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Evaluation datasets 27

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "2000 WL 375242, at *5", "parenthetical": "rebuttal shown where alleged recipient \"established a regular practice of logging certified articles delivered to the office, which includes recording the article number, name of sender, and addressee,\" and there was \"no record in the log book\" indicating receipt", "sentence": "See Robinson, 228 B.R. at 82 (presumption of receipt was not rebutted by affidavit stating that all mail was filed, and the file did not contain the notice at issue); Ms. Interpret, 222 B.R. at 414 (no evidence of “standardized sorting and routing procedures” to rebut presumption of receipt); cf. Hogarth, No. 97 Civ. 0625, 2000 WL 375242 at *5 (rebuttal shown where alleged recipient “established a regular practice of logging certified articles delivered to the office, which includes recording the article number, name of sender, and addressee,” and there was “no record in the log book” indicating receipt)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "228 B.R. 82, 82", "parenthetical": "presumption of receipt was not rebutted by affidavit stating that all mail was filed, and the file did not contain the notice at issue", "sentence": "See Robinson, 228 B.R. at 82 (presumption of receipt was not rebutted by affidavit stating that all mail was filed, and the file did not contain the notice at issue); Ms. Interpret, 222 B.R. at 414 (no evidence of “standardized sorting and routing procedures” to rebut presumption of receipt); cf. Hogarth, No. 97 Civ. 0625, 2000 WL 375242 at *5 (rebuttal shown where alleged recipient “established a regular practice of logging certified articles delivered to the office, which includes recording the article number, name of sender, and addressee,” and there was “no record in the log book” indicating receipt)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "222 B.R. 414, 414", "parenthetical": "no evidence of \"standardized sorting and routing procedures\" to rebut presumption of receipt", "sentence": "See Robinson, 228 B.R. at 82 (presumption of receipt was not rebutted by affidavit stating that all mail was filed, and the file did not contain the notice at issue); Ms. Interpret, 222 B.R. at 414 (no evidence of “standardized sorting and routing procedures” to rebut presumption of receipt); cf. Hogarth, No. 97 Civ. 0625, 2000 WL 375242 at *5 (rebuttal shown where alleged recipient “established a regular practice of logging certified articles delivered to the office, which includes recording the article number, name of sender, and addressee,” and there was “no record in the log book” indicating receipt)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "2000 WL 375242, at *5", "parenthetical": "rebuttal shown where alleged recipient \"established a regular practice of logging certified articles delivered to the office, which includes recording the article number, name of sender, and addressee,\" and there was \"no record in the log book\" indicating receipt", "sentence": "See Robinson, 228 B.R. at 82 (presumption of receipt was not rebutted by affidavit stating that all mail was filed, and the file did not contain the notice at issue); Ms. Interpret, 222 B.R. at 414 (no evidence of “standardized sorting and routing procedures” to rebut presumption of receipt); cf. Hogarth, No. 97 Civ. 0625, 2000 WL 375242 at *5 (rebuttal shown where alleged recipient “established a regular practice of logging certified articles delivered to the office, which includes recording the article number, name of sender, and addressee,” and there was “no record in the log book” indicating receipt)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Although district courts post -Booker have discretion to assign sentences outside of the Guidelines-authorized range, they should also continue to apply the Guidelines departure provisions in appropriate cases.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Sierrar-Castillo, 405 F.3d 932, 936 n. 2 (10th Cir.2005) (“Although district courts post -Booker have discretion to assign sentences outside of the Guidelines-authorized range, they should also continue to apply the Guidelines departure provisions in appropriate cases.”); U.S.S.G. § 1A1.1 editorial note, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. n. 4(b) (“When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "128 S.Ct. 586, 596", "parenthetical": "\"[A] district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.\"", "sentence": "Gall v. United States, — U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (“[A] district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). One step in applying the Guidelines is to determine whether or not to depart from the range specified in the Sentencing Table." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Although district courts post -Booker have discretion to assign sentences outside of the Guidelines-authorized range, they should also continue to apply the Guidelines departure provisions in appropriate cases.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Sierrar-Castillo, 405 F.3d 932, 936 n. 2 (10th Cir.2005) (“Although district courts post -Booker have discretion to assign sentences outside of the Guidelines-authorized range, they should also continue to apply the Guidelines departure provisions in appropriate cases.”); U.S.S.G. § 1A1.1 editorial note, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. n. 4(b) (“When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted.”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[A] district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.\"", "sentence": "Gall v. United States, — U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (“[A] district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). One step in applying the Guidelines is to determine whether or not to depart from the range specified in the Sentencing Table." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "544 U.S. 243, 243", "parenthetical": "\"Unlike the business necessity test, which asks whether there are other ways for the employer to achieve its goals that do not result in a disparate impact on a protected class, the reasonableness inquiry includes no such requirement.\"", "sentence": "See City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 243, 125 S.Ct. 1536 (“Unlike the business necessity test, which asks whether there are other ways for the employer to achieve its goals that do not result in a disparate impact on a protected class, the reasonableness inquiry includes no such requirement.”); see also id. at 239, 125 S.Ct. 1536 (stating that there is no liability under the ADEA if the adverse impact of the challenged employment action is “attributable to a nonage factor-that [i]s ‘reasonable’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that there is no liability under the ADEA if the adverse impact of the challenged employment action is \"attributable to a nonage factor-that [i]s 'reasonable' \"", "sentence": "See City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 243, 125 S.Ct. 1536 (“Unlike the business necessity test, which asks whether there are other ways for the employer to achieve its goals that do not result in a disparate impact on a protected class, the reasonableness inquiry includes no such requirement.”); see also id. at 239, 125 S.Ct. 1536 (stating that there is no liability under the ADEA if the adverse impact of the challenged employment action is “attributable to a nonage factor-that [i]s ‘reasonable’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that there is no liability under the ADEA if the adverse impact of the challenged employment action is \"attributable to a nonage factor-that [i]s 'reasonable' \"", "sentence": "See City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 243, 125 S.Ct. 1536 (“Unlike the business necessity test, which asks whether there are other ways for the employer to achieve its goals that do not result in a disparate impact on a protected class, the reasonableness inquiry includes no such requirement.”); see also id. at 239, 125 S.Ct. 1536 (stating that there is no liability under the ADEA if the adverse impact of the challenged employment action is “attributable to a nonage factor-that [i]s ‘reasonable’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"Unlike the business necessity test, which asks whether there are other ways for the employer to achieve its goals that do not result in a disparate impact on a protected class, the reasonableness inquiry includes no such requirement.\"", "sentence": "See City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 243, 125 S.Ct. 1536 (“Unlike the business necessity test, which asks whether there are other ways for the employer to achieve its goals that do not result in a disparate impact on a protected class, the reasonableness inquiry includes no such requirement.”); see also id. at 239, 125 S.Ct. 1536 (stating that there is no liability under the ADEA if the adverse impact of the challenged employment action is “attributable to a nonage factor-that [i]s ‘reasonable’ ”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "954 F.Supp. 124, 128", "parenthetical": "treating each decoder device distributed by defendant as a separate violation", "sentence": "See Columbia Cable TV Co. v. McCary, 954 F.Supp. 124, 128 (D.S.C.1996) (treating each decoder device distributed by defendant as a separate violation); Time Warner Cable v. Freedom Elecs., Inc., 897 F.Supp. 1454, 1459 (S.D.Fla.1996) (holding that “[e]ach converter-decoder manufactured or distributed in violation of § 553 is a separate violation of the statute”); but see Continental Cablevision, Inc. v. Poll, 124 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir.1997) (concluding that “it is inappropriate for a court to multiply a civil damage award under § 553 based on the number of violations involved in a single action”); Lokshin, 980 F.Supp. at 112-15 (rejecting multiple violations theory)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "124 F.3d 1044, 1050", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"it is inappropriate for a court to multiply a civil damage award under SS 553 based on the number of violations involved in a single action\"", "sentence": "See Columbia Cable TV Co. v. McCary, 954 F.Supp. 124, 128 (D.S.C.1996) (treating each decoder device distributed by defendant as a separate violation); Time Warner Cable v. Freedom Elecs., Inc., 897 F.Supp. 1454, 1459 (S.D.Fla.1996) (holding that “[e]ach converter-decoder manufactured or distributed in violation of § 553 is a separate violation of the statute”); but see Continental Cablevision, Inc. v. Poll, 124 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir.1997) (concluding that “it is inappropriate for a court to multiply a civil damage award under § 553 based on the number of violations involved in a single action”); Lokshin, 980 F.Supp. at 112-15 (rejecting multiple violations theory)." }

{ "signal": "but see", "identifier": "124 F.3d 1044, 1050", "parenthetical": "concluding that \"it is inappropriate for a court to multiply a civil damage award under SS 553 based on the number of violations involved in a single action\"", "sentence": "See Columbia Cable TV Co. v. McCary, 954 F.Supp. 124, 128 (D.S.C.1996) (treating each decoder device distributed by defendant as a separate violation); Time Warner Cable v. Freedom Elecs., Inc., 897 F.Supp. 1454, 1459 (S.D.Fla.1996) (holding that “[e]ach converter-decoder manufactured or distributed in violation of § 553 is a separate violation of the statute”); but see Continental Cablevision, Inc. v. Poll, 124 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir.1997) (concluding that “it is inappropriate for a court to multiply a civil damage award under § 553 based on the number of violations involved in a single action”); Lokshin, 980 F.Supp. at 112-15 (rejecting multiple violations theory)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "897 F.Supp. 1454, 1459", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[e]ach converter-decoder manufactured or distributed in violation of SS 553 is a separate violation of the statute\"", "sentence": "See Columbia Cable TV Co. v. McCary, 954 F.Supp. 124, 128 (D.S.C.1996) (treating each decoder device distributed by defendant as a separate violation); Time Warner Cable v. Freedom Elecs., Inc., 897 F.Supp. 1454, 1459 (S.D.Fla.1996) (holding that “[e]ach converter-decoder manufactured or distributed in violation of § 553 is a separate violation of the statute”); but see Continental Cablevision, Inc. v. Poll, 124 F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir.1997) (concluding that “it is inappropriate for a court to multiply a civil damage award under § 553 based on the number of violations involved in a single action”); Lokshin, 980 F.Supp. at 112-15 (rejecting multiple violations theory)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "861 F.2d 1225, 1229", "parenthetical": "\"Oates has been criticized by both courts and commentators as an unduly broad interpretation of Rule 803(8", "sentence": "See United States v. Wilmer, 799 F.2d 495, 500-01 (9th Cir.1986) (expressly rejecting the Oates court’s reasoning and concluding “calibration certificate was admissible under Rule 803(8)(B)” because “the exclusionary provisions of [that rule] were intended to apply to observations made by law enforcement officials at the scene of a crime or the apprehension of the accused and not ‘records of routine, nonadversarial matters’ made in a nonadversarial setting”), quoting United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir.1989) (“Oates has been criticized by both courts and commentators as an unduly broad interpretation of Rule 803(8).”); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1202 (6th Cir.1985) (“[W]e now join the Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in [refusing to apply] the restriction [in Oates ].”) “" }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "799 F.2d 495, 500-01", "parenthetical": "expressly rejecting the Oates court's reasoning and concluding \"calibration certificate was admissible under Rule 803(8", "sentence": "See United States v. Wilmer, 799 F.2d 495, 500-01 (9th Cir.1986) (expressly rejecting the Oates court’s reasoning and concluding “calibration certificate was admissible under Rule 803(8)(B)” because “the exclusionary provisions of [that rule] were intended to apply to observations made by law enforcement officials at the scene of a crime or the apprehension of the accused and not ‘records of routine, nonadversarial matters’ made in a nonadversarial setting”), quoting United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir.1989) (“Oates has been criticized by both courts and commentators as an unduly broad interpretation of Rule 803(8).”); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1202 (6th Cir.1985) (“[W]e now join the Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in [refusing to apply] the restriction [in Oates ].”) “" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "778 F.2d 1195, 1202", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e now join the Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in [refusing to apply] the restriction [in Oates ].\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Wilmer, 799 F.2d 495, 500-01 (9th Cir.1986) (expressly rejecting the Oates court’s reasoning and concluding “calibration certificate was admissible under Rule 803(8)(B)” because “the exclusionary provisions of [that rule] were intended to apply to observations made by law enforcement officials at the scene of a crime or the apprehension of the accused and not ‘records of routine, nonadversarial matters’ made in a nonadversarial setting”), quoting United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir.1989) (“Oates has been criticized by both courts and commentators as an unduly broad interpretation of Rule 803(8).”); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1202 (6th Cir.1985) (“[W]e now join the Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in [refusing to apply] the restriction [in Oates ].”) “" }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "799 F.2d 495, 500-01", "parenthetical": "expressly rejecting the Oates court's reasoning and concluding \"calibration certificate was admissible under Rule 803(8", "sentence": "See United States v. Wilmer, 799 F.2d 495, 500-01 (9th Cir.1986) (expressly rejecting the Oates court’s reasoning and concluding “calibration certificate was admissible under Rule 803(8)(B)” because “the exclusionary provisions of [that rule] were intended to apply to observations made by law enforcement officials at the scene of a crime or the apprehension of the accused and not ‘records of routine, nonadversarial matters’ made in a nonadversarial setting”), quoting United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir.1989) (“Oates has been criticized by both courts and commentators as an unduly broad interpretation of Rule 803(8).”); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1202 (6th Cir.1985) (“[W]e now join the Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in [refusing to apply] the restriction [in Oates ].”) “" }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "590 F.2d 789, 793", "parenthetical": "expressly rejecting the Oates court's reasoning and concluding \"calibration certificate was admissible under Rule 803(8", "sentence": "See United States v. Wilmer, 799 F.2d 495, 500-01 (9th Cir.1986) (expressly rejecting the Oates court’s reasoning and concluding “calibration certificate was admissible under Rule 803(8)(B)” because “the exclusionary provisions of [that rule] were intended to apply to observations made by law enforcement officials at the scene of a crime or the apprehension of the accused and not ‘records of routine, nonadversarial matters’ made in a nonadversarial setting”), quoting United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir.1989) (“Oates has been criticized by both courts and commentators as an unduly broad interpretation of Rule 803(8).”); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1202 (6th Cir.1985) (“[W]e now join the Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in [refusing to apply] the restriction [in Oates ].”) “" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "861 F.2d 1225, 1229", "parenthetical": "\"Oates has been criticized by both courts and commentators as an unduly broad interpretation of Rule 803(8", "sentence": "See United States v. Wilmer, 799 F.2d 495, 500-01 (9th Cir.1986) (expressly rejecting the Oates court’s reasoning and concluding “calibration certificate was admissible under Rule 803(8)(B)” because “the exclusionary provisions of [that rule] were intended to apply to observations made by law enforcement officials at the scene of a crime or the apprehension of the accused and not ‘records of routine, nonadversarial matters’ made in a nonadversarial setting”), quoting United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir.1989) (“Oates has been criticized by both courts and commentators as an unduly broad interpretation of Rule 803(8).”); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1202 (6th Cir.1985) (“[W]e now join the Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in [refusing to apply] the restriction [in Oates ].”) “" }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "778 F.2d 1195, 1202", "parenthetical": "\"[W]e now join the Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in [refusing to apply] the restriction [in Oates ].\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Wilmer, 799 F.2d 495, 500-01 (9th Cir.1986) (expressly rejecting the Oates court’s reasoning and concluding “calibration certificate was admissible under Rule 803(8)(B)” because “the exclusionary provisions of [that rule] were intended to apply to observations made by law enforcement officials at the scene of a crime or the apprehension of the accused and not ‘records of routine, nonadversarial matters’ made in a nonadversarial setting”), quoting United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir.1989) (“Oates has been criticized by both courts and commentators as an unduly broad interpretation of Rule 803(8).”); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1202 (6th Cir.1985) (“[W]e now join the Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in [refusing to apply] the restriction [in Oates ].”) “" }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "590 F.2d 789, 793", "parenthetical": "expressly rejecting the Oates court's reasoning and concluding \"calibration certificate was admissible under Rule 803(8", "sentence": "See United States v. Wilmer, 799 F.2d 495, 500-01 (9th Cir.1986) (expressly rejecting the Oates court’s reasoning and concluding “calibration certificate was admissible under Rule 803(8)(B)” because “the exclusionary provisions of [that rule] were intended to apply to observations made by law enforcement officials at the scene of a crime or the apprehension of the accused and not ‘records of routine, nonadversarial matters’ made in a nonadversarial setting”), quoting United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Hayes, 861 F.2d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir.1989) (“Oates has been criticized by both courts and commentators as an unduly broad interpretation of Rule 803(8).”); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195, 1202 (6th Cir.1985) (“[W]e now join the Second, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in [refusing to apply] the restriction [in Oates ].”) “" }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "112 N.H. 216, 219", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he mere fact that a grantor imposes restrictions in part of a tract of land which he is selling does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he intended thereby to have the restrictions apply to his remaining land.\"", "sentence": "See Sun Valley etc., Co. v. Watts, 98 N.H. 428, 433 (1954); Carroll v. Schechter, 112 N.H. 216, 219 (1972) (“[T]he mere fact that a grantor imposes restrictions in part of a tract of land which he is selling does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he intended thereby to have the restrictions apply to his remaining land.”); cf. Varney v. Fletcher, 106 N.H. 464, 466-67 (1965) (implying an equitable servitude where 100 lots were laid out on a series of recorded plans and all but the fifteen or eighteen lots still owned by the real estate developer were conveyed with the same restrictions)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "106 N.H. 464, 466-67", "parenthetical": "implying an equitable servitude where 100 lots were laid out on a series of recorded plans and all but the fifteen or eighteen lots still owned by the real estate developer were conveyed with the same restrictions", "sentence": "See Sun Valley etc., Co. v. Watts, 98 N.H. 428, 433 (1954); Carroll v. Schechter, 112 N.H. 216, 219 (1972) (“[T]he mere fact that a grantor imposes restrictions in part of a tract of land which he is selling does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he intended thereby to have the restrictions apply to his remaining land.”); cf. Varney v. Fletcher, 106 N.H. 464, 466-67 (1965) (implying an equitable servitude where 100 lots were laid out on a series of recorded plans and all but the fifteen or eighteen lots still owned by the real estate developer were conveyed with the same restrictions)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "543 F.3d 1001, 1003", "parenthetical": "finding no involuntary confession where defendant had stopped crying by the time he confessed", "sentence": "See United States v. Santos-Garcia, 313 F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir.2002) (noting that raised voices and promises of leniency do not render a confession involuntary); cf. Gingras v. Weber, 543 F.3d 1001, 1003 (8th Cir.2008) (finding no involuntary confession where defendant had stopped crying by the time he confessed)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "313 F.3d 1073, 1079", "parenthetical": "noting that raised voices and promises of leniency do not render a confession involuntary", "sentence": "See United States v. Santos-Garcia, 313 F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir.2002) (noting that raised voices and promises of leniency do not render a confession involuntary); cf. Gingras v. Weber, 543 F.3d 1001, 1003 (8th Cir.2008) (finding no involuntary confession where defendant had stopped crying by the time he confessed)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "authority of Regents subject to power of Legislature to fix general appropriations limits beyond which Regents have no authority to bind state by contract", "sentence": "See also Jewell Nursery Co. v. State, 4 S.D. 213, 56 N.W. 113, 114 (1893)(authority of Regents subject to power of Legislature to fix general appropriations limits beyond which Regents have no authority to bind state by contract)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "428 N.W.2d 541, 541", "parenthetical": "Regents, while' under duty to negotiate in good faith, are not required to agree to a contract or any specific rates of pay, wages or other conditions", "sentence": "See Heege, 428 N.W.2d at 541 (Regents, while' under duty to negotiate in good faith, are not required to agree to a contract or any specific rates of pay, wages or other conditions)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "428 N.W.2d 541, 541", "parenthetical": "Regents, while' under duty to negotiate in good faith, are not required to agree to a contract or any specific rates of pay, wages or other conditions", "sentence": "See Heege, 428 N.W.2d at 541 (Regents, while' under duty to negotiate in good faith, are not required to agree to a contract or any specific rates of pay, wages or other conditions)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "56 N.W. 113, 114", "parenthetical": "authority of Regents subject to power of Legislature to fix general appropriations limits beyond which Regents have no authority to bind state by contract", "sentence": "See also Jewell Nursery Co. v. State, 4 S.D. 213, 56 N.W. 113, 114 (1893)(authority of Regents subject to power of Legislature to fix general appropriations limits beyond which Regents have no authority to bind state by contract)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "21 Vet.App. 545, 552", "parenthetical": "Board required to consider all issues raised by the claimant or by evidence of record", "sentence": "See Clemons, 23 Vet.App. at 3 (stating that a claimant has no special medical expertise, but may testify as to symptoms he can observe, and holding that the Board may not deny a claim for benefits based on one condition when the evidence submitted and developed during the processing of the claim showed that the claimant’s symptoms emanated from another condition); see also Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 552 (2008) (Board required to consider all issues raised by the claimant or by evidence of record). Therefore, the Court will remand this matter for the Board to weigh all the evidence of onset of the appellant’s tinnitus and make a factfinding, with due regard for the benefit of the doubt provision, as to that matter." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "23 Vet.App. 3, 3", "parenthetical": "stating that a claimant has no special medical expertise, but may testify as to symptoms he can observe, and holding that the Board may not deny a claim for benefits based on one condition when the evidence submitted and developed during the processing of the claim showed that the claimant's symptoms emanated from another condition", "sentence": "See Clemons, 23 Vet.App. at 3 (stating that a claimant has no special medical expertise, but may testify as to symptoms he can observe, and holding that the Board may not deny a claim for benefits based on one condition when the evidence submitted and developed during the processing of the claim showed that the claimant’s symptoms emanated from another condition); see also Robinson v. Peake, 21 Vet.App. 545, 552 (2008) (Board required to consider all issues raised by the claimant or by evidence of record). Therefore, the Court will remand this matter for the Board to weigh all the evidence of onset of the appellant’s tinnitus and make a factfinding, with due regard for the benefit of the doubt provision, as to that matter." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "recognizing that \"the ADA is interpreted in a manner similar to Title VII\"", "sentence": "See EEOC v. Aniego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 145 n. 7 (1st Cir.1997) (recognizing that \"the ADA is interpreted in a manner similar to Title VII”); see also Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir.1997) (\"We regard Title VII, ADEA, ERISA, and FLSA as standing in pari passu and endorse the practice of treating judicial precedents interpreting one statute as instructive in decisions involving another.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "119 F.3d 982, 985", "parenthetical": "\"We regard Title VII, ADEA, ERISA, and FLSA as standing in pari passu and endorse the practice of treating judicial precedents interpreting one statute as instructive in decisions involving another.\"", "sentence": "See EEOC v. Aniego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 145 n. 7 (1st Cir.1997) (recognizing that \"the ADA is interpreted in a manner similar to Title VII”); see also Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 985 (1st Cir.1997) (\"We regard Title VII, ADEA, ERISA, and FLSA as standing in pari passu and endorse the practice of treating judicial precedents interpreting one statute as instructive in decisions involving another.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "643 F.3d 807, 841", "parenthetical": "\"Rule 701 does not prohibit lay witnesses from testifying based on particularized knowledge gained from their own personal experiences.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316, 1331-32 (11th Cir.2006) (concluding a financial analyst from the Federal Bureau of Investigation gave lay testimony when he summarized thousands ' of financial documents, compared time sheets to payroll entries, and testified a fraud victim was billed for work that was performed for someone else, because “while [the agent’s] expertise and the use of computer software may have made him more efficient at reviewing [the company’s] records, his review itself was within the capacity of any reasonable lay person”); see also United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 841 (11th Cir.2011) (“Rule 701 does not prohibit lay witnesses from testifying based on particularized knowledge gained from their own personal experiences.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "455 F.3d 1316, 1331-32", "parenthetical": "concluding a financial analyst from the Federal Bureau of Investigation gave lay testimony when he summarized thousands ' of financial documents, compared time sheets to payroll entries, and testified a fraud victim was billed for work that was performed for someone else, because \"while [the agent's] expertise and the use of computer software may have made him more efficient at reviewing [the company's] records, his review itself was within the capacity of any reasonable lay person\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316, 1331-32 (11th Cir.2006) (concluding a financial analyst from the Federal Bureau of Investigation gave lay testimony when he summarized thousands ' of financial documents, compared time sheets to payroll entries, and testified a fraud victim was billed for work that was performed for someone else, because “while [the agent’s] expertise and the use of computer software may have made him more efficient at reviewing [the company’s] records, his review itself was within the capacity of any reasonable lay person”); see also United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 841 (11th Cir.2011) (“Rule 701 does not prohibit lay witnesses from testifying based on particularized knowledge gained from their own personal experiences.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "981 S.W.2d 690, 691", "parenthetical": "\"It is well-settled 'that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.' \" (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991", "sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural); see also Ex parte Rojas, 981 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (“It is well-settled ‘that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.’ ” (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "501 U.S. 722, 729", "parenthetical": "determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural", "sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural); see also Ex parte Rojas, 981 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (“It is well-settled ‘that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.’ ” (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)))." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "816 S.W.2d 383, 385", "parenthetical": "\"It is well-settled 'that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.' \" (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991", "sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural); see also Ex parte Rojas, 981 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (“It is well-settled ‘that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.’ ” (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "501 U.S. 722, 729", "parenthetical": "determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural", "sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural); see also Ex parte Rojas, 981 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (“It is well-settled ‘that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.’ ” (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural", "sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural); see also Ex parte Rojas, 981 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (“It is well-settled ‘that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.’ ” (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)))." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "981 S.W.2d 690, 691", "parenthetical": "\"It is well-settled 'that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.' \" (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991", "sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural); see also Ex parte Rojas, 981 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (“It is well-settled ‘that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.’ ” (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)))." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "816 S.W.2d 383, 385", "parenthetical": "\"It is well-settled 'that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.' \" (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991", "sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural); see also Ex parte Rojas, 981 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (“It is well-settled ‘that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.’ ” (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural", "sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural); see also Ex parte Rojas, 981 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (“It is well-settled ‘that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.’ ” (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)))." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "981 S.W.2d 690, 691", "parenthetical": "\"It is well-settled 'that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.' \" (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991", "sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural); see also Ex parte Rojas, 981 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (“It is well-settled ‘that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.’ ” (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural", "sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural); see also Ex parte Rojas, 981 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (“It is well-settled ‘that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.’ ” (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)))." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "816 S.W.2d 383, 385", "parenthetical": "\"It is well-settled 'that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.' \" (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991", "sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural); see also Ex parte Rojas, 981 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (“It is well-settled ‘that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.’ ” (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural", "sentence": "See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (determining there can be no federal review of a state court decision if that decision is based on an independent state law ground, either substantive or procedural); see also Ex parte Rojas, 981 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (“It is well-settled ‘that the writ of habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been raised on direct appeal.’ ” (citing Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)))." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "531 U.S. 167, 167", "parenthetical": "finding that Riverside Bayview Homes turned on the \"significant nexus\" between the wetlands and the \"navigable waters\"", "sentence": "See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167, 121 S.Ct. 675 (finding that Riverside Bayview Homes turned on the “significant nexus” between the wetlands and the “navigable waters”); see also Rice, 250 F.3d at 271 (requiring that the adjacent body of water be “sufficiently linked” to the navigable-in-fact water)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "250 F.3d 271, 271", "parenthetical": "requiring that the adjacent body of water be \"sufficiently linked\" to the navigable-in-fact water", "sentence": "See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167, 121 S.Ct. 675 (finding that Riverside Bayview Homes turned on the “significant nexus” between the wetlands and the “navigable waters”); see also Rice, 250 F.3d at 271 (requiring that the adjacent body of water be “sufficiently linked” to the navigable-in-fact water)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "finding that Riverside Bayview Homes turned on the \"significant nexus\" between the wetlands and the \"navigable waters\"", "sentence": "See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167, 121 S.Ct. 675 (finding that Riverside Bayview Homes turned on the “significant nexus” between the wetlands and the “navigable waters”); see also Rice, 250 F.3d at 271 (requiring that the adjacent body of water be “sufficiently linked” to the navigable-in-fact water)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "250 F.3d 271, 271", "parenthetical": "requiring that the adjacent body of water be \"sufficiently linked\" to the navigable-in-fact water", "sentence": "See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167, 121 S.Ct. 675 (finding that Riverside Bayview Homes turned on the “significant nexus” between the wetlands and the “navigable waters”); see also Rice, 250 F.3d at 271 (requiring that the adjacent body of water be “sufficiently linked” to the navigable-in-fact water)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "782 F.Supp. 1042, 1042", "parenthetical": "refusing to apply Pennsylvania law when plaintiff did not reside in Pennsylvania at the time of the publication", "sentence": "See Fitzpatrick, 537 F.Supp. at 171-72 (holding that Pennsylvania’s interest in compensating victim of defamation outweighed New York’s interests in protecting free discussion and financial injury to defendant); Wilson, 970 F.Supp. at 414 (holding that “the state of plaintiffs domicile generally has the greatest concern in vindicating plaintiffs good name and providing compensation for harm caused by defamatory publication”); cf. Buckley, 782 F.Supp. at 1042 (refusing to apply Pennsylvania law when plaintiff did not reside in Pennsylvania at the time of the publication)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "537 F.Supp. 171, 171-72", "parenthetical": "holding that Pennsylvania's interest in compensating victim of defamation outweighed New York's interests in protecting free discussion and financial injury to defendant", "sentence": "See Fitzpatrick, 537 F.Supp. at 171-72 (holding that Pennsylvania’s interest in compensating victim of defamation outweighed New York’s interests in protecting free discussion and financial injury to defendant); Wilson, 970 F.Supp. at 414 (holding that “the state of plaintiffs domicile generally has the greatest concern in vindicating plaintiffs good name and providing compensation for harm caused by defamatory publication”); cf. Buckley, 782 F.Supp. at 1042 (refusing to apply Pennsylvania law when plaintiff did not reside in Pennsylvania at the time of the publication)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "782 F.Supp. 1042, 1042", "parenthetical": "refusing to apply Pennsylvania law when plaintiff did not reside in Pennsylvania at the time of the publication", "sentence": "See Fitzpatrick, 537 F.Supp. at 171-72 (holding that Pennsylvania’s interest in compensating victim of defamation outweighed New York’s interests in protecting free discussion and financial injury to defendant); Wilson, 970 F.Supp. at 414 (holding that “the state of plaintiffs domicile generally has the greatest concern in vindicating plaintiffs good name and providing compensation for harm caused by defamatory publication”); cf. Buckley, 782 F.Supp. at 1042 (refusing to apply Pennsylvania law when plaintiff did not reside in Pennsylvania at the time of the publication)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "970 F.Supp. 414, 414", "parenthetical": "holding that \"the state of plaintiffs domicile generally has the greatest concern in vindicating plaintiffs good name and providing compensation for harm caused by defamatory publication\"", "sentence": "See Fitzpatrick, 537 F.Supp. at 171-72 (holding that Pennsylvania’s interest in compensating victim of defamation outweighed New York’s interests in protecting free discussion and financial injury to defendant); Wilson, 970 F.Supp. at 414 (holding that “the state of plaintiffs domicile generally has the greatest concern in vindicating plaintiffs good name and providing compensation for harm caused by defamatory publication”); cf. Buckley, 782 F.Supp. at 1042 (refusing to apply Pennsylvania law when plaintiff did not reside in Pennsylvania at the time of the publication)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26", "parenthetical": "\"There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97", "parenthetical": "state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13", "parenthetical": "failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26", "parenthetical": "\"There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26", "parenthetical": "\"There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "504 F.2d 1345, 1351", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97", "parenthetical": "state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13", "parenthetical": "failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "504 F.2d 1345, 1351", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "504 F.2d 1345, 1351", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97", "parenthetical": "state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13", "parenthetical": "failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97", "parenthetical": "state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13", "parenthetical": "failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97", "parenthetical": "state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13", "parenthetical": "failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.\"", "sentence": "Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021, 1025-26 (4th Cir.1980) (“There can be no doubt that an effective defense sometimes requires the assistance of an expert witness____ Moreover, provision for experts reasonably necessary to assist indigents is now considered essential to the operation of a just judicial system.”); Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 (9th Cir.1974) (“[T]he effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the ... appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effective preparation of their defense by their attorneys.”), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936, 95 S.Ct. 1145, 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); cf. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1494-97 (11th Cir.1983) (state must furnish psychiatric or psychological experts to indigent capital defendant if evidence not available from other sources is necessary to prove mitigating circumstances); Knott v. Mabry, 671 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.1982) (failure of counsel to obtain expert to contradict government witness may constitute \"constitu tional flaw in the representation of a defendant----\"). The former Fifth Circuit considered this question in Hoback v. Alabama, 607 F.2d 680, 682 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1979), and said that, while there might be some situations where states could be required to furnish experts, that question need not be decided in that case." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "587 So.2d 629, 630", "parenthetical": "holding that a mortgagee can successfully recover twice on one mortgage for multiple periods of default because the payments were different \"installments\"", "sentence": "See[ Olympia Mortgage Corp. v. Pugh, 774 So.2d 863, 866 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)] (“We disagree that the election to accelerate placed future installments at issue.”); see also Greene v. Boyette, 587 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that a mortgagee can successfully recover twice on one mortgage for multiple periods of default because the payments were different “installments”), For example, a mortgagor may prevail in a foreclosure action by demonstrating that she was not in default on the payments alleged to be in default, or that the mortgagee had waived reliance on the defaults." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "774 So.2d 863, 866", "parenthetical": "\"We disagree that the election to accelerate placed future installments at issue.\"", "sentence": "See[ Olympia Mortgage Corp. v. Pugh, 774 So.2d 863, 866 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)] (“We disagree that the election to accelerate placed future installments at issue.”); see also Greene v. Boyette, 587 So.2d 629, 630 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that a mortgagee can successfully recover twice on one mortgage for multiple periods of default because the payments were different “installments”), For example, a mortgagor may prevail in a foreclosure action by demonstrating that she was not in default on the payments alleged to be in default, or that the mortgagee had waived reliance on the defaults." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "321 F.3d 889, 897-98", "parenthetical": "holding that equitable tolling is available where petitioner's attorney engaged in fraudulent or deceptive acts", "sentence": "See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897-98 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that equitable tolling is available where petitioner’s attorney engaged in fraudulent or deceptive acts); see also Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir.2002) (recognizing equitable tolling of deadlines and numerical limits on motions to reopen or reconsider during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "282 F.3d 1218, 1224", "parenthetical": "recognizing equitable tolling of deadlines and numerical limits on motions to reopen or reconsider during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error", "sentence": "See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897-98 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that equitable tolling is available where petitioner’s attorney engaged in fraudulent or deceptive acts); see also Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir.2002) (recognizing equitable tolling of deadlines and numerical limits on motions to reopen or reconsider during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "475 F.3d 360, 365", "parenthetical": "concluding that a jury could find adversity where, after a lateral transfer, plaintiff supervised fewer employees and managed a smaller budget", "sentence": "Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 365 (D.C.Cir.2007) (citations omitted) (concluding that a jury could find adversity where, after a lateral transfer, plaintiff supervised fewer employees and managed a smaller budget); see also Pardo-Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 607 (D.C.Cir.2010) (noting that “the fact-finder must compare the position[s]” at issue); Evans v. D.C., 754 F.Supp.2d 30, 47 (D.D.C.2010) (“it is for a jury to decide whether plaintiffs diminished duties and responsibilities rose to the level of an adverse employment action”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "601 F.3d 599, 607", "parenthetical": "noting that \"the fact-finder must compare the position[s]\" at issue", "sentence": "Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 365 (D.C.Cir.2007) (citations omitted) (concluding that a jury could find adversity where, after a lateral transfer, plaintiff supervised fewer employees and managed a smaller budget); see also Pardo-Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 607 (D.C.Cir.2010) (noting that “the fact-finder must compare the position[s]” at issue); Evans v. D.C., 754 F.Supp.2d 30, 47 (D.D.C.2010) (“it is for a jury to decide whether plaintiffs diminished duties and responsibilities rose to the level of an adverse employment action”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "475 F.3d 360, 365", "parenthetical": "concluding that a jury could find adversity where, after a lateral transfer, plaintiff supervised fewer employees and managed a smaller budget", "sentence": "Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 365 (D.C.Cir.2007) (citations omitted) (concluding that a jury could find adversity where, after a lateral transfer, plaintiff supervised fewer employees and managed a smaller budget); see also Pardo-Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 607 (D.C.Cir.2010) (noting that “the fact-finder must compare the position[s]” at issue); Evans v. D.C., 754 F.Supp.2d 30, 47 (D.D.C.2010) (“it is for a jury to decide whether plaintiffs diminished duties and responsibilities rose to the level of an adverse employment action”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "754 F.Supp.2d 30, 47", "parenthetical": "\"it is for a jury to decide whether plaintiffs diminished duties and responsibilities rose to the level of an adverse employment action\"", "sentence": "Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 365 (D.C.Cir.2007) (citations omitted) (concluding that a jury could find adversity where, after a lateral transfer, plaintiff supervised fewer employees and managed a smaller budget); see also Pardo-Kronemann v. Donovan, 601 F.3d 599, 607 (D.C.Cir.2010) (noting that “the fact-finder must compare the position[s]” at issue); Evans v. D.C., 754 F.Supp.2d 30, 47 (D.D.C.2010) (“it is for a jury to decide whether plaintiffs diminished duties and responsibilities rose to the level of an adverse employment action”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]his court, of course, does not normally address issues not raised in the district court nor does it normally address issues not raised by a litigant on appeal\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Walrath, 324 F.3d 966, 970 n. 2 (8th Cir.2003) (declining to address an argument that was not raised before the district court or in the briefs or at oral argument); see also Latorre v. United States, 193 F.3d 1035, 1037 n. 1 (8th Cir.1999) (stating that \"[t]his court, of course, does not normally address issues not raised in the district court nor does it normally address issues not raised by a litigant on appeal”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "declining to address an argument that was not raised before the district court or in the briefs or at oral argument", "sentence": "See United States v. Walrath, 324 F.3d 966, 970 n. 2 (8th Cir.2003) (declining to address an argument that was not raised before the district court or in the briefs or at oral argument); see also Latorre v. United States, 193 F.3d 1035, 1037 n. 1 (8th Cir.1999) (stating that \"[t]his court, of course, does not normally address issues not raised in the district court nor does it normally address issues not raised by a litigant on appeal”)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "427 F.3d 1217, 1217", "parenthetical": "upholding ALJ decision despite failure to perform function-by-function assessment and failure to consider drowsiness or reactions to stress", "sentence": "Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217 (upholding ALJ decision despite failure to perform function-by-function assessment and failure to consider drowsiness or reactions to stress); see also Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir.2008) (finding that the ALJ adequately captured limitations to “concentration, persistence, or pace” with a restriction to “simple tasks”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "539 F.3d 1169, 1174", "parenthetical": "finding that the ALJ adequately captured limitations to \"concentration, persistence, or pace\" with a restriction to \"simple tasks\"", "sentence": "Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217 (upholding ALJ decision despite failure to perform function-by-function assessment and failure to consider drowsiness or reactions to stress); see also Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir.2008) (finding that the ALJ adequately captured limitations to “concentration, persistence, or pace” with a restriction to “simple tasks”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "727 F.3d 1144, 1152", "parenthetical": "\"But, as we see it, 'any matter within the jurisdiction' is merely a jurisdictional element, for which no mens rea is required.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1131 (11th Cir.2004) (construing defendant’s claim that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 as an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence); United States v. Key, 76 F.3d 350, 353 (11th Cir.1996) (“Whether the government proved [a] jurisdictional element is measured as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.”); see also United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144, 1152 (11th Cir.2013) (“But, as we see it, ‘any matter within the jurisdiction’ is merely a jurisdictional element, for which no mens rea is required.”). Thus we analyze this issue using the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "382 F.3d 1110, 1131", "parenthetical": "construing defendant's claim that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. SS 1001 as an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence", "sentence": "See United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1131 (11th Cir.2004) (construing defendant’s claim that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 as an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence); United States v. Key, 76 F.3d 350, 353 (11th Cir.1996) (“Whether the government proved [a] jurisdictional element is measured as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.”); see also United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144, 1152 (11th Cir.2013) (“But, as we see it, ‘any matter within the jurisdiction’ is merely a jurisdictional element, for which no mens rea is required.”). Thus we analyze this issue using the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "76 F.3d 350, 353", "parenthetical": "\"Whether the government proved [a] jurisdictional element is measured as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1131 (11th Cir.2004) (construing defendant’s claim that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 as an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence); United States v. Key, 76 F.3d 350, 353 (11th Cir.1996) (“Whether the government proved [a] jurisdictional element is measured as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.”); see also United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144, 1152 (11th Cir.2013) (“But, as we see it, ‘any matter within the jurisdiction’ is merely a jurisdictional element, for which no mens rea is required.”). Thus we analyze this issue using the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "727 F.3d 1144, 1152", "parenthetical": "\"But, as we see it, 'any matter within the jurisdiction' is merely a jurisdictional element, for which no mens rea is required.\"", "sentence": "See United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1131 (11th Cir.2004) (construing defendant’s claim that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 as an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence); United States v. Key, 76 F.3d 350, 353 (11th Cir.1996) (“Whether the government proved [a] jurisdictional element is measured as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.”); see also United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144, 1152 (11th Cir.2013) (“But, as we see it, ‘any matter within the jurisdiction’ is merely a jurisdictional element, for which no mens rea is required.”). Thus we analyze this issue using the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "848 S.W.2d 255, 255", "parenthetical": "\"the underlying dispute is over one issue, insurance coverage, arising from one incident\"", "sentence": "Admiral Ins., 848 S.W.2d at 255 (“the underlying dispute is over one issue, insurance coverage, arising from one incident”); cf. Christensen, 719 S.W.2d at 163 (“[w]hile both proceedings here undoubtedly concern the same general subject matter, Christensen’s California lawsuit raises issues and involves parties that differ from those in the Texas litigation”); Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 308 (“the issues of the prior Canadian suit and the Texas action are similar ”); see also PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 492 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming a trial court’s grant of a temporary injunction restraining PPG from continuing to prosecute a Louisiana suit that was filed subsequent to and was identical to the Texas action) (cited with approval in Admiral Ins., 848 S.W.2d at 257)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "719 S.W.2d 163, 163", "parenthetical": "\"[w]hile both proceedings here undoubtedly concern the same general subject matter, Christensen's California lawsuit raises issues and involves parties that differ from those in the Texas litigation\"", "sentence": "Admiral Ins., 848 S.W.2d at 255 (“the underlying dispute is over one issue, insurance coverage, arising from one incident”); cf. Christensen, 719 S.W.2d at 163 (“[w]hile both proceedings here undoubtedly concern the same general subject matter, Christensen’s California lawsuit raises issues and involves parties that differ from those in the Texas litigation”); Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 308 (“the issues of the prior Canadian suit and the Texas action are similar ”); see also PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 492 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming a trial court’s grant of a temporary injunction restraining PPG from continuing to prosecute a Louisiana suit that was filed subsequent to and was identical to the Texas action) (cited with approval in Admiral Ins., 848 S.W.2d at 257)." }

{ "signal": "cf.", "identifier": "706 S.W.2d 308, 308", "parenthetical": "\"the issues of the prior Canadian suit and the Texas action are similar \"", "sentence": "Admiral Ins., 848 S.W.2d at 255 (“the underlying dispute is over one issue, insurance coverage, arising from one incident”); cf. Christensen, 719 S.W.2d at 163 (“[w]hile both proceedings here undoubtedly concern the same general subject matter, Christensen’s California lawsuit raises issues and involves parties that differ from those in the Texas litigation”); Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 308 (“the issues of the prior Canadian suit and the Texas action are similar ”); see also PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 492 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming a trial court’s grant of a temporary injunction restraining PPG from continuing to prosecute a Louisiana suit that was filed subsequent to and was identical to the Texas action) (cited with approval in Admiral Ins., 848 S.W.2d at 257)." }

{ "signal": "no signal", "identifier": "848 S.W.2d 255, 255", "parenthetical": "\"the underlying dispute is over one issue, insurance coverage, arising from one incident\"", "sentence": "Admiral Ins., 848 S.W.2d at 255 (“the underlying dispute is over one issue, insurance coverage, arising from one incident”); cf. Christensen, 719 S.W.2d at 163 (“[w]hile both proceedings here undoubtedly concern the same general subject matter, Christensen’s California lawsuit raises issues and involves parties that differ from those in the Texas litigation”); Gannon, 706 S.W.2d at 308 (“the issues of the prior Canadian suit and the Texas action are similar ”); see also PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 492 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming a trial court’s grant of a temporary injunction restraining PPG from continuing to prosecute a Louisiana suit that was filed subsequent to and was identical to the Texas action) (cited with approval in Admiral Ins., 848 S.W.2d at 257)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "271 F.3d 407, 407", "parenthetical": "finding estoppel warranted for claims \"linked textually\" to the contract containing the arbitration clause and \"bound up\" with the arbitrated dispute", "sentence": "See JLM, 387 F.3d at 178 n. 7 (“[A]ny claim against an Owner jointly liable for the injury caused by [any one] contract is inextricably intertwined with the arbitrable claim against the Owner liable under that contract.”); see also Choctaw, 271 F.3d at 407 (finding estoppel warranted for claims “linked textually” to the contract containing the arbitration clause and “bound up” with the arbitrated dispute)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": null, "parenthetical": "\"[A]ny claim against an Owner jointly liable for the injury caused by [any one] contract is inextricably intertwined with the arbitrable claim against the Owner liable under that contract.\"", "sentence": "See JLM, 387 F.3d at 178 n. 7 (“[A]ny claim against an Owner jointly liable for the injury caused by [any one] contract is inextricably intertwined with the arbitrable claim against the Owner liable under that contract.”); see also Choctaw, 271 F.3d at 407 (finding estoppel warranted for claims “linked textually” to the contract containing the arbitration clause and “bound up” with the arbitrated dispute)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "984 F.2d 25, 27", "parenthetical": "stating that \"[o]bjection to a magistrate's report preserves only those objections that are specified\"", "sentence": "Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir.1992); see Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d 143, 150-51 (1st Cir.1994) (holding that objections are required when challenging findings actually set out in a magistrate’s recommendation, as well as the magistrate’s failure to make additional findings); see also Lewry v. Town of Standish, 984 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir.1993) (stating that “[o]bjection to a magistrate’s report preserves only those objections that are specified”); Borden v. Sec. of H.H.S., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1987) (holding that appellant was entitled to a de novo review, “however he was not entitled to a de novo review of an argument never raised”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "36 F.3d 143, 150-51", "parenthetical": "holding that objections are required when challenging findings actually set out in a magistrate's recommendation, as well as the magistrate's failure to make additional findings", "sentence": "Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir.1992); see Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d 143, 150-51 (1st Cir.1994) (holding that objections are required when challenging findings actually set out in a magistrate’s recommendation, as well as the magistrate’s failure to make additional findings); see also Lewry v. Town of Standish, 984 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir.1993) (stating that “[o]bjection to a magistrate’s report preserves only those objections that are specified”); Borden v. Sec. of H.H.S., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1987) (holding that appellant was entitled to a de novo review, “however he was not entitled to a de novo review of an argument never raised”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "36 F.3d 143, 150-51", "parenthetical": "holding that objections are required when challenging findings actually set out in a magistrate's recommendation, as well as the magistrate's failure to make additional findings", "sentence": "Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir.1992); see Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d 143, 150-51 (1st Cir.1994) (holding that objections are required when challenging findings actually set out in a magistrate’s recommendation, as well as the magistrate’s failure to make additional findings); see also Lewry v. Town of Standish, 984 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir.1993) (stating that “[o]bjection to a magistrate’s report preserves only those objections that are specified”); Borden v. Sec. of H.H.S., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1987) (holding that appellant was entitled to a de novo review, “however he was not entitled to a de novo review of an argument never raised”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "836 F.2d 4, 6", "parenthetical": "holding that appellant was entitled to a de novo review, \"however he was not entitled to a de novo review of an argument never raised\"", "sentence": "Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st Cir.1992); see Henley Drilling Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d 143, 150-51 (1st Cir.1994) (holding that objections are required when challenging findings actually set out in a magistrate’s recommendation, as well as the magistrate’s failure to make additional findings); see also Lewry v. Town of Standish, 984 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir.1993) (stating that “[o]bjection to a magistrate’s report preserves only those objections that are specified”); Borden v. Sec. of H.H.S., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1987) (holding that appellant was entitled to a de novo review, “however he was not entitled to a de novo review of an argument never raised”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "965 F.Supp. 598, 598", "parenthetical": "although all plaintiffs were exposed to lead emission, finding no commonality because whether and to what extent emissions affected each class member is not common, and any common claims changed by individual facts and situation of each plaintiff", "sentence": "See Barnes, 161 F.3d at 145-46 (finding that individualized issues of causation, addiction, the affirmative defenses of comparative and contributory negligence and the need for medical monitoring presented too many individual issues to permit class certification and medical monitoring relief); see also Guillory v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 97 C. 8641, 2001 WL 290603, at *6 (N.D.Ill. Mar.20, 2001); Reilly, 965 F.Supp. at 598 (although all plaintiffs were exposed to lead emission, finding no commonality because whether and to what extent emissions affected each class member is not common, and any common claims changed by individual facts and situation of each plaintiff)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "161 F.3d 145, 145-46", "parenthetical": "finding that individualized issues of causation, addiction, the affirmative defenses of comparative and contributory negligence and the need for medical monitoring presented too many individual issues to permit class certification and medical monitoring relief", "sentence": "See Barnes, 161 F.3d at 145-46 (finding that individualized issues of causation, addiction, the affirmative defenses of comparative and contributory negligence and the need for medical monitoring presented too many individual issues to permit class certification and medical monitoring relief); see also Guillory v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 97 C. 8641, 2001 WL 290603, at *6 (N.D.Ill. Mar.20, 2001); Reilly, 965 F.Supp. at 598 (although all plaintiffs were exposed to lead emission, finding no commonality because whether and to what extent emissions affected each class member is not common, and any common claims changed by individual facts and situation of each plaintiff)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "475 U.S. 54, 54", "parenthetical": "First Amendment requires only that ordinance refrain from denying reasonable opportunity to operate business and does not require invalidation of regulations which merely reduce plaintiffs' audience", "sentence": "See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54, 106 S.Ct. at 932 (First Amendment requires only that ordinance refrain from denying reasonable opportunity to operate business and does not require invalidation of regulations which merely reduce plaintiffs’ audience); see also, DLS, Inc., 107 F.3d at 413 (First Amendment analysis generally is not concerned with economic impact and that, unless the ordinance were intended to destroy an entire market, an adverse effect will not violate the First Amendment); Spokane Arcade, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 75 F.3d 663, 665 (9th Cir.1996) (“it is irrelevant [for First Amendment purposes] whether a regulation will result in lost profits, higher overhead costs, or even prove commercially unfeasible for an adult business.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "107 F.3d 413, 413", "parenthetical": "First Amendment analysis generally is not concerned with economic impact and that, unless the ordinance were intended to destroy an entire market, an adverse effect will not violate the First Amendment", "sentence": "See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54, 106 S.Ct. at 932 (First Amendment requires only that ordinance refrain from denying reasonable opportunity to operate business and does not require invalidation of regulations which merely reduce plaintiffs’ audience); see also, DLS, Inc., 107 F.3d at 413 (First Amendment analysis generally is not concerned with economic impact and that, unless the ordinance were intended to destroy an entire market, an adverse effect will not violate the First Amendment); Spokane Arcade, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 75 F.3d 663, 665 (9th Cir.1996) (“it is irrelevant [for First Amendment purposes] whether a regulation will result in lost profits, higher overhead costs, or even prove commercially unfeasible for an adult business.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "75 F.3d 663, 665", "parenthetical": "\"it is irrelevant [for First Amendment purposes] whether a regulation will result in lost profits, higher overhead costs, or even prove commercially unfeasible for an adult business.\"", "sentence": "See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54, 106 S.Ct. at 932 (First Amendment requires only that ordinance refrain from denying reasonable opportunity to operate business and does not require invalidation of regulations which merely reduce plaintiffs’ audience); see also, DLS, Inc., 107 F.3d at 413 (First Amendment analysis generally is not concerned with economic impact and that, unless the ordinance were intended to destroy an entire market, an adverse effect will not violate the First Amendment); Spokane Arcade, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 75 F.3d 663, 665 (9th Cir.1996) (“it is irrelevant [for First Amendment purposes] whether a regulation will result in lost profits, higher overhead costs, or even prove commercially unfeasible for an adult business.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "475 U.S. 54, 54", "parenthetical": "First Amendment requires only that ordinance refrain from denying reasonable opportunity to operate business and does not require invalidation of regulations which merely reduce plaintiffs' audience", "sentence": "See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54, 106 S.Ct. at 932 (First Amendment requires only that ordinance refrain from denying reasonable opportunity to operate business and does not require invalidation of regulations which merely reduce plaintiffs’ audience); see also, DLS, Inc., 107 F.3d at 413 (First Amendment analysis generally is not concerned with economic impact and that, unless the ordinance were intended to destroy an entire market, an adverse effect will not violate the First Amendment); Spokane Arcade, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 75 F.3d 663, 665 (9th Cir.1996) (“it is irrelevant [for First Amendment purposes] whether a regulation will result in lost profits, higher overhead costs, or even prove commercially unfeasible for an adult business.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "106 S.Ct. 932, 932", "parenthetical": "First Amendment requires only that ordinance refrain from denying reasonable opportunity to operate business and does not require invalidation of regulations which merely reduce plaintiffs' audience", "sentence": "See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54, 106 S.Ct. at 932 (First Amendment requires only that ordinance refrain from denying reasonable opportunity to operate business and does not require invalidation of regulations which merely reduce plaintiffs’ audience); see also, DLS, Inc., 107 F.3d at 413 (First Amendment analysis generally is not concerned with economic impact and that, unless the ordinance were intended to destroy an entire market, an adverse effect will not violate the First Amendment); Spokane Arcade, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 75 F.3d 663, 665 (9th Cir.1996) (“it is irrelevant [for First Amendment purposes] whether a regulation will result in lost profits, higher overhead costs, or even prove commercially unfeasible for an adult business.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "107 F.3d 413, 413", "parenthetical": "First Amendment analysis generally is not concerned with economic impact and that, unless the ordinance were intended to destroy an entire market, an adverse effect will not violate the First Amendment", "sentence": "See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54, 106 S.Ct. at 932 (First Amendment requires only that ordinance refrain from denying reasonable opportunity to operate business and does not require invalidation of regulations which merely reduce plaintiffs’ audience); see also, DLS, Inc., 107 F.3d at 413 (First Amendment analysis generally is not concerned with economic impact and that, unless the ordinance were intended to destroy an entire market, an adverse effect will not violate the First Amendment); Spokane Arcade, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 75 F.3d 663, 665 (9th Cir.1996) (“it is irrelevant [for First Amendment purposes] whether a regulation will result in lost profits, higher overhead costs, or even prove commercially unfeasible for an adult business.”)." }

{ "signal": "see also", "identifier": "75 F.3d 663, 665", "parenthetical": "\"it is irrelevant [for First Amendment purposes] whether a regulation will result in lost profits, higher overhead costs, or even prove commercially unfeasible for an adult business.\"", "sentence": "See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54, 106 S.Ct. at 932 (First Amendment requires only that ordinance refrain from denying reasonable opportunity to operate business and does not require invalidation of regulations which merely reduce plaintiffs’ audience); see also, DLS, Inc., 107 F.3d at 413 (First Amendment analysis generally is not concerned with economic impact and that, unless the ordinance were intended to destroy an entire market, an adverse effect will not violate the First Amendment); Spokane Arcade, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 75 F.3d 663, 665 (9th Cir.1996) (“it is irrelevant [for First Amendment purposes] whether a regulation will result in lost profits, higher overhead costs, or even prove commercially unfeasible for an adult business.”)." }

{ "signal": "see", "identifier": "106 S.Ct. 932, 932", "parenthetical": "First Amendment requires only that ordinance refrain from denying reasonable opportunity to operate business and does not require invalidation of regulations which merely reduce plaintiffs' audience", "sentence": "See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54, 106 S.Ct. at 932 (First Amendment requires only that ordinance refrain from denying reasonable opportunity to operate business and does not require invalidation of regulations which merely reduce plaintiffs’ audience); see also, DLS, Inc., 107 F.3d at 413 (First Amendment analysis generally is not concerned with economic impact and that, unless the ordinance were intended to destroy an entire market, an adverse effect will not violate the First Amendment); Spokane Arcade, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 75 F.3d 663, 665 (9th Cir.1996) (“it is irrelevant [for First Amendment purposes] whether a regulation will result in lost profits, higher overhead costs, or even prove commercially unfeasible for an adult business.”)." }