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Levin, J. The question presented is whether annual installments of a Michigan state lottery prize, unpaid at the winner’s death, are exempt from the inheritance tax under a provision of the Lottery Act providing that no state or local tax "of any kind whatsoever shall be imposed upon the proceeds from a prize” awarded by the state lottery. We hold that state lottery prize proceeds, including the right to transfer and receive an inheritance of such proceeds, were so exempt. i Rose D’Amico won a state lottery prize entitling her to $1,000,000 payable in twenty annual installments of $50,000. Fourteen installments were unpaid when she died in March, 1981. The inheritance tax examiner, in accordance with the Department of Treasury’s eleven-year practice of not seeking to tax state lottery proceeds, did not include the lottery proceeds in the December, 1981, calculation of the inheritance tax. The tax was redetermined in April, 1986, after a September, 1983, Department of Treasury decision to seek to collect inheritance tax on the transfer of the right to receive future installments of a decedent’s lottery winnings. The additional tax sought to be imposed is $13,527.70. The probate court ruled that state lottery proceeds were not, before the 1988 repeal of the statutory provision exempting state lottery proceeds from the imposition of tax, subject to inheritance tax. 1988 PA 516. The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the exemption was for a "direct” tax on property and did not apply to a tax on the privilege of transferring or receiving property by inheritance. ii The United States Supreme Court held in 1900 that legislation exempting securities issued by the United States government from taxation did not exempt the securities from federal estate or state inheritance taxation. State court cases generally adopt the analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court. _ Judicial opinions so holding draw a distinction, adopted by the Court of Appeals and in the dissenting opinion, between a "direct” and an "indirect” tax, and distinguish between a direct tax on property or income and a tax on the "privilege” of transferring or receiving property, and sometimes explain their results by characterizing an estate or inheritance tax as an excise tax. The courts so holding also invoke, as did the Court of Appeals and the dissent, rules of construction disfavoring exemption from taxation. The most telling rule of construction, however, is often a court’s teleological assessment of the consequences of one construction as opposed to another, as appears from the seminal decision of the United States Supreme Court in Plummer v Coler, 178 US 115, 138; 20 S Ct 829; 44 L Ed 998 (1900), where an underlying policy is stated: It is often impracticable to secure from living persons their fair share of contribution to maintain the administration of the State, and such [inheritance tax] laws seem intended to enable to secure payment from the estate of the citizen when his final account is settled with the State. Nor can it be readily supposed that such obligations can be evaded or defeated by the particular form in which the property of the decedent was invested. [Emphasis added.] Were the United States Supreme Court to have held that United States government securities were exempt from estate and inheritance taxation, persons whose wealth is in liquid form — cash, checking, or savings accounts, or marketable securities — could, in anticipation of death, have invested the bulk of their fortunes in tax-exempt United States government securities and thereby avoided all estate and inheritance taxation of wealth in that form. The Court undoubtedly cor rectly assessed the matter in concluding that the Congress did not intend such a result when it exempted United States government securities from taxation. The policy concern identified in Plummer does not obtain where lottery proceeds are involved. While a lottery winner expends money in purchasing lottery tickets, there is no "investment” or transfer of wealth, in the sense referred to in Plummer, in purchasing a lottery ticket, and no need, by judicial construction, to guard against avoidance, beyond the policy of the statute, of estate and inheritance tax. I acknowledge that United States Trust Co v Helvering, 307 US 57; 59 S Ct 692; 83 L Ed 1104 (1939), cannot be explained on the policy basis suggested. There the exemption was of life insurance proceeds, apparently payable ex gratia, by the United States to veterans of World War I. The Court observed that the rule distinguishing between a direct and indirect tax, and the excise distinction, had been well established, before enactment of the legislation providing the life insurance benefit, since 1900 when Plummer was decided. hi This Court has not heretofore considered the question dealt with in Plummer. There is no decision of this Court holding that a legislative exemption from taxation applies only to direct taxes, or that an indirect or excise tax on the right or privilege of transferring or receiving property is not included within an exemption from taxation. There not having been a ruling by this Court establishing the law in Michigan, the department’s eleven-year practice of exempting lottery proceeds from inheritance tax on the basis of a ruling by the Attorney General takes on, in our opinion, decisive significance. A The letter, dated October 5, 1977, advising of the first, contemporaneous construction of the lottery tax exemption from taxation, stated: The Attorney General’s Department, Revenue and Collections Division, Mr. Richard R. Roesch Assistant in Charge, has ruled that lottery winnings are not subject to any Michigan tax which, of course, includes inheritance tax. [Emphasis added.][ ] In 1983, the department announced that it would no longer adhere to that ruling. B This Court has held that "the construction placed upon a statute by the agency legislatively chosen to administer it is entitled to great weight.” Davis v River Rouge Bd of Ed, 406 Mich 486, 490; 280 NW2d 453 (1979). A leading treatise on statutory construction states: Interpretations and application of regulations by officers, administrative agencies, departmental heads and others officially charged with the duty of administering and enforcing a statute have great weight in determining the operation of a statute. The greatest weight attaches to an admin istrative interpretation in favor of parties who have reasonably relied upon it. [2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), §49.05, p 362. Emphasis added.] One of the soundest reasons sustaining contemporaneous interpretations of long standing is the fact that the public has relied on the interpretation. . . . While the principle here is not strictly that of estoppel running against the government there is some analogy to that principle when the interpretation has been made by a government agency or officer. [Id., § 49.07, p 394. Emphasis added.] The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit said: Deference to the Attorney General’s interpretation of the [Kentucky Consumer Protection] Act is particularly appropriate here because the interpretation is adverse to his best interests in this litigation. [In re Glenn W Turner Enterprises Litigation, 521 F2d 775, 779 (CA 3, 1975). Emphasis added.] In holding that promissory notes were not debentures within the meaning of a statute that imposed a stamp tax on "all bonds debentures, or certificates of indebtedness issued by any corporation,” the United States Supreme Court said: Against the Treasury’s prior longstanding and consistent administrative interpretation its more recent ad hoc contention as to how the statute should be construed cannot stand. [United States v Leslie Salt Co, 350 US 383, 396; 76 S Ct 416; 100 L Ed 441 (1956). Emphasis added.]_ The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Jandorf’s Estate v Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 171 F2d 464 (CA 2, 1948), declined to apply the direct/excise/privilege/transfer tax distinction for, among other reasons, the department’s longstanding policy of construing the statute at issue in that case as granting an estate tax exemption for United States government bonds owned by nonresident aliens. Both the instant case and Jandorf’s Estate may be contrasted with United States v Wells Fargo Bank, 485 US 351, 353; 108 S Ct 1179; 99 L Ed 2d 368 (1988), a case cited by the department in support of the direct/excise/privilege/transfer tax distinction. The Court there noted that [f]or almost 50 years after the Act’s passage, it was generally assumed that this [the provision of the Housing Act of 1937 exempting project notes from all taxation imposed by the United States] exempted the Notes from federal income tax, but not from federal estate tax. The unbroken assumption regarding the construction of the exemption in Wells Fargo Bank was thus the opposite of that operating in Jandorf’s Estate and in the instant case. c For over a decade, the department construed § 34 of the Lottery Act as exempting state lottery prize proceeds from inheritance taxation. Persons who bought lottery tickets during the regime when the department and field examiners were administering the inheritance tax law as exempting lottery proceeds from inheritance tax should be accorded the benefit of the first, contemporaneous construction of the law: It has been held that an administrative agency having interpretive authority may reverse its interpretation of a statute, but that its new interpretation applies only prospectively. [Sands, supra, § 49.05, p 365.] D A state lottery winner’s right to a lottery prize is governed by principles of contract law. In that context, it has been said: The practical interpretation of the contract by one party, evidenced by his words or acts, can be used against him on behalf of the other party, even though that other party had no knowledge of those words or acts when they occurred and did not concur in them. [3 Corbin, Contracts, § 558, p 256.] E Persons who buy tax-exempt bonds may be more likely to consult lawyers and accountants familiar with the esoteric distinction enunciated in Plummer than purchasers of state lottery tickets, who are not likely to become aware of a distinction between direct and indirect taxation, and income, privilege, transfer, and excise taxes: The words of the statute are to be taken in the sense in which they will be understood by that public in which they are to take effect. [United States v Isham, 84 US (17 Wall) 496, 504; 21 L Ed 728 (1873).] It is unlikely that Rose D’Amico’s heirs would perceive a meaningful distinction between being required to pay $13,754 as income tax, from which they are concededly exempt, and paying $13,527.70 as inheritance tax. The proceeds of the lottery prize that they receive and may retain free of tax will have been reduced by $13,527.70 whether called an income, an excise, a privilege, a transfer, or an inheritance tax. IV In sum, the Lottery Act provides that no state tax "of any kind whatsoever” shall be imposed on the proceeds of a state lottery prize. The inheritance tax is, in terms, a tax, and it cannot seriously be suggested that it is not a tax. It is a tax even if it is an excise tax, an indirect tax, a transfer tax, a privilege tax, and not simply, as the Legislature called it, an inheritance tax. This tax is measured by the present value, at the time of death, of the unpaid "proceeds” of the lottery prize. The first, contemporaneous construction by the state that the inheritance tax is a tax within the meaning of § 34 of the Lottery Act was, for reasons earlier stated, an entirely plausible and defensible construction. The Department of Treasury should be held to be bound by the first, contemporaneous construction by the state, at least with regard to the estates of persons who purchased lottery tickets before September 14, 1983, when the department advised inheritance tax field examiners of a "new development.” We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Brickley, Cavanagh, and Archer, JJ., concurred with Levin, J. Section 1 provides: A tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon the transfer of any property, real or personal, of the value of $100.00 or over, or of any interest therein or income therefrom, in trust or otherwise, to persons or corporations, not exempt by law in this state from taxation on real or personal property .... [MCL 205.201 et seq.; MSA 7.561 et seq., 1899 PA 188, as amended. Emphasis added.] Section 34 of the Lottery Act (1972 PA 239, MCL 432.1 et seq.; MSA 18.969[1] et seq.) provided: No state or local taxes of any kind whatsoever shall be imposed upon the proceeds from a prize awarded by the state lottery. [MCL 432.34; MSA 18.969(34).] The probate judge said: "This court, however, feels that the clear meaning of the State Lottery Statute should be carried out and that states quite clearly that there should be no tax assessed against lottery winnings.” The Court of Appeals said: We find no conflict between those statutes clearly indicating that state or local taxes shall not be imposed on lottery proceeds and those statutes clearly indicating that an inheritance tax shall be imposed upon the transfer of any property. Because the Michigan inheritance tax is not a tax on the property itself, but is instead a tax on the transfer of property, measured by the value of the property so transferred, the inheritance tax may be validly imposed upon the transfer of such property and not violate the provision that lottery proceeds be exempt from taxation. [In re Fish Estate, 219 Mich 369, 373; 189 NW 177 (1922)]; MCL 205.201; MSA 7.561. . . . Therefore, we hold that the right to receive such winnings, as intangible personal property payable to decedent’s estate, became a taxable privilege subject to the state’s inclusion as a measure for imposing inheritance tax upon transfer from decedent to her beneficiaries. [In re D’Amico Estate, 171 Mich App 296, 302-303; 429 NW2d 659 (1988). Emphasis in original.] See Plummer v Coler, 178 US 115, 138; 20 S Ct 829; 44 L Ed 998 (1900), Murdock v Ward, 178 US 139; 20 S Ct 775; 44 L Ed 1009 (1900), and United States Trust Co v Helvering, 307 US 57; 59 S Ct 692; 83 L Ed 1104 (1939). See anno: Statutory provision that speciñed fund or property shall be "exempt from taxation,” "exempt from any tax,” or the like, as exempting such property from estate or succession taxes, 47 ALR2d 999, § 3, p 1003. This Court observed in In re Fish Estate, n 4 supra, p 373, relied on in the dissenting opinion: The weight of authority, however, is not always determined by the use of an adding machine. We not infrequently follow the minority in number of the holdings, and should do so where such holdings appeal to our judgment and convince us that the true rule has been arrived at by the minority in number. The dissent cites Michigan Baptist Homes & Development Co v Ann Arbor, 396 Mich 660, 669-670; 242 NW2d 749 (1976), Ladies Literary Club v Grand Rapids, 409 Mich 748, 753; 298 NW2d 422 (1980), Detroit v Detroit Commercial College, 322 Mich 142, 148; 33 NW2d 737 (1948), St Joseph’s Church v Detroit, 189 Mich 408; 155 NW 588 (1915), Edison v Revenue Dep’t, 362 Mich 158, 162; 106 NW2d 802 (1961), Romeo Homes, Inc v Revenue Comm’r, 361 Mich 128, 137; 105 NW2d 186 (1960), In re Smith Estate, 343 Mich 291; 72 NW2d 287 (1955), and Town & Country Dodge, Inc v Treasury Dep’t, 420 Mich 226, 243; 362 NW2d 618 (1984). The constructional issue presented in the instant case, whether the inheritance tax is a "tax” "of any kind whatsoever,” is somewhat different from the constructional issues presented in the cited cases. In each of the cited cases there was clearly a debatable question concerning the meaning of the words chosen to express the exemption from taxation. Acknowledging that there is rarely if ever such clarity in expression as might justify the use of the "plain meaning” shibboleth, the words "taxes of any kind whatsoever” are at least, in terms, unambiguous. In Michigan Baptist Homes, the question was whether a licensed home for the aged was within an exemption from ad valorem property taxation for charitable or benevolent purposes. In Ladies Literary Club, the question was whether the club was exempt from ad valorem property taxation as an educational institution. In Detroit Commercial College, the question was whether the Detroit Commercial College was an educational institution within an exemption from ad valorem property taxation. In St Joseph’s Church, the question was whether vacant land adjoining a parsonage was "occupied as such” within the meaning of an exemption from ad valorem property taxation. In Edison, the question was whether the construction of a highway was "industrial processing” within the meaning of a use tax exemption. In Romeo Homes, Inc, the question was whether prefabricated homes were within a use tax exemption for materials affixed and made a structural part of real estate. In Smith Estate, the question was whether the natural child of the adopted daughter of the decedent was a "lineal decedent” within the meaning of the inheritance tax law. In Town & Country Dodge, the question was whether monies returned to an automobile dealer as a portion of the finance charge was interest income within the meaning of the Single Business Tax Act. Moreover, a Department of Treasury regulation restated the Plummer rationale. Treasury regulations have been regarded, for purposes of federal taxation, as having the force of law. See Hartley v Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 295 US 216, 220; 55 S Ct 756; 79 L Ed 1399 (1935). The dissent states that "it cannot be said with a certainty 'beyond doubt or cavil’ that the Legislature also intended to preclude any tax 'upon the transfer’ at death of entitlement to a lottery prize. See In re Fish Estate, supra." Post, pp 570-571. In re Fish Estate does not, however, construe the words "upon the transfer of any property” in the inheritance tax statute. See n 1 for text of the statute. The question presented in In re Fish Estate was whether the amount paid to the federal government as an estate tax is deductible from the value of the decedent’s property at the time of decedent’s death in computing state inheritance tax. The only exemption referred to in In re Fish Estate is a $50,000 exemption from the federal estate tax. The statement in In re Fish Estate, supra, pp 373-374, that the inheritance tax is not "a tax upon property,” and that the "right of transmission of property” and "to receive property” upon death "are not inherent rights, but are privileges which may be taxed by a privilege tax,” may be black letter law. D’Amico’s estate does not challenge the power of the state to impose a tax on the value of property or a privilege tax on the transfer or receipt of property. It claims rather that the Legislature, when it enacted that no tax "of any kind whatsoever” shall be imposed upon the proceeds of a state lottery prize, expressly chose not to exercise that power and not to impose the inheritance tax in respect to such proceeds. The statements in In re Fish Estate do not concern or address the question presented, whether the language of the Lottery Act, barring the imposition of "any tax whatsoever,” bars imposition of the inheritance tax in the instant case. No decision of this Court addresses or provides insight in respect to the resolution of that question. The letter, addressed to the attorney for a decedent’s estate, is on the stationery of Stanley D. Steinborn, Deputy Attorney General, and was signed by E. Boomie Mikrut, Assistant Attorney General, with a copy to Francis Gould, Inheritance Tax Division. On September 14, 1983, the department issued the following communication from Gould (see n 10) to "All Inheritance Tax Auditors”: A new development has occurred in the transferring of lottery receivables from a decedent to another. Previously we bad indicated we would consider all lottery winnings as exempt from taxation. Lottery winnings are still exempt in some cases, however, an individual who has received a lottery prize and has a receivable for the payment of funds over a number of years, has an asset. On death, the transfer of property is not the transfer of a lottery winning but a transfer of an account receivable to a beneficiary. This will be taxable. We have had a court case in Macomb County upholding this position and our Attorney General has informed me that it is a proper position. In the future, tax all transfers of accounts receivable from lottery winnings the same as any other transfer of property. [Emphasis added.] The court also noted that the department’s original interpretation had express and implied congressional acquiescence and that it was in accord with the generally understood meaning of the term "debentures.” Leslie Salt Co, supra, pp 396-397. The statute at issue in that case (§ 4 of the Victory Liberty Loan Act of March 3, 1919, 40 Stat 1311) exempted United States government bonds owned by nonresident aliens from taxation at national, state, and local levels. In response to cases cited in support of drawing a distinction between a direct tax on property and an estate tax, the court said: Those cases support the proposition that a provision exempting United States bonds from taxation as to principal and interest, without more, relates exclusively to direct taxation of them as property. The cited cases would be persuasive, if Congress had not shown an intent to use the phrase "exempt . . . from all taxation” to include estate taxes by expressly excepting them in one section of the statute and not in the other, and if the Treasury Department had not for 20 years construed the statute as granting exemption with respect to the estate tax. [Jandorf’s Estate, supra, p 467. First emphasis in original, second emphasis added.] Paulsen v State Lottery Bureau, 167 Mich App 328, 334: 421 NW2d 678 (1988). The additional inheritance tax sought to be imposed on the D’Amico heirs is $13,527.70. The present value, at the time of Rose D’Amico’s death, of the right to receive the fourteen unpaid installments was, as determined by the department, $299,000. That amount multiplied by the state income tax rate of 4.6 percent is $13,754. See post, p 568, n 3. The Legislature did not, however, enact a law escheating all or some part of a decedent’s property, but, rather, an inheritance tax. See n 11.

Griffin, J. Defendant was bound over for trial to face felony charges on the basis of hearsay testimony erroneously admitted at the preliminary examination. Although it appears that the ensuing trial was fair and error free, the Court of Appeals determined that this error compelled automatic reversal of defendant’s conviction. We disagree. Concluding that a harmless error analysis is appli cable, we hold that such an evidentiary deficiency at the preliminary examination is not ground for vacating a subsequent conviction where the defendant received a fair trial and was not otherwise prejudiced by the error. i Following a preliminary examination, defendant was bound over on charges of delivery and conspiracy to deliver cocaine upon the basis of hearsay statements made to police by two alleged coconspirators. Defendant made timely objection to admission of the hearsay evidence. Subsequently, the coconspirators pleaded guilty and then testified at the trial of defendant, who was convicted of the conspiracy to deliver charge. On appeal, the prosecutor conceded that the hearsay statements at the preliminary examination were not admissible under MRE 801(d)(2)(E). The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the authority of People v Walker, 385 Mich 565; 189 NW2d 234 (1971). In Walker, the defendant’s car was stopped, and the car and his person were searched by police officers on the basis of a "tip” they received from an informant. The defendant was arrested and subsequently convicted of unlawful possession of narcotics. On appeal, the defendant complained that at the preliminary examination probable cause for the search and seizure of the defendant’s person and automobile had not been established. Motions to quash the information, made by the defendant at the preliminary examination and again prior to trial, were denied. Subsequently, at a preliminary stage of the trial, testimony by a police officer clearly established that in fact there had been probable cause. Nevertheless, the Walker Court set aside the conviction, and stated: From both the Michigan and Federal cases, it is clear that while police officers may proceed upon the basis of information received from an informer and need not disclose the identity of the informer, in order to establish probable cause there must be a showing that the information was something more than a mere suspicion, a tip, or anonymous telephone call, and that it came from a source upon which the officers had a right to rely. This is the showing which should have been made at the preliminary examination in this case, but was not. Unless we require such a showing, the preliminary examination becomes meaningless, and a defendant is forced to stand trial in violation of a proper determination from legally admissible evidence at the preliminary examination stage that a crime has been committed and that there is probable cause to believe he is guilty of it. [Id., pp 575-576. Emphasis in original. See also People v White, 276 Mich 29, 31; 267 NW 777 (1936); People v Kennedy, 384 Mich 339; 183 NW2d 297 (1971).] In this appeal we are urged to reconsider Walker and to hold that error at the preliminary examination stage should be examined under a harmless error analysis. We agree and hold that the evidentiary error committed at the prelimi nary examination stage of this case does not require automatic reversal of the subsequent conviction absent a showing that defendant was prejudiced at trial. ii Initially, it should be recognized that the preliminary examination is not a procedure that is constitutionally based. While it has been determined that a judicial determination of probable cause is a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest, the federal constitution does not require that an adversary hearing, such as a preliminary examination, be held prior to prosecution by information. Gerstein v Pugh, 420 US 103; 95 S Ct 854; 43 L Ed 2d 54 (1975). "In Michigan, the preliminary examination is solely a creation of the Legislature — it is a statutory right.” People v Johnson, 427 Mich 98, 103; 398 NW2d 219 (1986) (opinion of Boyle, J.). See also People v Dunigan, 409 Mich 765, 770; 298 NW2d 430 (1980); People v Duncan, 388 Mich 489, 495; 201 NW2d 629 (1972). The Legislature, which created the preliminary examination procedure, has also mandated by statute that a conviction shall not be reversed where error is harmless: No judgment or verdict shall be set aside or reversed or a new trial be granted by any court of this state in any criminal case, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court, after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. [MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096. Emphasis added.] MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096 parallels FR Crim P 52(a), which provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” Although the United States Supreme Court has held that certain constitutional violations do require automatic reversal, see, e.g., Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335; 83 S Ct 792; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963) (denial of counsel at trial), "[I]t is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are harmless, including most constitutional violations . . . .” United States v Hasting, 461 US 499, 509; 103 S Ct 1974; 76 L Ed 2d 96 (1983). See also People v Johnson, supra, p 103, n 1. Under the federal system, it is well established that a defendant’s conviction will not be set aside even though only hearsay evidence was presented to the grand jury which indicted him, Costello v United States, 350 US 359, 362; 76 S Ct 406; 100 L Ed 397 (1956), or for other evidentiary errors at the indictment stage, Holt v United States, 218 US 245, 247; 31 S Ct 2; 54 L Ed 1021 (1910). See also United States v Blue, 384 US 251; 86 S Ct 1416; 16 L Ed 2d 510 (1966) (the fact that the grand jury was presented with self-incriminating evidence obtained from the defendant in violation of the Fifth Amendment does not bar prosecution). In its review of Florida court proceedings against a criminal defendant charged under Florida law, the United States Supreme Court made clear that while a defendant presently detained may challenge the probable cause for his confinement, once he has been tried and convicted, there is no requirement under the federal constitution that the conviction be vacated because the defendant was detained pending trial without a determination of probable cause. The Gerstein Court explained: In holding that the prosecutor’s assessment of probable cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint of liberty pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court’s prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite to prosecution by information. Beck v Washington, 369 US 541, 545 [82 S Ct 955; 8 L Ed 2d 98] (1962); Lem Woon v Oregon, 229 US 586 [33 S Ct 783; 57 L Ed 1340] (1913). Nor do we retreat from the established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction. Frisbie v Collins, 342 US 519 [72 S Ct 509; 96 L Ed 541] (1952); Ker v Illinois, 119 US 436 [7 S Ct 225; 30 L Ed 421] (1886). Thus, as the Court of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is presently detained may challenge the probable cause for that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the defendant was detained pending trial without a determination of probable cause. [Pugh v Rainwater, 483 F2d 778, 786-787 (CA 5, 1973).] [Id., pp 118-119. Emphasis added.] See also Murphy v Beto, 416 F2d 98 (CA 5, 1969); McCoy v Wainwright, 396 F2d 818 (CA 5, 1968); Scarbrough v Dutton, 393 F2d 6 (CA 5, 1968); cf. Hamilton v Alabama, 368 US 52; 82 S Ct 157; 7 L Ed 2d 114 (1961). The Supreme Court has recognized the viability of the harmless error principle even where fundamental constitutional rights of a defendant are involved at the preliminary examination. In Cole man v Alabama, 399 US 1, 9; 90 S Ct 1999; 26 L Ed 2d 387 (1970), the Court held that because the preliminary hearing prior to indictment is a " 'critical stage’ ” in the course of prosecution under Alabama law, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. However, instead of reversing the defendant’s conviction, after finding that the right to counsel had been unconstitutionally denied, the Court remanded the case to the state courts for a determination of whether denial of counsel at the preliminary hearing was harmless error. More recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to the harmless error doctrine in a context that is close to this case. In United States v Mechanik, 475 US 66; 106 S Ct 938; 89 L Ed 2d 50 (1986), two government agents appeared together and testified in sequence before a federal grand jury in violation of F R Crim P 6(d), which states that only "the witness under examination” may be present. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that transgression of Rule 6(d) required automatic reversal of the defendant’s subsequent conviction which came at the conclusion of a five-month jury trial. However, the Supreme Court reversed, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority, explained: The Rule [6(d)] protects against the danger that a defendant will be required to defend against a charge for which there is no probable cause to believe him guilty . . . [b]ut the petit jury’s subsequent guilty verdict means not only that there was probable cause to believe that the defendants were guilty as charged, but also that they are in fact guilty as charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Measured by the petit jury’s verdict, then, any error in the grand jury proceeding connected with the charging decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. It might be argued in some literal sense that because the Rule was designed to protect against an erroneous charging decision by the grand jury, the indictment should not be compared to the evidence produced by the Government at trial, but to the evidence produced before the grand jury. But even if this argument were accepted, there is no simple way after the verdict to restore the defendant to the position in which he would have been had the indictment been dismissed before trial. He will already have suffered whatever inconvenience, expense, and opprobrium that a proper indictment may have spared him. In courtroom proceedings as elsewhere, "the moving finger writes; and, having writ, moves on.” [475 US 70-71. Emphasis deleted.] The Court noted: No long line of precedent requires the setting aside of a conviction based on a rule violation in the antecedent grand jury proceedings .... See, e.g., Gerstein v Pugh, 420 US 103, 119-123 (1975); Coleman v Alabama, 399 US 1, 10-11 (1970); Chapman v California, 386 US 18 [87 S Ct 824; 17 L Ed 2d 705] (1967). [Id., p 71, n 1.] Importantly, the Court found that the error in Meehanik was harmless when measured by a standard which requires a showing that the error prejudicially affected the outcome of the trial. Id., p 72. Subsequently, in Bank of Nova Scotia v United States, 487 US 250; 108 S Ct 2369; 101 L Ed 2d 228 (1988), the Supreme Court dealt with a trial court’s authority to dismiss an indictment prior to trial on the basis of the cumulative effect of several acts of prosecutorial misconduct in the grand jury proceeding. By a vote of eight to one, the Court found the harmless error principle to be applicable. Pointing to Mechanik, supra, the Court said: In United States v Mechanik, 475 US 66 (1986), we held that there is "no reason not to apply [Rule 52(a)] to 'errors, defects, irregularities, or variances,’ occurring before a grand jury just as we have applied it to such error occurring in the criminal trial itself.” Id. at 71-72. In United States v Hasting, 461 US 506, we held that "[supervisory power to reverse a conviction is not needed as a remedy when the error to which it is addressed is harmless since, by definition, the conviction would have been obtained notwithstanding the asserted error.” We stated that deterrence is an inappropriate basis for reversal where "means more narrowly tailored to deter objectionable prosecutorial conduct are available.” Aid. We also recognized that where the error is harmless, concerns about the "integrity of the [judicial] process” will carry less weight, ibid., and that a court may not disregard the doctrine of harmless error simply "in order to chastise what the court view[s] as prosecutorial overreaching.” Id. at 507. Unlike the present cases, see infra at 258-259, Hasting involved constitutional error. It would be inappropriate to devise a rule permitting federal courts to deal more sternly with nonconstitutional harmless errors than with constitutional errors that are likewise harmless. [487 US 255-256. Emphasis added.] As Mechanik made clear, if the federal standard were to be applied in this case, the nonconstitu tional error assigned by defendant would not be ground for reversal in the absence of a showing that the error prejudiced the outcome of his subsequent trial. Id., p 72. State courts have also addressed the question before us and have concluded that errors in the preliminary examination proceedings do not require reversal per se on an appeal from a subsequent trial. For example, the California Supreme Court has held that reversal of a conviction is not required unless the defendant shows that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of the error at the preliminary examination. People v Pompa-Ortiz, 27 Cal 3d 519; 612 P2d 941 (1980). In so holding, the Pompa-Ortiz court expressly overruled precedent (People v Elliot, 54 Cal 2d 498; 354 P2d 225 [1960]) in which it had earlier ruled that preliminary examination errors required reversal per se. See also People v Lofink, 206 Cal App 3d 161, 169-170; 253 Cal Rptr 384 (1988); People v Moore, 185 Cal App 3d 1005, 1017-1018; 230 Cal Rptr 237 (1986); People v Oyaas, 173 Cal App 3d 663, 670-671; 219 Cal Rptr 243 (1985). The California Supreme Court, sitting en banc, has explained its Pompa-Ortiz rule by pointing to art VI, § 13, of the California Constitution which mandates that "a judgment shall not be set aside for error not resulting in a miscarriage of justice.” People v Crandell, 46 Cal 3d 833, 856; 760 P2d 423 (1988). See also People v Alcala, 36 Cal 3d 604; 685 P2d 1126 (1984). The issue at hand has also been addressed by the Colorado Supreme Court. In People v Alexander, 663 P2d 1024, 1025-1026, n 2 (Colo, 1983), it said: The defendant . . . argues that the trial court erred in finding probable cause at the preliminary hearing. Absent unusual circumstances not present here, however, any issue as to the presence of probable cause is rendered moot by the jury’s guilty verdict. “Resolution of these questions must be made prior to trial in order to avoid the anomalous situation where a defendant may be found guilty at trial, and then attempt to have the conviction reversed for a preliminary hearing on probable cause. The illogic of this anomaly is further exemplified by the observation of Judge McGowan, writing for the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, when he states: " 'Where, as here, the accused has been found guilty of those charges in a full-scale trial that we have otherwise found to be free of error, the chances that he could persuade a magistrate that no probable cause exists for his continued detention are perhaps not ungenerously to be characterized as speculative. Blue v United States [119 US App DC 315] 342 F2d 894 (1964) [cert den 380 US 944; 85 S Ct 1029; 13 L Ed 2d 964 (1965)’].” Kuypers v District Court, 188 Colo 332, 335; 534 P2d 1204, 1206 (1975). Accord People v Horrocks, 190 Colo 501; 549 P2d 400 (1976). We consider the probable cause issue to be moot, and we accordingly do not discuss it further. [See also Commonwealth v Troop, 391 Pa Super 613; 571 A2d 1084 (1990); State v West, 223 Neb 241; 388 NW2d 823 (1986); State v Navarrete, 221 Neb 171; 376 NW2d 8 (1985); State v Tomrdle, 214 Neb 580; 335 NW2d 279 (1983); State v Franklin, 194 Neb 630; 234 NW2d 610 (1975); State v Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493; 660 P2d 1336 (1983), cert den 461 US 934 (1983); Commonwealth v McCullough, 501 Pa 423; 461 A2d 1229 (1983).] We agree with the United States Supreme Court and with state courts which have held that automatic reversal is not warranted in the present circumstances. Like the California Constitution and FR Crim P 52(a), MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096 clearly mandates that a conviction shall not be reversed for harmless error. Except for this Court’s decision in Walker, we find no impediment to the application of that principle in this case. It is significant that the question of possible application of the harmless error standard was not decided or even discussed in Walker. If, and to the extent that, the Walker decision by this Court can be read as rejecting the applicability of the harmless error doctrine in circumstances such as are presented by this case, it is overruled. In this appeal it is contended that a harmless error analysis would be inconsistent with recently adopted revisions of the Michigan Court Rules which were based upon recommendations by a committee appointed by this Court. Among its recommendations, the committee proposed MCR 6.107(G), which would have incorporated the harmless error principle into postconviction review of preliminary examination errors. The proposed rule read: Motions to Dismiss; Harmless Error on Appeal. If, on proper motion, the circuit court finds a violation of subrule (C), (D), (E), or (F), it shall either dismiss the information or remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. Absent a showing of prejudice, a court may not reverse an otherwise valid conviction because of either a violation of these subrules or an error in . failing to dismiss an information for violation of these subrules. [422A Mich 28 (1985). Emphasis supplied.] It is true that the rule as finally adopted and renumbered by this Court, MCR 6.110(H), does not contain the words emphasized above. However, deletion of this language need not be read as a rejection by this Court of a harmless error analysis in the present situation. Rather, as staff comments which accompanied MCR 6.110(H) explain: Subrule (H) is consistent with current practice. This subrule does not address, and leaves to case law, what effect a violation of these rules or an error in ruling on a motion filed in the trial court may have when raised following conviction. [Mich Ct R, p R 6.1-9.] In other words, as adopted, MCR 6.110(H) was designed merely to reflect the then-existing state of the law. Of course, the new rule could not, and was not intended to, preclude this Court from reexamining the rule in Walker. In our view, this Court can no longer ignore the applicability of MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096 to facts such as those presented in this case. Since we consider ourselves bound by the legislation which established the preliminary examination procedure, it is reasonable and logical to also consider the Legislature’s harmless error mandate which has direct application to the "admission or rejection of evidence.” This case involves exactly such a situation. Moreover, the instant case provides insight concerning the exacting toll of an automatic reversal rule. When the two coconspirators testified at defendant’s trial, and thus were subject to cross-examination, the hearsay issue was mooted. The trial was rather lengthy for a bench trial, and the error at the preliminary examination was unre lated to the issues which were the focus of the trial. To require automatic reversal of an otherwise valid conviction for an error which is harmless constitutes an inexcusable waste of judicial resources and contorts the preliminary examination screening process so as to protect the guilty rather than the innocent. As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in Mechanik, supra, p 72: The reversal of a conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to expend further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already once taken place; victims may be asked to relive their disturbing experiences. See Morris v Slappy, 461 US 1, 14 [103 S Ct 1610; 75 L Ed 2d 610] (1983). The "[p]assage of time, erosion of memory, and dispersion of witnesses may render retrial difficult, even impossible.” Engle v Isaac, 456 US 107, 127-128 [102 S Ct 1558; 71 L Ed 2d 783] (1982). Thus, while reversal "may, in theory, entitle the defendant only to retrial, in practice it may reward the accused with complete freedom from prosecution,” id. at 128, and thereby "cost society the right to punish admitted offenders.” Id. at 127. Even if a defendant is convicted in a second trial, the intervening delay may compromise society’s "interest in the prompt administration of justice,” United States v Hasting, supra at 509, and impede accomplishment of the objectives of deterrence and rehabilitation. These societal costs of reversal and retrial are an acceptable and often necessary consequence when an error in the first proceeding has deprived a defendant of a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. But the balance of interest tips decidedly the other way when an error has had no effect on the outcome of the trial.[ ]_ Otherwise stated, [Procedural rules] are not to be things to which individual litigants have claims in and of themselves. Nothing is so subversive of the real purposes of legal procedure as individual vested rights in procedural errors .... [Pound, The canons of procedural reform, 12 ABA J 541, 543 (1926).] Although we do not overlook the concerns expressed in the dissenting opinion, we believe the availability of an interlocutory appeal affords protection in those cases where an innocent accused should have been screened out by the preliminary examination process. Given the viability of that remedy and the enormous price of reversing valid convictions obtained pursuant to fair, error-free trials, we cannot support application of the automatic reversal rule under circumstances such as those presented in this case. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for an analysis of whether the admission of hearsay evidence at the preliminary examination constituted harmless error and, if so, for resolution of the other issues raised by defendant in her appeal of right. Riley, C.J., and Brickley and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Griffin, J. MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096. MCL 333.7401(1), (2)(a)(iii), 750.157a; MSA 14.15(7401X1), (2)(a)(iii), 28.354(1). MRE 801(d)(2) provides in pertinent part: A statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he statement is offered against a party and is (A) his own statement ... or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy on independent proof of the conspiracy. The Court of Appeals did not address the defendant’s other allegations of error raised on appeal. See MCL 766.1 et seq.; MSA 28.919 et seq. In Michigan hearsay evidence may be presented to a grand jury. Our Rules of Evidence do not apply to grand jury proceedings. MRE 1101(b)(2). In this preconviction setting, the standard for determining whether the error was harmless differed from that applied in Mechanik: [D]ismissal of the indictment is appropriate only "if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict,” or if there is "grave doubt” that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations. United States v Mechanik, supra at 78 [O’Connor, J., concurring], [487 US 256.] The applicability of this standard in the present context has been recognized by this Court, albeit in dicta. In People v Johnson, supra, the defendant argued that evidence of premeditation and deliberation at his preliminary examination was insufficient to justify binding the defendant over on an open charge of murder, thereby requiring reversal of his second-degree murder conviction. The Johnson Court (per Boyle, J.) disagreed, finding that there was evidence from which the magistrate could have inferred premeditation and deliberation. In a footnote, Justice Boyle discussed the issue of reversals for errors at preliminary examination: While the opinion for reversal bases its result upon an admittedly nonconstitutional error, post, pp 137-138, it errs in the standard it applies to determine whether the error is harmless. Certain constitutional violations require automatic reversal. See, e.g., Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335; 83 S Ct 792; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963) (denial of counsel at trial). Other constitutional violations are measured by the standard that requires a court to be convinced "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 24; 87 S Ct 824; 17 L Ed 2d 705 (1967) (commenting on defendant’s failure to testify at trial could be harmless error); Rose v Clark, 478 US [570]; 106 S Ct 3101; 92 L Ed 2d 460 (1986) (jury instruction shifting the burden of proof to the defendant can be harmless error). Nonconstitutional violations, such as that alleged in the instant case, are measured by a third standard in the federal system: The defendant must show a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial. See United States v Mechanik, 475 US 66; 106 S Ct 938; 89 L Ed 2d 50 (1986) (no reversal for grand jury error unless the error affected the outcome of the trial). [427 Mich 115, n 14.] The Elliot case had held that where an accused is illegally bound over due to a material error at the preliminary hearing, the binding over is voidable, and, upon proper objection, the court has no jurisdiction to proceed. In overruling Elliot, the Pompa-Ortiz court rejected the prior cases’ "uncritical use of the term 'jurisdiction’ ” and held that a trial court is not deprived of "jurisdiction” in the fundamental sense ("legal power to hear and determine a cause”) in matters correctable by pretrial motions. 27 Cal 3d 528-529. This Court likewise has held that the circuit court does not lose jurisdiction where a void or improper information is filed. See People v Johnson, supra, p 106, n 7. This Court has previously applied MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096 in a number of contexts. See, e.g., People v Straight, 430 Mich 418; 424 NW2d 257 (1988); People v Beach, 429 Mich 450; 418 NW2d 861 (1988); People v Crawford, 429 Mich 151; 414 NW2d 360 (1987); People v Blue, 428 Mich 684; 411 NW2d 451 (1987); People v Cash, 419 Mich 230; 351 NW2d 822 (1984); People v Woods, 416 Mich 581; 331 NW2d 707 (1982), cert den 462 US 1134 (1983); People v Weston, 413 Mich 371; 319 NW2d 537 (1982); People v Eady, 409 Mich 356; 294 NW2d 202 (1980); People v Richardson, 409 Mich 126; 293 NW2d 332 (1980); People v Wilkens, 408 Mich 69; 288 NW2d 583 (1980). The trial commenced January 7, 1987, and defendant was found guilty on January 29,1987. An automatic reversal rule would contradict MCR 6.002, which provides: These rules are intended to promote a just determination of every criminal proceeding. They are to be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay. The underlying assumption of the dissent’s dismay at the result of this opinion is that short of a reversal of an error-free trial, we cannot depend on the magistrate who is bound to follow the rules of evidence, the circuit or Recorder’s Court judge who is bound to quash a bindover where the rules of evidence are not followed, and the Court of Appeals which is required to correct error of this nature to maintain the applicability of the rules of evidence in preliminary examinations. We obviously do not share that skepticism. In his dissent in People v Johnson, supra, p 127, n 9, Justice Levin wrote: Any other rule would deprive the accused of any remedy for a defect in the conduct of a preliminary examination. Manifestly, the accused cannot be convicted unless sufficient evidence is adduced at the trial; if the sufficiency of the evidence at the trial cured an insufficiency at the preliminary examina tion, there would be no remedy unless the circuit judge quashed the information or the Court of Appeals or this Court granted an interlocutory appeal from an adverse decision by the circuit judge. Interlocutory appeals are infrequently granted defendants in criminal cases, and, thus, if there is to be any review of the circuit judge’s decision, it can occur only, in the ordinary case, after trial and conviction. If a problem does exist because appellate courts do not grant applications of criminal defendants for interlocutory appeal in sufficient numbers or in appropriate cases, it is suggested that this Court could deal with the problem directly through the exercise of its supervisory authority, rather than by adhering to an arbitrary rule that automatically reverses otherwise valid convictions. For example, the rules of appellate procedure could be amended.

Archer, J. We granted leave to appeal in order to consider two principal questions. The first question is whether four police reports were properly admitted into evidence under either MRE 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule, or MRE 803(8), the public records hearsay exception. The second question is whether the jury was properly instructed on the so-called rescue doctrine. We would hold that the police reports were improperly admitted into evidence and that the jury was improperly instructed on the rescue doctrine. We therefore would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for a new trial. i Plaintiff-appellant Charlotte Solomon, personal representative of the estate of Joseph Solomon, filed this wrongful death action against the City of Detroit and Detroit Police Officers John Shuell, Michael Hall, and Richard Nixon after Officer Shuell shot and killed her husband on March 20, 1981. Officers Shuell and Nixon were members of the department’s Western Surveillance Unit. Sergeant Hall was their supervisor. The three officers were plain clothed and drove separate unmarked automobiles. On March 19 and 20, 1981, the officers were investigating a series of armed robberies on Detroit’s west side. Prior to March 19, four armed men had stolen two cars from two separate automobile dealership salesmen while on test drives. Both robberies were at gunpoint. After reporting the robberies, both salesmen told the police that the perpetrators had driven to their dealerships in a Ford Thunderbird, license plate number SYF-830. The Thunderbird was registered to Claudia Williams, and the police began an undercover surveillance of her home at 18603 Curtis Street in Detroit. On March 20, at 2:30 p.m., Officers Shuell and Nixon were assigned to the surveillance of Curtis Street in plain clothes and in separate unmarked vehicles. Alvin Solomon, Joseph Solomon’s son, and a male passenger arrived in an Oldsmobile at the Curtis Street house and picked up two more men. After informing Sergeant Hall, who was also on duty in his own unmarked car, the officers were ordered to follow the Oldsmobile. They followed it to 20045 Ward, where two of the men got out of the vehicle. The car drove on, and the officers continued to follow the vehicle but lost it in traffic. Sergeant Hall ordered the officers to return to Ward Street and watch the house. Later that afternoon, the two suspects, who had previously entered 20045 Ward, left the residence. Sergeant Hall and Officers Nixon and Shuell then stopped and questioned the suspects as they walked down the block away from the house. At approximately the same time as the two suspects were being questioned, another police officer radioed Shuell and Nixon and told them that the Ford Thunderbird used in the armed robberies had returned to the Curtis Street address. Sergeant Hall ordered Shuell and Nixon to return to Curtis Street. Along the way, Nixon spotted the Oldsmobile driven by Alvin Solomon. Alvin, now accompanied by his girl friend, Wynee Green, was driving north on Strathmoor Street. Nixon relayed the information to Shuell and Sergeant Hall and followed the Oldsmobile to 20045 Strathmoor, the Solomon family home. Nixon pulled up behind the Oldsmobile. Shortly thereafter, Shuell stopped in front of the suspect’s automobile. The two officers got out and approached the Oldsmobile. The account of what happened next differs according to the trial testimony. Alvin testified that, after he got out of his car, Nixon rushed him, quickly flashed a badge, threw him toward the car, and confiscated a pellet gun that he carried in his waistband. Shuell ran toward the two, failed to identify himself as a police officer, put his gun to Alvin’s head and dragged him to the rear of the car. Alvin told Wynee to get his father, Joseph Solomon, who came outside with a gun, which was pointed down toward the ground. Neither Nixon nor Shuell identified themselves to Alvin’s father. Before Joseph Solomon could come off the front porch, Shuell fired his gun, striking him. Joseph Solomon kept approaching Shuell and Alvin and fell dead at the end of the driveway. Charlotte Solomon, Alvin’s mother and Joseph’s wife, testified that, at the time of the incident, she and her husband were inside their home watching television. Joseph got up, briefly left the room and came back in and said, "[sjomebody got my child out there.” He went outside with his gun and yelled, "[t]urn my child loose.” Charlotte got to the doorway in time to see her husband fall at the end of the driveway. Nixon testified that, as he approached the Oldsmobile, he showed Alvin his badge and id card and told him he was a police oflicer. As Alvin got out of the vehicle, Nixon saw a gun in Alvin’s waistband, which he confiscated. At this time, Shuell asked Alvin to put his hands on the car so he could be frisked. Alvin resisted, shouting at his girl friend to get his father. As Nixon walked around the car to restrain the girl, he heard a noise at the doorway of the house. Joseph Solomon ran out of the house and came off the porch holding a gun in both hands, extended in a combat stance. Nixon held his badge up and yelled, "Sir, we’re police officers, we’re police officers.” Nixon heard one shot, turned, and saw Joseph Solomon’s hands recoil. He then heard other shots, after which Joseph fell. Nixon also stated that neither Shuell nor he had drawn their guns before Joseph Solomon came out of the house. Shuell testified that both Nixon and he approached the car, showed Alvin their badges, and told him they were police officers. As Alvin got out of his car, Shuell told Nixon he saw a gun in Alvin’s waistband and grabbed Alvin by his left wrist. Shuell told Alvin he was under arrest, and asked him to place his hands on the car. Alvin backed away from the car and told his girl friend to get his father. Shuell told Alvin to go to the rear of the car and put his hands on the trunk. Shuell was frisking Alvin when Nixon yelled, "Police, police, John, look out, he’s got a gun.” Joseph Solomon assumed a two-hand stance and aimed his gun at Shuell. As Shuell grabbed Alvin, Joseph told Alvin to get down. Alvin shouted, "Daddy, don’t do it.” Shuell yelled, "Drop the gun. Police.” As Shuell fell to the ground with Alvin, his pistol was still in its holster. Joseph fired one shot, which missed Shuell. By this time, Shuell had drawn his weapon and returned Joseph Solomon’s fire. Joseph Solomon fired at least one shot. Shuell fired nine, eight of which hit Solomon, instantly killing him. Plaintiff-appellant filed the present case in Wayne Circuit Court. She alleged negligence, assault and battery, and the violation of her husband’s constitutional rights. Before the case went to the jury, defendant Nixon had been dismissed. In addition, the trial judge granted a directed verdict in favor of defendants Michael Hall and the City of Detroit. As to defendant Shuell, the jury returned a special verdict, finding that Shuell was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of Joseph Solomon’s death. Consequently, the jury found plaintiff’s damages to be $100,000. The jury also found, however, that decedent was negligent and that his own negligence was also a proximate cause of his death and assessed this at eighty percent. Accordingly, a judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff for $20,000. Plaintiff subsequently filed a claim of appeal, alleging that the trial court had improperly admitted four exhibits into evidence and had improperly instructed the jury. The Court of Appeals panel, one judge dissenting, rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence four police reports under MRE 803(6), the business records hearsay exception. Although two members of the panel agreed with plaintiff that the trial court also committed error by giving a modified version of SJI2d 13.07, stating the so-called rescue doctrine, the Court found this error to be harmless. The Court of Appeals, therefore, affirmed the decision of the trial court. 166 Mich App 19; 420 NW2d 160 (1988). Plaintiff-appellant subsequently applied for leave to appeal in this Court, which we granted on April 11, 1989, limited to the issues (1) whether the trial court improperly admitted into evidence four police reports prepared during the investigation of decedent’s shooting, and (2) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the so-called rescue doctrine. 432 Mich 891 (1989). Subsequently, we ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on the applicability of MRE 803(8), the public records hearsay exception, to the four police reports. We also invited amicus curiae briefs to be filed. The order was entered on October 24, 1989. ii The first question presented is whether four police reports were improperly admitted into evidence. Plaintiff’s exhibit 113 and defendant’s exhibit 122 are police department homicide witness statements taken during the investigation of decedent’s death. Both witness statements are in question and answer form. Plaintiff’s exhibit 113 contains Nixon’s version of the decedent’s shooting, and defendant’s exhibit 122 contains Shuell’s. Plaintiff’s exhibit 34A and defendant’s exhibit 121 are preliminary complaint reports, the initial report an officer writes detailing his actions during a particular assignment. A preliminary complaint report is the starting point for the subsequent interdepartmental investigation of an incident. Plaintiff’s exhibit 34A is a supplementary report Sergeant Hall wrote describing in detail his con versation with Officer Shuell immediately following decedent’s shooting. Defendant’s exhibit 121 is Officer Shuell’s report describing his actions during the events leading up to decedent’s death. At various points during the trial, the defense moved to admit each exhibit. The trial court admitted each exhibit over plaintiff’s timely objection, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Before this Court, the parties concede that the four exhibits are defined as hearsay, MRE 801(c). The exhibits are, therefore, inadmissible under MRE 802, unless subject to an MRE 803 exception. Consequently, we must determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the four reports were properly admitted into evidence and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it overruled plaintiff’s timely objection. Hadley v Trio Tool Co, 143 Mich App 319, 328; 372 NW2d 537 (1985). See People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298, 322; 319 NW2d 518 (1982). A Plaintiff-appellant first argues that the four exhibits are inadmissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. MRE 803(6) provides: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: * * # (6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, transactions, occurrences, or events, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business” as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.™ The defense offered the four exhibits over plaintiff’s timely objection. Before the trial court, plaintiff argued that, even if the reports were "records” within the meaning of MRE 803(6), the source of information and the circumstances of preparation lacked trustworthiness. Plaintiff reasoned that the reports and homicide witness statements were untrustworthy because when the documents were prepared, the police officers knew they were the subject of a homicide investigation that could result in criminal prosecution, civil liability, and interdepartmental discipline. In addition, the four documents were prepared following a waiver of Miranda rights and in the presence of counsel. Although the trial court noted the circumstances under which the reports were prepared, it nevertheless rejected plaintiff’s argument that the exhibits lacked trustworthiness. As to the motivation to misrepresent, the court acknowledged that the officers could have made their statements in a light most favorable to protect their relationships and avoid interdepartmental sanctions and potential criminal and civil liability. In addition, the court also held, in effect, that the issue of trustworthiness under MRE 803(6) went to the credibility and weight the jury should assign each exhibit and not to admissibility. Because plaintiff could not point to specific facts on the face of each exhibit indicating a lack of trustworthiness, the court overruled plaintiff’s objection and admitted each exhibit into evidence. On appeal, two Court of Appeals panel members affirmed. Judge Shepherd, in dissent, however, would have found that the trial court’s ruling amounted to prejudicial error requiring reversal because "the motivation to misrepresent is obvious.” 166 Mich App 31. The narrow issue presented under the hearsay business records exception, consequently, is whether the trial court improperly held that the four reports satisfied the trustworthiness requirement of MRE 803(6). It is beyond dispute that the presumed trustworthiness of both the source of information reported and the accuracy with which the information is recorded lies at the heart of the business records hearsay exception as it was conceived by the common law, promulgated in model, uniform, and state statutes, and, finally, adopted and enacted in the current Rules of Evidence. We unanimously concluded in Central Fabricators v Big Dutchman, 398 Mich 352; 247 NW2d 804 (1976), that an interoffice memorandum of a purported telephone conversation was inadmissible under MCL 600.2146; MSA 27A.2146, the statutory precursor of MRE 803(6). In Central Fabricators, we noted that trustworthiness is furnished not merely from the high degree of reliance placed upon business records, but also from the circumstances under which traditional business records are prepared: The exception to the hearsay rule for records made in the regular course of business "is justified on grounds analogous to those underlying other exceptions to the hearsay rule. Unusual reliability is regarded as furnished by the fact that in practice regular entries have a comparatively high degree of accuracy (as compared to other memoranda) because such books and records are customarily checked as to correctness by systematic balance-striking, because the very regular ity and continuity of the records is calculated to train the record-keeper in habits of precision, and because in actual experience the entire business of the nation and many other activities constantly function in reliance upon entries of this kind.” McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence (2d ed), §306, p 720. [Central Fabricators, supra, pp 356-357.] The current business records hearsay exception codified in MRE 803(6) and its federal counterpart, FRE 803(6), derives from two separate and distinct common-law exceptions to the hearsay rule, the shop book rule and the regular entries rule. 5 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev), § 1518, pp 426-430; McCormick, Evidence (3d ed), § 305, p 871. The rules were limited in scope and imposed stringent foundation requirements on the parties offering evidence. Notwithstanding the common law’s limitations that in the modern commercial context would seem unduly burdensome and have been appropriately rejected by the modern rules, the justifications for these two common-law hearsay exceptions were soundly rooted in the rationale for excluding hearsay evidence in the first place and continue to be so to this very day. Ideally, a witness’ testimony is evaluated while the witness is under oath, subject to cross-examination, and personally present before the trier of fact. People v Kirtdoll, 391 Mich 370, 386, n 8; 217 NW2d 37 (1974); FRE Advisory Committee Note, 56 FRD 183, 288 (1972). See also Colgrove v Goodyear, 325 Mich 127, 134; 37 NW2d 779 (1949). While the definition of hearsay, both at common-law and under the current rules as well, would exclude much probative evidence where one or more of these ideal conditions is lacking, the common-law hearsay exceptions recognized that, when evaluated in light of two principles, hearsay evidence was in limited circumstances as sufficiently reliable as evidence given under ideal conditions. Wigmore, supra, §§ 1420-1423, pp 251-255. Under the principle of necessity, the admission of hearsay evidence was justified not merely to avoid the loss of a person’s evidence because the witness may be unavailable to personally testify, but also to admit evidence, such as an excited utterance, that may derive from an inherently superior source. Wig-more, supra, § 1421, p 253. The second principle, the circumstantial probability of trustworthiness, arose from the fact that, under certain circumstances, the trustworthiness of the source of information and the accuracy of recording is sufficiently great to be the equivalent of a statement given under the ideal conditions of oath, cross-examination, and in the presence of the trier of fact. Wigmore, supra, § 1422, pp 253-254. It is under the circumstantial probability-of-trustworthiness principle, and to a lesser extent the necessity principle, that the traditional common-law business records exception was premised. Specifically, the circumstantial probability of trustworthiness of traditional business records is suffi ciently great to justify an exception to the hearsay rule because of habit, the detection of errors, and an employer’s reliance on the result. Wigmore, supra, § 1522, pp 442-443. Habit, or the regular and systematic preservation of information, by its very nature calls for accuracy. Id. Consequently, errors or unintentional misstatements are almost certain to be detected. Id. Furthermore, if the employee preparing the report is under a duty to do so or is aware of his employer’s general reliance on the accuracy of the records, a powerful motivation to be accurate is supplied. Id. It is clear that the traditional business records hearsay exception is justified on grounds of trustworthiness: unintentional mistakes made in the preparation of a record would very likely be detected and corrected. Where, however, the source of information or the person preparing the report has a motivation to misrepresent, trustworthiness can no longer be presumed, and the justification for the business records exception no longer holds true. Wigmore, supra, § 1522, pp 442-443, § 1527, p 448; McCormick, Evidence, § 308, pp 875-878. Thus, in Central Fabricators, supra, we found the leading case of Palmer v Hoffman, 318 US 109; 63 S Ct 477; 87 L Ed 645 (1943), persuasive authority supporting the proposition that the motivation to misrepresent is a strong indicator of a lack of trustworthiness. In Palmer, the United States Supreme Court held that a railroad accident report was not made "'in the regular course’ of the business,” a requirement by its nature ensuring trustworthiness, as defined in the federal business records hearsay statute. The Supreme Court reasoned that, although it may have been in the regular course of the railroad’s systematic operations to record its employee’s version of an accident, the admission of the report into evidence would make the act applicable to any recording system, "though it had little or nothing to do with the management or operation of the business as such.” 318 US 113. Thus, the Court concluded that the report was not made "for the systematic conduct of the enterprise as a railroad business. . . . [The report’s] primary utility is in litigating, not in railroading.” 318 US 114. Although in Palmer the Supreme Court analyzed the issue in terms of whether the report was made in the regular course of railroad business as defined in the federal act, the motivation for making the report in the first place lies at the very heart of the act’s definition of "regular course of business,” and, in this respect, the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Palmer analyzed the report from a slightly different perspective while reaching the same result. The Second Circuit panel noted, as did the Supreme Court, that even though the railroad’s employee was under a duty to his employer to make the report, the circumstances surrounding the preparation of the report, such as the anticipation of highly probable litigation, took the report outside the special legal meaning of "regular course of business”: Each trade has its peculiar jargon and courts rely on that jargon when it finds its way into a statute dealing with that trade. And so with "regular course of business” as applied to records or memoranda in an evidence statute. To a layman, the words might seem to mean any record or paper prepared by an em ployee in accordance with a rule, established in that business by his employer. But according to the jargon of lawyers and judges those words, in discussions of evidence, have always meant writings made in such a way as to afford some safeguards against the existence of any exceptionally strong bias or powerful motive to misrepresent. [129 F2d 976, 984 (CA 2, 1942). Emphasis in the original.] Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that the document was inadmissible under the federal act not merely because it may have been prepared to "perpetuate evidence” in anticipation of litigation, 129 F2d 991, but rather because the looming specter of potential liability supplied a powerful motivation to misrepresent. Because the railroad and its employee were exposed to highly probable litigation and potential liability, any possible errors in the report could no longer be considered mere misstatements. Consequently, the report was "dripping with motivations to misrepresent.” 129 F2d 991. Although the dissenting panel member noted that "there is hardly a grocer’s account book which could not be excluded on that basis,” 129 F2d 1002 (Clark, J., dissenting), Palmer has subsequently been read to stand for the proposition that the trial court, in its discretion, may exclude evidence meeting the literal requirements of the business records exception where the underlying circumstances indicate a lack of the trustworthiness business records are presumed to have. McCormick, supra, § 308, p 877. As Palmer indicates, trustworthiness, under the current Rules of Evidence, no longer serves as a mere philosophical justification for the admission of evidence otherwise excluded as hearsay. Rather, under MRE 803(6) and FRE 803(6), trustworthiness is itself an express threshold condition of admissibility. First, the rule on its face provides that evidence otherwise meeting the literal requirements of MRE 803(6) and FRE 803(6) shall not be admissible where "the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.” MRE 803(6), FRE 803(6) (emphasis added). In addition, the evolution of the business records hearsay exception from its common-law origins to the current Rules of Evidence further supports this interpretation. Beginning in the 1920’s, various model and uniform acts were formulated to ease the burdensome restrictions that had developed under the common-law business records exception. Many of the limitations, such as the narrow definition of "business,” the requirements of "originality,” and the unavailability of all participants involved in the preparation of a record, no longer served to ensure the practical trustworthiness of the proffered evidence. McCormick, supra, §§ 305-306, pp 871-872; Wigmore, supra, § 1561a, pp 489-490. The 1927 Commonwealth Fund Act, which served as the model for the federal and Michigan statutory forerunners of the current Rules of Evidence, eliminated these restrictions which no longer comported with modern commercial practices. At the same time, the Commonwealth Fund Act ensured the trustworthiness business records were presumed to have by requiring that a "writing or record” was prepared "in the regular course of any business” and that "it was the regular course of such business” to prepare the "writing or record.” The 1936 Uniform Business Records As Evidence Act further broadened and simplified the traditional business records exception. At the same time, however, the act expressly introduced the element of judicial discretion, directing the trial court to determine, as a matter of admissibility, whether "the sources of information, method, and time of preparation were such as to justify [a record’s] admission.” Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(13) also expressly referred to "the judge,” and it provided for the trial court to determine not merely whether the "writing[]” was "made in the regular course of a business,” but also whether "the sources of information from which made and the method and circumstances of their preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness.” Because the uniform rule eliminated the requirement that the memorandum be prepared by a person with knowledge of the facts recorded, the rule’s policy was to expressly require the trial court to ensure that the proffered evidence had the trustworthiness business records traditionally were presumed to have. It is the uniform rule’s language of the trustworthiness element that most closely parallels that of the rule adopted by the United States Supreme Court, which Congress ultimately enacted as FRE 803(6). The evolution of the business records hearsay exception clearly indicates that FRE 803(6) and MRE 803(6) have eliminated burdensome common-law restrictions and have broadened the scope of the exception. In order to ensure the same high degree of accuracy and reliability upon which the traditional, but narrowly construed business records exception was founded, the current rules also recognize that trustworthiness is the principal justification giving rise to the exception. Thus, FRE 803(6) and MRE 803(6) provide that trustworthiness is presumed, subject to rebuttal, when the party offering the evidence establishes the requisite foundation. Even though proffered evidence may meet the literal requirements of the rule, however, the presumption of trustworthiness is rebutted where "the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.” Consequently, in cases like the present, the trial court, upon a party’s timely objection, must determine as a question of admissibility whether the proffered evidence lacks trustworthiness. Upon the basis of our review of this record, we conclude that the trial court improperly held that the proffered exhibits did not lack trustworthiness. We would hold, therefore, that, under the facts of this case, the four exhibits lacked trustworthiness within the meaning of MRE 803(6) and were improperly admitted into evidence. The trial court improperly concluded that the sources of information and the circumstances under which the four police reports were prepared did not lack trustworthiness as that term is narrowly defined in MRE 803(6). As to the officer’s motivation to misrepresent, we agree with dissenting Judge Shepherd, that, in this case, the motivation to misrepresent is obvious and indicates a lack of trustworthiness. Officers Nixon and Shuell’s witness statements were taken during the course of the department’s homicide investigation, which they knew could result in a criminal prosecution. They, along with Sergeant Hall, would also be subject to the department’s internal affairs investigation, which could result in interdepartmental discipline. Finally, it was highly probable that the officers and the city faced civil litigation and potential liability. Although the trial court rejected this potential motivation to misrepresent as too speculative, it did recognize that even Officer Nixon, who did not fire a single shot at dece dent, possibly was "anything but totally frank with thé homicide investigators.” Rather than reject as speculative plaintiff’s argument that the officers had a motivation to misrepresent, we believe that, when the exhibits are viewed under the circumstances of their preparation, the motivation to misrepresent becomes clearer. Although the trial court noted that there is no evidence suggesting an improper motivation to misrepresent on the part of departmental homicide investigators and that proper departmental procedures were followed, it is these very same procedures that indicate a lack of trustworthiness as that term is defined under MRE 803(6). The homicide witness statements, for example, were taken following a waiver of Miranda rights, which could only heighten the officers’ awareness that anything said could and would be used against them in a court of law. In addition, the witness statements and the preliminary complaint reports were taken and prepared with the assistance of counsel, who would, at the very least, advise the officers not to make any inculpatory statements. The homicide statements were taken on March 25 and 26, five and six days following decedent’s shooting, which permitted time for reflection and deliberation not contemplated within the meaning of MRE 803(6). We conclude, therefore, that the homicide investigation reports, as well as the pre liminary complaint reports, lacked trustworthiness and, when made under these circumstances and in light of the highly probable civil and criminal litigation and departmental discipline the officers potentially faced, were not the type of records contemplated by MRE 803(6). The trial court also incorrectly analyzed the significance of trustworthiness under MRE 803(6). The trial court held in effect that, under MRE 803(6), trustworthiness and the presence of a self-serving motivation to misrepresent were questions for the jury and did not affect admissibility. We agree that the credibility and weight to be assigned to otherwise admissible evidence is a question for the trier of fact. We disagree, however, that, under MRE 803(6), trustworthiness is not also a question of admissibility. As the rule and its theoretical underpinnings indicate, trustworthiness is, under MRE 803(6), unlike MCL 600.2146; MSA 27A.2146, an express condition of admissibility. The flaw in the trial court’s reasoning was that its analysis was essentially a strict and literal interpretation of MCL 600.2146; MSA 27A.2146, which preceded MRE 803(6). Unlike the present rule, § 2146 expressly provided that, once the appropriate foundation had been established, "[a]ll other circumstances of the making of such writing or record including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight but not its admissibility.” Unlike §2146, MRE 803(6) now expressly provides that trustworthiness is a question of admissibility and is not an issue solely affecting the weight of the evidence. We finally note that each exhibit is replete with multiple layers of hearsay within hearsay. Plaintiff’s exhibit 34A, Sergeant Hall’s preliminary complaint report, is typical, and it recounts a conversation Sergeant Hall had with Officer Shuell following decedent’s shooting. Under MRE 805, hearsay within hearsay is excluded where no foundation has been established to bring each independent hearsay statement within a hearsay exception. See In re Freiburger, 153 Mich App 251, 260; 395 NW2d 300 (1986). Although the trial court agreed with plaintiff’s counsel that the exhibits were replete with multiple hearsay statements within hearsay, the court nevertheless overruled plaintiff’s timely objection. The court reasoned that plaintiff’s objection went to the weight and credibility the jury should assign each exhibit. We disagree, however, with the lower court’s ruling and reasoning. Because defendant failed to establish an appropriate foundation for each independent hearsay statement to fall within a hearsay exception, most, if not all, of the information contained in each report is inadmissible hearsay and was improperly admitted into evidence. B Plaintiff-appellant also argues that each exhibit is inadmissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rule. MRE 803(8) excepts from the hearsay rule: (8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement per sonnel, and subject to the limitations of MCL 257.624; MSA 9.2324.[ ] Because MRE 803(8)(A) is limited to "records or reports” describing the general activities of an agency per se, the four exhibits do not fall within subsection (A) since they relate to a single specific incident. Attorney General v John A Biewer Co, Inc, 140 Mich App 1, 16; 363 NW2d 712 (1985); Hewitt v Grand Trunk W R Co, 123 Mich App 309, 326-327; 333 NW2d 264 (1983). The four exhibits are also inadmissible under MRE 803(8)(B), which excepts from the hearsay rule records of matters observed and reported pursuant to a duty. Although the four exhibits do meet the literal requirements of MRE 803(8)(B), they are nevertheless inadmissible because of the circumstances under which they were prepared and because they are replete with multiple layers of hearsay within hearsay. As with the business records hearsay exception, MRE 803(6), inherent trustworthiness also lies at the heart of the public records hearsay exception codified in MRE 803(8). See FRE Advisory Committee Note, 56 FRD 183, 311 (1972). See also Wig-more, supra, §§ 1630-1632, pp 617-621. Chief Justice Riley, then a Court of Appeals judge, also noted in Hewitt v Grand Trunk W R Co, supra, that the rationale giving rise to the traditional public records exception was rooted not merely in the practical necessity of relieving public officials from becoming " 'a class of official witnesses,’ ” but rather in the high probability that the declarant would properly discharge his duty to make an accurate and reliable report: McCormick’s treatise on the law of evidence explains the purpose, scope and justification for this exception: "The special trustworthiness of official written statements is found in the declarant’s official duty and the high probability that the duty to make an accurate report has been performed. . . . "A special need for this category of hearsay is found in the inconvenience of requiring public officials to appear in court and testify concerning the subject matter of their statements. Not only would this disrupt the administration of public affairs, but it almost certainly would create a class of official witnesses. Moreover, given the volume of business in public officers, the official written statement will usually be more reliable than the official’s present memory.” McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 315, pp 735-736. [Hewitt, supra, p 326.] Thus, the principle justification for excepting public records from the hearsay rule is trustworthiness, which is generally ensured when records are prepared under circumstances providing an official duty to observe and report. Our Court of Appeals has previously taken into consideration the circumstances under which documents are prepared in order to determine whether they fall within the public records hearsay exception. In Attorney General v Biewer, supra, the Court concluded that documents prepared in anticipation of litigation do not fall within the scope of MRE 803(8)(B) because they lack trustworthiness. At issue in Biewer was whether several Department of Natural Resources memoranda, setting forth the costs the agency incurred during the investigation of defendant’s plant for ground water contamination, fell within the scope of MRE 8Q3(8)(B). The Court concluded the memoranda were beyond the scope of MRE 803(8)(B) not merely because there was no specific legal duty imposed on dnr employees to report agency investigative expenditures, but rather because the memoranda were prepared to document the investigatory costs that the dnr sought to recover as damages in a civil lawsuit. 140 Mich App 17. Consequently, the circumstances of preparation indicated the memoranda were prepared for litigation, and "[t]he inherent trustworthiness of documents prepared by a public official in carrying out his duties which justifies the public records exception does not apply to this case.” Id. It is clear that under certain circumstances, such as when records are prepared in anticipation of litigation or where the preparer or source of information had a motivation to misrepresent, trustworthiness, the principle rationale for admissibility under MRE 803(8), is no longer present, even though a record may meet the literal requirements of the rule. See Wigmore, supra, § 1633(7), p 624. Thus, we again take note of the circumstances under which the four exhibits in the present case were prepared, see ante, pp 126-129, and likewise conclude they were improperly admitted into evidence under MRE 803(8)(B). Under MRE 803(8)(B), trustworthiness is the cardinal justification for the admissibility of public records otherwise excluded as hearsay, and the circumstances under which the four exhibits in this case were prepared do not furnish the same high degree of reliability and accuracy that the literal requirements of MRE 803(8)(B) were intended to ensure. Rather than affecting solely the weight of the evidence, the circumstances under which these four exhibits were prepared touch upon the underlying threshold issue of admissibility. In addition, each record, as previously noted, see ante, pp 128-129, also contains numerous statements of hearsay within hearsay. MRE 805. Consequently, we would hold that the four exhibits are inadmissible hearsay and were improperly admitted into evidence under MRE 803(8). c The admission of the four exhibits into evidence over plaintiff’s timely objection was clearly improper and constituted an abuse of discretion. We also agree with Judge Shepherd that the prejudice to plaintiff is obvious. "The reports, given their imprimatur as official police documents, might be viewed as more credible than the testimony of live witnesses. It is impossible to conclude the jury, faced with a quasi-official document which purports to offer an objective recitation of the 'facts,’ would not place heavy reliance on its accuracy.” 166 Mich App 31 (Shepherd, J., dissenting). When added to the fact that the exhibits create the impression that decedent came out of his home specifically intending to shoot someone even though his own son would be endangered, the error cannot be deemed harmless. Because the substantial rights of the plaintiff were adversely affected, automatic reversal is required. Swartz v Dow Chemical Co, 414 Mich 433, 444; 326 NW2d 804 (1982); Ilins v Burns, 388 Mich 504, 510-511; 201 NW2d 624 (1972). Ill The second question presented is whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the so-called rescue doctrine. SJI2d 13.07 provides: A person who goes to the rescue of another who is in imminent and serious peril caused by the negligence of someone else is not contributorily negligent, so long as the rescue attempt is not recklessly or rashly made. Over plaintiff’s timely objection, the trial court read to the jury a modified version of SJI2d 13.07: If you find, under the facts, from the evidence, that Alvin Solomon was in imminent and serious peril, a person who goes to the rescue of another who is in imminent and serious peril caused by the negligence of someone else, is not contributorily negligent, so long as the rescue attempt is not recklessly or rashly made. The basis of plaintiff’s objection was that the victim need not be in actual danger in order for the rescue doctrine to apply, and that the instructions misled the jury by stating contributory negligence principles instead of comparative negligence principles. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Although the Court concluded that the trial court had erroneously instructed the jury, the Court deemed the error harmless. The Court held that the rescue doctrine applies if the rescuer reasonably believes the victim is in actual danger. Consequently, the victim need not ever have been in actual danger in order for the doctrine to apply. The Court found the error harmless, however, because on the whole, the jury instructions adequately presented plaintiff’s theory of the case to the jury and properly instructed the jury on comparative negligence principles. Consequently, we must determine whether the Court of Appeals properly held that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury and whether the error was harmless. A Under the rescue doctrine, the tortfeasor whose negligence endangers the victim owes the victim’s rescuer a duty of reasonable care. Brugh v Bigelow, 310 Mich 74, 77, 80; 16 NW2d 668 (1944), citing Wagner v Int'l R Co, 232 NY 176; 133 NE 437 (1921); Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 43, pp 288-289, §44, pp 307-308. Since rescuers, as a class, are foreseeable, the tortfeasor’s duty of care owed to the rescuer is independent of that owed to the victim. Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 44, p 308. Traditionally, the rescue doctrine has served two purposes. First, the doctrine established a causal nexus linking the tortfeasor’s negligent conduct to the rescuer’s injuries. See Parks v Starks, 342 Mich 443; 70 NW2d 805 (1955). Consequently, the fact that the rescuer voluntarily exposed himself to an increased risk of harm was not, as a matter of law, deemed to be a superseding cause of the rescuer’s injuries that would discharge the tortfeasor’s liability. Sweetman v State Hwy Dep’t, 137 Mich App 14, 26-27; 357 NW2d 783 (1984); Restatement Torts, 2d, § 445; Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 44, pp 307-308. Second, the doctrine also provided that, when the rescue attempt itself was reasonable, the rescuer’s recovery was not otherwise absolutely barred by the affirmative defense of contributory negligence merely because the rescuer voluntarily exposed himself to an increased risk of injury in order to save a third person. Sweetman, supra, pp 26-27; 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 472, p 521; Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 44, pp 307-308, § 65, pp 451-453. An injured rescuer’s recovery would still be barred, even if the rescue attempt itself was reasonable, when the rescuer did not exercise reasonable care in the manner in which he carried out the attempt. Sweetman, supra, p 27; 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, §472, comment c, p 522; SJI2d 13.07. Thus, as the Court of Appeals noted in Sweetman, the application of the rescue doctrine requires a two-step analysis. First, the trier of fact must determine whether a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances would have acted as did the rescuer. To determine this, the trier of fact must balance the utility of the rescuer’s conduct against the magnitude of the increased risk of harm. See Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 433-434; 254 NW2d 759 (1977); Sweetman, supra, pp 26-27. If the rescue attempt itself is reasonable, then the rescuer is not deemed comparatively negligent merely for voluntarily exposing himself to an increased risk of harm in order to save another. The second step of the analysis is to determine whether the rescuer carried out the rescue attempt in a reasonable manner. If the rescuer did not, then the rescuer’s recovery is reduced by his comparative degree of fault. Sweet-man, supra, pp 26-27. The Court of Appeals correctly held that the rescue doctrine applies even if the victim never was in actual danger. Although previous Michigan cases held that the victim had to be in actual danger at the time of the rescue attempt, pr if not, at least shortly before, it is clear that the dispositive issue determining whether the rescue attempt itself is reasonable is whether the rescuer acted as a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances. Because the inquiry as to whether the rescue attempt itself was reasonable also rests upon whether the utility of the rescue attempt outweighs the increased risk of harm the rescuer faces, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the rescue doctrine applies even if the victim never was in actual danger. Accord Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 44, p 306, n 45 and pp 307-308. Because the trial court instructed the jury that Alvin Solomon had to be in actual danger at the time of the rescue attempt, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the instruction was erroneous. Consequently, the instruction was also misleading because it did not clearly charge the jury to undertake its inquiry from the viewpoint of a reasonable person acting under the same or similar circumstances as decedent. See Sweetman, supra, pp 26-28. B The Court of Appeals deemed the instructional error harmless because it found that the jury instructions as a whole adequately stated plaintiff’s theory of the case and, therefore, did not constitute error requiring reversal. See Baker v Saginaw City Lines, Inc, 366 Mich 180, 189-190; 113. NW2d 912 (1962); Scalabrino v Grand Trunk W R Co, 135 Mich App 758, 766; 356 NW2d 258 (1984), lv den 422 Mich 877 (1985). The Court also reasoned that, because it had reduced plaintiff’s award by eighty percent, the jury must have been properly instructed on comparative negligence principles. We disagree and would hold the instructional error prejudicial and inconsistent with substantial justice. Under the instructions the trial court read to the jury, the jury could not properly analyze plaintiff’s theory of the case under the rescue doctrine. Plaintiff’s theory of the case was that the rescue attempt itself was reasonable and that decedent carried out the rescue attempt in a reasonable manner. In light of the fact that Alvin never was in actual danger, however, the trial court in effect told the jury that the rescue doctrine did not apply and that the rescue attempt itself was unreasonable. Consequently, the instructions precluded the jury from properly considering whether a reasonable person would have undertaken a rescue attempt under these same circumstances and in the same manner. Thus, it is no comfort to state that the jury was otherwise properly instructed on comparative negligence principles and, notwithstanding the instructional error, undertook an otherwise proper negligence analysis. The simple fact is that the jury, under these instructions, could not determine whether the rescue attempt itself was reasonable. Thus, plaintiff’s theory of the case was not adequately presented to the jury. Plaintiff suffered prejudice inconsistent with substantial justice, and, therefore, reversal is required._ CONCLUSION As we noted in Moncrief v Detroit, 398 Mich 181; 247 NW2d 783 (1976), police reports will not usually qualify for admission into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. In the present case, we would hold that the four police reports were improperly admitted into evidence under MRE 803(6) because each exhibit lacked the trustworthiness that the rule requires as a condition of admissibility. Each exhibit also contains numerous statements of hearsay within hearsay, MRE 805, and is not otherwise admissible as a public record, MRE 803(8). We also conclude that plaintiff suffered substantial prejudice because of the reports’ imprimatur as "official” police records and their depiction of decedent’s conduct. We also would hold that the jury was erroneously instructed on the rescue doctrine. Because the trial court’s instructions did not adequately present plaintiff’s theory of the case to the jury and the jury could not otherwise undertake a proper negligence analysis, we would hold the error cannot be deemed harmless. The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion._ Levin and Cavanagh, JJ., concurred with Archer, J. The jury also found that Shuell did not commit assault and battery. In addition, the jury did not answer whether decedent’s constitutional rights had been violated. The dissenting judge did not address the jury instruction issue. (c) Hearsay. "Hearsay” is a statement, other than the one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. [MRE 801(c).] Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules. [MRE 802.] Neither party argues that the exhibits are admissible under MRE 804. MRE 803(6) is identical to FRE 803(6) except that MRE 803(6) is limited to "acts, transactions, occurrences, or events,” while FRE 803(6) applies to "acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses . . . .” Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). The record reveals that, during oral argument outside the pres ence of the jury, plaintiff’s counsel informed the court that the officers were advised of their constitutional rights and provided counsel. Plaintiff-appellant concedes before this Court that the four exhibits were "kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity” and that it was the department’s regular practice to compile such reports. Therefore, we assume, without deciding, that these two elements of MRE 803(6) have been established. Any writing or record whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum of any act, transaction, occurrence or event shall be admissible in evidence in all trials, hearings and proceedings in any cause or suit in any court, or before any officer, arbitrators, or referees, in proof of said act, transaction, occurrence or event if it was made in the regular course of any business and it was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence or event or within a reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances of the making of such writing or record including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight but not its admissibility. The term "business” shall include business, profession, occupation and calling of every kind. [MCL 600.2146; MSA 27A.2146.] In addition to requiring that the entries be regularly made at or about the time of the transaction and as a part of the routine of the business, other common restrictions were that (1) the party using the book not have had a clerk, (2) the party fie a "supplemental oath” to the justness of the account, (3) the books bear an honest appearance, (4) each transaction not exceed a certain limited value, (5) witnesses testify from their experience in dealing with the party that the books are honest, (6) the books be used only to prove open accounts for goods and services furnished the defendant (thus making them unavailable for proof of loans, and goods and services furnished under special contract or furnished to third persons on defendant’s credit), and (7) other proof be made of the actual delivery of some of the goods. [McCormick, supra, §305, p 871. See also Laughlin, Business entries and the like, 46 Iowa L R 276, 282-283 (1961).] See Wigmore, supra, § 1420, p 251. "The purpose and reason of the hearsay rule is the key to the exceptions to it.” 28 USC 695 (currently codified as amended at 28 USC 1732). The federal business records statute is substantially identical to MCL 600.2146; MSA 27A.2146. Hoffman v Palmer, 129 F2d 976 (CA 2, 1942). See also Laughlin, n 11 supra, p 289 (Palmer "violates the letter” of the federal statute). The Commonwealth Fund Act was essentially identical to 28 USC 695 (currently codified as amended at 28 USC 1732) and MCL 600.2146; MSA 27A.2146. See Morgan, The Law of Evidence, Some Proposals for Its Reform (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927), p 63. § 1. Definition. — The term "business” shall include every kind of business, profession, occupation, calling or operation of institutions, whether carried on for profit or not. §2. Business Records. — A record of an act, condition or event, shall, in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission. [9A ULA 506 (1965).] (13) Business Entries and the Like. Writings offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events to prove the facts stated therein, if the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of a business at or about the time of the act, condition or event recorded, and that the sources of information from which made and the method and circumstances of their preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness. [9A ULA 637 (1965).] Instead of prescribing as does Model Code Rule 514 that the memorandum must be made by the person having knowledge of the act, event or condition or must be transmitted by such person in the course of the business for inclusion in the memorandum, the broader policy of the Uniform Act is adopted leaving it up to the judge to determine whether or not the sources of information, method and time of preparation reflect trustworthiness. [Uniform Rules of Evidence, comment to ¶ 13, 9A ULA 646 (1965).] The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, all in the course of a regularly conducted activity, as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. [56 FRD 183, 300-301 (1972).] The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary-system — that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest. [Miranda v Arizona, n 7 supra, p 469.] See n 10 for text. Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule provided in these rules. [MRE 805.] MRE 803(8) is identical to FRE 803(8) except for the reference to MCL 257.624; MSA 9.2324 and the omission of FRE 803(8)(C) (evaluative reports), which was rejected as inconsistent with prior Michigan law. See Swartz v Dow Chemical Co, 414 Mich 433, 443-444; 326 NW2d 804 (1982). See also Bradbury v Ford Motor Co, 419 Mich 550, 554; 358 NW2d 550 (1984). In Hewitt, the Court concluded in dicta that an accident report prepared by an officer without a duty to report did not fall within the scope of MRE 803(8)(B). Although records meeting the literal requirements of the public records hearsay exception have traditionally been admitted into evidence, "a statement otherwise admissible is to be excluded where there existed for the declarant a special interest or motive to misrepresent. No doubt, in a given case, circumstances may justify the exclusion of an official statement where a strong motive to misrepresent appears to have existed . . . .” Wigmore, supra, § 1633(7), p 624. (Emphasis in original.) Although in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979), reh den 406 Mich 1119 (1979), we abolished the contributory negligence doctrine as an absolute bar to a negligent plaintiff’s recovery, comparative negligence principles now apply in rescue cases. Sweetman, supra, p 26. See, e.g., Parks v Starks, 342 Mich 443; 70 NW2d 805 (1955); Brown v Ross, 345 Mich 54; 75 NW2d 68 (1956); Hughes v Polk, 40 Mich App 634; 199 NW2d 224 (1972), lv den 388 Mich 770 (1972). Sweetman, supra. We also agree that the jury instruction was erroneous and misleading because it stated the contributory negligence doctrine instead of comparative negligence principles. MCR 2.613(A). The harmless error standard set forth in MCR 2.613(A) is applicable in all civil actions. Johnson v Corbet, 423 Mich 304, 326; 377 NW2d 713 (1985). The police report is a writing. It could be admitted into evidence as an exhibit if the proponent can show that it meets the requirements of the business records exception. However, because of the "nature” of police business and the circumstances under which such reports are usually made, the possibility of police reports so qualifying is unlikely. [Moncrief, supra, p 189.] Although the erroneous admission of the four police reports and the instructional error each are independent grounds requiring reversal because plaintiff suffered substantial prejudice, the cumulative effect of these errors also requires reversal. Haynes v Seiler, 16 Mich App 98, 103; 167 NW2d 819 (1969). See Hickey v Zezulka, 177 Mich App 606, 623; 443 NW2d 180 (1989).

Boyle, J. We consider whether the Court of Appeals properly reversed the trial court’s decision to terminate alimony under an express provision in the parties’ divorce judgment. We conclude that the Court of Appeals applied an erroneous standard in reviewing the decision of the trial court. i After some twenty-eight years of marriage, the parties were divorced by a judgment of the Monroe Circuit Court dated, April 23, 1985, which was taken by settlement of the parties. Pursuant to the divorce judgment, plaintiff Kenneth Beason was to pay alimony of $320 per month to defendant, Mary Beason. The divorce judgment provided, however, "that said alimony payments shall terminate upon the re-marriage of the said Mary L. Beason or when the said Mary L. Beason should reside with an unrelated adult male person.” On April 8, 1986, plaintiff filed a motion for the permanent termination of alimony, alleging that defendant was residing with an unrelated male person, John Robinson, in defendant’s house at 15475 Dayton Road in Monroe, Michigan. At a hearing on plaintiff’s motion, John Robinson testified that as a long-distance truck driver, he often made trips lasting several days and that he was outside of Monroe County most of the time. According to Robinson, he considered his residence to be a mobile home which he had purchased in January or February of 1986. Before that, he considered his residence to be an apartment which he rented until the purchase of the mobile home. Robinson stated that "on occasion” he used the mobile home as a mailing address, but that he would have important mail such as paychecks or credit card bills sent to a post office box. He testified that he never used the Dayton Road address as a mailing address. Robinson’s thirty-two-year-old niece also lived in the mobile home free of rent and, according to Robinson, performed services such as doing laundry and taking care of the mobile home for him. Robinson testified that he did not keep any clothing or personal articles at defendant’s home. He did change clothes at the Dayton Road address after work and before going out to dinner with the defendant, but he changed into clothes that he brought with . him. Because of the nature of his work, Robinson carried a change of clothing at all times. Robinson kept his Trans-Am automobile at defendant’s house when he was out of town. Robinson stated that when he went to work he some times drove his own car and sometimes drove defendant’s, a green Thunderbird. According to Robinson, defendant probably drove his car to work more often than she drove her own. Robinson testified that he did not help defendant with her bills or give her money. He did maintain her lawn and shrubbery, and would sometimes come over to mow the lawn when defendant was not at home. However, he testified that defendant had not given him a key to the Dayton Road address and had not given him permission to be there when she was not at home. On one occasion, Robinson performed a repair inside the house when defendant was not there. Defendant stated that on this occasion she told Robinson where the spare key was so that he could let himself into the house. Defendant Mary Beason testified that Robinson was a very frequent visitor to her home and had spent the night there. She stated that they spent most of the time together on weekends, and when Robinson was not out of town, she would see him a lot. Every Friday night he took her out to dinner. Robinson would occasionally pay for groceries if he and defendant went to the store to get something to prepare for dinner. The parties stipulated, however, that defendant paid her own bills for gas, water, electricity, cable television, garbage pickup, and telephone. Defendant testified that she never received mail for Robinson at Dayton Road. According to defendant, Robinson did not keep personal effects such as clothing, a razor, or a toothbrush at her house. Defendant testified that Robinson spent as many as two consecutive nights in a row at her house, and when he had long weekends he generally spent them with her. There was testimony from Sandra Chittum, the adult daughter of the parties, who stated that she had seen no evidence of anyone other than defendant living at the Dayton Road address. She had seen no male clothing in the house and when she used items from the bathroom cabinet had never noticed any toothbrushes other than those of defendant and Mrs. Chittum’s own sons. Plaintiff Kenneth Reason hired a private investigator to make observations of defendant’s residence on Dayton Road. The surveillance revealed that on three nights, March 21, 22, and 28, 1986 (a Friday, Saturday, and Friday, respectively), defendant and Robinson were seen entering the Dayton Road address and thereafter all the lights went out. Defendant and Robinson testified that defendant had accompanied Robinson on an over-the-road trip to Texas, and defendant testified that she "might have” accompanied Robinson on a trip to Indiana. Defendant and Robinson both stated their intention to marry, although defendant had doubts because of Robinson’s drinking. Because of these doubts and other unexpected events, defendant and Robinson had postponed their wedding at the time of the hearing on plaintiff’s motion to terminate alimony. The trial court in its opinion found John Robinson to be "less than candid” and concluded that his testimony was not to be believed. The court considered the definition of the term "reside” as used in the divorce judgment and concluded, after reference to dictionary definitions of the term and case law in the area of jurisdiction and venue, that "a common meaning of the word is ... a place where one remains for a time either permanently or continuously ... a place where a person makes his home.” The trial court found Robinson was in the closest telephone contact with defendant, and that since his vehicle was stored at her home it was logical that upon return from his trips he would go there to secure the vehicle. The court specially noted that Robinson did not leave the vehicle at his mobile home. The court further found that while Robinson did not regularly pay defendant’s bills, he did assist her by regularly taking her out to eat. The court noted that although Robinson denied having a key to defendant’s house, he had done work there in her absence. The court found this, together with the parties’ stated intention to marry, the fact that they had traveled cross-country together, and the fact that Robinson had on numerous occasions stayed overnight at the Dayton Road address, sufficient to show that defendant did reside with an unrelated adult male. In an opinion by two members of the panel, the Court of Appeals reversed, stating, "We are convinced that we would have reached a different result had we occupied the position of the trial court.” Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided January 13, 1988 (Docket No. 98716). ii Divorce cases are equitable actions that historically were heard and decided by a chancellor rather than a jury. Although Michigan no longer has separate equity courts, divorce actions continue to be decided by judges rather than by juries. _ In a divorce case, the trial judge performs two distinct functions. First, the court must find facts on the basis of the evidence presented, and then the court must exercise its discretion in fashioning a disposition. In its fact-finding role, the trial court must hear the evidence, choose which witnesses to credit when the evidence conflicts, and, pursuant to MCR 2.517, must place findings of fact on the record or in a written opinion. Upon the basis of the facts, the trial court must then make a disposition of the case. Before the advent of no-fault divorce, the ultimate dispositional ruling was whether a divorce should be granted. Today, the court still must exercise its discretion in fixing the amount of alimony or child support, in dividing property between the parties, or in modifying provisions of the divorce judgment. All of these are dispositional rulings. The trial court’s disposition is of course intimately related to its findings of fact, yet it is distinct. We are not asked here to review a dispositional ruling such as an award of alimony or a modification of such award. Plaintiff Kenneth Beason moved to enforce the terms of the divorce judgment which provided that alimony would terminate if defendant should reside with an unrelated adult male. To rule on plaintiff’s motion, the court was required to make a factual determination regarding the living arrangements of the parties. Then, the court was required to construe the word "reside” in the divorce judgment. Finally, the trial court had to apply the definition of the term "reside” as used in the divorce judgment to the facts as it found them, to determine whether defendant’s alimony should be terminated. m .Equity actions historically were treated differently from law cases on appeal. It is frequently said that divorce cases are reviewed de novo. Stratmann v Stratmann, 287 Mich 94, 95; 282 NW 914 (1938); Westgate v Westgate, 291 Mich 18, 23; 288 NW 860 (1939); Wells v Wells, 330 Mich 448, 452; 47 NW2d 687 (1951). However, in examining Michigan case law to determine the meaning of "de novo” review, we find such a variety of terminology and application that a single clear standard of appellate review does not emerge. Mindful of our distance from the trial bench function, we do see one clear and consistent historical theme: appellate courts have recognized the superior position of the trial court in evaluating the evidence and have hesitated to interfere with factual findings. Very early, this Court recognized the superior position of the trial court in making factual determinations and, consequently, limited review of such determinations: Scattered through the large record there are many traces of truth and of untruth, and numerous instances of coloring and of exaggeration. There is much to believe and much to disbelieve, and the case is one of those where the decision of the judge exercising primary jurisdiction on matters of fact ought not to be overruled by a court of appeal except upon clear and satisfactory grounds. The appellate tribunal ought to be fully persuaded that it must have reached a different conclusion had it occupied the position of the court appealed from and been favored with all the advantages of that court for judging rightly. [Nicholas v Nicholas, 50 Mich 162; 15 NW 64 (1883). Emphasis in original.] Despite some shifting degree of certainty which the appellate courts have felt necessary before reversing a factual determination, this Court and the Court of Appeals have recognized the advantage of the trial judge in making factual determinations. While we acknowledge that it is impossible and perhaps unwise to articulate a bright-line standard of review, we take this occasion to observe that it is as true today as when first stated that "[t]here are many aids possessed by the judge who hears the oral testimony in deciding who of the witnesses are truthful that do not get upon the printed page.” Donaldson v Donaldson, 134 Mich 289, 291; 96 NW 448 (1903). This Court has stated that where the circuit judge saw the witnesses and heard the testimony we give great weight to the findings of fact. Bowler v Bowler, 351 Mich 398; 88 NW2d 505 (1958); Hartka v Hartka, 346 Mich 453; 78 NW2d 133 (1956). It is also said that in a chancery case the decree of the trial court will not be reversed unless the record fails to sustain the decree. Whittaker v Whittaker, 343 Mich 267; 72 NW2d 207 (1955); Kuntze v Kuntze, 351 Mich 144; 88 NW2d 608 (1958). Appellate review of a trial court’s factual determinations was again addressed in the Michigan Court Rules of 1963. GCR 1963, 517.1, modeled after F R Civ P 52(a), directed: Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In the application of this principle regard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of those witnesses who appeared before it. The Michigan Court Rules continue to recognize that the trial court has a superior opportunity to determine factual questions, and that the trial court’s factual determinations are entitled to due regard. MCR 2.613(C). Because MCR 2.613(C) and its predecessor do not distinguish between law and equity cases, our appellate courts have struggled from time to time with the apparent contradiction between the historic standard of review de novo in divorce cases and the court rule’s command that trial court findings of fact must not be set aside unless "clearly erroneous.” While the de novo standard continues to be cited in appellate review of divorce cases, we find that the review accorded is not truly de novo. The appellate courts have consistently, and properly, given deference to the factual findings of the trial court. Thus, the "clearly erroneous” standard of review articulated in MCR 2.613(C) merely restates the standard of review formerly applicable in chancery proceedings. See Michigan Court Rules Practice (3d ed), R 2.613, pp 575-576. FR Civ P 52(a), from which GCR 1963, 517.1 (now MCR 2.613[C]) was patterned, "was intended, in all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, to make applicable the then prevailing equity practice.” United States v United States Gypsum Co, 333 US 364, 394-395; 68 S Ct 525; 92 L Ed 746 (1948). The standard then applicable in federal practice was described as follows: The practice in equity prior to the present Rules of Civü Procedure was that the findings of the trial court, when dependent upon oral testimony where the candor and credibility of the witnesses would best be judged, had great weight with the appellate court. The findings were never conclusive, however. A finding is "clearly erroneous” when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. [Id., p 395.] This Court has adopted the standard for clear error set forth in Gypsum Co and Tuttle v State Hwy Dep’t, 397 Mich 44, 46; 243 NW2d 244 (1976). Despite the repeated citation of a standard of review de novo in divorce cases in our state, we recognize today that the definition of clearly erroneous which we adopted in Tuttle does not contemplate a review de novo. Pursuant to MCR 2.613(C), then, the Court of Appeals was required to accept the trial court’s findings unless those findings were clearly erroneous. In Anderson v Bessemer City, 470 US 564, 573-574; 105 S Ct 1504; 84 L Ed 2d 518 (1985), the United States Supreme Court emphasized the deference which is due a trial court’s factual determination in a review for clear error under F R Civ P 52(a): This standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently. The reviewing court oversteps the bounds of its duty under Rule 52(a) if it undertakes to duplicate the role of the lower court. ... If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Thus, if the trial court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the Court of Appeals may not reverse. However,_ In applying the clearly erroneous standard to the findings of a district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de novo. The authority of an appellate court, when reviewing the findings of a judge as well as those of a jury, is circumscribed by the deference it must give to decisions of the trier of the fact, who is usually in a superior position to appraise and weigh the evidence. [Zenith Radio Corp v Hazeltine Research, 395 US 100, 123; 89 S Ct 1562; 23 L Ed 2d 129 (1969). See also United States v Yellow Cab Co, 338 US 338, 341-342; 70 S Ct 177; 94 L Ed 150 (1949).] This is not to suggest that the trial judge may insulate his findings from review by denominating them credibility determinations, for factors other than demeanor and inflection go into the decision whether or not to believe a witness. Documents or objective evidence may contradict the witness’ story; or the story itself may be so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face that a reasonable factfinder would not credit it. Where such factors are present, the court of appeals may well find clear error even in a finding purportedly based on a credibility determination. [Anderson, supra at 575.] Unlike the findings of a jury, which are binding in the sense that all inferences in favor of the prevailing party must be accepted, a trial court’s factual conclusions in a divorce action are only presumptively correct. However, the burden is on the appellant to persuade the reviewing court that a mistake has been committed, failing which the appellate court may not overturn the trial court’s findings. See 9 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2585, p 729. The trial court’s conclusions of law are not subject to the "clearly erroneous” standard of review. 9 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2585, p 732. Case v Morrisette, 155 US App DC 31, 39; 475 F2d 1300 (1973). Where a finding is derived from an erroneous application of law to facts, the appellate court is not limited to review for clear error. Nor is an appellate court so limited where the trial judge’s factual findings may have been influenced by an incorrect view of the law. Pavlides v Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc, 727 F2d 330, 339, n 16 (CA 5, 1984); Weissmann v Freeman, 868 F2d 1313, 1317 (CA 2, 1989), cert den 493 US —; 110 S Ct 219; 107 L Ed 2d 173 (1989). Chaparral Resources, Inc v Monsanto Co, 849 F2d 1286, 1289 (CA 10, 1988). In summary, we hold that the factual findings of a trial court in a divorce case are to be reviewed for clear error. A finding is clearly erroneous if the appellate court, on all the evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. While this standard gives the appellate judge more latitude than when reviewing a trial by jury, it does not authorize a reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court; if the trial court’s view of the evidence is plausible, the reviewing court may not reverse. iv We find that the Court of Appeals applied an erroneous standard of review to the factual determinations of the trial court when it stated that "although this court hears divorce cases de novo, it will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court . . . unless convinced that it would have reached a different result.” The "would have reached a different result” inquiry, in our view, invites a substitution of judgment by the reviewing court. However, this case cannot be resolved by a simple application of the clearly erroneous standard of review, because it appears the trial court’s findings of fact may have been based on an erroneous view of the law. The meaning of the term "reside” in the divorce judgment may be a factual or legal question. However, the record before us does not reveal how the trial court arrived at its definition of the term. The trial court resorted to several extrinsic sources to define "reside” without first determining that the term was ambiguous. Until the trial court has been afforded an opportunity to clarify the basis of its earlier findings regarding the meaning of the term "reside,” we cannot ascertain whether the proper legal rule has been misapplied in arriving at the findings of fact made below. Thus, we remand this case to the trial court for consideration of the meaning of the term "reside” in the parties’ divorce judgment, and direct the trial court to state the legal and factual basis for its definition of the term, specifying which findings are of fact and which of law. MCR 7.316(A)(7). We do not retain jurisdiction. Riley, C.J., and Levin, Brickley, Cavanagh, Archer, and Griffin, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J. Const 1963, art 6, § 5 abolished the distinction between law and equity proceedings as far as practicable, and prohibited the office of master in chancery. MCL 552.12; MSA 25.92 provides: Suits to annul or affirm a marriage, or for a divorce, shall be conducted in the same manner as other suits in courts of equity; and the court shall have the power to award issues, to decree costs, and to enforce its decrees, as in other cases. Construction of the term "reside” may be a question of fact or law. Courts in other jurisdictions, interpreting terms such as "reside,” "cohabit” and "live with” as used in divorce judgments which incorporate a stipulation of the parties, generally interpret the judgment in the same manner as a contract. See Gertrude LQ v Stephen PQ, 466 A2d 1213, 1217 (Del, 1983); Kenyon v Kenyon, 496 So 2d 839, 840 (Fla App, 1986). Thus, if the meaning of the terms used is clear and unambiguous, the decree may be construed as a matter of law. See Brown v Brown, 122 Misc 2d 849, 851-852; 472 NYS2d 550 (1984), modified 505 NYS2d 648 (1986); Bell v Bell, 393 Mass 20, 21, n 1; 468 NE2d 859 (1984), cert den 470 US 1027 (1985). However, where the meaning is not clear, the court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Desler v Desler, 56 Or App 812, 817; 643 P2d 655 (1982). The rule in Michigan is essentially simüar. A divorce decree is to be construed in light of the findings of fact and conclusions of law. Walker v Walker, 327 Mich 707, 712; 42 NW2d 790 (1950). If it is unambiguous when viewed in this manner, it may be construed as a matter of law. See Tessmer v Tessmer, 261 Mich 681, 683; 247 NW 93 (1933) (read in light of the divorce proceedings, the decree was not ambiguous). However if the terms used are ambiguous, they may be interpreted and clarified by extrinsic evidence. Vigil v Vigil, 118 Mich App 194, 200; 324 NW2d 571 (1982); Bers v Bers, 161 Mich App 457, 464; 411 NW2d 732 (1987). It has been variously stated that the appellate court "generally does not reverse or modify unless convinced that it would have had to reach another result had it occupied the position of the trial court,” Paul v Paul, 362 Mich 43, 47; 106 NW2d 384 (1960), or "unless convinced that we would have reached a different conclusion had we occupied the situation of the trial court,” Bradley v Bradley, 292 Mich 370, 372; 290 NW 832 (1940), "that we should have reached a different conclusion had we occupied the position of the trial court,” Wellman v Wellman, 305 Mich 365, 372; 9 NW2d 579 (1943), or "unless it is clear the reviewing court could have reached a different result had it occupied the position of the trial judge.” York v York, 113 Mich App 306, 309; 317 NW2d 604 (1982). United _ States Supreme Court cases subsequent to Gypsum Co make explicit that a review for clear error pursuant to FR Civ P 52(a) does not contemplate review de novo: Some courts state that a finding which is unsupported by "substantial evidence” is clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Duty v United States, 735 F2d 1012, 1015 (CA 6, 1984); Canizzo v Farrell Lines, Inc, 579 F2d 682, 686 (CA 2, 1978), cert den 439 US 929 (1978). Examination of the origins of this interpretation of the language of Rule 52(a) reveals that a review for substantial evidence is a review for bare sufficiency of the trial court’s findings. See Baltimore & O R Co v Postom, 85 US App DC 207, 208; 177 F2d 53 (1949); Miller v Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 203 F2d 350, 353 (CA 6, 1953); Federal Security Ins Co v Smith, 259 F2d 294, 295 (CA 10, 1958). Thus, a finding which is unsupported by substantial evidence must be reversed. However, the converse is not true; a finding which is supported by substantial evidence is not immune from further review. See Jones v Pitt Co Bd of Ed, 528 F2d 414, 418 (CA 4, 1975); Williams v Procunier, 735 F2d 875, 878 (CA 5, 1984), cert den 469 US 1075 (1984). The extent of such further review, of course, is the question before us today. In making the threshold ambiguity determination, the court may look to the findings of law and fact on which the divorce judgment was based. Walker, Tessmer, n 3 supra.

Per Curiam. The defendants are insurance companies that cannot agree with regard to their respective liability for personal protection insurance (first-party) benefits that are payable to the plaintiff’s subrogors. The Court of Appeals has concluded that the obligation must be borne by defendant American Commercial Insurance Company. We conclude, however, that the Legislature has directed that the obligation be shared equally by these defendant insurers. i This case arises out of an accident that occurred on August 22, 1985. An automobile collided with a motorcycle operated by Gerald Wilson. His passenger was Monique Wilson. Mr. Wilson was seriously injured; Ms. Wilson was killed. Neither the owner nor the operator of the automobile was insured. The owner of the motorcycle was likewise uninsured. Further, neither Wilson had purchased an insurance policy. They were, however, covered by three policies that had been issued to their aunt, Mary N. Taylor, with whom they lived. Each of the defendant insurance companies had insured one of Ms. Taylor’s three vehicles. The policies issued by State Farm Insurance Company and by Allstate Insurance Company provided for coordination of benefits. The policy issued by American Commercial Liability Insurance Company did not. The insurers agree that, aside from the possible effect of the coordination-of-benefits clauses, they are of equal priority under the no-fault act. Following the accident, the medical expenses of Mr. Wilson and Ms. Wilson were met by the Department of Social Services through its medical assistance program (Medicaid). After paying over $120,000 in medical and related expenses, the dss sought reimbursement from the defendant insurers. When no payment was received, the dss exercised its statutory right to bring a subrogation action to recover the insurance proceeds that were owed to the Wilsons._ II In August 1986, the dss filed in circuit court a pair of complaints, one pertaining to Mr. Wilson, and one to Ms. Wilson. The circuit court later consolidated the cases. To date, no genuine controversy has arisen concerning whether the dss must be reimbursed. All appear to agree that such payment must be made. The issue is whether the burden must be borne by American Commercial alone on the ground its policy provided full benefits, whereas the policies issued by State Farm and Allstate provided coordinated benefits. American Commercial believes that, because the three insurers are of equal priority, each must share the burden equally. In circuit court, State Farm and Allstate moved for summary disposition, urging that American Commercial alone is liable. After considering the arguments of the parties, the circuit judge granted the motions. The court ordered that the dss take judgment against American Commercial "for whatever amount of damages are [sic] established,” and that a dismissal enter in favor of State Farm and Allstate. hi The Court of Appeals affirmed the summary disposition. In explaining its decision, the Court relied upon Auto-Owners Ins Co v Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co, 171 Mich App 46; 429 NW2d 637 (1988): We agree with the trial court’s decision. State Farm and Allstate both had coordination of bene fits clauses in their policies which allowed the policyholder to pay a lower premium. American Commercial did not have a coordination of benefits clause in its policy. By operation of the coordination of benefits clauses, State Farm and Allstate were made secondary insurers and American Commercial became the primary insurer. MCL 500.3109a; MSA 24.13109(1), MCL [500.]3115(2); MSA 24.13115(2); Auto-Owners Ins Co v Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co, 171 Mich App 46, 49-53; [429] NW2d [637] (1988). As the primary insurer, American Commercial is solely responsible for the amount owed to dss. Auto-Owners, supra. American Commercial then applied to this Court for leave to appeal, urging us to reverse the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals. After deciding to grant leave to appeal in Auto-Owners, we issued an order holding the present case in abeyance pending our decision in Auto-Owners. The parties in the Auto-Owners case settled their dispute, however, and stipulated to a dismissal of the appeal. Thus we turn again to consideration of the present case. IV In Auto-Owners, the Court of Appeals considered the issue "whether no-fault coverage with a coordination-of-benefits provision is excess coverage over equal priority no-fault coverage without such a clause,” which it characterized as "an issue of first impression.” Id. at 49-50. After noting that the statutory phrase "other health and accident cover age” has been applied in a variety of contexts, the Court of Appeals turned to our decision in LeBlanc v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 410 Mich 173, 201; 301 NW2d 775 (1981). In that decision, we stated: Furthermore, the fact that "other health and accident coverage” immediately follows a reference to "personal protection insurance benefits” compels a conclusion that "other health and accident coverage” clearly means coverage other than personal protection insurance benefits payable under any no-fault policy. The Court of Appeals panel that decided Auto-Owners chose not to rely upon the quoted statement from LeBlanc, however. The panel observed that LeBlanc concerned whether Medicare benefits were subject to coordination, and predicted that this Court "would reach a different conclusion” if presented with a case directly posing the question found in Auto-Owners and the present case. 171 Mich 53. Thus the Auto-Owners panel concluded that the insurer that had issued coordinated-benefits coverage (Farm Bureau) should prevail over the insurer that had issued a full-benefits policy (Auto-Owners). v In the present case, the insurers agree that they are of equal statutory priority. Each must therefore share the cost of the personal protection insurance benefits that have been paid by the dss, unless the coordination-of-benefits clauses in the State Farm and Allstate policies can be invoked with respect to the full-benefits policy issued by American Commercial. It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed in Auto-Owners, that our LeBlanc decision concerned another issue. However, we adhere to our conclusion in LeBlanc that the phrase "other health and accident coverage” clearly means coverage other than personal protection insurance benefits payable under a no-fault policy. We again emphasize that, in crafting MCL 500.3109a; MSA 24.13109(1), the Legislature placed the reference to "other health and accident coverage” immediately after a reference to "personal protection insurance benefits.” The legislative history of MCL 500.3109a; MSA 24.13109(1) was presented in our LeBlanc opinion. 410 Mich 194-197. See also Federal Kemper Ins Co, Inc v Health Ins Administration, Inc, 424 Mich 537, 546-550; 383 NW2d 590 (1986). While the legislative history of MCL 500.3109a; MSA 24.13109(1) is not dispositive, it supports our con elusion. That is, the purpose of MCL 500.3109a; MSA 24.13109(1) was to eliminate duplicate coverage, typically where automobile insurance and health insurance would both be available to an injured motorist. However, there is no duplicate coverage under the no-fault act, since insurers are given priorities, and, where the priorities are equal, the liability is divided, not duplicated. A full-benefits no-fault policy having the same statutory priority as a coordinated no-fault policy does not constitute "other health and accident coverage” within the meaning of MCL 500.3109a; MSA 24.13109(1). Thus a no-fault insurer that has issued a coordinated policy may not "coordinate” benefits so as to place the full obligation to pay on a no-fault insurer that is of equal statutory priority, and that has issued a full-benefits policy. For these reasons, and in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court, and we remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. MCR 7.302(F)(1). Riley, C.J., and Brickley, Cavanagh, Boyle, Archer, and Griffin, JJ., concurred. Levin, J. (separate opinion). I would grant leave to appeal. I adhere to the view that peremptory reversal should be reserved for those cases in which the law is settled and no factual assessment is required. While no factual assessment is required in the instant case, the law is not settled. This Court granted leave to appeal in Auto-Owners Ins Co v Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co, 171 Mich App 46; 429 NW2d 637 (1988), lv gtd 433 Mich 880 (1989), to address the question peremptorily decided in the per curiam opinion filed today. Auto-Owners was settled, and the appeal in this Court was dismissed. Counsel for defendantappellees, State Farm Insurance Company and Allstate Insurance Company, will wonder why Auto-Owners was grant worthy, but the decision of the Court of Appeals in the instant case, which adopted the reasoning of Auto-Owners, is not. The opinion in Auto-Owners was written by a judge sitting by assignment and was signed by two judges of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals per curiam opinion in the instant case was signed by two different judges of the Court of Appeals and a judge sitting by assignment. Four Court of Appeals judges and two judges sitting by assignment have thus so expressed themselves. No contrary authority is cited by the appellant or in the per curiam opinion filed today other than a statement in the opinion that is conceded to be obiter dictum. I would, again, grant leave to appeal._ MCL 500.3107; MSA 24.13107. MCL 500.3114(1); MSA 24.13114(1). (This case would fall within MCL 500.3114[5]; MSA 24.13114[5], but for the inapplicability of paragraphs [a] through [d] in MCL 500.3114[5]; MSA 24.13114[5].) MCL 500.3109a; MSA 24.13109(1). MCL 400.105 et seq.; MSA 16.490(15) et seq. MCL 400.106(l)(b)(ii)(b); MSA 16.490(16)(l)(b)(ii)(b). Dep’t of Social Services v American Commercial Liability Ins Co, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided January 30,1989 (Docket No. 107100). Auto-Owners Ins Co v Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co, 433 Mich 880 (1989). Dep’t of Social Services v American Commercial Liability Ins Co, unpublished order of the Supreme Court, dated September 28, 1989 (Docket No. 85493). See n 7. For example, in Nyquist v Aetna Ins Co, 84 Mich App 589; 269 NW2d 687 (1978), aff’d 404 Mich 817 [280 NW2d 792] (1979), this Court held that Blue Cross-Blue Shield benefits were subject to coordination with personal injury protection benefits payable under a no-fault policy containing the § 3109a clause and offered at a reduced premium. Although Blue Cross-Blue Shield is technically not "insurance,” this Court reasoned that the Legislature clearly intended to include this type of medical benefits coverage within the scope of § 3109a. In numerous other decisions, this Court has expanded the scope of coverages included within the meaning of "other health and accident coverage” subject to § 3109a coordination of benefits: Lewis v Transamerica Ins Corp of America, 160 Mich App 413; 408 NW2d 458 (1987), lv den 429 Mich 855 (1987) (benefits under Teamsters Welfare Plan); Auto-Owners Ins Co v Lacks Industries, 156 Mich App 837; 402 NW2d 102 (1986), lv den 428 Mich 902 (1987) (employer’s self-insurance plan); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Group Health Plan of Southeast Michigan, 131 Mich App 268; 345 NW2d 683 (1983) (health maintenance organizations); Bagley v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 101 Mich App 733; 300 NW2d 322 (1980) (military medical and disability benefits). [Auto-Owners, 171 Mich App 50.] Indeed, the holding in LeBlanc has been substantially affected by federal law. See 42 USC 1395y(b)(l). MCL 500.3115(2); MSA 24.13115(2). Roek v Chippewa Valley Bd of Ed, 430 Mich 314, 322; 422 NW2d 680 (1988) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Grames v Amerisure Ins Co, 434 Mich 867, 868-875; 451 NW2d 304 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting); People v Little, 434 Mich 752, 769-770; 456 NW2d 237 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting). See Schweiker v Hansen, 450 US 785, 791; 101 S Ct 1468; 67 L Ed 2d 685 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("A summary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved by this Court for situations in which the law is settled and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error”); Leis v Flynt, 439 US 438, 457-458; 99 S Ct 698; 58 L Ed 2d 717 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Summary reversal 'should be reserved for palpably clear cases of . . . error.’ Eaton v Tulsa, 415 US 697, 707 [94 S Ct 1228; 39 L Ed 2d 693 (1974)] [Rehnquist, J., dissenting]”). This Court’s last decision construing § 3109a of the Insurance Code, MCL 500.3109a; MSA 24.13109(1), is Tatum v GEICO, 431 Mich 663; 431 NW2d 391 (1988).

"Brickley, J.\nThis case presents the question whether procedural due process is denied a public sch(...TRUNCATED)

"Brickuey, J.\nI. INTRODUCTION\nA\nBefore us today stands a defendant who alleges that the trial cou(...TRUNCATED)

"AFTER REMAND\nBrickley, J.\nThe issues presented in this case are whether a plaintiff, before comme(...TRUNCATED)

"AFTER REMAND\nBrickley, J.\nI am unable to agree entirely with the analysis adopted in the opinions(...TRUNCATED)

"ON REHEARING\nBrickley, J.\nAddison Township and Michigan Consolidated Gas Company entered into a c(...TRUNCATED)