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Stability and proteolytic domains of Nef protein from human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) type 1.
Proteolytic experiments in conjunction with 1H-NMR spectroscopy show that the Nef (negative factor) protein from human immunodeficiency virus type 1 probably consists of two main domains, the N-terminal anchor domain at amino acid positions 2-65 and the C-terminal core domain at positions 66-206. The N-terminal domain is likely to be located at the surface of the protein, while the C-terminal domain has a compactly folded core and is stable in the absence of the anchor domain. It is conceivable that the core domain represents a functional domain of the Nef protein, activated after the removal of the membrane anchor by the human-immunodeficiency-virus protease or cellular proteases. Nef is stable at pH 5-12 and denatures at 317-322 K. The Nef protein remains in its native conformation in dimethyl-sulfoxide/water mixtures up to 35% (by vol.), and in acetonitrile/water up to 14% (by vol.). Nef refolds spontaneously after denaturation with urea or guanidinium hydrochloride. The 1H-NMR parameters and pKa values of five of the nine histidine residues and one of the seven tyrosine residues were determined and were found in four cases to be typical for residues which are not located in the interior of the protein. |
using System;
namespace NBitcoin.Altcoins.HashX11.Crypto.SHA3
{
internal class JH224 : JHBase
{
public JH224() :
base(NBitcoin.Altcoins.HashX11.HashSize.HashSize224)
{
}
}
internal class JH256 : JHBase
{
public JH256() :
base(NBitcoin.Altcoins.HashX11.HashSize.HashSize256)
{
}
}
internal class JH384 : JHBase
{
public JH384() :
base(NBitcoin.Altcoins.HashX11.HashSize.HashSize384)
{
}
}
internal class JH512 : JHBase
{
public JH512() :
base(NBitcoin.Altcoins.HashX11.HashSize.HashSize512)
{
}
}
internal abstract class JHBase : BlockHash, ICryptoNotBuildIn
{
#region Consts
private static readonly ulong[] s_bitslices =
{
0x67F815DFA2DED572, 0x571523B70A15847B, 0xF6875A4D90D6AB81, 0x402BD1C3C54F9F4E,
0x9CFA455CE03A98EA, 0x9A99B26699D2C503, 0x8A53BBF2B4960266, 0x31A2DB881A1456B5,
0xDB0E199A5C5AA303, 0x1044C1870AB23F40, 0x1D959E848019051C, 0xDCCDE75EADEB336F,
0x416BBF029213BA10, 0xD027BBF7156578DC, 0x5078AA3739812C0A, 0xD3910041D2BF1A3F,
0x907ECCF60D5A2D42, 0xCE97C0929C9F62DD, 0xAC442BC70BA75C18, 0x23FCC663D665DFD1,
0x1AB8E09E036C6E97, 0xA8EC6C447E450521, 0xFA618E5DBB03F1EE, 0x97818394B29796FD,
0x2F3003DB37858E4A, 0x956A9FFB2D8D672A, 0x6C69B8F88173FE8A, 0x14427FC04672C78A,
0xC45EC7BD8F15F4C5, 0x80BB118FA76F4475, 0xBC88E4AEB775DE52, 0xF4A3A6981E00B882,
0x1563A3A9338FF48E, 0x89F9B7D524565FAA, 0xFDE05A7C20EDF1B6, 0x362C42065AE9CA36,
0x3D98FE4E433529CE, 0xA74B9A7374F93A53, 0x86814E6F591FF5D0, 0x9F5AD8AF81AD9D0E,
0x6A6234EE670605A7, 0x2717B96EBE280B8B, 0x3F1080C626077447, 0x7B487EC66F7EA0E0,
0xC0A4F84AA50A550D, 0x9EF18E979FE7E391, 0xD48D605081727686, 0x62B0E5F3415A9E7E,
0x7A205440EC1F9FFC, 0x84C9F4CE001AE4E3, 0xD895FA9DF594D74F, 0xA554C324117E2E55,
0x286EFEBD2872DF5B, 0xB2C4A50FE27FF578, 0x2ED349EEEF7C8905, 0x7F5928EB85937E44,
0x4A3124B337695F70, 0x65E4D61DF128865E, 0xE720B95104771BC7, 0x8A87D423E843FE74,
0xF2947692A3E8297D, 0xC1D9309B097ACBDD, 0xE01BDC5BFB301B1D, 0xBF829CF24F4924DA,
0xFFBF70B431BAE7A4, 0x48BCF8DE0544320D, 0x39D3BB5332FCAE3B, 0xA08B29E0C1C39F45,
0x0F09AEF7FD05C9E5, 0x34F1904212347094, 0x95ED44E301B771A2, 0x4A982F4F368E3BE9,
0x15F66CA0631D4088, 0xFFAF52874B44C147, 0x30C60AE2F14ABB7E, 0xE68C6ECCC5B67046,
0x00CA4FBD56A4D5A4, 0xAE183EC84B849DDA, 0xADD1643045CE5773, 0x67255C1468CEA6E8,
0x16E10ECBF28CDAA3, 0x9A99949A5806E933, 0x7B846FC220B2601F, 0x1885D1A07FACCED1,
0xD319DD8DA15B5932, 0x46B4A5AAC01C9A50, 0xBA6B04E467633D9F, 0x7EEE560BAB19CAF6,
0x742128A9EA79B11F, 0xEE51363B35F7BDE9, 0x76D350755AAC571D, 0x01707DA3FEC2463A,
0x42D8A498AFC135F7, 0x79676B9E20ECED78, 0xA8DB3AEA15638341, 0x832C83324D3BC3FA,
0xF347271C1F3B40A7, 0x9A762DB734F04059, 0xFD4F21D26C4E3EE7, 0xEF5957DC398DFDB8,
0xDAEB492B490C9B8D, 0x0D70F36849D7A25B, 0x84558D7AD0AE3B7D, 0x658EF8E4F0E9A5F5,
0x533B1036F4A2B8A0, 0x5AEC3E759E07A80C, 0x4F88E85692946891, 0x4CBCBAF8555CB05B,
0x7B9487F3993BBBE3, 0x5D1C6B72D6F4DA75, 0x6DB334DC28ACAE64, 0x71DB28B850A5346C,
0x2A518D10F2E261F8, 0xFC75DD593364DBE3, 0xA23FCE43F1BCAC1C, 0xB043E8023CD1BB67,
0x75A12988CA5B0A33, 0x5C5316B44D19347F, 0x1E4D790EC3943B92, 0x3FAFEEB6D7757479,
0x21391ABEF7D4A8EA, 0x5127234C097EF45C, 0xD23C32BA5324A326, 0xADD5A66D4A17A344,
0x08C9F2AFA63E1DB5, 0x563C6B91983D5983, 0x4D608672A17CF84C, 0xF6C76E08CC3EE246,
0x5E76BCB1B333982F, 0x2AE6C4EFA566D62B, 0x36D4C1BEE8B6F406, 0x6321EFBC1582EE74,
0x69C953F40D4EC1FD, 0x26585806C45A7DA7, 0x16FAE0061614C17E, 0x3F9D63283DAF907E,
0x0CD29B00E3F2C9D2, 0x300CD4B730CEAA5F, 0x9832E0F216512A74, 0x9AF8CEE3D830EB0D,
0x9279F1B57B9EC54B, 0xD36886046EE651FF, 0x316796E6574D239B, 0x05750A17F3A6E6CC,
0xCE6C3213D98176B1, 0x62A205F88452173C, 0x47154778B3CB2BF4, 0x486A9323825446FF,
0x65655E4E0758DF38, 0x8E5086FC897CFCF2, 0x86CA0BD0442E7031, 0x4E477830A20940F0,
0x8338F7D139EEA065, 0xBD3A2CE437E95EF7, 0x6FF8130126B29721, 0xE7DE9FEFD1ED44A3,
0xD992257615DFA08B, 0xBE42DC12F6F7853C, 0x7EB027AB7CECA7D8, 0xDEA83EAADA7D8D53,
0xD86902BD93CE25AA, 0xF908731AFD43F65A, 0xA5194A17DAEF5FC0, 0x6A21FD4C33664D97,
0x701541DB3198B435, 0x9B54CDEDBB0F1EEA, 0x72409751A163D09A, 0xE26F4791BF9D75F6
};
private static readonly ulong[][] s_initial_states =
{
new ulong []
{
0xac989af962ddfe2d, 0xe734d619d6ac7cae, 0x161230bc051083a4, 0x941466c9c63860b8,
0x6f7080259f89d966, 0xdc1a9b1d1ba39ece, 0x106e367b5f32e811, 0xc106fa027f8594f9,
0xb340c8d85c1b4f1b, 0x9980736e7fa1f697, 0xd3a3eaada593dfdc, 0x689a53c9dee831a4,
0xe4a186ec8aa9b422, 0xf06ce59c95ac74d5, 0xbf2babb5ea0d9615, 0x6eea64ddf0dc1196
},
new ulong []
{
0xebd3202c41a398eb, 0xc145b29c7bbecd92, 0xfac7d4609151931c, 0x038a507ed6820026,
0x45b92677269e23a4, 0x77941ad4481afbe0, 0x7a176b0226abb5cd, 0xa82fff0f4224f056,
0x754d2e7f8996a371, 0x62e27df70849141d, 0x948f2476f7957627, 0x6c29804757b6d587,
0x6c0d8eac2d275e5c, 0x0f7a0557c6508451, 0xea12247067d3e47b, 0x69d71cd313abe389
},
new ulong []
{
0x8a3913d8c63b1e48, 0x9b87de4a895e3b6d, 0x2ead80d468eafa63, 0x67820f4821cb2c33,
0x28b982904dc8ae98, 0x4942114130ea55d4, 0xec474892b255f536, 0xe13cf4ba930a25c7,
0x4c45db278a7f9b56, 0x0eaf976349bdfc9e, 0xcd80aa267dc29f58, 0xda2eeb9d8c8bc080,
0x3a37d5f8e881798a, 0x717ad1ddad6739f4, 0x94d375a4bdd3b4a9, 0x7f734298ba3f6c97
},
new ulong []
{
0x17aa003e964bd16f, 0x43d5157a052e6a63, 0x0bef970c8d5e228a, 0x61c3b3f2591234e9,
0x1e806f53c1a01d89, 0x806d2bea6b05a92a, 0xa6ba7520dbcc8e58, 0xf73bf8ba763a0fa9,
0x694ae34105e66901, 0x5ae66f2e8e8ab546, 0x243c84c1d0a74710, 0x99c15a2db1716e3b,
0x56f8b19decf657cf, 0x56b116577c8806a7, 0xfb1785e6dffcc2e3, 0x4bdd8ccc78465a54
}
};
#endregion
protected readonly ulong[] m_state = new ulong[16];
public JHBase(HashSize a_hash_size) :
base((int)a_hash_size, 128, 64)
{
Initialize();
}
protected override void TransformBlock(byte[] a_data, int a_index)
{
ulong[] data = Converters.ConvertBytesToULongs(a_data, a_index, 64);
const ulong c_2_1 = 0x5555555555555555;
const ulong c_2_2 = 0xaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa;
const ulong c_4_1 = 0x3333333333333333;
const ulong c_4_2 = 0xcccccccccccccccc;
const ulong c_8_1 = 0x0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0f;
const ulong c_8_2 = 0xf0f0f0f0f0f0f0f0;
const ulong c_16_1 = 0x00ff00ff00ff00ff;
const ulong c_16_2 = 0xff00ff00ff00ff00;
const ulong c_32_1 = 0x0000ffff0000ffff;
const ulong c_32_2 = 0xffff0000ffff0000;
ulong m0 = m_state[0] ^ data[0];
ulong m1 = m_state[1] ^ data[1];
ulong m2 = m_state[2] ^ data[2];
ulong m3 = m_state[3] ^ data[3];
ulong m4 = m_state[4] ^ data[4];
ulong m5 = m_state[5] ^ data[5];
ulong m6 = m_state[6] ^ data[6];
ulong m7 = m_state[7] ^ data[7];
ulong m8 = m_state[8];
ulong m9 = m_state[9];
ulong m10 = m_state[10];
ulong m11 = m_state[11];
ulong m12 = m_state[12];
ulong m13 = m_state[13];
ulong m14 = m_state[14];
ulong m15 = m_state[15];
ulong t0;
ulong t1;
for (int r = 0; r < 42; r = r + 7)
{
m12 = ~m12;
m14 = ~m14;
m0 ^= ~m8 & s_bitslices[r * 4];
m2 ^= ~m10 & s_bitslices[r * 4 + 2];
t0 = s_bitslices[r * 4] ^ (m0 & m4);
t1 = s_bitslices[r * 4 + 2] ^ (m2 & m6);
m0 ^= m8 & m12;
m2 ^= m10 & m14;
m12 ^= ~m4 & m8;
m14 ^= ~m6 & m10;
m4 ^= m0 & m8;
m6 ^= m2 & m10;
m8 ^= m0 & ~m12;
m10 ^= m2 & ~m14;
m0 ^= m4 | m12;
m2 ^= m6 | m14;
m12 ^= m4 & m8;
m14 ^= m6 & m10;
m4 ^= t0 & m0;
m6 ^= t1 & m2;
m8 ^= t0;
m10 ^= t1;
m2 ^= m4;
m6 ^= m8;
m10 ^= m0 ^ m12;
m14 ^= m0;
m0 ^= m6;
m4 ^= m10;
m8 ^= m2 ^ m14;
m12 ^= m2;
m2 = ((m2 & c_2_1) << 1) | ((m2 & c_2_2) >> 1);
m6 = ((m6 & c_2_1) << 1) | ((m6 & c_2_2) >> 1);
m10 = ((m10 & c_2_1) << 1) | ((m10 & c_2_2) >> 1);
m14 = ((m14 & c_2_1) << 1) | ((m14 & c_2_2) >> 1);
m13 = ~m13;
m15 = ~m15;
m1 ^= ~m9 & s_bitslices[r * 4 + 1];
m3 ^= ~m11 & s_bitslices[r * 4 + 1 + 2];
t0 = s_bitslices[r * 4 + 1] ^ (m1 & m5);
t1 = s_bitslices[r * 4 + 1 + 2] ^ (m3 & m7);
m1 ^= m9 & m13;
m3 ^= m11 & m15;
m13 ^= ~m5 & m9;
m15 ^= ~m7 & m11;
m5 ^= m1 & m9;
m7 ^= m3 & m11;
m9 ^= m1 & ~m13;
m11 ^= m3 & ~m15;
m1 ^= m5 | m13;
m3 ^= m7 | m15;
m13 ^= m5 & m9;
m15 ^= m7 & m11;
m5 ^= t0 & m1;
m7 ^= t1 & m3;
m9 ^= t0;
m11 ^= t1;
m3 ^= m5;
m7 ^= m9;
m11 ^= m1 ^ m13;
m15 ^= m1;
m1 ^= m7;
m5 ^= m11;
m9 ^= m3 ^ m15;
m13 ^= m3;
m3 = ((m3 & c_2_1) << 1) | ((m3 & c_2_2) >> 1);
m7 = ((m7 & c_2_1) << 1) | ((m7 & c_2_2) >> 1);
m11 = ((m11 & c_2_1) << 1) | ((m11 & c_2_2) >> 1);
m15 = ((m15 & c_2_1) << 1) | ((m15 & c_2_2) >> 1);
m12 = ~m12;
m14 = ~m14;
m0 ^= ~m8 & s_bitslices[(r + 1) * 4];
m2 ^= ~m10 & s_bitslices[(r + 1) * 4 + 2];
t0 = s_bitslices[(r + 1) * 4] ^ (m0 & m4);
t1 = s_bitslices[(r + 1) * 4 + 2] ^ (m2 & m6);
m0 ^= m8 & m12;
m2 ^= m10 & m14;
m12 ^= ~m4 & m8;
m14 ^= ~m6 & m10;
m4 ^= m0 & m8;
m6 ^= m2 & m10;
m8 ^= m0 & ~m12;
m10 ^= m2 & ~m14;
m0 ^= m4 | m12;
m2 ^= m6 | m14;
m12 ^= m4 & m8;
m14 ^= m6 & m10;
m4 ^= t0 & m0;
m6 ^= t1 & m2;
m8 ^= t0;
m10 ^= t1;
m2 ^= m4;
m6 ^= m8;
m10 ^= m0 ^ m12;
m14 ^= m0;
m0 ^= m6;
m4 ^= m10;
m8 ^= m2 ^ m14;
m12 ^= m2;
m2 = ((m2 & c_4_1) << 2) | ((m2 & c_4_2) >> 2);
m6 = ((m6 & c_4_1) << 2) | ((m6 & c_4_2) >> 2);
m10 = ((m10 & c_4_1) << 2) | ((m10 & c_4_2) >> 2);
m14 = ((m14 & c_4_1) << 2) | ((m14 & c_4_2) >> 2);
m13 = ~m13;
m15 = ~m15;
m1 ^= ~m9 & s_bitslices[(r + 1) * 4 + 1];
m3 ^= ~m11 & s_bitslices[(r + 1) * 4 + 1 + 2];
t0 = s_bitslices[(r + 1) * 4 + 1] ^ (m1 & m5);
t1 = s_bitslices[(r + 1) * 4 + 1 + 2] ^ (m3 & m7);
m1 ^= m9 & m13;
m3 ^= m11 & m15;
m13 ^= ~m5 & m9;
m15 ^= ~m7 & m11;
m5 ^= m1 & m9;
m7 ^= m3 & m11;
m9 ^= m1 & ~m13;
m11 ^= m3 & ~m15;
m1 ^= m5 | m13;
m3 ^= m7 | m15;
m13 ^= m5 & m9;
m15 ^= m7 & m11;
m5 ^= t0 & m1;
m7 ^= t1 & m3;
m9 ^= t0;
m11 ^= t1;
m3 ^= m5;
m7 ^= m9;
m11 ^= m1 ^ m13;
m15 ^= m1;
m1 ^= m7;
m5 ^= m11;
m9 ^= m3 ^ m15;
m13 ^= m3;
m3 = ((m3 & c_4_1) << 2) | ((m3 & c_4_2) >> 2);
m7 = ((m7 & c_4_1) << 2) | ((m7 & c_4_2) >> 2);
m11 = ((m11 & c_4_1) << 2) | ((m11 & c_4_2) >> 2);
m15 = ((m15 & c_4_1) << 2) | ((m15 & c_4_2) >> 2);
m12 = ~m12;
m14 = ~m14;
m0 ^= ~m8 & s_bitslices[(r + 2) * 4];
m2 ^= ~m10 & s_bitslices[(r + 2) * 4 + 2];
t0 = s_bitslices[(r + 2) * 4] ^ (m0 & m4);
t1 = s_bitslices[(r + 2) * 4 + 2] ^ (m2 & m6);
m0 ^= m8 & m12;
m2 ^= m10 & m14;
m12 ^= ~m4 & m8;
m14 ^= ~m6 & m10;
m4 ^= m0 & m8;
m6 ^= m2 & m10;
m8 ^= m0 & ~m12;
m10 ^= m2 & ~m14;
m0 ^= m4 | m12;
m2 ^= m6 | m14;
m12 ^= m4 & m8;
m14 ^= m6 & m10;
m4 ^= t0 & m0;
m6 ^= t1 & m2;
m8 ^= t0;
m10 ^= t1;
m2 ^= m4;
m6 ^= m8;
m10 ^= m0 ^ m12;
m14 ^= m0;
m0 ^= m6;
m4 ^= m10;
m8 ^= m2 ^ m14;
m12 ^= m2;
m2 = ((m2 & c_8_1) << 4) | ((m2 & c_8_2) >> 4);
m6 = ((m6 & c_8_1) << 4) | ((m6 & c_8_2) >> 4);
m10 = ((m10 & c_8_1) << 4) | ((m10 & c_8_2) >> 4);
m14 = ((m14 & c_8_1) << 4) | ((m14 & c_8_2) >> 4);
m13 = ~m13;
m15 = ~m15;
m1 ^= ~m9 & s_bitslices[(r + 2) * 4 + 1];
m3 ^= ~m11 & s_bitslices[(r + 2) * 4 + 1 + 2];
t0 = s_bitslices[(r + 2) * 4 + 1] ^ (m1 & m5);
t1 = s_bitslices[(r + 2) * 4 + 1 + 2] ^ (m3 & m7);
m1 ^= m9 & m13;
m3 ^= m11 & m15;
m13 ^= ~m5 & m9;
m15 ^= ~m7 & m11;
m5 ^= m1 & m9;
m7 ^= m3 & m11;
m9 ^= m1 & ~m13;
m11 ^= m3 & ~m15;
m1 ^= m5 | m13;
m3 ^= m7 | m15;
m13 ^= m5 & m9;
m15 ^= m7 & m11;
m5 ^= t0 & m1;
m7 ^= t1 & m3;
m9 ^= t0;
m11 ^= t1;
m3 ^= m5;
m7 ^= m9;
m11 ^= m1 ^ m13;
m15 ^= m1;
m1 ^= m7;
m5 ^= m11;
m9 ^= m3 ^ m15;
m13 ^= m3;
m3 = ((m3 & c_8_1) << 4) | ((m3 & c_8_2) >> 4);
m7 = ((m7 & c_8_1) << 4) | ((m7 & c_8_2) >> 4);
m11 = ((m11 & c_8_1) << 4) | ((m11 & c_8_2) >> 4);
m15 = ((m15 & c_8_1) << 4) | ((m15 & c_8_2) >> 4);
m12 = ~m12;
m14 = ~m14;
m0 ^= ~m8 & s_bitslices[(r + 3) * 4];
m2 ^= ~m10 & s_bitslices[(r + 3) * 4 + 2];
t0 = s_bitslices[(r + 3) * 4] ^ (m0 & m4);
t1 = s_bitslices[(r + 3) * 4 + 2] ^ (m2 & m6);
m0 ^= m8 & m12;
m2 ^= m10 & m14;
m12 ^= ~m4 & m8;
m14 ^= ~m6 & m10;
m4 ^= m0 & m8;
m6 ^= m2 & m10;
m8 ^= m0 & ~m12;
m10 ^= m2 & ~m14;
m0 ^= m4 | m12;
m2 ^= m6 | m14;
m12 ^= m4 & m8;
m14 ^= m6 & m10;
m4 ^= t0 & m0;
m6 ^= t1 & m2;
m8 ^= t0;
m10 ^= t1;
m2 ^= m4;
m6 ^= m8;
m10 ^= m0 ^ m12;
m14 ^= m0;
m0 ^= m6;
m4 ^= m10;
m8 ^= m2 ^ m14;
m12 ^= m2;
m2 = ((m2 & c_16_1) << 8) | ((m2 & c_16_2) >> 8);
m6 = ((m6 & c_16_1) << 8) | ((m6 & c_16_2) >> 8);
m10 = ((m10 & c_16_1) << 8) | ((m10 & c_16_2) >> 8);
m14 = ((m14 & c_16_1) << 8) | ((m14 & c_16_2) >> 8);
m13 = ~m13;
m15 = ~m15;
m1 ^= ~m9 & s_bitslices[(r + 3) * 4 + 1];
m3 ^= ~m11 & s_bitslices[(r + 3) * 4 + 1 + 2];
t0 = s_bitslices[(r + 3) * 4 + 1] ^ (m1 & m5);
t1 = s_bitslices[(r + 3) * 4 + 1 + 2] ^ (m3 & m7);
m1 ^= m9 & m13;
m3 ^= m11 & m15;
m13 ^= ~m5 & m9;
m15 ^= ~m7 & m11;
m5 ^= m1 & m9;
m7 ^= m3 & m11;
m9 ^= m1 & ~m13;
m11 ^= m3 & ~m15;
m1 ^= m5 | m13;
m3 ^= m7 | m15;
m13 ^= m5 & m9;
m15 ^= m7 & m11;
m5 ^= t0 & m1;
m7 ^= t1 & m3;
m9 ^= t0;
m11 ^= t1;
m3 ^= m5;
m7 ^= m9;
m11 ^= m1 ^ m13;
m15 ^= m1;
m1 ^= m7;
m5 ^= m11;
m9 ^= m3 ^ m15;
m13 ^= m3;
m3 = ((m3 & c_16_1) << 8) | ((m3 & c_16_2) >> 8);
m7 = ((m7 & c_16_1) << 8) | ((m7 & c_16_2) >> 8);
m11 = ((m11 & c_16_1) << 8) | ((m11 & c_16_2) >> 8);
m15 = ((m15 & c_16_1) << 8) | ((m15 & c_16_2) >> 8);
m12 = ~m12;
m14 = ~m14;
m0 ^= ~m8 & s_bitslices[(r + 4) * 4];
m2 ^= ~m10 & s_bitslices[(r + 4) * 4 + 2];
t0 = s_bitslices[(r + 4) * 4] ^ (m0 & m4);
t1 = s_bitslices[(r + 4) * 4 + 2] ^ (m2 & m6);
m0 ^= m8 & m12;
m2 ^= m10 & m14;
m12 ^= ~m4 & m8;
m14 ^= ~m6 & m10;
m4 ^= m0 & m8;
m6 ^= m2 & m10;
m8 ^= m0 & ~m12;
m10 ^= m2 & ~m14;
m0 ^= m4 | m12;
m2 ^= m6 | m14;
m12 ^= m4 & m8;
m14 ^= m6 & m10;
m4 ^= t0 & m0;
m6 ^= t1 & m2;
m8 ^= t0;
m10 ^= t1;
m2 ^= m4;
m6 ^= m8;
m10 ^= m0 ^ m12;
m14 ^= m0;
m0 ^= m6;
m4 ^= m10;
m8 ^= m2 ^ m14;
m12 ^= m2;
m2 = ((m2 & c_32_1) << 16) | ((m2 & c_32_2) >> 16);
m6 = ((m6 & c_32_1) << 16) | ((m6 & c_32_2) >> 16);
m10 = ((m10 & c_32_1) << 16) | ((m10 & c_32_2) >> 16);
m14 = ((m14 & c_32_1) << 16) | ((m14 & c_32_2) >> 16);
m13 = ~m13;
m15 = ~m15;
m1 ^= ~m9 & s_bitslices[(r + 4) * 4 + 1];
m3 ^= ~m11 & s_bitslices[(r + 4) * 4 + 1 + 2];
t0 = s_bitslices[(r + 4) * 4 + 1] ^ (m1 & m5);
t1 = s_bitslices[(r + 4) * 4 + 1 + 2] ^ (m3 & m7);
m1 ^= m9 & m13;
m3 ^= m11 & m15;
m13 ^= ~m5 & m9;
m15 ^= ~m7 & m11;
m5 ^= m1 & m9;
m7 ^= m3 & m11;
m9 ^= m1 & ~m13;
m11 ^= m3 & ~m15;
m1 ^= m5 | m13;
m3 ^= m7 | m15;
m13 ^= m5 & m9;
m15 ^= m7 & m11;
m5 ^= t0 & m1;
m7 ^= t1 & m3;
m9 ^= t0;
m11 ^= t1;
m3 ^= m5;
m7 ^= m9;
m11 ^= m1 ^ m13;
m15 ^= m1;
m1 ^= m7;
m5 ^= m11;
m9 ^= m3 ^ m15;
m13 ^= m3;
m3 = ((m3 & c_32_1) << 16) | ((m3 & c_32_2) >> 16);
m7 = ((m7 & c_32_1) << 16) | ((m7 & c_32_2) >> 16);
m11 = ((m11 & c_32_1) << 16) | ((m11 & c_32_2) >> 16);
m15 = ((m15 & c_32_1) << 16) | ((m15 & c_32_2) >> 16);
m12 = ~m12;
m14 = ~m14;
m0 ^= ~m8 & s_bitslices[(r + 5) * 4];
m2 ^= ~m10 & s_bitslices[(r + 5) * 4 + 2];
t0 = s_bitslices[(r + 5) * 4] ^ (m0 & m4);
t1 = s_bitslices[(r + 5) * 4 + 2] ^ (m2 & m6);
m0 ^= m8 & m12;
m2 ^= m10 & m14;
m12 ^= ~m4 & m8;
m14 ^= ~m6 & m10;
m4 ^= m0 & m8;
m6 ^= m2 & m10;
m8 ^= m0 & ~m12;
m10 ^= m2 & ~m14;
m0 ^= m4 | m12;
m2 ^= m6 | m14;
m12 ^= m4 & m8;
m14 ^= m6 & m10;
m4 ^= t0 & m0;
m6 ^= t1 & m2;
m8 ^= t0;
m10 ^= t1;
m2 ^= m4;
m6 ^= m8;
m10 ^= m0 ^ m12;
m14 ^= m0;
m0 ^= m6;
m4 ^= m10;
m8 ^= m2 ^ m14;
m12 ^= m2;
m2 = (m2 << 32) | (m2 >> 32);
m6 = (m6 << 32) | (m6 >> 32);
m10 = (m10 << 32) | (m10 >> 32);
m14 = (m14 << 32) | (m14 >> 32);
m13 = ~m13;
m15 = ~m15;
m1 ^= ~m9 & s_bitslices[(r + 5) * 4 + 1];
m3 ^= ~m11 & s_bitslices[(r + 5) * 4 + 1 + 2];
t0 = s_bitslices[(r + 5) * 4 + 1] ^ (m1 & m5);
t1 = s_bitslices[(r + 5) * 4 + 1 + 2] ^ (m3 & m7);
m1 ^= m9 & m13;
m3 ^= m11 & m15;
m13 ^= ~m5 & m9;
m15 ^= ~m7 & m11;
m5 ^= m1 & m9;
m7 ^= m3 & m11;
m9 ^= m1 & ~m13;
m11 ^= m3 & ~m15;
m1 ^= m5 | m13;
m3 ^= m7 | m15;
m13 ^= m5 & m9;
m15 ^= m7 & m11;
m5 ^= t0 & m1;
m7 ^= t1 & m3;
m9 ^= t0;
m11 ^= t1;
m3 ^= m5;
m7 ^= m9;
m11 ^= m1 ^ m13;
m15 ^= m1;
m1 ^= m7;
m5 ^= m11;
m9 ^= m3 ^ m15;
m13 ^= m3;
m3 = (m3 << 32) | (m3 >> 32);
m7 = (m7 << 32) | (m7 >> 32);
m11 = (m11 << 32) | (m11 >> 32);
m15 = (m15 << 32) | (m15 >> 32);
m12 = ~m12;
m14 = ~m14;
m0 ^= ~m8 & s_bitslices[(r + 6) * 4];
m2 ^= ~m10 & s_bitslices[(r + 6) * 4 + 2];
t0 = s_bitslices[(r + 6) * 4] ^ (m0 & m4);
t1 = s_bitslices[(r + 6) * 4 + 2] ^ (m2 & m6);
m0 ^= m8 & m12;
m2 ^= m10 & m14;
m12 ^= ~m4 & m8;
m14 ^= ~m6 & m10;
m4 ^= m0 & m8;
m6 ^= m2 & m10;
m8 ^= m0 & ~m12;
m10 ^= m2 & ~m14;
m0 ^= m4 | m12;
m2 ^= m6 | m14;
m12 ^= m4 & m8;
m14 ^= m6 & m10;
m4 ^= t0 & m0;
m6 ^= t1 & m2;
m8 ^= t0;
m10 ^= t1;
m2 ^= m4;
m6 ^= m8;
m10 ^= m0 ^ m12;
m14 ^= m0;
m0 ^= m6;
m4 ^= m10;
m8 ^= m2 ^ m14;
m12 ^= m2;
m13 = ~m13;
m15 = ~m15;
m1 ^= ~m9 & s_bitslices[(r + 6) * 4 + 1];
m3 ^= ~m11 & s_bitslices[(r + 6) * 4 + 1 + 2];
t0 = s_bitslices[(r + 6) * 4 + 1] ^ (m1 & m5);
t1 = s_bitslices[(r + 6) * 4 + 1 + 2] ^ (m3 & m7);
m1 ^= m9 & m13;
m3 ^= m11 & m15;
m13 ^= ~m5 & m9;
m15 ^= ~m7 & m11;
m5 ^= m1 & m9;
m7 ^= m3 & m11;
m9 ^= m1 & ~m13;
m11 ^= m3 & ~m15;
m1 ^= m5 | m13;
m3 ^= m7 | m15;
m13 ^= m5 & m9;
m15 ^= m7 & m11;
m5 ^= t0 & m1;
m7 ^= t1 & m3;
m9 ^= t0;
m11 ^= t1;
m3 ^= m5;
m7 ^= m9;
m11 ^= m1 ^ m13;
m15 ^= m1;
m1 ^= m7;
m5 ^= m11;
m9 ^= m3 ^ m15;
m13 ^= m3;
t0 = m2;
m2 = m3;
m3 = t0;
t0 = m6;
m6 = m7;
m7 = t0;
t0 = m10;
m10 = m11;
m11 = t0;
t0 = m14;
m14 = m15;
m15 = t0;
}
m_state[0] = m0;
m_state[1] = m1;
m_state[2] = m2;
m_state[3] = m3;
m_state[4] = m4;
m_state[5] = m5;
m_state[6] = m6;
m_state[7] = m7;
m_state[8] = m8 ^ data[0];
m_state[9] = m9 ^ data[1];
m_state[10] = m10 ^ data[2];
m_state[11] = m11 ^ data[3];
m_state[12] = m12 ^ data[4];
m_state[13] = m13 ^ data[5];
m_state[14] = m14 ^ data[6];
m_state[15] = m15 ^ data[7];
}
protected override void Finish()
{
ulong bits = m_processed_bytes * 8;
int padindex = 56;
if (m_processed_bytes % 64 != 0)
padindex += m_buffer.Length - m_buffer.Pos;
byte[] pad = new byte[padindex + 8];
pad[0] = 0x80;
Converters.ConvertULongToBytesSwapOrder(bits, pad, padindex);
padindex += 8;
TransformBytes(pad, 0, padindex);
}
protected override byte[] GetResult()
{
return Converters.ConvertULongsToBytes(m_state, 8, 8).SubArray(64 - HashSize, HashSize);
}
public override void Initialize()
{
switch (HashSize)
{
case 28:
Array.Copy(s_initial_states[0], m_state, m_state.Length);
break;
case 32:
Array.Copy(s_initial_states[1], m_state, m_state.Length);
break;
case 48:
Array.Copy(s_initial_states[2], m_state, m_state.Length);
break;
case 64:
Array.Copy(s_initial_states[3], m_state, m_state.Length);
break;
}
base.Initialize();
}
}
}
|
Recognition of age-damaged (R,S)-adenosyl-L-methionine by two methyltransferases in the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae.
The biological methyl donor S-adenosylmethionine (AdoMet) can exist in two diastereoisomeric states with respect to its sulfonium ion. The S configuration, (S,S)-AdoMet, is the only form that is produced enzymatically as well as the only form used in almost all biological methylation reactions. Under physiological conditions, however, the sulfonium ion can spontaneously racemize to the R form, producing (R,S)-AdoMet. As of yet, (R,S)-AdoMet has no known physiological function and may inhibit cellular reactions. In this study, we found two Saccharomyces cerevisiae enzymes that are capable of recognizing (R,S)-AdoMet and using it to methylate homocysteine to form methionine. These enzymes are the products of the SAM4 and MHT1 genes, identified previously as homocysteine methyltransferases dependent upon AdoMet and S-methylmethionine, respectively. We found here that Sam4 recognizes both (S,S)- and (R,S)-AdoMet, but that its activity is much higher with the R,S form. Mht1 reacts with only the R,S form of AdoMet, whereas no activity is seen with the S,S form. R,S-Specific homocysteine methyltransferase activity is also shown here to occur in extracts of Arabidopsis thaliana, Drosophila melanogaster, and Caenorhabditis elegans, but has not been detected in several tissue extracts of Mus musculus. Such activity may function to prevent the accumulation of (R,S)-AdoMet in these organisms. |
Developing the world's first universal Internet radio platform
Torian Wireless, the Australian developer of the world's first universal Internet radio platform, iRoamer, has agreements with manufacturers that will see the first commercial batch of products with the iRoamer technology launched next month.
Torian Wireless developed the iRoamer platform to give wireless Internet radio capabilities to almost any consumer electronic device, such as portable media players, Hi-Fi systems, set-top boxes, IP-TV units, car radio products, mobile and VoIP telephones.
Providing the interface between the iRoamer platform and the user is miRoamer, a customisable Internet media aggregation portal that gives users access to tens of thousands of Internet radio stations all over the world.
Torian provides a software suite which manufacturers can embed into their products, allowing access to the miRoamer.com back-end infrastructure.
Each device is registered with miRoamer, allowing users to listen to live radio in real time from anywhere at any time, manage content through folders, and share content with miRoamer "buddies".
Torian Wireless CEO and iRoamer developer George Parthimos, said the driving force behind the technology was a realisation that millions of users worldwide were streaming radio stations online.
"In the USA alone, 33 million people listen to iRadio every week (up from 19 million in 2005). Most of these users are tied to their desktop computer, and are seeking an alternative method for accessing the vast amounts of content available," Parthimos said.
"miRoamer.com is a free service. Users simply need to register an account to use the service on their desktop. The service is also free to purchasers of miRoamer-enabled devices, who can configure their device using the online portal."
miRoamer isn't just targeted at end users, with corporate content available via a user-pays model. Users can also subscribe to specific content, such as the Bloomberg stock market summary, as well as tutorials, eBooks and other podcasts.
The company is also working on a car radio service expected to be launched as early as 2009 in "several global markets across multiple continents" according to Parthimos, who believes the impact of Internet radio will be similar to the introduction of the FM band.
"We believe that the traditional radio model will not necessarily change with the growth of Internet radio take-up through connected devices. In fact, the compelling reason for users listening to radio remains 'programming'," Parthimos said.
"As with the launch of FM in the 1980's in Australia, AM stations retained their place in the radio landscape due to their programming. Advertising will support iRadio content. The model is being defined now, and miRoamer is at the forefront of working with several global advertising and content companies to build an appropriate advertising and delivery model.
Parthimos cites the growth in wireless broadband as a key driver of connected devices, and expects user's desires for compelling Internet content on those devices to drive Internet radio's popularity.
However, on the local front, Parthimos believes that limited availability of suitable products in retail channels compared to countries like the USA, UK and Germany, and expensive and restrictive monthly broadband download fees could stifle the popularity of iRadio compared to the rest of the world.
But the iRoamer platform's popularity will significantly increase once manufacturers begin pushing out devices.
"There are several license and distribution agreements in place with manufacturers in China, Singapore and USA, and the first commercial batch of miRoamer-enabled products is due to begin shipping from July/August."
The screen was particularly good. It is bright and visible from most angles, however heat is an issue, particularly around the Windows button on the front, and on the back where the battery housing is located.
My first impression after unboxing the Q702 is that it is a nice looking unit. Styling is somewhat minimalist but very effective. The tablet part, once detached, has a nice weight, and no buttons or switches are located in awkward or intrusive positions.
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An appeals court keeps religious freedom within decent bounds
On Wednesday, a federal appeals court said that you can’t fire a transgender person just because you think gender is a gift from God that can’t be changed. The case, EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, was brought by Aimee Stephens, a funeral director in Michigan who was fired when she told her boss, Thomas Rost, that she had a gender identity disorder and planned to transition from male to female.
Reversing a lower court decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that 1) the ban on sex discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act applies to transgender identity; and 2) the firing was not protected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).
Rost claimed that he would be “violating God’s commands” if he permitted a male funeral director “to wear the uniform for female directors while at work.” I guess the applicable command here is Deuteronomy 22:5, which reads (in the King James Version): “The woman shall not wear that which pertaineth unto a man, neither shall a man put on a woman’s garment: for all that do so are abomination unto the LORD thy God.”
Of course, that begs the gender identity question: What, exactly, is “woman” and “man”?
On that, Rost’s asserted his sincere belief that “the Bible teaches that a person’s sex is an immutable God-given gift,” and that to let Stephens transition in the job would make him complicit “in supporting the idea that sex is a changeable social construct.”
But in America it is not enough to possess a sincere religious belief. You’ve got to show that your free exercise is substantially burdened by having to do something that in your view violates that belief. In the present case, the court said it wasn’t:
Rost may sincerely believe that, by retaining Stephens as an employee, he is supporting and endorsing Stephens’s views regarding the mutability of sex. But as a matter of law, bare compliance with Title VII—without actually assisting or facilitating Stephens’s transition efforts—does not amount to an endorsement of Stephens’s views…At bottom, the fact that Rost sincerely believes that he is being compelled to make such an endorsement does not make it so.
Let’s be clear. The societal issue here is not with the sincere belief of individuals in commands from the Hebrew Bible like Deuteronomy 22:5. If so, we’d be seeing people being fired for committing adultery, violating the Sabbath, dishonoring their parents, wearing garments that mix wool and linen, etc. etc. etc. The issue is the extent to which those opposed to same-sex marriage and transgender identity get to carve out socio-economic space for the old norms they prefer.
But it’s possible to hold to those old norms without having devout small business owners turn into litigious culture warriors. Here, for instance, is what Andrew T. Walker, Director of Policy Studies for the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, has to say about the transgender debate.
Holding a biblical conviction in this debate means that individuals will find themselves in disagreements with friends, families, and co-workers—and that, however we express ourselves, we will be accused of being haters, bigots, and worse.
At a time like this, Christians need the courage to defend a true vision for human flourishing based on the biblical understanding of being made in His image. We must avoid trite explanations or knee-jerk reactions, but we must continue to say that, since God made us, he gets the ultimate say in who we are. We must put steel in our spines.
But all the conviction in the world won’t matter if we act or speak without compassion. Jesus did not aim to win debates. He sought to love people. So must we as his followers. As we ground our convictions in God’s unchanging, perfect, Word, we must speak with compassion in our hearts.
As I understand this injunction, Thomas Rost should have had the courage to tell Aimee Stephens that he believes gender is God’s immutable gift. And he should have had the compassion to keep her on the job, according to the dictates of the conscience that is hers.
This content is not available for republication.
RNS columns are direct-published opinion pieces. They are not always edited and reflect the views only of the author. |
Q:
Controller actions for home, about and contact pages
I've just started a project and created a pages_controller and within the controller I have this:
class PagesController < ApplicationController
def home
end
end
these are my routes:
devise_for :users
root to: "pages#home"
I created the pages controller thinking I can use it to have a home page, about page & contact page. From my limited experience, it seems that your actions within your controllers should stick to the new,create,destroy,delete,show,index,edit and update
Is it bad to name an action Home, contact or about like I've done above? What do you usually do?
A:
There is nothing wrong with not having 100% RESTful routes in a Rails application. Particularly for your exact use case, which is to collect a handful of "static" pages. You're absolutely on the right track. The only thing I would consider changing would be to break out the contact page to its own controller (ContactPageSubmissions, perhaps), if it has a form on it - if it is just contact information, I would leave that where it is, too.
|
Subhashni Giridhar
Subhashni Giridhar (born 27 April 1965) is an Indian classical dancer of Bharatanatyam and a Chartered Accountant.
Early life and background
Subhashni Giridhar had the passion for dance since childhood and had trained in Thanjavur style of Bharata Natyam from the well known Gurus - ‘Kalaimamani’ late Guru A.T Govindaraj Pillai and later on from ‘Kalaimamani’ late Guru T.K. Mahalingam Pillai and Guru Vasant kumar of renowned Sri Rajarajeswari Bharatha Natya Kala Mandir, Matunga. Learning from the age of 8, she gave her first stage performance – ‘Arangetram’ on 26 January 1990.
Dance career
After her ‘Arangetram’ in 1990, she has been giving several solo performance.
Being a national level danseuse, her specialization is solo recitals.
She has been giving solo performances since 1990 and has performed in several major sabhas / organizations such as Sri Shanmukhananda Sabha in Mumbai (1995) and New Delhi (2016), Ministry of Culture (India), Mulund Fine Arts Society, twice in NCPA in Little theatre and Godrej Dance Academy, four in ISKCON – monthly festival and Janmashtami Festival, Mulund Fine Arts Society, Cultural Festivals organized by Governments of Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, ‘Vividha Kala Mahotsav’ organized by Department of Cultural Affairs, Govt of Maharashtra, ‘Pongal festival’ organized by Govt of Tamil Nadu at Taj Mahal Palace & Tower, and Centaur Hotel, festival under the aegis of Department of Tourism, Govt of Andhra Pradesh at Shilparamam, Regional conference of ICSI, SICA at Ravindra Bharathi, Hyderabad, dance festival of Kalasagaram, Secunderabad and Bombay Andhra Maha Sabha, Mumbai. In the year 2014, Subhashni completed 25 years as a dance exponent. She performed at the Potti Sreeramulu Telugu University to mark this occasion.
She also has set up a BharataNatyam Academy by the name - "Suguna Nrityalaya" in the memory of her late sister Smt Suguna, who mentored her to pursue BharataNatyam in the first place.
The money from this Academy would be forming the corpus of a Trust. The Trust money would be for imparting education to the underprivileged.
Academic career
She is a post graduate in commerce from R.A.Podar College of Commerce, and also a Chartered Accountant. She became a FCA – fellow member of Institute of Chartered Accountants of India from 2003. In 2004, she acquired a post qualification degree DISA – Diploma in Information and Systems Audit from the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India.
She has been conferred the title of ‘SHRINGAR MANI’ and adjudged as best dancer all over India, by SUR SINGAR SAMSAD.
She has been pursuing her academic career with equal dedication and is a practising Chartered Accountant in Mumbai.
Choreographies
Subhashni has choreographed many of her Dance Recitals
She choreographed special dance theme "Shri Krishna Kaarunya" and performed it at Sri Janmashtami Festival at ISKCON, Kharghar, Navi Mumbai and "Shri Krishna Vaibhav" performed at ISKCON, Juhu, Mumbai.
Her recent concept which she gave shape to was ‘Navarasas in the life of a student till he / she becomes a Professional / CA’. The concept, choreography and the performance was appreciated by the audience.
"First time in the history of Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, CA motto and history of CA emblem was shown by me in Abhinaya and Mudras with English subtitles, on CA Foundation day on 1 July 2011."
Philosophy
The reason God made her to pursue her career and her passion (Bharathanatyam), both with the same zeal and enthusiasm was because God had chosen CA to fulfill the financial needs and Dance for her inner Bliss, she says.
The Supreme satisfaction of the inner self while performing dance is unexplainable.
The main reason that She has never made Dance a source of income after being a performer for more than two decades is that, she has always considered Bharathnatyam Dance as eternal and spiritual. When one could get so much of immense self-satisfaction and pure happiness then what else one could ask for from Dance? Materialistic thing like money?
She has dedicated herself to Bharathanatyam. She believes in continuing her art all through her life and train as many dancers as possible who will carry on this legacy in to the future generations, without making it a commercial proposition. She says "If Every dance Performance of mine can motivate at least one person to pursue this rich Indian art of Bharata Natyam that would be my humble contribution to the field of art."
References
Official Website
The Hindu Friday Review
The Hindu Friday Review
The Hindu Friday Review
The Hindu Friday Review
The Hindu Friday Review
Times Of India Article
Times Of India Article
Times Of India Article
Times Of India Article
Article in Hindustan Times
Westside Plus, Times Of India Article
Article in Mumbai Mirror
The Hindu Friday Review
Review in Hans India
Review in Hans India
Review in Hans India
Review in Telangana Today
Category:1965 births
Category:Living people
Category:Bharatanatyam exponents
Category:Indian female classical dancers
Category:Performers of Indian classical dance
Category:Dancers from Tamil Nadu
Category:Artists from Chennai
Category:Women artists from Tamil Nadu
Category:20th-century Indian dancers
Category:20th-century Indian women artists |
1. Field of the Invention
This invention relates to identification cards of the type used as credit cards, bank ATM cards, or for other applications requiring user identification, and more particularly to a card having a special code arrangement which requires an adjustment of the card by one familiar with the code before the card will identify the authorized card holder.
2. Description of Background Art
A background art search directed to the subject matter of this application conducted in the U.S. Pat. and Trademark Office disclosed the following U.S. Letters Patent: U.S. Pat. Nos. 3,399,473; 3,705,294; 4,801,790; and 4,899,038.
None of the patents uncovered in the search discloses an identification card having a primary magnetic code portion located on a non-movable part of the card and a secondary magnetic code portion located on a movable part of the card which card requires action by one familiar with the code arrangement to move one part of the card relative to the other to make the two separate code portions function in combination with each other to identify the authorized holder of the card. |
646 F.Supp. 1077 (1986)
NEW CONCEPT INDUSTRIES, INC., a corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
Comer F. GREEN, Defendant.
Civ. A. No. 86-H-696-N.
United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, N.D.
November 3, 1986.
Hill, Hill, Carter, Franco, Cole & Black, Robert W. Bradford, Jr., Montgomery, Ala., for plaintiff.
Lynn W. Jinks, III, Union Springs, Ala., Melton & Espy, Michael S. Jackson, Montgomery, Ala., for defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
HOBBS, Chief Judge.
This cause is now before the Court on defendant's motion for summary judgment, filed August 13, 1986. The Court is of the opinion that this motion should be denied.
FACTS
Plaintiff, New Concept Industries, Inc., (New Concept) is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Aberdeen, Mississippi. On October 9, 1985, New Concept negotiated a contract with defendant, Comer F. Green, (Green) in Aberdeen, Mississippi for the construction of pre-fab modular motel units. New Concept manufactured these units in Mississippi and installed them in Union Springs, Alabama. During the negotiations, Green had assured New Concept that he would take "all necessary steps to see that New Concept complied with Alabama laws." (Affidavit of Sara Bowen) Furthermore, the one-page contract clearly stated that defendant *1078 would "be responsible for securing all permits necessary for the construction of this building in accordance with all city and state requirements...."
During the installation of the pre-fab units in Union Springs, Green was dissatisfied with the construction materials and workmanship. He withheld payment. Plaintiff filed a lien on the Union Springs property and sued for breach of contract. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract and fraud. Defendant has moved for summary judgment on plaintiff's claim on the ground that plaintiff is a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in this state under the provisions of Ala.Code § 10-2A-247 (1980). This Court finds that New Concept is a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in the state, but for equitable reasons New Concept is not barred from enforcing the contract.
Legal Consideration
Foreign corporations qualify to do business by filing an application with the Secretary of State, Ala.Code § 10-2A-243 (1980). Alabama law provides that a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in this state may not enforce its contracts but can have its contracts enforced against it, Ala. Code § 10-2A-247(a) (1980). As a practical matter, this statute allows an Alabama corporation to enforce its contracts against a foreign corporation, but the foreign corporation may not counterclaim on that same contract, unless it has qualified to do business in Alabama, see Sanjay, Inc. v. Duncan Construction Co., Inc., 445 So.2d 876 (Ala.1983).
Courts have recognized the harshness of this rule and its potential for injustice. The Eleventh Circuit has characterized this statute as penal in nature and because it is in derogation of common law the rule must be strictly construed, see Aim Leasing Corp. v. Helicopter Medical Evacuation, Inc., 687 F.2d 354 (11th Cir.1982); Hughes Associates, Inc. v. Printed Circuit Corp., 631 F.Supp. 851 (N.D.Ala.1986). Alabama courts and legal commentators have criticized this rule for its harshness. See Sanjay, supra, at 881 (Torbert, C.J., dissenting). Note, Sanctions For Failure to Comply with Corporate Qualification Statutes: An Evaluation, 63 Colum.L. Rev. 117 (1963); Note, Sanjay, Inc. v. Duncan Construction Co: Alabama Refuses Equity's Knock and Closes Another Door on Unqualified Foreign Corporations, 36 Ala.L.Rev. 715 (1985). The type of punitive sanctions imposed for violation of the Alabama qualification statute does not enjoy wide acceptance. As Chief Justice Torbert explained in his Sanjay dissent: "Alabama is one of four states which permits a party to elect to hold void a contract with a non-qualified foreign corporation." Sanjay, supra, at 881 (Torbert, C.J., dissenting).
This rule is limited to businesses conducting intrastate activities, see In re Delta Molded Products, 416 F.Supp. 938 (N.D.Ala.1976), aff'd, 571 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1978). Businesses conducting interstate activities are not covered by this rule. New Concept argues that it was engaged in essentially interstate activities. These pre-fab units were manufactured in Mississippi with Mississippi employees. New Concept was only in Alabama for a relatively short time to connect the units to one another in Union Springs, Alabama. New Concept offers Delta Molded Products, supra, as support for its position. The Court rejects this argument.
The rule created by Alabama qualification statutes comprises "substantive" state law; therefore, this Court must apply this rule in accordance with state court decisions, see Aim Leasing Corp., supra. New Concept argues that Delta Molded Products, supra, establishes criteria which would compel this Court to characterize this construction project as interstate activity. However, Delta Molded Products involved the installation and operation of complex machinery; this case involves construction. Alabama decisions are clear that construction is intrastate in character, whereas the installation of complex machinery is interstate activity, see Wallace Construction Co. v. Industrial Boiler Co., *1079 470 So.2d 1151 (Ala.1985). The Alabama Supreme Court has specifically held that the implacement of prefabricated units constructed outside the state is intrastate activity which is covered by the qualification rule, see Sanjay, 445 So.2d at 880. This Court is bound by Alabama decisions which construe Alabama statutes; therefore, New Concept's activities are covered by this rule.
Alabama's qualification statute also expressly includes an equitable exception to this harsh rule. On the facts of this case New Concept falls within this equitable exception. The statute specifically states: "Nothing in this section shall abrogate the equitable rule that he who seeks equity must do equity...." Ala.Code § 10-2A-247(a) (1980). In this case, Mr. Green assured New Concept that he would take "all necessary steps to see that New Concept complied with Alabama laws." Moreover, the one-page contract provided that Mr. Green would "be responsible for securing all permits necessary for the construction of this building in accordance with all city and state requirements...." A reasonable construction of the parties' contract obliges the defendant to file the necessary application to qualify the plaintiff to do business in Alabama. His failure to submit this application should not be the basis for allowing defendant to bar plaintiff's recourse to the courts of this state.
Equitable estoppel promotes justice by preventing a party from asserting rights under a rule of law when the party's own conduct renders assertion of such rights contrary to equity and good conscience, Mazer v. Jackson Insurance Co., 340 So.2d 770 (Ala.1976). The Alabama Supreme Court has denied enforcement of the qualification rule when equity demanded such a result, Day v. Ray E. Friedman & Co., 395 So.2d 54 (Ala.1981). The basic elements of equitable estoppel are:
1) the actor, who usually must have knowledge of the facts, communicates something in a misleading way, either by words or conduct, or silence; 2) another relies upon that communication; and 3) the other party would be harmed materially if the actor is permitted to assert any claim inconsistent with his earlier conduct.
Baker v. Hospital Corp. of America, 432 So.2d 1281, 1285 (Ala.1983). These elements are satisfied in this case. Green cannot cause New Concept to be in violation of the qualification statute and then claim the statute's protection.
Defendant argues that the Alabama Supreme Court has refused to apply the equitable exception on facts similar to those in the instant case. The Alabama Supreme Court in Sanjay would not apply the equity exception even though the party seeking the protection of the statute had offered to "make it `legal' to do the construction work in Alabama." Sanjay, 445 So.2d at 883. The case at bar is distinguishable because of the specificity of the oral representation and the presence of the provision in the one-page contract. If such an agreement of a party is insufficient to bring into operation the equitable exception created by statute, then this Court fails to understand how it would ever operate.
CONCLUSION
New Concept is a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in this state and New Concept's intrastate activities are covered by the Alabama qualification statute. Nevertheless, the statutory equitable exception operates in this case to allow plaintiff to proceed with this action. Therefore, defendant's motion for summary judgment is due to be denied. A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with this memorandum opinion.
|
Joel 2:28
And it shall come to pass afterward, that I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh; and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, your young men shall see visions...
Pages
Sunday, August 7, 2011
We arrived back to Nicaragua in May with a lot on our minds. We spent a majority of the plane ride home, mentally going through our house, pricing and figuring out what we were going to sell. Then we began to talk about how we were going to break the news to our friends, both Nicaraguan and missionary friends that we have become so close to. Oh, how we didn't want to have to do it. If we thought there would be an easier way, we would have found it, trust me! We knew it would be so hard.
When we arrived, we were so glad to be back, but sad because we knew it was for such a short time and we were going to have to say goodbye.
Roger had a conference in Puerto Cabezas, in the northeast, less than a week after we arrived, we also had to get school supplies out to the schools and communities, and we had a clinic in just days. We had a lot going on right away, but also had the impending move in the forefront of our minds. We realized we couldn't think about leaving yet and had to focus. Once we finished those tasks we'd hit it with full force, and did we ever.
I was feeling the weight of all the logistics...selling, packing, leaving. It's always a balancing act, as people leave, to have just enough stuff left behind so you can live but not too much where you are having people in your home up to the last day picking things up; and packing all at the same time. We were talking with some friends of ours one night via Skype (pretty sure God inspired the invention of Skype...amazing) and she gave us a great idea. Sell, pack and get out of your house early, rent a furnished apt. so that you can have time to spend with the people you want to spend your last weeks with, friends. I literally felt the weight of the world lift from my shoulders. It was such a freeing moment. We immediately called some friends of ours, missionaries, who happen to have a guest house. God answered our prayers, they had the house free for nearly 3 weeks so that we could use it.
We began to get serious about this purging thing. Everything must go!!! We could only move back with suitcases and totes. So if it wasn't really important or too big it was sold or given away. Now, don't get me wrong, there were things that were important that we parted with, but it was tough to make the cut :) We were also blessed by some other missionary friends who had teams that were coming down that offered to take some totes back for us; who also happened to live close to where we were moving to...God again!!! I really wasn't for sure how we were going to scale everything down from 9 years of living, and accumulating, to 8 suitcases. God must have known we needed the help. And the kids were grateful too. There were just things that were hard to part with for them, and as a parent, it's hard to ask them to do such a hard thing sometimes. They were already giving up and leaving everything they had ever known.
Well, within a few weeks we had everything sold. It was a very liberating, but sobering realization. This move was really going to happen. I was trying so hard to stay focused on the logistics that when we finally had a chance to catch our breath it hit me hard. We were really saying goodbye to our lives of 9 years. We were really leaving the work in the hands of our new directors there. We were really saying goodbye to so many friends that had become more like family. We were really leaving it all behind.
We spent the last few weeks working with our new directors, Michelle and Eliseo, making sure they were ready to take over the Nicaragua projects and work. We also took every opportunity to spend time with our friends there, both missionary and Nicaraguan friends. We tried to enjoy the last days to the fullest. The goodbyes were, by far, the hardest. Not knowing when the next time is that we would see them. We are still planning on visiting Nicaragua, but after spending year after year with these families, birthday parties, weddings, babies, it just doesn't seem the same to maybe get to see them once a year. It's still hard to think about it. We miss them all so much.
But God had asked us to do something for Him. And we knew it. He had asked us to leave our country behind. To follow Him and His leading. To be obedient in the midst of difficulty, when it wasn't what we wanted. Not our will but His. He had been faithful to us during this whole process. He worked things out before we knew we needed it. Our truck sold in days, we had a house to live in, we were able to bring more suitcases back with us, and just a few weeks before we left Nicaragua we had already found out we had an apt. that would be open for us to rent within 2 days of landing in the States. The hand of God had been over us and seen throughout this whole time. I know it would have been so much harder had we not known without a doubt that this is what God was calling us to do. His peace, in the midst of sadness, reigned in our hearts and minds. Don't get me wrong, there are still days that are hard, but I know God will see us through.
July 10th we landed in the States. Two months and 5 days after we returned to Nicaragua. What a crazy two months they were. Without God, I don't know how it could have come together....but I wouldn't have wanted to go through it without Him.
Saturday, August 6, 2011
As I have laid in bed many a night knowing I need to update the blog, I think, "Where does one even begin". I realize the last post was in March and look back on that date and realize I never knew what was coming.
We arrived in the States, excited, and ready to travel. To see our friends and family. Excited to share all the things that God is doing and extend our gratitude for all those who have made it possible.
Little did we know what God had in store for us.
The trip progressed as normal. We traveled from place to place, realizing that we wished we could stay longer everywhere we went, and realized that wasn't possible. Enjoyed the fellowship, the late nights, card games, and visits. But, there was an underlying theme going on that not many saw.
In Branson, our first stop, the conference was amazing. The Lord spoke and we enjoyed the fellowship as we always do. Then, the Lord said something about coming back to the States. WHAT!?!?!! We didn't see that coming. We weren't even sure if that was the Lord. Can't be. So we just kept that in our hearts, the back burner, and continued our trip. It seemed as though someone would say something about coming back to the States or taking a break, nearly everywhere we went. We both were simmering on that internally. Not even discussing it amongst ourselves. Then one night came where we were receiving prayer and, again, it came up. OK, now this is in a group setting. Can't ignore it. So we went there a bit. Discussed. Cried. Thought.
The days following Roger and I (Rhonda) were in some serious meetings with the Lord and each other. "Was this really His will?" "We've always said we'd stay for the people of Nicaragua." "We love the people." "Our hearts are with them." "They are going through, and are getting ready to go through, such a hard time." "Could this really be?" We cried more, talked more, thought more, prayed more. Later in April we came to an agreement, the two of us, that we felt peace about returning to the States. (Even as I write this I can't believe we did it.)
We kept it between us, for the most part, until early May, when we told family. It was one of the hardest decisions I have been a part of, to date. It was hard for all of us. The kids have never lived in the States. It was a totally new thing to them. They weren't returning to a life they once knew. And we, Roger and I, weren't returning as the people we once were. We've been changed and molded by the time we've been out of the States, 9 years, and the people we have met and the God that has seen us through.
The Euceda Family
We have been blessed to live in other countries and to minister to those whom God has called us to. And we've had the joy of doing it together, as a FAMILY!! Continuing to walk in obedience to God, wherever and whatever He wants us and calls us. |
THE HAGUE, Netherlands -- Japan's annual whale hunt is a commercial slaughter of marine mammals dressed up as science, Australian lawyers argued Wednesday as they urged the United Nations' highest court to ban the hunt in the waters around Antarctica.Australia's case at the International Court of Justice, supported by New Zealand, is the latest step in years of attempts by governments and environmental groups to halt the Japanese whaling fleet's annual trips to harpoon minke and fin whales for what Tokyo argues is scientific research allowed under international law.Australia calls the research claim a front for a commercial hunt that puts whale meat, considered a delicacy in Japan, on plates across the country. Commercial whaling was halted by a 1986 moratorium."Japan seeks to cloak its ongoing commercial whaling in the lab coat of science," Australia's agent to the court, Bill Campbell told the 16-judge panel in the wood-panelled Great Hall of Justice in The Hague."You don't kill 935 whales in a year to conduct scientific research. You don't even need to kill one whale to conduct scientific research," Campbell said.Japan insists its hunt is legal under a 1946 convention regulating whaling.The case in The Hague covers Japan's hunt in the Southern Ocean around Antarctica, but Japan also hunts in the northwestern Pacific."Japan's research programs have been legally conducted for the purposes of scientific research, in accordance with the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling," Japan's Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Koji Tsuruoka said outside the courtroom. "Australia's claim is invalid. Japan's research whaling has been conducted for scientific research in accordance with international law."But Australia argued that the scientific whaling program, under which thousands of whales have been killed in factory ships plying Antarctic waters, was set up simply to sidestep the 1986 moratorium on commercial whaling."No other nation, before or since, has found the need to engage in lethal scientific research on anything like this scale," Australian Solicitor -General Justin Gleeson told the judges.Japan's government claims the research is needed to provide data on whale populations so that the international ban on commercial hunt can be re-examined or hopefully lifted eventually based on scientific studies."This is something we are prepared to demonstrate: That our program is in line with Article Eight of the convention and is not commercial whaling at all," said Noriyuki Shikata, spokesman for Japan's delegation at the court.Shikata also said that Japan would be challenging the court's jurisdiction to hear the case, but did not elaborate on the reason for the challenge.Australia is presenting its legal arguments this week and Japan will make its case starting July 2. New Zealand also gets a chance to outline its arguments July 8.The Sea Shepherd environmentalist group, whose pursuit of Japanese whalers ensures the hunt makes news each year, said that the opening of the case was a victory for whales and vindication of the group's controversial tactics in confronting the harpooners in the icy waters of the Southern Ocean."Without that, trade considerations would have been more important than the slaughter of whales in Australian waters and the Antarctic whale sanctuary," said Geert Vons of the Dutch arm of Sea Shepherd, who was in court to watch proceedings."It's a shame it's taken 10 years, but it is good that Australia is making this public statement by bringing this case against Japan."Campbell sought to broaden the dispute by casting Japan's decision to kill whales as undermining the global consensus to protect the broader environment."There is now broad recognition ... that the environment and its constituent elements are a common resource which has to be safeguarded and managed by collective action," he said.He also highlighted the devastating effect of wide-scale whaling before it was reined in by the 1946 convention, saying that the global blue whale population was estimated at 235,000-307,000 before whaling. A 1998 estimate put the population at "a mere 2,280 worldwide," he said.The court will take months to issue a final and binding decision on the legality of Japan's hunt.Australian officials are hoping that the court will deliver a judgment by the end of the year, ahead of the Southern Hemisphere summer, when Japan's annual hunt begins near Antarctica.Greenpeace campaigner John Frizell said he was impressed by the opening of the case."We have heard very strong arguments from Australia why this whaling should cease and I certainly hope they will prevail," he said. "This is commercial whaling and it should stop."
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I've ported cc9cii BSA changes from https://github.com/OpenMW/openmw/pull/1955/ to current version of OpenMW. There is no impact on Morrowind BSA reading code - the code is only executed if previous BSA reader would reject the file because of unknown header. Linux and Windows builds passed successfully. I've tested the solution on various BSAs from Oblivion, Oblivion mods and Skyrim. I've run new compilation of OpenMW with few mods and started new Morrowind game - no issues found.
The cc9cii changes concerning Nif, ESM and ESP changes were not ported yet.
I had to use library that deals with zip compressed data structures, so I've decided to use boost, as boost is already used in the engine.
It is my first pull request in OpenMW - so please let me know about everything that does not seem right about it.
I wanted to make sure that cc9cii hard work on supporting later file formats does not get lost as OpenMW engine code evolves.
Support for new BSA formats will be useful for: |
Q:
How to add a button on the Google maps in iOS?
I am new to iOS Programming and I have downloaded the google maps sdk for iOS and followed the instruction on their website ( as shown in this link
https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/ios/start
)
and was able to get the map in my application.
Now I am trying to add a button on the screen at the bottom over Google maps for giving an option to the user to go back to the previous screen.
I just know that UIButton is a subclass of UIView and we can make a button appear on a view by making it the sub view of that class. Previously iOS used to use Google Maps by default by MKMapView and I have seen examples in books an on the Internet showing screen shots of apps where a button or a text box would appear on the map. But now just dragging the button in the interface builder doesn't help with the SDK of google maps.
Here is my code:
ViewController.h
#import <UIKit/UIKit.h>
#import <MapKit/MapKit.h>
#import <GoogleMaps/GoogleMaps.h>
@interface ViewController : UIViewController
@property (weak, nonatomic) IBOutlet UIButton *btn;
@end
ViewController.m
#import "ViewController.h"
#import <MapKit/MapKit.h>
#import <GoogleMaps/GoogleMaps.h>
#import <CoreLocation/CoreLocation.h>
@interface ViewController ()
@end
@implementation ViewController
{
GMSMapView *mapView_;
}
- (void)viewDidLoad
{
[super viewDidLoad];
// Do any additional setup after loading the view, typically from a nib.
}
- (void)didReceiveMemoryWarning
{
[super didReceiveMemoryWarning];
// Dispose of any resources that can be recreated.
}
- (void)loadView
{
CLLocationManager *locationManager = [[CLLocationManager alloc] init];
locationManager.distanceFilter = kCLDistanceFilterNone;
locationManager.desiredAccuracy = kCLLocationAccuracyKilometer;
[locationManager startUpdatingLocation];
//Latitude and longitude of the current location of the device.
double lati = locationManager.location.coordinate.latitude;
double longi = locationManager.location.coordinate.longitude;
NSLog(@"Latitude = %f", lati);
NSLog(@"Longitude = %f", longi);
CLLocation *myLocation = [[CLLocation alloc] initWithLatitude:lati longitude:longi];
// Create a GMSCameraPosition that tells the map to display the coordinate
GMSCameraPosition *camera = [GMSCameraPosition cameraWithLatitude:lati
longitude:longi
zoom:11.5];
mapView_ = [GMSMapView mapWithFrame:[[UIScreen mainScreen] bounds] camera:camera];
mapView_.myLocationEnabled = YES;
self.view = mapView_;
// Creates a marker in the center of the map.
GMSMarker *marker = [[GMSMarker alloc] init];
marker.position = CLLocationCoordinate2DMake(lati, longi);
marker.title = @"It's Me";
marker.snippet = @"My Location";
marker.map = mapView_;
[mapView_ addSubview:_btn];
[mapView_ bringSubviewToFront:_btn];
}
@end
You can see that in the last 2 lines I have made the button the subview of mapview and tried to bring it front. But this didn't help. Please let me know what is it that I am missing or if there is another way to do this by using some other function.
Please also do check the screenshot of the storyboard which I have created so that you can understand better what I am trying to do here.
Thanks.
A:
GMSMapView is subclass of UIView so you can add subviews as to any other view
Try this code
UIButton *button = [UIButton buttonWithType:UIButtonTypeRoundedRect];
button.frame = CGRectMake(mapView_.bounds.size.width - 110, mapView_.bounds.size.height - 30, 100, 20);
button.autoresizingMask = UIViewAutoresizingFlexibleLeftMargin | UIViewAutoresizingFlexibleTopMargin;
[button setTitle:@"Button" forState:UIControlStateNormal];
[mapView_ addSubview:button];
It adds 100x20 button as the subview of the GMSMapView, positioned to the bottom right corner. I have tested it and the button can be touched as in any other view
Edit:
Also move all your code from -loadView to -viewDidLoad. -loadView method is never called when using IB to create UI. Docs to -loadView says:
If you use Interface Builder to create your views and initialize the view controller, you must not override this method.
Edit 2:
I believe when you create view hierarchy using Interface Builder, you CAN NOT reset self.view property like you are doing.
Do this in your -viewDidLoad
[self.view addSubview: mapView_];
instead of
self.view = mapView_;
if you are passing GMSMapView to the self.view property, the map is only view which is in the controller from this point. Thats, I believe, the reason why u can't see your IB-created button.
A:
Make your view normally with InterfaceBuilder and to put mapView at 0 index subview :
mapView_ = [GMSMapView mapWithFrame:self.view.bounds camera:camera];
mapView_.myLocationEnabled = YES;
[self.view insertSubview:mapView_ atIndex:0];
Thanks to Raul Clauss from this thread
And you can custom the size of mapView, change :
mapView_ = [GMSMapView mapWithFrame:_mapHolder.bounds camera:camera];
mapView_.myLocationEnabled = YES;
[_mapHolder insertSubview:mapView_ atIndex:0];
Where mapHolder, is a UIView made inside the IB.
A:
I faced the same issue and the fix is very easy, just override this UIViewController method:
-(void) viewWillAppear:(BOOL)animated and put your UIButton creation logic inside that method.
Example:
-(void) viewWillAppear:(BOOL)animated
{
locationButton = [UIButton buttonWithType:UIButtonTypeCustom];
locationButton.frame = CGRectMake(0, 30, self.view.frame.size.width/6, self.view.frame.size.height/6);
[locationButton setImage:[UIImage imageNamed:@"location_enabled.png"] forState:UIControlStateNormal];
[self.view addSubview:locationButton];
}
|
It was late June and retired firefighter Keith Newlin was speeding down the slopes of Snow Valley Mountain Resort near Running Springs. Never mind that the sun-soaked mountain was free of all winter snow.
The outdoor enthusiast was one of the first cyclists to try out Snow Valley’s new three-mile downhill cycling trail. Newlin and his bike zipped to the summit on a $6-million high-speed lift that was installed in December for skiers and snowboarders but converted this summer to carry bicycles.
“It was exciting,” Newlin said of his day on the slopes. “I’m glad they are doing it. Snow Valley has a lot of potential for summer stuff.”
Like other ski resort operators in the West, Snow Valley is no longer relying solely on winter snow to draw visitors to the peaks. The latest season of weak snowfall once again pushed ski resorts such as Snow Valley to add new money-making activities for summer and fall, including zip lines, yoga, downhill cycling, kids camps and mountainside weddings.
“It’s definitely part of what we have been seeing for the last several years,” said Michael Reitzell, president of the California Ski Industry Assn., which represents 30 ski resorts in California and Nevada. “It will only continue to grow.”
Such activities have grown partly because of the unpredictable snowfall over the last few years, a condition many scientists are blaming on climate change. The federal government gave the ski industry a boost by adopting a 2011 law that allows resorts that lease forest land to add year-round activities.
The 2016-2017 ski season was a boon for resorts in the West because of record snowfall and surging visitation numbers. But Mother Nature was not as generous with her snow during the most recent ski season.
California’s snowfall measured only 58% of the annual average as of April 1, the most recent measurement by the state’s Department of Water Resources.
At California and Nevada resorts, ski visits dropped 14% this season — from 7 million visitors during the 2016-2017 season to 6.03 million this season, according to Reitzell. Ski resorts in the West operated for an average of 140 days this season, down from 150 days last season, he said.
“As we have learned over the years, it’s a basic formula: If it snows, they will come,” Reitzell said.
The new high-speed ski lift has been fitted to take mountain bikes to the summit at Snow Valley Mountain Resort near Running Springs. (Snow Valley )
To hedge its bets against further seasons of meager snow, the state’s most popular resort, Mammoth Mountain Ski Area in the Eastern Sierra, plans a summer unveiling of Mammoth Mega Zip, a zip line with what the resort describes as the tallest vertical drop in North America (2,100 feet).
The zip line will allow two riders to fly down the mountain side by side for more than a mile, reaching speeds of up to 60 mph.
The resort is also opening a new elevated obstacle course for kids and a new network of rock climbing routes. The resort also is allowing electric bikes on the more than 80 miles of trails in the Mammoth Bike Park.
“As we see our summer visitation numbers continue to grow, we are going to continue to add activities for all ages,” Mammoth resort spokeswoman Lauren Burke said.
Mammoth Mountain has yet to disclose the fee to ride the Mega zip line, but a pass to use the bike park ranges from $55 to $59 a day.
The Snow Summit ski resort near Big Bear this year also added a summer day camp that lets kids hike, scale a 30-foot climbing wall, play on a trampoline, ride a chair lift and speed around on a mountain bike, among other activities. The camp can cost up to $48 a day, depending on the day of the week.
“I don’t look at it as if we are trying to make up for the winter snow,” said Justin Kanton, marketing manager for Big Bear Mountain Resorts, which includes the Bear Mountain and Snow Summit resorts. “We are trying to provide a fuller lineup of activities for the summer. We are trying to make sure people have stuff to do when they are up here.”
A rider zips down the mountain at Heavenly Ski Resort on the Ridge Rider Mountain Coaster. The gravity-powered coaster is scheduled to be open June 30. (Rachid Dahnoun )
At the Heavenly Ski Resort in South Lake Tahoe, a gravity-powered coaster opened on the mountain in 2016 to add to the resort’s summer activities. But the snow dump in the winter of 2016-2017 was so heavy that it damaged the tracks, forcing the resort to keep the ride offline last summer.
The Ridge Rider Mountain Coaster, which is tentatively scheduled to reopen June 30, reaches speeds of up to 27 mph on 3,400 feet of track, powered entirely by gravity on a descent of 300 feet. The riders can use levers to slow or stop the sleds.
The resort, which hasn’t revealed how much was spent to build the coaster, charges riders $27 each.
The resort also is starting a daily yoga class on a mountainside observation deck, at an elevation of more than 9,000 feet. The classes, offered during July and August, are free but guests who don’t have an annual ski pass must pay $49 for a gondola ride to the observation deck.
At Snow Valley, the six-seat, high-speed ski lift that opened in December can carry 2,600 skiers and snowboarders per hour, moving 1,000 feet per minute, compared with 400 feet per minute on the lift it replaced, said Kevin Somes, vice president and general manager of the resort.
The lift was modified this summer to carry bikes to the summit so that riders can speed on the three-mile trail to the base of the mountain on what Somes describes as a route of intermediate difficulty.
“There is a trend that the whole industry is moving toward: generating revenue year-round,” he said.
Resort management hopes to expand cycling in the next few years to 10 miles of bike trails. Riders who take the lift now, however, also get access to the neighboring Rim Nordic Bike Park, which has about 13 miles of trails, with difficulty levels that range from beginner to advanced.
With the faster ski lift, Somes said he hopes to also offer scenic locations on the mountain — such as verdant meadows — as sites for outdoor weddings.
“We are looking at everything that makes sense,” he said.
[email protected]
Twitter: @hugomartin |
Concentration polarization in translocation of DNA through nanopores and nanochannels.
In this Letter we provide a theory to show that high-field electrokinetic translocation of DNA through nanopores or nanochannels causes large transient variations of the ionic concentrations in front and at the back of the DNA due to concentration polarization (CP). The CP causes strong local conductivity variations, which can successfully explain the nontrivial current transients and ionic distributions observed in molecular dynamics simulations of nanopore DNA translocations as well as the transient current dips and spikes measured for translocating hairpin DNA. Most importantly, as the future of sequencing of DNA by nanopore translocation will be based on time-varying electrical conductance, CP, must be considered in experimental design and interpretation--currently these studies are mostly based on the incomplete pore conductance models that ignore CP and transients in the electrical conductance. |
/**
* Copyright 2014 National University of Ireland, Galway.
*
* This file is part of the SIREn project. Project and contact information:
*
* https://github.com/rdelbru/SIREn
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
package org.sindice.siren.search.node;
import static org.sindice.siren.search.AbstractTestSirenScorer.NodeTermQueryBuilder.ntq;
import static org.sindice.siren.search.AbstractTestSirenScorer.NodeBooleanQueryBuilder.nbq;
import static org.sindice.siren.search.AbstractTestSirenScorer.BooleanClauseBuilder.must;
import java.io.IOException;
import org.apache.lucene.search.DocIdSetIterator;
import org.apache.lucene.search.Scorer;
import org.junit.Test;
import org.sindice.siren.index.codecs.RandomSirenCodec.PostingsFormatType;
import org.sindice.siren.search.AbstractTestSirenScorer;
public class TestLuceneProxyNodeScorer extends AbstractTestSirenScorer {
@Override
protected void configure() throws IOException {
this.setAnalyzer(AnalyzerType.JSON);
this.setPostingsFormat(PostingsFormatType.RANDOM);
}
@Test
public void testNextDoc()
throws Exception {
this.addDocuments(
"{ \"aaa bbb\" : \"aaa ccc\" , \"ccc\" \"bbb ccc\" }",
"{ \"aaa\" : \"aaa bbb ddd\" }"
);
final Scorer scorer1 = this.getScorer(
ntq("aaa").getLuceneProxyQuery()
);
assertTrue(scorer1.nextDoc() != DocIdSetIterator.NO_MORE_DOCS);
assertEquals(0, scorer1.docID());
assertEquals(2, scorer1.freq(), 0);
assertTrue(scorer1.nextDoc() != DocIdSetIterator.NO_MORE_DOCS);
assertEquals(1, scorer1.docID());
assertEquals(2, scorer1.freq(), 0);
assertTrue(scorer1.nextDoc() == DocIdSetIterator.NO_MORE_DOCS);
final Scorer scorer2 = this.getScorer(
ntq("ccc").getLuceneProxyQuery()
);
assertTrue(scorer2.nextDoc() != DocIdSetIterator.NO_MORE_DOCS);
assertEquals(0, scorer2.docID());
assertEquals(3, scorer2.freq(), 0);
assertTrue(scorer2.nextDoc() == DocIdSetIterator.NO_MORE_DOCS);
final Scorer scorer3 = this.getScorer(
ntq("ddd").getLuceneProxyQuery()
);
assertTrue(scorer3.nextDoc() != DocIdSetIterator.NO_MORE_DOCS);
assertEquals(1, scorer3.docID());
assertEquals(1, scorer3.freq(), 0);
assertTrue(scorer3.nextDoc() == DocIdSetIterator.NO_MORE_DOCS);
}
@Test
public void testAdvance()
throws Exception {
this.addDocuments(
"{ \"baba\" : \"aaa ccc\" , \"ccc\" \"bbb ccc\" }",
"{ \"aaa\" : \"aaa bbb ddd\" }",
"{ \"ddd\" : [ \"bobo\", \"bibi\" ] }"
);
final Scorer scorer1 = this.getScorer(
ntq("bobo").getLuceneProxyQuery()
);
assertTrue(scorer1.advance(2) != DocIdSetIterator.NO_MORE_DOCS);
assertEquals(2, scorer1.docID());
assertEquals(1, scorer1.freq(), 0);
assertTrue(scorer1.nextDoc() == DocIdSetIterator.NO_MORE_DOCS);
final Scorer scorer2 = this.getScorer(
ntq("baba").getLuceneProxyQuery()
);
assertTrue(scorer2.advance(2) == DocIdSetIterator.NO_MORE_DOCS);
}
@Test
public void testAdvanceInfiniteLoop()
throws Exception {
this.addDocuments(
"{ \"baba\" : \"bibi ccc\" , \"ccc\" \"bbb ccc\" }",
"{ \"baba bibi baba bibi\" : \"aaa bbb ddd\" }",
"{ \"baba bibi\" : \"aaa bbb ddd\" }"
);
final Scorer scorer1 = this.getScorer(
nbq(must("baba", "bibi")).getLuceneProxyQuery()
);
assertTrue(scorer1.advance(0) != DocIdSetIterator.NO_MORE_DOCS);
assertEquals(1, scorer1.docID());
assertEquals(2, scorer1.freq(), 0);
final float score1 = scorer1.score();
assertTrue(scorer1.nextDoc() != DocIdSetIterator.NO_MORE_DOCS);
assertEquals(2, scorer1.docID());
assertEquals(2, scorer1.freq(), 0);
final float score2 = scorer1.score();
assertTrue(score1 > score2);
assertTrue(scorer1.nextDoc() == DocIdSetIterator.NO_MORE_DOCS);
}
}
|
Online Extras
MORE ONLINE:To read more about local leaders who are leaning in and creating opportunities for women in the Erie community, click here.
MORE ONLINE:To read more food-related stories, get recipes, see food-related photo galleries and videos, click here.
ABOUT THIS SERIES
Leaning Into Leadership is an occasional series that features local leaders who are leaning in and creating opportunities for women in our community. This is the series' final installment. Find more stories at GoErie.com/leaningin.
It all started with the cream puffs. "You just made the batter and put it in the oven and whoop!" said Jean Reed, 57, sous chef at the Lake View Country Club, where she's worked for 33 years. She remembered cream puffs were the first thing she ever cooked.
"That was so much fun. And I'm still making cream puffs."
Reed is something of a rare breed in Erie: a female kitchen manager.
"It's still a man's world out there, and you have to be able to show them that you love this work and you're willing to work hard," Reed said.
Heidi May, 34, executive chef at the Bel-Aire Clarion Hotel and Conference Center, 2800 W. Eighth St., can tell you that many kitchens have changed dramatically, and capable women are as welcome as men on staff. Others, though, are still behind the times.
"The last chef I worked for told me that women were too much drama," May said, adding that she was already working at that restaurant when he came on board. "Most men chefs have been very supportive, but one told me he wouldn't have hired me."
While the profession might still bear the residue of gender discrimination, May said, other companies she's worked for wouldn't have tolerated that chef's point of view.
She said there are other more practical reasons fewer women make it up the ladder in the kitchen.
She and other chefs and instructors said that the physical and time demands of working as a professional chef just don't work for many women who want to raise a family.
"I don't see a lot of applications from females, really," May said. "We work crazy hours, seven days a week, holidays and weekends when most people would want to be with their family."
Family time?
Jessica Law, 24, a chef instructor at the Culinary and Wine Institute of Mercyhurst North East, worked on gorgeous and delicate caramel "cages" that would be served the next day set over a pastry.
As she worked in a Mercyhurst kitchen -- filled with women -- she agreed that professional cooking might not work for family-oriented females.
"I just got married this summer, and the idea of starting a family with a job like that would be conflicting," Law said.
Reed raised three children while working at the country club, but it wasn't easy.
"I worked five minutes from home," she said. "I had the opportunity to work a full day, but take periods of leave when need be."
Michelle Davis, 34, sous chef at Bertrand's Bistro on North Park Row, who is studying to be certified as an executive chef, sees the male-dominated culture changing, too.
"I think people who have children can work in this industry," she said. "Some people have to bend a little bit, rely on family, but I've seen people make it work."
There are other reasons more women don't even want to work in professional kitchens, including physical requirements of standing on your feet and lifting huge bags of ingredients, and heavy scrubbing, work done by everyone in the kitchen.
"You actually have to be physically ready for that," Reed said. After 33 years, she said she's taken up yoga in an attempt to keep her body strong enough to do her job.
Kitchen culture
Aspiring chef Stephanie Cruz-Warner, 24, carefully slid a cylindrical "crab tower" out of a can she used to shape it. The tower included layers of off-white crab meat, bright green avocado and tomato salsa. It was almost too pretty to eat.
Cruz-Warner showed it off to her instructor, who smiled proudly, and then sat down to talk about women in her chosen profession.
To begin with, she's one woman who has no problem lifting a 50-pound bag of flour.
The Mercyhurst North East culinary student, who also works at the Erie Club, is a power lifter. She said she can dead lift 215 pounds.
She said she wants to incorporate her love of working out into her own restaurant.
"I'd like to open up some kind of restaurant with a power lifting side, with a gym that serves healthy food for athletes," Cruz-Warner said.
She said she sees no lack of interest in professional cooking from women she knows.
"When I'm at work, there's not a lot of women," she said. "But when I go to school, there's all kinds of women. I think kitchen culture is changing."
Melissa Ripley, 35, agrees. "My classes seem to have more female than male students," she said.
Mercyhurst North East chef instructor Dennis Dunne, 63, said that in general, his female students are more serious about working in the professional cooking world than his male students.
"It's not that there aren't any men," he said. "I have some excellent male students, but the majority of women who come into this program are more serious about wanting to do it."
He said he thinks that the male-dominated kitchens are quickly becoming a thing of the past.
"Modern chefs have evolved to think differently about women in the kitchen," Dunne said. "At this present time, I think any female that walks into a kitchen has just as good a shot as any guy does, all things being equal."
JENNIE GEISLER can be reached at 870-1885 or by e-mail. Visit her food blog at GoErie.com/blogs/loaves. Follow her on Twitter at twitter.com/ETNgeisler.
Online Extras
MORE ONLINE:To read more about local leaders who are leaning in and creating opportunities for women in the Erie community, click here.
MORE ONLINE:To read more food-related stories, get recipes, see food-related photo galleries and videos, click here.
ABOUT THIS SERIES
Leaning Into Leadership is an occasional series that features local leaders who are leaning in and creating opportunities for women in our community. This is the series' final installment. Find more stories at GoErie.com/leaningin. |
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Month: May 2016
Are you a Letter Inner or Not (Selfish)?
This question “Are We More Selfish Then Animals?” popped into my head while waiting frustrated and bewildered at the junction of my busy road. I counted the cars going past, the 22nd let me out! It took no more time for them but makes a massive difference to the poor sod waiting!
Givers, Takers, and Parasites.
We all experienced selfish behavior ranging from little to huge levels of selfishness, and even from those suppose to love us! We have all experience generosity, kindness, and unconditional acts of love. Are animals any better than us? Lets take a look;
Four main types of interactions between animals including Us;
Altruistic – Animals that behave in ways that reduce their fitness but increase the fitness of other individuals in the population (sacrifice). Extreme examples of sacrifice are shown in protecting young. One example is matriphagy (the consumption of the mother by her offspring) in the spider Stegodyphus. We do not let our own children eat us BUT they can suck us dry, however we would die for them.
Commensalism – Relationship between two organisms where one is helped and the other is unaffected. Example the Anemone fishes (Nemo) or Clown fishes (Fig 1) – live amid the tentacles of the anemones which protects them from predators. Predators are poisoned by the nematocysts (stinging cells) of the anemones.
Fig 1. Clown Fish (Who you calling Selfish?)
Parasitic – One organism, the parasite, lives off of another organism, the host, harming it and possibly causing death. The parasite lives on or in the body of the host. A few examples of parasites are tapeworms, fleas, barnacles, and humans. Parasitic people – those that expect everything and take without giving and hurt us along the way.
Mutualistic – Two organisms of different species “work together,” each benefiting from the relationship. One example is that of the Oxpecker (Fig 2) a bird that eats the parasites from, rhinoceros, zebra, and the antelope. In a relationship Two people working equally towards a common goal.
Fig 2. Oxpecker
SO where does that leave us?
Are we fundamentally self-interested? Studies have found that people’s first impulse is to cooperate rather than compete; that toddlers spontaneously help people in need.
Recent neuroscience studies have shown that when people behave altruistically, their brains activate in regions that signal pleasure and reward, similar to when they eat chocolate (or have sex). So does this mean we behave Altruistically because it makes us feel better therefore we are Selfish?
The evidence suggests we have deeply ingrained tendencies to act in either direction. Our challenge lies in finding ways to evoke the better angels of our nature. And that my friends comes down to CHOICE again.
When you see a poor fellow motorist waiting at a junction to come out- let them out, your feel good (like eating chocolate or having Sex) and your be a Altruist.
AN HONEST LIVING OR NOT!
Many animals work an “honest” living through their size, strength, and hunting prowess to survive. Likewise, we do the same to get what we want in life. If we are lacking in some way, we do what animals do to survive;
Deception, Treachery, and Downright Fraud
A selection of animals have chosen deception, treachery, and downright fraud to either resemble dangerous animals for protection (defensive mimicry). For example the Milk snake (Fig 1). This beautiful harmless Snake has a coloration that mimics the highly venomous Coral Snake and in doing so avoids being eaten by predators, very clever!.
Fig 1: Milk Snake
Some animals pass as a literal wolf in sheep’s clothing to get within striking distance of prey (aggressive mimicry). A strange and rather morbid feat of deception shown by the NimbochromisCichlids (Fig 2) is to lie limply on their sides on the lake bottom. When a curious scavenging fish approaches, the fishy corpse suddenly “resurrects” into a truly lethal predator, consuming the curious investigator. The strange fish are often nicknamed “sleepers” due to their rather creepy hunting habits.
Fig 2. Nimbochromis cichlid (Sleepers)
Survival of the Adapters
Unlike animals, we no longer have predators to worry about that will eat us! But we do, however, have stresses like animals to either blend in or stand out. We can mimic a bad or good behavior of a person either consciously or subconsciously to be like them to impress. This is adapting to a situation so we can to control it. We do this like animals as a survival technique.
We are different.
A positive example of mimicry is emulating a positive role model to make a positive change in your life. A negative example would be a negative person imprinting on you. We are higher thinking animals and this is where the difference lies, the good news is we can control how we react to ANY situation.
Please subscribe to my blog for more updates and incites leave comments if you wish
Change is inevitable and essential. We grow old; our bodies change, we go to school, change schools, we move Jobs, we move home, we can change our sexual orientation, we lose loved ones, we end relationship and friendships, we date new people and meet new people, we have children. The list goes on and on.
The BAD NEWS… Change is out of our control and will happen if we like it or not! The GOOD NEWS… We are in control of how we react, respond and adapt to change.
In this series I will be using my PhD on Neurophysiology and degree in Zoology to draw comparisons with the mighty Cuttlefish (Cephalopod) and other extraordinary animals and how they have evolved to survive and thrive in a ever changing world and how this can help you. Also, I will be using my 49 years of experience in the changing market both as an academic and business woman, and boy do I embrace change!
My Aim is to provide an understanding, some comfort, and strategies that will help you survive and accept change. My wish for you is to flourish in our fast changing society in which ever way YOU choose!.
Cuttlefish change their skin color with elaborate patterns, and even texture, to fit in to their surroundings; to camouflage away from predators or to lay in ambush for prey or dazzle a mate. Can you relate to hiding under the radar and trying to be invisible, either at school, in the work place, when out, or even at home; to not get noticed? Or shown off in front of your peers, classmates, teachers, boss, or friends to impress them with displays of your brilliance ?!
Cuttlefish also use color to attract a mate and warn off rivals (Fig 1). They can also communicate a feeling through color and we also do the same. Another stunning example are the male Birds of Paradise which show impressive displays and plumage to attract a mate (Fig 2). While we do not display the same level of elaborate and intricate skin changes as the Cuttlefish or Plumage like the Birds of paradise, we do wear make-up and attractive clothes to attract a mate, we blush with shyness or sexual desire, we go red with anger or pale with fear. |
Some computing devices (e.g., mobile phones, tablet computers, etc.) may provide a graphical keyboard as part of a graphical user interface for composing text (e.g., using a presence-sensitive input device and/or display, such as a touchscreen). The graphical keyboard may enable a user of the computing device to enter text (e.g., an e-mail, a text message, or a document, etc.). For instance, a display device of a computing device may output a graphical (or “soft”) keyboard that enables the user to enter data by indicating (e.g., by tapping) keys displayed at the presence-sensitive display.
In some cases, the computing device may present a graphical keyboard with which the user interacts by tapping individual keys of the keyboard or essentially gesturing out a word by sliding his or her finger over the regions associated with the keys. In this way, graphical keyboards provide an input method that allows the user to enter characters, words, or a group of words by one or more gestures. As such, a graphical keyboard may allow the user to achieve a certain degree of efficiency by quickly and accurately entering text.
However, graphical keyboards have certain drawbacks. For example, a computing device may receive a series of tap gestures or sliding gestures from a user paying little attention to accuracy. The characters inputted by the computing device, though, may be different than the characters that the user attempted to select. Consequently, the user may need to correct the inputted characters. As such, entering text with gestures using a graphical keyboard may be difficult and reduce the speed at which the user may interact with the computing device. |
Edward James Olmos joins The Predator
First he’s fighting Replicants, then Cylons, now Predators. The Hollywood Reporter has announced that Battlestar Galactica actor Edward James Olmos has joined the cast of Shane Black’s The Predator. Olmos will play a military figure as Boyd Holbrook and his team hunt down the Predator. |
57 Cal.App.3d 521 (1976)
129 Cal. Rptr. 238
KARL STEPHAN MORRIS, Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MERCED COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
Docket No. 2789.
Court of Appeals of California, Fifth District.
April 21, 1976.
*523 COUNSEL
John W. Ellery, Public Defender, and James M. Barnett, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Arnold O. Overoye, Assistant Attorney General, Eddie T. Keller, Charles P. Just and Nancy L. Sweet, Deputy Attorneys General, for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
GARGANO, J.
(1a) The question presented in this proceeding is of constitutional dimensions; it is whether evidence adduced through the execution of a search warrant must be suppressed if the officer who procured the warrant intentionally withheld factual information from his supporting affidavit. We have concluded that the integrity of the judicial system must be preserved no matter how painful the result may be, and *524 that the evidence must be suppressed if the facts intentionally withheld from the affidavit were material and relevant, to the extent that it can be said, fairly, that the magistrate's inference-drawing process was interfered with, substantially.
On June 14, 1975, an unknown person or persons broke into the home of Alverez Arceo in Merced, California, and took a six-string Gibson standard electric guitar and a black guitar case. Two days later Arceo reported the burglary to the City of Merced Police Department; Detective Gary Southerland was placed in charge of the investigation.
On June 18, Arceo informed Detective Southerland that a neighbor, Clifton Robinson, offered to return the stolen guitar for $10. Robinson was known to Southerland as a person on the "fringes" of crime, and believing that the suspect was involved in the burglary, the detective went to Robinson's home and interrogated him. The suspect explained that he knew what the stolen guitar looked like because he had seen it in Arceo's house on several occasions and that he merely told his neighbor that he wanted $10 to find it. Southerland informed Robinson that he could be prosecuted for burglary. Upon further interrogation Robinson told Southerland that the guitar was in petitioner's house; he also produced the stolen guitar case and gave it to the detective. Then Southerland asked Robinson if he knew where to obtain some marijuana, and when the suspect said that he did a controlled marijuana buy was arranged.
On the evening of June 18, Detective Southerland and a fellow law enforcement officer, Detective West, drove Robinson to a location on "I" Street in the City of Merced; West watched Robinson walk through an alley toward the 200 block of 17th Street; then Southerland saw Robinson exit from the end of the alley and approach someone; a few minutes later Robinson returned to West with some marijuana; subsequently, he told the detectives that the person from whom he had purchased the marijuana had 1,300 lids of the contraband in his car.
On June 19, 1975, Detective Southerland obtained a search warrant authorizing the search of petitioner's house for the guitar, and the police executed the warrant on the same day; the stolen guitar was found in the house. The warrant was issued upon Southerland's supporting affidavit which read in pertinent part as follows:
*525 "That on June 18, 1975, a reliable confidential informant advised the affiant that he, the informant observed on the ... premises [at 623 West 7th Street in the City of Merced] within the past three days [a Gibson standard six-string electric guitar, yellow and brown in color]. The informant stated that he has observed the guitar in the possession of a A. Arceo in the past and that he is familiar with the guitar and the fact that it belongs to Arceo. Affiant further deposes and states that Arceo reported the guitar taken from his residence on June 14, 1975 and Arceo made a report to the Merced Police Department on June 16, 1975 in which the guitar was reported stolen....
"Affiant further deposes and states that the aforementioned informant is reliable inasmuch as he has provided information and rendered assistance to the affiant that has led to the obtaining of marijuana during a controlled buy of narcotics."
On September 18, 1975, an information was filed in the Superior Court of Merced County, charging petitioner with burglary in violation of section 459 of the Penal Code; in a second count petitioner was charged with receiving stolen property in violation of subdivision 1 of section 496 of the Penal Code. He entered pleas of not guilty to both charges. Thereafter, petitioner noticed a motion pursuant to section 1538.5 of the Penal Code to suppress the evidence obtained in the execution of the search warrant; the basis for the motion was that critical information in the affidavit in support of the search warrant was furnished by the informant, Clifton Robinson, and that Detective Southerland deliberately withheld pertinent factual information pertaining to the informant's reliability.
On October 24, 1975, after a de novo hearing in respondent court, petitioner's suppression motion was denied even though the People presented no evidence explaining why the pertinent factual information was omitted from the affidavit. Then petitioner petitioned this court for a writ of mandate to compel the lower court to grant his motion to suppress the evidence. Because we were impressed by the importance of the question presented, we issued an order to show cause.
(2) It now is settled that pursuant to a 1538.5 suppression motion a person charged with a crime founded upon evidence adduced through the execution of a search warrant may go behind the face of the supporting affidavit in an effort to prove that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. (Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 *526 Cal.3d 77, 90-95 [104 Cal. Rptr. 226, 501 P.2d 234].) Therefore, an accused may show that the affidavit contains factual misstatements or material factual omissions which could have had an adverse effect upon the normal inference-drawing process of the magistrate.
(3) If the factual misstatements are not intentional and are the result of reasonable conduct, they are retained in the document and probable cause is tested by what appears upon the face of the affidavit; on the other hand, if the factual misstatements, though not intentional, are the result of negligent conduct, they must be excised and probable cause tested from the remaining information. (Theodor v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal.3d 77, 95-101.) (4) Likewise, if material factual omissions are not intentional and are reasonable under the circumstances, the omitted matters are disregarded and the existence of probable cause is tested by whatever appears upon the face of the affidavit; if the failure to include material information, though not intentional, is negligent, the omitted facts are added to the affidavit and probable cause is tested in light of the additional information. (People v. Barger (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 662, 668-669 [115 Cal. Rptr. 298].)
(1b) Left unanswered is the fundamental question which arises when factual misstatements are intentional (Theodor v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal.3d 77, 101, fn. 14), or when material information is omitted deliberately (People v. Barger, supra, 40 Cal. App.3d 662, 669).
The Attorney General argues that Detective Southerland acted "negligently" in failing to disclose in the affidavit all of the facts known to him pertaining to his informant's reliability. He seizes upon the ratio decidendi of the Barger opinion to argue that the detective's affidavit must be tested with the omitted matter included. The Attorney General concludes that when the omitted information is included, it strengthens the reliability of the informant because the affidavit shows that Robinson not only "provided information and rendered assistance" leading to a controlled buy of the marijuana but his statement to Detective Southerland concerning the whereabouts of the stolen guitar was a declaration against penal interest. (See Skelton v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 144, 154, fn. 7 [81 Cal. Rptr. 613, 460 P.2d 485]; Ming v. Superior Court (1970) 13 Cal. App.3d 206, 214 [91 Cal. Rptr. 477]; see also United States v. Harris (1971) 403 U.S. 573, 583-584 [29 L.Ed.2d 723, 733-734, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2082].)
*527 We are not persuaded by this argument. Detective Southerland knew that his informant was totally unreliable. Robinson was a person bordering upon the "fringes" of crime, and the detective had good cause to suspect that he participated in the theft of Arceo's guitar; the suspect had offered to return the guitar to its owner for $10, and he had the stolen guitar case in his home. It was for this very reason that Southerland asked the suspect if he knew where to obtain some marijuana and then proceeded to create an aura of reliability by arranging a controlled buy. Yet the detective deliberately omitted all of these pertinent facts from his affidavit. Instead, he worded the affidavit in the manner to suggest to the unsuspecting reader that the informant was reliable because he provided information leading to a controlled buy of marijuana before he told the detective that he had seen the stolen guitar in petitioner's house. Clearly, the conduct of the detective transcended negligence.
Furthermore, the factual information Southerland omitted from his affidavit was material, in the sense that it could have negated the magistrate's finding of probable cause. (Theodor v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal.3d 77, 96, fn. 11; see also United States v. Averell (E.D.N.Y. 1969) 296 F. Supp. 1004, 1018; cf. People v. Rummler (1975) 44 Cal. App.3d 638, 643 [118 Cal. Rptr. 872].) Robinson did not inculpate petitioner until he realized that he was himself a suspect about to be arrested for the burglary; his statements were in large part exculpatory. Then, the informant agreed to participate in a controlled buy at Southerland's suggestion, obviously, to curry favor with the police. It is conceivable that if the detective had disclosed all of the facts in his affidavit, the magistrate might have determined that the informant was unreliable and his information untrustworthy; the magistrate could have believed that Robinson told Southerland that the guitar was in petitioner's house and then agreed to participate in a controlled buy to shift the blame on someone else until he could rid himself of the stolen instrument.
(5) It is uncontestable that an officer who is seeking a search warrant has a duty to disclose to the magistrate all material facts relevant to the issue of probable cause. (People v. Barger, supra, 40 Cal. App.3d 662, 668; People v. Legard (1970) 12 Cal. App.3d 1006, 1010 [91 Cal. Rptr. 257].) (1c) It is also uncontestable that Detective Southerland failed to fulfill his burden and that the failure painted a distorted picture which adversely affected the normal inference-drawing process of the magistrate. In short, the detective's deliberate omission of material facts resulted in an affidavit that was factually inaccurate (Theodor v. Superior *528 Court, supra, 8 Cal.3d 77, 96, fn. 11; see also United States v. Averell, supra, 296 F. Supp. 1004, 1018; cf. People v. Webb (1973) 36 Cal. App.3d 460, 469-471 [111 Cal. Rptr. 524]), and it became the People's burden "to show proper justification" (Theodor v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal.3d 77, 102). The People failed to meet this burden, and we have no alternative but to order the suppression of the evidence.
We summarize briefly. This is not a case where an officer who prepared an affidavit in support of a search warrant intentionally omitted a few immaterial facts which he reasonably believed, in good faith, were irrelevant or inconsequential. Here the record leads, inescapably, to the conclusion that Detective Southerland not only concealed his own distrust of the informant and the information upon which the distrust was grounded but that he deliberately attempted to manufacture reliability through the auspices of a controlled buy and then concealed this important fact as well. To uphold the warrant now merely because it is arguable that the omitted information does not negate, necessarily, the existence of probable cause, would invite gross abuses by over-zealous law enforcement officers; it is precisely this type of police conduct the exclusionary rule was designed to discourage. (See People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905, 50 A.L.R.2d 513].) If we were to uphold the search warrant under the facts of this case, we would impair, seriously, the independent-judgment-by-a-neutral-magistrate concept visualized by the framers of the Constitution as the safeguard needed to protect the citizens of this nation from unfettered and unreasonable police searches of homes and other sanctuaries. (See Chapman v. United States (1961) 365 U.S. 610, 614-615 [5 L.Ed.2d 828, 832-833, 81 S.Ct. 776, 778-779.)
We do not reach the question as to whether a police officer who receives information from an untested informant may establish reliability on the part of the informant by thereafter arranging a police buy of contraband as was done in this case. Nor do we answer the question as to whether Robinson's primarily exculpatory statement that the stolen guitar was in petitioner's house qualifies as a declaration against penal interest. (See People v. Shipe (1975) 49 Cal. App.3d 343, 352-354 [122 Cal. Rptr. 701].) Under the circumstances of this case, the search warrant must be quashed without regard to the effect of the omissions on probable cause.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent court to suppress the evidence obtained in the execution of the search warrant in question.
*529 CARKEET, J.[*]
I concur in the foregoing opinion and the reasoning underlying the same. I would enlarge upon one aspect of the case.
At the conclusion of the 1538.5 hearing in the superior court, the court stated: "I think under the circumstances of this case, the acts of the officer were proper...." This could be inferred to be a finding that the affiant did not omit the material facts with a deliberate intent to deceive the magistrate, and removes from the case the issue of intentional bad faith falsification, whether by misstatement or omission.
In Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 100-101 [104 Cal. Rptr. 226, 501 P.2d 234], the court held that the presence in an affidavit for a search warrant of inaccurate facts that were not intentional but were caused by unreasonable police activity, such as negligence, requires that such information be deleted and that the validity of the affidavit be tested by the remaining accurate information. The court noted: "We add that as the prosecution is thus barred from relying on negligent mistakes in an affidavit, it is a fortiori barred from relying on information known by the affiant to be intentionally false. Since in the latter situation there obviously can be no question of showing a reasonable belief in the truth of deliberate misinformation, any such statements must also be stricken prior to testing the warrant for probable cause." (Supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 101, fn. 14.) Whether the use of such intentional misstatements should result in automatically quashing the warrant without regard to the effect of those misstatements on probable cause was left undecided in Theodor. (Ibid.)
In People v. Barger (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 662 [115 Cal. Rptr. 298], it was argued that the magistrate's finding of probable cause could not be upheld since, by omission, facts relevant to the reliability of an informant were withheld from the magistrate. The court reasoned that inaccuracies in an affidavit caused by omission of material facts creates the same problem as factual inaccuracies placed in the affidavit. The court said: "The Supreme Court [in Theodor] pointed out that false or inaccurate information in an application for a warrant adversely affects the normal inference-drawing process of the magistrate. (8 Cal.3d at p. 96.) The magistrate's inference-drawing process would also be hindered if the affiant were permitted to `edit' his informant's allegations by omitting unfavorable facts." (Supra, 40 Cal. App.3d at p. 668.) Left undecided in *530 Barger was the question whether an intentional omission of material facts should result in automatically quashing the warrant without regard to the effect of the omitted material facts on probable cause, if the affidavit were read with those facts inserted; in Barger, the court found the omission to be due to "negligence" of the officer rather than wilfulness.
If the omission intentionally were done to create a false image of reliability, the element of reasonable belief in the truth of the affidavit as doctored by the omission would be absent, and under the reasoning expressed in Theodor, as extended in Barger, the missing information, at least, would have to be inserted prior to testing the affidavit for probable cause.
Although this court may infer a finding by the lower court which negates any deliberate bad faith omission of material facts with an intent to deceive the magistrate, the same record (i.e., the transcript of testimony at the 1538.5 hearing) which supports such an inferred finding clearly shows that the material facts which were missing from the affidavit were the result of knowing, or intentional, conduct on the part of Detective Southerland.[1]
One need only to insert the missing material facts in the affidavit to illuminate the obvious fact that the inaccuracies created by Detective Southerland's omissions were due to something more censurable than mere negligence.[2] The testimony at the 1538.5 hearing compels an inferred finding that the omissions were intentional.
*531 Theodor indicates that the problem of inaccuracies creates the same result, however caused: "Regardless of whether misstatements are intentionally false or the product of reasonable or unreasonable cerebration, their ineluctable result is an adverse effect upon the normal inference-drawing process of the magistrate." (Supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 96.) The same rationale would apply to inaccuracies created by omission. (People v. Barger, supra, 40 Cal. App.3d 662, 668-669.)
That an unintentional error can be deemed "correctible" in the manner above indicated now is established law which is grounded upon the statement in Theodor that: "There is no reason to hold an officer to a standard of absolute accuracy in those instances in which the inference-drawing power is reserved for the magistrate who is to issue a warrant, when the officer is only required to reach a reasonable factual deduction *532 in those instances in which he makes the inferences and acts without a warrant. In both cases, the constitutional standard is one of reasonableness." (Theodor v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal.3d 77, 100.)
The same reasoning, however, does not permit of a conclusion that an officer should be permitted by intentional misstatement of facts, or intentional omission of material facts, to create a purported factual portrayal upon which to rest his claim of probable cause.
The evil that can accompany such performance is manifest from an examination of the affidavit in the instant case with the omitted material inserted (see fn. 2, ante). From such examination, it becomes immediately apparent that the magistrate was not made aware of many, very material facts relating to the question of the reliability of the informant: for example, that the informant had lied to the detective about the $10 offer to the owner of the guitar and so rephrased it as to attempt to exculpate himself; that the informant himself was suspected of and accused by the detective of participating in the burglary but had denied it; that the informant only had agreed to make the marijuana buy when he was asked to do so after he had been implicated in the burglary; and that there had been no past experience with the informant to test his reliability.
The foregoing data immediately raises a question as to the informant's reliability and as to the reasonableness of the detective's belief in his reliability, which the magistrate was deprived of evaluating.
While there may be merit in the contention that the exclusionary rule should not be extended beyond the limits to which it already has been extended by the appellate courts, the conduct here criticized is of the type which brought about the decision in People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905, 50 A.L.R.2d 513], in the first instance.
An intentional usurping of the decision-making process of the court in the manner done in this case clearly illustrates the need for a plainly enunciated rule that such conduct will invalidate a search warrant without regard to the effect of the omissions on probable cause.
I concur that the peremptory writ of mandate should issue directing respondent court to suppress the evidence obtained in the execution of the search warrant in question, for the reasons enunciated in Justice Gargano's opinion.
*533 BROWN (G.A.), P.J.
I dissent.
First, I disagree that as a matter of law the record herein compels a finding by this court that the omission of the information from the affidavit was done intentionally and deliberately for the purpose of withholding data from and deceiving the magistrate. The petitioner makes no such contention.[1]
The thrust of petitioner's argument is that where information is withheld from the affidavit, whether intended or negligent, the situation is different from that where information is intentionally or carelessly included in the affidavit in that in the former case such excluded information, if it is material to probable cause, should result in automatically quashing the affidavit. Petitioner does not attempt to make a clear distinction between an intended and a careless omission but argues merely that in either case the affidavit is "constitutionally defective."
By denying the motion to suppress, the trial court inferentially found against petitioner on this factual issue. We are, of course, bound by the factual determinations of the trial court, and we must infer findings in favor of the trial court's determination in support of the order, rather than seek a basis for upsetting it. (People v. Superior Court (Keithley) (1975) 13 Cal.3d 406, 410 [118 Cal. Rptr. 617, 530 P.2d 585]; People v. Superior Court (Peck) (1974) 10 Cal.3d 645, 649 [111 Cal. Rptr. 565, 517 P.2d 829].)
Notwithstanding petitioner's failure to make the contention which is the basis of the majority's opinion, and despite the applicability of the substantial evidence rule to the trial court's order, the majority laces its opinion with such tendentious and argumentative conclusions as "Detective Southerland deliberately withheld pertinent factual information pertaining to the informant's reliability." "Detective Southerland knew that his informant was totally unreliable." "It was for this very reason *534 that Southerland asked the suspect if he knew where to obtain some marijuana and then proceeded to create an aura of reliability by arranging a controlled buy." "Yet the detective deliberately omitted all of these pertinent facts from his affidavit. Instead, he worded the affidavit in the manner to suggest to the unsuspecting reader that the informant was reliable because he provided information leading to a controlled buy of marijuana before he told the detective that he had seen the stolen guitar in petitioner's house. Clearly, the conduct of the detective transcended negligence." "Here the record leads, inescapably, to the conclusion that Detective Southerland not only concealed his own distrust of the informant and the information upon which the distrust was grounded but that he deliberately attempted to manufacture reliability through the auspices of a controlled buy and then concealed this important fact as well."
It is submitted that the above conclusional statements might be warranted if they had been made by the trial court, but the record in this case is such as to preclude this court from coming to those conclusions as a matter of law. The facts before the court are clearly susceptible of an interpretation that would impute only careless conduct to the officer.
If it was a careless omission, as the trial court impliedly found, the case could be disposed of under the persuasive precedent of People v. Barger (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 662, 668-669 [115 Cal. Rptr. 298]. Under that case the omitted material should be placed in the affidavit and probable cause determined based on the included material, thus disposing of the case upon precedent without reaching for the issue of intentional and deliberate omission. An appellate court should decide a case upon grounds as narrow as possible and not reach out for bases not necessary to the disposition or which have not been fully explored by the parties.
If the omitted information is included, it does not as a matter of law render the informant unreliable. This necessarily follows for the reasons stated by the Attorney General.
Secondly, assuming I am in error in my conclusion that this omission was not intentional and deliberate as a matter of law, I would nonetheless affirm the trial court.
In Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 96 [104 Cal. Rptr. 226, 501 P.2d 234], the court said: "However, if a magistrate is presented with false or inaccurate information in an application for a warrant, the *535 inferences he draws from such information are not based on reality but on the fantasies of the misinformed or misinforming affiant. Regardless of whether misstatements are intentionally false or the product of reasonable or unreasonable cerebration, their ineluctable result is an adverse effect upon the normal inference-drawing process of the magistrate." (Italics added.)
The Theodor case dealt with inaccurate included information. People v. Barger, supra, 40 Cal. App.3d at pages 668-669, extended the same philosophy to excluded information. The majority herein approves Barger and concedes that had the information been carelessly omitted, the facts should be added to the affidavit and probable cause tested in the light of the additional information.
From these precepts, it must be apparent that there is not, and indeed the petitioner does not contend that there is, one whit of difference in the effect on the magistrate's inference-drawing process whether the omission is in good faith, negligent or intended. In each case, the magistrate does not have the information which may be pertinent to determining the issue of probable cause.
It is also inescapable that this defect in the inference-drawing process can be cured by adding the excluded information whether the omission is in good faith, negligent or intentional. By adding the excluded information and testing probable cause in the light of the additional information the processes of justice, the defendant, the victim and the public have in each instance been deprived of nothing. On the other hand, if the warrant is automatically quashed the defendant will, in most cases, go free, and society is the loser.
It follows that the only justification for automatically quashing the warrant is reliance upon the necessity of (1) allegedly preventing interference with the "integrity of the judicial system" and (2) punishing the officer.
The former largely meaningless, all inclusive generality is usually relied upon to justify a conclusion where there is no readily recognizable, more specific rationale upon which to base a result. So far as the term may be intended to relate to the regard and respect of the public and the criminal defendant for the judicial system, experience with the exclusionary rule demonstrates the opposite.
*536 That rule has resulted in impracticable and technical hair-splitting analyses (such as that undertaken in this case) equivalent in many respects to determining the solution to that classical conundrum of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. But does the exclusion of the evidence cause such punishment to the officer as to have a deterrent effect upon the officer's future misconduct? While to my knowledge there are no definitive studies on the subject, it is common knowledge that the reaction of the officer and the public generally is that the officer did his job in catching the suspect and providing the evidence to convict but the (expletive) court let him go. The officer is commended the court is condemned. The public is appalled and the victim is shocked. As a consequence, the deterrent effect of rendering the evidence inadmissible has not worked out in practice and has turned out to be a myth, largely because the sanction imposed does not reach the heart of the problem. And until some criminal and/or civil penalty is brought directly to bear upon the officer and the public entity for which he is employed, the deterrent effect will continue to be minimal certainly too minuscule to justify the price the public pays in return.
The realistic, visible and practical result has been to clog our court calendars in endless and confused debate, invoke the derision of criminals who have "beat the rap" in the face of perfectly competent suppressed evidence and to cause the citizenry to have grave concern for the "integrity of the judicial process" and to lose respect for a system whose rules are apparently designed to let criminals go free at the expense of the innocent victim and the public. There are far better and more effective ways to deter illegal conduct by officers, such as a statutory suit for damages against the officer and the public entity for which he works. One such program is explicated in the cogent and forceful statements of Mr. Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents (1971) 403 U.S. 388, 412-428 [29 L.Ed.2d 619, 636-645, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2012-2020].
While the exclusionary rule is still with us, and as an intermediate appellate court we are bound by its tenets, I do not think it should be extended beyond the limits to which it has already been extended by higher courts. As Professor Anthony Amsterdam, who is no enemy of the exclusionary rule, has noted: "As it serves this function, the rule is a needed, but grudgingly taken medicament; no more should be swallowed than is needed to combat the disease. Granted that so many criminals must go free as will deter the constables from blundering, pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity *537 inflicts gratuitous harm on the public interest...." (Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment (1964) 112 U.Pa.L.Rev. 378, 389; fn. omitted.) (See also Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule (1974) 26 Stan.L.Rev. 1027.)
The Supreme Court has already opened the way to a restriction of the exclusionary rule. United States v. Calandra (1974) 414 U.S. 338 [38 L.Ed.2d 561, 94 S.Ct. 613] and Michigan v. Tucker (1974) 417 U.S. 433 [41 L.Ed.2d 182, 94 S.Ct. 2357] manifest not only a growing disenchantment with the rule but also the court's belief that it should not be universally applied.
I would deny the writ.
A petition for a rehearing was denied May 21, 1976. Brown (G.A.), J., did not participate therein. The petition of the real party in interest for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 17, 1976.
NOTES
[*] Retired judge of the superior court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
[1] The testimony of Detective Southerland at the 1538.5 hearing clearly shows that the omitted material facts were within his knowledge, and he gives no reasonable explanation for leaving them out.
[2] The writer of this opinion has attempted to reproduce the detective's affidavit in support of the search warrant, with the missing information placed in it. Such operation produces an affidavit which would contain the following information (facts omitted from the original affidavit but within the detective's knowledge according to his testimony at the 1538.5 hearing, are underscored):
1. A. Arceo, owner of a Gibson guitar, reported on
June 16, 1975, to the Merced Police Department that
said guitar and the guitar case had been stolen in
a burglary of his residence on June 14, 1975.
2. On June 18, 1975, affiant (Detective Southerland)
was informed that the "confidential" informant in
this case had offered to return the guitar to Arceo
if the latter paid the informant $10.
3. Because of this information affiant suspected the
informant of the burglary and interrogated him
about the $10 offer.
4. Informant stated that he has observed the guitar
in the possession of Arceo in the past and that he
is familiar with the guitar and the fact it belongs
to Arceo.
5. Informant stated that he merely had told Arceo
that "he thought he could get the guitar back for
about $10 if he could find it."
6. Informant stated that he had seen the guitar in
the residence of Karl Morris (petitioner) in the
last three days.
7. On June 18, 1975, informant produced the guitar
case for affiant and stated to affiant that he had
received it from Karl Morris in exchange for some
kind of a stereo tape or stereo tape deck.
8. On the basis of the foregoing information,
affiant, on June 18, 1975, accused the informant of
committing the burglary and affiant denied doing
so.
9. Affiant did not personally know the informer
prior to this transaction but on the basis of
general knowledge knew him to be on the "fringes of
crime," although affiant had no knowledge of any
prior criminal convictions against informant.
10. On June 18, 1975, affiant indicated to informant
that informant might be prosecuted for the Arceo
burglary.
11. Because of the foregoing facts, affiant did not
know on June 18, 1975, whether informant's
statement as to the location of the guitar was
reliable.
12. In order to make a test of his reliability
affiant, after informant knew he was a suspect in
the burglary, asked informant if he knew where he
could make a "buy" of marijuana, and informant then
stated that he did know and would make a buy for
the police.
13. On the evening of June 18, 1975, informant made a
controlled buy of a "lid" of marijuana for affiant
and upon his return with the purchased marijuana
informed the affiant that the subject he had bought
it from had 1,300 lids of marijuana in his
automobile.
14. That informant further offered to assist affiant
in getting the guitar back and stated that he did
not want to go to jail for something he didn't do
and that he knew where the guitar was and could get
it back.
15. Because informant had implicated himself to the
extent of revealing his own possession of the
guitar case and knowledge of the location of the
guitar in the residence of K. Morris, where
informant had admittedly visited and seen it, and
because informant carried out the drug "buy"
without any deceptive practices against the police,
affiant believes the informant in this case to be
reliable.
(NOTE: As to other necessary details, the affidavit was in standard form and is not objectionable.)
[1] The most the petitioner has said is: "In the present case, it must be said that Officer Southerland intentionally prepared an affidavit which omitted information of which he had knowledge. (The evidence does not show that the officer realized that his omission deceived the court, nor does it show the extent of his experience in preparing such affidavits.)" Obviously, he intentionally prepared the affidavit which omitted information. However, this is not the equivalent of intentionally and deliberately omitting the information to deceive the magistrate. By petitioner's caveat in the parentheses, he has disavowed any knowledge of whether the omission was intended or was innocent or careless.
|
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Justice News
Former Union Officer Sentenced to 1½ Years for Embezzling over $280,000 in Union Funds
Portland, Maine: United States Attorney Halsey B. Frank announced that Ryan Jones, 35 of Bath, Maine was sentenced today in U.S. District Court by Judge George Z. Singal to 1½ years in prison and three years of supervised release for embezzling $280,865 from a union during a period when he served as an officer of that union. He was also ordered to pay $280,865 in restitution. He pleaded guilty on September 6, 2017.
According to court records, from 2009 until January 2017, the defendant was the Secretary-Treasurer of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge S6, a labor union. The defendant’s tenure ended when he failed to win re-election. In January, the newly elected union officials discovered discrepancies with union finances. The ensuing federal investigation revealed that the defendant made almost 200 unauthorized withdrawals from the union’s bank account, he fabricated monthly bank statements to conceal his withdrawals, he provided the fabricated bank statements to union auditors to deceive them, and he embezzled about $280,865 between May 2012 and November 2016.
The investigation was conducted by the Bath Police Department; the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Labor-Management Standards; and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. |
Q:
Chemoautotrophy in large organisms?
The major nutritional mechanisms include chemoautotrophy, heterotrophy (including parasitism and saprotrophy) and photoautotrophy. All of these modes of nutrition developed first in prokaryotic ancestors, and gradually, through the course of evolution, these prokaryotes formed complex eukaryotic, multicellular organisms. Some of these complex descendants (the majority of Kingdom Plantae) possessed the photoautotrophic mode and some (the majority of Kingdom Animalia, some of Kingdom Protista & Kingdom Fungi) possessed the heterotrophic mode.
My question is, since all the three modes developed quite early in evolutionary history, why didn't any chemoautotrophic multicellular, eukaryotic organism develop? (Or, if they did, why did they not form a wide-diverse group as the organisms with other two modes of nutrition did.)
(One possible reason could be lesser availability of chemoautotrophic substrates, but I have no proof, nor any argument to support this.)
A:
I've been thinking about this question for a few days and along the lines of @ThomasIngalls comment, the simple answer is that cooperation between organisms has such a huge advantage in selection that any chance a eukaryote would become a chemautotroph would simply not adapt fast enough to compete with those that are already holding these niches.
The chemautotrophs I'm aware of are usually archaeabacteria. They are optimized to grow slowly and have a large number of genes that can break down the unusual chemical compounds to grow in an inorganic often anoxic environment. These bacteria have genes evolved from the chemautotrophic earliest days of life on earth. They live deep within the earth, under ground, in volcanic vents. There are animals that live in some of these environments, but its simply too easy for these to use the bacteria that are already growing here readily rather then re-evolve the genes to do it by themselves.
Eukaryotes are already symbiotes - they used bacteria to create ATP and photosynthetically fix carbon to the extent that they absorbed them as mitochondria and chloroplasts respectively. If eukaryotes were under a tremendous amount of selective pressure, some of them might absorb symbiotic chemautotrophs, but without such pressure, it doesn't happen when you are competing against plants with roots and animals that eat for their energy.
Forming systems of organisms is much more stable than having individual species that can do it all. This question is actually similar to other questions that ask why we don't have metal armor, run as fast as cheetahs, etc. Evolution doesn't actually create super animals that are completely self contained. The ones that reproduce the best are the ones that can actually spread out the risk of survival and contribute to an ecosystem.
It kind of makes me think of human beings - the only superorganism on the planet in this regard. We don't really need to compete against any organism - we are in fact killing most of them out there without really thinking about it. That might now turn out to be good for us long term.
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340 F.Supp. 1368 (1972)
UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Henry JOHNSON, H-8407
v.
R. L. JOHNSON, Superintendent.
Civ. A. No. 71-1528.
United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.
March 10, 1972.
*1369 Henry Johnson, pro se.
Arlen Specter, Dist. Atty., Mark Sendrow, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia County, Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
EDWARD R. BECKER, District Judge.
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a state prisoner who is serving a five to ten year sentence following his conviction by Judge Robert W. Honeyman of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pa., sitting without a jury, of the crimes of burglary, larceny, and conspiracy. In his petition, relator claims entitlement to relief on essentially three grounds: (1) that he was arrested without probable cause; (2) that the search of the automobile in which he was riding at the time of his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment; and (3) that the testimony of his co-defendant, Albert Johnson, exonerated him of the crimes charged. Relator has essentially exhausted his available state remedies and his case is properly before us for an adjudication of his constitutional claims.[1]*1370 Since the only issues which we must now decide concern facts which are amply developed in the existing state court records, we deem it unnecessary to hold an evidentiary hearing.[2] Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed. 2d 770 (1963). For the reasons stated herein, we must deny relator's petition.
We shall first consider the question of probable cause for relator's arrest, i. e., did the "facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed [citations omitted]." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102, 80 S.Ct. 168, 171, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959). Accord, United States v. Dento, 382 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 944, 88 S.Ct. 307, 19 L.Ed.2d 299, rehearing denied, 389 U.S. 997, 88 S.Ct. 493, 19 L.Ed.2d 502. Since questions of probable cause must be viewed in light of all the surrounding circumstances, a particularized recitation of the facts is necessary to our discussion. The facts are ably summarized by Judge Honeyman in his opinion:
"On Sunday, January 14th, 1968, at approximately 4:35 a. m., an Officer of the Springfield Township Police was on motor patrol in the vicinity of the intersection of Bethlehem Pike and Mill Road. As he approached the intersection he observed a car starting to pull out of a closed gas station onto Bethlehem Pike. As the Officer proceeded to the gas station the car stopped, backed up and parked. At this time, with the exception of a small light in the gas station, the station was dark.
After the Officer drove into the station and parked in front of the car the two occupants, the defendants, alighted from the car and walked over to the police car. The driver, defendant Albert Johnson, upon request of the Officer, who was still in his car, produced his driver's license. The license indicated that the defendant lived at 4316 Terrace Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. When asked to produce his owner's card, the driver said that it was inside the gas station. He went on to explain that he had had his car repaired in the station earlier in the day and then had gone to Allentown. On the return trip from Allentown the car trouble reoccurred and he had pulled into the gas station to leave the car for further repairs. The defendants then asked for the location of a pay phone and were directed to a telephone booth adjacent to an Acme market which was approximately 100 yards away. The two defendants then walked towards the telephone booth.
After they had left, the Officer pulled his car around behind the defendants' car and noted its license number. He then made a radio call to the County Police Radio Room to ascertain the registered owner of the car. He was told that the car was registered in the name of a Lucille Philpot of Philadelphia.
Upon receiving this information the Officer got out of his car and with *1371 the aid of a flashlight looked into the defendant's automobile. He observed two large boxes filled with between 300 and 400 cartons of cigarettes on the back seat and a five foot length of angle iron, partially covered with ice and snow, in the front seat.
The Officer, after making this observation, drove over to the defendants who were in the vicinity of the telephone booth. He arrested the defendants for larceny of the automobile and for possession of stolen goods, i. e., cigarettes. The defendants were then taken back to the car and the trunk was opened. Inside were found many loose cartons of cigarettes.
The defendants were then taken to the Springfield Township Police Building. The next morning the arresting Officer swore out an affidavit for a search warrant and a warrant was issued by Justice of the Peace Thomas Jenkins. A search was subsequently made of the car. The items seized, the angle iron and cigarettes, were physically shown to Mr. Jenkins but no written return was made on the warrant itself. The warrant and the affidavit were retained by the Police until the Court hearing on the defendants' Motion to Suppress."
While the caselaw has enunciated certain basic standards, in the final analysis, probable cause must be determined on a case by case basis in light of the totality of surrounding circumstances existing at the time of the arrest. Our analysis of the facts reveals a number of ingredients relative to a finding of probable cause.
The suspects were first observed at 4:30 A.M. on a Sunday morning, pulling out of a closed gasoline station; as the officer proceeded to the gas station, their car backed up and parked. The driver, who also represented himself to be the owner of the car,[3] did not live in the immediate area, and could not produce proof of ownership. His justification for his presence at a closed gas station, i. e., that he was bringing the car in for repairs on his return from Allentown, was suspicious in light of the officer's personal observation that when he first saw the car, it was exiting from the gas station and was not entering or parked. Furthermore, the information received by the officer that the license plate (and apparently the car) was registered in another's name, with no apparent connection with the driver, was at variance with the representation that the driver owned the car. As of this point, the officer at least had reason to be highly suspicious that a crime had been or was being committed by relator and his companion.
We do not have to decide if probable cause to arrest the relator existed at this point in time because the presence in the car of the two large boxes full of cartons of cigarettes and the long length of "angle iron" covered with snow and ice, when combined with the other facts known by the officer, clearly created probable cause. However, if the search of the interior of the car from the outside with a flashlight by looking through the windows constituted an illegal warrantless search, then the knowledge gained through an illegal search cannot be used as an indicia of probable cause to arrest. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176-177, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969); Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). But see, Scearce v. Field, 292 F.Supp. 807 (C.D. Cal.1968).
On similar facts, some courts have concluded that there was not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Johnson, 431 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1970) (alternative holding); United States v. Polk, 433 F.2d 644 (5th *1372 Cir. 1970); United States v. Morales, 440 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1971); Gil v. Beto, 440 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1971). Other courts have held that there was a search but that it was reasonable. Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F.Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y.1970). Also, United States v. Johnson, supra (alternative holding). Regardless of the basis for upholding these visual acts, the cases require that the officer have the right to be in the position to have that view. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968). In this case, it is obvious that the officer who was on the premises of a gasoline service station which is open to the public met this requirement. Therefore, we conclude that the knowledge of the cigarettes and angle iron was lawfully obtained by the officer for "what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210, 87 S.Ct. 424, 427, 17 L. Ed.2d 312 (1966); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563, 47 S.Ct. 746, 748, 71 L.Ed. 1202 (1927); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L. Ed. 898 (1924)." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2059 n. 6, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (Mr. Justice Black, concurring and dissenting).[4]
We find that the presence of some 200 cartons of cigarettes on the back seat of a passenger motor vehicle[5] is highly unusual; the normal smoker does not purchase cigarettes in such large quantities. Moreover, where there is visualized in the same car an "angle iron" still covered with ice and snow which indicates that it had been used very recently (for there was snow on the ground at the time), the point is reached when a group of facts, no one of which would constitute probable cause, but each one of which is highly suspicious, fits together to cement the pattern. In our view, the combined and collated facts are such as would reasonably lead a prudent officer to believe that a felony has been committed. Having found that probable cause existed for the warrantless arrest of relator, we must determine if the warrantless search at the scene and the warrantless search and seizure at the police station comport with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.[6]
We disagree with the characterization that the trial judge and the relator have given the searches and seizure involved in this case. They both have described it as a search and seizure incident to arrest. Such a characterization of the issue, if accurate, would invalidate the seizure of the contraband at the police station for "`[o]nce an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to arrest.'" Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1979, 26 L.Ed.2d *1373 419 (1970), citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964). Moreover, the search incident to arrest theory might not support the search of the trunk at the gas station, since the relator was under arrest and in custody at the parking lot across the street from the gas station where the car was located. However, as we shall see infra, we are not confronted with the thorny problems attendant to the search incident to arrest theory, for the recent case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, reaffirms the principles of automobile searches as first enunciated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).[7]
Coolidge makes clear that the warrantless search of an automobile must meet two requirements (1) probable cause to search; and (2) "exigent circumstances."[8] The first requirement is satisfied if the officer has probable cause to believe that contraband, weapons or evidence of a crime[9] will be found in the car. Moreover, the right to search is not determined by the right to arrest.
"The Court [in Carroll] also noted that the search of an auto on probable cause proceeds on a theory wholly different from that justifying the search incident to an arrest:
`The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the arresting officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law.'" Chambers v. Maroney, supra, 399 U.S. at 49, 90 S.Ct. at 1980, citing Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S. at 158-159, 45 S.Ct. 280.
Therefore, we are not bound by the spatial limitation imposed by the search incident to arrest theory, except as it relates to the second requirement the presence of "exigent circumstances." But as for the probable cause (the first requirement), the circumstances that give rise to probable cause for arrest are often (as they are here) the same that will furnish probable cause for a search.[10] Chambers v. Maroney, supra, 399 U.S. at 47, n. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1975. We, therefore, conclude that the arresting officer *1374 had probable cause to conduct an immediate warrantless search of the automobile.
Having found that the arresting officer had probable cause to search, we must next decide if "exigent circumstances" existed for "no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent `exigent circumstances.'" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 91 S.Ct. at 2039.[11] An examination of Coolidge is illustrative for this purpose. While the Court in Coolidge conceded that the arresting officers had probable cause to search the defendant's auto while it was parked in his driveway, it found no "exigent circumstances." The following quotation from Coolidge will not only validate the court's conclusion, but will also highlight some of the types of situations constituting "exigent circumstances" sufficient to justify an automobile search.
"In this case, the police had known for some time of the probable role of the Pontiac car in the crime. Coolidge was aware that he was a suspect in the Mason murder, but he had been extremely cooperative throughout the investigation, and there was no indication that he meant to flee. He had already had ample opportunity [about 4 weeks] to destroy any evidence he thought incriminating. There is no suggestion that, on the night in question, the car was being used for any illegal purpose, and it was regularly parked in the driveway of the house. The opportunity for search was thus hardly `fleeting.' The objects which the police are assumed to have had probable cause to search for in the car *1375 were neither stolen nor contraband nor dangerous.
... There was no way in which he could conceivably have gained access to the automobile after the police arrived on his property. When Coolidge had been taken away, the police informed Mrs. Coolidge, the only other adult occupant of the house, that she and her baby must spend the night elsewhere and that she could not use either of the Coolidge cars. Two police officers then drove her in a police car to the house of a relative in another town, and they stayed with her there until around midnight, long after the police had had the Pontiac towed to the station house. The Coolidge premises were guarded throughout the night by two policemen.
The word `automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears. And surely there is nothing in this case to invoke the meaning and purpose of the rule of Carroll v. United States no alerted criminal bent on flight, no fleeting opportunity on an open highway after a hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods or weapons, no confederates waiting to move the evidence, not even the inconvenience of a special police detail to guard the immobilized automobile." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 91 S.Ct. at 2035-2036.
It is readily apparent why the court concluded that there were no "exigent circumstances" to justify a warrantless search or seizure.[12]
However, contrary to Coolidge, the facts of this case present numerous kinds of the "exigent circumstances" enumerated there. The car was stopped on a public thoroughfare and thus movable. The arresting officer had probable cause to believe that contraband was contained in the auto. Obtaining a warrant would have necessitated "the inconvenience of a special police detail to guard the immobilized automobile." When the suspects went across the street to use the telephone, they may have been alerting a confederate to come and move the car or remove the contraband, or other confederates may have been in the vicinity, armed or otherwise ready for ambush.
We conclude that the warrantless search at the gas station was lawful because the officer's probable cause to search was accompanied by "exigent circumstances."
This does not end our discussion, however. We must decide if the warrantless search and seizure of the cigarettes, "angle iron", lighter fluid, etc., at the police station comports with the Fourth Amendment standards. In that regard, we are governed by Chambers v. Maroney, supra.
In Chambers, it was argued, in circumstances similar to the present ones, that when an arrest is made in a car on the open highway, and the car and the accused are transported to the police station, the question of probable cause to search the car should be submitted to a detached magistrate in the form of a search warrant. The car is no longer movable and the suspects are in custody. In short, it was contended that all of the "exigent circumstances" which justify a warrantless search on the highway no longer obtain at the police station. The court rejected this argument and held that when the initial intrusion is permissible under Carroll, i. e., when there are probable cause and "exigent circumstances" necessary to *1376 justify a warrantless search of the car on the highway, a subsequent search made at the station house is also permissible.
"For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search [at the station house] without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Chambers v. Maroney, supra, 399 U.S. at 52, 90 S.Ct. at 1981, 26 L.Ed.2d 419.
Thus, the touchstone of the court's holding is probable cause.[13] The Court reasons that a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights are adequately protected if probable cause exists at the time that the automobile is stopped; the same probable cause to search is present when an immediate search is conducted at the station house. We conclude that the search and seizure at the police station were lawful and reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that evidence was properly admitted at trial.[14]
The relator's final contention is that his co-defendant's testimony exonerated the relator from any complicity in the crime. Such matters of credibility must be left to the trial judge or jury and are not properly before this court to consider in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254; Trujillo v. Tinsley, 333 F.2d 185 (10th Cir. 1964); Judy v. Pepersack, 284 F.2d 443 (4th Cir. 1960); United States ex rel. Rooney v. Ragen, 173 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1949); United States ex rel. Williams v. Myers, 196 F.Supp. 280 (E.D.Pa.1961).
NOTES
[1] Following his conviction, relator moved for a new trial and for arrest of judgment. His motions were heard by the Court of Common Pleas, en banc, and were denied per curiam on April 29, 1969. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed his conviction per curiam on February 5, 1970, Commonwealth v. Johnson, 216 Pa.Super. 785, 261 A.2d 102.
In his petition, petitioner alleged that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had "Denied Per Curiam" his Petition for Allowance of Appeal. We accepted this allegation and proceeded with the research and writing of this opinion. Just prior to filing, we learned from the Prothonotaries of the Superior and Supreme Courts that no such appeal had been taken. We feel that justice would not be best served by dismissing this petition, thereby requiring the petitioner to seek further relief in state court with the probable eventual filing of a second petition for writ of habeas corpus. Two considerations militate against dismissal at this juncture for failure to exhaust:
(1) the unlikely success of a petition to appeal nunc pro tunc in state court and, even if granted, the unlikely success of that appeal in light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's unfavorable ruling on the co-defendant's timely appeal; and
(2) the fact that "[t]he rule of exhaustion `is not one defining power but one which relates to the appropriate exercise of power.' [citations omitted]." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420, 83 S.Ct. 822, 839, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963).
Accordingly, we have reached the merits of relator's petition.
[2] The record is comprised of testimony taken at the pretrial motion to suppress evidence (which was denied) and at the trial itself.
[3] From the record, it is apparent that the driver consistently referred to the car as "his" car, although the officer never directly asked him if he actually owned the car.
[4] Our discussion of this point would not be complete without some reference to the opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). Mr. Justice Stewart (with Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall concurring in that portion of the opinion) presented a thorough discussion of the "plain view" exception to the warrant requirement. A careful reading of that discussion discloses that it is unapplicable to this part of our case. The thrust of Justice Stewart's discussion concerns the seizure of evidence or contraband after a search is already in progress. Here, we are not concerned with the seizure of the cartons of cigarettes, but whether the knowledge of its presence in the car was lawfully obtained by the officer, which knowledge can be added to other facts otherwise lawfully obtained in order to constitute probable cause for arrest.
[5] 375 to 400 cartons were seized from the back seat and the trunk of the car. At trial, it was estimated that the majority of the cartons were contained in boxes located on the back seat.
[6] Both searches must be judged by exceptions to the warrant requirements since the subsequently-obtained search warrant is conceded to be defective because the police failed to return the warrant and affidavit to the Justice of the Peace.
[7] See also, Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 51 S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629 (1931); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 59 S.Ct. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151 (1938); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970).
[8] "[Our] legal system ... regards warrantless searches as `per se unreasonable' in the absence of `exigent circumstances.'" Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2040 (1971).
[9] See, Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782.
[10] There are circumstances where probable cause to arrest exists but probable cause to search is lacking. In Preston v. United States, supra, the defendants were arrested for vagrancy. While the court found that the arrest was valid, there could be no probable cause to search because there are no fruits or instrumentalities of the "crime" or vagrancy subject to seizure. Likewise, in Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Co., 391 U.S. 216, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 20 L.Ed.2d 538, the court found that there was no probable cause to search a car, the occupants of which had been arrested for reckless driving. The court stated that the Carroll line of cases insisted that the searching officers have "`probable cause' to believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless search." Id. at 221, 88 S.Ct. at 1475.
It should be noted that probable cause to believe that an automobile is stolen apparently will justify an immediate warrantless search. Preston v. United States, supra, 376 U.S. at 367-368, 84 S.Ct. 881. See also, Cooper v. State of California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967).
There may be situations where an officer has probable cause to stop an automobile on the highway and conduct a warrantless search, but he does not have probable cause to arrest. Such a situation would exist when the police have received information from a reliable informant that the fruits of a recent crime are hidden in a particular car but the same information exonerates the occupants of the car.
[11] The Carroll line of cases are often cited to justify a distinction between an automobile and a home in terms of circumstances allowing a warrantless search. Chambers v. Maroney, supra, 399 U.S. at 48, 90 S.Ct. 1975. This concept has spawned what is called the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement. In a sense, such language has only clouded the real issues vis-a-vis automobile searches, for in terms of pure legal issues there is no "automobile exception." As stated previously, automobiles, like homes or offices, cannot be searched without a warrant except on probable cause and when accompanied by "exigent circumstances." As we see it, then, the standard to be applied is essentially the same regardless of the object to be searched. What has created the distinction is what normally inheres in the very nature of the object searched and not the application of different standards. Generally, courts have presumed the existence of "exigent circumstances" when the validity of an automobile search is questioned for "the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained" Chambers v. Maroney, supra, at 51, 90 S.Ct. at 1981. On the other hand, courts have generally presumed that there are no "exigent circumstances" to justify a warrantless search of a home or office.
This is not to suggest that the stringent standards for a warrantless search would never allow a warrantless search of a home or office, but it is a great deal more difficult to sustain the existence of "exigent circumstances" in such a situation. Likewise, we do not suggest that "exigent circumstances" are always present in searches of automobiles.
"Neither Carroll, supra, nor other cases in this Court require or suggest that in every conceivable circumstance the search of an auto even with probable cause may be made without the extra protection for privacy that a warrant affords." Chambers v. Maroney, supra at 50, 90 S.Ct. at 1980.
We feel that this language infers what we are here saying, i. e., that it is at least difficult to sustain the nonexistence of "exigent circumstances" in automobile searches. We do not conclude that any search of an automobile with probable cause is per se reasonable (see, Mr. Justice Stewart's characterization of the concurring and dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice White, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 91 S.Ct. at 2045), only that "exigent circumstances" are far more likely to be present in automobile searches than in house searches.
[12] In fact, Coolidge is almost sui generis because of the unusual set of circumstances, and we do not feel that it has disturbed, in any way, the law of automobile searches as enunciated in Carroll and its progeny; it is mainly the fruition of the warning in Chambers (see n. 11) that we cannot dispense with the search warrant in every automobile search. Notwithstanding Coolidge, the existence of "exigent circumstances" accompanying automobile searches is still the normal rule but that determination must be made in each case after reviewing all of the surrounding circumstances.
[13] The court in Chambers is not unmindful of the "exigent circumstances" requirement of the warrantless search at the station house. However, the court takes a pragmatic approach to the problem.
"The probable-cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the mobility of the car unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured. In that event there is little to choose in terms of practical consequences between an immediate search [at the station house] without a warrant and the car's immobilization until a warrant is obtained." Chambers v. Maroney, supra at 52, 90 S.Ct. at 1981.
[14] It appears from the court's discussion that the search at the station house must be "immediate." It is possible that this qualification will pose line-drawing problems in future cases, but we are not presented with such problems here. As pointed out in Coolidge, 91 S.Ct. at n. 20, the search in Chambers was conducted "many hours" after the car had been removed to the station house. In the present case, the relator was stopped at 4:30 a. m., Sunday morning, and the search and seizure was started at the police station at 12:30 p. m., Sunday afternoon. Thus, the search and seizure in our case appears to be as "immediate" as it was in Chambers.
|
GT Advanced Technologies Inc. (NASDAQ: GTAT) (the “Company”) today announced the pricing of $205 million aggregate principal amount of its 3.00% Convertible Senior Notes due 2017. The Company has granted the underwriters an option to purchase up to an additional $15 million aggregate principal amount of the notes from the Company.
The notes will mature on October 1, 2017, unless repurchased or converted in accordance with their terms prior to such date, and will bear interest at a rate of 3.00% per year, payable semiannually in arrears on April 1 and October 1 of each year, beginning on April 1, 2013. The notes will be convertible, under certain circumstances, into cash, shares of the Company’s common stock, or a combination of both, at the Company’s election, at an initial conversion rate of 129.7185 shares of the Company’s common stock per $1,000 principal amount of notes, which is equivalent to an initial conversion price of approximately $7.71 per share of the Company’s common stock. The Company will not have the right to redeem the notes prior to maturity.
The Company has also entered into convertible note hedge transactions with certain financial institutions, some of which are affiliates of the underwriters (the “Option Counterparties”) , which are intended to reduce its exposure under the notes to future increases in the price of the Company’s common stock. The Company has also entered into separate warrant transactions with the Option Counterparties, and the warrants have an exercise price that is approximately 67.5% higher than the closing price per share of the Company’s common stock on September 24, 2012. The issuance of the warrants could have a dilutive effect on the Company’s common stock to the extent that the market price exceeds the exercise price of the warrants. If the underwriters exercise their option to purchase additional notes, the Company may enter into additional convertible note hedge transactions and additional warrant transactions with the Option Counterparties.
The Company estimates that the net proceeds of this offering will be $198.3 million (or $212.9 million if the underwriters’ option to purchase additional notes is exercised in full), after deducting the underwriters’ discounts and commissions and estimated offering expenses. The Company expects to use approximately $15.2 million of the net proceeds from the offering to pay the cost of the convertible note hedge transactions (after such cost is partially offset by the proceeds to the Company from the sale of the warrants in the warrant transactions). The Company intends to use the remainder of the net proceeds of the offering for general corporate purposes, which may include the acquisition of companies or businesses, repayment and refinancing of debt, working capital and capital expenditures.
In connection with the convertible note hedge transactions and the separate warrant transactions, the Option Counterparties (or their affiliates) that will be parties to those transactions have advised the Company that they expect to enter into various derivative transactions in the Company’s common stock, and may purchase and sell the Company’s common stock in secondary market transactions, concurrently with or shortly after the pricing of the notes. This activity could increase (or reduce the size of any decrease in) the market price of the Company’s common stock or the notes at that time. In addition, the Option Counterparties or affiliates thereof may modify their hedge positions by entering into or unwinding various derivatives with respect to the Company’s common stock and/or purchasing or selling the Company’s common stock or other securities of the Company in secondary market transactions following the pricing of the notes and prior to the expected maturity of the notes (and are likely to do so during any observation period related to a conversion of notes). This activity could also cause or avoid an increase or a decrease in the market price of the Company’s common stock.
This press release shall not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy these securities, nor shall there be any sale of these securities, in any state in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such state.
UBS Investment Bank, BofA Merrill Lynch and Credit Suisse will act as joint book-running managers for the offering. The issuer has filed a registration statement (including a base prospectus and related preliminary prospectus supplement) with the Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC, for the offering. Before you invest, you should read the preliminary prospectus supplement, the accompanying prospectus and the other documents the issuer has filed with the SEC for more complete information about the issuer and the offering. You may get these documents for free by visiting EDGAR on the SEC web site at www.sec.gov. Alternatively, the issuer, the underwriters or any dealer participating in the offering will arrange to send you the preliminary prospectus supplement and the accompanying prospectus if you request them by contacting UBS Investment Bank, Attn: Prospectus Department, 299 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10171 or by calling (888) 827-7275, by contacting BofA Merrill Lynch, Attn: Prospectus Department, 222 Broadway, 7th Floor, New York, NY 10038, by calling (866) 500-5408 or by emailing [email protected] or by contacting Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Attn: Prospectus Department, One Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10010, by calling (800) 221-1037 or by emailing [email protected].
About GT Advanced Technologies Inc.
GT Advanced Technologies Inc. is a global provider of polysilicon production technology, and sapphire and silicon crystalline growth systems and materials for the solar, LED and other specialty markets. The company's products and services allow its customers to optimize their manufacturing environments and lower their cost of ownership. For additional information please visit www.gtat.com.
Forward-Looking Statements
This press release contains forward-looking statements regarding our planned offer and sale of senior convertible notes and the use of the net proceeds from any such sale. We cannot be sure that we will complete the offering or, if we do, on what terms we will complete it.Forward-looking statements are based on current beliefs and expectations and are subject to inherent risks and uncertainties, including those discussed under the caption “Risk Factors” in the prospectus and prospectus supplement.In addition, management retains broad discretion with respect to the allocation of the net proceeds of this offering.The forward-looking statements speak only as of the date of this release, and GT Advanced Technologies Inc. is under no obligation to, and expressly disclaims any such obligation to, update or alter its forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise. |
Q:
Checking if an attribute exists in a shortcode
I've written a small plugin that spits out html for a button. It works great, except for one thing: If the user doesn't specify an image, the image appears broken. Is there a way for me to check and see if the user has specified an image, and only print the image code if that's the case?
Here's my plugin code:
function button_shortcode($args) {
return "<a class=\"button\" href=\"" . $args["url"] . "\"><img alt=\"" . $args["bigtext"] . "\" class=\"alignleft\" src=\"" . $args["img"] . "\" /><small>" . $args["smalltext"] . "</small>" . $args["bigtext"] . "</a>";
}
add_shortcode("button", "button_shortcode");
Here's the shortcode:
[button url="http://www.example.com/" img="/path/to/image.png" smalltext="Smaller Text" bigtext="Bigger Text"]
A:
Okay, I've re-written the function so that it does the following:
checks that your array values are set before using them. You can't always be sure they'll be there.
if the image is empty, it returns with an error message. Not sure if this is what you want, but you can just remove it.
first creates your image html.
then, if there's a URL specified, it wraps up the image in your link HTML. If not, it'll just return your image HTML.
Note the way I've created your HTML. Breaking and opening strings and escaping quotes etc. is messy and difficult to read. Use single quotes when constructing HTML strings so you can use double-quotes without escaping them.
I've also used sprintf() and then substitute each piece I want. Much easier to read, and modify later.
Hope it helps!
function button_shortcode($args) {
if ( empty( $args['img'] ) ) {
return 'Error - no image source was specified';
}
$sBigText = isset( $args['bigtext'] )? $args['bigtext'] : '';
$sSmallText = isset( $args['smalltext'] )? $args['smalltext'] : '';
$sHtmlToReturn = sprintf( '<img alt="%s" class="alignleft" src="%s" /><small>%s</small>%s', $sBigText, $args['img'], $sSmallText, $sBigText );
if ( !empty( $args['url'] ) ) {
$sHtmlToReturn = sprintf( '<a class="button" href="%s">%s</a>', $args['url'], $sHtmlToReturn );
}
return $sHtmlToReturn;
}
Paul.
A:
Borek pointed in the right direction, here's my fine code*:
function button_shortcode($attributes, $content) {
if ($attributes["image"] != "") {
$img = "<img alt=\"" . $content . "\" class=\"alignleft\" src=\"" . $attributes["image"] . "\" />";
} else {
$img = "";
}
if ($attributes["intro"] != "") {
$intro = "<small>" . $attributes["intro"] . "</small>";
}
return "<a class=\"button\" href=\"" . $attributes["link"] . "\">" . $img . $intro . $content . "</a>";
}
add_shortcode("button", "button_shortcode");
*Note: I did change some of the attribute names and stuff as well, but that wasn't necessary.
|
National differences in environmental concern and performance are predicted by country age.
There are obvious economic predictors of ability and willingness to invest in environmental sustainability. Yet, given that environmental decisions represent trade-offs between present sacrifices and uncertain future benefits, psychological factors may also play a role in country-level environmental behavior. Gott's principle suggests that citizens may use perceptions of their country's age to predict its future continuation, with longer pasts predicting longer futures. Using country- and individual-level analyses, we examined whether longer perceived pasts result in longer perceived futures, which in turn motivate concern for continued environmental quality. Study 1 found that older countries scored higher on an environmental performance index, even when the analysis controlled for country-level differences in gross domestic product and governance. Study 2 showed that when the United States was framed as an old country (vs. a young one), participants were willing to donate more money to an environmental organization. The findings suggest that framing a country as a long-standing entity may effectively prompt proenvironmental behavior. |
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