exchange of ideas.” 473 U. S., at 800. Moreover, consistent with the notion that the government— like other property owners — “has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,” Greer, 424 U. S., at 836, the government does not create a public forum by inaction. Nor is a public forum created “whenever members of the public are permitted freely to visit a plaee owned or operated by the Government.” Ibid. The decision to create a public forum must instead be made “by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.” Cornelius, supra, at 802. Finally, we have recognized that the location of property also has bearing because separation from acknowledged public areas may serve to indicate that the separated property is a special enclave, subject to greater restriction. United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171, 179-180 (1983). These precedents foreclose the conclusion that airport terminals are public fora. Reflecting the general growth of the air travel industry, airport terminals have only recently achieved their contemporary size and character. See H. Hubbard, M. MeClintock, & F. Williams, Airports: Their Location, Administration and Legal Basis 8 (1930) (noting that the United States had only 807 airports in 1930). But given the lateness with which the modern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly qualifies for the description of having “immemorially... time out of mind” been held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity. Hague, supra, at 516. Moreover, even within the rather short history of air transport, it is only “[i]n recent years [that] it has become a common practice for various religious and nonprofit organizations to use commercial airports as a forum for the distribution of literature, the solicitation of funds, the proselytizing of new members, and other similar activities.” 45 Fed. Reg. 35314 (1980). Thus, the tradition of airport activity does not demonstrate that airports have historically been made available for speech activity. Nor can we say that these particular terminals, or airport terminals generally, have been intentionally opened by their operators to such activity; the frequent and continuing litigation evidene-ing the operators’ objections belies any such claim. See n. 2, supra. In short, there can be no argument that society’s time-tested judgment, expressed through acquiescence in a continuing practice, has resolved the issue in petitioners’ favor. Petitioners attempt to circumvent the history and practice governing airport activity by pointing our attention to the variety of speech activity that they claim historically occurred at various “transportation nodes” such as rail stations, bus stations, wharves, and Ellis Island. Even if we were inclined to accept petitioners’ historical account describing speech activity at these locations, an account respondent contests, we think that such evidence is of little import for two reasons. First, much of the evidence is irrelevant to public fora analysis, because sites such as bus and rail terminals traditionally have had private ownership. See United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678, 687 (1982); H. Grant & C. Bohi, The Country Railroad Station in America 11-15 (1978); U. S. Dept, of Transportation, The Intercity Bus Terminal Study 31 (Dec. 1984). The development of privately owned parks that ban speech activity would not change the public fora status of publicly held parks. But the reverse is also true. The practices of privately held transportation centers do not bear on the government’s regulatory authority over a publicly owned airport. Second, the relevant unit for our inquiry is an airport, not “transportation nodes” generally. When new methods of transportation develop, new methods for accommodating that transportation are also likely to be needed. And with each new step, it therefore will be a new inquiry whether the transportation necessities are compatible with various kinds of expressive activity. To make a category of “transportation nodes,” therefore, would unjustifiably elide what may prove to be critical differences of which we should rightfully take account. The “security magnet,” for example, is an airport commonplace that lacks a counterpart in bus terminals and train stations. And public access to air terminals is also not infrequently restricted — -just last year the Federal Aviation Administration required airports for a 4-month period to limit access to areas normally publicly accessible. See 14 CFR 107.11(f) (1991) and U. S. Dept, of Transportation News Release, Office of Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Jan. 18, 1991. To blithely equate airports with other transportation centers, therefore, would be a mistake. The differences among such facilities are unsurprising since, as the Court of Appeals noted, airports are commercial establishments funded by users fees and designed to make a regulated profit, 925 F. 2d, at 581, and where nearly all who visit do so for some travel related purpose, id., at 578. As commercial enterprises, airports must provide services attractive to the marketplace. In light of this, it cannot fairly be said that an airport terminal has as a principal purpose promoting “the free exchange of ideas.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 800 (1985). To the contrary, the record demonstrates that Port Authority management considers the purpose of the terminals to be the facilitation of passenger air travel, not the promotion of expression. Sloane Affidavit, ¶ 11, App. 464; Defendant’s Civil Rule 3(g) Statement, ¶ 39, App. 453. Even if we look beyond the intent of the Port Authority to the manner in which the terminals have been operated, the terminals have never been dedicated (except under the threat of court order) to expression in the form sought to be exercised here: i. e., the solicitation of contributions and the distribution of literature. The terminals here are far from atypical. Airport builders and managers focus their efforts on providing terminals that will contribute to efficient air travel. See, e. g., R. Hor-onjeff & F. McKelvey, Planning and Design of Airports 326 (3d ed. 1983) (“The terminal is used to process passengers and baggage for the interface with aircraft and the ground transportation modes”). The Federal Government is in accord; the Secretary of Transportation has been directed to publish a plan for airport development necessary “to anticipate and meet the needs of civil aeronautics, to meet requirements in support of the national defense... and to meet identified needs of the Postal Service.” 49 U. S. C. App. § 2203(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 35817 (1980) (“The purpose for which the [Dulles and National airport] terminals] [were] built and maintained is to process and serve air travelers efficiently”). Although many airports have expanded their function beyond merely contributing to efficient air travel, few have included among their purposes the designation of a forum for solicitation and distribution activities. See supra, at 680-681. Thus, we think that neither by tradition nor purpose can the terminals be described as satisfying the standards we have previously set out for identifying a public forum. The restrictions here challenged, therefore, need only satisfy a requirement of reasonableness. We reiterate what we stated in Kokinda: The restriction “‘need only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation.’ ” 497 U. S., at 730 (plurality opinion) (quoting Cornelius, supra, at 808). We have no doubt that under this standard the prohibition on solicitation passes muster. We have on many prior occasions noted the disruptive effect that solicitation may have on business. “Solicitation requires action by those who would respond: The individual solicited must decide whether or not to contribute (which itself might involve reading the solicitor’s literature or hearing his pitch), and then, having decided to do so, reach for a wallet, search it for money, write a check, or produce a credit card.” Kokinda, supra, at 734; see Heffron, 452 U. S., at 663 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Passengers who wish to avoid the solicitor may have to alter their paths, slowing both themselves and those around them. The result is that the normal flow of traffic is impeded. Id., at 653. This is especially so in an airport, where “[a]ir travelers, who are often weighted down by cumbersome baggage . . . may be hurrying to catch a plane or to arrange ground transportation.” 925 F. 2d, at 582. Delays may be particularly costly in this setting, as a flight missed by only a few minutes can result in hours worth of subsequent inconvenience.. In addition, face-to-face solicitation presents risks of duress that are an appropriate target of regulation. The skillful, and unprincipled, solicitor can target the most vulnerable, including those accompanying children or those suffering physical impairment and who cannot easily avoid the solicitation. See, e. g., International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 506 F. Supp. 147, 159-163 (NDNY 1980), rev’d on other grounds, 650 F. 2d 430 (CA21981). The unsavory solicitor can also commit fraud through concealment of his affiliation or through deliberate efforts to shortchange those who agree to purchase. 506 F. Supp., 159-163. See 45 Fed. Reg. 35314-35315 (1980). Compounding this problem is the fact that, in an airport, the targets of such activity frequently are on tight schedules. This in turn makes such visitors unlikely to stop and formally complain to airport authorities. As a result, the airport faces considerable difficulty in achieving its legitimate interest in monitoring solicitation activity to assure that travelers are not interfered with unduly. The Port Authority has concluded that its interest in monitoring the activities can best be accomplished by limiting solicitation and distribution to the sidewalk areas outside the terminals. Sloane Supp. Affidavit, ¶ 11, App. 514. This sidewalk area is frequented by an overwhelming percentage of airport users, see id., at ¶ 14, App. 515-516 (noting that no more than 3% of air travelers passing through the terminals are doing so on intraterminal flights, i. e., transferring planes). Thus the resulting access of those who would solicit the general public is quite complete. In turn we think it would be odd to conclude that the Port Authority’s terminal regulation is unreasonable despite the Port Authority having otherwise assured access to an area universally traveled. The inconveniences to passengers and the burdens on Port Authority officials flowing from solicitation activity may seem small, but viewed against the fact that “pedestrian congestion is one of the greatest problems facing the three terminals,” 925 F. 2d, at 582, the Port Authority could reasonably worry that even such incremental effects would prove quite disruptive. Moreover, “[t]he justification for the Rule should not be measured by the disorder that would result from granting an exemption solely to ISKCON.” Heffron, supra, at 652. For if ISKCON is given access, so too must other groups. “Obviously, there would be a much larger threat to the State’s interest in crowd control if all other religious, nonreligious, and noncommercial organizations could likewise move freely.” 452 U. S., at 653. As a result, we conclude that the solicitation ban is reasonable. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals sustaining the ban on solicitation in Port Authority terminals is Affirmed. The suit was filed in 1975. ISKCON originally sought access to both the airline controlled areas and tó the terminals and as a result sued both respondent and various private airlines. The suit worked a meandering course, see 721 F. Supp. 572, 573-574 (SDNY 1989), with the private airlines eventually being dismissed and leaving, as the sole remaining issue, ISKCON’s claim against respondent seeking a declaration and injunction against the regulation. The regulation at issue was not formally promulgated until 1988 although it represents a codification of presuit policy. App. to Pet. for Cert. 52. As noted in the text, supra this page, respondent concedes that sankirtan may be performed on the sidewalks outside the terminals. Compare decision below with Jamison v. St. Louis, 828 F. 2d 1280 (CA8 1987), cert. denied, 485 U. S. 987 (1988); Chicago Area Military Project v. Chicago, 508 F. 2d 921 (CA7), cert. denied, 421 U. S. 992 (1975); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F. 2d 619 (CA5 1981), cert. dism’d, 458 U. S. 1124 (1982); U.S. Southwest Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United States, 228 U. S. App. D. C. 191, 708 F. 2d 760 (1983); Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles, 785 F. 2d 791 (CA9 1986), aff’d on other grounds, 482 U. S. 569 (1987). We deal here only with petitioners’ claim regarding the permissibility of solicitation. Respondent’s cross-petition concerning the leafletting ban is disposed of in the companion case, Lee v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., post, p. 830. Respondent also argues that the regulations survive under the strict scrutiny applicable to public fora. We find it unnecessary to reach that question. The congestion problem is not unique to these airports. See 45 Fed. Reg. 35314-35315 (1980) (describing congestion at Washington's Dulles and National Airports) and 49 U. S. C. App. §2201(a)(ll) (congressional declaration that as part of the national airport system plan airport projects designed to increase passenger capacity “should be undertaken to the maximum feasible extent”).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ROCKFORD LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE et al. No. 86-251. Argued March 31, 1987 Decided June 8, 1987 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Erwin N. Griswold argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Karl L. Kellar, Ira L. Burleson, and John C. McCarthy. Patricia Rosen, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief for ap-pellees Illinois Department of Revenue et al. were Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, and Roma Jones Stewart, Solicitor General. Charles J. Prorok filed a brief for appellee Aurand. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Olsen, Alan I. Horowitz, Michael L. Pawp, and Ernest J. Brown; for the National Governor’s Association et al. by Benna Ruth Solomon, Beate Bloch, and Alan S. Madans; and for the California Franchise Tax Board by Benjamin F. Miller and Anna Jovanovich. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. This case involves financial instruments commonly known as “Ginnie Maes.” These instruments are issued by private financial institutions, which are obliged to make timely payment of the principal and interest as set forth in the certificates. The Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) guarantees that the payments will be made as scheduled. The question presented today is whether these instruments are exempt from state taxation under the constitutional principle of intergovernmental tax immunity, or under the relevant immunity statute. Prior to 1979 changes in Illinois’ tax law, Rockford Life Insurance Company (Rockford) paid an annual property tax on the assessed value of its capital stock. In 1978, the Illinois taxing authorities included the value of Rockford’s portfolio of Ginnie Maes in their calculation of the corporation’s net assets. Rockford challenged the assessment in the Illinois courts and the County Treasurer filed an action to collect the full amount of the assessment ($723,053.70). The Illinois courts uniformly rejected Rockford’s contention that the securities were exempt from state property taxes, reasoning that “the securities in question here were not ‘other obligations of the United States’ within the meaning of § 3701,” and that the constitutional and statutory inquiries were identical in this case. 112 Ill. 2d 174, 176-184, 492 N. E. 2d 1278, 1279-1283 (1986). We noted probable jurisdiction, 479 U. S. 947 (1986), and now affirm. I The instruments involved here are standard securities bearing the title “Mortgage Backed Certificate Guaranteed by Government National Mortgage Association.” App. 56. True to that title, the instruments contain a provision in which GNMA pledges the “full faith and credit of the United States” to secure the timely payment of the interest and principal set forth in the instrument. The purpose of the guarantee, and the function of GNMA, which is a wholly owned government corporation within the Department of Housing and Urban Development, is to attract investors into the mortgage market by minimizing the risk of loss. See 12 U. S. C. § 1716(a). There is uncontradicted evidence in the record supporting the conclusion that GNMA’s guarantee is responsible for the ready marketability of these securities. That guarantee is not the primary obligation described in the instrument, however. The duty to make monthly payments of principal and interest to the investors falls squarely on the issuer of the certificate. The issuer of the certificate is a private party, generally a financial institution, that posesses a pool of federally guaranteed mortgages. Those individual mortgages are the product of transactions between individual borrowers and private lending institutions. It is this pool of private obligations that provides the source of funds, as well as the primary security, for the principal and interest that the issuer promises to pay to the order of the holder of the instrument. After a pool of qualified mortgages is assembled by a qualified issuer, the issuer enters into an agreement with GNMA authorizing the issuer to sell one or more certificates, each of which is proportionately based on and backed by all the mortgages in the designated pool, and each of which is also guaranteed by GNMA. The issuer thereafter may sell the “mortgage-backed certificates” to holders such as Rockford. The issuer administers the pool by collecting principal and interest from the individual mortgagors and remitting the amounts specified in the certificates to the holders. GNMA’s costs for the regulatory duties is covered by a fee charged to the issuer. Unless the issuer defaults in its payments to the holder of a certificate, no federal funds are used in connection with the issuance and sale of these securities, the administration of the pool of mortgages, or the payments of principal and interest set forth in the certificates. Under the type of Ginnie Maes involved in this case, see n. 5, supra, the issuer is required to continue to make payments to the holders even if an individual mortgage in the pool becomes delinquent. In such event, the issuer may pursue its remedies against the individual mortgagor, or the guarantor of the mortgage, but the issuer does not have any rights against GNMA. GNMA’s guarantee is implicated only if the issuer fails to meet its obligations to the holders under the certificates. In that event the holder proceeds directly against GNMA, and not against the issuer. But the risk of actual loss to GNMA is minimal because its guarantee is secured not only by the individual mortgages in the pool but also by the separate guarantee of each of those mortgages, and by a fidelity bond which the issuer is required to post. See 24 CFR § 390.1 (1986). rH The GNMA guarantee of payment that is contained m the mortgage-backed certificates held by Rockford is a pledge of the “full faith and credit of the United States.” But that does not mean that it is the type of “obligation” of the United States which is subject to exemption under the Constitution or the immunity statute. Because the statutory immunity provision now codified at 31 U. S. C. § 3124(a) is “principally a restatement of the constitutional rule,” see Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U. S. 392, 397 (1983), we shall first decide whether the statute requires that Ginnie Maes be exempted from state property taxes, and then consider whether the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity requires any broader exemption. At the time relevant to this case, Rev. Stat. §3701, as amended, 31 U. S. C. §742 (1976 ed.), provided that “all stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other obligations of the United States, shall be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority” (emphasis added). The full text of the sentence in which these words appear, rules of statutory construction, and the earlier legislation that was codified by the enactment of this statute, are all consistent with the conclusion that the phrase “other obligations” refers “only to obligations or securities of the same type as those specifically enumerated.” Smith v. Davis, 323 U. S. 111, 117 (1944). This longstanding interpretation resolves the statutory question before us. GNMA certificates are fundamentally different from the securities specifically named in the statute. Most significantly, they are neither direct nor certain obligations of the United States. As the certificate provides, it is the issuer that bears the primary obligation to make timely payments — the United States’ obligation is secondary and contingent. In short, the United States is the guarantor — not the obligor. This distinction is more than adequate to support our conclusion that Ginnie Maes do not qualify as “other obligations of the United States” for the purposes of this statute. Nor does the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity exempt these instruments from state property taxes. In Smith v. Davis, supra, the United States owed money to a construction company for work that the company had performed on open account. In computing its assets for state tax purposes, the company sought to exclude the amount owed to it by the Federal Government, but a unanimous Court held that the debt was not exempt. The Court concluded that “a unilateral, unliquidated creditor’s claim, which by itself does not bind the United States and which in no way increases or affects the public debt, cannot be said to be a credit instrumentality of the United States for the purposes of tax immunity,” 323 U. S., at 114, and went on to explain that the claim differed “vitally from the type of credit instrumentalities which this Court in the past has recognized as constitutionally exempt from state and local taxation. Such instrumen-talities in each instance have been characterized by (1) written documents, (2) the bearing of interest, (3) a binding promise by the United States to pay specified sums at specified dates and (4) specific Congressional authorization, which also pledged the full faith and credit of the United States in support of the promise to pay.” Id., at 114-115. With respect to Ginnie Maes, the third element described in Smith v. Davis is clearly lacking, and its absence is critical in view of the purposes behind the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine. That doctrine is based on the proposition that the borrowing power is an essential aspect of the Federal Government’s authority and, just as the Supremacy Clause bars the States from directly taxing federal property, it also bars the States from taxing federal obligations in a manner which has an adverse effect on the United States’ borrowing ability. See Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449 (1829); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). The lack of a fixed and certain obligation by the United States in the Ginnie Mae context makes this concern far too attenuated to support constitutional immunity. Cf. Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 225 (1931); Hibernia Sav ings Society v. San Francisco, 200 U. S. 310, 315 (1906); Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 136 (1900). Moreover, none of the proceeds of the issuance and sale of the GNMA certificates are received by the Federal Government or used to finance any governmental function. Indeed, given the fixed fees that GNMA charges issuers, and the lack of any GNMA profit sharing, it has not been suggested here that the federal fisc would at all benefit from a holding that Ginnie Maes are exempt from state taxation. Appellant asserts that Congress authorized the GNMA’s guarantee for the salutary purpose of facilitating the financing of private mortgages, and that an exemption from state taxation will further this purpose. But our job is neither to assess the underlying merits of the program, nor to opine on whether Congress would be wise to exempt Ginnie Maes from state taxation. Our task is simply to decide whether the indirect, contingent, and unliquidated promise that GNMA is authorized to make is the type of federal obligation for which the Constitution, in Congress’ silence, imposes an exemption from state taxation. We hold that it is not. H — < 1 — i A court must proceed carefully when asked to recognize an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly established. We do well to remember the concluding words in Smith, which although spoken in reference to the statute, are relevant to our role in applying the constitutional doctrine as well: “All of these related statutes are a clear indication of an intent to immunize from state taxation only the interest-bearing obligations of the United States which are needed to secure credit to carry on the necessary functions of government. That intent, which is largely codified in § 3701, should not be expanded or modified in any degree by the judiciary.” 323 U. S., at 119. The judgment is Affirmed. At the time relevant to this case, that statute was Rev. Stat. § 3701, as amended, and provided: “Except as otherwise provided by law, all stocks, bonds, Treasury notes, and other obligations of the United States, shall be exempt from taxation by or under State or municipal or local authority. This exemption extends to every form of taxation that would require that either the obligations or the interest thereon, or both, be considered, directly or indirectly, in the computation of the tax, except nondiscriminatory franchise or other non-property taxes in lieu thereof imposed on corporations and except estate taxes or inheritance taxes.” 31 U. S. C. §742 (1976 ed.). The 1982 reformulation of the statute was “without substantive change” see Pub. L. 97-258, § 4(a), 96 Stat. 1067, and now appears at 31 U. S. C. § 3124(a) with some minor variations in its language, which are not relevant to this case. As in First National Bank of Atlanta v. Bartow County Tax Assessors, 470 U. S. 583 (1985), the tax at issue here was levied prior to the recodification, and “the pre-1982 form of the statute technically controls this case.” Id., at 585, n. 1. Appellant’s state-court action also involved a variety of state-law claims, and claims that some other federally guaranteed securities were exempt from state taxation. See 112 Ill. 2d 174, 177, 185-187, 492 N. E. 2d 1278, 1279, 1283-1284 (1986). These claims are not at issue here. The issue presented is not the type that would usually merit our attention if presented in a petition for certiorari. The issue has divided neither the federal courts of appeals nor the state courts. Indeed, aside from the Illinois courts, no court has ever considered whether Ginnie Maes are exempt from state taxes. Nor does it appear that this case presents an overly important question of federal law “which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court. ” This Court’s Rule 17.1(c). The fact is that the Illinois property tax imposed here was repealed in 1979. Nonetheless, this case arises under our mandatory jurisdiction, 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2), and Congress has not allowed us to consider these factors in deciding whether to rule on this case on its merits. “The Mortgage-Backed Securities Program provides a means for channeling funds from the Nation’s securities markets into the housing market. The U. S. Government full faith and credit guaranty of securities makes them widely accepted in those sectors of the capital markets that otherwise would not be likely to supply funds to the mortgage market. The funds raised through the securities issued are used to make residential and other mortgage loans. Through this process, the program serves to increase the overall supply of credit available for housing and helps to assure that this credit is available at reasonable interest rates.” Dept, of Housing and Urban Development, Handbook GNMA 5500.1 Rev. 6, GNMA I Mortgage Backed Securities Guide 1-1 (1984) (hereinafter GNMA Guide). The promises set forth in the representative GNMA certificate in the record read as follow: “THE ISSUER, NAMED BELOW, PROMISES TO PAY TO THE ORDER OF: “ROCKFORD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY “36 1695690 F “(HEREINAFTER CALLED THE HOLDER) The sum of $1,018,717 DOLS 20 CTS in principal amount, together with interest thereon and on portions thereof outstanding from time to time at the fixed rate set forth hereon, such payment to be in monthly installments, adjustable as set forth below. All monthly installments shall be for application first to interest at such fixed rate and then in reduction of principal balance then outstanding, and shall continue until payment in full of the principal amount, and of all interest accruing thereon. “[T]he issuer shall pay to the holder, whether or not collected by the issuer, and shall remit as set forth below, monthly payments of not less than the amounts of principal being due monthly on the mortgages and apportioned to the holder by reason of the aforesaid base and backing, together with any apportioned prepayments or other early recoveries of principal and interest at the fixed rate.” App. 56-57. Sample certificates are published in the GNMA Guide, at App. 39-43. The Ginnie Maes held by Rockford, are “modified pass-through securities” that provide for the payment of specific amounts whether or not timely collections are made from the individual mortgagors in the pool. See 128 Ill. App. 3d 302, 313, 470 N. E. 2d 596, 603 (2d Dist. 1984). GNMA also guarantees “straight pass-through securities” which provide that the issuer shall pay the holders of the securities the amounts collected from the pool, “as collected,” less specified administrative costs. See 24 CFR § 390.5(a) (1986); GNMA Guide, at 1-1. The issuer must satisfy various financial requirements imposed by the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and GNMA. See 24 CFR § 390.3 (1986). In addition each of the individual mortgages in the pool must be guaranteed by the FHA, the Veterans Administration, or another Government agency. Ibid. GNMA is authorized to make this guarantee under 12 U. S. C. § 1721(g). The fact that the guarantee is executed by a federal agency, rather than by the United States itself, does not avoid the application of the immunity doctrine and statute. See Memphis Bank & Trust v. Garner, 459 U. S. 392, 396 (1983). See n. 1, supra. Appellant contends that the issuer is not an obligor at all because the certificate provides that the holder’s sole recourse is against the GNMA. We disagree. That GNMA is willing to pay the investor in case of default and then pursue its own remedies against the issuer does not detract from the reality that the primary obligor is in fact the issuer, and not the GNMA. While the holder of the certificate may not enforce the obligation through a direct action against the issuer, GNMA may, upon default, institute a claim against the issuer’s fidelity bond or extinguish the issuer’s interest in the underlying mortgages thereby making the mortgages the absolute property of GNMA “subject only to unsatisfied rights therein of the holders of the securities.” 24 CFR § 390.15(b) (1986); see also 12 U. S. C. § 1721(g); New York Guardian Mortgagee Corp. v. Cleland, 473 F. Supp. 409, 411 (SDNY 1979). As the GNMA Guide provides: An “issuer of GNMA-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities is responsible for . . . making the full and timely payment of all amounts due to securities holders.” GNMA Guide, at 2-1. This statement is supported by the regulations which prohibit GNMA from guaranteeing securities “if the pool arrangement proposed by the issuer does not satisfactorily provide for . . . [t]imely payment of principal and interest, in accordance with the terms of the guaranteed securities.” 24 CFR § 390.9(c) (1986). See also GNMA Guide, at App. 19, §4.01 (issuer’s contractual agreement with GNMA binds issuer to “remit to the holders all payments ... in a timely manner”). “But when effort is made, as is the case here, to establish the un-constititional character of a particular tax by claiming that its remote effect will be to impair the borrowing power of the government, courts in overturning statutes, long established and within the ordinary sphere of state legislation, ought to have something more substantial to act upon than mere conjecture. The injury ought to be obvious and appreciable.” Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 137-138 (1900). The proposition that a federal guarantee of a loan does not preclude state taxation is a “long established” one. See Board of Comm’rs of Montgomery County v. Elston, 32 Ind. 27, 32 (1869); S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 5 N. Y. 2d 635, 641, 159 N. E. 2d 195, 197-198, cert. denied, 361 U. S. 912 (1959); see also 47 Op. N. C. Atty. Gen. 19 (1977) (concluding that Ginnie Maes are not “obligation of the United States” for these purposes, and indicating that the Assistant Director of GNMA agreed with this position). In fact, during the debate on one of the predecessors to the current immunity statute, Senator Sherman assured the Senate that bonds of the Pacific Railroad, which had been guaranteed by the United States, were not subject to immunity. See Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 1591 (1870), discussing Act of July 14, 1870, 16 Stat. 272. Even if there were a somewhat more certain effect, state taxation of these privately issued instruments would not necessarily be invalid. See Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1 (1941); Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U. S. 466 (1939); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134 (1937). Immunity from taxation “may not be conferred simply because the tax has an effect on the United States.” United States v. New Mexico, 455 U. S. 720, 734 (1982).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

LEOCAL v. ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. No. 03-583. Argued October 12, 2004 Decided November 9, 2004 Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. J. Sedwick Sollers III argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Patricia L. Maher and Michael J. Ciatti Dan Himmelfarb argued the cause for respondents. With him on.the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitors General Dreeben and Kneedler, Donald E. Keener, and Greg D. Mack. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Citizens and Immigrants for Equal Justice et al. by Carmine D. Boccuzzi, Jr.; for the Midwest Immigrant & Human Rights Center by Shashank S. Upadhye; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Paul A. Engelmayer, Douglas F. Curtis, Joshua L. Dratel, Lucas Guttentag, Steven R. Shapiro, Robin L. Goldfaden, Lory Diana Rosenberg, Jeanne A. Butterfield, Marianne Yang, and Manuel D. Vargas. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioner Josué Leocal, a Haitian citizen who is a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted in 2000 of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and causing serious bodily injury, in violation of Florida law. See Fla. Stat. §316.193(3)(c)(2) (2003). Classifying this conviction as a “crime of violence” under 18 U. S. C. § 16, and therefore an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordered that petitioner be deported pursuant to § 237(a) of the INA. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed, dismissing petitioner’s petition for review. We disagree and hold that petitioner’s DUI conviction is not a crime of violence under 18 U. S. C. §16. Petitioner immigrated to the United States in 1980 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1987. In January 2000, he was charged with two counts of DUI causing serious bodily injury under Fla. Stat. §316.193(3)(c)(2), after he caused an accident resulting in injury to two people. He pleaded guilty to both counts and was sentenced to 2lA years in prison. In November 2000, while he was serving his sentence, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated removal proceedings against him pursuant to § 237(a) of the INA. Under that provision, “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony... is deportable” and may be removed upon an order of the Attorney General. 66 Stat. 201, 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Section 101(a)(43) of the INA defines “aggravated felony” to include, inter alia, “a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18, but not including a purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (footnote omitted). Title 18 U. S. C. § 16, in turn, defines the term “crime of violence” to mean: “(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or “(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” Here, the INS claimed that petitioner’s DUI conviction was a “crime of violence” under § 16, and therefore an “aggravated felony” under the INA. In October 2001, an Immigration Judge found petitioner removable, relying upon the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Le v. United States Attorney General, 196 F. 3d 1352 (1999) (per curiam), which held that a conviction under the Florida DUI statute qualified as a crime of violence. The BIA affirmed. Petitioner completed his sentence and was removed to Haiti in November 2002. In June 2003, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed petitioner’s petition for review, relying on its previous ruling in Le, supra. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a-7a. We granted certiorari, 540 U. S. 1176 (2004), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether state DUI offenses similar to the one in Florida, which either do not have a mens rea component or require only a showing of negligence in the operation of a vehicle, qualify as a crime of violence. Compare Le, supra, at 1354; and Omar v. INS, 298 F. 3d 710, 715-718 (CA8 2002), with United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F. 3d 1140, 1145-1146 (CA9 2001); Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F. 3d 200, 205-206 (CA2 2001); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F. 3d 600, 609-611 (CA7 2001); and United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F. 3d 921, 926-927 (CA5), amended, 262 F. 3d 479 (CA5 2001) (per curiam); see also Ursu v. INS, 20 Fed. Appx. 702 (CA9 2001) (following Trinidad-Aquino, supra, and ruling that a violation of the Florida DUI statute at issue here and in Le does not count as a “crime of violence”). We now reverse the Eleventh Circuit. Title 18 U. S. C. § 16 was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, which broadly reformed the federal criminal code in such areas as sentencing, bail, and drug enforcement, and which added a variety of new violent and nonviolent offenses. § 1001(a), 98 Stat. 2136. Congress employed the term “crime of violence” in numerous places in the Act, such as for defining the elements of particular offenses, see, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 1959 (prohibiting threats to commit crimes of violence in aid of racketeering activity), or for directing when a hearing is required before a charged individual can be released on bail, see § 3142(f) (requiring a pretrial detention hearing for those alleged to have committed a crime of violence). Congress therefore provided in §16 a general definition of the term “crime of violence” to be used throughout the Act. See § 1001(a), 98 Stat. 2136. Section 16 has since been incorporated into a variety of statutory provisions, both criminal and noneriminal. Here, pursuant to § 237(a) of the INA, the Court of Appeals applied §16 to find that petitioner’s DUI conviction rendered him deportable. In determining whether petitioner’s conviction falls within the ambit of § 16, the statute directs our focus to the “offense” of conviction. See § 16(a) (defining a crime of violence as “an offense that has as an element the use ... of physical force against the person or property of another” (emphasis added)); § 16(b) (defining the term as “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense” (emphasis added)). This language requires us to look to the elements and the nature of the offense of conviction, rather than to the particular facts relating to petitioner’s crime. Florida Stat. § 316.193(3)(c)(2) makes it a third-degree felony for a person to operate a vehicle while under the influence and, “by reason of such operation, eaus[e]. . . [s]erious bodily injury to another.” The Florida statute, while it requires proof of causation of injury, does not require proof of any particular mental state. See State v. Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552, 562-564 (Fla. 1999) (holding, in the context of a DUI manslaughter conviction under § 316.193, that the statute does not contain a mens rea requirement). Many States have enacted similar statutes, criminalizing DUI causing serious bodily injury or death without requiring proof of any mental state, or, in some States, appearing to require only proof that the person acted negligently in operating the vehicle. The question here is whether § 16 can be interpreted to include such offenses. Our analysis begins with the language of the statute. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 144 (1995). The plain text of § 16(a) states that an offense, to qualify as a crime of violence, must have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” We do not deal here with an at tempted, or threatened use of force. Petitioner contends that his conviction did not require the “use” of force against another person because the most common employment of the word “use” connotes the intentional availment of force, which is not required under the Florida DU I statute. The Government counters that the “use” of force does not incorporate any mens rea component, and that petitioner’s DUI conviction necessarily includes the use of force. To support its position, the Government dissects the meaning of the word “use,” employing dictionaries, legislation, and our own case law in contending that a use of force may be negligent or even inadvertent. Whether or not the word “use” alone supplies a mens rea element, the parties’ primary focus on that word is too narrow. Particularly when interpreting a statute that features as elastic a word as “use,” we construe language in its context and in light of the terms surrounding it. See Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 229 (1993); Bailey, supra, at 143. The critical aspect of § 16(a) is that a crime of violence is one involving the “use ... of physical force against the person or property of another.” (Emphasis added.) As we said in a similar context in Bailey, “use” requires active employment. 516 U. S., at 145. While one may, in theory, actively employ something in an accidental manner, it is much less natural to say that a person actively employs physical force against another person by accident. Thus, a person would “use . . . physical force against” another when pushing him; however, we would not ordinarily say a person “use[s] . . . physical force against” another by stumbling and falling into him. When interpreting a statute, we must give words their “ordinary or natural” meaning. Smith, supra, at 228. The key phrase in § 16(a) — the “use . ... of physical force against the person or property of another” — most naturally suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct. See United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F. 3d, at 1145; Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F. 3d, at 609. Petitioner’s DUI offense therefore is not a crime of violence under § 16(a). Neither is petitioner’s DUI conviction a crime of violence under § 16(b). Section 16(b) sweeps more broadly than § 16(a), defining a crime of violence as including “any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” But § 16(b) does not thereby encompass all negligent misconduct, such as the negligent operation of a vehicle. It simply covers offenses that naturally involve a person acting in disregard of the risk that physical force might be used against another in committing an offense. The reckless disregard in § 16 relates not to the general conduct or to the possibility that harm will result from a person’s conduct, but to the risk that the use of physical force against another might be required in committing a crime. The classic example is burglary. A burglary would be covered under § 16(b) not because the offense can be committed in a generally reckless way or because someone may be injured, but because burglary, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that the burglar will use force against a victim in completing the crime. Thus, while § 16(b) is broader than § 16(a) in the sense that physical force need not actually be applied, it contains the same formulation we found to be determinative in § 16(a): the use of physical force against the person or property of another. Accordingly, we must give the language in § 16(b) an identical construction, requiring a higher mens rea than the merely accidental or negligent conduct involved in a DUI offense. This is particularly true in light of § 16(b)’s requirement that the “substantial risk” be a risk of using physical force against another person “in the course of committing the offense.” In no “ordinary or natural” sense can it be said that a person risks having to “use” physical force against another person in the course of operating a vehicle while intoxicated and causing injury. In construing both parts of § 16, we cannot forget that we ultimately are determining the meaning of the term “crime of violence.” The ordinary meaning of this term, combined with § 16’s emphasis on the use of physical force against another person (or the risk of having to use such force in committing a crime), suggests a category of violent, active crimes that cannot be said naturally to include DUI offenses. Cf. United States v. Doe, 960 F. 2d 221, 225 (CA1 1992) (Breyer, C. J.) (observing that the term “violent felony” in 18 U. S. C. § 924(e) (2000 ed. and Supp. II) “calls to mind a tradition of crimes that involve the possibility of more closely related, active violence”). Interpreting §16 to encompass accidental or negligent conduct would blur the distinction between the “violent” crimes Congress sought to distinguish for heightened punishment and other crimes. See United States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F. 3d 1202, 1205-1206 (CA10 2003). Section 16 therefore cannot be read to include petitioner’s conviction for DUI causing serious bodily injury under Florida law. This construction is reinforced by Congress’ use of the term “crime of violence” in § 101(h) of the INA, which was enacted in 1990. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, § 131, 104 Stat. 31 (hereinafter FRAA). Section 212(a)(2)(E) of the INA renders inadmissible any alien who has previously exercised diplomatic immunity from criminal jurisdiction in the United States after committing a “serious criminal offense.” 8 U. S. C. § 1182(a)(2)(E). Section 101(h) defines the term “serious criminal offense” to mean: “(1) any felony; “(2) any crime of violence, as defined in section 16 of title 18; or “(3) any crime of reckless driving or of driving while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol or of prohibited substances if such crime involves personal injury to another.” 8 U. S. C. § 1101(h) (emphasis added). Congress’ separate listing of the DUI-causing-injury offense from the definition of “crime of violence” in § 16 is revealing. Interpreting §16 to include DUI offenses, as the Government urges, would leave § 101(h)(3) practically devoid of significance. As we must give effect to every word of a statute wherever possible, see Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001), the distinct provision for these offenses under § 101(h) bolsters our conclusion that § 16 does not itself encompass DUI offenses. This case does not present us with the question whether a state or federal offense that requires proof of the reckless use of force against the person or property of another qualifies as a crime of violence under 18 U. S. C. § 16. DUI statutes such as Florida’s do not require any mental state with respect to the use of force against another person, thus reaching individuals who were negligent or less. Drunk driving is a nationwide problem, as evidenced by the efforts of legislatures to prohibit such conduct and impose appropriate penalties. But this fact does not warrant our shoehorning it into statutory sections where it does not fit. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. Congress first made commission of an aggravated felony grounds for an alien’s removal in 1988, and it defined the term to include offenses such as murder, drug trafficking crimes, and firearm trafficking offenses. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, §§ 7342, 7344, 102 Stat. 4469, 4470. Since then; Congress has frequently amended the definition of aggravated felony, broadening the scope of offenses which render an alien deportable. See, e. g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 440(e), 110 Stat. 1277 (adding a number of offenses to § 101(a)(43) of the INA); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), §321,110 Stat. 3009-627 (same). The inclusion of any “crime of violence” as an aggravated felony came in 1990. See Immigration Act of 1990, § 501, 104 Stat. 5048. When petitioner first appealed, the BIA’s position was that a violation of DUI statutes similar to Florida’s counted as a crime of violence under 18 U. S. C. § 16. See, e. g., Matter of Puente-Salazar, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1006, 1012-1013 (BIA 1999) (en banc). Before petitioner received a decision from his appeal (due to a clerical error not relevant here), the BIA in another case reversed its position from Puente-Salazar and held that DUI offenses that do not have a mens rea of at least recklessness are not crimes of violence within the meaning of § 16. See Matter of Ramos, 23 I. & N. Dec. 336, 346 (BIA 2002) (en banc). However, because the BIA held in Ramos that it would “follow the law of the circuit in those circuits that have addressed the question whether driving under the influence is a crime of violence,” id., at 346-347, and because it found the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Le controlling, it affirmed the Immigration Judge’s removal order. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a-4a. Pursuant to the IIRIRA, the Eleventh Circuit was without jurisdiction to review the BIA’s removal order in this case if petitioner was “removable by reason of having committed” certain criminal offenses, including those covered as an “aggravated felony.” See 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). Because the Eleventh Circuit held that petitioner’s conviction was such an offense, it concluded that it had no jurisdiction to consider the removal order. For instance, a number of statutes criminalize conduct that has as an element the commission of a crime of violence under § 16. See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. §842(p) (prohibiting the distribution of information relating to explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction in relation to a crime of violence). Other statutory provisions make classification of an offense as a crime of violence consequential for purposes of, inter alia, extradition and restitution. See §§3181(b), 3663A(c). And the term “crime of violence” under §16 has been incorporated into a number of noncriminal enactments. See, e. g., 8 U. S. C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (rendering an alien deportable for committing a crime of violence, as petitioner is charged here). See, e. g., Ala. Code § 18A-6-20(a)(5) (West 1994); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3— 205(1)(b)(I) (Lexis 2003); Conn. Gen. Stat. §53a-60d(a) (2008); Ga. Code Ann. § 40-6-394 (Lexis 2004); Idaho Code § 18-8006(1) (Lexis 2004); Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., ch. 625, § 5/11—501(d)(1)(C) (West 2002); Ind. Code § 9-30-5-4 (1993); Iowa Code §707.6A(4) (2003); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 189A.010(1) and (11)(c) (Lexis Supp. 2004); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 29-A, § 2411(1-A)(D)(1) (West Supp. 2003); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §257.625(5) (West Supp. 2004); Neb. Rev. Stat. §60-6,198(1) (2002 Cum. Supp.); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 265:82-a(I)(b) and (II)(b) (West 2004); N. J. Stat. Ann. §2C:12-l(c) (West Supp. 2003); N. M. Stat. Ann. §§66-8-101(B) and (C) (2004); N. D. Cent. Code §39-09-01.1 (Lexis 1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.08(A)(1)(a) (Lexis 2003); Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 47, §11-904(B)(1) (West 2001); 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3804(b) (Supp. 2003); R. I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2.6(a) (Lexis 2002); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.07(a)(1) (West 2003); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 23, § 1210(f) (Lexis Supp. 2004); Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.522(1)(b) (1994); Wis. Stat. §940.25(1) (1999-2000); Wyo. Stat. §31-5-233(h) (Lexis 2003). See, e. g., Cal. Veh. Code Ann. § 23153 (West 2000); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §§628(2), 629 (Lexis 1995); La. Stat. Ann. §§ 14:39.1(A), 14:39.2(A) (West 1997 and Supp. 2004); Md. Crim. Law Code Ann. §§3-211(c) and (d) (Lexis 2004); Miss. Code Ann. §63-11-30(5) (Lexis 2004); Mo. Ann. Stat. §565.060.1(4) (West 2000); Mont. Code Ann. §45-5-205(1) (2003); Nev. Rev. Stat. §484.3795(1) (2003); S. C. Code Ann. §56-5-2945(A)(1) (2003); S. D. Codified Laws §22-16-42 (West Supp. 2003); Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-44(3)(a)(ii)(A) and (3)(b) (Lexis Supp. 2004); W. Va. Code § 17C-5-2(c) (Lexis 2004). Thus, § 16(b) plainly does not encompass all offenses which create a “substantial risk” that injury will result from a person’s conduct. The “substantial risk” in § 16(b) relates to the use of force, not to the possible effect of a person’s conduct. Compare § 16(b) (requiring a “substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used”) with United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §4B1.2(a)(2) (Nov. 2003) (in the context of a career-offender sentencing enhancement, defining “crime of violence” as meaning, inter alia, “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”). The risk that an accident may occur when an individual drives while intoxicated is simply not the same thing as the risk that the individual may “use” physical force against another in committing the DUI offense. See, e. g., United States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F. 3d 1202, 1205-1207 (CA10 2003); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F. 3d 600, 609-610 (CA7 2001). Even if §16 lacked clarity on this point, we would be constrained to interpret any ambiguity in the statute in petitioner’s favor. Although here we deal with § 16 in the deportation context, § 16 is a criminal statute, and it has both criminal and noncriminal applications. Because we must interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies. Cf. United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U. S. 505, 517-518 (1992) (plurality opinion) (applying the rule of lenity to a tax statute, in a civil setting, because the statute had criminal applications and thus had to be interpreted consistently with its criminal applications). This point carries significant weight in the particular context of this case. Congress incorporated § 16 as an aggravated felony under § 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA in 1990. See Immigration Act of 1990, § 501, 104 Stat. 5048 (Nov. 29, 1990). Congress enacted § 101(h), with its incorporation of § 16 and a separate provision covering DUI-causing-injury offenses, just nine months earlier. See FRAA, §131, 104 Stat. 31 (Feb. 16, 1990). That Congress distinguished between a crime of violence and DUI-causing-injury offenses (and included both) in § 101(h), but did not do so shortly thereafter in making only a crime of violence an aggravated felony under § 101(a)(43)(F), strongly supports our construction of § 16.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BARNARD, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS v. THORSTENN et al. No. 87-1939. Argued January 11, 1989 Decided March 6, 1989 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia, JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which White and O’Connor, JJ., joined, post, p. 559. Maria Tankenson Hodge argued the cause for petitioners in both cases. With her on the briefs were Vincent A. Coli-anni and Geoffrey W. Barnard, pro se. Cornish F. Hitchcock argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Alan B. Morrison and William L. Blum. Together with No. 87-2008, Virgin Islands Bar Association v. Thor-stenn et al., also on certiorari to the same court. Godfrey R. de Castro, Attorney General of the Virgin Islands, Rosalie Shnmonds Ballentine, Solicitor General, and Susan Frederick Rhodes, Assistant Attorney General, filed a brief for the Government of the Virgin Islands as amicus curiae urging reversal. John Cary Sims filed a brief for Paul Hoffman et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. In order to be admitted to the Bar of the District Court of the Virgin Islands, an otherwise qualified attorney must demonstrate that he or she has resided in the Virgin Islands for at least one year and that, if admitted, the attorney intends to continue to reside and practice in the Virgin Islands. The question before us is whether these residency requirements are lawful. I Local Rule 56(b) of the District Court of the Virgin Islands provides that before an otherwise qualified attorney is admitted to the Virgin Islands Bar, he must “allege and prove to the satisfaction” of the Committee of Bar Examiners that he has “resided in the Virgin Islands for at least one year immediately preceding his proposed admission to the Virgin Islands Bar,” V. I. Code Ann., Tit. 5, App. V., Rule 56(b)(4) (1982); and that, “[i]f admitted to practice, he intends to continue to reside in and to practice law in the Virgin Islands,” Rule 56(b)(5). The rule applies not only to practice before the District Court, but also to practice before the local territorial courts. Respondents Susan Esposito Thorstenn and Lloyd DeVos are attorneys who are members in good standing of the Bars of the States of New York and New Jersey, and who practice law in New York City. Neither respondent resides in the Virgin Islands. In the spring of 1985, respondents applied to take the Virgin Islands bar examination, but their applications were rejected by the Committee of Bar Examiners because they did not satisfy the residency requirements of Local Rule 56(b). Respondents filed this suit in the District Court against petitioner Geoffrey W. Barnard, the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners, seeking a declaration that the residency requirements of Rule 56(b) violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution, as interpreted by our decision in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U. S. 274 (1985). Respondents also sought to enjoin the enforcement of Rule 56(b) against them. On June 21, 1985, while reserving a decision on the merits, the District Court ordered that respondents be allowed to take the bar examination. They took the examination and passed. Petitioner Virgin Islands Bar Association intervened, and all parties submitted motions for summary judgment with supporting affidavits. The District Court granted summary judgment for petitioners, concluding that the reasons offered for Rule 56(b)’s residency requirements, grounded in the unique conditions in the Virgin Islands, were substantial enough to justify the discrimination against nonresidents. App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a-67a. While the District Court’s decision was pending on appeal in the Third Circuit, we decided Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U. S. 641 (1987), where we invoked our supervisory power to invalidate certain residency requirements contained in the local rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s judgment for petitioners, concluding that the reasons given for Rule 56(b) were in essence the same as those we rejected in Heebe. See Esposito v. Barnard, No. 87-3034 (CA3, Sept. 30, 1987), vacated sub nom. Thorstenn v. Barnard, 833 F. 2d 29 (1987). The case was reheard en banc, and a majority of the full Court of Appeals agreed with the original panel decision that the residency requirements of Rule 56(b) were invalid under Heebe. See 842 F. 2d 1393 (1988). The en banc court emphasized that alternative and less restrictive means, short of a residency requirement, were available to the District Court to assure that nonresident bar members would bear professional responsibilities comparable to those imposed on resident attorneys. Id., at 1396. In view of its determination that Heebe controlled the case, the Court of Appeals did not address respondents’ claim under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 842 F. 2d, at 1397, n. 6. We granted certiorari, 487 U. S. 1232 (1988), and now affirm. II In Frazier v. Heebe, supra, we invoked supervisory power over district courts of the United States to invalidate discriminatory residency requirements for admission to the Bar of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The Court of Appeals in the case now before us expressed “no doubt” that our supervisory power extends to the bar requirements of the District Court of the Virgin Islands. 842 F. 2d, at 1396. Without attempting to define the limits of our supervisory power, we decline to apply it in this case. Both the nature of the District Court of the Virgin Islands and the reach of its residency requirements implicate interests beyond the federal system. As to the former, the District Court, which was given its current form and jurisdiction by Congress in the Revised Organic Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 506, see 48 U. S. C. §§ 1611-1616 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV); see generally §§ 1541-1645, is not a United States district court, but an institution with attributes of both a federal and a territorial court. Although it is vested with the jurisdiction of a United States district court, see 48 U. S. C. § 1612(a) (1982 ed., Supp. IV), the District Court also has original jurisdiction over certain matters of local law not vested in the local courts of the Virgin Islands, see § 1612(b), as well as concurrent jurisdiction with the local courts over certain criminal matters, see § 1612 (c). It also serves as an appellate court for decisions rendered by the local courts. See 48 U. S. C. § 1613a (1982 ed., Supp. IV). In fact, Congress provides in the Revised Organic Act that, for certain purposes, the District Court “shall be considered a court established by local law.” § 1612(b). The application of Rule 56(b) itself similarly extends beyond practice in the federal system. Unlike the rule in Heebe, which was confined to practice before the United States District Court, Rule 56(b) applies to admission to the Bar of the Virgin Islands, and so governs practice before the territorial courts. See n. 1, supra. Because these territorial interests are intertwined with the operation of Rule 56, we decline to examine this case as an issue of supervisory power. HH I — I 1 — 4 Respondents also contend that Rule 56(b) violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution, which Congress has made applicable to the Virgin Islands in the Revised Organic Act. See 48 U. S. C. § 1561. Petitioners concede that the District Court is an instrumentality of the Government of the Virgin Islands and is subject to the Privileges and Immunities Clause through the Revised Organic Act. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6. Article IV, § 2, of the Constitution provides that the “Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” When a challenged restriction deprives nonresidents of a privilege or immunity protected by this Clause, it is invalid unless “(i) there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State’s objective.” Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, supra, at 284; see Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U. S. 59, 65 (1988). In deciding whether the discrimination bears a substantial relation to the State’s objectives, we consider, among other things, whether less restrictive means of regulation are available. Piper, 470 U. S., at 284. It is by now well settled that the practice of law is a privilege protected by Article IV, § 2, and that a nonresident who passes a state bar examination and otherwise qualifies for practice has an interest protected by the Clause. See Friedman, supra, at 65; Piper, supra, at 279-283. We need consider here only whether there are substantial reasons to support treating qualified nonresident attorneys differently, and whether the means chosen by the District Court, total exclusion from the Bar, bear a close or substantial relation to the Territory’s legitimate objectives. Petitioners offer five justifications for the residency requirements of Rule 56(b), which track the reasons recited by the District Court. First, petitioners contend that the geographical isolation of the Virgin Islands, together with irregular airline and telephone service with the mainland United States, will make it difficult for nonresidents to attend court proceedings held with little advance notice. Second, petitioners cite the District Court’s finding that the delay caused by trying to accommodate the schedules of nonresident attorneys would increase the massive caseload under which that court suffers. Third, petitioners contend that delays in publication and lack of access to local statutes, regulations, and court opinions will prevent nonresident attorneys from maintaining an adequate level of competence in local law. Fourth, petitioners argue that the Virgin Islands Bar does not have the resources for adequate supervision of a nationwide bar membership. Finally, petitioners exert much energy arguing that the residency requirements of Rule 56(b) are necessary to apply Local Rule 16 in a strict and fair manner. That Rule requires all active members of the Bar to represent indigent criminal defendants on a regular basis. See V. I. Code Ann., Tit. 5, App. V, Rule 16 (1982). We find none of these justifications sufficient to meet the Virgin Island’s burden of demonstrating that the discrimination against nonresidents by Rule 56(b) is warranted by a substantial objective and bears a close or substantial relation to that objective. The answer to petitioners’ first justification, based on the geographical isolation of the Virgin Islands and the unreliable airline and telephone service, is found in Piper. In that case, as here, the Bar argued that “[e]ven the most conscientious lawyer residing in a distant State may find himself unable to appear in court for an unscheduled hearing or proceeding.” 470 U. S., at 286. We did not find this a sufficient justification for a residency requirement for two reasons. First, we found it likely that a high percentage of nonresidents who took the trouble to take the state bar examination and to pay the annual dues would reside in a place convenient to New Hampshire. Id,., at 286-287. Although that observation is not applicable here, we went on to hold in Piper that, for lawyers who reside a great distance from New Hampshire, the State could protect its interests by requiring the lawyer to retain a local attorney who will be available for unscheduled meetings and hearings. Id., at 287. The same solution is available to the Virgin Islands. The exclusion of nonresidents from the bar is not substantially related to the District Court’s interest in assuring that counsel will be available on short notice for unscheduled proceedings. Petitioners’ second proffered justification is similar to their first. The District Court found that because of its unusually large and increasing caseload, it could not countenance interruptions caused by nonresident lawyers attempting to reach the Virgin Islands from the mainland, or conflicts with their appearances on the mainland. To the extent this justification reiterates the point we have addressed above, the same response applies. Any burden on the Virgin Islands court system to accommodate travel schedules of nonresidents can be relieved in substantial part by requiring nonresidents to associate with local counsel. The large caseload of the Virgin Islands District Court does not alter the analysis. Quite aside from the paradox in citing extreme caseload as the reason to exclude more attorneys, it is clear that a State, or a Territory to which the Privileges and Immunities Clause applies, may not solve the problem of congested court dockets by discriminating against nonresidents. Nor do we see the problem of conflicting court appearances as justifying the exclusion of nonresidents from the bar. The problem is not unique to the Virgin Islands. A court in New Jersey may be inconvenienced to some extent by a request to accommodate the conflicting court appearance of a nonresident attorney in New York. But that does not justify closing the New Jersey Bar to New York residents. Further, the District Court may make appropriate orders for prompt appearances and speedy trials. Nor are we persuaded by petitioners’ claim that the delay in publication of local law requires exclusion of nonresidents because they will be unable to maintain an adequate level of professional competence. As we said in Piper, we will not assume that “a nonresident lawyer — any more than a resident — would disserve his clients by failing to familiarize himself with the [local law].” Id., at 285. We can assume that a lawyer who anticipates sufficient practice in the Virgin Islands to justify taking the bar examination and paying the annual dues, see ibid., will inform himself of the laws of the Territory. And although petitioners allege that the most recent legal materials, such as District Court opinions and local statutes and regulations, are not available on a current basis, this does not justify exclusion of nonresidents. If legal materials are not published on a current basis, we do not see how this is more of a problem for nonresidents than residents. All that petitioners allege on this point is that residents can review slip opinions by visiting the offices of the law clerks for the District Court judges. See Affidavit of Patricia D. Steele, App. 45. We do not think it either realistic or practical to assume that residents resort to this practice with regularity, or that nonresidents, faced with the occasional need to do so, cannot find some adequate means to review unpublished materials. We note, moreover, that the record discloses that after the initial affidavits were submitted by petitioners in this case, the Virgin Islands Bar Association Committee on Continuing Legal Education began a subscription service for all opinions of the District Court and the territorial courts, available to all members of the bar. See Affidavit of William L. Blum, App. 51. In short, we do not think the alleged difficulties in maintaining knowledge of local law can justify the drastic measure of excluding all nonresidents as a class. Petitioners’ fourth contention, that the Virgin Islands Bar Association does not have the resources and personnel for adequate supervision of the ethics of a nationwide bar membership, is not a justification for the discrimination imposed here. Increased bar membership brings increased revenue through dues. Each lawyer admitted to practice in the Virgin Islands pays an initial fee of $200 to take the bar examination, annual bar association dues of $100, and an annual license fee of $500. There is no reason to believe that the additional moneys received from nonresident members will not be adequate to pay for any additional administrative burden. To the extent petitioners fear that the Bar will be unable to monitor the ethical conduct of nonresident practitioners, respondents note that petitioners can, and do, rely on character information compiled by the National Conference of Bar Examiners. In this regard, the monitoring problems faced by the Virgin Islands Bar are no greater than those faced by any mainland State with limited resources. The final reason offered by petitioners for Rule 56(b)’s residency requirements is somewhat more substantial, though ultimately unavailing. Under District Court Rule 16, each active member of the Virgin Islands Bar must remain available to accept appointments to appear on behalf of indigent criminal defendants. See V. I. Code Ann., Tit. 5, App. V, Rule 16(A) (1982). According to the affidavit of the President of the Virgin Islands Bar Association, each member can expect to receive appointments about four times per year. App. 44. Once appointed, it is the duty of the lawyer “to communicate with the defendant at his place of incarceration as promptly as possible and not later than five days from the date of the clerk’s mailing of the order of appointment.” Rule 16(B)(f). Although the statute does not specifically so provide, the District Court interprets Rule 16 tc require that only the appointed attorney may appear on behalf of the criminal defendant. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 66a. The District Court found that, in light of this individual appearance requirement and the strict time constraints imposed by the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U. S. C. §§3161-3174, it would be virtually impossible for this system of appointed counsel to work with nonresident attorneys. App. to Pet. for Cert. 65a-66a. In Piper, we recognized that a State can require nonresidents to share in the burden of representing indigent criminal defendants as a condition for practice before the Bar. 470 U. S., at 287. That, however, is not quite what is at issue here. The question in this case is whether bar admission can be denied to a nonresident because at times it may not be feasible for him to appear personally to represent his share of indigent defendants. We determine that this requirement is too heavy a burden on the privileges of nonresidents and bears no substantial relation to the District Court’s objective. Petitioners offer no persuasive reason why the strong interests in securing representation for indigent criminal defendants cannot be protected by allowing an appointed nonresident attorney to substitute a colleague in the event he is unable to attend a particular appearance. Further, contrary to the District Court’s characterization of the personal appearance requirement as a hard and fast rule, we must assume that in some circumstances it would in fact be detrimental to the goal of competent representation for criminal defendants to require the appointed attorney, whether a resident or nonresident, to appear personally. For instance, where the bar member is an expert in trusts and estates, but has no prior experience in criminal procedure, it would seem counterproductive to the interests that Rule 16 is designed to serve to require the appointed attorney to make an individual appearance. The text of Rule 16 appears to recognize as much in its explicit provision that, where the interests of justice so require, the District Court may substitute one appointed counsel for another. See V. I. Code Ann., Tit. 5, App. V, Rule 16(B)(j) (1982). Petitioners’ only effort to explain why this seemingly more sensible and less intrusive alternative would not work is to predict that resident attorneys would not be willing to make the additional appearances required where nonresidents are unavailable. Such speculation, however, is insufficient to justify discrimination against nonresidents. As respondents point out, if handling indigent criminal cases is a requirement of admission to the Bar, a nonresident knows that he must either appear himself or arrange with a resident lawyer to handle the case when he is unavailable. If the nonresident fails to make all arrangements necessary to protect the rights of the defendant, the District Court may take appropriate action. This possibility does not, however, justify a blanket exclusion of nonresidents. IV In sum, we hold that petitioners neither advance a substantial reason for the exclusion of nonresidents from the Bar, nor demonstrate that discrimination against nonresidents bears a close or substantial relation to the legitimate objectives of the court’s Rule. When the Privileges and Immunities Clause was made part of our Constitution, commercial and legal exchange between the distant States of the Union was at least as unsophisticated as that which exists today between the Virgin Islands and the mainland United States. Nevertheless, our Founders, in their wisdom, thought it important to our sense of nationhood that each State be required to make a genuine effort to treat nonresidents on an equal basis with residents. By extending the Privileges and Immunities Clause to the Virgin Islands, Congress has made the same decision with respect to that Territory. The residency requirements of Rule 56(b) violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2, of the Constitution, as extended to the Virgin Islands by 48 U. S. C. § 1561. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. This is true because “[t]he Virgin Islands Bar Association [is] an integrated bar association comprising all attorneys admitted to practice in the District Court of the Virgin Islands pursuant to the provisions of Rule 56 . . . Rule 51(a), and “[n]o attorney may practice law in the Virgin Islands who is not an active or government member of the Virgin Islands Bar Association . . . except pursuant to the provisions in the District Court’s rules governing pro hac vice participation in litigation and limited participation by inactive members of the bar, Rule 51(b). The District Court decided this case on cross-motions for summary-judgment after the parties had submitted affidavits that offered conflicting accounts of, inter alia, the ease of travel and communications between the Virgin Islands and the continental United States. See App. 32-46. The Court of Appeals concluded that, in light of the justifications we rejected in Piper and Heebe, these conflicting affidavits did not create an issue of material fact. See 842 F. 2d 1393, 1395, and n. 3 (CA3 1988). To the extent that any points of factual disagreement are material to our analysis here, we have assumed the facts included in petitioners’ affidavits to be true.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. BLAZE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. No. 97-1536. Argued December 8, 1998 Decided March 2, 1999 Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Patrick Irvine, Assistant Attorney General of Arizona, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Grant Woods, Attorney General, C. Tim Delaney, Solicitor General, and Carter G. Phillips. Beth S. Brinkmann argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney General Schiffer, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Roy W. McLeese III, and Elizabeth Ann Peterson. Bruce C. Smith argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Lat J. Celmins. Briefe of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, and Thomas F. Gede, Special Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Jan Graham of Utah, and James E- Doyle of Wisconsin; and for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Gila River Indian Community by Rodney B. Lewis; for the Navajo Nation by Marcelino R. Gomez; for the San Carlos Apache Indian Tribe by Richard T. Treon; and for Frank Adson et al. by Tracy A. Labin and Melody L. McCoy. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court. In United States v. New Mexico, 455 U. S. 720 (1982), we held that a State generally may impose a nondiscriminatory tax upon a private company’s proceeds from contracts with the Federal Government. This case asks us to determine whether that same rule applies when the federal contractor renders its services on an Indian reservation. We hold that it does. I Under the Federal Lands Highways Program, 23 U. S. C. §204, the Federal Government finances road construction and improvement projects on federal public roads, including Indian reservation roads. Various federal agencies oversee the planning of particular projects and the allocation of funding to them. §§202(d), 204. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs has the responsibility to “plan, survey, design and construct” Indian reservation roads. 25 CFR § 170.3 (1998). Over a several-year period, the Bureau of Indian Affairs contracted with Blaze Construction Company to build, repair, and improve roads on the Navajo, Hopi, Fort Apache, Colorado River, Tohono O’Odham, and San Carlos Apache Indian Reservations in Arizona. Blaze is incorporated under the laws of the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana and is owned by a member of that Tribe. But, as the company concedes, Blaze is the equivalent of a non-Indian for purposes of this case because none of its work occurred on the Blackfeet Reservation. Brief in Opposition 2, n. 1; see Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, 160-161 (1980). At the end of the contracting period, the Arizona Department of Revenue (Department) issued a tax deficiency assessment against Blaze for its failure to pay Arizona’s transaction privilege tax on the proceeds from its contracts with the Bureau; that tax is levied on the gross receipts of companies doing business in the State. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§42-1306, 42-1310.16 (1991). Blaze protested the assessment and prevailed at the end of administrative proceedings, but, on review, the Arizona Tax Court granted summary-judgment in the Department’s favor. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed. 190 Ariz. 262, 947 P. 2d 836 (1997). It rejected the Department’s argument that our decision in New Mexico, supra, controlled the case and held that federal law pre-empted the application of Arizona’s transaction privilege tax to Blaze. The Arizona Supreme Court denied the Department’s petition for review, with one justice voting to grant the petition. We granted certiorari, 523 U. S. 1117 (1998), and now reverse. II In New Mexico, we considered whether a State could impose gross receipts and use taxes on the property, income, and purchases of private federal contractors. To remedy “the confusing nature of our precedents” in this area, 455 U. S., at 733, we announced a clear rule: “[T]ax immunity is appropriate in only one circumstance: when the levy falls on the United States itself, or on an agency or instrumentality so closely connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically be viewed as separate entities, at least insofar as the activity being taxed is concerned.” Id., at 735. We reasoned that this “narrow approach” to the scope of governmental tax immunity “accordfed] with competing constitutional imperatives, by giving full range to each sovereign’s taxing authority.” Id., at 735-736 (citing Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 483 (1939)). For that immunity to be expanded beyond these “narrow constitutional limits,” we explained that Congress must “take responsibility for the decision, by so expressly providing as respects contracts in a particular form, or contracts under particular programs.” 455 U. S., at 737 (emphasis added); see also Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U. S. 232, 234 (1952). Applying those principles, we upheld each of the taxes at issue in that case because the legal incidence of the taxes fell on the contractors, not the Federal Government; the contractors could not be considered agencies or instru-mentalities of the Federal Government; and Congress had not expressly exempted the contractors’ activities from taxation but, rather, had expressly repealed a pre-existing statutory exemption. See New Mexico, 455 U. S., at 743-744. These principles control the resolution of this case. sent a constitutional immunity or congressional exemption, federal law does not shield Blaze from Arizona’s transaction privilege tax. See id., at 737; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 161 (1937). The incidence of Arizona’s transaction privilege tax falls on Blaze, not the Federal Government. Blaze does not argue that it is an agency or instrumentality of the Federal Government, and New Mexico’s clear rule would have foreclosed any such argument under these circumstances. Nor has Congress exempted these contracts from taxation. Cf. Carson, supra, at 234. Nevertheless, the Arizona Blaze urges here) that the tax cannot be applied to activities taking place on Indian reservations. After it employed a balancing test “weighing the respective state, federal, and tribal interests,” Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U. S. 163, 177 (1989), the court below held that a congressional intent to pre-empt Arizona’s tax could be inferred from federal laws regulating the welfare of Indians. In cases involving taxation of on-reservation activity, we have undertaken this “particularized examination,” Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of N. M., 458 U. S. 832, 838 (1982), where the legal incidence of the tax fell on a nontribal entity engaged in a transaction with tribes or tribal members. See, e. g., Cotton Petroleum Corp., supra, at 176-187 (state severance tax imposed on non-Indian lessee’s production of oil and gas); Ramah, supra, at 836-846 (state gross receipts tax imposed on private contractor’s proceeds from contract with tribe for school construction); Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 448 U. S. 160, 165-166 (1980) (tax imposed on sale of farm machinery to tribe); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 144-153 (1980) (motor carrier license and use fuel taxes imposed on logging and hauling operations pursuant to contract with tribal enterprise). But we have never employed this balancing test in a case such as this one where a State seeks to tax a transaction between the Federal Government and its non-Indian private contractor. We decline to do so now. Interest balancing in this setting would only cloud the clear rule established by our decision in New Mexico. The need to avoid litigation and to ensure efficient tax administration counsels in favor of a bright-line standard for taxation of federal contracts, regardless of whether the contracted-for activity takes place on Indian reservations. Cf. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U. S. 450, 458-459 (1995); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U. S. 251, 267-268 (1992). Moreover, as we recognized in New Mexico, the “political process is ‘uniquely adapted to accommodating’ ” the interests implicated by state .taxation of federal contractors. 455 U. S., at 738 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 456 (1978) (plurality opinion)). Accord, Washington v. United States, 460 U. S. 536, 546 (1983). Whether to exempt Blaze from Arizona’s transaction privilege tax is not our decision to make; that decision rests, instead, with the State of Arizona and with Congress. Our conclusion in no way limits the opportunity to advance their interests when they choose to do so. Under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 88 Stat. 2203, 25 U. S. C. §450 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. III), a tribe may request the Secretary of Interior to enter into a self-determination contract “to plan, conduct, and administer programs or portions thereof, including construction programs.” §450f(a)(1). Where a tribe enters into such a contract, it assumes greater responsibility over the management of the federal funds and the operation of certain federal programs. See, e. g., 25 CFR § 900.3(b)(4) (1998). Here, the Tribes on whose reservations Blaze’s work was performed have not exercised this option, and the Federal Government has retained contracting responsibility. Because the Tribes in this ease have not assumed this responsibility, we have no occasion to consider whether the Indian pre-emption doctrine would apply when Tribes choose to take a more direct and active role in administering the federal funds. Therefore, we see no need to depart from the clear rule announced in New Mexico. * * * For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Department initially also sought to tax Blaze’s proceeds from contracts with tribal housing authorities but eventually dropped its claim. We therefore have no occasion to consider Blaze’s tax liability with respect to those contracts. Blaze also appears to argue that Arizona’s tax infringes on the Tribes’ right to make their own decisions and be governed by them and that this is sufficient, by itself, to preclude application of Arizona’s tax. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959). Our decisions upholding state taxes in a variety of on-reservation settings squarely foreclose that argument. See, e. g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, 156 (1980); Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U. S. 463, 483 (1976). Indeed, a recent decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court illustrates the perils of a more fact-intensive inquiry. See Blaze Constr. Co., Inc. v. Taxation and Revenue Dept. of New Mexico, 118 N. M. 647, 884 P. 2d 803 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U. S. 1016 (1995). In that case, also involving the imposition of a tax on the gross receipts of Blaze’s federal contracts, the New Mexico Supreme Court applied the balancing test in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U. S. 163 (1989), and reached the exact opposite conclusion from the Arizona Court of Appeals. 118 N. M., at 652-653, 884 P. 2d, at 808-809.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BATH IRON WORKS CORP. et al. v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, et al. No. 91-871. Argued November 4, 1992 Decided January 12, 1993 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Kevin M. Gillis argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Allan M. Muir. Christopher J. Wright argued the cause for the federal respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Deputy Solicitor General Mahoney, Allen H. Feld-man, Nathaniel I. Spiller, and Elizabeth Hopkins. Ronald W. Lupton argued the cause and filed a brief for Ernest C. Brown, respondent under this Court’s Rule 12.4. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. Respondent Ernest C. Brown, a former employee of petitioner Bath Iron Works Corp., learned after he retired that he suffered from a work-related hearing loss. The parties agree that under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act), 44 Stat. 1424, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq., respondent is entitled to disability benefits on account of his injury. They disagree, however, as to the proper method of calculating those benefits. There are essentially three “systems” for compensating partially disabled workers under the Act, two of which are at issue in this case. The “first” system provides for compensation for partially disabled claimants who have suffered certain statutorily “scheduled” injuries, one of which is hearing loss. The “third” system provides for compensation for retirees who suffer from occupational diseases that do not become disabling until after retirement. In most, but not all, cases, benefits for scheduled injuries are more generous than those provided retirees suffering from latent occupational diseases. The question presented in this case is whether a claimant who discovers, after retirement, that he suffers from a work-related hearing loss should be compensated under the first system, because loss of hearing is a scheduled injury, or under the third system, because he did not become aware of the disabling condition until after retirement. I Prior to 1984, the LHWCA provided that compensation for a permanent partial disability should be determined in one of two ways. If the injury was of a kind specifically identified in the schedule set forth in § 8(c) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 908(c)(1) — (20) (1982 ed.), the injured employee was entitled to two-thirds of his average weekly wage at the time of the injury for a specific number of weeks, regardless of whether his earning capacity had actually been impaired. See Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 449 U. S. 268, 269-270 (1980). Loss of hearing was among those specified injuries. In all other cases, the Act authorized compensation equal to two-thirds of the difference between the employee’s average weekly wage and his postinjury earning capacity. 33 U. S. C. §908(c)(21). In those cases, unlike the scheduled-injury cases in which disability was presumed, it was necessary for the employee to prove that his injury had actually decreased his earning capacity. In early 1984, the Benefits Review Board was confronted with a case in which the claimant had contracted asbestosis, a latent occupational disease that did not manifest itself until after his retirement. Because the disease did not qualify as a scheduled benefit, the claimant was not entitled to a presumption of disability; moreover, because it did not affect his actual earnings, he could not establish “disability” as defined in § 902(10). Therefore, the Board held, the claimant was not entitled to any compensation under the Act. Aduddell v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass, 16 BRBS 131, 134 (1984). Three weeks after the Aduddell decision, the Board followed its reasoning in a case involving a hearing loss claim filed after the claimant’s retirement. Redick v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 16 BRBS 155 (1984). Although the ALJ in Redick had made a finding of disability because “scheduled awards are conclusive presumptions of loss of wage-earning capacity and cannot be rebutted,” id., at 156, the Board vacated the award of benefits, reasoning that the “voluntary retirement was prior to manifestation of the injury, and was unrelated to his hearing loss,” id., at 157. In 1984, Congress amended the Act by adding the “third” compensation system that unquestionably provides compensation for the type of claim rejected in Aduddell and the other asbestos cases. With the 1984 amendments, Congress authorized the payment of benefits to retirees suffering from occupational diseases that become manifest only after retirement. More precisely, a new §10(i) addresses claims for death or disability “due to an occupational disease which does not immediately result in death or disability.” 33 U.S. C. §9100). As is the case under the first two compensation systems, compensation under the third system turns in large part on the “average weekly wage” used to calculate benefits. When the “time of injury” — defined as “the date on which the employee or claimant becomes aware, or ... should have been aware, of the relationship between the employment, the disease, and the death or disability,” ibid. — is within the first year of retirement, the claimant’s average weekly wage is based upon the claimant’s wages just prior to retirement. § 910(d)(2)(A). When the “time of injury” is more than one year after retirement, the average weekly wage is deemed to be the national average weekly wage at that time. § 910(d)(2)(B). Once the “average weekly wage” is determined, a claimant’s benefits are calculated under § 8 of the Act. For claims in which “the average weekly wages are determined under section 910(d)(2),” that is, for retirees with claims involving “an occupational disease which does not immediately result in death or disability,” 33 U. S. C. § 910(i), a new § 8(c)(23) provides that compensation shall be two-thirds of the applicable average weekly wage multiplied by the percentage of permanent impairment as determined by particular medical guides specified in the statute, 33 U. S. C. § 908(c)(23). The claimant is entitled to such benefits for the duration of the impairment. Ibid, The differences between the first and third compensation systems can result in significantly differing benefits. An award to a claimant under the schedule, i. e., the first system, is based upon the degree of loss to the scheduled body part, whereas an award under the third system is based on the extent to which the “whole body” has been impaired. In most cases, this difference makes recovery under the schedule more generous than that under the retiree provisions. ( Respondent was exposed to loud noise during his employment as a riveter and chipper at petitioner’s iron works from 1939 until 1947, and again from 1950 until his retirement in 1972. In 1985 he received the results of an audiogram indicating an 82.4 percent loss of hearing. As authorized by a provision in the 1984 amendments-that is not at issue in this case, he then filed a timely claim for benefits. The ALJ, following Board precedent, applied a hybrid of the first and third compensation systems to calculate respondent’s benefits. The ALJ concluded that respondent’s hearing loss fell within the scope of the 1984 amendments as an occupational disease that does not immediately result in disability and that the relevant “time of injury” was the date in September 1985 when respondent received his audiogram and became aware of his hearing loss. Accordingly, the ALJ identified the national average weekly wage in September 1985 as the relevant average weekly wage. At that point, however, the ALJ departed from the third system; instead of applying the formula in § 8(c)(23) applicable to claims for latent occupational diseases, he turned to the first system, the schedule in §8(c)(13), to calculate respondent’s weekly benefit. Respondent’s benefits were thus limited to a precise number of weeks, as opposed to continuing throughout the duration of his disability as would be required under §8(c)(23). Yet, because of the differing formulas used in §§8(c)(23) and 8(c)(13), the amount of each weekly benefit was higher than it would have been had respondent’s benefit been calculated under §8(c)(23). The Benefits Review Board affirmed on the same rationale. On appeal, petitioners (the employer and its insurance carrier) agreed with the ALJ and the Board that respondent suffers from a latent occupational disease within the meaning of § 10(i), but argued that the ALJ and the Board erred in failing to apply the benefit formula in § 8(c) (23) appropriate to such claims. While petitioners challenged the method of computing the benefit, they did not contest the use of 82.4 percent as the measure of Brown’s hearing loss, even though the record contains persuasive evidence that a portion of that loss is attributable to the aging process after his retirement. The Director of the Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs challenged the ALJ’s and the Board’s reasoning on different grounds. The error they made, the Director argued, was in looking to the third compensation system at all, for hearing loss is not an occupational disease that “does not immediately result in death or disability.” 33 U. S. C. §910(i). Relying on undisputed scientific evidence, the Director argued that work-related hearing loss, unlike a disease such as asbestosis, does cause immediate disability: “[D]eafness is an injury that a worker typically suffers before retirement. After retirement a worker’s workplace-noise-induced deafness will not ordinarily grow worse; if anything it will get better. See R. T. Sataloff & J. Sataloff, Occupational Hearing Loss 357 (1987). Moreover, unlike asbestosis, the symptoms of deafness occur simultaneously with the ‘disease.’ In other words, to say that a worker is ‘84.4% deaf’ is to say that he has lost 84.4% of his hearing. If he does not notice his deafness, and does not file a claim until long after retirement, that fact does not mean he is not deaf; it does not mean he has no deafness symptom; rather, it means he may have grown accustomed to his deafness, which is quite a different matter.” 942 F. 2d 811, 816 (CA1 1991) (summarizing Director’s argument). Accepting the Director’s undisputed characterization of occupational hearing loss, the Court of Appeals held that respondent’s disability was not “due to an occupational disease which does not immediately result in . . . disability,” 33 U. S. C. § 910(i), and that therefore his claim did not fall within the third compensation system. “[U]sing ordinary English,” the court noted, “one would normally say that deafness is a disease that causes its symptoms, namely loss of hearing, simultaneously with its occurrence. One simply cannot say that a person suffering from deafness is not deaf — whether or not he notices how deaf he is.” 942 F. 2d, at 817 (emphasis added). Having ruled out application of the third compensation system, the court found that respondent’s claim fell squarely within the first system, which draws no distinction between retired and working claimants and expressly provides for compensation for work-related hearing loss. The court thus affirmed the Board’s result — application of the benefit calculation formula for scheduled injuries in §8(c)(13) — but rejected its reliance on the third compensation system for latent occupational diseases. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have reached the opposite conclusion. While both courts have agreed with the court below in rejecting the Board’s “hybrid” approach, they have both held, in contrast to the decision below, that a retiree’s claim for occupational hearing loss is “a claim for compensation for . . . disability due to an occupational disease which does not immediately result in . . . disability,” 33 U. S. C. § 910(i), and therefore should be compensated under the retiree provisions enacted in 1984. See Ingalls Shipbuilding v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 898 F. 2d 1088 (CA5 1990); Alabama Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Corp. v. Sowell, 933 F. 2d 1561 (CA111991). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 503 U. S. 935 (1992). We now affirm. Ill Petitioners do not dispute the Director’s or the lower court’s characterization of occupational hearing loss, and we find no basis for doing so ourselves. Once we accept that characterization, it follows that the retiree provisions enacted in 1984—the so-called “third” compensation system— do not apply to claims for occupational hearing loss. Occupational hearing loss, unlike a long-latency disease such as asbestosis, is not an occupational disease that does not “immediately result in . . . disability.” 33 U. S. C. §910(i). Whereas a worker who has been exposed to harmful levels of asbestos suffers no injury until the disease manifests itself years later, a worker who is exposed to excessive noise suffers the injury of loss of hearing, which, as a scheduled injury, is presumptively disabling, simultaneously with that exposure. Because occupational hearing loss does result in immediate disability, the plain language of § 10(i) leads to the conclusion that a retiree’s claim for occupational hearing loss does not fall within the class of claims covered by the third compensation system. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits recognized the crucial distinction between occupational hearing loss and latent diseases such as asbestosis, but nonetheless concluded that Congress, in enacting the third compensation system, did not intend to distinguish between the different types of occupational diseases suffered by retirees. In particular, these courts were concerned that if a retiree’s claim for occupational hearing loss was not deemed to be a claim with respect to “an occupational disease which does not immediately result in ... disability,” then the Act would be silent as to the appropriate “time of injury” for such a claim. That is, if the “time of injury” for a retiree’s claim of occupational hearing loss is not “the date on which the employee or claimant becomes aware, or . . . should have been aware, of the relationship between the employment, the disease, and the death or disability,” then when is it? To the Director’s response that in the case of occupational hearing loss the time of injury is the date on which the disabling condition is complete, that is, the date of last exposure to the workplace noise, both courts found that the “date of last exposure” rule had been rejected by other courts and by Congress and therefore should not be resurrected absent some indication of congressional intent to do so. Ingalls, 898 F. 2d, at 1093-1094; Sowell, 933 F. 2d, at 1566-1567. We do not find the reasoning of these courts persuasive for two reasons. First, the statute provides that the retiree provisions apply not to every occupational disease, but just to an occupational disease “which does not immediately result in ;.. disability.” 33 U. S. C. § 910(i) (emphasis added). Asbestosis is such a disease; hearing loss is not. In ignoring the fact that occupational hearing loss does immediately result in disability, the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have essentially read that key phrase out of the statute. Congress certainly could have enacted a compensation system that treated retirees differently from current workers in all cases, regardless of the nature of the particular occupational disease from which they suffered. As we read the statute, however, that is not the path Congress took. Second, while it is true that prior to the 1984 amendments some courts had rejected fixing the time of injury, and thus the applicable average weekly wage, as the date of last exposure to the harmful substance, those cases involved long-, latency diseases such as asbestosis. See, e. g., Todd Ship yards Corp. v. Black, 717 F. 2d 1280 (CA9 1983). In such cases, using the date of last exposure as the relevant time of injury was deemed inappropriate because, according to ordinary understanding, a worker is not injured at that time; the injury arises years later when the disease manifests itself. Id., at 1290 (“The average person . . . would not consider himself ‘injured’ merely because the [asbestos] fibers were embedded in his lung”). For the reasons explained above, the same cannot be said about occupational hearing loss. The injury, loss of hearing, occurs simultaneously with the exposure to excessive noise. Moreover, the injury is complete when the exposure ceases. Under those circumstances, we think it quite proper to say that- the date of last exposure — the date upon which the injury is complete — is the relevant time of injury for calculating a retiree’s benefits for occupational hearing loss. Nor are we persuaded by petitioners’ arguments as to why retiree claims for occupational hearing loss should be compensated pursuant to the third compensation system. Petitioners correctly point out that even though the portion of a retiree’s hearing loss that is attributable to his occupation may remain constant after retirement, the aging process may cause it to worsen during retirement. In our view, however, this is a matter that is relevant to the computation of the amount of the benefit — a matter that is not in dispute in this case — rather than to the retiree’s eligibility for a scheduled benefit. To the extent there is any unfairness in the statutory scheme in that employers may be liable for hearing loss attributable to aging, employers can protect themselves by providing their employees with an audiogram at the time of retirement and thereby freezing the amount of compensable hearing loss attributable to the claimant’s employment. Petitioners also point out, again correctly, that during debate on the 1984 amendments a Senator made a passing reference to the Redick case and suggested that the House and Senate conferees disagreed with the Board’s decision in that case. 130 Cong. Rec. 26300 (1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Because that was a hearing loss case, they infer that the retiree provisions of the amendment should be construed to apply to such cases. In addition to the fact that the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premise, we reject the argument for two reasons, each of which is sufficient. First, when carefully read, we find the text of the statute unambiguous on the point at issue; accordingly, we give no weight to a single reference by a single Senator during floor debate in the Senate. Second, as part of. the 1984 amendments, Congress amended §8(c)(13) to preserve the timeliness of hearing loss claims filed more than a year after the employee’s last exposure. It accomplished that purpose not by postponing the time of injury until the date of awareness, but, on the contrary, by providing that the “time for filing a . . . claim for compensation . . . shall not begin to run in connection with any claim for loss of hearing under this section . . . until the employee has received an' audiogram . . . .” 33 U. S. C. § 908(c)(13)(D). Thus, Congress responded to its concern about latent diseases that are not scheduled and cause no loss of earnings by enacting the interrelated provisions constituting the “third” compensation system, whereas it responded to a concern about hearing loss claims by amending § 8(c)(13). r — < C For the reasons given, we hold, as did the court below, that claims for hearing loss, whether filed by current workers or retirees, are claims for a scheduled injury and must be compensated pursuant to §8(c)(13) of the LHWCA, not § 8(c)(23). The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is affirmed. It is so ordered. The various methods for calculating benefits under the Act were so labeled by the Court of Appeals, and the parties retain that characterization in their briefs before this Court. We find that characterization useful and adhere to it in our discussion of the Act. For example, workers who lose an arm are entitled to two-thirds of their weekly pay for 312 weeks, 33 U. S. C. § 908(c)(1), whereas workers who lose a leg are entitled to such compensation for 288 weeks, § 908(c)(2). Section 8(c)(13), both before and after the LHWCA Amendments of 1984, authorized compensation of two-thirds of the average weekly wage for a period of 200 weeks for a total loss of hearing in both ears. For a partial loss of hearing, the Act requires a proportionate reduction in benefits. See n. 9, infra. Prior to 1984, §902(10) defined the term “disability” to mean “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.” 33 U. S. C. §902(10) (1982 ed.). An employee with a scheduled injury, however, is presumed to be disabled, even though the injury does not actually affect his earnings. As we held in Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 449 U. S. 268 (1980), such an employee is only entitled to the scheduled benefit even when the actual impairment of his earnings would have produced a higher benefit if calculated under §8(c)(21). Id., at 270-271. The Benefits Review Board was created by Congress to “hear and determine appeals . . . with respect to claims of employees under [the Act].” 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3). See n. 4, supra. See also Worrell v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 16 BRBS 216 (1983) (Administrative Law Judge (AU) decision denying death benefits where claimant who had been exposed to asbestos developed and died from mesothelioma after retirement); Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 681 F. 2d 938, 942 (CA4 1982) (“Before retirement, the asbestosis was not disabling; after retirement there was no diminished capacity”). Piecing all these various provisions together, § 8(c), 33 U. S. C. § 908(c), provides: “Permanent partial disability: In case of disability partial in character but permanent in quality the compensation shall be 66/3 per centum of the average weekly wages,. . . and shall be paid to the employee, as follows: “(13) Loss of Hearing: “(B) Compensation for loss of hearing in both ears, two-hundred weeks. “(21) Other cases: In all other cases in the class of disability, the compensation shall be 66% per centum of the difference between the average weekly wages of the employee and the employee’s wage-earning capacity thereafter in the same employment or otherwise, payable during the continuance of partial disability. “(23) Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) through (22), with respect to a claim for permanent partial disability for which the average weekly wages are determined under section 910(d)(2) of this title, the compensation shall be 66% per centum of such average weekly wages multiplied by the percentage of permanent impairment, as determined under the guides referred to in section 902(10) of this title, payable during the continuance of such impairment.” Section 10(d), 33 U. S. C. § 910(d), provides: “(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), with respect to any claim based on a death or disability due to an occupational disease for which the time of injury (as determined under subsection (i) of this section) occurs— “(A) within the first year after the employee has retired, the average weekly wages shall be one fifty-second part of his average annual earnings during the 52-week period preceding retirement; or “(B) more than one year after the employee has retired, the average weekly wage shall be deemed to be the national average weekly wage ... applicable at the time of the injury.” Section 10(i), 33 U. S. C. § 910(i), provides: “For purposes of this section with respect to a claim for compensation for death or disability due to an occupational disease which does not immediately result in death or disability, the time of injury shall be deemed to be the date on which the employee or claimant becomes aware, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence or by reason of medical advice should have been aware, of the relationship between the employment, the disease, and the death or disability.” For example, because respondent’s hearing loss is partial (82.4 percent), see infra this page, his recovery under the schedule would be reduced from two-thirds of his average weekly wage for 200 weeks to the same amount for 165 weeks (200 weeks times .824 equals 165 weeks). See 33 U. S. C. § 908(c)(19). Under the guides referenced in § 8(c)(23), however, an 82.4 percent hearing loss translates into a 29 percent impairment of the “whole person.” Thus, under the third system respondent would only receive 29 percent of two-thirds of the appropriate average weekly wage. There are some aspects of the third system, however, that may provide for more favorable treatment to claimants. For instance, benefits calculated pursuant to the third system are paid weekly for as long as the claimant is impaired, whereas benefits for a scheduled injury continue only for a specified number of weeks. Title 33 U. S. C. § 908(c)(13)(D) provides: “The time for filing a notice of injury, under section 912 of this title, or a claim for compensation, under section 913 of this title, shall not begin to run in connection with any claim for loss of hearing under this section, until the employee has received an audiogram, with thé accompanying report thereon, which indicates that the employee has suffered a loss of hearing.” See n. 9, supra, and accompanying text. The Board did not fully apply the benefit calculation for scheduled injuries. Instead of using the average weekly wage at the time respondent was injured, it used the national average weekly wage in September 1985, the average weekly wage that would be appropriate had respondent in fact suffered from “an occupational disease which does not immediately result in death or disability.” 33 U. S. C. § 910(i). See supra, at 160. Petitioners did not raise the issue below and the Court of Appeals considered it waived. 942 F. 2d, at 819. We do as well. As explained above, the average weekly wage used to calculate benefits under the Act is the wage that the claimant was receiving at the time of injury. Thus, in order to calculate benefits under the Act, one must be able to identify the appropriate time of injury. See supra, at 161. See n. 10, supra. In so holding, we reject respondent employee’s arguments in support of the Board’s hybrid approach. There is simply no basis in the statute for combining the compensation provisions applicable for retirees suffering from latent occupational diseases with those governing claimants with scheduled injuries. We note that even the Board has now receded from that interpretation of the Act. See Harms v. Stevedoring Services of America, 25 BRBS 375, 382 (1992) (“Where claimant is a retiree and Section 10(i) applies, the plain language of the statute renders the provisions of Section[s] 8(c)(l)-(22), including Section 8(c)(13), inapplicable”).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

Moones MELLOULI, Petitioner v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General. No. 13-1034. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Jan. 14, 2015. Decided June 1, 2015. Jon Laramore, Indianapolis, IN, for Petitioner. Rachel P. Kovner, for Respondent. Jon Laramore, Counsel of Record, D. Lucetta Pope, Daniel E. Pulliam, Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Petitioner. Katherine Evans, Benjamin Casper, University of Minnesota Law School Center for New Americans, Minneapolis, MN, Michael Sharma-Crawford, Sharma-Crawford, Attys. at Law, LLC, Kansas City, MO, John Keller, Sheila Stuhlman, Immigrant Law Center of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN, for Petitioner. Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Rachel P. Kovner, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Donald E. Keener, W. Manning Evans, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. This case requires us to decide how immigration judges should apply a deportation (removal) provision, defined with reference to federal drug laws, to an alien convicted of a state drug-paraphernalia misdemeanor. Lawful permanent resident Moones Mellouli, in 2010, pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor offense under Kansas law, the possession of drug paraphernalia to "store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5709(b)(2) (2013 Cum. Supp.). The sole "paraphernalia" Mellouli was charged with possessing was a sock in which he had placed four orange tablets. The criminal charge and plea agreement did not identify the controlled substance involved, but Mellouli had acknowledged, prior to the charge and plea, that the tablets were Adderall. Mellouli was sentenced to a suspended term of 359 days and 12 months' probation. In February 2012, several months after Mellouli successfully completed probation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers arrested him as deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) based on his Kansas misdemeanor conviction. Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) authorizes the removal of an alien "convicted of a violation of ... any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21 )." We hold that Mellouli's Kansas conviction for concealing unnamed pills in his sock did not trigger removal under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The drug-paraphernalia possession law under which he was convicted, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5709(b), by definition, related to a controlled substance: The Kansas statute made it unlawful "to use or possess with intent to use any drug paraphernalia to ... store [or] conceal ... a controlled substance." But it was immaterial under that law whether the substance was defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802 . Nor did the State charge, or seek to prove, that Mellouli possessed a substance on the § 802 schedules. Federal law ( § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) ), therefore, did not authorize Mellouli's removal. I A This case involves the interplay between several federal and state statutes. Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163, as amended, authorizes the removal of an alien "convicted of a violation of ... any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21 ), other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana." Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) incorporates 21 U.S.C. § 802, which limits the term "controlled substance" to a "drug or other substance" included in one of five federal schedules. § 802(6). The statute defining the offense to which Mellouli pleaded guilty, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5709(b), proscribes "possess[ion] with intent to use any drug paraphernalia to," among other things, "store" or "conceal" a "controlled substance." Kansas defines "controlled substance" as any drug included on its own schedules, and makes no reference to § 802 or any other federal law. § 21-5701(a). At the time of Mellouli's conviction, Kansas' schedules included at least nine substances not included in the federal lists. See § 65-4105(d)(30), (31), (33), (34), (36) (2010 Cum. Supp.); § 65-4111(g) (2002); § 65-4113(d)(1), (e), (f) (2010 Cum. Supp.); see also Brief for Respondent 9, n. 2. The question presented is whether a Kansas conviction for using drug paraphernalia to store or conceal a controlled substance, § 21-5709(b), subjects an alien to deportation under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which applies to an alien "convicted of a violation of [a state law] relating to a controlled substance (as defined in [ § 802 ] )." B Mellouli, a citizen of Tunisia, entered the United States on a student visa in 2004. He attended U.S. universities, earning a bachelor of arts degree, magna cum laude, as well as master's degrees in applied mathematics and economics. After completing his education, Mellouli worked as an actuary and taught mathematics at the University of Missouri-Columbia. In 2009, he became a conditional permanent resident and, in 2011, a lawful permanent resident. Since December 2011, Mellouli has been engaged to be married to a U.S. citizen. In 2010, Mellouli was arrested for driving under the influence and driving with a suspended license. During a postarrest search in a Kansas detention facility, deputies discovered four orange tablets hidden in Mellouli's sock. According to a probable-cause affidavit submitted in the state prosecution, Mellouli acknowledged that the tablets were Adderall and that he did not have a prescription for the drugs. Adderall, the brand name of an amphetamine-based drug typically prescribed to treat attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, is a controlled substance under both federal and Kansas law. See 21 CFR § 1308.12(d)(1) (2014) (listing "amphetamine" and its "salts" and "isomers"); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4107(d)(1) (2013 Cum. Supp.) (same). Based on the probable-cause affidavit, a criminal complaint was filed charging Mellouli with trafficking contraband in jail. Ultimately, Mellouli was charged with only the lesser offense of possessing drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor. The amended complaint alleged that Mellouli had "use[d] or possess[ed] with intent to use drug paraphernalia, to-wit: a sock, to store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled substance." App. 23. The complaint did not identify the substance contained in the sock. Mellouli pleaded guilty to the paraphernalia possession charge; he also pleaded guilty to driving under the influence. For both offenses, Mellouli was sentenced to a suspended term of 359 days and 12 months' probation. In February 2012, several months after Mellouli successfully completed probation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers arrested him as deportable under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) based on his paraphernalia possession conviction. An Immigration Judge ordered Mellouli deported, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the order. Mellouli was deported in 2012. Under federal law, Mellouli's concealment of controlled-substance tablets in his sock would not have qualified as a drug-paraphernalia offense. Federal law criminalizes the sale of or commerce in drug paraphernalia, but possession alone is not criminalized at all. See 21 U.S.C. § 863(a) - (b). Nor does federal law define drug paraphernalia to include common household or ready-to-wear items like socks; rather, it defines paraphernalia as any "equipment, product, or material" which is "primarily intended or designed for use " in connection with various drug-related activities. § 863(d) (emphasis added). In 19 States as well, the conduct for which Mellouli was convicted-use of a sock to conceal a controlled substance-is not a criminal offense. Brief for National Immigrant Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae 7. At most, it is a low-level infraction, often not attended by a right to counsel. Id., at 9-11. The Eighth Circuit denied Mellouli's petition for review. 719 F.3d 995 (2013). We granted certiorari, 573 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2873, 189 L.Ed.2d 831 (2014), and now reverse the judgment of the Eighth Circuit. II We address first the rationale offered by the BIA and affirmed by the Eighth Circuit, which differentiates paraphernalia offenses from possession and distribution offenses. Essential background, in evaluating the rationale shared by the BIA and the Eighth Circuit, is the categorical approach historically taken in determining whether a state conviction renders an alien removable under the immigration statute. Because Congress predicated deportation "on convictions, not conduct," the approach looks to the statutory definition of the offense of conviction, not to the particulars of an alien's behavior. Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1669, 1701, 1746 (2011). The state conviction triggers removal only if, by definition, the underlying crime falls within a category of removable offenses defined by federal law. Ibid. An alien's actual conduct is irrelevant to the inquiry, as the adjudicator must "presume that the conviction rested upon nothing more than the least of the acts criminalized" under the state statute. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 1684-1685, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The categorical approach "has a long pedigree in our Nation's immigration law." Id., at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 1685. As early as 1913, courts examining the federal immigration statute concluded that Congress, by tying immigration penalties to convictions, intended to "limi[t] the immigration adjudicator's assessment of a past criminal conviction to a legal analysis of the statutory offense," and to disallow "[examination] of the facts underlying the crime." Das, supra, at 1688, 1690. Rooted in Congress' specification of conviction, not conduct, as the trigger for immigration consequences, the categorical approach is suited to the realities of the system. Asking immigration judges in each case to determine the circumstances underlying a state conviction would burden a system in which "large numbers of cases [are resolved by] immigration judges and front-line immigration officers, often years after the convictions." Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 Geo. Immigration L. J. 257, 295 (2012). By focusing on the legal question of what a conviction necessarily established, the categorical approach ordinarily works to promote efficiency, fairness, and predictability in the administration of immigration law. See id., at 295-310; Das, supra, at 1725-1742. In particular, the approach enables aliens "to anticipate the immigration consequences of guilty pleas in criminal court," and to enter " 'safe harbor' guilty pleas [that] do not expose the [alien defendant] to the risk of immigration sanctions." Koh, supra, at 307. See Das, supra, at 1737-1738. The categorical approach has been applied routinely to assess whether a state drug conviction triggers removal under the immigration statute. As originally enacted, the removal statute specifically listed covered offenses and covered substances. It made deportable, for example, any alien convicted of "import[ing]," "buy[ing]," or "sell[ing]" any "narcotic drug," defined as "opium, coca leaves, cocaine, or any salt, derivative, or preparation of opium or coca leaves, or cocaine." Ch. 202, 42 Stat. 596-597. Over time, Congress amended the statute to include additional offenses and additional narcotic drugs. Ultimately, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 replaced the increasingly long list of controlled substances with the now familiar reference to "a controlled substance (as defined in [ § 802 ] )." See § 1751, 100 Stat. 3207-47. In interpreting successive versions of the removal statute, the BIA inquired whether the state statute under which the alien was convicted covered federally controlled substances and not others. Matter of Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274 (1965), is illustrative. At the time the BIA decided Paulus, the immigration statute made deportable any alien who had been "convicted of a violation of ... any law or regulation relating to the illicit possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs or marihuana." Id., at 275. California controlled certain "narcotics," such as peyote, not listed as "narcotic drugs" under federal law. Ibid . The BIA concluded that an alien's California conviction for offering to sell an unidentified "narcotic" was not a deportable offense, for it was possible that the conviction involved a substance, such as peyote, controlled only under California law. Id., at 275-276. Because the alien's conviction was not necessarily predicated upon a federally controlled "narcotic drug," the BIA concluded that the conviction did not establish the alien's deportability. Id., at 276. Under the Paulus analysis, adhered to as recently as 2014 in Matter of Ferreira, 26 I. & N. Dec. 415 (BIA 2014), Mellouli would not be deportable. Mellouli pleaded guilty to concealing unnamed pills in his sock. At the time of Mellouli's conviction, Kansas' schedules of controlled substances included at least nine substances-e.g., salvia and jimson weed-not defined in § 802. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4105(d)(30), (31). The state law involved in Mellouli's conviction, therefore, like the California statute in Paulus, was not confined to federally controlled substances; it required no proof by the prosecutor that Mellouli used his sock to conceal a substance listed under § 802, as opposed to a substance controlled only under Kansas law. Under the categorical approach applied in Paulus, Mellouli's drug-paraphernalia conviction does not render him deportable. In short, the state law under which he was charged categorically "relat[ed] to a controlled substance," but was not limited to substances "defined in [ § 802 ]." The BIA, however, announced and applied a different approach to drug-paraphernalia offenses (as distinguished from drug possession and distribution offenses) in Matter of Martinez Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. 118 (2009). There, the BIA ranked paraphernalia statutes as relating to "the drug trade in general." Id., at 121. The BIA rejected the argument that a paraphernalia conviction should not count at all because it targeted implements, not controlled substances. Id., at 120. It then reasoned that a paraphernalia conviction "relates to" any and all controlled substances, whether or not federally listed, with which the paraphernalia can be used. Id., at 121. Under this reasoning, there is no need to show that the type of controlled substance involved in a paraphernalia conviction is one defined in § 802. The Immigration Judge in this case relied upon Martinez Espinoza in ordering Mellouli's removal, quoting that decision for the proposition that " 'the requirement of a correspondence between the Federal and State controlled substance schedules, embraced by Matter of Paulus ... has never been extended' " to paraphernalia offenses. App. to Pet. for Cert. 32 (quoting Martinez Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec., at 121 ). The BIA affirmed, reasoning that Mellouli's conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia "involves drug trade in general and, thus, is covered under [ § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) ]." App. to Pet. for Cert. 18. Denying Mellouli's petition for review, the Eighth Circuit deferred to the BIA's decision in Martinez Espinoza, and held that a Kansas paraphernalia conviction " 'relates to' a federal controlled substance because it is a crime ... 'associated with the drug trade in general.' " 719 F.3d, at 1000. The disparate approach to state drug convictions, devised by the BIA and applied by the Eighth Circuit, finds no home in the text of § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The approach, moreover, "leads to consequences Congress could not have intended." Moncrieffe, 569 U.S., at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 1690. Statutes should be interpreted "as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme." FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The BIA, however, has adopted conflicting positions on the meaning of § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), distinguishing drug possession and distribution offenses from offenses involving the drug trade in general, with the anomalous result that minor paraphernalia possession offenses are treated more harshly than drug possession and distribution offenses. Drug possession and distribution convictions trigger removal only if they necessarily involve a federally controlled substance, see Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274, while convictions for paraphernalia possession, an offense less grave than drug possession and distribution, trigger removal whether or not they necessarily implicate a federally controlled substance, see Martinez Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. 118. The incongruous upshot is that an alien is not removable for possessing a substance controlled only under Kansas law, but he is removable for using a sock to contain that substance. Because it makes scant sense, the BIA's interpretation, we hold, is owed no deference under the doctrine described in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). III Offering an addition to the BIA's rationale, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that a state paraphernalia possession conviction categorically relates to a federally controlled substance so long as there is "nearly a complete overlap" between the drugs controlled under state and federal law. 719 F.3d, at 1000. The Eighth Circuit's analysis, however, scarcely explains or ameliorates the BIA's anomalous separation of paraphernalia possession offenses from drug possession and distribution offenses. Apparently recognizing this problem, the Government urges, as does the dissent, that the overlap between state and federal drug schedules supports the removal of aliens convicted of any drug crime, not just paraphernalia offenses. As noted, § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) authorizes the removal of any alien "convicted of a violation of ... any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in [ § 802 ] )." According to the Government, the words "relating to" modify "law or regulation," rather than "violation." Brief for Respondent 25-26 (a limiting phrase ordinarily modifies the last antecedent). Therefore, the Government argues, aliens who commit "drug crimes" in States whose drug schedules substantially overlap the federal schedules are removable, for "state statutes that criminalize hundreds of federally controlled drugs and a handful of similar substances, are laws 'relating to' federally controlled substances." Brief for Respondent 17. We do not gainsay that, as the Government urges, the last reasonable referent of "relating to," as those words appear in § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), is "law or regulation." The removal provision is thus satisfied when the elements that make up the state crime of conviction relate to a federally controlled substance. As this case illustrates, however, the Government's construction of the federal removal statute stretches to the breaking point, reaching state-court convictions, like Mellouli's, in which "[no] controlled substance (as defined in [ § 802 ] )" figures as an element of the offense. We recognize, too, that the § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) words to which the dissent attaches great weight, i.e., "relating to," post, at 1991 - 1992, are "broad" and "indeterminate." Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 2191, 2199-2200, 186 L.Ed.2d 275 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). As we cautioned in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995), those words, "extend[ed] to the furthest stretch of [their] indeterminacy, ... stop nowhere." "[C]ontext," therefore, may "tu [g] ... in favor of a narrower reading." Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1074, 1083, 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015). Context does so here. The historical background of § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) demonstrates that Congress and the BIA have long required a direct link between an alien's crime of conviction and a particular federally controlled drug. Supra, at 1987 - 1988. The Government's position here severs that link by authorizing deportation any time the state statute of conviction bears some general relation to federally controlled drugs. The Government offers no cogent reason why its position is limited to state drug schedules that have a "substantial overlap" with the federal schedules. Brief for Respondent 31. A statute with any overlap would seem to be related to federally controlled drugs. Indeed, the Government's position might well encompass convictions for offenses related to drug activity more generally, such as gun possession, even if those convictions do not actually involve drugs (let alone federally controlled drugs). The Solicitor General, while resisting this particular example, acknowledged that convictions under statutes "that have some connection to drugs indirectly" might fall within § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. This sweeping interpretation departs so sharply from the statute's text and history that it cannot be considered a permissible reading. In sum, construction of § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) must be faithful to the text, which limits the meaning of "controlled substance," for removal purposes, to the substances controlled under § 802. We therefore reject the argument that any drug offense renders an alien removable, without regard to the appearance of the drug on a § 802 schedule. Instead, to trigger removal under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the Government must connect an element of the alien's conviction to a drug "defined in [ § 802 ]." * * * For the reasons stated, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed. It is so ordered. The Court reverses the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on the ground that it misapplied the federal removal statute. It rejects the Government's interpretation of that statute, which would supply an alternative ground for affirmance. Yet it offers no interpretation of its own. Lower courts are thus left to guess which convictions qualify an alien for removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), and the majority has deprived them of their only guide: the statutory text itself. Because the statute renders an alien removable whenever he is convicted of violating a law "relating to" a federally controlled substance, I would affirm. I With one exception not applicable here, § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) makes removable "[a]ny alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )." I would hold, consistent with the text, that the provision requires that the conviction arise under a "law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )." Thus, Mellouli was properly subject to removal if the Kansas statute of conviction "relat[es] to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )," regardless of whether his particular conduct would also have subjected him to prosecution under federal controlled-substances laws. See ante, at 1986 ("An alien's actual conduct is irrelevant to the inquiry"). The majority's 12 references to the sock that Mellouli used to conceal the pills are thus entirely beside the point. The critical question, which the majority does not directly answer, is what it means for a law or regulation to "relat[e] to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )." At a minimum, we know that this phrase does not require a complete overlap between the substances controlled under the state law and those controlled under 21 U.S.C. § 802. To "relate to" means " 'to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with.' " Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979)). In ordinary parlance, one thing can "relate to" another even if it also relates to other things. As ordinarily understood, therefore, a state law regulating various controlled substances may "relat[e] to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )" even if the statute also controls a few substances that do not fall within the federal definition. The structure of the removal statute confirms this interpretation. Phrases like "relating to" and "in connection with" have broad but indeterminate meanings that must be understood in the context of "the structure of the statute and its other provisions." Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 2191, 2200, 186 L.Ed.2d 275 (2013) ("in connection with"); see also New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995) ("relate to"); see generally California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324, 117 S.Ct. 832, 136 L.Ed.2d 791 (1997) (describing the Court's efforts to interpret the " 'clearly expansive' " "relate to" language in the pre-emption provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974). In interpreting such phrases, we must be careful to honor Congress' choice to use expansive language. Maracich, supra, at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 2199 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting) (noting that a statute should be interpreted broadly in light of Congress' decision to use sweeping language like "in connection with"); see also, e.g., Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 484, 124 S.Ct. 983, 157 L.Ed.2d 967 (2004) (GINSBURG, J.) (interpreting Environmental Protection Agency's authority in light of the "notably capacious terms" contained in its authorizing statute). Here, the "structure of the statute and its other provisions" indicate that Congress understood this phrase to sweep quite broadly. Several surrounding subsections of the removal statute reveal that when Congress wanted to define with greater specificity the conduct that subjects an alien to removal, it did so by omitting the expansive phrase "relating to." For example, a neighboring provision makes removable "[a]ny alien who ... is convicted under any law of purchasing, selling, offering for sale, exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying ... any weapon, part, or accessory which is a firearm or destructive device (as defined in section 921(a) of title 18)." 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added). This language explicitly requires that the object of the offense fit within a federal definition. Other provisions adopt similar requirements. See, e.g., § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (making removable "[a]ny alien who ... is convicted of a crime of domestic violence," where "the term 'crime of domestic violence' means any crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18) ... committed by" a person with a specified family relationship with the victim); see generally § 1101(a)(43) (defining certain aggravated felonies using federal definitions as elements). That Congress, in this provision, required only that a law relate to a federally controlled substance, as opposed to involve such a substance, suggests that it understood "relating to" as having its ordinary and expansive meaning. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983). Applying this interpretation of "relating to," a conviction under Kansas' drug paraphernalia statute qualifies as a predicate offense under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). That state statute prohibits the possession or use of drug paraphernalia to "store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5709(b)(2) (2013 Cum. Supp.). And, as used in this statute, a "controlled substance" is a substance that appears on Kansas' schedules, § 21-5701(a), which in turn consist principally of federally controlled substances. Ante, at 1984 - 1985; see also Brief for Petitioner 3 (listing nine substances on Kansas' schedules that were not on the federal schedules at the time of Mellouli's arrest); Brief for Respondent 8 (noting that, at the time of Mellouli's arrest, more than 97 percent of the named substances on Kansas' schedules were federally controlled). The law certainly "relat[es] to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )" because it prohibits conduct involving controlled substances falling within the federal definition in § 802. True, approximately three percent of the substances appearing on Kansas' lists of "controlled substances" at the time of Mellouli's conviction did not fall within the federal definition, ante, at 1984 - 1985, meaning that an individual convicted of possessing paraphernalia may never have used his paraphernalia with a federally controlled substance. But that fact does not destroy the relationship between the law and federally controlled substances. Mellouli was convicted for violating a state law "relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )," so he was properly removed under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). II A The majority rejects this straightforward interpretation because it "reach[es] state-court convictions ... in which '[no] controlled substance (as defined in [ § 802 ] )' figures as an element of the offense." Ante, at 1990. This assumes the answer to the question at the heart of this case: whether the removal statute does in fact reach such convictions. To answer that question by assuming the answer is circular. The majority hints that some more limited definition of "relating to" is suggested by context. See ibid. I wholeheartedly agree that we must look to context to understand indeterminate terms like "relating to," which is why I look to surrounding provisions of the removal statute. These "reveal that when Congress wanted to define with greater specificity the conduct that subjects an alien to removal, it did so by omitting the expansive phrase 'relating to.' " Supra, at 1992. For its part, the majority looks to the context of other provisions referring to "controlled substances" without a definitional parenthetical, ante, at 1990, n. 11, and rejoins that the most natural reading of the statute "shrinks to the vanishing point the words 'as defined in [ § 802 ],' " ante, at 1988, n. 9. But the definition of controlled substances does play a role in my interpretation, by requiring that the law bear some relationship to federally controlled substances. Although we need not establish the precise boundaries of that relationship in this case given that Kansas' paraphernalia law clearly qualifies under any reasonable definition of "relating to," the definition of controlled substances imposes a meaningful limit on the statutes that qualify. B The majority appears to conclude that a statute "relates to" a federally controlled substance if its "definition of the offense of conviction" necessarily includes as an element of that offense a federally controlled substance. Ante, at 1986. The text will not bear this meaning. The first problem with the majority's interpretation is that it converts a removal provision expressly keyed to features of the statute itself into one keyed to features of the underlying generic offense. To understand the difference, one need look no further than this Court's decision in Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013). In that case, removal was predicated on the generic offense of "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance." Id., at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 1683. Thus, in order to satisfy the federal criteria, it was necessary for the state offense at issue to have as elements the same elements that make up that generic offense. Id., at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 1684-1685. By contrast, § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) does not refer to a generic offense for which we must discern the relevant criteria from its nature. Instead, it establishes the relevant criteria explicitly, and does so for the law of conviction itself rather than for some underlying generic offense-that is, the law of conviction must "relat [e] to" a federally controlled substance. The only plausible way of reading the text here to refer to a generic offense that has as one element the involvement of a federally controlled substance would be to read "relating to" as modifying "violation" instead of "law." Under that reading, the statute would attach immigration consequences to a "violation ... relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )," rather than a violation of a "law ... relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )." Yet the majority expressly-and correctly-rejects as grammatically incorrect Mellouli's argument that the "relating to" clause modifies "violation." Ante, at 1989 - 1990. Having done so, the majority can reconcile its outcome with the text only by interpreting the words "relating to" to mean "regulating only." It should be obvious why the majority does not make this argument explicit. Even assuming "regulating only" were a permissible interpretation of "relating to"-for it certainly is not the most natural one-that interpretation would be foreclosed by Congress' pointed word choice in the surrounding provisions. And given the logical upshot of the majority's interpretation, it is it even more understandable that it avoids offering an explicit exegesis. For unless the Court ultimately adopts the modified categorical approach for statutes, like the one at issue here, that define offenses with reference to "controlled substances" generally, and treats them as divisible by each separately listed substance, ante, at 1986, n. 4, its interpretation would mean that no conviction under a controlled-substances regime more expansive than the Federal Government's would trigger removal. Thus, whenever a State moves first in subjecting some newly discovered drug to regulation, every alien convicted during the lag between state and federal regulation would be immunized from the immigration consequences of his conduct. Cf. Brief for Respondent 10 (explaining that two of the nine nonfederally controlled substances on Kansas' schedules at the time Mellouli was arrested became federally controlled within a year of his arrest). And the Government could never, under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), remove an alien convicted of violating the controlled-substances law of a State that defines "controlled substances" with reference to a list containing even one substance that does not appear on the federal schedules. Finding no support for its position in the text, the majority relies on the historical background, ante, at 1990, and especially the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision in Matter of Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274 (1965) -a surprising choice, given that the majority concludes its discussion of that history by acknowledging that the BIA's atextual approach to the statute makes "scant sense," ante, at 1988 - 1989. To the extent that the BIA's approach to § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) and its predecessors is consistent with the majority's, it suffers from the same flaw: It fails to account for the text of the removal provision because it looks at whether the conviction itself necessarily involved a substance regulated under federal law, not at whether the statute related to one. See Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec., at 276 ("[O]nly a conviction for illicit possession of or traffic in a substance which is defined as a narcotic drug under federal laws can be the basis for deportation" (emphasis added)); Matter of Ferreira, 26 I. & N. Dec. 415, 418-419 (BIA 2014) (modeling its categorical approach to § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) after the analysis in Moncrieffe, which, as explained above, keyed removal to the characteristics of the offense). Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) requires only that the state law itself, not the "generic" offense defined by the law, "relat[e] to" a federally controlled substance. The majority has not offered a textual argument capable of supporting a different conclusion. * * * The statutory text resolves this case. True, faithfully applying that text means that an alien may be deported for committing an offense that does not involve a federally controlled substance. Nothing about that consequence, however, is so outlandish as to call this application into doubt. An alien may be removed only if he is convicted of violating a law, and I see nothing absurd about removing individuals who are unwilling to respect the drug laws of the jurisdiction in which they find themselves. The majority thinks differently, rejecting the only plausible reading of this provision and adopting an interpretation that finds no purchase in the text. I fail to understand why it chooses to do so, apart from a gut instinct that an educated professional engaged to an American citizen should not be removed for concealing unspecified orange tablets in his sock. Or perhaps the majority just disapproves of the fact that Kansas, exercising its police powers, has decided to criminalize conduct that Congress, exercising its limited powers, has decided not to criminalize, ante, at 1985 - 1986. Either way, that is not how we should go about interpreting statutes, and I respectfully dissent. At the time of Mellouli's conviction, Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-5701(a) and 21-5709(b) (2013 Cum. Supp.) were codified at, respectively, §§ 21-36a01(a) and 21-36a09(b) (2010 Cum. Supp.). See H. Silverman, The Pill Book 23 (13th ed. 2008). We departed from the categorical approach in Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009), based on the atypical cast of the prescription at issue, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). That provision defines as an "aggravated felony" an offense "involv[ing] fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000." The following subparagraph, (M)(ii), refers to an offense "described in section 7201 of title 26 (relating to tax evasion) in which the revenue loss to the Government exceeds $10,000." No offense "described in section 7201 of title 26," we pointed out, "has a specific loss amount as an element." 557 U.S., at 38, 129 S.Ct. 2294. Similarly, "no widely applicable federal fraud statute ... contains a relevant monetary loss threshold," id., at 39, 129 S.Ct. 2294 and "[most] States had no major fraud or deceit statute with any relevant monetary threshold," id., at 40, 129 S.Ct. 2294. As categorically interpreted, (M)(ii), the tax evasion provision, would have no application, and (M)(i), the fraud or deceit provision, would apply only in an extraordinarily limited and haphazard manner. Ibid. We therefore concluded that Congress intended the monetary thresholds in subparagraphs (M)(i) and (M)(ii) to apply "to the specific circumstances surrounding an offender's commission of [the defined] crime on a specific occasion." Ibid. In the main, § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the provision at issue here, has no such circumstance-specific thrust; its language refers to crimes generically defined. A version of this approach, known as the "modified categorical approach," applies to "state statutes that contain several different crimes, each described separately." Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 1684, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013). In such cases, "a court may determine which particular offense the noncitizen was convicted of by examining the charging document and jury instructions, or in the case of a guilty plea, the plea agreement, plea colloquy, or some comparable judicial record of the factual basis for the plea." Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Off limits to the adjudicator, however, is any inquiry into the particular facts of the case. Because the Government has not argued that this case falls within the compass of the modified-categorical approach, we need not reach the issue. Mellouli's plea may be an example. In admitting only paraphernalia possession, Mellouli avoided any identification, in the record of conviction, of the federally controlled substance (Adderall) his sock contained. See supra, at 1984 - 1985. The 1956 version of the statute, for example, permitted removal of any alien "who at any time has been convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation relating to the illicit possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs, or who has been convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation governing or controlling the taxing, manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation, exportation, or the possession for the purpose of the manufacture, production, compounding, transportation, sale, exchange, dispensing, giving away, importation, or exportation of opium, coca leaves, heroin, marihuana, any salt derivative or preparation of opium or coca leaves or isonipecaine or any addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining opiate." Narcotic Control Act of 1956, § 301(b), 70 Stat. 575. See, e.g., Matter of Fong, 10 I. & N. Dec. 616, 619 (BIA 1964) (a Pennsylvania conviction for unlawful use of a drug rendered alien removable because "every drug enumerated in the Pennsylvania law [was] found to be a narcotic drug or marijuana within the meaning of [the federal removal statute]"), overruled in part on other grounds, Matter of Sum, 13 I. & N. Dec. 569 (1970). The Government acknowledges that Ferreira "assumed the applicability of [the Paulus ] framework." Brief for Respondent 49. Whether Ferreira applied that framework correctly is not a matter this case calls upon us to decide. The dissent maintains that it is simply following "the statutory text." Post, at 1991. It is evident, however, that the dissent shrinks to the vanishing point the words "as defined in [§ 802 ]." If § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) stopped with the words "relating to a controlled substance," the dissent would make sense. But Congress did not stop there. It qualified "relating to a controlled substance" by adding the limitation "as defined in [§ 802 ]." If those words do not confine § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)'s application to drugs defined in § 802, one can only wonder why Congress put them there. The BIA posited, but did not rely on, a similar rationale in Martinez Espinoza . See 25 I. & N. Dec., 118, 121 (2009) (basing decision on a "distinction between crimes involving the possession or distribution of a particular drug and those involving other conduct associated with the drug trade in general"). The dissent observes that certain provisions of the immigration statute involving firearms and domestic violence "specif[y] the conduct that subjects an alien to removal" without "the expansive phrase 'relating to.' " Post, at 1992. From this statutory context, the dissent infers that Congress must have intended the words "relating to" to have expansive meaning. Post, at 1992 - 1993. But the dissent overlooks another contextual clue-i.e., that other provisions of the immigration statute tying immigration consequences to controlled-substance offenses contain no reference to § 802. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (allowing detainer of any alien who has been "arrested by a Federal, State, or local law enforcement official for a violation of any law relating to controlled substances"); § 1184(d)(3)(B)(iii) (allowing Secretary of Homeland Security to deny certain visa applications when applicant has at least three convictions of crimes "relating to a controlled substance or alcohol not arising from a single act"). These provisions demonstrate that when Congress seeks to capture conduct involving a "controlled substance," it says just that, not "a controlled substance (as defined in [§ 802 ] )." It is likewise beside the point that the pills were, in fact, federally controlled substances, that Mellouli concealed them in his sock while being booked into jail, that he was being booked into jail for his second arrest for driving under the influence in less than one year, that he pleaded to the paraphernalia offense after initially being charged with trafficking contraband in jail, or that he has since been charged with resisting arrest and failure to display a valid driver's license upon demand. If the Court ultimately adopts the modified categorical approach, it runs into new textual problems. Under that approach, an alien would be subject to removal for violating Kansas' drug paraphernalia statute whenever a qualifying judicial record reveals that the conviction involved a federally controlled substance. If that result is permissible under the removal statute, however, then Kansas' paraphernalia law must qualify as a law "relating to" a federally controlled substance. Otherwise, the text of the statute would afford no basis for his removal. It would then follow that any alien convicted of "a violation of" that law is removable under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), regardless of whether a qualifying judicial record reveals the controlled substance at issue.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS, Petitioner v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION. No. 13-534. Supreme Court of the United States Argued Oct. 14, 2014. Decided Feb. 25, 2015. Hashim M. Mooppan, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Malcolm L. Stewart, for Respondent. Glen D. Nager, Counsel of Record, Hashim M. Mooppan, Amanda R. Parker, Jones Day, Washington, DC, for Petitioner. Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, General Counsel, David C. Shonka, Principal Deputy General Counsel, Imad D. Abyad, Mark S. Hegedus, Attorneys, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, William J. Baer, Assistant Attorney General, Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Brian H. Fletcher, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent. Opinion Justice KENNEDYdelivered the opinion of the Court. This case arises from an antitrust challenge to the actions of a state regulatory board. A majority of the board's members are engaged in the active practice of the profession it regulates. The question is whether the board's actions are protected from Sherman Act regulation under the doctrine of state-action antitrust immunity, as defined and applied in this Court's decisions beginning with Parker v. Brown,317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943). I A In its Dental Practice Act (Act), North Carolina has declared the practice of dentistry to be a matter of public concern requiring regulation. N.C. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 90-22(a) (2013). Under the Act, the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners (Board) is "the agency of the State for the regulation of the practice of dentistry." § 90-22(b). The Board's principal duty is to create, administer, and enforce a licensing system for dentists. See §§ 90-29 to 90-41. To perform that function it has broad authority over licensees. See § 90-41. The Board's authority with respect to unlicensed persons, however, is more restricted: like "any resident citizen," the Board may file suit to "perpetually enjoin any person from ... unlawfully practicing dentistry." § 90-40.1. The Act provides that six of the Board's eight members must be licensed dentists engaged in the active practice of dentistry. § 90-22. They are elected by other licensed dentists in North Carolina, who cast their ballots in elections conducted by the Board. Ibid.The seventh member must be a licensed and practicing dental hygienist, and he or she is elected by other licensed hygienists. Ibid. The final member is referred to by the Act as a "consumer" and is appointed by the Governor. Ibid.All members serve 3-year terms, and no person may serve more than two consecutive terms. Ibid. The Act does not create any mechanism for the removal of an elected member of the Board by a public official. See ibid. Board members swear an oath of office, § 138A-22(a), and the Board must comply with the State's Administrative Procedure Act, § 150B-1 et seq.,Public Records Act, § 132-1 et seq.,and open-meetings law, § 143-318.9 et seq.The Board may promulgate rules and regulations governing the practice of dentistry within the State, provided those mandates are not inconsistent with the Act and are approved by the North Carolina Rules Review Commission, whose members are appointed by the state legislature. See §§ 90-48, 143B-30.1, 150B-21.9(a). B In the 1990's, dentists in North Carolina started whitening teeth. Many of those who did so, including 8 of the Board's 10 members during the period at issue in this case, earned substantial fees for that service. By 2003, nondentists arrived on the scene. They charged lower prices for their services than the dentists did. Dentists soon began to complain to the Board about their new competitors. Few complaints warned of possible harm to consumers. Most expressed a principal concern with the low prices charged by nondentists. Responding to these filings, the Board opened an investigation into nondentist teeth whitening. A dentist member was placed in charge of the inquiry. Neither the Board's hygienist member nor its consumer member participated in this undertaking. The Board's chief operations officer remarked that the Board was "going forth to do battle" with nondentists. App. to Pet. for Cert. 103a. The Board's concern did not result in a formal rule or regulation reviewable by the independent Rules Review Commission, even though the Act does not, by its terms, specify that teeth whitening is "the practice of dentistry." Starting in 2006, the Board issued at least 47 cease-and-desist letters on its official letterhead to nondentist teeth whitening service providers and product manufacturers. Many of those letters directed the recipient to cease "all activity constituting the practice of dentistry"; warned that the unlicensed practice of dentistry is a crime; and strongly implied (or expressly stated) that teeth whitening constitutes "the practice of dentistry." App. 13, 15. In early 2007, the Board persuaded the North Carolina Board of Cosmetic Art Examiners to warn cosmetologists against providing teeth whitening services. Later that year, the Board sent letters to mall operators, stating that kiosk teeth whiteners were violating the Dental Practice Act and advising that the malls consider expelling violators from their premises. These actions had the intended result. Nondentists ceased offering teeth whitening services in North Carolina. C In 2010, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed an administrative complaint charging the Board with violating § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45. The FTC alleged that the Board's concerted action to exclude nondentists from the market for teeth whitening services in North Carolina constituted an anticompetitive and unfair method of competition. The Board moved to dismiss, alleging state-action immunity. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied the motion. On appeal, the FTC sustained the ALJ's ruling. It reasoned that, even assuming the Board had acted pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy to displace competition, the Board is a "public/private hybrid" that must be actively supervised by the State to claim immunity. App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a. The FTC further concluded the Board could not make that showing. Following other proceedings not relevant here, the ALJ conducted a hearing on the merits and determined the Board had unreasonably restrained trade in violation of antitrust law. On appeal, the FTC again sustained the ALJ. The FTC rejected the Board's public safety justification, noting, inter alia,"a wealth of evidence ... suggesting that non-dentist provided teeth whitening is a safe cosmetic procedure." Id.,at 123a. The FTC ordered the Board to stop sending the cease-and-desist letters or other communications that stated nondentists may not offer teeth whitening services and products. It further ordered the Board to issue notices to all earlier recipients of the Board's cease-and-desist orders advising them of the Board's proper sphere of authority and saying, among other options, that the notice recipients had a right to seek declaratory rulings in state court. On petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the FTC in all respects. 717 F.3d 359, 370 (2013). This Court granted certiorari. 571 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 1491, 188 L.Ed.2d 375 (2014). II Federal antitrust law is a central safeguard for the Nation's free market structures. In this regard it is "as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,405 U.S. 596, 610, 92 S.Ct. 1126, 31 L.Ed.2d 515 (1972). The antitrust laws declare a considered and decisive prohibition by the Federal Government of cartels, price fixing, and other combinations or practices that undermine the free market. The Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.,serves to promote robust competition, which in turn empowers the States and provides their citizens with opportunities to pursue their own and the public's welfare. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.,504 U.S. 621, 632, 112 S.Ct. 2169, 119 L.Ed.2d 410 (1992). The States, however, when acting in their respective realm, need not adhere in all contexts to a model of unfettered competition. While "the States regulate their economies in many ways not inconsistent with the antitrust laws," id.,at 635-636, 112 S.Ct. 2169, in some spheres they impose restrictions on occupations, confer exclusive or shared rights to dominate a market, or otherwise limit competition to achieve public objectives. If every duly enacted state law or policy were required to conform to the mandates of the Sherman Act, thus promoting competition at the expense of other values a State may deem fundamental, federal antitrust law would impose an impermissible burden on the States' power to regulate. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,437 U.S. 117, 133, 98 S.Ct. 2207, 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978); see also Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. Law & Econ. 23, 24 (1983). For these reasons, the Court in Parker v. Browninterpreted the antitrust laws to confer immunity on anticompetitive conduct by the States when acting in their sovereign capacity. See 317 U.S., at 350-351, 63 S.Ct. 307. That ruling recognized Congress' purpose to respect the federal balance and to "embody in the Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States possess a significant measure of sovereignty under our Constitution." Community Communications Co. v. Boulder,455 U.S. 40, 53, 102 S.Ct. 835, 70 L.Ed.2d 810 (1982). Since 1943, the Court has reaffirmed the importance of Parker's central holding. See, e.g., Ticor, supra,at 632-637, 112 S.Ct. 2169; Hoover v. Ronwin,466 U.S. 558, 568, 104 S.Ct. 1989, 80 L.Ed.2d 590 (1984); Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,435 U.S. 389, 394-400, 98 S.Ct. 1123, 55 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978). III In this case the Board argues its members were invested by North Carolina with the power of the State and that, as a result, the Board's actions are cloaked with Parkerimmunity. This argument fails, however. A nonsovereign actor controlled by active market participants-such as the Board-enjoys Parkerimmunity only if it satisfies two requirements: "first that 'the challenged restraint ... be one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy,' and second that 'the policy ... be actively supervised by the State.' " FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.,568 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1003, 1010, 185 L.Ed.2d 43 (2013)(quoting California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105, 100 S.Ct. 937, 63 L.Ed.2d 233 (1980)). The parties have assumed that the clear articulation requirement is satisfied, and we do the same. While North Carolina prohibits the unauthorized practice of dentistry, however, its Act is silent on whether that broad prohibition covers teeth whitening. Here, the Board did not receive active supervision by the State when it interpreted the Act as addressing teeth whitening and when it enforced that policy by issuing cease-and-desist letters to nondentist teeth whiteners. A Although state-action immunity exists to avoid conflicts between state sovereignty and the Nation's commitment to a policy of robust competition, Parkerimmunity is not unbounded. "[G]iven the fundamental national values of free enterprise and economic competition that are embodied in the federal antitrust laws, 'state action immunity is disfavored, much as are repeals by implication.' " Phoebe Putney, supra,at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 1010(quoting Ticor, supra,at 636, 112 S.Ct. 2169). An entity may not invoke Parkerimmunity unless the actions in question are an exercise of the State's sovereign power. See Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,499 U.S. 365, 374, 111 S.Ct. 1344, 113 L.Ed.2d 382 (1991). State legislation and "decision[s] of a state supreme court, acting legislatively rather than judicially," will satisfy this standard, and "ipso factoare exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws" because they are an undoubted exercise of state sovereign authority. Hoover, supra,at 567-568, 104 S.Ct. 1989. But while the Sherman Act confers immunity on the States' own anticompetitive policies out of respect for federalism, it does not always confer immunity where, as here, a State delegates control over a market to a non-sovereign actor. See Parker, supra,at 351, 63 S.Ct. 307 ("[A] state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful"). For purposes of Parker,a nonsovereign actor is one whose conduct does not automatically qualify as that of the sovereign State itself. See Hoover, supra,at 567-568, 104 S.Ct. 1989. State agencies are not simply by their governmental character sovereign actors for purposes of state-action immunity. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,421 U.S. 773, 791, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975)("The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members"). Immunity for state agencies, therefore, requires more than a mere facade of state involvement, for it is necessary in light of Parker's rationale to ensure the States accept political accountability for anticompetitive conduct they permit and control. See Ticor,504 U.S., at 636, 112 S.Ct. 2169. Limits on state-action immunity are most essential when the State seeks to delegate its regulatory power to active market participants, for established ethical standards may blend with private anticompetitive motives in a way difficult even for market participants to discern. Dual allegiances are not always apparent to an actor. In consequence, active market participants cannot be allowed to regulate their own markets free from antitrust accountability. See Midcal, supra,at 106, 100 S.Ct. 937("The national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting [a] gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement"). Indeed, prohibitions against anticompetitive self-regulation by active market participants are an axiom of federal antitrust policy. See, e.g.,Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.,486 U.S. 492, 501, 108 S.Ct. 1931, 100 L.Ed.2d 497 (1988); Hoover, supra,at 584, 104 S.Ct. 1989(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The risk that private regulation of market entry, prices, or output may be designed to confer monopoly profits on members of an industry at the expense of the consuming public has been the central concern of ... our antitrust jurisprudence"); see also Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 Harv. L.Rev. 667, 672 (1991). So it follows that, under Parkerand the Supremacy Clause, the States' greater power to attain an end does not include the lesser power to negate the congressional judgment embodied in the Sherman Act through unsupervised delegations to active market participants. See Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political Process, 96 Yale L.J. 486, 500 (1986). Parkerimmunity requires that the anticompetitive conduct of nonsovereign actors, especially those authorized by the State to regulate their own profession, result from procedures that suffice to make it the State's own. See Goldfarb, supra,at 790, 95 S.Ct. 2004; see also 1A P. Areeda & H. Hovencamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 226, p. 180 (4th ed. 2013) (Areeda & Hovencamp). The question is not whether the challenged conduct is efficient, well-functioning, or wise. See Ticor, supra,at 634-635, 112 S.Ct. 2169. Rather, it is "whether anticompetitive conduct engaged in by [nonsovereign actors] should be deemed state action and thus shielded from the antitrust laws." Patrick v. Burget,486 U.S. 94, 100, 108 S.Ct. 1658, 100 L.Ed.2d 83 (1988). To answer this question, the Court applies the two-part test set forth in California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,445 U.S. 97, 100 S.Ct. 937, 63 L.Ed.2d 233, a case arising from California's delegation of price-fixing authority to wine merchants. Under Midcal,"[a] state law or regulatory scheme cannot be the basis for antitrust immunity unless, first, the State has articulated a clear policy to allow the anticompetitive conduct, and second, the State provides active supervision of [the] anticompetitive conduct." Ticor, supra,at 631, 112 S.Ct. 2169(citing Midcal, supra,at 105, 100 S.Ct. 937). Midcal's clear articulation requirement is satisfied "where the displacement of competition [is] the inherent, logical, or ordinary result of the exercise of authority delegated by the state legislature. In that scenario, the State must have foreseen and implicitly endorsed the anticompetitive effects as consistent with its policy goals." Phoebe Putney,568 U.S., at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 1013. The active supervision requirement demands, inter alia,"that state officials have and exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy." Patrick, supra,486 U.S., at 101, 108 S.Ct. 1658. The two requirements set forth in Midcalprovide a proper analytical framework to resolve the ultimate question whether an anticompetitive policy is indeed the policy of a State. The first requirement-clear articulation-rarely will achieve that goal by itself, for a policy may satisfy this test yet still be defined at so high a level of generality as to leave open critical questions about how and to what extent the market should be regulated. See Ticor, supra,at 636-637, 112 S.Ct. 2169. Entities purporting to act under state authority might diverge from the State's considered definition of the public good. The resulting asymmetry between a state policy and its implementation can invite private self-dealing. The second Midcalrequirement-active supervision-seeks to avoid this harm by requiring the State to review and approve interstitial policies made by the entity claiming immunity. Midcal's supervision rule "stems from the recognition that '[w]here a private party is engaging in anticompetitive activity, there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own interests, rather than the governmental interests of the State.' " Patrick, supra,at 100, 108 S.Ct. 1658. Concern about the private incentives of active market participants animates Midcal' s supervision mandate, which demands "realistic assurance that a private party's anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely the party's individual interests." Patrick, supra,at 101, 108 S.Ct. 1658. B In determining whether anticompetitive policies and conduct are indeed the action of a State in its sovereign capacity, there are instances in which an actor can be excused from Midcal's active supervision requirement. In Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45, 105 S.Ct. 1713, 85 L.Ed.2d 24 (1985), the Court held municipalities are subject exclusively to Midcal's " 'clear articulation' " requirement. That rule, the Court observed, is consistent with the objective of ensuring that the policy at issue be one enacted by the State itself. Hallieexplained that "[w]here the actor is a municipality, there is little or no danger that it is involved in a private price-fixing arrangement. The only real danger is that it will seek to further purely parochial public interests at the expense of more overriding state goals." 471 U.S., at 47, 105 S.Ct. 1713. Halliefurther observed that municipalities are electorally accountable and lack the kind of private incentives characteristic of active participants in the market. See id.,at 45, n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 1713. Critically, the municipality in Hallieexercised a wide range of governmental powers across different economic spheres, substantially reducing the risk that it would pursue private interests while regulating any single field. See ibid.That Hallieexcused municipalities from Midcal's supervision rule for these reasons all but confirms the rule's applicability to actors controlled by active market participants, who ordinarily have none of the features justifying the narrow exception Hallieidentified. See 471 U.S., at 45, 105 S.Ct. 1713. Following Goldfarb,Midcal,and Hallie,which clarified the conditions under which Parkerimmunity attaches to the conduct of a nonsovereign actor, the Court in Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,499 U.S. 365, 111 S.Ct. 1344, 113 L.Ed.2d 382, addressed whether an otherwise immune entity could lose immunity for conspiring with private parties. In Omni,an aspiring billboard merchant argued that the city of Columbia, South Carolina, had violated the Sherman Act-and forfeited its Parkerimmunity-by anticompetitively conspiring with an established local company in passing an ordinance restricting new billboard construction. 499 U.S., at 367-368, 111 S.Ct. 1344. The Court disagreed, holding there is no "conspiracy exception" to Parker. Omni, supra,at 374, 111 S.Ct. 1344. Omni,like the cases before it, recognized the importance of drawing a line "relevant to the purposes of the Sherman Act and of Parker: prohibiting the restriction of competition for private gain but permitting the restriction of competition in the public interest." 499 U.S., at 378, 111 S.Ct. 1344. In the context of a municipal actor which, as in Hallie,exercised substantial governmental powers, Omnirejected a conspiracy exception for "corruption" as vague and unworkable, since "virtually all regulation benefits some segments of the society and harms others" and may in that sense be seen as " 'corrupt.' " 499 U.S., at 377, 111 S.Ct. 1344. Omnialso rejected subjective tests for corruption that would force a "deconstruction of the governmental process and probing of the official 'intent' that we have consistently sought to avoid." Ibid.Thus, whereas the cases preceding it addressed the preconditions of Parkerimmunity and engaged in an objective, ex anteinquiry into nonsovereign actors' structure and incentives, Omnimade clear that recipients of immunity will not lose it on the basis of ad hoc and ex postquestioning of their motives for making particular decisions. Omni's holding makes it all the more necessary to ensure the conditions for granting immunity are met in the first place. The Court's two state-action immunity cases decided after Omnireinforce this point. In Ticorthe Court affirmed that Midcal's limits on delegation must ensure that "[a]ctual state involvement, not deference to private price-fixing arrangements under the general auspices of state law, is the precondition for immunity from federal law." 504 U.S., at 633, 112 S.Ct. 2169. And in Phoebe Putneythe Court observed that Midcal's active supervision requirement, in particular, is an essential condition of state-action immunity when a nonsovereign actor has "an incentive to pursue [its] own self-interest under the guise of implementing state policies." 568 U.S., at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 1011(quoting Hallie, supra,at 46-47, 105 S.Ct. 1713). The lesson is clear: Midcal's active supervision test is an essential prerequisite of Parkerimmunity for any nonsovereign entity-public or private-controlled by active market participants. C The Board argues entities designated by the States as agencies are exempt from Midcal's second requirement. That premise, however, cannot be reconciled with the Court's repeated conclusion that the need for supervision turns not on the formal designation given by States to regulators but on the risk that active market participants will pursue private interests in restraining trade. State agencies controlled by active market participants, who possess singularly strong private interests, pose the very risk of self-dealing Midcal's supervision requirement was created to address. See Areeda & Hovencamp ¶ 227, at 226. This conclusion does not question the good faith of state officers but rather is an assessment of the structural risk of market participants' confusing their own interests with the State's policy goals. See Patrick,486 U.S., at 100-101, 108 S.Ct. 1658. The Court applied this reasoning to a state agency in Goldfarb. There the Court denied immunity to a state agency (the Virginia State Bar) controlled by market participants (lawyers) because the agency had "joined in what is essentially a private anticompetitive activity" for "the benefit of its members." 421 U.S., at 791, 792, 95 S.Ct. 2004. This emphasis on the Bar's private interests explains why Goldfarb,though it predates Midcal,considered the lack of supervision by the Virginia Supreme Court to be a principal reason for denying immunity. See 421 U.S., at 791, 95 S.Ct. 2004; see also Hoover,466 U.S., at 569, 104 S.Ct. 1989(emphasizing lack of active supervision in Goldfarb); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,433 U.S. 350, 361-362, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977)(granting the Arizona Bar state-action immunity partly because its "rules are subject to pointed re-examination by the policymaker"). While Halliestated "it is likely that active state supervision would also not be required" for agencies, 471 U.S., at 46, n. 10, 105 S.Ct. 1713, the entity there, as was later the case in Omni,was an electorally accountable municipality with general regulatory powers and no private price-fixing agenda. In that and other respects the municipality was more like prototypical state agencies, not specialized boards dominated by active market participants. In important regards, agencies controlled by market participants are more similar to private trade associations vested by States with regulatory authority than to the agencies Hallieconsidered. And as the Court observed three years after Hallie,"[t]here is no doubt that the members of such associations often have economic incentives to restrain competition and that the product standards set by such associations have a serious potential for anticompetitive harm." Allied Tube,486 U.S., at 500, 108 S.Ct. 1931. For that reason, those associations must satisfy Midcal's active supervision standard. See Midcal,445 U.S., at 105-106, 100 S.Ct. 937. The similarities between agencies controlled by active market participants and private trade associations are not eliminated simply because the former are given a formal designation by the State, vested with a measure of government power, and required to follow some procedural rules. See Hallie, supra,at 39, 105 S.Ct. 1713(rejecting "purely formalistic" analysis). Parkerimmunity does not derive from nomenclature alone. When a State empowers a group of active market participants to decide who can participate in its market, and on what terms, the need for supervision is manifest. See Areeda & Hovencamp ¶ 227, at 226. The Court holds today that a state board on which a controlling number of decisionmakers are active market participants in the occupation the board regulates must satisfy Midcal's active supervision requirement in order to invoke state-action antitrust immunity. D The State argues that allowing this FTC order to stand will discourage dedicated citizens from serving on state agencies that regulate their own occupation. If this were so-and, for reasons to be noted, it need not be so-there would be some cause for concern. The States have a sovereign interest in structuring their governments, see Gregory v. Ashcroft,501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991), and may conclude there are substantial benefits to staffing their agencies with experts in complex and technical subjects, see Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,471 U.S. 48, 64, 105 S.Ct. 1721, 85 L.Ed.2d 36 (1985). There is, moreover, a long tradition of citizens esteemed by their professional colleagues devoting time, energy, and talent to enhancing the dignity of their calling. Adherence to the idea that those who pursue a calling must embrace ethical standards that derive from a duty separate from the dictates of the State reaches back at least to the Hippocratic Oath. See generally S. Miles, The Hippocratic Oath and the Ethics of Medicine (2004). In the United States, there is a strong tradition of professional self-regulation, particularly with respect to the development of ethical rules. See generally R. Rotunda & J. Dzienkowski, Legal Ethics: The Lawyer's Deskbook on Professional Responsibility (2014); R. Baker, Before Bioethics: A History of American Medical Ethics From the Colonial Period to the Bioethics Revolution (2013). Dentists are no exception. The American Dental Association, for example, in an exercise of "the privilege and obligation of self-government," has "call[ed] upon dentists to follow high ethical standards," including "honesty, compassion, kindness, integrity, fairness and charity." American Dental Association, Principles of Ethics and Code of Professional Conduct 3-4 (2012). State laws and institutions are sustained by this tradition when they draw upon the expertise and commitment of professionals. Today's holding is not inconsistent with that idea. The Board argues, however, that the potential for money damages will discourage members of regulated occupations from participating in state government. Cf. Filarsky v. Delia,566 U.S. ----, ----, 132 S.Ct. 1657, 1666, 182 L.Ed.2d 662 (2012)(warning in the context of civil rights suits that the "the most talented candidates will decline public engagements if they do not receive the same immunity enjoyed by their public employee counterparts"). But this case, which does not present a claim for money damages, does not offer occasion to address the question whether agency officials, including board members, may, under some circumstances, enjoy immunity from damages liability. See Goldfarb,421 U.S., at 792, n. 22, 95 S.Ct. 2004; see also Brief for Respondent 56. And, of course, the States may provide for the defense and indemnification of agency members in the event of litigation. States, furthermore, can ensure Parkerimmunity is available to agencies by adopting clear policies to displace competition; and, if agencies controlled by active market participants interpret or enforce those policies, the States may provide active supervision. Precedent confirms this principle. The Court has rejected the argument that it would be unwise to apply the antitrust laws to professional regulation absent compliance with the prerequisites for invoking Parkerimmunity: "[Respondents] contend that effective peer review is essential to the provision of quality medical care and that any threat of antitrust liability will prevent physicians from participating openly and actively in peer-review proceedings. This argument, however, essentially challenges the wisdom of applying the antitrust laws to the sphere of medical care, and as such is properly directed to the legislative branch. To the extent that Congress has declined to exempt medical peer review from the reach of the antitrust laws, peer review is immune from antitrust scrutiny only if the State effectively has made this conduct its own." Patrick,486 U.S. at 105-106, 108 S.Ct. 1658(footnote omitted). The reasoning of Patrick v. Burgetapplies to this case with full force, particularly in light of the risks licensing boards dominated by market participants may pose to the free market. See generally Edlin & Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny? 162 U. Pa. L.Rev. 1093 (2014). E The Board does not contend in this Court that its anticompetitive conduct was actively supervised by the State or that it should receive Parkerimmunity on that basis. By statute, North Carolina delegates control over the practice of dentistry to the Board. The Act, however, says nothing about teeth whitening, a practice that did not exist when it was passed. After receiving complaints from other dentists about the nondentists' cheaper services, the Board's dentist members-some of whom offered whitening services-acted to expel the dentists' competitors from the market. In so doing the Board relied upon cease-and-desist letters threatening criminal liability, rather than any of the powers at its disposal that would invoke oversight by a politically accountable official. With no active supervision by the State, North Carolina officials may well have been unaware that the Board had decided teeth whitening constitutes "the practice of dentistry" and sought to prohibit those who competed against dentists from participating in the teeth whitening market. Whether or not the Board exceeded its powers under North Carolina law, cf. Omni,499 U.S., at 371-372, 111 S.Ct. 1344, there is no evidence here of any decision by the State to initiate or concur with the Board's actions against the nondentists. IV The Board does not claim that the State exercised active, or indeed any, supervision over its conduct regarding nondentist teeth whiteners; and, as a result, no specific supervisory systems can be reviewed here. It suffices to note that the inquiry regarding active supervision is flexible and context-dependent. Active supervision need not entail day-to-day involvement in an agency's operations or micromanagement of its every decision. Rather, the question is whether the State's review mechanisms provide "realistic assurance" that a nonsovereign actor's anticompetitive conduct "promotes state policy, rather than merely the party's individual interests." Patrick, supra,at 100-101, 108 S.Ct. 1658; see also Ticor,504 U.S., at 639-640, 112 S.Ct. 2169. The Court has identified only a few constant requirements of active supervision: The supervisor must review the substance of the anticompetitive decision, not merely the procedures followed to produce it, see Patrick,486 U.S., at 102-103, 108 S.Ct. 1658; the supervisor must have the power to veto or modify particular decisions to ensure they accord with state policy, see ibid.; and the "mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the State," Ticor, supra,at 638, 112 S.Ct. 2169. Further, the state supervisor may not itself be an active market participant. In general, however, the adequacy of supervision otherwise will depend on all the circumstances of a case. * * * The Sherman Act protects competition while also respecting federalism. It does not authorize the States to abandon markets to the unsupervised control of active market participants, whether trade associations or hybrid agencies. If a State wants to rely on active market participants as regulators, it must provide active supervision if state-action immunity under Parkeris to be invoked. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is affirmed. It is so ordered. Justice ALITO, with whom Justice SCALIAand Justice THOMASjoin, dissenting. The Court's decision in this case is based on a serious misunderstanding of the doctrine of state-action antitrust immunity that this Court recognized more than 60 years ago in Parker v. Brown,317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943). In Parker,the Court held that the Sherman Act does not prevent the States from continuing their age-old practice of enacting measures, such as licensing requirements, that are designed to protect the public health and welfare. Id., at 352, 63 S.Ct. 307. The case now before us involves precisely this type of state regulation-North Carolina's laws governing the practice of dentistry, which are administered by the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners (Board). Today, however, the Court takes the unprecedented step of holding that Parkerdoes not apply to the North Carolina Board because the Board is not structured in a way that merits a good-government seal of approval; that is, it is made up of practicing dentists who have a financial incentive to use the licensing laws to further the financial interests of the State's dentists. There is nothing new about the structure of the North Carolina Board. When the States first created medical and dental boards, well before the Sherman Act was enacted, they began to staff them in this way.Nor is there anything new about the suspicion that the North Carolina Board-in attempting to prevent persons other than dentists from performing teeth-whitening procedures-was serving the interests of dentists and not the public. Professional and occupational licensing requirements have often been used in such a way.But that is not what Parkerimmunity is about. Indeed, the very state program involved in that case was unquestionably designed to benefit the regulated entities, California raisin growers. The question before us is not whether such programs serve the public interest. The question, instead, is whether this case is controlled by Parker,and the answer to that question is clear. Under Parker,the Sherman Act (and the Federal Trade Commission Act, see FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.,504 U.S. 621, 635, 112 S.Ct. 2169, 119 L.Ed.2d 410 (1992)) do not apply to state agencies; the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners is a state agency; and that is the end of the matter. By straying from this simple path, the Court has not only distorted Parker; it has headed into a morass. Determining whether a state agency is structured in a way that militates against regulatory capture is no easy task, and there is reason to fear that today's decision will spawn confusion. The Court has veered off course, and therefore I cannot go along. I In order to understand the nature of Parkerstate-action immunity, it is helpful to recall the constitutional landscape in 1890 when the Sherman Act was enacted. At that time, this Court and Congress had an understanding of the scope of federal and state power that is very different from our understanding today. The States were understood to possess the exclusive authority to regulate "their purely internal affairs." Leisy v. Hardin,135 U.S. 100, 122, 10 S.Ct. 681, 34 L.Ed. 128 (1890). In exercising their police power in this area, the States had long enacted measures, such as price controls and licensing requirements, that had the effect of restraining trade. The Sherman Act was enacted pursuant to Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce, and in passing the Act, Congress wanted to exercise that power "to the utmost extent." United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn.,322 U.S. 533, 558, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1440 (1944). But in 1890, the understanding of the commerce power was far more limited than it is today. See, e.g.,Kidd v. Pearson,128 U.S. 1, 17-18, 9 S.Ct. 6, 32 L.Ed. 346 (1888). As a result, the Act did not pose a threat to traditional state regulatory activity. By 1943, when Parkerwas decided, however, the situation had changed dramatically. This Court had held that the commerce power permitted Congress to regulate even local activity if it "exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." Wickard v. Filburn,317 U.S. 111, 125, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942). This meant that Congress could regulate many of the matters that had once been thought to fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the States. The new interpretation of the commerce power brought about an expansion of the reach of the Sherman Act. See Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital,425 U.S. 738, 743, n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 1848, 48 L.Ed.2d 338 (1976)("[D]ecisions by this Court have permitted the reach of the Sherman Act to expand along with expanding notions of congressional power"). And the expanded reach of the Sherman Act raised an important question. The Sherman Act does not expressly exempt States from its scope. Does that mean that the Act applies to the States and that it potentially outlaws many traditional state regulatory measures? The Court confronted that question in Parker. In Parker,a raisin producer challenged the California Agricultural Prorate Act, an agricultural price support program. The California Act authorized the creation of an Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission (Commission) to establish marketing plans for certain agricultural commodities within the State. 317 U.S., at 346-347, 63 S.Ct. 307. Raisins were among the regulated commodities, and so the Commission established a marketing program that governed many aspects of raisin sales, including the quality and quantity of raisins sold, the timing of sales, and the price at which raisins were sold. Id., at 347-348, 63 S.Ct. 307. The ParkerCourt assumed that this program would have violated "the Sherman Act if it were organized and made effective solely by virtue of a contract, combination or conspiracy of private persons," and the Court also assumed that Congress could have prohibited a State from creating a program like California's if it had chosen to do so. Id., at 350, 63 S.Ct. 307. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the California program did not violate the Sherman Act because the Act did not circumscribe state regulatory power. Id., at 351, 63 S.Ct. 307. The Court's holding in Parkerwas not based on either the language of the Sherman Act or anything in the legislative history affirmatively showing that the Act was not meant to apply to the States. Instead, the Court reasoned that "[i]n a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to ify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." 317 U.S., at 351, 63 S.Ct. 307. For the Congress that enacted the Sherman Act in 1890, it would have been a truly radical and almost certainly futile step to attempt to prevent the States from exercising their traditional regulatory authority, and the ParkerCourt refused to assume that the Act was meant to have such an effect. When the basis for the Parkerstate-action doctrine is understood, the Court's error in this case is plain. In 1890, the regulation of the practice of medicine and dentistry was regarded as falling squarely within the States' sovereign police power. By that time, many States had established medical and dental boards, often staffed by doctors or dentists,and had given those boards the authority to confer and revoke licenses.This was quintessential police power legislation, and although state laws were often challenged during that era under the doctrine of substantive due process, the licensing of medical professionals easily survived such assaults. Just one year before the enactment of the Sherman Act, in Dent v. West Virginia,129 U.S. 114, 128, 9 S.Ct. 231, 32 L.Ed. 623 (1889), this Court rejected such a challenge to a state law requiring all physicians to obtain a certificate from the state board of health attesting to their qualifications. And in Hawker v. New York,170 U.S. 189, 192, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898), the Court reiterated that a law specifying the qualifications to practice medicine was clearly a proper exercise of the police power. Thus, the North Carolina statutes establishing and specifying the powers of the State Board of Dental Examiners represent precisely the kind of state regulation that the Parkerexemption was meant to immunize. II As noted above, the only question in this case is whether the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners is really a state agency, and the answer to that question is clearly yes. • The North Carolina Legislature determined that the practice of dentistry "affect[s] the public health, safety and welfare" of North Carolina's citizens and that therefore the profession should be "subject to regulation and control in the public interest" in order to ensure "that only qualified persons be permitted to practice dentistry in the State." N.C. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 90-22(a) (2013). • To further that end, the legislature created the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners "as the agency of the State for the regulation of the practice of dentistry in th[e] State." § 90-22(b). • The legislature specified the membership of the Board. § 90-22(c). It defined the "practice of dentistry," § 90-29(b), and it set out standards for licensing practitioners, § 90-30. The legislature also set out standards under which the Board can initiate disciplinary proceedings against licensees who engage in certain improper acts. § 90-41(a). • The legislature empowered the Board to "maintain an action in the name of the State of North Carolina to perpetually enjoin any person from ... unlawfully practicing dentistry." § 90-40.1(a). It authorized the Board to conduct investigations and to hire legal counsel, and the legislature made any "notice or statement of charges against any licensee" a public record under state law. §§ 90-41(d)-(g). • The legislature empowered the Board "to enact rules and regulations governing the practice of dentistry within the State," consistent with relevant statutes. § 90-48. It has required that any such rules be included in the Board's annual report, which the Board must file with the North Carolina secretary of state, the state attorney general, and the legislature's Joint Regulatory Reform Committee. § 93B-2. And if the Board fails to file the required report, state law demands that it be automatically suspended until it does so.Ibid. As this regulatory regime demonstrates, North Carolina's Board of Dental Examiners is unmistakably a state agency created by the state legislature to serve a prescribed regulatory purpose and to do so using the State's power in cooperation with other arms of state government. The Board is not a private or "nonsovereign" entity that the State of North Carolina has attempted to immunize from federal antitrust scrutiny. Parkermade it clear that a State may not " 'give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful.' " Ante,at 1111 (quoting Parker,317 U.S., at 351, 63 S.Ct. 307). When the ParkerCourt disapproved of any such attempt, it cited Northern Securities Co. v. United States,193 U.S. 197, 24 S.Ct. 436, 48 L.Ed. 679 (1904), to show what it had in mind. In that case, the Court held that a State's act of chartering a corporation did not shield the corporation's monopolizing activities from federal antitrust law. Id., at 344-345, 63 S.Ct. 307. Nothing similar is involved here. North Carolina did not authorize a private entity to enter into an anticompetitive arrangement; rather, North Carolina created a state agency and gave that agency the power to regulate a particular subject affecting public health and safety. Nothing in Parkersupports the type of inquiry that the Court now prescribes. The Court crafts a test under which state agencies that are "controlled by active market participants," ante,at 1114, must demonstrate active state supervision in order to be immune from federal antitrust law. The Court thus treats these state agencies like private entities. But in Parker,the Court did not examine the structure of the California program to determine if it had been captured by private interests. If the Court had done so, the case would certainly have come out differently, because California conditioned its regulatory measures on the participation and approval of market actors in the relevant industry. Establishing a prorate marketing plan under California's law first required the petition of at least 10 producers of the particular commodity. Parker,317 U.S., at 346, 63 S.Ct. 307. If the Commission then agreed that a marketing plan was warranted, the Commission would "select a program committee from among nominees chosen by the qualified producers." Ibid.(emphasis added). That committee would then formulate the proration marketing program, which the Commission could modify or approve. But even after Commission approval, the program became law (and then, automatically) only if it gained the approval of 65 percent of the relevant producers, representing at least 51 percent of the acreage of the regulated crop. Id., at 347, 63 S.Ct. 307. This scheme gave decisive power to market participants. But despite these aspects of the California program, Parkerheld that California was acting as a "sovereign" when it "adopt[ed] and enforc[ed] the prorate program." Id., at 352, 63 S.Ct. 307. This reasoning is irreconcilable with the Court's today. III The Court goes astray because it forgets the origin of the Parkerdoctrine and is misdirected by subsequent cases that extended that doctrine (in certain circumstances) to private entities. The Court requires the North Carolina Board to satisfy the two-part test set out in California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,445 U.S. 97, 100 S.Ct. 937, 63 L.Ed.2d 233 (1980), but the party claiming Parkerimmunity in that case was not a state agency but a private trade association. Such an entity is entitled to Parkerimmunity, Midcalheld, only if the anticompetitive conduct at issue was both " 'clearly articulated' " and " 'actively supervised by the State itself.' " 445 U.S., at 105, 100 S.Ct. 937. Those requirements are needed where a State authorizes private parties to engage in anticompetitive conduct. They serve to identify those situations in which conduct by private partiescan be regarded as the conduct of a State. But when the conduct in question is the conduct of a state agency, no such inquiry is required. This case falls into the latter category, and therefore Midcalis inapposite. The North Carolina Board is not a private trade association. It is a state agency, created and empowered by the State to regulate an industry affecting public health. It would not exist if the State had not created it. And for purposes of Parker,its membership is irrelevant; what matters is that it is part of the government of the sovereign State of North Carolina. Our decision in Hallie v. Eau Claire,471 U.S. 34, 105 S.Ct. 1713, 85 L.Ed.2d 24 (1985), which involved Sherman Act claims against a municipality, not a State agency, is similarly inapplicable. In Hallie,the plaintiff argued that the two-pronged Midcaltest should be applied, but the Court disagreed. The Court acknowledged that municipalities "are not themselves sovereign." 471 U.S., at 38, 105 S.Ct. 1713. But recognizing that a municipality is "an arm of the State," id., at 45, 105 S.Ct. 1713, the Court held that a municipality should be required to satisfy only the first prong of the Midcaltest (requiring a clearly articulated state policy), 471 U.S., at 46, 105 S.Ct. 1713. That municipalities are not sovereign was critical to our analysis in Hallie,and thus that decision has no application in a case, like this one, involving a state agency. Here, however, the Court not only disregards the North Carolina Board's status as a full-fledged state agency; it treats the Board less favorably than a municipality. This is puzzling. States are sovereign, Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham County,547 U.S. 189, 193, 126 S.Ct. 1689, 164 L.Ed.2d 367 (2006), and California's sovereignty provided the foundation for the decision in Parker, supra,at 352, 63 S.Ct. 307. Municipalities are not sovereign. Jinks v. Richland County,538 U.S. 456, 466, 123 S.Ct. 1667, 155 L.Ed.2d 631 (2003). And for this reason, federal law often treats municipalities differently from States. Compare Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)("[N]either a State nor its officials acting it their official capacities are 'persons' under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983"), with Monell v. City Dept. of Social Servs., New York,436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)(municipalities liable under § 1983where "execution of a government's policy or custom ... inflicts the injury"). The Court recognizes that municipalities, although not sovereign, nevertheless benefit from a more lenient standard for state-action immunity than private entities. Yet under the Court's approach, the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, a full-fledged state agency, is treated like a private actor and must demonstrate that the State actively supervises its actions. The Court's analysis seems to be predicated on an assessment of the varying degrees to which a municipality and a state agency like the North Carolina Board are likely to be captured by private interests. But until today, Parkerimmunity was never conditioned on the proper use of state regulatory authority. On the contrary, in Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,499 U.S. 365, 111 S.Ct. 1344, 113 L.Ed.2d 382 (1991), we refused to recognize an exception to Parkerfor cases in which it was shown that the defendants had engaged in a conspiracy or corruption or had acted in a way that was not in the public interest. Id.,at 374, 111 S.Ct. 1344. The Sherman Act, we said, is not an anticorruption or good-government statute. 499 U.S., at 398, 111 S.Ct. 1344. We were unwilling in Omnito rewrite Parkerin order to reach the allegedly abusive behavior of city officials. 499 U.S., at 374-379, 111 S.Ct. 1344. But that is essentially what the Court has done here. IV Not only is the Court's decision inconsistent with the underlying theory of Parker; it will create practical problems and is likely to have far-reaching effects on the States' regulation of professions. As previously noted, state medical and dental boards have been staffed by practitioners since they were first created, and there are obvious advantages to this approach. It is reasonable for States to decide that the individuals best able to regulate technical professions are practitioners with expertise in those very professions. Staffing the State Board of Dental Examiners with certified public accountants would certainly lessen the risk of actions that place the well-being of dentists over those of the public, but this would also compromise the State's interest in sensibly regulating a technical profession in which lay people have little expertise. As a result of today's decision, States may find it necessary to change the composition of medical, dental, and other boards, but it is not clear what sort of changes are needed to satisfy the test that the Court now adopts. The Court faults the structure of the North Carolina Board because "active market participants" constitute "a controlling number of [the] decisionmakers," ante,at 1114, but this test raises many questions. What is a "controlling number"? Is it a majority? And if so, why does the Court eschew that term? Or does the Court mean to leave open the possibility that something less than a majority might suffice in particular circumstances? Suppose that active market participants constitute a voting bloc that is generally able to get its way? How about an obstructionist minority or an agency chair empowered to set the agenda or veto regulations? Who is an "active market participant"? If Board members withdraw from practice during a short term of service but typically return to practice when their terms end, does that mean that they are not active market participants during their period of service? What is the scope of the market in which a member may not participate while serving on the board? Must the market be relevant to the particular regulation being challenged or merely to the jurisdiction of the entire agency? Would the result in the present case be different if a majority of the Board members, though practicing dentists, did not provide teeth whitening services? What if they were orthodontists, periodontists, and the like? And how much participation makes a person "active" in the market? The answers to these questions are not obvious, but the States must predict the answers in order to make informed choices about how to constitute their agencies. I suppose that all this will be worked out by the lower courts and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), but the Court's approach raises a more fundamental question, and that is why the Court's inquiry should stop with an examination of the structure of a state licensing board. When the Court asks whether market participants control the North Carolina Board, the Court in essence is asking whether this regulatory body has been captured by the entities that it is supposed to regulate. Regulatory capture can occur in many ways.So why ask only whether the members of a board are active market participants? The answer may be that determining when regulatory capture has occurred is no simple task. That answer provides a reason for relieving courts from the obligation to make such determinations at all. It does not explain why it is appropriate for the Court to adopt the rather crude test for capture that constitutes the holding of today's decision. V The Court has created a new standard for distinguishing between private and state actors for purposes of federal antitrust immunity. This new standard is not true to the Parkerdoctrine; it diminishes our traditional respect for federalism and state sovereignty; and it will be difficult to apply. I therefore respectfully dissent. S. White, History of Oral and Dental Science in America 197-214 (1876) (detailing earliest American regulations of the practice of dentistry). See, e.g., R. Shrylock, Medical Licensing in America 29 (1967) (Shrylock) (detailing the deterioration of licensing regimes in the mid-19th century, in part out of concerns about restraints on trade); Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. Chi. L.Rev. 6 (1976); Shepard, Licensing Restrictions and the Cost of Dental Care, 21 J. Law & Econ. 187 (1978). See Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. BrownState Action Doctrine, 76 Colum. L.Rev. 1, 4-6 (1976)(collecting cases). Shrylock 54-55; D. Johnson and H. Chaudry, Medical Licensing and Discipline in America 23-24 (2012). In Hawker v. New York,170 U.S. 189, 18 S.Ct. 573, 42 L.Ed. 1002 (1898), the Court cited state laws authorizing such boards to refuse or revoke medical licenses. Id.,at 191-193, n. 1, 18 S.Ct. 573. See also Douglas v. Noble,261 U.S. 165, 166, 43 S.Ct. 303, 67 L.Ed. 590 (1923)("In 1893 the legislature of Washington provided that only licensed persons should practice dentistry" and "vested the authority to license in a board of examiners, consisting of five practicing dentists"). See, e.g., R. Noll, Reforming Regulation 40-43, 46 (1971); J. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation 357-394 (1980). Indeed, it has even been charged that the FTC, which brought this case, has been captured by entities over which it has jurisdiction. See E. Cox, "The Nader Report" on the Federal Trade Commission vii-xiv (1969); Posner, Federal Trade Commission, Chi. L.Rev. 47, 82-84 (1969).

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. HAGGAR APPAREL CO. No. 97-2044. Argued January 11, 1999 Decided April 21, 1999 Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part IV, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor, Scaua, Souter, Thomas, and Beeyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 395. Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Watcman, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, William Kanter, and Bruce G. Forrest. Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Mark E. Haddad, Ronald W. Gerdes, Gilbert Lee Sandler, Edward M. Joffe, and Marc W. Joseph. Briefs of amid curiae urging affirmance were filed for Anhydrides & Chemicals, Inc., et al. by Richard C. King; and for the Customs and International Trade Bar Association by Terence P. Stewart, Bernard J Babb, Munford Paige Hall II, Rufus E. Jarman, Jr., William D. Outman II, Christopher E. Pey, Melvin Schwechter, David Seiko, Sidney N. Weiss, and Sandra Liss Friedman. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. This case concerns regulations relating to the customs classification of certain imported goods. The regulations were issued by the United States Customs Service with approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. The question is whether these regulations, deemed controlling by the Treasury, are entitled to judicial deference in a refund suit brought in the Court of International Trade. Contrary to the position of that court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, we hold the regulation in question is subject to the analysis required by Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), and that if it is a reasonable interpretation and implementation of an ambiguous statutory provision, it must be given judicial deference. I Respondent Haggar Apparel Co. designs, manufactures, and markets apparel for men. This matter arises from a refund proceeding for duties imposed on men’s trousers shipped by respondent to this country from an assembly plant it controlled in Mexico. The fabric had been cut in the United States and then shipped to Mexico, along with the thread, buttons, and zippers necessary to complete the garments. App. 37-38. There the trousers were sewn and reshipped to the United States. If that had been the full extent of it, there would be no dispute, for if there were mere assembly without other steps, all agree the imported garments would have been eligible for the duty exemption which respondent claims. Respondent, one other step at the Mexican plant: permapressing. Per-mapressing is designed to maintain a garment’s crease in the desired place and to avoid other creases or wrinkles that detract from its proper appearance. There are various methods and sequences by which permapressing can be accomplished, and one of respondent’s contentions is that the Treasury’s categorical approach fails to take these differences into account. For the permapressed ent purchased fabric in the United States that had been treated with a chemical resin. Id., at 37. After the treated fabric had been cut in the United States, shipped to Mexico, and sewn and given a regular pressing there, respondent baked the garments in an oven at the Mexican facility before tagging and shipping them to the United States. The baking operation took some 12 to 15 minutes. Id., at 38. With the right heat, the preapplied chemical was activated and the permapress quality was imparted to the garment. If it had delayed baking until the articles returned to the United States, respondent would have had to take extra, otherwise unnecessary steps in the United States before shipping the garments to retailers. Id., at 127-128; App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a~21a. In addition, respondent maintained below, there would have been a risk that during shipping unwanted creases and wrinkles might have developed in the otherwise finished garments. Ibid. The Customs process in addition to assembly, and denied a duty exemption; respondent claimed the baking was simply part of the assembly process, or, in the words of the controlling statute, an “operatio[n] incidental to the assembly process.” Subheading 9802.00.80, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS), 19 U. S. C. § 1202; Item 807.00, Tariff Schedule of the United States (TSUS), 19 U. S. C. § 1202 (1982 ed.). Respondent's case was made more difficult by a regulation, to be discussed further, that deems all perma-pressing operations to be an additional step in manufacture, not part of or incidental to the assembly process. See 19 CFR § 10.16(c) (1998). The issue before us is the force and effect of the regulation in subsequent judicial proceedings. sought for the perma-pressed articles, respondent brought suit for refund in the Court of International Trade. The court declined to treat the regulation as controlling. 938 F. Supp. 868, 874-875 (1996). In making its determination, the court relied on a detailed analysis stemming from United States v. Mast Industries, Inc., 668 F. 2d 501 (CCPA 1981), a leading precedent on this duty exemption from the predecessor to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Mast Industries, in fact, involved garment fabrication and assembly, though the Court of International Trade drew also on cases involving other assembly operations. E. g., 938 F. Supp., at 872 (citing General Motors Corp. v. United States, 976 F. 2d 716 (CA Fed. 1992) (painting of sheet metal component parts used in motor vehicles)). The court ruled in favor of respondent. 938 F. Supp., at 875. On review, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit declined to analyze the regulation under Chevron, and affirmed. 127 F. 3d 1460, 1462 (1997). We granted certiorari, 524 U. S. 981 (1998), and we now vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings. >*H HH The statute on which respondent relies provides importers a partial exemption from duties otherwise imposed. The exemption extends to: "Articles . . . assembled abroad in whole or in part of fabricated components, the product of the United States, which . . . (c) have not been advanced in value or improved in condition abroad except by being assembled and except by operations incidental to the assembly process such as cleaning, lubricating and painting.” Subheading 9802.00.80, HTSUS, 19 U. S. C. §1202. (The HTSUS became law on January 1, 1989, replacing the provisions of the former TSUS. See 19 U. S. C. §3004. Item 807.00 of the TSUS, the previous statute which governs some of the shipments at issue in this case, is identical to HTSUS Subheading 9802.00.80.) spect to permapressed articles provides as follows: “Any significant process, or other than assembly whose primary purpose is the fabrication, completion, physical or chemical improvement of a component, or which is not related to the assembly process, whether or not it effects a substantial transformation of the article, shall not be regarded as incidental to the assembly and shall preclude the application of the exemption to such article. The following are examples of operations not considered incidental to the assembly ...: “(4) Chemical treatment of components or assembled articles to impart new characteristics, such as shower-proofing, permapressing, sanforizing, dying or bleaching of textiles.” 19 CFR § 10.16(c) (1998). The regulation was adopted in 1975 by the Commissioner of Customs upon approval by the Treasury Department, after notice-and-comment rulemaking. See 39 Fed. Reg. 24651 (1974) (proposed regulation); 40 Fed. Reg. 43021 (1975) (final regulation). In contending that the purview of the Chevron framework, respondent advances two sets of arguments. First, citing the terms of the regulation and its enabling statutes, respondent contends the regulation is limited in application to customs officers themselves and is not intended to govern the adjudication of importers’ refund suits in the Court of International Trade. Second, in reliance on the authority and jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade, respondent argues that even if the Treasury Department did intend the regulation to bear on the determination of refund suits, the Court of International Trade is empowered to interpret the tariff statute without giving the usual deference to regulations issued by the administering agency. to the first set of arguments, respondent says the regulation binds Customs Service employees when they classify imported merchandise under the tariff schedules but does not bind the importers themselves. The statutory scheme does not support this limited view of the force and effect of the regulation. The Customs Service (which is within the Treasury Department) is charged with the classification of imported goods under the proper provision of the tariff schedules in the first instance. There is specific statutory direction to this effect: “The Customs Service shall, under rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary [of the Treasury,] ... fix the final classification and rate of duty applicable to” imported goods. 19 U. S. C. § 1500(b). In addition, the Secretary is directed by statute to “establish and promulgate such rules and regulations not inconsistent with the law ... as may be necessary to secure a just, impartial and uniform appraisement of imported merchandise and the classification and assessment of duties thereon at the various ports of entry.” § 1502(a). See also General Headnote 11, TSUS, 19 U. S. C. § 1202 (1982 ed.) (authorizing the Secretary “to issue rules and regulations governing the admission of articles under the provisions” of the tariff schedules); General Note 20, HTSUS, 19 U. S. C. § 1202 (same). The Secretary, in turn, has delegated to the Commissioner of Customs the authority to issue generally applicable regulations, sub-jeet to the Secretary’s approval. Treasury Dept. Order No. 165, T. D. 53160 (Dec. 15,1952). tary to make rules of classification for “the various ports of entry” to argue that the statute authorizes promulgation of regulations that do nothing more than ensure that customs officers in field offices around the country classify goods according to a similar and consistent scheme. The regulations issued under the statute have no bearing, says respondent, on the rights of the importer. We disagree. The phrase in question is explained by the simple fact that classification decisions must be made at the port where goods enter. We shall not assume Congress was concerned only to ensure that customs officials at the various ports of entry make uniform decisions but that it had no concern for uniformity once the goods entered the country and judicial proceedings commenced. The tariffs do not mean one thing for customs officers and another for importers. It is of course possible, even common, for agencies to give instructions or legal opinions to their officers and employees in one form or another, without intending to bind the public. Cf. Crandon v. United States, 494 U. S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). The statutory authorization for the regulations in this case, we conclude, was not limited in this way. Like other regulations which help to define the legal relations between the Government and regulated entities, customs regulations were authorized by Congress at least in part to clarify the rights and obligations of importers. Our conclusion is not United States Trade Representative (USTR), by delegation from the President, and the International Trade Commission (ITC) have certain responsibilities for recommending and proclaiming changes in the HTSUS. See 19 U. S. C. §§ 3004(c), 3005,3006; 3 CFR 443 (1992). These powers pertain to changing or amending the tariff schedules themselves; the Treasury Department and the Customs Service are charged with administering the adopted schedules applicable on the date of importation. This also is the position of the Government, for it acknowledged at oral argument that it is for the Treasury Department and the Customs Service, not for the USTR or ITC, to issue regulations entitled to judicial deference in the interpretation of the tariff schedules. Tr. of Oral Arg. 14. Respondent further cites a portion of the regulation and argues that the Customs Service itself views its regulatory authority as limited to controlling its own agents’ classification decisions, without affecting the course of later proceedings. It cites subsection (a) of 19 CFR § 10.11 (1998), which introduces §10.16 and the other classification regulations adopted at the same time. Section 10.11(a) provides that “[t]he definitions and regulations that follow are promulgated to inform the public of the constructions and interpretations that the United States Customs Service shall give to relevant statutory terms and to assure the impartial and uniform assessment of duties upon merchandise claimed to be partially exempt from duty ... at the various ports of entry.” It further provides that “[n]othing in these regulations purports or is intended to restrict the legal right of importers or others to a judicial review of the matters contained therein.” Ibid. This language, in our view, does not suffice to displace the usual rule of Chevron deference. Subsections (a) and (b) of § 10.11 together serve to introduce the two kinds of regulations which follow. Section 10.11(b) advises that a refund claimant must comply with both the substantive terms of the statute and with certain “documentary requirements” set forth in §10.24. If the importer fails to comply with the documentary requirements, it is foreclosed from judicial review of the classification decision. § 10.11(b). In contrast, subsection (a) recites that nothing in the substantive classification regulations “purports or is intended to restrict the legal right... to a judicial review of the matters contained therein.” Assuming an importer complies with the documentary requirements of § 10.24, the disclaimer in § 10.11(a) is applicable, and the importer is entitled to bring a refund suit challenging Customs’ decision in federal court. Apart from tive rules and documentary requirements, the quoted language from § 10.11(a) may be thought surplusage in that it merely confirms the existence of judicial review. Even if the language is thought to be unnecessary, however, we do not view it as a tacit instruction for courts to disregard the substantive regulations. Particularly in light of the fact that the agency utilized the notice-and-comment rulemaking process before issuing the regulations, the argument that they were not intended to be . entitled to judicial deference implies a sufficient departure from conventional contemporary administrative practice that we ought not to adopt it absent a different statutory structure and more express language to this effect in the regulations themselves. Ill For the reasons we have given, the statutes authorizing customs classification regulations are consistent with the usual rule that regulations of an administering agency warrant judicial deference; and nothing in the regulation itself persuades us that the agency intended the regulation to have some lesser force and effect. We turn to respondent’s second major contention, that the statutes governing the reviewing authority of the Court of International Trade in classification cases displace this customary framework. In support of the argument cable, both respondent and the Court of Appeals rely on 28 U. S. C. §2643. It provides: “If the Court of International Trade mine the correct decision on the basis of the evidence presented in any civil action, the court may order a retrial or rehearing for all purposes, or may order such further administrative or adjudicative procedures as the court considers necessary to reach the correct decision.” The authority of the Court of International Trade to order additional proceedings to reach the correct decision, as well as its duty to “make its determinations upon the basis of the record made before the court,” §2640(a), and its authority to consider new grounds not advanced to the agency, §2638, are said to be inconsistent with deference to an agency’s regulation. A central theme in respondent’s argument is that the trial court proceedings may be, as they were in this case, de novo, and hence the court owes no deference to the regulation under Chevron principles. Brief for Respondent 16-28. The conclusion does not follow from the premise. Valid regulations establish legal norms. Courts can give them proper effect even while applying the law to newfound facts, just as any court conducting a trial in the first instance must conform its rulings to controlling statutes, rules, and judicial precedents. Though Congress might have chosen to direct the court not to pay deference to the agency’s views, we do not find that directive in these statutes. Cf. Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L. J. 511, 515-516 (suggesting that “[i]f. . . Congress had specified that in all suits involving interpretation or application of [a statute] the courts were to give no deference to the agency’s views, but were to determine the issue de novo,” Chevron deference would be inappropriate). De novo proceedings presume a foundation of law. The question here is whether the regulations are part of that controlling law. Deference can be given to the regulations without impairing the authority of the court to make factual determinations, and to apply those determinations to the law, de novo. The Court of Appeals held in this case, and in previous cases presenting the issue, that these regulations were not entitled to deference because the Court of International Trade is charged to “ ‘reach the correct decision’ ” in determining the proper classification of goods. 127 F. 3d, at 1462; see also Rollerblade, Inc. v. United States, 112 F. 3d 481, 483 (CA Fed. 1997); Universal Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 112 F. 3d 488, 491-493 (CA Fed. 1997). The whole point of regulations such as these, however, is to ensure that the statute is applied in a consistent and proper manner. Deference to an agency’s expertise in construing a statutory command is not inconsistent with reaching a correct decision. The analysis of a regulation’s any ease, of course, may disclose an imprecise or imperfect implementation of the statute. “One can doubtless imagine questionable applications of the regulation that test the limits of the agency’s authority.” Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 714 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). In the process of considering a regulation in relation to specific factual situations, a court may conclude the regulation is inconsistent with the statutory language or is an unreasonable implementation of it. In those instances, the regulation will not control. Under Chevron, if a court determines that “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” then “that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” 467 U. S., at 842-843. If, however, the agency’s statutory interpretation “fills a gap or defines a term in a way that is reasonable in light of the legislature’s revealed design, we give [that] judgment ‘controlling weight.’” NationsBank of N. C., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U. S. 251, 257 (1995) (quoting Chevron, supra, at 844). A statute may be ambiguous, analysis, without being inartful or deficient. The present ease exemplifies the familiar proposition that Congress need not, and likely cannot, anticipate all circumstances in which a general policy must be given specific effeet. Here Congress has authorized the agency to issue rules so that the tariff statutes may be applied to unforeseen situations and changing circumstances in a manner consistent with Congress’ general intent. The statute under which respondent claims an exemption gives direction not only by stating a general policy (to grant the partial exemption where only assembly and incidental operations were abroad) but also by determining some specifies of the policy (finding that painting, for example, is incidental to assembly). For purposes of the Chevron analysis, the statute is ambiguous nonetheless, ambiguous in that the agency must use its discretion to determine how best to implement the policy in those cases not covered by the statute’s specific terms. Those specifics are instructive to the agency as to the general congressional purpose, and the agency’s rules as to instances not covered by the statute should be parallel, to the extent possible, with the specific cases Congress did address. respondent and a supporting amicus contend Chevron deference is inconsistent with the historical practice in customs cases. Brief for Respondent 1-6; Brief for Customs and International Trade Bar Association as Amicus Curiae 6-11. This history, suffice it to say, is not so uniform and clear as to convince us that judicial deference would thwart congressional intent. As early as 1809, Chief Justice Marshall noted in a customs case that “[i]f the question had been doubtful, the court would have respected the uniform construction which it is understood has been given by the treasury department of the United States upon similar questions.” United States v. Vowell, 5 Cranch 368, 372. See also P. Reed, The Role of Federal Courts in U. S. Customs & International Trade Law 289 (1997) ('‘Consistent with the Chevron methodology, and as has long been the rule in customs cases, customs regulations are sustained if they represent reasonable interpretations of the statute”); cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U. S. 443, 450 (1978) (deferring to the Treasury Department’s “longstanding and consistent administrative interpretation” of the countervailing duty provision of the Tariff Act). IV A The customs regulations may not be disregarded. Application of the Chevron framework is the beginning of the legal analysis. Like other courts, the Court of International Trade must, when appropriate, give regulations Chevron deference. Cf. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U. S. 382, 389 (1998) (when a term in the Internal Revenue Code is ambiguous, “the task that confronts us is to decide, not whether the Treasury regulation represents the best interpretation of the statute, but whether it represents a reasonable one”). The expertise of the Court of International Trade, somewhat like the expertise of the Tax Court, guides it in making complex determinations in a specialized area of the lav;; it is well positioned to evaluate customs regulations and their operation in light of the statutory mandate to determine if the preconditions for Chevron deference are present. B In addition to the applicability of the Chevron framework in general, we also granted certiorari on a second question, asking whether 19 CFR § 10.16(c) (1998) met the preconditions for Chevron deference as a reasonable interpretation of the statutory phrase “operations incidental to the assembly process,” Subheading 9802.00.80, HTSUS, 19 U. S. C. § 1202, and Item 807.00, TSUS, 19 U.S.C. §1202 (1982 ed.). Because the Court of Appeals determined the Chevron framework was not applicable, it did not go on to consider whether the regulation ultimately warrants deference under that framework. Respondent has made various arguments turning on the details mid facts of its manufacturing process, including substantial arguments challenging the regulation’s interpretation of the statutory language as well as the application of the regulation to the particular process and goods at issue here. For instance, the Customs Service granted the exemption for trousers made from a pure synthetic fabric, which were apparently pressed in the Mexico facility. App. 33,37; Brief for Respondent 47. Yet it denied the exemption when ovenbaking was used for 12 to 15 minutes after some pressing, notwithstanding the fact that the permapress characteristics could have been achieved on the trousers involved here by pressing them for an additional period of time in lieu of ovenbaking. TV. 79-87. Moreover, though the regulation refers to the “[c]hemical treatment of components, . . . such as ... permapressing,” 19 CFR § 10.16(e)(4) (1998), it is undisputed that the chemical resin was applied to the trousers in the United States. App. 37. It will be open to respondent on remand to argue that the baking of the garments in quantity is, from the standpoint of the statute or the regulation itself, no less incidental to the assembly process which the statute permits, or no more within the regulation’s reference to permapressing, than is a pressing-only operation. We conclude that these and similar arguments, which raise the difficult question of how the regulation at issue fares under the Chevron framework, are best addressed in the first instance to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or to the Court of International Trade. Declining to reach the second question on which certiorari was granted, we remand the case to the Court of Appeals. case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

SHAPIRO, WELFARE COMMISSIONER OF CONNECTICUT v. DOE No. 805. Decided January 26, 1970 Robert K. Killian, Attorney General of Connecticut, and Francis J. MacGregor, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. Lee A. Albert for appellee. Per Curiam. The motion of the appellee for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The motion to dismiss is also granted and the appeal is dismissed for failure to docket the case within the time prescribed by Rule 13.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

UNITED STATES v. ENERGY RESOURCES CO., INC., et al. No. 89-255. Argued March 19, 1990 Decided May 29, 1990 White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Blackmun, J., dissented. Alan I. Horowitz argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Peterson, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Gary D. Gray, and Linda E. Mosakowski. Guy B. Moss argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Matthew J. McGowan and Martin S. Allen. Mark Bemsley filed a brief for GLK, Inc., as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. In this case, we decide that a bankruptcy court has the aur thority to order the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to treat tax payments made by Chapter 11 debtor corporations as trust fund payments where the bankruptcy court determines that this designation is necessary for the success of a reorganization plan. I The Internal Revenue Code requires employers to withhold from their employees’ paychecks money representing employees’ personal income taxes and Social Security taxes.' 26 U. S. C. §§ 3102(a), 3402(a). Because federal law requires employers to hold these funds in “trust for the United States,” 26 U. S. C. § 7501(a), these taxes are commonly referred to as “trust fund” taxes. Slodov v. United States, 436 U. S. 238, 242-243 (1978). Should employers fail to pay trust fund taxes, the Government may collect an equivalent sum directly from the officers or employees of the employer who are responsible for collecting the tax. 26 U. S. C. § 6672. These individuals are commonly referred to as “responsible” individuals. Slodov, supra, at 244-245. This case involves corporations that have filed petitions for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. §§ 1101-1174. Newport Offshore, Ltd., filed a petition for reorganization on November 13, 1985; the Bankruptcy Court approved a reorganization plan in June 1986, creating Newport Oil Offshore, Inc. Over the IRS’ objection, that plan included a provision stating that the reorganized Newport Offshore would pay its tax debts (totaling about $300,000) over a period of about six years and that the payments would be applied to extinguish all trust fund tax debts “ ‘prior to the commencement of payment of the non-trust fund portion’ ” of the tax debts owed. In re Energy Resources Co., 871 F. 2d 223, 226 (CA1 1989). The IRS appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, which reversed in an unpublished opinion. The debtor then sought review in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Energy Resources Co., Inc., petitioned for reorganization under Chapter 11 in January 1983. In September 1984, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed a reorganization plan that created a special trust which, among other things, was to pay Energy Resources’ federal tax debt of approximately $1 million over roughly five years. In November 1985, the trustee of the special trust sent approximately $358,000 in payment to the IRS. The trustee asked the IRS to apply the money to Energy Resources’ trust fund tax debt. After the IRS refused to do so, the trustee successfully petitioned the Bankruptcy Court to order the IRS to apply the money to the trust fund tax liabilities. Id., at 226-227. The IRS ap: pealed this order to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which affirmed the Bankruptcy Court in an oral opinion. The Government then appealed to the First Circuit. Consolidating the two cases, the First Circuit reversed in In re Newport Offshore Ltd. and affirmed in In re Energy Resources Co. Id., at 234. The court first considered whether a tax payment made pursuant to a Chapter 11 reorganization plan is “voluntary” or “involuntary” as those terms are used in the IRS’ own rules. IRS policy permits taxpayers who “voluntarily” submit payments to the IRS to designate the tax liability to which the payment will apply. See id., at 227, citing Rev. Rul. 79-284, 1979-2 Cum. Bull. 83, modifying Rev. Rul. 73-305, 1973-2 Cum. Bull. 43, superseding Rev. Rul. 58-239, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 94. The taxpayer corporations argued that tax payments within a Chapter 11 reorganization are best characterized as “voluntary” and therefore that the IRS’ own rules bind the agency to respect the debtors’ designation of the tax payments. Granting deference to the agency’s interpretation of its own rules, the First Circuit accepted the IRS’ view that payments made pursuant to the Chapter 11 plan are involuntary for purposes of the IRS’ rules. 871 F. 2d, at 230. The First Circuit concluded, however, that even if the payments were properly characterized as involuntary under the IRS’ regulations, the Bankruptcy Courts nevertheless had the authority to order the IRS to apply an “involuntary” payment made by a Chapter 11 debtor to trust fund tax liabilities if the Bankruptcy Court concluded that this designation was necessary to ensure the success of the reorganization. Id., at 230-234. We granted certiorari because the First Circuit’s conclusion on this issue conflicts with decisions in other Circuits. 493 U. S. 963 (1989); see, e. g., In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc., 828 F. 2d 199 (CA3 1987). We affirm the judgment below, for whether or not the payments at issue are rightfully considered to be involuntary, a bankruptcy court has the authority to order the IRS to apply the payments to trust fund liabilities if the bankruptcy court determines that this designation is necessary to the success of a reorganization plan. II The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly authorize the bankruptcy courts to approve reorganization plans designating tax payments as either trust fund or nontrust fund. The Code, however, grants the bankruptcy courts residual authority to approve reorganization plans including “any . . . appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title.” 11 U. S. C. § 1123(b)(5); see also §1129. The Code also states that bankruptcy courts may “issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions” of the Code. § 105 (a). These statutory directives are consistent with the traditional understanding that bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, have broad authority to modify creditor-debtor relationships. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 303-304 (1939); United States National Bank v. Chase National Bank, 331 U. S. 28, 36 (1947); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U. S. 323, 327 (1966). The Government suggests that, in this case, the Bankruptcy Courts have transgressed one of the limitations on their equitable power. Specifically, the Government contends that the orders conflict with the Code’s provisions protecting the Government’s ability to collect delinquent taxes. As the Government points out, the Code provides a priority for specified tax claims, including those at issue in this case, and makes those tax debts nondischargeable. See 11 U. S. C. §§ 507(a)(7), 523(a)(1)(A). The Code, moreover, requires a bankruptcy court to assure itself that reorganization will succeed, § 1129(a)(ll), and therefore that the IRS, in all likelihood, will collect the tax debt owed. The tax debt must be paid off within six years. § 1129(a)(9)(C). It is evident that these restrictions on a bankruptcy court’s authority do not preclude the court from issuing orders of the type at issue here, for those restrictions do not address the bankruptcy court’s ability to designate whether tax payments are to be applied to trust fund or non-trust-fund tax liabilities. The Government is correct that, if it can apply a debtor corporation’s tax payments to non-trust-fund liability before trust fund liability, it stands a better chance of debt discharge because the debt that is not guaranteed will be paid off before the guaranteed debt. While this result might be desirable from the Government’s standpoint, it is an added protection not specified in the Code itself: Whereas the Code gives it the right to be assured that its taxes will be paid in six years, the Government wants an assurance that its taxes will be paid even if the reorganization fails — i. e., even if the bankruptcy court is incorrect in its judgment that the reorganization plan will succeed. Even if consistent with the Code, however, a bankruptcy court order might be inappropriate if it conflicted with another law that should have been taken into consideration in the exercise of the court’s discretion. The Government maintains that the orders at issue here contravene § 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code, the provision permitting the IRS to collect unpaid trust fund taxes directly from the personal assets of “responsible” individuals. The Government contends that § 6672 reflects a congressional decision to protect the Government’s tax revenues by ensuring an additional source from which trust fund taxes might be collected. It is true that § 6672 provides that, if the Government is unable to collect trust fund taxes from a corporate taxpayer, the Government has an alternative source for this revenue. Here, however, the Bankruptcy Courts’ orders do not prevent the Government from collecting trust fund revenue; to the contrary, the orders require the Government to collect trust fund payments before collecting non-trust-fund payments. As the Government concedes, § 6672 remains both during and after the corporate Chapter 11 filing as an alternative collection source for trust fund taxes. The Government nevertheless contends that the Bankruptcy Courts’ orders contravene § 6672 because, if the IRS cannot designate a debtor corporation’s tax payments as non-trust-fund, the debtor might be able to pay only the guaranteed debt, leaving the Government at risk for non-trust-fund taxes. This may be the case, but § 6672, by its terms, does not protect against this eventuality. That section plainly does not require us to hold that the orders at issue here, otherwise wholly consistent with a bankruptcy court’s authority under the Bankruptcy Code, were nonetheless improvident. Ill In this case, the Bankruptcy Courts have not transgressed any limitation on their broad power. We therefore hold that they may order the IRS to apply tax payments to offset trust fund obligations where it concludes that this action is necessary for a reorganization’s success. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore Affirmed. Justice Blackmun dissents.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MEDTRONIC, INC. v. LOHR et vir No. 95-754. Argued April 23, 1996 Decided June 26, 1996 Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, V, and VII, in which Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and VI, in which Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 503. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 509. Arthur Miller argued the cause for Medtronic, Inc., in both cases. With him on the briefs were Daniel G. Jarcho, Donald R. Stone, Kenneth S. Geller, Roy T. Englert, Jr., Alan E. Untereiner, Dennis P. Waggoner, Ronald E. Lund, John W. Borg, and Sue R. Halverson. Brian Wolfman argued the cause for Lohr et vir in both cases. With him on the brief were Allison M. Zieve, Alan B. Morrison, Laurence H. Tribe, Robert L. Cowles, and Robert F. Spohrer. Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Preston, Richard H. Seamon, and Douglas N. Letter. Together with No. 95-886, Lohr et vir v. Medtronic, Inc., also on certiorari to the same court. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of California by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Roderick E. Walston, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Theodora Berger, Assistant Attorney General, and Susan S. Fiering, Deputy Attorney General; for the State of Florida et al. by Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, and Louis F. Hube-ner and Charley McCoy, Assistant Attorneys General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Winston Bryant of Arkansas, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Pamela Carter of Indiana, A. B. Chandler III of Kentucky, Andrew Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Jeremiah W. Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Tom Udall of New Mexico, Dennis C. Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Theodore R. Kulongoski of Oregon, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Charles W. Bur-son of Tennessee, Han Morales of Texas, and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; for the American Association of Retired Persons et al. by David Halperin; for the American Insurance Association et al. by Victor E. Schwartz, Joseph N. Onek, Robert P. Charrow, Mark A. Behrens, and Jan S. Amundson; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White and Pamela A. Liapakis; for the Center for Patient Advocacy et al. by John G. Roberts, Jr.; for Collagen Corp. by Joe W. Redden, Jr., Keith A. Jones, and Frederick D. Baker; for General Motors Corp. by Kenneth W Starr, Richard A. Cordray, Paul T. Cappuccio, David M. Heilbron, Leslie G. Landau, and James A. Durkin; for the Health Industry Manufacturers Association et al. by Bruce N. Kuhlik, Paul J. Maloney, and William J. Carter; for the Medical Device Manufacturers Association by Stephen S. Phillips and James M. Beck; for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda and Lee Fennell; for the Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee in MDL Docket,No. 1014 by Stanley M. Chesley, John J. Cummings III, Calvin Fayard, Jr., Wendell Gauthier, Darryl J. Tschirn, and Michael D. Fishbein; for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., by Robert N. Weiner and Hugh F. Young, Jr.; for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, P. C., by Jonathan S. Massey and Arthur H. Bryant; for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp; and for Two Products Liability Law Professors by Richard N. Pearson, pro se. Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, V, and VII, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and VI, in which Justice Kennedy, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join. Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, in the words of the statute’s preamble, “to provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use.” 90 Stat. 539. The question presented is whether that statute pre-empts a state common-law negligence action against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective medical device. Specifically, we must consider whether Lora Lohr, who was injured when her pacemaker failed, may rely on Florida common law to recover damages from Med-tronic, Inc., the manufacturer of the device. HH Throughout our history the several States have exercised their police powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens. Because these are “primarily, and historically,.. . matter[s] of local concern,” Hillsborough County v. Automated, Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U. S. 707, 719 (1985), the “States traditionally have had great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons,” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 756 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). Despite the prominence of the States in matters of public health and safety, in recent decades the Federal Government has played an increasingly significant role in the protection of the health of our people. Congress’ first significant enactment in the field of public health was the Food and Drug Act of 1906, a broad prohibition against the manufacture or shipment in interstate commerce of any adulterated or mis-branded food or drug. See 34 Stat. 768; Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs Legislation, 1 Law & Contemp. Prob. 1 (1933). Partly in response to an ongoing concern about radio and newspaper advertising making false therapeutic claims for both “quack machines” and legitimate devices such as surgical instruments and orthopedic shoes, in 1938 Congress broadened the coverage of the 1906 Act to include misbranded or adulterated medical devices and cosmetics. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA), §§501, 502, 52 Stat. 1049-1051; Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive Provisions, 6 Law & Contemp. Prob. 2 (1939); H. R. Rep. No. 94-853, p. 6 (1976). While the FDCA provided for premarket approval of new drugs, Cavers, 6 Law & Contemp. Prob., at 40, it did not authorize any control over the introduction of new medical devices, see S. Rep. No. 93-670, pp. 1-2 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 94-853, at 6. As technologies advanced and medicine relied to an increasing degree on a vast array of medical equipment “[f]rom bedpans to brainscans,” including kidney dialysis units, artificial heart valves, and heart pacemakers, policymakers and the public became concerned about the increasingly severe injuries that resulted from the failure of such devices. See generally Finck, The Effectiveness of FDA Medical Device Regulation, 7 U. C. D. L. Rev. 293, 297-301 (1974); H. R. Rep. No. 94-853, at 7. In 1970, for example, the Daikon Shield, an intrauterine contraceptive device, was introduced to the American public and throughout the world. Touted as a safe and effective contraceptive, the Daikon Shield resulted in a disturbingly high percentage of inadvertent pregnancies, serious infections, and even, in a few cases, death. Id., at 8; Regulation of Medical Devices (Intrauterine Contraceptive Devices), Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). In the early 1970’s, several other devices, including catheters, artificial heart valves, defibrillators, and pacemakers (including pacemakers manufactured by petitioner Medtronic), attracted the attention of consumers, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and Congress as possible health risks. See Medical Device Amendments, 1973, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 270-361 (1973). In response to the mounting consumer and regulatory concern, Congress enacted the statute at issue here: the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA or Act), 90 Stat. 539. The Act classifies medical devices in three categories based on the risk that they pose to the public. Devices that present no unreasonable risk of illness or injury are designated Class I and are subject only to minimal regulation by “general controls.” 21 U. S. C. § 360c(a)(l)(A). Devices that are potentially more harmful are designated Class II; although they may be marketed without advance approval, manufacturers of such devices must comply with federal performance regulations known as “special controls.” § 360c(a)(l)(B). Finally, devices that either “presenft] a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury,” or which are “purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health,” are designated Class III. § 360c(a)(l)(C). Pacemakers are Class III devices. See 21 CFR §870.3610 (1995). Before a new Class III device may be introduced to the market, the manufacturer must provide the FDA with a “reasonable assurance” that the device is both safe and effective. See 21 U. S. C. § 360e(d)(2). Despite its relatively innocuous phrasing, the process of establishing this “reasonable assurance,” which is known as the “premarket approval,” or “PMA” process, is a rigorous one. Manufacturers must submit detailed information regarding the safety and efficacy of their devices, which the FDA then reviews, spending an average of 1,200 hours on each submission. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy & Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Ser. No. 100-34), p. 384 (1987) (hereinafter 1987 Hearings); see generally Kahan, Premarket Approval Versus Premarket Notification: Different Routes to the Same Market, 39 Food Drug Cosm. L. J. 510, 512-514 (1984). Not all, nor even most, Class III devices on the market today have received premarket approval because of two important exceptions to the PMA requirement. First, Congress realized that existing medical devices could not be withdrawn from the market while the FDA completed its PMA analysis for those devices. The statute therefore includes a “grandfathering” provision which allows pre-1976 devices to remain on the market without FDA approval until such time as the FDA initiates and completes the requisite PMA. See 21 U. S. C. § 360e(b)(l)(A); 21 CFR § 814.1(c)(1) (1995). Second, to prevent manufacturers of grandfathered devices from monopolizing the market while new devices clear the PMA hurdle, and to ensure that improvements to existing devices can be rapidly introduced into the market, the Act also permits devices that are “substantially equivalent” to pre-existing devices to avoid the PMA process. See 21 U. S. C. § 360e(b)(l)(B). Although “substantially equivalent” Class III devices may be marketed without the rigorous PMA review, such new devices, as well as all new Class I and Class II devices, are subject to the requirements of §360(k). That section imposes a limited form of review on every manufacturer intending to market a new device by requiring it to submit a “pre-market notification” to the FDA (the process is also known as a “§ 510(k) process,” after the number of the section in the original Act). If the FDA concludes on the basis of the § 510(k) notification that the device is “substantially equivalent” to a pre-existing device, it can be marketed without further regulatory analysis (at least until the FDA initiates the PMA process for the underlying pre-1976 device to which the new device is “substantially equivalent”). The § 510(k) notification process is by no means comparable to the PMA process; in contrast to the 1,200 hours necessary to complete a PMA review, the § 510(k) review is completed in an average of only 20 hours. See 1987 Hearings, at 384. As one commentator noted: “The attraction of substantial equivalence to manufacturers is clear. [Section] 510(k) notification requires little information, rarely elicits a negative response from the FDA, and gets processed very quickly.” Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in the Right Direction Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 Food Drug Cosm. L. J. 511, 516 (1988); see also Kahan, 39 Food Drug Cosm. L. J., at 514-519. Congress anticipated that the FDA would complete the PMA process for Class III devices relatively swiftly. But because of the substantial investment of time and energy necessary for the resolution of each PMA application, the ever-increasing numbers of medical devices, and internal administrative and resource difficulties, the FDA simply could not keep up with the rigorous PMA process. As a result, the § 510(k) premarket notification process became the means by which most new medical devices — including Class III devices — were approved for the market. In 1983, for instance, a House Report concluded that nearly 1,000 of approximately 1,100 Class III devices that had been introduced to the market since 1976 were admitted as “substantial equivalents” and without any PMA review. See Medical Device Regulation: The FDA’s Neglected Child (Committee Print compiled for the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce), Comm. Print 98-F, p. 34 (1983). This lopsidedness has apparently not evened out; despite an increasing effort by the FDA to consider the safety and efficacy of substantially equivalent devices, the House reported in 1990 that 80% of new Class III devices were being introduced to the market through the §510(k) process and without PMA review. H. R. Rep. No. 101-808, p. 14 (1990); see also D. Kessler, S. Pape, & D. Sundwall, The Federal Regulation of Medical Devices, 317 New England J. Med. 357,359 (1987) (55 § 510(k) notifications are filed for each PMA application; average FDA response to § 510(k) notification is one-fifth the response time to a PMA). II As have so many other medical device manufacturers, petitioner Medtronic took advantage of §510(k)’s expedited process in October 1982, when it notified the FDA that it intended to market its Model 4011 pacemaker lead as a device that was “substantially equivalent” to devices already on the market. (The lead is the portion of a pacemaker that transmits the heartbeat-steadying electrical signal from the “pulse generator” to the heart itself.) On November 30, 1982, the FDA found that the model was “substantially equivalent to devices introduced into interstate commerce” prior to the effective date of the Act, and advised Medtronic that it could therefore market its device subject only to the general control provisions of the Act, which could be found in the Code of Federal Regulations. See Respondent’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment in No. 93-482 (MD Fla., Nov. 1,1993), Exh. A to Exh. 1 (Declaration of Charles H. Swanson) (hereinafter FDA Substantial Equivalence Letter). The agency emphasized, however, that this determination should not be construed as an endorsement of the pacemaker lead’s safety. Ibid. Cross-petitioner Lora Lohr is dependent on pacemaker technology for the proper functioning of her heart.. In 1987 she was implanted with a Medtronic pacemaker equipped with one of the company’s Model 4011 pacemaker leads. On December 30,1990, the pacemaker failed, allegedly resulting in a “complete heart block” that required emergency surgery. According to her physician, a defect in the lead was the likely cause of the failure. In 1993 Lohr and her husband filed this action in a Florida state court. Their complaint contained both a negligence count and a strict-liability count. The negligence count alleged a breach of Medtronic’s “duty to use reasonable care in the design, manufacture, assembly, and sale of the subject pacemaker” in several respects, including the use of defective materials in the lead and a failure to warn or properly instruct the plaintiff or her physicians of the tendency of the pacemaker to fail, despite knowledge of other earlier failures. Complaint ¶ 5. The strict-liability count alleged that the device was in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous to foreseeable users at the time of its sale. Id., ¶ 11. (A third count alleging breach of warranty was dismissed for failure to state a claim under Florida law.) Medtronic removed the case to Federal District Court, where it filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that both the negligence and strict-liability claims were preempted by 21 U. S. C. § 360k(a). That section, which is at the core of the dispute between the parties in this suit, provides: “§360k. State and local requirements respecting devices “(a) General rule “Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement— “(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and “(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.” The District Court initially denied Medtronic's motion, finding nothing in the statute to support the company’s argument that the MDA entirely exempted from liability a manufacturer who had allegedly violated the FDA’s regulations. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 5d. Not long after that decision, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that §360k required pre-emption of at least some common-law claims brought against the manufacturer of a medical device. See Duncan v. Iolab Corp., 12 F. 3d 194 (1994). After reconsidering its ruling in light of Duncan, the District Court reversed its earlier decision and dismissed the Lohrs’ entire complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part. 56 F. 3d 1335 (CA11 1995). Rejecting the Lohrs’ broadest submission, it first decided that “common law actions are state requirements within the meaning of §360k(a).” Id., at 1342. It next held that pre-emption could not be avoided by merely alleging that the negligence flowed from a violation of federal standards. Id., at 1343. Then, after concluding that the term “requirements” in §360k(a) was unclear, it sought guidance from FDA’s regulations regarding pre-emption. Those regulations provide that a state requirement is not pre-empted unless the FDA has established “ ‘specific requirements applicable to a particular device.’ ” Id., at 1344 (citing 21 CFR § 808.1(d) (1995)). Under these regulations, the court concluded, it was not necessary that the federal regulation specifically deal with pacemakers, but only that the federal requirement “should, in some way, be ‘restricted by nature’ to a particular process, procedure, or device and should not be completely open-ended,” 56 F. 3d, at 1346 (footnote omitted), and that the specific device at issue should be subject to its requirements. Under this approach, the court concluded that the Lohrs’ negligent design claims were not pre-empted. It rejected Medtronic’s argument that the FDA’s finding of “substantial equivalence” had any significance with respect to the pacemaker’s safety, or that the FDA’s continued surveillance of the device constituted a federal “requirement” that its design be maintained. Id., at 1347-1349. On the other hand, it concluded that the negligent manufacturing and failure to warn claims were pre-empted by FDA’s general “good manufacturing practices” regulations, which establish general requirements for most steps in every device’s manufacture, see id., at 1350; 21 CFR §§820.20-820.198 (1995), and by the FDA labeling regulations, which require devices to bear various warnings, see 56 F. 3d, at 1350-1351; 21 CFR §801.109 (1995). The court made a parallel disposition of the strict-liability claims, holding that there was no pre-emption insofar as plaintiffs alleged an unreasonably dangerous design, but they could not revive the negligent manufacturing or failure to warn claims under a strict-liability theory. 56 F. 3d, at 1351-1352. Medtronic filed a petition for certiorari seeking review of the Court of Appeals’ decision insofar as it affirmed the District Court and the Lohrs filed a cross-petition seeking review of the judgment insofar as it upheld the pre-emption defense. Because the Courts of Appeals are divided over the extent to which state common-law claims are pre-empted by the MDA, we granted both petitions. 516 U. S. 1087 (1996). Ill As in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504 (1992), we are presented with the task of interpreting a statutory provision that expressly pre-empts state law. While the pre-emptive language of § 360k(a) means that we need not go beyond that language to determine whether Congress intended the MDA to pre-empt at least some state law, see id., at 517, we must nonetheless “identify the domain expressly pre-empted” by that language, ibid. Although our analysis of the scope of the pre-emption statute must begin with its text, see Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Assn., 505 U. S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), our interpretation of that language does not occur in a contextual vacuum. Rather, that interpretation is informed by two presumptions about the nature of pre-emption. See ibid. First, because the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action. In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has “legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947), we “start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Ibid.; Hillsborough Cty., 471 U. S., at 715-716; cf. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U. S. 1, 22 (1987). Although dissenting Justices have argued that this assumption should apply only to the question whether Congress intended any pre-emption at all, as opposed to questions concerning the scope of its intended invalidation of state law, see Cipollone, 505 U. S., at 545-546 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part), we used a “presumption against the pre-emption of state police power regulations” to support a narrow inter-:? pretation of such an express command in Cipollone. Id., at 518, 523. That approach is consistent with both federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety. Second, our analysis of the scope of the statute’s preemption is guided by our oft-repeated comment, initially made in Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U. S. 96, 103 (1963), that “[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone” in every pre-emption case. See, e. g., Cipollone, 505 U. S., at 516; Gade, 505 U. S., at 96; Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504 (1978). As a result, any understanding of the scope of a pre-emption statute must rest primarily on “a fair understanding of congressional purpose.” Cipollone, 505 U. S., at 530, n. 27 (opinion of Stevens, J.). Congress’ intent, of course, primarily is discerned from the language of the pre-emption statute and the “statutory framework” surrounding it. Gade, 505 U. S., at 111 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Also relevant, however, is the “structure and purpose of the statute as a whole,” id., at 98 (opinion of O’Connor, J.), as revealed not only in the text, but through the reviewing court’s reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the law. With these considerations in mind, we turn first to a consideration of petitioner Medtronic’s claim that the Court of Appeals should have found the entire action pre-empted and then to the merits of the Lohrs’ cross-petition. > In its petition, Medtronic argues that the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the Lohrs’ claims alleging negligent design were not pre-empted by 21 U. S. C. § 360k(a). That section provides that “no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.” Medtronic suggests that any common-law cause of action is a “requirement” which alters incentives and imposes duties “different from, or in addition to,” the generic federal standards that the FDA has promulgated in response to mandates under the MDA. In essence, the company argues that the plain language of the statute pre-empts any and all common-law claims brought by an injured plaintiff against a manufacturer of medical devices. Medtronic’s argument is not only unpersuasive, it is implausible. Under Medtronic’s view of the statute, Congress effectively precluded state courts from affording state consumers any protection from injuries resulting from a defective medical device. Moreover, because there is no explicit private cause of action against manufacturers contained in the MDA, and no suggestion that the Act created an implied private right of action, Congress would have barred most, if not all, relief for persons injured by defective medical devices. Medtronic’s construction of §360k would therefore have the perverse effect of granting complete immunity from design defect liability to an entire industry that, in the judgment of Congress, needed more stringent regulation in order “to provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use,” 90 Stat. 539 (preamble to Act). It is, to say the least, “difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct,” Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 251 (1984), and it would take language much plainer than the text of §360k to convince us that Congress intended that result. Furthermore, if Congress intended to preclude all common-law causes of action, it chose a singularly odd word with which to do it. The statute would have achieved an identical result, for instance, if it had precluded any “remedy” under state law relating to medical devices. “Requirement” appears to presume that the State is imposing a specific duty upon the manufacturer, and although we have on prior occasions concluded that a statute pre-empting certain state “requirements” could also pre-empt common-law damages claims, see Cipollone, 505 U. S., at 521-522 (opinion of Stevens, J.), that statute did not sweep nearly as broadly as Medtronic would have us believe that this statute does. The pre-emptive statute in Cipollone was targeted at a limited set of state requirements — those “based on smoking and health” — and then only at a limited subset of the possible applications of those requirements — those involving the “advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of” the federal statute. See id., at 515. In that context, giving the term “requirement” its widest reasonable meaning did not have nearly the pre-emptive scope nor the effect on potential remedies that Medtronic’s broad reading of the term would have in this suit. The Court in Cipollone held that the petitioner in that case was able to maintain some common-law actions using theories of the case that did not run afoul of the pre-emption statute. See id., at 524-530. Here, however, Medtronic’s sweeping interpretation of the statute would require far greater interference with state legal remedies, producing a serious intrusion into state sovereignty while simultaneously wiping out the possibility of remedy for the Lohrs’ alleged injuries. Given the ambiguities in the statute and the scope of the preclusion that would occur otherwise, we cannot accept Medtronic’s argument that by using the term “requirement,” Congress clearly signaled its intent to deprive States of any role in protecting consumers from the dangers inherent in many medical devices. Other differences between this statute and the one in Cipollone further convince us that when Congress enacted § 360k, it was primarily concerned with the problem of specific, conflicting state statutes and regulations rather than the general duties enforced by common-law actions. Unlike the statute at issue in Cipollone, §360k refers to “requirements” many times throughout its text. In each instance, the word is linked with language suggesting that its focus is device-specific enactments of positive law by legislative or administrative bodies, not the application of general rules of common law by judges and juries. For instance, subsections (a)(2) and (b) of the statute also refer to “requirements”— but those “requirements” refer only to statutory and regulatory law that exists pursuant to the MDA itself, suggesting that the pre-empted “requirements” established or continued by States also refer primarily to positive enactments of state law. Moreover, in subsection (b) the FDA is given authority to exclude certain “requirements” from the scope of the preemption statute. Of the limited number of “exemptions” from pre-emption that the FDA has granted, none even remotely resemble common-law claims. An examination of the basic purpose of the legislation as well as its history entirely supports our rejection of Med-tronic’s extreme position. The MDA was enacted “to provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use.” 90 Stat. 539. Medtronic asserts that the Act was also intended, however, to “protect innovations in device technology from being ‘stifled by unnecessary restrictions,’ ” Brief for Petitioner in No. 95-754, p. 3 (citing H. R. Rep. No. 94-853, at 12), and that this interest extended to the pre-emption of common-law claims. While the Act certainly reflects some of these concerns, the legislative history indicates that any fears regarding regulatory burdens were related more to the risk of additional federal and state regulation rather than the danger of pre-existing duties under common law. See, e. g., 122 Cong. Rec. 5850 (1976) (statement of Rep. Collins) (opposing further “redundant and burdensome Federal requirements”); id., at 5855 (discussing efforts taken in MDA to protect small businesses from the additional requirements of the Act). Indeed, nowhere in the materials relating to the Act’s history have we discovered a reference to a fear that product liability actions would hamper the development of medical devices. To the extent that Congress was concerned about protecting the industry, that intent was manifested primarily through fewer substantive requirements under the Act, not the pre-emption provision; furthermore, any such concern was far outweighed by concerns about the primary issue motivating the MDA’s enactment: the safety of those who use medical devices. The legislative history also confirms our understanding that § 360(k) simply was not intended to pre-empt most, let alone all, general common-law duties enforced by damages actions. There is, to the best of our knowledge, nothing in the hearings, the Committee Reports, or the debates suggesting that any proponent of the legislation intended a sweeping pre-emption of traditional common-law remedies against manufacturers and distributors of defective , devices. If Congress intended such a result, its failure even to hint at it is spectacularly odd, particularly since Members of both Houses were acutely aware of ongoing product liability litigation. Along with the less-than-precise language of §360k(a), that silence surely indicates that at least some common-law claims against medical device manufacturers may be maintained after the enactment of the MDA. V Medtronic asserts several specific reasons why, even if § 360k does not pre-empt all common-law claims, it at least pre-empts the Lohrs’ claims in this suit. In contrast, the Lohrs argue that their entire complaint should survive a reasonable evaluation of the pre-emptive scope of §360k(a). First, the Lohrs claim that the Court of Appeals correctly held that their negligent design claims were not pre-empted because the § 510(k) premarket notification process imposes no “requirement” on the design of Medtronic’s pacemaker. Second, they suggest that even if the FDA’s general rules regulating manufacturing practices and labeling are “requirements” that pre-empt different state requirements, § 360k(a) does not pre-empt state rules that merely duplicate some or all of those federal requirements. Finally, they argue that because the State’s general rules imposing' common-law duties upon Medtronic do not impose a requirement “with respect to a device,” they do not conflict with the FDA’s general rules relating to manufacturing and labeling and are therefore not pre-empted. Design Claim The Court of Appeals concluded that the Lohrs’ defective design claims were not pre-empted because the requirements with which the company had to comply were not sufficiently concrete to constitute a pre-empting federal requirement. Medtronic counters by pointing to the FDA’s determination that Model 4011 is “substantially equivalent” to an earlier device as well as the agency’s continuing authority to exclude the device from the market if its design is changed. These factors, Medtronic argues, amount to a specific, federally enforceable design requirement that cannot be affected by state-law pressures such as those imposed on manufacturers subject to product liability suits. The company’s defense exaggerates the importance of the § 510(k) process and the FDA letter to the company regarding the pacemaker’s substantial equivalence to a grandfathered device. As the court below noted, “[t]he 510(k) process is focused on equivalence, not safety.” 56 F. 3d, at 1348. As a result, “substantial equivalence determinations provide little protection to the public. These determinations simply compare a post-1976 device to a pre-1976 device to ascertain whether the later device is no more dangerous and no less effective than the earlier device. If the earlier device poses a severe risk or is ineffective, then the later device may also be risky or ineffective.” Adler, 43 Food Drug Cosm. L. J., at 516. The design of the Model 4011, as with the design of pre-1976 and other “substantially equivalent” devices, has never been formally reviewed under the MDA for safety or efficacy. The FDA stressed this basic conclusion in its letter to Medtronic finding the 4011 lead “substantially equivalent” to devices already on the market. That letter only required Medtronic to comply with “general standards” — the lowest level of protection “applicable to all medical devices,” and including “listing of devices, good manufacturing practices, labeling, and the misbranding and adulteration provisions of the Act.” It explicitly warned Medtronic that the letter did “not in any way denote official FDA approval of your device,” and that “[a]ny representation that creates an impression of official approval of this device because of compliance with the premarket notification regulations is misleading and constitutes misbranding.” FDA Substantial Equivalence Letter. Thus, even though the FDA may well examine §510(k) applications for Class III devices (as it examines the entire medical device industry) with a concern for the safety and effectiveness of the device, see Brief for Petitioner in No. 95-754, at 22-26, it did not “require” Medtronics’ pacemaker to take any particular form for any particular reason; the agency simply allowed the pacemaker, as a device substantially equivalent to one that existed before 1976, to be marketed without running the gauntlet of the PMA process. In providing for this exemption to PMA review, Congress intended merely to give manufacturers the freedom to compete, to a limited degree, with and on the same terms as manufacturers of medical devices that existed prior to 1976. There is no suggestion in either the statutory scheme or the legislative history that the §510(k) exemption process was intended to do anything other than maintain the status quo with respect to the marketing of existing medical devices and their substantial equivalents. That status quo included the possibility that the manufacturer of the device would have to defend itself against state-law claims of negligent design. Given this background behind the “substantial equivalence” exemption, the fact that “[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone” in every pre-emption case, 505 U. S., at 516 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and the presumption against pre-emption, the Court of Appeals properly concluded that the “substantial equivalence” provision did not pre-empt the Lohrs’ design claims. Identity of Requirements Claims The Lohrs next suggest that even if “requirements” exist with respect to the manufacturing and labeling of the pacemaker, and even if we can also consider state law to impose a “requirement” under the Act, the state requirement is not pre-empted unless it is “different from, or in addition to,” the federal requirement. §360k(a)(1). Although the precise contours of their theory of recovery have not yet been defined (the pre-emption issue was decided on the basis of the pleadings), it is clear that the Lohrs’ allegations may include claims that Medtronic has, to the extent that they exist, violated FDA regulations. At least these claims, they suggest, can be maintained without being pre-empted by § 360k, and we agree. Nothing in §360k denies Florida the right to provide a traditional damages remedy for violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel federal requirements. Even if it may be necessary as a matter of Florida law to prove that those violations were the result of negligent conduct, or that they created an unreasonable hazard for users of the product, such additional elements of the state-law cause of action would make the state requirements narrower, not broader, than the federal requirement. While such a narrower requirement might be “different from” the federal rules in a literal sense, such a difference would surely provide a strange reason for finding pre-emption of a state rule insofar as it duplicates the federal rule. The presence of a damages remedy does not amount to the additional or different “requirement” that is necessary under the statute; rather, it merely provides another reason for manufacturers to comply with identical existing “requirements” under federal law. The FDA regulations interpreting the scope of §360k’s pre-emptive effect support the Lohrs’ view, and our interpretation of the pre-emption statute is substantially informed by those regulations. The different views expressed by the Courts of Appeals regarding the appropriate scope of federal pre-emption under § 360k demonstrate that the language of that section is not entirely clear. In addition, Congress has given the FDA a unique role in determining the scope of § 360k’s pre-emptive effect. Unlike the statute construed in Cipollone, for instance, pre-emption under the MDA does not arise directly as a result of the enactment of the statute; rather, in most cases a state law will be pre-empted only to the extent that the FDA has promulgated a relevant federal “requirement.” Because the FDA is the federal agency to which Congress has delegated its authority to implement the provisions of the Act, the agency is uniquely qualified to determine whether a particular form of state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941), and, therefore, whether it should be pre-empted. For example, Congress explicitly delegated to the FDA the authority to exempt state regulations from the pre-emptive effect of the MDA — an authority that necessarily requires the FDA to assess the pre-emptive effect that the Act and its own regulations will have on state laws. See § 360k(b). FDA regulations implementing that grant of authority establish a process by which States or other individuals may request an advisory opinion from the FDA regarding whether a particular state requirement is pre-empted by the statute. See 21 CFR § 808.5 (1995). The ambiguity in the statute — and the congressional grant of authority to the agency on the matter contained within it — provide a “sound basis,” post, at 509 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), for giving substantial weight to the agency’s view of the statute. See Chevron U S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984); Hillsborough Cty., 471 U. S., at 714 (considering FDA understanding of pre-emptive effect of its regulations “dispositive”). The regulations promulgated by the FDA expressly support the conclusion that §360k “does not preempt State or local requirements that are equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements imposed by or under the act.” 21 CFR § 808.1(d)(2) (1995); see also § 808.5(b)(1)(i). At this early stage in the litigation, there was no reason for the Court of Appeals to preclude altogether the Lohrs’ manufacturing and labeling claims to the extent that they rest on claims that Medtronic negligently failed to comply with duties “equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements imposed” under federal law. Manufacturing and Labeling Claims Finally, the Lohrs suggest that with respect to the manufacturing and labeling claims, the Court of Appeals should have rejected Medtronic’s pre-emption defense in full. The Court of Appeals believed that these claims would interfere with the consistent application of general federal regulations governing the labeling and manufacture of all medical devices, and therefore concluded that the claims were preempted altogether. The requirements identified by the Court of Appeals include labeling regulations that require manufacturers of every medical device, with a few limited exceptions, to include with the device a label containing “information for use,. .. and any relevant hazards, contraindications, side effects, and precautions.” 21 CFR §§ 801.109(b) and (c) (1995). Similarly, manufacturers are required to comply with “Good Manufacturing Practices,” or “GMP’s,” which are set forth in 32 sections and less than 10 pages in the Code of Federal Regulations. In certain circumstances, the Court of Appeals recognized, the FDA will enforce these general requirements against manufacturers that violate them. See 56 F. 3d, at 1350-1351. While admitting that these requirements exist, the Lohrs suggest that their general nature simply does not pre-empt claims alleging that the manufacturer failed to comply with other duties under state common law. In support of their claim, they note that § 360k(a)(1) expressly states that a federal requirement must be “applicable to the device” in question before it has any pre-emptive effect. Because the labeling and manufacturing requirements are applicable to a host of different devices, they argue that they do not satisfy this condition. They further argue that because only state requirements “with respect to a device” may be pre-empted, and then only if the requirement “relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device,” § 360k(a) mandates pre-emption only where there is a conflict between a specific state requirement and a federal requirement “applicable to” the same device. The Lohrs’ theory is supported by the FDA regulations, which provide that state requirements are pre-empted “only” when the FDA has established “specific counterpart regulations or ... other specific requirements applicable to a particular device.” 21 CFR § 808.1(d) (1995). They further note that the statute is not intended to pre-empt “State or local requirements of general applicability where the purpose of the requirement relates either to other products in addition to devices ... or to unfair trade practices in which the requirements are not limited to devices.” § 808.1(d)(1). The regulations specifically provide, as examples of permissible general requirements, that general electrical codes and the Uniform Commercial Code warranty of fitness would not be pre-empted. See ibid. The regulations even go so far as to state that § 360k(a) generally “does not preempt a state or local requirement prohibiting the manufacture of adulterated or misbranded devices” unless “such a prohibition has the effect of establishing a substantive requirement for a specific device.” §808.1(d)(6)(ii). Furthermore, under its authority to grant exemptions to the pre-emptive effect of § 360k(a), the FDA has never granted, nor, to the best of our knowledge, even been asked to consider granting, an exemption for a state law of general applicability; all 22 existing exemptions apply to excruciatingly specific state requirements regarding the sale of hearing aids. See §§808.53-808.101. Although we do not believe that this statutory and regulatory language necessarily precludes “general” federal requirements from ever pre-empting state requirements, or “general” state requirements from ever being pre-empted, see Part VI, infra, it is impossible to ignore its overarching concern that pre-emption occur only where a particular state requirement threatens to interfere with a specific federal interest. State requirements must be “with respect to” medical devices and “different from, or in addition to,” federal requirements. State requirements must also relate “to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device,” and the regulations provide that state requirements of “general applicability” are not pre-empted except where they have “the effect of establishing a substantive requirement for a specific device.” Moreover, federal requirements must be “applicable to the device” in question, and, according to the regulations, pre-empt state law only if they are “specific counterpart regulations” or “specific” to a “particular device.” The statute and regulations, therefore, require a careful comparison between the allegedly pre-empting federal requirement and the allegedly pre-empted state requirement to determine whether they fall within the intended pre-emptive scope of the statute and regulations. Such a comparison mandates a conclusion that the Lohrs’ common-law claims are not pre-empted by the federal labeling and manufacturing requirements. The generality of those requirements make this quite unlike a case in which the Federal Government has weighed the competing interests relevant to the particular requirement in question, reached an unambiguous conclusion about how those competing considerations should be resolved in a particular case or set of cases, and implemented that conclusion via a specific mandate on manufacturers or producers. Rather, the federal requirements reflect important but entirely generic concerns about device regulation generally, not the sort of concerns regarding a specific device or field of device regulation that the statute or regulations were designed to protect from potentially contradictory state requirements. Similarly, the general state common-law requirements in this suit were not specifically developed “with respect to” medical devices. Accordingly, they are not the kinds of requirements that Congress and the FDA feared would impede the ability of federal regulators to implement and enforce specific federal requirements. The legal duty that is the predicate for the Lohrs’ negligent manufacturing claim is the general duty of every manufacturer to use due care to avoid foreseeable dangers in its products. Similarly, the predicate for the failure to warn claim is the general duty to inform users and purchasers of potentially dangerous items of the risks involved in their use. These general obligations are no more a threat to federal requirements than would be a state-law duty to comply with local fire prevention regulations and zoning codes, or to use due care in the training and supervision of a work force. These state requirements therefore escape pre-emption, not because the source of the duty is a judge-made common-law rule, but rather because their generality leaves them outside the category of requirements that § 360k envisioned to be “with respect to” specific devices such as pacemakers. As a result, none of the Lohrs’ claims based on allegedly defective manufacturing or labeling are pre-empted by the MDA. > In their cross-petition, the Lohrs present a Anal argument, suggesting that common-law duties are never “requirements” within the meaning of §360k and that the statute therefore never pre-empts common-law actions. The Lohrs point out that our holding in Cipollone is not dispositive of this issue, for as Part IV, supra, suggests, there are significant textual and historical differences between the Cipollone statute and § 360k, and the meaning of words must always be informed by the environment within which they are situated. We do not think that the issue is resolved by the FDA regulation suggesting that § 360k is applicable to those requirements “having the force and effect of law” that are “established by . . . court decision,” 21 CFR § 808.1(b) (1995); that reference, it appears, was intended to refer to court decisions construing state statutes or regulations. See 42 Fed. Reg. 30383, 30385 (1977); Brief for Petitioners in No. 95-886, p. 26, n. 7. Nevertheless, we do not respond directly to this argument for two reasons. First, since none of the Lohrs’ claims is pre-empted in this suit, we need not resolve hypothetical cases that may arise in the future. Second, given the critical importance of device specificity in our (and the FDA’s) construction of §360k, it is apparent that few, if any, common-law duties have been pre-empted by this statute. It will be rare indeed for a court hearing a common-law cause of action to issue a decree that has “the effect of establishing a substantive requirement for a specific device.” 21 CFR §808.1(d)(6)(ii) (1995). Until such a case arises, we see no need to determine whether the statute explicitly preempts such a claim. Even then, the issue may not need to be resolved if the claim would also be pre-empted under conflict pre-emption analysis, see Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U. S. 280, 287 (1995). VII Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed insofar as it held that any of the claims were preempted and affirmed insofar as it rejected the pre-emption defense. The cases are remanded for further proceedings. It is so ordered. Medical Device Regulation: The FDA’s Neglected Child (Committee Print compiled for the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce), Comm. Print 98-F, p. 1 (1983). S. Rep. No. 94-33, p. 5 (1975). The FDA has not yet initiated nor suggested the initiation of a PMA process for pacemakers or most other grandfathered devices. But see 60 Fed. Reg. 41984, 41986 (1995) (pursuant to Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 4511, calling for submission of information by February 1997 which may lead the FDA to reclassify or initiate PMA process at some time in the future for implantable pacemaker pulse generators and lead adapters). In 1990, Congress enacted amendments to the MDA which were designed to reduce the FDA’s reliance on the § 510(k) process while continuing to ensure that particularly risky devices received full PMA review. See Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990. Subsection (b) of the statute authorizes the FDA to grant exemptions to state requirements that would otherwise be pre-empted by subsection (a). Section 360k(b) provides: “(b) Exempt requirements “Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof, the Secretary may, by regulation promulgated after notice and opportunity for an oral hearing, exempt from subsection (a) of this section, under such conditions as may be prescribed in such regulation, a requirement of such State or political subdivision applicable to a device intended for human use if— “(1) the requirement is more stringent than a requirement under this chapter which would be applicable to the device if an exemption were not in effect under this subsection; or “(2) the requirement— “(A) is required by compelling local conditions, and “(B) compliance with the requirement would not cause the device to be in violation of any applicable requirement under this chapter.” To carry out this grant of authority, the FDA has issued regulations under the statute which both construe the scope of § 360k(a) and address the instances in which the FDA will grant exemptions to its pre-emptive effect. See 21 CFR § 808.1 (1995); n. 18, infra. We note that although it is the FDA that exercises this authority, the Act gives that authority directly to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who subsequently delegated her authority to the FDA. See, e. g., 21 U. S. C. §360k(b) (“the Secretary may” exempt state requirements), § 321(d) (“Secretary” defined as “the Secretary of Health and Human Services”). Under the FDCA, the Secretary is vested with “[t]he authority to promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of” the Act. 21 U.S.C. § 371(a). See, e. g., English v. Mentor Corp., 67 F. 3d 477 (CA3 1995) (§ 510(k) process creates pre-emptive “requirements”); Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F. 3d 431 (CA5 1995) (§510(k) process does not create pre-emptive “requirements”); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F. 3d 1316 (CA3 1995) (claim alleging violation of federal requirement not pre-empted); 56 F. 3d 1335 (CA11 1995) (case below) (claim alleging violation of federal requirement may be pre-empted; §510(k) process may create pre-emptive requirements; common-law claims covered by §360k(a)); Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F. 3d 1453 (CA9 1995) (common-law claims not covered at all by § 360k(a)). The FDA’s authority to require manufacturers to recall, replace, or refund defective devices is of little use to injured plaintiffs, since there is no indication that the right is available to private parties, the remedy would not extend to recovery for compensatory damages, and the authority is rarely invoked, if at all. See Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in the Right Direction Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 Food Drug Cosm. L. J. 511, 526-527 (1988). There were actually two pre-emptive statutes at issue: The first, enacted in 1965, provided that “[n]o statement relating to smoking and health ... shall be required” on any cigarette package or in any cigarette advertising. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S., at 514. That provision, the Court concluded, did not pre-empt any of the petitioner’s common-law claims. Id., at 518-520. In 1969, Congress superseded the 1965 pre-emption statute with part of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, which provided that “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.” Id., at 515. The bulk of Cipollone’s analysis involved this later statute; unless otherwise stated, it is this statute to which we refer in subsequent references to the pre-emptive statute in Cipollone. Unlike § 360k, the pre-emptive effect of the statute in Cipollone was not dependent on the issuance of any agency regulations. The territory exclusively occupied by federal law was defined in the text of the statute itself; that text specified the precise warning to smokers that Congress deemed both necessary and sufficient. In the MDA, no such specifics exist until the FDA provides them. See also infra, at 495-496 (reliance on the FDA’s interpretation of § 360k warranted, inter alia, because of the FDA’s role in the administration of §360k). Moreover, the statute in Cipollone was clearly intended to have a broader pre-emptive effect than its 1965 predecessor. See 505 U. S., at 515, 520-521. The text of the statute is quoted supra, at 482, and n. 5. All 22 exemptions at 21 CFR §§ 808.53-808.101 (1995) are exemptions for state statutes and regulations regarding the sale of hearing aids. Special statutory exemptions, for example, permit the FDA (with various oversight provisions) to allow investigative, experimental devices to be used in commerce without either PMA review or “substantial equivalence.” See 21 U. S. C. §360j(g); 21 CFR pt. 813 (1995). Moreover, the very existence of the pre-emption statute demonstrates some concern that competing state requirements may unduly interfere with the market for medical devices. Furthermore, if Congress had intended the MDA to work this dramatic change in the availability of state-law remedies, one would expect some reference to that change in the extensive contemporary reviews of the legislation. We have been able to find no such reference. See, e. g., Lesparre, Industry Spokesman Comments on Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 50 Hospitals 99, 103 (Sept. 16, 1976); A. Levine, Device Failure and the Plaintiff’s Lawyer, in Proceedings of the Second Annual AAMI/FDA Conference on Medical Device Regulation 54 (1975); Medical Device Amendments of 1975, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Ser. No. 94-39, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 271 (1975) (statement of Anita Johnson, Public Citizen’s Health Research Group) (arguing that the pre-emption provision should not be included, but making no mention of common law, and specifically discussing only a positive California enactment regarding the safety of intrauterine contraceptive devices); Medical Devices and Equipment Liability Avoidance (Frost & Sullivan pub. June 1977) (comprehensive 2-volume, 600-page review of published medical device product liability eases from 1910 to 1976, suggesting nowhere that MDA had mooted or even altered the longstanding ability of plaintiffs to seek and receive damages awards under state law). As the FDA Commissioner put it in 1982: “[T]he 510(k) provision of the law is a procompetition mechanism that permits firms to make and quickly market me-too versions of pre-1976 devices. The Congress apparently believed that a firm whose device happened to be on the market before enactment of the amendments and was never subject to preclearance by FDA should not enjoy a lengthy monopoly at the expense of other firms and ultimately the consumer.” FDA Oversight: Medical Devices, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1982). See also Kahan, Premarket Approval Versus Premarket Notification: Different Routes to the Same Market, 39 Food Drug Cosm. L. J. 510, 514-515 (1984); D. Kessler, S. Pape, & D. Sundwall, The Federal Regulation of Medical Devices, 317 New England J. Med. 357, 359 (1987). See n. 5, supra; 21 U. S. C. § 371(a). We also note that the agency permits manufacturers of devices that have received PMA to make certain labeling, quality control, and manufacturing changes which would “enhanc[e] the safety of the device or the safety in the use of the device” without prior FDA approval. See 21 CFR §§ 814.39(d)(1) and (2) (1995). Some GMP’s include the duty to institute a “quality assurance program,” §820.5, to have an “adequate organizational structure,” §820.20, to ensure that personnel in contact with a device are “clean, healthy, and suitably attired” where such matters are relevant to the device’s safety, §820.25, and to have buildings, environmental controls, and equipment of a quality adequate to produce a safe product, see §§820.40, 820.46, 820.60. FDA’s narrow understanding of the scope of §360k(a) is obvious from the full text of the regulation, which provides, in relevant part: “(d) State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food and Drug Administration has established specific counterpart regulations or there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the act, thereby making any existing divergent State or local requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addition to, the specific Food and Drug Administration requirements. There are other State or local requirements that affect devices that are not preempted by section 521(a) of the act because they are not ‘requirements applicable to a device’ within the meaning of section 521(a) of the act. The following are examples of State or local requirements that are not regarded as preempted by section 521 of the act: “(1) Section 521(a) does not preempt State or local requirements of general applicability where the purpose of the requirement relates either to other products in addition to devices (e. g., requirements such as general electrical codes, and the Uniform Commercial Code (warranty of fitnéss)), or to unfair trade practices in which the requirements are not limited to devices. “(2) Section 521(a) does not preempt State or local requirements that are equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements imposed by or under the act. “(6)(i) Section 521(a) does not preempt State or local requirements respecting general enforcement, e. g., requirements that State inspection be permitted of factory records concerning all devices .... “(ii) Generally, section 521(a) does not preempt a State or local requirement prohibiting the manufacture of adulterated or misbranded devices. Where, however, such a prohibition has the effect of establishing a substantive requirement for a specific device, e. g., a specific labeling requirement, then the prohibition [may] be preempted.” 21 CFR § 808.1(d) (1995). A plurality of this Court concluded in Cipo llone that a similar analysis was required under the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. That Act pre-empted requirements and prohibitions based on smoking and health “imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion” of cigarettes in packages that were labeled in conformity with that Act. 505 U. S., at 515. We held that the petitioner’s fraudulent misrepresentation claims, including those based on allegedly false statements made in advertisements, were not pre-empted because they were “predicated not on a duty ‘based on smoking and health’ but rather on a more general obligation — the duty not to deceive.” Id., at 528-529. The general common-law duty “not to make fraudulent statements” was not within the specific category of requirements or prohibitions based on smoking and health imposed under state law “with respect to the advertising or promotion” of cigarettes that were pre-empted by the 1969 statute. Id., at 529. If anything, the language of the MDA’s pre-emption statute and its counterpart regulations require an even more searching inquiry into the relationship between the federal requirement and the state requirement at issue than was true under the statute in Cipollone.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

CITY OF CHICAGO et al. v. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND et al. No. 92-1639. Argued January 19, 1994 Decided May 2, 1994 Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in. which Rehnquist, C. J., and Blackmun, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor, J., joined, post, p. 340. Lawrence Rosenthal argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Susan S. Sher, Benna, Ruth Solomon, and Mardell Nereim. Jeffrey R Minear argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Days, Acting Assistant Attorney General Flint, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, David C. Shilton, M. Alice Thurston, Gerald H. Yamada, and Lisa K. Friedman. Richard J. Lazarus argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New York by Robert Abrams, Attorney General, Jerry Boone, Solicitor General, Peter H. Schiff, Deputy Solicitor General, and James A Sevinsky and Kathleen Liston Morrison, Assistant Attorneys General; for Barron County, Wisconsin, et al. by Philip G. Sunderland, Max Rothal, Pamela K. Akin, Stephen O. Nunn, Cynthea L. Perry, Howard J. Wein, Charles H. Younger, John D. Pirich, David P. Bobzien, Felshaw King, Mary Anne Wood, Michael F. X. Gillin, Ruth C. Balkin, Patrick T. Boulden, and Barry S. Shanoff; for the City of Spokane, Washington, et al. by Craig S. Trueblood; for the County of Westchester, New York, by Carol L. Van Scoyoc; for the National League of Cities et al. by Richard Ruda, David R. Berz, and David B. Hird; for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. by Daniel J. Popeo, Paul D. Kamenar, and Kurt J. Olson; and for Wheelabrator Technologies Inc., et al. by Harold Himmelman, David M. Friedland, and Mark P. Paul. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. We are called upon to decide whether, pursuant to § 3001(i) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)), as added, 98 Stat. 3252, 42 U. S. C. §6921(i), the ash generated by a resource recovery facility’s incineration of municipal solid waste is exempt from regulation as a hazardous waste under Subtitle C of RCRA. I Since 1971, petitioner city of Chicago has owned and operated a municipal incinerator, the Northwest Waste-to-Energy Facility, that burns solid waste and recovers energy, leaving a residue of municipal waste combustion (MWC) ash. The facility burns approximately 350,000 tons of solid waste each year and produces energy that is both used within the facility and sold to other entities. The city has disposed of the combustion residue — 110,000 to 140,000 tons of MWC ash per year — at landfills that are not licensed to accept hazardous wastes. In 1988, respondent Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) filed a complaint against petitioners, the city of Chicago and its mayor, under the citizen suit provisions of RCRA, 42 U. S. C. § 6972, alleging that they were violating provisions of RCRA and of implementing regulations issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Respondent alleged that the MWC ash generated by the facility was toxic enough to qualify as a “hazardous waste” under EPA’s regulations, 40 CFR pt. 261 (1993). It was uncontested that, with respect to the ash, petitioners had not adhered to any of the requirements of Subtitle C, the portion of RCRA addressing hazardous wastes. Petitioners contended that RCRA §3001(i), 42 U. S. C. §6921(i), excluded the MWC ash from those requirements. The District Court agreed with that contention, see Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Chicago, 727 F. Supp. 419, 424 (1989), and subsequently granted petitioners’ motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the “ash generated from the incinerators of municipal resource recovery facilities is subject to regulation as a hazardous waste under Subtitle C of RCRA.” Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Chicago, 948 F. 2d 345, 352 (CA7 1991). The city petitioned for a writ of certiorari, and we invited the Solicitor General to present the views of the United States. Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., 504 U. S. 906 (1992). On September 18, 1992, while that invitation was outstanding, the Administrator of EPA issued a memorandum to EPA Regional Administrators, directing them, in accordance with the agency’s view of §3001(i), to treat MWC ash as exempt from hazardous waste regulation under Subtitle C of RCRA. Thereafter, we granted the city’s petition, vacated the decision, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for further consideration in light of the memorandum. Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 506 U. S. 982 (1992). On remand, the Court of Appeals reinstated its previous opinion, holding that, because the statute’s plain language is dispositive, the EPA memorandum did not affect its analysis. 985 F. 2d 303, 304 (CA7 1993). Petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted. 509 U. S. 903 (1993). II RCRA is a comprehensive environmental statute that empowers EPA to regulate hazardous wastes from cradle to grave, in accordance with the rigorous safeguards and waste management procedures of Subtitle C, 42 U. S. C. §§6921-6934. (Nonhazardous wastes are regulated much more loosely under Subtitle D, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6941-6949.) Under the relevant provisions of Subtitle C, EPA has promulgated standards governing hazardous waste generators and transporters, see 42 U. S. C. §§ 6922 and 6923, and owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDF’s), see § 6924. Pursuant to § 6922, EPA has directed hazardous waste generators to comply with handling, recordkeeping, storage, and monitoring requirements, see 40 CFR pt. 262 (1993). TSDF’s, however, are subject to much more stringent regulation than either generators or transporters, including a 4- to 5-year permitting process, see 42 U. S. C. §6925; 40 CFR pt. 270 (1993); U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, The Nation’s Hazardous Waste Management Program at a Crossroads, The RCRA Implementation Study 49-50 (July 1990), burdensome financial assurance requirements, stringent design and location standards, and, perhaps most onerous of all, responsibility to take corrective action for releases of hazardous substances and to ensure safe closure of each facility, see 42 U. S. C. § 6924; 40 CFR pt. 264 (1993). “[The] corrective action requirement is one of the major reasons that generators and transporters work diligently to manage their wastes so as to avoid the need to obtain interim status or a TSD permit.” 3 Environmental Law Practice Guide § 29.06[3][d] (M. Gerrard ed. 1993) (hereinafter Practice Guide). RCRA does not identify which wastes are hazardous and therefore subject to Subtitle C regulation; it leaves that designation to EPA. 42 U. S. C. § 6921(a). When EPA’s hazardous waste designations for solid wastes appeared in 1980, see 45 Fed. Reg. 33084, they contained certain exceptions from normal coverage, including an exclusion for “household waste,” defined as “any waste material . . . derived from households (including single and multiple residences, hotels and motels),” id., at 33120, codified as amended at 40 CFR § 261.4(b)(1) (1993). Although most household waste is harmless, a small portion — such as cleaning fluids and batteries — would have qualified as hazardous waste. The regulation declared, however, that “[h]ousehold waste, including household waste that has been collected, transported, stored, treated, disposed, recovered (e. g., refuse-derived fuel) or reused” is not hazardous waste. Ibid. Moreover, the preamble to the 1980 regulations stated that “residues remaining after treatment (e. g. incineration, thermal treatment) [of household waste] are not subject to regulation as a hazardous waste.” 45 Fed. Reg. 33099. By reason of these provisions, an incinerator that burned only household waste would not be considered a Subtitle C TSDF, since it processed only nonhazardous (i. e., household) waste, and it would not be considered a Subtitle C generator of hazardous waste and would be free to dispose of its ash in a Subtitle D landfill. The 1980 regulations thus provided what is known as a “waste stream” exemption for household waste, ibid., i. e., an exemption covering that category of waste from generation through treatment to final disposal of residues. The regulation did not, however, exempt MWC ash from Subtitle C coverage if the incinerator that produced the ash burned anything in addition to household waste, such as what petitioners’ facility burns: nonhazardous industrial waste. Thus, a facility like petitioners’ would qualify as a Subtitle C hazardous waste generator if the MWC ash it produced was sufficiently toxic, see 40 CFR §§ 261.3, 261.24 (1993) — though it would still not qualify as a Subtitle C TSDF, since all the waste it took in would be characterized as nonhazardous. (An ash can be hazardous, even though the product from which it is generated is not, because in the new medium the contaminants are more concentrated and more readily leachable, see 40 CFR §§261.3, 261.24, and pt. 261, App. II (1993).) Four years after these regulations were issued, Congress enacted the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, which added to RCRA the “Clarification of Household Waste Exclusion” as § 3001(i), § 223, 98 Stat. 3252. The essence of our task in this case is to determine whether, under that provision, the MWC ash generated by petitioners’ facility — a facility that would have been considered a Subtitle C generator under the 1980 regulations — is subject to regulation as hazardous waste under Subtitle C. We conclude that it is. Section 3001(i), 42 U. S. C. § 6921(i), entitled “Clarification of household waste exclusion,” provides: “A resource recovery facility recovering energy from the mass burning of municipal solid waste shall not be deemed to be treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise managing hazardous wastes for the purposes of regulation under this subchapter, if— “(1) such facility— “(A) receives and burns only— “(i) household waste (from single and multiple dwellings, hotels, motels, and other residential sources), and “(ii) solid waste from commercial or industrial sources that does not contain hazardous waste identified or listed under this section, and “(B) does not accept hazardous wastes identified or listed under this section, and “(2) the owner or operator of such facility has established contractual requirements or other appropriate notification or inspection procedures to assure that hazardous wastes are not received at or burned in such facility.” The plain meaning of this language is that so long as a facility recovers energy by incineration of the appropriate wastes, it (the facility) is not subject to Subtitle C regulation as a facility that treats, stores, disposes of, or manages hazardous waste. The provision quite clearly does not contain any exclusion for the ash itself Indeed, the waste the facility produces (as opposed to that which it receives) is not even mentioned. There is thus no express support for petitioners’ claim óf a waste-stream exemption. Petitioners contend, however, that the practical effect of the statutory language is to exempt the ash by virtue of exempting the facility. If, they argue, the facility is not deemed to be treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous waste, then the ash that it treats, stores, or disposes of must itself be considered nonhazardous. There are several problems with this argument. First, as we have explained, the only exemption provided by the terms of the statute is for the facility. It is the facility, not the ash, that “shall not be deemed” to be subject to regulation under Subtitle C. Unlike the preamble to the 1980 regulations, which had.been in existence for four years by the time §3001(i) was enacted, §3001(i) does not explicitly exempt MWC ash generated by a resource recovery facility from regulation as a hazardous waste. In light of that difference, and given the statute’s express declaration of national policy that “[w]aste that is ... generated should be treated, stored, or disposed of so as to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the environment,” 42 U. S. C. § 6902(b), we cannot interpret the statute to permit MWC ash sufficiently toxic to qualify as hazardous to be disposed of in ordinary landfills. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals observed, the statutory language does not even exempt the facility in its capacity as a generator of hazardous waste. RCRA defines “generation” as “the act or process of producing hazardous waste.” 42 U. S. C. § 6903(6). There can be no question that the creation of ash by incinerating municipal waste constitutes “generation” of hazardous waste (assuming, of course, that the ash qualifies as hazardous under 42 U. S. G. § 6921 and its implementing regulations, 40 CFR pt. 261 (1993)). Yet although §3001(i) states that the exempted facility “shall not be deemed to be treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise managing hazardous wastes,” it significantly omits from the catalog the word “generating.” Petitioners say that because the activities listed as exempt encompass the full scope of the facility’s operation, the failure to mention the activity of generating is insignificant. But the statute itself refutes this. Each of the three specific terms used in §3001(i)— “treating,” “storing,” and “disposing of” — is separately defined by RCRA, and none covers the production of hazardous waste. The fourth and less specific term (“otherwise managing”) is also defined, to mean “collection, source separation, storage, transportation, processing, treatment, recovery, and disposal,” 42 U. S. C. §6903(7) — -just about every hazardous waste-related activity except generation. We think it follows from the carefully constructed text of §3001(i) that while a resource recovery facility’s management activities are excluded from Subtitle C regulation, its generation of toxic ash is not. Petitioners appeal to the legislative history of §3001(i), which includes, in the Senate Committee Report, the statement that “[a]ll waste management activities of such a facility, including the generation, transportation, treatment, storage and disposal of waste shall be covered by the exclusion.” S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 61 (1983) (emphasis added). But it is the statute, and not the Committee Report, which is the authoritative expression of the law, and the statute prominently omits reference to generation. As the Court of Appeals cogently put it: “Why should we, then, rely upon a single word in a committee report that did not result in legislation? Simply put, we shouldn’t.” 948 F. 2d, at 351. Petitioners point out that the activity by which they “treat” municipal waste is the very same activity by which they “generate” MWC ash, to wit, incineration. But there is nothing extraordinary about an activity’s being exempt for some purposes and nonexempt for others. The incineration here is exempt from TSDF regulation, but subject to regulation as hazardous waste generation. (As we have noted, see supra, at 331-332, the latter is much less onerous.) Our interpretation is confirmed by comparing §3001(i) with another statutory exemption in RCRA. In the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-499, § 124(b), 100 Stat. 1689, Congress amended 42 U. S. C. § 6921 to provide that an “owner and operator of equipment used to recover methane from a landfill shall not be deemed to be managing, generating, transporting, treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous or liquid wastes within the meaning of” Subtitle C. This provision, in contrast to §3001(i), provides a complete exemption by including the term “generating” in its list of covered activities. “[I]t is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely” when it “includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another,” Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U. S. 200, 208 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). We agree with respondents that this provision “shows that Congress knew how to draft a waste stream exemption in RCRA when it wanted to.” Brief for Respondents 18. Petitioners contend that our interpretation of §3001(i) turns the provision into an “empty gesture,” Brief for Petitioners 23, since even under the pre-existing regime an incinerator burning household waste and nonhazardous industrial waste was exempt from the Subtitle C TSDF provisions. If §3001(i) did not extend the waste-stream exemption to the product of such a combined household/ nonhazardous-industrial treatment facility, petitioners argue, it did nothing at all. But it is not nothing to codify a household waste exemption that had previously been subject to agency revision; nor is it nothing (though petitioners may value it as less than nothing) to restrict the exemption that the agency previously provided — which is what the provision here achieved, by withholding all waste-stream exemption for waste processed by resource recovery facilities, even for the waste stream passing through an exclusively household waste facility. We also do not agree with petitioners’ contention that our construction renders §3001(i) ineffective for its intended purpose of promoting household/nonhazardous-industrial resource recovery facilities, see 42 U. S. C. §§ 6902(a)(1), (10), (11), by subjecting them “to the potentially enormous expense of managing ash residue as a hazardous waste.” Brief for Petitioners 20. It is simply not true that a facility which is (as our interpretation says these facilities are) a hazardous waste “generator” is also deemed to be “managing” hazardous waste under RCRA. Section 3001(i) clearly exempts these facilities from Subtitle C TSDF regulations, thus enabling them to avoid the “full brunt of EPA’s enforcement efforts under RCRA.” Practice Guide §29.05[1]. * * * RCRA’s twin goals of encouraging resource recovery and protecting against contamination sometimes conflict. It is not unusual for legislation to contain diverse purposes that must be reconciled, and the most reliable guide for that task is the enacted text. Here that requires us to reject the Solicitor General’s plea for deference to the EPA’s interpretation, cf. Chevron U S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843-844 (1984), which goes beyond the scope of whatever ambiguity §3001(i) contains. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U. S. 86,109 (1993). Section 3001(i) simply cannot be read to contain the cost-saving waste-stream exemption petitioners seek. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is Affirmed. The dissent is able to describe the provision as exempting the ash itself only by resorting to what might be called imaginative use of ellipsis: “even though the material being treated and disposed of contains hazardous components before, diming, and after its treatment[,] that material ‘shall not be deemed to be . . . hazardous.’” Post, at 346. In the full text, quoted above, the subject of the phrase “shall not be deemed . . . hazardous” is not the material, but the resource recovery facility, and the complete phrase, including (italicized) the ellipsis, reads “shall not be deemed to be treating, storing, disposing of, or otherwise managing hazardous wastes.” Deeming a facility not to be engaged in these activities with respect to hazardous wastes is of course quite different from deeming the output of that facility not to be hazardous. “Treatment” means “any method, technique, or process, including neutralization, designed to change the physical, chemical, or biological character or composition of any hazardous waste so as to neutralize such waste or so as to render such waste nonhazardous, safer for transport, amenable for recovery, amenable for storage, or reduced in volume. Such term includes any activity or processing designed to change the physical form or chemical composition of hazardous waste so as to render it nonhazardous.” 42 U. S. C. §6903(34). “Storage” means “the containment of hazardous waste, either on a temporary basis or for a period of years, in such a manner as not to constitute disposal of such hazardous waste.” §6903(33). “Disposal” means “the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters.” §6903(3). Nothing in the dissent’s somewhat lengthier discourse on §3001(i)’s legislative history, see post, at 343-345, convinces us that the statute’s omission of the term “generation” is a scrivener’s error. We express no opinion as to the validity of EPA’s household waste regulation as applied to resource recovery facilities before the effective date of §3001(i). Furthermore, since the statute in question addresses only resource recovery facilities, not household waste in general, we are unable to reach any conclusions concerning the validity of EPA’s regulatory scheme for household wastes not processed by resource recovery facilities. In view of our construction of § 3001(i), we need not consider whether an agency interpretation expressed in a memorandum like the Administrator’s in this case is entitled to any less deference under Chevron than an interpretation adopted by rule published in the Federal Register, or by adjudication.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

MASSACHUSETTS et al. v. FEENEY No. 76-265. Decided November 8, 1976 Per Curiam. This Court, on its own motion, hereby certifies to the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, pursuant to Rule 3:21 of the Rules of that court, the question of law hereinafter set forth. Statement of Facts On March 29, 1976, a three-judge Federal District Court in the District of Massachusetts, after dismissing the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and its Division of Civil Service as parties defendant, entered a judgment for Helen B. Feeney against the Massachusetts Director of Civil Service (now designated “Personnel Administrator of the Commonwealth”) and members of the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission, declaring unconstitutional the Massachusetts veterans’ preference statute, Mass. Gen. Laws c. 31, § 23, and enjoining its enforcement by said state officers. 415 F. Supp. 485 (1976). The Attorney General for the Commonwealth, who appeared for all parties defendant in the District Court, has filed a Jurisdictional Statement in this Court stating, at 1-2, that the same is filed “on behalf of the Personnel Administrator of the Commonwealth and the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission,” the state officers against whom the District Court judgment was entered. However, the Personnel Administrator of the Commonwealth and the members of the Civil Service Commission have advised the Clerk of this Court, by letter of September 1, 1976, that “the appeal is without our authorization,” that “each of us informed the Attorney General of our request that this matter not be appealed,” and that “we request that the Court dismiss the appeal.” A stipulation filed' in the District Court dated June 21, 1976, signed by the Attorney General and the attorney for appellee, confirms these statements in the letter, and states further that the Governor of the Commonwealth has also requested the Attorney General not to prosecute an appeal. The Attorney General, on October 8, 1976, filed a brief in this Court supporting his authority under state law to docket the appeal. It therefore appears that there are involved in the proceeding before this Court questions of Massachusetts law which may be determinative of such cause, with respect to which there seem to be no clearly controlling precedents in the decisions of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Accordingly, this Court desires to certify to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, pursuant to Rule 3:21 of its Rules, the following question: Question Certified Under the circumstances herein presented, does Massachusetts law authorize the Attorney General of the Commonwealth to prosecute an appeal to this Court from the judgment of the District Court without the consent and over the expressed objections of the state officers against whom the judgment of the District Court was entered? Me. Justice Blackmun would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BEILAN v. BOARD OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA. No. 63. Argued March 4, 1958. Decided June 30, 1958. John Rogers Carroll argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was A. Harry Levitan. C. Brewster Rhoads argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Edward B. Soken. Mr. Justice Burton delivered the opinion of the Court. The question before us is whether the Board of Public Education for the School District of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States when the Board, purporting to act under the Pennsylvania Public School Code, discharged a public school teacher on the ground of “incompetency,” evidenced by the teacher’s refusal of his Superintendent’s request to confirm or refute information as to the teacher’s loyalty and his activities in certain allegedly subversive organizations. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that it did not. On June 25, 1952, Herman A. Beilan, the petitioner, who had been a teacher for about 22 years in the Philadelphia Public School System, presented himself at his Superintendent’s office in response to the latter’s request. The Superintendent said he had information which reflected adversely on petitioner’s loyalty and he wanted to determine its truth or falsity. In response to petitioner’s suggestion that the Superintendent do the questioning, the latter said he would ask one question and petitioner could then determine whether he would answer it and others of that type. The Superintendent, accordingly, asked petitioner whether or not he had been the Press Director of the Professional Section of the Communist Political Association in 1944. Petitioner asked permission to consult counsel before answering and the Superintendent granted his request. On October 14, 1952, in response to a similar request, petitioner again presented himself at the Superintendent’s office. Petitioner stated that he had consulted counsel and that he declined to answer the question as to his activities in 1944. He announced he would also decline to answer any other “questions similar to it,” “questions of this type,” or “questions about political and religious beliefs . . . .” The Superintendent warned petitioner that this “was a very serious and a very important matter and that failure to answer the questions might lead to his dismissal.” The Superintendent made it clear that he was investigating “a real question of fitness for ■ [petitioner] to be a teacher or to continue in the teaching work.” These interviews were given no publicity and were attended only by petitioner, his Superintendent and the Assistant Solicitor of the Board. On November 25, 1953, the Board instituted dismissal proceedings against petitioner under § 1127 of the Pennsylvania Public School Code of 1949. The only specification which we need consider charged that petitioner’s refusal to answer his Superintendent’s questions constituted “incompetency” under § 1122 of that Code. The Board conducted a formal hearing on the charge. Petitioner was present with counsel but did not testify. Counsel for each side agreed that petitioner’s loyalty was not in issue, and that evidence as to his disloyalty would be irrelevant. On January 7, 1954, the Board found that the charge of incompetency had been sustained and, by a vote of fourteen to one, discharged petitioner from his employment as a teacher. On an administrative appeal, the Superintendent of Public Instruction of Pennsylvania sustained the local Board. However, on petitioner’s appeal to the County Court of Common Pleas, that court set aside petitioner’s discharge and held that the Board should have followed the procedure specified by the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act, rather than the Public School Code. Finally, on the Board’s appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with two justices dissenting, reversed the Court of Common Pleas and reinstated petitioner’s discharge. 386 Pa. 82, 98, 110, 125 A. 2d 327, 334, 340. We granted certiorari. 353 U. S. 964. In addition to the Public School Code, Pennsylvania has a comprehensive Loyalty Act which provides for the discharge of public employees on grounds of disloyalty or subversive conduct. Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann., 1941 (Cum. Ann. Pocket Pt., 1957), Tit. 65, §§ 211-225. Petitioner stresses the fact that the question asked of him by his Superintendent related to his loyalty. He contends that he was discharged for suspected disloyalty and that his discharge is invalid because of failure to follow the Loyalty Act procedure. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Board was not limited to proceeding under the Loyalty Act, even though the questions asked of petitioner related to his loyalty. We are bound by the interpretation thus given to the Pennsylvania statutes by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 448; Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Risty, 276 U. S. 567, 570. The only question before us is whether the Federal Constitution prohibits petitioner’s discharge for statutory “incompetency” based on his refusal to answer the Superintendent’s questions. By engaging in teaching in the public schools, petitioner did not give up his right to freedom of belief, speech or association. He did, however, undertake obligations of frankness, candor and cooperation in answering inquiries made of him by his employing Board examining into his fitness to serve it as a public school teacher. “A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in which they live. In this, the state has a vital concern. It must preserve the integrity of the schools. That the school authorities have the right and the duty to screen the officials, teachers, and employees as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools as a part of ordered society, cannot be doubted.” Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485, 493. As this Court stated in Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716, 720, “We think that a municipal employer is not disabled because it is an agency of the State from inquiring of its employees as to matters that may prove relevant to their fitness and suitability for the public service.” The question asked of petitioner by his Superintendent was relevant to the issue of petitioner’s fitness and suitability to serve as a teacher. Petitioner is not in a position to challenge his dismissal merely because of the remoteness in time of the 1944 activities. It was apparent from the circumstances of the two interviews that the Superintendent had other questions to ask. Petitioner’s refusal to answer was not based on the remoteness of his 1944 activities. He made it clear that he would not answer any question of the same type as the one asked. Petitioner blocked from the beginning any inquiry into his Communist activities, however relevant to his present loyalty. The Board based its dismissal upon petitioner’s refusal to answer any inquiry about his relevant activities — not upon those activities themselves. It took care to charge petitioner with incompetency, and not with disloyalty. It found him insubordinate and lacking in frankness and candor — it made no finding as to his loyalty. We find no requirement in the Federal Constitution that a teacher’s classroom conduct be the sole basis for determining his fitness. Fitness for teaching depends on a broad range of factors. The Pennsylvania tenure provision specifies several disqualifying grounds, including immorality, intemperance, cruelty, mental derangement and persistent and willful violation of the school laws, as well as “incompetency.” However, the Pennsylvania statute, unlike those of many other States, contains no catch-all phrase, such as “conduct unbecoming a teacher,” to cover disqualifying conduct not included within the more specific provisions. Consequently, the Pennsylvania courts have given “incompetency” a broad interpretation. This was made clear in Horosko v. Mt. Pleasant School District, 335 Pa. 369, 371, 374-375, 6 A. 2d 866, 868, 869-870: “If the fact be that she 'now commands neither the respect nor the good will of the community’ and if the record shows that effect to be the result of her conduct within the clause quoted, it will be conclusive evidence of incompetency. It has always been the recognized duty of the teacher to conduct himself in such way as to command the respect and good will of the community, though one result of the choice of a teacher’s vocation may be to deprive him of the same freedom of action enjoyed by persons in other vocations. Educators have always regarded the example set by the teacher as of great importance .... “The term 'incompetency’ has a ‘common and approved usage’. The context does not limit the meaning of the word to lack of substantive knowl-edgé of the subjects to be taught. Common and approved usage give a much wider meaning. For example, in 31 C. J., with reference to a number of supporting decisions, it is defined: ‘A relative term without technical meaning. It may be employed as meaning disqualification; inability; incapacity; lack of ability, legal qualifications, or fitness to discharge the required duty.’ In Black’s Law Dictionary (3rd edition) page 945, and in Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, (3rd revision) p. 1528, it is defined as ‘Lack of ability or fitness to discharge the required duty.’ Cases construing the word to the same effect are found in Words and Phrases, 1st series, page 3510, and 2nd series, page 1013. Webster’s New International Dictionary defines it as ‘want of physical, intellectual, or moral ability; insufficiency; inadequacy; specif., want of legal qualifications or fitness.’ Funk & Wagnalls Standard Dictionary defines it as ‘General lack of capacity of fitness, or lack of the special qualities required for a particular purpose.’ ” In the Horosko case, a teacher was discharged for “incompetency” because of her afterhours activity in her husband’s beer garden, serving as a bartender and waitress, occasionally drinking beer, shaking dice with the customers for drinks and playing the pinball machine. Cf. Schwer’s Appeal, 36 Pa. D. & C. 531, 536. In the instant case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “incompetency” includes petitioner’s “deliberate and insubordinate refusal to answer the questions of his administrative superior in a vitally important matter pertaining to his fitness.” 386 Pa., at 91, 125 A. 2d, at 331. This interpretation is not inconsistent with the Federal Constitution. Petitioner complains that he was denied due process because he was not sufficiently warned of the consequences of his refusal to answer his Superintendent. The record, however, shows that the Superintendent, in his second interview, specifically warned petitioner that his refusal to answer “was a very serious and a very important matter and that failure to answer the questions might lead to his dismissal.” That was sufficient warning to petitioner that his refusal to answer might jeopardize his employment. Furthermore, at petitioner’s request, his Superintendent gave him ample opportunity to consult counsel. There was no element of surprise. Our recent decisions in Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U. S. 551, and Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U. S. 252, are distinguishable. In each we envisioned and distinguished the situation now before us. In the Slochower case, at 558, the Court said : “It is one thing for the city authorities themselves to inquire into Slochower’s fitness, but quite another for his discharge to be based entirely on events occurring before a federal committee whose inquiry was announced as not directed at ‘the property, affairs, or government of the city, or . . . official conduct of city employees.’ In this respect the present case differs materially from Garner [341 U. S. 716], where the city was attempting to elicit information necessary to determine the qualifications of its employees. Here, the Board had possessed the pertinent information for 12 years, and the questions which Professor Slochower refused to answer were admittedly asked for a purpose wholly unrelated to his college functions. On such a record the Board cannot claim that its action was part of a bona fide attempt to gain needed and relevant information.” In the Konigsberg case, supra, at 259-261, this Court stressed the fact that the action of the State was not based on the mere refusal to answer relevant questions— rather, it was based on inferences impermissibly drawn from the refusal. In the instant case, no inferences at all were drawn from petitioner’s refusal to answer. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court merely equated refusal to answer the employing Board’s relevant questions with statutory “incompetency.” Inasmuch as petitioner’s dismissal did not violate the Federal Constitution, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is Affirmed. The Communist Political Association was the predecessor organization of the Communist Party of the United States. See Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 304, n. 5. Pa. Laws 1949, No. 14, Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann., 1950, Tit. 24, § 11-1127. Petitioner’s refusal to answer his Superintendent was also charged as persistent and willful violation of the school laws, another statutory ground for dismissal. See note 4, infra. On November 18, 1953, petitioner had been called to testify as a witness in a Philadelphia hearing of a Subcommittee of the United States House Committee on Un-American Activities. There he was asked to confirm or refute several reports as to his alleged subversive activities in 1949 and earlier years. He declined to answer, relying upon the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. That invocation of the Fifth Amendment was specified by the Board as a further ground of “incompetency.” All charges were sustained on the administrative level. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that petitioner’s refusal to answer his Superintendent evidenced a statutory “incompetency” sufficient to support his dismissal and, therefore, found it unnecessary to pass on the other grounds for dismissal. 386 Pa. 82, 94, 125 A. 2d 327, 333. It is suggested that petitioner has a right to the initial judgment of the administrative authorities on whether refusal to answer the Superintendent, independent of the other, charges, would support the dismissal. Under the Pennsylvania Public School Code, Common Pleas Courts exercise de novo review of dismissals. Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann., 1950 (Cum. Ann. Pocket Pt., 1957), Tit. 24, § 11-1132 (b). A dismissal can be sustained if the court finds support for any one of the multiple grounds relied upon by the dismissing school board. Cf. Brown Case, 347 Pa. 418, affirming 151 Pa. Super. 522, 30 A. 2d 726, reported sub nom. Appeal of School District of City of Bethlehem, 32 A. 2d 565. This allocation of functions between the Pennsylvania courts and administrative agencies does not violate due process. Accordingly, it is necessary for us to consider only the one ground relied upon by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. As a matter of jurisdiction, our only jurisdiction is over the Pennsjdvania Supreme Court, as the highest court of the State. Section 1122 of that Code, in 1952 and 1953, provided that “The only valid causes for termination of a contract heretofore or hereafter entered into with a professional employe shall be immorality, incompetency, intemperance, cruelty, persistent negligence, mental derangement, persistent and wilful violation of the school laws of this Commonwealth on the part of the professional employe.” (Emphasis supplied.) Pa. Laws 1949, No. 14, as amended, Pa. Laws 1951, No. 463, § 16; Purdon’s Pa. Stat. Ann., 1950 (Cum. Ann. Pocket Pt., 1957), Tit. 24, §11-1122. As enacted in 1949, § 1122 had contained, after the words “mental derangement,” the clause, “advocation of or participating in un-American or subversive doctrines.” Pa. Laws 1949, No. 14. That clause, however, was deleted by § 16 of the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act, approved December 22,1951, effective March 1, 1952. Pa. Laws 1951, No. 463. Counsel for the Board, at the outset of the hearing, stated: “It is my contention, and it has been the thought of your counsel since these proceedings were initiated, that these are not proceedings brought against these respondents charging them with disloyalty. If that were the situation we would have a completely different record, a completely different set of facts, a completely different section under which the charges would be made, if made at all. “Now, so far as I am concerned, sir, and so far as my presentation of testimony is concerned, I don’t think whether this man is loyal or disloyal has anything to do with this case. And if your counsel’s advice were being asked in the matter, I should say that any testimony directed toward present loyalty or disloyalty is completely out of this case. “So far as this case is concerned, we are not delving into present or past loyalty.” Counsel for petitioner stated: “Mr. President, if you please, I have no intention of seeing this proceeding become a loyalty hearing. Mr. Rhoads [counsel for the Board] has stated that it is not. I agree with him completely.” There is no showing that the statute was discriminatorily applied. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268. See note 4, supra. E. g., Baldwin’s Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann., 1955, § 161.790 (1), “conduct unbecoming a teacher,” “during good behavior.” Mass. Ann. Laws, 1953 (Cum. Supp., 1957), c. 71, §42, “conduct unbecoming a teacher,” “or other good cause.” West’s Ann. Cal. Code, Education, § 13521 (a), (e), “unprofessional conduct,” “Evident unfitness for service.” Smith-Hurd’s Ill. Ann. Stat., 1946 (Cum. Ann. Pocket Pt., 1957), c. 122, § 6-36, “other sufficient cause.” Burns’ Ann. Ind. Stat., 1948 Replacement Vol., § 28-4308, “other good and just cause.”

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD CO. v. OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION et al. No. 86-337. Argued March 25, 1987 Decided April 28, 1987 MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Betty Jo Christian argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Timothy M. Walsh, Steven Reed, Jerald S. Howe, Jr., and Jeffrey D. Lerner. Albert G. Lauber, Jr., argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Richard G. Taranto, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, Jim J. Marquez, and John M. Mason. David W. Lee, Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondents State Board of Equalization of Oklahoma et al. were Robert H. Henry, Attorney General, and Neal Leader, Assistant Attorney General. J. Lawrence Blankenship and Donna E. Cox filed a brief for respondents Oklahoma Tax Commission et al. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Bus Association by Charles A. Webb and Theodore C. Knappen; and for the Association of American Railroads by Kenneth P. Kolson. Jerome B. Falk, Jr., and Steven L. Mayer filed a brief for Fifty California Counties as amici curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of California et al. by John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Timothy G. Laddish, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Julian O. Standen, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Duane Woodard of Colorado, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Mike Greeley of Montana, Robert M. Spire of Nebraska, Brian McKay of Nevada, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Dave Frohnmayer of Oregon, Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Roger A. Tellinghuisen of South Dakota, W. J. Michael Cody of Tennessee, Mary Sue Terry of Virginia, Kenneth 0. Eikenberry of Washington, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming; and for the State of Kansas et al. by Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, and Carol B. Bone-brake, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, Michael J. Bowers of Georgia, Jim Jones of Idaho, William L. Webster of Missouri, Hal Stratton of New Mexico, David L. Wilkinson of Utah, and Charles G. Brown of West Virginia. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue presented by this case is whether § 306 of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, 49 U. S. C. § 11503, permits review by federal courts of alleged overvaluation of railroad property by state taxation authorities. HH In 1976, after 15 years of intermittent and inconclusive legislative action, Congress passed the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act, Pub. L. 94-2Í0, 90 Stat. 31 (Act). The Act’s purpose, as stated in the congressional declaration of policy, was “to provide the means to rehabilitate and maintain the physical facilities, improve the operations and structure, and restore the financial stability of the railway system of the United States.” § 101(a). Among the means chosen by Congress to fulfill these objectives, particularly the goal of furthering railroad financial stability, was a prohibition on discriminatory state taxation of railroad property. After an extended period of congressional investigation, Congress concluded that “railroads are over-taxed by at least $50 million each year.” H. R. Rep. No. 94-725, p. 78 (1975). Congress’ solution to the problem of discriminatory state taxation of railroads was embodied in § 306 of the Act, currently codified at 49 U. S. C. § 11503. In broad terms, Congress declared in § 306(b) that assessment ratios or taxation rates imposed on railroad property which differ significantly from the ratios or rates imposed on other commercial and industrial property are prohibited as burdens on interstate commerce. Section 306(c) declared an exception from the provisions of the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U. S. C. §1341, allowing railroads to challenge discriminatory taxation in federal district courts. States were given a 3-year grace period, until February 1979, to bring their property taxation systems into compliance with the statutory requirements. §306(2)(b), 90 Stat. 54; see Act of Oct. 17, 1978, Pub. L. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1466. The present action was filed by petitioner Burlington Northern Railroad in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on March 3, 1983. The complaint alleged that respondents, the Oklahoma Tax Commission and State Board of Equalization and their members, had discriminated against petitioner in the assessment of state property taxes for the 1982 tax year. In particular, petitioner alleged that respondents had overvalued petitioner’s property. The determination of railroad property tax liability in Oklahoma proceeds in several discrete stages. The first step is to ascertain the amount of property subject to tax. The Oklahoma Tax Commission follows the procedure of determining the value of the entire railroad, and then allocating a portion of that total system value to Oklahoma. The value of the railroad is determined by calculating a weighted average of original cost of assets and capitalized net operating income. Response to Complaint ¶ 14, App. 16. A similar procedure for determining the value of railroad property subject to tax by valuing the total system and apportioning that value to the taxing jurisdiction is employed in almost all jurisdictions which apply property taxes to railroads. See J. Runke & A. Finder, State Taxation of Railroads and Tax Relief Programs 23-32 (1977). In allocating a proportion of petitioner’s property to Oklahoma, the Tax Commission took the position in 1982 that 3.53% of petitioner’s property was taxable in the State, an allocation which petitioner does not dispute. Brief for Petitioner 9, n. 14. Oklahoma does not assess property at full market value for tax purposes. See Okla. Const., Art. 10, § 8 (assessment not to exceed 35% of market value). Therefore, the second step in the determination of tax liability is the application to the true market valuation of the assessment ratio. In 1982, the State assessed the taxable value of petitioner’s property at 10.87% of true market value. Petitioner does not dispute that this was the same assessment ratio employed with respect to all other commercial and industrial property in the State. Brief for Petitioner 9, n. 14. Petitioner’s claim of discriminatory taxation was thus based solely upon the State’s original determination of the market value of petitioner’s entire railroad system. The 1982 assessment by the State determined that the “true” market value of the railroad was approximately $3.6 billion. Response to Complaint ¶ 28, App. 22. Petitioner contended that fair application of respondents’ own valuation methodology would have resulted in a determination that the “true” market value of the railroad was approximately $1.5 billion. Complaint ¶ 34, App. to Pet for Cert. 31a. The District Court, following the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Lennen, 715 F. 2d 494 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U. S. 1230 (1984), held that § 11503 does not permit the exercise of federal jurisdiction to review claims of state taxation based upon alleged overvaluation of railroad property, unless the railroad “‘can make a strong showing of purposeful overvaluation with discriminatory intent.’” CIV 83-419-R (WD Okla. Jan. 8, 1985), App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a (quoting Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Lennen, supra, at 498). The District Court found that no such showing had been made, and dismissed “for lack of subject matter jurisdiction” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. No. 85-1657 (CA10 May 2, 1986). We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. 913 (1986), to resolve a conflict between the position of the Tenth Circuit and that of the Eighth Circuit in Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Bair, 766 F. 2d 1222 (1985). We now reverse. H-i ► — I There is some difference of opinion between respondents and the Court of Appeals as to the proper interpretation of §11503. The Court of Appeals, following its decision in Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Lennen, supra, held that district courts may not review claims of discriminatory taxation based upon overvaluation of railroad property unless the plaintiff first makes a preliminary showing of intentional discrimination. Respondents suggest that § 11503 never permits district court review of such claims. Brief for Respondents State Board of Equalization et al. 9; Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, 52-53. Our reading of the statute convinces us that both positions are untenable. The parties have canvassed at length the 15-year legislative history of the Act, and of the protection against discriminatory state taxation which became § 11503. We find the results of that investigation inconclusive and irrelevant. Legislative history can be a legitimate guide to a statutory purpose obscured by ambiguity, but “[i]n the absence of a ‘clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary/ the language of the statute itself ‘must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.’” United States v. James, 478 U. S. 597, 606 (1986) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 108 (1980)). Unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise, “[w]hen we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.” Rubin v. United States, 449 U. S. 424, 430 (1981). In the present case, the language of §11503 plainly declares the congressional purpose. Subsection (b)(1) forbids any State to “assess rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value . . . than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial and industrial property.” It is clear from this language that in order to compare the actual assessment ratios, it is necessary to determine what the “true market values” are. Respondents take the position that the first occurrence of the phrase “true market value” in § 11503(b)(1) should be read as “state determined market value,” for they contend in essence that whatever the State determines the value of the railroad to be, the resulting assessment ratio is not subject to further judicial scrutiny in the federal courts. The obstacle to this position is the language of § 11503(c), which states that “[t]he burden of proof in determining assessed value and true market value is governed by State law.” It would be inconsistent to allocate the burden of proof as to an issue which could not be litigated in federal court in the first place. Respondents attempt to meet this argument by pointing to the remainder of subsection (c), which specifically instructs the district courts as to methods for proving the assessment ratio for other commercial and industrial property, either through statistical sampling of the assessed value and sale value of individual properties, or through the determination of assessed value and true market value of “all other commercial and industrial property” “in the assessment jurisdiction.” § 11503(c)(1). Respondents contend that these instructions as to the determination of assessment ratios for other commercial and industrial property show that it is the burden of proof on these issues only which is allocated in subsection (c), and that it is only these issues which may be the subject of proof before the district court. In fact, however, the language of subsection (c) leads to the opposite conclusion. The general statement that assessed value and true market value are subjects for judicial inquiry, and are to be proved under burdens allocated by state law, is followed by a specific instruction as to how two of those issues are to be addressed. These are not, by their placement or meaning, words of limitation on the preceding general statement, but rather a particular grant of authority to district courts to use statistical methods for establishing the assessed and market values of “other commercial and industrial property” where such methods will result in proof “to the satisfaction of the district court.” Congress has said that the value of one kind of property may, in the court’s discretion, be proved by particular means; this raises no implication whatever that the value of another kind of property may not be proved at all. Respondents’ position depends upon the addition of words to a statutory provision which is complete as it stands. Adoption of their view would require amendment rather than construction of the statute, and it must be rejected here. The position taken by the Court of Appeals is also unsatisfactory. The court found that some disputes as to state valuation of railroad property may be the subject of a federal claim under § 11503, but only where the plaintiff alleges, and makes a preliminary showing, that the overvaluation results from discriminatory intent. App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a; Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Lennen, 715 F. 2d, at 498. The statute provides no support for this interpretation. Subsection (b) speaks only in terms of “acts” which “unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate commerce”; nowhere does it refer to the intent of the actor. The Court of Appeals does not dispute that the other acts prohibited by the plain language of § 11503(b), such as the use of facially discriminatory disparities in assessment ratio or the systematic undervaluation of other commercial and industrial property, are not subject to an intent requirement. It does not explain how the same sentence can be interpreted in two such strikingly different senses depending upon whether the railroad’s challenge is to the State’s undervaluation of other commercial and industrial property or to the State’s overvaluation of railroad property. Further support for our conclusion is found in § 11503(c), which provides that “[rjelief may be granted under this subsection only if the ratio of assessed value to true market value of rail transportation property exceeds by at least 5 percent” the assessment ratio for other commercial and industrial property. Such a provision makes sense as a prohibition on the litigation of de minimis disparate-impact claims in the federal courts, but it is hard to reconcile with the proposition that Congress intended to reach only claims of intentional discrimination by overvaluation. If intentional discrimination is the evil to be remedied, did Congress propose to permit the States to discriminate at will, so long as they unfairly retained only one nickel out of every dollar? The Court of Appeals’ suggested interpolation of an intent requirement draws no support from the statute’s language and is inconsistent with its expressed purpose. I — I f-H f-H Respondents contend that injunctive relief against state taxation offends the principles of comity. Brief for Respondents State Board of Equalization et al. 41-42. The Court of Appeals found that its restrictions on valuation actions under § 11503 are necessary in order to avoid “an inevitable clog of federal dockets” and “unreasonable delay of the state tax collection process.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a. These are policy considerations which may have weighed heavily with legislators who considered the Act and its predecessors. It should go without saying that we are not free to reconsider them now. The decision of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. The language of the original § 306, first codified at 49 U. S. C. § 26c (1976 ed.), was slightly altered when in 1978 the provision was recodified at 49 U. S. C. § 11503. See Act of Oct. 17, 1978, Pub. L. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337 et seq. These changes “may not be construed as making a substantive change in the laws replaced.” § 3(a), 92 Stat. 1466. For convenience, further references to the statute are to the text of 49 U. S. C. § 11503. Title 49 U. S. C. § 11503(b) provides in relevant part: “The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate commerce, and a State, subdivision of a State, or authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any of them: “(1) assess rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation property than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial and industrial property. “(2) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be made under clause (1) of this subsection. ...” Title 49 U. S. C. § 11503(c) provides: “Notwithstanding section 1341 of title 28 and without regard to the amount in controversy or citizenship of the parties, a district court of the United States has jurisdiction, concurrent with other jurisdiction of courts of the United States and the States, to prevent a violation of subsection (b) of this section. Relief may be granted under this subsection only if the ratio of assessed value to true market value of rail transportation property exceeds by at least 5 percent, the ratio of assessed value to true market value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction. The burden of proof in determining assessed value and true market value is governed by State law. If the ratio of the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the assessment jurisdiction to the true market value of all other commercial and industrial property cannot be determined to the satisfaction of the district court through the random-sampling method known as a sales assessment ratio study (to be carried out under statistical principles applicable to such a study), the court shall find, as a violation of this section— “(1) an assessment of the rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation property than the assessed value of all other property subject to a property tax levy in the assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of all other commercial and industrial property; and “(2) the collection of an ad valorem property tax on the rail transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax ratio rate applicable to taxable property in the taxing district.” The Oklahoma Tax Commission submits each year a recommendation as to the assessment of railroad property to the State Board of Equalization, which makes the final assessment decision. Response to Complaint ¶14, App. 15-16. Petitioner has not challenged the valuation methodology employed by respondents in determining the value of petitioner’s railroad; petitioner’s sole challenge is to the application of that methodology, particularly the State’s evaluation of the cost of capital and the State’s refusal to make deductions for property which petitioner claims is obsolete. Tr. of Oral Arg. 16-16. This case therefore does not present the question whether a railroad may, in an action under § 11503, challenge in the district court the appropriateness of the accounting methods by which the State determined the railroad’s value, or is instead restricted to challenging the factual determinations to which the State’s preferred accounting methods were applied. Accordingly we express no view on that issue.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

REPUBLIC NATURAL GAS CO. v. OKLAHOMA et al. No. 134. Argued January 6, 1948. Decided May 3, 1948. Robert M. Rainey and John F. Eberhardt argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. Robert C. Foulston was also of counsel. Earl Pruet argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Mac Q. Williamson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Floyd Green. Mr. Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, arising from an order of the State Corporation Commission which concerned the correlative rights of owners of natural gas drawn from a common source. Since 1913, Oklahoma has regulated the extraction of natural gas, partly to prevent waste and partly to avoid excessive drainage as between producers sharing the same pool. The legislation provided that owners might take from a common source amounts of gas proportionate to the natural flow of their respective wells, but not more than 25% of that natural flow without the consent of the Corporation Commission; that any person taking gas away from a gas field, except for certain specified purposes, “shall take ratably from each owner of the gas in proportion to his interest in said gas”; and that such ratable taking was to be upon terms agreed upon by the various well owners, or, in the event of failure to agree, upon terms fixed by the Corporation Commission. The Hugoton Gas Field is one of the largest in the United States, covering a vast area in several States, including Oklahoma. It was discovered in 1924 or 1925, but the Oklahoma portion was not developed until 1937. Republic, a Delaware corporation, obtained permission to do business in Oklahoma in 1938, purchased gas leases in this field and drilled wells, removing the gas in its own pipelines. In 1944, the Peerless Oil and Gas Company completed a well in a portion of the gas field otherwise tapped only by Republic. It had no market for the gas obtained from this well, nor means of transporting such gas to any market. It offered to sell the gas to Republic, which refused it. Peerless then applied to the Corporation Commission for an order requiring Republic to take such gas from it “ratably” — that is, to take the same proportion of the natural flow of Peerless’ well as Republic took of the natural flow of its own wells. After a hearing, the Commission found that the production of natural gas in the Hugoton field was in excess of the market demand; that Republic had qualified to do business in Oklahoma with full knowledge of the existing legislation requiring the ratable taking of natural gas; and that Republic was taking more than its ratable share of gas from that portion of the field tapped both by its wells and that belonging to Peerless, thereby draining gas away from Peerless’ tract and, in effect, taking property belonging to Peerless. The Commission ordered Republic: “1. . . . to take gas ratably from applicant’s [Peerless’] well . . ., and to make necessary connection as soon as applicant lays a line connecting said well with respondent’s [Republic’s] line, and to continue to do so until the further order of this Commission ; provided that, applicant shall lay its line from its well to the lines of respondent at some point designated by the respondent, but in said Section 14 in which said well of Peerless Oil and Gas Company has been drilled; and said respondent is required to make said designation immediately and without unreasonable delay, and in event of failure of respondent so to do, respondent shall no longer be permitted to produce any of its wells located in the Hugoton Oklahoma Gas Field. “2. The terms and conditions of such taking of natural gas by Republic Natural Gas Company from said Peerless Oil and Gas Company’s well shall be determined and agreed upon by and between applicant and respondent; and in the event said parties are unable to agree, applicant and respondent are hereby granted the right to make further application to the Commission for an order fixing such terms and conditions; and the Commission retains jurisdiction hereof for said purpose.” On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Republic, having been given leave to enter the State on the basis of the legislation governing natural gas production, might not challenge its validity, and that neither the order nor the legislation on which it is based runs counter to asserted constitutional rights. 198 Okla. 350. The court interpreted the Commission’s order as giving Republic “a choice between taking the gas from Peerless and paying therefor direct, or marketing the gas and accounting to Peerless therefor, or to shut in its own production from the same common source of supply.” 198 Okla. at 356. Invoking both the Due Process and the Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, Republic appealed to this Court. This case raises thorny questions concerning the regulation of fugacious minerals, of moment both to States whose economy is especially involved and to the private enterprises which develop these natural resources. Cf. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U. S. 55; Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573, 311 U. S. 570. Before reaching these constitutional issues, we must determine whether or not we have jurisdiction to do so. Ever since 1789, Congress has granted this Court the power of review in State litigation only after “the highest court of a State in which a decision in a suit could be had” has rendered a “final judgment or decree.” § 237 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 344, rephrasing § 25 of the Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 85. Designed to avoid the evils of piecemeal review, this reflects a marked characteristic of the federal judicial system, unlike that of some of the States. This prerequisite for the exercise of the appellate powers of this Court is especially pertinent when a constitutional barrier is asserted against a State court’s decision .on matters peculiarly of local concern. Close observance of this limitation upon the Court is not regard for a strangling technicality. History bears ample testimony that it is an important factor in securing harmonious State-federal relations. No self-enforcing formula defining when a judgment is “final” can be devised. Tests have been indicated which are helpful in giving direction and emphasis to decision from case to case. Thus, the requirement of finality has not been met merely because the major issues in a case have been decided and only a few loose ends remain to be tied up — for example, where liability has been determined and all that needs to be adjudicated is the amount of damages. Bruce v. Tobin, 245 U. S. 18; Martinez v. International Banking Corp., 220 U. S. 214, 223; Mississippi Central R. Co. v. Smith, 295 U. S. 718. On the other hand, if nothing more than a ministerial act remains to be done, such as the entry of a judgment upon a mandate, the decree is regarded as concluding the case and is immediately reviewable. Board of Commissioners v. Lucas, 93 U. S. 108; Mower v. Fletcher, 114 U. S. 127. There have been instances where the Court has entertained an appeal of an order that otherwise might be deemed interlocutory, because the controversy had proceeded to a point where a losing party would be irreparably injured if review were unavailing. Cf. Clark v. Williard, 294 U. S. 211; Gumbel v. Pitkin, 113 U. S. 545; and compare Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201, 204, with Barnard v. Gibson, 7 How. 650, 657. For related reasons, an order decreeing immediate transfer of possession of physical property is final for purposes of review even though an accounting for profits is to follow. In such cases the accounting is deemed a severed controversy and not part of the main case. Forgay v. Conrad, supra; Carondelet Canal Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U. S. 362; Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120. But a decision that a taking by eminent domain is for a public use, where the amount of compensation has not been determined, is not deemed final, certainly where the property will not change hands until after the award of compensation. Grays Harbor Logging Co. v. Coats-Fordney Co., 243 U. S. 251; cf. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 147 U. S. 337; Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229. One thing is clear. The considerations that determine finality are not abstractions but have reference to very real interests — not merely those of the immediate parties but, more particularly, those that pertain to the smooth functioning of our judicial system. On which side of the line, however faint and faltering at times, dividing judgments that were deemed “final” from those found not to be so, does the judgment before us fall? The order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, as affirmed below, terminates some but not all issues in this proceeding. Republic is required to take ratably from Peerless, but it may do so in any one of three ways. If, as is most probable, Republic would choose not to close down its own wells, under the Commission’s order it must allow Peerless to connect its well to Republic’s pipeline. But there has been left open for later determination, in event of failure to reach agreement, the terms upon which Republic must take the gas, the rates which it must pay on purchase, or may charge if it sells as agent of Peerless. Does either its alternative character, or the fact that it leaves matters still open for determination, so qualify the order as to make it short of “final” for present review? We turn first to the latter point. Certainly what remains to be done cannot be characterized as merely “ministerial.” Whether or not the amount of gas to be taken by Republic from Peerless can be ascertained through application of a formula, the determination of the price to be paid for the gas if purchased, or the fees to be paid to Republic for marketing it if sold on behalf of Peerless, clearly requires the exercise of judgment. Nor is there any immediate threat of irreparable damage to Republic, rendering postponed review so illusory as to make the decree “final” now or never. The Commission’s order requires Republic to designate a point on its pipeline at which Peerless might attach a line, and after Peerless had done so to connect it immediately. But it does not appear that the order requires Republic to commence taking Peerless’ gas before the terms of taking have either been agreed upon or ordered by the Commission. Nor does it appear that Republic would have to bear the expense of connecting the pipeline, nor that such expense would be substantial. Indeed, the incurring of some loss, before a process preliminary to review here is exhausted, is not in itself sufficient to authorize our intervention. Cf. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 50-52. But even i>f the Commission’s order were construed to require Republic to take and dispose of Peerless’ gas immediately — and we are not so advised by the State court — there is no ground for assuming that any loss that Republic might incur could not be recovered should the completed direction of the Oklahoma Commission, on affirmance by that State’s Supreme Court, ultimately be found to be unconstitutional. Merely because a party to a litigation may be temporarily out of pocket, is not sufficient to warrant immediate review of an incomplete State judgment. Appellant, of course, has the burden of affirmatively establishing this Court’s jurisdiction. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U. S. 649, 651. The policy against premature constitutional adjudications demands that any doubts in maintaining this burden be resolved against jurisdiction. See citation of cases in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandéis in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 341, 345, 348. The condemnation precedents attract this case more persuasively than do the accounting cases. Where it is claimed that a decree transferring property overrides an asserted federal right, as in Forgay v. Conrad, supra, and Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, supra, no disposition of the subsequent accounting proceeding can possibly make up for the defeated party’s loss, since the party who has lost the property must also pay to his opponent what the accounting decrees. Hence his desire to appeal the issue of the right to the property will almost certainly persist. On the other hand, in an eminent domain case, as in a case like this, the fate of the whole litigation may well be affected by the fate of the unresolved contingencies of the litigation. An adequate award in an eminent domain case or a profitable rate in the case before us might well satisfy the losing party to acquiesce in the disposition of the earlier issue. It is of course not our province to discourage appeals. But for the soundest of reasons we ought not to pass on constitutional issues before they have reached a definitive stop. Another similarity between this case and the condemnation cases calls for abstention until what is organically one litigation has been concluded in the State. It is that the matters left open may generate additional federal questions. This brings into vivid relevance the policy against fragmentary review. In accounting cases, that which still remains to be litigated can scarcely give rise to new federal questions. The policy against fragmentary review has therefore little bearing. But contests over valuation in eminent domain cases, as price-fixing in this type of case, are inherently provocative of constitutional claims. This potentiality of additional federal questions arising out of the same controversy has led this Court to find want of the necessary finality of adjudicated constitutional issues in condemnation decrees before valuation has been made. Like considerations are relevant here. In short, the guiding considerations for determining whether the decree of the court below possesses requisite finality lead to the conclusion that this case must await its culmination in the judicial process of the State before we can assume jurisdiction. “Only one branch of the case has been finally disposed of below, therefore none of it is ripe for review by this court.” Collins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364, 371. This makes it unnecessary to consider whether the mere fact that the decree gave alternative commands precluded it from being final. Cf. Paducah v. East Tennessee Tel. Co., 229 U. S. 476; Jones’s Adm’r v. Craig, 127 U. S. 213; Note, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 302, 305-306. Since the judgment now appealed from lacks the necessary finality, we cannot consider the merits. All of Republic’s constitutional objections are of course saved. Appeal dismissed. L. 1913, e. 198, §§ 1-3 (Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 52, §§ 231-33): “Section 1. All natural gas under the surface of any land in this state is hereby declared to be and is the property of the owners, or gas lessees, of the surface under which gas is located in its original state. “Section 2. Any owner, or oil and gas lessee, of the surface, having the right to drill for gas shall have the right to sink a well to the natural gas underneath the same and to take gas therefrom until the gas under such surface is exhausted. In case other parties, having the right to drill into the common reservoir of gas, drill a well or wells into the same, then the amount of gas each owner may take therefrom shall be proportionate to the natural flow of his well or wells to the natural flow of the well or wells of such other owners of the same common source of supply of gas, such natural flow to be determined by any standard measurement at the beginning of each calendar month; provided, that not more than twenty-five per cent of the natural flow of any well shall be taken, unless for good cause shown, and upon notice and hearing the Corporation Commission may, by proper order, permit the taking of a greater amount. The drilling of a gas well or wells by any owner or lessee of the surface shall be regarded as reducing to possession his share of such gas as is shown by his well. “Section 3. Any person, firm or corporation, taking gas from a gas field, except for purposes of developing a gas or oil field, and operating oil wells, and for the purpose of his own domestic use, shall take ratably from each owner of the gas in proportion to his interest in said gas, upon such terms as may be agreed upon between said owners and the party taking such, or in case they cannot agree at such a price and upon such terms as may be fixed by the Corporation Commission after notice and hearing; provided, that each owner shall be required to deliver his gas to a common point of delivery on or adjacent to the surface overlying such gas.” See also L. 1915, c. 197, §§ 4, 5 (Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 52, §§ 239, 240): “Section 4. That whenever the full production from any common source of supply of natural gas in this state is in excess of the market demands, then any person, firm or corporation, having the right to drill into and produce gas from any such common source of supply, may take therefrom only such proportion of the natural gas that may be marketed without waste, as the natural flow of the well or wells owned or controlled by any such person, firm or corporation bears to the total natural flow' of such common source of supply having due regard to the acreage drained by each well, so as to prevent any such person, firm or corporation securing any unfair proportion of the gas therefrom; provided, that the Corporation Commission may by proper order, permit the taking of a greater amount whenever it shall deem such taking reasonable or equitable. The said commission is authorized and directed to prescribe rules and regulations for the determination of the natural flow of any such well or wells, and to regulate the taking of natural gas from any or all such common sources of supply within the state, so as to prevent waste, protect the interests of the public, and of all those having a right to produce therefrom, and to prevent unreasonable discrimination in favor of any one such common source of supply as against another. “Section 5. That every person, firm or corporation, now or hereafter engaged in the business of purchasing and selling natural gas in this state, shall be a common purchaser thereof, and shall purchase all of the natural gas which may be offered for sale, and which may reasonably be reached by its trunk lines, or gathering lines without discrimination in favor of one producer as against another, or in favor of any one source of supply as against another save as authorized by the Corporation Commission after due notice and hearing; but if any such person, firm or corporation, shall be unable to purchase all the gas so offered, then it shall purchase natural gas from each producer ratably. It shall be unlawful for any such common purchaser to discriminate between like grades and pressures of natural gas, or in favor of its own production, or of production in which it may be directly or indirectly interested, either in whole or in part, but for the purpose of prorating the natural gas to be marketed, such production shall be treated in like manner as that of any other producer or person, and shall be taken only in the ratable proportion that such production bears to the total production available for marketing. The Corporation Commission shall have authority to make regulations for the delivery, metering and equitable purchasing and taking of all such gas and shall have authority to relieve any such common purchaser, after due notice and hearing, from the duty of purchasing gas of an inferior quality or grade.” In the Catlin case our decision was based on the general rule that condemnation orders prior to determination of just compensation are not appealable. The wartime statutes there involved were urged by the claimants as a reason for not applying the general rule. We rejected this contention. This case is unlike those in which a rate had been fixed, subject to a continuing jurisdiction to modify it later. Cf. Market Street R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 324 U. S. 548; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern R. Co. v. Southern Express Co., 108 U. S. 24. Here, no rates have been set, and their future establishment has been left open.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

STANDARD PRESSED STEEL CO. v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF WASHINGTON No. 73-1697. Argued December 16, 1974 Decided January 22, 1975 Douglas, J., wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. Kenneth L. Cornell argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Harold S. Fardal. Slade Gorton, Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Timothy R. Malone, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and William D. Dexter, Assistant Attorney General. Opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Douglas, announced by Mr. Chief Justice Burger. Appellant, a manufacturer of industrial and aerospace fasteners (nuts and bolts generally), has its home office in Pennsylvania, one manufacturing plant there and another in California. Its principal customer in the State of Washington is the Boeing Company, in Seattle. In the years relevant here it had one employee, one Martinson, in Washington who was paid a salary and who operated out of his home near Seattle. He was an engineer whose primary duty was to consult with Boeing regarding its anticipated needs and requirements for aerospace fasteners and to follow up any difficulties in the use of appellant’s product after delivery. Martinson was assisted by a group of engineers of appellant who visited Boeing about three days every six weeks, their meetings being arranged by Martinson. Martinson did not take orders from Boeing; they were sent directly to appellant. Orders accepted would be filled and shipment made by common carrier to Boeing direct, all payments being made directly to appellant. Martinson had no office except in his home; he had no secretary; but appellant maintained an answering service in the Seattle area which received calls for Martinson, bills for that service being sent direct to appellant. The State Board of Tax Appeals found that the activities of Martinson were necessary to appellant in making it aware of which products Boeing might use, in obtaining the engineering design of those products, in securing the testing of sample products to qualify them for sale to Boeing, in resolving problems of their use after receipt by Boeing, in obtaining and retaining good will and rapport with Boeing personnel, and in keeping the invoicing personnel of appellant up to date on Boeing’s lists of purchasing specialists or control buyers. The Board sustained the assessment of the Washington business and occupation tax, Wash. Rev. Code § 82.04.270 (1972), levied on the unapportioned gross receipts of appellant resulting from its sale of fasteners to Boeing. The Superior Court affirmed the Board, and the Court of Appeals in turn affirmed, 10 Wash. App. 45, 516 P. 2d 1043 (1973). The Supreme Court denied review. The constitutionality, as applied, of the Washington statute being challenged, we noted probable jurisdiction, 417 U. S. 966 (1974). Appellant argues that imposition of the tax violates due process because the in-state activities were so thin and inconsequential as to make the tax on activities occurring beyond the borders of the State one which has no reasonable relation to the protection and benefits conferred by the taxing State, Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435 (1940). In other words the question is “whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return,” id., at 444. We think the question in the context of the present case verges on the frivolous. For appellant’s employee, Martinson, with a full-time job within the State, made possible the realization and continuance of valuable contractual relations between appellant and Boeing. The case is argued on the interstate commerce aspect as if Washington were taxing the privilege of doing an interstate business with only orders being sent from within the State and filled outside the State, McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327 (1944). Much reliance is placed on Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U. S. 534 (1951), where a Massachusetts corporation qualified to do business in Illinois and maintained an office there from which it made local sales at retail. It was accordingly subjected to the Illinois gross receipts tax on retailers. There were, however, orders sent by Illinois buyers directly to Massachusetts, filled there, and shipped directly to the customer. As to these a divided Court held that the income from those sales was not taxable by Illinois by reason of the Commerce Clause. The disagreement in the Court was not over the governing principle; it concerned the burden of showing a nexus between the local office and interstate sales — whether a nexus could be assumed and whether the taxpayer had carried the burden of establishing its immunity. General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U. S. 436 (1964), is almost precisely in point so far as the present controversy goes. While the zone manager for sales of the Chevrolet, Pontiac, and Oldsmobile divisions was in Portland, Ore., district managers lived and operated within Washington. Each operated from his home, having no separate office. Each had from 12 to 30 dealers under supervision. He called on each of these dealers, kept tabs on the sales forces, and advised as to promotional and training plans. He also advised on used car inventory control. He worked out with the dealer estimated needs over a 30-, 60-, and 90-day projection of orders. General Motors also had in Washington service representatives who called on dealers regularly, assisted in any troubles experienced, and checked the adequacy of the service department’s inventory. They conducted service clinics, teaching dealers and employees efficient service techniques. We held that these activities served General Motors as effectively when administered from “homes” as from “offices” and that those services were substantial “with relation to the establishment and maintenance of sales, upon which the tax was measured,” id., at 447. We noted in General Motors that a vice in a tax on gross' receipts of a corporation doing an interstate business is the risk of multiple taxation; but that the burden is on the taxpayer to demonstrate it, id., at 449. The corporation made no such showing there. Nor is any effort made to establish it here. This very tax was involved in Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434 (1939). The taxpayer was a Washington corporation, doing business there and shipping fruit from Washington to places of sale in the various States and in foreign countries. The Court held the tax, as applied, unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. “Here the tax, measured by the entire volume of the interstate commerce in which appellant participates, is not apportioned to its activities within the state. If Washington is free to exact such a tax, other states to which the commerce extends may, with equal right, lay a tax similarly measured for the privilege of conducting within their respective territorial limits the activities there which contribute to the service. The present tax, though nominally local, thus in its practical operation discriminates against interstate commerce, since it imposes upon it, merely because interstate commerce is being done, the risk of a multiple burden to which local commerce is not exposed.” Id., at 439. In the instant case, as in Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing District, 145 U. S. 1 (1892), the tax is on the gross receipts from sales made to a local consumer, which may have some impact on commerce. Yet as we said in Gwin, White & Prince, supra, at 440, in describing the tax in Ficklen, it is “apportioned exactly to the activities taxed,” all of which are intrastate. Affirmed. Appellant paid the taxes under protest, and it is stipulated that should appellant prevail it would be entitled to a refund of $33,444.91. In that case the taxpayers did business as brokers in Tennessee. They solicited local customers and sent their orders to out-of-state vendors who shipped directly to the purchaser. Tennessee levied a tax on their gross commissions. The Court, in distinguishing the “drummer” cases illustrated by Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489 (1887), stated that in Ficklen Tennessee did not tax more than its own internal commerce.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

YOUAKIM et al. v. MILLER, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, et al. No. 73-6935. Argued December 8, 1975 Decided March 31, 1976 Patrick A. Keenan argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants. Paul J. Bargiel, Assistant Attorney General of Illinois, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was William J. Scott, Attorney General. Per Curiam. As part of the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., the State of Illinois provides federally subsidized foster care (AFDC-FC) payments of $105 per month for a dependent child placed with unrelated foster parents. Under Illinois' administration of the program no foster care payments are made to foster parents who are related to the foster child. Related foster parents are eligible, however, to receive payments under the State’s regular AFDC program for the support of dependent children in the amount of $63 per month. These payments are made without regard to the financial circumstances of the family caring for the child. In addition, as an exception to the State’s regular policy, related foster parents, upon an adequate showing of financial need, may receive supplemental payments for child care which bring the payments in connection with the related foster child to approximately $105 per month. Appellants are Linda Youakim and her husband, Marcel, and Linda’s four minor brothers and sisters, Timothy, Mary Lou, Larry, and Sherry Robertson. Since 1972, the Youakims have been foster parents of Timothy and Mary Lou. Larry and Sherry have been living in separate, unrelated foster care facilities since 1969. Because Linda is related to Timothy and Mary Lou, the Youakims were ineligible for AFDC-FC foster care payments. They did apply for and receive the smaller AFDC payments for both children. Alleging injury resulting from financial inability to provide adequate care for Timothy and Mary Lou and to bring Larry and Sherry into their foster family, appellants filed suit in the District Court against the state officials on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated. Their complaint described the suit as an action to enjoin enforcement of the foster care payment scheme on the ground that it denied related foster families the equal protection of the laws and likewise discriminated against wards of the State and relatives who could not provide an adequate foster home without full foster care payments. They asked that a three-judge District Court convene and enjoin the enforcement of the Illinois statutes and regulations. The three-judge court “approved” the Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (b)(2) class, granted appellees' motion for summary judgment, and ultimately held that the “Illinois scheme does not deny plaintiffs equal protection of the laws.” 374 F. Supp. 1204, 1210 (ND Ill. 1974). The jurisdictional statement filed here expressly challenged the Illinois scheme both on equal protection grounds and on the ground of conflict with the Social Security Act. We noted probable jurisdiction. 420 U. S. 970 (1975). Although the jurisdictional statement as to which we noted probable jurisdiction presented the question of conflict between the Illinois law and the Social Security Act, it appears that the Supremacy Clause claim was not presented to the District Court as an independent ground for invalidating the state law. The complaint described the suit as one seeking an injunction on equal protection grounds. The sole ground for relief expressly claimed in each of the three causes of action which the complaint purported to allege, as well as in the prayer for relief, was that the Illinois program denied appellants equal protection of the laws. It does not appear from the record in the District Court that as the case developed appellants rested on the Supremacy Clause as a separate basis for their injunction claim. Nor did the District Court address the relationship between state and federal law independently of the equal protection issue. Ordinarily, this Court does not decide questions not raised or resolved in the lower court. California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553, 557 n. 2 (1957); Lawn v. United States, 355 U. S. 339, 362-363, n. 16 (1958). But as Pollard v. United States, 352 U. S. 354, 359 (1957), and Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395, 412 (1947), for example, demonstrate, the rule is not inflexible. Cf. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U. S. 454, 457 (1960). Its usual formulation is: “It is only in exceptional cases coming here from the federal courts that questions not pressed or passed upon below are reviewed.” Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200 (1927). Here, as we shall describe, the circumstances justify our dealing with the issue of conflict between state and federal statutes at least to the extent of vacating the judgment below and remanding the case for consideration of the claim that the Illinois foster care program is in conflict with the Social Security Act. Initially, it should be noted that the statutory issue is not foreign to the subject matter of the complaint. Attacks on state welfare statutes often combine Equal Protection Clause and Supremacy Clause issues. The latter question could surely have been pursued under the complaint filed in this case, which, as part of the “facts” incorporated by reference in each of the three causes of action, alleged that the Illinois program was in conflict with the policy of the United States expressed in sub-chapter IV of the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., specifically with the federal policy of encouraging the care of children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives wherever possible. It is also apparent that the District Court was of the view that under Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971), “serious equal protection problems” might arise if “a state attempts to rely on the concept of fiscal integrity to limit beyond statutory standards the class eligible to receive federally subsidized payments.” 374 F. Supp., at 1210. For this reason, the District Court compared federal and state law, and concluded: “Far from being inconsistent with the federal scheme, the Illinois scheme in general seems to parallel it. . . . Thus the federal statute makes the same classification as the Illinois statute.” Ibid. Had appellants relied on the Supremacy Clause issue as a separate ground for decision it would appear that the claim would have been rejected by the District Court. In light of these circumstances, the case is at most only marginally subject to the rule that this Court will not consider issues “not pressed or passed upon” in the court below. Beyond these considerations, on October 25, 1974, after the filing of the jurisdictional statement but before we noted probable jurisdiction, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued Program Instruction APA-PI-75-9 stating that under the controlling federal law, “[w]hen a child has been removed from his home by judicial determination and is placed in foster care under the various conditions specified . .., the foster care rate of payment prevails regardless of whether or not the foster home is operated by a relative.” Also, in response to appellants' jurisdictional statement, the Solicitor General filed a statement in this Court urging that the Illinois foster care program was inconsistent with the Social Security Act insofar as it provided higher payments to unrelated foster parents than to those who were related. Neither the appellants nor the District Court had the benefit of either of these developments when the case was in the lower court. The interpretation of a statute by an agency charged with its enforcement is a substantial factor to be considered in construing the statute, New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U. S. 405, 421 (1973); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Comm., 412 U. S. 94, 121 (1973); Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617, 626-627 (1971); and-appellants now wish to press the issue of conflict between state and federal law. We think that it is appropriate to afford them the opportunity to do so, but that the claim should be aired first in the District Court. Vacating the judgment and remanding the case for this purpose will require the District Court first to decide the statutory issue, Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528 (1974), and if appellants prevail on that question, it will be unnecessary for either the District Court or this Court to reach the equal protection issue at all. A remand is thus consistent with our usual practice of avoiding decisions on constitutional matters if a case may be resolved on other grounds. The action we take here is similar to the order the Court entered in Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U. S. 670 (1967). There, rather than deciding the constitutionality of an eviction from a public housing project, the Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of a, supervening administrative directive which was issued by federal authorities and which it was thought might provide a nonconstitutional basis for decision. Cf. Richardson v. Wright, 405 U. S. 208, 209 (1972). The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered. Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. The appellee state officials have met both of appellants’ claims on the merits and have not sought to restrict our review to the equal protection issue. From papers lodged with the Court, it appears, and appellants do not dispute, that since September 1, 1974, the Youakims have been receiving need-based payments supplementing the AFDC payments for Timothy and Mary Lou. They now receive monthly payments totaling $105, the same amount they would receive under the AFDC-FC program. Their receipt of these payments does not moot the case. The complaint alleged that ineligibility for regular foster care payments had precluded the Youakims “from even considering accepting for foster care the [two] other family members” who are living with nonrelatives in other foster care facilities. App. 12. Were it not for the Illinois program, they allege, the Youakims could seek to bring Larry and Sherry into their foster home and would receive the same monthly $105 AFDC-FC payments per child received as a matter of course by the foster care facilities now caring for Larry and Sherry without any showing of need and without applying for need-based funds supplementing the $63 AFDC payments. Whatever its strength, the Youakims’ claim that it is unlawful to require them to demonstrate need and to rely on an exception to policy in order to receive the same child care payments is not mooted by current receipt of larger payments for Timothy and Mary Lou who are living in the Youakim home. Because we conclude that the case is not moot as to the Youakims, we need not decide whether the District Court properly identified the Rule 23 (b) (2) class, compare Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393 (1975), with Indianapolis School Comm’rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), so that the class action might be maintained notwithstanding mootness as to the named plaintiffs, or whether appellant Linda Youakim properly sued as “next friend” of her four brothers and sisters, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 17 (c), so that their constitutional interests could be adjudicated by the court.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?

OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION v. TEXAS COMPANY. NO. 40. Argued November 19, 1948. Decided March 7, 1949. R. F. Barry argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Joe M. Whitaker. Mac Q. Williamson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Fred Hansen, Assistant Attorney General, were also of counsel. B. W.'Griffith argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 40. Robert W. Richards argued the cause for respondent in No. 41. With him on the brief was Walace Hawkins. Hayes McCoy and R. O. Mason filed a brief in No. 40, as amici curiae, urging affirmance. Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Caudle, Arnold Raum and Hilbert P. Zarky filed a brief in Nos. 40 and 41 on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. Mr. Justice Rutledge delivered the opinion of the Court. The principal question is whether a lessee of mineral rights in allotted and restricted Indian lands is immunized by the Constitution against payment of nondiscriminatory state gross production taxes and state excise taxes on petroleum produced from such lands. In effect the issue is whether this Court’s previous decisions in Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co., 247 U. S. 503; Large Oil Co. v. Howard, 248 U. S. 549; and Oklahoma v. Barnsdall Refineries, 296 U. S. 521, invalidating such taxes as applied to like lessees, have been so undermined by later decisions, in particular Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376, that they should now be overruled. With certain exceptions, the lands from which was extracted the petroleum sought to be taxed are held in trust by the United States, pursuant to allotments made under the General Allotment Act, for various members of the Pottawatomie, Apache, Comanche, and Otoe and Missouria Tribes. All the lands are located within the State of Oklahoma and at all material times they were restricted against alienation by the Indian cestui owners without the consent of the Secretary of the Interior. He approved each of the leases now in question. The respondents Texas Company (No. 40) and Magnolia Petroleum Company (No. 41) acquired their leases before Oklahoma levied the assessments now in issue, either as original lessees or by assignment from non-Indians who were such lessees. The companies thus became owners of all right, title and interest in their respective leases, subject only to the one-eighth royalty interest reserved to the Indian lessors, and were such owners at the times of the respective assessments. It may be taken that they have operated the leases in conformity with the applicable regulations of the Department of the Interior and of the State of Oklahoma, except for the payment of the state taxes in question. The Oklahoma gross production tax requires payment of five per cent of the gross value of production, including royalty interests. It is imposed on every person engaged in the production in Oklahoma of petroleum, crude oil or other mineral oil, and natural gas and casinghead gas. The tax is exacted in lieu of all taxes by the state and its political subdivisions on property rights in minerals and mineral rights, producing leases, machinery used in connection with any oil or gas well, the oil and gas during the tax year in which it is produced, and any investment in any leases, minerals, or other property. The statute authorizes the state board of equalization to raise or lower the rate of tax to equate the amount payable with the amount which would be payable if the general ad valorem property tax were assessed against the property of the producers subject to taxation. The board’s rate changes are subject to review by the state supreme court. In consequence of these provisions, the tax has been construed consistently by the state courts to be a tax on the lessee’s property, not an occupation or excise tax. The petroleum excise tax requires payment of one mill, formerly one-eighth of one cent, per barrel on every barrel of petroleum produced in Oklahoma. The statute was enacted first in 1933 to defray the expenses of administering the state’s newly adopted proration law and has been reenacted at each subsequent session of the legislature. The tax, unlike the gross production tax, is construed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court as an excise tax on the production of oil. Barnsdall Refineries v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 171 Okla. 145, affirmed, 296 U. S. 521. In No. 40 the Oklahoma Tax Commission, petitioner here, assessed both gross production and petroleum excise taxes against the Texas Company for production, less royalties to the Indian lessors, during September, October and November, 1942. In No. 41 the commission likewise assessed both taxes, less royalties, on the Magnolia Company’s production for various periods between June 1, 1942, and March 1, 1946. The orders were entered after the cases were consolidated for hearing before the commission and were thus heard by it. In No. 40 the Texas Company paid the taxes under protest and brought suit to recover them in an Oklahoma trial court. After hearing, that court sustained the commission’s demurrer to the company’s amended petition and ordered it dismissed. Appeal was duly taken to the state supreme court. In No. 41, following a different statutory procedure, the Magnolia Company appealed from the assessments against it directly to that court. In both cases the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, with one judge dissenting, held the assessments invalid. The decisions rested flatly on the ground that the lessee was an instrumentality of the Federal Government and as such, under prior and controlling decisions of this Court, particularly in the Large Oil, Gipsy Oil, and Barnsdall Refineries cases, supra, not subject to the taxes in question. In the Texas Company case the court expressly distinguished Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., supra, on the ground that the decision in that case related to income taxes assessed against the lessee there situated as were the lessees here. The opinion, indicating the writer’s personal view that reconsideration of the earlier decisions well might be sought, nevertheless stated: “But it is thought beyond the power of this court to now engage in such reconsideration, in view of the cited decisions of the higher authority which thus far wholly sustain the claim of [the Texas Company] to immunity from the tax here involved. “Upon questions of federal law, citizens and their attorneys have the right to rely upon decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and upon such questions it is our fixed duty to follow such decisions, leaving to the United States Congress or Supreme Court the making of the necessary changes in such legal rules.” From the state supreme court’s decisions the Oklahoma Tax Commission filed appeals in this Court. We dismissed the appeals for want of jurisdiction. But treating them as applications for certiorari, we granted the writs and consolidated the cases for argument. 333 U. S. 870. The Solicitor General was requested to file a brief as amicus curiae. I. But for the course of decision here from Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292, decided in 1914, to Oklahoma v. Barnsdall Refineries, 296 U. S. 521, decided in 1936, the problems of taxation and intergovernmental immunity these cases present would seem subject to solution on well-settled or fairly obvious legal principles. It has long been established that property owned by a private person and used by him in performing services for the Federal Government is subject to state and local ad valorem taxes. And the oil and gas produced is, of course, subject to such taxation. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization, 288 U. S. 325. Both by the substance of the statute’s explicit provisions and by the consistent construction of the Oklahoma Supreme Court,' that state’s so-called gross production tax in its presently applicable form is a tax on the lessee’s property used in carrying- out its contractual obligations with the Federal Government and on the oil and gas during the tax year in which it was produced. The tax is levied expressly in lieu of all property taxes which the state might constitutionally impose in ad valorem form, the gross production levy being a tentative measure for the value of that property. To guard against that measure’s being utilized to lay in effect a tax not actually of that character, the state board of equalization is authorized, indeed is required upon complaint, to equate the amount payable with what would be payable if the general ad valorem tax were assessed against the property of the producing lessees subject to taxation, with provision for judicial review of the board’s action. Unembarrassed by some of this Court’s prior decisions, therefore, Oklahoma’s so-called gross production tax would seem to be sustained by the well-established line of decisions cited above. Moreover, even if the status of respondents as federal instrumentalities, in the sense in which they use the term, were fully conceded, it seems difficult to imagine how any substantial interference with performing their functions as such in developing the leaseholds could be thought to flow from requiring them to pay the small tax Oklahoma exacts to satisfy their shares of the state’s expense in maintaining and administering its proration program. That system works for respondents’ benefit in performing their producing function, as it does for the benefit of all other producers, by stabilizing, production, eliminating waste, and preventing runaway competition in an industry notorious for those evils in the absence of some such control. Cf. Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573; Republic Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U. S. 62, dissenting opinion Part III, 89. Indeed respondents do not claim they are exempt from the plan’s regulatory features. They claim only that they are constitutionally immune from contributing to the plan’s support. As a matter entirely fresh, the contention would not seem weighty. II. But neither issue is fresh. Each is complicated by this Court’s prior decisions squarely ruling that the taxes are invalid as unconstitutional intrusions by the state upon the performance of federal functions. Those decisions have not been explicitly overruled. But it is strongly urged that our later decisions, especially in Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., supra, have stricken the foundation from beneath the Gipsy Oil, Large Oil and Barnsdall Refineries decisions, supra, so that the latter no longer can stand in reason and consistency with the former. It is true that this Court’s more recent pronouncements have beaten a fairly large retreat from its formerly prevailing ideas concerning the breadth of so-called intergovernmental immunities from taxation, a retreat which has run in both directions — to restrict the scope of immunity of private persons seeking to clothe themselves with governmental character from both federal and state taxation. The history of the immunity, by and large in both aspects, represents a rising or expanding curve, tapering off into a falling or contracting one. Our present problem lies on the constitutional level. It requires reconsideration of former decisions specifically in point, together with later ones deviating in rationale. It is of substantial importance both for the states’ powers of taxation and for the subjects on which they may impinge. Moreover, even though the immediate questions are closely related to federal policies concerning Indian lands, they are equally tangent to considerations affecting other types of situation raising questions of immunity. For these reasons it will not be amiss to consider the questions in the context of two conflicting courses of decision. Before we turn to the survey, however, two delimitations of the specific issues should be made. These cases present no question concerning the immunity of the Indian lands themselves from state taxation. There is no possibility that ultimate liability for the taxes may fall upon the owner of the land. Cf. Wilson v. Cook, 327 U. S. 474, dissenting opinion, 489. Nor, as has been noted, do the cases involve challenges to the immunity from state taxation of royalty oil, the Indian’s share of production. III. Despite the possibility that the prospect of taxation by the state may reduce the amount the United States might receive from the sale of its property, it is well established that property purchased by a private person from the Federal Government becomes a part of the general mass of property in the state and must bear its fair share of the expenses of local government. The theoretical burden which state ad valorem property taxation thus imposes upon the Federal Government is regarded as too remote and indirect to justify tax immunity for property purchased from that Government. New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. S. 547; Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U. S. 762; Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527; see Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 468. Also subject to local ad valorem taxation, as has been noted above, is property owned by a private party and used by him in performing services for the Federal Government. Where oil produced by a private lessee from restricted Indian lands was owned solely by the lessee and had been removed from the leased lands and stored in the lessee’s tanks, it was held subject to state ad valorem taxation. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization, 288 U. S. 325. And equipment used by a lessee of restricted Indian lands has been held subject to the same sort of exaction. Taber v. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co., 300 U. S. 1. Cf. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, sustaining a state tax on cattle grazing on tribal lands leased from Indians by the non-Indian owner of the cattle. Anomalous in the light of these rulings was the evolution of a line of decisions of this Court condemning forms of taxation which would have imposed no more direct or substantial burden upon the United States than would an ad valorem property tax applied to property purchased from the United States. Private lessees of restricted or tribal Indian lands came to be held “federal instrumentalities” like the lands themselves, and so immune from various forms of state taxation ranging from a gross production tax on production from the leased lands to a tax upon the lessee’s net income. The theory of the Court was the one which was rejected in directly analogous cases: A state tax on the lessee, the lease, or the profits from the lease would be “a direct hamper upon the effort of the United States to make the best terms that it can for its wards.” Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 506. Alternatively, “A tax upon the leases is a tax upon the power to make them, and could be used to destroy the power to make them.” Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522, 530. The history of this development is a progression “from exemption of the gross income of the lessee of Indian lands . . . through exemption of net receipts to serious impairment of the taxing powers of Oklahoma.” Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 257, n. 29 (1942). The development is an outgrowth and a progressive extension of early rulings that tribal lands themselves are immune from state taxation. More immediately it stems from the later ruling that allotted Indian lands held in trust by the United States were “an instrumentality employed by the United States for the benefit and control of this dependent race,” and so were immune from state taxation. United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432, 437-439. In 1908 Oklahoma imposed, in addition to ad valorem property taxes, a gross production tax, the progenitor of the present tax bearing that label, on oil, gas and other minerals produced within the state. Okla. Laws, 1908, c. 71, Art. II, § 6. The Oklahoma court held that the 1910 reenactment of the statute imposed a property tax. McAlester-Edwards Coal Co. v. Trapp, 43 Okla. 510. But the statute, as applied to a lessee of restricted Indian coal lands, was held by this Court to be an occupational tax and so an unconstitutional burden on the lessee, who was held to be an instrumentality of the Federal Government. Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Harrison, supra. Next the Court held the lease itself a federal instrumentality immune from state taxation. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, supra. The Oklahoma legislature revised the gross production tax statute in 1915 and again in 1916, a principal change being the provision that the tax was in lieu of all other ad valorem taxes. The revised tax was held by the Oklahoma Supreme Court to be a property tax. But this Court rejected that construction sub silentio and invalidated the tax in memorandum opinions citing only the Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. case (235 U. S. 292) and the Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. case (240 U. S. 522). Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co., 247 U. S. 503; Large Oil Co. v. Howard, 248 U. S. 549. Suspicions that this Court had overlooked the fact that under the revised statute the gross production tax was in lieu of rather than in addition to all other ad valorem property taxes, were dispelled by Mr. Justice Holmes’ remark in Gillespie v. Oklahoma, supra at 504 — 505, that the statutory change had been noticed and regarded as immaterial. If a gross receipts tax was a burden on the Federal Government “so as to interfere with the performance of its functions, it could not be saved because it was in lieu of a tax upon property or was so characterized.” See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 158. The high-water mark of immunity for non-Indian lessees of restricted and allotted Indian lands came in 1922 when the Gillespie decision, supra, invalidated an Oklahoma net income tax upon income derived by a lessee from sales of his share of oil produced from restricted lands. The non-Indian lessee’s immunity was last sustained here by Oklahoma v. Barnsdall Refineries, supra. That decision held, on application of a rule of strict construction of congressional waivers, that Congress’ express waiver of immunity from gross production taxes on oil produced from the specified Indian lands did not extend to petroleum excise taxes. The state did not challenge the implied constitutional immunity but pitched its argument on the ground of statutory exemption. The instrumentality doctrine has been applied to confer a correlative immunity upon private lessees of state-owned lands. The Texas rule that oil and gas leases are present sales to the lessees of the oil and gas in place caused this Court to sustain the imposition of the federal income tax upon income of the lessee derived from the sale of oil and gas produced from lands leased from that state. It was observed that “. . . the remote and indirect effects upon the one government of such a non-discriminatory tax by the other have never been considered adequate grounds for thus aiding the one at the expense of the taxing power of the other.” Group No. 1 Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U. S. 279, 282. Although this decision may be taken to mark a turning point in expansion of the lessee’s immunity, it was not immediately permitted to impair the Gillespie rationale. A tax on income would be no greater burden where, under applicable state law, “title” to the oil did not “pass” until the oil was removed from the ground. And although Justices Brandéis, Stone, Roberts and Cardozo contended that the Gillespie decision could not stand consistently with the principles which had been reaffirmed in the Group No. 1 Oil case, a majority of one in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, provided a corollary to the rule of the Gillespie case. This was done by holding that the Federal Government was barred from taxing the income of a lessee of state lands as the state was barred from taxing the income of the lessee of federal lands. A parallel immunity from state occupational or privilege taxes was once accorded private contractors with, or agencies of, the Government, Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404, notwithstanding the venerable rule that the property of such a contractor or agency is liable to state property taxation. See the cases cited supra in note 18. Decisions curtailing this immunity were presaged by Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514. It held subject to federal income taxation income received by a consulting engineer from a state for services in connection with temporary work. Equally significant was Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509, 514, which sustained a state tax measured by gross receipts on the property of a stage line engaged in carrying the mails. Later this Court sustained a state tax on the gross receipts of a contractor with the Federal Government, James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134; Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U. S. 186; a state tax on the net income of such a contractor, Atkinson v. Tax Commission, 303 U. S. 20; state sales and use taxes on purchases of materials used by a contractor in performing a cost-plus contract with the United States, Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1; Curry v. United States, 314 U. S. 14; and a state severance tax imposed on a contractor who severed and purchased timber from lands owned by the United States, Wilson v. Cook, 327 U. S. 474. It was pointed out that “. . . the Constitution, unaided by Congressional legislation, . . . [does not prohibit] a tax exacted from the contractors merely because it is passed on economically, by the terms of the contract or otherwise, as a part of the construction cost to the Government. So far as such a non-discriminatory state tax upon the contractor enters into the cost of the materials to the Government, that is but a normal incident of the organization within the same territory of two independent taxing sovereignties. The asserted right of the one to be free of taxation by the other does not spell immunity from paying the added costs, attributable to the taxation of those who furnish supplies to the Government and who have been granted no tax immunity.” Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1, 8-9. The opportunity to reexamine the Gillespie and Coronado cases arose in 1938 in Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 376, the decision upon which the Oklahoma commission relies most strongly to secure reversal of the judgments in the present cases. The Mountain Producers case involved the application of the federal income tax law to a cestui of an express trust which received the proceeds of the sale of oil taken from school lands owned by the State of Wyoming. The Court declined to distinguish the Gillespie and Coronado decisions on the narrow ground available, the fact that the taxpayer was a cestui of a trust which received the proceeds of the sale of the oil rather than the lessee itself. 303 U. S. at 383. Rather the Court sought broader grounding, which lay in reconsideration of the foundations of the Gillespie and Coronado decisions. The opinion stated: “The ground of the decision in the Gillespie case, as stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in speaking for the Court, was that ‘a tax upon the leases’ was ‘a tax upon the power to make them, and could be used to destroy the power to make them’ (240 U. S. p. 630) and that a tax ‘upon the profits of the leases’ was ‘a direct hamper upon the effort of the United States to make the best terms that it can for its wards.’ [257 U. S. at 506.] In the light of the expanding needs of State and Nation, the inquiry has been pressed whether this conclusion has adequate basis . . . .” 303 U. S. at 384. Noting that it had held that the Gillespie ruling should be limited strictly to cases closely analogous, and asserting that “the distinctions thus maintained have attenuated its teaching and raised grave doubt as to whether it should longer be supported,” 303 U. S. at 384-385, the Court went on to say: “In numerous decisions we have had occasion to declare the competing principle, buttressed by the most cogent considerations, that the power to tax should not be crippled ‘by extending the constitutional exemption from taxation to those subjects which fall within the general application of nondiscriminatory laws, and where no direct burden is laid upon the governmental instrumentality and there is only remote, if any, influence upon the exercise of the functions of government.’ Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 225, and illustrations there cited.” 303 U. S. at 385. That competing principle the Court found applicable to the case before it and to require that the decisions in the Gillespie and Coronado cases be overruled. Rejecting as insubstantial the distinction based on the passage of title to the oil at the time of making the lease, compare Group No. 1 Oil Corp. v. Bass, supra, with Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra, and after reviewing various other decisions denying the immunity when claimed by private persons, 303 U. S. at 385-386, the Court said: “These decisions in a variety of applications enforce what we deem to be the controlling view— that immunity from non-discriminatory taxation sought by a private person for his property or gains because he is engaged in operations under a government contract or lease cannot be supported by merely theoretical conceptions of interference with the functions of government. Regard must be had to substance and direct effects.” 303 U. S. at 386. IV. Respondents strongly urge that the Mountain Producers decision is not controlling or effective to require reversal in these cases, since it involved a tax on net income rather than gross production and excise taxes. And they insist that a sharp line should be drawn between what they call lessees performing a governmental function and independent contractors doing work for the Government. The latter distinction is largely, if not altogether verbal, in the context of the fact situations in these cases. As for the former difference, although the Court explicitly overruled only the Gillespie and Coro nado cases, the groundings of the Mountain Producers decision do not permit limiting its effects to so narrow an application. The language last quoted above is as applicable to the present cases as it was to the Gillespie and Coronado decisions. The taxes here are nondiscriminatory. The respondents are “private persons” who seek immunity “for their property or gains because they are engaged in operations under a government contract or lease.” The functions they perform in operating the leases are hardly more governmental in character than those performed by lessees of school lands or, indeed, by many contractors with the Government. The lessees in the Mountain Producers case stood identically with the respondents in all these respects. Moreover the burdens of the taxes here, if any of a character likely to interfere with respondents in carrying out the terms of their leases, are as appropriately to be judged by “regard ... to substance and direct effects,” and as inappropriately to be determined “by merely theoretical conceptions of interference with the functions of government,” as were those in the Mountain Producers case. True, as respondents say, a net income tax may be a step farther removed from interfering effect than a gross production tax or an excise tax on production. But this all depends upon the rate at which each tax is levied. To the adaptation of Marshall’s oft-quoted aphorism made by Mr. Justice McKenna in Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. at 530, and followed by Mr. Justice Holmes in Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. at 505, namely, that “A tax upon the leases is a tax upon the power to make them, and could be used to destroy the power to make them,” Chief Justice Hughes in the Mountain Producers case did not explicitly make the rejoinder given by Holmes in another connection, “The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.” Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 223. But this was the effect of the Mountain Producers decision, when in a single paragraph it challenged both the aphorism and the assumption that “a tax upon the profits of the leases” was “a direct hamper upon the effort of the United States to make the best terms that it can for its wards.” The Mountain Producers case was not decided on narrow, merely technical or presumptive grounds. Its very foundation was a repudiation of those insubstantial bases for securing broad private tax exemptions, unjustified by actual interfering or destructive effects upon the performance of obligations to or work for the government, state or national. The decision came as the result of experience and of observation of the constant widening of the exempting process from tax to tax to tax. Since that decision, as we have noted, the process has been reversed in direction. True intergovernmental immunity remains for the most part. But, so far as concerns private persons claiming immunity for their ordinary business operations (even though in connection with governmental activities), no implied constitutional immunity can rest on the merely hypothetical interferences with governmental functions here asserted to sustain exemption. In the light of the broad groundings of the Mountain Producers decision and of later decisions, we cannot say that the Gipsy Oil, Large Oil and Barnsdall Refineries decisions remain immune to the effects of the Mountain Producers decision and others which have followed it. They “are out of harmony with correct principle,” as were the Gillespie and Coronado decisions and, accordingly, they should be, and they now are, overruled. This accords with the result reached in Santa Rita Oil Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 112 Mont. 359. Moreover, since the decisions in Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Harrison, supra, and Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, supra, rest upon the same foundations as those underlying the Gipsy Oil, Large Oil and Barnsdall Refineries decisions, indeed supplied those foundations, we think they too should be, and they now are, overruled. We do not imply, by this decision, that Congress does not have power to immunize these lessees from the taxes we think the Constitution permits Oklahoma to impose in the absence of such action. The question whether immunity shall be extended in situations like these is essentially legislative in character. But Congress has not created an immunity here by affirmative action, and “The immunity formerly said to rest on constitutional implication cannot now be resurrected in the form of statutory implication.” Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States, 319 U. S. 598, 604. And see Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 480: “. . . if it appears that there is no ground for implying a constitutional immunity, there is equally a want of any ground for assuming any purpose on the part of Congress to create an immunity.” The Oklahoma Supreme Court appears to suggest, though the opinions do not flatly so state, as a possible alternative support for its conclusion in these cases that “Congress has acted on the theory that such immunity exists in the case of leases of this character unless waived,” that is, several congressional enactments permit Oklahoma to impose a gross production tax on minerals produced from the lands of the Osages, the Kaws, the Quapaws, and the Five Civilized Tribes, and authorize payment of taxes due on account of the Indians’ royalty interest. But Congress’ purpose in enacting these statutes was the removal of the immunities of the Indians themselves, immunities which are not challenged in these cases; the action was occasioned by the favorable economic position of the particular Indians. The resulting removal of the immunity of private lessees of those Indian lands was an incidental effect of this legislation. Finally, we refuse to infer from mere congressional silence approval of the doctrine of immunity enunciated in the Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co., Indian Territory Illuminating Oil (240 U. S. 522), Gipsy Oil, Large Oil and Barnsdall Refineries decisions, supra. Congress’ silence prior to the Mountain Producers decision did not preclude this Court from curtailing the lessee’s immunity in that case; and Congress seems to have accepted that decision with equanimity. Cf. Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61, 69-70; Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 479-480. Reversed and remanded. Mr. Justice Jackson concurs in the result. Interests in the lands to which the United States does not hold title are of two kinds: (1) undivided interests acquired by non-Indians; (2) an interest (which is still restricted) conveyed to the son of an allottee by approved noncompetent Indian deeds, pursuant to the Act of March 1, 1907, 34 Stat. 1018, 25 U. S. C. § 405. February 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 331 et seq. The allotments were made to members of the Apache and Comanche tribes pursuant to the agreement approved by Congress on June 6, 1900, 31 Stat. 676. Members of the Citizen Band of the Pottawatomie Tribe were allotted land pursuant to the agreement of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1016. Allotments were made to the Otoe and Missouria Indians under the General Allotment Act without special agreement. Mills, Oklahoma Indian Land Laws § 438 (1924). The nature of the Indians’ interest has been described as follows: "... the United States retained the legal title, giving the Indian allottee a paper or writing, improperly called a patent, showing that at a particular time in the future, unless it was extended by the President, he would be entitled to a regular patent conveying the fee.” United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432, 436. With these exceptions: (1) In a single immaterial instance in No. 40, an undivided 7/16th interest in one of the leases was alienable and was owned by non-Indians. The Texas Company paid without protest the taxes levied against it which were attributable to this 7/16th interest. (2) In No. 41, an undivided l/4th interest in the lands subject to one of the leases and an undivided l/3d interest in the land subject to another lease were owned by non-Indians. The effect of the decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court was to deny the portion of the assessments applicable to these interests. However, it was conceded at the argument here that the assessments were valid insofar as they applied to interests in lands owned, when the assessments were made, by non-Indian owners or by Indian owners not under restriction. 24 Stat. 389, 390, as amended, 25 U. S. C. §§ 348, 349. See Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 108-109 (1942). Leases of allotted land for mining purposes may be made with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior under 35 Stat. 783, 25 U. S. C. § 396. 52 Stat. 348, 25 U. S. C. § 396d; 30 C. F. R. Cum. Supp. §§ 221.1-221.67. 52 Okla. Stat. §§81-286.17 (Conservation of Oil and Gas), §§ 291-303 (Regulation and Inspection of Wells) (Cum. Supp. 1947) ; Order No. 1299 — Cause No. 2935, Thirty-seventh Annual Report of Corporation Comm’n of Okla., 1944, p. 84. The assumption stated in the text is made, although in No. 41 the commission excluded, as irrelevant, evidence tendered to show compliance with the federal and state regulations, and in No. 40 no evidence of compliance was introduced. The three oil and gas leases involved in No. 40 were made by members of the Apache Tribe to non-Indian lessees who assigned their interests to the Texas Company. In No. 41, in which eight leases are involved, the Indian lessors are members of the Apache, Comanche, Citizen Pottawatomie, and Otoe and Missouria Tribes. Undivided interests in the lands subject to certain leases were held by non-Indians at the time of assessment. See notes 1 and 4, 68 Okla. Stat. §821 (1941). The (general) scheme of the tax is as follows: The tax falls due on the first day of each calendar month as to production during the preceding month. The purchaser pays the tax on oil or gas sold at the time of production and is authorized to deduct the amount of tax paid when settling with the producer (and with the royalty owner in cases in which the tax applies to him, see note 14). If the tax becomes due before the oil is sold, the producer is required to pay the tax for himself (and, in cases where the tax applies to royalties, see note 14, for the royalty owner, and is permitted to deduct the amount of tax paid on royalty oil when settling with the royalty owner). 68 id. § 833. The tax is a first and paramount lien against the property of the person liable for the tax. 68 id. § 836. Of the proceeds received from the tax, 78 per cent is paid into the state treasury to be used for the general expenses of state government. Ten per cent is paid to the county treasurer of the county in which the oil or gas was produced, and is used for the construction and maintenance of county highways. Ten per cent is paid to the county treasurer for distribution among the county’s school districts. The remaining two per cent is placed to the credit of the Oklahoma Tax Commission and is used for collection and enforcement activities. 68 id. §827 (Cum. Supp. 1947). But see note 27 and text infra. The amount of the tax was one-eighth of one cent per barrel for the period prior to July 1, 1943, Okla. Laws, 1941, tit. 68, c. 26, and one mill per barrel after that date, Okla. Laws, 1943, tit. 68, c. 26. The Texas Company was assessed under the former act. Magnolia was assessed under both acts. Okla. Laws, 1933, e. 131, as amended, 52 Okla. Stat. 81 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1947). Okla. Laws, 1933, c. 132; Okla. Laws, 1935, c. 59, Art. 2; Okla. Laws, 1937, c. 59, Art. 2; Okla. Laws, 1939, c. 66, Art. 7; Okla. Laws, 1941, tit. 68, c. 26; Okla. Laws, 1943, tit. 68, c. 26; Okla. Laws, 1945, tit. 68, c. 26; Okla. Laws, 1947, tit. 68, c. 26. The present statute appears at 68 Okla. Stat. § 1220.1 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1947). The tax receipts, collected in the same manner as in the case of the gross production tax, present 68 Okla. Stat. § 1220.1 (Cum. Supp. 1947), are deposited to the credit of the “Conservation Fund” and the “Interstate Oil Compact Fund of Oklahoma.” 68 id. 1220.3. Although the Oklahoma statutes in their general application lay the taxes on gross production, including royalties, cf. notes 9 and 13, they provide, with respect to the gross production tax, that the producer, in his required monthly statement to the Oklahoma Tax Commission, state “where such royalty is claimed to be exempt from taxation by law, the facts on which such claim of exemption is based.” 68 Okla. Stat. §821 (1941). This provision is made applicable to the petroleum excise tax by the first section of each of the several enactments establishing and continuing that exaction. See note 13 supra. Only the interests of the lessees were assessed in these cases. The Oklahoma Supreme Court rendered separate, unreported opinions. The principal opinion, filed in the Texas Company case, was followed in the later one filed in the Magnolia Petroleum case. Rehearing was denied in both cases. The original judgment in the Texas Company case provided for reversal of the trial court’s judgment, with directions to overrule the commission’s demurrer “and proceed consistent with the views here expressed.” On motion of counsel for the commission this was modified to provide that “The trial court judgment ... is reversed” and that “final judgment is hereby rendered for plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum sued for,” thus eliminating all question concerning the finality of the judgment. See note 15 supra. Pursuant to former §237 (c) of the Judicial Code, as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 344 (c), present 28 U. S. C. § 2103. Thomson v. Pacific R. Co., 9 Wall. 579; Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5; Central Pacific R. Co. v. California, 162 U. S. 91; Gromer v. Standard Dredging Co., 224 U. S. 362, 371; Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Mackey, 256 U. S. 531, 535-537. See note 27 and text. But see text infra, Part III. Unless the measure of a tax is fairly to be considered as designed to conceal or distort unduly its true nature, the tax is not to be invalidated because the measure is not one customarily employed if as applied it achieves fairly the purpose for which it is avowedly laid, that purpose of course being one within the legislative power to accomplish. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459; Hope Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284; Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165. Moreover, ordinarily the construction given to a state statute by the state’s highest court capable of deciding the question is taken as binding on this Court. See e. g., Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 265 U. S. 30, 32-33; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 287 U. S. 509, 513; Hartford Accident Co. v. Nelson Co., 291 U. S. 352, 358. Cf. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 227; Hanover Insurance Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494, 509-510; Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 367-368. See note 14 supra. Cf. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, holding that oil royalties received by Indian lessors from nontaxable allotted lands were not subject to a state gross production tax, the tax being regarded as on the lessor’s interest rather than on the severed oil. But royalty income is subject to state and federal net income taxes. Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 691; Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U. S. 418; Leahy v. State Treasurer, 297 U. S. 420. At note 18. Distinguishing Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. S. 609, on the ground that there the interest of the Indian lessor had not been prepaid or segregated. See The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737; The New York Indians, 5 Wall. 761. Those early decisions seem to rest on the basis that the Indian tribes possessed many attributes of sovereignty. As to the immunity from state taxation of lands acquired by individual Indians by treaty or under the general homestead laws rather than under the General Allotment Act, see Cohen, op. cit. supra note 5, at 257-258,259-260. Lands outside a reservation purchased with restricted Indian funds from a person who did not hold the land tax exempt were held subject to state taxes in Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U. S. 575. But Congress specifically exempted such lands from taxation. Act of June 20, 1936, 49 Stat. 1542, as amended, 50 Stat. 188 (to limit the exemption to homesteads), 25 U. S. C. § 412a. See Cohen, op. cit. supra, at 260-261. This legislation was sustained and applied in Board of Commissioners v. Sober, 318 U. S. 705. Okla. Laws, 1910, c. 44, § 6, adding a provision permitting the producer to deduct the amount of royalties paid for the benefit of an Indian tribe. Okla. Laws, 1915, c. 107, Art. 2, subd. A; Okla. Laws, 1916, c. 39. Further amendments were made by Okla. Laws, 1933, c. 103, and by Okla. Laws, 1935, c. 66, Art. 4. See note 9 and text supra. Large Oil Co. v. Howard, 63 Okla. 143, reversed per curiam, 248 U. S. 549. In re Gross Production Tax of Wolverine Oil Co., 53 Okla. 24, which had held that the 1915 Act was an occupational rather than a property tax, was distinguished because of changes made by the 1916 Act. The Wolverine case was specifically overruled in In re Skelton Lead & Zinc Co.’s Gross Production Tax, 1919, 81 Okla. 134; accord, Bergin Oil & Gas Co. v. Howard, 82 Okla. 176. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has since consistently held that the tax is a property tax in lieu of all other ad valorem taxes. E. g., In re Protest of Bendelari, Agent, 82 Okla. 97. And see Meriwether v. Lovett, 166 Okla. 73; State v. Indian Royalty Co., 177 Okla. 238; Peteet v. Carmichael, 191 Okla. 593. The Oklahoma Supreme Court assumed for a time that the statutory difference was overlooked by this Court and that an opposite result would have been reached had the difference been noticed. In re Skelton Lead & Zinc Co.’s Gross Production Tax, 1919, 81 Okla. 134; In re Protest of Bendelari, Agent, 82 Okla. 97. The Oklahoma Supreme Court capitulated in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. McCurdy, 86 Okla. 148. See note 39 infra. Cf. the contemporary case of Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, holding capital gain resulting from resale of municipal bonds taxable under the federal income tax law. Cf. Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust, 288 U. S. 508, 516, in which a city leased oil and gas land to a private trust, which was held liable for a federal income tax on its share of the receipts, the Court stating that “the doctrine of Gillespie v. Oklahoma is to be applied strictly and only in circumstances closely analogous to those which it disclosed.” Citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, which the opinion characterized as “a corollary” to the Gillespie case. 303 U. S. at 383. The federal income tax in the Coronado case was levied upon the lessee of state school lands. Cf. note 32 supra. Among the cases which one or the other of respondents attempts to distinguish on the ground that the tax was imposed on an independent contractor rather than a “true Federal instrumentality” are: James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134; Buckstaff Co. v. McKinley, 308 U. S. 358; Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1; and Wilson v. Cook, 327 U. S. 474. It is also contended that cases sustaining taxes on the property of a federal instrumentality, e. g., Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5; Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509; Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization, 288 U. S. 325, are not inconsistent with the view they ask us to take. Cf. Part I supra. The incongruity of the doctrine respondents ask us to perpetuate is underscored by decisions subsequent to the Mountain Producers case withdrawing income tax immunity for state and federal official salaries. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405; Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U. S. 466. See generally, Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 633; Powell, The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 757. Respondents merely assert hypothetically that imposition of the taxes might in some instances make the margin between successful and unsuccessful operation. Leases approved by the Secretary of the Interior provided for the same rental and royalty payments both before and after the Mountain Producers decision. 25 C. F. R. § 189.16. And rental and royalty payments provided for by the Department of the Interior are the same for lands allotted under the General Allotment Act as they are for lands of members of the Five Civilized Tribes, 25 C. F. R. §§ 183.24, 189.16. Production from the latter lands has been subject to Oklahoma’s gross production tax since 1928. See note 42 infra. The Government, in its brief amicus curiae, states that, because differences in the value of different tracts of land would be reflected in the bonuses which lessees are willing to pay, an exact comparison of bonuses is impossible. See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 160-161; Pittman v. Home Owners Corp., 308 U. S. 21, 32-33; Maricopa County v. Talley Bank, 318 U. S. 357, 361; Board of Commissioners v. Seber, 318 U. S. 705, 715-719; Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States, 319 U. S. 598, 606-607; Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441, 446; Smith v. Davis, 323 U. S. 111, 116-119. See Cohen, op. cit. supra note 5, at 255-256. 41 Stat. 1250. As has been stated, Oklahoma v. Barnsdall Refineries, 296 U. S. 521, held that this statute did not authorize the imposition of the state’s petroleum excise tax. See text at note 30 supra. 43 Stat. 176. 41 Stat. 1248, as amended, 50 Stat. 68. 45 Stat. 496. H. R. Rep. No. 1377, 66th Cong., 3d Sess. 4; H. R. Rep. No. 1278, 66th Cong., 3d Sess. 2-3; S. Rep. No. 704, 66th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (all relating to the Osage Act, note 39 supra); H. R. Rep. No. 269, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3; S. Rep. No. 433, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (both relating to the Kaw Act, note 40 supra); H. R. Rep. No. 431, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 234, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (both relating to the Quapaw Act, note 41 supra); H. R. Rep. No. 1193, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 5; S. Rep. No. 982, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (both relating to the Five Civilized Tribes Act, note 42 supra). Respondents also urge that the Oklahoma legislature has recognized the immunity they assert here by authorizing the refund of “payment made in error on account of the production being derived from restricted Indian lands and therefore exempt from taxation.” 68 Okla. Stat. §832 (1941). Although respondents tell us that this argument was urged upon the Oklahoma Supreme Court, that court did not mention this possible state ground but rested its decision exclusively on the federal ground. We do not purport to decide whether Oklahoma law affords the exemption which federal law denies. See note 4 as to the assessments attributable to the undivided interests in lands held by non-Indians in No. 41.

What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to identify the federal agency involved in the administrative action that occurred prior to the onset of litigation. If the administrative action occurred in a state agency, respond "State Agency". Do not code the name of the state. The administrative activity may involve an administrative official as well as that of an agency. If two federal agencies are mentioned, consider the one whose action more directly bears on the dispute;otherwise the agency that acted more recently. If a state and federal agency are mentioned, consider the federal agency. Pay particular attention to the material which appears in the summary of the case preceding the Court's opinion and, if necessary, those portions of the prevailing opinion headed by a I or II. Action by an agency official is considered to be administrative action except when such an official acts to enforce criminal law. If an agency or agency official "denies" a "request" that action be taken, such denials are considered agency action. Exclude: a "challenge" to an unapplied agency rule, regulation, etc.; a request for an injunction or a declaratory judgment against agency action which, though anticipated, has not yet occurred; a mere request for an agency to take action when there is no evidence that the agency did so; agency or official action to enforce criminal law; the hiring and firing of political appointees or the procedures whereby public officials are appointed to office; attorney general preclearance actions pertaining to voting; filing fees or nominating petitions required for access to the ballot; actions of courts martial; land condemnation suits and quiet title actions instituted in a court; and federally funded private nonprofit organizations.

What is the agency involved in the administrative action?