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ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS PER CURIAM. hThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent notarized a document outside the presence of the sig natory. Prior to the institution of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline, in which the parties stipulated that respondent engaged in the alleged misconduct. Having reviewed the petition, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Royal L. Colbert, Louisiana Bar Roll number 27412, be and he hereby is publicly reprimanded. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

In re Nelso, Reinier; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. H, No. 2005-9350. Denied. Relator must first seek, relief in the district court

In re Bruce D. Greenstein, in his official capacity only as the Secretary of the De partment of Health & Hospitals of the State of Louisiana; Department of Health & Hospitals of the State of Louisiana; Julie Foster, in her official capacity only as the Administrator of North Lake Supports and Services Center; North Lake Supports and Services Center; The State of Louisiana; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 2011-0002703; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW 0909. Denied.

In re Lane, JerXavier; — Plaintiff; Applying for Reconsideration of this court’s action dated October 3, 2014; Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. F., No. 272,091; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 48,951-KH. Reconsideration denied.

In re Scott, William; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 06-96-0672; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 2238. Denied. See State v. Tate, 12-2763 (La. 11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829, cert. denied, Tate v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2663,189 L.Ed.2d 214 (2014). WEIMER, J., recused.

In re Joseph Beaud Capps; Progressive Security Insurance Company; — Defendants); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 2012-7965; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 14-671. Not considered, not timely filed. See Supreme Court Rule X, § 5(a).

IN RE: Livas, Glenn; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 309-892; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No.2018-K-1665; Denied. See State v. Tate, 12-2763 (La.11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829, cert. denied, Tate v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2663,189L.Ed.2d 214 (2014).

In re State of Louisiana; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. J, No. 520-107; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2015-K-96. Denied. Moot.

GENOVESE, Judge. _JjLn this negligence case, Plaintiffs, Amy Tepper, Eric Tepper, and Leni Tepper, appeal the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant, Red River Academy, L.L.C. (RRA). For the reasons that follow, we reverse. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Eric Tepper and Leni Tepper were the legal guardians of Amy Tepper who, beginning July 2008, was a student at RRA, a boarding school in Lecompte, Louisiana. During her residency at RRA, in October 2010, Amy developed an ingrown toenail. She reported her condition to Alicia Davenport Hall, the medical station attendant employed by RRA, who was responsible for tending to the medical needs of the students. Ms. Hall telephoned Woodworth Family Medicine (Woodworth), and Kimberly Bostick-Field, a nurse practitioner, prescribed Cleocin, an antibiotic, for Amy on November 4, 2010. After taking the antibiotic, Amy began having diarrhea. When Amy’s diarrhea continued, Ms. Hall again called Wood-worth and spoke to the nurse practitioner’s assistant. In response thereto, on December 14, 2010, Ms. Bostick-Field prescribed Lomotil for Amy, to alleviate her diarrhea. Thereafter, Amy continued to experience diarrhea and also began vomiting. On December 20, 2010, Ms. Hall brought Amy to Woodworth, where she was examined by Ms. Bostick-Field. Amy was then prescribed Phenergan for the nausea and vomiting. On the night of December 20, 2010, Ms. Hall took Amy to the emergency room at Rapides Regional Medical Center (Rapides Regional). Amy was diagnosed with clostridium-difficile colitis and toxic mega-colon, a side effect caused by an allergic reaction to the antibiotic she had taken. After her admission to Rapides Regional, Amy underwent surgery, including a total | pcolectomy and the creation of an ileostomy. Amy required two additional surgeries before being released from Rapides Regional. Amy, Eric, and Leni Tepper filed suit against RRA, alleging that its negligence caused Amy’s illness and resultant condition. A separate negligence action was instituted by Amy against RRA. The two suits were subsequently consolidated in the trial court. RRA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of liability. Following a hearing, the trial court granted RRA’s Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed all claims of Amy, Eric, and Leni Tepper. The Teppers appeal. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR The Teppers present the following for our review: 1. The lower court erroneously held that the standard of care that applies to a boarding school[ — ]who has constant custody over students twenty-four (4)[sic] hours a day, seven (7) days a week[ — ]is the same as the standard of care that applies to a public school, that only has custody over its students for eight (8) hours a day and five (5) days a week. 2. The lower court failed to hold that a breach of the duty of care occurred when an employee of a boarding school failed to obtain medical treatment for a student who has been experiencing negative health symptoms for approximately two (2) weeks. 3. The lower court erroneously determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact even though medical records, pertaining to the same patient, indicated different dates of the onset of negative health symptoms. [¾4. The lower court misapplied the law set out in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure [Ajrticle 966 by granting dismissal of all claims against all parties pursuant to a motion for summary judgment from a single party. LAW AND DISCUSSION Our Louisiana Supreme Court has set forth the governing jurisprudence relative to a motion for summary judgment and our appellate standard of review thereof as follows: Appellate review of the granting of a motion for summary judgment is de novo, using the identical criteria that govern the trial court’s consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Bonin v. Westport Ins. Corp., 05-0886, p. 4 (La.5/17/06), 930 So.2d 906, 910; Schroeder v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 591 So.2d 342, 345 (La.1991). A motion for summary judgment is properly granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art, 966; Duncan v. USAA Ins. Co., 06-0363, p. 4 (La.11/29/06), 950 So.2d 544, 546-547. A fact is material if it potentially insures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute. Hines v. Garrett, 04-0806, p. 1 (La.6/25/04), 876 So.2d 764, 765 (per curiam Xciting Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512, p. 27 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730, 751). A genuine issue of material fact is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for trial on that issue and summary judgment is appropriate. Hines, 876 So.2d at 765-66. Smitko v. Gulf South Shrimp, Inc., 11-2566, pp. 7-8 (La.7/2/12), 94 So.3d 750, 755. Hunt v. Golden Corral Corp., 13-06, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/3/13), 116 So.3d 1035, 1037. Moreover, “[i]n determining whether an issue is‘genuine,’ courts cannot consider the merits, make credibility determinations, evaluate testimony or weigh evidence.” Phillips v. City of Crowley, 12-1306, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/19/13), 115 So.3d 1240, 1244, writ denied, 13-1718 (La.11/1/13), 125 So.3d 432 Inciting Smith, 639 So.2d 730; Simon v. Fasig-Tipton Co. of New York, 524 So.2d 788 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writs denied, 525 So.2d 1048, 1049 (La.1988)). In the instant case, considering the assignments of error as presented for our review, we shall begin by addressing assignment of error number three. For the reasons that follow, we find that genuine issues of material fact remain which precluded the grant of summary judgment. This finding mandates a reversal of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of RRA and renders the remaining assignments of error moot. The trial court in this case provided Written Reasons on Motion for Summary Judgment. Therein, it is stated, “[bjased upon the evidence submitted at the [s]um-mary [jjudgment hearing, the Court makes the following findings of fact[.]” (emphasis added). The trial court’s written reasons proceed to specifically list thirteen of these factual findings. Admittedly, not all of these facts were disputed by the parties. However, it is clear from the record that certain facts were in dispute and were contradicted by the testimony and medical evidence which required the trial court to evaluate the evidence. As set forth above, making findings of fact requires a weighing of the evidence by the trier of fact, which is impermissible at the summary judgment stage of any legal proceeding. Phillips, 115 So.3d 1240. Critical to a determination of any potential liability herein is the relevant time frame of the events as they transpired: namely, the date Amy’s complaint originated; the date RRA responded to her original complaint; the date the course of antibiotic was begun and completed; the date of onset of Amy’s additional complaint of diarrhea; when her additional complaint was made known to RRA; the timing and manner in which RRA responded to the new complaint; the date of onset of nausea and vomiting; the date RRA became aware of the nausea and |Bvomiting; and the timing and manner in which RRA responded to these additional complaints. Amy’s initial complaint of an ingrown toenail was made to Ms. Hall on October 27, 2010. However, much of what occurred and what was done by RRA between October 27, 2010 and December 20, 2010, when she was ultimately seen by a doctor at Rapides Regional and underwent surgery, has not been established with certainty and is in dispute. Although an antibiotic was prescribed by Ms. Bostick-Field on November 4, 2010, it was not administered by RRA until November 8, 2010. According to Amy, when the she began taking the antibiotic, she “had really bad diarrhea” and “started throwing up really bad.” Amy was taken to Woodworth on November 16, 2010, but its records are void of any documentation of an antibiotic being prescribed for her, and the records do not contain any complaints of diarrhea and nausea. The medical record for November 16, 2010, simply documents that Amy was still suffering from the ingrown toenail. According to RRA’s medication administration log, Amy took her last dose of the antibiotic the next day, November 17, 2010. Exactly what subsequent information RRA had about Amy’s symptoms and when they had it is also unclear and uncertain. Ms. Hall testified that she was made aware “in late November” that Amy had “a complaint” of diarrhea. However, Ms. Hall testified that when she checked with Amy a couple of days later, Amy told her that “[s]he felt fine.” Ms. Hall was certainly aware by December 14, 2010, that Amy was having diarrhea, because she called Woodworth and obtained the prescription for Lomotil. Notably, RRA’s medication administration log does not document that the Lomotil was actually given to Amy, and Amy herself denied being given medication for diarrhea. |fiTwo shift supervisors at RRA, who were responsible for seeing that the medication was administered, documented that Amy continued to complain of diarrhea. According to one shift supervisor who gave Amy the Lomotil on December 15 and 16, 2010, despite the prescription medication, Amy “let [him] know throughout the day she was still having diarrhea.” Yet, Ms. Hall testified that Amy reported to her on December 16, 2010, that her diarrhea was a little better. A second shift supervisor noted that Amy was still not feeling well on December 19, 2010. Amy told this shift supervisor that her stomach hurt and that she had vomited after dinner. Ms. Hall was then told, on December 19, 2010, that Amy had also begun vomiting, which resulted in Ms. Hall taking her to Wood-worth on December 20, 2010, where she was seen by Ms. Bostick-Field and prescribed medication for nausea. Later that same evening, Ms. Hall took Amy to the emergency room at Rapides Regional. In addition to the discrepancies found in the testimony of Amy and Ms. Hall, the RRA’s medication administration log, and the notes of the shift supervisors, the medical records of Woodworth and Rapides Regional are also inconsistent and in dispute. Woodworth’s records of Amy’s December 20, 2010 visit document that Amy had begun vomiting the day prior and that she had diarrhea for one week that was “severe.” The record also notes that a prescription for Lomotil had been called in, but that Amy still had diarrhea as well as nausea and five episodes of vomiting since then. Further notations indicate that Amy had begun having diarrhea on and off for one month and that it had been “[i]ncreasing in severity [the] past ten days,” now with nausea and vomiting. Notably, Ms. Bostick-Field testified that she was unaware of the issues of diarrhea pri- or to December 14, 2010, when the Lomotil ^prescription was called in, and she never actually examined Amy between November 16, 2010, and December 20, 2010. The Rapides Regional records contain a history of diarrhea and nausea for two weeks as well as “diffuse abdominal pain.” Additional records of Rapides Regional note the ten day course of antibiotic which had been completed by Amy two weeks prior, “and then [she] began having diarrhea.” Rapides Regional records described her symptoms as being “somewhat intermittent” and indicated that Amy’s condition had “become more persistent over the last week[,]” and was accompanied with vomiting. In addition to the genuine issues of material fact that remain relative to when Amy’s symptoms began, when they became known to RRA, what action was taken by RRA, and when action was taken, we further find that genuine issues of material fact remain concerning RRA’s alleged lack of reasonable supervision and failure to timely obtain medical treatment. The Woodworth doctor, Dr. Guillot, testified that when side effects of the antibiotic developed, the prescribing health care provider “should have been notified[;]” and, a timely notification of Amy’s condition to the health care provider “could have potentially” avoided the unfortunate progression that occurred in this case. Although Amy’s initial complaints began in October 2010, she was not actually seen by a doctor until her condition was diagnosed as emergent on December 20, 2010. Further, given the evidence in the record, genuine issues of fact remain as to whether or not the appropriate medical protocol was adhered to by RRA. Undis-putedly, Ms. Hall was not a nurse during the relevant time period. If a student at RRA had a medical complaint, Ms. Hall, acting as a liaison, was | ^responsible for ensuring that their needs were attended to. The student was first required to complete a nurse request form. RRA’s ar rangement with Woodworth was for Ms. Bostick-Field to then examine the students at RRA in order to avoid having to transport them to the clinic. However, Dr. Guillot testified that he should have been on location at all times when Ms. Bostick-Field was treating patients, and this was not done. Additionally, because of the number of students that complained of ingrown toenails, RRA had established a standard treatment regime. According to Ms. Hall, RRA had a “general protocol from doctor’s orders” that the affected toe was to be soaked for two to four days, and an antibiotic ointment was to be applied. If there was no improvement, the student was then supposed to be taken to Wood-worth to be seen by Dr. Guillot in case a procedure needed to be performed. Yet, when Amy was taken to Woodworth on November 16, 2010, she was seen by Ms. Bostick-Field. Despite documentation in Woodworth’s records that her ingrown toenail was unresolved at that time, Amy was not seen by Dr. Guillot. Thereafter, with continuing complaints of diarrhea, Amy still was not seen by a doctor, nor was she seen by the nurse practitioner before being prescribed Lomotil on December 14, 2010. Finally, although Ms. Hall testified that, according to protocol, an unresolved toenail warranted a student being taken to Woodworth to see Dr. Guil-lot, Amy was not actually seen and evaluated by a doctor until December 20, 2010. Based upon our de novo review of the record, for the reasons set forth above, we find that genuine issues of material fact remain which preclude the grant of summary judgment. Considering the negligence claims asserted herein against RRA, these facts certainly “insure[ ] or preclude[ ] recovery, affect[ ] a litigant’s ultimate success, or determine! ] the outcome of the legal dispute.” Hines, 876 |9So.2d at 765. Thus, the trial court’s grant of RRA’s Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing all claims, with prejudice, is hereby reversed. DECREE For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the trial court granting the Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of Red River Academy L.L.C., and dismissing all of the claims of Amy Tepper, Eric Tepper, and Leni Tepper, is reversed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Red River Academy, L.L.C. REVERSED. . A colectomy is generally defined as the "excision of a portion of the colon ... or of the whole colon.” Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary, pg. 389 (31st ed.2007). . An ileostomy is generally defined as the "surgical creation of an opening into the ileum[.]” Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary, pg. 926 (31st ed.2007). . Eric and Leni Tepper sought damages for loss of consortium, society, and service. . Amy Tepper's individual counsel also filed a brief on her behalf. The assignment of error presented therein is worded differently; however, it is encompassed in the Teppers’ assignment of error number two. . We note that the record contains a lab report of Omega Diagnostics, L.L.C., apparently for the results of blood work drawn at Wood-worth on December 1, 2010, for purposes of monitoring Amy’s routine medication levels.

In re Bazley, Lucien P.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 07-2459; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-KH-44. Denied.

In re Eola Properties, L.L.C.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Avoyelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2012-8424-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 14-362. Denied. KNOLL, J., recused.

In re Lloyd M. Hughes; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. A No. C608161; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 2167. Denied.

In re Swayze, Holly D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Re view, Parish of Ouachita, Monroe City Court, No. 2011CV01094; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,079-CA. Granted.

In re Wilson, Aaron C.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 213,012; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,-095-KW. Denied. See State v. Tate, 12-2763 (La.11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829, cert. denied, Tate v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 134 S.Ct. 2663,189 L.Ed.2d 214 (2014).

In re Young, Dwaine; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Rapides, 9th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 236,670; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. KH 14-00090. Denied. See State v. Tate, 12-2763 (La.11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829, cert. denied, Tate v. Louisiana, — U.S.—, 134 S.Ct. 2663,189 L.Ed.2d 214 (2014). KNOLL, J., recused.

In re Laris Insurance Agency, L.L.C.;— Defendant;. Applying For Writ of Certio-rari and/or Review, Parish of Lafourche, 17th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 118631-B; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 1682. Granted. The judgments of the lower courts are hereby reversed and set aside. We find there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute precluding defendants from being entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants, Laris Insurance Agency, L.L.C., and Westport Insurance Corporation, is hereby denied. This case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. WEIMER and GUIDRY, JJ., would deny.

In re Louisiana Workforce Commission; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 615,827; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW 1008. Denied.

MAX N. TOBIAS, JR., Judge. [!Justo E. Roque, Jr., plaintiff/appellant, appeals a judgment that affirmed a decision by the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services (hereafter referred to as “Family Services”), determining the amount of benefits to which Mr. Roque was entitled from 1 January 2012 to February 2014. In addition, we review the decisions rendered on 5 March 2012 and 12 March 2012 by the Louisiana Division of Administrative Law that were also affirmed by the trial court. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The facts of this case are essentially undisputed. Mr. Roque was disabled in 2005. In addition, to receiving Supplemental Security Income payments from the Social Security Administration, he is also a participant in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) administered by Family Services. Eligibility for SNAP is regulated by the Food and Nutrition Service of the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”). The regulations governing eligibility are found in 7 C.F.R. 271 through 285. Family Services is the Louisiana state agency authorized to administer and distribute funds under the program and Family | ^Services must comply with federal regulations to determine eligibility and the amounts necessary to meet the needs of qualified households. In December 2011, Mr. Roque was receiving Supplemental Security Income in the monthly amount of $607 and SNAP benefits in the amount of $86 per month. In late November 2011, he received a Notice of Change of Payment from the Social Security Administration indicating that he would be receiving a cost-of-living increase starting in January 2012, resulting in a total monthly amount of $698, an increase of $91 per month. In mid-December 2011, Mr. Roque received a “mass change” letter from DCFS stating that in light of his increase of income, his monthly SNAP benefits would be reduced from $86 to $41. The amount of $41 was paid to Mr. Roque for one month; the following month, the payment was adjusted to $62 because one of his allowable expenses (rent) had increased. Mr. Roque appealed the reduction and requested a fair hearing. In a letter dated 26 January 2012, the Louisiana Division of Administrative Law notified Mr. Roque at his current address that his fair hearing request had been granted and he would be notified of an upcoming hearing date. In a 16 February 2012 letter, Mr. Roque was advised that his fair hearing would be held by telephone conference on 5 March 2012 at 10:00 a.m.; he was provided with instructions on how to initiate the call. The record reflects that Mr. Roque did not call in on the date and time set; the matter was considered abandoned after the hearing officer .allowed an additional fifteen minutes for Mr. Roque to call. |sOn 12 March 2012, Mr. Roque filed a petition for rehearing with the Louisiana Division of Administrative Law. The request was denied on the basis that Mr. Roque did not set forth or explain any grounds for a rehearing as set forth in and required by La. R.S. 49:959 (which includes “other good grounds for further consideration of the issues and the evidence in the public interest[.]”) and that the order terminating adjudication was not contrary to the law. Mr. Roque filed a petition for judicial review with the 19th Judicial District Court for East Baton Rouge Parish as required by law, but was unable to travel to Baton Rouge to litigate his case. By agreement of the parties and order of the 19th Judicial District Court, the case was transferred to Orleans Parish Civil District Court where it was heard on 22 May 2014. At the time of trial, the court noted that Mr. Roque was then receiving $90 per month in SNAP benefits. After oral argument and the presentation of evidence, the trial court ruled in favor of Family Services; .reasons for judgment were issued on 17 June 2014. This timely appeal followed. Mr. Roque’s appeal does not assign any errors for our review. In any event, we understand Mr. Roque’s complaint, that being that Family Services intentionally and improperly applied federal and state law, statutes, and regulations and reduced his SNAP benefits from 2012 until March 2014, when the amount was ^increased. Mr. Roque does not address the issue that he missed the date of his fair hearing and that his request for rehearing was denied. In any event, we address both issues to provide the parties with a complete decision. When across-the-board changes are made that affect the benefits of many, a “mass change” letter is sent out. When providing guidance on mass changes, federal law, as found in 7 C.F.R. 273.12(e) states that “Certain changes are initiated by the State or Federal government which may affect the entire caseload or significant portions of the caseload. These changes include, but are not limited to, adjustments to the income eligibility standards, the shelter and dependent care deductions, the maximum food stamp allotment and the standard deduction; annual and seasonal adjustments to State utility standards; periodic cost-of-living adjustments to Retirement, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (RSDI), Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and other Federal benefits.” When these changes increase the amount of income one receives, offsets are often made to other public assistance, in this case, SNAP. The offsets to SNAP affected thousands of Louisiana residents also receiving public assistance in addition to Mr. Roque. However, the law provided Mr. Roque with the opportunity to address his grievances. Pursuant to 7 C.F.R. 273.15, Mr. Roque requested, and was granted, a fair hearing on 5 March 2012. Unfortunately, he was unable to “appear” by telephone on 5 March 2012 at 10:00 a.m. The record even reflects that the hearing | ¡¡officer gave Mr. Roque an extra fifteen minutes before adjourning the hearing at approximately 10:15 a.m. In a pleading filed the next day, Mr. Roque states that he called to access the teleconference services at 9:05 a.m., 9:15 a.m., and 9:30 a.m.; the teleconference service did not respond. On 12 March 2012, Mr. Roque filed another pleading, acknowledging the correct hearing time of 10:00 a.m., along with the phone number he was supposed to call for the telephone hearing to take place. However, Mr. Ro-que provided no reason for missing the hearing; thus, the rehearing was denied. In denying the request for rehearing, the Louisiana Division of Administrative Law recognized the grounds for rehearing and found none present in Mr. Roque’s case. La. R.S. 49:959 provides in pertinent part: A. A decision or order in a case of adjudication shall be subject to rehearing, reopening, or reconsideration by the agency, within ten days from the date of its entry. The grounds for such action shall be either that: (1) The decision or order is clearly contrary to the law and the evidence; (2) The party has discovered since the hearing evidence important to the issues which he could not have with due diligence obtained before or during the hearing; (3) There is a showing that issues not previously considered ought to be examined in order properly to dispose of the matter; or (4) There is other good ground for further consideration of the issues and the evidence in the public interest. | fiThe Louisiana Division of Administrative Law stated that Mr. Roque did not provide any additional evidence that would warrant a rehearing. Because it is substantially certain that his initial appeal, had he appeared, would have been denied, we cannot say and do not find that the Louisiana Division of Administrative Law erred in denying the rehearing. Administrative procedure under Louisiana law provides judicial review of a decision from a department of the state of Louisiana. La. R.S. 49:964 A(l) states in pertinent part: [A] person who is aggrieved by a final decision or order in an adjudication proceeding is entitled to judicial review under this Chapter whether or not he has applied to the agency for rehearing, without limiting, however, utilization of or the scope of judicial review available under other means of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo provided by law. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy and would inflict irreparable injury. Under La. R.S. 49:964 G(6), the reviewing court may not reverse or modify an administrative decision, unless the reviewing court determines by a preponderance of the evidence after an independent review of the record, that the department’s decision prejudiced substantial rights of the appellant. Doe v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 00-1987, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/30/01), 788 So.2d 1234, 1238. We do not find that Mr. Roque’s rights were prejudiced by a denial of his motion for rehearing. We find that the trial court was correct when it affirmed the decision by the Louisiana Division of Administrative Law denying the rehearing request. |7We have also reviewed the record that contains Mr. Roque’s numerous allegations set forth in voluminous, repetitive filings in the trial court regarding the calculation of his benefits. We find neither evidence of prejudice, conspiracy, collusion, and/or fraud in the determination of his benefits level nor any error in calculations. Family Services has no discretion in what it may or may not consider as “expenses.” Family Services has no discretion in how the calculations are to be made. In its reasons for judgment, the trial court stated: The Summary of Evidence made a part of the appeal record for purposes of the fair hearing reflect that the expenses allotted by the Department were in line with policy and the Department cannot consider every expense as a necessary deduction [from Mr. Roque’s income]. This Court finds that DCFS [Louisiana Division of Administrative Law] did issue benefits accordingly for the time period in question and petitioner provided no additional evidence to support that an under-issuance in benefits existed. To the extent that this issue is properly before us, we find no error by the trial court. Based on our foregoing review of the law and pleadings, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. AFFIRMED. . SNAP payments are the equivalent of food stamps. . We note that Mr. Roque’s first language is Spanish, having emigrated from Cuba as a young adult. We commend the trial court for using an interpreter at the trial on 22 May 2014. . See Uniform Rules of the Louisiana Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(5); see also La. C.C.P. art. 2129. However, because Mr. Roque is representing himself and has limited knowledge of the law, we will not dismiss his appeal for failing to comply with the rules of court.?

In re Lavergne, Brandon; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs,'Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 138234; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 13-01250. Denied.

In re Juniors Jr., Glynn; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. James, 23rd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 98-CR-002803. Denied.

In re Banker Jr., Raymond W.; Magnolia Ridge Properties LLC — Defendant(s); Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated November 7, 2014, Parish of West Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 21149; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 1171. Not considered. See Supreme Court Rule IX, § 6.

In re Caston, Larry; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 354-600; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-K-0247. Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 980.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172. See also State v. Cotton, 09-2397 (La.10/15/10), 45 So.3d 1030.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS PER CURIAM. Respondent and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) submitted a joint petition for consent discipline in which respondent acknowledges that he failed to provide competent representation to a client in a succession matter and engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Having reviewed the petition, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Nicholas J. Trenticosta, Louisiana Bar Roll number 18475, be and he hereby is publicly reprimanded. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

In re Harriett Cooper; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Ouachita, Monroe City Court, No. 2009CV02406; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,109-CA. Denied.

In re Cooper, Shawn; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 14-PDB-065. Leave to appeal denied.

DOMENGEAUX, Judge. For the reasons set forth in the matter entitled State v. Guidry, 524 So.2d 1254 (La.App.3d Cir.1988), in which a separate decision is being rendered this day, the sentence of Donald James Guidry is affirmed. AFFIRMED.

In re Hidalgo, Gibbon; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. KA-7476; Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court, Div. “H”, No. 316-475. Prior report: La.App., 516 So.2d 471. Denied.

In re St. Francis Medical Center; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, Nos. 19346-CA, 19347-CA; Parish of Ouachita, 4th Judicial District Court, Div. “F”, Nos. 85-4448, 86-4405. Prior report: La.App., 521 So.2d 758. Denied.

In re Our Lady of Lourdes Hosp.; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, supervisory and/or remedial writs; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW87-0503; Parish of Vermilion, 15th Judicial District Court, Div. “G”, No. 83-47188. Denied.

In re Ronda Lane Bonnette; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. K, No. 2011-04023; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-CA-0550. | iDenied. HUGHES, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. CRICHTON, J., concurs in the denial of the writ.

In re Baton Rouge General Medical Center; — Defendant; Applying for Rehearing of this court’s action dated November 13, 2014, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 629-768; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW1099. Rehearing denied.

In re Jones, Rebecca; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 14-PDB-077. Leave to appeal denied. HUGHES, J., would grant.

In re Black, Richard; — Plaintiff; Applying For Appeal of the Decision of the Disciplinary Board Office of Disciplinary Board, No. 14-PDB-048. Leave to appeal denied.

In re Gary Tyler; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Charles, 29th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 74-033. Denied. JOHNSON, C.J., and WEIMER, J., would grant.

In re Confidential Party; — Plaintiff; Applying For Petition to Take the February 2015 Bar Exam. Petitioner’s application to take the February 2015 bar examination is denied as untimely. See Supreme Court. Rule XVII, § 9(B). Reasons to follow.

CONERY, Judge. _JjThis medical malpractice action was filed on behalf of The Estate of Willie Walters (Estate), by his wife Opal Walters, who was designated as succession administrator only for the purpose of pursuing this action against West Louisiana Health Services, Inc., d/b/a Beauregard Memorial Hospital (Beauregard). The trial court granted Beauregard’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Mr. Walters’ claim on the basis that the Estate failed to submit an expert medical opinion to support the claim that a breach of the standard of care caused injury to Mr. Walters. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On June 15, 2009, Mr. Walters was admitted by Dr. Flynn Taylor, a family practitioner, to Beauregard with complaints of cough, congestion, fever, and breathing difficulties. Dr. Taylor diagnosed Mr. Walters with pneumonia and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). The family reported that Mr. Walters had previously fallen at home. Mr. Walters was determined to be ambulatory, but he required some assistance with ambulation and was assessed to be at high risk for falls. Having determined that Mr. Walters was at high risk for falls, the hospital was required to implement a fall prevention procedure, including several fall prevention steps. Beauregard contends that these steps included placing the bedside rails up times three, placing the bed in the low position, placing a commode near the bedside, and putting the nurse call light within Mr. Walters’ reach, so that Mr. Walters could call the nurses for assistance. He was allegedly instructed to call the nurses whenever he needed assistance. On June 20, 2009, a nurse found Mr. Walters on the floor next to his bedside commode. He had suffered a non-displaced fracture of his left hip and was ^subsequently transferred to Lake Charles Memorial Hospital by his treating physician, Dr. Taylor, for surgery on his fractured hip. On or about June 11, 2010, in accordance with La.R.S. 40:1299.47, the Estate filed a complaint of medical malpractice against Beauregard with the Division of Administration. The Estate requested a medical review panel (MRP) and alleged that Beauregard breached the standard of care owed to Mr. Walters by allowing him to fall and fracture his hip. Evidently, Mr. Walters died of unrelated causes prior to the filing of the Estate’s complaint with the Division of Administration. The medical review panel, consisting of three physicians, Drs. Kelvin Spears, Gerald Mouton, and Vincent Lococo, reviewed Mr. Walters’ complaint, and on October 12, 2011, the panel issued an opinion, unanimously finding that, based on the evidence presented, Beauregard did not breach the applicable standard of care in its treatment of Mr. Walters. On January 26, 2012, the Estate timely filed suit, claiming medical malpractice against Beauregard. Beauregard answered the Estate’s suit on February 28, 2012, and propounded interrogatories seeking the name of all experts the Estate intended to use at the time of trial. On June 28, 2012, Beauregard filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Estate had no expert testimony to support its claim as required by La.R.S. 9:2794(A). In support of its motion for summary judgment, Beauregard relied on the opinion of the medical review panel that the hospital had not breached the standard of care in its treatment of Mr. Walters. | ¡.Beauregard's motion for summary judgment was set for hearing on September 13, 2012. On September 11, 2012, the Estate filed a motion and order for continuance on the grounds that its expert, Mae A. Williams, Associate Chief, Nursing Services for Education, and Acting Chief of Education Service for the Alexandria Veterans Administration Health Care System in Pineville, Louisiana (Nurse Williams), did not have adequate time to review the records from Beauregard in time for the hearing. Beauregard opposed the motion for continuance as untimely, citing the failure of the Estate to have an expert review the case despite three years having passed since the alleged malpractice and eleven months since the medical review panel issued its opinion in favor of Beauregard. The hearing on Beauregard’s motion for summary judgment was held, as scheduled, on September 18, 2012. The trial court denied the Estate’s motion for a continuance, but left the record open for seven days to allow Nurse Williams the opportunity to review the records and to allow the Estate to file into the record an affidavit of Nurse Williams in opposition to Beauregard’s motion for summary judgment. On September 20, 2012, the Estate filed its opposition to Beauregard’s motion, asserting expert testimony was not required in this case, and, in the alternative, the affidavit of Nurse Williams established that Beauregard breached the applicable standard of care. Beauregard filed a reply brief on September 21, 2012, urging that the affidavit of Nurse Williams did not create a genuine issue of material fact for trial. On September 26, 2012, in its written Reasons For Judgment and Judgment, the trial court granted Beauregard’s motion for summary judgment on the basis |4that the Estate failed to produce expert medical testimony refuting the opinion of the medical review panel. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 1. The district court erred when it relied upon the defendant’^] inadequate medical record keeping [and] dismissed the plaintiffs claim on defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 2. The district court erred when it failed to recognize that a medical facility that fails to maintain adequate medical records breaches the standard of care for medical professionals. In other words, the Estate urges that the trial court erred in relying on inadequate medical records in reaching its ruling and in not recognizing that Beauregard’s failure to maintain adequate medical records is a breach of the standard of care. Thus, a genuine issue of material fact was created by Nurse Williams’ affidavit which questioned the quality and completeness of the nurses’ notes pertaining to the care of Mr. Walters while he was' a patient at Beauregard. By inference, there is a factual dispute as to whether an appropriate high-fall risk procedure was actually in place and followed. The Estate alleged in its petition that Mr. Walters did call for assistance several times and fell after trying to get up to go to the bathroom when no one came to assist him. The hospital records that were provided do not contain any record of Mr. Walters’ alleged calls, nor do they show that Mr. Walters fell, broke his hip, and was found next to his bed on the floor. DISCUSSION Summary Judgment Issue Summary judgments are reviewed de novo, applying the same standard to the matter as that applied by the trial court. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730. Summary judgment is favored by law and provides a vehicle by which the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of an action may be achieved. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(2). The trial court is required to render summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B). In 1997, the legislature enacted La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(2) which clarified the burden of proof in summary judgment proceedings. The initial burden of proof remains with the mover to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. If the mover has made a prima facie showing that the motion should be granted, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present evidence demonstrating that a material factual issue remains. “[T]he failure of the non-moving party to produce evidence of a material factual dispute mandates the granting of the motion.” Hutchinson v. Knights of Columbus, Council No. 5U7, 03-1533, p. 6 (La.2/20/04), 866 So.2d 228, 233 (citing Hardy v. Bowie, 98-2821, (La.9/8/99), 744 So.2d 606). When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, the adverse party may not rest on the allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. La.Code Civ.P. art. 967(B). A fact is material when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to a plaintiffs cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery. “[F]acts are material if they potentially insure or preclude recovery, affect a litigant’s ultimate success, or determine the outcome of the legal dispute.” Smith, 639 So.2d at 751 (quoting South Louisiana Bank v. Williams, 591 So.2d 375, 377 (La.App. 3 Cirjl991),R writs denied, 596 So.2d 211 (La.1992)). In other words, a “material” fact is one that would matter on the trial on the merits. “Any doubt as to a dispute regarding a material issue of fact must be resolved against granting the motion and in favor of a trial on the merits.” Id. at 751 (citations omitted). In determining whether a fact is material, we must consider the substantive law governing the litigation. Davenport v. Albertson’s, Inc., 00-685 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/00), 774 So.2d 340, writ denied, 01-73 (La.3/23/01), 788 So.2d 427. Our supreme court in McGlothlin v. Christus St. Patrick Hospital, 10-2775, pp. 17-18 (La.7/1/11), 65 So.3d 1218,1231-32 stated: In a medical malpractice action against a hospital, the plaintiff must prove, as in any negligence action, the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to protect against this risk, the defendant breached that duty, the plaintiff suffered an injury, and the defendant’s actions were a substantial cause in fact of the injury. Smith v. State through Dept, of Health and Human Resources Admin., 523 So.2d 815, 819 (La.1988). “A hospital is bound to exercise the requisite standard of care toward a patient that the particular patient’s condition may require and to protect the patient from external circumstances peculiarly within the hospital’s control.” Id. Whether a hospital has breached those duties depends on the circumstances and facts of the case. Hunt v. Bogalusa Community Medical Center, 303 So.2d 745, 747 (La.1974). The McGlothlin court additionally stated: “Moreover, the resolution of whether the alleged malpractice constitutes negligence as well as the assessment of factual conflicts, including those involving the contradictory testimony of expert witnesses, falls within the province of the trier of fact.” Id. at 1232 (citing Martin v. East Jefferson General Hosp., 582 So.2d 1272, 1277-78 (La.1991)). In addition, our supreme court in S.J. v. Lafayette Parish School Board., 06-2862, p. 5 (La.6/29/07), 959 So.2d 884, 887, reminds us that: “Even though summary judgment is now favored, it is not a substitute for trial on the merits, and it is inappropriate for judicial determination of subjective facts, such as motive, intent, |7good faith or knowledge that call for credibility evaluations and the weighing of testimony.” The trial court, in deciding a motion for summary judgment, must assume that all of the affiants are credible. Davis v. Delta Bank, 42,529 (LaApp. 2 Cir. 11/7/07), 988 So.2d 1254. Genuine Issue of Material Fact On June 26, 2012, Beauregard filed its original motion for summary judgment, approximately five months after suit was filed on behalf of the Estate. Beauregard claimed the Estate had failed to identify a medical expert as requested in Beauregard’s interrogatories which were propounded in conjunction with its February 28, 2012 answer to the Estate’s petition. The record does not contain the Estate’s response to Beauregard’s interrogatories or reflect that any steps were taken by Beauregard to require the Estate’s response. In addition, the record does not contain a scheduling order -with court-ordered deadlines for the naming and/or the production of expert reports. In the September 11, 2012 correspondence to the trial court seeking a continuance, counsel for the Estate notes his continuing obligation to update the Estate’s answers to interrogatories and, thus, names and attaches the curriculum vitae of Nurse Williams. The Estate then requested a continuance of the September 18, 2012 hearing in order to allow its retained expert, Nurse Williams, time to review the file and render a report and affidavit on behalf of the Estate. Beauregard opposed the continuance on the basis that the Estate “failed to have this matter reviewed by an expert despite three years having passed since the date of the alleged malpractice, eleven months having passed since the panel rendered an opinion in favor of | «Defendant, and over two months having passed since Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.” The hearing on Beauregard’s motion for summary judgment was held, as scheduled, on September 18, 2012. The trial court, in its colloquy with counsel for the Estate, had apparently adopted the position of Beauregard that the Estate should have retained an expert at an earlier date. THE COURT: the date of the hearing in September of 2012. The Estate filed its claim on June 11, 2010, with the medical review panel. However, a plaintiff in a malpractice Inaction is not required at the medical review panel to “specify the health care providers’ standards of care.” Perritt v. Dona, 02-2601, 02-2603, p. 13 (La.7/2/03), 849 So.2d 56, 65. This matter is set before the Court on a motion for summary judgment, and yesterday the Court received a fax from Mr. Hickman requesting a continuance of this matter based upon the fact that you recently retained the services of [Mae] Williams to review the medical records in this matter. When Ms. Williams was retained, Mr. Hickman? MR. HICKMAN: About three weeks ago, Judge. Ms. Williams, she is the chief associate nurse at the VA Hospital in Pineville in charge of nursing education. I retained her about three weeks ago to review the record. Since that time, she’s had a death in the family; and she’s also had to go to Florida to teach a class there for a week. So out of that three weeks that she had, she’s probably had a possible week to review the records. I’m asking the Court for — to give me an opportunity to let her review it and render an opinion as to whether or not there is any breach of the standard of care in this case. It may be very possible that she may review it and agree with the medical review panel that there is no breach of the standard of care. I don’t know, but I would like to at least have an opportunity to see what she has to say. THE COURT: Did you let her know that you had to have something filed at least eight days prior to this hearing in order for it to be considered by the Court? MR. HICKMAN: Yes, Judge, and she told me she would do the best she could; but she just wasn’t able to get it to me. 13THE COURT: Well, quite honestly, this thing has been going on for quite some time. As I understand the pleadings, the primary thrust is that Mr. Walters called for assistance, allegedly, and did not get it and as a result fell and injured himself. As I understand it, there’s no notation in the records whatsoever of Mr. Walters making that call for assistance. MR. HICKMAN: There’s no notation of — There’s no notation of the fall itself, Judge, in the record. The only reference to the fall is actually a notation by Dr. Taylor as he’s transferring Mr. Walters from Beauregard Hospital to Lake Charles. He mentioned that he had fell [sic] while in the bathroom. THE COURT: My point of that is, if there’s nothing in the records that indicates that here was a call for assistance and none was given timely, I don’t know how this expert is going to make a determination from reviewing those records. But I don’t like to throw people’s cases out because their lawyers didn’t do timely what they should have done. The hospital is going to suffer no ill consequences for waiting two more weeks to make this decision; because, quite honestly, if there’s not expert testimony that there was liability here, then the motion for summary judgment is appropriate. The trial court then denied the Estate’s motion to continue, but granted the Estate seven days, until the close of business on September 20, 2012, to submit an affidavit from its expert witness, Nurse Williams. The Estate complied and filed its opposition as ordered on September 20, 2012, along with an affidavit by Nurse Williams, her curriculum vitae, and a document entitled “Requested Report.” Beauregard filed its opposition on September 21, 2012. The trial court denied the Estate’s requested continuance primarily on the basis that there was a three year period from the alleged malpractice, in June of 2009, to The medical review panel rendered its decision on October 12, 2011. Pursuant to La.R.S. 40:1299.47(N)(l)(a)(ii), the Estate had ninety days from receipt of notification by certified mail to file suit and did so in district court on January 26, 2012. Beauregard’s motion for summary judgment was filed on June 28, 2012, some four months after Beauregard filed its answer to the Estate’s petition and propounded interrogatories requesting the name of the Estate’s medical expert. As previously indicated, there was no scheduling order setting forth dates to hire experts and furnish reports. In compliance with the order of the trial court, on September 20, 2012, the Estate filed its opposition to Beauregard’s motion, asserting expert testimony was not required in this case, based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. The Estate argued in the alternative, the affidavit of Nurse Williams established that Beauregard breached the standard of care. Nurse Williams’ report raises a number of questions concerning the adequacy of the nurses’ notes at Beauregard and supports the statement in Nurse Williams’ affidavit that, “The documentation of treatment and nurse’s progress notes are inadequate and fail to meet the standard of care of nurses in the State of Louisiana.” In its reasons, the trial court found that Nurse Williams’ affidavit did “not refute the conclusions reached by the medical review panel, nor does it contain ^factual assertions in support of the plaintiffs claims.” The trial court further stated: Instead, Nurse Williams attests that the documentation of treatment that she viewed was so inadequate that she could not determine if the standard of care was breached. Nurse Williams never opines that a breach of the standard of care caused injury to the plaintiff. This affidavit is insufficient to establish that the plaintiff will be able to satisfy her evidentiary burden at trial. As such, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On the contrary, a review of the record reveals that the affidavit of Nurse Williams does opine that the standard of care was breached by Beauregard. Her affidavit states, “The documentation of treatment and nurse’s progress notes are inadequate and fail to meet the standard of care of nurses in the State of Louisiana.” This statement is further supported by her finding that, “it was noted during this admission to Beauregard Memorial Hospital that Mr. Walters had fallen at home. Given diagnosis and his history of falling, there should have been some documentation of the risk of falling for Mr. Walters.” Nurse Williams then details additional procedures that should have been implemented by the nurses and detailed in the records of Beauregard based on the information provided upon Mr. Walters’ admission to the hospital. Nurse Williams in her affidavit states: Once a fall risk analysis was done, Mr. Walters’s [sic] chart, bed and Care Plans should have been tagged with the Fall Risk precautions that were being undertaken to prevent Mr. Walters from falling and injuring himself. This information should have been reported in the Hand off Communications between shifts. There should have been Fall Protocols and Interventions in place. I could not tell if any of this was done because the medical records are so inadequate and does not include documentation that such action and precautions were undertaken. In Cook v. Jefferson Parish Hospital Service District No. 2, 04-17 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/26/04), 876 So.2d 173, remanded on other grounds, 04-2134 (La.12/8/04), 112888 So.2d 819, a woman fell at home and broke her left arm when trying to get to the bathroom. After she was admitted to East Jefferson General Hospital (East Jefferson), she fell again and broke her right arm while trying to close the door to the bathroom. Her daughters filed a medical malpractice claim against the hospital, alleging the staff should have implemented a “Falls Care Plan” because she was 70 years old and had a history of a prior fall. The fifth circuit affirmed the trial court’s ruling in favor of the daughters, finding the East Jefferson nursing staff breached the standard of care “by not creating a ‘Falls Care Plan’ since documentation of this plan could not be found in the patient’s record.” Id. at 175 (emphasis added). The affidavit of Nurse Williams references the “Falls Risk” precautions that should have been implemented for Mr. Walters. The medical review panel opinion indicates that Mr. Walters “was determined to be ambulatory, but required some assistance with ambulation, and was assessed to be at high risk for falls.” Although the panel opinion references a “fall assessment,” which lists several fall prevention steps required for Mr. Walters, without further clarification, there can be no determination that the “fall assessment” discussed by the panel was actually in place or implemented, or whether any plan was equivalent to the “Falls Risk” precautions outlined by Nurse Williams as the standard of care. In fact the Beauregard medical records are not in evidence at all. Moreover, when he was admitted to the hospital, the notice to Beauregard that Mr. Walters had previously fallen at home mirrors the facts of Cook. The opinion of the medical review panel, upon which Beauregard relies to support its motion, does not include the information that Beauregard was on notice that he had suffered a fall at home. Thus, this fact, combined with the standard of care which |1sNurse Williams attests is required for a patient in this condition, create genuine issues of material facts precluding summary judgment. In addition, the trial court, in its reasons for granting summary judgment, relies heavily on Beauregard’s staff progress notes. There is no indication in the nurses’ progress notes that Mr. Walters rang for assistance prior to leaving his bed and suffering the fall which fractured his hip. The statement of the Estate’s counsel on the record and Nurse William’s report, however, reflect that Mr. Walters’ fall on September 20, 2009, was not documented at all in the Beauregard nurses’ notes. According to counsel for the Estate, no mention of the fall was made in the records until Dr. Taylor transferred Mr. Walters, on September 22, 2012, to Lake Charles Memorial Hospital for surgery to repair the hip fracture. Given this glaring omission, this court is reluctant to rely on Beauregard’s claim that the absence of a documented call for assistance in the medical records leads to the conclusion that no such call was made. The medical review panel’s “finding” that Mr. Walters did not ring for assistance cannot be supported by a record which does not even contain the undisputed fact that the patient did fall and fracture his hip. At best, the trial court’s ruling granting Beauregard’s motion for summary judgment is premature at this stage of the litigation. Discovery appears to be in its infancy and inadequate. The Estate has named a medical expert who has raised genuine issues of fact which at least require further inquiry in order to determine if the alleged breach of the standard of care by Beauregard bears a causal link to Mr. Walters’ injuries. Borne v. St. Francis Medical Center, 26,940 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/10/95), 655 So.2d 597, writ denied, 95-1403 (La.9/15/95), 660 So.2d 453. See also Cook, 876 So.2d 173. 11 .(Considering the Estate’s retention of Nurse Williams as its medical expert, and in light of this court’s ruling, the Estate’s argument about the case proceeding without a medical expert on the basis of res ipsa loquitor need not be addressed by this court at this time. DISPOSITION The judgment of the trial court granting the motion for summary judgment on behalf of West Louisiana Health Services Inc., d/b/a Beauregard Memorial Hospital and dismissing the claims of The Estate of Willie Walters is reversed. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. All costs are assessed against West Louisiana Health Services Inc., d/b/a Beauregard Memorial Hospital. REVERSED AND REMANDED. . The Estate's Petition for Damages indicates Mr. Walters' death and designates his certificate of death as Exhibit "A.” However, the record before us does not contain the referenced death certificate. . Although the medical review panel decision was technically issued on October 12, 2011, it was not signed by the attorney chairman until October 25, 2011. The record does not reflect the date the panel opinion was sent or received. However, considering the date of signing by the attorney chairman, allowing a few days for mailing, and considering the date the petition was filed, January 26, 2012, it would appear the suit was timely filed. This assumption is bolstered by the fact that Defendant has not raised the issue of timeliness on appeal.

In re Gordon, Warren; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 494535; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 2094. Denied on the showing made.

In re Charles F. Albright, IV; Tracy Lynn Warner Albright, et al.; — Defendants); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. B, No. 2014-9878; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-1266. Denied. JOHNSON, C.J., and HUGHES, J., would grant.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS PER CURIAM. hThe Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) commenced an investigation into allegations that respondent commingled and converted client funds, failed to promptly provide an accounting to her client, and made dubious entries on the belated accounting to justify the retention of the client’s funds. Prior to the filing of formal charges, respondent and the ODC submitted a joint petition for consent discipline, in which the parties stipulated that respondent has violated Rules 1.4(a), 1.5(f)(3), 1.5(f)(5), 1.15(c), 1.15(d), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Having reviewed the petition, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Consent Discipline be accepted and that Vivica D. Smith Pierre, Louisiana Bar Roll number 22625, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years, subject to the conditions set forth in the petition for consent discipline. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from, the date of finality of this court’s judgment until paid.

SANDRA CABRINA JENKINS, Judge. 11 J.W., a juvenile, appeals his delinquency adjudication for battery of a police officer, a violation of La. R.S. 14:34.2. In the one assignment of error presented to this Court on appeal, J.W. challenges his adjudication on the grounds that there was no reasonable suspicion for a detention or probable cause for an arrest. For the following reasons, we affirm the delinquency adjudication. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On November 13, 2013, the State filed a petition charging J.W. with one count of battery of a police officer. The adjudication hearing was held on February 12, 2014 with New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) Officer Brandon Callias (“Officer Callias”) appearing as the State’s sole witness. J.W. did not present any witnesses. Officer Callias testified that he and his partner, Officer Willard Pearson (“Officer Pearson”), were conducting proactive patrols in their assigned district on November 6, 2013. According to Officer Callias, he saw J.W. run from the 12alleyway of a known drug house, while looking over his shoulder at their marked police vehicle and clutching his waistband. Officer Callias testified that, based on his six years of experience, when one grips his waistband, it typically indicates that he has a weapon. Because of this inference, Officer Callias testified that he requested J.W. to come to the police unit. J.W. ignored the Officer’s request and instead shouted profanities. According to Officer Callias, he approached J.W. and grabbed him by his arm to escort him to the vehicle. J.W. then elbowed the officer in the chest causing the officer’s grip to be released. When the officer attempted to regain his grasp of J.W.’s arm, he swung at the officer, but did not make contact. With the help of Officer Pearson, the officers were ultimately able to handcuff J.W. and place him in the police vehicle. The trial court adjudicated J.W. delinquent for battery of a police officer and immediately proceeded with his disposition hearing. The trial court committed J.W. to the Department of Public Safety and Corrections for a period of six months, however, J.W.’s commitment was suspended and he was placed on active probation for one year. This appeal followed. LAW AND ANALYSIS In juvenile appeals, this Court reviews both “facts and law to determine whether there is sufficient evidence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to adjudicate a child a delinquent.” State in the Interest of D.R., 10-0405, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/13/10), 50 So.3d 927, 932. Furthermore, appellate courts must accord great deference to the trial court’s factual findings, credibility determinations, and assessments of the testimony of witnesses. State ex rel. W.B., 08-1458, p. 1 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/22/09), 11 So.3d 60, 61 (citing State in the Interest of J.N., 07-1229, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/7/08), 984 So.2d 910, 915). J.W.’s delinquency adjudication for battery of a police officer is defined as “a battery committed without the consent of the victim when the offender has reasonable grounds to believe the victim is a police officer acting in the performance of his duty.” La. R.S. 14:34.2(A)(1). J.W. is not challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to his adjudication; rather, J.W. asserts that the trial court erred in his adjudication given that there was no reasonable suspicion for a detention or probable cause for an arrest. When a detention is for the limited purpose of allowing officers adequate time to examine suspicions of criminal activity, it is deemed an investigatory stop rather than an arrest. State v. Turner, 13-0180, p. 2 (La.3/1/13), 108 So.3d 753, 754 (quoting U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); State v. Miller, 00-1657, p. 3 (La.10/26/01), 798 So.2d 947, 948 (per curiam)). Officer Callias’? hearing testimony represents that J.W. struck the officer almost immediately after he had attempted to approach J.W. to escort him to the vehicle; thus, these two events were very close in time. J.W. asserts that the officer’s grab of J.W.’s arm was a physical restraint which automatically escalated the scenario to an arrest. We reject this contention. As this Court has stated: “Inherent in the right of the police to conduct a brief investigatory detention is also the right to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention.” State v. Stewart, 13-0779, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/22/14), 133 So.3d 166, 171 (quoting State v. Porche, 06-0312, p. 7 (La.11/29/06), 943 So.2d 335, 339). We find that at the time J.W. struck Officer Callias, J.W. was not under arrest, and that this incident was nothing |4more than an investigatory stop. J.W.’s argument that he had a right to resist an unlawful arrest is therefore without merit. J.W.’s remaining argument is that Officer Callias lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory Terry stop under La.C.Cr.P. art. 215.1, thereby rendering the detention unlawful. J.W. contends that Officer Callias had no grounds to detain him. He argues that merely observing a person run from an alleyway of a known drug house, while looking over his shoulder at a marked police car, and clutching his waistband, is not enough. In furtherance of this argument, J.W. stresses Officer Callias’ hearing testimony that he neither saw J.W. do anything criminal nor had any specific information regarding any criminal activity by J.W. J.W. contends that because the detention was unlawful, he had a right to resist; in support, J.W. cites jurisprudence stating that “if [a person] can be charged for resisting lawful detention the inference is that he may resist unlawful detention.” State v. Manuel, 06-0486, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/21/06), 946 So.2d 245, 248. On the contrary, the State asserts that when Officer Callias encoun tered J.W., he had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop under La. C.Cr.P. art. 215.1. The State points out that the reasonable suspicion that justifies a Terry stop “need not rise to the probable cause required for a lawful arrest.” State v. Duhe, 12-2677, p. 7 (La.12/10/13), 130 So.3d 880, 885 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)). The officer, however, “must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of | .^criminal activity.” State v. Greenberry, 14-0076, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/28/14), 141 So.3d 925, 928 (quoting State v. Temple, 02-1895, p. 4 (La.9/9/03), 854 So.2d 856, 859-60). Furthermore, our review must consider “the totality of the circumstances of each case, a process which allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training ...” State v. Ulmer, 12-0949, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/29/13), 116 So.3d 1004, 1009 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Temple, 02-1895, p. 5, 854 So.2d at 860). When considering whether the officer’s investigatory stop was justified, “the reputation of an area is an articulable fact upon which a police officer may legitimately rely and is therefore relevant in the determination of reasonable suspicion.” Greenberry, 14-0076, p. 5,141 So.3d at 928 (quoting Temple, 02-1895, p. 5, 854 So.2d at 860). However, “an individual’s presence in an area of expected crime, standing alone, is insufficient to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that a person is involved in criminal activity.” State v. McClendon, 13-1454, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/30/14), 133 So.3d 239, 248 (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979)). Thus, additional, independent factors are required to prove a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Factors such as “flight, nervousness, or a startled look at the sight of a police officer” may warrant a finding of reasonable cause to stop an individual. State v. Vingle, 01-0840, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/21/01), 802 So.2d 887, 890 (citing State v. Belton, 441 So.2d 1195 (La.1983); State v. Noto, 596 So.2d 416 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992); State v. Preston, 569 So.2d 50 (LaApp. 4 Cir.1990)). Likewise, an individual’s unprovoked flight in a high-crime area has been found sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. State v. Robertson, 13-1403, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/9/14), 136 So.3d 1010, 1015 (quoting State v. Morgan, 09-2352, p. 6 (La.3/15/11), 59 So.3d 403, 407). It is well established that “in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” State v. Boyer, 07-0476, p. 20 (La.10/16/07), 967 So.2d 458, 471 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868,1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). The juvenile court found that J.W.’s unprovoked flight while grabbing his waistband, coupled with the high-crime area, and Officer Callias’ inferences and deductions based upon his six years of experience, taken together, support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Given the juvenile court judge’s ability to examine the credibility of witnesses, after a review of the testimony, we do not find that the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding reasonable suspicion for the stop. As we conclude there was adequate reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop, J.W.’s contention that he had a right to resist an unlawful detention is meritless. Because, as recognized at the outset, the detention did not rise to the level of an arrest, J.W.’s assertion that he had a right to resist an unlawful arrest is likewise without merit. Moreover, J.W. does not assign error as to the sufficiency of the evidence for his adjudication. Accordingly, J.W.’s battery on the officer was unjustified, and J.W.’s delinquency adjudication was not error. DECREE For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court adjudicating J.W. delinquent is affirmed. AFFIRMED. LOBRANO, J., concurs in the result. . As J.W. is a juvenile, he will be referred to by his initials. La. Ch.C. art. 412(a). . Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). . La.C.Cr.P. art. 215.1 provides: "A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense and may demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his actions.”

In re Leonard, Colby D.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial Ilistrict Court Div. N, No. 04-07-0409; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 1729. Denied.

In re Smith, Kerry A.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 492-480; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0073. Denied.

KEATY, Judge. hFor the reasons set forth in the companion case in this consolidated matter, Freeman v. Durel, 12-349 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/1/13), 157 So.3d 642, 2013 WL 1810577, we reverse the trial court’s decision reinstating Plaintiffs as commissioners of the Housing Authority of the City of Lafayette. We further reverse the trial court’s judgment in favor of Plaintiffs declaring Defendant, Joey Durel, in contempt of court for Durel’s decision to remove Plaintiffs as commissioners of the Housing Authority of the City of Lafayette. We further reverse the trial court’s reinstatement of Plaintiffs and its finding Durel in contempt of court as moot. REVERSED. COOKS, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.

ROSEMARY LEDET, Judge. | ¶ This is a suit for declaratory and in-junctive relief. The principal issue is whether the director of the New Orleans Department of Public Works (“DPW”) was authorized to issue a permit to a residential association, Newcomb Boulevard Association (“NBA”), to permanently close Newcomb Boulevard, a dedicated public street, at the intersection of Freret Street. Plaintiffs are two residents who live in the immediate vicinity of the intersection— Derek Huston and Keith Hardie, Jr. — and two neighborhood associations — Maple Area Residents, Inc. (“MARI”) and Car-rollton/Riverbend Residents? Association (“CRRA”)(collectively “Plaintiffs”). The defendants are the City of New Orleans (the “City”); John H. Shires, in his official capacity as DPWs director; and Robert Mendoza, as Mr. Shires’ successor. NBA was granted leave to intervene as a defendant in order to enforce its alleged right to maintain the permanent barrier — an ornate, wrought iron fence that it cemented into the ground at the intersection (the “Fence”). From |2the trial court’s judgment granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, NBA appeals. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In 1916, Newcomb Boulevard became a dedicated public street. Newcomb Boulevard is a narrow (22 feet wide), two-way street (with a third parking lane). It is approximately 1400 feet long with no cross streets or outlets. Newcomb Boulevard is located in close proximity to two colleges, Tulane University and Loyola University. Until 2006, Newcomb Boulevard was one of the few through streets in the university area that connected St. Charles Avenue and Ferret Street. According to Mr. LeClercq (NBA’s former president), the residents of Newcomb Boulevard for several decades had expressed to the City their concerns regarding the safety issues created by speeding vehicles given the unique characteristics of their street. Mr. LeClercq stated that “[t]he residents had asked the City of New Orleans to take some action to address those issues, but nothing was done.” In April 2005, Urban Systems, Inc. (“USI”) submitted the findings of its study, done at the City’s request, regarding the traffic on Newcomb Boulevard. The report states that the residents of Newcomb Boulevard reported two major concerns: speeding and cut-through traffic. The report concludes that speeding exists and recommends the use of speed humps as a traffic calming measure. The [..¡report, however, recommends that “[f]ur-ther study should be considered before implementation of such devices.” As to cut-through traffic, the report indicates that the residents believed their street was being used as a cut-through “to avoid congestion on St. Charles Avenue.” The report, however, concludes that the amount of cut-through traffic was “normal and not excessive.” In late 2005, Newcomb residents submitted a petition to the City requesting relief from the speeding and safety problem on their street. The matter was referred to DPW’s director, Mr. Shires. On January 31, 2006, Mr. Shires, in his official capacity, issued a letter (also referred to as a “permit”) directed to Mr. LeClercq, as NBA’s president, authorizing the closure of Newcomb Boulevard at Freret, stating: We have reviewed the request and plan dated January 24, 2006 to close New-comb Boulevard at Freret Street. This letter shall serve as your approval to proceed with the closure of the street at Freret Street subject to your compliance with the applicable City of New Orleans Department of Public Works specifications. The normal and customary review by the Departments of Sanitation, Fire, and Parks and Parkways has been done and those Departments have no objection to the proposed closure. You will install the turnaround for single unit trucks designed by Urban Systems, Inc. and pay for that installation, allow for continued pedestrian access, continued public parking outside the turnaround area, and will obtain the servi-tudes for the turnaround in favor of the City of New Orleans. Prior to the commencement of work you will need to notify the Department of Public Works, Fire Department, Sanitation Department and Parks and Parkways for the necessary permits. |Jn the summer of 2006, a temporary barrier (yellow concrete blocks) appeared at the intersection of Freret Street and Newcomb Boulevard. Later that year, a permanent barrier, the Fence, was erected at the intersection. The Fence blocked all vehicular traffic from entering or leaving Newcomb Boulevard at Freret Street and rendered Newcomb Boulevard a dead end street (cul-de-sac). The Fence thus precluded vehicular traffic from using New-comb Boulevard to travel between Freret Street and St. Charles Avenue. To alert motorists, a “No Outlet” sign was placed on the corner of Newcomb Boulevard and St. Charles Avenue. At the Fire Department’s request, NBA incorporated a removable panel into the Fence to permit emergency access. The sidewalk at the intersection remained open, allowing pedestrian and bicycle access. Newcomb Boulevard residents funded all of the work associated with the installation of the Fence. In January 2007, Mr. Hardie and Mr. Huston, residents living in the immediate vicinity of Newcomb Boulevard, filed this suit against the City and Mr. Shires in his official capacity as DPWs director. Mr. Hardie and Mr. Huston averred that they regularly used Newcomb Boulevard as a means of navigating between Freret Street and St. Charles Avenue before it was closed. They alleged, among other things, that the Fence was improperly authorized by DPWs director without approval of the New Orleans City Council (“City Council”) or the City Planning Commission. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to have Newcomb Boulevard returned to its original status as a through street. Simply stated, the relief Plaintiffs sought is to have the Fence removed. 15In April 2007, an amending and supplemental petition was filed joining as plaintiffs two neighborhood associations, MARI and CRRA, and as defendant Mr. Mendoza, in his official capacity as DPWs director (as Mr. Shires’ successor). In July 2007, NBA filed a motion for leave to file a petition for intervention to enforce its right to maintain the Fence. In its motion, NBA averred the following: In January 2008, the trial court, over Plaintiffs’ objection, granted NBA’s motion for leave to intervene as a defendant. • Newcomb [NBA] is a neighborhood association representing the interests of the residents of Newcomb Boulevard, New Orleans, Louisiana. • Newcomb [NBA] legally obtained the permission of the City of New Orleans through the Director of Public Works to erect the traffic barrier. • John Shires, the former Director of the Department of Public Works, approved the plan to erect the traffic barrier and to redirect cut-through traffic from Newcomb Boulevard by letter, dated January 31, 2006. • Newcomb [NBA] hired the engineer, surveyor, and architect to design the turnaround and [F]ence, complied with the request of the Fire Department to include a removable center panel in the [F]ence, and coordinated the design and construction with City employees. • In June of 2006, representatives of Newcomb [NBA] met with Mr. Hardie [a plaintiff] to discuss the plan. Mr. Hardie waited until after the construction was complete to bring this lawsuit. • Newcomb [NBA] paid for all of the work itself at a cost of approximately $65,000. No City money was spent on the project. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by the parties. Following a hearing on the motions, the trial court, on March 27, 2012, rendered judgment granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denying the defendants’ |fi(NBA’s and the City’s) motions for summary judgment. In its judgment, the trial court framed the central issues presented as two-fold: 1) Whether the closure of Newcomb Blvd. at Freret Street to vehicular traffic was accomplished by the installation of a “traffic control device”. 2) Whether the Director of Public Works, John Shires, exceeded his authority in the letter of Jan. 31, 2006 (wherein he gave “approval to proceed with the closure of the street at Freret Street ...” when the traffic study commissioned by the City called for speed humps. The trial court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the following factors: • The iron fence is not a temporary structure or a traffic control device. • Newcomb Boulevard is a formally dedicated street whose revocation can only be accomplished by formal action of the City Council. • The Home Rule Charter [the “Charter”] grants the power to control franchises, privileges and permits concerning public streets to the City Council. • The closure of Newcomb Boulevard at Freret Street violated the Council’s plenary charter authority to control changes in streets. • The Director of Public Works did not have the authority under the City Code to grant a permit , to close New-comb Boulevard. • The Director of Public Works did not have the authority to install the [F]ence as a traffic control device. • The City of New Orleans violated [La. Const.,] Article VII [§ 14(A) ] by permitting a private association to erect and maintain a private fence barring vehicular traffic on a dedicated public street. The trial court further found that DPW’s director’s authorization of the permit resulted in a usurpation • of City Council’s plenary power to control changes in the streets. The trial court still further found that the installation of the Fence was “done in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” In so finding, the trial court noted that “[i]n |7the Trianon Plaza matter, the residents were similarly concerned about speeding and cut-through traffic, but the process utilized by the City to approve closure was different.” Continuing, the trial court noted that the following steps were taken in Trianon Plaza matter: 1. Trianon was initially closed on a “trial basis” to determine whether “non-local traffic ... can be accommodated elsewhere without serious congestion or delay.” ... 2. Trianon residents were allowed to convert the “trial” closure to a “permanent closure” only after public hearings were held by the Planning Commission and the City Council; 3. The Council made an explicit finding that Trianon was “no longer needed for public purposes” ...; 4. The residents of Trianon were “required to purchase” the street bed for $97,000.00 and to assume the cost of its maintenance and street lights in order to convert the “trial basis” closure to a “permanent closure of Trianon Plaza to non-local traffic.” The trial court thus found that “[w]hen the Newcomb [Boulevard] closure is compared to the closure of Trianon Plaza, the abuse of power is crystal clear.” Finally, the trial court noted that “[t]he evidence in this case demonstrates the lack of any critical analysis of the cost/benefits of closing Newcomb Boulevard at Freret Street and its impact to all New Orleanians.” This suspensive appeal by NBA followed. DISCUSSION This court recently summarized the standard of review of a trial court’s ruling granting a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to La. C.C.P. arts. 966 and 967 and the jurisprudence, as follows: 18Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, using the same criteria applied by trial courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. This standard of review requires the appellate court to look at the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together ■with the affidavits, if any, to determine if they show that no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to the plaintiffs cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery; a fact is material if it potentially insures or precludes recovery, affects a litigant’s ultimate success, or determines the outcome of the legal dispute. A genuine issue is one as to which reasonable persons could disagree; if reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, no need for trial on that issue exists and summary judgment is appropriate. To affirm a summary judgment, we must find reasonable minds would inevitably conclude that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of the applicable law on the facts before the court. The summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of actions. Summary judgments are favored, and the summary judgment procedure shall be construed to accomplish these ends. The code provides that where [as in the instant case] the party moving for summary judgment will not bear the burden of proof at trial, their burden does not require them to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, but rather to point out to the court that an absence of factual support exists for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that it will be able to satisfy its evidentiary burden of proof at trial, no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The adverse party cannot rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported by affidavits, but is required to present evidence establishing that material facts are still at issue. Johnson v. Loyola University of New Orleans, 11-1785, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/8/12), 98 So.3d 918, 923-24. The jurisprudence has held that questions of law are appropriate for resolution within the summary judgment framework. See Levy v. Enterprise Leasing Co. of New Orleans, 08-650, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/8/09), 8 So.3d 839, 841 (citing State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. U.S. Agencies, \JL,.L.C., 05-0728 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/24/06), 934 So.2d 745, and noting that “interpretation of a statute is a question of law that may be decided by a motion for summary judgment”); Cutsinger v. Redfem, 08-2607 (La.5/22/09), 12 So.3d 945 (noting that interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law that can be resolved in the framework of a motion for summary judgment). “When addressing legal issues, a reviewing court gives no special weight to the findings of the trial court. It conducts a de novo review of questions of law and renders a judgment on the record.” Campbell v. Markel American Ins. Co., 00-1448, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/21/01), 822 So.2d 617, 620 (citing Gaylord Container Corp. v. CNA Ins. Companies, 99-1795, p. 9 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/03/01), 807 So.2d 864, 870). Such is the case here. The cross-motions for summary judgment raise the legal issue (question of law) of whether DPW’s director had the power to authorize NBA, a private organization, to permanently close a public street by erecting the Fence without obtaining City Council’s approval. Finding DPW’s director lacked the power, the trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. Based on our de novo review, we affirm. For purposes of our analysis, we summarize NBA’s arguments on appeal as fol lows: (i) The Charter empowers DPW’s director to control traffic and to regulate city streets; this power includes the discretionary authority to 110erect traffic control devices, such as the Fence, to enhance safety. (ii) The Fence is not a complete street closure requiring City Council approval. (iii) The erection of the Fence did not constitute a donation of public property in violation of La. Const., art. 7, § 14(A) because the City retained ownership of the street, which remains available for public use. We separately address each of these issues. (i) DPW’s director’s power to control traffic and regulate streets NBA’s position is that the placement of a traffic control device, such as the Fence, on a residential street to enhance safety is not a legislative power; rather, it is an executive function within DPW’s director’s discretionary authority to control traffic and regulate streets. In support, NBA cites Charter § 4-901, which provides that DPWs director shall: (1) Provide for the design, construction, paving, maintenance, and marking of streets, bridges, and related structures and approaches. (2) Supervise, regulate and control installations in, above or under streets.... (4) Collect and compile traffic data as directed by the Mayor or by ordinance; prepare engineering studies with regard to vehicular and pedestrian traffic as directed by the Mayor or by ordinance; prescribe regulations governing traffic and parking on streets and other public places; and determine the type need, and location of all traffic control devices and marking and install, design, construct, operate, and maintain them. NBA, based on the City’s responses to its requests for admission, offers the following syllogism: hi. DPW’s director has the authority to make decisions concerning the placement of traffic control structures. 2. Decisions concerning the placement of traffic control structures are within the discretion of DPWs director. 3. The decision to permit the traffic control structure on Newcomb Boulevard, the Fence, was within DPWs director’s discretion. NBA contends that there is no requirement in the Charter that DPWs director obtain City Council’s approval to exercise its discretionary authority to install traffic control devices, such as the Fence and barricades. NBA further contends that DPWs director’s exercise of its discretionary authority to install traffic control devices does not violate City Council’s authority under the Charter to control certain changes in streets. According to Plaintiffs, the crux of NBA’s argument is that DPWs director may exercise the means of its assigned function of installing traffic control devices to seek the discretionary end of determining whether a public intersection should be closed. That discretionary end, Plaintiffs contend, is reserved to City Council, as the governing authority, by the Charter, the City Code, the statutes, and the jurisprudence. See Hero Lands Co. v. City of New Orleans, 566 So.2d 149, 152 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990) (holding that the authority to close an intersection is inherent in City Council’s power to regulate the physical development of the City and citing numerous cases in which a government entity was held to have the authority to close a street, to alienate a roadway, and to withdraw the dedication of a street); City of New Orleans v. Badie, 146 La. 550, 552, 88 So. 826, 827 (1920) |12(“[t]he city, through its own council, is vested with control over its streets ...”); Scott v. City of West Monroe, 95 So.2d 343, 346 (La.App. 2d Cir.1957) (“a city, through its governing authority, is vested with control over its streets and may make reasonable regulations for their use”). Plaintiffs contend that DPWs director’s limited power concerning installations in streets does not permit it to determine which streets will be closed by an installation. Rather, when an installation will close an intersection — which Mr. Shires’ letter (permit) authorized the NBA to do at the Freret Street intersection — City Council must first authorize the street closure before DPWs director can “supervise, regulate, and control” the installation used to implement the closure. We agree. A review of the governing statutory, Charter, and City Code provisions and the relevant jurisprudence supports the trial court’s finding that DPWs director lacked the unilateral authority to issue the permit authorizing the permanent closure of Newcomb Boulevard at Freret Street by erecting the Fence; City Council approval was required. The applicable principles that support this finding are as follows: • Newcomb Boulevard is a formally dedicated street whose revocation can only be accomplished by formal action of City Council. See State, Dept, of Transp. & Development v. Scramuzza, 96-1796, p. 8 (La.4/8/97), 692 So.2d 1024, 1029 (noting that a formal act of revocation is necessary to revoke a statutory dedication of a street). See also Bragg Apartments, Inc. v. City of Montgomery, 281 Ala. 253, 256, 201 So.2d'510, 512 (1967) (citing 75 A.L.R. 760, 762, and holding that a city may not permanently close a public street simply by adopting a resolution). • The Legislature has “granted to municipalities the legal authority to alienate public property not needed for public purposes in La. R.S. 33:4712(A).” | mLake Terrace Property Owners Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 567 So.2d 69, 73 (La.1990). • “Under § 3-112(5)(d) of the home rule charter, the Council is empowered to adopt proposed ordinances alienating any immovable property and granting any servitude, franchise or privilege.” Coliseum Square Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 544 So.2d 351, 359 (La. 1989). • “There are no general or constitutional prohibitions against a home rule entity closing a public street and alienating it for a private purpose- The authority to abandon a public street is inherent in the power of a municipality to regulate its physical development. ...” Giambelluca v. Parish of St. Charles, 96-364, p. 11 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/14/96), 687 So.2d 423, 428 (citing Hero Lands, supra.) • Under the Charter, City Council has the power to “regulate the physical development of the city,” which includes the inherent power to close an intersection. Hero Lands, 566 So.2d at 152; see Charter § 5-402(3)(b) and § 5-405(3)(b). L* Under La. R.S. 48:512, it is unlawful to construct any structure on a public street without approval of the governing authority. The governing authority of the City is City Council. See La. Const., art. VI, § 44(4) (defining the “governing authority” as “the body which exercises the legislative functions of the political subdivision”). • Under the City Code, the general rule is that City Council’s permission is required to construct any structure on a public street. City Code, § 146-276. An exception is recognized for temporary revocable permits for the use of the public streets; DEW’S director is authorized to issue such temporary permits. City Code § 146-315. Consistent with the above principles, the trial court, in its reasons for judgment, concluded that “[w]hile the Director of Public Works has the authority and discretion to install traffic devices and provide permits for temporary street 11r,closures (due to festivals, block parties, etc.), only the City Council has authority to permanently close a street.” NBA contends that the jurisprudence the trial court relied in support of this conclusion (Hero Lands, Badie, and Scott) is not controlling because none of the cited cases addresses the issue of DPWs discretionary power to erect traffic control devices. Contrary to NBA’s contention, the jurisprudence which the trial court cited (Hero Lands, Badie, and Scott) stands for the principle for which it was cited — the authority to permanently close a public street is vested in the governing authority, City Council. NBA’s argument that DPWs director had the discretionary authority to approve the Fence pursuant to its power to regulate traffic and regulate streets hinges on its classification of the Fence as a form of traffic control device. The trial court rejected that classification. Explaining its finding that the Fence is not a form of traffic control device, the trial court stated: The court posed a hypothetical question to the defendants as to whether the Director of Public Work’s placement of “Ferdinand the Bull” at the intersection of Newcomb and Freret would constitute a “traffic control device.” While the defendants maintained that such an expansive definition would be an absurdity, they nevertheless concluded that the bull would indeed be a lawful installation of a traffic control device by the Director of Public Works. Further, the gate prohibits traffic; it does not control the flow of traffic (i.e., stop, go[,] turn, yield, slow, etc.). Traffic control devices are uniform in shape. Gates are not. The gate in question was not obtained from the City’s traffic control device supplied. Even assuming, arguendo, that the Fence is a form of traffic control device, DPWs director, as Plaintiffs point out, lacks the power to use the means of a traffic control device to accomplish the discretionary end of closing an intersection. The power to close an intersection is reserved by the Charter, City Code, statutes, and jurisprudence to the governing authority, City Council. It is |1fithus unnecessary to address the issue of whether the Fence is a form of traffic control device. ii) Street closure NBA contends that the Fence is not a street closure requiring City Council approval (as was required in the Trianon Plaza matter) because it does not: (i) permanently transfer Newcomb Boulevard to its residents, (ii) foreclose public pedestrian use, (iii) foreclose vehicular traffic or public parking, or (iv) foreclose public bicycle use. NBA cites the Trianon Plaza matter as an example of a permanent and complete street closure requiring City Council approval. NBA contends that several factors were present in the Trianon Plaza matter that are lacking in this case, and it offers the following comparison: • Trianon Plaza involved a permanent cessation of the public’s right to use the street — Newcomb Boulevard remains open for public use; • Trianon Plaza involved a permanent, irrevocable transfer of the street to its residents — Newcomb Boulevard remains city property; • The City determined that Trianon Plaza was “no longer needed for any public purpose” (including pedestrian and parking purposes) — no such finding has been made with respect to New-comb Boulevard. NBA further contends that the Fence is not a street closure requiring City Council approval because it “merely restricts automobile entrance at one end of a long narrow street in order to alleviate a hazard.” NBA still further contends that the Fence is not a permanent street closure because DPWs director can order it removed at any time. Plaintiffs counter that, contrary to NBA’s suggestion, “[t]he intersection of Newcomb at Freret is closed to automobile and legal bicycle traffic, and the 117[F]ence not only prevents automotive traffic between Newcomb and Freret, but also prevents any citizen from accessing the strip of public land on which the [Fjence sits.” Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that the conversion of Newcomb Boulevard to a dead end street (cul-de-sac) effectively limits the use of the public street only to Newcomb Boulevard residents and those persons visiting or those businesses making deliveries to those residents. Newcomb Boulevard can no longer be used for non-local, through traffic. NBA’s argument that there was no street closure is belied, as Plaintiffs point out, by the DPWs director’s letter (the permit), which expressly authorizes the “closure” of Newcomb Boulevard at Freret Street. Indeed, the letter uses the term “close” or “closure” three times. Moreover, the letter contains no indication that the permit is temporary. Stated another way, the letter provides for no temporal limitation on the permit. Nor is the Fence a temporary structure; rather, it is a permanent, wrought iron structure that is cemented into the ground. Regardless of whether the erection of the Fence resulted in a complete or partial street closure, an obstruction of an intersection, or a conversion of a through street to a dead end street (cul-de-sac), the result, as Plaintiffs contend, is the same— City Council approval was required. See Coliseum Square, supra (public street closure); Worthen v. DeLong, 99-1149 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/23/00), 763 So.2d|18820 (construction of a fence to obstruct a right of way); and Hero Lands, supra (conversion of an intersection to a cul-de-sac or dead end street). iii) Donation of public property The final issue is whether the trial court erred in finding that the permit authorizing the erection of the Fence constituted a donation of public property in violation of La. Const., art. 7, § 14(A). NBA contends that there was no constitutional violation for the following three reasons: (i) no public funds are at issue — the Newcomb Boulevard residents paid for the erection of the Fence; (ii) no public property has been alienated; no sale, lease, servitude, or privilege was granted to NBA; and (iii) even assuming, arguendo, an alienation of public property, the erection of the Fence served a public purpose by addressing the safety concern posed by speeding through traffic and thus was not a gratuitous alienation. See Board of Directors of Indus. Development Bd. of City of Gomales, Louisiana, Inc. v. All Taxpayers, Property Owners, Citizens of City of Gonzales, 05-2298, p. 4 (La.9/6/06), 938 So.2d 11, 14 (holding that an alienation of public property is not gratuitous when it serves a public purpose). Plaintiffs counter that while there was no formal transfer of title to NBA, the permit authorized NBA to take control of a public intersection. They argue that the Fence prevents other members of the public from accessing the strip of land under it and from accessing Newcomb Boulevard from Freret Street by vehicle. This obstruction, they contend, is a violation of the public’s right to use public property. See Worthen, 99-1149 at p. 7, 763 So.2d at 825 (noting that “[i]f the DeLongs were 119allowed to fence in the portion of the right-of-way adjoining their property, they would inevitably obstruct the public use of that segment of land.”). Because the Newcomb Boulevard residents, unlike the Trianon Plaza residents, were not required to purchase the public right of way and to assume responsibility for its maintenance, a violation of La. Const., art. 7, § 14 occurred. Contrasting the Newcomb Boulevard closure with the Trianon Plaza matter demonstrates the appropriate steps the City should have taken, in addressing NBA’s request to erect the Fence, to avoid a constitutional violation. Mr. Shires, in his capacity as DPWs director, alluded to this point in his letter to the City Council in which he voiced his approval of the permanent closure of Tria-non Plaza; he stated: In 2002, Trianon Plaza was closed at the Walmsley Avenue end, as requested, on a trial basis.... Given the configuration of streets in this area, the trial period has demonstrated that the non-local traffic volumes which previously utilized Trianon Plaza can be accommodated elsewhere without serious congestion or delay. The more basic issue which arises is whether the closure of a given block of a public street should be considered on the lone premise that the residents have the desire to eliminate through traffic. Trianon Plaza is somewhat unique in that it consists of only one block.... The ongoing' frequency of complaints relative to speeding in residential neighborhoods would likely prompt many such proposals from every part of the city. Inasmuch as the maintenance of these streets, their rights-of-way, and the utilities below is performed by public funds and agencies, they should remain open to public usage. The potential exists, should a given block not be essential to area circulation, of private ownership. To achieve this, the abutting property owners would be required to purchase the public right-of-way at market value and bear all future roadway and utility maintenance costs. Should the residents commit to this option, the Department of Public Works would have no objection to the permanent closure of Trianon Plaza to non-local traffic. |20UnIike in the Trianon Plaza matter, Mr. Shires authorized the closure of Newcomb Boulevard without obtaining approval of either the City Planning Commission or City Council and without requiring that Newcomb Boulevard residents purchase the public right-of-way and assume the maintenance costs. The result was an illegal donation of public property in violation of La. Const., art. 7, § 14. NBA’s reliance on the City of Gonzales, supra, as dictating a different result is misplaced. In that case, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained that the constitutional prohibition against donating public property is intended “to prohibit a gratuitous alienation of public property.” City of Gonzales, 05-2298 at p. 15, 938 So.2d at 20. To establish the lack of a gratuitous alienation, NBA was required to show the benefits to the public as a whole, not to Newcomb Boulevard residents. As Plaintiffs point out, the benefits from the Fence flowed almost entirely in favor of New-comb Boulevard residents, not the general public. As noted, the conversion of New-comb Boulevard to a dead end street effectively limited the use of the public street only to local traffic — Newcomb Boulevard residents and persons visiting or those businesses making deliveries to those residents. The Newcomb Boulevard residents thus obtained free use of a public intersection, a decrease in vehicular traffic on their street, and a quieter street. The general public, on the other hand, suffered the loss of the right to use Newcomb Boulevard as a through street and an increase in traffic congestion on neighboring streets. Moreover, as Plaintiffs point out, the general public suffered the loss of the revenue that would have been produced if Newcomb Boulevard residents had been treated in the same manner as the Trianon Plaza residents — required to purchase the public right-of-way and to assume the maintenance costs. . _J¿jFor these reasons, we find no error in the trial court’s finding that there was a violation of La. Const., art. 7, § 14(A) as a result of the City “permitting a private association [NBA] to erect and maintain a private fence barring vehicular traffic on a dedicated public street.” DECREE For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court granting Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is affirmed. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED . The City neither filed its own appeal nor joined in NBAs appeal. . The City disputed NBA’s allegation that it did nothing in response to the residents' prior complaints. The report indicates that "the total traffic exhibit 85th percentile speeds greater that [sic] the posted speed limits.” . The report indicates that "statistically, it would appear that since 46% of the total traffic on Newcomb Boulevard is ‘cut-thru’ traffic, a total of 352 vehicles in a 24 hour period in this area of the city is considered to be normal and not excessive.” . The record reflects that Mr. Shires issued the letter (permit) on his last day in office. .The record does not contain a copy of the plan dated January 24, 2006. At the summary judgment hearing, Plaintiffs' counsel pointed out that Plaintiffs "sent specific discovery requests directed to what the plan was that was referred to in Mr. Shires' letter. There was no production made on that. Mr. LeClercq, the head of NBA, was asked in his deposition ... He said he didn’t know.” . The Trianon Plaza matter arose out of a request by residents that their street be closed to non-local traffic, to alleviate the problem caused by cut-through traffic of students who attended a nearby high school, St. Mary's Dominical High School. Similarly, in this case, the Newcomb Boulevard residents requested their street be closed to non-local traffic to alleviate the problem caused by cut-through traffic of students who attended nearby colleges, Tulane University and Loyola University. . On appeal, NBA asserts the following three assignments of error: 1. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the erection of the traffic barrier did not violate the Council's plenary charter authority to control changes in streets; and the Department of Public Works (DPW) does have the authority to control traffic based on hazardous street conditions. 2. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the traffic barrier is a temporary structure and a traffic control device which does not constitute a street closure requiring City Council approval. 3. The City of New Orleans did not violate La. Const., art. VII § 14 by permitting NBA to erect the barrier. . NBA emphasizes that the City has a “May- or-Council form of government" under which the power of government is divided between the Legislative Branch (City Council) and the Executive Branch. The DPW is part of the Executive Branch. NBA further emphasizes that the Charter delegates to DPW's director, as an arm of the executive branch, the power to control traffic and regulate streets. .Plaintiffs contend that NBA's reliance on the responses to requests for admission by an aligned party is misplaced. See Kittrick v. GAF Corp., 125 F.R.D. 103 (M.D.Pa.1989). Plaintiffs further contend that requests for admissions cannot be used for issues of law. See Grevemberg v. G.P.A. Strategic Forecasting Group, Inc., 06-0766, p. 10, n. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/9/07), 959 So.2d 914, 920(noting that "Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1466 does not authorize a request for admission of a conclusion of law. Instead, the article authorizes only requests for admission of ‘relevant matters of fact' and the genuineness of documents” and citing Ball Mktg. Enter, v. Rainbow Tomato Co., 340 So.2d 700, 702 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1976)). Given our finding in Plaintiffs’ favor on other grounds, we find it unnecessary to reach this issue. . NBA cites the deposition testimony of Mr. Mendoza that DPW’s director, acting on his own discretionary authority, has used barricades to close streets in other areas of the City. . For ease of reference, these three cases are subsequently referred to as "Hero Lands, Ba-die, and Scott." . La. R.S. 33:4712(A) provides: . A. A municipality may sell, lease for a term of up to ninety-nine years, exchange, or otherwise dispose of, to or with other political corporations of this state, or private persons, at public or private sale, any property, or portions thereof, including real property, which is, in the opinion of the governing authority, not needed for public purposes. . Charter § 3-112(5)(d) provides: Proposed ordinances on any of the following specified subjects can be adopted only at a regular meeting of the Council and shall not be adopted until at least twenty calendar days have transpired beginning on the day after the date of introduction of the ordinance and not until a notice of the introduction of such proposed ordinance shall have been published in the official journal of the City not less than seven calendar days nor more than fourteen calendar days after the introduction thereof, which notice shall state the substance of the proposed ordinance and the date of the meeting at which the Council shall begin its consideration thereof: (d) Alienating any immovable property or granting any servitude, or privilege. . Charter § 5-402(3)(b) provides that the City Planning Commission shall “[pjrepare and recommend to the Council, all to be consistent with the Master Plan” the following: (b) The Official Map of the City and amendments thereto, upon which shall be shown all existing and established streets, recommended street lines, all streets or street lines located on final or recorded plats of subdivisions, and the location of existing or planned parks and other open spaces. Street locations on final or recorded plats of subdivisions shall constitute amendments to the Official Map and shall be placed thereon. . Charter § 5-405(3)(b) provides: After the adoption of the Official Map or any plat showing the lines of planned or mapped streets, no change in any street shall be made by the Council until such proposed change shall have been submitted to the Commission for its approval or disapproval for conformity with the Official Map. Pending the adoption of the Official Map, the Council shall not vacate, narrow, or extend any existing street without having secured the approval of the Commission thereon. .La. R.S. 48:512 provides: A. No person shall close, obstruct, or change any legal road, public road, or street, as defined in'R.S. 48:491 and being a parish or municipal road, except upon order of the governing authority of the parish for a parish road, whether or not within a municipality, or upon order of the governing authority of the municipality for a municipal road, except as hereinafter provided. B. If any public road or street is closed, obstructed, or changed in violation of the provisions of this Section; the governing authority of the parish or the governing authority of the municipality shall summarily open the road, remove all obstructions therefrom, and restore it to its former condition, at the expense of the person who closed, obstructed, or changed the public road or street. C. The governing authority of Orleans Parish may authorize a person to close, obstruct, or change a public road or street for a period not to exceed twelve consecutive months, provided that the governing authority determines that it is for a public purpose and in the best interests and for the benefit of the parish or municipality, provided further that such closing shall occur only after consultation with and approval by the secretary of the department, provided further that all obstructions be removed therefrom and the public roads or streets be restored for use by the general public at the sole expense of the person authorized to close, obstruct, or change a public road or street, and provided further that the removal of obstructions and the restoration of the public roads or streets be completed within the period authorized by the governing authority, which period shall not exceed twelve months. . City Code § 146-276 provides: It shall be unlawful for any person to construct or maintain or operate any structure or service on, above or beneath the public streets and other public places within the city without permission of the council in accordance with the regulations provided in this article.... . City Code § 146-315 provides: The issuance of temporary revocable permits for the use of the public streets and other public places when the furnishing of a public service is temporarily required shall be under the jurisdiction of the director of the department of public works -in accordance with the regulations described in this division. . Although NBA assigned as error the trial court’s finding that the fence was not a traffic control device, it failed to brief that issue. . Plaintiffs point out that because the Fence blocks the entire roadway at the intersection, bicycle traffic can only access Newcomb Boulevard at Freret Street by use of the sidewalk. See City Code § 154 — 1416 (providing that "[n]o person 15 or more years of age shall ride a bicycle upon any sidewalk in the city nor will bicycles be allowed on sidewalks in the business district.”) . The pertinent portion of the letter states: We have reviewed the request ... to close Newcomb Boulevard at Freret Street. This letter shall serve as your approval to proceed with the closure of the street at Freret Street subject to your compliance with the applicable City of New Orleans Department of Public Works specifications. The normal and customary review by the Departments of Sanitation, Fire, and Parks and Parkways has been done and those Departments have no objection to the proposed closure. (Emphasis supplied). .La. Const., art. 7, § 14(A) provides: Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the funds, credit, property, or things of value of the state or of any political subdivision shall not be loaned, pledged, or donated to or for any person, association, or corporation, public or private. Except as otherwise provided in this Section, neither the state nor a political subdivision shall subscribe to or purchase the stock of a corporation or association or for any private enterprise.

In re Coldman, Floyd; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. C610796; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA1313. Denied.

In re Drew Broach; The Times-Picayune, L.L.C.; — Third Party(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 723^185; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 13-CA-590. Granted. GUIDRY, J., recused.

STOKER, Judge. This is an election contest. The plaintiff-appellant, Sammy Davis, Jr., seeks to have the election which resulted in the victory of defendant-appellee, Glen McGlothin, set aside. From a judgment maintaining an exception of no cause of action, plaintiff appeals. The Ferriday municipal elections were held on March 8, 1988. There were three candidates for Mayor: Sammy Davis, Jr., Glen McGlothin and Eddie Newman. Of the 1835 votes cast for the office of Mayor in the primary, McGlothin received 936, Davis received 772, and Newman received 127. McGlothin was declared the winner, and appellant, Sammy Davis, Jr., filed this law suit to contest the election. The petition alleged that except for substantial irregularities, errors, fraud, and other unlawful activities prior to and at the time of the election, petitioner would have been elected. The suit sought to have the petitioner declared the winner, or in the alternative declare the election void and a new primary election ordered. The attached exhibits challenged the votes of 58 voters accused of various voting irregularities. The petition and attached exhibits have been made a part of this opinion. (See attached appendix). The defendant, Glen McGlothin, filed an exception of no cause of action contending that Davis would not have been elected even if he were successful in all 58 challenges. A hearing was held on March 18, 1988. The trial court sustained the exception of no cause of action as to plaintiffs request to be declared the winner, but refused to dismiss the suit on the ground plaintiff had challenged enough votes to require a run off election and plaintiff had prayed for a new primary election. At this point plaintiffs attorney asked the Court “to give us an opportunity to put into evidence on this particular motion, and I think that clearly on the Motion of No Cause of Action, I can put evidence in as it relates to that motion.” Mr. Thomas, plaintiffs attorney, then called the Registrar of Voters to testify concerning his records in connection with the exception of no cause of action. Defendant’s attorney offered no objection to the testimony. Through the examination of the petition and the attached lists of voters challenged as well as the testimony of Mr. J.P. House, the Registrar of Voters for Concordia Parish, thirty-one of the fifty-seven contested votes were stricken from the plaintiffs list of challenges. The trial court then sustained the plaintiffs exception of no cause of action and dismissed the suit. Plaintiff was then permitted to make a proffer of his own testimony regarding his due diligence in connection with his failure to timely challenge voters, either in advance or on election day. The parties had stipulated that no formal challenges had been made to the qualifications or right to vote of voters either before the election or at the polls under the provisions of LSA R.S. 18:191 et seq., or 18:1315, nor were any voters formally challenged at the polls on election day pursuant to R.S. 18:565. The plaintiff has appealed raising the following issues: 1) whether the trial court erred in allowing defendant to present evidence at the hearing; 2) whether the trial court erred in sustaining defendant’s exception of no cause of action; and 3) whether the trial court erred in failing to allow petitioner’s witnesses to testify as to their non-residence status on the ground that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in challenging the voters prior to or at the time of the election. Plaintiff relies upon LSA-C.C.P. art. 931 in support of his argument that the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to present evidence at the hearing of the exception. LSA-C.C.P. art. 931 states in pertinent part as follows: “No evidence may be introduced at any time to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action.” However, as the recent case of Boykin v. Foster, 493 So.2d 731 (La.App. 2 Cir.1986) stated: Plaintiffs point out that under LSA-C. C.P. Art. 931 evidence is not admissible to judge an exception of no cause of action. However, when evidence is introduced without objection on an exception of no cause of action, the pleadings are deemed expanded to that extent. Jordan v. Sweeney, 467 So.2d 569 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985), writ denied 469 So.2d 985 (La.1985). In this regard, we are not unmindful of American Creosote Company v. Springer, 257 La. 116, 241 So.2d 510 (1970), which, in dicta, specifically disapproved the practice of considering documents attached to pleadings in judging the validity of an exception of no cause of action. We are also mindful of Parks v. Winnfield Life Insurance Company, 336 So.2d 1021 (La.App. 3d Cir.1976). There, the Third Circuit, influenced by American Creosote, concluded that even where evidence is admitted without objection on an exception of no cause of action that this evidence may not be considered in evaluating the exception. We determine that the evaluation of an exception of no cause of action by considering attachments to plaintiffs’ petition is a different circumstance than that of evaluating evidence admitted without objection. By definition, a defendants’ exception of no cause of action accepts the plaintiffs’ allegations as true for the purposes of that exception. However, it does not accept the attached documents. On the other hand, if both the plaintiffs and defendants present evidence on an exception of no cause of action without objection, both sides have consented to the consideration thereof. We see no useful purpose in a trial court reversal in circumstances such as presented here. A remand would only amount to a reconsideration of the same evidence under the guise of different label. The simplest and most judicially economical procedure is to follow the course of the First Circuit in Jordan. In the present case plaintiff’s attorney requested that the trial court allow him to call Mr. House to testify regarding the exception of no cause of action. There was clearly no objection to the presentation of this testimony by plaintiff. Under these circumstances where the plaintiff initiates the evidence, we see no useful purpose in a trial court reversal. A remand would only amount to a reconsideration of the same evidence. Therefore, the pleadings are deemed to be expanded to the extent of the evidence presented at the hearing on the exception of no cause of action. It is well settled that general charges of fraud and irregularities are not sufficient to state a cause of action in an election contest suit. Wayne v. Green, 389 So.2d 102 (La.App. 1 Cir.1980) writ den. 390 So.2d 494 (La.1980). LSA-R.S. 18:1406 requires a plaintiff contesting an election to “set forth in specific detail the facts upon which the objection or contest is based.” In the present suit plaintiff’s petition originally set forth specific facts challenging 58 voters. However, the trial court, upon examination of the original pleadings and “expanded pleadings” determined that plaintiff’s petition only alleged specific facts which could result in the challenge of 27 votes. Since the challenge of 27 votes could not effect the outcome of the election, the trial court sustained the defendant’s exception of no cause of action. In determining whether the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff’s petition failed to state a cause of action, we must examine whether the trial court was correct in striking 31 of the challenged votes from the plaintiff’s list for failure to allege sufficient facts to challenge the votes. These voters may be categorized into six groups: persons on probation, absentee voters, voters allegedly receiving compensation, “nonresident” voters, “deceased” voters, and persons voting twice. Persons on Probation LSA-R.S. 18:102 provides in pertinent part as follows: “No person shall be permitted to register or vote who is: [1] under an order of imprisonment, as defined in R.S. 18:2(2), for conviction of a felony.” On petitioner’s list of challenges, four names were challenged by reason of being on probation. The list clearly shows that three of these persons were convicted and on probation for misdemeanors, and not felonies. Plaintiffs counsel agreed and offered no objection. The trial court properly struck these three persons from plaintiffs list for failing to state facts sufficient to support a challenge of these votes. Absentee Voters The trial court struck eight names from plaintiffs challenge list who voted by absentee ballot but were in town on election day. We agree with the trial court that a voter who votes by absentee ballot cannot be challenged on the grounds that he remained in town on election day. LSA-R.S. 18:1305 merely prohibits a person who has voted by absentee ballot from voting at the polls on election day. The trial court correctly struck these eight voters from plaintiffs challenge list. The trial court also struck four persons who voted by absentee ballot from plaintiffs list, for failure of the plaintiff to challenge these votes timely. LSA-R.S. 18:1315(A) provides in pertinent part: “A. (1) A candidate or his representative, a member of the board, or a qualified elector may challenge an absentee ballot for the grounds specified in R.S. 18:565(A), by personally filing his written challenge with the registrar, no later than the fourth day before the election for which the ballot is challenged. Such challenge shall be on a form provided by the commissioner of elections.” The testimony of Mr. House was clear that the list of persons who voted absentee was published daily and posted on the wall of the office of the Registrar of Voters and that no challenges were filed in this election. Since R.S. 18:1315(A) requires plaintiffs challenge to be made no later than the fourth day before the election, the plaintiffs present challenge is untimely and the trial court properly removed these names from the plaintiffs challenge list. Nonresidents Five individuals which were challenged by plaintiff as nonresidents were stricken by the trial court from plaintiffs list based on the testimony of Mr. House. Mr. House testified that two of the voters did not vote in this election, while he personally knew that three of the voters on the list lived in the city limits and were not nonresidents. The trial court was correct in striking these names from the list. Deceased Voters Two individuals which were challenged by plaintiff as being deceased at the time of the election were also stricken by the trial court from plaintiffs list based on the testimony of Mr. House. Mr. House testified that one of the voters did not vote in the election and that the other voter was still living and employed by the Concordia Parish Police Jury. Under these circumstances the names were properly stricken from plaintiff’s list. Persons Voting Twice Three individuals which were challenged by plaintiff as persons who voted twice were stricken by the trial court from plaintiff’s list based on the testimony of Mr. House. His testimony revealed that the vote register revealed that two of the individuals did not vote twice. The evidence also clearly revealed that the other “voter” was in reality two different people of different races. Under these circumstances, the names were properly stricken. Voters Receiving Compensation Plaintiff in his petition alleged that four voters received or were promised compensation for their vote and two persons were intimidated by individuals other than election officials. Finding no authority for plaintiff to challenge voters on this ground, the trial court struck these names from the plaintiff’s challenge list. Although LSA-R.S. 18:1461(A)(4) and LSA:R.S. 14:119 makes such behavior a crime, we can find no authority which allows this court to disqualify these votes in an election. Therefore, these six names were properly stricken from plaintiff’s list. However, even if we were to find that the trial court erred in striking these six votes, this would not have effected the outcome of the election. Pursuant to LSA-R.S. 18:1432 “[i]f the trial judge in an action contesting an election determines that: ... (3) the number of unqualified voters who were allowed to vote by the election officials was sufficient to change the result of the election if they had not been allowed to vote, ... the judge may render a final judgment declaring the election void In the present case, if we were to assume as true that plaintiff could prove 33 voters were unqualified to vote in this election, then the final vote count would have resulted in 1802 total qualified votes with McGlothin receiving a majority of 903 votes. Under these facts the result of the election would have remained the same, McGlothin the winner. Since we have determined that the trial court properly struck 31 of the voters off of the plaintiff’s challenge list, only 27 viable challenges remained in his petition. If plaintiff were successful in all 27 challenges, and these were stricken from the vote count, this number would not be sufficient to vary the outcome of the election. McGlothin would still have a majority of the votes cast. Therefore, the trial court at this point properly sustained defendant’s exception of no cause of action. Plaintiff also alleges that the trial court erred in not allowing plaintiff’s witnesses to testify as to their nonresidence status on the ground that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in challenging the voters pri- or to the election. However, the record does not reveal that plaintiff attempted to proffer the testimony of these witnesses. Therefore, we will discuss whether this testimony was necessary. LSA-R.S. 18:1434 states as follows: “An objection to the qualifications of a voter or to an irregularity in the conduct of the election which, with the exercise of due diligence, could have been raised by a challenge of the voter or objections at the polls to the procedure is deemed waived.” In Veuleman v. O’Con, 417 So.2d 131 (La.App. 3 Cir.1982) this Court held that voters who have not properly registered and qualified to vote must be formally challenged either before or at the time they offer to vote, or pursuant to R.S. 18:1434 the challenge is deemed waived. In Veuleman v. O’Con, supra, the plaintiff challenged the qualification of a voter after the election. The testimony revealed that the plaintiff’s alleged mistaken identity of the voter illustrated his lack of due diligence. Therefore the plaintiff was deemed to have waived the challenge of that voter. In the present case, the plaintiff was allowed to present his own testimony by proffer to show due diligence. The plaintiff testified that he received the voter registration list weeks prior to the election. However his testimony clearly revealed that prior to the election he did nothing to try to determine the qualifications of the voters on the list. He stated, “I had no need to because I’ve always won.” The way he discovered the alleged irregularities is after the elections friends looked over the list of voters and told him about the irregularities such as nonresidence. If plaintiff had distributed the voter registration list to his workers prior to the election, the challenges for nonresidency could have easily been discovered. The only evidence presented by plaintiff at the proffer shows a lack of due diligence on plaintiff’s part to determine the qualifications of the voters prior to the election. For this reason, any proffered testimony of the nonresident witnesses would have served no purpose. For the reasons assigned the judgment of the trial court is affirmed at appellant’s cost. APPENDIX SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF CONCORDIA, STATE OF LOUISIANA PETITION The petition of SAMMY DAVIS, JR., domiciled in Concordia Parish, respectfully represents: 1. GLEN McGLOTHIN, domiciled in Con-cordia Parish, Louisiana is made defendant herein. The Honorable Jim Brown, Secretary of State of Louisiana and Honorable Jerry Fowler, Commissioner of Elections are made defendants herein solely for the purpose of giving the trial court jurisdiction over those officers insofar as the judgment affects their ministerial duties. 2. Petitioner and defendant were candidates for Mayor of the City of Ferriday in the primary election held on Tuesday, March 8, 1988. 3. Petitioner received 772 votes in the election; defendant received 936 votes and Eddie Newman received 127. 4. Except for substantial irregularities, errors, fraud and other unlawful activities prior to and in conduct of the election, petitioner would have been elected. 5. Such irregularities, errors, fraud and other unlawful activities in the conduct of the election include, but are not limited to: 1)Votes casted for defendant illegally or fraudulently. (See Exhibit “A,” pages 1-6) 2) Unqualified voters who resided outside of the city limits of Ferriday in excess of three (3) months were allowed to vote by election officials. (See Exhibit “B”, pages 1-5). 3) Voters were given money and other items of value for their votes. (See Exhibit “B” pages 1 & 3). 6. Petitioner could not have, with due dilli-gence, discovered the irregularities particularized above. WHEREFORE, PETITIONER PRAYS THAT: 1) Defendant be served with citation directing him to appear in court at 10:00 A.M. on Friday, March 18, 1988. 2) That this petition be served on the defendant through the Clerk of Court for Concordia Parish, Louisiana, who is appointed as his agent of service of process in any action contesting an election of office. 3) That the Clerk immediately send notice together with a copy of citation, by certified mail, return receipt requested to addressee only, to the defendant at his domiciliary address as listed in the notice of candidacy. 4) For service of this petition and accompanying order on the defendant at his domicile. 5) That the trial of this case be held on Friday, March 18, 1988 at 10:00 A.M. at Vidalia, Louisiana and, after such trial; 6) There be judgment herein in favor of plaintiff, SAMMY DAVIS, JR., and against defendant, GLEN McGLOTHIN, declaring the election of GLEN McGLOTHIN to be unlawful and to declare petitioner, SAMMY DAVIS, JR., the winner of the primary election for Mayor of the City of Ferriday, or, alternatively, to declare the election of GLEN McGLOTHIN void and order a new primary election. /s/ Samuel Thomas SAMUEL THOMAS, ESQ. 209 N. Walnut Street P.O. Box 814 Tallulah, LA 71282 318-574-1953 EXHIBIT A (Page 1) VIOLATIONS OF LOUISIANA ELECTION CODE THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUAL© HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED AS BEING DECEASED PRIOR TO THE MUNICIPAL PRIMARY IN FERRIDAY AND AS SUCH SHOULD HAVE BEEN PURGED FROM THE ACTIVE VOTER REGISTRATION ROLLS. THE BELOW LISTED INDIVIDUAL© VOTED IN THE MUNICIPAL PRIMARY ELECTION OR OTHER INDIVIDUALS VOTED FOR THOSE DECEASED PERSONS. DECEASED MCKEEL, WILLIAMS 3/11/44 D.O.B. 401 SOUTH 5TH STREET FERRIDAY, LA. 71334 DATE OF DEATH: 1983 * VOTING LOCATION CATHOLIC CENTER WARD 1 PRECINCT 1 NORRIS, ELNORA 1/07/1919 D.O.B. 321 SOUTH 10TH STREET FERRIDAY, LA. 71334 DATE OF DEATH: 12/30/87 (SEE ATTACHED OBITUARY) A COPY OF THE EXPANDED VOTER REGISTRATION LIST WITH THE INDIVIDUAL CHECK IN WILL BE SUBMITTED WHEN OBTAINED FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF ELECTIONS AND REGISTRATION. EXHIBIT A (Page 2) 9 March 1988 SUBJECT: Persons found to have voted twice in the primary election of March 8, 1988. Carolyn Jones voted absentee and voted on election day in Ward 1, Precinct 2. Emma Lee Holmes voted absentee and voted on election day in Ward 1, Precinct 1. Minnie G. Fletcher voted absentee and voted on election day in Ward 1, Precinct 2 as Minnie F. Brooks. EXHIBIT A (Page 3) VIOLATION OF LOUISIANA ELECTION CODE INDIVIDUAL© VOTED BY ABSENTEE BALLOT SUBMITTED DURING THE PERIOD FENRUARY 25, 1988 TO MARCH 3, 1988 AND ALSO VOTED ON MARCH 8, 1988 IN THE MUNICIPAL PRIMARY ELECTION AT CITY HALL (WARD 1 PRECINCT 2). REGISTERED VOTER USED TWO NAMES: ABSENTEE BALLOT — NAME UTILIZED WAS: FLETCHER, MIMMIE G. CITY HALL PRECINCT — NAME UTILIZED WAS: BROOKS, MINNIE F. ADDRESS: 102 JONES STREET FERRIDAY, LA. 71334 EXHIBIT A (Page 4) 9 March 1988 SUBJECT: Persons voting in the March 8 election who are currently on probation. Exhibit A-Page 5 9 March 1988 SUBJECT: Vote buying during absentee voting of the March 8, 1988 primary election. STATEMENT OF: Lyle Schiele On Wednesday, 9 March 1988, at approximatley 3:26 pm, I, Chief Lyle Schiele of the Ferriday Police Department, received an orally recorded statement from Mr. Johnny Wright of 414 South First Street in Ferriday, Louisiana. The recording of the statement is contained in this file. This is only a synopsis of the statement . During the statement, Mr. Wright told Chief Schiele that about two weeks prior to the statement, during absentee voting, Bettie Johnson drove up beside him by Oscar Watkins lounge in Ferriday. Wright explained that Johnson blew her horn and hollered to Wright, "Come on, let's go vote." Wright stated that after a short conversation, that Johnsons stated to him that she would give him a.little something. Wright stated that he entered the rear seat of Johnson's brown cadilac and rode to Vidalia, Louisiana with Johnson and a passenger in the front seat known to Wright to be Poon Savage. Wright stated that Johnsons gave him the number 31 and told him to vote for number 31. Wright stated that they parked outside of the back of the courthouse in Vidalia and they exited the vehicle and went upstairs in the courthouse. Wright stated that he alone entered the registrars office and voted. 'Wright further stated that after leaving, Johnson gave Wright a ride back to Ferriday and put Wright out at the same lounge where Wright had been picked up. Wright said that Johnson gave Wright two dollars just prior to putting Wright out. Wright stated that he had heard on the street that Johnson was giving out 3.00 dollars for absentee's and was somewhat disappointed that he only got two. Exhibit A-Page 6 March 10, 1988 SUBJECT: VOTING IRREGULARITIES ON MARCH 8, 1988 PRIMARY ELECTION. STATEMENT OF LYLE SCHIELE: ON THURSDAY, 10 MARCH 1988, AT ABOUT 8:00 A.M., I, CHIEF LYLE SCHIELE ORALLY INTERVIEWED MR. ROBERT JAMES WINDON AT THE WINDON RESIDENCE. MR. WINDON LIVES IN A WOODFRAME DUPLEX BEHIND THE GREATER ST. REED CHURCH ON SOUTH EIGHT STREET IN FERRIDAY IN THE ALLEY. DURING THE INTERVIEW WINDON STATED HE WAS CONTACTED BY MR. ROBERT TAYLOR DURING ABSENTEE VOTING FOR THE ABOVE LISTED ELECTION. MR. WINDON STATED THAT MR. TAYLOR GAVE, MR. WINDON A CARD WITH # 32 ON IT AND TOLD HIM TO VOTE FOR THAT NUMBER. MR. WINDON FURTHER STATED THAT MR. TAYLOR THEN DROVE HIM (MR. WINDON) TO THE COURTHOUSE IN VIDALIA TO VOTE ABSENTEE. MR. WINDON STATED THAT AT THAT TIME HE FELT HE WOULD BE IN NEW ORLEANS ON ELECTION DAY. MR. WINDON STATED HE FELT'LIKE HE WAS MISLEAD DURING THE PROCEDURE. MR. WINDON STATED HIS WIFE MRS. MARTHA MAE WINDON ALSO WENT WITH THEM AND VOTED. EXHIBIT B (Page 1) EXHIBIT B (Page 3) EXHIBIT B (Page 4) 9 March 1988 SUBJECT: Non-residents voting inside Ferriday City Limits during March 8, 1988 election. EXHIBIT B (Page 5) In addition to the above named individual non-resident voters, the following voter has changed residences within the city limits of Ferriday from Ward 1 precinct 2 to Ward 1 precinct 1. However, continues to vote at Ward 1 precint 2. Deloris Ford Now resides on Fudikar Street in Ferriday All of the above persons are known to reside at the locations listed and are known or have been residing at those locations for length of times in excess of three (3) months.

BOWES, Judge. Appellant Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of the City of New Orleans (hereinafter “Board”) appeals a judgment of the trial court declaring the plaintiff Veronica Schneckenburger Quirk a beneficiary of the pension fund administered by the Board on behalf of the defendant Anthony Quirk. Mr. and Mrs. Quirk were married in 1964; they separated in 1978 and eventually were divorced in 1979. Mrs. Quirk filed a petition for partition of the community property in 1986, alleging therein that she was entitled to an interest in Mr. Quirk’s police pension from which he was then receiving retirement benefits. Mrs. Quirk requested that the court award her her interest in proceeds already paid to Mr. Quirk, to declare her interest in the Fund, and to order the Board to pay to her a percentage of the regular monthly benefit to be determined by the court. The Board was not cited as a party, nor served with a copy of the petition. On November 18, 1986, the court issued the following judgment based on the joint stipulation and consent of the parties: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that VERONICA SCHNECKENBURGER QUIRK be and is hereby adjudicated a beneficiary of the pension fund administered by the Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of the City of New Orleans on behalf of ANTHONY J. QUIRK. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that VERONICA SCHNECKENBURGER QUIRK shall receive the sum of $100.00 per month by virtue of her being adjudicated a beneficiary of said Pension Fund and shall receive the said $100.00 per month throughout her natural life. The Board appealed this judgment in December, 1986. On September 2, 1987, a “Qualified Domestic Relations Order” with the following terms was issued by the Court: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the proper rights of Veronica Schneckenbur-ger Quirk in the employee annuity benefit plan of Anthony J. Quirk with the Board of Trustees of this Police Pension Fund of the City of New Orleans are hereby recognized, and that Ms. Quirk shall retain her fractional interest in the said employee benefit rights which shall be governed by the following: 1. The participant is Anthony J. Quirk of 2829 Glendale, Metairie, LA.; and the alternate payee is Veronica Schneckenburger Quirk whose address is 9433 Mark Lane, River Ridge, LA., 70123. 2. Parties agree that Veronica Schneckenburger Quirk shall receive the sum of $100.00 per month to be paid by the Board of Trustees Pension Fund of New Orleans to the alternate payee during her natural life. 3. The foregoing amount shall affect any and all payments received by the participate [sic] in the future without expiration. The record reveals that the judgment of November 18, 1986 is the only judgment properly before this court on appeal inasmuch as the motion for appeal was taken only on that judgment; no motion for appeal of the September 2, 1987 judgment is in the record. That November judgment declares that Mrs. Quirk is a beneficiary of the pension fund, which appellant claims is erroneous for two reasons: the Board contends that the trial court had no jurisdic tion over it since it was never cited nor served, and had never been a party to the present lawsuit; and, alternatively, the court was without statutory authority or jurisprudential precedence to order the Board to split the benefits between the pensioner and his ex-wife. Appellant cites Eskine v. Eskine, 383 So.2d 421 (La.App. 4 Cir.1980) for the latter assignment of error. There the Fourth Circuit held in a virtually identical situation that the police pension fund cannot be compelled to perform services outside the requirements of the law, that is, there was no authority for the Board to pay anyone other than the pensioner, citing Louisiana Revised Statute 33:2302: Sec. 2302. Fund not subject to claim against beneficiary Any portion of the fund shall, either before or after its order of distribution by the board to a beneficiary under this Subpart, be exempt from seizure by virtue of any judicial process, and shall be exempt from any state or municipal tax. The same shall not be subject to assignment, transfer or pledge. The fund shall be sacredly held, kept, secured, and distributed for the purposes of granting the benefits and pensioning the persons named in this Subpart and for no other purpose. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court has now considered the very same case; see Eskine v. Eskine, 518 So.2d 505 (La.1988). In its decision handed down on January 18, 1988, the Fourth Circuit opinion delivered in Eskine v. Eskine, supra, was expressly overruled. The Supreme Court considered the manner in which Mrs. Es-kine could receive her ownership interest in Mr. Eskine’s police fund (which is subject to the same statutory limitations as in the present case) and made the following pronouncement: Under LSA-C.C. arts. 1289 and 1308, Beverly had the right to seek a partition of property she owned with her former husband. Wilmer Eskine’s retirement benefits have been judicially determined to be a community asset. As co-owner of these funds, Beverly Eskine sought and obtained a judicial partition-in-kind. The only means of “localizing her right to ownership”, by actually “allotting the property itself” to Beverly and Wilmer Eskine is through the issuance of two monthly benefit checks, one to Beverly and one to Wilmer. Since monthly checks continue to be issued solely to Wilmer, Beverly has been deprived of the ownership interest she received by partition. She is co-owner of the pension fund and entitled to a judgment ordering the retirement system to issue her a monthly check representing one-half the value of the benefits. The decision in Eskine v. Eskine, 383 So.2d 421 (La.App. 4 Cir.1980) is expressly overruled. Beverly Eskine has a property right in the retirement benefits being issued solely to her former husband. She has been deprived of her property. The Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System is hereby ordered to pay one-half of any benefits due Wilmer Eskine directly to his former wife, Beverly Eskine. Two checks are to be issued each month, one to each of the co-owners of the benefits. LSA-C.C.P. art. 2164. Accordingly, the trial court’s adjudication of Mrs. Quirk as a beneficiary of the pension fund and their order of payment to her from the pension fund of her interest in the community property would now be correct under the Supreme Court decision in Eskine, supra. However, the judgment on appeal does not order appellant to take any action whatsoever. It merely declares that Mrs. Quirk is to receive the sum of $100.00 per month by virtue of being adjudicated a beneficiary of the fund. Since, under the Supreme Court’s ruling in Eskine, supra, it was proper for the trial judge to render such a decree, we find no basis for appellant’s argument on appeal that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the Board. Besides, this judgment does not purport to exercise jurisdiction over the Board. It merely adjudicates rights in the pension fund. This assignment of error is without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment on appeal is affirmed. AFFIRMED.

CRAIN, Judge. Defendant was indicted by the Tangipa-hoa Parish Grand Jury and charged with five counts in a single indictment. The counts charged were aggravated rape, sexual battery and aggravated oral sexual battery of his seven-year-old daughter, violations of La.R.S. 14:42, 43.1 and 43.4, respectively. Additionally, the counts charged sexual battery and aggravated oral sexual battery of his one and one-half-year-old daughter, violations of La.R.S. 14:43.1 and 43.4, respectively. Defendant was tried by a jury which convicted him as charged on all five counts. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced defendant to life, without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence for the aggravated rape. For each of the sexual batteries defendant received ten years. A sentence of twenty years was imposed for each of the aggravated oral sexual batteries. The court ordered that all five sentences run consecutive to each other. Defendant has appealed, urging seven assignments of error, consisting of two unnumbered assignments and five numbered assignments. Defendant briefed five of his assignments of error and expressly abandoned assignment of error one and the second of his unnumbered assignments. FACTS The record reflects that defendant was thirty years old at the time of his March 10-12, 1987, trial. Kimberly King, defendant’s wife and the victims’ stepmother, testified that she, defendant and the children lived together in Tangipahoa Parish for about three or four months. They lived there in what she described as a “wreck”, an “old house” that was a single story brick building. She testified that they had moved from Illinois to Louisiana and that, at the time the police came and removed the children from their home, they were living in the “run down building” in Hammond, Louisiana. On September 8, 1986, Tangipahoa Parish deputy sheriff Kermit Stewart met with Monica Edwards, a state child protection investigator, and another individual. They informed Stewart that they had a “pick up order” for defendant’s two children. In response, he picked up the children at their home on Ward Line Road in Hammond. On September 16, 1986, Tangipahoa Parish deputy sheriff Cullen Kennedy executed a warrant for defendant’s arrest at defendant’s Ward Line Road residence. In response to a September 8, 1986, referral that had been received regarding the sexual abuse of defendant’s seven-year-old child, Monica Edwards went to the child’s school that same day and interviewed her. During the interview, the child told Edwards that defendant “licked on her thing,” makes her “lick his,” and “sticks it inside the little hole in front” and “inside her butt.” During the initial interview, the seven-year-old victim told Edwards that defendant had been doing the foregoing things to her for a “long, long time” and that the last time it happened was the weekend preceding the initial interview. Later, on September 12, 1986, Monica Edwards conducted a second interview with the seven-year-old victim at the Division of Children, Youth and Family Services of the Department of. Health and Human Resources in Amite, Louisiana. This interview was videotaped pursuant to La.R.S. 15:440.1 et seq., which provides for electronic recording of statements by child abuse victims fourteen years of age or under and for the admissibility of such a recording as an exception to the hearsay rule. At trial, the videotape was introduced into evidence and viewed by the jury. During the videotaped interview, the victim made additional disclosures that defendant had also committed similar acts to her younger sister. Dr. Nicholas Cefalu, Jr., qualified and was accepted by the trial court as an expert in the field of medicine with a speciality in family practice. He testified that he examined the seven-year-old victim on September 9, 1986. He determined that the child had some cervical irritation. When asked if he could determine how long the irritation had existed, he opined that it had existed for four to seven days. Based upon his findings of vaginal, cervical irritation and some laxity of the hymenal ring, Dr. Cefalu concluded that his examination had revealed a case of probable sexual abuse. At trial, the seven-year-old victim gave testimony in which she repeated her descriptions of the acts of sexual abuse that defendant had committed against her and her sister. ALLEGED FAILURE TO ESTABLISH VENUE In defendant's first unnumbered assignment of error, he contends that the state failed to establish venue. We disagree. La.C.Cr.P. art. 611 provides that all trials shall take place in the parish where the offense has been committed unless a change of venue is obtained. In order for the conviction to stand, venue must be proven during the course of the trial. La. C.Cr.P. art. 615; State v. Adams, 394 So.2d 1204 (La.1981); State v. Hookfin, 476 So.2d 481 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985). However, because venue is a special question, the scope of appellate review on that question is limited to determining whether there was some evidence, no matter how little, submitted to the jury to establish venue. State v. Adams, 394 So.2d at 1210. To sustain this proof, a trial court may take judicial notice of the fact that geographical locations mentioned by witnesses are within a particular parish, even if the parish is never specifically mentioned in the testimony. See La.R.S. 15:422; State v. Hookfin, 476 So.2d at 493. The seven-year-old victim testified on direct examination that the offenses were committed while “we were living in that junky house.” On cross-examination, the child testified that she did not remember living in a two story house. Thereafter, the child was asked two successive questions. The questions and her answer were as follows: Q. When some of these things happened to you, weren’t you living in the upstairs? It wasn’t in that brick house was it? A. No, sir. Based upon the child’s reply to the foregoing questions, defendant argues that the offenses could not have happened in Louisiana because the family only lived in the brick house while in Louisiana. However, Tangipahoa Parish deputy sheriff Kermit Stewart testified that, after meeting with Monica Edwards on September 8, 1986, he picked up the victims at their single story brick home on Ward Line Road. Tangipahoa Parish deputy sheriff Cullen Kennedy testified that he arrested defendant on September 16, 1986, at his 1870 Ward Line Road residence, in Hammond, Louisiana. Monica Edwards testified that she went to the residence accom panied by law enforcement personnel. She described it as a one story brick home located in Tangipahoa Parish that appeared from the outside as “almost abandoned” and from the inside as unkept. Edwards further testified that the seven-year-old victim told her that the offenses (committed against both victims) occurred at that home. Kimberly Sue King testified that she, defendant and the victims lived together in an abandoned one story brick building in Tangipahoa Parish for about three or four months and that they were residing in the “run down” building in Hammond when the police came and took the children away. In addition, the child testified that the acts occurred frequently when Kimberly King got into a brown car with a lady and left the premises. Kimberly King testified that when she worked in Hammond at a restaurant, she rode with a girlfriend who drove a brown car. Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that venue in Tangipa-hoa Parish was established at trial. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. TWO AND FIVE: By means of these assignments, defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing into evidence the hearsay testimony of Monica Edwards and Carolyn Ratcliff Dupont as to statements that the seven-year-old victim made to each of them. He argues that the alleged improperly admitted testimony of Edwards and Dupont does not fall within the early complaint of a victim of sexual assault exception to the hearsay rule. He asserts that none of the hearsay can be attributed to the child until days after the cessation of the alleged events and that there was no evidence to establish a shocking episode or a time frame between the alleged events and the victim’s statements. Assignment of error two relates to the testimony of Monica Edwards recounting the victim’s statements (during Edwards’ September 8, 1986, interview) that defendant had sexually abused her. Assignment of error five pertains to Dupont’s testimony repeating statements made to her by the victim, while she served as the child’s foster parent. Dupont testified that the victim drew her some pictures and stated that one of the pictures depicted her father climbing on top of her trying to penetrate her. Dupont also essentially testified that the victim frequently complained that her “front” or her “butt” hurt her and that it felt like it did when her father was penetrating her. The testimony of Edwards and Du-pont repeating what the victim told them constitutes hearsay because the testimony of each is an out of court unsworn statement of a third person offered for the truth of its content. State v. Elzie, 351 So.2d 1174 (La.1977). However, in prosecutions of sex offenses, the original complaint of a young child is admissible when the particular facts and circumstances of the case indicate that it was a product of the shocking episode and not a fabrication. State v. Prestridge, 399 So.2d 564 (La.1981); State v. Ohrberg, 448 So.2d 1316 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984). The evidence adduced at trial established that Edwards’ initial interview with the victim was conducted alone with the child at her school on September 8, 1986, the same day that the case was referred to the child protection agency and the victim was removed from the family home. Edwards testified that she did not have to ask the child many questions. The child was “very talkative, very open.” She “just opened up and began talking.” Edwards testified that the child told her, during the interview, that the last time defendant had sexually abused her was on the weekend prior to the interview and that the abuse occurred at home in the bedroom. Pursuant to La.R.S. 15:422(6), we take judicial cognizance that September 8, 1986, was a Monday. Under the instant facts and circumstances, we conclude that Edwards’ testimony repeating the victim’s disclosures falls within the original or early complaint of a rape victim exception to the hearsay rule. During the interview conducted on Monday, the child told Edwards that defendant had most recently committed the instant offenses against her on the previous weekend, one or two days before the interview. Dr. Cefalu’s opinion that the child’s vaginal, cervical irritation had existed for four to seven days was thus consistent with the child’s statement that defendant had last abused her on the weekend before her first interview with Edwards. The record indicates that the disclosures to Edwards (a compassionate adult whom the child apparently felt she could trust) were the product of the shocking episode and not a fabrication. See State v. Simmons, 484 So.2d 894 (La.App. 1st Cir.1986). Hence, the trial court’s ruling allowing Edwards’ testimony into evidence was correct. Moreover, even if improperly introduced, the testimony was merely corroborative and cumulative of other properly introduced testimony of the victim and is thus harmless error. See State v. Hookfin, 476 So.2d at 489. However, in regard to Dupont’s testimony, the record shows that the disclosures made to her do not fall within the ambit of the original or early complaint of a rape victim exception. These disclosures were made long after the September 8th interview with Edwards. Dupont testified that she was the victim’s foster parent from the “first part of September” through October 31, that the disclosures were made to her while the child was riding home in her car following a psychological examination by Dr. Jansen in Metairie and that the foregoing occurred “just before” the child was taken out of her custody and placed into the custody of her aunt and uncle. Although we conclude that Dupont’s testimony was improperly allowed into evidence, it was merely corroborative and cumulative of other properly introduced testimony of the victim and is accordingly harmless error. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. THREE: By means of this assignment, defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence (state exhibit three) the September 12, 1986, videotaped interview of the seven-year-old victim. He asserts that the interview was not conducted in accordance with La.R.S. 15:440.-4(A)(5). La.R.S. 15:440.4(A)(5) provides as follows: A videotape of a child fourteen years of age or under may be offered in evidence either for or against a defendant charged with the rape or physical or sexual abuse of a child. To render such a videotape competent evidence, it must be satisfactorily proved: * * # * # # (5) That the taking of the child’s statement was supervised by a physician, a board-certified social worker, a law enforcement officer, a licensed psychologist, or an authorized representative of the Department of Health and Human Resources. * # # * # # Gerson Saltz, an investigator with the Tangipahoa Parish Sheriff’s Office, testified that he was present throughout the entire videotaped interview of the victim. Monica Edwards questioned the victim during the interview, and she testified that the only other persons present at the time of the interview were Mark Stafford and Mrs. Beauty Guildner. Edwards stated that Stafford was a detective with the Tangipa-hoa Parish Sheriff’s Office and that Guild-ner was also employed by the sheriff's office. Edwards testified that she was employed by the Louisiana Department of Health and Human Resources as a child protection investigator and that she had been so employed for about two years. She graduated from high school in 1982 and from Northeast Louisiana University in 1984, where she received a BA in social work. She was presently attending Louisiana State University working on a Master’s degree in social work and had completed thirty-six hours of course credit toward that degree. She testified that she had attended the requisite training for employment as a child protection investigator. She had attended a child abuse and child neglect film training conducted by law enforcement personnel, a workshop regarding the use of anatomical dolls, the Fourth National Conference on the Sexual Abuse of Children and the Kids Are Worth It Conference. She stated that she had child protection investigation skills training, child investigation policy review training, life form training, supervision of videotaping and anatomically correct dolls training and baby day protocol training. Additionally, Edwards testified that, during the approximate two years of her employment with the state, she handled an average of ten to fifteen cases of child abuse each month. She stated that she was qualified by the State of Louisiana to conduct videotaped statements of child abuse victims. Thereupon, Edwards produced in court a certificate of her training which, according to her, listed her record of training from the state office to do videotaping. She also presented a document which she stated contained a record of additional training in supervision of videotaping and showed that she was certified for the next two years. These documents were offered into evidence by the state; but, following defense counsel’s objection, the offerings were withdrawn by the prosecutor. Later, during cross-examination, Edwards testified that she had read the rules and regulations of the Department of Health and Human Resources regarding training requirements and certification of department personnel who supervise the taking of a child abuse victim’s statement, but that she did not have a copy of the rules in her possession on the day of the trial. We find that the state clearly complied with the provisions of La.R.S. 15:440.1 et seq., and in particular with the provisions of La.R.S. 15:440.4(A)(5) and (B) through Edwards’ testimony. Her testimony showed that, in her capacity as an authorized representative of the Department of Health and Human Resources, she was qualified to supervise the child’s videotaped statement. Accordingly, this assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. FOUR: By means of this assignment, defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to allow defense counsel to introduce into evidence several records at the conclusion of counsel’s cross-examination of Dr. Cefalu. Defendant states that the purpose of introducing the records was to enable the jury to decide whether or not Dr. Cefalu’s testimony was inconsistent with those records. During the prosecutor’s direct examination of Dr. Cefalu, the prosecutor gave defense counsel a copy of the doctor’s report of his examination of the seven-year-old victim. Defendant does not now argue that defense counsel was denied use of the report in cross-examining Dr. Cefalu nor does the appellate record in any way indicate that there was any such denial. The appellate record reflects that, during defense counsel’s cross-examination of Dr. Cefalu, the doctor produced in court what he referred to as his copy of the emergency room records and that he apparently permitted defense counsel to look at those records. In reading the appellate record it is apparent that, after defense counsel resumed his cross-examination of the doctor, he had access to the copy of the doctor’s emergency room records. It is unclear which document was offered into evidence by defense counsel. However, when the offering was made at the conclusion of counsel’s cross-examination, the state objected on the basis that the document was not the best evidence and the trial court sustained the objection. The requirement that “best evidence” be produced, if it is within a party’s control and by the nature of the case presumed to exist, does not preclude the introduction of corroborative evidence. La.R.S. 15:436; State v. Hollingsworth, 337 So.2d 461 (La.1976); State v. Collins, 470 So.2d 553 (La.App. 1st Cir.1985). In Hollingsworth, the Supreme Court found no violation of the best evidence rule in admitting a coroner’s report into evidence in addition to the coroner’s testimony. The court stated: Written reports are favored for their reliability as the best evidence. They are less likely to contain errors than a witness’ testimony, especially when the time lapse between the recorded facts and the testimony is appreciable. ****** These reports were also admissible in corroboration of the testimony of the witnesses. 337 So.2d at 466-467. Herein, we conclude that the doctor’s reports and his records were admissible as corroborative evidence and not excludable on the basis that they were not the best evidence. Hence, depending upon which of the documents was offered by defendant, that document was improperly excluded by the trial court. However, defendant does not allege nor do we find that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s ruling. Injury, as well as error, must be alleged and shown to justify reversal of a conviction because of the exclusion of evidence. State v. Clay, 441 So.2d 1227 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), writ denied, 446 So.2d 1213 (La.1984). Accordingly, the error was harmless and does not merit reversal. PATENT ERROR This Court has discovered fatal error patent on the face of the record requiring that defendant’s convictions and sentences for sexual battery and aggravated oral sexual battery be reversed. Louisiana Constitution, Article I, Section 17, provides in pertinent part, as follows: A criminal case in which the punishment may be capital shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons, all of whom must concur to render a verdict. A case in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom must concur to render a verdict. A case in which the punishment may be confinement at hard labor or confinement without hard labor for more than six months shall be tried before a jury of six persons ... See also La.C.Cr.P. art. 782, which comports with the above constitutional requirements. Herein, defendant was tried before a twelve-person jury. The punishment for aggravated rape is necessarily confinement at hard labor, and trial by the twelve-person jury was proper for that offense. See La.R.S. 14:42. However, the crimes of sexual battery (La.R.S. 14:43.1) and aggravated oral sexual battery (La.R.S. 14:43.4) are punishable with or without hard labor and, thus, require a six person jury. As both the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions require a six-person jury to try a case which is punishable with or without hard labor, trying defendant before a twelve-person jury was fatal error recognizable by this Court ex proprio motu. State v. Nedds, 364 So.2d 588 (La.1978). In a case where an accused is tried by a jury composed of either more or less than the correct number of jurors, the verdict is null. State v. Nedds, 364 So.2d at 589; State v. Pollard, 438 So.2d 1208 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1983), writ denied, 443 So.2d 1125 (La.1984). Hence, in the instant case, the verdicts relating to the four counts in the indictment charging the crimes of sexual battery and aggravated oral sexual battery are null. We do not, however, find it necessary to reverse and set aside defendant’s conviction and sentence for the aggravated rape of the seven-year-old victim. We note that the record reflects that defendant never objected to his consolidated trials on the five counts charged in the indictment or to the mode of trial. We find that defendant was not prejudiced by the consolidated trials since the evidence established that the acts of sexual abuse committed against both victims constituted one continuous transaction of sexual abuse of the children. Hence, the criminal acts fell within the res gestae; and evidence of those acts would have been admissible if defendant had been charged and tried only as to the aggravated rape. Furthermore, the facts of the case were not so complex as to confuse the jury. See La.R.S. 15:447 and 448; Cf State v. Donahue, 355 So.2d 247 (La.1978); State v. Pollard, 438 So.2d at 1211. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence for aggravated rape. The defendant’s convictions and sentences for sexual batteries and aggravated oral sexual batteries are reversed and this portiofi of the case is remanded to the district court for a new trial. CONVICTION AND SENTENCE FOR AGGRAVATED RAPE AFFIRMED. CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES FOR SEXUAL BATTERY AND AGGRAVATED ORAL SEXUAL BATTERY ARE REVERSED AND REMANDED TO THE DISTRICT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL. . LSA-R.S. 15:440.4(B) provides as follows: The department shall develop and promulgate regulations on or before September 12, 1984, regarding training requirements and certification for department personnel designated in Paragraph (A)(5) who supervise the taking of the child’s statement. We note that, contrary to the implication made in defendant's brief that the state was required to produce a copy of the rules at the trial, there is no such legal requirement. . The prosecutor also stated that he had previously provided defense counsel with an exact copy of the report. Defense counsel responded that he had been provided only with part of the report, pages two and three. Defense counsel further noted: "I was not provided with the first page. I don’t think — I am not objecting to it necessarily.”

YELVERTON, Judge. Defendant Victor Fontenot was convicted by a jury of two counts of distribution of marijuana, a violation of La.R.S. 40:966(A)(1). His appeal sets forth seven assignments of error. We find that assignment of error No. 2 has merit, requiring that the conviction be set aside, and we will discuss this assignment first. On November 6, 1985, two undercover police officers went to the Golden Spur Bar in Reddell, Louisiana, to see if they could buy some narcotics as part of their undercover operation. The two officers, Detectives Vidallia and Davis, were accompanied by two females. The identities of these two women were not revealed at the trial, because one of them was working as a confidential informant on the case, and the name of the other, who played no part in the activities that night, was simply forgotten due to the passage of time. After arriving at the bar around 9:30 or 10:00 that night and sitting down at a table, Detective Vidallia was introduced to the defendant, Fontenot, who came to the table from the bar. Vidallia and defendant engaged in small talk for a few minutes, then Fontenot returned to his seat at the bar. The confidential informant left the table and the detectives, and talked briefly with the defendant at the bar. Neither detective overheard what was said in this conversation. When the confidential informant returned to the table, she told Detective Vi-dallia that Fontenot would try to get him a bag of marijuana as soon as “his man” came in. Twenty to thirty minutes later, defendant came back to the table and, addressing the confidential informant, told her to tell Vidallia to follow him outside, that it was “time to deal”. It is not clear from the record whether Vidallia overheard that message, or whether it was relayed to him by the confidential informant, but in any event Vidallia got up and followed defendant outside the bar where a man introduced as Kurt LaFleur was waiting. Detective Davis, the other woman, and the confidential informant remained inside the bar. Outside, after defendant introduced Kurt LaFleur, Detective Vidallia asked LaFleur “How much?”, LaFleur responded “Thirty-five Dollars”, and Vidallia paid the money to LaFleur and LaFleur gave him a clear plastic bag of marijuana. After this exchange, defendant made a remark about how good the marijuana was that Detective Vidallia had just bought. At the trial the state’s case consisted of the testimony of the two officers, Vidallia and Davis, and the introduction of the bag of marijuana. The state’s two witnesses told the jury what they said and did, what the confidential informant said and did, what the defendant said and did, and what Kurt LaFleur said and did. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2 While Vidallia was on the witness stand, the defendant asked for the identification of the confidential informant. The state objected and the trial court sustained the objection. Defendant’s assignment of error No. 2 is addressed to this ruling. He argues that the confidential informant was an active participant in the crime, and that he needed to know her identity so he could get her into court and cross examine her. He argues that the refusal to let him know the identity of this witness and subpoena her was a violation of his basic right to confront the witnesses against him. On the facts of this case this assignment of error has merit. The defendant has a constitutional right to confront witnesses against him in a criminal prosecution. U.S. Const, art. VI; La. Const, art. 1, § 16. This right is often argued as a means to get around the confidential informant’s privilege, but the privilege is still firmly rooted in the law. The privilege of withholding the identity of an informer who supplies information to law enforcement officers concerning crime is founded on public policy and seeks to advance the public interests and effective law enforcement by encouraging and protecting the flow of information. State v. James, 396 So.2d 1281 (La.1981). For this reason the general rule is that the state is not required to divulge the name of a confidential informant to the accused. Id. However, an exception is made when the confidential informant was a participant in an illegal drug transaction, and the state introduces evidence at the merit-trial of a crime in which the informant participated. State v. Dotson, 260 La. 471, 256 So.2d 594 (1971); State v. Diliberto, 362 So.2d 566 (La.1978); State v. James, supra. In the present case the confidential informant was not merely a bystander, or onlooker, and her participation was more than merely furnishing a tip that enabled the police to make an arrest. While working with the undercover agents, she took part in the illegal transaction itself. When she was alone with the defendant at the bar, the confidential informant helped arrange for a sale of marijuana to take place. Defendant was convicted as a principal, under La.R.S. 14:24, as having procured another to commit the crime. Take away evidence of the participation of the confidential informant in the events, and the evidence would have been wholly insufficient to have established that defendant was a principal to the crime of distribution of marijuana. The message the confidential informant brought back to the table after her conversation with the defendant at the bar, a conversation the content of which was never revealed, leaves the impression that the informant and the defendant made an agreement whereby the defendant would procure another to commit the crime of distribution of marijuana. Defendant had the right to confront this witness at the merit trial. To exercise that right he was entitled to know the name of the informant. The failure to accord him that right was reversible error. Although we reverse the conviction based on Assignment of Error No. 2, we will briefly evaluate the remaining assignments of error. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1 Kurt LaFleur did not testify. His participation in the activities was told by way of the testimony of Detective Vidallia. Defendant objected to this testimony as hearsay. We find that the objection was properly overruled. Kurt LaFleur’s activity was part of the res gestae. La.R.S. 15:447; State v. Kimble, 407 So.2d 693 (La.1981); State v. Sharp, 414 So.2d 752 (La.1982); and State v. Green, 448 So.2d 782 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1984). This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NOS. 3 & 4 On redirect examination Detective Vidallia was permitted to identify the bag of marijuana, whereupon it was then introduced in evidence. Defendant objected arguing that this was improper redirect and in violation of La.R.S. 15:281, which limits redirect examination. The assignment of error has no merit. Although the cited article limits redirect examination, the ultimate application of the limitation is left to the discretion of the trial judge. La.R.S. 15:281; State v. Chapman, 410 So.2d 689 (La.1982); State v. Freeman, 447 So.2d 1145 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1984). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5 This assignment was addressed to the overruling by the trial court of the objection, based on hearsay, to Detective Davis’ testimony concerning what the con fidential informant said. The trial court was correct. This, too, was part of the res gestae, for the reasons discussed above under Assignment of Error No. 1. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 6 This is addressed to/\the failure of the trial judge to give a requested instruction on entrapment. The trial court declined to give that instruction for the reason that there was no evidence in the record from which the jury could infer entrapment or other government misconduct. On the evidence presented we have to agree that there was no showing of entrapment and the refusal to give the charge was proper. However, defendant’s reliance on the defense of entrapment underscores why the identity of the confidential informant should, in this case, have been revealed, because the primary witness essential to establish the defense of entrapment was the informant. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 7 This was a sufficiency of the evidence assignment of error under the well known Jackson v. Virginia standard. We find that the evidence, viewed according to this standard, was sufficient to convict defendant as a principal to the crime of distribution of marijuana. For the above reasons, the conviction and sentence of defendant are hereby reversed and set aside, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with law. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

In re Holmes, John; applying for writ of certiorari and/or review, supervisory and/or remedial writs; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 88CW-0393; Parish of Orleans, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, Div. “E”, No. 87-106-03Q. Prior report: La.App., 523 So.2d 10. Denied. DENNIS, J., would grant the writ.

WILLIAM A. CULPEPPER, Judge Pro Tern. On June 27,1984 defendant, Corbie Lynn Williams, was charged by bill of information with three counts of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance (marijuana), a violation of LSA-R.S. 40:966(A)(1). On December 3,1986 a jury of 12 returned a verdict of guilty as charged by a vote of ten to two. Defendant was sentenced to seven years at hard labor on each count, each sentence to run consecutively. In addition, the trial court imposed a $5,000 fine on each count, plus court costs. On default of payment, defendant was ordered to serve an additional one year on each count. On appeal, defendant sets forth 23 assignments of error. Ten of those assignments of error were not briefed and are considered abandoned. State v. Dewey, 408 So.2d 1255 (La.1982). FACTS Mr. Tony Mills, a former business partner of the defendant, became upset after being shortchanged by defendant in several drug transactions. Mr. Mills contacted the Vernon Parish Sheriff's Department which launched an investigation of defendant in conjunction with the Leesville City Police Department and the Louisiana State Police. The investigation covered the months of September and October 1983. Mr. Mills was put in touch with Mark Harper, who functioned as an undercover agent in the investigation. On five separate occasions, September 2, September 20, October 4, October 12 and October 24, 1983, defendant sold approximately one-quarter pound of marijuana at prices ranging from $175 to $200. Mark Harper testified that some of the marijuana purchased was “homegrown” by defendant. The State elected to charge defendant in two separate bills of information. The first trial concerned two counts of distribution of marijuana on October 12 and October 24, 1983. Defendant was acquitted of those charges. The instant trial concerned the three earlier sales on September 2, September 20 and October 4, 1983. The prosecution relied on the testimony of Mark Harper and Tony Mills to prove commission of the offenses. The defendant presented no witnesses and did not testify at trial. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 1 By this assignment, defendant maintains that his second trial constituted double jeopardy. Before trial, the defendant filed a motion to quash based on double jeopardy which was denied. Defendant argues that by separating the five counts into two bills of information, he was tried twice for the same course of conduct in violation of the constitutional mandate against double jeopardy. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 15 of the Louisiana Constitution provide that no person shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. In State v. David, 468 So.2d 1133, 1135 (La.1985), the court stated: “Inherent in the guarantee against double jeopardy are three constitutional protections: 1) against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; 2) against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; 3) against multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 [89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656] (1969).” Jeopardy began for the defendant when the first witness was sworn at the trial on the merits. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 592. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 596 sets forth the requirements for double jeopardy: “Double jeopardy exists in a second trial only when the charge in that trial is: 1) Identical with or a different grade of the same offense for which the defendant was in jeopardy in the first trial, whether or not a responsive verdict could have been rendered in the first trial as to the charge in the second trial; or 2) Based on a part of a continuous offense for which offense the defendant was in jeopardy in the first trial.” In addition to the statutory pronouncement, Louisiana uses two tests in determining whether a prosecution presents a double jeopardy problem. The first, the “distinct fact test,” enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), provides that when the same conduct constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions the test to be applied is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not. See State v. Holmes, 475 So.2d 1057 (La.1985). The “same evidence” test used in Louisiana is somewhat broader in concept than Blockburger, the governing test being that one should not be punished (or put in jeopardy) twice for the same course of conduct. State v. Steele, 387 So.2d 1175 (La.1980). The same evidence test holds that two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes if the same evidence is required for the conviction of each offense. If one offense requires proof of additional facts which the other does not, the accused may be tried and convicted on both offenses unless the gravamen of the second offense is essentially included within the offense for which first tried, in which case the second prosecution is barred because of double jeopardy. State v. Solomon, 379 So.2d 1078 (La.1980); State v. Cotten, 438 So.2d 1156 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), writ denied, 444 So.2d 606 (La.1984). The “same evidence” test depends on the evidence necessary for conviction, not all the evidence introduced at trial. State v. Steele. Defendant’s contention is that the State sought to take “two bites out of the apple,” by charging defendant in two separate bills of information. The offense charged was the same in all of the counts, violations of LSA-R.S. 40:966(A)(1), distribution of a controlled substance, marijuana. Double jeopardy embodies the constitutional protection against multiple punishment and multiple convictions for a single criminal wrong. State v. Cotten. However, neither test is satisfied in defendant’s case. Each time defendant sold marijuana to the undercover agent, he violated LSA-R.S. 40:966(A)(1). The mandate against double jeopardy does not seek to protect criminals who engage in the same type of criminal conduct over a long period of time. The State, within its discretion, could have charged defendant in five separate bills of information for the five counts of distribution of marijuana and tried him in five separate trials without violating the defendant’s constitutional rights. This is not a case in which the State, after failing to .convict defendant of one offense, sought to convict defendant for another offense based on the same course of conduct. Each sale constituted a separate course of conduct and a separate crime for which defendant could be charged and tried. See State v. Buckley, 344 So.2d 980 (La.1977) and State v. Reed, 499 So.2d 132 (La.App. 3d Cir.1986). This assignment is without merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 2 Defendant maintains that the false statement of a juror on voir dire constitutes reversible error. Vera Sue Goodwin was asked by both the district attorney and defense counsel during voir dire if she had any friends or family in law enforcement. In response to each inquiry, Ms. Goodwin replied “No.” Therefore, she was accepted by both sides and sworn in to the jury. Since the trial, defendant has obtained an affidavit from the chief of police of New Llano, Louisiana, stating that Ms. Goodwin’s father has been a police officer in New Llano since May of 1983. Defendant argues that because Ms. Goodwin testified falsely on voir dire, he was deprived of the opportunity to request a challenge for cause and, if that was denied, to exercise one of his peremptory challenges. Since defendant could not ascertain Ms. Goodwin’s true relationship with a law enforcement official, he was denied any opportunity to remove her from the jury. Ms. Goodwin was one of the ten jurors voting guilty. It should be noted that defendant does not reveal when he learned of the false statements made by Ms. Goodwin, but the affidavit is dated April 2, 1987, several months after trial. Defendant asserts that the perjured testimony of Ms. Goodwin constitutes reversible error under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 775(6) which provides: “A mistrial may be ordered, and in a jury case the jury dismissed, when: >!< * * # # * “(6) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial.” Article 775 sets forth permissive grounds upon which the trial judge may grant a mistrial. However, the decision to grant or deny a motion for mistrial rests within the trial court’s discretion. Article 775(6) requires a showing by the defendant that the defendant was denied a fair trial as a result of the juror’s false statement. It does not constitute mandatory grounds for a mistrial. The information concerning Ms. Goodwin might have served as the basis for a motion for new trial. However, in that instance the defendant must have shown that he was unable to discover the prejudicial error or defect in the proceeding prior to verdict or judgment, notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, and that some injustice had been done to the defendant. LSA-C. Cr.P. art. 851. The defendant did not move for a new trial and has failed to show on appeal that he was unable to discover the information, notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, and that any injustice resulted. A juror’s association with law enforcement personnel will not alone disqualify him from service on a criminal jury; however, such associations should be closely scrutinized. The association must be such that it would affect the juror’s impartiality or influence the juror in arriving at a verdict. State v. Jones, 474 So.2d 919 (La.1985) and State v. Madison, 345 So.2d 485 (La.1977). Based upon our review of the record of the voir dire of Ms. Goodwin, there is nothing to indicate, that had the fact of her father's employment been known, the trial court would have granted a challenge for cause on that basis alone. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 797. There is no basis for this court to reverse on the highly speculative argument of the defendant that he would have exercised a peremptory challenge had Ms. Goodwin answered truthfully. Since we have nothing more before us to review, we conclude that any relief, if available, must be sought in the trial court. This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 3 and 4 By these assignments, defendant claims that the trial judge erred in restricting defendant’s questioning on voir dire. Specifically, defendant wished to question prospective jurors about their feelings about his prior acquittal in the earlier trial. Also defendant felt the trial judge erred in not allowing him to question one prospective juror, Ms. Goodwin, relative to her attitude as to the integrity of law enforcement. La.C.Cr.P. art. 786 provides: “The court, the state, and the defendant shall have the right to examine prospective jurors. The scope of the examination shall be within the discretion of the court. A prospective juror, before being examined, shall be sworn to answer truthfully questions asked him relative to his qualifications to serve as a juror in the case.” The court in State v. Perry, 420 So.2d 139, 144 (La.1982), stated the purpose of voir dire examination: “We have recognized that the purpose of voir dire examination is to determine qualifications of prospective jurors by testing their competency and impartiality. It is designed to discover bases for challenges for cause and to secure information for an intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. The scope of voir dire examination is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and his rulings will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.” [Citations omitted] Therefore it is clear that the defendant has wide latitude to conduct voir dire examinations. However, the trial judge has discretion in determining the scope of the examination under the prevailing facts and circumstances. State v. Vinet, 352 So.2d 684 (La.1977). When a question arises concerning whether voir dire examination has been unduly, restricted, the disallowance of a proper question is not automatically reversible. In evaluating the fairness of the ruling the entire examination must be considered. Id. at 687. With respect to the questions concerning the prior acquittal of defendant, the trial judge refused to allow defendant to question prospective jurors about their knowl edge of the verdict in the prior trial. However, the trial judge did allow defendant to ask about their knowledge of the prior trial. The voir dire was only restricted with respect to the verdict rendered in the prior trial. The trial judge allowed defense counsel to ask whatever questions were necessary to find out if the prospective jurors were prejudiced against the defendant, subject to that one restriction. Defendant complains that the trial judge erred in not allowing him to question Ms. Goodwin, a prospective juror about her attitude toward the integrity of law enforcement officers. The following exchange occurred between the defense counsel and the juror: “Q. Now, Mr. Burkett talked with you a little bit about drugs in general, and of course, it’s a waste of time to ask anybody if they’re opposed to drugs. We’re all, as good human beings who think sensibly, supposed to be opposed to drugs, and should be. But, Mr. Burkett has explored your attitude about whether or not you think it should be a crime for a person to sell drugs to an undercover narcotics agent, and you’ve indicated it ... A. Yes sir. Q. ... you think it should, right? At the same time, do you think it’s possible that sometimes over zealous, over active State Police Narcotics Agents, people who take off the uniform and hide their badge and grow a beard, do you think it’s possible that sometimes they make cases without having evidence? A. I don’ know. Q. Do you think it’s possible sometimes that they want to arrest somebody they think’s a bad person bad enough that they would take some marijuana they got some place else and say they got it from him, for example, in order to make a case when one didn’t exist? BY MR. BURKETT: Your Honor, excuse me, I’m going to object to that. BY THE COURT: I’m going to sustain that objection. You can make the final argument or the opening statement later, Counsel.” The following took place during a bench conference on the objection: “BY THE COURT: Before you say what you have to say, I’m getting weary about this repetition on the presumption of innocence and that sort of thing. There’s been no objection and I’ll grant you wide latitude, but I’m tired of this repetition, though. All right, go ahead and say what you want to say. BY MR. TILLMAN: Your Honor, I understand the Court’s already ruled, and I do not intend to offend the Court’s ruling, but if they’re going to be allowed to ask whether or not — the juror’s attitude about drug sales, then I don’t know why I can’t be allowed to ask whether or not their attitude about whether or not the integrity of the police which is an issue in this case. We’re talking about general attitudes. BY THE COURT: You can ask them if they are related or if they think that a witness for the State— of an officer of the law — if they’d give more credence to his testimony than somebody elses, but this business of giving a scenario, that you have no evidence on or anything like that at this time, that would normally come up in a closing argument. Or perhaps even in opening statement, where you tell the jurors to listen for this or listen for that and so forth, and then in closing argument, well, you heard this and you heard that, but you’re — I don’t want to — I’m not going to permit you to make closing argument here in the voir dire.” We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court with respect to its limitation of the defendant’s questioning of prospective jurors on voir dire. Our review of the voir dire examination in its entirety reveals that defendant’s questions generally attempted to elicit from the jurors in advance their opinions concerning the weight of evidence to be offered at trial and the guilt or innocence of the defendant based upon the previous trial and verdict of acquittal. See State v. Square, 257 La. 743, 244 So.2d 200 (1971). These assignments lack merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 5 Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause, relative to prospective juror, JoAnn Pollard. The voir dire examination revealed that Mrs. Pollard’s husband had been a Vernon Parish deputy and from time to time discussed cases with her. However, she did not remember having discussed the defendant with her husband. She stated that despite any conversations she may have had with her husband, she could be a fair and impartial juror and could judge the case strictly on the evidence presented. Defendant’s challenge for cause was refused and he exercised a peremptory challenge. Subsequently, defendant exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 797(3) provides: “The state or the defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that: s): s)e * * s)s * (3) The relationship, whether by blood, marriage, employment, friendship, or enmity between the juror and the defendant, the person injured by the offense, the district attorney, or defense counsel is such that it is reasonable to conclude that it would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict;” Sjc J¡< ¡Je % $ $ Defendant need show only two things to obtain reversible error: (1) that the trial judge erred in refusing to sustain a challenge for cause by the defendant and (2) that he exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. State v. Smith, 466 So.2d 1343 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985). Implicit in the right to jury trial is the guarantee that an accused will receive an impartial jury. State v. Freeze, 438 So.2d 1340 (La.App. 3d Cir.1983), writ denied, 466 So.2d 465 (La.1985). The constitutional standard of fairness requires that a defendant have a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors. Id. Mrs. Pollard testified during voir dire that her husband had been a Vernon Parish deputy. However, it is well settled that mere relationship of a prospective juror to a law enforcement officer is not of itself grounds for cause. State v. Smith, 430 So.2d 31 (La.1983). The question is whether the juror can assess the credibility of each witness independent of his relationship to law enforcement. This determination is within the great discretion of the trial judge and will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. In addition to showing that a relationship exists between a prospective juror and a law enforcement official, defendant must also show that the relationship would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 797(3); State v. Chapman, 410 So.2d 689 (La.1981). If a juror reveals details of his relationship with a law enforcement official such that bias or prejudice may be reasonably implied, the juror may be properly refused for cause. State v. Lewis, 391 So.2d 1156 (La.1980). However, if the trial court could reasonably conclude, from the juror’s answers on voir dire examination, that he could render an impartial verdict according to the law and evidence, the trial court may deny the challenge for cause. State v. Freeze. The defendant relies heavily upon State v. Sylvester, 400 So.2d 640 (La.1981), a case which is easily distinguishable. In State v. Sylvester the prospective juror had worked for the police department for a number of years, recently retired at a high rank and was the former employer of the State’s principal witness. The court ruled that the trial judge erred in not sustaining a challenge for cause based on these facts. State v. Sylvester does not lend support to defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in denying the challenge for cause. Mrs. Pollard was not involved with law enforcement duties as the potential juror was in State v. Sylvester, she is merely married to a former deputy. That relationship alone will not support a challenge for cause unless it is also shown that the relationship would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict. Although Mrs. Pollard admitted to discussing cases with her husband, she had not discussed this case or this defendant with her husband. Furthermore, she stated that she did not know the defendant and that she would be able to serve as a fair and impartial juror notwithstanding her husband’s former occupation and her past discussions with him. The trial judge is vested with broad discretion in ruling on a challenge for cause, and his ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record demonstrates a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Freeze. The trial judge concluded from the responses Mrs. Pollard gave during voir dire examination that she could serve as a fair and impartial juror. Based upon the entire voir dire examination of Mrs. Pollard, the trial judge’s conclusion was reasonable and not an abuse of his discretion. This assignment of error lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 6 Defendant contends that the trial judge erred by commenting on the evidence in the presence of the jury. During the cross-examination of Mark Harper, the undercover agent, the trial judge interrupted defense counsel and the following exchange took place: “BY THE COURT: I don’t hear any objection from the other Counsel but he should be objecting, because this is clearly repetitious, you see, Counsel. BY MR. TILLMAN: I understand. Your Honor, but Counsel is not objecting. BY MR. BURKETT: Your Honor, I — I (inaudible). BY THE COURT: I don’t know why you don’t object to that, Counsel. BY MR. BURKETT: Excuse me just a moment. I would object, but the State has nothing to hide. We’ve laid our case out. BY THE COURT: Well, I — I don’t want any argument. I’m just saying that this is repetitious and I’m going to have to start stepping in here myself if you don’t. Go ahead. BY MR. TILLMAN: Your Honor, as I understood, there was no objection, and I’d like to continue the questioning. BY THE COURT: That’s correct, but it’s the prerogative and duty of this Court to move this thing on.” Defendant argues that these remarks amounted to an improper comment on the evidence since the trial judge interrupted the defense counsel’s questioning of a witness. Defendant did not make an objection to the trial court curtailing the line of questioning. Therefore this assignment of error is not properly before us on appeal. LSA-C.Cr.P. arts. 841, 920. However, we observe that the trial judge’s comments in this case fall within the province of LSA-R.S. 15:275 which states: “In the discipline of his court, the trial judge is vested with a sound discretion to stop the prolonged, unnecessary and irrelevant examination of a witness, whether such examination be direct or cross, even though no objection be urged by counsel.” The trial judge’s remarks were merely an exercise of his discretion to put an end to the repetitious questioning of the witness. State v. Williams, 386 So.2d 1342 (La.1980). ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 7 Defendant maintains that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Mark Harper, the undercover agent involved in both prosecutions of defendant, to answer questions concerning his testimony in the prior trial. Also defendant claims the trial court erred in refusing to admit into evidence the entire testimony of the first trial in which defendant was acquitted. Defendant maintains that since the charges and the evidence against him in the first trial were the same as those in the second, that the first trial’s entire transcript should have been admitted under LSA-R.S. 15:459 and 15:441. Defendant asserts the evidence was admissible pursuant to LSA-R.S. 15:459 and LSA-R.S. 15:441. LSA-R.S. 15:459 reads as follows: “Whenever, during the trial of any criminal case, either party may desire to offer in evidence any record, paper or document belonging to the files or records of the court in which the trial is proceeding, the presiding judge shall, at the request of such party, direct the clerk to produce such record, document or paper, in order that the same may be used in evidence; and it shall not be necessary for the clerk in any such case to make a copy of such record, document or paper.” LSA-R.S. 15:441 reads as follows: “Relevant evidence is that tending to show the commission of the offense and the intent, or tending to negative the commission of the offense and the intent. ...” The defendant sought to offer the verdict of the prior trial in order to show that he was acquitted of the same charges in a prior trial in which the State used the same evidence. The State objected on the grounds of relevancy. The trial judge consistently refused to allow defense counsel to refer to the prior verdict each time he attempted references to it during the trial and on voir dire. The defendant’s argument is essentially the same as his assignment concerning double jeopardy. As discussed previously in defendant’s first assignment of error, the defendant committed several violations of the same criminal statute, each involving the same type of controlled dangerous substance, but each act is a separate and distinct crime. The only purpose for admitting the evidence of the prior verdict of acquittal would be to show that the defendant did not commit the crimes. Therefore this would constitute evidence of his good character. LSA-R.S. 15:579 and 15:480. We do not find that the trial court committed error in ruling that the evidence was inadmissible. The State cannot use prior criminal acts to prove an accused’s bad or criminal character, and good character cannot be shown by documentary or testimonial evidence that an accused has never been in trouble. The defendant’s good character can only be established by proof of his general reputation in the community in which he lives. State v. Oliver, 247 La. 729, 174 So.2d 509 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 124, 15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1966). This was improper character evidence. This assignment lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 8 By this assignment, defendant asserts that the trial judge erred in not allowing defense counsel to learn the whereabouts of the wife of witness Tony Mills so that defense counsel could have her subpoenaed. Defendant contends that Mrs. Mills’ testimony would have contradicted that of her husband, and that she would have been a material witness for the defense. Defendant alleges that the prosecution led him to believe the State would be unable to subpoena Tony Mills, only to fly Tony Mills in to testify for the trial. The Mills are living some 700 miles from Lees-ville, but the prosecution refused to disclose their whereabouts due to threats made by the defendant against Mr. and Mrs. Mills. Defendant alléges the trial court erred by depriving him of the right to subpoena a material witness to his defense. Tony Mills stated in his testimony that his wife was out of state at the time of the trial. A defendant is entitled to summon, at state expense, the attendance of witnesses from outside the state, provided he makes a prior showing that the testimony is relevant and material. State v. Hogan, 372 So.2d 1211 (La.1979). This right to compulsory process is predicated on the exercise of due diligence by the defendant. State v. Clark, 437 So.2d 879, (La.App. 2d Cir.1983), writ denied, 442 So.2d 460 (La.1983). Defendant did not subpoena this witness until after trial began and then no specific relief was sought except to request the issuance of a subpoena. More importantly, the defendant must show that testimony is material and relevant before he can summon witnesses from outside the State. State v. Hogan. “The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Rosiere, 488 So.2d 965, 970 (La.1986). “A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). In this case, defendant made no showing that the testimony of Mrs. Mills would be material. Defendant alleged that Mrs. Mills might have been able to impeach the credibility of her husband as a result of prior inconsistent statements. Mrs. Mills’ testimony was not alleged to be exculpatory. Defendant did not make a showing that Mrs. Mills’ testimony would be material, nor did he exercise due diligence in obtaining her appearance. This assignment is without merit. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 9 and 10 These assignments relate to comments made by the district attorney during his closing argument. The defendant contends the district attorney committed reversible error when he commented about the defendant’s failure to testify and his failure to put his sons on the stand. Defendant argues the following comments constitute reversible error: “Nobody has put on any evidence to say they wasn’t there. You didn’t see any Williams kids say, T never saw those people at home when I was — at my house when I was there.’ This son that brought the baggie out. He didn’t get up here and deny it.” Defendant also complains about the following: "... should do. It’s just not done. This case is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. There’s no doubt it’s been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence is not controverted. Nobody disputes what we’ve said about going out there. They try to pick it apart, but nobody disputes it. Corbie Lynn Williams’s sons didn’t tell you that he didn’t bring any dope out there and give it to anybody. He could have. He didn’t testify that they didn’t come out there while I was there, I never saw anything happen. And you remember, he was a big part of it and he didn’t get on the stand and tell you that. He could have.” It is fundamentally unfair to allow the accused’s silence to impeach him at trial. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); State v. Sam, 412 So.2d 1082 (La.1982). LSA-C.Cr.P. 770(3) provides that a mistrial shall be granted when the district attorney remarks upon the failure of the defendant to testify in his own defense. The prosecutor’s remarks in this case seemed to encompass the whole case and not just highlight the failure of defendant to testify. Each passage which the defendant alleges to be prejudicial refers to the defendant’s failure to put on witnesses— not his failure to take the stand. The court in State v. Jackson, 454 So.2d 116, 118 (La.1984), stated: “A statement that the state’s evidence is uncontradicted is not necessarily a prohibited comment on defendant’s failure to testify. However, when defendant is the only person who can dispute the state’s evidence, a reference to testimony as uncontroverted constitutes reversible error. Similarly, a reference to something ‘only the defendant knows’ is a prohibited reference to defendant’s failure to testify. However, when there are other possible witnesses, an argument that the state’s case is unrebutted does not focus the jury’s attention on defendant’s failure to testify.” (Citations omitted) In order to raise this issue on appeal, the defense must have made a timely objection during the trial. At no point during the prosecutor’s closing argument did the defense object to the alleged prejudicial re marks. Generally, the defense cannot avail itself of an error which was not objected to at the time of its occurrence. LSA-C.Cr.P. arts. 841, 920. This assignment is without merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 11 Defendant asserts that the district attorney’s closing argument constituted an appeal to prejudice and the trial judge erred in overruling the defense counsel’s motion for mistrial. The district attorney’s rebuttal argument, in pertinent part, was as follows: Mr. Tillman tells you, you know, the State’s short. Think about it. It could be you. It could be your wife. Your son. Your spouse next time. It sure could. They may be the one that would end up with some of this dope that came from Corbie Lynn Williams. I want you to think about that. There’s a time for all good things to end and this is the time for Corbie Lynn Williams. Are you going to walk out of here and allow him to make a mockery of your Court system in Vernon Parish? A laughing stock of Vernon Parish period? Are you going to let that happen? Are you tired of it? Are you fed up with it? Are you going to tell him, “Corbie Lynn, enough is enough, your day has come. It’s time for you to face the music.” Now, I’m not going to get into all this little evidence again and this, that and the other. You know what the case is about. You know what you saw. And reasonable people, based on this evidence, shouldn’t have any reasonable doubt. Mark Harper hadn’t planted anything on anybody. Herb Cross didn’t help him do it. Tony Mills might not be the best person in the world, but he did the right thing for once in his life. Corbie Lynn’s caught. He knows he’s caught. His guilt’s been proven, not beyond a reasonable doubt but to an absolute certainty. There’s no logical reason you can give why you think he didn’t sell the dope on not one, not two, but on three occasions to the State Police. I urge you to consider it. Think about your duties. Think about your obligations as citizens to this Parish. BY THE COURT: You need to summarize, Counsel. Give it a lot of thought. I have faith in people and I have faith in the people of Vernon Parish. I’m a close neighbor of yours and I care about what happens to you. I wouldn’t be down here if I didn’t. I’ve got lots to do in my district. But I hope you care enough. I hear people say all the time, ‘Why don’t ya’ll do something.’ ‘Why don’t ya’ll’ (interruption— inaudible)— BY MR. TILLMAN: Your Honor, I’m going to object. It’s been proven over and over than an appeal to prejudice is an improper argument and I’m going to object and move for a mistrial. The above quoted passage was made in response to the following arguments made by defense counsel during his closing statement: ... ‘You don’t have to labor and say, “I found him not guilty.” Mr. Burkett would have you pressured to say, “You’re going to have to come back out and face society, and say you found him not guilty.” Well, first of all, you are society. You don’t have to face anybody or explain your decision to anybody. But secondly, you don’t have to find him not guilty. He is not guilty. He has been not guilty since the beginning of this proceeding and he’s going to remain not guilty unless the twelve of you in that room decide the State has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and you don’t have to explain or be embarrassed or — or justify that to anybody, anywhere along the line. You can convict this man on this evidence if you see fit to do so. If you see fit to believe completely Mark Harper. If you see completely proper to disregard all the discrepencies, all the evidence problems, then you can convict this man. The State’s asking you to do it. The State’s asking you to convict. You know, the danger of that is that one of these days the person seated over there next to the lawyer may be you or your husband or wife, or your child. And the danger of that is that is that that evidence that might go either way might be used against them. That’s what’s so holy, that’s what’s so proper and that’s what’s so sacramental about the function that you’re going to receive and take on today, is that the jury is the protection of every citizen against cases where the evidence is not right, cases where the witnesses didn’t testify properly, and cases that don’t exist except in the mind of the investigating officers. I appreciate your time and attention and I’ve already told you probably too much.’ The appropriate response to defense counsel’s argument would have been a prosecutorial objection. However, the prosecutor chose to refute defendant’s warning, that members of the jury or other families may someday find themselves in the defendant’s chair, by warning that members of the jury may find members of their family with some of defendant’s drugs. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 774 governs the scope of closing arguments by the State and the defense. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 774 reads as follows: “The argument shall be confined to the evidence admitted, to the lack of evidence, the conclusions of fact that the state or defendant may draw therefrom, and to the law applicable to the case. The argument shall not appeal to prejudice. The state’s rebuttal shall be confined to answering the argument of the defendant.” Article 774 does not provide a sanction against one who goes beyond the permissible scope of argument. State v. Craddock, 435 So.2d 1110 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983). If argument goes beyond the scope of Article 774, the court may grant a mistrial or an admonishment, premised upon argument by opposing party which is irrelevant or immaterial and of such a nature that it might create prejudice against the defendant in the mind of the jury. The trial judge, however, has wide discretion in controlling the scope of argument. Id. A prosecutor’s predictions as to the consequences of a not guilty verdict, or the societal costs of such a result, are clearly improper and should be avoided. State v. Barrow, 410 So.2d 1070 (La.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 852, 103 S.Ct. 115, 74 L.Ed. 2d 101. Accordingly, a prosecutor should refrain from argument which tends to divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused. State v. Guillory, 461 So.2d 492 (La.App. 3d Cir.1984). Occasionally, prosecutors have been given some latitude to use argument outside the scope of Article 774 to refute defense’s argument of a like character. State v. Morris, 404 So.2d 1186 (La.1981). We find this to be the case herein and find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in refusing to grant a mistrial. Defendant’s next argument focuses on the remarks made at the end of the prosecution’s closing statement, where the prosecutor states “I wouldn’t be down here if I didn’t [care].” Defendant relies on State v. Kaufman, 304 So.2d 300 (La. 1974), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 981, 97 S.Ct. 495, 50 L.Ed.2d 591 (1976), in which the court held that a prosecutor’s expression of his personal belief in the defendant’s guilt constituted reversible error. In Kaufman the prejudicial remark came during closing argument. The prosecutor stated: “Gentlemen, my argument, when I speak in a personal way, my argument is based on the evidence, and believe me, that’s right, I personally feel from the evidence that I have a case; otherwise, I wouldn’t be here, because it’s within my power to be here or not be here.” Id. at 307. The remarks of the prosecutor in the instant case are not nearly as blatant as those in State v. Kaufman. Bead in context, the jury could have made the inference that the prosecutor was explaining the reason why the district attorney from Sabine Parish was prosecuting the defendant in Vernon Parish rather than leaving a mere inference that the defendant is guilty or I would not have come this far to prosecute. Nevertheless, if the comments of the district attorney constituted impermissible argument under Article 774 to amount to reversible error, the court must be firmly convinced that the jury was influenced by the remarks and that they contributed to the verdict. State v. Guillory. The State presented during trial the two witnesses who testified that they bought the marijuana from defendant on three separate occasions, the marijuana purchased from the defendant, and other corroborating witnesses. There was enough evidence of defendant’s guilt so that one would not be firmly convinced that the remarks contributed to the verdict. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF- ERROR 12 Defendant contends the sentence imposed was excessive. Defendant was convicted on an indictment of distribution of marijuana. LSA-R.S. 40:966(B)(2) provides a maximum penalty of ten years at hard labor for each count and a fine up to $15,000. Defendant was given a presen-tence hearing and thereafter was sentenced to seven years at hard labor on each count, to run consecutively, three fines of $5,000 with an additional year on each count if the fines were not paid. Defendant alleges that the trial judge did not comply with Article 894.1 when imposing the sentence, in that the trial judge considered juvenile arrests and charges that had been dismissed. Also defendant argues that the record does not reflect that the trial judge considered any mitigating factors. Defendant urged in mitigation the fact that he had only one previous felony conviction, no prior drug convictions, and the fact that defendant has five children that are dependent upon him for support. Prior to sentencing, the court held a hearing on defendant’s application for bail, at which time a great deal of information concerning defendant’s personal, work, family and criminal history were elicited. Additionally, the court received a presen-tence investigation report and conducted a presentence hearing. It was the court’s opinion, based upon the evidence adduced at trial, that the defendant intended to continue drug trafficking and in even larger quantities. In considering the defendant’s criminal record, the trial judge noted the defendant’s extensive juvenile record and the fact that defendant has been arrested at least 40 times on charges ranging from disturbing the peace to conspiracy to commit murder since reaching the age of majority. The defendant was convicted of at least ten of those charges, one being a felony conviction for which the defendant received a suspended sentence and supervised probation. The trial judge went on, at length, to discuss the seriousness of the instant crime committed by defendant and that defendant would not be entitled to a suspended sentence. The trial judge did not believe that, based on the defendant’s history, he would refrain from future criminal conduct and imposed the sentence complained of. Defendant argues that the trial court improperly considered defendant’s arrests, charges that had been dismissed, and his juvenile record in imposing a sentence. This argument lacks merit. The trial court is not limited to consideration of convictions only in imposing a sentence. Prior criminal activity is one of the factors to be considered by the trial court under LSA-C. Cr.P. 894.1. See State v. Cruz, 438 So.2d 1251 (La.App. 3d Cir.1983). The weight accorded this information lies in the discretion of the trial court. C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. The trial court committed no error in this respect. Defendant next argues that the record is completely devoid of any mitigating factors taken into account by the trial court in imposing sentence. The mitigating factors which defendant asked the court to consider were that he had only one prior felony conviction and that he had five children who were dependent on him. It is clear from the record of the presentencing and sentencing hearings that the trial court considered several of the mitigating factors under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 B in reaching its sentence. While the trial court did not specifically state that it had considered the defendant’s marital status and dependent children, it did adequately comply with Article 894.1. The trial court need not articulate every aggravating and mitigating circumstance, so long as the record reflects that he adequately considered these guidelines in particularizing the sentence to defendant. State v. Cox, 474 So.2d 1040 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985). The record reflects the fact that the defendant has five dependents; this is the only mitigating factor present. The record of the bail application hearing indicates that defendant has had a sporadic work history and continuous trouble with the law, including recent charges filed against him by one of his sons and a brother for violent behavior directed toward them. The possibility of job loss and financial difficulties is confronted by virtually any individual who may be facing a jail sentence. State v. Shelby, 438 So.2d 1166 (La.App. 3d Cir.1983). In this case the trial court did not have the option to suspend the defendant’s sentence because of his previous felony conviction. There do not seem to be any unusual or extenuating circumstances which would warrant mitigation of the defendant’s sentence. Nonetheless, a sentence may be unconstitutionally excessive if the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime. On review the court must consider the punishment and the crime in light of the harm to society caused by its commission and determine whether the penalty is so disproportionate to the crime committed that it shocks the court’s sense of justice. State v. James, 447 So.2d 580 (La.App. 3d Cir.1984). The trial court has wide discretion in imposing sentences within statutory limits and absent a manifest abuse of that discretion, the sentence will not be set aside. Id. The maximum term of imprisonment which the defendant was exposed to was 30 years at hard labor. The maximum fine which could be imposed was $45,000. The aggregate of the defendant’s sentences is 21 years at hard labor, plus the possibility of an additional three years in default of payment of the fine. The fines imposed totaled $15,000. The sentence imposed is within statutory limits, albeit in the upper range. However, the defendant was convicted of selling marijuana on three separate occasions to an undercover police officer in quantities of approximately one-quarter pound for sums between $175 and $200. The defendant also grew his own marijuana at his home, and promised much larger quantities to the officer in a future deal for approximately $25,000. The officer and the State’s principal witness both testified that at least one of the defendant’s minor children was present during their dealings and was instructed to retrieve the marijuana for the buyers. This child brought and handed the marijuana to the buyers. In light of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding these crimes and the history of this particular defendant, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sentence. We find no merit in this assignment. CONCLUSION Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction and sentence are hereby affirmed. AFFIRMED.

LOBRANO, Judge. Defendant, Gary J. Hall, was charged by bill of information with possession of phen-cyclidine (PCP), a violation of La.R.S. 40:966. On November 25, 1986, defendant was arraigned and pled not guilty. Trial was held on May 20, 1987 and defendant was found guilty of attempted possession of PCP by a twelve member jury. Defendant pled guilty to the multiple bill filed by the state. Defendant waived all sentencing delays. He was sentenced to serve twenty (20) months at hard labor with credit for time served to run concurrently with any other sentence. FACTS: On October 14, 1986, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Officers Fred Wagner and James Pollard observed a blue Oldsmobile exiting a service station at the intersection of Martin Luther King Boulevard and South Claiborne Avenue. The vehicle’s head lights and tail lights were not on. A near collision occurred with another vehicle. The officers then observed the Oldsmobile driving into the Calliope Project. They followed and pulled the vehicle over to the side of the street. Defendant and the driver of the car, Gary Truvia, got out of the car. When asked for his driver’s license and vehicle registration, Truvia responded that they were in the car. Officer Wagner accompanied Truvia to the driver’s door. When Truvia opened the door, Wagner noticed the distinctive and powerful odor associated with PCP. Wagner then instructed Truvia to go to the rear of the car and wait there with Officer Pollard. Wagner then looked inside the vehicle and observed on the passenger side of the front seat a hand-rolled marijuana cigarette that proved to be the source of the odor. Officer Pollard testified at the trial that defendant, the passenger in the vehicle, was under the influence of either alcohol or drugs at the time of his arrest. Both men were arrested for possession of PCP. Truvia pled guilty to the charge of possession of PCP. At defendant’s trial, Truvia testified that the “joint” belonged to defendant who possessed it when both men left a party earlier that night. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence asserting that as a matter of law it was manifest error for the jury to have found him guilty of attempted possession of PCP in view of the fact that there was no showing that he ever possessed any of the illegal drug nor ever exercised any dominion or control over it. We disagree. When reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Fuller, 414 So.2d 306 (La.1982). In addition, when circumstantial evidence partly forms the basis of the conviction, such evidence must consist of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372 (La.1983); State v. Austin, 399 So.2d 158 (La.1981); State v. Bailey, 457 So.2d 94 (La.App. 4th Cir.1984). La.R.S. 15:438 provides that, assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La.R.S. 15:438 is not a separate test from Jackson but rather an evi-dentiary guideline to “facilitate appellate review of whether a rational juror could have found a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Porretto, 468 So.2d 1142 (La.1985); State v. Wright, 445 So.2d 1198 (La.1984). All evidence, both direct and circumstantial must meet the Jackson reasonable doubt standard. State v. Porretto, supra. To support a conviction for attempted possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of La.R.S. 40:966, the state must prove that the defendant was (1) in possession of the illegal drug and (2) that he knowingly possessed the drug. Attempted possession of PCP is a responsive verdict to the charge of possession of PCP. C.Cr.P. Art. 814(A)(49); La.R.S. 40:979. The state need not prove that a defendant was in actual physical possession of the drugs found; constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction. State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222 (La.1983). The mere presence of the defendant in the area where the drugs are found, or the mere fact that the defendant knows the person in actual possession is insufficient to prove constructive possession. State v. Trahan, supra; State v. Johnson, 404 So.2d 239 (La.1981), cert. den.; Kelly v. Louisiana, 456 U.S. 925, 102 S.Ct. 1970, 72 L.Ed.2d 440 (1982). However, a person found in the area of the contraband may be considered in constructive possession if the illegal substance is subject to his dominion and control. State v. Trahan, supra; State v. Johnson, supra; State v. Smith, 257 La. 1109, 245 So.2d 327 (1971); or in joint possession of a drug which is in the physical possession of a companion, if he willfully and knowingly shares with the other the right to control the drug. Guilty knowledge is the essential element. State v. Trahan, supra, citing State v. Smith, supra. See also, State v. Hayes, 488 So.2d 1287 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986). The determination of whether there is possession sufficient to convict depends on the facts peculiar to each case. State v. Trahan, supra citing State v. Cann, 319 So.2d 396 (La.1975). Several factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant exercised “dominion and control” over narcotics to constitute constructive possession are as follows: “... a defendant’s knowledge that illegal drugs are in the area; the defendant’s relationship with the person found to be in actual possession; the defendant’s access to the area where the drugs were found; the evidence of recent drug use by the defendant; the defendant’s physical proximity to the drugs; and any evidence that the particular area was frequented by the drug users.” State v. Tasker, 448 So.2d 1311, 1314 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984), citing Bujol v. Cain, 713 F.2d 112 (5th Cir.1983). Defendant argues that the only evidence presented at trial to associate him with the ownership of the PCP was the testimony of his co-defendant, Gary Truvia. Defendant asserts Truvia’s testimony was tainted and not credible in that he admitted receiving a suspended sentence in exchange for his testimony against defendant. Whether Truvia’s testimony was or was not credible is not within the province of this court to decide. State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983). Evaluations of credibility are well within the province of the jury as trier of fact. State v. Shephard, 332 So.2d 228 (La.1976); State v. Bailey, supra. Obviously, the jury believed Truvia’s testimony. Even if we reject Truvia’s testimony, the evidence is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found defendant guilty of attempted possession of PCP. Officer Wagner smelled the distinct odor of PCP and found a marijuana cigarette on the front passenger seat where defendant had been seated. Officer Pollard testified that defendant, at the time of his arrest, was “under the influence” of either drugs or alcohol. For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed. AFFIRMED.

FORET, Judge. This is a suit filed by H.R. Jackson, Jr., Jean Craig, Evelyn Michalk, and Robert Eugene Stidham, heirs of Helen Lola Jackson, seeking to set aside a sale made by Mrs. Jackson approximately one year prior to her death. On November 11, 1981, Helen Lola Jackson sold to Edward James Lopez, a tract of land consisting of approximately 190 acres situated in St. Landry Parish, less and except 59 acres, more or less, previously conveyed by Mrs. Jackson to the State of Louisiana. On November 18, 1982, Mrs. Jackson died intestate and, shortly after her death, the above mentioned lawsuit was filed by H.R. Jackson, Jr., Jean Craig, and Evelyn Michalk. Robert Eugene Stid-ham was added as a plaintiff by a subsequent amendment to the petition. After filing suit against Edward James Lopez, H.R. Jackson, Jr., Jean Craig and Evelyn Michalk filed a petition for appointment of Leon S. Haas, Jr. and Alfred Octave Pavy as joint administrators of the succession of Helen Lola Jackson. On February 23, 1983, Guy Andrew Stidham and Robert Eugene Stidham filed a petition asking that they be appointed joint administrators of Mrs. Jackson’s estate. On that same date, H.R. Jackson, Jr., Jean Craig, and Evelyn Michalk filed another petition for appointment of administrator and/or administra-trix, asking that Jean Craig be appointed as administratrix of Mrs. Jackson’s succession. Thereafter, the parties agreed upon the appointment of James T. Genovese as provisional administrator of the succession, a position he continued to hold as of the filing of this appeal. Subsequent to Genovese’s appointment as administrator, a petition was filed by H.R. Jackson, Jr., Jean Craig and Evelyn Michalk (this being done prior to the addition of Robert Eugene Stidham as plaintiff) requesting that the administrator, James T. Genovese, be ordered to join the lawsuit filed by these parties against Edward James Lopez. The trial court denied this request. Thereafter, on May 14, 1986, an exception of no right of action and motion to dismiss was filed by Edward James Lopez, in proper person, challenging the right of appellants to file suit while the succession is under administration. The trial court observed that the succession was under administration and held that only the succession representative could sue to enforce rights due the succession as long as the succession is under administration. Accordingly, the trial court sustained the exception of no right of action and further ordered that the lawsuit be dismissed in view of the fact that the grounds for the exception could not be removed or cured. Plaintiffs appealed. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether or not the heirs to a succession can bring suit to annul a sale made by the decedent while the succession is under administration. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we affirm the ruling of the trial court. Art. 685 of the La.Code of Civil Procedure states as follows: “Except as otherwise provided by law, the succession representative appointed by a court of this state is the proper plaintiff to sue to enforce a right of the deceased or of his succession, while the latter is under administration. The heirs or legatees of the deceased, whether present or represented in the state or not, need not be joined as parties, whether the action is personal, real, or mixed.” Additionally, Art. 3211 of the La.Code of Civil Procedure states, in part, that the succession representative shall “have possession of all property of the succession and shall enforce all obligations in its favor.” Neither of these articles provides for or establishes the right of an heir or legatee to enforce any rights of the succession while the succession is under administration and there are no other statutes or provisions of Louisiana law providing for such right. As for the jurisprudence, in Rogers v. Read, 355 So.2d 46 (La.App. 2 Cir.1978), the court held that the right to institute an action to rescind a sale for lesion can only be asserted by the administrator of the succession while the succession is under administration. Similarly, in Succession of Lambright v. Lambright, 252 So.2d 349 (La.App. 3 Cir.1971), the court held that until the heirs are placed into possession, the succession representative, alone, may institute an action to collect succession property. We therefore find that the jurisprudence completely supports the statutory law in reference to this issue and hold that appellants have no right of action to enforce a right of the succession while the succession of Helen Lola Jackson is under administration. We will now discuss briefly the arguments made by appellants herein in support of their position. Firstly, appellants contend that an exception of no right of action should not be sustained when the allegations of the petition set forth a right of action as to any portion of the plaintiffs’ demand and, as authority for this position, cite the case of Cenac Towing Co. v. Cenac, 413 So.2d 1351 (La.App. 1 Cir.1982). Even assuming this to be a correct statement of the law, it is clear that such an argument is not dispositive of the issue at hand. It is well established that an exception of no right of action directs itself to the question of whether or not a plaintiff has the right to assert the cause of action. Insofar as the petition filed by appellants is concerned, each and every cause of action set forth therein can only be asserted by the succession representative until he is discharged from his duties and, therefore, the appellants in this case had no right of action as to any and all claims made in their lawsuit. Appellants also contend that Lam-bright, cited above, is authority for the position that appellant, Robert Eugene Stidham, has a right of action in this case in view of the fact that he has been placed in possession of his portion of the succession of Helen Lola Jackson. The court in Lambright did state, quite correctly, that the heirs of a succession had no right to bring any action to collect succession property until such time as they were placed in possession of succession property. However, appellants’ reliance on Lambright is misplaced. We disagree with plaintiffs’ interpretation of Lambright. We do not believe that Lambright meant that where one of a number of heirs has been placed in possession of his share of the succession, that heir can start filing lawsuits on behalf of the succession when there is an administrator of the said succession in place. To so hold would clearly defeat the spirit and intent of C.C.P. art. 685, which is to provide for orderly administration of successions by allowing only the succession representative to enforce rights of the succession as long as the succession is under administration. We therefore find that until such time as the administrator is discharged, the succession representative, alone, may enforce rights of the succession, by suit or otherwise. See also C.C.P. arts. 3198, 3211, 3221, and 3223-3228; Official Comments to Art. 685. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and all costs of this appeal are assessed against appellants, H.R. Jackson, Jr., Jean Craig, Evelyn Michalk, and Robert Eugene Stidham. AFFIRMED.

In re Carter, Robert C; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div. O, No. 10-3550; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 12-KA-932. Denied. GUIDRY, J., recused. HUGHES, J., would grant.

In re Church, Carlton James; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Caddo, 1st Judicial District Court Div. 4, No. 277,388; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 47,809-KA. Denied. HUGHES, J„ would grant.

In re Campbell, Terry et al.; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. 0, No. 597,072; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CW 1400. Denied. VICTORY, J., would grant.

In re Scott Benjamin, et al; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Pointe Coupee, 18th Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 40,587; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 0610. Denied.

'OGERS, Justice. The State of Louisiana brought this suit against the Humble Oil & Refining Company and the Cameron Parish School Board to be recognized as the owner of twenty regular sixteenth section lands situated in Cameron Parish, and to have decreed that none of the- sections is affected by two mineral leáses acquired by the oil company from the original lessees. In support of its action, the State asserts that section 30 of Act 100 of 1922, authorizing parish school boards to grant mineral leases on sixteenth section lands, was repealed by implication by Act 93 of 1936, as amended by Act 80 of 1938, vesting in the State Mineral Board the right to grant mineral leases on state lands. Defendants' deny that the legislature intended to, or did, divest the school board of its power to lease such lands, and they aver that if the legislative act has the effect claimed by plaintiff, it is unconstitutional. Holding that section 30 of Act 100 of 1922 was not affected by the acts creating and defining the powers and duties of the State Mineral Board, the court below rejected plaintiff’s demands. Plaintiff is appealing from the judgment. The facts are not disputed. The decision of the case turns solely on a question of law, which is whether section 30 of 1922' has been repealed by Act 93 of 1936, as amended by Act 80 of 1938. Briefly stated, the facts out of which the question of law arises are as follows: The State holds title to the lands in all sections numbered sixteen in place, by virtue of the Acts of Congress approved April 21, 1806, 2 Stat. 391, Ch. 39; March 3, 1811, 2 Stat. 665, Ch. 46, Sec. 10; and April 23, 1912, 37 Stat. 90. The State Constitution dedicates and appropriates the proceeds from the sale of and the revenues derived from such lands to the use and benefit of the public schools. The legislature clothed the. parish school boards with the right to grant mineral leases covering the sixteenth section lands, — the rents to be credited to the current school fund of the parish. The latest act on the subject is Act 100 of 1922, which was preceded by Act 120 of 1916 and Act 129 of 1908, as amended by Act 54 of 1910. At the time Act 100 of 1922 was enacted,. Act 30 of the Extra Session of 1915 was in effect, under which the Governor was authorized to grant mineral leases covering “any lands, including lake and river beds and other bottoms, belonging to the State.”’ This statute was preceded by Act 271 of 1914 and Act 258 of 1912. Act 30 of 1915 was amended by Act 315 of 1926. By Act 9 of the Extra Session of 1928, the Register of the Land Office, with the approval of the Governor, was authorized to interpret state mineral leases. On February 5, 1934, the Cameron Parish School Board granted a mineral lease to Sidney W. Sweeney covering nineteen sixteenth sections. Sweeney assigned the lease to the Humble Company on June 29, 1934. The lease was continued in ef- feet, without drilling, by payment of annual rentals, up to and including February 5, 1939. On September 6, 1938, while the Sweeney lease was still in effect, the school board granted a top lease to John B. Daigle, covering the nineteen sixteenth sections described in the Sweeney lease and one additional sixteenth section in another township. On October 31, 1938, Daigle assigned his lease rights to the Humble Company. After securing these rights, the Humble •Company relinquished all its rights under the Sweeney lease. Later the Humble Company brought in two producing wells on the property covered by the leases, and the school board is now deriving royalties from this production. The State contends that the Daigle lease is void because it was granted subsequent to the adoption of Act 93 of 1936 and Act 80 of 1938. The State concedes the lease granted to Sweeney on February 5, 1934, was a valid lease, but contends that due to its relinquishment by the Humble Company it is no longer in effect. The history of the sixteenth section lands reveals that the Federal Government set aside and dedicated them for the use of public education, and it was not until many years after this State was admitted into the Union that the title to the lands was finally determined. If it be conceded that the title to these sixteenth sections is in the State, there is a moral, if not a clear legal obligation, resting upon the State to dedicate the revenues derived from such lands to public education. The framers of the various State Constitutions have clearly recognized the State’s moral obligation and have embodied in the various •constitutions provisions dealing with sixteenth sections, expressly dedicating the revenues from those sections to public education. At a number of sessions of the legislature, statutes have been enacted providing for the sale, leasing and operation of the sixteenth sections. From the first constitutional or legislative pronouncement up to and including the legislative session •of 1934, sixteenth sections haw been continuously recognized as school lands, and as such, separate and distinct from other kinds of public lands. The provisions of Act 93 of 1936 are very broad. It is possible that they might be construed so as to bring sixteenth section lands within the category of the public lands to which they refer! Such a construction, however, would clearly violate the spirit, if not the letter,- of the law governing the leasing of the sixteenth section lands and attach a meaning to the legislative act that probably is not its true meaning. Neither Act 93 of 1936, nor Act 80 of 1938 refers by name to school lands or sixteenth sections, nor does either expressly repeal section 30 of Act 100 of 1922, although Act 80 of 1938, which enlarges the grant of power so as to cover the leasing of levee board lands by the Mineral Board when so requested, does provide that all laws, general and special, in conflict with the provisions of the act are repealed. If Act 93 of 1936, or Act 80 of 1938, repealed section 30 of Act 100 of 1922 so as to withdraw from parish school boards the right to rent sixteenth section lands, or to lease the mineral rights on those lands, the repeal was by necessary implication for, as we have stated, the later statutes do not contain repealing clauses. The repeal of a law may be implied, as well as express. Civ. Code, art. 23. And a special legislative act may be impliedly repealed by a general legislative act, the question of whether it has been so repealed being one of legislative intention. This rule is important in this case in view of the fact that this Court, in State v. Rapides Parish School Board, 158 La. 251, 103 So. 757, was called upon to decide whether section 32 of Act 100 of 1922 (which permits school boards to operate on a fiscal year basis and to borrow money for budgeted expenditures) had been repealed by Act 94 of 1924, the general appropriation bill, providing for- appropriations on a calendar year basis. The Court referred to Act 100 of 1922 as a special statute for a particular case and to the general appropriation bill as a general law, and held that the general law had not repealed the special law. Under this ruling it appears that Act 100 of 1922 must be construed as a special and not as a general law. On the other hand, it is clear that Act 93 of" 1936 and Act 80 of 1938, which in terms authorize the State Mineral Board to lease for mineral purposes “any lands belonging to the State or the title to which is in the public, including rights of way, road-beds, lake and river beds and other bottoms, lands adjudicated to the State at tax sale, and any other, lands and water bottoms by whatever title acquired,”' is not a special but is a general law. For more than one hundred years it has been the settled policy of this State, as reflected in various constitutional and statutory provisions, to treat sixteenth section lands as separate and distinct from all other State lands and to place them under the control of the school authorities. Had the legislature, in adopting the Mineral Board acts, intended to change this well recognized policy and to vest jurisdiction of those lands in the Mineral Board, it is unlikely that it would have left open for construction its intention to do so. The Constitution provides that the revenues derived from sixteenth section lands shall be segregated and dedicated to the use of the public schools. There is no provision either in Act 93 of 1936 or Act 80 of 1938, for the segregation and dedication of such revenues, and in order to hold that the effect of the acts is to repeal Section 30 of Act 100 of 1922, the Court would of necessity have to hold, also, that certain provisions of the repealing acts are unconstitutional. It would seem to be obvious that before the legislature intended to make such a drastic change in public policy, a change which would have the effect of placing school lands in the same class as other public lands and to vest the control of such lands in the Mineral Board, the legislature, in compliance with the mandate of the Constitution, would have provided that the revenues derived from the sixteenth section lands should be segregated and used solely for school purposes. Act 93 of 1936 and Act 80 of 1938 are general statutes prescribing the manner by which public lands belonging to the State may be leased for the production of oil, gas and óther minerals. It is clear that the purpose of the act is to secure for the State greater returns from the mineral development of the public lands. As we have hereinabove observed, the sixteenth section lands have been set apart as school lands and have been dealt with as such for many years. They have been excluded ex industria from all legislation covering or relating to public lands. Their status as school lands was not affected by any previous legislative act dealing with the leasing of public lands for mineral purposes. Prior to the institution of this suit, the right of a school board to control and administer, for the benefit of the public schools, the sixteenth section lands situated in its parish was never questioned. In fact, subsequent to the adoption of Act 30 of 1915, authorizing the leasing, for mineral purposes, of any lands belonging to the State, the legislature adopted Act 100 of 1922 specifically authorizing the school boards of the various parishes to lease for mineral development the sixteenth section lands situated in their parishes, the funds realized therefrom to be credited to the current school funds of the parishes. The language used in Act 93 of 1936 to describe the lands covered by its provisions is both general and particular. After providing generally in Section 4 that the Mineral Board was vested with authority to lease “any lands belonging to the State or the title to which is in the public,” the statute proceeds to designate the kind of lands that are included in the general description, viz., “rights of way, road-beds, lake and river beds and other bottoms, lands adjudicated to the State at tax sale, and any other lands and water bottoms by whatever title acquired.” It will thus appear that the legislature was excessively careful to describe certain kinds of lands that were included in the grant to the State Mineral Board. If it were the intention of the legislature that sixteenth section lands, which were under the jurisdiction of the school authorities, should be amenable to the provisions of the act, it would have been a simple matter for the legislature to also mention those lands in the statutory provisions. The legislature did not do this. No mention of the sixteenth section lands is made anywhere in the legislative act. The omission is significant and can not lead the earnest inquirer to any other conclusion than that the omission was intentional and that it was never within the contemplation of the legislature to divest the school boards of their control and administration of the sixteenth section lands. Other provisions of Act 93 of 1936 also show that it was not within the intention of the legislature to include sixteenth section lands. For instance, under Section 6 the Register of the Land Office is required to advertise the land, keep the records, and to furnish the Mineral Board with information with respect to lands under its jurisdiction. The legislature has never granted the Register any authority over the sixteenth section lands, and it is clear that the Register is not in a position to furnish the Board with any information concerning those lands. Section 9 gives the Mineral Board supervision “of all mineral leases granted by the State, now in effect or hereafter entered into.” The mineral leases on the sixteenth section lands executed prior to the adoption of the statute were not granted by the State, but were granted by the school boards and were executed in the name of those boards. The meaning of that provision, under a reasonable construction, is that the supervision of the leases granted 'by the school boards was not given to the Mineral Board as those leases were not per se granted by the State. This being true, it is clear that the legislature did not intend that Act 93 of 1936 should apply to any lands but those covered by Act 30 of the Extra Session of 1915, and the leases referred to in Section 9 are the leases granted by the State in accordance with the act of 1915, Ex.Sess., which is one of the acts expressly repealed by Act 93 of 1936. Section 13 dedicates certain royalties, in addition to the one-eighth royalty on oil and gas and 75 cents per ton on sulphur, to the State University, social security, and servicing of the State debt. Section 14 extends the provisions of the act to public roads', canals of other rights of way and easements, the title to which is in either the State or one of its parishes. It is significant that the framers of the act thought it necessary to specifically refer to that character of property and failed to mention the sixteenth section lands, which are of vital importance to the public schools, if the legislature should have intended that the school lands should fall within the terms of the legislative act. Section 20 requires that all funds derived from mineral leases shall be collected by the Register and deposited in the State treasury to the credit of the general fund. The State Constitution, Sections 14 and 15 of Article 12, specifically and in terms, requires that the proceeds from the sale or lease of sixteenth section lands shall constitute part of the school funds and that those funds must be segregated and kept in separate bank accounts under the control of the parish school boards. Since it can not h" presumed that the legislature would violate a constitutional mandate by misappropriating school funds, it would seem to be clear that the legislature did not intend to do so by enacting the Mineral Board acts. Finally, as we have hereinabove remarked, the repealing clause of the statute, Section 21, expressly repeals certain statutes, which otherwise would have been repealed under the clause providing for the repeal of statutes in conflict therewith, but makes no mention of Section 30 of Act 100 of 1922. This plainly indicates that it was not the legislative intention that Act 93 of 1936 was to be a substitute for Act 100 of 1922. As is well said by the judge of the district court in his reasons for judgment and as hereinabove pointed out, “these Sixteenth Sections have always been considered as a separate and distinct part of the public lands. The machinery set up for the administration of these lands is now and has always been separate and distinct from that set up for the administration of other public lands. To permit Act 100 of 1922 to remain in full force and' effect in no wise interferes with the operation of Act 93 of 1936 or Act 80 of 1938, and in our opinion the Legislature did not intend that the powers vested in the School Boards by Act 100 of 1922 should be taken from them by the general statutes.” The repeal claimed herein, if admitted, would operate to the prejudice of the educational system of the State and the legislative intent to do this should be clear and controlling before it can be held to have that effect. It is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature did not intend such an effect to result from the adoption of the Mineral Board acts. Since we have reached the conclusion that the administration and control vested by Act 100 of 1922 in the defendant school board over the sixteenth section lands involved in this suit was not affected by the adoption of Act 93 of 1936 or Act 80 of 1938, it is unnecessary for us to pass on the several alternative pleas of the defendants. For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

In re Larry Spencer, III; Sysco Corporation; Zurich American Insurance Company; — Defendant(s); Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Bernard, 34th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 119-588; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2014-C-1005. Denied.

O’NIELL, Chief Justice. The relators in this case are fifty electors in the City of Shreveport. They are proceeding by mandamus to compel the mayor and councilmen to take action upon a proposed ordinance, either by adopting it or by submitting it to a vote of the electors of the city, at an election to be-called for the purpose. The mayor and councilmen are appealing from a judgment making the mandamus peremptory. The object of the proposed ordinance is-to regulate and restrict the number of hours the firemen and fire-alarm operators in the city shall be required to be on-active duty, and to provide penalties for violation of the ordinance. The City of Shreveport is governed by Act No. 302 of 1910, which provides a form of government which certain classes of cities may adopt. The statute has been succeeded by Act No. 13 of the Third Extraordinary Session of 1934, having the same object. It is contended by the rela-tors that the City of Shreveport is not subject to the provisions of the act of 1934 because the citizens have not voted to adopt the act; but it is declared in the repealing clause, in section 21, of the act of 1934 that the cities that have adopted the provisions of the act of 1910 shall ■continue to be governed by that act “as modified by this act” — the act of 1934— “and except as otherwise provided herein”. In Section 14 of the act of 1910, and in Section 16 of the act of 1934, it is declared that, if a proposed ordinance is accompanied by a petition signed by a number of electors not less than a third of the number of votes cast for all candidates for mayor in the last preceding general election, and if the sufficiency of the number of petitioners is verified by the certificate of the registrar of voters, the council shall either adopt the ordinance within twenty days or forthwith submit it to a vote of the electors of the city. The petition in this instance was signed by more than the necessary number of electors; and the fact was verified by the certificate of the registrar of voters, as required by the statute. Nevertheless the council refused to adopt the ordinance, and refused to submit it to a vote of the electors. In response to the rule to show cause why the mandamus should not be granted, the mayor and councilmen filed an exception of no cause or right of action, and an answer setting forth in twenty-two numbered articles their reasons for refusing to take action upon the proposed ordinance. The relators then filed a plea which they called a motion to strike out the articles numbered 9 to 22, inclusive, in the defendants’ answer. The judge overruled the defendants’ exception of no cause or right of action, and maintained the relators’ so-called motion to strike out, to the extent of ' ordering articles numbered 13 to 22, inclusive, stricken from the defendants’ answer. The case was heard then on the remaining issues, and resulted in a judgment for the relators. The appellants complain first of the ruling of the judge “striking out” the allegations contained in the last ten articles in their answer; and they cite the case of Babst v. Hartz, 161 La. 427, 108 So. 871, where it was said that it was not permissible for a judge to strike out from any pleading any pertinent matter couched in language not offensive. In that case it was said that if the defense which was set up in the answer to the suit was not sufficient in law, the plaintiffs’ remedy was to take a rule on the defendants for a judgment on the petition and answer, according to the provisions of Act No. 300 of 1914, known as the Pleading and Practice Act. There is no provision in the Pleading and Practice Act, or in the Code of Practice, for such a pleading as a motion to strike out; and our opinion is that the Code of Practice and the Pleading and Practice Act contain everything that is necessary or useful in the regulation of pleading and practice in this State. A better practice, in a case like this, is either to ask for a judgment on the petition and answer or to object to the introduction of evidence in support of any allegation under which the evidence might not be relevant. In that way a record is made of the evidence that is offered, for use in the appellate court in case of an appeal; and nothing is stricken out. It is argued for the relators that the condemning of the motion to strike ■ out, in Babst v. Hartz, had reference only to “pertinent matter” in a defendant’s answer; and it is said that the allegations which were stricken from the defendants’ answer in the present case were not pertinent matter. What the court meant by referring to the allegations as “pertinent matter”, in Babst v. Hartz, was that the allegations were not impertinent, or not foreign to the subject of the lawsuit. It goes without saying that an allegation in the answer to a lawsuit should not be stricken out if evidence to support it would be pertinent or relevant to some issue in the case. The striking out of the last ten of the twenty-two allegations in the defendants' answer in this case did not leave the record in any worse condition than that in which it would be if the relators had bided their time and had objected to the offering of evidence to support the allegations. They are in the record, and they disclose that proof of them would, not be admissible. There is no necessity ior quoting the allegations here. They merely set forth the reasons why the mayor and councilmen deemed it inadvisable, from a standpoint of economy, to adopt the proposed ordinance. That is a question which the council is required by the statute to submit to the electors, in any case where the council does not see fit to adopt the ordinance. A municipal council has no authority to decide the question of wisdom of an initiative ordinance which has been presented properly to' the council. 43 C.J. Sec. 963, p. 592; State ex rel. Fleck v. Dalles City, 72 Or. 337, 143 P. 1127, 1128, Ann.Cas.1916B, 855. In the latter case it was said: “The question of the wisdom of municipal legislation proposed by initiative or of difficulties in its execution does not affect the question of its. validity.” The next complaint of the appellants is made in their exception of no cause or right of action. The exception presents two separate and distinct complaints. The first complaint is that the electors, in their petition to the council to either adopt the ordinance or submit it to a vote of the electors, did not give the street address of each petitioner, or state his age or length of residence in the city. That information was not given as to any of the petition. The petition, however, was supported by the certificate of the registrar of voters, showing that the necessary number of the petitioners were qualified electors in the city. The defendants rely upon Section 8 of Act No. 302 of 1910 and Section 11 of Act No. 13 of the Third Extraordinary Session of 1934, where it is Said: “That petitions provided for in this Act shall be signed by none but qualified electors of the city. Each petition shall contain, in addition to the names of the petitioners, the street and house number in which petitioner resides, whenever practicable, his age, and length of residence in the city.” ' It is declared also in that section of the act of 1934 that the petition shall be accompanied by the certificate of the registrar of voters of the parish, stating that the signers of the petition were at the time of signing qualified electors of the city, and stating the number of such signers, and the fact that they constituted the necessary number of electors, as required by the statute. In the corresponding section — Section 8 — of the act of 1910, the affidavit of one or more of the electors was required, instead of the certificate of the registrar of voters. The relators argue that the petitions that are referred to in Section 8 of the act of 1910 and in Section 11 of the act of 1934 are the petitions of the citizens to adopt the form of government provided for by the act, and not the petitions of electors asking the city council to adopt a proposed ordinance or submit it to a vote of the electors. The argument is supported by the fact that everything in the act of 1910 preceding Section 8, and everything in the act of 1934 preceding Section 11, relates to the method of adopting the form of government provided for in the act. Petitions for the adoption of a proposed ordinance are provided for in Section 14 of the act of 1910 and in Section 16 of the act of 1934; and there is no requirement in either of these sections that the petitioners shall give the street address of each petitioner, or state his age and term of residence in the city. We prefer, however, to rest our ruling on this question upon the idea that, if the information concerning the street address and the age and term of residence of each petitioner is required in a petition for the submission of a proposed ordinance, the information is required primarily if not only as a matter of convenience, to facilitate the checking of the names of the petitioners and to verify the fact that the required number of them are qualified electors. It is not disputed that the petition which was presented to the city council in this instance was signed by the necessary number of qualified electors, as certified by the registrar of voters before the council refused to take action upon the. petition. The refusal was not based upon any defect in the petition, or upon a want of proof that the signers of the petition constituted the required number of qualified electors residing in the city. When the petition was presented first it was not supported by a certificate of the registrar of voters. For that reason the council refused to act upon the petition. The petitioners then obtained the required certificate of the registrar of voters, and their attorney went before the council in open session and again requested the council to adopt the ordinance. In response to the request the mayor informed the attorney for the petitioners that the council would not take any further action on the petition. That fact is admitted in the answer to this suit. If the mayor or any councilman had complained that the petition did not inform him of the street address or of the age or term of residence of each petitioner, at the time when the mayor in the open session of the council informed the attorney for the petitioners that the council would not take any further action on the petition, the petitioners might have supplied the information, — even though it would have served no purpose after the registrar of voters had certified that a sufficient number of the petitioners were qualified electors residing in the city. When the people exercise their reserved power of initiative and referendum they must comply, substantially, with the statutory requirements; but the requirements must be given a reasonable if not liberal construction. Ley v. Dominguez, 212 Cal. 587, 299 P. 713. Our conclusion on this subject is that the defendants’ complaint, being urged for the first time in response to this suit, that the petition asking them to adopt the ordinance did not inform them of the street address or of the age or term of residence of the petitioners, came too late to be of any importance. The other defense urged in the exception of‘no cause or right of action is that the proposed ordinance, if adopted by a vote of the electors, would conflict with the statute on the subject, Act No. 61 of 1920, and therefore would be void. The statute is entitled an act to promote the efficiency of paid fire departments in cities-having 10,000 or more inhabitants, — except New Orleans, — and defining the conditions under which they shall be operated. The plaintiffs contend that the council has no right to contest the validity of the ordinance before the voters have had an opportunity to adopt it. In support of the argument the plaintiffs cite the rule that the courts will not enjoin a municipal council from adopting an ordinance on a subject committed to its jurisdiction. The rule is recognized in 32 C.J. Sec. 412, p. 262, and in Harrison v. City of New Orleans, 33 La.Ann. 222, 39 Am.Rep. 272; and New Orleans Elevated R. Co. v. Mayor and Council of New Orleans, 39 La.Ann. 127, 131, 1 So. 434. The defendants, on the other hand, rely upon the rule that a vote of the people cannot validate an invalid ordinance, and hence that mandamus will not lie to compel a municipal council to submit an invalid ordinance to the voters for their adoption or approval. The rule is sustained by the following authorities: Hyde v. Wilde, 51 Cal.App. 82, 196 P. 118; Myers v. Stringham, 195 Cal. 672, 235 P. 448; State ex rel. Davies v. White, 36 Nev. 334, 136 P. 110, 50 L.R.A.,N.S., 195; McQuillan on Mun.Corp.2d Ed., Sec. 366; 43 C.J. Secs. 951 and 952. It is not necessary to decide in this case whether the municipal council could be compelled by mandamus to submit the proposed ordinance to a vote of the electors if the ordinance would be invalid. We have concluded that the ordinance, if adopted, will not be invalid, or violative of Act No. 61 of 1920. The purpose of the act of 1920, as we have said, is to promote the efficiency of paid fire departments in all cities having 10,000 or-more inhabitants, except New Orleans. Shreveport is in the class of cities to which the statute is applicable. The principal provision in the statute is that it requires the fire departments to be divided into two forces or platoons, — a day force and a night force. The proposed ordinance requires that no member of the uniformed force of the fire department shall be required or permitted to work more than 144 hours in any 1'4-day period, except in an extraordinary emergency, and requires that every employee in the department shall have not less than 15 days leave of absence annually, with full pay. The proposed ordinance requires also that the operators of the alarm system shall not be required or permitted to work more than 8 hours in any 24-hour period, and shall not be required or permitted to work more than 6 8-hour days in any 7-day period, except on the days for changing shift. The provisions of the ordinance go further than the statute requires the city to go in its purpose to promote the efficiency of the fire department; but there is nothing in the ordinance opposed to the provisions of the statute. The only reasonable interpretation of the statute is that it prescribes minimum requirements for promoting the efficiency of fire departments. The State is not concerned otherwise in the matter of regulating the operation of any city’s fire department. A municipality cannot permit by ordinance what a statute forbids, or forbid what a statute expressly permits, but it may supplement a statute or cover any part of an authorized field of local legis lation that is not covered by state legislation. Power v. Nordstrom, 150 Minn. 228, 184 N.W. 967, 18 A.L.R. 733, 738. When the legislature has assumed to regulate a given course of conduct by prohibiting certain local enactments, a municipality with subordinate authority to legislate on the subject may make such new and additional regulations in furtherance of the purpose of the state law as may seem fit and appropriate to the necessities of the locality and be not in themselves unreasonable. Mann v. Scott, 180 Cal. 550, 182 P. 281. An example of this is given in Re Hoffman, 155 Cal. 114, 99 P. 517, 132 Am.St.Rep. 75, where it is suggested that if the state should pass a law fixing the height beyond which it would be unlawful to erect a chimney, no one would doubt that any city in the state and within an earthquake zone might further restrict the height of chimneys within the city. The judgment is affirmed.

HERMANN MOYSE, Judge ad hoc. For the reasons assigned in the opinion this day handed down in the case of Cal Prevost v. Robert H. Smith et al., 197 So. 905, it is ordered that the judgment in favor of the plaintiff be amended by reducing the amount of the award from the sum of $3,500 to $3,000 and that, as thus amended, it be affirmed. The judgment in favor of the Board of Administrators of the Charity Hospital of Louisiana at New Orleans is likewise affirmed. Appellant is to pay all costs. ' LE BLANC and OTT, JJ., concur in the decree. DORE, J., not participating.

OTT, Judge. The plaintiff, Cooper, executed a mortgage in favor of the defendant’ land bank in November, 1922, to secure a loan of $1,200, represented by his note for that amount, payable in 35 annual installments of $78 each, except the last installment which was for $75. The land covered by the mortgage consists of 80 acres with improvements in Tangipahoa Parish. It appears that several installments were paid when, in May, 1930, the first of a series of suits on this loan was filed by the land bank against Cooper for the foreclosure of the mortgage on account of the failure to pay an installment. It appears that this suit was dismissed on the payment of the past due installment. Another suit was filed by the land bank to foreclose the mortgage in February, 1931, and after an effort on the part of said Cooper to enjoin the sale of the mortgaged property, a judgment was rendered in the injunction suit rejecting the demands of Cooper. The foreclosure proceedings were dismissed, however, in October, 1931, on the adjustment of the installments. Another suit was filed to foreclose the mortgage in May, 1935, which suit was likewise compromised and the suit dismissed. No further suit was filed to foreclose the mortgage until February, 1937, when suit No. 7914 was filed to foreclose on an alleged balance due on the mortgage of $1,544.10. As this latter suit plays a considerable part in the decision of the present case, it is necessary to give the substance of the issues raised and decided in this last, suit which will be referred to as 7914. In 7914, the defendant Cooper filed a petition for an injunction to restrain the sale on the ground that the bank was due him for amounts paid and not credited and for certain reports, commissions and dividends due him as the Secretary of the local farm loan association, which sums exceeded the balance due on the mortgage note. In his petition in that suit he alleged that the bank was also due him $229,100, for damages by reason of having been sued four times by the bank, on account of withholding money due him thereby causing him to lose his -credit and good name; in preventing him from developing his farm, sacrificing cattle .and hogs in order to raise money to defend these suits; neglect of the education of his children, loss of property mortgaged to the Southern Homestead Asso- • ciatioTL,' and for embarrassment and humili.ation caused by forcing him to go on relief. He did not pray for a judgment against .the bank in that suit for these fabulous items of damage, but he did reserve his right to sue the bank for these items of damage in a separate suit. The prayer of his petition in suit 7914 was for an injunction to restrain the sale of the property and for judgment against the bank for whatever difference was found to be due him by the bank over and above the balance due on the mortgage. A final judgment was rendered in suit 7914 in February, 1938, dissolving the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which had been issued in the case and rejecting the demands of Cooper. The latter took an appeal to this court and the judgment was affirmed. 183 So.’ 575. The property was again advertised to be sold on March 2, 1940, and on February 23rd, seven or eight days before the sale, the present suit bearing the number 9537 was filed by Cooper asking for an injunction to stop the sale of his property and for damages against the bank. The ground on which the plaintiff Cooper in this suit 9537 sought to enjoin the sale on March 2nd was that the bank owed him for salary and dividends while Secretary-Treasurer of the local farm loan association an amount more than sufficient to pay the balance due on the mortgage. He also set out in his petition his claim for damages exactly as he had stated his claim for damages in suit 7914, wherein he reserved his right to sue for said damages in a separate suit, but has added to his claim for damages in this suit another item of $50,000 because of two more years of mental worry and financial strain, as well as the neglect of his family and his business, resulting from the continued litigation. A rule nisi was issued on this petition against the bank to show cause on February 29, 1940, why a preliminary injunction should not be issued restraining the bank and the sheriff from selling the property. On the return day of the rule, the bank filed an exception of no cause or right of action and a plea of res judicata to the petition for a preliminary injunction. The record in suit 7914 was introduced under the plea of res judicata and this plea was sustained and a judgment was signed on the return day of the rule wherein it was ordered “that the exception of res adjudicata be sustained, and that the rule for a preliminary injunction be denied at the cost of plaintiff in rule.” The plaintiff asked for and was granted an order of appeal from the above judgment on the day of its rendition. The property was sold as advertised on March 2nd, the bank becoming the purchaser. On March 14th following, the bank filed further exceptions and pleas wherein it stated that it had filed exceptions of no right or cause of action and of res judicata in connection with the rule for a preliminary injunction, which resulted in the court’s refusal to grant the preliminary injunction; that the court having disposed of the rule for a preliminary injunction, it (the bank) appeared for the purpose 'of excepting to plaintiff’s petition on account of vagueness and want of compliance with the pleading and practice act; that, in the alternative, the petition sets out no cause or right of action, and for further exception, the bank pleaded res judicata in the former suit 7914. None of these exceptions were passed on by the court, and it is therefore obvious that the case is here on appeal from the judgment which denied the rule for a preliminary injunction by reason of sustaining the plea of res judicata filed against that rule. As the lower court has never passed on any of the exceptions and pleas filed against the petition on the other claims, these exceptions and pleas are not now before us. The effect of denying the preliminary injunction by reason of sustaining the plea of res judicata was tantamount to a denial of any kind of injunctive relief to prevent the sale of the property for the causes set out in the petition; i. e., because the bank owed plaintiff for salary, commissions, etc., an amount more than sufficient to pay the mortgage note. Baton Rouge Production Credit Ass’n v. Newsom, La.App., 191 So. 154. Insofar as the right of plaintiff to enjoin the sale, or to -litigate his claim for salary, commissions, etc., as an off-set to the note is concerned, that question was as effectively decided in denying the preliminary injunction as it would have been had the case been tried on the merits. But as to any ’other claims set up in the petition, the suit is still pending subject to the exceptions and pleas filed by the bank after the judgment on the rule was rendered. The appeal is only devolutive in nature. : The bank has filed a motion in this 'court to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appellant has acquiesced in the judgment by leasing the farm from the bank after its purchase by the bank at sheriff sale. A copy of this lease, dated March 23, 1940, is annexed to the motion. The lease expires Jamtary 1, 1941, and Cooper agrees to pay a rental of $150 and surrender possession of the leased premises at the expiration of the lease. The lease also contains a clause to the effect that the tenant will not attempt to off-set any part of the rent by any amount allegedly due him by the bank. To take away the right of appeal, there must be an unconditional, voluntary, and absolute acquiescence in the judgment on the part of the appellant, who must have intended to acquiesce and abandon his right of appeal. Even though it be claimed and admitted that the appellant concedes the validity of the sheriff sale of the property and the bank’s ownership of it, that fact would not be sufficient to justify a dismissal of the appeal. Acquiescence implies consent; admission does not. There is no consent shown on the part of appellant to abandon or dismiss his appeal by the mere fact that he leased the property which was purchased at the sheriff sale, the prevention of which sale was the object of the suit from the adverse judgment in which the appeal is taken. Appellant in order to keep from being ousted from the property may have been forced to lease it, which fact certainly could not be construed as an abandonment of his appeal by consent and acquiescence. Saunders v. Busch-Everett Co., 138 La. 1049, 71 So. 153; Prentice v. Chewning, 1 Rob. 71. We do not consider that any act has been shown on the part of Cooper that would indicate that he has voluntarily executed the judgment from which he has appealed and which would prevent him from prosecuting his appeal under Article 567 of the Code of Practice. For these reasons, the motion to dismiss the appeal is overruled.

In re Nicholson, Herbert; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. F, No. 479-690; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2011-KA-0883, 2011-K-0681. Granted.

HAMITER, Judge, The plaintiff in this cause, L. F. Taylor, signed and executed an instrument dated April 23, 1930, reading, in so far as is here relevant, as follows: “I acknowledge to owe and that I am indebted unto Shreveport Fert. Works or order, the sum of Seven Hundred Sixty Five Dollars. “For value received and eight per cent interest per annum thereon, from date, interest payable annually, and ten per cent ‘ attorney’s fees on said sum if necessary to collect same by legal process, and all cost. The amount s'tated in this note is due, and I hereby waive citation, time and all legal delays and confess judgment in 'favor of said payee or any legal holder hereof or said amount interest, cost and attorney’s fees, to be incorporated in and form a part of this judgment.” The named payee, on April 25, 1938, instituted suit No. 11,653 on the docket of the District Court of Bienville Parish, seeking recovery under the instrument; and on the following day judgment was rendered in its favor for $765, with interest, attorney’s fees and costs. No citation or other notice of the proceeding was given to the maker. Taylor, in this cause, attacks said judgment on several grounds, and prays that its nullity be decreed. The answer of defendant avers that it is valid and legal in all .respects. The district judge heard testimony on the issues presented, and granted the relief sought by the plaintiff herein. In other words, the judgment of the former suit was declared to be null and void, and it was ordered cancelled from the records of Bienville Parish, Louisiana. Defendant appealed. The ruling, we think, was correct. The ’ evidence conclusively shows that the confession of judgment note, dated April 23, 1930, and which formed the basis of the attacked decree, was given by Taylor for fertilizer to be delivered to him thereafter, or throughout the spring of 1930, as needed. The obligation was not payable until the fall of that year after the harvesting of the crops. Article 7, Section 44 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, provides that, “Service of citation shall not be waived, nor judgment confessed, prior to the maturity of the obligation sued on,' except for the purpose of executory process; provided, this prohibition shall not apply to contracts by authentic acts passed prior tf> the adoption of this Constitution.” Taylor’s act of waiving service of citation and of confessing judgment with respect to that unmatured obligation, was clearly violative of the quoted constitutional provision; and the instrument was, therefore, null and void. Counsel for defendant argue in their brief that the testimony offered in proof of the maturity of the debt was improperly admitted by the district court, be-cause the petition contained no allegations of error or fraud respecting the signing of the note. In our opinion it was unnecessary that such allegations be made. The instrument itself was an absolute nullity, having been executed and given in contravention of a prohibitory law. The case of Phillips v. Bryan, 172 La. 269, 134 So. 88, is directly in point, involves a similar note, and sustains our above announced position. The judgment is affirmed.

In re Griffin, Frank; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Tangipahoa, 21st Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 81307; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 2127. Denied. See State v. Tate, 12-2763 (La.11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829, cert. denied, Tate v. Louisiana, — U.S.—, 134 S.Ct. 2663,189 L.Ed.2d 214 (2014). WEIMER, J., recused.

In re Perkins, Steve; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. L, No. 01-75-5676; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 2128. Denied. See State v. Tate, 12-2763 (La.11/5/13), 130 So.3d 829, cert. denied, Tate v. Louisiana, — U.S.—, 134 S.Ct. 2663,189 L.Ed.2d 214 (2014).

PONDER, Justice. This is a suit to set aside a mineral lease and a mineral deed on the grounds of fraud and on the further grounds of inadequacy of consideration. The plaintiff, Sue Galighan Aaron Mi-zer, is the owner of an undivided 1/2 interest in 8% acres of land, and the owner of an undivided 1/8 interest in 9 acres of land, more or less, in the Eola ‘oil field, Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana. On July 26, 1939, the plaintiff executed a mineral deed conveying to Samuel J. Ten-nant, Jr., the defendant, 1/16 of her in-rerest in the minerals and a mineral lease covering her entire interests in the lands. The consideration recited in each of these instruments was $100 cash and other valuable consideration. On this same date, the plaintiff executed a power of attorney to the defendant authorizing him to institute and conduct such proceedings as necessary to gain possession of the property and vindicate her title thereto. In this power of attorney the plaintiff conveyed to the defendant a 1/16 of her mineral rights and a mineral lease on her entire interest in the property. It was recited in this instrument that the defendant agreed to institute all legal proceedings necessary to vindicate title and gain possession of the property at defendant’s cost. On January 27, one day after the plaintiff had executed the aforementioned instruments, the plaintiff executed a mineral lease to W. D. Hays, Jr., covering her interest in the entire property. One day thereafter, on January 28, 1939, the plaintiff instituted this suit seeking to cancel and set aside the defendant’s mineral lease and mineral deed on the grounds that it had been obtained from her through fraud, and on the further ground that the consideration given was inadequate. The defend ant denied that the lease and deed were obtained through fraud, and denied that the consideration was inadequate. Further answering, the defendant averred that he was an attorney at law and that the plaintiff had secured his services as an attorney to investigate the conditions of the titles to the property and take whatever legal steps necessary to vindicate the plaintiff’s title and gain possession of the property. It is alleged that in consideration of the services rendered ■and to be rendered that the defendant was to have the mineral lease and the mineral interest as payment for his services. Upon these issues the cause was tried and the lower court rendered judgment annulling and setting aside the lease and the-deed, and awarded the defendant the entire 1/8 royalty in the minerals based on the plaintiff’s undivided interest. From this judgment defendant has appealed. The plaintiff. has answered the appeal and asked that the judgment be amended by disallowing the defendant the 1/8 royalty interest and as amended that- the judgment be affirmed. From our examination of the record we find that eight witnesses testified on behalf of the plaintiff. Four witnesses testified as to the value of the property. Two other witnesses did not know inything about the transaction. The only witnesses offered by the plaintiff to prove .what transpired at the time of the transaction was the plaintiff and Sarah Wade. While the plaintiff’s testimony is to the effect that she did not understand the transaction and did not understand the purport of the instruments when she signed them, yet she admits in her testimony that 'her stepson, issue of a prior marriage of her deceased husband, was ’in possession of the property and claimed to be the owner of it. It appears that she went out and secured witnesses to come to her place to witness the instruments. It also appears that this property was acquired by her deceased husband during his life-time, while she was living with him. There was no issue of the marriage of plaintiff and her deceased husband. Her deceased husband was father of several children, issue of -a former marriage, who owned an undivided interest in the land. One of her stepsons ha,s had possession of the property for a number of years, during which time the plaintiff has never received any rent from it. The plaintiff at present is paying rent on another piece of property where she is now living. This testimony corroborates the testimony of the defendant and the recitals in the instrument to the effect that it was necessary to take some legál proceedings to vindicate the plaintiff’s title and secure possession of the property. The testimony of Sarah Wade is more favorable to the defendant than to the plaintiff. The defendant’s testimony is to the effect that the plaintiff understood the entire transaction and that he thoroughly explained the instruments to her before she signed them. He also testified that she was very elated over the transaction. His testimony is corroborated by that of Donald Madden, a witness to the transaction. Sarah Wade, the witness for the plaintiff, corroborates the defendant’s testimony to the effect that the plaintiff was highly elated at the time, of the transaction and shortly thereafter. After carefully considering all the testimony in this case, we are of the opinion that the disputed instruments were not obtained through fraud and that no undue advantage was taken of the plaintiff. The case cited by the plaintiff, Logan v. Walker, 152 La. 880, 94. So. 430, is not applicable because the facts in this case are entirely different. From analysis of the plaintiff’s testimony, it appears that the subsequent lease holder prompted this suit and that he in fact is conducting it. It appears from the testimony in this case that the cash consideration of $100 called for in the deed and in the lease was never paid and that the only amount paid the plaintiff was $10. The three instruments, the lease, the deed, and the power of attorney, coupled with a transfer of mineral interest and lease, were executed simultaneously and constitute one transaction. The entire transaction involved the employment of the defendant to gain possession of the property and to vindicate the title thereto. Such being the case the instruments must be construed together. While the consideration of $100 expressed in the deed and the lease was not paid, yet the evidence shows that there was a true and sufficient consideration, the securing of the defendant’s services to gain. possession of the property and vindicate the title thereto. Ar-tide 1900, R.C.C. From the testimony in this case it appears that property in this locality is worth' between $1,500 and $2,000 an acre. Based on these figures the plaintiff’s undivided % interest in the 8% acre tract is worth between $750 and $1,000 an acre, and the plaintiff’s 1/8 undivided interest in the 9 acres would be worth approximately $200 to $300 an acre. Under the express provisions of Act 124 of 1906, the defendant was within his rights in acquiring an interest in the subject matter of a proposed suit or claim by written contract with his client to compensate him for his employment to gain possession of the property and vindicate the title thereto. Even prior to ■the adoption of Act 124 of 1906 it was permissible for an attorney at law to enter into a contract of this nature with his client for the payment of his fee conditioned on his success in recovering property or collecting a claim. A deed executed by a client to his attorney conveying to him an interest" in the subject matter of the proposed suit is permissible independently of Act 124 of 1906. This court having so recently reviewed this subject matter in the case of Hope v. Madison, 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666, it could serve no useful purpose to again review the prior jurisprudence touching on this question other than make reference to this recent decision. For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and set aside and the plaintiff’s demands are rejected at her cost. LAND, J., absent.

DREW, Judge. This is a suit which was filed in torma pauperis. The testimony was taken down by the court reporter but was not transcribed, and is therefore not in the record. The lower court decided the case without the transcribed evidence having been filed and plaintiff, whose demands were rejected, has perfected an appeal to this court. Plaintiff has appeared here and filed a motion to remand the case. The motion is as follows: “Now into this Honorable Court comes Harmon H. Kilcrease, plaintiff-appellant in the above entitled and numbered cause appearing herein solely for the purpose of this motion to remand, and says: “1. That this case was tried in the Honorable City Court for the City of Monroe; that the amount prayed for was $499.00; that the said City Court was sitting as a Court of Record and that the Honorable Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit for Louisiana, has appellate jurisdiction over the said City Court in this said case; “2. That this case resulted in a judg- . ment in defendant’s favor rejecting plaintiff’s demands; that plaintiff perfected a devolutive appeal to the Honorable Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit from this judgment; “3. That the record of this, case was lodged in the Court of Appeal before the return date fixed by the Court; “4. Appearer avers that when this mat-, ter came on for trial in the City Court, F. O. Browning was appointed as court reporter to take the evidence in the case; that this is a pauper case, that is, it was filed under the provisions of the Louisiana statute, relative to suits in forma pauperis; that upon learning this, the said court reporter refused to take the evidence unless someone of responsibility guaranteed the payment of his charges; that, thereupon, counsel for defendant made some arrangement with said court reporter and the case proceeded and the evidence was taken in shorthand. “5. That the case was decided by the City Court without the benefit of a note of, evidence. “6. Appearer avers that he has just learned, through his attorney, that the said court reporter has never transcribed his shorthand notes and that the record in this case was lodged in the Court of Appeal without the note of evidence; that appear-er is informed and believes, and so believing avers that the court reporter has refused to transcribe his shorthand notes and deliver a note of evidence to this Honorable Court until he is paid for his services. “7. Appearer avers that it is the duty of the Clerk of the City Court of Monroe to lodge in this Honorable Court a complete transcript of this case, including a note of evidence; that it was the duty of the City Court to supply a court reporter who could and would take and transcribe this note of evidence. “8. Appearer avers that he is entitled to have.his case heard and decided by the Court of Appeal and that this Court cannot decide the case unless the record is complete; that appearer is entitled to have this case remanded by your Honorable Court to the City Court of Monroe with instructions to the Clerk of Court to complete the record in this case by inserting the note of evidence, and to return the same to this Honorable Court so that this case may be refixed for argument; that a time should be fixed within which the Clerk shall complete the record and return same to this Honorable Court. “9. That this case has been fixed on the docket of the Court of Appeals for argument on Wednesday, November 8, 1939; that this should be upset and continued until the time when the complete record is returned to this Court.” That part of the motion relating to the case being remanded is well founded. Articles 549 and 552 of the Code of Practice and Act No. 203 of 1898 make the plaintiff primarily bound for all costs until defendant is cast in judgment. Crespo v. Viola, 152 La. 1088, 95 So. 256. Act No. 156 of 1912, commonly designated as the Pauper’s Act, relieves an impecunious litigant from the payment of costs as it accrues, but in doing so does not deprive him of any right granted to other and more fortunate litigants who are financially able to pay costs. Under the law, plaintiff was entitled to have the testimony in this case taken down by a court reporter. That was done. He is also entitled to have the testimony transcribed and filed in the record. However, this is not the proper court in which plaintiff should seek this relief. The court of original jurisdiction is the correct one. We conclude, therefore, that the case should be remanded to the lower court in order that plaintiff may take the proper steps to complete the record, and if and when this is done,- the case be returned to this court for hearing.

O’NIELL, Chief Justice. This case and the case No. 35821, 197 So. 419, having the same title, and decided today, are companion cases. In this case the defendant was charged in three counts in a bill of information with the crime called misprision of felony. The statute which denounces the crime and on which the bill of information is founded is Section 856 of the Revised Statutes, which provides: “Sec. 856. If any person having knowledge of the commission of any crime punishable with death, or imprisonment at hard labor, shall conceal and not disclose if to some committing magistrate or district attorney, on conviction he shall be fined not exceeding three hundred dollars, and imprisoned at hard labor or otherwise not exceeding twelve months, at the discretion of the court.’’ In the first count in the bill of information the defendant was accused of having knowledge of and concealing and not disclosing the commission of a felony in Grant Parish, in which this defendant is being prosecuted. In the second and third count he was accused of having knowledge of and concealing and not disclosing the commission of a felony in Caddo Parish. The defendant in this case filed a motion to quash the bill of information on the ground that it was not alleged that the commission of the felonies referred to was not known by any committing magistrate or by the district attorney, or by any. officer having authority to institute a prosecution. And the defendant moved to quash the second and third count in the bill of information on the further ground that the venue for this prosecution was in Caddo Parish, where the felonies which were alleged to have been concealed were alleged to have been committed.. The judge overruled the motion to quash the first count and quashed the two other counts. The State is appealing from the ruling quashing the two counts. The question whether the judge was right or wrong in refusing to quash the first count in the bill of information is not before us now, because the defendant has • not yet been tried. The ruling complained of by the district attorney is supported by the decision rendered in State v. Graham, 190 La. 669, 182 So. 711, 714. In that case it was held that the defendant was not subject to prosecution in Louisiana for having knowledge of and concealing and not disclosing, in this State, the commission of a murder that was alleged to have been committed in Mississippi. On the same principle, the venue for a prosecution for the crime of having knowledge of the commission of a felony and concealing and not disclosing it to some committing magistrate or district attorney is in the parish in which the felony is alleged to have been committed. If it were not so the person having such knowledge and failing to disclose it would be subject to prosecution in any and every parish in which he might happen to go while having and concealing his knowledge of the commission of the felony. The Constitution, in Article I, Section 9, requires that all trials shall take place in the parish in which the offense was committed. Hence the decision in the Graham case is as appropriate to this case as if the decision had had reference to two parishes, instead of having reference to two states. Here is what was said in the Graham case: “Referring now to the bill of information in which the defendant is accused of misprision of felony, our opinion is that Section 856 of the Revised Statutes, which defines and denounces misprision of felony, —and on which this bill of information is founded,- — has reference only to a concealment and failure to disclose the commission of a felony that was committed in Louisiana. The question whether a prosecution for misprision of felony may be instituted in a State other than the State in which the felony itself was committed never has been decided by this court, or by any other State court, as far as our research shows. The reason for the scarcity of judicial decisions on the subject of misprision of felony is that prosecutions for the offense have become almost obsolete. In Wharton’s Criminal Law, 12th Edition, Vol. 1, p. 376, Sec. 289, it is said: ‘Misprision, as a substantive offense, however, is practically obsolete.’ The reason for that is that, in the modern acceptation of the term, misprision of felony is almost if not identically the same offense as that of an accessory after the fact. The federal statute on the subject is Section 146 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C.A. § 251, which' was originally enacted April 30, 1790 (i Stat. 113, § 6), R.S.U.S. § 5390, and is very similar to Section 856 of the Revised Statutes of Louisiana. In the case of Bratton v. United States, 73 F.2d 795, the Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, made this observation (page 797) : ‘Section 146 was enacted April 30, 1790 (1 Stat. 113, § 6), and as far as the researches of court and counsel disclose, has been before the courts but twice in the 144 years of its life.’ The decision in Bratton v. United States, supra, is authority for the proposition that the venue of the offense of misprision of felony, or. concealment and failure to disclose the commission of a felony, is the place where the disclosure or report should be made; which we understand to mean the place where the felony was committed. On that subject the court said: . “ ‘As far as the failure to disclose to federal authority is concerned, the venue Is the plade where the report should have been made. Rumely v. McCarthy, 250 U.S. 283, 39 S.Ct. 483, 63 L.Ed. 983; United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 36 S.Ct. 508, 60 L.Ed. 897; United States v. Commerford [2 Cir.], 64 F.2d 28.’ ” The district attorney in his brief quotes from the opinion in United States v. Angeline Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 77, 78, 36 S.Ct. 508, 510, 60 L.Ed. 897, 898, the following paragraph, which is to some extent appropriate to this case, viz.: “It may be that where there is a gen-' erál duty it may be considered as insistent both where the ‘actor’ is and the ‘subject’ is, to borrow the government’s apt designations, as in the case of the duty of a father to -support his children; and if the duty' have criminal sanction, it may be enforced in either place. The principle is not applicable where there is a place explicitly designated by law, as in § 6.” [This reference to § 6 means section 6 of the “white slave traffic act”, 36 Stat, at L. 826, chap. 395, 18 U.S.C.A. § 402, requiring the filing of certain statements with the Commissioner General of Immigration, whose office is by law established at Washington, D. C.] Apropos the illustration, “as in the case of the duty of a father to support his children”, the venue for a prosecution for a violation of Act No. 34 of 1902 by neglect of a husband to supporf his wife, or by neglect of a father to support his child, is at the domicile of the husband or father; as the case may be, even though the wife or child may be elsewhere, the reason for the rule being that it is at the domicile of the husband or father that he owes the duty of supporting his wife and child. State v. Baurens, 117 La. 136, 41 So. 442; State v. Fick, 140 La. 1063, 74 So. 554; State v. Smith, 145 La. 913, 83 So. 189; State v. Morel, 146 La. 6, 83 So. 318; State v. Hopkins, 171 La. 919, 132 So. 501. The venue for the prosecution for any crime that consists of a failure to perform a duty imposed by law is in the place where the duty should be performed, unless there is a statute fixing the venue elsewhere. In a case of embezzlement of property received in trust in the parish in which it is to -be returned, but disposed of in another parish, the venue • is in the parish in which the property was to be returned. State v. Reonnals, 14 La.Ann. 278; State v. Sullivan, 49 La.Ann. 197, 21 So. 688, 62 Am.St. 644. And so, in a case of misprision of felony, the place where the person having knowledge of the commission of the felony is obliged to “disclose it to some committing magistrate or district attorney” is in the parish where the felony was committed, because in that parish only may the felon be prosecuted. The judgment appealed from is affirmed.

In re Haymer, Niles B.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. M, No. 575,-924; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 CA 2256. Denied.

In re Deventer M.D., Paul Van; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. F, No. 2013-11671; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CA 0157. Denied. HUGHES, J, recused.

PAUL A. BONIN, Judge. |2Mace Scott, an emergency room physician, sued Kamran Zaherí, another emergency room physician, because Dr. Scott came to believe that Dr. Zaherí published four anonymous defamatory letters about him over a three year period. The first three of the four letters were published more than one year before Dr. Scott filed his suit on February 14, 2018. Dr. Zaherí filed an exception of prescription regarding the first three letters and exceptions of no cause and of no right of action regarding the fourth letter. Rejecting Dr. Scott’s contention that the four letters constituted a continuous tort, the trial judge concluded that the publication of each of the four letters gave rise to discrete causes of action and thus the causes of action arising out of the three letters published more than one year before the filing of the lawsuit were prescribed by the expiration of more than one year due to the inaction of Dr. Scott. With respect to the fourth publication, while finding that Dr. Scott had stated a cause of action for defamation and intentional infliction of mental distress, the trial judge nonetheless sustained the exception of no cause of action in part to dismiss Dr. Scott’s claims for intentional and/or negligent interference with a contract, ^negligent infliction of emotional distress, and fraud. Dr. Scott now seeks our review of the trial judge’s rulings. We agree with the trial judge that the publication of the four letters does not constitute a continuing tort and that the causes of action arising from the publications of the first three anonymous letters are prescribed on the face of the petition. And thus the trial judge correctly sustained the exception of prescription. But because Dr. Scott argued to the trial judge that the softening doctrine of contra non valentem applies, we conclude that the trial judge was required to afford Dr. Scott time within which to amend his petition in order to plead facts to support the application of contra non valentem and thereby prove that the one-year prescriptive period was tolled until the discovery by Dr. Scott of the identity of the anonymous letter-writer. We therefore amend the judgment insofar as it sustained the exception of prescription in order to allow time for Dr. Scott to amend his petition. And we affirm that part of the judgment as amended and remand with instructions. We disagree, however, with the trial judge’s ruling granting a partial exception of no cause of action because our law has long disfavored the granting of partial exceptions of no cause of action. See Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, 616 So.2d 1234,1239 (La.1993). We thus reverse that part of the trial court’s judgment. |4We turn now to explain our decision in detail. I We begin with a brief description of this matter’s factual and procedural history. Between September 2010 and May 2011, Dr. Scott, a physician working at Touro Infirmary’s emergency room, was the subject of three defamatory letters addressed to Touro by an anonymous writer. The letters accused Dr. Scott of various acts of medical malpractice, professional malfeasance, personal negligence, sexual misconduct, and criminal behavior. Although Touro’s internal investigation into the letters’ allegations exonerated Dr. Scott, he resigned from Touro in January 2012. In February 2012, Southern Emergency Medicine, LLC, whose sole member is Dr. Scott, was awarded the emergency room operation contract from St. Bernard Parish Hospital. Dr. Scott began working at St. Bernard’s emergency room shortly thereafter. In October 2012, the hospital, in addition to several other individuals in St. Bernard Parish, received a fourth anonymous letter which contained additional defamatory comments and attached the prior three defamatory letters which had been addressed to Touro. Dr. Scott alleges that he acquired sufficient information after the fourth letter’s receipt to | sindícate that Dr. Zaherí, a former coworker at Touro’s emergency room, was the letters’ anonymous author. Dr. Scott and Southern Emergency Medicine subsequently filed suit on February 14, 2013, against Dr. Zaherí requesting damages for defamation, fraud, intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional and/or negligent interference with a contract. Dr. Zaherí responded to the suit by filing an answer, as well as exceptions of prescription, no cause of action, and no right of action on June 3, 2013. Dr. Za-heri’s exception of prescription argued that Dr. Scott’s claims for defamation with respect to the anonymous letters addressed to Touro were prescribed because defamation is a tort subject to a one-year prescriptive period and the letters’ publications to Touro in 2010 and 2011 occurred more than one year before the February 14, 2013 filing of Dr. Scott’s petition for damages. Dr. Zaheri’s exception of no right of action asked the trial court to dismiss Dr. Scott’s claims for intentional and/or negligent interference with a contract with Tou-ro because neither Southern Emergency nor Dr. Scott had a contract with Touro. Lastly, Dr. Zaheri’s exception of no cause of action asserted that the Dr. Scott’s claims for fraud, intentional and/or negligent interference with a contract, and intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotion distress should be dismissed because the petition fails to properly plead these causes of action. Dr. Scott filed an opposition memorandum and the parties argued the merits of Dr. Zaheri’s exceptions before the trial judge on August 23, 2013. The trial _yudge took the matter under advisement, and subsequently issued a written judgment, and reasons for judgment, on March 7, 2014. Specifically, the trial judge sustained Dr. Zaheri’s exception of prescription and dismissed with prejudice “all delictual claims arising from the letters allegedly sent by Dr. Zaherí to individuals and groups affiliated with Touro Infirmary in or around September 2010, February 2011, and May 2011.” Further, the trial judge sustained Dr. Zaheri’s exception of no right of action with respect to Dr. Scott’s claims for fraud, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional and/or negligent interference with the Touro contract. Conversely, the trial judge overruled Dr. Zaheri’s exception of no cause of action with respect to Dr. Scott’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and overruled as moot Dr. Zaheri’s exception of no-right of action. The trial judge certified the judgment as final and appealable on May 9, 2014, in response to a motion filed by Dr. Scott who subsequently sought timely appellate review. See La. C.C.P. art. 1915 B. On appeal, Dr. Scott challenges the trial judge’s granting of Dr. Zaheri’s exceptions of prescription and partial no cause of action. Dr. Scott, specifically, argues that the exception of prescription was improperly sustained because the continuing tort doctrine applies to the facts of this case and serves to prevent the running of prescription. Dr. Scott also argues that the doctrine of contra non valentem applies to the facts of his case and that this |7Court should remand this matter to the trial court so that he can amend his petition to plead this doctrine. Lastly, Dr. Scott argues that the judgment sustaining Dr. Za-heri’s partial exception of no cause of action should be reversed on the grounds that Louisiana law has long disfavored the granting of partial exceptions of no cause of action. See Everything on Wheels Subaru, supra. II We summarize now the well-established decisional rules applicable to exceptions of prescription and of no cause of action. A “Prescription must be pleaded. Courts may not supply a plea of prescription.” La. Civil Code art. 3452. See also La. C.C.P. art. 927 B (“The court may not supply the objection of prescription, which shall be specially pleaded.”). Prescription is an objection raised by peremptory exception. See La. C.C.P. art. 927 A(1). Like other peremptory exceptions, a defendant may raise the exception of prescription in the trial court at any time prior to the matter’s submission after trial. La. C.C.P. arts. 927 and 928(B). La. C.C.P. art. 929 provides that when a peremptory exception is pled prior to trial, the exception is tried and disposed of in advance of or on the trial of the case. Ordinarily, the exceptor bears the burden of proof at the trial of the peremp tory exception. See Spott v. Otis Elevator Co., 601 So.2d 1355, 1361 (La.1992). If prescription is evident on the face of the pleadings, however, the burden j «shifts to the plaintiff to show that the action has not prescribed. See Williams v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 611 So.2d 1383, 1386 (La.1993). The trial court is not bound to accept as true the allegations of a plaintiffs petition in its trial of the peremptory exception. See Bowers v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 95-2530 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/29/96); 694 So.2d 967, 972. Evidence may be introduced at the trial of all peremptory exceptions, except the objection of no cause of action. See La. C.C.P. art. 931. A judgment granting a peremptory exception is generally reviewed de novo, because the exception raises a legal question. See Metairie III v. Poche’ Const., Inc., 10-0353, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/29/10); 49 So.3d 446, 449. When evidence is introduced and evaluated at the trial of a peremptory exception, we must review the entire record to determine whether the trial court manifestly erred with its factual conclusions. See Davis v. Hibernia Nat. Bank, 98-1164 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/24/99); 732 So.2d 61, 63. The standard of review of a trial court’s finding of facts supporting prescription is that the appellate court should not disturb the finding of the trial court unless it is clearly wrong. See In re Medical Review Proceedings of Ivon, 01-1296, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/13/02); 813 So.2d 532, 536. The standard controlling our review of a peremptory exception of prescription also requires that we strictly construe the statutes against prescription and in favor of the claim that is said to be extinguished. See Proctor’s Landing Property Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Leopold, 11-0668, p. 10 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/30/12); 83 So.3d 1199, 1206; Bosarge v. DePaul/Tulane Behavioral Health Center, 09-1345, p. 2 (La.App.9 4 Cir. 5/19/10); 39 So.3d 790, 792. Nevertheless, the courts of this state have held “that where the plaintiff has raised allegations in an argument which might be sufficient to overcome a peremptory exception of prescription, he should be allowed time to amend his petition to assert such allegations, even though the claim asserted in the original petition is prescribed on its face.” Whitnell v. Menville, 540 So.2d 304, 309 (La.1989), discussing La. C.C.P. art. 934. B Whether a petition states a cause of action is raised by the peremptory exception of no cause of action. See La. C.C.P. art. 927 A(5). An exception of no cause of action questions whether the law extends a remedy against the defendant to anyone under the factual allegations of the petition. See Needom v. Robein, 08-0318, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/18/09); 7 So.3d 30, 34. “No evidence may be introduced at any time to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action.” La. C.C.P. art. 931. The exception is triable on the face of the petition and, to determine the issues raised by the exception, the well-pleaded facts of the petition must be accepted as true. See Joubert v. City of New Orleans, Office of Safety & Permits, 09-0601, p. 7 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/13/10); 30 So.3d 186, 191. “When the grounds of the objection pleaded by the peremptory exception may be removed by amendment of the petition, the judgment sustaining the exception shall order such amendment within the delay allowed by the court.” See La. C.C.P. art. 934. However, if “the grounds of the objection raised through |inthe exception cannot be so removed, or if the plaintiff fails to comply with the order to amend, the action, claim, demand, issue, or theory shall be dismissed.” Id. Ill We first address Dr. Scott’s two challenges to that portion of the judgment which granted Dr. Zaheri’s exception of prescription and dismissed all claims stemming from the three 2010 and 2011 publications to Touro officials. At the outset, we note that the trial judge properly granted Dr. Zaheri’s exception of prescription with respect to these publications. No evidence was introduced into the record either in support, or contravention, of this exception. The exception, therefore, was tried solely on the face of Dr. Scott’s petition, which advanced six causes of action: 1) defamation; 2) fraud; 3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; 4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; 5) intentional interference with contractual relations; and 6) negligent interference with contractual relations. These causes of action are, unquestionably, tort-based or delictual, and thus subject to one-year prescriptive periods. Simply put, the trial judge concluded correctly that any tort-based, or delictual, causes of action which flowed from the three publications that occurred between September 2010 and May 2011 would have prescribed by the time Dr. Scott filed his petition on February 14, 2013. |T1But Dr. Scott argues that the harsh effects of prescription should be softened in his case by the application of either the continuing tort doctrine — which would prevent the running of prescription until the publication of the last anonymous letter in October 2012 — or contra non valentón— which would serve to interrupt prescription until Dr. Scott discovered the identity of the letter-writer — to the facts of this case. We address each argument in turn. A First, Dr. Scott argues that the continuing tort doctrine applies to this case, thus preventing the running of prescription on his claims until the last anonymous letter was sent in October 2012. We disagree. When damaging conduct is of a continuous nature, prescription does not begin to run until the date of the last harmful act. See South Central Bell v. Texaco, 418 So.2d 531 (La.1982). This continuing-tort doctrine, however, requires not only that the tortious conduct be of a continuing nature, but also that it give rise to successive damages from day to day. South Central Bell, 418 So.2d at 533 (“Where the cause of the injury is a continuous one giving rise to successive damages, prescription dates from cessation of the wrongful conduct causing damage.”). Typically, courts have found torts to be continuous in nature where each individual act would not necessarily give rise to a cause of action; but instead, the cumulative effect of regularly-occurring or continuous actions results in successive damages from day to day. See, e.g., Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So.2d 532 (La.1992); South Central Bell, supra. | 12To the extent the plaintiff claims that the damage he suffered as a result of the successive publications is continuing, we find the law is clear that the allegations of the plaintiffs petition cannot constitute a continuing tort. In Crump v. Sabine River Authority, 98-2326, p. 7 (La.6/29/99); 737 So.2d 720, 726, the Supreme Court noted that “the theory of continuing tort has its roots in property damage cases and requires that the operating cause of the injury be a continuous one which results in continuous damages.” The Supreme Court has held that “[a] continuing tort is occasioned by continual unlawful acts and for there to be a continuing tort there must be a continuing duty owed to the plaintiff and a continuing breach of that duty by the defendant.” Crump, 98-2326, p. 10, 737 So.2d at 728. The inquiry as to whether there is continuous tortious conduct “is essentially a conduct-based one, asking whether the tortfeasor perpetuates the injury through overt, persistent, and ongoing acts.” Hogg v. Chevron USA Inc., 09-2632, p. 16 (La.7/6/10), 45 So.3d 991, 1003. In Hogg, the Supreme Court indicated that “courts look[ ] to the alleged injury-producing conduct of the tortfeasors to determine whether that conduct was perpetuated through overt, persistent, and ongoing acts.” 09-2632, p. 21, 45 So.3d at 1005. Summarizing the jurisprudence, the Supreme Court concluded that in cases where “the wrongful conduct was completed, but the plaintiff continued to experience injury in the absence of any further activity by the tort-feasor, no continuing tort was found.” Id. 11sWe find that the operating cause of the injuries claimed in the petition here was the publication of the anonymous letters in September 2010, February 2011, May 2011, and October 2012. Although it pleads the applicability of the continuing tort doctrine, the petition does not claim that there have been continual or ongoing unlawful acts; instead, the petition asserts several distinct tortious publications, which ceased as of the final publication in October 2012. But Dr. Scott cites, in support of his argument, to several cases where the continuing tort doctrine has been applied to workplace harassment cases for the proposition that defamatory, harassing conduct can constitute a continuing tort. See, e.g., Bustamento, supra; King v. Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P., 98-1805 (La.6/4/99); 743 So.2d 181. These opinions, however, are inappo-site to the present matter. In Dr. Scott’s case, the alleged publications are clearly separate and distinct, with particular damages flowing from each individual publication. See Neyrey, supra. Even though the four publications share similarities, they are not continuous or systematic acts of abuse. We conclude that the trial judge did not error when he concluded that the facts as pled in Dr. Scott’s petition do not rise to the level of a continuing tort. B Next, Dr. Scott argues that the portion of the judgment granting Dr. Za-heri’s exception of prescription should be reversed in light of the softening doctrine of contra non valentem. Alternatively, Dr. Scott argues that the portion of the | j Judgment granting Dr. Zaheri’s exception of prescription should be vacated, and this matter remanded so that he can attempt to amend his petition and plead contra non valentem. Here, Dr. Scott has failed to formally plead the doctrine before the trial court. Generally, issues not raised in the trial court will not be given consideration for the first time on appeal. See Rule 1-3, Uniform Rules-Courts of Appeal. Therefore, we will not consider as error the trial judge’s refusal to deny Dr. Zaheri’s exception of prescription on the grounds of contra non valentem. Our conclusion, nevertheless, does not require dismissal of Dr. Scott’s claims for damages arising out of the three 2010 and 2011 publications to Touro officials. Code of Civil Procedure art. 934, as noted, provides that a judgment sustaining a peremptory exception shall provide the losing party with an opportunity to amend their petition if the grounds of the objection pleaded by the exception could be removed by amendment of the petition. As the Supreme Court noted in Whitnell, Article 934 “has been liberally applied in cases involving prescription.” 540 So.2d at 309. In numerous cases, Louisiana courts of appeal have held that “where the plaintiff has raised allegations in argument which might be sufficient to overcome a peremptory exception of prescription, he should be allowed time to amend his petition to assert such allegations, even though the claim asserted in the original petition is prescribed on its face.” Id. As the | ^Supreme Court observed, this “rule recognizes this state’s liberal approach toward allowing amended pleadings, and promotes the interests of justice.” Id. “While it is not necessary to allow plaintiff time to amend if he cannot even point out possible grounds sufficient to overcome the exception, a court may allow time to amend if the new allegations raise the possibility that the claim is not prescribed, even if the ultimate outcome of the prescription issue, once the petition is amended, is uncertain.” Whitnell, 540 So.2d at 309. Therefore, unless a court can determine in advance of an amendment that any new allegation could have no effect on the prescription issue, an opportunity to amend should be allowed. Id. Here, Dr. Scott seeks to amend his petition to plead the doctrine of contra non valentem. Louisiana jurisprudence has long recognized this doctrine as a means of suspending the running of prescription when the circumstances of a case fall within one of four categories. See Albe v. City of New Orleans, 14-0186, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/17/14); 150 So.3d 361, 364-64; Frank L. Maraist and Thomas C. Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law § 10-4(b), 222 (1996). Dr. Scott asserts only one of these four categories: where the obligor himself has done some act effectually to prevent the obligee from availing himself of his cause of action. In light of this category of contra non valentem, and Dr. Scott’s allegation that Dr. |1fiZaheri authored the defamatory letters anonymous^ ly, we cannot say that any new allegation along these lines could have no effect on the prescription issue. We, accordingly, affirm the trial court’s sustaining of Dr. Zaheri’s exception of prescription • but amend the judgment to allow Dr. Scott on remand the opportunity to amend his petition to plead facts which establish the applicability of the doctrine of contra non valentem. IV We next address Dr. Scott’s challenge to that portion of the judgment which sustained in part Dr. Zaheri’s exception of no cause of action with respect to Dr. Scott’s claims for fraud, tortious interference with his contractual relationship ■with St. Bernard Parish Hospital, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Dr. Scott, among other things, asserts that the judgment on this point is erroneous because it constitutes a prohibited partial no cause of action. On this point we need not linger long. Dr. Zaheri’s exception of no cause of action left untouched Dr. Scott’s defamation cause of action. Dr. Zaheri’s exception, therefore, is a prohibited partial no cause of action exception because it essentially concedes that Dr. Scott’s petition states a cause of action for defamation. The Supreme Court, in Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So.2d 1234, 1286 (La.1993), stated clearly that “[if] the petition states a cause of action as to any ground or portion of the demand, the exception of no cause of |17action generally should be overruled.” “The purpose of this general rule is to prevent a multiplicity of appeals which forces an appellate court to consider the merits of the action in a piecemeal fashion.” Id. Because it sought the dismissal of some, but not all, of Dr. Scott’s causes of action, Dr. Zaheri’s exception of no cause of action should have been denied by the trial judge. REMAND INSTRUCTIONS After the finality of this judgment, the trial court shall issue an order which provides that, within the delay to be set by the trial court, the plaintiffs shall be afforded an opportunity to amend their petition to remove the objection of prescription by pleading facts which establish the applicability of the doctrine of contra non valentem to the three facially-prescribed causes of action. See La. C.C.P. art. 934. DECREE The judgment of the trial court in that part which sustained Dr. Kamran Zaheri’s exception of prescription is affirmed, except that the judgment in that part is amended to afford Dr. Mace Scott the opportunity to amend his petition. The judgment of the trial court in that part which sustained Dr. Zaheri’s exception of no cause of action is reversed. The matter is remanded with instructions. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART, AMENDED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. . The parties did not introduce any evidence at the hearing on the exception of prescription. See La. C.C.P. art. 931 ("On the trial of the peremptory exception pleaded at or prior to the trial of the case, evidence may be introduced to support or controvert any of the objections pleaded, when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition.”); see also Denoux v. Vessel Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 07-2143, p. 6 (La.5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84, 88. . We note that the trial court’s judgment mislabels Dr. Zaheri’s exception of no cause of action as an exception of no right of action. No party makes an issue of this undoubtedly inadvertent mistake, and neither will we. . While we draw no legal conclusions with respect to the letters, they are arguably defamatory. See Trentecosta v. Beck, 96-2388, p. 10 (La.10/21/97); 703 So.2d 552, 559 (La.1997) ("A communication is defamatory if it tends to harm the reputation of another so as to lower the person in the estimation of the community or to deter others from associating or dealing with the person.”). See also Brungardt v. Summitt, 08-0577, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/8/09); 7 So.3d 879, 885, citing Costello v. Hardy, 03-1146, pp. 13-14 (La.1/21/04); 864 So.2d 129, 140. ("[w]ords which expressly or implicitly accuse another of criminal conduct, or which by their very nature tend to injure one’s personal or professional reputation, even without considering extrinsic facts or surrounding circumstances, are considered defamatory per se.”). . Although there are two distinct plaintiffs in this matter, we refer to them collectively as "Dr. Scott” for brevity's sake. . We interpret the trial judge’s ruling on this point to mean that the re-publication of the September 2010, February 2011, and May 2011 anonymous letters to St. Bernard Parish Hospital in October 2012 is actionable. See Neyrey v. Lebrun, 309 So.2d 722, 725 (La.App. 4th Cir.1975) (“Each publication of a defamatory letter or statement results in a new and separate tort.”). . See La. Civil Code art. 3492. See also Zeigler v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 12-1168, p. 19 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/24/13); 118 So.3d 442, 455 (defamation); Cacioppo v. Alton Ochsner Foundation Hospital, 01-808, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/26/01); 806 So.2d 803, 805 (fraud); King v. Phelps Dunbar, 98-1805, p. 7 (La.6/4/99); 743 So.2d 181, 187 (intentional infliction of emotional distress); Duncan v. Bartholomew, 11-0855, p. 11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/14/12); 88 So.3d 698, 707-708 (negligent infliction of emotional distress); Scott v. City of New Orleans, 04-0414, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/27/04); 888 So.2d 318, 320 (tortious interference with a contract). . We arrive at this conclusion regardless of the standard of review employed. See Davis, supra; Hunter v. Tensas Nursing Home, 32,217, p. 3 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/27/99); 743 So.2d 839, 841. . See, e.g., Quinn v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corp., 12-0152 (La.11/2/12); 118 So.3d 1011; Whitnell, supra; Vegelos v. Abramson, 12-1235 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/2/13); 126 So.3d 639; Zoulek v. PIP America, 08-0550 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/10/08); 2 So.3d 511; Craig v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, 482 So.2d 148 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986); Royal v. Schwartz, 433 So.2d 390 (La.App. 4th Cir.1983). . Contra non valentem non currit praescriptio means that prescription does not run against a person who could not bring his suit. See Harvey v. Dixie Graphics, Inc., 593 So.2d 351, 354 (La.1992); see also, Cartwright v. Chrysler Corp., 255 La. 597, 232 So.2d 285, 287 (La.1970). .The other three categories of contra non valentem are: 1) where there was some legal cause which prevented the courts or their officers from taking cognizance of or acting on the plaintiff’s action; 2) where there was some condition coupled with the contract or connected with the proceedings which prevented the creditor from suing or acting; and 3) where the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even though this ignorance is not induced by the defendant. See Wells v. Zadeck, 11-1232, pp. 8-9 (La.3/30/12); 89 So.3d 1145, 1150. . We note that the March 10, 2014 judgment afforded Dr. Scott fifteen days to attempt to amend his petition so as to remove the grounds of Dr. Zaheri’s exception. See. La. C.C.P. art. 934. However, it does not appear from the record before us that Dr. Scott ever attempted to so amend his pleadings.

In re Houston, Michael; Houston Steve; — Other(s); Applying for Reconsideration of this Court’s action dated November 26, 2014, Parish of Desoto, 42nd Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 74746; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49651-CW. Reconsideration denied; original application not timely filed. See Hooper v. Wisteria Lakes Sub., 13-2433 (La.1/27/14), 130 So.3d 954.

DANIEL L. DYSART, Judge. J^Plaintiffs-appellants, Billy Delacruz, Louis Perkins and David East, Jr. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), appeal the district court’s denial of their Motion to Set Aside Judgment of Dismissal and the trial court’s judgment dismissing this lawsuit as abandoned. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the ruling, reverse the dismissal, reinstate the case, and remand for further proceedings. BACKGROUND On March 10, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Seaman’s Complaint against defendant-ap-pellee, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation (“APC”). According to the Complaint, on October 18, 2003, Plaintiffs were crew-members of the M/V BAM BAM, a commercial oyster fishing vessel owned and then being operated by Billy Delacruz in Black Bay, which struck “an improperly submerged oil/gas line” owned by APC. Plaintiffs claimed to have suffered “severe, permanent and disabling physical and mental injuries,” in addition to damages to Mr. Delacruz’s vessel. The matter was removed to federal court; however, by order dated May 26, 2004, the matter was remanded back to the 25th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Plaquemines. Plaintiffs then filed a First Amended Petition, adding | gAnadarko E & P Company, LP, as a defendant. Plaintiffs alleged that the submerged oil/gas pipeline was owned by APC and Anadarko E & P Company. On July 9, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Set Status Conference, to Set Deadlines and to Set a Trial Date. A telephone pretrial status conference was held on August 19, 2010 and a jury trial was scheduled to commence on August 30, 2011. On July 7, 2011, a Motion to Continue the trial was filed by Plaintiffs following a July 6, 2011 automobile accident in which counsel for Plaintiffs was injured. By Order dated July 19, 2011, the trial was continued without date. On September 9, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Set Scheduling Conference Wherein a Pretrial Conference and a Trial Date Might be Set. A telephone scheduling conference was then set for October 1, 2013. Thereafter, on September 17, 2018, APC filed an Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss for Abandonment with an incorporated supporting memorandum. APC took the position that “no party ha[d] taken any step in the prosecution or defense of the matter in the trial or appellate court for a period in excess of three (3) years.” APC’s motion was set for hearing on November 18, 2013. On November 4, 2013, APC filed a supplemental supporting memorandum in which it alleged that, the “record shows no activity for three years after August 24, 2010 other than the filing and grating of a motion to continue ‘without date of any hearings, conferences, or meeting[s.]’ ” The October 1, 2013 telephone conference took place as scheduled “among counsel for the parties and the Court,” and a jury trial was re-set for October 28, |s2014. APC’s Motion to Dismiss was then heard on November 18, 2013. After hearing argument of counsel, the trial court indicated that it found the cáse to be abandoned and by judgment dated December 3, 2013, APC’s motion was granted. The record reflects that notice of the judgment was issued on the same date of the judgment. On December 19, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment with an incorporated supporting memorandum, in which Plaintiffs maintained that APC’s participation in the October 1, 2013 telephone status conference to select the October 28, 2014 trial date “constituted a waiver of defendant’s claim of abandonment.” Plaintiffs’ Motion was then set for February 24, 2014. In opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion, APC maintained that Plaintiffs’ Motion (which APC characterized as “more accurately ... a Motion for New Trial”), raised no issues that were not present when the hearing on APC’s Motion to Dismiss was heard. It further argued that a Motion to Set Aside may be filed only “when the Court has entered an order of dismissal on an ex parte basis.” APC argued that counsel for Plaintiffs expressly agreed in advance of the October 1, 2013 status conference that his participation in that conference would not constitute a waiver of his abandonment defense. After the February 24, 2014, hearing, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal for Abandonment by judgment dated |4March 6, 2014. Notice of the judgment was issued that date. The trial court issued Reasons for Judgment on March 28, 2014. In those reasons, the trial court noted that the Motion to Set Aside was untimely. After noting that the Motion to Set Aside “should have been framed as a motion for new trial,” the trial court concluded that, under La. C.C.Pr. art 1974: [A] motion for new trial must be filed within seven days, exclusive of legal holidays, from the day after the mailing of notice of judgment. In the instant case, the Judgment was mailed on December 3, 2013. This, the latest day plaintiff could have timely filed a motion for new trial was December 12, 2013. Plaintiffs filed their motion seven days late. The trial court’s Reasons for Judgment also found that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Set Aside was without merit insofar as Plaintiffs were unable to show that their ease was not abandoned under La. C.C.Pr. art. 561. The trial court concluded that Plaintiffs’ “Motion to Continue the August 30, 2011 trial “without date’ did not set a date certain for the trial, and therefore it did not signal plaintiffs’ intention to move the case forward.” Plaintiffs filed a Motion and Order for Appeal on March 12, 2014. DISCUSSION Timeliness of Appeal After the appeal was lodged with this Court, APC filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Untimely. In that Motion, APC maintains that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal was essentially an untimely Motion for New Trial. Thus, APC argues, the appeal delays commenced with the trial court’s December 2, 2013 judgment. Accordingly, APC contends that the period for taking an appeal lsof that judgment expired on February 15, 2014, approximately a month before Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Appeal. Under La. C.C.P. art. 561, a case is considered abandoned “when the parties fail to take any step in its prosecution or defense in the trial court for . a period of three years.” That Article further provides: This provision shall be operative without formal order, but, on ex parte motion of any party or other interested person by affidavit which provides that no step has been timely taken in the prosecution or defense of the action, the trial court shall enter a formal order of dismissal as of the date of its abandonment. La. C.C.P. art. 561A(3). A party seeking to set aside a judgment dismissing an action as abandoned must file a motion to set aside the judgment “within thirty days of the date of the sheriffs service of the order of dismissal.” La. C.C.P. art. 561A(4). APC maintains that, because the trial court held a contradictory hearing on the Motion to Dismiss for Abandonment, rather than dismissing the case on an ex parte basis (as the Motion was filed), Plaintiffs may not avail themselves of the 30 day period for moving to set aside the dismissal. Rather, according to APC, Plaintiffs were relegated to a Motion for New Trial pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1974, which requires that applications for new trial be filed that within “seven days, exclusive of legal holidays,” which delay “commences to run on the day after the clerk has ^mailed, or the sheriff has served, the notice of judgment as required by Article 1913.” La. C.C.P. art. 1974. APC’s contention is essentially that the manner by which a judgment of dismissal on grounds of abandonment is issued governs how that judgment is to be challenged — if the judgment is entered on an ex parte basis, the challenging party has 30 days to move to set it aside; if the judgment is entered after a contradictory hearing, the challenging party may either move for a new trial or appeal the judgment. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in holding a contradictory hearing, noting that, since Article 561’s amendment in 2003, the trial court had no authority to schedule a contradictory hearing. Plaintiffs further argue that the hearing that took place was not truly a contradictory hearing because the trial court “allowed no live testimony, no presentation of witnesses and no introduction of any extrinsic evidence.” Plaintiffs thus argue that they should not be prejudiced by the trial court’s “errors and misapplication of the ex parte procedures of Art. 561.” APC cites no case' law which makes any distinction between a judgment of dismissal, entered on an ex parte basis and one which is entered after a contradictory hearing. Arguably, the longer period for moving to set aside an ex parte dismissal on the grounds of abandonment (30 days) contemplates that the party against whom the judgment is rendered had no prior knowledge of the motion to dismiss or an opportunity to be heard. However, Article 561 makes no distinction between a judgment entered into on an ex parte basis or one that is entered following a contradictory hearing. Article 561 simply states: A motion to set aside a dismissal may be made only within thirty days of the date of the sheriffs service of the order of dismissal. If the trial court denies a timely 17motion to set aside the dismissal, the clerk of court shall give notice of the order of denial pursuant to Article 1913(A) and shall file a certificate pursuant to Article 1913(D). La. C.C.P. art. 561A(4). The Louisiana Supreme Court has indicated that La. C.C.P. art. 561 is to be liberally construed in favor of maintaining a plaintiffs suit. Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto.Ins. Co., 00-3010, p. 8 (La.5/15/01), 785 So.2d 779, 785; See also Williams v. Abadie, 03-0605, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/24/03), 857 So.2d 1118, 1121. Indeed, our jurisprudence has uniformly followed this principle, recognizing that “dismissal is the harshest of remedies.” Prestenback v. Hearn, 11-1380, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/22/12), 85 So.3d 256, 259, writ denied, 2012-0942 (La.6/15/12), 90 So.3d 1065; Succession of Sigur v. Henritzy, 13-0398, p. 9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/18/13), 126 So.3d 529, 536; Brown v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 07-772, p. 5 (La.App. 5 Cir. 2/19/08), 980 So.2d 62, 65. Our jurisprudence also indicates that “any reasonable doubt about abandonment should be resolved in favor of allowing the prosecution of the claim and against dismissal for abandonment.” Louisiana Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Oilfield Heavy Haulers, L.L.C., 11-0912, p. 5 (La.12/6/11), 79 So.3d 978, 982. See also, Clark, 00-3010, p. 10, 785 So.2d at 787. Given that Article 561 does not expressly state that motions to set aside judgments of dismissal pertain only to judgments rendered on an ex parte basis, coupled with our well-settled jurisprudence that Article 561 is to be liberally interpreted, we find that, under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff had 30 days within which to file a motion to set aside the trial court’s December 3, 2013 judgment. Plaintiffs’ Motion, filed on December 19, 2013 was, therefore, timely. APC’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Untimely is denied. |RWe now turn to the merits of this appeal. Abandonment of Action The question of whether a suit was abandoned is a legal question. See Olavarrieta v. St. Pierre, 04-1566, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/11/05), 902 So.2d 566, 568. Accordingly, the standard of review by an appellate court “in reviewing a question of law is simply whether the lower court’s interpretive decision is correct.” Id., citing Faust v. Greater Lakeside Corporation, 03-0808, p. 3, (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/26/03), 861 So.2d 716, 718. In this appeal, Plaintiffs maintain that the trial court erred in “unilaterally converting the ex parte motion” of APC into “a contradictory motion” and then refusing to allow Plaintiffs to offer “any extrinsic evidence or testimony in support of their opposition to Defendant’s motion ... or to allow oral testimony or argument to the issues of intent to abandon....” Plaintiffs further argue that the trial court erred in finding their Motion to Set Aside Judgment as untimely. Plaintiffs then recite a number of cases in which activity outside the record was found to have been sufficient to interrupt the tolling of the three year abandonment period. We need not reach these particular issues. In our de novo review of the record and the pertinent case law, we find that the record demonstrates suit was not abandoned and the trial court erred in dismissing it. As we previously noted, “[a]n action ... is abandoned when the parties fail to take any step in its prosecution or defense in the trial court for a period of three years.... ” La. C.C.P. art. 561A(1). This Court recently reiterated the welljestab-lishedg criteria to be considered in determining whether a case has been abandoned: 1) a party must take a step toward the prosecution or defense of the action; 2) the step must be taken in the proceeding and, with the exception of formal discovery, must appear in the record; and 3) the step must be taken within three years of the last step taken by either party. Heirs of Simoneaux v. B-P Amoco, 13-0760, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/5/14), 131 So.3d 1128, 1130-31, writ denied, 14-0600 (La.5/16/14), 144 So.3d 1035, citing Dean v. Delacroix Corp., 12-0917, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/26/12), 106 So.3d 283, 287, writ denied, 13-0485 (La.4/26/13), 112 So.3d 844. At the outset, we note that a “step” toward the prosecution of a matter has consistently been defined as “a formal action before the court intended to hasten the suit towards judgment” or as “the taking of formal discovery.” Id., 13-0760, p. 4,131 So.3d at 1131. See also, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Harris, 13-1335, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/14/14), 141 So.3d 829, 835; Lewis v. Comm’r of Ins., 11-347, p. 7 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/13/11), 81 So.3d 890, 895; Dendy v. City Nat. Bank, 06-2436 p. 8 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/17/07), 977 So.2d 8, 12. Our jurisprudence reflects that the “step” must be evident from the record. Louisiana Dep’t of Transp. & Dev. v. Oilfield Heavy Haulers, L.L.C., 11-0912, pp. 10-11 (La.12/6/11), 79 So.3d 978, 984-85 (“in order for an action by a party other than formal discovery to constitute a step, it must be before the trial court or filed in the trial court record”). Two exceptions to the rule that the “step” be demonstrated by the record have developed: “(1) a plaintiffs failure to prosecute based on circumstances beyond the plaintiffs control; or (2) a defendant’s waiver of the right to assert abandonment by taking action inconsistent with an intent to treat the case as | inabandoned.” Id., citing Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 00-3010, p. 7 (La.5/15/01); 785 So.2d 779, 784-85. Neither of these exceptions apply to the in stant matter. However, a review of the record indicates that the three year period for abandonment had not elapsed at the time that APC filed its Motion to Dismiss. The question of when the. tolling period for abandonment begins when a trial date has been set and continued without date can be resolved by reviewing recent cases addressing similar scenarios. In Dean, the trial court issued an order on April 4, 2008, setting the case for trial on November 3, 2008. Between May of 2008 and June, 2008, the parties filed pleadings related to exceptions which were to be heard on June 24, 2008. The last of the pleadings was an opposition to the exceptions filed on June 16, 2008. On August 14, 2008, one of the parties filed an unopposed motion to continue the hearing on the exceptions and the trial date. The motion was granted on August 18, 2008, continuing hearing and the trial without date. On August 5, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reset the exceptions for hearing. The defendant moved to dismiss the case as abandoned on August 15, 2011. Finding that the August 15, 2011 filing of the motion to reset was timely, this Court held: [P]rior to the filing ... of the motion to continue both the hearing on [the] exceptions and the trial, which motion was unopposed, all parties were contemplating the case moving forward as there were dates set for hearings and trial. Once the trial court ruled on [the] exceptions, the case would proceed to trial with or without Delacroix as a party. There was no further action needed by any party, such as the formal filing of pleadings, to move the case forward. Thus, it would be patently unfair to hold that the last date any action taken in this case to hasten it to judgment was June 16, 2008, when [plaintiff] filed its opposition to [the] exceptions. Rather, we find the operative date to begin the tolling of the three-year ^abandonment rule was August 18, 2008, the date Judge Ragusa signed the order continuing both the hearing on Delacroix’s exceptions and the trial date. Id., 12-0917, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/26/12), 106 So.3d at 288. More recently, in Heirs of Simoneaux, plaintiffs moved to set a status conference on March 26, 2008, citing the need to “put the case back on track for resolution.” Id., 13-0760, p. 1, 131 So.3d at 1129. The trial court scheduled a conference for August 28, 2008. A telephone conference took place that date, at which time the parties agreed to an indefinite continuance of the status conference so that settlement discussion could take place. After plaintiffs filed a Motion for Status Conference on August 23, 2011, for the purpose of putting the case “back on track,” the defendants filed an Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of Abandonment. Citing Dean, we rejected the defendants’ argument that the last step in the prosecution of the case was the March, 2008, motion for status conference. We noted: This Court held that it would be inherently unfair to Dean to start the tolling of the three-year abandonment period on June 15, 2008, when Dean had already obtained a trial date of November 3, 2008 — the ultimate step in the prosecution of the case. Put another way, the case was progressing to trial until the case was continued on August 18, 2008. For that reason, this Court held that the date to begin the tolling of the three-year abandonment period was August 18, 2008. Therefore, when Dean moved to reset the exceptions for trial on August 15, 2011, he was within the statutory three-year period. Applying Dean to the facts of this case, we find that August 28, 2008, is the date to begin the tolling of the three-year period. To consider the tolling period to have begun on March 26, 2008, the date the motion for status conference was requested would be inherently unfair, as the motion for status conference specifically requested to have deadlines set and to “put the case back on track.” 112This clearly evinces a desire to move the case forward to prosecution. Id., 13-0760, p. 5,131 So.3d at 1131. In the instant matter, like in Dean, Plaintiffs had already obtained a trial date, “the ultimate step in the prosecution of the case.” Id. No further action was required of Plaintiffs (or any other party at that time). As we held in Dean, it would be patently unfair to hold that the last step in the prosecution of this matter was the issuance of the August 24, 2010 scheduling order following the August 19, 2010 telephone status conference, as APC contends. Given that a trial date had already been selected, together with our holdings in Dean and Heirs of Simoneaux, we find that, under the circumstances of this case, the last step in the prosecution was the trial court’s July 19, 2011 order continuing the trial. Plaintiffs’ September 9, 2013 Motion to Set was, therefore, filed a little over two years after that last step and well within the three year period for abandonment of cases under Article 561. Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in granting APC’s Motion to Dismiss for Abandonment. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings. JUDGMENT VACATED, DISMISSAL REVERSED, AND REMANDED; MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL DENIED. JENKINS, J., dissents with reasons. . Anadarko E & P Company is further described as "previously known as Union Pacific Resources Company, which bought Laurel operating Company.” . In that Motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel stated that Mr. Delacruz "does not appear to have been sufficiently injured that he is interested in cooperating in the prosecution of his case, while Mr. East cannot be located.” At that time, Mr. Perkins was to "be the sole remaining plaintiff after due proceedings to notify the other plaintiffs.” . The parties stipulated that the telephone conference and trial date selection would not prejudice APC's Ex Parte Motion to Dismiss for Abandonment. . Indeed, Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded to that agreement. . In its Reasons for Judgment, the trial court found that the Motion “should have been framed as a motion for new trial.” . Pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 561A(5), "[a] appeal of an order of dismissal may be taken only within sixty days of the date of the sheriff's service of the order of dismissal." .Prior to 2003, Article 561 provided that the “the trial court may direct that a contradictory hearing be held prior to dismissal” of a case as abandoned. By .Act No. 545, § 1 of 2003, Article 561 was amended to delete the language pertaining to a contradictory hearing. . This issue was fully addressed by Plaintiffs in their Opposition to APC’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal. As we have already determined, the Motion to Set Aside was not untimely. . The issue of abandonment is a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. Liner v. Ippolito, 08-0208, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/20/08), 991 So.2d 1150, 1152.

AMY, Judge. hln this workers’ compensation matter, the claimant alleged that the defendants failed to timely pay his first week’s indemnity benefits and failed to timely reimburse him for medical expenses. The claimant sought penalties and attorney fees in connection with these allegations. The defendants filed an exception of res judicata with regard to the claim for failure to timely pay the claimant his first week’s indemnity benefits. The workers’ compensation judge rejected the defendants’ exception of res judicata and found in the claimant’s favor on the merits, awarding penalties and attorney fees for both claims. The defendants appeal and have additionally filed a motion to supplement the record. Further, the claimant answers the appeal, seeking additional attorney fees. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the workers’ compensation judge in part and reverse in part. We deny both the defendants’ motion to supplement the record and the claimant’s request for additional attorney fees. Factual and Procedural Background According to the record, there is little dispute that the claimant, Gary Pickett, was injured in a work-related accident in 2006. At that time, Mr. Pickett was employed by the defendant, J.B. Tuck Land Clearing. In 2009, Mr. Pickett filed a disputed claim for compensation. The record indicates that the parties negotiated a settlement to that claim. Thereafter, Mr. Pickett filed a motion to enforce the settlement and was awarded additional penalties and attorney fees by the workers’ compensation judge. 1 ?Mr. Pickett subsequently filed this disputed claim for compensation, alleging that the insurer failed to timely pay the first week of indemnity benefits and that the insurer failed to timely reimburse him for medical expenses, specifically, a prescription for Lortab. Mr. Pickett requested penalties and attorney fees. In response, the defendants filed exceptions of res judi-cata and no cause of action. The basis for the defendants’ exception of no cause of action was that Mr. Pickett had erroneously named the third-party administrator, Summit Claims Center, as a defendant. That exception was resolved by stipulated judgment and the insurer, Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Company, was substituted as a defendant. The exception of res judicata was directed at Mr. Pickett’s claim that the insurer failed to timely pay the first week of indemnity benefits. After several hearings, the workers’ compensation judge deferred ruling on the exception of res judicata to the trial on the merits. The workers’ compensation judge ultimately denied the defendants’ exception of res judicata. On the merits, the workers’ compensation judge concluded that it failed to timely pay the first week of indemnity benefits and that the insurer failed to timely reimburse Mr. Pickett for his Lortab prescription. Accordingly, the workers’ compensation judge awarded Mr. Pickett $2,000.00 in penalties for the failure to timely pay the first week of indemnity benefits, $150.00 in penalties for the failure to timely reimburse Mr. Pickett for his prescriptions, and $16,250.00 in attorney fees. The defendants appeal, asserting as error that: 1. The trial court committed legal error in failing to grant defendants/appellants’ exception of res judicata. |⅞2. Alternatively, the trial court committed manifest error in awarding Gary Pickett penalties and attorney’s fees based on the late payment of his first week of indemnity benefits. 3. The trial court committed manifest error in finding that defendants/appellants failed to timely reimburse Mr. Pickett for his prescription medication or, alternatively, committed manifest error in not finding that the late reimbursement resulted from conditions over which the employer or insurer had no control. 4. The trial court committed manifest error in awarding Gary Pickett penalties and attorney’s fees based on the alleged late reimbursement of his prescription medication. 5. Alternatively, the trial court erred in awarding Mr. Pickett and/or his counsel attorney’s fees for attending media-tions, for drafting, filing and defending a motion for summary judgment that was clearly improper and for prosecuting a claim that was clearly barred by res judicata. Mr. Pickett has styled his appellate brief as “Original Brief on Behalf of Gary Pickett, Plaintiff — Appellee, and In Support of Answer to Appeal.” No separate answer to the appeal is contained in the record. In his brief, Mr. Pickett requests additional attorney fees for work done on appeal. Further, the defendants have filed a motion to supplement the record, seeking to have the disputed claim for compensation from Mr. Pickett’s earlier case included in the appellate record. Discussion Res Judicata and Untimely Payment of Indemnity Benefits Several of the defendants’ assignments of error concern Mr. Pickett’s claim that the defendants failed to pay his first week of indemnity benefits timely. Pursuant to La.R.S. 23:1224, “[n]o compensation shall be paid for the first week after the injury is received; provided, that in cases where disability from injury continues for six weeks or longer after date of the accident, compensation for the |4first week shall be paid after the first six weeks have elapsed.” According to the record, the defendants did not pay Mr. Pickett his first week of indemnity benefits, also known as the “waiting week,” for more than three and a half years. The defendants do not contest that this payment was untimely. The defendants’ main argument is that Mr. Pickett’s prior disputed claim is res judicata as to his current claim. More specifically, the defendants contend that “Mr. Pickett had already asserted and indeed prevailed on the same claim for penalties and attorney’s fees in his earlier case.” The defendants also argue that, even if the claims were not identical, Mr. Pickett could have and should have brought his claim regarding failure to pay the first week of indemnity benefits timely in the earlier case. Mr. Pickett contends that the issue concerning payment of his first week of indemnity benefits arose after the judgment in his earlier case, as he was unaware that he had not been paid his first week of indemnity benefits until the insurer issued a check for those benefits. Further, Mr. Pickett argues that the issue cannot be precluded because the workers’ compensation judge did not address it in the earlier case. Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4231 addresses the doctrine of res judicata, stating: Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent: (1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and merged in the judgment. | s(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action. (3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigat ed and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment. When doubt exists as to whether a party’s substantive rights have actually been previously addressed and finally resolved, an assertion of res judicata should be rejected. Lee v. Twin Bros. Marine Corp., 03-2034 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/17/04), 897 So.2d 35. Further, when the exception of res judicata is raised prior to the case being submitted and both parties submit evidence, the trial court’s ruling on the exception is subject to the manifest error standard of review. Daigle v. Merrill Lynch, 11-965 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/8/12), 85 So.3d 168, writ denied, 12-523 (La.4/13/12), 85 So.3d 1253. The burden of proof rests with the mover. Id. Identification of those issues which were actually litigated is determined not only from the pleadings, but from examining the entire record in the first suit. Lee, 897 So.2d 35. Failure to introduce such documentary evidence into the record can prevent the moving party from meeting their burden of proof. Brielle’s Florist & Gifts, Inc. v. Trans Tech, Inc., 11-260 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/11), 74 So.3d 833 (citing Union Planters Bank v. Commercial Capital Holding Corp., 04-871 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05), 907 So.2d 129). According to the record, the defendants submitted documents into evidence on the issue of res judicata. Further, the record indicates that Mr. Pickett was given an opportunity to introduce evidence into the record to controvert the defendants’ assertions but chose not to do so. Accordingly, we still apply the | fimanifest error standard of review to the workers’ compensation judge’s ruling on the exception of res judi-cata. See Fogleman v. Meaux Surface Protection, Inc., 10-1210 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/9/11), 58 So.3d 1057, writ denied, 11-712 (La.5/27/11), 63 So.3d 995. In rejecting the defendants’ exception of res judicata, the workers’ compensation judge found that: The governing statute, La.R.S. 13:4213, allows for the barring of a claim only if it arises out of what the statute refers to as, quote, “the same issue”, end of quote, previously before this court. The ruling of this court in ordering that the 2009 compromised settlement be enforced dealt exclusively with specifically listed issues and none of those were in any fashion related to the late indemnity payments. That subject was never mentioned, much less litigated. Although the defendants asserted that Mr. Pickett’s earlier case sought adjudication of “medical treatment, wage benefits, penalties and attorney’s fees,” they failed to file the record of the earlier case into evidence. In Denoux v. Vessel Management Services, Inc., 07-2143, p. 6 (La.5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84, 88 (citations omitted), the supreme court discussed an appellate court’s ability to consider evidence not formally filed into the record, stating: Evidence not properly and officially offered and introduced cannot be considered, even if it is physically placed in the record. Documents attached to memo-randa do not constitute evidence and cannot be considered as such on appeal. Appellate courts are courts of record and may not review evidence that is not in the appellate record, or receive new evidence. In addition, “the courts of appeal have no authority to consider facts, memoranda or exhibits referred to in the appellate briefs if they are not in the appellate record.” \nBrielle’s Florist, 74 So.3d at 836 (citing Jones v. Jones, 09-757 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/29/09), 30 So.3d 137). Our review of the record indicates that, although the defendants did not file the entire record of Mr. Pickett’s earlier disputed claim for compensation into evidence, they did enter into evidence the judgment on Mr. Pickett’s “Motion to Enforce Settlement and for Penalties and Attorney’s Fees” from docket number 09-04278. That document states that “the initial agreed upon settlement is hereby enforced.” However, it does not expound upon the issues considered in that settlement. Our review of the record does not reveal any other evidence concerning Mr. Pickett’s prior disputed claim for compensation. Thus, we find that the record does not contain enough evidence such that the defendants could meet their burden of proof with regard to the exception of res judicata. Accordingly, we find no error in the workers’ compensation judge’s denial of the exception of res judicata. In addition to their res judicata argument, the defendants contend that the workers’ compensation judge erred in awarding penalties for failure to timely pay Mr. Pickett his first week of indemnity benefits. The workers’ compensation judge’s decision to impose penalties is subject to the manifest error — clearly wrong standard of review. Cobb v. Lafayette Parish Sch. Bd., 10-430 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/3/10), 49 So.3d 597 (citing Authement v. Shappert Eng’g, 02-1631 (La.2/25/03), 840 So.2d 1181), writ denied, 10-2692 (La.1/28/11), 56 So.3d 958. The defendants paid Mr. Pickett his first week of indemnity benefits more than three and a half years late. The defendants failed to offer any kind of explanation for why the payment was untimely. Accordingly, we find no error in the workers’ compensation judge’s award of penalties with regard to this claim. IsThe defendants’ assignments of error with regard to these issues are without merit. Untimely Reimbursement for Medical Expenses The defendants also object to the workers’ compensation judge’s finding that the defendants failed to timely reimburse Mr. Pickett for his prescription for Lortab. Alternatively, the defendants argue that any untimeliness was due to conditions beyond their control. Pursuant to La.R.S. 23:1201(E), “[mjedical benefits payable under this Chapter shall be paid within sixty days after the employer or insurer receives written notice thereof.” Further, La.R.S. 23:1201(F) provides that failure to provide payment as required by La.R.S. 23:1201(E): shall result in the assessment of a penalty in an amount up to the greater of twelve percent of any unpaid compensation or medical benefits, or fifty dollars per calendar day for each day in which any and all compensation or medical benefits remain unpaid or such consent is withheld, together with reasonable attorney fees for each disputed claim; however, the fifty dollars per calendar day penalty shall not exceed a maximum of two thousand dollars in the aggregate for any claim. However, no penalties shall be assessed “if the claim is reasonably controverted or if such nonpayment results from conditions over which the employer or insurer had no control.” La.R.S. 23:1201(F)(2). The workers’ compensation judge’s determination of whether a defendant is subject to penalties and attorney fees, including the determination of whether the required no tice has been given is a question of fact subject to the manifest error — clearly wrong standard of review. Semere v. Our Lady of Lourdes Hosp., 03-1702 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/9/04), 875 So.2d 1048. UThe defendants concede in their appellate brief that “Mr. Pickett was not reimbursed until 63 days after he purchased the Lortab.” However, the defendants’ argument is that Mr. Pickett did not meet his burden of proof with regard to when he provided the defendants with written notice of the reimbursement owed. The defendants’ argument is twofold. First, the defendants contend that Mr. Pickett did not establish the date that the defendants received notice that he was seeking reimbursement at all for prescription medication. Second, the defendants contend that the claim was reasonably controverted because they were not apprised that Mr. Pickett was seeking reimbursement for Lortab, and not some other medication, until a later date. In his reasons for ruling, the workers’ compensation judge found that “[Mr. Pickett] testified that he sent the receipt for reimbursement on June 30th, 2010 and the defendant issued a check dated August 4th, 2010.” According to the record, Mr. Pickett received two prescriptions from Dr. Michael Dole. One of those prescriptions was for Lortab. Mr. Pickett testified that he went to Walmart to fill those prescriptions, and that normally “comp pa[id] for it.” However, on that occasion, one of his pre-seriptions was approved, but his prescription for Lortab was not approved. Thus, Mr. Pickett paid for that prescription out of pocket. Mr. Pickett testified as follows: [Mr. lies, claimant’s attorney]: And did you send that receipt to the insurance company for reimbursement? [Mr. Pickett]: Yes, sir. [Mr. lies]: Was it more than 60 days, before they reimbursed you? [Mr. Pickett]: Yeah, I think it was. [Mr. lies]: Okay. | m[Mr. Pickett]: It was a pretty good while. Later in the hearing, Mr. Pickett testified that: This thing for Lortab, I — I went in here awhile back with a prescription, and they wouldn’t pay for it, and I paid out-of-pocket; and then, I went back the next day for something — anyway—anyway, they give me my money back. They okayed it, after I done paid for it, but Wal-mart give me my money back on it. A copy of the receipt, dated June 2, 2010, was submitted into evidence. Mr. Pickett also submitted a copy of the stub for his reimbursement check into evidence. The stub does not indicate the date when the check was drafted. In the transcript of the trial on the merits, Mr. Pickett’s attorney refers to a “cover letter” that shows “it was the Lortab that was not approved,” and the defendant’s attorney refers to “a certified record from Wal Mart, and it shows hydrocodone on that date” and Mr. Pickett’s affidavit, which was attached to the Motion for Summary Judgment. None of these documents were entered into evidence. Although the rules for the admissibility of evidence are relaxed in workers’ compensation hearings, there must still be competent evidence in the record to support the workers’ compensation judge’s findings. Joumet v. Greene’s Energy Group, 09-347 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/7/09), 20 So.3d 1195 (quoting Chaisson v. Cajun Bag & Supply Co., 97-1225 (La.3/4/98), 708 So.2d 375). As already discussed, this court may not consider documents which were not submitted into evidence. Brielle’s Florist, 74 So.3d 833; see also Reese v. Dresser Valve Indus., |nl0-241 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/6/10), 48 So.3d 406; Jackson v. United Seros. Auto. Ass’n. Cas. Ins. Co., 08-333 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/28/08), 1 So.3d 512. Based on the evidence in the record before us, we find that the workers’ compensation judge erred in finding Mr. Pickett had met his burden of proof. Our review of the record reveals that sufficient competent evidence was not submitted into the record to support the workers’ compensation judge’s finding, most notably that Mr. Pickett did not state when he sent the receipt in for reimbursement and there was no evidence in the record concerning when the defendants issued a reimbursement check. We also note that the documents submitted into evidence do not contain the date that the check was mailed to Mr. Pickett. Mr. Pickett could not state with any certainty that more than sixty days had passed between when he sent the receipt for Lortab to the defendants and when he was reimbursed. Although the defendants concede in their appellate brief that more than sixty days passed between when Mr. Pickett purchased the medication and when they issued the reimbursement check, they do not concede that more than sixty days passed between when they received urritten notification of the request for reimbursement and when they issued the reimbursement check. Accordingly, we reverse the workers’ compensation judge’s award of penalties for failure to timely reimburse Mr. Pickett. Award of Attorney Fees The defendants next complain that the workers’ compensation judge erred in awarding Mr. Pickett $16,250.00 in attorney fees. The defendants contend that the award is precluded pursuant to La.R.S. 23:1201(J) and that the workers’ compensation judge should not have awarded attorney fees “for attending me-diations, for drafting, filing and defending a motion for summary judgment that 112was clearly improper and for prosecuting a claim that was clearly barred by res judicata.” The supreme court addressed the award of attorney fees in McCarroll v. Airport Shuttle, Inc., 00-1123, pp. 9-10 (La.11/28/00), 773 So.2d 694, 700 (footnote omitted), stating: The only limitation on the amount is the reasonableness of the fee awarded by the judge. [Cain v. Employers Cas. Co., 236 La. 1085, 110 So.2d 108 (1959)]. The amount awarded rests within the discretion of the workers’ compensation judge, as long as that amount is supported by the record. Some of the factors taken into account by the judge in fixing the amount of the fee are the degree of skill and ability exercised by the attorney, the amount of the claim, the amount recovered for the employee, and the amount of time the attorney devoted to the case. [14 H. Alston Johnson, III, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Workers’ Compensation Law & Practice § 389 (3rd ed.1994)]. The amount awarded is intended to provide full recovery, without statutory limitation, for attorney’s services and expenses in connection with the litigation. An award of penalties and attorney fees in a workers’ compensation case is essentially penal in nature. Normand v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 11-522 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/9/11), 79 So.3d 448. Thus, although the' Workers’ Compensation Act is to be liberally construed with regard to benefits, statutes addressing penalties are to be strictly construed. Id. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1201(J) provides that: Notwithstanding the fact that more than one violation in this Section which provides for an award of attorney fees may be applicable, only one reasonable attorney fee may be awarded against the employer or insurer in connection with any hearing on the merits of any disputed claim filed pursuant to this Section, and an award of such single attorney fee shall be res judicata as to any and all conduct for which penalties may be imposed under this Section which precedes the date of the hearing. We find no merit to the defendants’ argument with regard to the applicability of La.R.S. 23:1201(J). As previously discussed, the workers’ | ^compensation judge did not err in denying the defendants’ exception of res judicata. Accordingly, Mr. Pickett’s previous disputed claim for compensation does not preclude an award of attorney fees in his present case. Further, we have reviewed the documentation submitted by Mr. Pickett’s attorney in seeking attorney fees. Mr. Pickett’s attorney listed multiple actions which required his time and expertise over the course of two years of litigation, including drafting briefs, and attending me-diations, multiple hearings, and the trial on the merits. We observe that although Mr. Pickett’s attorney sought $20,000.00 in attorney fees, the workers’ compensation judge determined that $16,250.00 was a more reasonable amount. Given our review of the record, we find no abuse of the workers’ compensation judge’s exercise of discretion. See Ivory v. Sw. Dev. Ctr., 07-1201 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/08), 980 So.2d 108; Semere, 875 So.2d 1048. The defendants’ assignments of error with regard to attorney fees are without merit. Answer to Appeal As part of his appellate brief, Mr. Pickett has answered the appeal, seeking additional attorney fees for work done on appeal. However, Mr. Pickett’s answer was untimely, as it was filed more than a month after the deadline for filing an answer to the appeal had passed. See La. Code Civ.P. art. 2133. We also note that filing a brief does not satisfy Article 2133’s requirements. TTV, L.L.C. v. Simmons, 10-1163 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/9/11), 58 So.3d 684, writ denied, 11-1048 (La.6/24/11), 64 So.3d 222. Therefore, we do not further consider Mr. Pickett’s answer. | uMotion to Supplement the Record The defendants have filed a motion to supplement the record, seeking to include Mr. Pickett’s disputed claim for compensation filed in docket number 09-04278 into the record on appeal. Citing Rapides Grocery Co., Inc. v. Grant, 173 La. 367, 137 So. 64 (1931), the defendants contend that under certain circumstances it is permissible to supplement the record with a pleading that was not filed into evidence in the trial court. The defendants’ motion was referred for consideration with the merits of the appeal. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2132 provides, in relevant part, that: A record on appeal which is incorrect or contains misstatements, irregularities or informalities, or which omits a material part of the trial record, may be corrected even after the record is transmitted to the appellate court, by the parties by stipulation, by the trial court or by the order of the appellate court. The defendants’ motion does not address any of the circumstances delineated in Article 2132. Instead, it seeks to introduce evidence which was not before the workers’ compensation judge in support of its arguments on appeal. As previously discussed, the appellate court may not consider evidence not in the record before the trial court and may not receive new evidence. Brown v. State, 06-709 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/06), 942 So.2d 721. Accordingly, it is not appropriate for an appellate court to supplement the record “with documents that have never been offered, introduced, or admitted into evidence,” and we deny the defendants’ motion. Franklin v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 12-555, p. 5 (LaApp. 3 Cir. 12/5/12), 104 So.3d 720, 723. | i.r,DECREE For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the workers’ compensation judge awarding the claimant, Gary Pickett, $150.00 in penalties for failure to timely reimburse medical expenses. We affirm the judgment in all other respects. We deny the motion to supplement the record filed by the defendants, J.B. Tuck Land Clearing and Bridgefield Casualty Insurance Company. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the defendants-appellants. REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART. MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD DENIED. . The defendant is also referred to as simply "J.B. Tuck” in the disputed claim for compensation. . Summit is also referred to as "Summit Claims Center” and "Heritage Summit” in the record. . Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1224 was amended by 2012 La. Acts No. 860, effective August 1, 2012, to change the waiting period from six weeks to two weeks. . The defendants have filed a motion to supplement the appellate record to include Mr. Pickett’s earlier disputed claim for compensation. That motion will be addressed elsewhere in this opinion. . In contrast, in support of his claim that the "waiting week" was paid untimely, Mr. Pickett submitted into evidence a copy of both the check stub and the check for his first week of indemnity benefits. That check is dated June 23, 2010. We note that the record also contains Mr. Pickett's Motion for Summary Judgment. Attached to that motion is a copy of both the check stub and the check reimbursing him for his prescription purchase. The date of that check is August 4, 2010. However, our review of the record does not reveal that the documents attached to Mr. Pickett’s Motion for Summary Judgment were entered into evidence. "Evidence not properly and officially offered and introduced cannot be considered, even if it is physically placed in the record.” Brielle’s Florist, 74 So.3d at 836.

In re Clark, Roy; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. C, No. 46011. Denied.

In re Harrell, Thaddeus; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Jefferson, 24th Judicial District Court Div., No. 11-3802; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-KH-183. Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

AMY, Judge. |, After the plaintiffs sustained damage to their Cameron Parish beach house as a result of Hurricane Ike, their flood insurance provider declared the policy void ab initio. They filed suit against their insurance'agency and the flood insurance provider, seeking damages for tort and contractual claims. The trial court denied pre-trial exceptions regarding subject matter jurisdiction and preemption by federal law. After trial, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding damages and apportioning fault equally between the defendants. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Factual and Procedural Background The plaintiffs, Kay and Barry- Barnett, own a beach house in Cameron Parish. Their original dwelling on that property was destroyed in 2005 by Hurricane Rita. Although Travelers. Insurance Company had issued a policy on the property to the plaintiffs under the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), Travelers informed them after Hurricane Rita that their property could not be insured under that pro gram given its location within a Coastal Barrier Resource System (CBRS). Thereafter, Mr. Barnett contacted Gary Pearce, an agent at Insurance Unlimited of Louisiana, Inc., to inquire about the possibility of obtaining NFIP flood insurance for their property. Mr. Barnett explained that he did so after learning that a neighbor had been able to insure his property through the agency. Mr. Pearce forwarded the Barnett application to Fidelity National Property and Casualty Insurance Company, a Write Your Own (WYO) Program carrier |2participating in the NFIP. Fidelity subsequently issued the policy, purportedly effective on July 2, 2008. However, after the plaintiffs’ house sustained damage as a result of Hurricane Ike in September 2008, Fidelity issued a December 2008 notice of cancellation indicating that the policy was cancelled, retroactive to the policy inception date of July 2, 2008. The record establishes that the basis for the cancellation was a determination that the property was located within a CBRS zone. The Barnetts filed suit against Fidelity and Insurance Unlimited, seeking damages for breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. The trial court rejected exceptions and a motion for summary judgment filed by Fidelity, wherein it asserted that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the matter was preempted by federal law as the policy was issued pursuant to the NFIP. The trial court also denied a motion for summary judgment filed by Insurance Unlimited wherein it had alleged that the plaintiffs failed to inform the agency of the home’s location in a CBRS. After a trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. In reasons for ruling, the trial court found that Insurance Unlimited was negligent in failing to follow federal guidelines in processing the plaintiffs’ application. It found that both Insurance Unlimited and Fidelity were |snegligent in failing to determine that the property was in a CBRS zone and that they had negligently misrepresented the validity of the flood insurance policy issued and the insurability of the property under the NFIP. The trial court determined that the plaintiffs relied on those negligent misrepresentations, believing that they had a valid policy in place at the time of Hurricane Ike and that the defendants also breached fiduciary duties owed to the plaintiffs. The defendants’ negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duties, the trial court concluded, were causes-in-fact of the harm suffered by the plaintiffs. The risk of the harm suffered was found to be within the scope of the duties owed by the defendants. The trial court assessed fault equally to the defendants. With regard to damages, the trial court found that the plaintiffs sustained in excess of $50,000.00 in damages stemming from the conduct of the defendants. However, given the plaintiffs’ pre-trial stipulation and waiver of jury demand under La.Code Civ.P. art. 1732(1), the judgment reduced the damages awarded to $50,000.00. Both defendants have appealed the judgment. Discussion Fidelity — Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Preemption The plaintiffs advanced state-law-based claims against Fidelity, asserting that they relied on the representation of a flood insurance policy. In pre-trial exceptions, and again on appeal, Fidelity asserts that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction insofar as the claim stems from a policy involving the NFIP. \4See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4071-72. It also asserts that any state-law claims are preempted by operation of the NFIP. See 44 C.F.R. § 61.5(e). The trial court denied Fidelity’s exceptions regarding the existence of federal question jurisdiction and preemption, rejecting its claims throughout this litigation. The trial court resolved the jurisdiction and preemption issues by relying on Campo v. Allstate Insurance Company, 562 F.3d 751 (5th Cir.2009), |swherein the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit recognized the federal statutory and regulatory framework of the NFIP and the federal question jurisdiction and preemption implications of that body of law. However, the Fifth Circuit recognized a distinction between state-law claims arising from claims handling, which implicate both jurisdiction and preemption concerns, and those state-law claims stemming from policy procurement, which do not have such implications. Id. Under the guidance of Campo, the trial court found that the plaintiffs advanced claims strictly related to policy procurement. Thus, the trial court ultimately resolved this matter under the plaintiffs’ state-law claims. After review, we find that the trial court correctly determined that this case involves policy procurement. In this case, Fidelity declared the policy to be cancelled and did so retroactive to the inception date. At trial, Fidelity’s Vice President of Claims, | JDeborah Price, affirmed that the policy was determined to be void from its inception. When the plaintiffs’ counsel inquired whether it was “as if it never existed basically,” Ms. Price replied “[cjorrect.” While denying the existence of the policy at issue, Fidelity seeks to avail itself of the jurisdictional and preemptive qualities of the federal' statutory scheme applicable to that very policy. We note that, in Landry v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 428 F.Supp.2d 531 (E.D.La.2006), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana considered a case in which the insurer posed , the preemption issue in the context of a plaintiffs claim against an agent and NFIP insurer for failure to procure contents coverage as part of the insured’s flood insurance policy issued under the NFIA. Even for this discrete aspect of coverage, the district court concluded that the matter was one involving procurement insofar as it “involve[d] the initial obtaining of coverage.” Id. at 535. It noted that “many aspects of NFIPs are heavily regulated by FEMA; however, the obtaining of coverage does not involve the interpretation or management of an active NFIP.” Id. (Emphasis added.) Therefore, the federal district court determined that the matter before it involved procurement and did not pose a federal question. Id. The matter was ultimately remanded to a Louisiana state district court. Id. In Campo, 562 F.3d 751, a case involving a renewal of a flood insurance policy, the Fifth Circuit remarked favorably on the approach of Landry and extended that reasoning beyond initial procurement. Rather, the plaintiff in Campo alleged that the insurer and its representatives made negligent misrepresentations preventing a renewal of his flood insurance policy. The Fifth Circuit noted that the |7plaintiffs “claim” was merely a “fictitious claim” insofar as “the act of filing a claim on an expired policy, i.e., a dormant policy, is equivalent to filing no claim at all.” Id. at 756. The court stated that: “At the relevant time, Campo’s policy had expired subject to restoration only in the event that he paid the premium within the extended grace period. Allstate was thus by definition incapable of handling any new claims based on post-expiration occurrences.” Id. The court observed that in light of a failure to renew: Campo’s coverage had expired; there was thus nothing to continue. Instead, as a former policyholder, Campo would have had to procure flood insurance. One way for him to do this was to pay his renewal premium to Allstate by December 12, which would have caused his expired policy to be reinstated. The mere fact that Allstate, for a time, mistakenly acted as though a claim existed does not make it so. It is thus impossible for Campo’s claims to fall within the category of handling. Id. Here, it is apparent that the claims are procurement-related. As in Campo, there was no claim to handle and the plaintiffs do not seek to enforce the policy or pursue their damages claim under the policy. Rather, in essence, the plaintiffs in this case did not procure a policy. The mere issuance of a declaration page cannot be said to equate to the existence of a policy when, as here, the insurer declared that policy to be invalid from the date of inception. As affirmed by Ms. Price of Fidelity, whose testimony is referenced above, the policy essentially never existed. Additionally, in Grissom v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 678 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.2012), the Fifth Circuit explained that: The key factor to determine if an interaction with an insurer is “claims handling” is the status of the insured at the time of the interaction between the parties. If the individual is already covered and in the midst of a non-lapsed insurance policy, the interactions between the insurer and insured, including renewals of insurance, are “claims handling” subject to preemption. ^Consideration of this “key factor” in light of the facts of this case pointedly reveals the interactions involved as procurement-related, not claims handling. Fidelity’s treatment of the underlying policy as one that never came into existence evidences that any interaction was not in the midst of a relationship between an insured and an insurer. In light of the above guidance, we find that this matter does not involve federal question jurisdiction. Further, we find that the trial court appropriately determined that the plaintiffs’ policy procurement claims are not preempted by federal law. Such a result is dictated by Campo, 562 F.3d 751. In reaching its pronouncement that “federal law does not preempt state-law procurement based claims[,]” the Fifth Circuit found that the United States Congress expressly preempted state law only as to handling-related claims. Id. at 757. In a footnote, the Fifth Circuit referenced that portion of the Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP) providing that: “ ‘This policy and all disputes arising from the handling of any claim under the policy are governed exclusively by FEMA regulations.” Campo, 562 F.3d at 757, n. 38 (quoting 44 C.F.R. pt. 61, app. A(1), art. IX). This defined term of preemptive reach, the Fifth Circuit determined, reveals a lack of congressional interest in a 13more wide-reaching limit of state power. Id. (quoting United States v. 4,432 Mastercases of Cigarettes, More or Less, 448 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir.2006)). Additionally, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “unlike in handling-based cases, permitting prosecution of procurement-related state-law tort suits does not impede the full purposes and objective of Congress.” Campo, 562 F.3d at 758. Instead, it noted that the purpose of the NFIP is to reduce the burden on the federal fisc since FEMA does not reimburse insurers for judgments that are procurement-related. Id. (citing, in part, Landry, 428 F.Supp.2d 531). Finally, in this discussion, we are mindful that Fidelity suggests that this case should follow Florida and California state appellate court decisions finding that those states lacked concurrent subject matter jurisdiction. See Seibels Bruce Ins. Cos. v. Deville Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 786 So.2d 616 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1st Cir.2001); McCormick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 86 Cal.App.4th 404,103 Cal.Rptr.2d 258 (Cal.Ct.App.2001). However, those cases were rendered outside the Fifth Circuit, were rendered before Campo was decided, and involved claims on existing policies. They did not involve, as here, state-law claims based on a policy void from its inception. For these reasons, we find no merit in Fidelity’s arguments regarding federal question jurisdiction and preemption of state law claims. Fidelity — Federal Funds Fidelity also argues that the trial ' court’s rejection of its preemption claims runs afoul of the Appropriations Clause of the United States Constitution and United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. See also Office of Personnel Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 110 S.Ct. 2465,110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990) (wherein the Supreme Court found that payments from the Federal Treasury are limited to those statutorily authorized). Fidelity asserts that proceedings arising Imfrom its status as an insurer under the NFIP implicates federal funds, whether such expenditures are related to litigation or to a resulting judgment against it. It contends that the plaintiffs had the burden of proving that federal funds are not, in fact, at risk, citing Grissom, 678 F.3d 397 and Wright v. Allstate Insurance Company, 415 F.3d 384 (5th Cir.2005). . Under the facts of this case, however, we find no merit in Fidelity’s argument.' Certainly, 42 U.S.C. § 4071(a)(1) recognizes insurers under the NFIP as fiscal agents of the United States. Additionally, the financial relationship between FEMA and such insurers is governed by the terms and conditions of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Insurance Administration, Financial/Assistance Subsidy Arrangement. See 44 C.F.R. pt. 62, app. A. See also Grissom, 678 F.3d 397. That Arrangement provides that the federal government will pay certain claims and reimburse certain costs incurred by those private insurers participating in the NFIP. See 44 C.F.R. pt. 62, app. A, art. III(D). Specifically, the federal government indemnifies and defends NFIP insurers for insurance and litigation expenses. Id. However, the federal regulations plainly provide that such expenses will be provided unless the FEMA Office of the Chief Counsel finds “that the litigation is grounded in actions by the Company that are significantly outside of this Arrangement, and/or involves issues of agent negligence.” 44 C.F.R. pt. 62, app. A, art. III(D)(3)(a). The Arrangement, thereafter, provides for related notices and reviews of such a determination. See 44 C.F.R. pt. 62, app. A, art. III(D)(3)(a). Additionally, in Grissom, 678 F.3d 397, the Fifth Circuit considered the above aspects of the Arrangement in its consideration of whether cases arising launder the NFIP may be heard by a jury. In the context of that discussion, the Fifth Circuit explained that: Unless FEMA explicitly notifies the insurance company of its intent not to defend or indemnify, FEMA is presumed to pay the litigation expenses and any resulting damages awards. In the absence of this document or even any allegation that FEMA notified [the insurer] of its intent not to defend or indemnify, FEMA is assumed to be paying the expenses of the litigation. Id. at 402. Fidelity points to this presumption and asserts that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence of an intent not to defend or indemnify in this case. However, this ease differs from Grissom, 678 F.3d 397. Significantly, Grissom was a claims handling case in which a policy was in place. Thus, the Fifth Circuit determined that “Campo [did] not control” and the plaintiffs “state law claim [was] preempted.” Id. at 401. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit considered the question before it in the context of whether the use of federal funds prohibited consideration of the matter by a jury. Id. In contrast to Grissom, this case involves policy procurement. Neither are the plaintiffs’ state law claims preempted in this case. See Campo, 562 F.3d 751. Further, in light of the circumstances of this case, we note that the Arrangement provides for the payment of litigation expenses unless “the litigation is grounded in actions by the Company that are significantly outside of this Arrangement, and/or involves issues of agent negligence.” 44 C.F.R. pt. 62, app. A, art. (III)(D)(3)(a). Having recognized these distinctions, we do not disturb the trial court’s adherence to Campo, wherein the Fifth Circuit pointedly concluded: “[S]tate-law tort claims related to procurement do not interfere with Congress’s objectives. Federal law thus does not preclude Campo from pursing his procurement-based suit that asserts 112a state-law cause of action for Allstate’s allegedly negligent misrepresentations.” Id. at 758 (footnotes omitted). This assignment lacks merit. Fidelity — Misrepresentation Claims . The distinction that the subject policy was void from its inception date also undermines Fidelity’s contention that the plaintiffs cannot pursue claims for misrepresentations against it, as a fiscal agent of the federal government, through the NFIP. However, the cases that Fidelity cites are factually distinguishable insofar as they involve the existence of a relationship between the plaintiff and the federal government or its agents. See e.g., Federal Crop. Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 68 S.Ct. 1, 92 L.Ed. 10 (1947); Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 104 S.Ct. 2218, 81 L.Ed.2d 42 (1984). In those cases, litigants were charged with knowledge of the laws surrounding the federal programs at issue and were not able to, therefore, rely on representations of the government’s agents. However, as explained above, the policy in this case was void from inception, distancing this case from the NFIP through which Fidelity could claim status as a fiscal agent of the federal government per 42 U.S.C. § 4071. Within this assignment, Fidelity also suggests that the plaintiffs’ recovery is barred by La.Civ.Code art. 5, which provides that: “No one may avail himself of ignorance of the law.” Fidelity contends that the plaintiffs must be held to have known of the prohibitions regarding the general unavailability of federal flood insurance in CBRS zones. However, in this case, the trial court found the status of 11sthe property’s location unclear and rejected the assertion that the plaintiffs made misleading representations in this regard. We find that the record supports this factual finding; thus, we find no merit in this assignment of error. Fidelity — Merits In its final assignment, Fidelity argues that the trial court erred in entering judgment on the plaintiffs’ negligence-based claims insofar as the evidence does not reveal a breach of a specific standard of care. Further, Fidelity contends that doing so suggests that the courts of this state can dictate the national standards applicable to the NFIP. We find no merit in this argument. Again, any relationship in this case has been found to exist outside of the NFIP. Thus, any requirement cannot be said to tread upon the dictates of that program as contained within the federal statutory and regulatory framework. Furthermore, and within the context of Louisiana negligence law, we do find that the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Fidelity breached a standard of care owed to the plaintiffs. In particular, Donald Brayer, accepted by the trial court as an expert in the customs and practices of agents and insurers in the procurement of insurance, testified that Fidelity had a duty to notify the plaintiffs that their property was potentially located in a CBRS zone, even after the policy was issued on July 2, 2008. Such a duty arose when Fidelity became aware that another property in the plaintiffs’ subdivision was identified as being located in the CBRS zone. Mr. Brayer explained that both Insurance Unlimited and Fidelity should have informed the plaintiffs of the potential that their policy was null and void due to its location. Yet, it is undisputed that such a question was not raised with regard to the plaintiffs’ property until after the claim was made on the 114damage sustained in Hurricane Ike. Insofar as it touches on the elements of negligent misrepresentation and damages, Mr. Brayer opined that it was more likely than not that, during that time frame, other flood insurance would likely have been available to the plaintiffs for their property. Accordingly, we find no merit in Fidelity’s contention that the plaintiffs’ did not provide adequate proof of a breach of a specific standard of care. Insurance Unlimited — Breach of a Duty In its separate appeal, Insurance Unlimited also contends that' the trial court erred in finding that it breached a duty owed to the plaintiffs. In particular, Insurance Unlimited contends that Mr. Pearce fulfilled his duty of seeking to secure a flood policy and that he did so by completing the NFIP application using information provided by the plaintiffs. It also notes that the application was submitted based on what it contends was the best available evidence on the question of eligibility. In finding in favor of the, plaintiffs, the trial court determined that Insurance Unlimited failed to follow the guidelines of the NFIP Flood Insurance Manual in processing the application and in failing to determine that the plaintiffs’ property was located in a CBRS zone. This negligence ultimately enabled the negligent misrepresentation that a valid policy was in place. The supreme court has explained that “an insurance agent owes a duty of ‘reasonable diligence’ to his customer.” Isidore Newman Sch. v. J. Everett Eaves, Inc., 09-2161, p. 7 (La.7/6/10), 42 So.3d 852, 356 (quoting Roger v. Dufrene, 613 So.2d 947, 949 (La.1993)). That duty is fulfilled when the agent procures the requested insurance. Id. An insured pursuing a claim must demonstrate that: “1) the insurance agent agreed to procure the insurance; 2) the agent failed to use | ^‘reasonable diligence’ in attempting to procure the insurance and failed to notify the client promptly that the agent did not obtain insurance and 3) the agent acted in such a way that the client could assume he was insured.” Id. at 356-57. The record supports the trial court’s ruling in light of the above standard. In part, the evidence supports the view that the application, as forwarded to Fidelity, was insufficient under the dictates of the NFIP manual. Shelley Young, Insurance Unlimited’s Managing Supervisor, confirmed that agents are expected to abide by the NFIP manual. However, despite knowledge that the Long Beach Road community was potentially in a CBRS zone, Mr. Pearce did not take measures to verify the property’s insura-bility in that regard. On this point, the NFIP manual provides that: To determine if a building is eligible for flood insurance coverage, the producer should consult the list of communities where coastal barriers and/or [Otherwise Protected Areas] have been identified. The list is included in this section. The community’s map should always be reviewed to determine if the property to be insured is located in a designated CBRS area or an OPA. (Emphasis in the original.) Ms. Young explained that the agency follows this guideline as the agents are familiar with the maps. However, it is clear that Mr. Pearce did not consult the map to “determine if the property to be insured [was] located in a designated CBRS area or an OPA.” Even assuming familiarity on the part of Mr. Pearce in this case, it is apparent that, ultimately, the plaintiffs’ property was determined to be within the CBRS. Additionally, the application Insurance Unlimited forwarded to Fidelity included an Elevation Certificate for the property which was silent on the CBRS location. According to Ms. Price of Fidelity, the NFIP manual requires that the document be certified as complete by the surveyor. However, the |,(¡Elevation Certificate submitted with the application did not resolve the CBRS question. Thus, the evidence supports a view that Insurance Unlimited forwarded a deficient application to Fidelity, which, in turn, is sued the subject policy. Relying upon this policy, later found to be void, the plaintiffs did not pursue other measures of insuring their property and subsequently sustained damage based on the lack of a valid policy. This assignment lacks merit. Insurance Unlimited — Material Misrepresentation Neither do we find merit in Insurance Unlimited’s contention that its liability is negated or diminished because it relied on information provided by the plaintiffs. The insurer asserts that the plaintiffs were aware that their property was uninsurable given Travelers’ cancellation of their prior policy in 2007, but that they did not reveal that the location of their property was within the CBRS zone in completing their 2008 application. Insurance Unlimited notes that the plaintiffs signed the application indicating that their statements were true and correct. In ruling on this defense, the trial court explained: The DEFENDANTS argue that Mr. Barnett intentionally hid the fact that his property was not eligible for NFIP coverage, and that his previous policy had been cancelled by Travelers because it was located in a CPRS [sic] zone. The overall testimony and evidence presented at trial does not indicate that Mr. Barnett was being deceitful or was intentionally omitting information to Mr. Pearce in order to obtain flood insurance. In fact, Mr. Barnett seems to be someone who does not really understand the working of insurance policies. He provided everything that Mr. Pearce had requested. Further, there was a sufficient question as to whether the plaintiffs’ property was actually located in a CBRS zone. Mr. George A. Evans, Jr., a registered professional land surveyor, issued |17an elevation certificate on the property, dated May 24, 2004, and did not check the applicable box indicating that the property was in a CBRS zone. Mr. Lonnie C. Harper, a registered professional land surveyor, also issued an elevation certificate on the same property, dated June 27, 2007, and he did not check the applicable box indicating that the property is located in a CBRS zone. Mr. • Barnett’s neighbor had advised Mr. Barnett that his property was eligible for flood insurance. Further, two separate site specific Standard Flood Hazard Determinations were completed on the Barnetts’ property during the application process. Both indicated that the Barnetts’ property was eligible for NFIP. Accordingly, the court does not find that Mr. Barnett made any. material misrepresentations during the application process. The transcript and documentary evidence in this case support the trial court’s observations regarding the questions surrounding the location of the plaintiffs’ property and further support the determination that no material misrepresentations were made. We point out that Mr. Barnett testified that he met with Mr. Pearce after being informed that a neighbor had obtained flood insurance through Insurance Unlimited. Mr. Barnett explained that he indicated to Mr. Pearce that Travelers had cancelled a prior policy due to location in a CBRS zone. Mr. Barnett denied that he withheld the information regarding the Travelers’ cancellation and stated that: “It was never my intent to hide anything.” In light of this evidence and the attendant credibility determinations made by the trial court, we find no merit in this claim of material misrepresentation. Insurance Unlimited — Federal Law Like Fidelity, Insurance Unlimited claims that the plaintiffs’ state law claims are preempted by the NFIP. However, as stated above, Campo, 562 F.3d 751, clearly indicates that claims related to policy procurement are not, in fact, preempted. In light of the discussion above, we do not address this assignment further. Neither do we separately address Insurance Unlimited’s assertion that the plaintiffs must be charged with the knowledge of the guidelines surrounding the NFIP. Rather, as explained above, the subject policy was determined to be void | lsfrom its inception, removing this case from the federal framework Insurance Unlimited asserts is applicable. For the reasons expressed herein, Insurance Unlimited’s arguments regarding the applicability of federal law lack merit. Insurance Unlimited — Damages Finally, Insurance Unlimited contests the trial court’s award of damages. In particular, it notes that the trial court reduced the damages awarded by reference to an alternate, private flood insurance policy obtained by the plaintiff shortly before trial. However, Insurance Unlimited argues that the trial court erred in relying on the figure of the private insurance since the quoted private insurance coverage was |1flfor less than the full coverage sought under the NFIP. Insurance Unlimited contends that “any damage consideration should include the appropriate reduction for premium and deductible amounts for similar coverage.” On this point, Insurance Unlimited would have preferred for the trial court to rely on a 2007 quote for full coverage, private flood insurance rejected by the plaintiffs before seeking NFIP coverage through Insurance Unlimited. While the private insurance ultimately obtained by the plaintiffs was not for the full coverage sought from the NFIP, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in relying on those figures as the appropriate evidence before it. The plaintiffs specifically rejected the 2007 private insurance quote for full coverage in light of its costs and, only later, pursued NFIP coverage. Without notice of their ineligibility under the NFIP, the plaintiffs did not pursue any available options for private insurance, full coverage or otherwise, until after the final determination that the instant policy was void from inception. Given the evidence before it, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in shaping the final award of damages. This assignment lacks merit. DECREE For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this proceeding are assessed equally to the defendants/appellants, Fidelity National Property & Casualty Insurance Company and Insurance Unlimited of Louisiana, Inc. AFFIRMED. . The NFIP Flood Insurance Manual, portions of which were entered into evidence in this case, provides as follows with regard to the Write Your Own Program: The Write Your Own (WYO) Program, begun in 1983, is a cooperative undertaking of FEMA and the private insurance industry. The WYO Program operates within the context of the NFIP and is subject to its rules and regulations. WYO allows participating property and casualty insurance companies to write and service federal flood insurance in their own names. The companies receive an expense allowance for policies written and claims processed while the federal government retains responsibility for underwriting losses. Individual WYO Companies may, to the extent possible, and consistent with Program rules and regulations, conform their flood business to their normal business practices for other lines of insurance. Many producers have elected to move or place their flood policies with one or more of the WYO Companies they represent. . In reasons for ruling, the trial court explained: FIDELITY argues that it acted at all times herein in its capacity as a Write Your Own (WYO) Program flood insurance carrier, as a fiscal agent of the United States, in a program governed exclusively by federal law. Further, the plaintiffs’ claims raise exclusive questions of federal law, and thus this court lacks concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over this litigation. . Plaintiffs argue that while federal law preempts state law tort claims arising from claims handling by a WYO carrier, federal law does not preempt state law claims related to insurance procurement, and directs the court to Campo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 562 F.3d 751 (5th Cir.2009). In that case, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal addressed this issue. The Campos had purchased a Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP) through Allstate Insurance Company in its capacity as a WYO. For over twenty years, plaintiffs had SFIP on their home. On August 13, 2005, plaintiffs’ coverage ended when the premium was paid. The policy included a 30-day grace period for payments, so that if the Campos paid the premium by September 13, they would have avoided a gap in coverage. On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina destroyed plaintiffs' home. Because of Hurricane Katrina, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) extended the deadline for an additional 90 days or until December 12, 2005 for the purposes of the plaintiffs’ policy. Shortly after Hurricane Katrina, Plaintiffs made a claim on their SFIP. Allstate indicated that they were evaluating the claim and had requested that the policy limits be paid. Allstate also made an advance payment of $2500 to the plaintiffs. However, Allstate never advised the plaintiffs that the payments were conditioned upon the timely payment of the renewal premium. After the deadlines for paying the premium had expired, Allstate denied the claim based on no coverage being in place. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs' claims were related to policy procurement and not preempted by federal law. In the instant case, the plaintiffs’ allege that FIDELITY sold them a policy that was invalid under federal law, and therefore, the plaintiffs never dealt with the federal government or its agents. Rather they were dealing with FIDELITY as a private insurer acting outside of its scope as a WYO carrier. Furthermore, because there was never any valid SFIP under federal law in this case, there are no federal laws at issue and thus no question of federal jurisdiction. Just as in the Campo case, this court finds that the issues in this case are related to policy procurement and not claims handling and thus are not preempted by federal law. Thus, the court has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims. The defendant's Exception of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is therefore overruled. The trial court revisited the matter upon summary judgments filed by Fidelity and Insurance Unlimited. Denying both motions, the trial court explained: FIDELITY argues that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because this matter involves only questions of federal law. This court has previously ruled on FIDELITY’S Exception of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and subsequently provided written reasons. FIDELITY’S motion for summary judgment is basically a reconsideration of its exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, the court will deny FIDELITY’S motion for summary judgment. . The Fidelity "Notice of Cancellation” issued to the plaintiffs provides: Dear Insured: We have sent you a policy under which you are anticipating coverage or have been provided coverage. Unfortunately, because of recently discovered information we are unable to provide the coverages set forth in your policy. Consequently, the policy indicated above has been cancelled as of the date and for reason(s) listed below. Cancellation Date: 12:01 a.m. Standard Time on 7/02/08 Reason(s) for Cancellation 06 — RISK NOT ELIGIBLE FOR COVERAGE The "Flood Declarations Page” includes an "Inception Date” of "7/02/08 12:01 am" and a "Policy Period” of "7/02/08 to “7/02/09 12:01 am Standard Time.” . Fidelity lodged separate jurisdictional and preemption arguments in this case. However, as with preemption, the Standard Flood Insurance Policy addresses the federal jurisdiction question in reference to claims handling. In this regard, the SFIP provides: R. Suit Against Us You may not sue us to recover money under this policy unless you have complied with all the requirements of the policy. If you do sue, you must start the suit within one year after the date of the written denial of all or part of the claim, and you must file the suit in the United States District Court of the district in which the covered property was located at the time of loss. This requirement applies to any claim that you may have under this policy and to any dispute that you may have arising out of the handling of any claim under the policy. See 44 C.F.R. pt. 61, app. A(1), art. VII (emphasis added). . We further point out that Campo acknowledged 44 C.F.R. pt. 62, app. A, art. III(D)(3)(a) in its consideration of the statutory and regulatory framework surrounding the preemption question. . In awarding damages, the trial court explained: DEFENDANTS further argue that the plaintiffs should not get the benefit of purchasing a non-NFIP policy just forty-five (45) days prior to trial. The explanation given by Mr. Barnett for waiting to purchase flood insurance until approximately two months before trial was that the defendants were still disputing whether the property was located in a CBRS zone and they had recently agreed that the property was in a CBRS zone. [Record citations omitted.] The court is aware that the defendants maintained up until February of 2012 that there was a valid flood insurance policy in effect on plaintiffs’ property at the time Hurricane Ike made landfall. It was not until February of 2012 that they conceded that the policy was without any effect. The court finds judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant equally in this matter. The damages proven by the plaintiffs are as follows: Flood Damage sustained by Hurricane Ike: $62,531.86 Premium paid to Fidelity: $ 1,539.00 TOTAL: $64,070.86 These damages are reduced by the SWBC Premium of $3,455.55 paid by the plaintiffs, and the $10,000 deductible that was applicable under the policy. The total damages proven by the plaintiffs, therefore, is $50,615.31. This amount is further reduced to $50,000 due to plaintiffs’ stipulation that their claim did not exceed the sum of $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs. We note that the plaintiffs’ calculation in their brief to this court reflects a reduction of an SWBC premium of $4,058.25 and a total damages award of $50,012.61. These figures relate to expert testimony estimating the expense associated with procuring private flood insurance in 2008. The trial court’s calculations are set forth above for purposes of illustration. Under either calculation, the sustained damages exceeded $50,000.00. In light of the plaintiffs’ pre-trial stipulation and waiver of jury demand pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 1732(1), the resulting judgment awarded a reduced figure of $50.000.00.

In re Strickland, Bobby; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 175218; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 2184. Denied.

In re Arbona III, Henry W.; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 506122; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 KW 0066. Denied.

In re Morris, Christopher; — Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review Office of Workers Compensation, District 6, No. 12-04423; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CA 0293. Denied. HUGHES, J., would grant.

SAVOIE, Judge. | iln this insurance coverage dispute, the Plaintiffs seek review of a summary judgment finding that the uninsured/underin-sured motorist coverage provisions in their policy did not provide coverage for an alleged reduction in market value of the Plaintiffs’ vehicle resulting from an auto accident with an uninsured driver, and dismissing their claims. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The parties submit that on June 6, 2013, an automobile accident occurred wherein a 2013 Volvo owned by Dr. and Mrs. Horton was struck by an uninsured motorist. The Hortons allege that, as a result of the accident, their vehicle sustained physical damage, as well as a reduction in market value. ANPAC Louisiana Insurance Company (ANPAC) issued a “Louisiana Automobile Policy” applicable to the Hortons’ vehicle. It is undisputed that ANPAC paid for the physical damages to the Hortons’ vehicle sustained in the accident pursuant to the collision coverage in the policy. ANPAC, however, refused to provide coverage for the vehicle’s alleged reduction in market value. Therefore, the Hortons filed suit against ANPAC, seeking damages for reduction in market value under the uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions of the policy, as well as penalties and attorney fees for failure to timely pay these damages. The pertinent uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage provisions of the policy state as follows: PART IV-UNINSURED/UNDERIN-SURED MOTORIST Coverage J — Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage We will pay damages which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury caused by ^accident and resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle. We will also pay damages which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of property damage caused by accident and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle. Uninsured Motorist Property Damage is subject to a $250 deductible per accident. The liability of the owner or operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle must result from the ownership, maintenance, or use of the vehicle. We will pay under each coverage only if a premium is shown for the respective coverage in the Declarations ... (emphasis added). The applicable declarations page shows a premium in the heading labeled “Uninsured & Underinsured Motorist[,]” and the line directly underneath, labeled “Limit Per Person/ACCIdent[,]” states “250,-000/500,000.” In addition, the Hortons’ insurance application reflects a premium, and a $250,000 per person, $500,000 per accident limit in the line labeled “Uninsured/Under-insured Motorist bi[.]” The line labeled “Uninsured Motorist pd” is blank. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment seeking a determination as to whether the uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions provide coverage for reduction in market value. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of ANPAC and dismissed the Hortons’ claims, finding the uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions did not provide property damage coverage to the Hortons, and, therefore, did not cover the alleged reduction in market value. LAW AND ANALYSIS We review summary judgments as follows: [¡¡Courts of appeal review summary judgments de novo applying the same analysis as the trial court. Schroeder v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 591 So.2d 342 (La.1991). Summary judgment is governed by La.Code Civ.P. arts. 966 and 967. Article 966 provides that while the burden of proving entitlement to summary judgment rests with the mover, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the mover’s burden does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party’s claim, action or defense, but rather to point out that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party’s claim, action or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient- to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there, is no genuine issue of material fact. Hardy v. Bowie, 98-2821 (La.9/8/99), 744 So.2d 606. Berard v. Home State County Mut. Ins. Co., 11-1372, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/9/12), 89 So.3d 470, 471-472. Interpretation of insurance policies is governed by the following principles: An insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed by using the general rules of interpretation of contracts set forth in the Louisiana Civil Code. The judiciary’s role in interpreting insurance contracts is to ascertain the common intent of the parties to the contract. Words and phrases used in an insurance policy are to be construed using their plain, ordinary and generally prevailing meaning, unless the words have acquired a technical meaning. An insurance contract, however, should not be interpreted in an unreasonable or strained manner under the guise of contractual interpretation to enlarge or to restrict its provisions beyond what is reasonably contemplated by unambiguous terms or achieve an absurd conclusion. Ambiguous policy provisions are generally construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage. Under this rule of strict construction, equivocal provisions seeking to narrow an insurer’s obligation are strictly construed against the insurer. That strict construction principle applies only if the ambiguous policy provision is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations. If the policy wording at issue is clear and unambiguously expresses the parties’ intent, the insurance contract must be enforced as written. Courts lack the authority to alter the terms of insurance contracts under the guise of contractual interpretation when the |4poIicy’s provisions are couched in unambiguous terms. The determination of whether a contract is clear or ambiguous is a question of law. Cadwallader v. Allstate Ins. Co., 02-1637, pp. 3-4 (La.6/27/03), 848 So.2d 577, 580 (citations omitted). The Hortons argue on appeal that the uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions of their policy entitle them to coverage for property damage, including reduction of market value, resulting from an uninsured driver. They submit that coverage for both bodily injury and property damage is automatically available under the uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions, provided that the insured purchases uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, and that a separate premium for uninsured/underinsured property damage coverage is not required. We disagree. The uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions are provided in the policy under “Part IV — Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist”. Thereunder, “Coverage J — Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage” provides that the insurer will pay for damages for both bodily injury and property damage “to which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle[,]” as those terms are defined in the policy. Coverage J then states that the insurer “will pay under each coverage only if a premium is shown for the respective coverage in the Declarations.” Reference to “each” coverage indicates there is more than one coverage available under Coverage J (i.e. coverage for damages for “bodily injury” and “property damage” as described therein). Coverage J also clearly requires a premium for each “respective” coverage available under Coverage J. Consequently, the policy affords property damage coverage under “Coverage J — Uninsured/ Underinsured Motorist Coverage” only if the declarations page reflects a premium |fifor that coverage. Therefore, it is necessary to determine if the declarations page reflects a premium for property damage coverage described under Coverage J. .The declarations page reflects a premium in the line labeled “uninsured and un-derinsured motorist.” This line-heading is consistent with the title of Part IV and Coverage J. However, the declarations page provides only one limit applicable to this coverage, which is stated as “limit per person/accident[,]” in the amount of “250,-000/500,000”. No applicable deductible is stated. The per person/accident limit described in the declarations is clearly the limit for coverage for bodily injury provided under Coverage J. The section of Part IV — Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist of the policy labeled “Limits of Liability” states that “subject to the bodily injury liability limits for “each person[,]” the bodily injury liability limit for “each occurrence” is the maximum we will pay as damages for bodily injury to two or more persons in one accident.” The limit applicable to uninsured/underinsured property damage coverage under Coverage J is not “subject to” a per person limit, but rather would be stated as a per accident limit. Because the declarations page does not provide a limit for uninsured/underinsured property damage coverage, the premium shown for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage does not include property damage coverage. Therefore, the policy does not provide coverage for property damage, including reduction in market value, under the uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions. |fiWhile we believe the uninsured/under-insured provisions unambiguously do not afford property damage coverage to the Hortons, we note that our finding is consistent with the Hortons’ insurance application. While the application shows a premium and $250,000/$500,000 limit for uninsured/underinsured bodily injury coverage, the line for any applicable premium and limit for uninsured/underinsured motorist property damage coverage is blank. The Hortons suggest that, because the declarations page reflects a premium in the line labeled “uninsured and uninsured motorist coverage[,]” they paid for and are entitled to both property damage and bodily injury coverage described in the uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions. However, this interpretation would lead to the unreasonable result of uninsured/un-derinsured property damage coverage that is not subject to a coverage limit, since the declarations page does not provide a limit for that coverage. In addition, interpreting the policy to subject both uninsured/underinsured bodily injury and property damage coverage to the $250,000/$500,000 “per person/accident” limit, which is the only limit provided for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, would effectively reduce the uninsured/underinsured bodily injury coverage by the amount of any property damage. This interpretation could also lead to an unreasonable result. It would potentially render the uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions insufficient under La. R.S. 22:1295(l)(a)(i) by reducing the statutorily required limit for uninsured/jun-derinsured7 coverage for “bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death therefrom” to less than “the limits of bodily injury provided by the policy[,]” without the requisite form selecting a lower limit. CONCLUSION The policy at issue affords property damage coverage under the uninsured/un-derinsured motorist provisions only if a premium for that coverage is shown in the declarations page. Because the declarations page does not show a premium for uninsured/underinsured property damage coverage, the Hortons are not entitled to coverage for property damage, including reduction in market value, under the uninsured/underinsured motorist policy provisions. DECREE For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this proceeding are assessed to Appellants, Dr. Steven M. Horton and Emilyn Horton. AFFIRMED. . Since the policy does not provide property damage coverage under the uninsured/under-insured motorist provisions, we do not consider whether the policy's definition of. "property damage” includes a reduction of a vehicle’s market value. . Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1295(l)(a)(i) provides in pertinent part: No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle designed for use on public highways and required to be registered in this state or as provided in this Section unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than the limits of bodily injury liability provided by the policy, under provisions filed with and approved by the commissioner of insurance, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover nonpunitive damages from owners or operators of uninsured or underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death resulting therefrom; however, the coverage required under this Section is not applicable when any insured named in the policy either rejects coverage, selects lower limits, or selects economic-only coverage, in the manner provided in Item (l)(a)(ii) of this Section.”

In re Burgo, Donald; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of St. Mary, 16th Judicial District Court Div. B, No. 168512; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 2157. Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189; La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.3; State ex rel. Melinie v. State, 93-1380 (La.1/12/96), 665 So.2d 1172.

In re State of Louisiana, Department of Social Services in the Interest of B.B.;— Plaintiff; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Jefferson, Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court, No. 03-NS-1050; to the Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, No. 14-CA-360. Denied.

In re Cannon, Johnny; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial. Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. K, No. 11-92-0990; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KW 2234. Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

In re Graham, James C.; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Tammany, 22nd Judicial District Court Div. H, No. 525785; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 1893. | j Denied. HUGHES, J., dissents with reasons.

In re Bayou Jack Logging, L.L.C., et al.; Kenneth Guillot; StarNet Insurance Company; — Defendant(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Avo-yelles, 12th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2012-8424-A; ■ to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 14-862. Denied. KNOLL, J., recused.

In re Smith, Clyde Edward; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Terrebonne, 32nd Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 600,641; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2012 KA1560. Denied.

In re OneBeacon American Insurance Company; Pennsylvania General Insurance Company; The Travelers Indemnity Company; — Defendant(s) Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court Div. F, No. 2012-6486; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Nos. 2014-C-0608, 2014-C-0639. Denied.

In re Davis, Marvin; — Defendant; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. D, No. 401-840; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-K-0680. Denied. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8; State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge. _JjThe State charged Defendant, Wade A. Tolliver, a/k/a Wade W. Tolliver, Jr., with attempted second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1; attempted armed robbery, in violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:64; aggravated battery, in violation of La.R.S. 14:34; possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of La.R.S 14:95.1; and aggravated burglary, in violation of La.R.S. 14:60. He pled guilty to aggravated burglary; the State dismissed the other counts and agreed not to file a habitual offender bill. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years at hard labor. Defendant now appeals his sentence, claiming it is excessive. We affirm Defendant’s sentence. I. ISSUE We will determine whether the sentence the trial court imposed on Defendant is excessive. II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The victims, Mr. and Mrs. Albert Harris, stopped for the night at the America’s Best Value Inn in Lafayette Parish. At a preliminary hearing, Mr. Harris testified that shortly before 10:00 p.m., a black male between the ages of twenty and thirty knocked on the door. Mr. Harris looked out the window and saw | ¡¡Defendant. When Defendant motioned for Mr. Harris to open the door, Mr. Harris opened the door slightly. Mr. Harris then saw a gun in Defendant’s hand and tried to close the door quickly. After a struggle, Defendant entered the hotel room. Mrs. Harris was able to flee the room and call for help. Defendant moved through the room and jerked the hotel phone out of the wall. He then hit Mr. Harris over the head, causing him to bleed profusely. Mr. Harris stated that Defendant fled the room and escaped on a bicycle. The police later apprehended Defendant and brought him to the hotel, where Mr. Harris identified him as the assailant. Defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement. In exchange for Defendant’s plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated burglary, the State agreed not to enhance Defendant’s sentence through a habitual offender bill, and it dismissed the other charges. The sentencing range for the offense of aggravated burglary is not less than one, nor more than thirty years at hard labor. Defendant received a sentence of twenty-five years at hard labor. He now appeals. III. LAW AND DISCUSSION In his sole assignment of error, Defendant argues his twenty-five year sentence is excessive. As there was no motion to reconsider sentence, he is limited to a bare claim of excessiveness, as this court has explained: Since Defendant did not object to his sentence or file a motion to reconsider sentence, he is relegated to a bare claim of excessiveness. This court has set forth the following standard to be used in reviewing excessive sentence claims: |3La. Const, art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La. 1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 8 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert, denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615,136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996). State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La.2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331. To decide whether a sentence shocks one’s sense of justice or makes no meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court has held: [A]n appellate court may consider several factors including the nature of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the legislative purpose behind the punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed for similar crimes. State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La.7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501. While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (LaApp. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is within the purview of the 14trial court to particularize the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 958. State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (LaApp. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La.5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061. State v. Jackson, 11-923, pp. 2-3 (LaApp. 3 Cir. 6/6/12), 92 So.3d 1243, 1245-46, writ denied, 12-1540 (La.1/18/13), 107 So.3d 626. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:60 sets forth a sentencing range of one to thirty years at hard labor for aggravated battery. Thus, Defendant’s sentence is in the upper range of possible sentences for aggravated burglary. We note, however, that the trial court carefully considered Defendant’s presentence report as well as the specific circumstances of the crime. Indeed, Defendant has two prior felony convictions, and he has been on probation/parole for the- last ten years. His probation/parole has been revoked on at least three occasions. In the commission of this crime, Defendant showed a reckless disregard for life and preyed on vulnerable victims. Specifically, Defendant ambushed two innocent, elderly individuals. His actions indicate that he was aggressive and knew that his behavior was wrong. For example, Defendant continuously tried to stick his gun through the crack between the hotel room door and the door jamb. Once he gained entry to the room, he jerked the phone out of the wall, thereby preventing Mr. or Mrs. Harris from calling for help. He then violently attacked Mr. Harris. lfiThus, this was a violent offense against vulnerable individuals, and Defendant’s past convictions and behavior indicate that he should be removed from society. We note this court’s earlier discussion of a sentence for aggravated burglary: [T]he trial court did not abuse its considerable discretion when it sentenced Defendant to thirty years at hard labor considering the circumstance of the case and Defendant’s criminal history. As noted by the trial court, Defendant is a five-time felony offender and has an extensive arrest record. In State v. Thompson,. 39,454, 39,455 (LaApp. 2 Cir. 3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1268, cited by the trial court in the present case as a comparison, Thompson was convicted of aggravated burglary and received the maximum sentence of thirty years. The second circuit affirmed the sentence, noting that Thompson was a four-time felony offender and had a lengthy criminal past. The second circuit further stated, “Defendant was the worst type of offender. The crimes were committed in a manner that endangered the lives of several people and with total disregard for public safety ... it was clear that [Thompson] had not benefited from his previous incarcerations and that, this time, he would be sent away to serve the interest of public safety.” Id. at 1285. Under the circumstances of the case as set forth by the trial court above and considering Defendant’s extensive criminal history, Defendant’s maximum sentence was not such that would shock this court’s sense of justice. Accordingly, there is no merit to this claim. State v. Brandenburg, 06-1158, pp. 30-31 (LaApp. 3 Cir. 2/7/07), 949 So.2d 625, 646, writs denied, 07-538, 07-614 (La.10/26/07), 966 So.2d 571, 966 So.2d 573. Thus, the current sentence is not “outside the norms of Louisiana jurisprudence.” State v. Office, 07-193, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/3/07), 967 So.2d 1185, 1194, writ denied, 07-2274 (La.4/18/08), 978 So.2d 348. |fíWe find that due to the violent nature of the crime, the trial court’s sentence of twenty-five years at hard labor was not an abuse of discretion. IV. DECREE We affirm the trial court’s judgment sentencing Defendant to twenty-five years at hard labor for the crime of aggravated burglary. AFFIRMED. . A preliminary examination was held to preserve the testimony of Mr. Harris. . In court, Mr. Harris identified Defendant as the perpetrator.

In re Vernice Kent as surviving mother of Santrell Glover; — Plaintiff; Applying For Supervisory and/or Remedial Writs, Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 19th Judicial District Court Div. D, No. 627,677; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2014 CW 1010. Denied. HUGHES, J., would grant.

In re Joanne Mathas LeCompte; Kenneth John LeCompte, et ux.; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of St. Martin, 16th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 72391-E; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. 14-242. Denied.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of East Feli-ciana. Prior report: La.App., 145 So.3d 436. Writ denied.

In re Don Paul J. Hargroder, Jr., et al.; — Defendant; Applying for Reconsideration of this court’s action dated November 21, 2014, Parish of Lafayette, 15th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 2012-6621-A; to the Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, No. CW 14-00666. Not considered. See Supreme Court Rule IX, § 6.

McClendon, j. l2The City of Slidell seeks review of a trial court judgment declaring that a former employee was entitled to continue to participate in the city’s health care plan and denying its exception raising the objection of prescription. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Dean Born was employed by the City of Slidell from April 30, 1984 through August 1, 2008, at which time Mr. Born began drawing retirement benefits. At the time of Mr. Born’s retirement, a city ordinance (section 21 — 21(b)(1)) provided that a city employee who met certain requirements might elect to continue to participate in the city’s health insurance plan. In that event, the city would pay the cost of the retired employee’s city medical plan (the “City Plan”). On August 26, 2008, the City amended the referenced ordinance to require city retirees, upon reaching the age of sixty-five, to apply for Medicare coverage, with the City required to pay Medicare Advantage at no cost to the retiree. The ordinance also provided that only those retirees who were ineligible for Medicare would be allowed to continue to participate in the City Plan to the same extent as prior to reaching the age of sixty-five. |sMr. Born turned sixty-five on July 26, 2018. On May 1, 2013, the City, in light of Mr. Born’s age-based Medicare eligibility, sent Mr. Born a letter informing him that he was required to: (1) enroll with the City’s Humana Group Medicare Plan, or (2) present adequate documentation to the City that he was not Medicare eligible. Mr. Born objected to the City requiring him to enroll in Medicare. In response, the City advised that it intended to terminate his City Plan coverage on July 26, 2013. On July 25, 2013, Mr. Born filed a “Petition for, Declaratory Judgment, Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Permanent Injunction” seeking a declaration of his right to continued health coverage under the City Plan and an injunction prohibiting the City from removing him from the City Plan. In response, the City filed a peremptory exception, urging that Mr. Born’s claims were prescribed insofar as they were claims for compensation subject to a liber-ative prescription period of three years. The City contended that the prescriptive period began to run when it amended the ordinance and that Mr. Born’s suit filed nearly five years post-amendment was untimely. At a hearing on October 23, 2013, the trial considered all claims asserted in Mr. Born’s petition as well as the City’s peremptory exception. Following the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. The trial court subsequently issued written reasons for judgment, denying the City’s exception and declaring that Mr. Born was entitled to continue to participate in the City Plan, with the City to pay 100% of the coverage premium. On November 14, 2013, the trial court signed a written judgment in accord with its written reasons, |4granting Mr. Born’s declaratory judgment and enjoining the City from removing Mr. Born from the City Plan. The City has appealed, assigning the following as error: 1. The trial court erred in finding Mr. Born’s claim was not prescribed. 2. The trial court erred in finding the City was obliged to keep Mr. Born on its Employee Medical Plan and pay 100% of the premium associated with the Plan for Mr. Born and his family. DISCUSSION In its first assignment of error, the City contends that Mr. Born’s claim was prescribed when it was filed. The City notes that contributions to retirement plans, including health benefits, are a form of deferred compensation. See Fishbein v. State ex rel. Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center, 04-2482 (La.4/12/05), 898 So.2d 1260, 1266. Such contributions are compensation for services rendered and are subject to the three-year prescriptive period found in LSA-C.C. art. 3494. Fishbein, 898 So.2d at 1266. This prescription commences to run from the day payment is exigible. LSA-C.C. art. 3495. The City notes that shortly after Mr. Born’s retirement in 2008, Section 21-21 was amended, and it changed the City health benefit for retirees sixty-five years of age or older. The City contends that because Mr. Born was vested with a right to the City health benefit at that time, he had three years from the amendment to contest the City’s action. The City concludes that Mr. Born’s action, filed nearly five years after the amendment, is untimely- In support, the City cites Ledoux v. City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge, 99-2061 (La.2/29/00), 755 So.2d 877. Therein, a former public employee sought payment for compensatory time he accrued at work | .^between 1977 and 1985. The employee was aggrieved by a policy change to accrued compensatory pay by his city/parish employer in 1985, but did not file suit until several months after he retired in 1995. The city/parish employer filed an exception raising the objection of prescription, In concluding that the matter had not prescribed, the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that because the city/parish policy prohibited compensatory time payments from being made before an employee was terminated or retired, the prescriptive period on such claims could not commence until such an occurrence. Accordingly, the employee’s “right to claim payment for compensatory time was not exigible until he retired in 1995.” Id. at 880. The City, relying on Ledoux, contends that Mr. Born’s right to claim payment for compensatory services was exigible at the time he retired. We disagree. For the following reasons, we conclude that the claim was not exigible until Mr. Born turned sixty-five and the City attempted to remove him from the City Plan. Regarding when a claim becomes exigi-ble, comment (b) of the 1983 Official Revision Comments for Article 3495 states: On principle, liberative prescription commences to run from the day a cause of action arises and its judicial enforcement is possible. See 2 M. Planiol, Traité élémentaire de droit civil 3 Pt. 2, at 358 (Louisiana State Law Institute trans. 1959): Liberative prescription begins to run as soon as the action accrues, or, as Pothier said “the day on which the creditor could institute his demand.” It cannot commence sooner, because the time given for prescription should be a time during which the action can be exercised, and one cannot reproach the creditor for not having acted at a time when he did not have the right to do so. Otherwise, it could happen that the right would be lost before it could be exercised, which would be as unjust as absurd (Cass.Civ., 11 Dec. 1918, D. 1923.1.96, P. and S. 1921.1.161). It is the City’s refusal to allow Mr. Born to continue participation in the City Plan upon reaching his sixty-fifth birthday that gives rise to the right to demand continued coverage under the City Plan. The prescriptive period did not begin to run until Mr. Born was removed from the City Plan. That would be the point at which the City failed to do what Mr. Born contends it was obligated to do — i.e. to ^provide health coverage under the City Plan. Prior to that time, there was no indication that the City would apply the ordinance retroactively to Mr. Born. Additionally, the City, had it chosen to do so, could have amended the ordinance again prior to Mr. Born reaching his sixty-fifth birthday. As such, any claim demanding post-age sixty-five coverage would have been premature. Accordingly, the claim for post-age sixty-five coverage under the City Plan became exigible when Mr. Born reached the age of sixty-five and the City failed to provide the benefit. See Fishbein, 898 So.2d at 1269 (“Once [the employer] first paid plaintiff a supplemental component in her salary and failed to contribute its portion based upon this component she alleges was part of her earnable compensation, plaintiffs claim could be acted upon.”) Assignment of error number one is without merit. In its second assignment of error, the City contends that the trial court erred in concluding that it was obligated to keep Mr. Born on the City Plan and pay 100% of the premium associated with the City Plan for Mr. Born and his family. In reaching its conclusion that the City was required to keep Mr. Born on the City Plan, the trial court found this court’s decision in Singletary v. City of Slidell, 11-1538 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/18/12), 97 So.3d 1087, writ not considered, 12-2068 (La.11/16/12), 102 So.3d 28, controlling. In Singletary, the same ordinance and same amendment were at issue. Therein, a councilman retired prior to the City of Slidell amending § 21-21 of the code of ordinances. The City, following its amendment of § 21-21, sent the retired councilman a letter informing him that it was making changes to. the City Plan, including moving all Medicare-eligible retirees and/or their spouses to a Medicare Advantage plan. Id., 97 So.3d at 1089. The retired councilman then filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declara tion that the amendment did not apply to him because he had a vested right in his retirement health benefit. The trial court denied the retired councilman relief, but this court reversed, finding that the amended 17ordinance impermissibly divested the councilman of his vested right to benefits. Id., 97 So.3d at 1091. In so ruling, this court noted that a contract is formed by the consent of the parties established through offer and acceptance. Singletary, 97 So.3d at 1089. Unless the law prescribes a certain formality for the intended contract, offer and acceptance may be made orally, in writing or by action or inaction that under the circumstances is clearly indicative of consent. LSA-C.C. art. 1927; Singletary, 97 So.3d at 1089-90. Nearly every state has determined, using precepts similar to our civilian principles, that when an employer promises a benefit to employees, and employees accept by the actions in meeting the conditions, the result is not a mere gratuity or illusory promise but a vested right in the employee to the promised benefit. Id., 97 So.3d at 1090, citing Knecht v. Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities and Northwestern State University, 591 So.2d 690, 695 (La.1991). This court noted that the councilman, at the time of his retirement, met all the conditions required to participate in the City Plan. Moreover, the ordinance, in effect at the time of the councilman’s retirement provided that the retired employee could elect to continue to participate in the City Plan and required the City to pay 100 percent of the cost of the coverage. Sin-gletary, 97 So.3d at 1090. Therefore, this court deemed the councilman’s right to participate in the City’s health plan a vested right. The City avers that Singletary is not controlling because it did not address the “Plan Document and Summary Plan Description for City of Slidell Employee Medical Plan” (“Plan Document”), which the City acknowledges it failed to bring to this court’s attention in Singletary. The City contends that the Plan Document contained a reservation for the City to alter the City’s health plan such that Mr. Born, at the time of his retirement, had no vested right to remain on the City Plan. Specifically, the Plan Document, at the time of Mr. Born’s retirement, required |sretired employees to meet the qualifications “as defined in City Ordinance, Section 21-21” and further provided: The Employer fully intends to maintain this Plan indefinitely. However, it reserves the right to terminate, suspend, discontinue or amend the Plan at any time and for any reason. Changes in the Plan may occur in any or all parts of the Plan including benefit coverage, deductibles, co-payments, exclusions, limitations, definitions, eligibility and the like. Based on the foregoing language in the Plan Document, the City concludes that the trial court erred in concluding Single-tary was controlling and that Mr. Born had a vested right to continue indefinitely under the same terms that the City Plan had at the time he retired. We recognize that the Plan Document was a contract between the City and Mr. Born, and reserved to the City “the right to terminate, suspend, discontinue or amend the Plan.” However, the City is not terminating, suspending, discontinuing or amending the City Plan; rather, it is attempting to remove Mr. Born from the City Plan that covers its employees and requiring him to enroll in an entirely different plan — ie. the Humana Medicare Advantage. Therefore, because the City Plan was not terminated, suspended, discontinued, or amended, Mr. Born, who met all the requisite conditions at the time of his retirement to participate in the City Plan, has the right to continue to participate in the City Plan. ^CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s November 14, 2013 Judgment is affirmed. Costs of this appeal in the amount of $1,376.50 are assessed to appellant, the City of Slidell. AFFIRMED. .Specifically, § 21-21 of the Code of Ordinances of Slidell provided, in pertinent part, as follows: (b) Retired city employees and retired elected officials shall participate in the city's health insurance program under the following conditions: 1. A city employee of city elected official who: a. Separates from city service after a minimum of ten years of service; b. Within 18 months after such separation receives retirement benefits under any retirement plan authorized by the city; c. Participated in the city's health insurance plan for a minimum of twelve (12) months immediately prior to such separation; and d. Participates in the city’s health insurance plan from the time of separation to the time retirement benefits are received; may elect to continue to participate in the ■city’s health insurance plan. The city shall pay 100 percent of the costs of the individual or family coverage elected by the former employee or elected official beginning at the time retirement benefits are received. . No one disputes that Mr. Born met the requirements set forth in § 21-21 of the Code of Ordinances of Slidell at the time he retired. . Specifically, Ordinance No. 3493 amended § 21-21 of the Code of Ordinances of Slidell by adding subsection 3, which provides: (3) Each City retiree shall, upon reaching the age of sixty five, apply for Medicare coverage Parts A and B. The City shall provide Medicare Advantage coverage at no cost to the retiree. Those retirees who are ineligible for Medicare shall be allowed to continue participation in the City's health insurance program to the same extent as prior to reaching the age of sixty five. . The City Plan is administered through Benefit Management Services. . There was no testimony adduced at the hearing. Rather, the court heard arguments and accepted a joint stipulation of facts and numerous exhibits into evidence. . Louisiana Civil Code article 3494 provides, in pertinent part: The following actions are subject to a liber-ative prescription of three years: (1) An action for the recovery of compensation for services rendered, including payment of salaries, wages, commissions, tuition fees, professional fees, fees and emoluments of public officials, freight, passage, money, lodging, and board; ... . In Singletary, this court, in dicta, indicated that the City’s plan was in contravention of the federally recognized right of beneficiaries to freely decide the type of Medicare coverage desired by them. 97 So.3d at 1091. However, we need not address this issue. . After the amended ordinance became effective, the City also amended the Plan Document, effective July 1, 2009, to provide: Eligibility Requirements for Employee Coverage is hereby amended by restating the following: (2) is a Retired Employee of the Employer who has met the qualifications as defined in the City Ordinance, Section 21-21, who is not Medicare eligible. Further, the Plan Document’s termination provisions were amended to reflect coverage through "[t]he last day of the calendar month prior to the month when a retiree become Medicare-eligible. ’ ’

In re Scott, Kendale; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of East Feliciana, 20th Judicial District Court Div. A, No. 12-CR-505; to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, No. 2013 KA 2061. Denied.

In re Williams, Jabari; — Defendant; Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Orleans, Criminal District Court Div. E, No. 508-064; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 2013-KA-0283. Denied.

In re Allen, Judyette; Baker, Prentiss et al.; Wigington, Sheryl; — Plaintiff(s); Applying For Writ of Certiorari and/or Review, Parish of Webster, 26th Judicial District Court Div. E, No. 71,566; to the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, No. 49,-122-CA. - Granted.