Add new SentenceTransformer model.

1_Pooling/config.json

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "word_embedding_dimension": 768,
+  "pooling_mode_cls_token": false,
+  "pooling_mode_mean_tokens": true,
+  "pooling_mode_max_tokens": false,
+  "pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens": false,
+  "pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens": false,
+  "pooling_mode_lasttoken": false,
+  "include_prompt": true
+}

README.md

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+---
+base_model: nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
+datasets: []
+language: []
+library_name: sentence-transformers
+metrics:
+- cosine_accuracy
+- dot_accuracy
+- manhattan_accuracy
+- euclidean_accuracy
+- max_accuracy
+pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
+tags:
+- sentence-transformers
+- sentence-similarity
+- feature-extraction
+- generated_from_trainer
+- dataset_size:10000
+- loss:TripletLoss
+widget:
+- source_sentence: met, Peter van Inwagen, a libertarian, concludes that free will
+    is a mystery. Recently, the Mind Argument has drawn a number of criticisms. Here
+    I seek to add to its woes. Quite apart from its other problems, I argue, the Mind
+    Argument does a poor job of isolating the important concern for libertarians that
+    it raises. Once this concern has been clarified,
+  sentences:
+  - however, another argument serves to renew the challenge. The Assimilation Argument
+    challenges libertarians to explain how ostensible exercises of free will are relevantly
+    different from other causally undetermined outcomes, outcomes that nobody would
+    count as exercises of free will. In particular, libertarians must explain how
+    agents can have the power
+  - contended that the Assimilation Argument is unsound. Here I defend the Assimilation
+    Argument and the Rollback Argument, a second challenge to libertarianism that
+    Franklin rejects. My aim in doing so is to underscore the force of these challenges,
+    and thereby to resist what appears to be an emerging trend in
+  - 'is meant to bring out a number of crucial points about the process itself: (a)
+    Scientific theories are formed at many levels of generality, ranging from simple''
+    generalizations covering a small portion of the data to complex theories covering
+    the whole area of inquiry. There are, of course, no rules dic tating which level
+    is most appropriate at a given stage of inquiry; the history of science suggests,
+    however (i) that it rarely works if one jumps from the data to an all-encompassing
+    theory but that (ii) one need not progress 448 BARUCH A. BRODY through all the
+    intermediary levels of generalization before one formulates a broad theory. I
+    want to claim that the history of morals suggests the same conclusions, and that
+    (i) in particular, suggests that moral theory and moral philosophy have been operating
+    in a fundamentally incorrect fashion. Full scale systematizations (such as utilitarianism)
+    have emerged long before we have had any even half-successful lower-level moral
+    generalizations of any sophistication. John Stuart Mill was, at least, sensitive
+    about this issue, and he3 put forward the following distinction between the methods
+    of science and of moral reasoning: The truths which are ultimately accepted as
+    the first principles of a science, are really the last result of metaphysical
+    analysis, practised on the elementary no tions with which the science is conversant;
+    and their relation to this science is not that of foundations to an edifice, but
+    of roots to a tree, which may'
+- source_sentence: when he comes to deal with the general theory of relativity and
+    with quantum theory, the reader has to have an elementary knowledge of tensor
+    analysis and of matrix mechanics. That Lenzen makes this demand upon his reader
+    is not his fault. We have reached a stage where the student of the philosophy
+    of science must equip himself with knowledge of at least the elements of a number
+    of mathematical disciplines. I shall touch only those parts of his book that any
+    intelligent reader can understand. First, what is " a physical thing"? "A fundamental
+    property of a thing is that it has aspects. If I look at a book upon the table
+    I experience in sensation a partial aspect of the book. A thing presents different
+    aspects from different points of view. We can describe an aspect by saying that
+    it is colored, that it has a certain shape, that it is smooth, etc. Knowledge
+    of a thing is ultimately based upon acquaintance with aspects of the thing. However,
+    the concept of thina implies more than the concept of given aspects; there are
+    also possible aspects. Thus while I am merely seeing the book some visible aspect
+    is given, whereas the tangible aspects are merely possible. Hence a thing may
+    be characterized as an entity which has given and possible aspects. . . . An aspect
+    is a union of particular qualities, complexities and relationships" (pp. 15-16).
+    "A physical body is a class of aspects which are or can be given to some mind."
+    "The problem of physics is the
+  sentences:
+  - 'But functions are cheap and determination is not there is probably a function
+    from the GDP of each country to the number of its bald citizens but the former
+    surely does not determine the latter. Obviously, (C) says more than that a certain
+    function exists. However, since it is a matter of controversy how much more it
+    says, for the purposes of this paper I won''t assume any strong construal of compositional
+    determination.8 There is a key ambiguity in (C) that has long been neglected in
+    the literature: the plural definite description in it can be construed either
+    distributively or collectively. The collective reading is compatible with the
+    possibility that the meanings of certain complex expressions depend not only on
+    the meanings their constituents have in themselves, but also on relations that
+    hold among these meanings. I will follow the usual practice in reading ''the meanings
+    of its constituents'' in (C) distributively.9 Thus construed (C) (together with
+    certain straightforward assumptions about the syntax of the language under consideration10)
+    entails that ambiguity in a complex expression is either syntactic (derives from
+    the fact that the expression has more than one structure) or lexical (derives
+    from the fact that some lexical constituent of the expression has more than one
+    meaning). (C) is not a principle anyone is interested in for its own sake. Philosophers,
+    linguists, and psychologists are all concerned with substantially stronger theses.
+    The philosopher''s compositionality is a claim about explanatory priority. It
+    says that'
+  - 'and their possible solution'' the book is divided into six parts, these into
+    sections and chapters. There are also two appendixes, one offering a scheme for
+    the history of philosophy, the other a bibliography. Under the ''Metaphysics of
+    Nature'' ''substance and quality,'' the PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS 133
+    mechanical and atomic theories, time and space, are ably discussed, and much that
+    is said represents very modern tendencies in physical science. It being the work
+    of science to discover universal characteristics, and the sciences being classifiable
+    on the basis of the degrees of the universality of their concepts, mechanics presents
+    itself as the most universal because it deals with extension, impenetrability,
+    location and motion. But the mere ubiquitousness of these does not disprove the
+    objectivity also of the ''secondary qualities.'' "Exceptional existence is not
+    necessarily subjective existence." Both classes of qualities are revealed upon
+    the same sense basis. In any case, we in treating of them make use only of abstractions,
+    and science is justified in using the more universally occurring qualities, for
+    they make all things comparable and systematizable. Therewith, because of this
+    genesis, this isolation of the primary from the secondary qualities in the process
+    of abstraction, the two coexisting in the concrete object, it is impossible to
+    reduce the secondary to the primary, although the latter may serve as an index,
+    or means of comparison, for the former. The question, fundamental for the understanding
+    of the meaning of mechanics, which the reviewer would ask here, is:'
+  - description of the characters and relations of aspects which may be represented
+    by numbers." "The objectivity of the physical order in grounded in correlations
+    between aspects given to different minds" (p. 6). From this it appears that "an
+    important relation to which aspects may be terms is the relation of objects to
+    subject. The discussion of this specific very pervasive relationship raises the
+    problem of the status of aspects with respect to their dependence on, or independence
+    of, being given to some mind. . . . I do not wish, however, to discuss this question
+    in the present book; it appears to me that it is possible 608 JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
+    to construct science without answering, or even raising, the metaphysical problem.
+    I have endeavored to use the term aspect without giving it a subjectivistic or
+    realistic interpretation. . . . We can describe given and possible aspects, or
+    elements, without considering the problem of their subjectivity or independent
+    reality. The systematic description and correlation of aspects of reality is the
+    problem of science. "Now the reference to the metaphysical problem has provided
+    us with additional concepts for the expression of the criterion of physical reality.
+    The fundamental principle is that in the construction of a physical theory one
+    employs a subjectivistic criterion of reality and assumes a realistic attitude.
+    A thing is real because it is an object of possible experience; yet one describes
+    it as if it
+- source_sentence: 'of touch which one has learned to expect, does not in fact occur
+    in these cases. It may be, on the other hand, that the matter of correlation is
+    merely unusual, as for example if one dreamt night after night of a certain object
+    being at a certain place: i. e., if one''s sense-data were correlated in a certain
+    way. Then if one went to the place at which the sense-data ordinarily would have
+    led one to expect to see certain sense-data correlated with the others in a particular
+    way, one might not experience such a sense datum. Again, if in what is called
+    "waking life" one saw sense data at different times which one could correlate
+    by saying that they all belong to the sun, one would probably see certain sense-data
+    as expected at other times ; but if the sense-data had only been given in dreams,
+    any reference of that kind would very probably be fallacious. Thus sense-data
+    are said to be unreal when inferences usually true turn out to be false. Thus
+    while it appears essential to predicate primary existence of all sense-data with
+    which we are 142 THE MONIST. acquainted, sense-data can be said to be real or
+    unreal in a definite sense. The things which make up the outside world appear
+    to be par ticulars and facts. Facts therefore have a kind of existence, which
+    we will call "primary existence of facts," but which is not of the same kind as
+    that for particulars : for the intrinsic nature of facts'
+  sentences:
+  - 'situations. Propositions (unlocated ones-there are also located propositions)
+    are sets P of situation types satisfying a monotonicity principle: If s e P and
+    s c s'' then s'' E P. These propositions are the objects of propositional attitudes
+    in general and so will serve to interpret the complements of indirect discourse
+    predicates such as ''believe'' and ''say,'' as well as NI complements. Intensionality
+    comes into propositions from two sources: through relations, which are not characterized
+    extensionally in this theory, and through the multiplicity of situation types.
+    The use of partial functions means that the logic of propositions will be non-Boolean
+    in some way. Semantic innocence and uncompromising situations (SIUS) sketches
+    the same theoretical apparatus, adding to it an extended discussion of innocence,
+    and of an argument (called "the slingshot" by the authors) that is felt to threaten
+    innocence. The authors devote much of these three articles to locating their approach
+    historically and to motivating it; relatively little space is spent on formulating
+    the theory. Mathematically-minded logicians interested in situation semantics
+    will probably be most concerned with technical matters. But the 1984, Association
+    for Symbolic Logic 0022-4812/84/4901-0032/$03.30 1403 1404 REVIEWS motivation
+    of theories is an indispensable part both of philosophical logic and of natural
+    language semantics, and in this review I will try to give equal attention to motivation
+    and to the theory itself. I will begin with semantic innocence, a recurrent theme
+    in the three articles. The term is meant to suggest a natural, direct'
+  - is different from the nature of particulars, and in view of their intrinsically
+    different natures, the same property cannot signifi cantly be predicated of both.
+    As far as one can see, this apparatus of particulars and facts is adequate for
+    the building up of empirical knowledge. Thus, we do not postulate existence of
+    the primary kind to any other objects of our thought. We do not assume primary
+    existence for physical objects and points and other non experienced things. Having
+    considered briefly the crude data given empirically, we have to build up the other
+    objects of thought by means of logical construction. It would perhaps be advisable
+    to state shortly what appears to be the essence of this method. The problem for
+    the solution of which this method is to be used is as follows. Cer tain things
+    are given in experience?sense-particulars of various kinds and facts. We then
+    wish to find other terms, such that in analyzing any proposition in which they
+    occur, they themselves do not occur, but only the things which are given in experience.
+    At the same time, these terms, are to have certain definite properties. Then although
+    a term a (say) appears in a proposition a yet it will be possible to analyze a
+    into a proposition not containing a if a stand for a logical construction. In
+    this way we shall be able to use propositions apparently containing a without
+    in any way pre judging whether a is
+  - particular (Socrates), so that it can't be predicated of Socrates without redundancy.
+    According to Preston, this suggests that a concrete particular and its property
+    instances aren't genuinely related. We argue that Preston's proffered solution
+    here-to treat property instances as "mental constructs"-is fraught with difficulty.
+    We then go on to
+- source_sentence: just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos
+    .... " 6 THE EXPLORATION OF THE LIFE-WORLD In France, this primordial mode of
+    reflection by which each person in a free society to some degree works out his
+    own style of life and his own way of understanding the world is now distinguished
+    as primary thinking from what is called secondary reflection, that critical reflection
+    on the former to which we may devote a calm moment in life, and which has been
+    judged important enough to be handed over to a special group, known as philosophers,
+    for disciplined attention throughout a large part of our history. Primary thought
+    is spontaneous, always concerned and interested, often creative, but uncritical.
+    It is to this type of thought that we owe the first original answers that have
+    been given to the ambiguities and agonies of life. But when left to itself, without
+    criticism, this style of reflection becomes provincial, fanatical, and closed
+    to what is universally human. Secondary reflection, on the other hand, is reflective
+    and disinterested, self-conscious, critical, and open to the universal. It is
+    through this type of secondary reflection, when it is in touch with the former,
+    that fanaticism is avoided, and our existence in the life-world is kept open and
+    free. When left to itself, however, it becomes abstract, sterile, and uncreative.
+    The original aim of academic philosophy was not to replace primary thought by
+    developing special techniques of its own. As expressed in the ancient ideal of
+  sentences:
+  - 'assertions of modernity. Only observed "constant conjunctions" of variables and
+    entities (e.g., heat and fire) allow us to state real (and even here he is skeptical)
+    and law-like relationships.2 This, of course, immediately entails problems for
+    forms of natural rights, which are then compounded by Hume''s second assertion,
+    his guillotine: that facts and values are separate things: In every system of
+    morality which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author
+    proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the 576
+    Philosophy East & West being of God or makes observations concerning human affairs;
+    when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations
+    of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected
+    with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however,
+    of the last consequence. For as this ought or ought not, expresses some new relation
+    or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and
+    at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable,
+    how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different
+    from it.3 Modern analogues are provided by Alfred Jules Ayer''s Logical Positivist
+    statement that "exhortations of moral virtue ... do not belong to any branch of
+    philosophy or science" or Richard Lipsey''s influential positive-normative distinction
+    in economics.4 The point, however, is that Empiricist philosophy splits apart
+    the possibility that being contributes something to a connection between the rights'
+  - wisdom, it was rather to exercise a kind of therapy over the acts of primary reflection
+    that constitute an essential phase of human existence, warning it against serious
+    errors, clarifying the basic meanings and issues, and thus helping it, so far
+    as possible, to face those decisions between different global interpretations
+    of the world which every free man must make. In so far as it has actually exercised
+    this therapeutic function, philosophy is properly regarded as the discipline of
+    freedom, and I believe that by its pressing of basic questions in the face of
+    political and theological tyranny, and by its maintenance of communication between
+    radically divergent worlds it has made an essential contribution to what we may
+    call the discipline of freedom, and the life of free societies in the West. But
+    it is easy for special groups, set aside to perform a basic therapeutic function,
+    to develop special aims and techniques of their own in its place. James had a
+    keen sense for the needlessly abstract and academic, and hated it with all his
+    heart and soul. He realized that the traditional philosophy of his time had become
+    separated from the primary thinking of our lived existence. Instead of trying
+    to clarify and criticize this vital process of the Lebenswelt, it was concerned
+    with formulating special techniques and artificial constructions in a very different
+    world of its own. There are many passages where James con7 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL
+    ASSOCIATION trasts the pattern, the meaning, the very feeling
+  - both the benign and the morbid in James's spiritual state. Moreover, the book
+    is philosophical in the further sense that it is by far the best account of James's
+    philosophical and psychological views, their development, their aims, and their
+    potencies that has yet appeared or (I should say) is ever likely to appear. Nothing
+    is lost by the biographical form of presentation or by the choice (wherever possible)
+    of a literary rather than of a technical vocabulary. Furthermore, James's many
+    contacts with the Europe of his day as well as with the American continent, his
+    polyglot 104 NEW BOOKS acquaintance with the antecedents of the contemporary ideas
+    that confronted him and that he did so much to improve; in a word, his intense
+    professional sociality, make an account of his thoughts very largely an account
+    of the thought of his times. Mr. Perry, half incidentally, has become the historian
+    of all philosophy at the turn of the present century with rather extensive retrospects
+    and prospects. There are very few living writers who could have done the job half
+    so well. Indeed, Mr. Perry's altogether peculiar opportunities for performing
+    this immense task are only equalled by his competence to perform it. He enjoyed
+    James's professional esteem as well as his friendship. Thus we read in the Letters
+    (II, I2I) that James, in I900, regarded Perry as "certainly the soundest, most
+    normal all-round man of our recent production" (i.e. in Harvard), and again, in
+    I907, that in James's opinion (II, 295) Perry "had
+- source_sentence: 'of aU governments, including democracy, as follows: If moraUty
+    presupposes individual autonomy, and every government denies that auto nomy, then
+    no government can be moraUy justified, (p. 1) An autonomous person, Cohen points
+    out, foUowing Kant, is one who is self-legislating, "Acting out of respect for
+    a rule which he imposes upon Studies in Soviet Thought 25 (1983) 219. 220 REVIEWS
+    himself, not out of fear or habit" (pp. 1?2). How, then, can an individual be
+    self-legislating on the one hand, but obligated to obey the commands of the state
+    on the other? Cohen finds the answer to this apparent d?emma in the notion of
+    partici pation : In a democracy but only in a democracy each citizen has a right
+    to a voice in the lawmaking process. Enjoyment of this right commits the citizen
+    to respect the laws ''resulting from that process. The agreement to participate
+    is not contingent upon getting one''s own way. Each citizen knows, even before
+    learning what issues w?l arise, that no one w?l always get his way. But be?eving
+    the legislative process fair, each person is com mitted in advance to observe
+    the rules that are its outcome. To that system, full consent is given. Governments
+    derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, (pp. 3-4) Cohen explains
+    that the obligation to obey the law, wh?e a "prima facie and very powerful" one,
+    is not absolute, (p. 5) A citizen is not required to do the bidding of the state
+    as though he were its slave. The ''promise'' which a citizen makes to obey the
+    law, as'
+  sentences:
+  - 'any other promise, may be broken moraUy in "truly exceptional circumstances"
+    where a duty stronger than the duty to obey the law arises.3 Having argued that
+    democracy is the only moraUy viable poUtical system, Professor Cohen moves next
+    to explore whether democracy thrives better in a sociaUst or capitaUst economic
+    setting. Cohen asserts that sociaUst democracy is bu?t on two main principles:
+    (1) pubUc ownership of the means of production and distribution; and (2) planning
+    production and distribution for the common good. (p. 58) SociaUsm is a logical
+    extension of democracy, he notes, bringing the popular w?l to matters of production
+    and wealth. SociaUsm involves "the democratic control of aU resources in the community
+    by society as a whole", (p. 41) Socialism meshes weU with human nature, Cohen
+    arugues, for human beings have "a deep and natural inclination to help (one another)
+    ..." (p. 64) He Usts a number of practical advantages of socialism over capitaUsm.
+    SociaUsm, he claims, is less subject to, if not immune from, inherent flaws in
+    capitaUsm, including extremes in wealth, cycles of boom and bust, unemploy ment,
+    wastes of competition associated with costly advertisement and packag ing, and
+    the subordination of workers. Further, socialism has an impressive track record:
+    "Many socialist countries, mamtaining five and seven year economic plans under
+    continual adjustment, have met with phenomenal success", (p. 59) Even capitaUst
+    countries impUcitly affirm the viab?ity of REVIEWS 221 sociaUsm'
+  - 'efficiency, the design of the market can reflect other social values, as we shall
+    see. A version of the market which is likely to appeal to socialists is the following:
+    the means of production are owned by the state but leased to groups of workers
+    in such a way that each worker gets productive resources of roughly equal value.
+    Each cooperative decides on the nature and volume of its production, and sells
+    its goods on the market. The profits are distributed among the members of each
+    cooperative according to mutually agreed rules, though we may suppose that profits
+    above a certain point are heavily taxed by the state, partly to accumulate resources
+    for future generations, partly to finance an extensive welfare state which provides
+    for essential needs without charge. For cooperatives which are unable to make
+    a profit, there is a social security system which supplements their members''
+    incomes until they find a more profitable line of production or move elsewhere.
+    The private hiring of labour is, however, made illegal in the same way as slavery
+    is today. This brief sketch of a socialist market system needs to be filled out
+    in various ways. There are difficulties in setting down the terms on [476] POLITICAL
+    THEORY / NOVEMBER 1977 which capital would be leased by the state to the workers''
+    cooperatives; for instance, in establishing how far cooperatives should be allowed
+    to accumulate capital for their own expansion. The rules of association for each
+    cooperative need to be specified, particularly those governing the entry and exit'
+  - the kinetropic and lexigraphemic to inaugurate the kinetic cogito. Maurice Merleau-Ponty's
+    phenomenological exposition of corporeality further amplified the reflexive potential
+    of movement and the philosophical understanding of kinesthesia, and King cites
+    as well
+model-index:
+- name: SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
+  results:
+  - task:
+      type: triplet
+      name: Triplet
+    dataset:
+      name: nomic
+      type: nomic
+    metrics:
+    - type: cosine_accuracy
+      value: 0.958
+      name: Cosine Accuracy
+    - type: dot_accuracy
+      value: 0.042
+      name: Dot Accuracy
+    - type: manhattan_accuracy
+      value: 0.956
+      name: Manhattan Accuracy
+    - type: euclidean_accuracy
+      value: 0.958
+      name: Euclidean Accuracy
+    - type: max_accuracy
+      value: 0.958
+      name: Max Accuracy
+  - task:
+      type: triplet
+      name: Triplet
+    dataset:
+      name: all nli test
+      type: all-nli-test
+    metrics:
+    - type: cosine_accuracy
+      value: 0.975
+      name: Cosine Accuracy
+    - type: dot_accuracy
+      value: 0.025
+      name: Dot Accuracy
+    - type: manhattan_accuracy
+      value: 0.9725
+      name: Manhattan Accuracy
+    - type: euclidean_accuracy
+      value: 0.975
+      name: Euclidean Accuracy
+    - type: max_accuracy
+      value: 0.975
+      name: Max Accuracy
+---
+
+# SentenceTransformer based on nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1
+
+This is a [sentence-transformers](https://www.SBERT.net) model finetuned from [nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1](https://huggingface.co/nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1). It maps sentences & paragraphs to a 768-dimensional dense vector space and can be used for semantic textual similarity, semantic search, paraphrase mining, text classification, clustering, and more.
+
+## Model Details
+
+### Model Description
+- **Model Type:** Sentence Transformer
+- **Base model:** [nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1](https://huggingface.co/nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1) <!-- at revision ec7a86b7066613e0a8acf87e1fcaaf23f8733dd6 -->
+- **Maximum Sequence Length:** 8192 tokens
+- **Output Dimensionality:** 768 tokens
+- **Similarity Function:** Cosine Similarity
+<!-- - **Training Dataset:** Unknown -->
+<!-- - **Language:** Unknown -->
+<!-- - **License:** Unknown -->
+
+### Model Sources
+
+- **Documentation:** [Sentence Transformers Documentation](https://sbert.net)
+- **Repository:** [Sentence Transformers on GitHub](https://github.com/UKPLab/sentence-transformers)
+- **Hugging Face:** [Sentence Transformers on Hugging Face](https://huggingface.co/models?library=sentence-transformers)
+
+### Full Model Architecture
+
+```
+SentenceTransformer(
+  (0): Transformer({'max_seq_length': 8192, 'do_lower_case': False}) with Transformer model: NomicBertModel 
+  (1): Pooling({'word_embedding_dimension': 768, 'pooling_mode_cls_token': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_tokens': True, 'pooling_mode_max_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_mean_sqrt_len_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_weightedmean_tokens': False, 'pooling_mode_lasttoken': False, 'include_prompt': True})
+  (2): Normalize()
+)
+```
+
+## Usage
+
+### Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)
+
+First install the Sentence Transformers library:
+
+```bash
+pip install -U sentence-transformers
+```
+
+Then you can load this model and run inference.
+```python
+from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer
+
+# Download from the 🤗 Hub
+model = SentenceTransformer("m7n/nomic-embed-philosophy-triplets_v1")
+# Run inference
+sentences = [
+    'of aU governments, including democracy, as follows: If moraUty presupposes individual autonomy, and every government denies that auto nomy, then no government can be moraUy justified, (p. 1) An autonomous person, Cohen points out, foUowing Kant, is one who is self-legislating, "Acting out of respect for a rule which he imposes upon Studies in Soviet Thought 25 (1983) 219. 220 REVIEWS himself, not out of fear or habit" (pp. 1?2). How, then, can an individual be self-legislating on the one hand, but obligated to obey the commands of the state on the other? Cohen finds the answer to this apparent d?emma in the notion of partici pation : In a democracy but only in a democracy each citizen has a right to a voice in the lawmaking process. Enjoyment of this right commits the citizen to respect the laws \'resulting from that process. The agreement to participate is not contingent upon getting one\'s own way. Each citizen knows, even before learning what issues w?l arise, that no one w?l always get his way. But be?eving the legislative process fair, each person is com mitted in advance to observe the rules that are its outcome. To that system, full consent is given. Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, (pp. 3-4) Cohen explains that the obligation to obey the law, wh?e a "prima facie and very powerful" one, is not absolute, (p. 5) A citizen is not required to do the bidding of the state as though he were its slave. The \'promise\' which a citizen makes to obey the law, as',
+    'any other promise, may be broken moraUy in "truly exceptional circumstances" where a duty stronger than the duty to obey the law arises.3 Having argued that democracy is the only moraUy viable poUtical system, Professor Cohen moves next to explore whether democracy thrives better in a sociaUst or capitaUst economic setting. Cohen asserts that sociaUst democracy is bu?t on two main principles: (1) pubUc ownership of the means of production and distribution; and (2) planning production and distribution for the common good. (p. 58) SociaUsm is a logical extension of democracy, he notes, bringing the popular w?l to matters of production and wealth. SociaUsm involves "the democratic control of aU resources in the community by society as a whole", (p. 41) Socialism meshes weU with human nature, Cohen arugues, for human beings have "a deep and natural inclination to help (one another) ..." (p. 64) He Usts a number of practical advantages of socialism over capitaUsm. SociaUsm, he claims, is less subject to, if not immune from, inherent flaws in capitaUsm, including extremes in wealth, cycles of boom and bust, unemploy ment, wastes of competition associated with costly advertisement and packag ing, and the subordination of workers. Further, socialism has an impressive track record: "Many socialist countries, mamtaining five and seven year economic plans under continual adjustment, have met with phenomenal success", (p. 59) Even capitaUst countries impUcitly affirm the viab?ity of REVIEWS 221 sociaUsm',
+    "efficiency, the design of the market can reflect other social values, as we shall see. A version of the market which is likely to appeal to socialists is the following: the means of production are owned by the state but leased to groups of workers in such a way that each worker gets productive resources of roughly equal value. Each cooperative decides on the nature and volume of its production, and sells its goods on the market. The profits are distributed among the members of each cooperative according to mutually agreed rules, though we may suppose that profits above a certain point are heavily taxed by the state, partly to accumulate resources for future generations, partly to finance an extensive welfare state which provides for essential needs without charge. For cooperatives which are unable to make a profit, there is a social security system which supplements their members' incomes until they find a more profitable line of production or move elsewhere. The private hiring of labour is, however, made illegal in the same way as slavery is today. This brief sketch of a socialist market system needs to be filled out in various ways. There are difficulties in setting down the terms on [476] POLITICAL THEORY / NOVEMBER 1977 which capital would be leased by the state to the workers' cooperatives; for instance, in establishing how far cooperatives should be allowed to accumulate capital for their own expansion. The rules of association for each cooperative need to be specified, particularly those governing the entry and exit",
+]
+embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
+print(embeddings.shape)
+# [3, 768]
+
+# Get the similarity scores for the embeddings
+similarities = model.similarity(embeddings, embeddings)
+print(similarities.shape)
+# [3, 3]
+```
+
+<!--
+### Direct Usage (Transformers)
+
+<details><summary>Click to see the direct usage in Transformers</summary>
+
+</details>
+-->
+
+<!--
+### Downstream Usage (Sentence Transformers)
+
+You can finetune this model on your own dataset.
+
+<details><summary>Click to expand</summary>
+
+</details>
+-->
+
+<!--
+### Out-of-Scope Use
+
+*List how the model may foreseeably be misused and address what users ought not to do with the model.*
+-->
+
+## Evaluation
+
+### Metrics
+
+#### Triplet
+* Dataset: `nomic`
+* Evaluated with [<code>TripletEvaluator</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/evaluation.html#sentence_transformers.evaluation.TripletEvaluator)
+
+| Metric             | Value     |
+|:-------------------|:----------|
+| cosine_accuracy    | 0.958     |
+| dot_accuracy       | 0.042     |
+| manhattan_accuracy | 0.956     |
+| euclidean_accuracy | 0.958     |
+| **max_accuracy**   | **0.958** |
+
+#### Triplet
+* Dataset: `all-nli-test`
+* Evaluated with [<code>TripletEvaluator</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/evaluation.html#sentence_transformers.evaluation.TripletEvaluator)
+
+| Metric             | Value     |
+|:-------------------|:----------|
+| cosine_accuracy    | 0.975     |
+| dot_accuracy       | 0.025     |
+| manhattan_accuracy | 0.9725    |
+| euclidean_accuracy | 0.975     |
+| **max_accuracy**   | **0.975** |
+
+<!--
+## Bias, Risks and Limitations
+
+*What are the known or foreseeable issues stemming from this model? You could also flag here known failure cases or weaknesses of the model.*
+-->
+
+<!--
+### Recommendations
+
+*What are recommendations with respect to the foreseeable issues? For example, filtering explicit content.*
+-->
+
+## Training Details
+
+### Training Dataset
+
+#### Unnamed Dataset
+
+
+* Size: 10,000 training samples
+* Columns: <code>anchor</code>, <code>positive</code>, and <code>negative</code>
+* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
+  |         | anchor                                                                               | positive                                                                            | negative                                                                             |
+  |:--------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+  | type    | string                                                                               | string                                                                              | string                                                                               |
+  | details | <ul><li>min: 15 tokens</li><li>mean: 253.76 tokens</li><li>max: 573 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 14 tokens</li><li>mean: 252.8 tokens</li><li>max: 680 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 13 tokens</li><li>mean: 273.24 tokens</li><li>max: 574 tokens</li></ul> |
+* Samples:
+  | anchor                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | positive                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | negative                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
+  |:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+  | <code>JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY have. Success in learning "how to know economically, liberally, effectively," is the measure of success in civilization; and the clarifying of this success which is the task of philosophy makes philosophy an effective instrument of advance. But "a problem of knowledge in general [of knowledge of 'the ontological'] is, to speak brutally, nonsense. " 5 Since the plain conjunctive experience which is the very definition of what is "radical" in James's empiricism has its being, according to his most explicit statement, in passing thought, there is most certainly another exceedingly vigorous motif in James's thought repeatedly declared by him to be his chief philosophic hope, which he had wished ardently to bring to adequate expression before he died. If a biological or situational behaviorism really runs counter to this motif, yet moves more vitally with his spirit, James himself in his dearest philosophic expectation was following a will-of-the-wisp. Now it may be the case that a majority of those who knew and loved James believe today that this is the case -both those with him in the empiricist camp and those against him in the rationalistic. No doubt most empiricists will welcome the name "radical" while repudiating James's often repeated definition so that no meaning for the term remains to them except either an implied boast or merely the profession of an ideal. The writer has long held the view that the conjunctive experience in James 's writings and the biological behaviorism (which Dewey shows as</code> | <code>present if not worked out in James's mind) seemingly so much at cross purposes rightly belong together and mutually support and fulfill each other. The purpose of this paper is to show how this is so. Dr. Lowe's study goes, if quietly, yet unhesitatingly, to the support of James's radical empiricism. He sums his argument up in recommending "a decision about his [James's] doctrine [of the conjuLnctive experience] as all but necessary preliminaries to the evaluation of Whitehead." 6 It is pointed out that the fulcrum of Whitehead's philosophy is his doctrine of the transmission of feelings. Sympathetic study of his philosophy depends upon initial conviction upon that point, precisely the doctrine that William James propounded with great vigor for twenty-five years. For later philosophers it is primarily directed upon the immediate temporal relation of "felt transition" displayed in "the plain conjunctive experience." The role of Whitehead's theory of prehensions is to develop this doctrine along general lines. 5 Experience and Nature, 1925, p. 21. 6 Ibid., p. 125. 7 Ibid., pp. 174 if. COMMENTS AND CRITICISM 99 In this doctrine the present moment is presented as an atom or "drop" of experience which has taken up the immediately past moment and holds it immanent in itself by a felt transition of next-to-next, which is itself a component contributing to the present drop of experience. The atomic structure of experienee, basis of pluralism, together with the felt transition from drop to drop is the central point. A "drop" or atom of</code> | <code>not only the specifically discriminated happenings "out there" but also the whole undiscriminated remainder.15 Our moments of experience and their associated durations succeed each other, forming a series of stratifications of nature. The successive 8 Alfred North Whitehead, An Enquiry Concerning the Principlea of Natural Knowledge, Cambridge: University Press, 1919, hereafter referred to as PNK; and The Principle of Relativity with applications to Physical Science, Cambridge: University Press, 1922, hereafter referred to as PRel. 9PNK, art. 16.1, 3.6. 10 PNK, art. 16.3-16.4; CN, pp. 106-107. 11 PNK, art. 20.2; CN, pp. 107, 187-188. 12 PNK, art. 16.5. 13 PNK, art. 14, 16.4-16.5, 18.1-18.2; CN, p. 52. 14 PNK, art. 14.1; CN, p. 51. 15 PNK, art. 19.4; CN, pp. 49-53, 186-187; PRel, pp. 25-26. APPEARANCE AND CAUSALITY IN WHITEHEAD'S EARLY WRITINGS 45 moments of experience bind the percipient events together into the locus of a directly experienced unity of awareness, with its memory of the past and anticipation of the future. The succession of associated durations or cross-sections of external nature exhibits a persisting, uniform structure which (through the operation of 'extensive abstraction') yields the uniform space-time continuum of geometry. Within this all-encompassing structure, particular happenings take place.16 The task of common sense and of physical science is to discover the particular factors that govern the directly perceived particular happenings. Two additional features of immediate experience are, as it were, given with the concrete data of sense-awareness as primordial attributions or assumptions.17 First, in sense-awareness, no clear demarcations between happenings can</code> |
+  | <code>wrongdoers receive the punishment they deserve. A deserved punishment is one that is proportionate to the offender's culpability. Culpability has two components: (1) the severity of the wrong, and (2) the offender's blameworthiness. The broader aim of this article is to outline an alternative retributivist model that directly involves the victim in</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              | <code>the determination of the appropriate and just punishment. The narrower aim is to show that the methodology employed by Michael Moore (1997) in support of the standard retributive model in fact better supports this alternative model. Moore himself explicitly rejects the idea that victims can play a role in determining just punishments, because this</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | <code>some role in producing it. According to retributive theory, punishment is justified as a way of restoring the just status quo ante that was disrupted by the offender.6 How punishment performs this task remains a matter of some controversy among retributive theorists. Though the view cannot be defended here, a plausible interpretation of how the state performs this task says that legal punishment involves state efforts to restore the equality of condition that, at least in those respects designated by basic moral rights, all citizens are entitled to. All citizens are entitled to have their lives, bodies, psychological integrity, and justly held property respected and defended by the law. In these respects, at least, the state should act to ensure their equality. Whether it should act in other ways to ensure equality among citizens is, of course, a matter of considerable controversy, though this is not a controversy the resolution of which may have significant implications for the core areas of the criminal law. 32 PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY Criminal offenders act in (legally prohibited) ways that deprive victims of some or all of the equality of condition victims are entitled to. There are, it must be admitted, various ways in which the state might attempt to restore the requisite equality of condition. But with most serious crimes it can arguably be shown that the imposition of penal losses is the only appropriate equalizing response by the state. In particular, where victims cannot be made whole again by offender compensation or restitution, the state</code>                                                                                                                                           |
+  | <code>modal logic (ML), suggesting that we are dealing with deeply divergent accounts of our modal talk. However, CT captures but one version of the relevant semantic intuition, and does so on the basis of metaphysical assumptions (all worlds are equally real, individuals are world-bound) that are ostensibly discretionary. Just as ML can be translated into a language that quantifies explicitly over worlds, CT may be formulated as a semantic theory in which world</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | <code>quantification is purely metalinguistic. And just as Kripke-style semantics is formally compatible with the doctrine of world-boundedness, a counterpart-based semantics may in principle allow for cases of trans-world identity. In fact, one may welcome a framework that is general enough to include both Lewis's counterpart-based account and Kripke's identity-based account as distinguished special cases. There are several ways of doing so. The purpose of this paper is</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | <code>regular and normal modal logics K, D(a Aß)z>'3ß and universal instantiation (UI) which a formal semantics should validate if it is to be a contender for a semantics of our natural intensional languages. I show that counterpart theory does not validate these principles. Counterpart Theory The basis of the logical system for counterpart theory involves the introduction of primitive predicates and postulates to the lower predicate calculus. Lewis (1968; 113) uses the following primitive predicates,1 (1) Wx * is a possible world (2) xly X is in possible world y (3) Ax jc is actual (4) xCy y is a counterpart of x 1 My notation varies slightly from that of Lewis (1968). In particular, note that for the counterpart predicate Lewis understands Cxy to mean that x is a counterpart of y. COUNTERPART THEORY AS A SEMANTICS FOR MODAL LOGIC 257 Lewis's postulates encapsulate the principles of the semantics of counterpart theory. Most especially we note that nothing is in two worlds. We also note that anything in a world is a counterpart of itself. Thus the counterpart relation is reflexive. The following discussion meets the requirement that nothing is a counterpart of anything else in its own world although it need not presuppose this postulate. Lewis (1986; 214) remarks that while the postulate that nothing is a counterpart of anything else in its own world is a feature of some counterpart relations, such a restriction on the counterpart relation constitutes giving up some of the built-in flexibility of counterpart theory. Counterpart theory also involves the extension of</code>                                                                                                                                  |
+* Loss: [<code>TripletLoss</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#tripletloss) with these parameters:
+  ```json
+  {
+      "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
+      "triplet_margin": 0.05
+  }
+  ```
+
+### Evaluation Dataset
+
+#### Unnamed Dataset
+
+
+* Size: 500 evaluation samples
+* Columns: <code>anchor</code>, <code>positive</code>, and <code>negative</code>
+* Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
+  |         | anchor                                                                              | positive                                                                            | negative                                                                             |
+  |:--------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+  | type    | string                                                                              | string                                                                              | string                                                                               |
+  | details | <ul><li>min: 10 tokens</li><li>mean: 237.7 tokens</li><li>max: 497 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 12 tokens</li><li>mean: 238.5 tokens</li><li>max: 485 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 23 tokens</li><li>mean: 260.95 tokens</li><li>max: 499 tokens</li></ul> |
+* Samples:
+  | anchor                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | positive                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | negative                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
+  |:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+  | <code>quantified modal logic, including the famous Barcan Formula. The paper appeared in the Journal of Symbolic Logic , followed shortly afterwards by two more papers published under the name Ruth C. Barcan. Alonzo Church, editor of the Journal, eventually insisted that she publish using her official name, and so a 1950 paper in the same Journal appeared already as authored by Ruth Barcan Marcus. Had Prof. Church's naming criteria been followed throughout, we would now be discussing the famous Marcus Formula. After she received her PhD, Ruth Barcan Marcus and her husband moved to Illinois, where he had accepted a position at Northwestern University. She spent an academic year as a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Chicago where Rudolf Carnap, whose paper 'Modalities and Quantification' had appeared also in 1946, and whose seminal Meaning and Necessity was published in 1947 [Carnap (1946), (1947)], was also working on quantified modal logic.2 After that year she held a series of post-doctoral, temporary or visiting positions and taught at Roosevelt University from 1959 to 1963. In 1964 she became head of the philosophy department of the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle and taught also at Northwestern. In 1973 she moved to Yale. She retired in 1992 but continued to be actively involved in philosophy dividing the time between her position as a senior research scholar at Yale and a distinguished visiting professorship at the</code>                                                                                                                                                        | <code>University of California, Irvine. II. Modality and Modal Logic Ruth Barcan Marcus' 1946 paper presents the first system of modal logic that combines modal operators and quantifiers. A question that had arisen regarding any such system is whether theorems of the non-modal predicate calculus such as (1) Vx (Px -> Qx) -> (Vx Px -> Vx Qx) On Modality and Reference. Ruth Barcan Marcus (1921-2012) 205 would also be theorems, were the conditional uniformly interpreted as C.I. Lewis' strict conditional.3 As it turns out, the strict conditional version of (1): (2) Vx (Px => Qx) => (Vx Px => Vx Qx) is not derivable in the system that results from adding quantifiers to Lewis' S2. However, (2) is derivable if we can count on this formula: (3) O 3x Px => 3x OPx. (3) is precisely the Barcan Formula. It was introduced in the system of the 1946 paper as Axiom 11, which allows the derivation of (2) theorem 19, p. 5. Nowadays the Barcan Formula is stated as a material conditional and introduced, in some systems, as an axiom4 (BF) O 3x Px -> 3x OPx. BF says that if it is possible that something be P, then there is something that is possibly P. An equivalent version of the Barcan Formula states that if everything is necessarily P, then it is necessary that everything be P: (BF') Vx DPx ^ □ Vx Px The converse of the Barcan Formula: (CBF) 3x OPx -> O 3x Px, equivalent to (CBF') □ Vx Px ^ Vx DPx is already derivable in the system without the addition of any</code>                                                                                                                                                    | <code>of the Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts in the latter part of 2010. 3. Bayart 195811 The soundness of first and second-order S5 modal logic I. Semantic definitions 0. To formulate a semantic theory of modal logic it is not sufficient to define for example, the necessary as that which is true in every model and 10 A generalisation of Bayart's completeness proof to the system T appeared in Cresswell (1967) and later in Hughes and Cresswell (1968). A more recent proof method for systems with the Barcan Formula is found in Thomason (1970). 11 Translation by M.J. Cresswell of 'La correction de la logique modale du premier et second ordre S5', Logique et Analyse 1, 1958, pp. 28-44. In this version I have corrected obvious typos. Some of these are indicated in the website version in square brackets [..]. I have changed Bayart's notation in the present version as explained in the introduction or commentary or in footnotes. (All footnotes are my comments on the translation.) ARNOULD BAYART'S MODAL COMPLETENESS THEOREMS 95 the possible as that which is true in some model. These definitions would do no more than introduce the notions of 'necessary' and 'possible' in the metalanguage. A semantics of modal logic demands that we assume an object language containing modal symbols and that we define under what conditions to attribute the values 'true' or 'false' to the formulae of this object language. One can</code>                                                                                                                                                     |
+  | <code>rebut four objections to the claim that attributions of intentional attitudes are</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    | <code>normative judgments, all stemming, directly or indirectly, from the widespread assumption</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             | <code>the article by sketching the picture of normative thought that results. Though I defend a particular theory of normative speech elsewhere, the core insights of this article can be used by other theorists as well. The arguments offered</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
+  | <code>picture are co-dependent, and their concerted action makes an intuitive pre -89 Beata Stawarska sentation of something absent in the (present) picture possible. Per ceptual apprehension gives picture consciousness its intuitive charac ter, while non-perceptual apprehension "fantasizes" the absent entity into the physical thing and turns it into a picture. Picture conscious ness involves therefore three interrelated elements: the picture-thing (Bildding), i.e. the physical thing (a piece of canvas, of paper, of stone) which serves as the material of the picture; the picture-object (.Bildobjekt), i.e. the picture apprehended not simply as a perceptual object but as a representation of a referent—the so-called picture subject (Bildsujet), i.e. an absent thing or person.6 This triple thing/object/subject structure is clearly at work in the apprehension of photographs or paintings. Can it also be discerned in fantasy, which no longer supports itself on physical or "external" things? Images, unlike physical pictures, are not independent from the consciousness that apprehends them. Instead, they are contents of consciousness, forming an integral and internal part of an imaginary experience. Unlike the physical picture which persists as a piece of canvas, paper, or stone, even after it ceases to function as a pictorial representation of an absent being, the internal picture does not "sur vive" the end of the fantasy episode—there is nothing left of it once the subject ceases to fantasize. The question arises: can such an immaterial "picture" serve the function of representing an absent</code> | <code>pic ture-subject? Can an evanescent no-thing stand as a symbol of another thing?7 Material content seems indispensable if the picture is to fulfil its representational function: only as a perceptual thing can a picture yield an intuitive apprehension of an absent referent. In order to function as a representation (Bildobjet), the picture must be a thing (Bildding). In other words, there must be a physical support if the picture is to symbolize the absent picture-subject (Bildsujet). Yet such physical support is wanting in the case of "internal" pic tures. In fantasy, it is impossible to distinguish a picture-thing from the picture-subject it represents, and so it is difficult to see how the internal picture can serve the symbolic function at all. As a result, one can hardly sustain the interpretation of fantasy as the conscious ness of non-physical pictures and preserve a uniform theory of imag ination as picture consciousness.8 The aforementioned difficulties led Husserl to reformulate the theory of imagination, no longer taking the apprehension of a pic ture but the internal structure of consciousness in memory as a clue. The way in which memory presents something non-given or the way in which the absent past manifests itself in the present is of direct rel evance to Husserl's later conception of imaginary activity. In recol -90 Sartre on Imagination lection, an object appears in the present as belonging to the past, it is apprehended in the now and yet remains separated by temporal dis tance. Should it be concluded that one apprehends an image (or an "internal picture") of an</code> | <code>He found, for instance, that as we can "see" a mountain which is not present by interpreting the paint marks on a canvas which are present, so in external perception we are perceiving a tree which is not immanent in consciousness by interpreting the sensations (Empfindungen) which are im manent. It would seem, therefore, that Husserl assumed at that time that any intuitive grasp of a real particular was either an inner perception of what is immanently present, or else a case where something immanently pres ent serves as a basis for an interpretation. To his astonishment, Husserl discovered after 1905, in his analyses of inner time-consciousness, that re membering could not be understood as an act of interpretation; that, for instance, remembering a past sound-sensation could not be described as an interpretation of a presently immanent sound-sensation, but had to be de scribed as a "direct" intuitive intending of a real particular which no longer existed.7 This exploded the myth of the unproblematic nature of inner per ception, because any perception whatsover necessarily involves some reten tion of the immediate past. In other words, a restriction of the domain of descriptive psychology or phenomenology to actually immanent real par ticulars proved to be absolutely impossible, since such a restriction would 66 GUIDO K?NG veto not only the use of external perception but that of inner perception as well! The only way out of all these difficulties was to officially admit all intentional objects, i.e., the intentional correlates of all mental acts, into the domain of</code> |
+* Loss: [<code>TripletLoss</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#tripletloss) with these parameters:
+  ```json
+  {
+      "distance_metric": "TripletDistanceMetric.COSINE",
+      "triplet_margin": 0.05
+  }
+  ```
+
+### Training Hyperparameters
+#### Non-Default Hyperparameters
+
+- `eval_strategy`: steps
+- `per_device_train_batch_size`: 4
+- `per_device_eval_batch_size`: 4
+- `learning_rate`: 1e-05
+- `num_train_epochs`: 5
+- `warmup_ratio`: 0.1
+- `batch_sampler`: no_duplicates
+
+#### All Hyperparameters
+<details><summary>Click to expand</summary>
+
+- `overwrite_output_dir`: False
+- `do_predict`: False
+- `eval_strategy`: steps
+- `prediction_loss_only`: True
+- `per_device_train_batch_size`: 4
+- `per_device_eval_batch_size`: 4
+- `per_gpu_train_batch_size`: None
+- `per_gpu_eval_batch_size`: None
+- `gradient_accumulation_steps`: 1
+- `eval_accumulation_steps`: None
+- `learning_rate`: 1e-05
+- `weight_decay`: 0.0
+- `adam_beta1`: 0.9
+- `adam_beta2`: 0.999
+- `adam_epsilon`: 1e-08
+- `max_grad_norm`: 1.0
+- `num_train_epochs`: 5
+- `max_steps`: -1
+- `lr_scheduler_type`: linear
+- `lr_scheduler_kwargs`: {}
+- `warmup_ratio`: 0.1
+- `warmup_steps`: 0
+- `log_level`: passive
+- `log_level_replica`: warning
+- `log_on_each_node`: True
+- `logging_nan_inf_filter`: True
+- `save_safetensors`: True
+- `save_on_each_node`: False
+- `save_only_model`: False
+- `restore_callback_states_from_checkpoint`: False
+- `no_cuda`: False
+- `use_cpu`: False
+- `use_mps_device`: False
+- `seed`: 42
+- `data_seed`: None
+- `jit_mode_eval`: False
+- `use_ipex`: False
+- `bf16`: False
+- `fp16`: False
+- `fp16_opt_level`: O1
+- `half_precision_backend`: auto
+- `bf16_full_eval`: False
+- `fp16_full_eval`: False
+- `tf32`: None
+- `local_rank`: 0
+- `ddp_backend`: None
+- `tpu_num_cores`: None
+- `tpu_metrics_debug`: False
+- `debug`: []
+- `dataloader_drop_last`: False
+- `dataloader_num_workers`: 0
+- `dataloader_prefetch_factor`: None
+- `past_index`: -1
+- `disable_tqdm`: False
+- `remove_unused_columns`: True
+- `label_names`: None
+- `load_best_model_at_end`: False
+- `ignore_data_skip`: False
+- `fsdp`: []
+- `fsdp_min_num_params`: 0
+- `fsdp_config`: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}
+- `fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap`: None
+- `accelerator_config`: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}
+- `deepspeed`: None
+- `label_smoothing_factor`: 0.0
+- `optim`: adamw_torch
+- `optim_args`: None
+- `adafactor`: False
+- `group_by_length`: False
+- `length_column_name`: length
+- `ddp_find_unused_parameters`: None
+- `ddp_bucket_cap_mb`: None
+- `ddp_broadcast_buffers`: False
+- `dataloader_pin_memory`: True
+- `dataloader_persistent_workers`: False
+- `skip_memory_metrics`: True
+- `use_legacy_prediction_loop`: False
+- `push_to_hub`: False
+- `resume_from_checkpoint`: None
+- `hub_model_id`: None
+- `hub_strategy`: every_save
+- `hub_private_repo`: False
+- `hub_always_push`: False
+- `gradient_checkpointing`: False
+- `gradient_checkpointing_kwargs`: None
+- `include_inputs_for_metrics`: False
+- `eval_do_concat_batches`: True
+- `fp16_backend`: auto
+- `push_to_hub_model_id`: None
+- `push_to_hub_organization`: None
+- `mp_parameters`: 
+- `auto_find_batch_size`: False
+- `full_determinism`: False
+- `torchdynamo`: None
+- `ray_scope`: last
+- `ddp_timeout`: 1800
+- `torch_compile`: False
+- `torch_compile_backend`: None
+- `torch_compile_mode`: None
+- `dispatch_batches`: None
+- `split_batches`: None
+- `include_tokens_per_second`: False
+- `include_num_input_tokens_seen`: False
+- `neftune_noise_alpha`: None
+- `optim_target_modules`: None
+- `batch_eval_metrics`: False
+- `eval_on_start`: False
+- `batch_sampler`: no_duplicates
+- `multi_dataset_batch_sampler`: proportional
+
+</details>
+
+### Training Logs
+| Epoch  | Step | Training Loss | loss   | all-nli-test_max_accuracy | nomic_max_accuracy |
+|:------:|:----:|:-------------:|:------:|:-------------------------:|:------------------:|
+| 0      | 0    | -             | -      | -                         | 0.94               |
+| 0.04   | 100  | 0.0106        | 0.0093 | -                         | 0.944              |
+| 0.08   | 200  | 0.009         | 0.0083 | -                         | 0.944              |
+| 0.12   | 300  | 0.0068        | 0.0073 | -                         | 0.952              |
+| 0.16   | 400  | 0.0066        | 0.0067 | -                         | 0.96               |
+| 0.2    | 500  | 0.0069        | 0.0061 | -                         | 0.956              |
+| 0.24   | 600  | 0.0056        | 0.0053 | -                         | 0.966              |
+| 0.28   | 700  | 0.0042        | 0.0050 | -                         | 0.962              |
+| 0.32   | 800  | 0.0059        | 0.0046 | -                         | 0.962              |
+| 0.36   | 900  | 0.0051        | 0.0048 | -                         | 0.964              |
+| 0.4    | 1000 | 0.0034        | 0.0046 | -                         | 0.964              |
+| 0.44   | 1100 | 0.0054        | 0.0051 | -                         | 0.962              |
+| 0.48   | 1200 | 0.0034        | 0.0047 | -                         | 0.964              |
+| 0.52   | 1300 | 0.0042        | 0.0049 | -                         | 0.966              |
+| 0.56   | 1400 | 0.0035        | 0.0041 | -                         | 0.968              |
+| 0.6    | 1500 | 0.0043        | 0.0041 | -                         | 0.972              |
+| 0.64   | 1600 | 0.0029        | 0.0045 | -                         | 0.964              |
+| 0.68   | 1700 | 0.005         | 0.0044 | -                         | 0.97               |
+| 0.72   | 1800 | 0.0036        | 0.0041 | -                         | 0.968              |
+| 0.76   | 1900 | 0.0031        | 0.0040 | -                         | 0.976              |
+| 0.8    | 2000 | 0.0037        | 0.0041 | -                         | 0.966              |
+| 0.84   | 2100 | 0.0041        | 0.0037 | -                         | 0.97               |
+| 0.88   | 2200 | 0.0044        | 0.0040 | -                         | 0.966              |
+| 0.92   | 2300 | 0.0038        | 0.0046 | -                         | 0.966              |
+| 0.96   | 2400 | 0.0043        | 0.0050 | -                         | 0.954              |
+| 1.0    | 2500 | 0.0031        | 0.0049 | -                         | 0.96               |
+| 1.04   | 2600 | 0.0046        | 0.0048 | -                         | 0.964              |
+| 1.08   | 2700 | 0.0017        | 0.0045 | -                         | 0.96               |
+| 1.12   | 2800 | 0.0015        | 0.0047 | -                         | 0.958              |
+| 1.16   | 2900 | 0.0015        | 0.0046 | -                         | 0.966              |
+| 1.2    | 3000 | 0.0011        | 0.0042 | -                         | 0.966              |
+| 1.24   | 3100 | 0.0009        | 0.0041 | -                         | 0.962              |
+| 1.28   | 3200 | 0.0006        | 0.0040 | -                         | 0.972              |
+| 1.32   | 3300 | 0.0006        | 0.0041 | -                         | 0.966              |
+| 1.3600 | 3400 | 0.0005        | 0.0046 | -                         | 0.958              |
+| 1.4    | 3500 | 0.0007        | 0.0048 | -                         | 0.964              |
+| 1.44   | 3600 | 0.0004        | 0.0046 | -                         | 0.966              |
+| 1.48   | 3700 | 0.0008        | 0.0048 | -                         | 0.96               |
+| 1.52   | 3800 | 0.0006        | 0.0047 | -                         | 0.966              |
+| 1.56   | 3900 | 0.0002        | 0.0048 | -                         | 0.958              |
+| 1.6    | 4000 | 0.0004        | 0.0047 | -                         | 0.964              |
+| 1.6400 | 4100 | 0.0004        | 0.0047 | -                         | 0.966              |
+| 1.6800 | 4200 | 0.0003        | 0.0048 | -                         | 0.96               |
+| 1.72   | 4300 | 0.0001        | 0.0049 | -                         | 0.96               |
+| 1.76   | 4400 | 0.0004        | 0.0050 | -                         | 0.956              |
+| 1.8    | 4500 | 0.0007        | 0.0048 | -                         | 0.96               |
+| 1.8400 | 4600 | 0.0006        | 0.0044 | -                         | 0.96               |
+| 1.88   | 4700 | 0.0001        | 0.0044 | -                         | 0.962              |
+| 1.92   | 4800 | 0.0005        | 0.0043 | -                         | 0.964              |
+| 1.96   | 4900 | 0.0004        | 0.0043 | -                         | 0.966              |
+| 2.0    | 5000 | 0.0004        | 0.0044 | -                         | 0.958              |
+| 2.04   | 5100 | 0.0002        | 0.0045 | -                         | 0.956              |
+| 2.08   | 5200 | 0.0002        | 0.0044 | -                         | 0.958              |
+| 2.12   | 5300 | 0.0001        | 0.0043 | -                         | 0.96               |
+| 2.16   | 5400 | 0.0005        | 0.0048 | -                         | 0.96               |
+| 2.2    | 5500 | 0.0003        | 0.0049 | -                         | 0.958              |
+| 2.24   | 5600 | 0.0004        | -      | 0.975                     | -                  |
+
+
+### Framework Versions
+- Python: 3.10.12
+- Sentence Transformers: 3.0.1
+- Transformers: 4.42.4
+- PyTorch: 2.3.1+cu121
+- Accelerate: 0.32.1
+- Datasets: 2.21.0
+- Tokenizers: 0.19.1
+
+## Citation
+
+### BibTeX
+
+#### Sentence Transformers
+```bibtex
+@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
+    title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
+    author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
+    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
+    month = "11",
+    year = "2019",
+    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
+    url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
+}
+```
+
+#### TripletLoss
+```bibtex
+@misc{hermans2017defense,
+    title={In Defense of the Triplet Loss for Person Re-Identification}, 
+    author={Alexander Hermans and Lucas Beyer and Bastian Leibe},
+    year={2017},
+    eprint={1703.07737},
+    archivePrefix={arXiv},
+    primaryClass={cs.CV}
+}
+```
+
+<!--
+## Glossary
+
+*Clearly define terms in order to be accessible across audiences.*
+-->
+
+<!--
+## Model Card Authors
+
+*Lists the people who create the model card, providing recognition and accountability for the detailed work that goes into its construction.*
+-->
+
+<!--
+## Model Card Contact
+
+*Provides a way for people who have updates to the Model Card, suggestions, or questions, to contact the Model Card authors.*
+-->

config.json

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+{
+  "_name_or_path": "nomic-ai/nomic-embed-text-v1",
+  "activation_function": "swiglu",
+  "architectures": [
+    "NomicBertModel"
+  ],
+  "attn_pdrop": 0.0,
+  "auto_map": {
+    "AutoConfig": "nomic-ai/nomic-bert-2048--configuration_hf_nomic_bert.NomicBertConfig",
+    "AutoModel": "nomic-ai/nomic-bert-2048--modeling_hf_nomic_bert.NomicBertModel",
+    "AutoModelForMaskedLM": "nomic-ai/nomic-bert-2048--modeling_hf_nomic_bert.NomicBertForPreTraining"
+  },
+  "bos_token_id": null,
+  "causal": false,
+  "dense_seq_output": true,
+  "embd_pdrop": 0.0,
+  "eos_token_id": null,
+  "fused_bias_fc": true,
+  "fused_dropout_add_ln": true,
+  "initializer_range": 0.02,
+  "layer_norm_epsilon": 1e-12,
+  "max_trained_positions": 2048,
+  "mlp_fc1_bias": false,
+  "mlp_fc2_bias": false,
+  "model_type": "nomic_bert",
+  "n_embd": 768,
+  "n_head": 12,
+  "n_inner": 3072,
+  "n_layer": 12,
+  "n_positions": 8192,
+  "pad_vocab_size_multiple": 64,
+  "parallel_block": false,
+  "parallel_block_tied_norm": false,
+  "prenorm": false,
+  "qkv_proj_bias": false,
+  "reorder_and_upcast_attn": false,
+  "resid_pdrop": 0.0,
+  "rotary_emb_base": 1000,
+  "rotary_emb_fraction": 1.0,
+  "rotary_emb_interleaved": false,
+  "rotary_emb_scale_base": null,
+  "rotary_scaling_factor": 2,
+  "scale_attn_by_inverse_layer_idx": false,
+  "scale_attn_weights": true,
+  "summary_activation": null,
+  "summary_first_dropout": 0.1,
+  "summary_proj_to_labels": true,
+  "summary_type": "cls_index",
+  "summary_use_proj": true,
+  "torch_dtype": "float32",
+  "transformers_version": "4.42.4",
+  "type_vocab_size": 2,
+  "use_cache": true,
+  "use_flash_attn": true,
+  "use_rms_norm": false,
+  "use_xentropy": true,
+  "vocab_size": 30528
+}

config_sentence_transformers.json

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+{
+  "__version__": {
+    "sentence_transformers": "3.0.1",
+    "transformers": "4.42.4",
+    "pytorch": "2.3.1+cu121"
+  },
+  "prompts": {},
+  "default_prompt_name": null,
+  "similarity_fn_name": null
+}

model.safetensors

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
+oid sha256:82a692f64b7ee86a83a2cdfea827ec7c91fb836b92b87586c8ad03a381323635
+size 546938168

modules.json

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+[
+  {
+    "idx": 0,
+    "name": "0",
+    "path": "",
+    "type": "sentence_transformers.models.Transformer"
+  },
+  {
+    "idx": 1,
+    "name": "1",
+    "path": "1_Pooling",
+    "type": "sentence_transformers.models.Pooling"
+  },
+  {
+    "idx": 2,
+    "name": "2",
+    "path": "2_Normalize",
+    "type": "sentence_transformers.models.Normalize"
+  }
+]

sentence_bert_config.json

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+{
+  "max_seq_length": 8192,
+  "do_lower_case": false
+}

special_tokens_map.json

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+{
+  "cls_token": {
+    "content": "[CLS]",
+    "lstrip": false,
+    "normalized": false,
+    "rstrip": false,
+    "single_word": false
+  },
+  "mask_token": {
+    "content": "[MASK]",
+    "lstrip": false,
+    "normalized": false,
+    "rstrip": false,
+    "single_word": false
+  },
+  "pad_token": {
+    "content": "[PAD]",
+    "lstrip": false,
+    "normalized": false,
+    "rstrip": false,
+    "single_word": false
+  },
+  "sep_token": {
+    "content": "[SEP]",
+    "lstrip": false,
+    "normalized": false,
+    "rstrip": false,
+    "single_word": false
+  },
+  "unk_token": {
+    "content": "[UNK]",
+    "lstrip": false,
+    "normalized": false,
+    "rstrip": false,
+    "single_word": false
+  }
+}

tokenizer_config.json

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+{
+  "added_tokens_decoder": {
+    "0": {
+      "content": "[PAD]",
+      "lstrip": false,
+      "normalized": false,
+      "rstrip": false,
+      "single_word": false,
+      "special": true
+    },
+    "100": {
+      "content": "[UNK]",
+      "lstrip": false,
+      "normalized": false,
+      "rstrip": false,
+      "single_word": false,
+      "special": true
+    },
+    "101": {
+      "content": "[CLS]",
+      "lstrip": false,
+      "normalized": false,
+      "rstrip": false,
+      "single_word": false,
+      "special": true
+    },
+    "102": {
+      "content": "[SEP]",
+      "lstrip": false,
+      "normalized": false,
+      "rstrip": false,
+      "single_word": false,
+      "special": true
+    },
+    "103": {
+      "content": "[MASK]",
+      "lstrip": false,
+      "normalized": false,
+      "rstrip": false,
+      "single_word": false,
+      "special": true
+    }
+  },
+  "clean_up_tokenization_spaces": true,
+  "cls_token": "[CLS]",
+  "do_lower_case": true,
+  "mask_token": "[MASK]",
+  "model_max_length": 8192,
+  "pad_token": "[PAD]",
+  "sep_token": "[SEP]",
+  "strip_accents": null,
+  "tokenize_chinese_chars": true,
+  "tokenizer_class": "BertTokenizer",
+  "unk_token": "[UNK]"
+}