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This leads to a flawed pedagogical model for debate -- reject the 1AC on face

Berube 2k

Berube 2k (David M, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and Director of Debate at the University of South Carolina. Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 21: 53-73 http://www.cedadebate.org/CAD/index.php/CAD/article/viewFile/248/232)

text retrieval services include some refereed published materials, they also incorporate transcripts and wire releases that are less vigilantly checked for accuracy. Searches on text retrieval services such as Lexis-Nexis Universe® and Congressional Universe® locate words and word strings within n words of each other. Search results are collated and loomed into an extended argument. Often, evidence collected in this manner is linked together to reach a conclusion of nearly infinite impact, such as the ever-present specter of global thermonuclear war Since anyone can post a web page and since transcripts and releases are seldom checked as factual, pseudo-experts abound and are at the core of the most egregious claims in extended arguments using mini-max reasoning Statements of alarm by newscasters and glorification of wannabe experts are two telltales tricks of the fear mongers' trade. . . : the use of poignant anecdotes in place of scientific evidence, the christening of isolated incidents as trends, depictions of entire categories of people as innately dangerous. . . . Often the link and internal link story is the machination of the debater making the claim rather than the sources cited in the linkage All these engines use Boolean connectors (and, or, and not) and Boolean connectors are dubious by nature. Boolean logic uses terms only to show relationships - of inclusion or exclusion -among the terms. It shows whether or not one drawer fits into another and ignores the question whether there is anything in the drawers. Keeping an abstract, cybernetic distance from the source of knowledge, we set up tiny funnels. . . . But even if we build our tunnels carefully, we still remain essentially tunnel dwellers. . . . Thinking itself happens only when we suspend the inner musings of the mind long enough to favor a momentary precision, and even then thinking belongs to musing as a subset of our creative mind. . . . The Boolean reader, on the contrary, knows in advance where the exits are, the on-ramps, and the well-marked rest stops. . . . The pathways of thought, not to mention the logic of thoughts, disappear under a Boolean arrangement of freeways researchers select word strings without reading its full context, a nearly universal practice among contest debaters. Using these computerized research services, debaters are easily able to build extended mini-max arguments ending in Armageddon. Policies driven by the consideration of low risk probabilities will, on the whole, lead to low investment strategies to prevent a hazard from being realized or to mitigate the hazard's consequences. By comparison, policies driven by the consideration of high consequences, despite low probabilities, will lead to high levels of public investment mini-max claims are not useful in resolving complex issues For example, in his assessment of low-probability, potentially high-consequence events such as terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, Bashor found simple estimates of potential losses added little to contingency planning. While adding little to policy analysis, extended arguments using mini-max reasoning remain powerful determinants of resource allocation Whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational solution to the problem at hand. If risk is defined one way, then one option will rise to the top as the most cost-effective or the safest or the best. If it is defined another way, perhaps incorporating qualitative characteristics or other contextual factors, one will likely get a different ordering of action solutions. Defining risk is thus an exercise in power When probability assessments are eliminated from risk calculi, as is the case in mini-max risk arguments, it is a political act, and all political acts need to be scrutinized with a critical lens

Searches locate word strings results are loomed into an argument to reach a conclusion of infinite impact, such as thermonuclear war fear mongers' use anecdotes of isolated incidents depictions of categories of people as dangerous the internal link story is the machination of the debater rather than the sources The pathways of thought disappear under a Boolean arrangement Using these services debaters build mini arguments ending in Armageddon policies driven by high consequences, despite low probabilities, will lead to high levels of investment mini-max claims are not useful in resolving complex issues such as terrorist use of w m d Whoever controls the definition of risk controls the solution to the problem When probability assessments are eliminated from risk calculi it is a political act

The dead ends checked the authenticity of the extended claims by debunking especially fanciful hypotheses. Text retrieval services may have changed that. While text retrieval services include some refereed published materials, they also incorporate transcripts and wire releases that are less vigilantly checked for accuracy. The World Wide Web allows virtually anyone to set up a site and post anything at that site regardless of its veracity. Sophisticated super search engines, such as Savvy Search® help contest debaters track down particular words and phrases. Searches on text retrieval services such as Lexis-Nexis Universe® and Congressional Universe® locate words and word strings within n words of each other. Search results are collated and loomed into an extended argument. Often, evidence collected in this manner is linked together to reach a conclusion of nearly infinite impact, such as the ever-present specter of global thermonuclear war. Furthermore, too much evidence from online text retrieval services is unqualified or under-qualified. Since anyone can post a web page and since transcripts and releases are seldom checked as factual, pseudo-experts abound and are at the core of the most egregious claims in extended arguments using mini-max reasoning. In nearly every episode of fear mongering . . . people with fancy titles appeared. . . . [F]or some species of scares . . . secondary scholars are standard fixtures. . . . Statements of alarm by newscasters and glorification of wannabe experts are two telltales tricks of the fear mongers' trade. . . : the use of poignant anecdotes in place of scientific evidence, the christening of isolated incidents as trends, depictions of entire categories of people as innately dangerous. . . . (Glassner 206, 208) Hence, any warrant by authority of this ilk further complicates probability estimates in extended arguments using mini-max reasoning. Often the link and internal link story is the machination of the debater making the claim rather than the sources cited in the linkage. The links in the chain may be claims with different, if not inconsistent, warrants. As a result, contextual considerations can be mostly moot. Not only the information but also the way it is collated is suspect. All these engines use Boolean connectors (and, or, and not) and Boolean connectors are dubious by nature. Boolean logic uses terms only to show relationships - of inclusion or exclusion -among the terms. It shows whether or not one drawer fits into another and ignores the question whether there is anything in the drawers. . . . The Boolean search shows the characteristic way that we put questions to the world of information. When we pose a question to the Boolean world, we use keywords, buzzwords, and thought bits to scan the vast store of knowledge. Keeping an abstract, cybernetic distance from the source of knowledge, we set up tiny funnels. . . . But even if we build our tunnels carefully, we still remain essentially tunnel dwellers. . . . Thinking itself happens only when we suspend the inner musings of the mind long enough to favor a momentary precision, and even then thinking belongs to musing as a subset of our creative mind. . . . The Boolean reader, on the contrary, knows in advance where the exits are, the on-ramps, and the well-marked rest stops. . . . The pathways of thought, not to mention the logic of thoughts, disappear under a Boolean arrangement of freeways." (Heim 18,22-25) Heim worries that the Boolean search may encourage readers to link together nearly empty drawers of information, stifling imaginative, creative thinking and substituting empty ideas for good reasons. The problems worsen when researchers select word strings without reading its full context, a nearly universal practice among contest debaters. Using these computerized research services, debaters are easily able to build extended mini-max arguments ending in Armageddon. Outsiders to contest debating have remarked simply that too many policy debate arguments end in all-out nuclear war. consequently, they categorize the activity as foolish. How many times have educators had contest debaters in a classroom discussion who strung out an extended mini-max argument to the jeers and guffaws of their classmates? They cannot all be wrong. Frighteningly enough, most of us agree. We should not ignore Charles Richet's adage: "The stupid man is not the one who does not understand something - but the man who understands it well enough yet acts as if he didn't" (Tabori 6). Regrettably, mini-max arguments are not the exclusive domain of contest debating. "Policies driven by the consideration of low risk probabilities will, on the whole, lead to low investment strategies to prevent a hazard from being realized or to mitigate the hazard's consequences. By comparison, policies driven by the consideration of high consequences, despite low probabilities, will lead to high levels of public investment" (Nehnevajsa 521). Regardless of their persuasiveness, Bashor and others have discovered that mini-max claims are not useful in resolving complex issues. For example, in his assessment of low-probability, potentially high-consequence events such as terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, Bashor found simple estimates of potential losses added little to contingency planning. While adding little to policy analysis, extended arguments using mini-max reasoning remain powerful determinants of resource allocation. As such, they need to be debunked. Experts agree. For example, Slovic advocates a better understanding of all risk analysis since it drives much of our public policy. "Whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational solution to the problem at hand. If risk is defined one way, then one option will rise to the top as the most cost-effective or the safest or the best. If it is defined another way, perhaps incorporating qualitative characteristics or other contextual factors, one will likely get a different ordering of action solutions. Defining risk is thus an exercise in power" (699). When probability assessments are eliminated from risk calculi, as is the case in mini-max risk arguments, it is a political act, and all political acts need to be scrutinized with a critical lens.

<h4>This leads to a flawed pedagogical model for debate -- reject the 1AC on face </h4><p><strong><mark>Berube</mark> <mark>2k</strong></mark> (David M, Associate Professor of Speech Communication and Director of Debate at the University of South Carolina. Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 21: 53-73 http://www.cedadebate.org/CAD/index.php/CAD/article/viewFile/248/232)</p><p>The dead ends checked the authenticity of the extended claims by debunking especially fanciful hypotheses. Text retrieval services may have changed that. While <u>text retrieval services include some refereed published materials, they also incorporate transcripts and wire releases that are less vigilantly checked for accuracy.</u> The World Wide Web allows virtually anyone to set up a site and post anything at that site regardless of its veracity. Sophisticated super search engines, such as Savvy Search® help contest debaters track down particular words and phrases. <u><mark>Searches</mark> on text retrieval services such as Lexis-Nexis Universe® and Congressional Universe® <mark>locate</mark> words and <mark>word strings </mark>within n words of each other. Search <mark>results are</mark> collated and <mark>loomed into an </mark>extended <mark>argument</mark>. Often, evidence collected in this manner is linked together<mark> to reach a conclusion of </mark>nearly <mark>infinite impact, such as</mark> the ever-present specter of global <strong><mark>thermonuclear war</u></strong></mark>. Furthermore, too much evidence from online text retrieval services is unqualified or under-qualified. <u>Since anyone can post a web page and since transcripts and releases are seldom checked as factual, pseudo-experts abound and are at the core of the most egregious claims in extended arguments using mini-max reasoning</u>. In nearly every episode of fear mongering . . . people with fancy titles appeared. . . . [F]or some species of scares . . . secondary scholars are standard fixtures. . . . <u>Statements of alarm by newscasters and glorification of wannabe experts are two telltales tricks of the <mark>fear mongers'</mark> trade. . . : the <mark>use</mark> of poignant <mark>anecdotes</mark> in place of scientific evidence, the christening <mark>of</mark> <mark>isolated incidents </mark>as trends, <mark>depictions of</mark> entire <mark>categories of people as </mark>innately <mark>dangerous</mark>. . . . </u>(Glassner 206, 208) Hence, any warrant by authority of this ilk further complicates probability estimates in extended arguments using mini-max reasoning. <u>Often <mark>the </mark>link and <mark>internal link story is the <strong>machination of the debater</strong></mark> making the claim <strong><mark>rather than the sources</strong> </mark>cited in the linkage</u>. The links in the chain may be claims with different, if not inconsistent, warrants. As a result, contextual considerations can be mostly moot. Not only the information but also the way it is collated is suspect. <u>All these engines use Boolean connectors (and, or, and not) and Boolean connectors are dubious by nature. Boolean logic uses terms only to show relationships - of inclusion or exclusion -among the terms. It shows whether or not one drawer fits into another and ignores the question whether there is anything in the drawers.</u> . . . The Boolean search shows the characteristic way that we put questions to the world of information. When we pose a question to the Boolean world, we use keywords, buzzwords, and thought bits to scan the vast store of knowledge. <u>Keeping an abstract, cybernetic distance from the source of knowledge, we set up tiny funnels. . . . But even if we build our tunnels carefully, we still remain essentially tunnel dwellers. . . . Thinking itself happens only when we suspend the inner musings of the mind long enough to favor a momentary precision, and even then thinking belongs to musing as a subset of our creative mind. . . . The Boolean reader, on the contrary, knows in advance where the exits are, the on-ramps, and the well-marked rest stops. . . . <mark>The pathways of thought</mark>, not to mention the logic of thoughts, <mark>disappear under a Boolean arrangement</mark> of freeways</u>." (Heim 18,22-25) Heim worries that the Boolean search may encourage readers to link together nearly empty drawers of information, stifling imaginative, creative thinking and substituting empty ideas for good reasons. The problems worsen when <u>researchers select word strings without reading its full context, a nearly universal practice among contest debaters. <mark>Using these</mark> computerized research <mark>services</mark>, <mark>debaters</mark> are easily able to <mark>build</mark> extended <mark>mini</mark>-max <mark>arguments</mark> <strong><mark>ending in Armageddon</strong></mark>.</u> Outsiders to contest debating have remarked simply that too many policy debate arguments end in all-out nuclear war. consequently, they categorize the activity as foolish. How many times have educators had contest debaters in a classroom discussion who strung out an extended mini-max argument to the jeers and guffaws of their classmates? They cannot all be wrong. Frighteningly enough, most of us agree. We should not ignore Charles Richet's adage: "The stupid man is not the one who does not understand something - but the man who understands it well enough yet acts as if he didn't" (Tabori 6). Regrettably, mini-max arguments are not the exclusive domain of contest debating. "<u>Policies driven by the consideration of low risk probabilities will, on the whole, lead to low investment strategies to prevent a hazard from being realized or to mitigate the hazard's consequences. By comparison, <strong><mark>policies driven by</strong></mark> the consideration of <strong><mark>high consequences</strong>, <strong>despite low probabilities, will lead to high levels of</strong></mark> public <strong><mark>investment</u></strong></mark>" (Nehnevajsa 521). Regardless of their persuasiveness, Bashor and others have discovered that <u><mark>mini-max claims are not useful in resolving complex issues</u></mark>. <u>For example, in his assessment of low-probability, potentially high-consequence events <mark>such as terrorist use of w</mark>eapons of <mark>m</mark>ass <mark>d</mark>estruction, Bashor found simple estimates of potential losses added little to contingency planning. While adding little to policy analysis, extended arguments using mini-max reasoning remain powerful determinants of resource allocation</u>. As such, they need to be debunked. Experts agree. For example, Slovic advocates a better understanding of all risk analysis since it drives much of our public policy. "<u><mark>Whoever controls the</mark> <mark>definition of risk controls the</mark> rational <mark>solution</mark> <mark>to the problem</mark> at hand. If risk is defined one way, then one option will rise to the top as the most cost-effective or the safest or the best. If it is defined another way, perhaps incorporating qualitative characteristics or other contextual factors, one will likely get a different ordering of action solutions. Defining risk is thus an exercise in power</u>" (699). <u><mark>When probability assessments are eliminated from risk calculi</mark>, as is the case in mini-max risk arguments, <mark>it is a political act</mark>, and all political acts need to be scrutinized with a critical lens</u>.</p>

1NC

1NC WTO

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx

N

Kentucky

7

Georgetown EK

Box, Brian

1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

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Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Afghan instability causes nuclear war

Carafano 10

Carafano 10

We can expect similar results if Obama’s Afghan strategy fails Most forget that throwing Vietnam to the wolves made the world far more dangerous Soviets saw it as a sign that America was in decline. They abetted military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America They went on a nuclear-arms spending spree. They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax to kill the world several times over terrorism came into fashion he world will get a lot less safe. Al-Qaida would be back in the game terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India triggering a nuclear war between the two countries Iran and North Korea could shift their nuclear programs into overdrive selling their nuclear weapons Their nervous neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own The resulting nuclear arms race could be far more dangerous than the Cold War’s the world would look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances snowballed into a very big, tragic war Russia, China and Venezuela would rethink their strategic calculus That could produce all kinds of serious regional challenges for the United States Our allies might rethink things as well NATO might well fall apart

We can expect if Afghan fails a nuclear spending spree to kill the world several times over Al-Qaida would be back in the game triggering a nuclear war , Iran and Korea could shift nuclear programs into overdrive The resulting arms race could be far more dangerous the world would snowball into a big, tragic war Russia, China and Venezuela would challenge the U S NATO might fall apart

James Jay is a senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage Foundation and directs its Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, “Con: Obama must win fast in Afghanistan or risk new wars across the globe,” Jan 2 http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/jan/02/con-obama-must-win-fast-afghanistan-or-risk-new-wa/ We can expect similar results if Obama’s Afghan strategy fails and he opts to cut and run. Most forget that throwing South Vietnam to the wolves made the world a far more dangerous place. The Soviets saw it as an unmistakable sign that America was in decline. They abetted military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America. They went on a conventional- and nuclear-arms spending spree. They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax to kill the world several times over. State-sponsorship of terrorism came into fashion. Osama bin Laden called America a “paper tiger.” If we live down to that moniker in Afghanistan, odds are the world will get a lot less safe. Al-Qaida would be back in the game. Regional terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India—potentially triggering a nuclear war between the two countries. Sensing a Washington in retreat, Iran and North Korea could shift their nuclear programs into overdrive, hoping to save their failing economies by selling their nuclear weapons and technologies to all comers. Their nervous neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own. The resulting nuclear arms race could be far more dangerous than the Cold War’s two-bloc standoff. With multiple, independent, nuclear powers cautiously eyeing one another, the world would look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances snowballed into a very big, tragic war. The list goes on. There is no question that countries such as Russia, China and Venezuela would rethink their strategic calculus as well. That could produce all kinds of serious regional challenges for the United States. Our allies might rethink things as well. Australia has already hiked its defense spending because it can’t be sure the United States will remain a responsible security partner. NATO might well fall apart. Europe could be left with only a puny EU military force incapable of defending the interests of its nations.

<h4>Afghan instability causes <u>nuclear war</h4><p></u><strong>Carafano 10</strong> </p><p>James Jay is a senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage Foundation and directs its Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, “Con: Obama must win fast in Afghanistan or risk new wars across the globe,” Jan 2 http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/jan/02/con-obama-must-win-fast-afghanistan-or-risk-new-wa/</p><p><u><mark>We can expect</mark> similar results <mark>if </mark>Obama’s <mark>Afghan </mark>strategy <mark>fails </u></mark>and he opts to cut and run. <u>Most forget that throwing </u>South <u>Vietnam to the wolves made the world </u>a <u>far more dangerous </u>place. The <u>Soviets saw it as a</u>n unmistakable <u>sign that America was in decline. They abetted</u> <u>military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America</u>. <u>They went on <mark>a</mark> </u>conventional- and <u><strong><mark>nuclear</mark>-arms <mark>spending spree</strong></mark>. They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax <mark>to <strong>kill the world several times over</u></strong></mark>. State-sponsorship of <u>terrorism came into fashion</u>. Osama bin Laden called America a “paper tiger.” If we live down to that moniker in Afghanistan, odds are t<u>he world will get a lot less safe. <mark>Al-Qaida would be back in the game</u></mark>. Regional <u>terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India</u>—potentially <u><strong><mark>triggering a nuclear war</strong> </mark>between the two countries</u>. Sensing a Washington in retreat<mark>, <u>Iran and </mark>North <mark>Korea could shift </mark>their <mark>nuclear programs into overdrive</u></mark>, hoping to save their failing economies by <u>selling their nuclear weapons</u> and technologies to all comers. <u>Their nervous neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own</u>. <u><mark>The resulting </mark>nuclear <mark>arms race could be far more dangerous</mark> than the Cold War’s</u> two-bloc standoff. With multiple, independent, nuclear powers cautiously eyeing one another, <u><mark>the world would</mark> look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances <strong><mark>snowball</mark>ed <mark>into a </mark>very <mark>big, tragic war</u></strong></mark>. The list goes on. There is no question that countries such as <u><mark>Russia, China and Venezuela would</mark> rethink their strategic calculus</u> as well. <u>That could produce all kinds of serious regional <mark>challenge</mark>s for <mark>the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u>. <u>Our allies might rethink things as well</u>. Australia has already hiked its defense spending because it can’t be sure the United States will remain a responsible security partner. <u><mark>NATO might</mark> well <mark>fall apart</u></mark>. Europe could be left with only a puny EU military force incapable of defending the interests of its nations.</p>

1AC Kentucky

Advantage -- UN

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx

A

Kentucky

2

Northwestern CS

Glinecki

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

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Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

As well, we need ask why the site of suffering so readily lends itself to inviting identification. Why is pain the conduit of identification? This question may seem to beg the obvious, given the violent domination and dishonor constitutive of enslavement, the acclaimed transformative capacities of pain in sentimental culture, the prevalence of public displays of suffering inclusive of the pageantry of the trade, the spectacle of punishment, circulating reports of slavery’s horrors, the runaway success of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and the passage through the “bloodstained gate,” which was a convention of the slave narrative, all of which contributed to the idea that the feelings and consciousness of the enslaved were most available at this site. However, what I am trying to suggest is that if the scene of beating readily lends itself to an identification with the enslaved, it does so at the risk of fixing and naturalizing this condition of pained embodiment and, in complete defiance of Rankin’s good intention, increases the difficulty of beholding black suffering since the endeavor to bring pain close exploits the spectacle of the body in pain and oddly confirms the spectral character of suffering and the inability to witness the captive’s pain. If, on one hand, pain extends humanity to the dispossessed and the ability to sustain suffering leads to transcendence, on the other, the spectral and spectacular character of this suffering, or, in other words, the shocking and ghostly presence of pain, effaces and restricts black sentience. As Rankin himself states, in order for this suffering to induce a reaction and stir feelings, it must be brought close. Yet if sentiment or morality are “inextricably tied to human proximity,” to quote Zygmunt Bauman, the problem is that in the very effort to “bring it near” and “inspect it closely” it is dissipated. According to Bauman, “morality conforms to the law of optical perspective. It looms large and thick close to the eye.” So, then, how does suffering elude or escape us in the very effort to bring it near? It does so precisely because it can only be brought near by way of a proxy and by way of Rankin’s indignation and imagination. If the black body is the vehicle of the other’s power, pleasure, and profit, then it is no less true that it is the white or near-white body that makes the captive’s suffering visible and discernible. Indeed, the elusiveness of black suffering can be attributed to a racist optics in which black flesh is itself identified as the source of opacity, the denial of black humanity, and the effacement of sentience integral to the wanton use of the captive body. And as noted earlier, this is further complicated by the repressive underside of an optics of morality that insists upon the other as a mirror of the self and that in order to recognize suffering must substitute the self for the other. While Rankin attempts to ameliorate the insufficiency of feeling before the spectacle of the other’s suffering, this insufficiency is, in fact, displaced rather than remedied by his standing in. Likewise, this attempt exacerbates the distance between the readers and those suffering by literally removing the slave from view as pain is brought close. Moreover, we need to consider whether the identification forged at the site of suffering confirms black humanity at the peril of reinforcing racist assumptions of limited sentience, in that the humanity of the enslaved and the violence of the institution can only be brought into view by extreme examples of incineration and dismemberment or by placing white bodies at risk. What does it mean that the violence of slavery or pained existence of the enslaved, if discernible, is only so in the most heinous and grotesque examples and not in the quotidian routines of slavery? As well, is not the difficulty of empathy related to both the devaluation and the valuation of black life? Empathic identification is complicated further by the fact that it cannot be extricated from the economy of chattel slavery with which it is at odds, for this projection of one’s feeling upon or into the object of property and the phantasmic slipping into captivity, while it is distinct from the pleasures of self-augmentation yielded by the ownership of the captive body and the expectations fostered therein, is nonetheless entangled with this economy and identification facilitated by a kindred possession or occupation of the captive body, albeit on a different register. In other words, what I am trying to isolate are the kinds of expectations and the qualities of affect distinctive to the economy of slavery. The relation between pleasure and the possession of slave property, in both the figurative and literal senses, can be explained in part by the fungibility of the slave-that is, the augmentation of the master subject through his embodiment in external objects and persons. Put differently, the fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values; and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion. Thus, while the beaten and mutilated body presumably establishes the brute materiality of existence, the materiality of suffering regularly eludes (re)cognition by virtue of the body’s being replaced by other signs of value, as well as other bodies. Thus the desire to don, occupy, or possess blackness or the black body as a sentimental resource and/or locus of excess enjoyment is both founded upon and enabled by the material relations of chattel slavery. In light of this, is it too extreme or too obvious to suggest that Rankin’s flight of imagination and the excitements engendered by suffering might also be pleasurable? Certainly this willing abasement confirms Rankin’s moral authority, but what about the pleasure engendered by this embrace of pain-that is the tumultuous passions of the flightly imagination stirred by this fantasy of being beaten? Rankin’s imagined beating is immune neither to the pleasures to be derived from the masochistic fantasy nor to the sadistic pleasure to be derived from the spectacle of sufferance. Here my intention is not to shock or exploit the perverse but to consider critically the complicated nexus of terror and enjoyment by examining the obviated and debased diversions of the capricious master; the pleasure of indignation yielded before the spectacle of sufferance; the instability of the scene of suffering; and the confusion of song and sorrow typical of the coffle, the auction block, performing before the master, and other popular amusements.

<h4>As well, <u><strong>we need ask why the site of suffering so readily lends itself to inviting identification. Why is pain the conduit of identification? This question may seem to beg the obvious, given the violent domination and dishonor constitutive of enslavement, <mark>the acclaimed transformative capacities of</mark> pain in sentimental culture, the prevalence of <mark>public displays of suffering</mark> inclusive of the pageantry of the trade, <mark>the spectacle of punishment, circulating reports of slavery’s horrors</mark>,</u></strong> the runaway success of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and the passage through the “bloodstained gate,” which was a convention of the slave narrative<u><strong>, <mark>all of which contributed to the idea that the feelings</mark> and consciousness <mark>of the enslaved were</mark> most <mark>available at this site.</mark> However, what I am trying to suggest is that <mark>if the scene of beating readily lends itself to an identification with the enslaved, it does so at the risk of fixing and naturalizing this condition of pained embodiment an</mark>d, in complete defiance of Rankin’s good intention, <mark>increases the difficulty of beholding black suffering since the endeavor to bring pain close exploits the spectacle of the body in pain and oddly confirms the spectral character of suffering and the inability to witness the captive’s pain</mark>. If, on one hand, pain extends humanity to the dispossessed and the ability to sustain suffering leads to transcendence, on the other, <mark>the spectral and spectacular character of this suffering</u></strong></mark>, or, in other words, the shocking and ghostly presence of pain, <u><strong><mark>effaces and restricts black sentience.</u></strong></mark> As Rankin himself states, <u><strong><mark>in order for this suffering to induce a reaction and stir feelings, it must be brought close</mark>. Yet if sentiment or morality are “inextricably tied to human proximity,”</u></strong> to quote Zygmunt Bauman, <u><strong>the problem is that <mark>in the very effort to “bring it near” and “inspect it closely” it is dissipated</mark>.</u></strong> According to Bauman, “morality conforms to the law of optical perspective. It looms large and thick close to the eye.” So, then, how does <u><strong>suffering elude or escape us</u></strong> in the very effort to bring it near? It does so <u><strong>precisely because it can only be brought near by way of a proxy</u></strong> and by way of Rankin’s indignation and imagination. <u><strong><mark>If the black body is the vehicle of the other’s power</mark>, pleasure, <mark>and profit, then it is</mark> no less true that it is <mark>the white</mark> or near-white body <mark>that makes the captive’s suffering visible</mark> and discernible. Indeed, the elusiveness of black suffering can be attributed to <mark>a racist optics in which black flesh is itself identified as</mark> the source of opacity, <mark>the denial of black humanity, and the effacement of sentience integral to the wanton use of the captive body</mark>.</u></strong> And as noted earlier, <u><strong>this is further complicated by the repressive underside of an optics of morality that insists upon the other as a mirror of the self and that in order to recognize suffering must substitute the self for the other. </u></strong> While Rankin attempts to ameliorate the insufficiency of feeling before the spectacle of the other’s suffering, this insufficiency is, in fact, displaced rather than remedied by his standing in. Likewise, <u><strong><mark>this</mark> attempt <mark>exacerbates the distance between the readers and those suffering by literally removing the slave from view as pain is brought close.</mark> Moreover, we need to consider whether the identification forged at the site of suffering confirms black humanity at the peril of reinforcing racist assumptions of limited sentience, in that the humanity of the enslaved and the violence of the institution can only be brought into view by extreme examples of incineration and dismemberment or by placing white bodies at risk. </u></strong>What does it mean that the violence of slavery or pained existence of the enslaved, if discernible, is only so in the most heinous and grotesque examples and not in the quotidian routines of slavery? As well, is not the difficulty of empathy related to both the devaluation and the valuation of black life? <u><strong><mark>Empathic identification is complicated</mark> further <mark>by the fact that it</u></strong> <u><strong>cannot be extricated from the economy of</mark> chattel <mark>slavery</mark> with which it is at odds, <mark>for this projection of one’s feeling upon</mark> or into <mark>the object of property</mark> and the phantasmic slipping into captivity, while it is distinct from the pleasures of self-augmentation yielded by the ownership of the captive body and the expectations fostered therein, <mark>is</u></strong></mark> nonetheless <u><strong><mark>entangled with this economy and identification facilitated by a kindred</mark> <mark>possession or occupation of the captive body</u></strong></mark>, albeit on a different register. <u><strong>In other words</u></strong>, what I am trying to isolate are the kinds of expectations and the qualities of affect distinctive to the economy of slavery. <u><strong><mark>The relation between pleasure</mark> <mark>and</mark> the <mark>possession</mark> of slave property, in both the figurative and literal senses, <mark>can be</mark> explained in part <mark>by the fungibility of the slave</u></strong></mark>-that is, the augmentation of the master subject through his embodiment in external objects and persons. Put differently, <u><strong><mark>the fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings</mark>, ideas, <mark>desires, and values</mark>; and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion.</u></strong> Thus, while the beaten and mutilated body presumably establishes the brute materiality of existence, the materiality of suffering regularly eludes (re)cognition by virtue of the body’s being replaced by other signs of value, as well as other bodies. <u><strong><mark>Thus the desire to don, occupy, or possess blackness or the black body as a sentimental resource and/or locus of excess enjoyment is both founded upon and enabled by the material relations of chattel slavery</u></strong></mark>. In light of this, is it too extreme or too obvious to suggest that Rankin’s flight of imagination and the excitements engendered by suffering might also be pleasurable? Certainly this willing abasement confirms Rankin’s moral authority, but what about the pleasure engendered by this embrace of pain-that is the tumultuous passions of the flightly imagination stirred by this fantasy of being beaten? Rankin’s imagined beating is immune neither to the pleasures to be derived from the masochistic fantasy nor to the sadistic pleasure to be derived from <u><strong>the spectacle of sufferance</u></strong>. Here my intention<u><strong> is</u></strong> not to shock or exploit the perverse but to consider critically <u><strong>the complicated nexus of terror and enjoyment by examining the obviated and debased diversions of the capricious master;</u></strong> the pleasure of indignation yielded before the spectacle of sufferance; the instability of the scene of suffering; <u><strong>and the confusion of</u></strong> song and sorrow typical of the coffle, the auction block, <u><strong>performing before the master,</u></strong> and other popular amusements.</h4>

2NC

Case

2NC Link -- Berlant

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx

N

Wake

2

Cal MS

JJustice

1AC - Marijuana Prison Reform 1NC - Marijuana Word PIC University K 2NC - University K 1NR - University K 2NR - University K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx

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Baylor BaSh

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ndtceda14

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college

The 2016 conference success is key to African and Afghan stability

Gomis 14

Benoit Gomis 14 is a Visiting Scholar at the University Of British Columbia and the Canadian Network for Research in Terrorism, Security and Society, PhD LSE and UChicago, “Illicit Drugs and International Security: Towards UNGASS 2016,” International Security, February, #SPS

the political context is more complicated today than it was around the 2012 Summit of the Americas. There is widespread consensus that the 'war on drugs' has failed drugs are a health problem and that use and possession should be decriminalized further. Political leadership towards reform is also more hesitant than it was in 2012. Santos of Colombia has taken a back seat in the international debate to some extent Guatemala remains very proactive However, it is a small country that needs partners and has been more reluctant than its neighbours to engage in a review of its domestic policy In the United States, the referendums in Colorado and Washington, and the OAS report, have put pressure on the Obama administration to discuss domestic and international drug policy reforms more openly. Some notable progress has been made Holder confirmed that the Department of Justice would not seek to challenge the marijuana regulation laws in Colorado and Washington. However, concerns remain on the international stage as to how open the United States will be in discussing and promoting reform given the country's historical reluctance to challenge international drugs conventions. Russia is pushing for harsher counter-narcotics policies in the country Russia's uncompromising prohibitionist stance continues to be popular in numerous countries in Asia and Africa that advocate zero-tolerance. European governments have largely stayed away from the recent international debates. Other regions of the world face increased levels of political uncertainty and insecurity related to drug production and trafficking. West Africa struggles to tackle the multiple challenges linked to the growing trade through the region, including corruption, organized crime, financing of extremist organizations, an increase in addiction and an increased burden on law-enforcement agencies and other already struggling public institutions. In Afghanistan, the withdrawal of ISAF from the country and the transition to an Afghan-led security apparatus shows little promise of mitigating opium production and related corruption. current difficulties and the overall complexity of the problem should not be used as an excuse for policy inaction and inertia. The current situation — characterized by persistent levels of violence, insecurity and corruption, changing trade routes causing instability in new regions, the emergence of new drugs and the negative impact of drug policies — is no longer sustainable. Drug control policies around the world have often proved at best ineffective and at worst counter-productive, unless they strayed away from the strict letter of the UN conventions. However, a tipping point has been reached Current policies are no longer sustainable and therefore momentum is growing towards more responsible and comprehensive responses to the global problem of illicit drugs. The UNGASS in 2016 provides an opportunity for governments to review and reform their policies at the national and regional levels. regional and international discussions will crucial to tackle these truly transnational challenges and opt for more adequate responses that focus on reducing the harms caused by drug consumption, trafficking and production, and drug policies themselves.

There is widespread consensus the 'war on drugs' has failed, and possession should be decriminalized leadership towards reform is hesitant referendums put pressure on Obama to discuss international drug policy concerns remain as to how the United States will reform given historical reluctance to challenge international drugs conventions. West Africa struggles to tackle crime extremist organizations and struggling institutions In Afghanistan, the withdrawal of ISAF and Afghan security shows little promise of mitigating production complexity should not be used as an excuse for inaction The current situation characterized by violence insecurity corruption instability is no longer sustainable Drug control policies proved counter-productive, unless they strayed away from UN conventions a tipping point has been reached momentum is growing towards responsible responses to global drugs. UNGAS 2016 provides an opportunity for governments to reform policies

I the last three years, the drug policy debate has evolved more than in the previous three decades. However, there remain a number of obstacles to making recent developments sustainable ahead of UNGASS 2016. Although Latin American leaders mental in pushing the debate forward, the political context is more complicated today than it was around the 2012 Summit of the Americas. There is widespread consensus in the region that the 'war on drugs' has failed, that drugs are primarily a health problem, and that use and possession should be decriminalized further. However, disagreements remain on how to control supply (in particular on the effectiveness of regulation models), what law enforcement should look like in a regulated market, and what public health strategies mean in practice, especially in countries that have had difficulty in controlling parts of their territory and collecting taxes. Political leadership towards reform is also more hesitant than it was in 2012. In Mexico, President Enriqe Pena Nieto has been willing to discuss alternative policies. He has said he would aim to prioritize social and economic issues, and readjust security policy towards reducing violence while ending widespread US access to Mexican intelligence. However, the Mexican government is undertaking other ambitious reforms, including in the energy and education sectors and in economic and fiscal policy. The country's diplomatic efforts with the United States have also prioritized immigration and gun laws drug policy reform. President Santos of Colombia over has taken a back seat in the international debate to some extent, focusing instead on the peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), and on the forth-coming presidential elections. Guatemala, under the leadership of President Molina and Foreign Minister Fernando Carrera, remains very proactive and continues to punch above its weight in the drug debate. However, it is a small country that needs partners and has been more reluctant than its neighbours to engage in a review of its domestic policy. Two elements further complicate the political context in Latin America. The revelation by Edward Snowden of widespread US intelligence activities that included targeting the emails of former president Felipe Calderön and the text messages of Pena Nieto when he "'as running for president may have an impact on Mexico's collaboration with the United States. Although such intelligence practices were arguably always presumed within the country s political elite, their public revelation means that government leaders need to address the issue." In addition, the populations of Latin American countries are still predominantly against more progressive drugs policies. In Uruguay, 63 per cent of the population were opposed to the marijuana bill in July 2013." Around the same time in Mexico, only 32 per cent of the population supported marijuana legalization." The support has been even lower in Colombia and Peru — respectively 13 per cent and 11 per cent in 2010." In the United States, the referendums in Colorado and Washington, and the OAS report, have put pressure on the Obama administration to discuss domestic and international drug policy reforms more openly. Some notable progress has been made domestically. US Attorney General Eric Holder has announced that the federal government would order prosecutors to sidestep federal mandatory minimum sentencing in certain low-level cases as a way to reduce the prison population. He also confirmed that the Department of Justice would not seek to challenge the marijuana regulation laws in Colorado and Washington. However, concerns remain on the international stage as to how open the United States will be in discussing and promoting reform given the country's historical reluctance to challenge international drugs conventions. Russia, meanwhile has expressed concerns over flows of drugs from Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2014. It is pushing for harsher counter-narcotics policies in the country, as the latest UN report indicates a record annual increase of opium production." Russia has also supported a series of counter-narcotics programmes focused on law enforcement and interdiction training in Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Pakistan, and in Central American countries. Russia's uncompromising prohibitionist stance continues to be popular in numerous countries in Asia and Africa that advocate zero-tolerance. Europe certainly has lessons to offer regarding drug policy but European governments have largely stayed away from the recent international debates. In countries such as Portugal, where progressive policies have been implemented, budgetary pressures and the rise of conservative views are endangering progress domestically." In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister David Cameron rejected the parliamentary Home Affairs Select Committee's proposal for a Royal Commission to comprehensively reassess current policies. Home Secretary Theresa May has been reluctant to discuss reform, even disregarding recommendations from the Advisory' Council on the Misuse of Drugs and putting in place a ban on khat. An internal review into drug policy concluded that decreases in use in the country demonstrate that policies are working. This argument, however, ignores the international nature of the challenge and the larger responsibility of West European governments in tackling a truly global and complex problem that fuels high levels of organized and violence. In addition, the United Kingdom faces an increase in the use of other drugs, including new psycho-active substances and over-the-counter or prescription medicine. Other regions of the world face increased levels of political uncertainty and insecurity related to drug production and trafficking. West Africa struggles to tackle the multiple challenges linked to the growing trade through the region, including corruption, organized crime, financing of extremist organizations, an increase in addiction and an increased burden on law-enforcement agencies and other already struggling public institutions. In Afghanistan, the withdrawal of ISAF from the country and the transition to an Afghan-led security apparatus shows little promise of mitigating opium production and related corruption. This international political context makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to substantially reform the UN conventions. However, current difficulties and the overall complexity of the problem should not be used as an excuse for policy inaction and inertia. The current situation — characterized by persistent levels of violence, insecurity and corruption, changing trade routes causing instability in new regions, the emergence of new drugs and the negative impact of drug policies — is no longer sustainable. In 2012, President Santos of Colombia said: 'Sometimes we all feel that we have been pedalling on a stationary bicycle. We look to our right and our left and we still see the same landscape. Little progress has been made in the drug policy field since President Richard Nixon first called drug abuse 'America's public enemy number one in the United States" and policies have caused much damage. Drug control policies around the world have often proved at best ineffective and at worst counter-productive, unless they strayed away from the strict letter of the UN conventions. However, a tipping point has been reached. Current policies are no longer sustainable and therefore momentum is growing towards more responsible and comprehensive responses to the global problem of illicit drugs. The UNGASS in 2016 provides an opportunity for governments to review and reform their policies at the national and regional levels. A number of national governments, including Colombia's, have embarked on much-needed review processes of their domestic drug policies, but regional and international discussions will crucial to tackle these truly transnational challenges and opt for more adequate responses that focus on reducing the harms caused by drug consumption, trafficking and production, and drug policies themselves.

<h4>The 2016 conference success is key to African and Afghan stability</h4><p>Benoit <strong>Gomis 14</strong> is a Visiting Scholar at the University Of British Columbia and the Canadian Network for Research in Terrorism, Security and Society, PhD LSE and UChicago, “Illicit Drugs and International Security: Towards UNGASS 2016,” International Security, February, #SPS</p><p>I the last three years, the drug policy debate has evolved more than in the previous three decades. However, there remain a number of obstacles to making recent developments sustainable ahead of UNGASS 2016. Although Latin American leaders mental in pushing the debate forward, <u><strong>the political context is more complicated today than it was around the 2012 Summit of the Americas.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>There is widespread consensus</u></strong></mark> in the region <u><strong>that <mark>the 'war on drugs' has failed</u></strong>,</mark> that <u><strong>drugs are </u></strong>primarily <u><strong>a health problem</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>and </mark>that use and <mark>possession should be decriminalized</mark> further.</u></strong> However, disagreements remain on how to control supply (in particular on the effectiveness of regulation models), what law enforcement should look like in a regulated market, and what public health strategies mean in practice, especially in countries that have had difficulty in controlling parts of their territory and collecting taxes. <u><strong>Political <mark>leadership towards reform is</mark> also more <mark>hesitant</mark> than it was in 2012.</u></strong> In Mexico, President Enriqe Pena Nieto has been willing to discuss alternative policies. He has said he would aim to prioritize social and economic issues, and readjust security policy towards reducing violence while ending widespread US access to Mexican intelligence. However, the Mexican government is undertaking other ambitious reforms, including in the energy and education sectors and in economic and fiscal policy. The country's diplomatic efforts with the United States have also prioritized immigration and gun laws drug policy reform. President <u><strong>Santos of Colombia</u></strong> over <u><strong>has taken a back seat in the international debate to some extent</u></strong>, focusing instead on the peace process with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), and on the forth-coming presidential elections. <u><strong>Guatemala</u></strong>, under the leadership of President Molina and Foreign Minister Fernando Carrera, <u><strong>remains very proactive</u></strong> and continues to punch above its weight in the drug debate. <u><strong>However, it is a small country that needs partners and has been more reluctant than its neighbours to engage in a review of its domestic policy</u></strong>. Two elements further complicate the political context in Latin America. The revelation by Edward Snowden of widespread US intelligence activities that included targeting the emails of former president Felipe Calderön and the text messages of Pena Nieto when he "'as running for president may have an impact on Mexico's collaboration with the United States. Although such intelligence practices were arguably always presumed within the country s political elite, their public revelation means that government leaders need to address the issue." In addition, the populations of Latin American countries are still predominantly against more progressive drugs policies. In Uruguay, 63 per cent of the population were opposed to the marijuana bill in July 2013." Around the same time in Mexico, only 32 per cent of the population supported marijuana legalization." The support has been even lower in Colombia and Peru — respectively 13 per cent and 11 per cent in 2010." <u><strong>In the United States, the <mark>referendums </mark>in Colorado and Washington, and the OAS report, have <mark>put pressure on </mark>the <mark>Obama </mark>administration <mark>to discuss</mark> domestic and <mark>international drug policy </mark>reforms more openly.</u></strong> <u><strong>Some notable progress has been made</u></strong> domestically. US Attorney General Eric <u><strong>Holder</u></strong> has announced that the federal government would order prosecutors to sidestep federal mandatory minimum sentencing in certain low-level cases as a way to reduce the prison population. He also <u><strong>confirmed that the Department of Justice would not seek to challenge the marijuana regulation laws in Colorado and Washington.</u></strong> <u><strong>However, <mark>concerns remain </mark>on the international stage <mark>as to how</mark> open <mark>the United States will</mark> be in discussing and promoting <mark>reform given</mark> the country's <mark>historical reluctance to challenge international drugs conventions.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Russia</u></strong>, meanwhile has expressed concerns over flows of drugs from Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2014. It <u><strong>is pushing for harsher counter-narcotics policies in the country</u></strong>, as the latest UN report indicates a record annual increase of opium production." Russia has also supported a series of counter-narcotics programmes focused on law enforcement and interdiction training in Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Pakistan, and in Central American countries. <u><strong>Russia's uncompromising prohibitionist stance continues to be popular in numerous countries in Asia and Africa that advocate zero-tolerance.</u></strong> Europe certainly has lessons to offer regarding drug policy but <u><strong>European governments have largely stayed away from the recent international debates.</u></strong> In countries such as Portugal, where progressive policies have been implemented, budgetary pressures and the rise of conservative views are endangering progress domestically." In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister David Cameron rejected the parliamentary Home Affairs Select Committee's proposal for a Royal Commission to comprehensively reassess current policies. Home Secretary Theresa May has been reluctant to discuss reform, even disregarding recommendations from the Advisory' Council on the Misuse of Drugs and putting in place a ban on khat. An internal review into drug policy concluded that decreases in use in the country demonstrate that policies are working. This argument, however, ignores the international nature of the challenge and the larger responsibility of West European governments in tackling a truly global and complex problem that fuels high levels of organized and violence. In addition, the United Kingdom faces an increase in the use of other drugs, including new psycho-active substances and over-the-counter or prescription medicine. <u><strong>Other regions of the world face increased levels of political uncertainty and insecurity related to drug production and trafficking.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>West Africa struggles to tackle</mark> the multiple challenges linked to the growing trade through the region, including corruption, organized <mark>crime</mark>, financing of <mark>extremist organizations</mark>, an increase in addiction <mark>and</mark> an increased burden on law-enforcement agencies and other already <mark>struggling</mark> public <mark>institutions</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>In Afghanistan, the withdrawal of ISAF </mark>from the country <mark>and </mark>the transition to an <mark>Afghan</mark>-led <mark>security </mark>apparatus <mark>shows little promise of mitigating</mark> opium <mark>production </mark>and related corruption.</u></strong> This international political context makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to substantially reform the UN conventions. However, <u><strong>current difficulties and the overall <mark>complexity</mark> of the problem <mark>should not be used as an excuse for</mark> policy <mark>inaction</mark> and inertia.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The current situation</mark> — <mark>characterized by</mark> persistent levels of <mark>violence</mark>, <mark>insecurity</mark> and <mark>corruption</mark>, changing trade routes causing <mark>instability </mark>in new regions, the emergence of new drugs and the negative impact of drug policies — <mark>is no longer sustainable</mark>.</u></strong> In 2012, President Santos of Colombia said: 'Sometimes we all feel that we have been pedalling on a stationary bicycle. We look to our right and our left and we still see the same landscape. Little progress has been made in the drug policy field since President Richard Nixon first called drug abuse 'America's public enemy number one in the United States" and policies have caused much damage. <u><strong><mark>Drug control policies </mark>around the world have often <mark>proved </mark>at best ineffective and at worst <mark>counter-productive, unless they strayed away from</mark> the strict letter of the <mark>UN conventions</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>However, <mark>a tipping point has been reached</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Current policies are no longer sustainable and therefore <mark>momentum is growing towards</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>more</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>responsible </mark>and comprehensive <mark>responses to</mark> the <mark>global</mark> problem of illicit <mark>drugs. </mark>The <mark>UNGAS</mark>S in <mark>2016 provides an opportunity for governments to</mark> review and <mark>reform</mark> their <mark>policies </mark>at the national and regional levels.</u></strong> A number of national governments, including Colombia's, have embarked on much-needed review processes of their domestic drug policies, but <u><strong>regional and international discussions will crucial to tackle these truly transnational challenges and opt for more adequate responses that focus on reducing the harms caused by drug consumption, trafficking and production, and drug policies themselves.</u></strong> </p>

1AC UNLV

Advantage -- UN

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

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1AC - MJ - UN and OAS 1NC - Cap Treaties DA Treaties and CEA CP 2NC - Cap 1NR - Cap 2NR - Cap

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

BaSh

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ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Marihuana legalization is a wedge issue that empirically brings voters to the polls to vote for democrats

Hudak 8/20 (John Hudak “Harry Reid Should Love Marijuana: How Legalization Could Keep the Senate Blue” August 20, 2014 ) mt

Hudak 8/20 (John Hudak “Harry Reid Should Love Marijuana: How Legalization Could Keep the Senate Blue” August 20, 2014 ) mt

Marijuana legalization could change that by dramatically changing the character and nature of the midterm electorat People turn out for elections when they feel passion about a candidate or a race, but ballot initiatives can also generate interest, passion and turnout. Passion about marijuana legalization can do the same, and we have evidence of this effect. 2012, Colorado and Washington had statewide referenda on the question of marijuana legalization. With those initiatives on the ballot, the composition of each state’s electorate changed in significant way Marijuana legalization supporters, particularly passionate ones, tend to be younger and either more liberal or more libertarian in nature—though recent polls suggest broader support in the electorate The effect was even more pronounced for the 18-24 demographic, where electoral composition increased from 5% to 13%. In addition, in 2008, 27% of the electorate called themselves “liberal.” In 2012, that number increased to 31 But in the states with marijuana legalization initiatives it did, dramatically There is also evidence those electoral shifts helped Democrats , those who voted in favor of Amendment 64 (marijuana legalization) voted for President Obama at a rate of 68%—far above his support among all Colorado voters Washington, among those who voted in favor of Initiative 502 (marijuana legalization), 72% also voted for President Obama Democrats have missed a real opportunity to make electoral gains—or limit losses—by pushing legalization initiatives Democrats could have received a similar boost by pushing legalization initiatives that would alter the electorate in a year when Democrats need it for structural and political reasons.

Marijuana legalization could dramatically chang the character and nature of the midterm electorat ballot initiatives can also generate interest, passion and turnout marijuana legalization can do the same Marijuana legalization supporters, particularly passionate ones, tend to be younger and either more liberal or more libertarian in nature—though recent polls suggest broader support in the electorate. The effect was more pronounced for the 18-24 demographic, where composition increased from 5% to 13%. those electoral shifts helped Democrats Democrats have missed a real opportunity to make electoral gains—or limit losses—by pushing legalization initiatives Democrats could have received a similar boost by pushing legalization initiatives that would alter the electorate in a year when Democrats need it for structural and political reasons.

Marijuana legalization could change that by dramatically changing the character and nature of the midterm electorate in Alaska, and helping Sen. Begich win reelection.¶ People turn out for elections when they feel passion about a candidate or a race, but ballot initiatives can also generate interest, passion and turnout. Research by Smith, DeSantis & Kassel illustrate that ballot initiatives in 2004 centering on outlawing same sex marriage generated additional turnout (even in a presidential year) among conservatives in key states. Passion about marijuana legalization can do the same, and we have evidence of this effect.¶ In 2012, Colorado and Washington had statewide referenda on the question of marijuana legalization. With those initiatives on the ballot, the composition of each state’s electorate changed in significant ways. Using exit poll data to compare changes in the characteristics of the electorate in each state between 2008 and 2012, we can make inferences about the effects of legalization initiatives. Marijuana legalization supporters, particularly passionate ones, tend to be younger and either more liberal or more libertarian in nature—though recent polls suggest broader support in the electorate. In Washington in 2008, the 18-29 demographic composed 10% of the electorate. In 2012, with legalization on the ballot, that number increased to 21% of the electorate—a more than 100% increase. The effect was even more pronounced for the 18-24 demographic, where electoral composition increased from 5% to 13%. In addition, in 2008, 27% of the electorate called themselves “liberal.” In 2012, that number increased to 31%. Similar trends existed in Colorado. In 2008, the 18-29 demographic composed 14% of the electorate. In 2012, that group composed 20% of voters. In fact, in Colorado the 18-24 demographic increased from 5% to 12% of the electorate from 2008 to 2012. The ideological composition of turnout changed as well. In 2008, 17% of the electorate called itself liberal. In 2012, that figure skyrocketed to 28%.¶ In Washington and Colorado, the composition of those who turned out to vote changed dramatically between 2008 and 2012—each a presidential year. Nationally, there was little change in the composition of the electorate in terms of youth and liberalism. But in the states with marijuana legalization initiatives it did, dramatically. There is also evidence those electoral shifts helped Democrats. In Colorado, those who voted in favor of Amendment 64 (marijuana legalization) voted for President Obama at a rate of 68%—far above his support among all Colorado voters (51%).¶ Similarly, in Washington, among those who voted in favor of Initiative 502 (marijuana legalization), 72% also voted for President Obama. The president won about 56% statewide. Roll Call’s Henry Decker and FireDogLake’s Jon Walker have also offered great insight into how electoral changes coincide with marijuana legalization initiatives.¶ However, there is more to this story than simply turnout. In many ways, Democrats have missed a real opportunity to make electoral gains—or limit losses—by pushing legalization initiatives. Some credit President Bush’s reelection in 2004 to the push for same sex marriage initiatives on statewide ballots by spurring social conservative turnout. Democrats could have received a similar boost by pushing legalization initiatives that would alter the electorate in a year when Democrats need it for structural and political reasons.

<h4><u><strong>Marihuana legalization is a wedge issue that empirically brings voters to the polls to vote for democrats</h4><p></u>Hudak 8/20 <u>(J<mark>ohn Hudak “Harry Reid Should Love Marijuana: How Legalization Could Keep the Senate Blue” August 20, 2014 ) mt</p><p>Marijuana legalization could </mark>change that by <mark>dramatically chang</mark>ing <mark>the character and nature of the midterm electorat</u></strong></mark>e in Alaska, and helping Sen. Begich win reelection.¶ <u><strong>People turn out for elections when they feel passion about a candidate or a race, but <mark>ballot initiatives can also generate interest, passion and turnout</mark>. </u></strong>Research by Smith, DeSantis & Kassel illustrate that ballot initiatives in 2004 centering on outlawing same sex marriage generated additional turnout (even in a presidential year) among conservatives in key states. <u><strong>Passion about <mark>marijuana legalization can do the same</mark>, and we have evidence of this effect.</u></strong>¶ In <u><strong>2012, Colorado and Washington had statewide referenda on the question of marijuana legalization. With those initiatives on the ballot, the composition of each state’s electorate changed in significant way</u></strong>s. Using exit poll data to compare changes in the characteristics of the electorate in each state between 2008 and 2012, we can make inferences about the effects of legalization initiatives. <u><strong><mark>Marijuana legalization supporters, particularly passionate ones, tend to be younger and either more liberal or more libertarian in nature—though recent polls suggest broader support in the electorate</u></strong>.</mark> In Washington in 2008, the 18-29 demographic composed 10% of the electorate. In 2012, with legalization on the ballot, that number increased to 21% of the electorate—a more than 100% increase. <u><strong><mark>The effect was </mark>even <mark>more pronounced for the 18-24 demographic, where </mark>electoral <mark>composition increased from 5% to 13%. </mark>In addition, in 2008, 27% of the electorate called themselves “liberal.” In 2012, that number increased to 31</u></strong>%. Similar trends existed in Colorado. In 2008, the 18-29 demographic composed 14% of the electorate. In 2012, that group composed 20% of voters. In fact, in Colorado the 18-24 demographic increased from 5% to 12% of the electorate from 2008 to 2012. The ideological composition of turnout changed as well. In 2008, 17% of the electorate called itself liberal. In 2012, that figure skyrocketed to 28%.¶ In Washington and Colorado, the composition of those who turned out to vote changed dramatically between 2008 and 2012—each a presidential year. Nationally, there was little change in the composition of the electorate in terms of youth and liberalism. <u><strong>But in the states with marijuana legalization initiatives it did, dramatically</u></strong>. <u><strong>There is also evidence <mark>those electoral shifts helped Democrats</u></strong></mark>. In Colorado<u><strong>, those who voted in favor of Amendment 64 (marijuana legalization) voted for President Obama at a rate of 68%—far above his support among all Colorado voters </u></strong>(51%).¶ Similarly, in <u><strong>Washington, among those who voted in favor of Initiative 502 (marijuana legalization), 72% also voted for President Obama</u></strong>. The president won about 56% statewide. Roll Call’s Henry Decker and FireDogLake’s Jon Walker have also offered great insight into how electoral changes coincide with marijuana legalization initiatives.¶ However, there is more to this story than simply turnout. In many ways, <u><strong><mark>Democrats have missed a real opportunity to make electoral gains—or limit losses—by pushing legalization initiatives</u></strong></mark>. Some credit President Bush’s reelection in 2004 to the push for same sex marriage initiatives on statewide ballots by spurring social conservative turnout. <u><strong><mark>Democrats could have received a similar boost by pushing legalization initiatives that would alter the electorate in a year when Democrats need it for structural and political reasons.</p></u></strong></mark>

1NR

Counterplan

1NR – Link Wall

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Kentucky

4

Emory KS

Kallmeyer, Kevin

1AC - Cannabis Exchange 1NC - Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) Mexico DA Security K Reeferendum CP 2NC - Reeferendum CP and Security K 1NR - Midterms DA

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That causes extinction

Chivian 11 works with the United Nations on how to address the pressing environmental problems the world is facing. (“Species Extinction, Biodiversity Loss and Human Health”, http://www.ilo.org/oshenc/part-vii/environmental-health-hazards/item/505-species-extinction-biodiversity-loss-and-human-health, 2011)

Chivian 11, Dr. Eric S. Chivian is the founder and Director of the Center for Health and the Global Environment (CHGE) at Harvard Medical School and directs the Biodiversity and Human Health Progam. He is also an Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School. Chivian works with the United Nations on how to address the pressing environmental problems the world is facing. (“Species Extinction, Biodiversity Loss and Human Health”, http://www.ilo.org/oshenc/part-vii/environmental-health-hazards/item/505-species-extinction-biodiversity-loss-and-human-health, 2011)

Human activity is causing the extinction of animal, plant and microbial species at rates that are a thousand times greater than those which would have occurred naturally approximating the largest extinctions in geological history this behaviour is upsetting the delicate ecological balance on which all life depends, including our own Global warming, acid rain, the depletion of ozone and the discharge of toxic chemicals lead to a loss of biodiversity. But it is habitat destruction by deforestation, that is the greatest destroyer. this destruction is primarily responsible for the mass extinction of the world’s species It is the author’s belief that if people fully comprehended the effect these massive species extinctions will have - in foreclosing the possibility of understanding and treating many incurable diseases, and ultimately, perhaps, in threatening human survival - then they would recognize that the current rates of biodiversity loss represent nothing less than a slowly evolving medical emergency and would

Human activity is causing the extinction of species is upsetting the ecological balance on which all life depends habitat destruction by deforestation, is the greatest destroyer this is primarily responsible for the mass extinction threatening human survival

Human activity is causing the extinction of animal, plant and microbial species at rates that are a thousand times greater than those which would have occurred naturally (Wilson l992), approximating the largest extinctions in geological history. When homo sapiens evolved, some l00 thousand years ago, the number of species that existed was the largest ever to inhabit the Earth (Wilson l989). Current rates of species loss are reducing these levels to the lowest since the end of the Age of Dinosaurs, 65 million years ago, with estimates that one-fourth of all species will become extinct in the next 50 years (Ehrlich and Wilson l99l). In addition to the ethical issues involved - that we have no right to kill off countless other organisms, many of which came into being tens of millions of years prior to our arrival - this behaviour is ultimately self-destructive, upsetting the delicate ecological balance on which all life depends, including our own, and destroying the biological diversity that makes soils fertile, creates the air we breathe and provides food and other life-sustaining natural products, most of which remain to be discovered. The exponential growth in human population coupled with an even greater rise in the consumption of resources and in the production of wastes, are the main factors endangering the survival of other species. Global warming, acid rain, the depletion of stratospheric ozone and the discharge of toxic chemicals into the air, soil and fresh- and salt-water ecosystems - all these ultimately lead to a loss of biodiversity. But it is habitat destruction by human activities, particularly deforestation, that is the greatest destroyer. This is especially the case for tropical rainforests. Less than 50% of the area originally covered by prehistoric tropical rainforests remains, but they are still being cut and burned at a rate of approximately l42,000 square kilometres each year, equal in area to the countries of Switzerland and the Netherlands combined; this is a loss of forest cover each second the size of a football field (Wilson l992). It is this destruction which is primarily responsible for the mass extinction of the world’s species. It has been estimated that there are somewhere between l0 million and l00 million different species on Earth. Even if a conservative estimate of 20 million total world species is used, then l0 million species would be found in tropical rainforests, and at current rates of tropical deforestation, this would mean 27,000 species would be lost in tropical rainforests alone each year, or more than seventy-four per day, three each hour (Wilson l992). This article examines the human health implications resulting from this widespread loss of biological diversity. It is the author’s belief that if people fully comprehended the effect these massive species extinctions will have - in foreclosing the possibility of understanding and treating many incurable diseases, and ultimately, perhaps, in threatening human survival - then they would recognize that the current rates of biodiversity loss represent nothing less than a slowly evolving medical emergency and would demand that efforts to preserve species and ecosystems be given the highest priority.

<h4>That causes extinction</h4><p><strong>Chivian 11</strong>, Dr. Eric S. Chivian is the founder and Director of the Center for Health and the Global Environment (CHGE) at Harvard Medical School and directs the Biodiversity and Human Health Progam. He is also an Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School. Chivian<u><strong><mark> works with the United Nations on how to address the pressing environmental problems the world is facing. (“Species Extinction, Biodiversity Loss and Human Health”, http://www.ilo.org/oshenc/part-vii/environmental-health-hazards/item/505-species-extinction-biodiversity-loss-and-human-health, 2011) </p><p>Human activity is causing the extinction of</mark> animal, plant and microbial <mark>species </mark>at rates that are a thousand times greater than those which would have occurred naturally</u></strong> (Wilson l992), <u><strong>approximating the largest extinctions in geological history</u></strong>. When homo sapiens evolved, some l00 thousand years ago, the number of species that existed was the largest ever to inhabit the Earth (Wilson l989). Current rates of species loss are reducing these levels to the lowest since the end of the Age of Dinosaurs, 65 million years ago, with estimates that one-fourth of all species will become extinct in the next 50 years (Ehrlich and Wilson l99l). In addition to the ethical issues involved - that we have no right to kill off countless other organisms, many of which came into being tens of millions of years prior to our arrival - <u><strong>this behaviour <mark>is</u></strong> </mark>ultimately self-destructive, <u><strong><mark>upsetting the </mark>delicate <mark>ecological balance on which all life depends</mark>, including our own</u></strong>, and destroying the biological diversity that makes soils fertile, creates the air we breathe and provides food and other life-sustaining natural products, most of which remain to be discovered. The exponential growth in human population coupled with an even greater rise in the consumption of resources and in the production of wastes, are the main factors endangering the survival of other species. <u><strong>Global warming, acid rain, the depletion of</u></strong> stratospheric <u><strong>ozone and the discharge of toxic chemicals</u></strong> into the air, soil and fresh- and salt-water ecosystems - all these ultimately <u><strong>lead to a loss of biodiversity. But it is <mark>habitat destruction by</u></strong> </mark>human activities, particularly <u><strong><mark>deforestation, </mark>that <mark>is the greatest destroyer</mark>.</u></strong> This is especially the case for tropical rainforests. Less than 50% of the area originally covered by prehistoric tropical rainforests remains, but they are still being cut and burned at a rate of approximately l42,000 square kilometres each year, equal in area to the countries of Switzerland and the Netherlands combined; this is a loss of forest cover each second the size of a football field (Wilson l992). It is <u><strong><mark>this </mark>destruction</u></strong> which <u><strong><mark>is primarily responsible for the mass extinction </mark>of the world’s species</u></strong>. It has been estimated that there are somewhere between l0 million and l00 million different species on Earth. Even if a conservative estimate of 20 million total world species is used, then l0 million species would be found in tropical rainforests, and at current rates of tropical deforestation, this would mean 27,000 species would be lost in tropical rainforests alone each year, or more than seventy-four per day, three each hour (Wilson l992). This article examines the human health implications resulting from this widespread loss of biological diversity. <u><strong>It is the author’s belief that if people fully comprehended the effect these massive species extinctions will have - in foreclosing the possibility of understanding and treating many incurable diseases, and ultimately, perhaps, in <mark>threatening human survival</mark> - then they would recognize that the current rates of biodiversity loss represent nothing less than a slowly evolving medical emergency and would </u></strong>demand that efforts to preserve species and ecosystems be given the highest priority.</p>

1AC

1AC – Scenario 1

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-UMKC-Round5.docx

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SFSU AG

Brian Rubaie

1AC Marijuana Environment 1NC Settlerism K 2NC Settlerism K 1NR Settlerism K 2NR Settlerism K

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Attempting to “know” China is based on a flawed epistemology -- causes serial policy failure

Pan 04

Pan 04

China and its relationship with the U St has been a fascinating subject of relations China scholars argue "what China precisely is," especially in terms of a positivist epistemology they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example Lampton suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the security-conscious nation, they are not value-free descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative practice that legitimates power politics in relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe the China field and "China threat" literature have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection as discursive practice

China scholars argue what China precisely is, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology , they believe that China is a knowable object whose reality can be revealed by scientific means it is object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are linked to how U.S. policymakers see themselves (as representatives of the security-conscious nation they are not value-free, descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are understood as a normative practice that legitimates power politics in relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe.

PhD degree in Political Science and International Relations from the Australian National University [Chengxin, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29, 2004] China and its relationship with the United States has long been a fascinating subject of study in the mainstream U.S. international relations community. This is reflected, for example, in the current heated debates over whether China is primarily a strategic threat to or a market bonanza for the United States and whether containment or engagement is the best way to deal with it. (1) While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world." (2) Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment." (3) Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations. (4) Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics. (5) It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution.

<h4>Attempting to “know” China is based on a flawed epistemology<strong> -- causes serial policy failure</h4><p>Pan 04 </p><p>PhD degree in Political Science and International Relations from the Australian National University [Chengxin, The "China Threat" in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29, 2004]</p><p></strong> <u>China and its relationship with the U</u>nited <u>St</u>ates <u>has</u> long <u>been a fascinating subject of</u> study in the mainstream U.S. international <u>relations</u> community. This is reflected, for example, in the current heated debates over whether China is primarily a strategic threat to or a market bonanza for the United States and whether containment or engagement is the best way to deal with it. (1) While U.S. <u><mark>China scholars argue</u></mark> fiercely over <u>"<mark>what China precisely is,</mark>"</u> their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, <u><mark>especially in terms of a positivist epistemology</u></mark>. Firstly<mark>, <u>they believe that China is</mark> ultimately <mark>a knowable object</mark>, <mark>whose reality can be</mark>, and ought to be, empirically <mark>revealed by scientific means</mark>. For example</u>, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. <u>Lampton</u>, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, <u>suggests that "<mark>it is</mark> time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world</u>." (2) Like many other China scholars, <u>Lampton views his <mark>object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment</u></mark>." (3) Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, <u>in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is</u>." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that <u><mark>U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are</u></mark> always <u>intrinsically <mark>linked to how U.S. policymakers</mark>/mainstream China specialists <mark>see themselves (as representatives</mark> <mark>of the</u></mark> indispensable, <u><mark>security-conscious nation</mark>,</u> for example). As such, <u><mark>they are not value-free</u>,</mark> objective <u><mark>descriptions</mark> <mark>of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are</mark> better <mark>understood as a</mark> kind of <mark>normative</u></mark>, meaning-giving <u><mark>practice that</u></mark> often <u><mark>legitimates power politics in</u></mark> U.S.-China <u><mark>relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality</mark>.</u> In other words, <u><mark>it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe</u>.</mark> In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations. (4) Yet, so far, <u>the China field</u> in the West in general <u>and</u> the U.S. <u>"China threat" literature</u> in particular <u>have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection</u> on both their normative status <u>as discursive practice</u> and their enormous practical implications for international politics. (5) It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution.</p>

1NC

1NC WTO

1NC

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Box, Brian

1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K

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Second is liberalism – the inclusion of supposed radical knowledge into debate instills institutional legitimacy which creates a smooth space for the academy to continue hegemonic practices of distancing from the subaltern -- leads to endless imperial warfare and structural violence -- their notion of “inclusion” becomes a laboratory for governmentality

Chatterjee and Maira 14

Chatterjee and Maira 14 (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 14-18) gz

Empires of knowledge rest on the foundation of racial statecraft, militarized science, and enduring notions of civilizational superiority imperial cartographies” can be traced through the meshed contours of research methods and scholarly theories as they are staked out in the pragmatic mappings of conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire expert knowledge on “other” cultures and civilizations has been a cornerstone of the development of academic disciplines and used in the management of “difference” within the nation as well as the conquest and management of native populations by the United States, here and overseas educational discourse and practices in the colonies exemplified a complex colonizing mission Cultural “difference” was mapped within the classroom through a distinct racial and gendered lens, one that, however benevolently, consistently tracked the ideologies of U.S. military, cultural, and economic supremacy. The educational mission for inclusion and civilization “there,” on the periphery, became a laboratory for new regimes of governmentality “here,” within the immediate territorial borders of the United States If universities of the imperial periphery introduced a new governmentality and constructed mobile, but unequal, racial/gendered and national subjects, then these processes must also be understood within the epistemologies of “othering” being constructed by disciplines such as anthropology Theoretical constructions of categories such as “savage” and “primitive” helped create the very scaffoldings of European and later U.S. imperial cartographies what happens when professional scholars use their disciplinary tools and training to further military projects to defend the “national interest”? Academic knowledges about others have been significant as both information and “intelligence” for the subjugation and administration of indigenous and minoritized communities, within and beyond the United States During World War I some archaeologists worked as spies to literally offer “on ground geographical knowledges” that were “highly valued in wartime intelligence circles It is World War II and the ascendance of the United States as a global superpower that propelled the alliance between the U.S. state and the academy to new heights. The Manhattan Project and the development of the atom bomb sealed this intimate and soon inextricable link between scientific research and militarism It is not General Groves at his desk in the Los Alamos labs that has provided the symbolic image of the atom bomb project’s iconography but an Italian professor building an atomic pile under the spectator’s stands of the University of Chicago’s athletic field As U.S. and Allied forces launched themselves into the global theatre of war, they recognized that they needed condensed, accelerated training about the geographies and peoples they were encountering linguistic anthropology created the capacity for “quickly learning and teaching the languages of the new theatres of warfare Army Specialized Training Programs were established on 227 college and university campuses, 25 and some anthropologists helped create “pocket guides” for Army Special Forces early predecessors to the post-9/ 11 manuals on understanding “the Arab mind” or Islam used to train U.S. military interrogators and FBI agents in the War on Terror. other sets of research skills were used for the surveillance and containment of “others” within the nation-state anthropologists at the Bureau of Indian Affairs monitored and influenced war-related opinion on Native American reservations anthropologists were involved in studying Japanese American communities as they “adapted” to their lives in the concentration camps Between 1945 and 1948, this rapid and intense distillation of “method” and “information” about world cultures consolidated in area studies, arguably a paradigm shift in U.S. scholarship, and one that was based on an interdisciplinary approach that would literally carve out—and map—“ regions” of the world By the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the state-university compact to ensure that scientific knowledges would continue to serve U.S. global power was well assured by 1945, U.S. wealth and power in the “international sphere probably had no counterpart in history Out of this mesh of forces of capital and superpower politics and supremacy emerged a consensus that state (and corporate) funding for “research and development” in science and technology in the service of military development was vital for the growth of universities McCarthyism and a new wave of political repression ensured that questions were not asked about the business of war—or the reasons that the business of war was also becoming an academic business This intersection of Department of Defense, Pentagon, and research university interests resulted in massive amounts of funding and shifted the fiscal nature of universities’ state patronage from land-grant, agricultural resources to the huge war chest of the defense establishment in 1960 the political science department at MIT was funded by the CIA; closed seminars were held and “they had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for doctoral dissertations the CIA supported social science research throughout the 1950s and 1960s to perfect psychological torture techniques that were outsourced to Vietnam, Argentina, and other countries.” World War II and the Cold War had created, without a doubt, the prime “condition for the socialization of research and education social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations—whether gathering more “benign” forms of information, serving with the army in Vietnam, or teaching in the School of the Americas—and after 9/11, became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq

Empires of knowledge rest on racial statecraft, militarized science, and civilizational superiority imperial cartographies” can be traced through scholarly theories staked out in conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire expert knowledge on “other” cultures has been a cornerstone of the management of “difference” as well as the conquest of native populations inclusion “there,” became governmentality “here,” universities must be understood within the epistemologies of “othering” constructed by anthropology constructions such as “savage” helped create the scaffoldings of imperial cartographies During World War I archaeologists worked as spies to offer “on ground geographical knowledges The Manhattan Project and the bomb sealed this inextricable link between research and militarism U.S. forces recognized they needed training about the peoples they were encountering linguistic anthropology created the capacity for teaching the languages of warfare Army Specialized Training Programs were established on 227 campuses anthropologists monitored Native American reservations were involved in studying Japanese American concentration camps McCarthyism ensured questions were not asked about the reasons the business of war was becoming an academic business This intersection of D o D Pentagon, and research interests shifted the fiscal nature of patronage to the defense establishment the CIA supported research to perfect psychological torture social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations and became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq

Empires of knowledge rest on the foundation of racial statecraft, militarized science, and enduring notions of civilizational superiority. What we call “imperial cartographies” can be traced through the meshed contours of research methods and scholarly theories as they are staked out in the pragmatic mappings of conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire.14 It is important to note that expert knowledge on “other” cultures and civilizations has been a cornerstone of the development of academic disciplines and used in the management of “difference” within the nation as well as the conquest and management of native populations by the United States, here and overseas. For example, Victor Bascara examines an early iteration (and a model, perhaps) of what Bill Readings has called the “Americanization” of the university. 15 Bascara’s chapter on the imperial universities founded in the U.S.-controlled territories of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after 1898 demonstrates how educational discourse and practices in the colonies exemplified a complex colonizing mission. Cultural “difference” was mapped within the classroom through a distinct racial and gendered lens, one that, however benevolently, consistently tracked the ideologies of U.S. military, cultural, and economic supremacy. The educational mission for inclusion and civilization “there,” on the periphery, became a laboratory for new regimes of governmentality “here,” within the immediate territorial borders of the United States. If universities of the imperial periphery introduced a new governmentality and constructed mobile, but unequal, racial/gendered and national subjects, then these processes must also be understood within the epistemologies of “othering” being constructed by disciplines such as anthropology. Late nineteenth-century anthropology emerged through centuries-old scientific curiosity (and debates) about human difference as well as the administrative imperatives of other imperial powers, such as Britain.16 Theoretical constructions of categories such as “savage” and “primitive” were not mere reflections of ivory tower ruminations about human origins and human science or “cultural” essences but helped create the very scaffoldings of European and later U.S. imperial cartographies.17 If these constructions of racial hierarchy shaped the curricular and disciplinary consensus about difference in the imperial university, then what can we say about institutional research practices that explicitly furthered state projects, especially during times of internal and external crises, such as war? In other words, what happens when professional scholars use their disciplinary tools and training to further military projects to defend the “national interest”? Academic knowledges about others have been significant as both information and “intelligence” for the subjugation and administration of indigenous and minoritized communities, within and beyond the United States, as demonstrated by González’s fascinating research on the contemporary Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence programs that target students of color. While this volume does not explore the fuller histories of the relationship between the U.S. academy and war efforts throughout the twentieth century, we gesture to some historical “plottings” that signal an enduring coimplication between the institutionalized practices of the military and the academy. It is this deep historicized process of normalization that has created the dominant “consensus” and “silence” in the imperial university in the post-9/11 period. During World War I, for instance, some archaeologists worked as spies to literally offer “on ground geographical knowledges” that, as David Price argues, were “highly valued in wartime intelligence circles.”18 This involvement, however, created controversy when Franz Boas, the preeminent anthropologist, protested the involvement of anthropologists with U.S. military intelligence.19 Though Boas was not supported by a majority of his colleagues, the controversy has shaped the debates about the politics and ethics of anthropologists’ relationship to military intelligence to this day, as addressed in González’s chapter and by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists within the American Anthropological Association. The imperial university was deeply embroiled in issues of war, labor, and protest throughout the first half of the twentieth century and during the earlier Red Scare. World War I and its aftermath saw the targeting and deportation of anarchists and antiwar socialists during the infamous Palmer Raids in a period of heightened nationalism and repression. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was cofounded in 1915 by John Dewey and Arthur Lovejoy; the latter resigned from Stanford University over a controversy regarding the abuse of immigrant labor by the industrialist Stanford family.20 In 1940, the Rapp-Coudert Committee was established to “investigate ‘subversive activities’ at public and private colleges in New York.”21 Faculty and students at the City College of New York were protesting fascism and capitalism through the 1930s, with progressive student groups staging mass protests and sit-ins. The committee actually subpoenaed and questioned more than a hundred faculty, students, and staff; denounced more than eight hundred public school teachers and college faculty; and fired over sixty CCNY faculty.22 It is, of course, World War II and the ascendance of the United States as a global superpower that propelled the alliance between the U.S. state and the academy to new heights. The Manhattan Project and the development of the atom bomb sealed this intimate and soon inextricable link between scientific research and militarism. As R. C. Lewontin powerfully suggests, “It is not General Groves at his desk in the Los Alamos labs that has provided the symbolic image of the atom bomb project’s iconography but an Italian professor building an atomic pile under the spectator’s stands of the University of Chicago’s athletic field. It is there, not in the Nevada desert, that Henry Moore’s ambiguous fusion of a mushroom cloud and a death’s head memorializes the Bomb.”23 As U.S. and Allied forces launched themselves into the global theatre of war, they recognized that they needed condensed, accelerated training about the geographies and peoples they were encountering. Ironically, it was the Boasian commitment to field-based linguistic anthropology that created the capacity for “quickly learning and teaching the languages of the new theatres of warfare.”24 Further, Army Specialized Training Programs (ASTPs) were established on 227 college and university campuses, 25 and some anthropologists helped create “pocket guides” for Army Special Forces. These booklets summarized a region’s geographical history and included gems of “cultural advice” such as “not approaching Egyptian women” and “not concluding that East Indian men holding hands are homosexuals,” 26 early predecessors to the post-9/ 11 manuals on understanding “the Arab mind” or Islam used to train U.S. military interrogators and FBI agents in the War on Terror. If the distilled study of “other cultures,” enabled by academic expertise, became important for warcraft in external theaters, other sets of research skills were used for the surveillance and containment of “others” within the nation-state. For instance, anthropologists at the Bureau of Indian Affairs monitored and influenced war-related opinion on Native American reservations. 27 Some anthropologists were involved in studying Japanese American communities as they “adapted” to their lives in the concentration camps set up by the War Relocation Authority, “one of the most publicly visible and volatile topics relating to anthropology’s war time contributions.”28 Between 1945 and 1948, this rapid and intense distillation of “method” and “information” about world cultures consolidated in area studies, arguably a paradigm shift in U.S. scholarship, and one that was based on an interdisciplinary approach that would literally carve out—and map—“ regions” of the world. By the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the state-university compact to ensure that scientific knowledges would continue to serve U.S. global power was well assured. Noam Chomsky has argued that by 1945, U.S. wealth and power in the “international sphere probably had no counterpart in history.”29 Out of this mesh of forces of capital and superpower politics and supremacy emerged a consensus that state (and corporate) funding for “research and development” in science and technology in the service of military development was vital for the growth of universities.30 Warnings about the dangers of this deep alliance between the U.S. military and intelligence, civil society, and the academy came not only from the margins but also from the Oval Office itself. Dwight Eisenhower prophetically warned about consequences of the immense power inhered in what he called the “military-industrial complex.” Interestingly, in an earlier draft of this famous speech, he had apparently inserted the word “academic” in the now famous mantra of power, but it was deleted.31 It was another politician, William Fulbright, who issued a clear warning of the dangers of academic collusion with the militarized state when he stated, “In lending itself too much for the purpose of government, a university fails its higher purpose.”32 These concerns about the narrowing of the sphere of democratic debate were also being raised by distinguished scholars (such as Hannah Arendt and John Dewey33) but McCarthyism and a new wave of political repression ensured that questions were not asked about the business of war—or the reasons that the business of war was also becoming an academic business.34 This intersection of Department of Defense, Pentagon, and research university interests resulted in massive amounts of funding and shifted the fiscal nature of universities’ state patronage from land-grant, agricultural resources to the huge war chest of the defense establishment. This fiscal patronage was both overt and covert, involving individual academics and departments across the disciplines, not just the sciences, with support from military grants. Chomsky, for example, remembers that in 1960 the political science department at MIT was funded by the CIA; closed seminars were held and “they had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for doctoral dissertations.”35 As González points out in his chapter, “the CIA supported social science research throughout the 1950s and 1960s to perfect psychological torture techniques that were outsourced to Vietnam, Argentina, and other countries.” World War II and the Cold War had created, without a doubt, the prime “condition for the socialization of research and education.”36 At the height of the Cold War, social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations—whether gathering more “benign” forms of information, serving with the army in Vietnam, or teaching in the School of the Americas—and after 9/11, became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq.37

<h4><u>Second is liberalism</u> – the inclusion of supposed radical knowledge into debate instills institutional legitimacy which creates a smooth space for the academy to continue hegemonic practices of distancing from the subaltern -- leads to <u>endless imperial warfare</u> and structural violence -- their notion of “inclusion” becomes a laboratory for governmentality </h4><p><strong>Chatterjee and Maira 14</strong> (Piya Chatterjee, PhD, associate professor of women’s studies at UC Riverside, Sunaina Maira, professor of Asian American studies at UC Davis, 2014, “The Imperial University: Race, War, and the Nation State,” pp 14-18) gz</p><p><u><strong><mark>Empires of knowledge rest on</mark> the foundation of <mark>racial statecraft, militarized science, and</mark> enduring notions of <mark>civilizational superiority</u></strong></mark>. What we call “<u><strong><mark>imperial cartographies” can be traced through</mark> the meshed contours of research methods and <mark>scholarly theories</mark> as they are <mark>staked out in</mark> the pragmatic mappings of <mark>conquest, settlement, and administration of U.S. empire</u></strong></mark>.14 It is important to note that <u><strong><mark>expert knowledge on “other” cultures</mark> and civilizations <mark>has been a cornerstone of</mark> the development of academic disciplines and used in <mark>the management of “difference”</mark> within the nation <mark>as well as the conquest</mark> and management <mark>of native populations</mark> by the United States, here and overseas</u></strong>. For example, Victor Bascara examines an early iteration (and a model, perhaps) of what Bill Readings has called the “Americanization” of the university. 15 Bascara’s chapter on the imperial universities founded in the U.S.-controlled territories of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines after 1898 demonstrates how <u><strong>educational discourse and practices in the colonies exemplified a complex colonizing mission</u></strong>. <u><strong>Cultural “difference” was mapped within the classroom through a distinct racial and gendered lens, one that, however benevolently, consistently tracked the ideologies of U.S. military, cultural, and economic supremacy. The educational mission for <mark>inclusion</mark> and civilization <mark>“there,”</mark> on the periphery, <mark>became</mark> a laboratory for new regimes of <mark>governmentality “here,”</mark> within the immediate territorial borders of the United States</u></strong>. <u><strong>If <mark>universities</mark> of the imperial periphery introduced a new governmentality and constructed mobile, but unequal, racial/gendered and national subjects, then these processes <mark>must </mark>also <mark>be understood within the epistemologies of “othering”</mark> being <mark>constructed by</mark> disciplines such as <mark>anthropology</u></strong></mark>. Late nineteenth-century anthropology emerged through centuries-old scientific curiosity (and debates) about human difference as well as the administrative imperatives of other imperial powers, such as Britain.16 <u><strong>Theoretical <mark>constructions</mark> of categories <mark>such as “savage”</mark> and “primitive”</u></strong> were not mere reflections of ivory tower ruminations about human origins and human science or “cultural” essences but <u><strong><mark>helped create the</mark> very <mark>scaffoldings of</mark> European and later U.S. <mark>imperial cartographies</u></strong></mark>.17 If these constructions of racial hierarchy shaped the curricular and disciplinary consensus about difference in the imperial university, then what can we say about institutional research practices that explicitly furthered state projects, especially during times of internal and external crises, such as war? In other words, <u><strong>what happens when professional scholars use their disciplinary tools and training to further military projects to defend the “national interest”? Academic knowledges about others have been significant as both information and “intelligence” for the subjugation and administration of indigenous and minoritized communities, within and beyond the United States</u></strong>, as demonstrated by González’s fascinating research on the contemporary Intelligence Community Center of Academic Excellence programs that target students of color. While this volume does not explore the fuller histories of the relationship between the U.S. academy and war efforts throughout the twentieth century, we gesture to some historical “plottings” that signal an enduring coimplication between the institutionalized practices of the military and the academy. It is this deep historicized process of normalization that has created the dominant “consensus” and “silence” in the imperial university in the post-9/11 period. <u><strong><mark>During World War I</u></strong></mark>, for instance, <u><strong>some <mark>archaeologists worked as spies to</mark> literally <mark>offer “on ground geographical knowledges</mark>” that</u></strong>, as David Price argues, <u><strong>were “highly valued in wartime intelligence circles</u></strong>.”18 This involvement, however, created controversy when Franz Boas, the preeminent anthropologist, protested the involvement of anthropologists with U.S. military intelligence.19 Though Boas was not supported by a majority of his colleagues, the controversy has shaped the debates about the politics and ethics of anthropologists’ relationship to military intelligence to this day, as addressed in González’s chapter and by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists within the American Anthropological Association. The imperial university was deeply embroiled in issues of war, labor, and protest throughout the first half of the twentieth century and during the earlier Red Scare. World War I and its aftermath saw the targeting and deportation of anarchists and antiwar socialists during the infamous Palmer Raids in a period of heightened nationalism and repression. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was cofounded in 1915 by John Dewey and Arthur Lovejoy; the latter resigned from Stanford University over a controversy regarding the abuse of immigrant labor by the industrialist Stanford family.20 In 1940, the Rapp-Coudert Committee was established to “investigate ‘subversive activities’ at public and private colleges in New York.”21 Faculty and students at the City College of New York were protesting fascism and capitalism through the 1930s, with progressive student groups staging mass protests and sit-ins. The committee actually subpoenaed and questioned more than a hundred faculty, students, and staff; denounced more than eight hundred public school teachers and college faculty; and fired over sixty CCNY faculty.22 <u><strong>It is</u></strong>, of course, <u><strong>World War II and the ascendance of the United States as a global superpower that propelled the alliance between the U.S. state and the academy to new heights. <mark>The Manhattan Project and the</mark> development of the atom <mark>bomb sealed this</mark> intimate and soon <mark>inextricable link</mark> <mark>between</mark> scientific <mark>research and militarism</u></strong></mark>. As R. C. Lewontin powerfully suggests, “<u><strong>It is not General Groves at his desk in the Los Alamos labs that has provided the symbolic image of the atom bomb project’s iconography but an Italian professor building an atomic pile under the spectator’s stands of the University of Chicago’s athletic field</u></strong>. It is there, not in the Nevada desert, that Henry Moore’s ambiguous fusion of a mushroom cloud and a death’s head memorializes the Bomb.”23 <u><strong>As <mark>U.S.</mark> and Allied <mark>forces</mark> launched themselves into the global theatre of war, they <mark>recognized</mark> that <mark>they needed</mark> condensed, accelerated <mark>training about the</mark> geographies and <mark>peoples they were encountering</u></strong></mark>. Ironically, it was the Boasian commitment to field-based <u><strong><mark>linguistic anthropology</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>created the capacity for</mark> “quickly learning and <mark>teaching the languages of</mark> the new theatres of <mark>warfare</u></strong></mark>.”24 Further, <u><strong><mark>Army Specialized Training Programs</u></strong></mark> (ASTPs) <u><strong><mark>were established on 227</mark> college and university <mark>campuses</mark>, 25 and some anthropologists helped create “pocket guides” for Army Special Forces</u></strong>. These booklets summarized a region’s geographical history and included gems of “cultural advice” such as “not approaching Egyptian women” and “not concluding that East Indian men holding hands are homosexuals,” 26 <u><strong>early predecessors to the post-9/ 11 manuals on understanding “the Arab mind” or Islam used to train U.S. military interrogators and FBI agents in the War on Terror. </u></strong>If the distilled study of “other cultures,” enabled by academic expertise, became important for warcraft in external theaters, <u><strong>other sets of research skills were used for the surveillance and containment of “others” within the nation-state</u></strong>. For instance, <u><strong><mark>anthropologists</mark> at the Bureau of Indian Affairs <mark>monitored</mark> and influenced war-related opinion on <mark>Native American reservations</u></strong></mark>. 27 Some <u><strong>anthropologists <mark>were involved in studying</mark> <mark>Japanese American</mark> communities as they “adapted” to their lives in the <mark>concentration camps</u></strong></mark> set up by the War Relocation Authority, “one of the most publicly visible and volatile topics relating to anthropology’s war time contributions.”28 <u><strong>Between 1945 and 1948, this rapid and intense distillation of “method” and “information” about world cultures consolidated in area studies, arguably a paradigm shift in U.S. scholarship, and one that was based on an interdisciplinary approach that would literally carve out—and map—“ regions” of the world</u></strong>. <u><strong>By the end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War, the state-university compact to ensure that scientific knowledges would continue to serve U.S. global power was well assured</u></strong>. Noam Chomsky has argued that <u><strong>by 1945, U.S. wealth and power in the “international sphere probably had no counterpart in history</u></strong>.”29 <u><strong>Out of this mesh of forces of capital and superpower politics and supremacy emerged a consensus that state (and corporate) funding for “research and development” in science and technology in the service of military development was vital for the growth of universities</u></strong>.30 Warnings about the dangers of this deep alliance between the U.S. military and intelligence, civil society, and the academy came not only from the margins but also from the Oval Office itself. Dwight Eisenhower prophetically warned about consequences of the immense power inhered in what he called the “military-industrial complex.” Interestingly, in an earlier draft of this famous speech, he had apparently inserted the word “academic” in the now famous mantra of power, but it was deleted.31 It was another politician, William Fulbright, who issued a clear warning of the dangers of academic collusion with the militarized state when he stated, “In lending itself too much for the purpose of government, a university fails its higher purpose.”32 These concerns about the narrowing of the sphere of democratic debate were also being raised by distinguished scholars (such as Hannah Arendt and John Dewey33) but <u><strong><mark>McCarthyism</mark> and a new wave of political repression <mark>ensured</mark> that <mark>questions were not asked about</mark> the business of war—or <mark>the reasons</mark> that <mark>the business of war was</mark> also <mark>becoming an academic business</u></strong></mark>.34 <u><strong><mark>This intersection of D</mark>epartment <mark>o</mark>f <mark>D</mark>efense, <mark>Pentagon, and research </mark>university <mark>interests </mark>resulted in massive amounts of funding and <mark>shifted the fiscal nature of</mark> universities’ state <mark>patronage</mark> from land-grant, agricultural resources <mark>to the</mark> huge war chest of the <mark>defense establishment</u></strong></mark>. This fiscal patronage was both overt and covert, involving individual academics and departments across the disciplines, not just the sciences, with support from military grants. Chomsky, for example, remembers that <u><strong>in 1960 the political science department at MIT was funded by the CIA; closed seminars were held and “they had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for doctoral dissertations</u></strong>.”35 As González points out in his chapter, “<u><strong><mark>the CIA supported</mark> social science <mark>research</mark> throughout the 1950s and 1960s <mark>to perfect psychological torture</mark> techniques that were outsourced to Vietnam, Argentina, and other countries.” World War II and the Cold War had created, without a doubt, the prime “condition for the socialization of research and education</u></strong>.”36 At the height of the Cold War, <u><strong><mark>social scientists were recruited to serve in military intelligence operations</mark>—whether gathering more “benign” forms of information, serving with the army in Vietnam, or teaching in the School of the Americas—<mark>and</mark> after 9/11, <mark>became “embedded” with the military in Afghanistan and Iraq</u></strong></mark>.37</p>

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ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx

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Multiple scenarios for nuclear escalation

Rubin, 11

Rubin, 11 (Joel, Director of Policy and Government Affairs, Ploughshares Fund, former congressional aide and diplomat, fellow at the State Department in both Near Eastern Affairs and Political-Military Affairs, Master’s degree in Public Policy and Business Administration from Carnegie Mellon University and a Bachelor’s degree in Politics from Brandeis University, Huffington Post, 77/2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joel-rubin/middle-east-nuclear-threat_b_891178.html)

underlying sources of conflict and tension will remain In a region that has deep experience on nuclear matters with nuclear aspirant Iran bordering Afghanistan on one side and nuclear-armed Pakistan and India on the other Afghanistan will determine the shape of our security challenges in the region we can't afford nuclear weapons a major security concern justifying our continued involvement in the region potential nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan will remain and may actually rise in importance The key here is to promote regional stability and cooperation, not a power vacuum maintain a stable Afghanistan

underlying sources of conflict and tension will remain In a region that has deep experience on nuclear matters -- with Iran and nuclear-armed Pakistan and India Afghanistan will determine security in the region potential nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan -- will remain and may rise in importance The key here is to promote regional stability , not a power vacuum

The national security calculus of keeping U.S. forces in Afghanistan has shifted. Any gains that we made from keeping 100,000 American soldiers in harm's way are now questionable, especially since al Qaeda has been dealt a significant blow with the killing of Osama bin Laden. President Obama's decision to end the surge by late next year only reinforces this reality. Yet many of the underlying sources of conflict and tension in South and Central Asia will remain after an American withdrawal. In a region that has deep experience on nuclear matters -- with nuclear aspirant Iran bordering Afghanistan on one side and nuclear-armed Pakistan and India on the other -- the United States must take into account the potential for regional nuclear insecurity caused by a poorly executed drawdown in Afghanistan. As much as we may like to, we can't just cut and run. So as the United States draws down its forces, we must take care to leave stable systems and relationships in place; failure to do so could exacerbate historic regional tensions and potentially create new national security risks. It is therefore essential that Washington policymakers create a comprehensive nuclear security strategy for the region as part of its Afghanistan withdrawal plans that lays the groundwork for regional stability. We have only to look to our recent history in the region to understand the importance of this approach. In the 1980s, the U.S. supported the Mujahedeen against the Soviet Union. When that conflict ended, we withdrew, only to see the rise of al Qaeda -- and its resultant international terrorism -- in the 1990s because we didn't pull out responsibly from Afghanistan. Our choices now in Afghanistan will determine the shape of our security challenges in the region for the foreseeable future. And we can't afford for nuclear weapons to become to South and Central Asia in the 21st century what al Qaeda was in the 1990s to Afghanistan. To avoid such an outcome, several key objectives must be included in any Afghanistan withdrawal plan. First, current levels of regional insecurity -- which already are extremely high -- will continue to drive tensions, and quite possibly conflict, amongst the regional powers. Therefore, we must ensure the implementation of a regional approach to military withdrawal. These efforts must bring all relevant regional players to the table, particularly the nuclear and potentially nuclear states. Iran and all the countries bordering Afghanistan must be part of this discussion. Second, the United States must be mindful to not leave a governance vacuum inside Afghanistan. While it is clear that the current counter-insurgency policy being pursued in Afghanistan is not working at a pace that meets either Western or Afghan aspirations, it is still essential that Afghanistan not be allowed to implode. We do not need 100,000 troops to do this, and as the Afghanistan Study Group has recommended, credible political negotiations that emphasize power-sharing and political reconciliation must take place to keep the country intact while the United States moves out. Third, while the rationale for our presence in Afghanistan -- to defeat al Qaeda -- has dissipated, a major security concern justifying our continued involvement in the region -- potential nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan -- will remain and may actually rise in importance. It is crucial that we keep a particularly close eye on these programs to ensure that all is done to prevent the illicit transfer or ill-use of nuclear weapons. Regardless of American troop levels in Afghanistan, the U.S. must maximize its military and intelligence relationships with these countries to continue to both understand their nuclear intentions and help prevent potential conflict. We must avoid a situation where any minor misunderstanding or even terrorist act, as happened in Mumbai in 2008, does not set off escalating tensions that lead to a nuclear exchange. Ultimately, the U.S. will one day leave Afghanistan -- and it may be sooner than anyone expects. The key here is to leave in a way that promotes regional stability and cooperation, not a power vacuum that could foster proxy conflicts. To ensure that our security interests are protected and that the region does not get sucked in to a new level of insecurity and tension, a comprehensive strategy to enhance regional security, maintain a stable Afghanistan, and keep a watchful eye on Pakistan and India is essential. Taking such steps will help us to depart Afghanistan in a responsible manner that protects our security interests, while not exacerbating the deep strategic insecurities of a region that has the greatest risk of arms races and nuclear conflict in the world.

<h4>Multiple scenarios for nuclear escalation</h4><p><strong>Rubin, 11</strong> (Joel, Director of Policy and Government Affairs, Ploughshares Fund, former congressional aide and diplomat, fellow at the State Department in both Near Eastern Affairs and Political-Military Affairs, Master’s degree in Public Policy and Business Administration from Carnegie Mellon University and a Bachelor’s degree in Politics from Brandeis University, Huffington Post, 77/2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joel-rubin/middle-east-nuclear-threat_b_891178.html)</p><p>The national security calculus of keeping U.S. forces in Afghanistan has shifted. Any gains that we made from keeping 100,000 American soldiers in harm's way are now questionable, especially since al Qaeda has been dealt a significant blow with the killing of Osama bin Laden. President Obama's decision to end the surge by late next year only reinforces this reality. Yet many of the <u><strong><mark>underlying sources of conflict and tension</u></strong></mark> in South and Central Asia <u><strong><mark>will remain</u></strong></mark> after an American withdrawal. <u><strong><mark>In a region that has deep experience on nuclear matters</u></strong></mark> <mark>-- <u><strong>with</mark> nuclear aspirant <mark>Iran</mark> bordering Afghanistan on one side <mark>and nuclear-armed Pakistan and India</mark> on the other</u></strong> -- the United States must take into account the potential for regional nuclear insecurity caused by a poorly executed drawdown in Afghanistan. As much as we may like to, we can't just cut and run. So as the United States draws down its forces, we must take care to leave stable systems and relationships in place; failure to do so could exacerbate historic regional tensions and potentially create new national security risks. It is therefore essential that Washington policymakers create a comprehensive nuclear security strategy for the region as part of its Afghanistan withdrawal plans that lays the groundwork for regional stability. We have only to look to our recent history in the region to understand the importance of this approach. In the 1980s, the U.S. supported the Mujahedeen against the Soviet Union. When that conflict ended, we withdrew, only to see the rise of al Qaeda -- and its resultant international terrorism -- in the 1990s because we didn't pull out responsibly from Afghanistan. Our choices now in <u><strong><mark>Afghanistan will determine</mark> the shape of our <mark>security</mark> challenges <mark>in the region</u></strong></mark> for the foreseeable future. And <u><strong>we can't afford</u></strong> for <u><strong>nuclear weapons</u></strong> to become to South and Central Asia in the 21st century what al Qaeda was in the 1990s to Afghanistan. To avoid such an outcome, several key objectives must be included in any Afghanistan withdrawal plan. First, current levels of regional insecurity -- which already are extremely high -- will continue to drive tensions, and quite possibly conflict, amongst the regional powers. Therefore, we must ensure the implementation of a regional approach to military withdrawal. These efforts must bring all relevant regional players to the table, particularly the nuclear and potentially nuclear states. Iran and all the countries bordering Afghanistan must be part of this discussion. Second, the United States must be mindful to not leave a governance vacuum inside Afghanistan. While it is clear that the current counter-insurgency policy being pursued in Afghanistan is not working at a pace that meets either Western or Afghan aspirations, it is still essential that Afghanistan not be allowed to implode. We do not need 100,000 troops to do this, and as the Afghanistan Study Group has recommended, credible political negotiations that emphasize power-sharing and political reconciliation must take place to keep the country intact while the United States moves out. Third, while the rationale for our presence in Afghanistan -- to defeat al Qaeda -- has dissipated, <u><strong>a major security concern justifying our continued involvement in the region</u></strong> -- <u><strong><mark>potential nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan</u></strong> -- <u><strong>will remain and may</mark> actually <mark>rise in importance</u></strong></mark>. It is crucial that we keep a particularly close eye on these programs to ensure that all is done to prevent the illicit transfer or ill-use of nuclear weapons. Regardless of American troop levels in Afghanistan, the U.S. must maximize its military and intelligence relationships with these countries to continue to both understand their nuclear intentions and help prevent potential conflict. We must avoid a situation where any minor misunderstanding or even terrorist act, as happened in Mumbai in 2008, does not set off escalating tensions that lead to a nuclear exchange. Ultimately, the U.S. will one day leave Afghanistan -- and it may be sooner than anyone expects. <u><strong><mark>The key here is to</u></strong></mark> leave in a way that <u><strong><mark>promote</u></strong></mark>s <u><strong><mark>regional stability</mark> and cooperation<mark>, not a power vacuum</u></strong></mark> that could foster proxy conflicts. To ensure that our security interests are protected and that the region does not get sucked in to a new level of insecurity and tension, a comprehensive strategy to enhance regional security, <u><strong>maintain a stable Afghanistan</u></strong>, and keep a watchful eye on Pakistan and India is essential. Taking such steps will help us to depart Afghanistan in a responsible manner that protects our security interests, while not exacerbating the deep strategic insecurities of a region that has the greatest risk of arms races and nuclear conflict in the world.</p>

1AC Kentucky

Advantage -- UN

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx

A

Kentucky

2

Northwestern CS

Glinecki

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college

African instability causes great power war

Glick 7

Caroline Glick 7, senior Middle East fellow at the Center for Security Policy, 12/12, Condi’s African holiday,http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/home.aspx?sid=56&categoryid=56&subcategoryid=90&newsid=11568

Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes can give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers The conflicts in the Horn of Africa have regional and global dimensions

Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have global aspects. All conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes can give rise to global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers conflicts in Africa have regional and global dimensions

The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars, which rage continuously, can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have regional and global aspects. All of the conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers. Located in and around the Horn of Africa are the states of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. Eritrea, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a 30-year civil war, is a major source of regional conflict. Eritrea has a nagging border dispute with Ethiopia which could easily ignite. The two countries fought a bloody border war from 1998-2000 over control of the town of Badme. Although a UN mandated body determined in 2002 that the disputed town belonged to Eritrea, Ethiopia has rejected the finding and so the conflict festers. Eritrea also fights a proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia and in Ethiopia's rebellious Ogaden region. In Somalia, Eritrea is the primary sponsor of the al-Qaida-linked Islamic Courts Union which took control of Somalia in June, 2006. In November 2006, the ICU government declared jihad against Ethiopia and Kenya. Backed by the US, Ethiopia invaded Somalia last December to restore the recognized Transitional Federal Government to power which the ICU had deposed. Although the Ethiopian army successfully ousted the ICU from power in less than a week, backed by massive military and financial assistance from Eritrea, as well as Egypt and Libya, the ICU has waged a brutal insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military for the past year. The senior ICU leadership, including Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheikh Sharif Ahmed have received safe haven in Eritrea. In September, the exiled ICU leadership held a nine-day conference in the Eritrean capital of Asmara where they formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia headed by Ahmed. Eritrean President-for-life Isaias Afwerki declared his country's support for the insurgents stating, "The Eritrean people's support to the Somali people is consistent and historical, as well as a legal and moral obligation." Although touted in the West as a moderate, Ahmed has openly supported jihad and terrorism against Ethiopia, Kenya and the West. Aweys, for his part, is wanted by the FBI in connection with his role in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Then there is Eritrea's support for the Ogaden separatists in Ethiopia. The Ogaden rebels are Somali ethnics who live in the region bordering Somalia and Kenya. The rebellion is run by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) which uses terror and sabotage as its preferred methods of warfare. It targets not only Ethiopian forces and military installations, but locals who wish to maintain their allegiance to Ethiopia or reach a negotiated resolution of the conflict. In their most sensationalist attack to date, in April ONLF terror forces attacked a Chinese-run oil installation in April killing nine Chinese and 65 Ethiopians. Ethiopia, for its part has fought a brutal counter-insurgency to restore its control over the region. Human rights organizations have accused Ethiopia of massive human rights abuses of civilians in Ogaden. Then there is Sudan. As Eric Reeves wrote in the Boston Globe on Saturday, "The brutal regime in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, has orchestrated genocidal counter-insurgency war in Darfur for five years, and is now poised for victory in its ghastly assault on the region's African populations." The Islamist government of Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir is refusing to accept non-African states as members of the hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping mission to Darfur that is due to replace the undermanned and demoralized African Union peacekeeping force whose mandate ends on December 31. Without its UN component of non-African states, the UN Security Council mandated force will be unable to operate effectively. Khartoum's veto led Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN undersecretary for peacekeeping to warn last month that the entire peacekeeping mission may have to be aborted. And the Darfur region is not the only one at risk. Due to Khartoum's refusal to carry out the terms of its 2005 peace treaty with the Southern Sudanese that ended Khartoum's 20-year war and genocide against the region's Christian and animist population, the unsteady peace may be undone. Given Khartoum's apparent sprint to victory over the international community regarding Darfur, there is little reason to doubt that once victory is secured, it will renew its attacks in the south. The conflicts in the Horn of Africa have regional and global dimensions. Regionally, Egypt has played a central role in sponsoring and fomenting conflicts. Egypt's meddling advances its interest of preventing the African nations from mounting a unified challenge to Egypt's colonial legacy of extraordinary rights to the waters of the Nile River which flows through all countries of the region.

<h4>African instability causes great power war</h4><p>Caroline <strong>Glick 7</strong>, senior Middle East fellow at the Center for Security Policy, 12/12, Condi’s African holiday,http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/home.aspx?sid=56&categoryid=56&subcategoryid=90&newsid=11568 </p><p>The Horn of<u><strong> <mark>Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars</u></strong></mark>, which rage continuously, <u><strong><mark>can easily escalate into big wars. Local conflicts have</mark> regional and <mark>global aspects. All</u></strong></mark> of the <u><strong><mark>conflicts in this tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes</u></strong></mark> from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, <u><strong><mark>can</u></strong></mark> potentially <u><strong><mark>give rise to</mark> regional, and indeed <mark>global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers</u></strong></mark>. Located in and around the Horn of Africa are the states of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. Eritrea, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a 30-year civil war, is a major source of regional conflict. Eritrea has a nagging border dispute with Ethiopia which could easily ignite. The two countries fought a bloody border war from 1998-2000 over control of the town of Badme. Although a UN mandated body determined in 2002 that the disputed town belonged to Eritrea, Ethiopia has rejected the finding and so the conflict festers. Eritrea also fights a proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia and in Ethiopia's rebellious Ogaden region. In Somalia, Eritrea is the primary sponsor of the al-Qaida-linked Islamic Courts Union which took control of Somalia in June, 2006. In November 2006, the ICU government declared jihad against Ethiopia and Kenya. Backed by the US, Ethiopia invaded Somalia last December to restore the recognized Transitional Federal Government to power which the ICU had deposed. Although the Ethiopian army successfully ousted the ICU from power in less than a week, backed by massive military and financial assistance from Eritrea, as well as Egypt and Libya, the ICU has waged a brutal insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military for the past year. The senior ICU leadership, including Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheikh Sharif Ahmed have received safe haven in Eritrea. In September, the exiled ICU leadership held a nine-day conference in the Eritrean capital of Asmara where they formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia headed by Ahmed. Eritrean President-for-life Isaias Afwerki declared his country's support for the insurgents stating, "The Eritrean people's support to the Somali people is consistent and historical, as well as a legal and moral obligation." Although touted in the West as a moderate, Ahmed has openly supported jihad and terrorism against Ethiopia, Kenya and the West. Aweys, for his part, is wanted by the FBI in connection with his role in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Then there is Eritrea's support for the Ogaden separatists in Ethiopia. The Ogaden rebels are Somali ethnics who live in the region bordering Somalia and Kenya. The rebellion is run by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) which uses terror and sabotage as its preferred methods of warfare. It targets not only Ethiopian forces and military installations, but locals who wish to maintain their allegiance to Ethiopia or reach a negotiated resolution of the conflict. In their most sensationalist attack to date, in April ONLF terror forces attacked a Chinese-run oil installation in April killing nine Chinese and 65 Ethiopians. Ethiopia, for its part has fought a brutal counter-insurgency to restore its control over the region. Human rights organizations have accused Ethiopia of massive human rights abuses of civilians in Ogaden. Then there is Sudan. As Eric Reeves wrote in the Boston Globe on Saturday, "The brutal regime in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, has orchestrated genocidal counter-insurgency war in Darfur for five years, and is now poised for victory in its ghastly assault on the region's African populations." The Islamist government of Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir is refusing to accept non-African states as members of the hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping mission to Darfur that is due to replace the undermanned and demoralized African Union peacekeeping force whose mandate ends on December 31. Without its UN component of non-African states, the UN Security Council mandated force will be unable to operate effectively. Khartoum's veto led Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN undersecretary for peacekeeping to warn last month that the entire peacekeeping mission may have to be aborted. And the Darfur region is not the only one at risk. Due to Khartoum's refusal to carry out the terms of its 2005 peace treaty with the Southern Sudanese that ended Khartoum's 20-year war and genocide against the region's Christian and animist population, the unsteady peace may be undone. Given Khartoum's apparent sprint to victory over the international community regarding Darfur, there is little reason to doubt that once victory is secured, it will renew its attacks in the south. <u><strong>The <mark>conflicts in</mark> the Horn of <mark>Africa have regional and global dimensions</u></strong></mark>. Regionally, Egypt has played a central role in sponsoring and fomenting conflicts. Egypt's meddling advances its interest of preventing the African nations from mounting a unified challenge to Egypt's colonial legacy of extraordinary rights to the waters of the Nile River which flows through all countries of the region.</p>

1AC UNLV

Advantage -- UN

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

A

Wake

1

George Washington TT

DStout

1AC - MJ - UN and OAS 1NC - Cap Treaties DA Treaties and CEA CP 2NC - Cap 1NR - Cap 2NR - Cap

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Increases Dem voter turnout but doesn’t cause GOP backlash

Edwards-Levy 14 <Ariel, HuffPo, Voters Say They're More Likely To Turn Out If Marijuana Is On The Ballot, March 25, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/25/marijuana-turnout-poll_n_5030351.html>#SPS

Edwards-Levy 14 <Ariel, HuffPo, Voters Say They're More Likely To Turn Out If Marijuana Is On The Ballot, March 25, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/25/marijuana-turnout-poll_n_5030351.html>#SPS

The chance to vote on marijuana could persuade some voters to show up on Election Day, according to a poll Sixty-nine percent of voters polled said they would be more likely to vote in an election if a proposal to legalize marijuana was on the ballot, just 13 percent said they'd be less likely Liberals were even more enthusiastic about voting under those circumstances than conservatives or moderates.¶ some Democrats hope their inclusion on state ballots could help boost midterm turnout, especially among young voters.¶ "You can imagine that we're very excited about the marijuana numbers in this poll, not only for personal consumption to get through this election but also in terms of turnout," With marijuana initiatives, we actually don't get a backlash."

The chance to vote on marijuana could persuade some voters to show up on Election Day according to a George Washington University Battleground poll Sixty-nine percent of voters polled said they would be more likely to vote in an election if a proposal to legalize marijuana was on the ballot Liberals were even more enthusiastic about voting under those circumstances than conservatives or moderates With marijuana initiatives, we actually don't get a backlash."

The chance to vote on marijuana could persuade some voters to show up on Election Day, according to a George Washington University Battleground poll conducted by the bipartisan team of Lake Research Partners and the Tarrance Group.¶ Sixty-nine percent of voters polled said they would be more likely to vote in an election if a proposal to legalize marijuana was on the ballot, while just 13 percent said they'd be less likely. Liberals were even more enthusiastic about voting under those circumstances than conservatives or moderates.¶ Getting voters to the polls during midterm elections is a recurrent challenge for Democrats. No one is suggesting marijuana initiatives as a key get-out-the-vote strategy, but some Democrats hope their inclusion on state ballots could help boost midterm turnout, especially among young voters.¶ Florida will have a medical marijuana initiative on its ballot in November, and pot advocates are pushing to get initiatives on the ballot in several other states.¶ "You can imagine that we're very excited about the marijuana numbers in this poll, not only for personal consumption to get through this election but also in terms of turnout," Democratic pollster Celinda Lake joked at a reporter breakfast sponsored by The Christian Science Monitor. Speaking later to HuffPost, she added, "The great thing about it is, marriage equality increases turnout, but we get a backlash too. Abortion issues increase turnout, but we get a backlash too. With marijuana initiatives, we actually don't get a backlash."

<h4>Increases Dem voter turnout but doesn’t cause GOP backlash</h4><p><strong>Edwards-Levy 14</strong> <u><strong><Ariel, HuffPo, Voters Say They're More Likely To Turn Out If Marijuana Is On The Ballot, March 25, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/25/marijuana-turnout-poll_n_5030351.html>#SPS</p><p><mark>The chance to vote on marijuana could persuade some voters to show up on Election Day</mark>, <mark>according to a</u></strong> George Washington University Battleground <u><strong>poll</u></strong></mark> conducted by the bipartisan team of Lake Research Partners and the Tarrance Group.¶ <u><strong><mark>Sixty-nine percent of voters polled said they would be more likely to vote in an election if a proposal to legalize marijuana was on the ballot</mark>,</u></strong> while <u><strong>just 13 percent said they'd be less likely</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Liberals were even more enthusiastic about voting under those circumstances than conservatives or moderates</mark>.¶ </u></strong>Getting voters to the polls during midterm elections is a recurrent challenge for Democrats. No one is suggesting marijuana initiatives as a key get-out-the-vote strategy, but <u><strong>some Democrats hope their inclusion on state ballots could help boost midterm turnout, especially among young voters.¶ </u></strong>Florida will have a medical marijuana initiative on its ballot in November, and pot advocates are pushing to get initiatives on the ballot in several other states.¶ <u><strong>"You can imagine that we're very excited about the marijuana numbers in this poll, not only for personal consumption to get through this election but also in terms of turnout,"</u></strong> Democratic pollster Celinda Lake joked at a reporter breakfast sponsored by The Christian Science Monitor. Speaking later to HuffPost, she added, "The great thing about it is, marriage equality increases turnout, but we get a backlash too. Abortion issues increase turnout, but we get a backlash too. <u><strong><mark>With marijuana initiatives, we actually don't get a backlash."</p></u></strong></mark>

1NR

Counterplan

1NR – Link Wall

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx

N

Kentucky

4

Emory KS

Kallmeyer, Kevin

1AC - Cannabis Exchange 1NC - Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) Mexico DA Security K Reeferendum CP 2NC - Reeferendum CP and Security K 1NR - Midterms DA

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Doha

NYT 14 (The New York Times, August 3, 2014, “Global Trade Talks Suffer another Setback”, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/opinion/global-trade-talks-suffer-another-setback.html///TS)

NYT 14 (The New York Times, August 3, 2014, “Global Trade Talks Suffer another Setback”, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/opinion/global-trade-talks-suffer-another-setback.html///TS)

The collapse last week of a global trade agreement on simplifying customs rules will make it much harder for the World Trade Organization to finish its much-delayed Doha round of negotiations, which has a much broader agenda to lower tariffs and reduce barriers to trade. India vetoed the final agreement on customs rules. In recent weeks, it had insisted that the W.T.O. move up negotiations over agricultural subsidies to this year. India vastly expanded its food subsidy program, under which the government buys wheat and rice from farmers at above-market prices, stockpiles the grain and sells some of it to consumers at much lower prices One of their concerns is that India is accumulating so much grain — with millions of tons rotting for lack of storage space — that the country will inevitably end up dumping some of it onto the world market, which would depress global prices and hurt farmers in other countries. . It is disappointing that the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which was elected in part because it promised to revive India’s economy, did not give the agreements reached in Bali a chance. W.T.O. members have a poor record of concluding trade deals — the current Doha round of talks, of which the Bali agreements are a part, has not resulted in a completed agreement since it began in 2001. This latest failure will further erode confidence in the global trading system, and it will encourage officials in the United States, the European Union, China and Japan to pursue more regional and industry-specific trade deals those deals often leave out the smallest and poorest nations . Trade negotiators might still be able to revive the Doha negotiations, but don’t count on it.

The collapse last week of a global trade agreement on customs rules will make it much harder for the W T O to finish its Doha negotiations, India vetoed the final agreement on customs rules W.T.O. members have a poor record of concluding trade deals This latest failure will further erode confidence in the global trading system, and will encourage officials in the U S E U China and Japan to pursue regional and industry-specific trade deals

The collapse last week of a global trade agreement on simplifying customs rules will make it much harder for the World Trade Organization to finish its much-delayed Doha round of negotiations, which has a much broader agenda to lower tariffs and reduce barriers to trade. Last year at a meeting on the Indonesian island of Bali, the W.T.O.’s 160 members agreed to improve customs procedures by reducing red tape — a deal that some analysts estimated could add $1 trillion to the global economy by increasing trade. The W.T.O. had set a July 31 deadline to finalize that agreement. At the Bali meeting, the countries also agreed to renegotiate existing rules on agricultural subsidies by the end of 2017 to address India’s concerns that those regulations were too restrictive and could hurt the nation’s ability to stockpile grains to ensure food security. But last week, India vetoed the final agreement on customs rules. In recent weeks, it had insisted that the W.T.O. move up negotiations over agricultural subsidies to this year. Under W.T.O. rules, agreements must be adopted unanimously before they can be sent to the legislature of each country for ratification; two-thirds of the countries have to ratify trade deals for them to become effective. Last year, India vastly expanded its food subsidy program, under which the government buys wheat and rice from farmers at above-market prices, stockpiles the grain and sells some of it to consumers at much lower prices. Other countries like the United States and Pakistan have complained that the program distorts trade. One of their concerns is that India is accumulating so much grain — with millions of tons rotting for lack of storage space — that the country will inevitably end up dumping some of it onto the world market, which would depress global prices and hurt farmers in other countries. India should, of course, have the ability to help its struggling farmers and protect the poor. But it could achieve those goals in a more constructive way. The Bali pact, which India’s previous government supported, included an agreement by the United States, the European Union and other nations not to challenge the food policies of India and other developing nations while the food subsidy rules were renegotiated. It is disappointing that the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which was elected in part because it promised to revive India’s economy, did not give the agreements reached in Bali a chance. Indian officials have played down their veto, saying that the July 31 deadline was an arbitrary date and arguing that trade negotiators can sign the agreement in September. But W.T.O. members have a poor record of concluding trade deals — the current Doha round of talks, of which the Bali agreements are a part, has not resulted in a completed agreement since it began in 2001. This latest failure will further erode confidence in the global trading system, and it will encourage officials in the United States, the European Union, China and Japan to pursue more regional and industry-specific trade deals. Sadly, those deals often leave out the smallest and poorest nations, as Roberto Carvalho de Azevêdo, the director general of the W.T.O., noted last week. Trade negotiators might still be able to revive the Doha negotiations, but don’t count on it.

<h4>Doha</h4><p><strong>NYT 14<u> (The New York Times, August 3, 2014, “Global Trade Talks Suffer another Setback”, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/04/opinion/global-trade-talks-suffer-another-setback.html///TS)</p><p><mark>The collapse last week of a global trade agreement on</mark> simplifying <mark>customs rules will make it much harder for the W</mark>orld <mark>T</mark>rade <mark>O</mark>rganization <mark>to finish its</mark> much-delayed <mark>Doha</mark> round of <mark>negotiations, </mark>which has a much broader agenda to lower tariffs and reduce barriers to trade.</u></strong> Last year at a meeting on the Indonesian island of Bali, the W.T.O.’s 160 members agreed to improve customs procedures by reducing red tape — a deal that some analysts estimated could add $1 trillion to the global economy by increasing trade. The W.T.O. had set a July 31 deadline to finalize that agreement. At the Bali meeting, the countries also agreed to renegotiate existing rules on agricultural subsidies by the end of 2017 to address India’s concerns that those regulations were too restrictive and could hurt the nation’s ability to stockpile grains to ensure food security. But last week, <u><strong><mark>India vetoed the final agreement on customs rules</mark>. In recent weeks, it had insisted that the W.T.O. move up negotiations over agricultural subsidies to this year.</u></strong> Under W.T.O. rules, agreements must be adopted unanimously before they can be sent to the legislature of each country for ratification; two-thirds of the countries have to ratify trade deals for them to become effective. Last year, <u><strong>India vastly expanded its food subsidy program, under which the government buys wheat and rice from farmers at above-market prices, stockpiles the grain and sells some of it to consumers at much lower prices</u></strong>. Other countries like the United States and Pakistan have complained that the program distorts trade. <u><strong>One of their concerns is that India is accumulating so much grain — with millions of tons rotting for lack of storage space — that the country will inevitably end up dumping some of it onto the world market, which would depress global prices and hurt farmers in other countries.</u></strong> India should, of course, have the ability to help its struggling farmers and protect the poor. But it could achieve those goals in a more constructive way. The Bali pact, which India’s previous government supported, included an agreement by the United States, the European Union and other nations not to challenge the food policies of India and other developing nations while the food subsidy rules were renegotiated<u><strong>. It is disappointing that the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which was elected in part because it promised to revive India’s economy, did not give the agreements reached in Bali a chance.</u></strong> Indian officials have played down their veto, saying that the July 31 deadline was an arbitrary date and arguing that trade negotiators can sign the agreement in September. But <u><strong><mark>W.T.O. members have a poor record of concluding trade deals</mark> — the current Doha round of talks, of which the Bali agreements are a part, has not resulted in a completed agreement since it began in 2001. <mark>This latest failure will further erode confidence in the global trading system, and</mark> it <mark>will</mark> <mark>encourage officials in the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates, the <mark>E</mark>uropean <mark>U</mark>nion, <mark>China and Japan to pursue</mark> more <mark>regional</mark> <mark>and industry-specific trade deals</u></strong></mark>. Sadly, <u><strong>those deals often leave out the smallest and poorest nations</u></strong>, as Roberto Carvalho de Azevêdo, the director general of the W.T.O., noted last week<u><strong>. Trade negotiators might still be able to revive the Doha negotiations, but don’t count on it. </p></u></strong>

1NC

1NC WTO

Alt Causes

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx

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Kentucky

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Box, Brian

1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx

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Baylor BaSh

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NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Legalization of marijuana would legalize hemp under the CSA

Duppong 9 . L. Rev. 403, Lexis)

Duppong 9 (Thomas A., J.D. candidate at the University of North Dakota School of Law, “NOTE: INDUSTRIAL HEMP: HOW THE CLASSIFICATION OF INDUSTRIAL HEMP AS MARIJUANA UNDER THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT HAS CAUSED THE DREAM OF GROWING INDUSTRIAL HEMP IN NORTH DAKOTA TO GO UP IN SMOKE,” 2009, 85 N. Dak. L. Rev. 403, Lexis)

The CSA was initiated under Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Prevention and Control Act of 1970 the CSA makes it illegal "to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess ... a controlled substance" except as authorized by the CSA. The CSA classifies marijuana in the first category of schedules, placing it among the most harmful and dangerous drugs. The CSA defines marijuana as follows: The term ""marihuana" means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin. This effectively placed the entire use of the hemp plant, whether for drug use or as industrial hemp, squarely under the control of the CSA. n141 Therefore, the DEA views industrial hemp containing .3% THC the same as marijuana grown for drug use which commonly contains a 24% THC level The CSA permits the United States Attorney General to establish the schedules of drugs in accordance with the CSA. These duties have been shifted to the Administrator and Deputy Administrator of the DEA, which allows them to maintain or exempt substances from the schedule. when the DEA executes rules regarding controlled substances, the newly implemented rules have the full force of the law. The DEA's power to make rulings on its regulation of industrial hemp is an important tool for the agency to influence the regulation of industrial hemp. , the DEA has interpreted every product that contains any amount of THC to be a Schedule I controlled substance. Although 21 C.F.R. § 1308.35 exempted certain products from the CSA Schedule I list, the DEA clearly stated that the exemptions did not change the rule for the manufacturing or cultivation of any THC-containing product, which still requires registration under the CSA The importance placed on registration and the ability of the DEA to control the manufacturing of THC-containing products has prohibited farmers from growing industrial hemp even though the .3% THC content makes it illegal.

The CSA classifies marijuana in the first category of schedules The CSA defines marijuana as all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., This effectively placed the entire hemp plant, whether for drug use or industri under the control of the CSA the DEA views industrial hemp the same as marijuana grown for drug use The DEA's regulation of industrial hemp is an important tool the DEA has interpreted every product that contains any amount of THC to be a Schedule I controlled substance The importance placed on registration and the ability of the DEA to control the manufacturing of THC-containing products has prohibited farmers from growing industrial hemp

Background of the Controlled Substances Act The CSA was initiated under Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Prevention and Control Act of 1970. n128 The CSA went into effect on May 1, 1971. n129 It streamlined federal drug enforcement by replacing more than fifty pieces of drug legislation. n130 The purpose of the CSA was to focus the federal government's efforts in curtailing the spread of drug use in Amer-ica. n131 The subsequent enforcement of the criminal and regulatory provisions [*417] of the CSA were consolidated into the DEA under the Department of Justice in 1973. n132 By creating the CSA, the federal government established a single system of control for both narcotic and psychotropic drugs for the first time in United States history. n133 In effect, the CSA makes it illegal "to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess ... a controlled substance" except as authorized by the CSA. n134 An essential component of this regulatory scheme was to implement a series of categories or "schedules" in order to distinguish potency among various drugs. n135 The CSA has implemented five schedules and determined various findings in order to properly classify each drug through three categories: (1) the drug's potential of abuse; (2) its medical relevance; and (3) the safety of use of the drug. n136 B. Classification of Marijuana Under the Controlled Substances Act The CSA classifies marijuana in the first category of schedules, placing it among the most harmful and dangerous drugs. n137 Marijuana meets the criteria for a Schedule I controlled substance because of its THC content, which is a psychoactive hallucinogenic substance with a high potential for abuse. n138 Another key classification made by the CSA regarding marijuana was its broad definition of the drug. n139 The CSA defines marijuana as follows: The term ""marihuana" means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin. Such term does not include the mature stalks of such plant, fiber produced from such stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such mature stalks (except [*418] the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or cake, or the sterilized seed of such plant which is incapable of germination. n140 This effectively placed the entire use of the hemp plant, whether for drug use or as industrial hemp, squarely under the control of the CSA. n141 Therefore, the DEA views industrial hemp containing .3% THC the same as marijuana grown for drug use which commonly contains a 24% THC level, or eighty times more THC. n142 The CSA permits the United States Attorney General to establish the schedules of drugs in accordance with the CSA. n143 The Attorney General must consider several factors in determining whether a drug should be controlled or removed from the schedule. n144 Also, the Attorney General, when appropriate, is authorized to enforce any rules, regulations, and procedures in order to execute the purpose of the CSA. n145 These duties have been shifted to the Administrator and Deputy Administrator of the DEA, which allows them to maintain or exempt substances from the schedule. n146 Accordingly, when the DEA executes rules regarding controlled substances, the newly implemented rules have the full force of the law. n147 C. The DEA Issues New Rules The DEA's power to make rulings on its regulation of industrial hemp is an important tool for the agency to influence the regulation of industrial hemp. n148 The most recent substantive rulings on industrial hemp are pro-vided in the next two sections to develop a better understanding of the [*419] proper role of the CSA as well as to present various regulatory issues facing American industrial hemp producers. Also, the subsequent section provides a brief overview of the DEA registration requirements, which is the basis to understand the purpose of the North Dakota registration requirements. 1. DEA Issues an "Interpretive Ruling" Since its inception, the DEA has interpreted every product that contains any amount of THC to be a Schedule I controlled substance. n149 In response to increased requests for clarifications on industrial hemp law, the DEA, on October 9, 2001, issued an interpretive ruling. n150 The purpose of the interpretive ruling was to make clear that the listing of THC "refers to both natural and synthetic THC." n151 This ruling initiated a lawsuit from the Hemp Industries Association (HIA) because the ruling would have banned them from selling their products. n152 In Hemp Industries Association v. Drug Enforcement Administration (Hemp I), n153 American hemp importers challenged the validity of the DEA's interpretive ruling of October 9, 2001. n154 Since the ruling would have banned many industrial hemp products that the petitioners sold, the HIA petitioned the Ninth Circuit to declare the rule invalid. n155 The HIA argued that the interpretive rule issued by the DEA was legislative and, therefore, subjected the DEA to the notice and comment procedure required by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). n156 [*420] Whether the ruling was interpretive or legislative was a critical determination because if the DEA's rule had the effect of a legislative rule, it would be invalid, because the agency cannot make legislative rules under the APA. n157 The DEA argued that its interpretative ruling did not have the effect of a legislative ruling. n158 However, the court concluded that because the interpretive ruling would have altered the way in which American hemp retailers could operate, it had the force of law. n159 Also, because the DEA did not post notice or comment regarding the rule, the DEA did not properly implement the ruling even if it was a legislative rather than an interpretive ruling. n160 The Ninth Circuit subsequently granted HIA's request and declared the ruling invalid. n161 2. DEA Issues a "Final Ruling" On March 21, 2003, the DEA issued the agency's final rules regarding the listing of industrial hemp products containing THC. n162 The purpose of the rules was to clarify the DEA's position that the CSA applied to both natural and synthetic THC. n163 Although the Ninth Circuit held that the DEA's interpretive rule had the effect of a legislative rule, the DEA determined that the October 2001 rule was consistent with APA principles. n164 According to the DEA, the agency's final ruling only prohibited hemp products that did not enter the human body, regardless of THC content. n165 It did not matter whether the product was grown naturally or synthetically. n166 The DEA's examples of exempted industrial hemp products that contain THC included, but were not limited to, paper, rope, clothes, animal feed mixtures, and personal care products. n167 The exemption effectively altered the scheduling from all products with THC to all products containing THC, excluding products that are not used for human consumption. n168 The practical reason behind the DEA's exemption of industrial hemp products [*421] was due to the DEA's belief that the regulation of these products was not an appropriate prioritization of its time. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals permanently enjoined the enforcement of the final rule. n169 In Hemp Industries Association v. Drug Enforcement Administration (Hemp II), n170 American importers of hemp challenged the DEA's final rule, which regulated any product that contained any amount of natural or synthetic THC. n171 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the DEA could regulate synthetic THC of any kind. n172 However, the court also held that the DEA could not regulate naturally-occurring THC not contained within or derived from marijuana products, because non-psychoactive hemp is not included in Schedule I. n173 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the DEA's definition of THC contradicts the "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress in the CSA" and therefore cannot be upheld. n174 Moreover, the court determined that the inclusion of hemp products would place non-psychoactive industrial hemp in Schedule I for the first time and therefore voided the DEA's rule making THC applicable to all parts of the Cannabis plant. n175 3. DEA Registration Requirements Although 21 C.F.R. § 1308.35 exempted certain products from the CSA Schedule I list, the DEA clearly stated that the exemptions did not change the rule for the manufacturing or cultivation of any THC-containing product, which still requires registration under the CSA. n176 Registration through the DEA is an essential component of the CSA as it "provides for control by the Justice Department of problems related to drug abuse" and "makes transactions outside the legitimate distribution chain illegal." n177 The importance placed on registration and the ability of the DEA to control the manufacturing of THC-containing products has prohibited North [*422] Dakota farmers from growing industrial hemp even though the .3% THC content makes it illegal.

<h4><strong>Legalization of marijuana would legalize hemp under the CSA</h4><p>Duppong 9 </strong>(Thomas A., J.D. candidate at the University of North Dakota School of Law, “NOTE: INDUSTRIAL HEMP: HOW THE CLASSIFICATION OF INDUSTRIAL HEMP AS MARIJUANA UNDER THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT HAS CAUSED THE DREAM OF GROWING INDUSTRIAL HEMP IN NORTH DAKOTA TO GO UP IN SMOKE,” 2009, 85 N. Dak<u><strong>. L. Rev. 403, Lexis)</p><p></u></strong>Background of the Controlled Substances Act <u><strong>The CSA was initiated under Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Prevention and Control Act of 1970</u></strong>. n128 The CSA went into effect on May 1, 1971. n129 It streamlined federal drug enforcement by replacing more than fifty pieces of drug legislation. n130 The purpose of the CSA was to focus the federal government's efforts in curtailing the spread of drug use in Amer-ica. n131 The subsequent enforcement of the criminal and regulatory provisions [*417] of the CSA were consolidated into the DEA under the Department of Justice in 1973. n132 By creating the CSA, the federal government established a single system of control for both narcotic and psychotropic drugs for the first time in United States history. n133 In effect, <u><strong>the CSA makes it illegal "to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess ... a controlled substance" except as authorized by the CSA.</u></strong> n134 An essential component of this regulatory scheme was to implement a series of categories or "schedules" in order to distinguish potency among various drugs. n135 The CSA has implemented five schedules and determined various findings in order to properly classify each drug through three categories: (1) the drug's potential of abuse; (2) its medical relevance; and (3) the safety of use of the drug. n136 B. Classification of Marijuana Under the Controlled Substances Act <u><strong><mark>The CSA classifies</mark> <mark>marijuana in the first category of schedules</mark>, placing it among the most harmful and dangerous drugs.</u></strong> n137 Marijuana meets the criteria for a Schedule I controlled substance because of its THC content, which is a psychoactive hallucinogenic substance with a high potential for abuse. n138 Another key classification made by the CSA regarding marijuana was its broad definition of the drug. n139 <u><strong><mark>The CSA defines marijuana as</mark> follows: The term ""marihuana" means <mark>all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., </mark>whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin.</u></strong> Such term does not include the mature stalks of such plant, fiber produced from such stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such mature stalks (except [*418] the resin extracted therefrom), fiber, oil, or cake, or the sterilized seed of such plant which is incapable of germination. n140 <u><strong><mark>This effectively placed the entire</mark> use of the <mark>hemp plant, whether for drug use or</mark> as <mark>industri</mark>al hemp, squarely <mark>under the control of the CSA</mark>. n141 Therefore, <mark>the DEA views industrial hemp</mark> containing .3% THC <mark>the same as marijuana grown for drug use</mark> which commonly contains a 24% THC level</u></strong>, or eighty times more THC. n142 <u><strong>The CSA permits the United States Attorney General to establish the schedules of drugs in accordance with the CSA.</u></strong> n143 The Attorney General must consider several factors in determining whether a drug should be controlled or removed from the schedule. n144 Also, the Attorney General, when appropriate, is authorized to enforce any rules, regulations, and procedures in order to execute the purpose of the CSA. n145 <u><strong>These duties have been shifted to the Administrator and Deputy Administrator of the DEA, which allows them to maintain or exempt substances from the schedule.</u></strong> n146 Accordingly, <u><strong>when the DEA executes rules regarding controlled substances, the newly implemented rules have the full force of the law.</u></strong> n147 C. The DEA Issues New Rules <u><strong><mark>The DEA's </mark>power to make rulings on its <mark>regulation of industrial hemp is an important tool </mark>for the agency to influence the regulation of industrial hemp.</u></strong> n148 The most recent substantive rulings on industrial hemp are pro-vided in the next two sections to develop a better understanding of the [*419] proper role of the CSA as well as to present various regulatory issues facing American industrial hemp producers. Also, the subsequent section provides a brief overview of the DEA registration requirements, which is the basis to understand the purpose of the North Dakota registration requirements. 1. DEA Issues an "Interpretive Ruling" Since its inception<u><strong>, <mark>the DEA has interpreted every product that contains any amount of THC to be a Schedule I controlled substance</mark>.</u></strong> n149 In response to increased requests for clarifications on industrial hemp law, the DEA, on October 9, 2001, issued an interpretive ruling. n150 The purpose of the interpretive ruling was to make clear that the listing of THC "refers to both natural and synthetic THC." n151 This ruling initiated a lawsuit from the Hemp Industries Association (HIA) because the ruling would have banned them from selling their products. n152 In Hemp Industries Association v. Drug Enforcement Administration (Hemp I), n153 American hemp importers challenged the validity of the DEA's interpretive ruling of October 9, 2001. n154 Since the ruling would have banned many industrial hemp products that the petitioners sold, the HIA petitioned the Ninth Circuit to declare the rule invalid. n155 The HIA argued that the interpretive rule issued by the DEA was legislative and, therefore, subjected the DEA to the notice and comment procedure required by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). n156 [*420] Whether the ruling was interpretive or legislative was a critical determination because if the DEA's rule had the effect of a legislative rule, it would be invalid, because the agency cannot make legislative rules under the APA. n157 The DEA argued that its interpretative ruling did not have the effect of a legislative ruling. n158 However, the court concluded that because the interpretive ruling would have altered the way in which American hemp retailers could operate, it had the force of law. n159 Also, because the DEA did not post notice or comment regarding the rule, the DEA did not properly implement the ruling even if it was a legislative rather than an interpretive ruling. n160 The Ninth Circuit subsequently granted HIA's request and declared the ruling invalid. n161 2. DEA Issues a "Final Ruling" On March 21, 2003, the DEA issued the agency's final rules regarding the listing of industrial hemp products containing THC. n162 The purpose of the rules was to clarify the DEA's position that the CSA applied to both natural and synthetic THC. n163 Although the Ninth Circuit held that the DEA's interpretive rule had the effect of a legislative rule, the DEA determined that the October 2001 rule was consistent with APA principles. n164 According to the DEA, the agency's final ruling only prohibited hemp products that did not enter the human body, regardless of THC content. n165 It did not matter whether the product was grown naturally or synthetically. n166 The DEA's examples of exempted industrial hemp products that contain THC included, but were not limited to, paper, rope, clothes, animal feed mixtures, and personal care products. n167 The exemption effectively altered the scheduling from all products with THC to all products containing THC, excluding products that are not used for human consumption. n168 The practical reason behind the DEA's exemption of industrial hemp products [*421] was due to the DEA's belief that the regulation of these products was not an appropriate prioritization of its time. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals permanently enjoined the enforcement of the final rule. n169 In Hemp Industries Association v. Drug Enforcement Administration (Hemp II), n170 American importers of hemp challenged the DEA's final rule, which regulated any product that contained any amount of natural or synthetic THC. n171 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the DEA could regulate synthetic THC of any kind. n172 However, the court also held that the DEA could not regulate naturally-occurring THC not contained within or derived from marijuana products, because non-psychoactive hemp is not included in Schedule I. n173 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the DEA's definition of THC contradicts the "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress in the CSA" and therefore cannot be upheld. n174 Moreover, the court determined that the inclusion of hemp products would place non-psychoactive industrial hemp in Schedule I for the first time and therefore voided the DEA's rule making THC applicable to all parts of the Cannabis plant. n175 3. DEA Registration Requirements <u><strong>Although 21 C.F.R. § 1308.35 exempted certain products from the CSA Schedule I list, the DEA clearly stated that the exemptions did not change the rule for the manufacturing or cultivation of any THC-containing product, which still requires registration under the CSA</u></strong>. n176 Registration through the DEA is an essential component of the CSA as it "provides for control by the Justice Department of problems related to drug abuse" and "makes transactions outside the legitimate distribution chain illegal." n177 <u><strong><mark>The importance placed on registration and the ability of the DEA to control the manufacturing of THC-containing products has prohibited</u></strong></mark> North [*422] Dakota <u><strong><mark>farmers from growing industrial hemp</mark> even though the .3% THC content makes it illegal.</p></u></strong>

1AC

1AC – Scenario 2

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-UMKC-Round5.docx

A

UMKC

5

SFSU AG

Brian Rubaie

1AC Marijuana Environment 1NC Settlerism K 2NC Settlerism K 1NR Settlerism K 2NR Settlerism K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-UMKC-Round5.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Their unique process of working within the university is bad -- it causes the appropriation of suffering and prevents successful movements

Nayar 13

Jayan Nayar 13, PhD from the University of Cambridge and Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, gz

Neither does the analysis of structures, of processes, of histories, of suffering require any accountable engagement on our part with suffering bodies nor with any of the vectors of violence whose complex intersections in historical time give material, embodied content to what we, in distance, name suffering the suffering condition when appropriated for the purposes of theory possesses no experiential meaning. Whilst lip service is paid to ‘voices of suffering’, voices as such are absented of experiential truth or ontological-political significance in any objectification of suffering as condition; voices are retained instead as theory’s justificatory launch-pads for intervention. At no point, for most of us theorists, is the suffering voice the voice of theory. the ‘subaltern cannot speak’! The politics of discoursing suffering therefore is a politics of the theorist, suffering a problem to be solved by the theorist, where prescription is divorced from experience, theory from the relationality of violence and its local, day-to-day, normal and norm-alised infliction. those that suffer, are invited to await the trickle-down of whatever benign ‘solution’ theory may purport to offer, post its lengthy journeys through intellectual and policy interrogations, as suffering is validated (or otherwise), its structural causation identified (or otherwise), its alleviation interrogated for many a disputed appropriateness of response (or otherwise). suffering itself becomes secondary to the politics of the ‘theorist/philosopher’ – the ‘Self’ thinking for the suffering Other - of imperial recognition, response and intervention Thus are offered rationalised solutions to the problem of the suffering condition, as if some ideal may indeed be redeemed and made ‘real’ from the incomplete actual of the present, laying as it were, immanent, latent, awaiting (re)discovery. The theorist becomes the technician, the expert wielder of knowledge and strategic wisdom, to overcome the problem of suffering, perceived as one of inadequate social cognition, institutional organisation and planning. suffering, as human rights violations becomes the result of inadequate understanding of rights-scope and obligations or of the conceptual essence of rights itself, or of the allocation of resources suffering, as global injustice, becomes a problem of reformulating political affinities within the new meta-game of globalisation as methodological cosmopolitanism towards ‘global citizenship’ to overcome the limits of anachronistic notions of political identities and responsibilities of ‘social connection models thinking suffering and its alleviation, true to the ‘problem of the passage’ becomes rational work, and the technocratic, even bureaucratic, measuring of suffering and its responses becomes the practical implication of theory constant fluctuations of betrayals and aspirations, always with some justification close at hand, only serving to further entrench the Levinasian injunction to responsibility - for further endeavours of thinking-hope, to further serve the cause of salvation for the lost souls of ‘strangers’, Suffering, as condition, as commodity to be exploited, as depoliticised category rather than experience, as a technical/bureaucratic/managerial problem to be solved, remains therefore the ever-present alibi for legitimate interventions amidst constant (and inevitable) disappointments. A corrupt, violent, imperial, global order(ing) of social relations becomes also the saviour, constantly revitalised and called unto renewed being, with every call for the alleviation of suffering How do we account for the constant supply of suffering that continues to move the demand for suffering-based thinking We make a huge assumption - we who theorise alleviatory possibilities out of the suffering condition - that our faith systems are true to the promises proclaimed we attempt to think our way out of (continuing) betrayals to enable the realisation of promises we wish to believe in. With so many questions, and perhaps to assuage our faith in the consequentiality of our thoughts, follows the so many ‘should’-assertions that crowd our repeated redesigns for Humanity – that the world community should respond to suffering; should expend the necessary resources that would alleviate chronic deprivation; should redress prevailing inequalities and injustices within the global economic order; should prioritise human rights in world trade and economic relations, should enforce legal regimes to hold transnational corporations responsible, should reform and democratise international institutions, the list, again, goes on. As do, notwithstanding all of these manifold ‘shoulds’, the ways of the world in which betrayals remain the normalities of business-as-usual

suffering when appropriated for theory possesses no experiential meaning lip service is paid to suffering’ voices are retained as theory’s justificatory launch-pads for intervention At no point is the suffering voice the voice of theory The politics of suffering is a politics of the theorist to be solved by the theorist where prescription is divorced from experience theory from the relationality of violence and local infliction those that suffer await the trickle-down of whatever ‘solution’ theory may offer post journeys through intellectual interrogations suffering becomes secondary to the philosopher’ the ‘Self’ thinking for the suffering Other - of imperial recognition, response and intervention The theorist becomes the technician expert of knowledge to overcome suffering suffering becomes rational work, and the technocratic bureaucratic, measuring of suffering entrench Levinasian responsibility to serve the cause of salvation for strangers’ Suffering as commodity to be exploited depoliticised experience, as a technical/bureaucratic problem remains the alibi for interventions A violent, imperial order(ing) of social relations becomes the saviour with every call for the alleviation of suffering With so many questions to assuage faith our thoughts follow should’-assertions that crowd our repeated redesigns for Humanity the world should respond to suffering should expend resources should redress inequalities should enforce legal regimes should democratise institutions the list, goes on the ways of the world remain the normalities of business-as-usual

People suffer.17 This is a simple truth that takes little effort to state. Neither does the analysis of structures, of processes, of histories, of suffering require any accountable engagement on our part with suffering bodies (save perhaps in our field-work phase of enquiry as we seek data) nor with any of the vectors of violence whose complex intersections in historical time give material, embodied content to what we, in distance, name suffering. Put differently, the suffering condition when appropriated for the purposes of theory possesses no experiential meaning. Whilst lip service is paid to ‘voices of suffering’, voices as such are absented of experiential truth or ontological-political significance in any objectification of suffering as condition; voices are retained instead (perhaps, again, through the inclusion of some choice quotes of wretchedness, accumulated as data from the field) as theory’s justificatory launch-pads for intervention. At no point, for most of us theorists, is the suffering voice the voice of theory. Indeed, as Gayatri Spivak (1988) so trenchantly affirmed, the ‘subaltern cannot speak’!18 The politics of discoursing suffering therefore is a politics of the theorist, suffering a problem to be solved by the theorist, where prescription is divorced from experience, theory from the relationality of violence and its local, day-to-day, normal and norm-alised infliction. At best, those that suffer, are invited to await the trickle-down of whatever benign ‘solution’ theory may purport to offer, post its lengthy journeys through intellectual and policy interrogations, as suffering is validated (or otherwise), its structural causation identified (or otherwise), its alleviation interrogated for many a disputed appropriateness of response (or otherwise).19 Having served the purpose of instigating theory suffering itself becomes secondary to the politics of the ‘theorist/philosopher’ – the ‘Self’ thinking for the suffering Other - of imperial recognition, response and intervention.20 Thus are offered rationalised solutions to the problem of the suffering condition, as if some ideal may indeed be redeemed and made ‘real’ from the incomplete actual of the present, laying as it were, immanent, latent, awaiting (re)discovery. The theorist becomes the technician, the expert wielder of knowledge and strategic wisdom, to overcome the problem of suffering, perceived as one of inadequate social cognition, institutional organisation and planning. Thus, for example, suffering, as human rights violations becomes the result of inadequate understanding of rights-scope and obligations (Craven 2007; Alston and Quinn 1987), or of the conceptual essence of rights itself, or of the allocation of resources.21 Or, to refer to another example of theory-talk (where the legacy of Levinas is apparent), suffering, as global injustice, becomes a problem of reformulating political affinities within the new meta-game of globalisation as methodological cosmopolitanism (Beck 2005),22 towards ‘global citizenship’ to overcome the limits of anachronistic notions of political identities and responsibilities (Dower and Williams 2002), of ‘social connection models (Young 2006), or of the ‘ethics of assistance’ (Chatterjee 2004), or of cosmopolitan care, responsibility, and the politics of redistribution and institutional reform (Pogge 2008). In these examples of discoursing suffering, thinking suffering and its alleviation, true to the ‘problem of the passage’ in Levinasian thought (Wolcher 2003),23 becomes rational work, and the technocratic, even bureaucratic, measuring of suffering and its (appropriate) responses becomes the practical implication of theory; the constant fluctuations of betrayals and aspirations, always with some justification close at hand, only serving to further entrench the Levinasian injunction to responsibility - for further endeavours of thinking-hope, to further serve the cause of salvation for the lost souls of ‘strangers’, as Wheeler (2000) so poignantly put it. Suffering, as condition, as commodity to be exploited, as depoliticised category rather than experience, as a technical/bureaucratic/managerial problem to be solved, remains therefore the ever-present alibi for legitimate interventions amidst constant (and inevitable) disappointments. A corrupt, violent, imperial, global order(ing) of social relations becomes also the saviour, constantly revitalised and called unto renewed being, with every call for the alleviation of suffering (Douzinas 2007b).24 For all the repeated urgings for the expansion of its boundaries, to repair the various denials of exteriority, totality, it seems, is little affected.25 How, therefore, do we account for the constant supply of suffering (through the cruelties of the world) that continues to move the demand for suffering-based thinking (despite these cruelties)? How might the apparent inconsequentiality of so much humanisation in the pervasiveness of inhumanity demand our critical self-reflection as we engage in the politics of hope? We make a huge assumption - we who theorise alleviatory possibilities out of the suffering condition - that our faith systems are true to the promises proclaimed. With this assumption, we attempt to think our way out of (continuing) betrayals to enable the realisation of promises we wish to believe in. Good promises they seemingly are: the promise to eliminate poverty; to end starvation; to realise education for all; the list goes on. We ask the question, what prevents the realisation of these promises? What might enable the realisation of these promises? How much more resources? What kind of political institutions? With so many questions, and perhaps 21 to assuage our faith in the consequentiality of our thoughts, follows the so many ‘should’-assertions that crowd our repeated redesigns for Humanity – that the world community should respond to suffering; should expend the necessary (miniscule) resources that would alleviate chronic deprivation; should redress prevailing inequalities and injustices within the global economic order; should prioritise human rights in world trade and economic relations, should enforce legal regimes to hold transnational corporations responsible, should reform and democratise international institutions, the list, again, goes on. As do, notwithstanding all of these manifold ‘shoulds’, the ways of the world in which betrayals remain the normalities of business-as-usual (Robinson and Tormey 2009).

<h4>Their unique process of working within the university is bad -- it causes the appropriation of suffering and prevents successful movements </h4><p>Jayan <strong>Nayar 13</strong>, PhD from the University of Cambridge and Department of Law at the University of Warwick, February 2013, “The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-The-World: Thinking Exteriority,” Law and Critique Volume 24 Issue 1, gz</p><p>People suffer.17 This is a simple truth that takes little effort to state. <u><strong>Neither does the analysis of structures, of processes, of histories, of suffering require any accountable engagement on our part with suffering bodies</u></strong> (save perhaps in our field-work phase of enquiry as we seek data) <u><strong>nor with any of the vectors of violence whose complex intersections in historical time give material, embodied content to what we, in distance, name suffering</u></strong>. Put differently, <u><strong>the <mark>suffering</mark> condition <mark>when appropriated for</mark> the purposes of <mark>theory possesses no experiential meaning</mark>. Whilst <mark>lip service is paid to </mark>‘voices of <mark>suffering’</mark>, voices as such are absented of experiential truth or ontological-political significance in any objectification of suffering as condition; <mark>voices are retained</mark> instead</u></strong> (perhaps, again, through the inclusion of some choice quotes of wretchedness, accumulated as data from the field) <u><strong><mark>as theory’s justificatory launch-pads for intervention</mark>. <mark>At no point</mark>, for most of us theorists, <mark>is the suffering voice the voice of theory</mark>.</u></strong> Indeed, as Gayatri Spivak (1988) so trenchantly affirmed, <u><strong>the ‘subaltern cannot speak’!</u></strong>18 <u><strong><mark>The politics of </mark>discoursing <mark>suffering</mark> therefore <mark>is a politics of the theorist</mark>, suffering a problem <mark>to be solved by the theorist</mark>, <mark>where prescription is divorced from experience</mark>, <mark>theory from the relationality of violence and</mark> its <mark>local</mark>, day-to-day, normal and norm-alised <mark>infliction</mark>.</u></strong> At best, <u><strong><mark>those that suffer</mark>, are invited to <mark>await the trickle-down of whatever</mark> benign <mark>‘solution’ theory may</mark> purport to <mark>offer</mark>, <mark>post</mark> its lengthy <mark>journeys through intellectual</mark> and policy <mark>interrogations</mark>, as suffering is validated (or otherwise), its structural causation identified (or otherwise), its alleviation interrogated for many a disputed appropriateness of response (or otherwise).</u></strong>19 Having served the purpose of instigating theory <u><strong><mark>suffering</mark> itself <mark>becomes secondary to the</mark> politics of the ‘theorist/<mark>philosopher’</mark> – <mark>the ‘Self’ thinking for the suffering</mark> <mark>Other - of imperial recognition, response and intervention</u></strong></mark>.20 <u><strong>Thus are offered rationalised solutions to the problem of the suffering condition, as if some ideal may indeed be redeemed and made ‘real’ from the incomplete actual of the present, laying as it were, immanent, latent, awaiting (re)discovery. <mark>The theorist becomes the technician</mark>, the <mark>expert</mark> wielder <mark>of knowledge</mark> and strategic wisdom, <mark>to overcome</mark> the problem of <mark>suffering</mark>, perceived as one of inadequate social cognition, institutional organisation and planning.</u></strong> Thus, for example, <u><strong>suffering, as human rights violations becomes the result of inadequate understanding of rights-scope and obligations</u></strong> (Craven 2007; Alston and Quinn 1987), <u><strong>or of the conceptual essence of rights itself, or of the allocation of resources</u></strong>.21 Or, to refer to another example of theory-talk (where the legacy of Levinas is apparent), <u><strong>suffering, as global injustice, becomes a problem of reformulating political affinities within the new meta-game of globalisation as methodological cosmopolitanism</u></strong> (Beck 2005),22 <u><strong>towards ‘global citizenship’ to overcome the limits of anachronistic notions of political identities and responsibilities</u></strong> (Dower and Williams 2002), <u><strong>of ‘social connection models</u></strong> (Young 2006), or of the ‘ethics of assistance’ (Chatterjee 2004), or of cosmopolitan care, responsibility, and the politics of redistribution and institutional reform (Pogge 2008). In these examples of discoursing suffering, <u><strong>thinking <mark>suffering</mark> and its alleviation, true to the ‘problem of the passage’</u></strong> in Levinasian thought (Wolcher 2003),23 <u><strong><mark>becomes rational work, and the technocratic</mark>, even <mark>bureaucratic, measuring of suffering</mark> and its</u></strong> (appropriate) <u><strong>responses becomes the practical implication of theory</u></strong>; the <u><strong>constant fluctuations of betrayals and aspirations, always with some justification close at hand, only serving to further <mark>entrench</mark> the <mark>Levinasian</mark> injunction to <mark>responsibility</mark> - for further endeavours of thinking-hope, <mark>to</mark> further <mark>serve the cause of salvation for</mark> the lost souls of ‘<mark>strangers’</mark>,</u></strong> as Wheeler (2000) so poignantly put it. <u><strong><mark>Suffering</mark>, as condition, <mark>as commodity to be exploited</mark>, as <mark>depoliticised</mark> category rather than <mark>experience, as a technical/bureaucratic</mark>/managerial <mark>problem</mark> to be solved, <mark>remains</mark> therefore <mark>the</mark> ever-present <mark>alibi for</mark> legitimate <mark>interventions</mark> amidst constant (and inevitable) disappointments. <mark>A</mark> corrupt, <mark>violent, imperial</mark>, global <mark>order(ing) of social relations becomes</mark> also <mark>the saviour</mark>, constantly revitalised and called unto renewed being, <mark>with every call for the alleviation of suffering</u></strong></mark> (Douzinas 2007b).24 For all the repeated urgings for the expansion of its boundaries, to repair the various denials of exteriority, totality, it seems, is little affected.25 <u><strong>How</u></strong>, therefore, <u><strong>do we account for the constant supply of suffering </u></strong>(through the cruelties of the world) <u><strong>that continues to move the demand for suffering-based thinking</u></strong> (despite these cruelties)? How might the apparent inconsequentiality of so much humanisation in the pervasiveness of inhumanity demand our critical self-reflection as we engage in the politics of hope? <u><strong>We make a huge assumption - we who theorise alleviatory possibilities out of the suffering condition - that our faith systems are true to the promises proclaimed</u></strong>. With this assumption, <u><strong>we attempt to think our way out of (continuing) betrayals to enable the realisation of promises we wish to believe in.</u></strong> Good promises they seemingly are: the promise to eliminate poverty; to end starvation; to realise education for all; the list goes on. We ask the question, what prevents the realisation of these promises? What might enable the realisation of these promises? How much more resources? What kind of political institutions? <u><strong><mark>With so many</mark> <mark>questions</mark>, and perhaps </u></strong>21 <u><strong><mark>to assuage</mark> our <mark>faith</mark> in the consequentiality of <mark>our thoughts</mark>, <mark>follow</mark>s the so many ‘<mark>should’-assertions</mark> <mark>that</mark> <mark>crowd our repeated redesigns for Humanity</mark> – that <mark>the world</mark> community <mark>should respond to suffering</mark>; <mark>should expend</mark> the necessary</u></strong> (miniscule) <u><strong><mark>resources</mark> that would alleviate chronic deprivation; <mark>should</mark> <mark>redress</mark> prevailing <mark>inequalities</mark> and injustices within the global economic order; should prioritise human rights in world trade and economic relations, <mark>should enforce legal regimes</mark> to hold transnational corporations responsible, <mark>should</mark> reform and <mark>democratise</mark> international <mark>institutions</mark>, <mark>the list,</mark> again, <mark>goes on</mark>. As do, notwithstanding all of these manifold ‘shoulds’, <mark>the ways of the world</mark> in which betrayals <mark>remain the normalities of business-as-usual</u></strong></mark> (Robinson and Tormey 2009).</p>

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AT Sawchuck -- Suffering Reps Good

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1AC - Marijuana Prison Reform 1NC - Marijuana Word PIC University K 2NC - University K 1NR - University K 2NR - University K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round2.docx

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Specifically, US prohibition undermines global implementation of AIDS harm-reduction policies

Csete 10, professor of Clinic Population and Family Health at Columbia University’s Mailman Public Health School, with Richard Parker and Nancy Worthington, Rethinking the War on Drugs: The Impact of US Drug Control Policy on Global Public Health, March, http://www.mailman.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/rethinking-the-war-on-drugs.pdf

Joanne Csete 10, professor of Clinic Population and Family Health at Columbia University’s Mailman Public Health School, with Richard Parker and Nancy Worthington, Rethinking the War on Drugs: The Impact of US Drug Control Policy on Global Public Health, March, http://www.mailman.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/rethinking-the-war-on-drugs.pdf

with the emergence of the HIV epidemic¶ health experts highlighted the need for risk-reduction to take precedence over criminal approaches to the¶ problem of drug dependency. social and behavioral research provided an unprecedented level of scientific evidence for the effectiveness of harm reduction services it seemed reasonable to assume that¶ the harm reduction approaches would be adopted, and that the¶ unprecedented scale-up of HIV services would, in turn,¶ force a rethinking of the global war on drugs that¶ impeded access to HIV services and pressed hundreds¶ of thousands into institutions where no such services¶ were available. ¶ Yet any review of global policy debates over the course¶ of the past decade would have to conclude that the¶ results have been far more ambiguous In 2003, at the mid-term review of¶ the UNGASS on drugs, the focus seemed to have reverted back to prohibition, nothing has been more important than the policy positions promoted and defended internationally by the US government all observers agree that ¶ the US has been at the center of most of the major decisions and activities driving international drug policy and US policies related to drugs have largely determined drug control practices globally. Even in the wake of the¶ global HIV and AIDS epidemic, US commitment to the war on drugs has been one of the central factors underlying resistance to the adoption of more¶ scientifically-informed policies grounded in¶ public health approaches to disease prevention There can be no doubt that the policies pursued by Bush are¶ among the most important factors that have shaped the¶ development of international drug policy debates over¶ the course of the past decade

with the emergence of HIV epidemic experts highlighted the need for risk-reduction to take precedence over criminal approaches to drug dependency research provided an unprecedented level of evidence for the effectiveness of harm reduction In 2003, at the UNGASS the focus seemed to have reverted back to prohibition nothing has been more important than the positions promoted by the US US policies have determined practices globally US commitment to the war on drugs has been the central factor underlying resistance to health approaches to disease

During the closing years of the 20th century,¶ particularly with the emergence of the HIV epidemic¶ and a growing awareness of the role of injection drug¶ use and needle sharing in driving this epidemic in¶ many countries outside sub-Saharan Africa public¶ health experts highlighted the need for risk-reduction to take precedence over criminal approaches to the¶ problem of drug dependency. A significant increase in¶ social and behavioral research carried out in response¶ to HIV and AIDS in the late 1980s and the early 1990s¶ provided an unprecedented level of scientific evidence for the effectiveness of harm reduction services, such¶ as medication-assisted drug dependence treatment,¶ needle exchange, and safer injection facilities, in¶ improving the health of drug users without increasing¶ levels of drug use,* As evidence for the effectiveness of¶ such measures in preventing injection-driven HIV¶ infection grew during the late 1990s and into the¶ present decade, it seemed reasonable to assume that¶ the harm reduction approaches grounded in public¶ health principles would be adopted, and that the¶ unprecedented scale-up of HIV services would, in turn,¶ force a rethinking of the global war on drugs that¶ impeded access to HIV services and pressed hundreds¶ of thousands into institutions where no such services¶ were available. ¶ Yet any review of global policy debates over the course¶ of the past decade would have to conclude that the¶ results have been far more ambiguous than might have¶ been expected. At best, the international community¶ seems to have oscillated between reaffirmation of the¶ drug war mentality and relatively timid steps in the¶ direction of public health approaches. If we open the¶ timeframe of our analysis to include the 1998 20a¶ United Nations General Assembly Special Session¶ (UNGASS) on illicit drugs, we find the UN General¶ Assembly committing member states to achieving "a¶ drug-free world."5 The 1998 UNGASS Declaration¶ outlined what it described as a comprehensive global¶ strategy for simultaneously reducing both the supply of¶ and demand for illicit drugs and developed a mandate¶ for the UN International Drug Control Programme¶ (UNDCP) to "develop strategies with a view to¶ eliminating or significantly reducing the illicit¶ cultivation of the coca bush, the cannabis plant and the opium poppy by the year 2008."6 Disappointing those¶ who had hoped for meaningful drug policy reform, it¶ basically reasserted the same goals that had driven the¶ global war on drugs for decades. HIV was¶ unmentioned.¶ Just a few years later, however, at the 2001 UNGASS on¶ HIV and AIDS, an assembly of the same nations seemed¶ to signal a possible shift of emphasis, including harm¶ reduction efforts and access to sterile injecting¶ equipment as part of the stated goals in its Declaration¶ of Commitment.7 In 2003, at the mid-term review of¶ the UNGASS on drugs, the focus seemed to have reverted back to prohibition, with UNODC arguing that¶ important progress had been made on reaching the¶ goals and targets that had been established in 1998 and¶ citing long lists of drug control measures undertaken ¶ by member states in the five years that had passed.8 In¶ June of 2005, the Programme Coordinating Board (PCB), which governs the Joint United Nations¶ Programme on AIDS (UNAIDS), pushed back in the¶ opposite direction, approving a UNAIDS policy position¶ paper, "Intensifying HIV Prevention," that officially¶ affirmed support for needle exchange programs as a¶ key part of the global fight against the epidemic; both¶ the paper and the PCB report approving it, however,¶ explicitly noted that the USA (the largest donor to UNAIDS) could not support needle exchange because it¶ contradicts its domestic drug policies.9 And in 2008, at¶ the ten-year review point for the 1998 UNGASS, which¶ was initiated at the 2008 meeting of the Commission on¶ Narcotic Drugs (CND) in Vienna, the debate seemed to¶ veer back yet again, with the UNODC claiming major¶ successes in the control of coca and opium production¶ and reaffirming the need to place greater emphasis on¶ demand reduction in resource- rich consumer¶ countries.10¶ While a range of complex factors have surely affected¶ the development of these contradictory policy debates,¶ probably nothing has been more important than the policy positions promoted and defended internationally by the US government. Indeed, no¶ matter which side of the debate one comes down on,¶ for or against the war on drugs, all observers agree that ¶ the US has been at the center of most of the major decisions and activities driving international drug policy since its inception more than a century ago, and US policies related to drugs have largely determined drug control practices globally. Even in the wake of the¶ global HIV and AIDS epidemic, US commitment to the war on drugs has been one of the central factors underlying resistance to the adoption of more¶ scientifically-informed policies grounded in¶ contemporary public health approaches to health promotion and disease prevention.¶ The history of US policy in relation to these issues has¶ also been marked by changes over time, as well as by¶ conflicts and differences of opinion that have shifted¶ policy emphasis both within and between different¶ administrations. There can be no doubt, for example,¶ that the policies pursued by the Bush administration,¶ from 2001 to 2009, and the Bush administration's¶ commitment to promoting those policies globally, are¶ among the most important factors that have shaped the¶ development of international drug policy debates over¶ the course of the past decade. Recognizing the¶ importance that US policies have had in shaping¶ responses to drug use globally, and the likelihood that¶ this will continue to be the case in the future, this paper¶ seeks to review the development of US policy on drugs over the course of the past decade, with a primary¶ focus on its relevance for the politics of global public¶ health more broadly. We are particularly interested in¶ looking at the consequences of US policy during the¶ eight years of the Bush administration, from 2001 to¶ 2009, as well as the initial steps taken by the Obama¶ administration, since its inauguration at the start of¶ 2009, in order to assess the potential policy impact of¶ both administrations in relation to the broader context¶ of global public health in the early 21st century.

<h4>Specifically, US prohibition undermines global implementation of AIDS harm-reduction policies</h4><p>Joanne <strong>Csete 10, professor of Clinic Population and Family Health at Columbia University’s Mailman Public Health School, with Richard Parker and Nancy Worthington, Rethinking the War on Drugs: The Impact of US Drug Control Policy on Global Public Health, March, http://www.mailman.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/rethinking-the-war-on-drugs.pdf</p><p></strong>During the closing years of the 20th century,¶ particularly <u><mark>with the emergence of</mark> the <mark>HIV epidemic</mark>¶ </u>and a growing awareness of the role of injection drug¶ use and needle sharing in driving this epidemic in¶ many countries outside sub-Saharan Africa public¶ <u>health <mark>experts highlighted the need for risk-reduction to take precedence over criminal approaches to</mark> the¶ problem of <mark>drug dependency</mark>. </u>A significant increase in¶ <u>social and behavioral <mark>research</u></mark> carried out in response¶ to HIV and AIDS in the late 1980s and the early 1990s¶ <u><mark>provided an unprecedented level of</mark> scientific <mark>evidence for the effectiveness of harm reduction</mark> services</u>, such¶ as medication-assisted drug dependence treatment,¶ needle exchange, and safer injection facilities, in¶ improving the health of drug users without increasing¶ levels of drug use,* As evidence for the effectiveness of¶ such measures in preventing injection-driven HIV¶ infection grew during the late 1990s and into the¶ present decade, <u>it seemed reasonable to assume that¶ the harm reduction approaches</u> grounded in public¶ health principles <u>would be adopted, and that the¶ unprecedented scale-up of HIV services would, in turn,¶ force a rethinking of the global war on drugs that¶ impeded access to HIV services</u> <u>and pressed hundreds¶ of thousands into institutions where no such services¶ were available. ¶ Yet any review of global policy debates over the course¶ of the past decade would have to conclude that the¶ results have been far more ambiguous</u> than might have¶ been expected. At best, the international community¶ seems to have oscillated between reaffirmation of the¶ drug war mentality and relatively timid steps in the¶ direction of public health approaches. If we open the¶ timeframe of our analysis to include the 1998 20a¶ United Nations General Assembly Special Session¶ (UNGASS) on illicit drugs, we find the UN General¶ Assembly committing member states to achieving "a¶ drug-free world."5 The 1998 UNGASS Declaration¶ outlined what it described as a comprehensive global¶ strategy for simultaneously reducing both the supply of¶ and demand for illicit drugs and developed a mandate¶ for the UN International Drug Control Programme¶ (UNDCP) to "develop strategies with a view to¶ eliminating or significantly reducing the illicit¶ cultivation of the coca bush, the cannabis plant and the opium poppy by the year 2008."6 Disappointing those¶ who had hoped for meaningful drug policy reform, it¶ basically reasserted the same goals that had driven the¶ global war on drugs for decades. HIV was¶ unmentioned.¶ Just a few years later, however, at the 2001 UNGASS on¶ HIV and AIDS, an assembly of the same nations seemed¶ to signal a possible shift of emphasis, including harm¶ reduction efforts and access to sterile injecting¶ equipment as part of the stated goals in its Declaration¶ of Commitment.7<u> <mark>In 2003, at the</mark> mid-term review of¶ the <mark>UNGASS</mark> on drugs, <mark>the focus seemed to have reverted back to prohibition</mark>,</u> with UNODC arguing that¶ important progress had been made on reaching the¶ goals and targets that had been established in 1998 and¶ citing long lists of drug control measures undertaken ¶ by member states in the five years that had passed.8 In¶ June of 2005, the Programme Coordinating Board (PCB), which governs the Joint United Nations¶ Programme on AIDS (UNAIDS), pushed back in the¶ opposite direction, approving a UNAIDS policy position¶ paper, "Intensifying HIV Prevention," that officially¶ affirmed support for needle exchange programs as a¶ key part of the global fight against the epidemic; both¶ the paper and the PCB report approving it, however,¶ explicitly noted that the USA (the largest donor to UNAIDS) could not support needle exchange because it¶ contradicts its domestic drug policies.9 And in 2008, at¶ the ten-year review point for the 1998 UNGASS, which¶ was initiated at the 2008 meeting of the Commission on¶ Narcotic Drugs (CND) in Vienna, the debate seemed to¶ veer back yet again, with the UNODC claiming major¶ successes in the control of coca and opium production¶ and reaffirming the need to place greater emphasis on¶ demand reduction in resource- rich consumer¶ countries.10¶ While a range of complex factors have surely affected¶ the development of these contradictory policy debates,¶ probably <u><strong><mark>nothing has been more important</strong> than the</mark> <strong>policy <mark>positions promoted</mark> and defended internationally <mark>by the US</mark> government</u></strong>. Indeed, no¶ matter which side of the debate one comes down on,¶ for or against the war on drugs, <u>all observers agree that ¶ the US has been at the center of most of the major decisions and activities driving international drug policy </u>since its inception more than a century ago, <u>and <mark>US policies</mark> related to drugs <mark>have</mark> <strong>largely <mark>determined</mark> drug control <mark>practices globally</mark>.</u></strong> <u>Even in the wake of the¶ global HIV and AIDS epidemic, <mark>US commitment to the war on drugs has been</mark> one of <mark>the central factor</mark>s <mark>underlying resistance to</mark> the adoption of more¶ scientifically-informed policies grounded in¶ </u>contemporary <u>public <mark>health approaches to</mark> </u>health promotion and <u><mark>disease</mark> prevention</u>.¶ The history of US policy in relation to these issues has¶ also been marked by changes over time, as well as by¶ conflicts and differences of opinion that have shifted¶ policy emphasis both within and between different¶ administrations. <u>There can be no doubt</u>, for example,¶ <u>that the policies pursued by</u> the <u>Bush</u> administration,¶ from 2001 to 2009, and the Bush administration's¶ commitment to promoting those policies globally, <u>are¶ among the most important factors that have shaped the¶ development of international drug policy debates over¶ the course of the past decade</u>. Recognizing the¶ importance that US policies have had in shaping¶ responses to drug use globally, and the likelihood that¶ this will continue to be the case in the future, this paper¶ seeks to review the development of US policy on drugs over the course of the past decade, with a primary¶ focus on its relevance for the politics of global public¶ health more broadly. We are particularly interested in¶ looking at the consequences of US policy during the¶ eight years of the Bush administration, from 2001 to¶ 2009, as well as the initial steps taken by the Obama¶ administration, since its inauguration at the start of¶ 2009, in order to assess the potential policy impact of¶ both administrations in relation to the broader context¶ of global public health in the early 21st century.</p>

1AC Kentucky

Advantage -- UN

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Kentucky-Round2.docx

A

Kentucky

2

Northwestern CS

Glinecki

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Afghan instability causes nuclear war

Carafano 10

Carafano 10

We can expect similar results if Obama’s Afghan strategy fails Most forget that throwing Vietnam to the wolves made the world far more dangerous Soviets saw it as a sign that America was in decline. They abetted military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America They went on a nuclear-arms spending spree. They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax to kill the world several times over terrorism came into fashion he world will get a lot less safe. Al-Qaida would be back in the game terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India triggering a nuclear war between the two countries Iran and North Korea could shift their nuclear programs into overdrive selling their nuclear weapons Their nervous neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own The resulting nuclear arms race could be far more dangerous than the Cold War’s the world would look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances snowballed into a very big, tragic war Russia, China and Venezuela would rethink their strategic calculus That could produce all kinds of serious regional challenges for the United States Our allies might rethink things as well NATO might well fall apart

We can expect if Afghan fails a nuclear spending spree to kill the world several times over Al-Qaida would be back in the game triggering a nuclear war , Iran and Korea could shift nuclear programs into overdrive The resulting arms race could be far more dangerous the world would snowball into a big, tragic war Russia, China and Venezuela would challenge the U S NATO might fall apart

James Jay is a senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage Foundation and directs its Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, “Con: Obama must win fast in Afghanistan or risk new wars across the globe,” Jan 2 http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/jan/02/con-obama-must-win-fast-afghanistan-or-risk-new-wa/ We can expect similar results if Obama’s Afghan strategy fails and he opts to cut and run. Most forget that throwing South Vietnam to the wolves made the world a far more dangerous place. The Soviets saw it as an unmistakable sign that America was in decline. They abetted military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America. They went on a conventional- and nuclear-arms spending spree. They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax to kill the world several times over. State-sponsorship of terrorism came into fashion. Osama bin Laden called America a “paper tiger.” If we live down to that moniker in Afghanistan, odds are the world will get a lot less safe. Al-Qaida would be back in the game. Regional terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India—potentially triggering a nuclear war between the two countries. Sensing a Washington in retreat, Iran and North Korea could shift their nuclear programs into overdrive, hoping to save their failing economies by selling their nuclear weapons and technologies to all comers. Their nervous neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own. The resulting nuclear arms race could be far more dangerous than the Cold War’s two-bloc standoff. With multiple, independent, nuclear powers cautiously eyeing one another, the world would look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances snowballed into a very big, tragic war. The list goes on. There is no question that countries such as Russia, China and Venezuela would rethink their strategic calculus as well. That could produce all kinds of serious regional challenges for the United States. Our allies might rethink things as well. Australia has already hiked its defense spending because it can’t be sure the United States will remain a responsible security partner. NATO might well fall apart. Europe could be left with only a puny EU military force incapable of defending the interests of its nations.

<h4>Afghan instability causes <u>nuclear war</h4><p></u><strong>Carafano 10</strong> </p><p>James Jay is a senior research fellow for national security at The Heritage Foundation and directs its Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, “Con: Obama must win fast in Afghanistan or risk new wars across the globe,” Jan 2 http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/jan/02/con-obama-must-win-fast-afghanistan-or-risk-new-wa/</p><p><u><strong><mark>We can expect</mark> similar results <mark>if </mark>Obama’s <mark>Afghan </mark>strategy <mark>fails </u></strong></mark>and he opts to cut and run. <u><strong>Most forget that throwing </u></strong>South <u><strong>Vietnam to the wolves made the world </u></strong>a <u><strong>far more dangerous </u></strong>place. The <u><strong>Soviets saw it as a</u></strong>n unmistakable <u><strong>sign that America was in decline. They abetted</u></strong> <u><strong>military incursions in Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and Latin America</u></strong>. <u><strong>They went on <mark>a</mark> </u></strong>conventional- and <u><strong><mark>nuclear</mark>-arms <mark>spending spree</mark>. They stockpiled enough smallpox and anthrax <mark>to kill the world several times over</u></strong></mark>. State-sponsorship of <u><strong>terrorism came into fashion</u></strong>. Osama bin Laden called America a “paper tiger.” If we live down to that moniker in Afghanistan, odds are t<u><strong>he world will get a lot less safe. <mark>Al-Qaida would be back in the game</u></strong></mark>. Regional <u><strong>terrorists would go after both Pakistan and India</u></strong>—potentially <u><strong><mark>triggering a nuclear war </mark>between the two countries</u></strong>. Sensing a Washington in retreat<mark>, <u><strong>Iran and </mark>North <mark>Korea could shift </mark>their <mark>nuclear programs into overdrive</u></strong></mark>, hoping to save their failing economies by <u><strong>selling their nuclear weapons</u></strong> and technologies to all comers. <u><strong>Their nervous neighbors would want nuclear arms of their own</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>The resulting </mark>nuclear <mark>arms race could be far more dangerous</mark> than the Cold War’s</u></strong> two-bloc standoff. With multiple, independent, nuclear powers cautiously eyeing one another, <u><strong><mark>the world would</mark> look a lot more like Europe in 1914, when precarious shifting alliances <mark>snowball</mark>ed <mark>into a </mark>very <mark>big, tragic war</u></strong></mark>. The list goes on. There is no question that countries such as <u><strong><mark>Russia, China and Venezuela would</mark> rethink their strategic calculus</u></strong> as well. <u><strong>That could produce all kinds of serious regional <mark>challenge</mark>s for <mark>the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong>. <u><strong>Our allies might rethink things as well</u></strong>. Australia has already hiked its defense spending because it can’t be sure the United States will remain a responsible security partner. <u><strong><mark>NATO might</mark> well <mark>fall apart</u></strong></mark>. Europe could be left with only a puny EU military force incapable of defending the interests of its nations.</p>

1AC UNLV

Advantage -- UN

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

A

Wake

1

George Washington TT

DStout

1AC - MJ - UN and OAS 1NC - Cap Treaties DA Treaties and CEA CP 2NC - Cap 1NR - Cap 2NR - Cap

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Pot on the ballot could save the dems

Mishak 14

Michael Mishak, staff, “Florida Democrats Hope Medical Pot Measure Will Boost Voter Turnout,” PBS NEWSHOUR, 4—14—14, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/florida-democrats-hope/, accessed 9-5-14.

Democrats see the question of whether to it’s particularly popular among young voters – a critical part of the Democratic coalition both Washington and Colorado saw spikes in youth turnout when marijuana initiatives//// were on the ballot It’s a smart move on the Democrats’ part It’s going to help them The marijuana initiative may be one bright spot for Democrats in an election year that could be grim for the party could have a marginal impact, and a marginal impact in Florida could be the difference between winning and losing.” Democrats say the ot measure could help counter Republican energy by motivating young and independent voters

Democrats see the question of whether to t’s particularly popular among young voters – a critical part of the Democratic coalition both Washington and Colorado saw spikes in youth turnout when marijuana initiatives//// were on the ballo It’s a smart move on the Democrats’ part It’s going to help them marijuana initiative may be one bright spot for Democrats in an election year that could be grim for the party could have a impact in Florida could be the difference between winning and losing.” Democrats say the measure could help counter Republican energy by motivating young and independent voters

Democrats in the nation’s largest swing-state see the question of whether to legalize medical marijuana as a rare source of hope and high voter turnout in this year’s midterm elections. Party operatives are pushing a constitutional amendment that would make Florida the first state in the South to legalize some pot use. Polls show the measure has widespread public support, and it’s particularly popular among young voters – a critical part of the Democratic coalition with historically weak turnout in non-presidential election years. “I wish that it didn’t take medical marijuana on the ballot to motivate our young voters to go and vote because there’s far too much at stake for them and their children,” said Ana Cruz, former executive director of the Florida Democratic Party. “But listen, we’ll take it any way we can get it.” At stake is the Florida governor’s office, as well as a handful of competitive House seats. But the nation’s political world will be watching Florida’s turnout in November for clues to whether pot on the ballot could draw young people to the polls. In 2012, both Washington and Colorado saw spikes in youth turnout when marijuana initiatives//// were on the ballot. This year, Florida could be a critical test case for whether those increases were an anomaly or the start of a trend in advance of the presidential election in 2016, when activists plan to launch legalization campaigns in at least six states, including battleground Nevada. “It’s a smart move on the Democrats’ part,” said David Flaherty, a Colorado-based GOP pollster. “It’s going to help them, no doubt about it.” The marijuana initiative may be one bright spot for Democrats in an election year that could be grim for the party. President Barack Obama remains unpopular, and Republicans are trying to make the elections a referendum on his health care law. Gov. Rick Scott is making the health care overhaul a central issue in the governor’s race and outside conservative groups, such as Americans for Prosperity, are funding a barrage of negative ads against Democrats in a handful of swing-voting House districts. “I would rather have it on the ballot than not,” said Steve Schale, a Democratic consultant who managed Obama’s Florida campaign in 2008. “It could have a marginal impact, and a marginal impact in Florida could be the difference between winning and losing.” A Republican victory in a special House election last month in Florida underscored the Democrats’ turnout problem. The St. Petersburg-area district has 2.4 percent more registered Republicans than Democrats, but GOP voters outnumbered Democrats by 8 percentage points among those who cast ballots. While far from a cure-all, Democrats say the medical pot measure could help counter Republican energy by motivating young and independent voters. According to a national survey sponsored by George Washington University last month, nearly 40 percent of likely voters said they would be “much more likely” to vote if a legalization measure was on the ballot, with another 30 percent saying they would be “somewhat” more likely to vote.

<h4>Pot on the ballot could save the dems</h4><p>Michael <strong>Mishak</strong>, staff, “Florida Democrats Hope Medical Pot Measure Will Boost Voter Turnout,” PBS NEWSHOUR, 4—14—<strong>14</strong>, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/florida-democrats-hope/, accessed 9-5-14.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Democrats</mark> </u></strong>in the nation’s largest swing-state <u><strong><mark>see the question of whether to </u></strong></mark>legalize medical marijuana as a rare source of hope and high voter turnout in this year’s midterm elections. Party operatives are pushing a constitutional amendment that would make Florida the first state in the South to legalize some pot use. Polls show the measure has widespread public support, and <u><strong>i<mark>t’s particularly popular among young voters – a critical part of the Democratic coalition</mark> </u></strong>with historically weak turnout in non-presidential election years. “I wish that it didn’t take medical marijuana on the ballot to motivate our young voters to go and vote because there’s far too much at stake for them and their children,” said Ana Cruz, former executive director of the Florida Democratic Party. “But listen, we’ll take it any way we can get it.” At stake is the Florida governor’s office, as well as a handful of competitive House seats. But the nation’s political world will be watching Florida’s turnout in November for clues to whether pot on the ballot could draw young people to the polls. In 2012,<u><strong> <mark>both Washington and Colorado saw spikes in youth turnout when marijuana initiatives//// were on the ballo</mark>t</u></strong>. This year, Florida could be a critical test case for whether those increases were an anomaly or the start of a trend in advance of the presidential election in 2016, when activists plan to launch legalization campaigns in at least six states, including battleground Nevada. “<u><strong><mark>It’s a smart move on the Democrats’ part</u></strong></mark>,” said David Flaherty, a Colorado-based GOP pollster. “<u><strong><mark>It’s going to help them</u></strong></mark>, no doubt about it.” <u><strong>The <mark>marijuana initiative may be one bright spot for Democrats in an election year that could be grim for the party</u></strong></mark>. President Barack Obama remains unpopular, and Republicans are trying to make the elections a referendum on his health care law. Gov. Rick Scott is making the health care overhaul a central issue in the governor’s race and outside conservative groups, such as Americans for Prosperity, are funding a barrage of negative ads against Democrats in a handful of swing-voting House districts. “I would rather have it on the ballot than not,” said Steve Schale, a Democratic consultant who managed Obama’s Florida campaign in 2008. “It <u><strong><mark>could have a</mark> marginal impact, and a marginal <mark>impact in Florida could be the difference between winning and losing.” </u></strong></mark>A<u><strong> </u></strong>Republican victory in a special House election last month in Florida underscored the Democrats’ turnout problem. The St. Petersburg-area district has 2.4 percent more registered Republicans than Democrats, but GOP voters outnumbered Democrats by 8 percentage points among those who cast ballots. While far from a cure-all, <u><strong><mark>Democrats say the</mark> </u></strong>medical p<u><strong>ot <mark>measure could help counter Republican energy by motivating young and independent voters</u></strong></mark>. According to a national survey sponsored by George Washington University last month, nearly 40 percent of likely voters said they would be “much more likely” to vote if a legalization measure was on the ballot, with another 30 percent saying they would be “somewhat” more likely to vote.</p>

1NR

Counterplan

1NR – Link Wall

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx

N

Kentucky

4

Emory KS

Kallmeyer, Kevin

1AC - Cannabis Exchange 1NC - Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) Mexico DA Security K Reeferendum CP 2NC - Reeferendum CP and Security K 1NR - Midterms DA

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No impact to trade –

<h4>No impact to trade – </h4>

1NC

1NC WTO

AT: Impact – Trade War

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N

Kentucky

7

Georgetown EK

Box, Brian

1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K

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Hemp production solves deforestation

Winterborne 12 – director at Esoteric Hydroponics

Winterborne 12 – director at Esoteric Hydroponics

Deforestation is a major threat. Hemp¶ is an outstanding substitute for wood¶ in the paper industry as it is an¶ extremely fast growing and renewable¶ crop One¶ hectare of hemp yields the equivalent¶ volume of usable fibre as 3-4 hectares¶ of forest one hectare of¶ industrial hemp preserves 3-4 hectares¶ of forest.¶ growing hemp is a very efficient way of¶ absorbing carbon dioxide, especially¶ if it is used as a means of reducing¶ deforestation.¶ the hemp plant helps to¶ replenish and detoxify the soil; it uses¶ far less fertiliser, fungicides, herbicides¶ or pesticides than other crops. and it¶ needs less amounts of water too.

Hemp is an outstanding substitute for paper industry one hectare of¶ hemp preserves 3-4 hectares¶ of forest. growing hemp is a very efficient way of absorbing carbon dioxide the hemp plant helps to¶ replenish and detoxify the soil

[Jeffrey, 5/1. “Medical Marijuana / Cannabis Cultivation: Trees of Life at the University of London”] Deforestation is a major threat. Hemp¶ is an outstanding substitute for wood¶ in the paper industry as it is an¶ extremely fast growing and renewable¶ crop. Hemp can be harvested every¶ three to four months whereas forests¶ take many years to regenerate. One¶ hectare of hemp yields the equivalent¶ volume of usable fibre as 3-4 hectares¶ of forest. In short, one hectare of¶ industrial hemp preserves 3-4 hectares¶ of forest.¶ The greenhouse effect is very much in¶ the news at the moment. Interestingly.¶ growing hemp is a very efficient way of¶ absorbing carbon dioxide, especially¶ if it is used as a means of reducing¶ deforestation.¶ In addition, the hemp plant helps to¶ replenish and detoxify the soil; it uses¶ far less fertiliser, fungicides, herbicides¶ or pesticides than other crops. and it¶ needs less amounts of water too. Hemp¶ grows well in a variety of climates and¶ conditions as long as they are frost-free¶ tor at least 90 days or more per year.¶ At the very least. hemp makes excellent¶ green manure, especially when used as¶ a rotational crop. Hemp stabilises and¶ enriches the soil and ensures fields are¶ free from weeds negating the needs¶ and costs of herbicides. Its value on¶ this point alone, even if no part of the¶ plant is being utilised is immense. Any¶ additional benefits. be they industrial¶ or monetary, represent a bonus.

<h4><strong>Hemp production solves deforestation </h4><p>Winterborne 12 – director at Esoteric Hydroponics</p><p></strong>[Jeffrey, 5/1. “Medical Marijuana / Cannabis Cultivation: Trees of Life at the University of London”]</p><p><u><strong>Deforestation is a major threat. <mark>Hemp</mark>¶ <mark>is an outstanding substitute for </mark>wood¶ in the <mark>paper industry </mark>as it is an¶ extremely fast growing and renewable¶ crop</u></strong>. Hemp can be harvested every¶ three to four months whereas forests¶ take many years to regenerate. <u><strong>One¶ hectare of hemp yields the equivalent¶ volume of usable fibre as 3-4 hectares¶ of forest</u></strong>. In short, <u><strong><mark>one hectare of¶ </mark>industrial <mark>hemp preserves 3-4 hectares¶ of forest.</mark>¶ </u></strong>The greenhouse effect is very much in¶ the news at the moment. Interestingly.¶ <u><strong><mark>growing hemp is a very efficient way of</mark>¶ <mark>absorbing carbon dioxide</mark>, especially¶ if it is used as a means of reducing¶ deforestation.¶ </u></strong>In addition, <u><strong><mark>the hemp plant helps to¶ replenish and detoxify the soil</mark>; it uses¶ far less fertiliser, fungicides, herbicides¶ or pesticides than other crops. and it¶ needs less amounts of water too.</u></strong> Hemp¶ grows well in a variety of climates and¶ conditions as long as they are frost-free¶ tor at least 90 days or more per year.¶ At the very least. hemp makes excellent¶ green manure, especially when used as¶ a rotational crop. Hemp stabilises and¶ enriches the soil and ensures fields are¶ free from weeds negating the needs¶ and costs of herbicides. Its value on¶ this point alone, even if no part of the¶ plant is being utilised is immense. Any¶ additional benefits. be they industrial¶ or monetary, represent a bonus.</p>

1AC

1AC – Scenario 2

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-UMKC-Round5.docx

A

UMKC

5

SFSU AG

Brian Rubaie

1AC Marijuana Environment 1NC Settlerism K 2NC Settlerism K 1NR Settlerism K 2NR Settlerism K

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Every demand is necessarily exclusionary and that is why we choose none. The only effect the ballot can ever have is to signal a participation in or refusal of the university. We can be in the University not OF it – that answers their “you are here too” argument

ACP 09

ACP 09 Anti-Capital Projects “Anti-Capital Projects: Questions & Answers” Anti-Capital Projects. 11-19-2009. http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/anti-capital-projects/

Why No Demands? First, because anything we might win now would be too insignificant. Countless times past student struggles have worked months and years – striking and occupying buildings and mobilizing thousands upon thousands of people – only to win back half of what they had already lost, a half that was again taken away one or two years later If we set our horizons higher we must realize that nothing short of full-scale insurrection could ever achieve this. And if we were strong enough to bring the existing order tumbling down around us, why would we stop short and settle The process of negotiation – the settlement of demands – is a dangerous one for a movement. It often signals its death We understand that, if we were to become powerful enough, and if we remained steadfast in our refusal of all negotiation or settlement, someone, some group, would step in and begin negotiating for us Once we become a threat, then the bargaining will begin Become a threat first you’ll never become a threat by determining to fight over the crumbs A demand defines those who utter it; it sets the limits of the struggle, determining who is and who is not in solidarity with a given fight. And such demands are, invariably, bound to exclude some party or group This is why we make no demands. Because we want to be in solidarity with all who are oppressed and exploited. We will not say who they are in advance. They will define themselves by rising up and standing with us

Why No Demands? because anything we win would be too insignificant past student struggles have worked years striking and occupying only to win half of what they lost a half that was taken away later we must realize that nothing short of full-scale insurrection could ever achieve this why would we stop short and settle The process of negotiation the settlement of demands is dangerous It signals its death you’ll never become a threat by determining to fight over the crumbs demand defines those who utter it it sets the limits of the struggle determining who is and who is not in solidarity demands are bound to exclude some party or group we make no demands

Why No Demands? First, because anything we might win now would be too insignificant. Countless times past student struggles have worked months and years – striking and occupying buildings and mobilizing thousands upon thousands of people – only to win back half of what they had already lost, a half that was again taken away one or two years later. But in any case, we are as yet far too small to win anything on a scale remotely close to the mildest of demands – a reduction or freeze of student fees, an end to the layoffs and furloughs. Even these demands would mean only a return to the status quo of last year or the year before – inadequate by any but the most cowardly measure. If we set our horizons higher – free education, a maximum salary differential of, for instance, 3 or 5, a university managed by faculty and students and workers – then we must realize, immediately, that nothing short of full-scale insurrection could ever achieve this. And if we were strong enough to bring the existing order tumbling down around us, why would we stop short and settle for the foregoing list? The process of negotiation – the settlement of demands – is a dangerous one for a movement. It often signals its death. We have no illusions about this. We understand that, if we were to become powerful enough, and if we remained steadfast in our refusal of all negotiation or settlement, someone, some group, would step in and begin negotiating for us. There is no avoiding that. Once we become a threat, then the bargaining will begin. If the first or second set of demands seems a worthy terminus, then we have a piece of advice. Become a threat first. You just might win something. But you’ll never become a threat by determining to fight over the crumbs. The whole theory of demands as it currently exists seems to rest upon a fundamental misconception. The demand is never really addressed to the existing powers. They can’t hear us – everyone knows that. And, in any case, they’ve never responded to petitions or requests, only force. The real addressee of the demand is on our side, not theirs. A demand defines those who utter it; it sets the limits of the struggle, determining who is and who is not in solidarity with a given fight. And such demands are, invariably, bound to exclude some party or group. We recognize, of course, that they can be useful in this respect – useful as a means to constitute and unify body in struggle, but this body can only be partial, fragmentary, divided from further support. Some groups attempt to get around this problem by making their demands an eclectic laundry-list, but such solutions always end in absurdity. This is why we make no demands. Because we want to be in solidarity with all who are oppressed and exploited. We will not say who they are in advance. They will define themselves by rising up and standing with us.

<h4>Every demand is necessarily exclusionary and that is why we choose none. The only effect the ballot can ever have is to signal a <u>participation in</u> or <u>refusal of</u> the university. We can be in the University not OF it – that answers their “you are here too” argument</h4><p><strong>ACP 09</strong> Anti-Capital Projects “Anti-Capital Projects: Questions & Answers” Anti-Capital Projects. 11-19-2009. http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/anti-capital-projects/</p><p><u><strong><mark>Why No Demands?</mark> First, <mark>because anything we</mark> might <mark>win</mark> now <mark>would be too insignificant</mark>. Countless times <mark>past student struggles have</mark> <mark>worked</mark> months and <mark>years</mark> – <mark>striking and occupying</mark> buildings and mobilizing thousands upon thousands of people – <mark>only to win</mark> back <mark>half of what</mark> <mark>they</mark> had already <mark>lost</mark>, <mark>a half that was</mark> again <mark>taken away</mark> one or two years <mark>later</u></strong></mark>. But in any case, we are as yet far too small to win anything on a scale remotely close to the mildest of demands – a reduction or freeze of student fees, an end to the layoffs and furloughs. Even these demands would mean only a return to the status quo of last year or the year before – inadequate by any but the most cowardly measure. <u><strong>If we set our horizons higher</u></strong> – free education, a maximum salary differential of, for instance, 3 or 5, a university managed by faculty and students and workers – then <u><strong><mark>we must realize</u></strong></mark>, immediately, <u><strong><mark>that nothing short of full-scale insurrection</mark> <mark>could ever achieve this</mark>. And if we were strong enough to bring the existing order tumbling down around us, <mark>why would we stop short and settle</u></strong></mark> for the foregoing list? <u><strong><mark>The process of negotiation</mark> – <mark>the settlement of demands</mark> – <mark>is</mark> a <mark>dangerous</mark> one for a movement. <mark>It</mark> often <mark>signals its death</u></strong></mark>. We have no illusions about this. <u><strong>We understand that, if we were to become powerful enough, and if we remained steadfast in our refusal of all negotiation or settlement, someone, some group, would step in and begin negotiating for us</u></strong>. There is no avoiding that. <u><strong>Once we become a threat, then the bargaining will begin</u></strong>. If the first or second set of demands seems a worthy terminus, then we have a piece of advice. <u><strong>Become a threat first</u></strong>. You just might win something. But <u><strong><mark>you’ll never become a threat by determining to fight over the crumbs</u></strong></mark>. The whole theory of demands as it currently exists seems to rest upon a fundamental misconception. The demand is never really addressed to the existing powers. They can’t hear us – everyone knows that. And, in any case, they’ve never responded to petitions or requests, only force. The real addressee of the demand is on our side, not theirs. <u><strong>A <mark>demand defines those who utter it</mark>; <mark>it sets the limits of the struggle</mark>, <mark>determining who is and who is not in solidarity</mark> with a given fight. And such <mark>demands are</mark>, invariably, <mark>bound to exclude some party or group</u></strong></mark>. We recognize, of course, that they can be useful in this respect – useful as a means to constitute and unify body in struggle, but this body can only be partial, fragmentary, divided from further support. Some groups attempt to get around this problem by making their demands an eclectic laundry-list, but such solutions always end in absurdity. <u><strong>This is why <mark>we make no demands</mark>. Because we want to be in solidarity with all who are oppressed and exploited. We will not say who they are in advance. They will define themselves by rising up and standing with us</u></strong>. </p>

1NR

Case

A2: Perm -- Do Both

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Cal MS

JJustice

1AC - Marijuana Prison Reform 1NC - Marijuana Word PIC University K 2NC - University K 1NR - University K 2NR - University K

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AIDS causes extinction

Kerns 99

Tom Kerns 99, professor of philosophy, “AIDS and Apocalyptics for Questioning Millennium Madness, http://bioethicscourse.info/aidsite/lec-millemad.html

AIDS is "the number one health problem on this planet." AIDS is the single greatest threat to well-being facing the world's population today. AIDS is "a messenger of apocalyptic change," as it is spread through "one of the most biologically urgent of human behaviors it has become increasingly evident that this pandemic will have profound economic and social implications for both developed and developing countries. The importance of health as an input to the economic development and growth of a country is well established - a healthier population is more productive and has an increased capacity for learning. The adverse impacts of the HIV/AIDS pandemic will undermine improvements in health status and, in turn, reduce the potential for economic growth. AIDS is distinct from other diseases, and its impact can be expected to be quite severe it selectively affects adults in their sexually most active ages, which coincide with their prime productive and reproductive years Whatever else AIDS is, it's not just another disease "We know that HIV is still evolving. Its global spread has meant there is far more HIV on earth today than ever before in history. What are the odds of its learning the tricks of airborne transmission? The short answer is "No one can be sure ven its other ugly attributes, it is hard to imagine a worse threat to humanity than an airborne variant of AIDS the proliferation of AIDS cases with secondary pneumonia [and TB] multiplies the odds of such a mutant, as an analog to the emergence of pneumonic plague." T]he ability of the virus to cause a slow, progressive and permanent infection with permanent infectivity makes it a unique cause of epidemic disease. Thus, with no recovery, no loss of infectivity, no development of either individual or herd immunity, there is no known biological mechanism which can stop the continuing expansion of the disease at present there is no feasible design for such an effective vaccine. HIV can, nly lead to an exponential increase in the number of individuals who will become infected until eventually the majority of the sexually active population will be infected unless interventions are at lease moderately successful.

AIDS is the greatest threat to the world today. HIV/AIDS will undermine improvements in health status and reduce economic growth HIV is evolving. Its global spread has meant there is far earth today What are the odds of airborne transmission? No one can be sure with no recovery no development of either individual or herd immunity present there is no feasible design for an effective vaccine.

The worst threat to humankind AIDS is "the number one health problem on this planet." (C. Everett Koop, former US Surgeon General) "AIDS is the single greatest threat to well-being facing the world's population today." (Marc Lappé) AIDS is "a messenger of apocalyptic change," as it is spread through "one of the most biologically urgent of human behaviors." - Dr June Osborn (former member of the US Presidential Commission on HIV/AIDS, & professor in U Mich SPH) Economic costs are high "Although it is less than a decade since the virus that causes AIDS was discovered, it has become increasingly evident that this pandemic will have profound economic and social implications for both developed and developing countries. The importance of health as an input to the economic development and growth of a country is well established - a healthier population is more productive and has an increased capacity for learning. The adverse impacts of the HIV/AIDS pandemic will undermine improvements in health status and, in turn, reduce the potential for economic growth. AIDS is distinct from other diseases, and its impact can be expected to be quite severe.... Its most critical feature, distinguishing AIDS from other life-threatening and fatal illnesses, such as diarrhea (among children in developing countries) or cancer (among the elderly in developed countries), is that it selectively affects adults in their sexually most active ages, which coincide with their prime productive and reproductive years." - in AIDS in the World, 1992, p 195 (Jill Armstrong is an economist in the Eastern Africa Dept of the World Bank, Washington, DC. Eduard Bos is a demographer in the Population, Health, and Nutrition Division of the World Bank's Population and Human Resources Department.) E. "Whatever else AIDS is, it's not just another disease." (Dr June Osborne, former member of the US Presidential Commission on HIV/AIDS) Features that make AIDS unique: * High morbidity & mortality * Lifelong infectiousness * lengthy asymptomatic stage * highly mutable virus Joshua Lederberg considers the possibility of HIV "learning the tricks of airborne transmission:" "We know that HIV is still evolving. Its global spread has meant there is far more HIV on earth today than ever before in history. What are the odds of its learning the tricks of airborne transmission? The short answer is "No one can be sure." ... [A]s time passes, and HIV seems settled in a certain groove, that is momentary reassurance in itself. However, given its other ugly attributes, it is hard to imagine a worse threat to humanity than an airborne variant of AIDS. No rule of nature contradicts such a possibility; the proliferation of AIDS cases with secondary pneumonia [and TB] multiplies the odds of such a mutant, as an analog to the emergence of pneumonic plague." * effective modes of transmission * destroys the immune system * viral reservoir expanding Dr Barry D Schoub, Director of the National Institute of Virology at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, sums up thus: "[T]he ability of the virus to cause a slow, progressive and permanent infection with permanent infectivity makes it a unique cause of epidemic disease. Thus, with no recovery, no loss of infectivity, no development of either individual or herd immunity, there is no known biological mechanism which can stop the continuing expansion of the disease unless an effective vaccine were to come about, and at present there is no feasible design for such an effective vaccine. The progressive increase in the pool of HIV can, in theory, only lead to an exponential increase in the number of individuals who will become infected until eventually the majority of the sexually active population will be infected unless interventions are at lease moderately successful."

<h4>AIDS causes extinction</h4><p>Tom<strong> Kerns 99</strong>, professor of philosophy, “AIDS and Apocalyptics for Questioning Millennium Madness, http://bioethicscourse.info/aidsite/lec-millemad.html</p><p>The worst threat to humankind <u>AIDS is "the number one health problem on this planet."</u> (C. Everett Koop, former US Surgeon General) "<u><strong><mark>AIDS is the </mark>single <mark>greatest threat to</strong></mark> well-being facing <strong><mark>the world</mark>'s population <mark>today.</u></strong></mark>" (Marc Lappé) <u>AIDS is "a messenger of apocalyptic change," as it is spread through "one of the most biologically urgent of human behaviors</u>." - Dr June Osborn (former member of the US Presidential Commission on HIV/AIDS, & professor in U Mich SPH) Economic costs are high "Although it is less than a decade since the virus that causes AIDS was discovered, <u>it has become increasingly evident that this pandemic will have profound economic and social implications for both developed and developing countries. The importance of health as an input to the economic development and growth of a country is well established - a healthier population is more productive and has an increased capacity for learning. The adverse impacts of the <mark>HIV/AIDS </mark>pandemic <mark>will undermine improvements in health status and</mark>, in turn, <mark>reduce</mark> the potential for <mark>economic growth</mark>. AIDS is distinct from other diseases, and its impact can be expected to be quite severe</u>.... Its most critical feature, distinguishing AIDS from other life-threatening and fatal illnesses, such as diarrhea (among children in developing countries) or cancer (among the elderly in developed countries), is that <u>it selectively affects adults in their sexually most active ages, which coincide with their prime productive and reproductive years</u>." - in AIDS in the World, 1992, p 195 (Jill Armstrong is an economist in the Eastern Africa Dept of the World Bank, Washington, DC. Eduard Bos is a demographer in the Population, Health, and Nutrition Division of the World Bank's Population and Human Resources Department.) E. "<u>Whatever else AIDS is, it's not just another disease</u>." (Dr June Osborne, former member of the US Presidential Commission on HIV/AIDS) Features that make AIDS unique: * High morbidity & mortality * Lifelong infectiousness * lengthy asymptomatic stage * highly mutable virus Joshua Lederberg considers the possibility of HIV "learning the tricks of airborne transmission:" <u>"We know that <mark>HIV is </mark>still <mark>evolving. Its global spread has meant there is far</mark> more HIV on <mark>earth today</mark> than ever before in history. <mark>What are the odds of</mark> its learning the tricks of <strong><mark>airborne transmission</strong>?</mark> The short answer is "<mark>No one can be sure</u></mark>." ... [A]s time passes, and HIV seems settled in a certain groove, that is momentary reassurance in itself. However, gi<u>ven its other ugly attributes, it is hard to imagine a worse threat to humanity than an airborne variant of AIDS</u>. No rule of nature contradicts such a possibility; <u>the proliferation of AIDS cases with secondary pneumonia [and TB] multiplies the odds of such a mutant, as an analog to the emergence of pneumonic plague." </u>* effective modes of transmission * destroys the immune system * viral reservoir expanding Dr Barry D Schoub, Director of the National Institute of Virology at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, sums up thus: "[<u>T]he ability of the virus to cause a slow, progressive and permanent infection with permanent infectivity makes it a unique cause of epidemic disease. Thus, <mark>with no recovery</mark>, no loss of infectivity, <mark>no development of either individual or herd immunity</mark>, there</u> <u>is no known biological mechanism which can stop the continuing expansion of the disease</u> unless an effective vaccine were to come about, and <u>at <mark>present there is no feasible design for</mark> such <mark>an effective vaccine.</mark> </u>The progressive increase in the pool of <u>HIV can,</u> in theory, o<u>nly lead to an exponential increase in the number of individuals who will become infected until eventually the majority of the sexually active population will be infected unless interventions are at lease moderately successful.</u>"</p>

1AC Kentucky

Advantage -- UN

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Kentucky

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Northwestern CS

Glinecki

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Multiple scenarios for nuclear escalation and

Rubin, 11

Rubin, 11 (Joel, Director of Policy and Government Affairs, Ploughshares Fund, former congressional aide and diplomat, fellow at the State Department in both Near Eastern Affairs and Political-Military Affairs, Master’s degree in Public Policy and Business Administration from Carnegie Mellon University and a Bachelor’s degree in Politics from Brandeis University, Huffington Post, 77/2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joel-rubin/middle-east-nuclear-threat_b_891178.html)

underlying sources of conflict and tension will remain In a region that has deep experience on nuclear matters with nuclear aspirant Iran bordering Afghanistan on one side and nuclear-armed Pakistan and India on the other Afghanistan will determine the shape of our security challenges in the region we can't afford nuclear weapons a major security concern justifying our continued involvement in the region potential nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan will remain and may actually rise in importance The key here is to promote regional stability and cooperation, not a power vacuum maintain a stable Afghanistan

underlying sources of conflict and tension will remain In a region that has deep experience on nuclear matters -- with Iran and nuclear-armed Pakistan and India Afghanistan will determine security in the region potential nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan -- will remain and may rise in importance The key here is to promote regional stability , not a power vacuum

The national security calculus of keeping U.S. forces in Afghanistan has shifted. Any gains that we made from keeping 100,000 American soldiers in harm's way are now questionable, especially since al Qaeda has been dealt a significant blow with the killing of Osama bin Laden. President Obama's decision to end the surge by late next year only reinforces this reality. Yet many of the underlying sources of conflict and tension in South and Central Asia will remain after an American withdrawal. In a region that has deep experience on nuclear matters -- with nuclear aspirant Iran bordering Afghanistan on one side and nuclear-armed Pakistan and India on the other -- the United States must take into account the potential for regional nuclear insecurity caused by a poorly executed drawdown in Afghanistan. As much as we may like to, we can't just cut and run. So as the United States draws down its forces, we must take care to leave stable systems and relationships in place; failure to do so could exacerbate historic regional tensions and potentially create new national security risks. It is therefore essential that Washington policymakers create a comprehensive nuclear security strategy for the region as part of its Afghanistan withdrawal plans that lays the groundwork for regional stability. We have only to look to our recent history in the region to understand the importance of this approach. In the 1980s, the U.S. supported the Mujahedeen against the Soviet Union. When that conflict ended, we withdrew, only to see the rise of al Qaeda -- and its resultant international terrorism -- in the 1990s because we didn't pull out responsibly from Afghanistan. Our choices now in Afghanistan will determine the shape of our security challenges in the region for the foreseeable future. And we can't afford for nuclear weapons to become to South and Central Asia in the 21st century what al Qaeda was in the 1990s to Afghanistan. To avoid such an outcome, several key objectives must be included in any Afghanistan withdrawal plan. First, current levels of regional insecurity -- which already are extremely high -- will continue to drive tensions, and quite possibly conflict, amongst the regional powers. Therefore, we must ensure the implementation of a regional approach to military withdrawal. These efforts must bring all relevant regional players to the table, particularly the nuclear and potentially nuclear states. Iran and all the countries bordering Afghanistan must be part of this discussion. Second, the United States must be mindful to not leave a governance vacuum inside Afghanistan. While it is clear that the current counter-insurgency policy being pursued in Afghanistan is not working at a pace that meets either Western or Afghan aspirations, it is still essential that Afghanistan not be allowed to implode. We do not need 100,000 troops to do this, and as the Afghanistan Study Group has recommended, credible political negotiations that emphasize power-sharing and political reconciliation must take place to keep the country intact while the United States moves out. Third, while the rationale for our presence in Afghanistan -- to defeat al Qaeda -- has dissipated, a major security concern justifying our continued involvement in the region -- potential nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan -- will remain and may actually rise in importance. It is crucial that we keep a particularly close eye on these programs to ensure that all is done to prevent the illicit transfer or ill-use of nuclear weapons. Regardless of American troop levels in Afghanistan, the U.S. must maximize its military and intelligence relationships with these countries to continue to both understand their nuclear intentions and help prevent potential conflict. We must avoid a situation where any minor misunderstanding or even terrorist act, as happened in Mumbai in 2008, does not set off escalating tensions that lead to a nuclear exchange. Ultimately, the U.S. will one day leave Afghanistan -- and it may be sooner than anyone expects. The key here is to leave in a way that promotes regional stability and cooperation, not a power vacuum that could foster proxy conflicts. To ensure that our security interests are protected and that the region does not get sucked in to a new level of insecurity and tension, a comprehensive strategy to enhance regional security, maintain a stable Afghanistan, and keep a watchful eye on Pakistan and India is essential. Taking such steps will help us to depart Afghanistan in a responsible manner that protects our security interests, while not exacerbating the deep strategic insecurities of a region that has the greatest risk of arms races and nuclear conflict in the world.

<h4>Multiple scenarios for nuclear escalation and</h4><p><strong>Rubin, 11</strong> (Joel, Director of Policy and Government Affairs, Ploughshares Fund, former congressional aide and diplomat, fellow at the State Department in both Near Eastern Affairs and Political-Military Affairs, Master’s degree in Public Policy and Business Administration from Carnegie Mellon University and a Bachelor’s degree in Politics from Brandeis University, Huffington Post, 77/2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joel-rubin/middle-east-nuclear-threat_b_891178.html)</p><p>The national security calculus of keeping U.S. forces in Afghanistan has shifted. Any gains that we made from keeping 100,000 American soldiers in harm's way are now questionable, especially since al Qaeda has been dealt a significant blow with the killing of Osama bin Laden. President Obama's decision to end the surge by late next year only reinforces this reality. Yet many of the <u><strong><mark>underlying sources of conflict and tension</u></strong></mark> in South and Central Asia <u><strong><mark>will remain</u></strong></mark> after an American withdrawal. <u><strong><mark>In a region that has deep experience on nuclear matters</u></strong></mark> <mark>-- <u><strong>with</mark> nuclear aspirant <mark>Iran</mark> bordering Afghanistan on one side <mark>and nuclear-armed Pakistan and India</mark> on the other</u></strong> -- the United States must take into account the potential for regional nuclear insecurity caused by a poorly executed drawdown in Afghanistan. As much as we may like to, we can't just cut and run. So as the United States draws down its forces, we must take care to leave stable systems and relationships in place; failure to do so could exacerbate historic regional tensions and potentially create new national security risks. It is therefore essential that Washington policymakers create a comprehensive nuclear security strategy for the region as part of its Afghanistan withdrawal plans that lays the groundwork for regional stability. We have only to look to our recent history in the region to understand the importance of this approach. In the 1980s, the U.S. supported the Mujahedeen against the Soviet Union. When that conflict ended, we withdrew, only to see the rise of al Qaeda -- and its resultant international terrorism -- in the 1990s because we didn't pull out responsibly from Afghanistan. Our choices now in <u><strong><mark>Afghanistan will determine</mark> the shape of our <mark>security</mark> challenges <mark>in the region</u></strong></mark> for the foreseeable future. And <u><strong>we can't afford</u></strong> for <u><strong>nuclear weapons</u></strong> to become to South and Central Asia in the 21st century what al Qaeda was in the 1990s to Afghanistan. To avoid such an outcome, several key objectives must be included in any Afghanistan withdrawal plan. First, current levels of regional insecurity -- which already are extremely high -- will continue to drive tensions, and quite possibly conflict, amongst the regional powers. Therefore, we must ensure the implementation of a regional approach to military withdrawal. These efforts must bring all relevant regional players to the table, particularly the nuclear and potentially nuclear states. Iran and all the countries bordering Afghanistan must be part of this discussion. Second, the United States must be mindful to not leave a governance vacuum inside Afghanistan. While it is clear that the current counter-insurgency policy being pursued in Afghanistan is not working at a pace that meets either Western or Afghan aspirations, it is still essential that Afghanistan not be allowed to implode. We do not need 100,000 troops to do this, and as the Afghanistan Study Group has recommended, credible political negotiations that emphasize power-sharing and political reconciliation must take place to keep the country intact while the United States moves out. Third, while the rationale for our presence in Afghanistan -- to defeat al Qaeda -- has dissipated, <u><strong>a major security concern justifying our continued involvement in the region</u></strong> -- <u><strong><mark>potential nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan</u></strong> -- <u><strong>will remain and may</mark> actually <mark>rise in importance</u></strong></mark>. It is crucial that we keep a particularly close eye on these programs to ensure that all is done to prevent the illicit transfer or ill-use of nuclear weapons. Regardless of American troop levels in Afghanistan, the U.S. must maximize its military and intelligence relationships with these countries to continue to both understand their nuclear intentions and help prevent potential conflict. We must avoid a situation where any minor misunderstanding or even terrorist act, as happened in Mumbai in 2008, does not set off escalating tensions that lead to a nuclear exchange. Ultimately, the U.S. will one day leave Afghanistan -- and it may be sooner than anyone expects. <u><strong><mark>The key here is to</u></strong></mark> leave in a way that <u><strong><mark>promote</u></strong></mark>s <u><strong><mark>regional stability</mark> and cooperation<mark>, not a power vacuum</u></strong></mark> that could foster proxy conflicts. To ensure that our security interests are protected and that the region does not get sucked in to a new level of insecurity and tension, a comprehensive strategy to enhance regional security, <u><strong>maintain a stable Afghanistan</u></strong>, and keep a watchful eye on Pakistan and India is essential. Taking such steps will help us to depart Afghanistan in a responsible manner that protects our security interests, while not exacerbating the deep strategic insecurities of a region that has the greatest risk of arms races and nuclear conflict in the world.</p>

1AC UNLV

Advantage -- UN

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Wake

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George Washington TT

DStout

1AC - MJ - UN and OAS 1NC - Cap Treaties DA Treaties and CEA CP 2NC - Cap 1NR - Cap 2NR - Cap

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Yes turnout

Linskey 14

Linskey 14, Annie, Bloomberg reporter, “Poll: Marijuana Legalization Measures Will Drive Voters,” March 25th, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-25/poll-marijuana-legalization-measures-will-drive-voters.html

A majority of Americans favor legalizing marijuana and would be motivated to vote 68 percent are “more likely” to go to their polling place to weigh in on a ballot. Support crosses party lines, though younger and single voters -- who tend to vote for Democrats -- are more motivated

A majority of Americans favor legalizing marijuana and would be motivated to vote 68 percent are “more likely” to go to their polling place to weigh in on a ballot. Support crosses party lines, though younger and single voters

A majority of Americans favor legalizing marijuana and would be motivated to vote if a measure to do so is on the ballot, according to a George Washington University Battleground poll released today. The survey of 1,000 likely voters found 73 percent support allowing marijuana for legal medical purposes, 53 percent favor decriminalization and 68 percent are “more likely” to go to their polling place to weigh in on a ballot. “Marijuana legalization and marijuana decriminalization is at a tipping point” said Celinda Lake, president of Lake Research Partners and one of the two pollsters who conducted the survey. Support crosses party lines, though younger and single voters -- who tend to vote for Democrats -- are more motivated by those issues, she said. Ballot measures on legalizing pot are set for Alaska’s August primary and probably this November in Oregon, according to Allen St. Pierre, the executive director Norml, a Washington-based nonprofit pushing for more access to the drug. Florida will see a decriminalization effort, he said.

<h4>Yes turnout</h4><p><strong>Linskey 14</strong>, Annie, Bloomberg reporter, “Poll: Marijuana Legalization Measures Will Drive Voters,” March 25th, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-25/poll-marijuana-legalization-measures-will-drive-voters.html</p><p><u><strong><mark>A majority of Americans favor legalizing marijuana and would be motivated to vote</u></strong></mark> if a measure to do so is on the ballot, according to a George Washington University Battleground poll released today. The survey of 1,000 likely voters found 73 percent support allowing marijuana for legal medical purposes, 53 percent favor decriminalization and <u><strong><mark>68 percent are “more likely” to go to their polling place to weigh in on a ballot.</mark> </u></strong>“Marijuana legalization and marijuana decriminalization is at a tipping point” said Celinda Lake, president of Lake Research Partners and one of the two pollsters who conducted the survey. <u><strong><mark>Support crosses party lines, though younger and single voters</mark> -- who tend to vote for Democrats -- are more motivated</u></strong> by those issues, she said. Ballot measures on legalizing pot are set for Alaska’s August primary and probably this November in Oregon, according to Allen St. Pierre, the executive director Norml, a Washington-based nonprofit pushing for more access to the drug. Florida will see a decriminalization effort, he said.</p>

1NR

Counterplan

1NR – Link Wall

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Kentucky

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Emory KS

Kallmeyer, Kevin

1AC - Cannabis Exchange 1NC - Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) Mexico DA Security K Reeferendum CP 2NC - Reeferendum CP and Security K 1NR - Midterms DA

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Their epistemology of threat production justifies nuclear lashout to eliminate the threat -- causes extinction

Massumi 07

Massumi 07

Preemption remains the official military strategy of the United States. preemption is an operative logic of power defining a political age one that combines an ontology with an epistemology in such a way as to trace itself out as a self-propelling tendency Preemption is not prevention. Although the goal of both is to neutralize threat, they fundamentally differ Epistemologically, prevention assumes an ability to assess threats empirically and identify their causes. Once the causes are identified, appropriate curative methods are sought Prevention operates in an objectively knowable world in which uncertainty is a function of a lack of information, and in which events run a predictable, linear course from cause to effect. this is very different from the epistemological premise of preemption Deterrence has no margin of error. It must know with certainty because the threat is fully formed and ready to detonate: the enemy has the bomb and the means to deliver it. The imminence of the threat means that deterrence cannot afford to subordinate itself to objects, norms, and criteria passed on to it from other domains. If it did, its ability to respond with an immediacy proportional to the imminence of the threat would be compromised. The only way to have the kind of epistemological immediacy necessary for deterrence is for its process to have its own cause and to hold it fast within itself. The quickest and most direct way for a process to acquire its own cause is for it to produce one. The easiest way to do this is to take the imminence of the very threat prevention has failed to neutralize and make it the foundation of a new process. In other words, the process must take the effect it seeks to avoid (nuclear annihilation) and organize itself around it, as the cause of its very own dynamic ). It must convert an effect that has yet to eventuate into a cause: a future cause. This is much easier to do and much less mysterious than it might sound. You start by translating the threat into a clear and present danger. You do this by acquiring a capability to realize the threat rather than prevent it. If your neighbor has a nuke, you build the nuclear weaponry that would enable you to annihilate the adversary, even at the price of annihilating yourself by precipitating a "nuclear winter." the more capable you are of destroying yourself along with your enemy, the better. You can be certain the enemy will follow your lead Mutually assured destruction is equilibrium-seeking. It tends toward the creation of a "balance of terror." MAD is certainty squared: to the certainty that there is objectively a threat is added the certainty that it is balanced out. You have to keep moving into the dangerous future. You have to race foward it ever faster. You have to build more weapons, faster and better, to be sure that your systems match the lethality of your opponent's The process soon becomes self-driving. The logic of mutually assured destruction becomes its own motor. It becomes self-propelling. Now that you've started, you can't very well stop. What began as an epistemological condition (a certainty about what you and your opponent are capable of doing) dynamizes into an ontology or mode of being (a race for dear life).

Preemption is not prevention Epistemologically, prevention assumes an ability to assess threats Prevention operates in an knowable world in uncertainty is a lack of information, The quickest way for a process to acquire its own cause is for it to produce one , the process must take the effect it seeks to avoid (nuclear annihilation) and organize itself around it, as the cause of its very own dynamic by translating the threat into a clear and present danger. you build the nuclear weaponry that would enable you to annihilate the adversary, even at the price of annihilating yourself the enemy will follow your lead You to race foward it ever faster. build more weapons, faster The logic of mutually assured destruction becomes its own motor. It becomes self-propelling.

Brian, Communication Department of the Université de Montréal, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/ v010/10.2massumi.html, “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption” It is certain that there will be adjustments. But it should be remembered that Bush referred to a change in "tactics," not a change in "strategy." Preemption remains the official military strategy of the United States. It can be argued that preemption is in any case far more than a specific military doctrine of a particular administration. It can be plausibly argued that preemption is an operative logic of power defining a political age in as infinitely space-filling and insiduously infiltrating a way as the logic of "deterrence" defined the Cold War era. By an "operative" logic I mean one that combines an ontology with an epistemology in such a way as to trace itself out as a self-propelling tendency that is not in the sway of any particular existing formation but sweeps across them all and where possible sweeps them up in its own dynamic. Preemption is not prevention. Although the goal of both is to neutralize threat, they fundamentally differ epistemologically and ontologically. Epistemologically, prevention assumes an ability to assess threats empirically and identify their causes. Once the causes are identified, appropriate curative methods are sought to avoid their realization. Prevention operates in an objectively knowable world in which uncertainty is a function of a lack of information, and in which events run a predictable, linear course from cause to effect. As we will see, this is very different from the epistemological premise of preemption, and entails a divergence from it on the ontological level as well. Prevention, in fact, has no ontology of its own because it assumes that what it must deal with has an objectively given existence prior to its own intervention. In practice, this means that its object is given to it predefined by other formations, in whose terms and on whose terrain it must then operate. A preventive approach to social conflict might analyze it, for example, as an effect of poverty, objectively quantifiable in terms of economic and health indexes. Each index is defined by a specialist formation (economics, medicine) in relation to a norm specific to that domain and against which goals may be set and success measured (annual income, mortality rates, life expectancy, etc.). The preventive measures will then operate as a political extension of the concerned specialist domains (economic analysis extended into politics as aid and development, medicine extended into vaccination programs, etc.). They will be regulated by the specialist logics proper to those fields. Prevention has no proper object, no operational sphere of its own, and no proprietary logic. It is derivative. It is a means toward a given end. Because of this, preventive measures are not self-sustaining. They must be applied. They must be leveraged from an outside source with outside force. They are not an organizing force in their own right. They run on borrowed power. Deterrence takes over at the end of this same process, when the means of prevention have failed. Deterrence makes use of the same epistemology prevention does, in that it assumes knowability and objective measurability. However, because it starts where prevention ends, it has no margin of error. It must know with certainty because the threat is fully formed and ready to detonate: the enemy has the bomb and the means to deliver it. The imminence of the threat means that deterrence cannot afford to subordinate itself to objects, norms, and criteria passed on to it from other domains. If it did, its ability to respond with an immediacy proportional to the imminence of the threat would be compromised. Since it would not hold the key to its own knowledge, in the urgency of the situation it would be haunted internally by the spectre of a possible incompleteness of the knowledge coming from the outside. Since its operations would be mediated by that outside domain, neither would it hold a direct key to its own actions. Since it would be responding to causes outside its specific purview, it would not be master of its own effects. The only way to have the kind of epistemological immediacy necessary for deterrence is for its process to have its own cause and to hold it fast within itself. The quickest and most direct way for a process to acquire its own cause is for it to produce one. The easiest way to do this is to take the imminence of the very threat prevention has failed to neutralize and make it the foundation of a new process. In other words, the process must take the effect it seeks to avoid (nuclear annihilation) and organize itself around it, as the cause of its very own dynamic (deterrence). It must convert an effect that has yet to eventuate into a cause: a future cause. Past causes are in any case already spoken for. They have been claimed as objects of knowledge and operational spheres by a crowded world of other already-functioning formations. Now for a future cause to have any palpable effect it must somehow be able act on the present. This is much easier to do and much less mysterious than it might sound. You start by translating the threat into a clear and present danger. You do this by acquiring a capability to realize the threat rather than prevent it. If your neighbor has a nuke, you build the nuclear weaponry that would enable you to annihilate the adversary, even at the price of annihilating yourself by precipitating a "nuclear winter." In fact, the more capable you are of destroying yourself along with your enemy, the better. You can be certain the enemy will follow your lead in acquiring the capability to annihilate you, and themselves as well. The imminent threat is then so imminent on both sides, so immediately present in its menacing futurity, that only a madman or suicidal regime would ever tip the balance and press the button. This gives rise to a unique logic of mutuality: "mutually assured destruction" (MAD). Mutually assured destruction is equilibrium-seeking. It tends toward the creation of a "balance of terror." MAD is certainty squared: to the certainty that there is objectively a threat is added the certainty that it is balanced out. The second certainty is dynamic, and requires maintenance. The assurance must be maintained by continuing to producing the conditions that bring the cause so vividly into the present. You have to keep moving into the dangerous future. You have to race foward it ever faster. You have to build more weapons, faster and better, to be sure that your systems match the lethality of your opponent's, give or take a few half-lives. The process soon becomes self-driving. The logic of mutually assured destruction becomes its own motor. It becomes self-propelling. Now that you've started, you can't very well stop. What began as an epistemological condition (a certainty about what you and your opponent are capable of doing) dynamizes into an ontology or mode of being (a race for dear life).

<h4>Their epistemology of threat production justifies nuclear lashout to eliminate the threat -- causes extinction </h4><p><strong><mark>Massumi 07</strong></mark> </p><p>Brian, Communication Department of the Université de Montréal, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/ v010/10.2massumi.html, “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption”</p><p>It is certain that there will be adjustments. But it should be remembered that Bush referred to a change in "tactics," not a change in "strategy." <u><strong>Preemption remains the official military strategy of the United States.</u></strong> It can be argued that preemption is in any case far more than a specific military doctrine of a particular administration. It can be plausibly argued that <u><strong>preemption is an operative logic of power defining a political age</u></strong> in as infinitely space-filling and insiduously infiltrating a way as the logic of "deterrence" defined the Cold War era. By an "operative" logic I mean <u><strong>one that combines an ontology with an epistemology in such a way as to trace itself out as a self-propelling tendency</u></strong> that is not in the sway of any particular existing formation but sweeps across them all and where possible sweeps them up in its own dynamic. <u><strong><mark>Preemption is not prevention</mark>. Although the goal of both is to neutralize threat, they fundamentally differ</u></strong> epistemologically and ontologically. <u><strong><mark>Epistemologically, prevention assumes an ability to assess threats </mark>empirically and identify their causes. Once the causes are identified, appropriate curative methods are sought</u></strong> to avoid their realization. <u><strong><mark>Prevention</mark> <mark>operates</mark> <mark>in an</mark> objectively <mark>knowable world</mark> <mark>in</mark> which <mark>uncertainty</mark> <mark>is a</mark> function of a <mark>lack of information,</mark> and in which events run a predictable, linear course from cause to effect.</u></strong> As we will see, <u><strong>this is very different from the epistemological premise of preemption</u></strong>, and entails a divergence from it on the ontological level as well. Prevention, in fact, has no ontology of its own because it assumes that what it must deal with has an objectively given existence prior to its own intervention. In practice, this means that its object is given to it predefined by other formations, in whose terms and on whose terrain it must then operate. A preventive approach to social conflict might analyze it, for example, as an effect of poverty, objectively quantifiable in terms of economic and health indexes. Each index is defined by a specialist formation (economics, medicine) in relation to a norm specific to that domain and against which goals may be set and success measured (annual income, mortality rates, life expectancy, etc.). The preventive measures will then operate as a political extension of the concerned specialist domains (economic analysis extended into politics as aid and development, medicine extended into vaccination programs, etc.). They will be regulated by the specialist logics proper to those fields. Prevention has no proper object, no operational sphere of its own, and no proprietary logic. It is derivative. It is a means toward a given end. Because of this, preventive measures are not self-sustaining. They must be applied. They must be leveraged from an outside source with outside force. They are not an organizing force in their own right. They run on borrowed power. Deterrence takes over at the end of this same process, when the means of prevention have failed. <u><strong>Deterrence</u></strong> makes use of the same epistemology prevention does, in that it assumes knowability and objective measurability. However, because it starts where prevention ends, it <u><strong>has no margin of error. It must know with certainty because the threat is fully formed and ready to detonate: the enemy has the bomb and the means to deliver it. The imminence of the threat means that deterrence cannot afford to subordinate itself to objects, norms, and criteria passed on to it from other domains. If it did, its ability to respond with an immediacy proportional to the imminence of the threat would be compromised.</u></strong> Since it would not hold the key to its own knowledge, in the urgency of the situation it would be haunted internally by the spectre of a possible incompleteness of the knowledge coming from the outside. Since its operations would be mediated by that outside domain, neither would it hold a direct key to its own actions. Since it would be responding to causes outside its specific purview, it would not be master of its own effects. <u><strong>The only way to have the kind of epistemological immediacy necessary for deterrence is for its process to have its own cause and to hold it fast within itself.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The quickest</mark> and most direct <mark>way for a process to acquire its own cause is for it to produce one</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>The easiest way to do this is to take the imminence of the very threat prevention has failed to neutralize and make it the foundation of a new process. In other words<mark>, the process must take the effect it seeks to avoid (nuclear annihilation) and organize itself around it, as the cause of its very own dynamic</u></strong></mark> (deterrence<u><strong>). It must convert an effect that has yet to eventuate into a cause: a future cause.</u></strong> Past causes are in any case already spoken for. They have been claimed as objects of knowledge and operational spheres by a crowded world of other already-functioning formations. Now for a future cause to have any palpable effect it must somehow be able act on the present. <u><strong>This is much easier to do and much less mysterious than it might sound. You start <mark>by translating the threat into a clear and present danger.</mark> You do this by acquiring a capability to realize the threat rather than prevent it. If your neighbor has a nuke, <mark>you build the nuclear weaponry that would enable you to annihilate the adversary, even at the price of annihilating yourself</mark> by precipitating a "nuclear winter." </u></strong>In fact, <u><strong>the more capable you are of destroying yourself along with your enemy, the better. You can be certain <mark>the enemy will follow your lead </u></strong></mark>in acquiring the capability to annihilate you, and themselves as well. The imminent threat is then so imminent on both sides, so immediately present in its menacing futurity, that only a madman or suicidal regime would ever tip the balance and press the button. This gives rise to a unique logic of mutuality: "mutually assured destruction" (MAD). <u><strong>Mutually assured destruction is equilibrium-seeking. It tends toward the creation of a "balance of terror." MAD is certainty squared: to the certainty that there is objectively a threat is added the certainty that it is balanced out.</u></strong> The second certainty is dynamic, and requires maintenance. The assurance must be maintained by continuing to producing the conditions that bring the cause so vividly into the present. <u><strong>You have to keep moving into the dangerous future. <mark>You</mark> have <mark>to race foward it ever faster.</mark> You have to <mark>build more weapons, faster </mark>and better, to be sure that your systems match the lethality of your opponent's</u></strong>, give or take a few half-lives. <u><strong>The process soon becomes self-driving. <mark>The logic of mutually assured destruction becomes its own motor. It becomes self-propelling.</mark> Now that you've started, you can't very well stop. What began as an epistemological condition (a certainty about what you and your opponent are capable of doing) dynamizes into an ontology or mode of being (a race for dear life).</strong> </p></u>

1NC

OFF CASE

1NC K

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx

N

Wake

3

Michigan KK

Logan Gramzinski

1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx

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Climate change puts deforestation on the brink – reducing human causes is key to prevent tipping points

Cotter 14 –

Cotter 14 – Senior Scientist from Greenpeace International Science Unit

Deforestation accounts globally for about 12% of total GHG roughly the same as transport and ag Forests are crucially important in soaking up humankind’s GHG emissions deforestation cancels this Climate change is an additional stressor for forest ecosystems Increased tree mortality has occurred as a result of high temperatures, drought n order for humans to adapt to climate change, we need forests because they provide essential “services”, such as water, food and raw materials Maintaining forests as intact increases their resilience to climate change a combination of deforestation and climate change could to lead to a “tipping point”, where the forest cover could change rapidly into savannah. This would cause not only a loss in biodiversity, but release carbon to the atmosphere, leading to additional climate change climate change alone will not cause this tipping point Reductions in deforestation rates will also navigate us away from such a tipping point. The massive decline in deforestation rates for the Brazilian Amazon demonstrates policy-led approaches to curb deforestation can work deforestation fragments the remaining forest, making it more vulnerable to drought-induced fires.

Climate change is an additional stressor for forest ecosystems. Maintaining forests as intact, increases their resilience to climate change deforestation and climate change could to lead to a ¶ “tipping point”, where the forest could change into savannah Reductions in deforestation will navigate us away from such a tipping point.

[Janet, 3/31. "What does the IPCC WGII report say on forests?" www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/briefings/climate/2014/IPCC-WGII-Forests.pdf] Deforestation accounts globally for about 12% of total man-made greenhouse gas emissions¶ (GHG). Deforestation causes roughly the same GHG emissions as both transport (13%) and ¶ agriculture (12%). ¶ • Forests are crucially important in soaking up humankind’s GHG emissions. Unfortunately,¶ deforestation largely cancels out this effect. While forests have taken up about 45% of the ¶ CO2 emissions to the atmosphere since 1750, this is roughly balanced by emissions from ¶ deforestation.¶ • Climate change is an additional stressor for forest ecosystems. Increased tree mortality has ¶ occurred in some regions, notably western and boreal North America – either as a result of ¶ high temperatures, drought, and/or changes in the distribution and abundance of insect pests ¶ and diseases which have been attributed, at least in part, to warming. In addition, the fire¶ regime in the boreal forests has intensified in recent decades.¶ What do the findings mean in practice?¶ • For forests, mitigation and adaptation go together. In order for humans to adapt to climate ¶ change, we need forests because they provide essential “services”, such as water, food and ¶ raw materials. Maintaining forests as intact, i.e. as unbroken tracts of forest landscape,¶ increases their resilience to climate change. This also enables the species living within them, ¶ to adapt to climate change and maintain these services.¶ • For the Amazon, a combination of deforestation and climate change could to lead to a ¶ “tipping point”, where the forest cover could change rapidly into savannah. This would cause ¶ not only a loss in biodiversity, but release carbon to the atmosphere, leading to additional ¶ climate change. However, climate change alone will not cause this tipping point to be ¶ reached this century, especially if warming remains below 2°C. Reductions in deforestation ¶ rates will also navigate us away from such a tipping point. The massive decline in ¶ deforestation rates for the Brazilian Amazon between the years 2005-2012 demonstrateshat policy-led approaches to curb deforestation can work (see IPCC WG2 Ch. 4). However, the reverse is also ¶ true as witnessed by last year’s increases in deforestation in the Amazon as a result of a severely weakened ¶ domestic forest policy.¶ What Greenpeace says about climate change and forests¶ Deforestation together with climate change makes for a vicious cocktail. Climate change is expected to increase ¶ periods of drought in tropical forests. At the same time, deforestation fragments the remaining forest, making it ¶ more vulnerable to drought-induced fires. Fires then release carbon, triggering even faster climate change. Last ¶ year’s massive forest fires in Indonesia were a stark reminder of what the future might look like if we do not end ¶ deforestation by the end of this decade.

<h4>Climate change puts deforestation on the brink – reducing human causes is key to prevent tipping points</h4><p><strong>Cotter 14 – </strong>Senior Scientist from Greenpeace International Science Unit</p><p>[Janet, 3/31. "What does the IPCC WGII report say on forests?" www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/briefings/climate/2014/IPCC-WGII-Forests.pdf]</p><p><u><strong>Deforestation accounts globally for about 12% of total</u></strong> man-made greenhouse gas emissions¶ (<u><strong>GHG</u></strong>). Deforestation causes <u><strong>roughly the same</u></strong> GHG emissions <u><strong>as</u></strong> both <u><strong>transport</u></strong> (13%) <u><strong>and </u>¶<u> ag</u></strong>riculture (12%). ¶ • <u><strong>Forests are crucially important in soaking up humankind’s GHG emissions</u></strong>. Unfortunately,¶ <u><strong>deforestation</u></strong> largely <u><strong>cancels</u></strong> out <u><strong>this</u></strong> effect. While forests have taken up about 45% of the ¶ CO2 emissions to the atmosphere since 1750, this is roughly balanced by emissions from ¶ deforestation.¶ • <u><strong><mark>Climate change is an additional stressor for forest ecosystems</u></strong>. <u><strong></mark>Increased tree mortality has </u>¶<u> occurred</u></strong> in some regions, notably western and boreal North America – either <u><strong>as a result of </u>¶<u> high temperatures, drought</u></strong>, and/or changes in the distribution and abundance of insect pests ¶ and diseases which have been attributed, at least in part, to warming. In addition, the fire¶ regime in the boreal forests has intensified in recent decades.¶ What do the findings mean in practice?¶ • For forests, mitigation and adaptation go together. I<u><strong>n order for humans to adapt to climate </u>¶<u> change, we need forests because they provide essential “services”, such as water, food and </u>¶<u> raw materials</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Maintaining forests as intact</u></strong>, </mark>i.e. as unbroken tracts of forest landscape,¶ <u><strong><mark>increases their resilience to climate change</u></strong></mark>. This also enables the species living within them, ¶ to adapt to climate change and maintain these services.¶ • For the Amazon, <u><strong>a combination of <mark>deforestation and climate change could to lead to a </u>¶<u> “tipping point”, where the forest </mark>cover <mark>could change </mark>rapidly <mark>into savannah</mark>. This would cause </u>¶<u> not only a loss in biodiversity, but release carbon to the atmosphere, leading to additional </u>¶<u> climate change</u></strong>. However, <u><strong>climate change alone will not cause this tipping point</u></strong> to be ¶ reached this century, especially if warming remains below 2°C. <u><strong><mark>Reductions in deforestation </u></mark>¶<u><mark> </mark>rates <mark>will </mark>also <mark>navigate us away from such a tipping point.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>The massive decline in </u>¶<u> deforestation rates for the Brazilian Amazon</u></strong> between the years 2005-2012 <u><strong>demonstrates</u></strong>hat <u><strong>policy-led approaches to curb deforestation can work</u></strong> (see IPCC WG2 Ch. 4). However, the reverse is also ¶ true as witnessed by last year’s increases in deforestation in the Amazon as a result of a severely weakened ¶ domestic forest policy.¶ What Greenpeace says about climate change and forests¶ Deforestation together with climate change makes for a vicious cocktail. Climate change is expected to increase ¶ periods of drought in tropical forests. At the same time, <u><strong>deforestation fragments the remaining forest, making it </u>¶<u> more vulnerable to drought-induced fires.</u></strong> Fires then release carbon, triggering even faster climate change. Last ¶ year’s massive forest fires in Indonesia were a stark reminder of what the future might look like if we do not end ¶ deforestation by the end of this decade.</p>

1AC

1AC – Scenario 2

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-UMKC-Round5.docx

A

UMKC

5

SFSU AG

Brian Rubaie

1AC Marijuana Environment 1NC Settlerism K 2NC Settlerism K 1NR Settlerism K 2NR Settlerism K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-UMKC-Round5.docx

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A. Resiliency

Rodrik ‘9

Rodrik ‘9 Dani Rodrik, Rafiq Hariri Professor of International Political Economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. “The Myth of Rising Protectionism”. 2009. http://relooney.fatcow.com/0_New_5973.pdf

The reality is that the international trade regime has passed its greatest test since the Great Depression with flying colors. Trade economists who complain about minor instances of protectionism sound like a child whining about a damaged toy in the wake of an earthquake that killed thousands. Three things explain this remarkable resilience : ideas, politics , and institutions Economists have been extraordinarily successful in conveying their message to policymakers Nothing reflects this better than how “protection” and “protectionists” have become terms of derision if you say that you favor protection from imports , you are painted into a corner with Smoot and Hawley economists’ ideas would not have gone very far without significant changes in the underlying configuration of political interests in favor of open trade. For every worker and firm affected adversely by import competition, there is one or more worker and firm expecting to reap the benefits of access to markets abroad. The latter have become increasingly vocal and powerful, often represented by large multinational corporations the relative docility of rank-and-file workers on trade issues must ultimately be attributed to the safety nets erected by the welfare state. Modern industrial societies now have a wide array of social protections that mitigate demand for cruder forms of protection If the world has not fallen off the protectionist precipice during the crisis, as it did during the 1930’s, much of the credit must go the social programs

the international trade regime has remarkable resilience significant changes in the underlying political interests in favor of open trade. For every worker affected adversely by competition more expecting to reap benefits of markets abroad industrial societies have a wide array of social protections

The reality is that the international trade regime has passed its greatest test since the Great Depression with flying colors. Trade economists who complain about minor instances of protectionism sound like a child whining about a damaged toy in the wake of an earthquake that killed thousands. Three things explain this remarkable resilience : ideas, politics , and institutions . Economists have been extraordinarily successful in conveying their message to policymakers – even if ordinary people still regard imports with considerable suspicion. Nothing reflects this better than how “protection” and “protectionists” have become terms of derision. After all, governments are generally expected to provide protection to its citizens. But if you say that you favor protection from imports , you are painted into a corner with Reed Smoot and Willis C. Hawley, authors of the infamous 1930 US tariff bill. But economists’ ideas would not have gone very far without significant changes in the underlying configuration of political interests in favor of open trade. For every worker and firm affected adversely by import competition, there is one or more worker and firm expecting to reap the benefits of access to markets abroad. The latter have become increasingly vocal and powerful, often represented by large multinational corporations. In his latest book, Paul Blustein recounts how a former Indian trade minister once asked his American counterpart to bring him a picture of an American farmer: “I have never actually seen one,” the minister quipped. “I have only seen US conglomerates masquerading as farmers.” But the relative docility of rank-and-file workers on trade issues must ultimately be attributed to something else altogether: the safety nets erected by the welfare state. Modern industrial societies now have a wide array of social protections – unemployment compensation, adjustment assistance, and other labor-market tools, as well as health insurance and family support – that mitigate demand for cruder forms of protection. The welfare state is the flip side of the open economy. If the world has not fallen off the protectionist precipice during the crisis, as it did during the 1930’s, much of the credit must go the social programs that conservatives and market fundamentalists would like to see scrapped. The battle against trade protection has been won – so far. But, before we relax, let’s remember that we still have not addressed the central challenge the world economy will face as the crisis eases: the inevitable clash between China’s need to produce an ever-growing quantity of manufactured goods and America’s need to maintain a smaller current-account deficit. Unfortunately, there is little to suggest that policymakers are yet ready to confront this genuine threat.

<h4>A. Resiliency</h4><p><u><strong>Rodrik ‘9</u></strong> Dani Rodrik, Rafiq Hariri Professor of International Political Economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. “The Myth of Rising Protectionism”. 2009. http://relooney.fatcow.com/0_New_5973.pdf</p><p><u><strong>The reality is that <mark>the international trade regime has </mark>passed its greatest test since the Great Depression with flying colors. Trade economists who complain about minor instances of protectionism sound like a child whining about a damaged toy in the wake of an earthquake that killed thousands. Three things explain this <mark>remarkable resilience</mark> : ideas, politics , and institutions</u></strong> . <u><strong>Economists have been extraordinarily successful in conveying their message to policymakers </u></strong>– even if ordinary people still regard imports with considerable suspicion. <u><strong>Nothing reflects this better than how “protection” and “protectionists” have become terms of derision</u></strong>. After all, governments are generally expected to provide protection to its citizens. But <u><strong>if you say that you favor protection from imports , you are painted into a corner with</u></strong> Reed <u><strong>Smoot and</u></strong> Willis C. <u><strong>Hawley</u></strong>, authors of the infamous 1930 US tariff bill. But <u><strong>economists’ ideas would not have gone very far without <mark>significant changes in the underlying</mark> configuration of <mark>political interests in</mark> <mark>favor of open trade. For every worker </mark>and firm <mark>affected adversely by </mark>import <mark>competition</mark>, there is one or <mark>more </mark>worker and firm <mark>expecting to reap </mark>the <mark>benefits of </mark>access to<mark> markets abroad</mark>. The latter have become increasingly vocal and powerful, often represented by large multinational corporations</u></strong>. In his latest book, Paul Blustein recounts how a former Indian trade minister once asked his American counterpart to bring him a picture of an American farmer: “I have never actually seen one,” the minister quipped. “I have only seen US conglomerates masquerading as farmers.” But <u><strong>the relative docility of rank-and-file workers on trade issues must ultimately be attributed to</u></strong> something else altogether:<u><strong> the safety nets erected by the welfare state. Modern <mark>industrial societies </mark>now <mark>have a wide array of social protections</u></strong></mark> – unemployment compensation, adjustment assistance, and other labor-market tools, as well as health insurance and family support – <u><strong>that mitigate demand for cruder forms of protection</u></strong>. The welfare state is the flip side of the open economy.<u><strong> If the world has not fallen off the protectionist precipice during the crisis, as it did during the 1930’s, much of the credit must go the social programs </u></strong>that conservatives and market fundamentalists would like to see scrapped. The battle against trade protection has been won – so far. But, before we relax, let’s remember that we still have not addressed the central challenge the world economy will face as the crisis eases: the inevitable clash between China’s need to produce an ever-growing quantity of manufactured goods and America’s need to maintain a smaller current-account deficit. Unfortunately, there is little to suggest that policymakers are yet ready to confront this genuine threat. </p>

1NC

1NC WTO

AT: Impact – Trade War

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Kentucky

7

Georgetown EK

Box, Brian

1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K

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We must refuse the university as an act of pure negation—only this way can we prevent the reappropriation of our act and means perm can never solve.

Novoa 05

Juan Bruce-Novoa 05, Lecturer in Mexican and Latino Literature and Culture the University of California-Irvine. “Eroticism, Counterculture, and Juan García Ponce.” CR: The New Centennial Review. 5.3. pp. 1-33

Instead of facilitating expression of creative instincts, society created an array of imaginary needs and desires By making individuals feel part of an illusory integration the potentially great variety of modes of social expression were funneled into a one-dimensional system in which the capacity to think and act freely in manners other than those sanctioned by the system eventually disappeared. By monopolizing the means of consumption as well alternative or oppositional forms of expression, advanced societies blocked development of an eroticized society All expression of rebellion, including literature and the arts, would be turned into chips in the game of competition The efforts to recapture the Great Refusal in the language of literature suffer the fate of being absorbed by what they refute Marcuse's answer: a Great Refusal beyond what the scandalous but ineffectual vanguards had achieved, a break he called a "rupture withdrawal from the system of organized social conduct the "establishment a society that had won the basic struggle for survival and eliminated excessive domination and repression should open itself to the development of a new being, an orphic-narcissist who would reject utilitarian goals or social standing in favor of love, pleasure, play, and contemplation. This rupture must not fall into the trap of oppositional collaboration; rather it must counter the system's capacity for appropriating everything in its path with "the politically impotent form of the 'absolute negation What we refuse is not without value or importance. Precisely because of that, the refusal is necessary. There is a reason which we no longer accept, there is an appearance of wisdom which horrifies us, there is a plea for agreement and conciliation which we will no longer heed. A break has occurred. We have been reduced to that frankness which no longer tolerates complicity

By making individuals feel part of an illusory integration the variety of modes of social expression were funneled into a one-dimensional system in which the capacity to think and act freely in manners other than those sanctioned by the system disappeared All expression of rebellion, would be turned into chips in the game of competition withdrawal from the system of organized social conduct the "establishment a society that had won the basic struggle for survival and eliminated excessive domination and repression should open itself to the development of a new being who would reject social standing in favor of love, pleasure, play, and contemplation What we refuse is not without value or importance. Precisely because of that, the refusal is necessary. There is a reason which we no longer accept, A break has occurred. We have been reduced to that frankness which no longer tolerates complicity

In One-Dimensional Man, a less optimistic Marcuse analyzed the manipulation by advanced industrial societies of communication media and concepts of modernity to stifle cultural revolution, voiding any possibility of the erotic liberation of the masses. Instead of facilitating expression of creative instincts, society created an array of imaginary needs and desires, the acquisition of which—through participation in the rites of consumption—constituted a sinister, complex, and highly developed form of sublimating human sexual energy. By making individuals feel part of an illusory integration of national life, the potentially great variety of modes of social expression were funneled into a one-dimensional system in which the capacity to think and act freely in manners other than those sanctioned by the system eventually disappeared. By monopolizing the means of consumption as well alternative or oppositional forms of expression, advanced societies blocked development of an eroticized society. Marcuse warned that control mechanisms even provided outlets for eroticism that channeled its energy into merely distracting and addictive consumption. All expression of rebellion, including literature and the arts, would be turned into chips in the game of competition and economic gain. The efforts to recapture the Great Refusal in the language of literature suffer the fate of being absorbed by what they refute. As modern classics, the avant-garde and the beatniks share the function of entertaining without endangering the good conscience of the men of good will. This absorption is justified by technical progress; the refusal is refuted by the alleviation of misery in the advanced industrial society. The liquidation of high culture is a by-product of the conquest of nature, and of the progressing conquest of scarcity. (Marcuse 1991, 70) Marcuse's answer: a Great Refusal beyond what the scandalous but ineffectual vanguards had achieved, a break he called a "rupture"—especially and significantly in the chapter "The New Sensibility" in An Essay on Liberation (1969a, 33–34, 36). This rupture signaled the withdrawal from the system of organized social conduct, or in 1960s parlance, the "establishment." Borrowing elements of his analysis from Eros and Civilization, Marcuse postulated that a society that had won the basic struggle for survival and eliminated excessive domination and repression should open itself to the development of a new being, an orphic-narcissist who would reject utilitarian goals or social standing in favor of love, pleasure, play, and contemplation. This eroticized being would be a product of an essentially new human reality, able to achieve the ultimate "break, the turn of quantity into quality" (1991, 231) and establish "the realm of the irrational [that] becomes the home of the really rational—of the ideas which may 'promote the art of life'" (247). This rupture must not fall into the trap of oppositional collaboration; rather it must counter the system's capacity for appropriating everything in its path with "the politically impotent form of the 'absolute negation'" (Marcuse 1991, 255). To support his claim while simultaneously offering an example of such an act of refusal in the guise of surrendering to appropriation, Marcuse cites Maurice Blanchot, a writer whose work would also become key reading for counterculture intellectuals in their passage to postmodernity, particularly for García Ponce. [End Page 7] What we refuse is not without value or importance. Precisely because of that, the refusal is necessary. There is a reason which we no longer accept, there is an appearance of wisdom which horrifies us, there is a plea for agreement and conciliation which we will no longer heed. A break has occurred. We have been reduced to that frankness which no longer tolerates complicity. (Blanchot, quoted in Marcuse 1991, 256)

<h4>We must refuse the university as an act of pure negation—only this way can we prevent the reappropriation of our act and means perm can never solve.</h4><p>Juan Bruce-<strong>Novoa 05</strong>, Lecturer in Mexican and Latino Literature and Culture the University of California-Irvine. “Eroticism, Counterculture, and Juan García Ponce.” CR: The New Centennial Review. 5.3. pp. 1-33</p><p>In One-Dimensional Man, a less optimistic Marcuse analyzed the manipulation by advanced industrial societies of communication media and concepts of modernity to stifle cultural revolution, voiding any possibility of the erotic liberation of the masses. <u><strong>Instead of facilitating expression of creative instincts, society created an array of imaginary needs and desires</u></strong>, the acquisition of which—through participation in the rites of consumption—constituted a sinister, complex, and highly developed form of sublimating human sexual energy. <u><strong><mark>By making individuals feel part of an illusory integration</u></strong></mark> of national life, <u><strong><mark>the</mark> potentially great <mark>variety of modes of social expression were funneled into a one-dimensional system in which the capacity to think and act freely in manners other than those sanctioned by the system </mark>eventually <mark>disappeared</mark>. By monopolizing the means of consumption as well alternative or oppositional forms of expression, advanced societies blocked development of an eroticized society</u></strong>. Marcuse warned that control mechanisms even provided outlets for eroticism that channeled its energy into merely distracting and addictive consumption.<u><strong> <mark>All expression of rebellion,</mark> including literature and the arts, <mark>would be turned into chips in the game of competition</u></strong></mark> and economic gain. <u><strong>The efforts to recapture the Great Refusal in the language of literature suffer the fate of being absorbed by what they refute</u></strong>. As modern classics, the avant-garde and the beatniks share the function of entertaining without endangering the good conscience of the men of good will. This absorption is justified by technical progress; the refusal is refuted by the alleviation of misery in the advanced industrial society. The liquidation of high culture is a by-product of the conquest of nature, and of the progressing conquest of scarcity. (Marcuse 1991, 70) <u><strong>Marcuse's answer: a Great Refusal beyond what the scandalous but ineffectual vanguards had achieved, a break he called a "rupture</u></strong>"—especially and significantly in the chapter "The New Sensibility" in An Essay on Liberation (1969a, 33–34, 36). This rupture signaled the <u><strong><mark>withdrawal from the system of organized social conduct</u></strong></mark>, or in 1960s parlance, <u><strong><mark>the "establishment</u></strong></mark>." Borrowing elements of his analysis from Eros and Civilization, Marcuse postulated that <u><strong><mark>a society that had won the basic struggle for survival and eliminated excessive domination and repression should open itself to the development of a new being</mark>, an orphic-narcissist <mark>who would reject</mark> utilitarian goals or <mark>social standing in favor of love, pleasure, play, and contemplation</mark>.</u></strong> This eroticized being would be a product of an essentially new human reality, able to achieve the ultimate "break, the turn of quantity into quality" (1991, 231) and establish "the realm of the irrational [that] becomes the home of the really rational—of the ideas which may 'promote the art of life'" (247). <u><strong>This rupture must not fall into the trap of oppositional collaboration; rather it must counter the system's capacity for appropriating everything in its path with "the politically impotent form of the 'absolute negation</u></strong>'" (Marcuse 1991, 255). To support his claim while simultaneously offering an example of such an act of refusal in the guise of surrendering to appropriation, Marcuse cites Maurice Blanchot, a writer whose work would also become key reading for counterculture intellectuals in their passage to postmodernity, particularly for García Ponce. [End Page 7] <u><strong><mark>What we refuse is not without value or importance. Precisely because of that, the refusal is necessary. There is a reason which we no longer accept, </mark>there is an appearance of wisdom which horrifies us, there is a plea for agreement and conciliation which we will no longer heed. <mark>A break has occurred. We have been reduced to that frankness which no longer tolerates complicity</u></strong></mark>. (Blanchot, quoted in Marcuse 1991, 256)</p>

1NR

Case

A2: Perm -- Do Both

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N

Wake

2

Cal MS

JJustice

1AC - Marijuana Prison Reform 1NC - Marijuana Word PIC University K 2NC - University K 1NR - University K 2NR - University K

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Independently, HIV spread causes Russian collapse—demographic hollowing out threatens the Russian military, results in overreliance on nukes

Evans 10, 2010, Volume l, Issue 1, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Evans%20PANDEMICS.pdf

Jane Evans 10, Department of Military Strategic Studies- U.S. Air Force Academy, “Pandemics and National Security,” Global Security Studies, Spring 2010, Volume l, Issue 1, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Evans%20PANDEMICS.pdf

several countries of strategic importance are experiencing an epidemic of AIDS that will soon threaten their stability and in turn cause global instability. AIDS is spreading faster in Russia than in any other country in the world It is aggravating Russia’s projected population decrease, will “significantly reduce worker output and decimate the working age population”, and if the AIDS trend continues, “Russia’s future GNP will remain stagnant through 2025 This will in turn lead to regional volatility and further exacerbate Eastern Europe’s economic difficulties “AIDS could further erode Russia’s ability to staff a conventional army and potentially lead Moscow to rely more on a deteriorating nuclear force to maintain its great power status In an increasingly global economy and international dependence, the collapse of Russia could profoundly affect the rest of the world the spread of HIV/AIDS is and will remain a critical security issue to U.S. policymakers.

several countries of strategic importance are experiencing an epidemic of AIDS that will threaten their stability and global instability AIDS is spreading faster in Russia than any other country It is aggravating Russia’s population decrease if the trend continues, “Russia’s future GNP will remain stagnant This will lead to regional volatility and further erode Russia’s ability to staff a conventional army and lead Moscow to rely more on a deteriorating nuclear force collapse of Russia could profoundly affect the world

Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, AIDS, was first identified in the U.S. in 1981 ¶ (although retrospective immunology showed the virus was being transmitted epidemically by the ¶ late 1970’s); the causative agent, HIV-1 virus, was found to have occurred in the Democratic ¶ Republic of the Congo in 1959 (CDC/HIV). Today, there is no vaccine and antiretroviral ¶ treatments can at best delay the onset of death. While incidence rates of HIV/AIDS remain low ¶ in the U.S., several countries of strategic importance are experiencing an epidemic of AIDS that will soon threaten their stability and in turn cause global instability. A little known fact is that ¶ AIDS is spreading faster in Russia than in any other country in the world, including many of the ¶ African nations. It is aggravating Russia’s projected population decrease, will “significantly reduce worker output and decimate the working age population”, and if the AIDS trend continues, “Russia’s future GNP will remain stagnant through 2025” (Peterson 66). This will in turn lead to regional volatility and further exacerbate Eastern Europe’s economic difficulties. A ¶ worst case scenario for national security in the future, “AIDS could further erode Russia’s ability to staff a conventional army and potentially lead Moscow to rely more on a deteriorating nuclear force to maintain its great power status” (Peterson 66). In an increasingly global economy and international dependence, the collapse of Russia could profoundly affect the rest of the world. A¶ similar situation in China would cause even more problems; however, China has the resources and the population to likely absorb and recover from the AIDS crisis. Nevertheless, the spread of HIV/AIDS is and will remain a critical security issue to U.S. policymakers.

<h4>Independently, HIV spread causes Russian collapse—demographic hollowing out threatens the Russian military, results in overreliance on nukes </h4><p>Jane <strong>Evans 10,</strong> Department of Military Strategic Studies- U.S. Air Force Academy, “Pandemics and National Security,” Global Security Studies, Spring<strong> 2010, Volume l, Issue 1, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Evans%20PANDEMICS.pdf</p><p></strong>Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, AIDS, was first identified in the U.S. in 1981 ¶ (although retrospective immunology showed the virus was being transmitted epidemically by the ¶ late 1970’s); the causative agent, HIV-1 virus, was found to have occurred in the Democratic ¶ Republic of the Congo in 1959 (CDC/HIV). Today, there is no vaccine and antiretroviral ¶ treatments can at best delay the onset of death. While incidence rates of HIV/AIDS remain low ¶ in the U.S., <u><mark>several countries of strategic importance are experiencing an epidemic of AIDS that will</mark> soon <mark>threaten their stability and</mark> in turn cause <mark>global instability</mark>.</u> A little known fact is that ¶ <u><mark>AIDS is spreading faster in Russia than</mark> in <mark>any other country</mark> in the world</u>, including many of the ¶ African nations. <u><mark>It is <strong>aggravating Russia’s</mark> projected <mark>population decrease</strong></mark>, will “significantly reduce worker output and decimate the working age population”, and <mark>if the</mark> AIDS <mark>trend continues, “Russia’s future GNP will remain stagnant</mark> through 2025</u>” (Peterson 66). <u><mark>This will</mark> in turn <mark>lead to regional volatility and</mark> further exacerbate Eastern Europe’s economic difficulties</u>. A ¶ worst case scenario for national security in the future, <u>“<strong>AIDS could <mark>further erode Russia’s ability to staff a conventional army and</mark> potentially <mark>lead Moscow to rely more on a deteriorating nuclear force</strong></mark> to maintain its great power status</u>” (Peterson 66). <u>In an increasingly global economy and international dependence, the <mark>collapse of Russia could profoundly affect the</mark> rest of the <mark>world</u></mark>. A¶ similar situation in China would cause even more problems; however, China has the resources and the population to likely absorb and recover from the AIDS crisis. Nevertheless, <u>the spread of HIV/AIDS is and will remain a critical security issue to U.S. policymakers. </p></u>

1AC Kentucky

Advantage -- UN

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Kentucky

2

Northwestern CS

Glinecki

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Academic studies prove---relevant ballot issues massively increase turn out in the midterm.

Biggers ‘10

Daniel R. Biggers, Professor of Government in Maryland, “When Ballot Issues Matter: Social Issue Ballot Measures and Their Impact on Turnout,” © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC ‘10

Stressing the importance of issue content this study finds social issue ballot measures have a significant impact on increasing the likelihood of turning out for all midterm elections by looking at all propositions on the ballot, instead of just initiatives the results demonstrate that an increase in the total number of propositions is only rarely associated with an increase in turnout for midterm elections social issues are able to increase turnout because they are well known and of significant importance to some citizens, the average measure on the ballot, possesses little ability to raise turnout.

social issue ballot measures have a significant impact n increasing the likelihood of turning out for all midterm social issues are able to increase turnout because they are well known and of significant importance to some citizens, the average measure on the ballot possesses little ability to raise turnout.

Stressing the importance of issue content, this study finds that social issue ballot measures have a significant impact on increasing the likelihood of turning out for all midterm and some presidential elections. In contrast, by looking at all propositions on the ballot, instead of just initiatives (as other studies have done), the results demonstrate that an increase in the total number of propositions is only rarely associated with an increase in turnout for midterm elections, and not at all for presidential elections. These empirical analyses confirm the theoretical expectations: while social issues are able to increase turnout because they are well known and of significant importance to some citizens, the average measure on the ballot, which does not meet either or both of these requirements, possesses little ability to raise turnout.

<h4>Academic studies prove---relevant ballot issues massively increase turn out in the midterm. </h4><p>Daniel R. <strong>Biggers</strong>, Professor of Government in Maryland, “When Ballot Issues Matter: Social Issue Ballot Measures and Their Impact on Turnout,” © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC <u><strong>‘10</p><p>Stressing the importance of issue content</u></strong>, <u><strong>this study finds</u></strong> that <u><strong><mark>social issue ballot measures</u></strong> <u><strong>have a significant impact</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>o<mark>n increasing the likelihood of turning out for all midterm</u></strong></mark> and some presidential <u><strong>elections</u></strong>. In contrast, <u><strong>by looking at all propositions on the ballot, instead of just initiatives</u></strong> (as other studies have done), <u><strong>the results demonstrate that an increase in the total number of propositions is only rarely associated with an increase in turnout for midterm elections</u></strong>, and not at all for presidential elections. These empirical analyses confirm the theoretical expectations: while <u><strong><mark>social issues are able to increase turnout because they are well known and of significant importance to some citizens, the average measure on the ballot</mark>,</u></strong> which does not meet either or both of these requirements, <u><strong><mark>possesses little ability to raise turnout.</p></u></strong></mark>

1NR

Counterplan

1NR – AT: Dunckleberg

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round4.docx

N

Kentucky

4

Emory KS

Kallmeyer, Kevin

1AC - Cannabis Exchange 1NC - Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) Mexico DA Security K Reeferendum CP 2NC - Reeferendum CP and Security K 1NR - Midterms DA

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Specifically, US prohibition undermines global implementation of AIDS harm-reduction policies

Csete 10

Joanne Csete 10, professor of Clinic Population and Family Health at Columbia University’s Mailman Public Health School, with Richard Parker and Nancy Worthington, Rethinking the War on Drugs: The Impact of US Drug Control Policy on Global Public Health, March, http://www.mailman.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/rethinking-the-war-on-drugs.pdf

with the emergence of the HIV epidemic¶ health experts highlighted the need for risk-reduction to take precedence over criminal approaches to the¶ problem of drug dependency. social and behavioral research provided an unprecedented level of scientific evidence for the effectiveness of harm reduction services it seemed reasonable to assume that¶ the harm reduction approaches would be adopted, and that the¶ unprecedented scale-up of HIV services would, in turn,¶ force a rethinking of the global war on drugs that¶ impeded access to HIV services and pressed hundreds¶ of thousands into institutions where no such services¶ were available. ¶ Yet any review of global policy debates over the course¶ of the past decade would have to conclude that the¶ results have been far more ambiguous In 2003, at the mid-term review of¶ the UNGASS on drugs, the focus seemed to have reverted back to prohibition, nothing has been more important than the policy positions promoted and defended internationally by the US government all observers agree that ¶ the US has been at the center of most of the major decisions and activities driving international drug policy and US policies related to drugs have largely determined drug control practices globally. Even in the wake of the¶ global HIV and AIDS epidemic, US commitment to the war on drugs has been one of the central factors underlying resistance to the adoption of more¶ scientifically-informed policies grounded in¶ public health approaches to disease prevention There can be no doubt that the policies pursued by Bush are¶ among the most important factors that have shaped the¶ development of international drug policy debates over¶ the course of the past decade

with the emergence of HIV epidemic experts highlighted the need for risk-reduction to take precedence over criminal approaches to drug dependency research provided an unprecedented level of evidence for the effectiveness of harm reduction In 2003, at the UNGASS the focus seemed to have reverted back to prohibition nothing has been more important than the positions promoted by the US US policies have determined practices globally US commitment to the war on drugs has been the central factor underlying resistance to health approaches to disease

During the closing years of the 20th century,¶ particularly with the emergence of the HIV epidemic¶ and a growing awareness of the role of injection drug¶ use and needle sharing in driving this epidemic in¶ many countries outside sub-Saharan Africa public¶ health experts highlighted the need for risk-reduction to take precedence over criminal approaches to the¶ problem of drug dependency. A significant increase in¶ social and behavioral research carried out in response¶ to HIV and AIDS in the late 1980s and the early 1990s¶ provided an unprecedented level of scientific evidence for the effectiveness of harm reduction services, such¶ as medication-assisted drug dependence treatment,¶ needle exchange, and safer injection facilities, in¶ improving the health of drug users without increasing¶ levels of drug use,* As evidence for the effectiveness of¶ such measures in preventing injection-driven HIV¶ infection grew during the late 1990s and into the¶ present decade, it seemed reasonable to assume that¶ the harm reduction approaches grounded in public¶ health principles would be adopted, and that the¶ unprecedented scale-up of HIV services would, in turn,¶ force a rethinking of the global war on drugs that¶ impeded access to HIV services and pressed hundreds¶ of thousands into institutions where no such services¶ were available. ¶ Yet any review of global policy debates over the course¶ of the past decade would have to conclude that the¶ results have been far more ambiguous than might have¶ been expected. At best, the international community¶ seems to have oscillated between reaffirmation of the¶ drug war mentality and relatively timid steps in the¶ direction of public health approaches. If we open the¶ timeframe of our analysis to include the 1998 20a¶ United Nations General Assembly Special Session¶ (UNGASS) on illicit drugs, we find the UN General¶ Assembly committing member states to achieving "a¶ drug-free world."5 The 1998 UNGASS Declaration¶ outlined what it described as a comprehensive global¶ strategy for simultaneously reducing both the supply of¶ and demand for illicit drugs and developed a mandate¶ for the UN International Drug Control Programme¶ (UNDCP) to "develop strategies with a view to¶ eliminating or significantly reducing the illicit¶ cultivation of the coca bush, the cannabis plant and the opium poppy by the year 2008."6 Disappointing those¶ who had hoped for meaningful drug policy reform, it¶ basically reasserted the same goals that had driven the¶ global war on drugs for decades. HIV was¶ unmentioned.¶ Just a few years later, however, at the 2001 UNGASS on¶ HIV and AIDS, an assembly of the same nations seemed¶ to signal a possible shift of emphasis, including harm¶ reduction efforts and access to sterile injecting¶ equipment as part of the stated goals in its Declaration¶ of Commitment.7 In 2003, at the mid-term review of¶ the UNGASS on drugs, the focus seemed to have reverted back to prohibition, with UNODC arguing that¶ important progress had been made on reaching the¶ goals and targets that had been established in 1998 and¶ citing long lists of drug control measures undertaken ¶ by member states in the five years that had passed.8 In¶ June of 2005, the Programme Coordinating Board (PCB), which governs the Joint United Nations¶ Programme on AIDS (UNAIDS), pushed back in the¶ opposite direction, approving a UNAIDS policy position¶ paper, "Intensifying HIV Prevention," that officially¶ affirmed support for needle exchange programs as a¶ key part of the global fight against the epidemic; both¶ the paper and the PCB report approving it, however,¶ explicitly noted that the USA (the largest donor to UNAIDS) could not support needle exchange because it¶ contradicts its domestic drug policies.9 And in 2008, at¶ the ten-year review point for the 1998 UNGASS, which¶ was initiated at the 2008 meeting of the Commission on¶ Narcotic Drugs (CND) in Vienna, the debate seemed to¶ veer back yet again, with the UNODC claiming major¶ successes in the control of coca and opium production¶ and reaffirming the need to place greater emphasis on¶ demand reduction in resource- rich consumer¶ countries.10¶ While a range of complex factors have surely affected¶ the development of these contradictory policy debates,¶ probably nothing has been more important than the policy positions promoted and defended internationally by the US government. Indeed, no¶ matter which side of the debate one comes down on,¶ for or against the war on drugs, all observers agree that ¶ the US has been at the center of most of the major decisions and activities driving international drug policy since its inception more than a century ago, and US policies related to drugs have largely determined drug control practices globally. Even in the wake of the¶ global HIV and AIDS epidemic, US commitment to the war on drugs has been one of the central factors underlying resistance to the adoption of more¶ scientifically-informed policies grounded in¶ contemporary public health approaches to health promotion and disease prevention.¶ The history of US policy in relation to these issues has¶ also been marked by changes over time, as well as by¶ conflicts and differences of opinion that have shifted¶ policy emphasis both within and between different¶ administrations. There can be no doubt, for example,¶ that the policies pursued by the Bush administration,¶ from 2001 to 2009, and the Bush administration's¶ commitment to promoting those policies globally, are¶ among the most important factors that have shaped the¶ development of international drug policy debates over¶ the course of the past decade. Recognizing the¶ importance that US policies have had in shaping¶ responses to drug use globally, and the likelihood that¶ this will continue to be the case in the future, this paper¶ seeks to review the development of US policy on drugs over the course of the past decade, with a primary¶ focus on its relevance for the politics of global public¶ health more broadly. We are particularly interested in¶ looking at the consequences of US policy during the¶ eight years of the Bush administration, from 2001 to¶ 2009, as well as the initial steps taken by the Obama¶ administration, since its inauguration at the start of¶ 2009, in order to assess the potential policy impact of¶ both administrations in relation to the broader context¶ of global public health in the early 21st century.

<h4>Specifically, US prohibition undermines global implementation of AIDS harm-reduction policies</h4><p>Joanne <strong>Csete 10<u></strong>, professor of Clinic Population and Family Health at Columbia University’s Mailman Public Health School, with Richard Parker and Nancy Worthington, Rethinking the War on Drugs: The Impact of US Drug Control Policy on Global Public Health, March, http://www.mailman.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/rethinking-the-war-on-drugs.pdf</p><p></u>During the closing years of the 20th century,¶ particularly <u><strong><mark>with the emergence of</mark> the <mark>HIV epidemic</mark>¶ </u></strong>and a growing awareness of the role of injection drug¶ use and needle sharing in driving this epidemic in¶ many countries outside sub-Saharan Africa public¶ <u><strong>health <mark>experts highlighted the need for risk-reduction to take precedence over criminal approaches to</mark> the¶ problem of <mark>drug dependency</mark>. </u></strong>A significant increase in¶ <u><strong>social and behavioral <mark>research</u></strong></mark> carried out in response¶ to HIV and AIDS in the late 1980s and the early 1990s¶ <u><strong><mark>provided an unprecedented level of</mark> scientific <mark>evidence for the effectiveness of harm reduction</mark> services</u></strong>, such¶ as medication-assisted drug dependence treatment,¶ needle exchange, and safer injection facilities, in¶ improving the health of drug users without increasing¶ levels of drug use,* As evidence for the effectiveness of¶ such measures in preventing injection-driven HIV¶ infection grew during the late 1990s and into the¶ present decade, <u><strong>it seemed reasonable to assume that¶ the harm reduction approaches</u></strong> grounded in public¶ health principles <u><strong>would be adopted, and that the¶ unprecedented scale-up of HIV services would, in turn,¶ force a rethinking of the global war on drugs that¶ impeded access to HIV services</u></strong> <u><strong>and pressed hundreds¶ of thousands into institutions where no such services¶ were available. ¶ Yet any review of global policy debates over the course¶ of the past decade would have to conclude that the¶ results have been far more ambiguous</u></strong> than might have¶ been expected. At best, the international community¶ seems to have oscillated between reaffirmation of the¶ drug war mentality and relatively timid steps in the¶ direction of public health approaches. If we open the¶ timeframe of our analysis to include the 1998 20a¶ United Nations General Assembly Special Session¶ (UNGASS) on illicit drugs, we find the UN General¶ Assembly committing member states to achieving "a¶ drug-free world."5 The 1998 UNGASS Declaration¶ outlined what it described as a comprehensive global¶ strategy for simultaneously reducing both the supply of¶ and demand for illicit drugs and developed a mandate¶ for the UN International Drug Control Programme¶ (UNDCP) to "develop strategies with a view to¶ eliminating or significantly reducing the illicit¶ cultivation of the coca bush, the cannabis plant and the opium poppy by the year 2008."6 Disappointing those¶ who had hoped for meaningful drug policy reform, it¶ basically reasserted the same goals that had driven the¶ global war on drugs for decades. HIV was¶ unmentioned.¶ Just a few years later, however, at the 2001 UNGASS on¶ HIV and AIDS, an assembly of the same nations seemed¶ to signal a possible shift of emphasis, including harm¶ reduction efforts and access to sterile injecting¶ equipment as part of the stated goals in its Declaration¶ of Commitment.7<u><strong> <mark>In 2003, at the</mark> mid-term review of¶ the <mark>UNGASS</mark> on drugs, <mark>the focus seemed to have reverted back to prohibition</mark>,</u></strong> with UNODC arguing that¶ important progress had been made on reaching the¶ goals and targets that had been established in 1998 and¶ citing long lists of drug control measures undertaken ¶ by member states in the five years that had passed.8 In¶ June of 2005, the Programme Coordinating Board (PCB), which governs the Joint United Nations¶ Programme on AIDS (UNAIDS), pushed back in the¶ opposite direction, approving a UNAIDS policy position¶ paper, "Intensifying HIV Prevention," that officially¶ affirmed support for needle exchange programs as a¶ key part of the global fight against the epidemic; both¶ the paper and the PCB report approving it, however,¶ explicitly noted that the USA (the largest donor to UNAIDS) could not support needle exchange because it¶ contradicts its domestic drug policies.9 And in 2008, at¶ the ten-year review point for the 1998 UNGASS, which¶ was initiated at the 2008 meeting of the Commission on¶ Narcotic Drugs (CND) in Vienna, the debate seemed to¶ veer back yet again, with the UNODC claiming major¶ successes in the control of coca and opium production¶ and reaffirming the need to place greater emphasis on¶ demand reduction in resource- rich consumer¶ countries.10¶ While a range of complex factors have surely affected¶ the development of these contradictory policy debates,¶ probably <u><strong><mark>nothing has been more important than the</mark> policy <mark>positions promoted</mark> and defended internationally <mark>by the US</mark> government</u></strong>. Indeed, no¶ matter which side of the debate one comes down on,¶ for or against the war on drugs, <u><strong>all observers agree that ¶ the US has been at the center of most of the major decisions and activities driving international drug policy </u></strong>since its inception more than a century ago, <u><strong>and <mark>US policies</mark> related to drugs <mark>have</mark> largely <mark>determined</mark> drug control <mark>practices globally</mark>.</u></strong> <u><strong>Even in the wake of the¶ global HIV and AIDS epidemic, <mark>US commitment to the war on drugs has been</mark> one of <mark>the central factor</mark>s <mark>underlying resistance to</mark> the adoption of more¶ scientifically-informed policies grounded in¶ </u></strong>contemporary <u><strong>public <mark>health approaches to</mark> </u></strong>health promotion and <u><strong><mark>disease</mark> prevention</u></strong>.¶ The history of US policy in relation to these issues has¶ also been marked by changes over time, as well as by¶ conflicts and differences of opinion that have shifted¶ policy emphasis both within and between different¶ administrations. <u><strong>There can be no doubt</u></strong>, for example,¶ <u><strong>that the policies pursued by</u></strong> the <u><strong>Bush</u></strong> administration,¶ from 2001 to 2009, and the Bush administration's¶ commitment to promoting those policies globally, <u><strong>are¶ among the most important factors that have shaped the¶ development of international drug policy debates over¶ the course of the past decade</u></strong>. Recognizing the¶ importance that US policies have had in shaping¶ responses to drug use globally, and the likelihood that¶ this will continue to be the case in the future, this paper¶ seeks to review the development of US policy on drugs over the course of the past decade, with a primary¶ focus on its relevance for the politics of global public¶ health more broadly. We are particularly interested in¶ looking at the consequences of US policy during the¶ eight years of the Bush administration, from 2001 to¶ 2009, as well as the initial steps taken by the Obama¶ administration, since its inauguration at the start of¶ 2009, in order to assess the potential policy impact of¶ both administrations in relation to the broader context¶ of global public health in the early 21st century.</p>

1AC UNLV

Advantage -- UN

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

A

Wake

1

George Washington TT

DStout

1AC - MJ - UN and OAS 1NC - Cap Treaties DA Treaties and CEA CP 2NC - Cap 1NR - Cap 2NR - Cap

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-Wake-Round1.docx

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cx

college

Legalization of PAS is an affirmation of the act by official state sanction within regulation

Yuill 13

Yuill 13

the only real difference between assisted dying and assisted suicide is that the former has been officially sanctioned by doctors and by legality Someone in Oregon with, according to two doctors, five months left to live who ingests poison is is an assisted death Someone who is dying but has seven months to live who ingests the same poison is, according to the same sources, an assisted suicide. change in terminology is not simply political correctness but an indication of a new role that proponents envisage for doctors the rejection of the term ‘suicide’ implies that the moral taint of suicide are determined by officials, lawmakers and doctors is to be removed courts where individuals are tried to determine the degree of their responsibility for a crime are less appropriate than professional regulatory tribunals, where the question becomes whether or not a set of regulations has been followed properly Rather than self-determining actors who choose our own fates there is little clarity and great scope for regulations at every step of the process The real issue at the heart of the debate – one which is obscured by the term assisted dying – is suicide, not dying. The question at the heart of this debate is whether we wish to pre-approve suicide in certain circumstances

the only difference between assisted dying and suicide is that the former has been officially sanctioned by legality ‘suicide’ implies that the moral taint determined by law is to be removed courts, are less appropriate than regulatory tribunals, where the question becomes whether or not regulations has been followed Rather than self-determining actors there is little clarity and great scope for regulations at every step of the process The real issue which is obscured by the term assisted dying – is suicide The question is whether we wish to pre-approve suicide

Senior Lecturer in American History at the University of Sunderland; author, Assisted Suicide: The Liberal Humanist Case Against Legalization) Kevin https://kevinyuill.wordpress.com/tag/assisted-suicide/ Second, and much more importantly, the only real difference between assisted dying and assisted suicide is that the former has been officially sanctioned by doctors and by legality. Someone in Oregon with, according to two doctors, five months left to live who ingests poison is, according to Compassion and Choices, Dignity in Dying, other proponents of a change in the law and, since 2006, the Oregon Department of Human Services, is an assisted death. Someone who is dying but has seven months to live who ingests the same poison is, according to the same sources, an assisted suicide. The change in terminology, then, is not simply political correctness but an indication of a new role that proponents envisage for doctors. Importantly, the rejection of the term ‘suicide’ implies that the moral taint of suicide in particular circumstances that are determined by officials, lawmakers and doctors is to be removed. The action of taking one’s life is no different in the two scenarios. But the former is given official imprimatur and is therefore an assisted death (good) instead of a suicide (bad). Such a change has important implications. The obvious one is that, as priests and other religious officials have departed the deathbed scene, their place has been filled by doctors. For it would be difficult to deny that, in the scenarios outlined in the introduction, doctors play a spiritual role only. As we shall explore in future chapters, suicide may be accomplished without the aid of official medicine so they play only an officiating role whereby they dispense deadly drugs that the patient might have bought herself, like a priest placing wafers on the tongues of his flock. The fact that the doctor gives the poison ritualizes the action within a set of bureaucratic guidelines. The implication for the patient, similarly, is validation of their suffering. In the past, religious figures comforted the dying by rationalizing suffering as part of God’s plan. Now, should assisted suicide be institutionalized, physicians will provide an end to depression and mental suffering (as we shall see, physical suffering plays very little role in requests for assisted suicide) by offering death as a medical treatment. The change in terminology reflects an important shift away from moral responsibility for the act. Whereas the right to die, self-determination and assisted suicide all imply that the individual involved takes full responsibility for the act, assignation of moral responsibility for ‘assisted dying’ is more diffuse. Importantly, such an apparently facile change lumps together very different things in moral terms – killing another person and suicide. Suppose I make a pact with my friend that, should I ever support a soccer team other than Arsenal, he should kill me and, twenty years later, I arrive to meet him with a Tottenham Hotspur shirt and he kills me. Alternately, suppose I agreed, upon meeting him with the offending shirt, that I should be killed for my lack of loyalty and for now supporting such a ridiculous football team. Suppose I then asked him for his gun and shot myself. These two very different acts might be construed as assisted dying (to satisfy Dignity in Dying criteria, let us also say that, at the time, I had less than six months to live), though, in a court of law, the former would be murder and the latter suicide. Though the effect would be the same for me (and, being dead, the question of my responsibility moot) and though my friend might bear some responsibility even if I pulled the trigger, the two acts are profoundly different for him. Yet the concept of assisted dying essentially equates these two different acts. In fact, as we shall discuss in Chapter 6, negating moral responsibility means that courts, where individuals are tried to determine the degree of their responsibility for a crime, are less appropriate than professional regulatory tribunals, where the question becomes whether or not a set of regulations has been followed properly. Rather than self-determining actors who choose our own fates, we become points on an increasingly complex flow chart, requiring a huge apparatus of bureaucratic experts. If we accept Dignity in Dying’s suggestion that assisted dying involves only those who are considered to be dying, an essentially philosophical question is determined by a professional regulatory body. There is little agreement on this issue even between advocates. Oregon’s and Washington’s legislation (and that contained in proposed UK legislation) define the dying as those with a terminal illness and six months to live whereas the UK Commission on Assisted Dying recommended that the subject be terminally ill and have 12 months or less to live. If the phrase ‘suffering unbearably’ is employed as it was in the proposed UK legislation, how will that be determined? Again, there is little clarity and great scope for regulations at every step of the process.[18] The assisted suicide legislation and proposed legislation has created a new identity in the ‘dying’. But the division between ‘the dying’ – whether they have six or 12 months to live – and the rest of us is false. Who is not dying one day at a time? We are all ‘terminal’, and the worth of our lives should not be crudely measured by the time we have left. Nor is dying a medical act; long before any medical intervention occurred, people were dying without any intervention at all. As Daniel Callahan has noted, there is now a tendency to view death as something that is done to us rather than something that occurs, ‘as if death were now our fault, the result of human choices, not the independent workings of nature’. As the old joke has it, life itself is a sexually transmitted disease that is always fatal. The difference between someone with less than six months to live and someone with many years is quantitative rather than qualitative. The ‘dying’ as a category are, in actuality, those who have little time left or, more controversially, as we shall explore in the next chapter, the elderly.[19] Such a term also obscures the historically different motivations behind the campaign. Autonomy, in the classical sense, implies the freedom to terminate one’s own life with no intrusion by the state or anyone else. Compassion might (mistakenly) motivate people to support a campaign for the dying to be put out of their misery. As expressed in the example above, if we support legalization of assisted dying, either we support selective suicides or selective killings. As we shall see in the next chapter, the movement for assisted dying builds upon distrust of medical personnel; none of the campaigns in the English-speaking world call for more power for doctors. As Professor Ray Tallis, prominent patron of the English proponent of a change in the law Dignity in Dying, notes, ‘It is one of the fundamental principles of medicine that you should be allowed to determine what is in your own best interest when you are of sound mind. Nobody else’s views should be able to over-ride this right.’[20] Yet the voices of doctors, should assisted suicide be institutionalized, will, as we will see in Chapter 6, will be the loudest in these decisions. Criticisms of this re-branding of suicide are not all from the anti-assisted suicide side. Such seasoned advocates of assisted suicide/dying as Derek Humphry have also questioned it. Reacting to news that the Oregon Department of Human Services chose in 2006 to replace references to ‘assisted suicide’ with ‘assisted dying’, Humphrey noted: ‘To wrap up our support for physician-assisted suicide in fancy language invites our critics to say that we are trying to change the law covertly and that we are ashamed of being frank about what we really want, neither of which is true.’ The Commission on Dying also refused to jettison the term ‘assisted suicide’, referring to ‘assisted dying’ as both assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia.[21] The real issue at the heart of the debate – one which is obscured by the term assisted dying – is suicide, not dying. The question at the heart of this debate is whether we wish to pre-approve suicide in certain circumstances.

<h4>Legalization of PAS is an affirmation of the act by official state sanction within regulation </h4><p><strong>Yuill 13</strong> </p><p>Senior Lecturer in American History at the University of Sunderland; author, Assisted Suicide: The Liberal Humanist Case Against Legalization) Kevin https://kevinyuill.wordpress.com/tag/assisted-suicide/</p><p>Second, and much more importantly, <u><strong><mark>the only</mark> real <mark>difference between assisted dying and</mark> assisted <mark>suicide is that the former has been officially sanctioned </mark>by doctors and <mark>by legality</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Someone in Oregon with, according to two doctors, five months left to live who ingests poison is</u></strong>, according to Compassion and Choices, Dignity in Dying, other proponents of a change in the law and, since 2006, the Oregon Department of Human Services, <u><strong>is an assisted death</u></strong>. <u><strong>Someone who is dying but has seven months to live who ingests the same poison is, according to the same sources, an assisted suicide. </u></strong>The <u><strong>change in terminology</u></strong>, then, <u><strong>is not simply political correctness but an indication of a new role that proponents envisage for doctors</u></strong>. Importantly, <u><strong>the rejection of the term <mark>‘suicide’ implies that the moral</u></strong> <u><strong>taint </mark>of suicide</u></strong> in particular circumstances that <u><strong>are <mark>determined by</mark> officials, <mark>law</mark>makers and doctors <mark>is to be removed</u></strong></mark>. The action of taking one’s life is no different in the two scenarios. But the former is given official imprimatur and is therefore an assisted death (good) instead of a suicide (bad). Such a change has important implications. The obvious one is that, as priests and other religious officials have departed the deathbed scene, their place has been filled by doctors. For it would be difficult to deny that, in the scenarios outlined in the introduction, doctors play a spiritual role only. As we shall explore in future chapters, suicide may be accomplished without the aid of official medicine so they play only an officiating role whereby they dispense deadly drugs that the patient might have bought herself, like a priest placing wafers on the tongues of his flock. The fact that the doctor gives the poison ritualizes the action within a set of bureaucratic guidelines. The implication for the patient, similarly, is validation of their suffering. In the past, religious figures comforted the dying by rationalizing suffering as part of God’s plan. Now, should assisted suicide be institutionalized, physicians will provide an end to depression and mental suffering (as we shall see, physical suffering plays very little role in requests for assisted suicide) by offering death as a medical treatment. The change in terminology reflects an important shift away from moral responsibility for the act. Whereas the right to die, self-determination and assisted suicide all imply that the individual involved takes full responsibility for the act, assignation of moral responsibility for ‘assisted dying’ is more diffuse. Importantly, such an apparently facile change lumps together very different things in moral terms – killing another person and suicide. Suppose I make a pact with my friend that, should I ever support a soccer team other than Arsenal, he should kill me and, twenty years later, I arrive to meet him with a Tottenham Hotspur shirt and he kills me. Alternately, suppose I agreed, upon meeting him with the offending shirt, that I should be killed for my lack of loyalty and for now supporting such a ridiculous football team. Suppose I then asked him for his gun and shot myself. These two very different acts might be construed as assisted dying (to satisfy Dignity in Dying criteria, let us also say that, at the time, I had less than six months to live), though, in a court of law, the former would be murder and the latter suicide. Though the effect would be the same for me (and, being dead, the question of my responsibility moot) and though my friend might bear some responsibility even if I pulled the trigger, the two acts are profoundly different for him. Yet the concept of assisted dying essentially equates these two different acts. In fact, as we shall discuss in Chapter 6, negating moral responsibility means that <u><strong><mark>courts</u></strong>, <u><strong></mark>where individuals are tried to determine the degree of their responsibility for a crime</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>are</u></strong> <u><strong>less appropriate than </mark>professional <mark>regulatory tribunals,</u></strong> <u><strong>where the question becomes whether or not </mark>a set of <mark>regulations has been followed </mark>properly</u></strong>. <u><strong><mark>Rather than</mark> <mark>self-determining actors</mark> who choose our own fates</u></strong>, we become points on an increasingly complex flow chart, requiring a huge apparatus of bureaucratic experts. If we accept Dignity in Dying’s suggestion that assisted dying involves only those who are considered to be dying, an essentially philosophical question is determined by a professional regulatory body. There is little agreement on this issue even between advocates. Oregon’s and Washington’s legislation (and that contained in proposed UK legislation) define the dying as those with a terminal illness and six months to live whereas the UK Commission on Assisted Dying recommended that the subject be terminally ill and have 12 months or less to live. If the phrase ‘suffering unbearably’ is employed as it was in the proposed UK legislation, how will that be determined? Again, <u><strong><mark>there is little clarity and great scope for regulations at every step of the process</u></strong></mark>.[18] The assisted suicide legislation and proposed legislation has created a new identity in the ‘dying’. But the division between ‘the dying’ – whether they have six or 12 months to live – and the rest of us is false. Who is not dying one day at a time? We are all ‘terminal’, and the worth of our lives should not be crudely measured by the time we have left. Nor is dying a medical act; long before any medical intervention occurred, people were dying without any intervention at all. As Daniel Callahan has noted, there is now a tendency to view death as something that is done to us rather than something that occurs, ‘as if death were now our fault, the result of human choices, not the independent workings of nature’. As the old joke has it, life itself is a sexually transmitted disease that is always fatal. The difference between someone with less than six months to live and someone with many years is quantitative rather than qualitative. The ‘dying’ as a category are, in actuality, those who have little time left or, more controversially, as we shall explore in the next chapter, the elderly.[19] Such a term also obscures the historically different motivations behind the campaign. Autonomy, in the classical sense, implies the freedom to terminate one’s own life with no intrusion by the state or anyone else. Compassion might (mistakenly) motivate people to support a campaign for the dying to be put out of their misery. As expressed in the example above, if we support legalization of assisted dying, either we support selective suicides or selective killings. As we shall see in the next chapter, the movement for assisted dying builds upon distrust of medical personnel; none of the campaigns in the English-speaking world call for more power for doctors. As Professor Ray Tallis, prominent patron of the English proponent of a change in the law Dignity in Dying, notes, ‘It is one of the fundamental principles of medicine that you should be allowed to determine what is in your own best interest when you are of sound mind. Nobody else’s views should be able to over-ride this right.’[20] Yet the voices of doctors, should assisted suicide be institutionalized, will, as we will see in Chapter 6, will be the loudest in these decisions. Criticisms of this re-branding of suicide are not all from the anti-assisted suicide side. Such seasoned advocates of assisted suicide/dying as Derek Humphry have also questioned it. Reacting to news that the Oregon Department of Human Services chose in 2006 to replace references to ‘assisted suicide’ with ‘assisted dying’, Humphrey noted: ‘To wrap up our support for physician-assisted suicide in fancy language invites our critics to say that we are trying to change the law covertly and that we are ashamed of being frank about what we really want, neither of which is true.’ The Commission on Dying also refused to jettison the term ‘assisted suicide’, referring to ‘assisted dying’ as both assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia.[21] <u><strong><mark>The real issue</mark> at the heart of the debate – one <mark>which is obscured by the term assisted dying – is suicide</mark>, not dying.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>The question </mark>at the heart of this debate <mark>is whether we wish to pre-approve suicide </mark>in certain circumstances</u></strong>. </p>

1NC

1NC

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx

N

UNLV

Quarters

Texas KS

Cheek, Ryan Paul, Amy Cram, Travis

1AC - PAS Death Control 1NC - T-Regs Medicalization K Pallative Care CP Euthanasia DA Midterms DA (Dems Good - RAPA) 2NC - T-Regs Case 1NR - Midterms DA 2NR - Midterms DA Case

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-UNLV-Quarters.docx

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Alternative – Reject the affirmative’s security logic

Neocleous 08

Neocleous 08

Mark, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, [Critique of Security, 185-6] Security politics is, , an anti-politics,"' reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. ; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, learning to tolerate the uncertainties, that come with being human; 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

Security politics is anti-politics," We need to get beyond security politics not add more 'sectors' to it The task is not to fill the hole with another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which does not throw us into the arms of the state. demanding 'more security' while hoping this increased security doesn't damage our liberty is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to forge another kind of politics it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition

Mark, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, [Critique of Security, 185-6] could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sewnse, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising= that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

<h4>Alternative – Reject the affirmative’s security logic </h4><p><strong><mark>Neocleous 08</strong></mark> </p><p><u><strong>Mark, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, [Critique of Security, 185-6]</p><p></u></strong>could be told - what might count as having achieved it. <u><strong><mark>Security politics is</mark>,</u></strong> in this sewnse<u><strong>, an <mark>anti-politics,"</mark>'</u></strong> dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, <u><strong>reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. <mark>We</mark> therefore <mark>need to get beyond security politics</mark>, <mark>not add</mark> yet <mark>more 'sectors' to it</u></strong></mark> in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if <u><strong>you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever</u></strong>. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. <u><strong><mark>The</mark> real <mark>task is</mark> <mark>not to fill the</mark> supposed <mark>hole with</mark> yet <mark>another vision of security, but</mark> <mark>to fight for an alternative political language which</mark> </u></strong>takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore <u><strong><mark>does not</mark> constantly <mark>throw us into the arms of the state.</mark> That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language</u></strong> more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that <u><strong>the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep <mark>demanding 'more security'</mark> (<mark>while</mark> meekly <mark>hoping</mark> that <mark>this increased security doesn't damage our liberty</mark>) <mark>is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives</mark> to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. <mark>To situate ourselves against security politics would</mark> </u></strong>allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also<u><strong> <mark>allow us to forge another kind of politics </mark>centred on a different conception of the good. </u></strong>We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising= that security is not the same as solidarity<u><strong>; <mark>it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition</mark>, </u></strong>and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead <u><strong>learning to tolerate the uncertainties, </u></strong>ambiguities and 'insecurities'<u><strong> that come with being human;</u></strong> it requires accepting that <u><strong>'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'</p></u></strong>

1NC

OFF CASE

1NC K

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx

N

Wake

3

Michigan KK

Logan Gramzinski

1AC OG Laundering Trade Econ 1NC Security K Iran Politics Econ DA Ban CP TRIPS CP 2NC Security K Case 1NR Iran Politics 2NR Iran Politics Case

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Wake-Round3.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

Deforestation leads to extinction

Watson 6

Watson 6 Captain Paul Watson, Founder and President of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society. 9/17/06, ìThe Politics of Extinction.î http://www.eco-action.org/dt/beerswil.html

The destruction of forests and the proliferation of human activity will remove more than 20 percent of all terrestrial plant species over the next fifty years. Because plants form the foundation for entire biotic communities, their demise will carry with it the extinction of an exponentially greater number of animal species -- perhaps ten times as many faunal species for each type of plant eliminated More importantly, the resurrection of bio diversity assumes an intact zone of tropical forests to provide for new speciation after extinction. Today, the tropical rain forests are disappearing more rapidly than any other bio-region, ensuring that after the age of humans Like a run-a-way train, civilization is speeding along tracks of our own manufacture towards the stone wall of extinction. Extinction is a difficult concept to fully appreciate. What has been is no more and never shall be again. It would take another creation and billions of years to recreate the passenger pigeon. it will not be long until the biospheric integrity of the Earth collapses under the weight of ecological strain and tides of death come pouring in. And that will be the price of progress -- ecological collapse, the death of nature, and with it the horrendous and mind numbing specter of massive human destruction.

plants demise will carry the extinction of a greater number of animal species the resurrection of bio diversity assumes an intact zone of tropical forests to provide for new speciation after extinction. civilization is speeding towards extinction it will not be long until the Earth collapses under the weight of ecological strain a

The destruction of forests and the proliferation of human activity will remove more than 20 percent of all terrestrial plant species over the next fifty years. Because plants form the foundation for entire biotic communities, their demise will carry with it the extinction of an exponentially greater number of animal species -- perhaps ten times as many faunal species for each type of plant eliminated. Sixty-five million years ago, a natural cataclysmic event resulted in extinction of the dinosaurs. Even with a plant foundation intact, it took more than 100,000 years for faunal biological diversity to re-establish itself. More importantly, the resurrection of biological diversity assumes an intact zone of tropical forests to provide for new speciation after extinction. Today, the tropical rain forests are disappearing more rapidly than any other bio-region, ensuring that after the age of humans, the Earth will remain a biological, if not a literal desert for eons to come. The present course of civilization points to ecocide -- the death of nature. Like a run-a-way train, civilization is speeding along tracks of our own manufacture towards the stone wall of extinction. The human passengers sitting comfortably in their seats, laughing, partying, and choosing to not look out the window. Environmentalists are those perceptive few who have their faces pressed against the glass, watching the hurling bodies of plants and animals go screaming by. Environmental activists are those even fewer people who are trying desperately to break into the fortified engine of greed that propels this destructive specicidal juggernaut. Others are desperately throwing out anchors in an attempt to slow the monster down while all the while, the authorities, blind to their own impending destruction, are clubbing, shooting and jailing those who would save us all. SHORT MEMORIES Civilized humans have for ten thousand years been marching across the face of the Earth leaving deserts in their footprints. Because we have such short memories, we forgot the wonder and splendor of a virgin nature. We revise history and make it fit into our present perceptions. For instance, are you aware that only two thousand years ago, the coast of North Africa was a mighty forest? The Phoenicians and the Carthaginians built powerful ships from the strong timbers of the region. Rome was a major exporter of timber to Europe. The temple of Jerusalem was built with titanic cedar logs, one image of which adorns the flag of Lebanon today. Jesus Christ did not live in a desert, he was a man of the forest. The Sumerians were renowned for clearing the forests of Mesopotamia for agriculture. But the destruction of the coastal swath of the North African forest stopped the rain from advancing into the interior. Without the rain, the trees died and thus was born the mighty Sahara, sired by man and continued to grow southward at a rate of ten miles per year, advancing down the length of the continent of Africa. And so will go Brazil. The precipitation off the Atlantic strikes the coastal rain forest and is absorbed and sent skyward again by the trees, falling further into the interior. Twelve times the moisture falls and twelve times it is returned to the sky -- all the way to the Andes mountains. Destroy the coastal swath and desertify Amazonia -- it is as simple as that. Create a swath anywhere between the coast and the mountains and the rains will be stopped. We did it before while relatively primitive. We learned nothing. We forgot. So too, have we forgotten that walrus once mated and bred along the coast of Nova Scotia, that sixty million bison once roamed the North American plains. One hundred years ago, the white bear once roamed the forests of New England and the Canadian Maritime provinces. Now it is called the polar bear because that is where it now makes its last stand. EXTINCTION IS DIFFICULT TO APPRECIATE Gone forever are the European elephant, lion and tiger. The Labrador duck, giant auk, Carolina parakeet will never again grace this planet of ours. Lost for all time are the Atlantic grey whales, the Biscayan right whales and the Stellar sea cow. Our children will never look upon the California condor in the wild or watch the Palos Verde blue butterfly dart from flower to flower. Extinction is a difficult concept to fully appreciate. What has been is no more and never shall be again. It would take another creation and billions of years to recreate the passenger pigeon. It is the loss of billions of years of evolutionary programming. It is the destruction of beauty, the obliteration of truth, the removal of uniqueness, the scarring of the sacred web of life To be responsible for an extinction is to commit blasphemy against the divine. It is the greatest of all possible crimes, more evil than murder, more appalling than genocide, more monstrous than even the apparent unlimited perversities of the human mind. To be responsible for the complete and utter destruction of a unique and sacred life form is arrogance that seethes with evil, for the very opposite of evil is live. It is no accident that these two words spell out each other in reverse. And yet, a reporter in California recently told me that "all the redwoods in California are not worth the life on one human being." What incredible arrogance. The rights a species, any species, must take precedence over the life of an individual or another species. This is a basic ecological law. It is not to be tampered with by primates who have molded themselves into divine legends in their own mind. For each and every one of the thirty million plus species that grace this beautiful planet are essential for the continued well-being of which we are all a part, the planet Earth -- the divine entity which brought us forth from the fertility of her sacred womb. As a sea-captain I like to compare the structural integrity of the biosphere to that of a ship's hull. Each species is a rivet that keeps the hull intact. If I were to go into my engine room and find my engineers busily popping rivets from the hull, I would be upset and naturally I would ask them what they were doing. If they told me that they discovered that they could make a dollar each from the rivets, I could do one of three things. I could ignore them. I could ask them to cut me in for a share of the profits, or I could kick their asses out of the engine room and off my ship. If I was a responsible captain, I would do the latter. If I did not, I would soon find the ocean pouring through the holes left by the stolen rivets and very shortly after, my ship, my crew and myself would disappear beneath the waves. And that is the state of the world today. The political leaders, i.e., the captains at the helms of their nation states, are ignoring the rivet poppers or they are cutting themselves in for the profits. There are very few asses being kicked out of the engine room of spaceship Earth. With the rivet poppers in command, it will not be long until the biospheric integrity of the Earth collapses under the weight of ecological strain and tides of death come pouring in. And that will be the price of progress -- ecological collapse, the death of nature, and with it the horrendous and mind numbing specter of massive human destruction.

<h4><strong>Deforestation leads to extinction</h4><p>Watson 6</p><p></strong>Captain Paul Watson, Founder and President of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society. 9/17/06, ìThe Politics of Extinction.î<u><strong> http://www.eco-action.org/dt/beerswil.html</p><p>The destruction of forests and the proliferation of human activity will remove more than 20 percent of all terrestrial plant species over the next fifty years. Because <mark>plants </mark>form the foundation for entire biotic communities, their <mark>demise will carry </mark>with it <mark>the extinction of a</mark>n exponentially <mark>greater number of animal species</mark> -- perhaps ten times as many faunal species for each type of plant eliminated</u></strong>. Sixty-five million years ago, a natural cataclysmic event resulted in extinction of the dinosaurs. Even with a plant foundation intact, it took more than 100,000 years for faunal biological diversity to re-establish itself. <u><strong>More importantly, <mark>the resurrection of bio</u></strong></mark>logical<mark> <u><strong>diversity assumes an intact zone of tropical forests to provide for new speciation after extinction.</mark> Today, the tropical rain forests are disappearing more rapidly than any other bio-region, ensuring that after the age of humans</u></strong>, the Earth will remain a biological, if not a literal desert for eons to come. The present course of civilization points to ecocide -- the death of nature. <u><strong>Like a run-a-way train, <mark>civilization is speeding </mark>along tracks of our own manufacture<mark> towards </mark>the stone wall of <mark>extinction</mark>.</u></strong> The human passengers sitting comfortably in their seats, laughing, partying, and choosing to not look out the window. Environmentalists are those perceptive few who have their faces pressed against the glass, watching the hurling bodies of plants and animals go screaming by. Environmental activists are those even fewer people who are trying desperately to break into the fortified engine of greed that propels this destructive specicidal juggernaut. Others are desperately throwing out anchors in an attempt to slow the monster down while all the while, the authorities, blind to their own impending destruction, are clubbing, shooting and jailing those who would save us all. SHORT MEMORIES Civilized humans have for ten thousand years been marching across the face of the Earth leaving deserts in their footprints. Because we have such short memories, we forgot the wonder and splendor of a virgin nature. We revise history and make it fit into our present perceptions. For instance, are you aware that only two thousand years ago, the coast of North Africa was a mighty forest? The Phoenicians and the Carthaginians built powerful ships from the strong timbers of the region. Rome was a major exporter of timber to Europe. The temple of Jerusalem was built with titanic cedar logs, one image of which adorns the flag of Lebanon today. Jesus Christ did not live in a desert, he was a man of the forest. The Sumerians were renowned for clearing the forests of Mesopotamia for agriculture. But the destruction of the coastal swath of the North African forest stopped the rain from advancing into the interior. Without the rain, the trees died and thus was born the mighty Sahara, sired by man and continued to grow southward at a rate of ten miles per year, advancing down the length of the continent of Africa. And so will go Brazil. The precipitation off the Atlantic strikes the coastal rain forest and is absorbed and sent skyward again by the trees, falling further into the interior. Twelve times the moisture falls and twelve times it is returned to the sky -- all the way to the Andes mountains. Destroy the coastal swath and desertify Amazonia -- it is as simple as that. Create a swath anywhere between the coast and the mountains and the rains will be stopped. We did it before while relatively primitive. We learned nothing. We forgot. So too, have we forgotten that walrus once mated and bred along the coast of Nova Scotia, that sixty million bison once roamed the North American plains. One hundred years ago, the white bear once roamed the forests of New England and the Canadian Maritime provinces. Now it is called the polar bear because that is where it now makes its last stand. EXTINCTION IS DIFFICULT TO APPRECIATE Gone forever are the European elephant, lion and tiger. The Labrador duck, giant auk, Carolina parakeet will never again grace this planet of ours. Lost for all time are the Atlantic grey whales, the Biscayan right whales and the Stellar sea cow. Our children will never look upon the California condor in the wild or watch the Palos Verde blue butterfly dart from flower to flower. <u><strong>Extinction is a difficult concept to fully appreciate. What has been is no more and never shall be again. It would take another creation and billions of years to recreate the passenger pigeon.</u></strong> It is the loss of billions of years of evolutionary programming. It is the destruction of beauty, the obliteration of truth, the removal of uniqueness, the scarring of the sacred web of life To be responsible for an extinction is to commit blasphemy against the divine. It is the greatest of all possible crimes, more evil than murder, more appalling than genocide, more monstrous than even the apparent unlimited perversities of the human mind. To be responsible for the complete and utter destruction of a unique and sacred life form is arrogance that seethes with evil, for the very opposite of evil is live. It is no accident that these two words spell out each other in reverse. And yet, a reporter in California recently told me that "all the redwoods in California are not worth the life on one human being." What incredible arrogance. The rights a species, any species, must take precedence over the life of an individual or another species. This is a basic ecological law. It is not to be tampered with by primates who have molded themselves into divine legends in their own mind. For each and every one of the thirty million plus species that grace this beautiful planet are essential for the continued well-being of which we are all a part, the planet Earth -- the divine entity which brought us forth from the fertility of her sacred womb. As a sea-captain I like to compare the structural integrity of the biosphere to that of a ship's hull. Each species is a rivet that keeps the hull intact. If I were to go into my engine room and find my engineers busily popping rivets from the hull, I would be upset and naturally I would ask them what they were doing. If they told me that they discovered that they could make a dollar each from the rivets, I could do one of three things. I could ignore them. I could ask them to cut me in for a share of the profits, or I could kick their asses out of the engine room and off my ship. If I was a responsible captain, I would do the latter. If I did not, I would soon find the ocean pouring through the holes left by the stolen rivets and very shortly after, my ship, my crew and myself would disappear beneath the waves. And that is the state of the world today. The political leaders, i.e., the captains at the helms of their nation states, are ignoring the rivet poppers or they are cutting themselves in for the profits. There are very few asses being kicked out of the engine room of spaceship Earth. With the rivet poppers in command, <u><strong><mark>it will not be long until the </mark>biospheric integrity of the <mark>Earth collapses under the weight of ecological strain a</mark>nd tides of death come pouring in. And that will be the price of progress -- ecological collapse, the death of nature, and with it the horrendous and mind numbing specter of massive human destruction.</p></u></strong>

1AC

1AC – Scenario 2

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-UMKC-Round5.docx

A

UMKC

5

SFSU AG

Brian Rubaie

1AC Marijuana Environment 1NC Settlerism K 2NC Settlerism K 1NR Settlerism K 2NR Settlerism K

ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Aff-UMKC-Round5.docx

BaSh

Baylor BaSh

An.....

Ba.....

Si.....

Sh.....

Baylor

Baylor

ndtceda14

NDT/CEDA 2014-15

cx

college

B. Statistics

Parlow and Chakrabati 9

Parlow and Chakrabati 9 Does trade promote peace? A new window in Economics Anton Parlow and Prof. Avik Chakrabati University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee Department of Economics November 24, 2009 https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/aparlow/www/papers/conflict_2.pdf

conflict does not explain trade and trade does not explain current level of conflicts Meaning there is no relationship between past values trade and conflict on current values of the two variables Both variables are only explained by their own past realizations. the conflict equation is hardly valid as a model The coefficients of the past realizations of conflict on trade and trade on conflict are unusual in magnitude and not significant at all.

trade does not explain current level of conflicts there is no relationship between past values trade and conflict on current values of the two variables The coefficients of the past realizations of conflict on trade and trade on conflict are unusual in magnitude and not significant at all

The regression results for the unrestricted bivariate VAR-model including one lag are presented in table 5. The main result is that conflict does not explain trade and trade does not explain current level of conflicts. Meaning there is no relationship between past values trade and conflict on current values of the two variables using the sample chosen here. Both variables are only explained by their own past realizations. Furthermore the conflict equation is hardly valid as a model (very low R2 and F-value). The coefficients of the past realizations of conflict on trade and trade on conflict are unusual in magnitude and not significant at all. There is no comparable approach so far in the literature which means we need further research to con_rm these results. Furthermore a longer time pe- riod is needed and maybe more variables for the VAR-model e.g. GDP as a measurement for economic size. A problem with adding more variables to a VAR-system is that it gets less tractable and needs some structure to make useful interpretations of the parameter estimates.

<h4>B. Statistics</h4><p><u><strong>Parlow and Chakrabati 9 </u></strong>Does trade promote peace? A new window in Economics Anton Parlow and Prof. Avik Chakrabati University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee Department of Economics November 24, 2009 https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/aparlow/www/papers/conflict_2.pdf</p><p>The regression results for the unrestricted bivariate VAR-model including one lag are presented in table 5. The main result is that <u><strong>conflict does not explain trade and <mark>trade does not explain current level of conflicts</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Meaning <mark>there is no relationship between past values trade and conflict on current values of the two variables</u></strong></mark> using the sample chosen here. <u><strong>Both variables are only explained by their own past realizations.</u></strong> Furthermore <u><strong>the conflict equation is hardly valid as a model </u></strong>(very low R2 and F-value). <u><strong><mark>The coefficients of the past realizations of conflict on trade and trade on conflict are unusual in magnitude and not significant at all</mark>.</u></strong> There is no comparable approach so far in the literature which means we need further research to con_rm these results. Furthermore a longer time pe- riod is needed and maybe more variables for the VAR-model e.g. GDP as a measurement for economic size. A problem with adding more variables to a VAR-system is that it gets less tractable and needs some structure to make useful interpretations of the parameter estimates.</p>

1NC

1NC WTO

AT: Impact – Trade War

./documents/ndtceda14/Baylor/BaSh/Baylor-Barron-Sheaff-Neg-Kentucky-Round7.docx

N

Kentucky

7

Georgetown EK

Box, Brian

1AC - Online Gambling Econ Laundering WTO 1NC - Death K Risk K China Reps K Fiat K 2NC - Death K 1NR - Risk K Fiat K Case 2NR - Death K