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LegislationAre laws covered by copyright?Avinash- June 29, 2010The simple answer is yes. Under the Copyright Act, 1957, the government, and the government alone, can print its laws and issue copies of them.  If, for instance, a person, takes a copy of an Act, and puts it up on their website for others to download, it's technically a violation of copyright. The only way any person can do so, without infringing copyright, is to 'value-add' to the text of the Act, by say, adding their own commentary or notes. But simply reproducing the entire text of the Act, without comment, is an infringement of the copyright. Section 52 (1)(q) of the copyright Act, which covers 'fair use' of a copyrighted work says the following:52 (1) The following acts shall not constitute an infringement of copyright, namely:(q) the reproduction or publication of-(i) any matter which has been published in any Official Gazette except an Act of a Legislature;(ii) any Act of a Legislature subject to the condition that such Act is reproduced or published together with any commentary thereon or any other original matter;(iii) the report of any committee, commission, council, board or other like body appointed by the Government if such report has been laid on the Table of the Legislature, unless the reproduction or publication of such report is prohibited by the Government;(iv) any judgement or order of a court, tribunal or other judicial authority, unless the reproduction or publication of such judgment or order is prohibited by the court, the tribunal or other judicial authority, as the case may be;So the text of an Act is copyrighted, but the rules produced under it, and published in the Gazette are not. This is odd, to put it politely. Why should the text of a law, one of the basic building blocks of  a modern state, not be freely available to anyone, without cost? (Even if you can make an argument that laws should be covered by copyright, shouldnt that copyright rest with Parliament, which 'creates' laws, rather than the government?) The Parliament Standing Committee on Human Resource Development is currently studying the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010, which has already achieved a certain amount of fame, for the changes it makes to the rights of lyricists and music composers.  But perhaps the Committee should also consider recommending an amendment to 52(1) of the Copyright Act, allowing not just laws, but all works funded by the government, and by extension the taxpayer, to be freely available to all.ParliamentFirst no-confidence motion of the 17th Lok Sabha discussed todayNiranjana Menon- August 8, 2023Discussion on the first no-confidence motion of the 17thLok Sabha began today.  No-confidence motions and confidence motions are trust votes, used to test or demonstrate the support of Lok Sabha for the government in power.  Article 75(3) of the Constitution states that the government is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha.  This means that the government must always enjoy the support of a majority of the members of Lok Sabha.  Trust votes are used to examine this support.  The government resigns if a majority of members support a no-confidence motion, or reject a confidence motion.So far, 28 no-confidence motions (including the one being discussed today) and 11 confidence motions have beendiscussed.  Over the years, the number of such motions has reduced.  The mid-1960s and mid-1970s saw more no-confidence motions, whereas the 1990s saw more confidence motions.Figure1: Trust votes in ParliamentNote: *Term shorter than 5 years; **6-year term.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.The no-confidence motion being discussed today wasmovedon July 26, 2023.  A motion of no-confidence is moved with the support of at least 50 members.   The Speaker has the discretion to allot time for discussion of the motion.  TheRules of Procedurestate that the motion must be discussed within 10 days of being introduced.  This year, the no-confidence motion wasdiscussed13 calendar days after introduction.  Since the introduction of the no-confidence motion on July 26, 12 Bills have been introduced and 18 Bills have been passed by Lok Sabha.  In the past, on four occasions, the discussion on no-confidence motions began seven days after their introduction.  On these occasions, Bills and other important issues were debated before the discussion on the no-confidence motion began.Figure2: Members rise in support of the motion of no-confidence in Lok SabhaSource: Sansad TV, Lok Sabha, July 26, 2023; PRS.Figure3: Number of days from introduction to discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: Number of days implies calendar days.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.On average, no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been discussed for 13 hours over three days.  Discussions have lasted longer than 20 hours on four instances, most recently in 2003.  Today’s no-confidence motion was allotted 12 hours discussion time by theBusiness Advisory Committee.Following the discussion, the motion is put to vote.  26 out of 27 no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been voted upon and rejected.  This means that no government has ever had to resign following a vote of no-confidence.   On one occasion, in 1979, the discussion on a no-confidence motion against the Morarji Desai government remained inconclusive.  He resigned before the motion was put to vote.  50% of all no-confidence motions (14 out of 28) were discussed between 1965 and 1975.  Of these, 12 were against governments headed by Indira Gandhi.Figure4: Duration of discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: This graph excludes the no confidence motion moved on July 26, 2023.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.In comparison, confidence motions have a more varied history.  The first motion, brought in 1979 to demonstrate confidence in Charan Singh’s government, was not discussed at all.  The Prime Minister resigned before the discussion could take place.  Since then, 11 confidence motions have been discussed in Lok Sabha, with nine occurring in the 1990s.  During this period, several coalition governments were formed, and Prime Ministers sought to prove their majority throughconfidence motions.   These motions have been discussed, on average, for 12 hours over two days.Figure5: Duration of discussion of confidence motionsSource: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.Of the 11 confidence motions discussed in Lok Sabha, seven were accepted.  On three instances, governments had to resign as they could not prove that they had the support of the majority.  On one instance in 1996, the motion was not put to vote.  Following an eleven-hour discussion on this confidence motion, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced his intention to resign on the floor of the House.  He resigned 16 days into his term.Vajpayee became Prime Minister again in 1999, and faced another confidence motion.   This time, it was put to vote.   The motion was defeated by a margin of one vote.  This has been the closest result on a trust vote in the history of Lok Sabha.  The next closest result was when a motion of no-confidence against P V Narasimha Rao’s government was defeated by 14 votes in 1993.  In most cases, results have been in favour of the government by a large margin.«12345678910»

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ParliamentCabinet Reshuffles since 2009Chakshu Roy- June 18, 2013Source: www.pib.nic.inYesterday the Prime Ministerreshuffled his Cabinetand inducted four cabinet ministers and four ministers of state.  Since the beginning of the UPA II government, there have been three major Cabinet reshuffles and a number of minor readjustments in the portfolios of ministers. Analysing changes in the portfolios of ministers gives an insight into the churn in the political leadership of the different ministries of the government of India. Until recently there was no central online resource where information could be collated about cabinet reshuffles. The information was scattered between the websites of thePresident, thePrime Ministerand thePress Information Bureau. Since 2012, theCabinet Secretariathas started putting details aboutchanges in the portfolio of the council of ministersin the public domain. However analysing this information becomes difficult as the information is split into different files and details about the Cabinet reshuffle do not go back till 2009. We have tried to collate data about changes in Cabinet portfolios since May 2009, so that it becomes easily accessible and can be analysed by interested individuals.  The rawdata file can be accessed here. This data could be analysed to see which Ministers have shifted across ministries or the average length of tenure of Ministers in different ministries. If you spot interesting trends in the raw data above, please share them with us on twitter@prslegislativeWe have done apreliminary analysis of the datato see which ministries have had the most changes in Cabinet Ministers since May 2009: - Railway Ministry portfolio has been held by six different Cabinet Ministers [Mamata Banerjee, Dinesh Trivedi, Mukul Roy, C P Joshi (twice), Pawan Kumar Bansal and now Mallikarjun Kharge] - Ministry of Law and Justice, Corporate Affairs and Science and Technology: Four Cabinet Ministers. - Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Civil Aviation, Rural Development, Tourism and Youth and Sports:  Three Cabinet Ministers. - Ministries like Finance, Home, External Affairs, Communications and Information Technology, Human Resource Development:  Two Cabinet Ministers. - Ministries like Agriculture and Non Conventional Energy Sources have the same Ministers from May 2009. This data also helped us put together a brief chronology of Cabinet reshuffles since the beginning of the term of the UPA II government:23 & 28- May-09Cabinet sworn in.31-May-09Meria Kumar resigns as Minister of Water Resources to become Speaker of Lok Sabha.19-Apr-10Shashi Tharoor resigns as Minister of State from the Ministry of External Affairs.15-Nov-10A Raja resigns as Minister of Communications and Information Technology. Kapil Sibal gets additional charge of the ministry.19-Jan-11First major cabinet reshuffle. Most ministries affected.12-Jul-11Second major Cabinet reshuffle. Dinesh Trivedi assumes charge of Railway Ministry after Mamata Banerjee, Salman Khursheed becomes Law Minister, Jairam Ramesh moves to Rural Development. New Ministers like Rajeev Shukla (Parliamentary Affairs) and Jayanthi Natarajan (Environment and Forest) get inducted.18-Dec-11RLD joins UPA. Ajit Singh inducted as Minister of Civil Aviation.20-Mar-12Dinesh Trivedi resigns and Mukul Roy becomes Railway Minister.27-Jun-12Pranab Mukherjee resigns as Finance Minister to fight the presidential election.31-Jul-12P Chidambaram moves from Home to Finance Ministry and Sushil Kumar Shinde moves from Power to Home Ministry.22-Sep-12Trinamool withdraws support to UPA. All TMC ministers resign. C P Joshi assumes additional charge of Railway Ministry.28-Oct-12Third major reshuffle. S M Krishna resigns from Ministry of External Affairs and Salman Khursheed takes over. Ashwani Kumar comes in place of Salman Khursheed in Law and Justice. Ambika Soni resigns and Manish Tiwari takes charge of Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Ajay Maken moves from Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports to Housing and Urban Poverty Alliviation.21-Mar-13DMK withdraws support. All DMK Ministers resign.11-May-13Ashwani Kumar and Pawan Kumar Bansal resign. Kapil Sibal takes charge of Ministry of Law and Justice and C P Joshi takes charge of Railways.16-Jun-13Ajay Maken and C P Joshi resign.ParliamentFirst no-confidence motion of the 17th Lok Sabha discussed todayNiranjana Menon- August 8, 2023Discussion on the first no-confidence motion of the 17thLok Sabha began today.  No-confidence motions and confidence motions are trust votes, used to test or demonstrate the support of Lok Sabha for the government in power.  Article 75(3) of the Constitution states that the government is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha.  This means that the government must always enjoy the support of a majority of the members of Lok Sabha.  Trust votes are used to examine this support.  The government resigns if a majority of members support a no-confidence motion, or reject a confidence motion.So far, 28 no-confidence motions (including the one being discussed today) and 11 confidence motions have beendiscussed.  Over the years, the number of such motions has reduced.  The mid-1960s and mid-1970s saw more no-confidence motions, whereas the 1990s saw more confidence motions.Figure1: Trust votes in ParliamentNote: *Term shorter than 5 years; **6-year term.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.The no-confidence motion being discussed today wasmovedon July 26, 2023.  A motion of no-confidence is moved with the support of at least 50 members.   The Speaker has the discretion to allot time for discussion of the motion.  TheRules of Procedurestate that the motion must be discussed within 10 days of being introduced.  This year, the no-confidence motion wasdiscussed13 calendar days after introduction.  Since the introduction of the no-confidence motion on July 26, 12 Bills have been introduced and 18 Bills have been passed by Lok Sabha.  In the past, on four occasions, the discussion on no-confidence motions began seven days after their introduction.  On these occasions, Bills and other important issues were debated before the discussion on the no-confidence motion began.Figure2: Members rise in support of the motion of no-confidence in Lok SabhaSource: Sansad TV, Lok Sabha, July 26, 2023; PRS.Figure3: Number of days from introduction to discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: Number of days implies calendar days.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.On average, no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been discussed for 13 hours over three days.  Discussions have lasted longer than 20 hours on four instances, most recently in 2003.  Today’s no-confidence motion was allotted 12 hours discussion time by theBusiness Advisory Committee.Following the discussion, the motion is put to vote.  26 out of 27 no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been voted upon and rejected.  This means that no government has ever had to resign following a vote of no-confidence.   On one occasion, in 1979, the discussion on a no-confidence motion against the Morarji Desai government remained inconclusive.  He resigned before the motion was put to vote.  50% of all no-confidence motions (14 out of 28) were discussed between 1965 and 1975.  Of these, 12 were against governments headed by Indira Gandhi.Figure4: Duration of discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: This graph excludes the no confidence motion moved on July 26, 2023.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.In comparison, confidence motions have a more varied history.  The first motion, brought in 1979 to demonstrate confidence in Charan Singh’s government, was not discussed at all.  The Prime Minister resigned before the discussion could take place.  Since then, 11 confidence motions have been discussed in Lok Sabha, with nine occurring in the 1990s.  During this period, several coalition governments were formed, and Prime Ministers sought to prove their majority throughconfidence motions.   These motions have been discussed, on average, for 12 hours over two days.Figure5: Duration of discussion of confidence motionsSource: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.Of the 11 confidence motions discussed in Lok Sabha, seven were accepted.  On three instances, governments had to resign as they could not prove that they had the support of the majority.  On one instance in 1996, the motion was not put to vote.  Following an eleven-hour discussion on this confidence motion, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced his intention to resign on the floor of the House.  He resigned 16 days into his term.Vajpayee became Prime Minister again in 1999, and faced another confidence motion.   This time, it was put to vote.   The motion was defeated by a margin of one vote.  This has been the closest result on a trust vote in the history of Lok Sabha.  The next closest result was when a motion of no-confidence against P V Narasimha Rao’s government was defeated by 14 votes in 1993.  In most cases, results have been in favour of the government by a large margin.«12345678910»

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ParliamentParliament's scrutiny over government financesAnirudh- December 20, 2010The recent 2G-controversy and the related debate over the role of the PAC as opposed to the JPC also raises a broader Issue regarding the general scrutiny of government finances by Parliament.  Oversight of the government’s finances involves the scrutiny of the government’s financial proposals and policies.  The Indian Constitution vests this power with the Parliament by providing that (a) taxes cannot be imposed or collected without the authority of law, and (b) expenditure cannot be incurred without the authorisation of the legislature. The Indian Parliament exercises financial oversight over the government budget in two stages: (1) at the time of presentation of the annual budget, and (2) reviewing the government’s budget implementation efforts through the year. The Parliament scrutinises the annual budget (a) on the floor of the House, and (b) by the departmentally related standing committees.Scrutiny on the floor of the HouseThe main scrutiny of the budget in the Lok Sabha takes place through: (a) General discussion and voting: The general discussion on the Budget is held on a day subsequent to the presentation of the Budget by the Finance Minister.  Discussion at this stage is confined to the general examination of the Budget and policies of taxation expressed during the budget speech. (b) Discussion on Demand for Grants: The general discussion is followed by a discussion on the Demand for Grants of different ministries. A certain number of days or hours are allocated for the discussion of all the demands. However, not all the demands are discussed within the allotted number of days. The remaining undiscussed demands are disposed of by the Speaker after the agreement of the House.  This process is known as the ‘Guillotine’.  Figure 1 shows the number of Demands discussed and guillotined over the last five years.  It shows that nearly 90% of the Demands are not discussed every year.Some Important Budget DocumentsAnnual Financial Statement – Statement of the estimated receipts and expenditure of the government. Demand for Grants –Expenditure required to be voted by the Lok Sabha.  A separate Demand is required to be presented for each department of the government. Supplementary Demand for Grants – Presented when (a) authorized amounts are insufficient, or (b) need for additional expenditure has arisen. Finance Bill – Details the imposition of taxes, the rates of taxation, and its regulation. Detailed Demand for Grants – Prepared on the basis of the Demand for Grants.  These show further break-up of objects by expenditure, and also actual expenditure in the previous year.For more details see detailed note on Financial Oversight by Parliamenthere.ParliamentFirst no-confidence motion of the 17th Lok Sabha discussed todayNiranjana Menon- August 8, 2023Discussion on the first no-confidence motion of the 17thLok Sabha began today.  No-confidence motions and confidence motions are trust votes, used to test or demonstrate the support of Lok Sabha for the government in power.  Article 75(3) of the Constitution states that the government is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha.  This means that the government must always enjoy the support of a majority of the members of Lok Sabha.  Trust votes are used to examine this support.  The government resigns if a majority of members support a no-confidence motion, or reject a confidence motion.So far, 28 no-confidence motions (including the one being discussed today) and 11 confidence motions have beendiscussed.  Over the years, the number of such motions has reduced.  The mid-1960s and mid-1970s saw more no-confidence motions, whereas the 1990s saw more confidence motions.Figure1: Trust votes in ParliamentNote: *Term shorter than 5 years; **6-year term.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.The no-confidence motion being discussed today wasmovedon July 26, 2023.  A motion of no-confidence is moved with the support of at least 50 members.   The Speaker has the discretion to allot time for discussion of the motion.  TheRules of Procedurestate that the motion must be discussed within 10 days of being introduced.  This year, the no-confidence motion wasdiscussed13 calendar days after introduction.  Since the introduction of the no-confidence motion on July 26, 12 Bills have been introduced and 18 Bills have been passed by Lok Sabha.  In the past, on four occasions, the discussion on no-confidence motions began seven days after their introduction.  On these occasions, Bills and other important issues were debated before the discussion on the no-confidence motion began.Figure2: Members rise in support of the motion of no-confidence in Lok SabhaSource: Sansad TV, Lok Sabha, July 26, 2023; PRS.Figure3: Number of days from introduction to discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: Number of days implies calendar days.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.On average, no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been discussed for 13 hours over three days.  Discussions have lasted longer than 20 hours on four instances, most recently in 2003.  Today’s no-confidence motion was allotted 12 hours discussion time by theBusiness Advisory Committee.Following the discussion, the motion is put to vote.  26 out of 27 no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been voted upon and rejected.  This means that no government has ever had to resign following a vote of no-confidence.   On one occasion, in 1979, the discussion on a no-confidence motion against the Morarji Desai government remained inconclusive.  He resigned before the motion was put to vote.  50% of all no-confidence motions (14 out of 28) were discussed between 1965 and 1975.  Of these, 12 were against governments headed by Indira Gandhi.Figure4: Duration of discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: This graph excludes the no confidence motion moved on July 26, 2023.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.In comparison, confidence motions have a more varied history.  The first motion, brought in 1979 to demonstrate confidence in Charan Singh’s government, was not discussed at all.  The Prime Minister resigned before the discussion could take place.  Since then, 11 confidence motions have been discussed in Lok Sabha, with nine occurring in the 1990s.  During this period, several coalition governments were formed, and Prime Ministers sought to prove their majority throughconfidence motions.   These motions have been discussed, on average, for 12 hours over two days.Figure5: Duration of discussion of confidence motionsSource: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.Of the 11 confidence motions discussed in Lok Sabha, seven were accepted.  On three instances, governments had to resign as they could not prove that they had the support of the majority.  On one instance in 1996, the motion was not put to vote.  Following an eleven-hour discussion on this confidence motion, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced his intention to resign on the floor of the House.  He resigned 16 days into his term.Vajpayee became Prime Minister again in 1999, and faced another confidence motion.   This time, it was put to vote.   The motion was defeated by a margin of one vote.  This has been the closest result on a trust vote in the history of Lok Sabha.  The next closest result was when a motion of no-confidence against P V Narasimha Rao’s government was defeated by 14 votes in 1993.  In most cases, results have been in favour of the government by a large margin.«12345678910»

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LegislationAre genetically modified crops safe enough?Sakshi- October 15, 2012A recentnews reportstated that the Planning Commission has advocated putting in place a “proper regulatory mechanism” before permitting the use of genetic modification in Indian crops.  A recent Standing Committee report on genetically modified (GM) crops found shortcomings in the regulatory framework for such crops.  The current framework is regulated primarily by two bodies: the Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee (GEAC) and the Review Committee on Genetic Manipulation (RCGM).  Given the inadequacy of the regulatory framework, the Standing Committee recommended that all research and development activities on transgenic crops be carried out only in containment (in laboratories) and that ongoing field trials in all states be discontinued.  The blog provides a brief background on GM crops, their regulation in India and the key recommendations of the Standing Committee.What is GM technology?GM crops are usually developed through the insertion or deletion of genes from plant cells.  Bt technology is a type of genetic modification in crops.  It was introduced in India with Bt cotton.  The debate around GM crops has revolved around issues of economic efficacy, human health, consumer choice and farmers’ rights.  Some advantages of Bt technology are that it increases crop yield, decreases the use of pesticides, and improves quality of crops.  However, the technology has also been known to cause crop loss due to resistance developed by pests and destruction of local crop varieties, impacting biodiversity.Approval process for commercial release of GM cropsInitially, the company developing the GM crop undertakes several biosafety assessments including, environmental, food, and feed safety assessments in containment.This is followed by Bio-safety Research Trials which require prior approval of the regulators, the GEAC and the RCGM.Approval for environmental release is accorded by the GEAC after considering the findings of bio-safety studies.Finally, commercial release is permitted only for those GM crops found to be safe for humans and the environment.Committee’s recommendations for strengthening the regulatory processThe Standing Committee report found several shortcomings in the regulatory framework, some of which are as follows:State governments are not mandatorily consulted for conducting open field trials on GM crops.  Several states such as Kerala and Bihar have opposed field trials for GM crops.  The Committee recommended that mandatory consultation with state governments be built into the regulatory process.The key regulators, the GEAC and the RCGM, suffer from poor organisational set-up and infrastructure.  The Committee recommended that the regulatory framework be given statutory backing so that there is no scope for ambiguity or complacency on the part of the authorities responsible for the oversight of GM organisms.  It urged the government to introduce the Biotechnology Regulatory Authority Bill.There is evidence that the GEAC has not complied with international treaties.  These include the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.  It recommended that legislation relating to liability and redress for damage arising from living modified organisms be enacted.Some international scientists have raised doubts about the safety of Bt Brinjal and the way tests were conducted.  To remedy this situation, the Committee recognised the need for an overarching legislation on biosafety to ensure that biotechnology is introduced without compromising the safety of biodiversity, human and livestock health, and environmental protection.Note that over the last few sessions of Parliament, the government has listed the Biotechnology Regulatory Authority Bill for introduction; however the Bill has not been introduced yet.  The Bill sets up an independent authority for the regulation of GM crops. For a PRS summary of the report and access to the full report, seehereandhere.ParliamentFirst no-confidence motion of the 17th Lok Sabha discussed todayNiranjana Menon- August 8, 2023Discussion on the first no-confidence motion of the 17thLok Sabha began today.  No-confidence motions and confidence motions are trust votes, used to test or demonstrate the support of Lok Sabha for the government in power.  Article 75(3) of the Constitution states that the government is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha.  This means that the government must always enjoy the support of a majority of the members of Lok Sabha.  Trust votes are used to examine this support.  The government resigns if a majority of members support a no-confidence motion, or reject a confidence motion.So far, 28 no-confidence motions (including the one being discussed today) and 11 confidence motions have beendiscussed.  Over the years, the number of such motions has reduced.  The mid-1960s and mid-1970s saw more no-confidence motions, whereas the 1990s saw more confidence motions.Figure1: Trust votes in ParliamentNote: *Term shorter than 5 years; **6-year term.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.The no-confidence motion being discussed today wasmovedon July 26, 2023.  A motion of no-confidence is moved with the support of at least 50 members.   The Speaker has the discretion to allot time for discussion of the motion.  TheRules of Procedurestate that the motion must be discussed within 10 days of being introduced.  This year, the no-confidence motion wasdiscussed13 calendar days after introduction.  Since the introduction of the no-confidence motion on July 26, 12 Bills have been introduced and 18 Bills have been passed by Lok Sabha.  In the past, on four occasions, the discussion on no-confidence motions began seven days after their introduction.  On these occasions, Bills and other important issues were debated before the discussion on the no-confidence motion began.Figure2: Members rise in support of the motion of no-confidence in Lok SabhaSource: Sansad TV, Lok Sabha, July 26, 2023; PRS.Figure3: Number of days from introduction to discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: Number of days implies calendar days.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.On average, no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been discussed for 13 hours over three days.  Discussions have lasted longer than 20 hours on four instances, most recently in 2003.  Today’s no-confidence motion was allotted 12 hours discussion time by theBusiness Advisory Committee.Following the discussion, the motion is put to vote.  26 out of 27 no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been voted upon and rejected.  This means that no government has ever had to resign following a vote of no-confidence.   On one occasion, in 1979, the discussion on a no-confidence motion against the Morarji Desai government remained inconclusive.  He resigned before the motion was put to vote.  50% of all no-confidence motions (14 out of 28) were discussed between 1965 and 1975.  Of these, 12 were against governments headed by Indira Gandhi.Figure4: Duration of discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: This graph excludes the no confidence motion moved on July 26, 2023.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.In comparison, confidence motions have a more varied history.  The first motion, brought in 1979 to demonstrate confidence in Charan Singh’s government, was not discussed at all.  The Prime Minister resigned before the discussion could take place.  Since then, 11 confidence motions have been discussed in Lok Sabha, with nine occurring in the 1990s.  During this period, several coalition governments were formed, and Prime Ministers sought to prove their majority throughconfidence motions.   These motions have been discussed, on average, for 12 hours over two days.Figure5: Duration of discussion of confidence motionsSource: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.Of the 11 confidence motions discussed in Lok Sabha, seven were accepted.  On three instances, governments had to resign as they could not prove that they had the support of the majority.  On one instance in 1996, the motion was not put to vote.  Following an eleven-hour discussion on this confidence motion, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced his intention to resign on the floor of the House.  He resigned 16 days into his term.Vajpayee became Prime Minister again in 1999, and faced another confidence motion.   This time, it was put to vote.   The motion was defeated by a margin of one vote.  This has been the closest result on a trust vote in the history of Lok Sabha.  The next closest result was when a motion of no-confidence against P V Narasimha Rao’s government was defeated by 14 votes in 1993.  In most cases, results have been in favour of the government by a large margin.«12345678910»

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MiscellaneousN-power in India. How safe are our plants?Anirudh- July 8, 2011In the aftermath of the nuclear leaks in Japan, there have been concerns regarding the safety of nuclear power plants around the world. There are some proposals to change the regulatory framework in India to ensure the safety of these plants. We examine some of the issues in the current structure.Which body looks at safety issues regarding nuclear power plants in the country?The apex institution tasked to look at issues regarding nuclear safety is the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board. The AERB was set up in 1983 to carry out regulatory and safety functions regarding nuclear and radiation facilities. The agency has to give clearances for establishing nuclear power plants and facilities.   It issues clearances for nuclear power projects in stages after safety reviews. The safety of setting up a nuclear plant in any given area is also assessed by the AERB. For example, it would have looked into the safety of setting up a nuclear power project in Jaitapur in Maharashtra.   AERB also reviews the safety mechanisms within existing nuclear plants and facilities. To do this, it requires nuclear facilities to report their compliance with safety regulations, and also makes periodic inspections.   Under the recently passed Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 the AERB is also the authority responsible for notifying when a nuclear incident takes place. Mechanisms for assessing and claiming compensation by victims will be initiated only after the nuclear incident is notified.Why is the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board in the news?Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced on March 29, 2011, "We will strengthen the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board and make it a truly autonomous and independent regulatory authority."   This announcement came in the backdrop of the continuing crisis and high radiation levels at the Fukusima nuclear plant in Japan.   News reports opined that the lack of proper autonomy of Japan's nuclear regulator curbed its effectiveness. Japan's ministry of economy, trade and industry regulates the nuclear power industry, and also promotes nuclear technology. These two aims work at cross-purposes. India's regulatory structure is similar to Japan in some respects.What measures has the AERB taken post the Fukushima nuclear incident in Japan?Following the nuclear incident in Japan, a high-level committee under the chairmanship of a former AERB chairman has been set up to review the safety of Indian nuclear power plants.   The committee shall assess the capability of Indian nuclear power plants to withstand earthquakes, tsunamis, cyclones, floods, etc. The committee will review the adequacy of provisions for ensuring safety in case of such events.Is there any issue in the current regulatory structure?The AERB is a regulatory body, which derives administrative and financial support from the Department of Atomic Energy. It reports to the secreatry, DAE.   The DAE is also involved in the promotion of nuclear energy, and is also responsible for the functioning of the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, which operates most nuclear power plants in the country.     The DAE is thus responsible both for nuclear safety (through the AERB), as well as the operation of nuclear power plants (through NPCIL). This could be seen as a conflict of interest.How does the system of independent regulators differ from this?The telecom sector provides an example of an independent regulator.   The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India does not report to the Department of Telecommunications. The DoT is responsible for policy matters related to telecommunications, promoting private investment in telecom, and also has a stake in BSNL. Had TRAI reported to the DoT, there would have been a conflict of interest within the DoT.What will the proposed legislation change?Recent news reports have stated that a bill to create an independent regulatory body will be introduced in Parliament soon.   Though there is no draft bill available publicly, news reports state that an independent Nuclear Regulatory Authority of India will be created by the bill, and the authority will subsume the AERB within it.   This post first appeared as an article on rediff.com and can be accessedhere.ParliamentFirst no-confidence motion of the 17th Lok Sabha discussed todayNiranjana Menon- August 8, 2023Discussion on the first no-confidence motion of the 17thLok Sabha began today.  No-confidence motions and confidence motions are trust votes, used to test or demonstrate the support of Lok Sabha for the government in power.  Article 75(3) of the Constitution states that the government is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha.  This means that the government must always enjoy the support of a majority of the members of Lok Sabha.  Trust votes are used to examine this support.  The government resigns if a majority of members support a no-confidence motion, or reject a confidence motion.So far, 28 no-confidence motions (including the one being discussed today) and 11 confidence motions have beendiscussed.  Over the years, the number of such motions has reduced.  The mid-1960s and mid-1970s saw more no-confidence motions, whereas the 1990s saw more confidence motions.Figure1: Trust votes in ParliamentNote: *Term shorter than 5 years; **6-year term.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.The no-confidence motion being discussed today wasmovedon July 26, 2023.  A motion of no-confidence is moved with the support of at least 50 members.   The Speaker has the discretion to allot time for discussion of the motion.  TheRules of Procedurestate that the motion must be discussed within 10 days of being introduced.  This year, the no-confidence motion wasdiscussed13 calendar days after introduction.  Since the introduction of the no-confidence motion on July 26, 12 Bills have been introduced and 18 Bills have been passed by Lok Sabha.  In the past, on four occasions, the discussion on no-confidence motions began seven days after their introduction.  On these occasions, Bills and other important issues were debated before the discussion on the no-confidence motion began.Figure2: Members rise in support of the motion of no-confidence in Lok SabhaSource: Sansad TV, Lok Sabha, July 26, 2023; PRS.Figure3: Number of days from introduction to discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: Number of days implies calendar days.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.On average, no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been discussed for 13 hours over three days.  Discussions have lasted longer than 20 hours on four instances, most recently in 2003.  Today’s no-confidence motion was allotted 12 hours discussion time by theBusiness Advisory Committee.Following the discussion, the motion is put to vote.  26 out of 27 no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been voted upon and rejected.  This means that no government has ever had to resign following a vote of no-confidence.   On one occasion, in 1979, the discussion on a no-confidence motion against the Morarji Desai government remained inconclusive.  He resigned before the motion was put to vote.  50% of all no-confidence motions (14 out of 28) were discussed between 1965 and 1975.  Of these, 12 were against governments headed by Indira Gandhi.Figure4: Duration of discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: This graph excludes the no confidence motion moved on July 26, 2023.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.In comparison, confidence motions have a more varied history.  The first motion, brought in 1979 to demonstrate confidence in Charan Singh’s government, was not discussed at all.  The Prime Minister resigned before the discussion could take place.  Since then, 11 confidence motions have been discussed in Lok Sabha, with nine occurring in the 1990s.  During this period, several coalition governments were formed, and Prime Ministers sought to prove their majority throughconfidence motions.   These motions have been discussed, on average, for 12 hours over two days.Figure5: Duration of discussion of confidence motionsSource: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.Of the 11 confidence motions discussed in Lok Sabha, seven were accepted.  On three instances, governments had to resign as they could not prove that they had the support of the majority.  On one instance in 1996, the motion was not put to vote.  Following an eleven-hour discussion on this confidence motion, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced his intention to resign on the floor of the House.  He resigned 16 days into his term.Vajpayee became Prime Minister again in 1999, and faced another confidence motion.   This time, it was put to vote.   The motion was defeated by a margin of one vote.  This has been the closest result on a trust vote in the history of Lok Sabha.  The next closest result was when a motion of no-confidence against P V Narasimha Rao’s government was defeated by 14 votes in 1993.  In most cases, results have been in favour of the government by a large margin.«12345678910»

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ParliamentCan the Supreme Court ask the government to frame a law?Anirudh- December 23, 2010In a recent case, the Supreme Court directed the appropriate government to enact a law by June 2011.  The case, Gainda Ram & Ors. V. MCD and Ors.[1], concerned the legal framework for regulating hawking in Delhi.  The judgement lays out the background to this case by stating that the regulation of hawking in Delhi had been proceeding under directions issued by the Supreme Court in previous cases, and was being implemented by municipal authorities such as the New Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC). The NDMC and the MCD have also framed schemes to regulate hawkers as per a policy of the government framed in 2004.  However, since these schemes were not laid before Parliament, the Court held that these schemes cannot be called ‘law’ or drafted under the authority of any law.  The Court also stated that there is an urgent need to enact a legislation to regulate hawking, and the rights of street vendors. It referred to a Bill which had been framed by the government, and stated that since the government has already taken the first step in the legislative process by drafting a Bill, the legislative process should be completed.  On the basis of this, and other reasons, it directed the government to enact a law by June 2011.  This judgement raises three issues:The government is not the law making body in India.  Enacting a law is the function of Parliament and state legislatures.Even if the Court were to address the correct authority, Courts in India have no authority to direct the legislature to frame a law, let alone specify a time-period.  This may be said to violate the basic principle of “separation of powers” which states that the executive, legislature and judiciary should function independently of each other.  Under the Indian Constitution, the Supreme Court and the High Courts have the power to protect fundamental rights and to interpret law.  The Constitution does not give power to Courts to direct the framing of a law.Persons can be held in contempt of court for not following its directions.  In this case, it is not clear who would be held in contempt for not enacting a law by June 2011.  The Supreme Court can either hold the Speaker of the Parliament in contempt for not enacting a law by the specified date (it is uncertain whether the Court has this power since no such past instance has arisen). Or it can hold the concerned government official in contempt for not enacting the law within the time period specified (the government in this case, having no power to enact a law).[1]Decided on October 8, 2010ParliamentFirst no-confidence motion of the 17th Lok Sabha discussed todayNiranjana Menon- August 8, 2023Discussion on the first no-confidence motion of the 17thLok Sabha began today.  No-confidence motions and confidence motions are trust votes, used to test or demonstrate the support of Lok Sabha for the government in power.  Article 75(3) of the Constitution states that the government is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha.  This means that the government must always enjoy the support of a majority of the members of Lok Sabha.  Trust votes are used to examine this support.  The government resigns if a majority of members support a no-confidence motion, or reject a confidence motion.So far, 28 no-confidence motions (including the one being discussed today) and 11 confidence motions have beendiscussed.  Over the years, the number of such motions has reduced.  The mid-1960s and mid-1970s saw more no-confidence motions, whereas the 1990s saw more confidence motions.Figure1: Trust votes in ParliamentNote: *Term shorter than 5 years; **6-year term.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.The no-confidence motion being discussed today wasmovedon July 26, 2023.  A motion of no-confidence is moved with the support of at least 50 members.   The Speaker has the discretion to allot time for discussion of the motion.  TheRules of Procedurestate that the motion must be discussed within 10 days of being introduced.  This year, the no-confidence motion wasdiscussed13 calendar days after introduction.  Since the introduction of the no-confidence motion on July 26, 12 Bills have been introduced and 18 Bills have been passed by Lok Sabha.  In the past, on four occasions, the discussion on no-confidence motions began seven days after their introduction.  On these occasions, Bills and other important issues were debated before the discussion on the no-confidence motion began.Figure2: Members rise in support of the motion of no-confidence in Lok SabhaSource: Sansad TV, Lok Sabha, July 26, 2023; PRS.Figure3: Number of days from introduction to discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: Number of days implies calendar days.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.On average, no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been discussed for 13 hours over three days.  Discussions have lasted longer than 20 hours on four instances, most recently in 2003.  Today’s no-confidence motion was allotted 12 hours discussion time by theBusiness Advisory Committee.Following the discussion, the motion is put to vote.  26 out of 27 no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been voted upon and rejected.  This means that no government has ever had to resign following a vote of no-confidence.   On one occasion, in 1979, the discussion on a no-confidence motion against the Morarji Desai government remained inconclusive.  He resigned before the motion was put to vote.  50% of all no-confidence motions (14 out of 28) were discussed between 1965 and 1975.  Of these, 12 were against governments headed by Indira Gandhi.Figure4: Duration of discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: This graph excludes the no confidence motion moved on July 26, 2023.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.In comparison, confidence motions have a more varied history.  The first motion, brought in 1979 to demonstrate confidence in Charan Singh’s government, was not discussed at all.  The Prime Minister resigned before the discussion could take place.  Since then, 11 confidence motions have been discussed in Lok Sabha, with nine occurring in the 1990s.  During this period, several coalition governments were formed, and Prime Ministers sought to prove their majority throughconfidence motions.   These motions have been discussed, on average, for 12 hours over two days.Figure5: Duration of discussion of confidence motionsSource: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.Of the 11 confidence motions discussed in Lok Sabha, seven were accepted.  On three instances, governments had to resign as they could not prove that they had the support of the majority.  On one instance in 1996, the motion was not put to vote.  Following an eleven-hour discussion on this confidence motion, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced his intention to resign on the floor of the House.  He resigned 16 days into his term.Vajpayee became Prime Minister again in 1999, and faced another confidence motion.   This time, it was put to vote.   The motion was defeated by a margin of one vote.  This has been the closest result on a trust vote in the history of Lok Sabha.  The next closest result was when a motion of no-confidence against P V Narasimha Rao’s government was defeated by 14 votes in 1993.  In most cases, results have been in favour of the government by a large margin.«12345678910»

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PolicyArguments regarding FDI in retailVishnu- December 4, 2012After months of discussion,  the issue of FDI in retail is being deliberated in the Lok Sabha today.  InSeptember 2012, the Cabinet had approved 51% of FDI in multi-brand retail (stores selling more than one brand).  Under these regulations, foreign retail giants like Walmart and Tesco can set up shop in India.  Discussions on permitting FDI in retail have focused on the effect of FDI on unorganised retailers, farmers and consumers. Earlier, the central government commissioned the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) toexamine the impactof organised retail on unorganised retail. The Standing Committee on Commerce also tabled areporton Foreign and Domestic Investment in the Retail Sector in May, 2009 while the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) released adiscussion paperexamining FDI in multi-brand retail in July, 2010.  Other experts have also made arguments – both in support of, and in opposition to, the move to permit FDI in retail sales. The table below summarises some of these arguments from the perspective of various stakeholders as collated from the above reports examining the issue.StakeholderSupporting arguments (source)Opposing arguments (source)Unorganised retailNo evidence of impact on job losses (ICRIER).The rate of closure of unorganised retail shops (4.2%) is lower than international standards (ICRIER).Evidence from Indonesia and China show that traditional and modern retail can coexist and grow  (Reardon and Gulati).Majority of small retailers keen to remain in operation even after emergence of organised retail (ICRIER).Unorganised retailers in the vicinity of organised retailers saw their volume of business and profit decline but this effect weakens over time (ICRIER).Other studies have estimated that traditional fruit and vegetable retailers experienced a 20-30% decline in incomes with the presence of supermarkets (Singh).There is potential for employment loss in the value chain. A supermarket may create fewer jobs for the volume of produce handled (Singh).Unemployment to increase as a result of retailers practicing product bundling (selling goods in combinations and bargains) and predatory pricing (Standing Committee).FarmersSignificant positive impact on farmers as a result of direct sales to organised retailers.  For instance, cauliflower farmers receive a 25% higher price selling directly to organised retailers instead of government regulated markets (mandis).  Profits for farmers selling to organised retailers are about 60% higher than when selling to mandis (ICRIER).Organised retail could remove supply chain inefficiencies through direct purchase from farmers and investment in better storage, distribution and transport systems.  FDI, in particular, could bring in new technology and ideas (DIPP).Current organised retail procures 60-70% from wholesale markets rather than farmers. There has been no significant impact on backend infrastructure investment (Singh).There are other issues like irrigation, technology and credit in agriculture which FDI may not address (Singh).Increased monopolistic strength could force farmers to sell at lower prices (Standing Committee).ConsumersOrganised retail lowers prices. Consumer spending increases with the entry of organised retail and lower income groups tend to save more (ICRIER).It will lead to better quality and safety standards of products (DIPP).Evidence from some Latin American countries (Mexico, Nicaragua, Argentina), Africa (Kenya, Madagascar) and Asia (Thailand, Vietnam, India) reveal that supermarket prices for fruits and vegetables were higher than traditional retail prices (Singh).Even with lower prices at supermarkets, low income households may prefer traditional retailers because they live far from supermarkets, they can bargain with traditional retailers and buy loose items (Singh).Monopolistic power for retailers could result in high prices for consumers.Source: ICRIER [1.  "Impact of Organized Retailing on the Unorganized Sector", ICRIER, September 2008]; Standing Committee [2.  "Foreign and domestic investment in retail sector", Standing Committee on Commerce, May 13, 2009]; Singh (2011) [3. "FDI in Retail: Misplaced Expectations and Half-truths",  Sukhpal Singh, Economic and Political Weekly, December 17, 2011];  Reardon and Gulati (2008)  [4. "Rise of supermarkets and their development implications," IFPRI Discussion Paper, Thomas Reardon and Ashok Gulati, February 2008.]; DIPP [5. "Discussion Paper on FDI in Multi-brand Retail Trading", Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, July 6, 2010]ParliamentFirst no-confidence motion of the 17th Lok Sabha discussed todayNiranjana Menon- August 8, 2023Discussion on the first no-confidence motion of the 17thLok Sabha began today.  No-confidence motions and confidence motions are trust votes, used to test or demonstrate the support of Lok Sabha for the government in power.  Article 75(3) of the Constitution states that the government is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha.  This means that the government must always enjoy the support of a majority of the members of Lok Sabha.  Trust votes are used to examine this support.  The government resigns if a majority of members support a no-confidence motion, or reject a confidence motion.So far, 28 no-confidence motions (including the one being discussed today) and 11 confidence motions have beendiscussed.  Over the years, the number of such motions has reduced.  The mid-1960s and mid-1970s saw more no-confidence motions, whereas the 1990s saw more confidence motions.Figure1: Trust votes in ParliamentNote: *Term shorter than 5 years; **6-year term.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.The no-confidence motion being discussed today wasmovedon July 26, 2023.  A motion of no-confidence is moved with the support of at least 50 members.   The Speaker has the discretion to allot time for discussion of the motion.  TheRules of Procedurestate that the motion must be discussed within 10 days of being introduced.  This year, the no-confidence motion wasdiscussed13 calendar days after introduction.  Since the introduction of the no-confidence motion on July 26, 12 Bills have been introduced and 18 Bills have been passed by Lok Sabha.  In the past, on four occasions, the discussion on no-confidence motions began seven days after their introduction.  On these occasions, Bills and other important issues were debated before the discussion on the no-confidence motion began.Figure2: Members rise in support of the motion of no-confidence in Lok SabhaSource: Sansad TV, Lok Sabha, July 26, 2023; PRS.Figure3: Number of days from introduction to discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: Number of days implies calendar days.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.On average, no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been discussed for 13 hours over three days.  Discussions have lasted longer than 20 hours on four instances, most recently in 2003.  Today’s no-confidence motion was allotted 12 hours discussion time by theBusiness Advisory Committee.Following the discussion, the motion is put to vote.  26 out of 27 no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been voted upon and rejected.  This means that no government has ever had to resign following a vote of no-confidence.   On one occasion, in 1979, the discussion on a no-confidence motion against the Morarji Desai government remained inconclusive.  He resigned before the motion was put to vote.  50% of all no-confidence motions (14 out of 28) were discussed between 1965 and 1975.  Of these, 12 were against governments headed by Indira Gandhi.Figure4: Duration of discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: This graph excludes the no confidence motion moved on July 26, 2023.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.In comparison, confidence motions have a more varied history.  The first motion, brought in 1979 to demonstrate confidence in Charan Singh’s government, was not discussed at all.  The Prime Minister resigned before the discussion could take place.  Since then, 11 confidence motions have been discussed in Lok Sabha, with nine occurring in the 1990s.  During this period, several coalition governments were formed, and Prime Ministers sought to prove their majority throughconfidence motions.   These motions have been discussed, on average, for 12 hours over two days.Figure5: Duration of discussion of confidence motionsSource: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.Of the 11 confidence motions discussed in Lok Sabha, seven were accepted.  On three instances, governments had to resign as they could not prove that they had the support of the majority.  On one instance in 1996, the motion was not put to vote.  Following an eleven-hour discussion on this confidence motion, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced his intention to resign on the floor of the House.  He resigned 16 days into his term.Vajpayee became Prime Minister again in 1999, and faced another confidence motion.   This time, it was put to vote.   The motion was defeated by a margin of one vote.  This has been the closest result on a trust vote in the history of Lok Sabha.  The next closest result was when a motion of no-confidence against P V Narasimha Rao’s government was defeated by 14 votes in 1993.  In most cases, results have been in favour of the government by a large margin.«12345678910»

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LegislationLegislative vacuum and the Bhopal Gas tragedyRohit- June 10, 2010Our Constitution provides protection against laws imposing criminal liability for actions committedpriorto the enactment of the law. Article 20 (1) under the Part III (Fundamental Rights), reads:20. (1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence.Thus, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on an offender cannot exceed those specified by the laws at the time. In the context of the Bhopal Gas tragedy in 1984, the Indian Penal Code (IPC) was the only relevant law specifying criminal liability for such incidents. The CBI, acting on behalf of the victims, filed charges against the accused under section 304 of the IPC(See Note 1). Section 304 deals with punishment for culpable homicide and requires intention of causing death. By a judgment dated September 13, 1996, the Supreme Court held that there was no material to show that “any of the accused had a knowledge that by operating the plant on that fateful night whereat such dangerous and highly volatile substance like MIC was stored they had the knowledge that by this very act itself they were likely to cause death of any human being.” The Supreme Court thus directed that the charges be re-framed under section 304A of the IPC(See Note 2). Section 304A deals with causing death by negligence and prescribes a maximum punishment of two years along with a fine. Consequently, the criminal liability of the accused lay outlined by section 304A of the IPC and they were tried accordingly. Civil liability, on the other hand, was adjudged by the Courts and allocated to the victims by way of monetary compensation. Soon after the Bhopal Gas tragedy, the Government proposed and passed a series of laws regulating the environment, prescribing safeguards and specifying penalties. These laws, among other things, filled the legislative lacunae that existed at the time of the incident. Given the current provisions(See Note 3), a Bhopal like incident will be tried in the National Green Tribunal (once operationalized) and most likely, under the provisions of the the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. The criminal liability provisions of the Act(See Note 4)prescribe a maximum penalty of five years along with a fine of one lakh rupees. Further, if an offence is committed by a company, every person directly in charge and responsible will be deemed guilty, unless he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such an offence.The civil liability will continue to be adjudged by the Courts and in proportion to the extent of damage unless specified separately by an Act of Parliament.Notes1) IPC, Section 304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murderWhoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,Or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.2) IPC, Section 304A. Causing death by negligenceWhoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.3) Major laws passed since 1984: 1986 - The Environment (Protection) Act authorized the central government to take measures to protect and improve environmental quality, set standards and inspect industrial units. It also laid down penalties for contravention of its provisions. 1991 - The Public Liability Insurance Act provided for public liability - insurance for the purpose of providing immediate relief to the persons affected by an accident while handling hazardous substances. 1997 - The National Environment Appellate Authority Act established to an appellate authority to hear appeals with respect to restriction of areas in which any industries, operations or processes are disallowed, subject to safeguards under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. 2009 - The National Green Tribunal Act, yet to be notified, provides for the establishment of a tribunal for expeditious disposal of cases relating to environmental protection and for giving relief and compensation for damages to persons and property. This Act also repeals the National Environment Appellate Authority Act, 1997. 4) Criminal liability provisions of the Environment Protection Act, 1986Section 15. Penalty for contravention of the provisions of the Act(1) Whoever fails to comply with or contravenes any of the provisions of this Act, or the rules made or orders or directions issued thereunder, shall, in respect of each such failure or contravention, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees, or with both, and in case the failure or contravention continues, with additional fine which may extend to five thousand rupees for every day during which such failure or contravention continues after the conviction for the first such failure or contravention.(2) If the failure or contravention referred to in sub-section (1) continues beyond a period of one year after the date of conviction, the offender shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years.Section 16. Offences by Companies(1) Where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was directly in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.ParliamentFirst no-confidence motion of the 17th Lok Sabha discussed todayNiranjana Menon- August 8, 2023Discussion on the first no-confidence motion of the 17thLok Sabha began today.  No-confidence motions and confidence motions are trust votes, used to test or demonstrate the support of Lok Sabha for the government in power.  Article 75(3) of the Constitution states that the government is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha.  This means that the government must always enjoy the support of a majority of the members of Lok Sabha.  Trust votes are used to examine this support.  The government resigns if a majority of members support a no-confidence motion, or reject a confidence motion.So far, 28 no-confidence motions (including the one being discussed today) and 11 confidence motions have beendiscussed.  Over the years, the number of such motions has reduced.  The mid-1960s and mid-1970s saw more no-confidence motions, whereas the 1990s saw more confidence motions.Figure1: Trust votes in ParliamentNote: *Term shorter than 5 years; **6-year term.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.The no-confidence motion being discussed today wasmovedon July 26, 2023.  A motion of no-confidence is moved with the support of at least 50 members.   The Speaker has the discretion to allot time for discussion of the motion.  TheRules of Procedurestate that the motion must be discussed within 10 days of being introduced.  This year, the no-confidence motion wasdiscussed13 calendar days after introduction.  Since the introduction of the no-confidence motion on July 26, 12 Bills have been introduced and 18 Bills have been passed by Lok Sabha.  In the past, on four occasions, the discussion on no-confidence motions began seven days after their introduction.  On these occasions, Bills and other important issues were debated before the discussion on the no-confidence motion began.Figure2: Members rise in support of the motion of no-confidence in Lok SabhaSource: Sansad TV, Lok Sabha, July 26, 2023; PRS.Figure3: Number of days from introduction to discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: Number of days implies calendar days.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.On average, no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been discussed for 13 hours over three days.  Discussions have lasted longer than 20 hours on four instances, most recently in 2003.  Today’s no-confidence motion was allotted 12 hours discussion time by theBusiness Advisory Committee.Following the discussion, the motion is put to vote.  26 out of 27 no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been voted upon and rejected.  This means that no government has ever had to resign following a vote of no-confidence.   On one occasion, in 1979, the discussion on a no-confidence motion against the Morarji Desai government remained inconclusive.  He resigned before the motion was put to vote.  50% of all no-confidence motions (14 out of 28) were discussed between 1965 and 1975.  Of these, 12 were against governments headed by Indira Gandhi.Figure4: Duration of discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: This graph excludes the no confidence motion moved on July 26, 2023.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.In comparison, confidence motions have a more varied history.  The first motion, brought in 1979 to demonstrate confidence in Charan Singh’s government, was not discussed at all.  The Prime Minister resigned before the discussion could take place.  Since then, 11 confidence motions have been discussed in Lok Sabha, with nine occurring in the 1990s.  During this period, several coalition governments were formed, and Prime Ministers sought to prove their majority throughconfidence motions.   These motions have been discussed, on average, for 12 hours over two days.Figure5: Duration of discussion of confidence motionsSource: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.Of the 11 confidence motions discussed in Lok Sabha, seven were accepted.  On three instances, governments had to resign as they could not prove that they had the support of the majority.  On one instance in 1996, the motion was not put to vote.  Following an eleven-hour discussion on this confidence motion, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced his intention to resign on the floor of the House.  He resigned 16 days into his term.Vajpayee became Prime Minister again in 1999, and faced another confidence motion.   This time, it was put to vote.   The motion was defeated by a margin of one vote.  This has been the closest result on a trust vote in the history of Lok Sabha.  The next closest result was when a motion of no-confidence against P V Narasimha Rao’s government was defeated by 14 votes in 1993.  In most cases, results have been in favour of the government by a large margin.«12345678910»

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States and State LegislaturesMaharashtra passes Bill to regulate property transactionsadmin_2- August 22, 2012(Authored by Anil Nair)The Maharashtra Legislative Assembly recently passed theMaharashtra Housing (Regulation and Development) Bill.  This is the first such Bill to be passed by any state, which sets up a housing regulator to regulate property transactions.  The Bill seeks to set up a Housing Regulatory Authority to provide for relief to flat purchasers against sundry abuses, malpractices and difficulties related to the construction, sale, management and transfer of flats. According tonews reports, the government felt that existing laws were not effective in protecting the interests of the flat purchasers and allowed the promoters to avoid statutory obligations imposed on them.The Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the promotion of construction, sale, management and transfer) Act, 1963did not provide for an effective implementing arm for its various statutory provisions, as the buyers could only approach consumer forum or civil court for acts of omission or commission regarding its provisions. The current Bill passed by the Maharashtra Assembly proposes to repeal the 1963 Act.  As per the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill, the Regulatory Authority will strive to encourage growth and promotion of a healthy, transparent, efficient and competitive real estate market.  The Bill specifies several conditions to be fulfilled by the developer to further transparency and fairness.  All projects proposing to develop more than four flats or of land area exceeding 250 square meters have to submit and update details of the project on the website of the Housing Regulatory Authority.  Developers would be required to disclose detailed information regarding the project including:building-wise time schedule of completion of each phase of the project,time schedule for connecting the project with the municipal services such as sewerage, water supply, electricity, drainage etc.,nature of fixtures and fittings with regard to the flooring and sanitary fittings including the brand or the price range if the items are unbranded.Failure to give possession of the flat on the agreed date would require repayment of the full amount paid by the buyer with interest.  The Authority would also be empowered to penalise the developer up to an amount of one crore rupees for non-compliance with provisions in the Bill.  Among other initiatives to assist the real estate industry, the Housing Regulatory Authority would promote rating of projects and of promoters, by the association of promoters, to improve the confidence level of investors and consumers through self-regulation. The full text of the Bill is available on theGovernment of Maharashtra website.ParliamentFirst no-confidence motion of the 17th Lok Sabha discussed todayNiranjana Menon- August 8, 2023Discussion on the first no-confidence motion of the 17thLok Sabha began today.  No-confidence motions and confidence motions are trust votes, used to test or demonstrate the support of Lok Sabha for the government in power.  Article 75(3) of the Constitution states that the government is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha.  This means that the government must always enjoy the support of a majority of the members of Lok Sabha.  Trust votes are used to examine this support.  The government resigns if a majority of members support a no-confidence motion, or reject a confidence motion.So far, 28 no-confidence motions (including the one being discussed today) and 11 confidence motions have beendiscussed.  Over the years, the number of such motions has reduced.  The mid-1960s and mid-1970s saw more no-confidence motions, whereas the 1990s saw more confidence motions.Figure1: Trust votes in ParliamentNote: *Term shorter than 5 years; **6-year term.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.The no-confidence motion being discussed today wasmovedon July 26, 2023.  A motion of no-confidence is moved with the support of at least 50 members.   The Speaker has the discretion to allot time for discussion of the motion.  TheRules of Procedurestate that the motion must be discussed within 10 days of being introduced.  This year, the no-confidence motion wasdiscussed13 calendar days after introduction.  Since the introduction of the no-confidence motion on July 26, 12 Bills have been introduced and 18 Bills have been passed by Lok Sabha.  In the past, on four occasions, the discussion on no-confidence motions began seven days after their introduction.  On these occasions, Bills and other important issues were debated before the discussion on the no-confidence motion began.Figure2: Members rise in support of the motion of no-confidence in Lok SabhaSource: Sansad TV, Lok Sabha, July 26, 2023; PRS.Figure3: Number of days from introduction to discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: Number of days implies calendar days.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.On average, no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been discussed for 13 hours over three days.  Discussions have lasted longer than 20 hours on four instances, most recently in 2003.  Today’s no-confidence motion was allotted 12 hours discussion time by theBusiness Advisory Committee.Following the discussion, the motion is put to vote.  26 out of 27 no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been voted upon and rejected.  This means that no government has ever had to resign following a vote of no-confidence.   On one occasion, in 1979, the discussion on a no-confidence motion against the Morarji Desai government remained inconclusive.  He resigned before the motion was put to vote.  50% of all no-confidence motions (14 out of 28) were discussed between 1965 and 1975.  Of these, 12 were against governments headed by Indira Gandhi.Figure4: Duration of discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: This graph excludes the no confidence motion moved on July 26, 2023.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.In comparison, confidence motions have a more varied history.  The first motion, brought in 1979 to demonstrate confidence in Charan Singh’s government, was not discussed at all.  The Prime Minister resigned before the discussion could take place.  Since then, 11 confidence motions have been discussed in Lok Sabha, with nine occurring in the 1990s.  During this period, several coalition governments were formed, and Prime Ministers sought to prove their majority throughconfidence motions.   These motions have been discussed, on average, for 12 hours over two days.Figure5: Duration of discussion of confidence motionsSource: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.Of the 11 confidence motions discussed in Lok Sabha, seven were accepted.  On three instances, governments had to resign as they could not prove that they had the support of the majority.  On one instance in 1996, the motion was not put to vote.  Following an eleven-hour discussion on this confidence motion, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced his intention to resign on the floor of the House.  He resigned 16 days into his term.Vajpayee became Prime Minister again in 1999, and faced another confidence motion.   This time, it was put to vote.   The motion was defeated by a margin of one vote.  This has been the closest result on a trust vote in the history of Lok Sabha.  The next closest result was when a motion of no-confidence against P V Narasimha Rao’s government was defeated by 14 votes in 1993.  In most cases, results have been in favour of the government by a large margin.«12345678910»

65c447791184950038984829

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MiscellaneousGovt. gives itself the master key to access sensitive personal informationChakshu Roy- May 9, 2011The government has given itself the “master key” to access major consumer databases maintained by companies in different sectors. Undernew regulationsmade underthe Information Technology Act, government can ask companies to share sensitive personal information about their customers. Sensitive personal information would cover medical records and history, information about physical, physiological and mental health, sexual orientation, credit and debit cards, biometric information and passwords. Under the new rules any government agency required under law to obtain information for the purpose of verifying identity, or for prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, and punishment of offences can ask a company to give sensitive personal information held by it about an individual. There are no checks on this power, except that the request for information be made in writing, and stating clearly the reason for seeking the information.  Usually information requests have certain inbuilt checks.  For example,search warrantsin criminal cases are issued by a court.  Tapping of telephones or interception of electronic communication can only be authorised by theUnion or the State Home Secretaryafter following a prescribed process.  The new Bill for Unique Identification Number (UID) permits such use only by the order of a court, or for national security (by an order of an authorised officer of at least Joint Secretary rank in the central government).ParliamentFirst no-confidence motion of the 17th Lok Sabha discussed todayNiranjana Menon- August 8, 2023Discussion on the first no-confidence motion of the 17thLok Sabha began today.  No-confidence motions and confidence motions are trust votes, used to test or demonstrate the support of Lok Sabha for the government in power.  Article 75(3) of the Constitution states that the government is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha.  This means that the government must always enjoy the support of a majority of the members of Lok Sabha.  Trust votes are used to examine this support.  The government resigns if a majority of members support a no-confidence motion, or reject a confidence motion.So far, 28 no-confidence motions (including the one being discussed today) and 11 confidence motions have beendiscussed.  Over the years, the number of such motions has reduced.  The mid-1960s and mid-1970s saw more no-confidence motions, whereas the 1990s saw more confidence motions.Figure1: Trust votes in ParliamentNote: *Term shorter than 5 years; **6-year term.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.The no-confidence motion being discussed today wasmovedon July 26, 2023.  A motion of no-confidence is moved with the support of at least 50 members.   The Speaker has the discretion to allot time for discussion of the motion.  TheRules of Procedurestate that the motion must be discussed within 10 days of being introduced.  This year, the no-confidence motion wasdiscussed13 calendar days after introduction.  Since the introduction of the no-confidence motion on July 26, 12 Bills have been introduced and 18 Bills have been passed by Lok Sabha.  In the past, on four occasions, the discussion on no-confidence motions began seven days after their introduction.  On these occasions, Bills and other important issues were debated before the discussion on the no-confidence motion began.Figure2: Members rise in support of the motion of no-confidence in Lok SabhaSource: Sansad TV, Lok Sabha, July 26, 2023; PRS.Figure3: Number of days from introduction to discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: Number of days implies calendar days.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.On average, no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been discussed for 13 hours over three days.  Discussions have lasted longer than 20 hours on four instances, most recently in 2003.  Today’s no-confidence motion was allotted 12 hours discussion time by theBusiness Advisory Committee.Following the discussion, the motion is put to vote.  26 out of 27 no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been voted upon and rejected.  This means that no government has ever had to resign following a vote of no-confidence.   On one occasion, in 1979, the discussion on a no-confidence motion against the Morarji Desai government remained inconclusive.  He resigned before the motion was put to vote.  50% of all no-confidence motions (14 out of 28) were discussed between 1965 and 1975.  Of these, 12 were against governments headed by Indira Gandhi.Figure4: Duration of discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: This graph excludes the no confidence motion moved on July 26, 2023.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.In comparison, confidence motions have a more varied history.  The first motion, brought in 1979 to demonstrate confidence in Charan Singh’s government, was not discussed at all.  The Prime Minister resigned before the discussion could take place.  Since then, 11 confidence motions have been discussed in Lok Sabha, with nine occurring in the 1990s.  During this period, several coalition governments were formed, and Prime Ministers sought to prove their majority throughconfidence motions.   These motions have been discussed, on average, for 12 hours over two days.Figure5: Duration of discussion of confidence motionsSource: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.Of the 11 confidence motions discussed in Lok Sabha, seven were accepted.  On three instances, governments had to resign as they could not prove that they had the support of the majority.  On one instance in 1996, the motion was not put to vote.  Following an eleven-hour discussion on this confidence motion, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced his intention to resign on the floor of the House.  He resigned 16 days into his term.Vajpayee became Prime Minister again in 1999, and faced another confidence motion.   This time, it was put to vote.   The motion was defeated by a margin of one vote.  This has been the closest result on a trust vote in the history of Lok Sabha.  The next closest result was when a motion of no-confidence against P V Narasimha Rao’s government was defeated by 14 votes in 1993.  In most cases, results have been in favour of the government by a large margin.«12345678910»

65c4475a1184950038984807

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ParliamentScenarios for upcoming Rajya Sabha, Presidential and VP electionsRohit- March 7, 2012Several Rajya Sabha seats go to elections this year. The President and the Vice-President are also due to be elected by August. We analyse the impact of the recent State Assembly elections on the composition of the Rajya Sabha and the outcome of the Presidential polls.Rajya Sabha - How will its composition change?Since Rajya Sabha members are elected by the elected members of State Legislative Assemblies, a change in the composition of State Assemblies can affect the composition of Rajya Sabha.  A total of 61 Rajya Sabha seats are up for election in April and July.  This includes 10 seats from Uttar Pradesh and 1 seat from Uttarakhand. In light of the recent Assembly elections, we work out two scenarios to estimate the composition of Rajya Sabha in 2012. Members of Rajya Sabha are elected through the system of proportional representation by means of the Single Transferable Vote (STV). In an STV election, a candidate is required to achieve a certain minimum number of votes (called the 'quota') to be elected.  (For more details on the STV system, clickhere) For instance, in the case of Uttar Pradesh (UP) 10 Rajya Sabha seats go to election this year.  Candidates will be elected to these 10 seats by the 403 elected MLAs of the Uttar Pradesh State Assembly.  Each MLA will rank the candidates based on his/ her preference. After successive rounds of elimination, candidates who are able to secure at least 37  {or 403/(10+1) } votes will be declared elected. In the new UP Assembly, Samajwadi  Party (SP) has a total strength of 224 members. As a result, SP can elect at least 6 (or 224/37) Rajya Sabha MPs of its choice.  BSP's strength of 80 will allow it to elect 2 (or 80/37) MPs to Rajya Sabha. Similarily, the BJP with a strength of 47 MLAs can have one candidate of its choice elected to the Rajya Sabha.  This leaves 1 seat.  The fate of this seat depends on the alliances that may be formed since no other party in UP has 37 or more seats in the Assembly.  If the Congress (28 seats) and RLD (9 seats) join hands, they may be able to elect a candidate of their choice. We build two scenarios which give the likely range of seats for the major coalitions and parties. The actual result will likely fall between these scenarios, depending on alliances for each election. Of the two scenarios, Scenario II is better for the UPA. It is based on the assumption that the UPA is able to put together the necessary support/ alliances to get its candidates elected to seats with indeterminate status.  Scenario I is based on the assumption that the UPA is not able to put together the required support. As a result, the seats in question get allocated to candidates from other parties/ coalitions.(See Notes for the composition of the coalitions)Composition of Rajya SabhaParty/ CoalitionCurrent compositionScenario IScenario IITotal seats245245245UPA939598NDA666765Left191414BSP181515SP599BJD687AIADMK555Nominated71212Others212020Vacant500It appears that there would not be a major change in the composition of the Rajya Sabha.Which party's candidate is likely to become the next President?The next Presidential election will be held in June or July.  The electoral college for the Presidential election consists of the elected members of Lok Sabha, Rajya Sabha and all Legislative Assemblies. Each MP/ MLA’s vote has a pre-determined value based on the population they represent. For instance, an MP's vote has a value of 708, an MLA from UP has a vote value of 208 and an MLA from Sikkim has a vote value of 7.(Note that all MPs, irrespective of the constituency or State they represent, have equal vote value)As is evident, changes in the composition of Assemblies in larger States such as UP can have a major impact on the outcome of the Presidential election. The elections to the office of the President are held through the system of proportional representation by means of STV (same as in the case of Rajya Sabha).  The winning candidate must secure at least 50% of the total value of votes polled.  (For details, refer to thisElection Commission document). By this calculation, a candidate will need at least 5,48,507 votes to be elected as the President. If the UPA were to vote as a consolidated block, its vote tally would reach 4,50,555 votes under Scenario II (the one that is favourable for the UPA).  Therefore, the UPA will have to seek alliances if it wants a candidate of its choice to be elected to the office of the President.Scenarios for Presidential elections(figures represent the value of votes available with each party/ coalition)Party/ CoalitionScenario IScenario IIUPA4,48,4314,50,555NDA3,05,3283,03,912Left51,57451,574BSP43,72343,723SP69,65169,651BJD30,92330,215AIADMK36,21636,216Others1,11,1661,11,166Total10,97,01210,97,012Minimum required to be elected5,48,5075,48,507What about the Vice-President?Elections to the office of the Vice-President (VP) will be held in July or August.  The electoral college will consist of all members of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha (i.e. both elected and nominated). Unlike the Presidential elections, all votes will have an equal value of one. Like the President, the VP is also elected through the system of proportional representation by means of STV.  The winning candidate must secure at least 50% of the total value of votes polled. Presently, two seats are vacant in the Lok Sabha. If we exclude these from our analysis, we find that a candidate will need at least 395 votes to be elected as the VP.  Under our best case scenario, the UPA holds 363 votes in the forthcoming VP elections. As is the case with Presidential elections, the UPA will have to seek alliances to get a candidate of its choice elected to the office of the Vice-President.Scenarios for VP elections(figures represent the value of votes available with each party/ coalition)Party/ CoalitionScenario IScenario IIUPA360363NDA216214Left3838BSP3636SP3131BJD2221AIADMK1414Nominated1414Others5757Total788788Minimum required to be elected395395Notes:[1]UPA:Congress, Trinamool, DMK, NCP,Rashtriya Lok Dal, J&K National Conference, Muslim League Kerala State Committee, Kerala Congress (M), All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen, Sikkim Democratic Front, Praja Rajyam Party, Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi [2]NDA:BJP, JD(U), Shiv Sena, Shiromani Akali Dal [3]Left:CPI(M), CPI, Revolutionary Socialist Party,All India Forward BlocParliamentFirst no-confidence motion of the 17th Lok Sabha discussed todayNiranjana Menon- August 8, 2023Discussion on the first no-confidence motion of the 17thLok Sabha began today.  No-confidence motions and confidence motions are trust votes, used to test or demonstrate the support of Lok Sabha for the government in power.  Article 75(3) of the Constitution states that the government is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha.  This means that the government must always enjoy the support of a majority of the members of Lok Sabha.  Trust votes are used to examine this support.  The government resigns if a majority of members support a no-confidence motion, or reject a confidence motion.So far, 28 no-confidence motions (including the one being discussed today) and 11 confidence motions have beendiscussed.  Over the years, the number of such motions has reduced.  The mid-1960s and mid-1970s saw more no-confidence motions, whereas the 1990s saw more confidence motions.Figure1: Trust votes in ParliamentNote: *Term shorter than 5 years; **6-year term.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.The no-confidence motion being discussed today wasmovedon July 26, 2023.  A motion of no-confidence is moved with the support of at least 50 members.   The Speaker has the discretion to allot time for discussion of the motion.  TheRules of Procedurestate that the motion must be discussed within 10 days of being introduced.  This year, the no-confidence motion wasdiscussed13 calendar days after introduction.  Since the introduction of the no-confidence motion on July 26, 12 Bills have been introduced and 18 Bills have been passed by Lok Sabha.  In the past, on four occasions, the discussion on no-confidence motions began seven days after their introduction.  On these occasions, Bills and other important issues were debated before the discussion on the no-confidence motion began.Figure2: Members rise in support of the motion of no-confidence in Lok SabhaSource: Sansad TV, Lok Sabha, July 26, 2023; PRS.Figure3: Number of days from introduction to discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: Number of days implies calendar days.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.On average, no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been discussed for 13 hours over three days.  Discussions have lasted longer than 20 hours on four instances, most recently in 2003.  Today’s no-confidence motion was allotted 12 hours discussion time by theBusiness Advisory Committee.Following the discussion, the motion is put to vote.  26 out of 27 no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been voted upon and rejected.  This means that no government has ever had to resign following a vote of no-confidence.   On one occasion, in 1979, the discussion on a no-confidence motion against the Morarji Desai government remained inconclusive.  He resigned before the motion was put to vote.  50% of all no-confidence motions (14 out of 28) were discussed between 1965 and 1975.  Of these, 12 were against governments headed by Indira Gandhi.Figure4: Duration of discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: This graph excludes the no confidence motion moved on July 26, 2023.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.In comparison, confidence motions have a more varied history.  The first motion, brought in 1979 to demonstrate confidence in Charan Singh’s government, was not discussed at all.  The Prime Minister resigned before the discussion could take place.  Since then, 11 confidence motions have been discussed in Lok Sabha, with nine occurring in the 1990s.  During this period, several coalition governments were formed, and Prime Ministers sought to prove their majority throughconfidence motions.   These motions have been discussed, on average, for 12 hours over two days.Figure5: Duration of discussion of confidence motionsSource: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.Of the 11 confidence motions discussed in Lok Sabha, seven were accepted.  On three instances, governments had to resign as they could not prove that they had the support of the majority.  On one instance in 1996, the motion was not put to vote.  Following an eleven-hour discussion on this confidence motion, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced his intention to resign on the floor of the House.  He resigned 16 days into his term.Vajpayee became Prime Minister again in 1999, and faced another confidence motion.   This time, it was put to vote.   The motion was defeated by a margin of one vote.  This has been the closest result on a trust vote in the history of Lok Sabha.  The next closest result was when a motion of no-confidence against P V Narasimha Rao’s government was defeated by 14 votes in 1993.  In most cases, results have been in favour of the government by a large margin.«12345678910»

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MiscellaneousMaternity leave in India and other countriesPrianka Rao- August 11, 2016Earlier today, aBillto raise maternity benefits was introduced and passed in Rajya Sabha.  The Bill amends the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961.  The Act regulates the employment of women during the period of child birth, and provides maternity benefits.  The Act applies to factory, mines, plantations, shops and other establishments.Duration of maternity leave: The Act states that every woman will be entitled to maternity benefit of 12 weeks.  The Bill increases this to 26 weeks.  Further, under the Act, this maternity benefit should not be availed before six weeks from the date of expected delivery.  The Bill changes this to eight weeks. In case of a woman who has two or more children, the maternity benefit will continue to be 12 weeks, which cannot be availed before six weeks from the date of the expected delivery.Maternity leave for adoptive and commissioning mothers: Further, the Bill introduces a provision to grant 12 weeks of maternity leave to: (i) a woman who legally adopts a child below three months of age; and (ii) a commissioning mother.  A commissioning mother is defined as a biological mother who uses her egg to create an embryo implanted in another woman.  The 12-week period of maternity benefit will be calculated from the date the child is handed over to the adoptive or commissioning mother.Informing women employees of the right to maternity leave:The Bill introduces a provision which requires every establishment to intimate a woman at the time of her appointment of the maternity benefits available to her.  Such communication must be in writing and electronically.Option to work from home: The Bill introduces a provision that states that an employer may permit a woman to work from home.  This would apply if the nature of work assigned to the woman permits her to work from home.  This option can be availed of, after the period of maternity leave, for a duration that is mutually decided by the employer and the woman.Crèche facilities: The Bill introduces a provision which requires every establishment with 50 or more employees to provide crèche facilities within a prescribed distance.  The woman will be allowed four visits to the crèche in a day.  This will include her interval for rest. Various countries provide maternity leave.  However, the duration of leave varies across different countries.[i]We present a comparison of maternity leave available in different countries, as on 2014, below.Sources: International Labour Organisation Report (2014); PRS.[i]. “Maternity and Paternity at work: Legislation across countries”, International Labour Organisation Report (2014),http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_242615.pdf.ParliamentFirst no-confidence motion of the 17th Lok Sabha discussed todayNiranjana Menon- August 8, 2023Discussion on the first no-confidence motion of the 17thLok Sabha began today.  No-confidence motions and confidence motions are trust votes, used to test or demonstrate the support of Lok Sabha for the government in power.  Article 75(3) of the Constitution states that the government is collectively responsible to Lok Sabha.  This means that the government must always enjoy the support of a majority of the members of Lok Sabha.  Trust votes are used to examine this support.  The government resigns if a majority of members support a no-confidence motion, or reject a confidence motion.So far, 28 no-confidence motions (including the one being discussed today) and 11 confidence motions have beendiscussed.  Over the years, the number of such motions has reduced.  The mid-1960s and mid-1970s saw more no-confidence motions, whereas the 1990s saw more confidence motions.Figure1: Trust votes in ParliamentNote: *Term shorter than 5 years; **6-year term.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.The no-confidence motion being discussed today wasmovedon July 26, 2023.  A motion of no-confidence is moved with the support of at least 50 members.   The Speaker has the discretion to allot time for discussion of the motion.  TheRules of Procedurestate that the motion must be discussed within 10 days of being introduced.  This year, the no-confidence motion wasdiscussed13 calendar days after introduction.  Since the introduction of the no-confidence motion on July 26, 12 Bills have been introduced and 18 Bills have been passed by Lok Sabha.  In the past, on four occasions, the discussion on no-confidence motions began seven days after their introduction.  On these occasions, Bills and other important issues were debated before the discussion on the no-confidence motion began.Figure2: Members rise in support of the motion of no-confidence in Lok SabhaSource: Sansad TV, Lok Sabha, July 26, 2023; PRS.Figure3: Number of days from introduction to discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: Number of days implies calendar days.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.On average, no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been discussed for 13 hours over three days.  Discussions have lasted longer than 20 hours on four instances, most recently in 2003.  Today’s no-confidence motion was allotted 12 hours discussion time by theBusiness Advisory Committee.Following the discussion, the motion is put to vote.  26 out of 27 no-confidence motions (excluding the one being discussed today) have been voted upon and rejected.  This means that no government has ever had to resign following a vote of no-confidence.   On one occasion, in 1979, the discussion on a no-confidence motion against the Morarji Desai government remained inconclusive.  He resigned before the motion was put to vote.  50% of all no-confidence motions (14 out of 28) were discussed between 1965 and 1975.  Of these, 12 were against governments headed by Indira Gandhi.Figure4: Duration of discussion on no-confidence motionsNote: This graph excludes the no confidence motion moved on July 26, 2023.Source: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.In comparison, confidence motions have a more varied history.  The first motion, brought in 1979 to demonstrate confidence in Charan Singh’s government, was not discussed at all.  The Prime Minister resigned before the discussion could take place.  Since then, 11 confidence motions have been discussed in Lok Sabha, with nine occurring in the 1990s.  During this period, several coalition governments were formed, and Prime Ministers sought to prove their majority throughconfidence motions.   These motions have been discussed, on average, for 12 hours over two days.Figure5: Duration of discussion of confidence motionsSource: Statistical Handbook 2021, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs; PRS.Of the 11 confidence motions discussed in Lok Sabha, seven were accepted.  On three instances, governments had to resign as they could not prove that they had the support of the majority.  On one instance in 1996, the motion was not put to vote.  Following an eleven-hour discussion on this confidence motion, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee announced his intention to resign on the floor of the House.  He resigned 16 days into his term.Vajpayee became Prime Minister again in 1999, and faced another confidence motion.   This time, it was put to vote.   The motion was defeated by a margin of one vote.  This has been the closest result on a trust vote in the history of Lok Sabha.  The next closest result was when a motion of no-confidence against P V Narasimha Rao’s government was defeated by 14 votes in 1993.  In most cases, results have been in favour of the government by a large margin.«12345678910»

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court_cases

Kerala High CourtFlemingo Duty Free Shop Private Ltd vs Airports Authority Of India on 28 June, 2022Author:Sathish NinanBench:Sathish NinanC. R.\n\n IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM\n PRESENT\n THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SATHISH NINAN\n TUESDAY, THE 28TH DAY OF JUNE 2022 / 7TH ASHADHA, 1944\n ARB.P. NO. 1 OF 2021\n AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 16.03.2016 IN AR 41/2015 OF HIGH COURT OF\n KERALA\n -----\nPETITIONER:\n\n FLEMINGO DUTY FREE SHOP PRIVATE LTD\n D-73/1, TTC INDUSTRIAL AREA,\n MIDC-TURBHE, NAVI MUMBAI-400075,\n REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY MR.NIXON VARGHESE.\n\n BY ADVS.\n G.HARIKUMAR (GOPINATHAN NAIR)\n AKHIL SURESH\n JAYAPRAKASH P. SEN (SR.)\n\n\n\nRESPONDENT:\n\n AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA\n CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS, RAJIV GANDHI BHAWAN, SAFDARJUNG\n AIRPORT, NEW DELHI-110001,\n REPRESENTED BY ITS AIRPORT DIRECTOR, CALICUT INTERNATIONAL\n AIRPORT(P.O), KARIPUR,\n MALAPPURAM-673647.\n\n BY ADVS.\n S.SUJIN\n V.SANTHARAM\n\n\n\n\n THIS ARBITRATION PETITION HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON\n28.06.2022, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:\n C. R.\n\n\n SATHISH NINAN, J.\n = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =\n Arbitration Petition No.1 of 2021\n = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =\n Dated this the 28th day of June, 2022\n\n O R D E RThe Arbitration Petition is filed seeking an order\n\nfor extension of period of arbitration on substitution\n\nof Arbitrator.2. The reliefs claimed in the Arbitration Petition\n\nreads thus:-"a) Declare that the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal\n presided by the Learned Sole Arbitrator A.K. Singhhal stands\n terminated in the arbitration matter of Flemingo Duty freeShop Private Limited vs. Airports Authority of India.b) Appoint a Sole Arbitrator in place of Learned Sole\n Arbitrator A.K. Singhal for continuation of the arbitration\n matter of Flemingo Duty freeShop Private Limited v.\n Airports Authority of India.c) Extend the time for completion of the arbitration\n proceedings in the arbitration matter of Flemingo Duty freeShop Private Limited vs. Airports Authority of Indiaby a\n period of six months from the date of appointment of the new\n Sole Arbitrator.Arbitration Petition No.1/2021-: 2 :-d) Grant the cost of the Application to the petitioner;\n ande) grant such other reliefs as may be deemed fit, just,\n proper and necessary in the facts and circumstances of the\n case."3. The petitioner is engaged in the business of\n\noperation of duty free shops at various airports in\n\nKerala. There arose disputes between the parties, which\n\nlead to conduct of arbitration proceedings as provided\n\nfor in the agreement between them. The sole Arbitrator\n\nwas appointed on 25.01.2016. The pleadings were complete\n\non 14.09.2017. The period for completion of arbitration\n\nas provided under Section 29A (1) and (3) of theArbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996(hereinafter\n\nreferred to as "the Act") expired. Even after the expiry\n\nof the term, the proceedings continued but, is not\n\ncompleted. Now the petitioner alleges bias on the part\n Arbitration Petition No.1/2021-: 3 :-of the Arbitrator. The petitioner has approached this\n\nCourt seeking substitution of the Arbitrator and for\n\nextension of the period in terms ofSection 29A (6)and\n\n(4) respectively, of the Act. The respondent opposes the\n\nprayer. The allegation of bias are denied. The\n\njurisdiction of this Court to entertain an application\n\nunderSection 29Ais also challenged.4. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri.J.P.Sen on\n\nbehalf of the petitioner and learned Senior Counsel\n\nSri.N.N.Sugunapalan, on behalf of the respondent.5. The respondent raised a preliminary objection\n\nregarding the jurisdiction of the High Court to\n\nentertain a petition underSection 29 Aof the Act.\n\nUnderSection 29A, power is conferred on the "Court",\n\nandSection 2(e)defines "Court" as, principal Civil\n\nCourt of original jurisdiction. Therefore, only the\n Arbitration Petition No.1/2021-: 4 :-District Court has the jurisdiction, is the contention.\n\nSuch contention has already been negatived by a Division\n\nBench of this Court inLots Shipping Company Limited v. Cochin\n\nPort Trust[2020 (2) KLT 907]. The Division Bench held thus:-"11. Taking note of the principle enunciated herein\n above and on the basis of the detailed analysis, we are\n inclined to hold that the term "court" used in Section\n 29(4) has to be given an contextual and purposive\n interpretation, which is to be in variance with the\n meaning conferred to the said term under Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Act. The term "court" contained inSection\n 29(4)has to be interpreted as the 'Supreme Court' in the\n case of international commercial arbitrations and as the\n 'High Court' in the case of domestic arbitrations. Hence\n it is held that, either of the party will be at liberty to file\n an arbitration petition before the High Court underSection 29A(5)of the Act, seeking extension of time for\n continuance of the arbitration proceedings in exercise of\n the power conferred underSection 29A(4)of the Act, in\n the case of any domestic arbitration. The reference is\n answered accordingly."Arbitration Petition No.1/2021-: 5 :-Therefore, the challenge against jurisdiction is\n\nliable to be rejected and I do so.6. Whether allegation of bias could be a ground for\n\nsubstitution of Arbitrator underSection 29A(6), is the\n\nissue for determination.7. For challenging an Arbitrator on the ground of\n\nbias, there is a specific provision in the Act viz.Section 12.Sections 13,14and15of the Act provide\n\nfor various situations enabling substitution of\n\nArbitrator:- (i) UnderSection 13when the Arbitrator\n\nwithdraws when a challenge is raised on the ground of\n\nbias or lack of required qualifications, being the\n\ngrounds stipulated underSection 12(3); (ii) On the\n\ngrounds of failure or impossibility to act as mentioned\n\ninSection 14 (1)(a)and the Arbitrator withdraws from\n\noffice or parties agree for termination of his mandate;(iii) UnderSection 15where under, for any reason other\n Arbitration Petition No.1/2021-: 6 :-than that provided underSections 13and14, the\n\nArbitrator withdraws from office, or the parties agree\n\nfor determination of the Arbitrator.8.Section 29Afixes a time limit for completion of\n\narbitration proceedings and for passing the award.\n\nExcept in the case of international commercial\n\narbitration, the award is to be passed within 12 months\n\nfrom the date of completion of pleadings. The said\n\nperiod could be extended for a further period of six\n\nmonths on agreement between the parties. In terms of\n\nsub-section (4) ofSection 29A, on failure to pass award\n\nwithin the period stipulated as above, the mandate of\n\nthe arbitrator shall terminate, unless extended by the\n\nCourt. The extension could either be prior to or after\n\nthe expiry of the period stipulated. Extension can be\n\ngranted by the Court on the application of any of\n\nparties, for sufficient cause. Sub-section 6ofSection\n\n29Aprovides that, while extending the period, Court can\n Arbitration Petition No.1/2021-: 7 :-order substitution of the Arbitrator.9.Section 29Ahas nine sub-sections. A reading of\n\nall the sub-sections ofSection 29Aindicate that, the\n\nSection deals with the time mandate for arbitral\n\nproceedings. In a request for extension of time, the\n\nCourt looks into as to at whose instance the delay has\n\noccurred. Costs could be imposed on the party who was\n\nresponsible for the delay. If delay was on the part of\n\nthe Arbitrator, his fee could be reduced. Therefore, it\n\nis in the said context that the power of substitution of\n\nArbitrator is vested in the Court.10. As noticed supra, the other grounds of\n\nchallenge against the Arbitrator, especially on the\n\nground of bias, and consequential substitution of\n\nArbitrator are dealt with under specific provisions of\n\nthe Act. When specific provisions are incorporated in\n\nthe Act for challenge against an Arbitrator and for\n\nsubstitution, allegation of bias cannot be raised as a\n Arbitration Petition No.1/2021-: 8 :-cause to seek substitution of Arbitrator under Section\n\n29-A.11. There is yet another circumstance to endorse\n\nsuch view. Sub-section (6) ofSection 29Aprovides that,\n\nwhen there is a substitution of Arbitrator under the\n\nSection, the Arbitral proceedings shall continue from\n\nthe stage already reached and on the basis of the\n\nevidence and materials already on record. It is further\n\nprovided that the substituted Arbitrator shall be deemed\n\nto have received the said evidence and materials on\n\nrecord. However, when Arbitrator is substituted under\n\nthe other situations noticed supra, in terms ofSection\n\n15(3), the previous hearings held by the Arbitrator may\n\nbe repeated at the discretion of the substituted\n\nArbitrator, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties.\n\nThere is a stark difference between the two. This\n\nfortifies the view that the request for substitution of\n\nan Arbitrator alleging bias will not come within the\n Arbitration Petition No.1/2021-: 9 :-scope of substitution underSection 29A(6)of the Act.12. A similar view has been taken by the Delhi High\n\nCourt inNCC Ltd. v. Union of India[2018 SCC online Delhi 12699]\n\nwherein it was held thus:-"Section 29Aof the Act is intended to sensitize the parties as\n also the Arbitral Tribunal to aim for culmination of the\n arbitration proceedings expeditiously. It is with this\n legislative intent,Section 29Awas introduced in the Act by\n way of theArbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act,\n 2015. This provision is not intended for a party to seek\n substitution of an Arbitrator only because the party has\n apprehension about the conduct of the arbitration\n proceedings by the said Arbitrator. The only ground for\n removal of the Arbitrator underSection 29Aof the Act can be\n the failure of the Arbitrator to proceed expeditiously in the\n adjudication process."13. Therefore, the request of the petitioner for\n\nextension of period on substitution of the Arbitrator,\n\nis not liable to be considered.Arbitration Petition No.1/2021-: 10 :-14. During the course of the arguments, a query was\n\nput to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner as\n\nto whether, if the Court is not inclined to accept the\n\nprayer for substitution, whether the petitioner is\n\npursuing the prayer for extension of time. After\n\nobtaining instructions, the learned Senior Counsel\n\nsubmitted before the Court that, the petitioner is not\n\nseeking for extension of time without grant of the\n\nprayer for substitution of Arbitrator.15. Having found that the petitioner is not\n\nentitled to seek for substitution alleging bias against\n\nthe Arbitrator in this proceedings, and in the light of\n\nthe stand adopted by the petitioner as noticed above,\n\nthe question of consideration of extension of time for\n\ncompletion of the arbitral proceedings underSection 29Adoes not arise.16. As noticed first above, the pleadings were\n\ncompleted on 14.09.2017. The one year period and the\n Arbitration Petition No.1/2021-: 11 :-extendable period of six months are over as early as on\n\n14.03.2019. There is no dispute between the parties\n\nthat, if time is not extended in terms ofSection\n\n29A(4), the mandate of the Arbitrator has terminated. It\n\nis declared accordingly.The Arbitration Petition is ordered as above.Sd/-SATHISH NINAN\n JUDGE\n\nkns/-//True Copy//\n P.S. to JudgeAPPENDIX OF ARB.P. 1/2021PETITIONER EXHIBITS\n\nExhibit P1 A TRUE COPY OF JUDGMENT DATED 16.03.2016 IN AR\n NO.41 OF 2015 PASSED BY THIS HON'BLE COURT\n\nExhibit P2 A TRUE COPY OF LETTER DATED 25.01.2016 ISSUED BY\n THE RESPONDENT ALONG WITH ITS ANNEXURE\n\nExhibit P3 A TRUE COPY OF TRANSCRIPTION OF THE CROSS-EXAMINATION DATED 10TH JUNE 2021\n\nExhibit P4 A TRUE COPY OF TRANSCRIPTION OF THE CROSS-EXAMINATION DATED 11TH JUNE, 2021\n\nExhibit P5 A TRUE COPY OF THE EMAILS CORRESPONDENCE DATED\n 24TH FEBRUARY,2021 EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE ARBITRAL\n TRIBUNAL AND THE RESPONDENT TO THE EXCLUSION OF\n THE PETITIONER ALONG WITH TRAIL MAIL\n\nExhibit P6 A TRUE COPY OF LETTER DATED 6TH AUGUST,2020 SENT\n BY THE RESPONDENT TO THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL TO THE\n EXCLUSION OF THE PETITIONER\n\nExhibit P7 TRUE COPY OF ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION\n AMENDMENT ACT,2015\n\nExhibit P8 TRUE COPY OF ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION\n AMENDMENT AT 2019\n\nExhibit P9 A TRUE COPY OF ORDER DATED 6TH JANUARY 2017 OF\n THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL\n\nExhibit P10 A TRUE COPY OF ORDER DATED 2NE NOVEMBER 2017 OF\n THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL\n\nExhibit P11 A TRUE COPY OF ORDER DATED 18TH DECEMBER 2019. OF\n THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL\n\nExhibit P12 A TRUE COPY OF ORDER DATED 12TH FEBRUARY 2020. OF\n THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNALAPPENDIX-ARB.P. 1/2021-2-Exhibit P13 A TRUE COPY OF ORDER DATED 4TH MARCH 2021 OF THE\n ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL\n\nExhibit P14 A TRUE COPY OF ORDER DATED 4TH MARCH 2021.OF THE\n ABRITRAL TRIBUNAL-----

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Take notes as you read a judgment using our Virtual Legal Assistant and get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out our Premium Member services -- Free for one month.\n\nPunjab-Haryana High Court\nTaslima And Anr vs State Of Haryana And Ors on 2 June, 2020108.\n IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA\n AT CHANDIGARH\n\n CRWP-3324-2020 (O&M)\n Date of decision: 02.06.2020\n\nTASLIMA AND ANR ... Petitioners\n\n versus\n\n\nSTATE OF HARYANA AND ORS .... Respondents\n\n\nCORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARI PAL VERMA\n ----\n\nPresent: Mr. Vipul Aggarwal, Advocate,\n for the petitioners.\n ----\n\nHARI PAL VERMA, J.(Oral)\n\n The matter has been taken up for hearing through video\n\nconferencing due to outbreak of COVID-19.\n\n Prayer in this criminal writ petition filed under Article 226 of\n\nthe Constitution of India is for issuance of direction to respondents No.2 and\n\n3 to provide adequate police protection/security to the petitioners and further\n\nrespondent No.3 be directed not to harass and threaten the petitioners at the\n\nbehest of respondents No.4 to 10.\n\n Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that both the\n\npetitioners are Muslim by religion. Petitioner No.1-Taslima has attained the\n\nage of majority so as to perform nikah, whereas petitioner No.2-Shehbaz\n\nKhan is of about 20 years and 8 months. Since they have performed nikah\n\nagainst the wishes of respondents No.4 to 10, they are apprehending threat\n\nto their life and liberty. The private respondents are not accepting their nikah\n\nand are adamant to separate them from each other by resorting to illegal\n\n\n\n 1 of 2\n ::: Downloaded on - 02-06-2020 22:55:14 :::\n CRWP-3324-2020 (O&M) -2-\n\nmeans. Learned counsel further submits that in view of imminent danger to\n\nthe life and liberty of the petitioners, they have moved a representation dated\n\n28.05.2020 (Annexure P-5) to respondent No.2-Superintendent of Police,\n\nFaridabad.\n\n Notice of motion to respondents No.1 to 3 only at this stage.\n\n At the asking of the Court, Mr. Manish Bansal, DAG, Haryana,\n\naccepts notice on behalf of respondents No.1 to 3.\n\n Without going into the validity of the marriage of the\n\npetitioners, the present petition is disposed of with a direction to the\n\nrespondent No.2-Superintendent of Police, Faridabad to take appropriate\n\nremedial measures on the representation dated 28.05.2020 (Annexure P-5)\n\nsubmitted by the petitioners as warranted by law.\n\n In the meantime, necessary order be passed to ensure that no\n\nharm is caused to the life and liberty of the petitioners.\n\n\n\n (HARI PAL VERMA)\n JUDGE\n02.06.2020\nsanjeev\n Whether speaking/reasoned? Yes/No\n Whether reportable? Yes/No\n\n\n\n\n 2 of 2\n ::: Downloaded on - 02-06-2020 22:55:14 :::

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Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)Rajib Chakraborty And Ors vs The State Of West Bengal And Ors on 14 January, 2022Author:I. P. MukerjiBench:I. P. Mukerji14.01.2022\nSl.1 (Via Video Conference)\nCt.No. 03\n Amalranjan\n IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA\n CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION\n APPELLATE SIDE\n W\n W.P.A.(P) 162 of 2021\n Rajib Chakraborty and Ors.\n -versus-\n The State of West Bengal and Ors.\n With\n CAN 1 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 746 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 151 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 178 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 401 of 2021\n with\n CPAN 402 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 403 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 410 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 411 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 412 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 413 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 414 of 2021\n with\n CPAN 469 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 473 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 562 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 563 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 569 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 574 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 599 of 2020\n 2\n\n\n\n\n With\n CPAN 642 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 645 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 685 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 692 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 723 of 2020\n 1999With\n CAN 1 of 2021\n With\n CAN 2 of 2021\n With\n CAN 3 of 2021\n With\n CPAN 755 of 2020\n With\n WPA 5378 of 2020\n Pratyush Patwari\n -versus-\n State of West Bengal and Anr.\n With\nCAN 2 of 2020 (Old CAN No. 3697 of 2020)\n With\nCAN 3 of 2020 (Old CAN No. 3698 of 2020)\n With\n WPA 5400 of 2020\n Raja Satyajit Banerjee\n -versus-\n State of West Bengal and Ors.\n With\n WPA 5530 of 2020\n Biplab Kr. Chowdhury\n VS\n Union of India & Ors.\n With\nCAN 1 of 2020(Old No:CAN 3252 of 2020)\n With\n WPA 5872 of 2020\n Santosh Kumar Yadav\n VS\n Union Of India & Ors\n With\nCAN 1 of 2020(Old No:CAN 3956 of 2020)\n With\n CPAN 131 of 2021\n With\n CAN 1 of 2021\n With\n WPA 5890 of 2020\n Vineet Ruia\n 3\n\n\n\n\n VS\n Principal secretary,\n Department of School,\n Bikash Bhavan & Ors.\n With\n CAN 17 of 2020\n With\n CAN 32 of 2020\n With\n CAN 33 of 2021\n\n\n (Via Video Conference)\n\n Mr. J. Sai Deepak,\n Ms. Priyanka Agarwal,\n Mr. Rishab Kumar Singh,\n Mr. Anurag Mitra,\n Mr. Tanvi Luhariwala...................For the petitioners in\n W.P.A.5890 of 2020 and\n CPAN 723 of 2020.\n\n Mr. Pratyush Patwari................ Petitioner (in person)\nin\n W.P.A. 5378 of 2020.\n Mr. Y.J. Dastoor,\n Mr. Siddhartha Lahiri.................For Union of India.\n\n Mr. Sayan Sinha........................For the State.\n Mr. U.S. Menon,\n Mr. Abhirup Chakraborty...........For C.B.S.E. Board.\n Mr. Durgadas Banerjee,\n Mr. S.P. Tewary,\n Mr. Partha Banerjee,\n Mr. Abhijit Tewari,\n Ms. Paramita Banerjee...........For Disari Public School.\n\n Mr. Abhrajit Mitra,\n Mr. Kunal Chatterjee\n Mr. Nikunj Berlia,\n Mr. Shoumendu Mukherjee,\n Ms. Anshu Jain..................For the Association of ICSE\n Schools, West Bengal Chapter.\n\n Ms. Koyeli Bhattacharyya...........For the West Bengal\n Board of Secondary Education.\n\n Mr. Samapriya Chowdhury,\n Mr. Deepan Kumar Sarkar,\n Mr. Dinabandhu Dan,\n Mr. Santanu chatterjee,\n Mr. Dipayan Dan.................For Delhi Public School,\n Ruby Park.\n Mr. Sabyasachi Chowdhury,\n Mr. Rajarshi Dutta,\n Mr. V.V.V. Sastry,\n Mr. Nischay Mall,\n Ms. Shivika Tiwari,\n Mr. Debajyoti Saha...............For Ashok Hall Group of\n Schools and Ballygunge\n 4\n\n\n\n\n Siksha Sadan.\nMr. Nabankur Pal,\nMd. Apzal Ansari,\nMs. Surabhi Gularia.............For Delhi Public School,\n Siliguri.\nMs. Surabhi Gularia,\nMr. Arkadipta Sengupta,\nMr. Subhajit Das............... For Delhi Public School,\n Kanyapur, St. Judges School and\n Burnpur Riverside School.\n\nMr. Abdur Raquib....................For Delhi Public School,\n Joka.\nMr. Vipul Kundalia,\nMr. Kushagra Shah................ For Delhi Public School,\n New Town.\nMr. Partha Sarathi Bhattacharya,\nMr. Raju Bhattacharya................For the Principal,\n St. Joseph College.\nMs. Amrita Pandey,\nMs. Anamika Pandey...................For the Assembly of\n God Church School.\nMs. Kabita Mukherjee,\nMr. Manas Dasgupta..........For Agrasain Balika Siksha\n Sadan and Boys' School.\nMr. Satarup Bhattacharya,\nMr. Saptarshi Dutta...........For South City International\n School.\nMr. Ananda Basu,\nMr. Emon Bhattacharya,\nMs. Pooja Shah........................For St. Hellen School,\n Howrah.\nMr. Pinaki Dhole...............For Hariyana Vidya Mandir.\n\nMr. Ayan Chakraborty..........For Adamas International\n School.\nMr. Tanvi Luhariwala.........For Adamas School Parents'\n Forum.\n\nMr. Arnab Chakraborty.......For Well and Gold Smith\n School.\nMr. Sandip Kumar Dey,\nMr. Abhijit Sarkar...............For Calcutta Girls' High\n School.\nMr. Arindam Banerjee,\nMr. Deepan Kumar Sarkar,\nMr. Sourav Bhagat,\nMs. Shruti Swaika,\nMs. Prajata Kishore Chakraborty.....For South Point\n School, South Point High School,\n Birla High School and\n Sri Sikshayatan School.\n\nMr. Arijit Bardhan,\nMr. Soumyajit Mishra............For Don Bosco School,\n Park Circus.\n\nMs. Chama Mookerji,\nMr. Anujit Mookerji,\nMs. Rinky Shaw..............For Calcutta Boys School,\n Julien Day School.\n\nMr. Partha Banerjee,\nMr. Arun Kumar Mandal.........For Heritage School.\n 5\n\n\n\n\nMs. Ameena Kabir..............For Frank Anthony Public\n School.\n\nMr. Arun Alo Roy,\nMr. Swagato Roy................For Mahadevi Birla World\n Academy and Birla Bharati.\n\nMr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan,\nMr. Paritosh Sinha,\nMr. Sankalp Narain,\nMr. Rohit Amit Sthalekar,\nMr. H.P. Sahi,\nMr. B.P. Tiwari,\nMr. Amitava Mitra,\nMs. Shrayashee Das,\nMr. Jishnujit Roy,\nMs. Antara Chowdhury............For La Martiniere and\n C.N.I. Group of Schools.\nMr. Ashoke Kumar Roy,\nMr. Ashim Kumar Roy................For Bharitiya Vidya\n Bhavan, Kolkata.\nMs. Lopita Banerjee,\nMs. Arijita Ghosh,\nMr. Souma Sil,\nMr. Lordly Guha.......................For New Town School.\n\nMr. Sanjay Kumar Baid,\nMs. Nupur Jalan.......................For Don Bosco, Liluah,\n Holy Family Convent, P.B. Academy,\n SreeJain Vidya Mandir, Well and\n Gould Smith School, Kolkata, Patuli,\n St. Aloysius Orphanage and Day School,\n St. Mary's Convent School, Santragachi.\n\nMr. Raj Mohan Chattoraj,\nMr. Sankar Prasad Dalapati,\nMr. Sourav Mondal........................For Swabhumi\n Foundation, G.D. Goenka\n Public School, Indira Gandhi\n Memorial High School,\n Dum Dum and Barasat.\n\nMr. Meghajit Mukherjee...........For Sri Sri Academy.\n\nMr. Sandip Kumar De,\nMr. Abhijit Sarkar,\nMr. Abhik Chitta Kundu..........For Calcutta Girls' High\n School.\nMr. Santosh Kumar Ray,\nMs. Rituparna Sanyal..............For Srihari Global\n School, Asansol.\n\nMr. Sarajit Sen,\nMr. Tapas Singha Roy..............For Delhi Public School,\n Asansol.\nMr. Aniruddha Mitra,\nMr. Ayan Chakraborty..........For Adamas World School.\n\nMr. Subir Pal........................ For St. Paul's Academy.\n\nMr. Ratnanko Banerjee,\nMr. Somopriyo Chowdhury,\nMr. Dinabandhu Dan,\nMr. Deepan Kumar Sarkar,\nMr. Sanatan Chatterjee,\n 6\n\n\n\n\n Mr. Dipayan Dan..................For the D.P.S. Ruby Park.\n\n Mr. Joydeep Kar,\n Mr. Billwadal Bhattacharya,\n Mr. Anish Kumar Mukherjee,\n Mr. Amrit Sinha....................For the respondent.Mr. Apurba Kumar Ghosh.......For Rose Bird School.Dr. Indrahjit Kundu...............For the petitioners in\n CPAN 562,563, 569, 574,\n 642, 151 and 178 of 2021.Mr. Rahul Karmakar,\n Mr. Debabrata Roy................For Arun Nursery and\n Future Foundation.Mr. Asif Sohail Tarafdar.........For Indus Valley and B.D.\n Memorial School.Mr. Subir Banerjee,\n Ms. Shreyosi Sengupta,\n Ms. Mumpy Singha.....................For the applicant in\n CPAN 685 of 2021.Mr. Shomendu Mukherjee..........For Indus Valley, BDM\n International and Apeejay School.Mr. Varun Kedia.........................For the applicant in\n CPAN 642 of 2021.Mr. Nikunj Belia,\n Mr. Shomendu Mukherjee.....For Lakshmipat Singhania\n Academy.Mr. Raja Satyajit Banerjee,\n Ms. Anwashal Haldeer,\n Ms. Krishnika Chatterjee...............For the petitioner in\n W.P.A. 5400 of 2020.List all these applications on 18 th February,\n\n2022 at 2 p.m.\n\n The interim order in force shall continue till\n\n15th March, 2022 or until further order,\n\nwhichever is earlier.7Learned counsel complaining of violation of\n\nour order by some schools may advise their\n\nclients to take out appropriate applications\n\nplacing those allegations on record, so that this\n\ncourt shall be in a position to consider them and\n\npass an appropriate order.( I. P. Mukerji,J. )\n\n\n ( Moushumi Bhattacharya,J. )

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Himachal Pradesh High CourtRP/39/2021 on 24 June, 2021Bench: L. Narayana Swamy, Anoop ChitkaraReview Petitions No. 32 to 42 of 2021\n\n24.06.2021 Present: Mr. Prashant Bhushan, Senior Advocate with Mr.\n\n\n\n\n .Jeetendra Pal, Advocate, for the petitioner(s).Mr. Ashok Sharma, Advocate General with Mr.\n Adarsh K. Sharma and Ms. Ritta Goswami,\n Additional Advocates General, for the respondent-State.Mr. Tara Singh Chauhan, Advocate, for the\n respondents-HPSEB.Ms. Shreya Chauhan, Advocate, for respondent-\n NHAI.(Through Video Conferencing)\n\n\n Review Petitions No. 32 to 42 of 2021\n\n Issue notice. Mr. Adarsh K. Sharma, learned\n\n Additional Advocate General, Mr. Tara Singh Chauhan and Ms.\n\n\n\n Shreya Chauhan, Advocates, accept notice for respondent-State, respondent-HPSEB and respondent-NHAI, respectively.Notice be issued to respondent(s) No. 4-Municial Corporation\n\n\n\n\n\n returnable within 10 days, on taking steps within two days.List on 05.07.2021 in the Regular Court.CMP No. 6370 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 32 of 2021\n CMP No. 6373 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 33 of 2021\n CMP No. 6376 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 34 of 2021\n CMP No. 6378 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 35 of 2021\n CMP No. 6384 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 36 of 2021\n CMP No. 6382 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 37 of 2021\n CMP No. 6391 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 38 of 2021\n CMP No. 6393 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 39 of 2021\n CMP No. 6399 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 40 of 2021\n CMP No. 6397 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 41 of 2021\n CMP No. 6401 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 42 of 2021\n\n Notice in the aforesaid terms. In the meantime, the\n\n respondents are restrained from demolishing the structure of\n\n the petitioners.::: Downloaded on - 24/06/2021 20:14:26 :::HCHPCMP No. 6371 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 32 of 2021\n CMP No. 6375 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 33 of 2021\n CMP No. 6377 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 34 of 2021\n\n\n\n\n .CMP No. 6379 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 35 of 2021\n\n\n\n\n\n CMP No. 6385 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 36 of 2021\n CMP No. 6383 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 37 of 2021\n CMP No. 6392 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 38 of 2021\n CMP No. 6395 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 39 of 2021\n\n\n\n\n\n CMP No. 6400 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 40 of 2021\n CMP No. 6398 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 41 of 2021\n CMP No. 6402 of 2021 in Rev Pet. No. 42 of 2021\n\n The applications are disposed of with the direction\n\n\n\n\n that the petitioners shall file the typed/legible/translated\n\n copies of the documents in issue by the next date of hearing\n\n\n Learned Counsel for the respondent-NHAI is directed\n\n to communicate this order to the Authorities concerned.Copy dasti.(L. Narayana Swamy)\n Chief Justice.June 24, 2021 (Anoop Chitkara)\n\n\n\n\n\n (hemlata) Judge.::: Downloaded on - 24/06/2021 20:14:26 :::HCHP

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Uttarakhand High CourtBA1/594/2021 on 29 September, 2021Author:R.C. KhulbeBench:R.C. KhulbeOffice Notes,\n reports, orders or\nSL. proceedings or\n Date COURT'S OR JUDGES'S ORDERS\nNo directions and\n Registrar's order\n with Signatures\n BA1 No.594 of 2021\n Hon'ble R.C. Khulbe, J.Ms. Manisha Bhandari with Mr. H.C. Pathak\n and Mr. B.D. Pande, learned counsel for the\n applicant.Mr. V.S. Rathore, learned A.G.A. for the\n State.Ms. Neetu Singh, learned counsel for the\n informant.Accused-Satendra Saini has sought his\n release on bail in connection with Case Crime/ FIR\n No.711/2020u/s 304,328,323,504IPC registered\n at P.S. Kotwali Mangalore, District Haridwar.As per the FIR dated 4.11.2020, on\n 30.10.2020, informant's father in law Atma Ram\n along with Vipul, Satendra came to her house and\n started abusing her; on asking them to refrain from\n such acts, they began to beat her and forcefully\n administered poison to her and then they ran away;\n on 2.11.2020 at about 7:30 PM her brother in law\n Arvind was called inside the house by Atma Ram;\n Arvind telephoned informant's husband about this\n fact; thereafter, Arvind, informant's husband and\n son was assaulted with sharp edged weapons by\n Satendra, Atma Ram, Shyam Lata and Vipul.On the basis of said information, the FIR was\n lodged at P.S. Mangalore on the very same day.It is argued by the learned counsel that the\n applicant has been falsely implicated; he was not\n present at the spot; as per the post-mortem report,\n there was abrasion found on the body of deceased;\n the eyewitnesses Vipul and Divya have clearly\n stated that the accused Satendra was not at the spot\n at the relevant point of time; it is a case where cross\nFIR has also been filed; applicant is ready to furnish\nthe sureties and may be granted bail.Per contra, learned counsel for the State as\nalso learned counsel for the informant opposed for\nbail.As per the FIR, accused Satendra, Atma Ram,\nSmt. Shyam Lata and Vipul were present at the spot\nat the time of incident and they caused injuries to\nArvind and also injured Jitendra and Himanshu.The statement of injured Himanshu and\nArvind were recorded during investigationu/s 161Cr.P.C.; they narrated the entire story and clearly\nstated that the accused Satendra Saini was very\nmuch present on the spot at the relevant point of\ntime who also committed the crime along with other\nco-accused; as per the post-mortem report, the cause\nof death is ante-mortem injuries; it is a matter of\nevidence whether the present accused was actually\npresent at the spot or not but as per the statement of\ninjured Himanshu, it prima facie appears that the\naccused was also present at the spot who caused\ninjury to Himanshu and other persons.Looking to the gravity of offence, it is not a\nfit case for bail at this stage. Accordingly, the bail\napplication is dismissed.Pending application, if any, stands disposed\nof.(R.C. Khulbe, J.)\n 29.09.2021\nRdang

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Telangana High CourtK.Narayana vs The Collector on 5 August, 2020Author:P.Naveen RaoBench:P.Naveen Rao*THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.NAVEEN RAO\n\n + WRIT PETITION Nos.18611 of 2017 & 5512 of 2020\n\n % 05.08.2020\n\n\nWP No.18611 of 2017:\n\n\n# K.Narayana s/o. Venkata Swamy, Aged about 52 years,\n Superintendent (Tahsildar), O/o Collectorate, Medak,\n Medak district.\n .....Petitioner\n\n And\n\n$ The Chief Commissioner of Land Administration,\n State of Telangana, Abids, Hyderabad and others.\n\n .....Respondents\n\n\n! Counsel for the petitioner : Sri D. Bala Kishan Rao\n\nCounsel for the Respondents: 1. Learned Govt. Pleader for\n Services for the respondents\n\n\n<Gist :\n\n>Head Note:\n\n? Cases referred:\n\n(1995) 3 SCC 134\n(1996) 3 SCC 157\n(2012) 11 SCC 565\n(1995) 2 SCC 570\n(2007) 14 SCC 49\n2019 SCC Online SC 1596\n(2009) 7 SCC 305\n PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 2020\n 2\n\n\n\n IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA\n\n ********\n\n WRIT PETITION Nos.18611 of 2017 & 5512 of 2020\n\n Date:05.08.2020\n\nWP No.18611 of 2017:\n\n\nBetween :\n\nK.Narayana s/o. Venkata Swamy, Aged about 52 years,\nSuperintendent (Tahsildar), O/o Collectorate, Medak,\nMedak district.\n .....Petitioner\n\n And\n\nThe Chief Commissioner of Land Administration,\nState of Telangana, Abids, Hyderabad and others.\n\n .....Respondents\n\n\nJUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON : 05.08.2020\n\n\n\n THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.NAVEEN RAO\n\n\n1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may : YES\n be allowed to see the judgments ? :\n\n2. Whether the copies of judgment may be marked : YES\n to Law Reporters/Journals :\n\n3. Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish to : NO\n See fair Copy of the Judgment ?\n PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 2020\n 3\n\n\n\n HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.NAVEEN RAO\n WRIT PETITION Nos.18611 of 2017 & 5512 of 2020\n\n Date:05.08.2020\n\nWP No.18611 of 2017:\n\n\nBetween:\n\nK.Narayana s/o. Venkata Swamy, Aged about 52 years,\nSuperintendent (Tahsildar), O/o Collectorate, Medak,\nMedak district.\n .....Petitioner\n\n And\n\nThe Chief Commissioner of Land Administration,\nState of Telangana, Abids, Hyderabad and others.\n\n .....Respondents\n\n\n\n\nThe Court made the following:\n PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 2020\n 4\n\n\n HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.NAVEEN RAO\n\n WRIT PETITION Nos.18611 of 2017 & 5512 of 2020\n\n\nCOMMON ORDER:In W.P.No.18611 of 2017, petitioner challenges the charge-\n\nmemo, dated 28.02.2017 and seeks consequential direction to\n\ngrant promotion to the post of Tahsildar, as per the placement\n\nassigned in the panel for the year 2011-12. During the pendency\n\nof above writ petition, Enquiry Officer submitted his report. Not\n\nsatisfied with the report of the Enquiry Officer, by proceedings\n\ndated 06.11.2019, the District Collector appointed another Enquiry\n\nOfficer to conduct de novo enquiry into the charges leveled against\n\nthe petitioner. In W.P.No.5512 of 2020, petitioner challenges the\n\nsaid order dated 06.11.2019 and seeks further direction that the\n\npetitioner is entitled for promotion as Tahsildar on par with his\n\njuniors by duly finalizing the departmental proceedings based on\n\nthe enquiry report submitted on 31.12.2018. In both Writ\n\nPetitions, petitioner is the same. By this common order these Writ\n\nPetitions are disposed of.2. To the extent relevant for the issues raised in these two Writ\n\nPetitions, the facts are as under:Petitioner is working as Deputy Tahsildar and is now\n\naspiring for promotion as Tahsildar. According to the petitioner, in\n\nseniority list of Deputy Tahsildars of Medak district, and in the\n\npanel of Deputy Tahsildars, eligible for promotion for the panel\n\nyear 2011-12, his name was shown at Sl.No.20. In the panel\n\napproved by the Chief Commissioner, Land Administration (CCLA),\n PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 20205vide his reference No.Ser.II(1)/789/2016, dated 08.03.2016,\n\npetitioner name was included at Sl.No.149. In March, 2016,\n\npromotions were made upto the Sl.No.120 in the said approved\n\npanel. During the subsistence of panel approved on 18.03.2016, as\n\na consequence to re-organization of the Revenue Districts,\n\nformation of new Mandals and Revenue Divisions and Districts,\n\n2109 posts of Tahsildars were created. Petitioner claims that he\n\nought to have been granted promotion in those vacancies. On\n\n01.05.2017, orders were issued granting promotion to the\n\npetitioner as Tahsildar and posted as Superintendent in the Office\n\nof the District Collector, Medak, but this promotion was not given\n\neffect. Petitioner alleges that he was denied promotion on the\n\nground that on 28.02.2017, charge-memo was drawn and\n\ndisciplinary proceedings were initiated. On 20.12.2017, this Court\n\ngranted interim orders directing consideration of the petitioner for\n\npromotion, if he is otherwise eligible, and if there is no prohibition\n\nin consideration of his case for promotion. On 06.11.2019\n\nproceedings were issued appointing another Enquiry Officer to\n\nconduct de novo enquiry.3. In these two writ petitions, the grievance of the petitioner is\n\nagainst inordinate delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings,\n\nnot finalizing the disciplinary proceedings based on the report of\n\nthe Enquiry Officer, ordering de novo enquiry and on the ground\n\nthat disciplinary proceedings are pending, not granting promotion\n\nto him as per his turn and seeks consequential direction to set\n\naside disciplinary proceedings and to grant promotion on par with\n\nhis juniors with all consequential benefits.PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 202064. Heard Mr. D.Balakishan Rao, learned counsel for petitioner,\n\nand Mr. N.Ramesh, learned Government Pleader for respondents.\n\n\n5.1. On the validity of charge-memo, learned counsel for the\n\npetitioner contended that disciplinary proceedings are liable to be\n\nset aside on the sole ground that there was inordinate delay in\n\ninitiation of the disciplinary proceedings. On the alleged incident\n\nof the year 2005, charge-memo was drawn for the first time on\n\n28.02.2017. Thus, on a stale issue, proceedings were initiated,\n\nafter 12 years, and no justification is shown for such inordinate\n\ndelay. Learned counsel further submitted that allegation made\n\nagainst the petitioner in the charge-memo is on trivial issue i.e.,\n\nmisplacement of file relating to the disciplinary proceedings\n\ninitiated against Mr. K.E.John Wesly. According to the learned\n\ncounsel, petitioner has submitted his explanation on 20.03.2017\n\ndenying the allegations; expressly taking the stand that as there\n\nwas heavy work load there was no occasion to concentrate on\n\nindividual files; that the file was circulated to the higher\n\nauthorities; and that it was not sent back to the section headed by\n\nhim and, therefore, the allegation that he was responsible for\n\nmisplacing the file was erroneous.5.2. According to the learned counsel, as per the G.O.Ms.No.679\n\ndated 01.11.2008, disciplinary enquiry has to be completed on\n\nsimple allegations, within three months and whenever serious\n\nallegations are made within six months. In the instant case,\n\nallegation is not serious and therefore ought to have been\n\ncompleted in three months, but they are kept pending for more\n\nthan three years.PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 202075.3. He would submit that on due consideration of the\n\nexplanation and on due verification of the records, the Enquiry\n\nOfficer in his report dated 31.12.2018 clearly recorded finding that\n\npetitioner was not responsible for the alleged charge and that he\n\ndid not misplace the file. He would submit that on trivial issue\n\nand more so when the Enquiry Officer clearly recorded a finding\n\nthat the petitioner is not responsible for misplacement of the file,\n\nthere is no justification to continue the disciplinary proceedings,\n\neven assuming, initiation was not erroneous.\n\n\n5.4. According to the learned counsel, the reason assigned for\n\nordering the de novo enquiry is not sustainable in law. It is also\n\ncontrary to Rules 20 & 21 of the Telangana State Civil Services\n\n(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (Rules, 1991).\n\nAccording to the learned counsel for petitioner, the disciplinary\n\nauthority can order de novo enquiry only if he is satisfied that the\n\nproceedings were not properly conducted or procedure required by\n\nthe Rules, 1991 were not observed by the Enquiry Officer. The\n\nDisciplinary Authority erred in holding that the Enquiry Officer has\n\nnot stated whether the charges are proved or not. This observation\n\nof the disciplinary authority is contrary to the report of the Enquiry\n\nOfficer and the reasons assigned therein are not in accordance\n\nwith the provisions in Rule 20(2) of the Rules, 1991.\n\n\n5.5. Learned counsel for petitioner further contended that even\n\nassuming that the disciplinary proceedings were validly initiated\n\nand continued and there is no inordinate delay in conclusion of the\n\ndisciplinary proceedings, denial of promotion to the petitioner as\n\nper the recommendations of the DPC, approved by the competent\n PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 20208authority, was erroneous. The panel was approved in March, 2016\n\nand the panel was operated by giving promotions to 120 persons\n\nincluded in the panel. On the date of approval of panel, effecting\n\nthe promotions and when the new posts were created, disciplinary\n\nproceedings were not initiated against the petitioner and they were\n\nset in motion only on 28.02.2017. Therefore, deferring the\n\npetitioner claim for promotion on the ground of initiation of\n\ndisciplinary proceedings subsequently is clearly erroneous and\n\nillegal. He would therefore submit that denial of promotion when\n\nit was due was illegal and amounts to arbitrary exercise of power.6. The learned Government Pleader would submit that due to\n\nwillful conduct of the petitioner taking action against Mr Wesley\n\ngot delayed. Deliberately petitioner misplaced the file. As soon as\n\nmatter came to the notice of the disciplinary authority, action was\n\ninitiated against petitioner. He would therefore submit that there\n\nwas no delay. He would submit that as a custodian of official\n\nrecords, misplacing the file in his custody is a grave misconduct.\n\nHe would further submit that enquiry report is not complete unless\n\nthe enquiry officer records his findings. As no findings are recorded\n\nby the enquiry officer, disciplinary authority has to order for fresh\n\nenquiry.7. Following issues arise for consideration:i) Whether disciplinary proceedings are vitiated on the\nground of delay in initiation and/or conclusion ?ii) Whether the decision to order de novo enquiry is within\nthe competence of the disciplinary authority ?PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 20209iii) Whether the denial of promotion to the petitioner on the\nground of pending disciplinary proceedings is legal ? andiv) Whether petitioner was illegally denied from joining and\nworking in the promotion post on the ground that disciplinary\nproceedings were initiated by the time he was granted promotion\nand therefore not effecting promotion was valid ?\n\n\n\nISSUE (i):8. The relationship between employer and employee is based on\n\ntrust and confidence. Apart from absolute loyalty, employer\n\nexpects employee to be honest, truthful and hardworking. He\n\nrewards employee who fulfills his criteria, encourages him by\n\nproviding him additional financial incentive, elevation of status,\n\nhigher responsibilities, so on. At the same time, he cannot tolerate\n\ninsubordination, misbehavior, corruption, disloyalty and poor\n\noutput. Whenever these aspects come to light, employer would\n\ninitiate disciplinary action and visit appropriate penal\n\nconsequences which may be minor or major. Depending on the\n\nnature of misconduct alleged he may also lodge complaint with the\n\nPolice. Conduct of the employee may not be confined to four\n\ncorners of the employment and employer may monitor behaviour of\n\nthe employee outside the employment which may reflect on the\n\npersonality of the employee or impact his performance.9. From the stand point of employee as long as he is in the\n\ngood books of his employer he will have smooth sailing. Problems\n\nwould arise only when employer loses confidence or develops\n\ndistrust or apprehends of misconduct. When a misconduct is\n\nalleged employee is bound to face disciplinary action and in a given\n PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 202010case criminal proceedings. If that stage arises, in addition to\n\nseveral other aspects, his grievance would be two fold: 1) employer\n\nis harassing him for a minor lapse/ incident, that took place long\n\nago; 2) even if allegation is proved, if concluded within a time\n\nframe, it may result in minor punishment such as censure,\n\nwarning, withholding of increment etc., and he would undergo\n\nsuch punishment with humility and carryon his work, but delay in\n\nconclusion would have more serious consequences, intended or\n\nunintended including depriving promotion, differing financial\n\nbenefits/ in case of retired employee denying retirement benefits,\n\netc. He may also have a grievance that delay in initiation and\n\nconclusion, causes grave prejudice to him in defending against\n\nallegations; difficulty in securing evidence, oral or documentary.10. Telangana State Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1991 (CCA\n\nRules) deal with all aspects of disciplinary proceedings against an\n\nemployee. The Rules prescribe elaborate procedure to conduct\n\ndisciplinary proceedings from the stage of initiation till passing of\n\nfinal orders, preferring of appeals and revisions and also prescribes\n\npunishments that can be imposed. Rule 20 of the Rules also\n\nprescribes time line from stage to stage in the enquiry.\n\nAdministrative instructions stipulate time line to conclude the\n\ndisciplinary proceedings. However, the Rules and the\n\nadministrative instructions are silent on time frame to initiate\n\ndisciplinary action on alleged delinquency against serving\n\nemployee, whereas certain limitations are imposed against retired\n\nemployees in Telangana State Revised Pension Rules, 1980. Thus,\n PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 202011there is no statutory embargo on when to initiate disciplinary\n\nproceedings.11. Invariably there is delay in initiation of disciplinary\n\nproceedings. Initiation takes months or years from the date of\n\nincident and so also conclusion. Delay in initiation can be for\n\ngenuine reasons. The incident may come to light much later;\n\nmany employees are involved in the same delinquency; lot of time\n\nis consumed in gathering information; many times intra-\n\ndepartmental correspondence consumes more time; when alleged\n\ndelinquency involves employees belong to more than one\n\ndepartment/one unit/one disciplinary authority processing itself\n\nconsumes lot of time. Further, on an alleged misconduct, if,\n\nsimultaneously, disciplinary action and criminal prosecution is set\n\nin motion, disciplinary authority may wait for completion of\n\ninvestigation by Police before he would decide to proceed or\n\ndiffer/drop the disciplinary action. But, in many instances, it is\n\ntardy and lethargic approach of the concerned authorities that\n\ncauses delay in setting in motion the disciplinary action. Many\n\ntimes, employees allege that just about the time he is due for\n\npromotion, disciplinary action is set in motion only to deprive him\n\npromotion or just about the time of retirement to hold up his\n\nretirement benefits.12. Though proceedings may have been initiated immediately\n\nbut they are dragged on for months together / years together. This\n\nmay happen because several employees of same Department/\n\ndifferent departments are involved; documents and witnesses are\n\nmore; employee(s) do not cooperate or litigate; frequent change of\n PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 202012enquiry officers; matters entrusted to tribunal for disciplinary\n\nproceedings or Commissioner of enquiries, but they do not\n\nfunction. Many times just to harass the employee proceedings are\n\nkept in the cold storage.13. One other aspect on which employees agitate is delay in\n\ndisposal of disciplinary proceedings and in the meantime ignoring\n\nthe employee for promotion and/or not granting other service\n\nbenefits. Though the Government, by way of administrative\n\ninstructions, prescribed three months to complete enquiry in case\n\nof petty allegations, and six months in case of grave allegations,\n\nthis time line is never adhered to and disciplinary proceedings are\n\nkept pending for months together/years together. Many a time the\n\ndelay is attributable to employer.14. Thus, more often than not employees knock the doors of this\n\nCourt underArticle 226of the Constitution of India against delay\n\nin initiation and/or continuation and denial of service benefits on\n\nthe ground of pending disciplinary proceedings, such as\n\npromotion, increments, financial upgradation, retirement benefits,\n\nas the case may be. Volume of cases and the decisions in those\n\ncases reflect the litigative gamit of this branch of service disputes.15. There are two competing claims. On the one side is the\n\nemployer's desire to enforce discipline, not to dole out benefits of\n\nelevation in status etc., or post retirement benefits as the case may\n\nbe, if he commits a misconduct in the past. On the other\n\nspectrum is the concern of employee in involving him in\n\ndisciplinary proceedings/in continuing him under the cloud for\n PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 202013past misconduct, without conducting/concluding proceedings and\n\nwithout affording opportunity to defend himself and depriving him\n\nservice benefits to which he is legitimately entitled. Whenever\n\nsuch matters come up before the Court, the Court is not only\n\nrequired to consider these competing claims but also look into the\n\naspect of public interest, vis-à-vis allegations of misconduct,\n\nhaving regard to public trust doctrine in public employment, and\n\nin a given case adopt balancing process.16. Per se disciplinary proceedings cannot be said as vitiated\n\nonly on the ground of delay in initiation. It all depends on facts of\n\na given case. However, if the delay is long the burden is on\n\nemployer to explain reasons for delay.17. On both aspects, i.e., delay in initiation of disciplinary\n\nproceedings and delay in conclusion, we are not in virgin territory.\n\nThe precedent decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court have laid down\n\nwell lit path leading to appreciation of the issue in right\n\nperspective. Suffice to note that precedent law, while emphasizing\n\nspeedy disposal of disciplinary proceedings, leaves it to the writ\n\nCourt to assess the issue depending upon the facts of a given case.18. At this stage it is expedient to consider precedent decisions.\n\n\n18.1. Whenever, grave allegations are made, such as\n\nembezzlement/misappropriation, falsification of records, etc.,\n\ndepartmental proceedings need not be set aside only on the ground\n\nof delay in initiation or conclusion (Deputy Registrar,\n PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 202014Co-operative Society, Faizabad Vs Sachindra Nath Pandey1andSecretary to Government, Prohibition & Excise Dept Vs\n\nL.Srinivasan2.Disciplinary proceedings are not liable to be\n\nquashed on the ground that they were initiated at a belated stage\n\nand could not be concluded in a reasonable period unless delay\n\ncreates prejudice to the delinquent employee (Ministry of Defence\n\nVs Prabhash Chander3).18.2.InState of Punjab and others Vs Chaman Lal Goyal4while emphasizing the need to conduct disciplinary proceedings,\n\nsoon after discovery of irregularities, the Hon'ble Supreme Court\n\nobserved that;"9. .......If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the Court may\n well interfere and quash the charges. But, how long a delay is too\n long always depends upon the facts of the given case. Moreover, if\n such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in\n defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever\n such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing\n for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of\n circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a\n process of balancing. ......"18.3.InGovernment of A.P., Vs V.Appala Swamy5the Hon'ble\n\nSupreme Court laid down parameters when court may accept plea\n\nof delay against continuing disciplinary proceedings, Hon'ble\n\nSupreme Court held as under :"12. So far as the question of delay in concluding the\n departmental proceedings as against a delinquent officer is\n concerned, in our opinion, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down\n therefor. Each case must be determined on its own facts. The1(1995) 3 SCC 1342(1996) 3 SCC 1573(2012) 11 SCC 5654(1995) 2 SCC 5705(2007) 14 SCC 49\n PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 202015principles upon which a proceeding can be directed to be quashed\n on the ground of delay are:(1) where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned the\n lapses on the part of the employee;(2) where the delay caused prejudice to the employee.Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the\n employee before the inquiry officer."18.4.InUnion of India Vs Udai Bhan Singh6, the Hon'ble\n\nSupreme Court reviewed precedent decision on delay in initiation\n\nand conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. Hon'ble Supreme Court\n\nheld, the aspect of delay must be considered in the context of\n\nadmitted facts (paragraph 17).18.5.InSecretary, Forest Department and Others Vs. Abdur\n\nRasul Choudhary7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court succinctly\n\nexplained when Court should interfere. Employee was served\n\ncharge memo dated 13.8.1987. Allegations were on excess\n\npayment to contractor for personal gain and financial loss to\n\nGovernment and falsification of accounts. Employee retired on\n\n31.3.1995. He filed O A No. 3963 of 1999 praying to direct\n\nrespondents to drop the disciplinary proceedings on the ground of\n\ndelay. The Tribunal did not agree to grant the prayer to drop the\n\ndisciplinary proceedings, but directed to complete the\n\ndepartmental enquiry within six months by its order dated\n\n1.8.2003. Challengingthe said decision, he preferred writ petition\n\nin the High Court. The High Court allowed the writ petition. One\n\nof the issues considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is, whether\n\nthe delay in completing the domestic enquiry proceedings would be\n\nfatal to the proceedings.?62019 SCC Online SC 15967(2009) 7 SCC 305\n PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 20201618.6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held:"16. The next issue is with regard to delay in concluding\n disciplinary proceedings. In our view the delay in concluding\n the domestic enquiry proceedings is not fatal to the proceedings.\n It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The\n unexplained protracted delay on the part of the employer may be\n one of the circumstances in not permitting the employer to\n continue with the disciplinary enquiry proceedings. At the same\n time, if the delay is explained satisfactorily then the proceedings\n should be permitted to continue." (emphasis supplied)19. In the case on hand, the substance of the allegation against\n\nthe petitioner is that disciplinary file of another employee was\n\nmisplaced by petitioner in the year 2006 when he was working as\n\nSenior Assistant. On the said allegation, charge memo was drawn\n\non 28.02.2017, i.e., more than eleven years after the incident.\n\nEven after three years, the proceedings are not concluded.20. The gravemen of the charge is, on a request made by the\n\nSiddipet District Collector to furnish original records pertaining to\n\ndisciplinary case against ex-Land Acquisition Officer by name\n\nK.E.John Wesly, while verifying the record of the A3 section of the\n\nCollectorate, it was noticed that as Senior Assistant of A3 section\n\npetitioner received the UO note of LA Section on 17.05.2005\n\nrecorded in personal register for the years 2005 and 2006 but\n\nphysically file was missing and from the year 2007 onwards the file\n\nwas not traceable. It is therefore alleged that petitioner misused\n\nhis official position and misplaced the file with mala fide intention.\n\nTherefore, the disciplinary case against Mr. Wesly could not be\n\nconcluded.PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 20201721. From the Annexure - I of the Charge Memo, it appears that\n\ncertain Land Acquisition OPs. were not effectively contested by\n\nconcerned staff and therefore on 14.05.2005, the Medak District\n\nCollector informed the Government that Mr. Wesly was responsible\n\nand disciplinary action should be taken against him. On\n\n23.07.1999, the Commissioner for Social Welfare requested to\n\ninitiate disciplinary action against Mr. Wesley.22. In substance, alleging that a particular file was misplaced by\n\npetitioner while he was working in the 'C' Section of the\n\nCollectorate in the years 2005 and 2006, Charge Memo was drawn\n\non 28.02.2017. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Sangareddy, was\n\nappointed as enquiry officer. During the enquiry, petitioner\n\ninformed that file is available in A3 section. The incumbent\n\n'C' section Assistant appeared before the enquiry officer and stated\n\nthat file is available. Apart from other aspects, petitioner has also\n\npleaded before the enquiry officer that he circulated the file on\n\n01.06.2005, was returned to section on 15.07.2005 from the Joint\n\nCollector and file was handed over to the Office Superintendent for\n\ndiscussion with Joint Collector; discussion took place and he has\n\nrecorded in the file as a note on the discussion, but file was not\n\nreturned to the Section. He expressed his inability to say anything\n\nmore after such a long time. On going through the record, the\n\nenquiry officer found whatever is stated by the petitioner is born\n\nout of record.23. The proceedings of the Commissioner for Social Welfare were\n\ndrawn on 23.07.1999 requesting the competent authority to take\n\ndisciplinary action against Mr. Wesley. The counter-affidavit is\n PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 202018blissfully silent as to why there was delay in initiating of action\n\nagainst Mr. Wesley and what transpired between 1999 to 2005 and\n\n2005 to 2017 and what is the stage of the action. It appears to be\n\na case of covering up the lapses on the part of concerned persons\n\nin taking action against Mr. Wesley, by throwing the blame on\n\npetitioner. It appears, no effort was made to trace the file before\n\ninitiating action against petitioner, whereas the finding of enquiry\n\nofficer would show file was very much available in A3 section.24. Be that as it may, allegation was file was not traceable, but it\n\nwas traced and available in A3 Section. Charge memo does not\n\nelaborate on allegation of the mala fide intention. There is no\n\nallegation of collusion of petitioner with Mr. Wesley to escape\n\ndisciplinary action. That being so, nothing remains in the\n\ndisciplinary action.25. There is no end in site to the petitioner. Adding to the\n\nmisery of facing disciplinary action after 10 years, even though\n\nenquiry officer finds that file is available in A3 Section, merely\n\nbecause the enquiry officer has not recorded as to whether charge\n\nis proved or not, the disciplinary authority resorts to hold de novo\n\nenquiry by appointing another enquiry officer. Apart from the fact\n\nthat no such power is traceable to CCA Rules, no reasons are\n\nassigned to take such a decision and prolong the agony to the\n\npetitioner. Further, even if what is stated is accepted, it is minor\n\nirregularity. The disciplinary authority has ample power to deal\n\nwith the situation and for this minor lapse that enquiry officer did\n\nnot record his conclusion, there is no need to subject the petitioner\n PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 202019to undergo the rigmarole of full fledged enquiry, that too after\n\nfifteen years.26. In the counter-affidavit, no reasons are assigned for the\n\ndelay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings. When disciplinary\n\naction is set in motion after 10 years, the competent authority has\n\nto explain clearly the reasons for delay. Certainly ten years is\n\nunreasonably long period on a trivial issue, more so when there is\n\nno allegation of collusion by the petitioner with Mr. Wesley to delay\n\ndisciplinary action against him. Having regard to the chronology of\n\nevents and relevant aspects noted above, the conclusion is\n\nirresistible that the entire action smacks of arbitrary exercise of\n\npower and vindictive.27. Petitioner succeeds on the 1st issue. The disciplinary\n\nproceedings against petitioner are set aside and the Writ Petition\n\nNo.18611 of 2017 is allowed. Petitioner is entitled to all\n\nconsequential benefits including promotion as Tahsildar from the\n\ndate of promotion of his junior. In view of the judgment in\n\nW.P.No.18611 of 2017, no further orders are required to be made\n\nin W.P.No.5512 of 2020 and is accordingly disposed of. In view of\n\nthe decision on the 1st issue, no findings are recorded on other\n\nissues. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.___________________________\n JUSTICE P.NAVEEN RAO\nDate: 05.08.2020\nKkm/Rds/KH/tvk\n\nNote: L R Copy to be marked-- YES\n PNR,J\n WP Nos.18611 of 2017 &\n 5512 of 202020HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.NAVEEN RAO\n\n\n\n\n WRIT PETITION Nos.18611 of 2017 & 5512 of 2020\n\n Date: 05.08.2020\nkkm/rds/kh/tvk

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Delhi High CourtUnion Of India & Anr. vs Sanjay Kumar & Ors. on 20 October, 2022Author:Sanjeev SachdevaBench:Sanjeev Sachdeva,Tushar Rao GedelaNeutral Citation Number 2022/DHC/004414\n\n\n $~14\n * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI\n % Judgment delivered on: 20th October, 2022\n\n + W.P.(C) 14875/2022 & CM. APPL. 45731-33/2022\n\n UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. ..... Petitioner\n\n Versus\n\n SANJAY KUMAR AND ORS. ... Respondents\n Advocates who appeared in this case:\n\n\n For the petitioners: Mr. Vijay Joshi, Mr. Gurjas Singh Narula\n and Mr. Lalit Sharma, Advocates.\n\n For the Respondents: Mr. K.P. Sundar Rao, Advocate.\n\n CORAM:-\n HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV SACHDEVA\n HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA\n JUDGMENTSANJEEV SACHDEVA, J (Oral)1. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that on account of an\n inadvertent error, Annexure-17 that was not part of the Tribunal's\n record has been annexed with this petition without a formal\n application for taking on additional document. The statement is taken\n on record.Signature Not VerifiedDigital Signed By:KUNALW.P. (C) 14875/2022 Page 1 of 4MAGGUSigning Date:20.10.2022 18:14:37\nThis file is digitally signed by PS\nto HMJ Sanjeev Sachdeva.Neutral Citation Number 2022/DHC/0044142. Issue notice. Notice is accepted by learned counsel appearing\n for respondents No.1 and 2. Let a digital copy of the entire paper\n book be furnished to him.3. With the consent of the parties, the writ petition is taken for\n final disposal.4. Petitioner, the Union of India has impugned order dated\n 26.04.2022, whereby the Original Application filed by respondents\n No.1 and 2 has been allowed and petitioners have been directed to\n issue offer of appointment to the said respondents for recruitment to\n the post of Health and Malaria Inspector, Grade-III.5. Pursuant to advertisement dated 13.03.2010, respondents had\n applied for the aforesaid post. The minimum educational qualification\n for the said post of Health and Malaria Inspector, Grade-III prescribed\n by the advertisement was:-"B.Sc. Chemistry plus (a) 1 year Diploma in Health\n Sanitary Inspector (OR) (b) 1 year National Trade\n Certificate (NTC) in Health/Sanitary Inspector awarded by\n National Council for Vocational Training, Ministry of\n Labour and Employment Govt. of India, New Delhi"6. Contention of learned counsel for petitioners is that the\n Diploma of the respondents is from Vinayaka Missions University,\n Salem, Tamil Nadu by way of distance education and as such is not\n acceptable as satisfying the eligibility condition and furthermore, theSignature Not VerifiedDigital Signed By:KUNALW.P. (C) 14875/2022 Page 2 of 4MAGGUSigning Date:20.10.2022 18:14:37\nThis file is digitally signed by PS\nto HMJ Sanjeev Sachdeva.Neutral Citation Number 2022/DHC/004414\n\n\n subject course was not a course which was recognized by the\n authorities and as such this is an unrecognized course though from a\n recognised University and as such the respondents did not satisfy the\n eligibility condition.7. Learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 and 2 submits\n that there is no bar on acceptance of a Diploma obtained by distance\n education for the eligibility condition and furthermore, the Diploma\n obtained by the respondents is from a recognized university and also a\n recognized course.8. Perusal of the orders shows that the Tribunal has not examined\n the said aspect, as to whether the qualification of the respondents\n satisfies the minimum educational qualification prescribed by the\n subject advertisement. The Tribunal has allowed the Original\n Application merely on the ground that offer of appointment has been\n issued to other candidates, who have also obtained degrees from the\n said University. The contention, on the other hand, of the petitioner is\n that though the University was recognized but the subject course was\n not a recognized course and as such even if degrees from the same\n University have been accepted would not ipso facto amount to\n acceptance of validity of the subject Diploma of the respondents.9. Since the Tribunal has granted relief to respondents solely on\n the ground that offer of appointment has been granted to otherSignature Not VerifiedDigital Signed By:KUNALW.P. (C) 14875/2022 Page 3 of 4MAGGUSigning Date:20.10.2022 18:14:37\nThis file is digitally signed by PS\nto HMJ Sanjeev Sachdeva.Neutral Citation Number 2022/DHC/004414\n\n\n candidates and directed issuance of offer of appointment without\n examining as to whether the objection of the petitioners i.e., diploma\n obtained by distance education cannot be accepted and the subject\n course not being a recognized course, the impugned order cannot be\n sustained and calls for a remit.10. In view of the above, the impugned order is set aside. The\n matter is remitted to the Tribunal to examine the objections of the\n petitioner noticed hereinabove on merits and also examine inter-alia\n the contention of the respondents that their Diploma satisfies the\n eligibility condition as prescribed by the subject advertisement.11. Keeping in view the fact that the subject post was advertised in\n the year 2010, we request the Tribunal to expedite the proceedings\n and endeavour to conclude the proceedings preferably within a period\n of four months.12. It is clarified that this Court has neither considered, nor\n commented upon the merits of the contentions of either party. All\n rights and contentions of parties are reserved.13. The parties shall appear before the Tribunal on 29.11.2022 for\n directions.,,,\n\n\n\n\n SANJEEV SACHDEVA, J.OCTOBER 20, 2022/NA TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J.Signature Not VerifiedDigital Signed By:KUNALW.P. (C) 14875/2022 Page 4 of 4MAGGUSigning Date:20.10.2022 18:14:37\nThis file is digitally signed by PS\nto HMJ Sanjeev Sachdeva.

0c139f54-9a85-5f72-be00-f50fc6b533e3

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Manipur High CourtShri Thoudam Heramani Singh vs Leishangthem Kriti Singh on 17 March, 2023Author:A. Guneshwar SharmaBench:A. Guneshwar SharmaItem - 36\n\n\n IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR\n AT IMPHAL\n\n\n CRP(C.R.P.Art. 227) No.8 of 2018\n\n\n Shri Thoudam Heramani Singh\n .... Petitioner/s\n - Versus -\n\n Leishangthem Kriti Singh\n .... Respondent/s\n\n\n\n BEFORE\n HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A. GUNESHWAR SHARMA\n\n ORDER17.03.2023\n\n\n On the request of the learned counsel for the respondent, fix on\n\n31st March, 2023.JUDGE- Larson

b0782833-2cfa-5197-afdb-c9d5d7821a65

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Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)M/S. J. S. Pigments Private Limited & Anr vs Commissioner Of Cgst & Central Tax on 17 March, 2022Author:T.S.SivagnanamBench:T.S. Sivagnanam,Hiranmay BhattacharyyaItem No.1.\n IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT CALCUTTA\n CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION\n APPELLATE SIDE\n\n HEARD ON: 17.03.2022.\n\n DELIVERED ON:17.03.2022\n\n CORAM:\n\n THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.S. SIVAGNANAM\n AND\n THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HIRANMAY BHATTACHARYYA\n\n MAT 340 OF 2022\n WITH\n I.A. NO.CAN 1 OF 2022\n\n M/S. J. S. PIGMENTS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.\n VERSUS\n COMMISSIONER OF CGST & CENTRAL TAX, HOWRAH COMMISSIONERATE &\n ORS.\n\nAppearance:-\nMr. P. K. Das,\nMr. Roshan Sengupta ......for the appellants\n\n\nMr. Bhaskar Prasad Banerjee,\nMr. Tapan Bhanja .. for respondents.\n\n\n JUDGMENT(Judgment of the Court was delivered by T.S.SIVAGNANAM, J.)21. We have heard Mr. P. K, Das, learned counsel appearing for\n\nthe appellants and Mr. Bhaskar Prasad Banerjee, learned standing\n\ncounsel appearing for the revenue.2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 7 th March,\n\n2022 in W.P.A. No.2692 of 2022. The said writ petition was filed\n\nby the appellants praying for issuance of writ of mandamus to\n\nquash the order dated 28th January, 2022 and the show cause\n\nnotice dated 4th September, 2017 issued by the second respondent;\n\nfor a writ of declaration to declare the order dated 28 th\n\nJanuary, 2022 and the show cause notice dated 4 th September, 2017\n\nas invalid and for a direction upon the respondent nos.2 and 3\n\nto return non-relied upon documents (Non RUDs) and relied upon\n\ndocuments (RUDs) as mentioned in the seizure list dated 12 th\n\nSeptember, 2017 and to prohibit the respondents from\n\nadjudicating the show cause notice. The learned Writ Court by\n\nthe impugned order dismissed the writ petition holding that the\n\norder dated 28th January, 2022 does not call for any\n\ninterference. Challenging the said order, the appellants are\n\nbefore us.33. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants has drawn\n\nour attention to Rule 24A of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 (for\n\nbrevity "Rules"), which deals with return of records. It is\n\nsubmitted that during the search and seizure operations, several\n\nrecords from the appellants' business premises were seized and\n\nin terms of Rule 24A, all documents, which are not relied upon\n\ndocuments for issuance of show cause notice under the provisions\n\nof theCentral Excise Act, 1944(for brevity "the Act") and the\n\nRules framed thereunder shall be returned within 30 days from\n\nthe date of issuance of the show cause notice or within 30 days\n\nfrom the date of expiry of the period of issuance of the show\n\ncause notice. It is further submitted that the proviso in Rule\n\n24A states that if the Central Excise Officer desires to retain\n\nthe documents, then an order to the said effect has to be passed\n\nby the Principal Commissioner of the Central Excise or the\n\nCommissioner of the Central Excise, as the case may be. It is\n\nsubmitted that the second respondent had violated Rule 24A and\n\nthough the show cause notice was issued as early as on 4th\n\nSeptember, 2017, the documents, which are not relied upon for\n\nissuance of the show cause notice have not been returned to the\n\nappellants, which had compelled the appellants to approach this4Court on two earlier occasions and the present impugned order\n\nwas passed in the third writ petition filed by the appellants.\n\nFurther, the learned counsel submitted that no case has been\n\nmade out for invoking the extended period of limitation underSection 11Aof the Act. It is further pointed out that unless\n\nand until the documents are returned to the appellants, they\n\nwill not be in a position to submit an effective reply to the\n\nshow cause notice thereby denying them reasonable opportunity.4. The learned counsel further submitted that though there was\n\na prayer in the writ petition to quash the show cause notice, in\n\nthis appeal the appellants do not wish to press the said relief\n\nsought for. The said submission is placed on record.5. The learned standing counsel for the respondents submitted\n\nthat the order dated 28th January, 2022 passed by the second\n\nrespondent is a speaking order passed after due application of\n\nmind and the authority should be permitted to adjudicate the\n\nshow cause notice.56. After having heard the learned counsels for the parties and\n\nperused the materials placed on record, we are of the view that\n\nthe challenge to the show cause notice was rightly rejected by\n\nthe learned Writ Court and therefore, to that extent the order\n\npassed in the writ petition stands affirmed.7. The second contention is with regard to the applicability\n\nof Rule 24A of the Rules to the case on hand. In our considered\n\nview, it will be too late for the appellants to now harp upon\n\nthe 30 days' time limit for returning the documents as it is the\n\nappellants, who approached this Court not once but thrice for\n\ncertain reliefs and in W.P. No.9985 of 2021 direction was issued\n\nto the authority to pass a speaking order on the request made by\n\nthe appellants. Thus, the order dated 28th January, 2022 having\n\nbeen passed in accordance with the directions issued by this\n\nCourt in the writ petition, the question of now invoking the 30\n\ndays' time limit under Rule 24A does not arise.8. With regard to whether the department was entitled to\n\ninvoke the extended period of limitation underSection 11Aof\n\nthe Act, it is not purely a question of law but a mixed question6of law and fact and it is for the appellants to agitate the same\n\nwhile submitting reply to the show cause notice. We take note\n\nof the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that\n\nif the appellants are not afforded reasonable opportunity to\n\nexamine the documents, they will not be in a position to submit\n\nan effective reply to the show cause notice. However, we wish\n\nto add a caveat to this submission that while it may be true\n\nthat the appellants should have an effective opportunity to\n\nsubmit a reply to the show cause notice, that would not\n\nautomatically entitle the appellants for return of the documents\n\nto them as the adjudication is yet to commence.9. Therefore, we are of the view that if the appellants are\n\npermitted to examine the documents in the office of the\n\nrespondents and permitted to take photostat copies of the\n\nrelevant pages of the documents at the cost of the appellants\n\nand thereafter if the appellants are given time to submit reply\n\nto the show cause notice, it would fulfill the principles of\n\nnatural justice.710. In the result, this appeal is partly allowed while\n\naffirming the order passed by the learned Single Bench in\n\nrejecting the challenge to the show cause notice.11. With regard to the relief sought for return of the\n\ndocuments, the same cannot be granted at this stage as\n\nadjudication is yet to commence. However, we direct that the\n\nsecond respondent shall permit the authorised representative of\n\nthe appellants to peruse all the documents, which have been\n\nreferred to in the show cause notice and in the order dated 28 th\n\nJanuary, 2022 and wherever required, permit the appellants to\n\ntake photostat copies of the same at their costs.12. The second respondent shall grant 10 clear days' time to\n\nperuse the documents in the office of the second respondent\n\nduring working hours. The appellants, upon completion of\n\nperusal within the time stipulated, are granted 15 days' time\n\nthereafter to submit reply to the show cause notice. After\n\nreceipt of the reply to the show cause notice, the second\n\nrespondent shall commence the adjudication process and complete\n\nthe same not later than 45 days from the date on which the reply8to the show cause notice is submitted after affording an\n\nopportunity of personal hearing to the authorised representative\n\nof the appellants.13. The appeal and the connected application are disposed of.\n\nNo costs.14. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied\n\nfor, be furnished to the parties expeditiously upon compliance\n\nof all legal formalities.(T.S. SIVAGNANAM, J)\n\n I agree.(HIRANMAY BHATTACHARYYA, J)\n\n\n\nNAREN/PALLAB(AR.C)

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Madras High CourtRajamani Gobinath vs The Union Of India on 3 January, 2020Author:C.V.KarthikeyanBench:C.V.KarthikeyanW.P.No.35930 of 2019\n\n IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS\n\n DATED : 03.01.2020\n\n CORAM\n\n THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE C.V.KARTHIKEYAN\n\n W.P. No.35930 of 2019\n and\n W.M.P. No.36845 of 2019\n\n Rajamani Gobinath\n ... Petitioner\n\n -vs-\n\n 1.The Union of India\n Represented by its Secretary\n Ministry of Corporate Affairs,\n Shastri Bhawan, Dr.Rajendra Prasad Road,\n New Delhi – 110001.\n\n 2.The Registrar of Companies\n Tamilnadu, Chennai,\n Block No.6, B Wing 2nd floor,\n Shastri Bhawan 26,\n Haddows road,\n Chennai – 600 034.\n ... Respondents\n\n\n Prayer:- Writ Petition filed underArticle 226of the Constitution of India\n praying to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for the records\n of the 2nd respondent relating to the impugned order dated 01.11.2017\n uploaded in the website of the 1st respondent in so far as the petitioner\n herein is concerned and quash the same as illegal, arbitrary and devoid of\n merits and consequentially direct the respondents herein to permit the\n petitioner to get reappointed as Director of any company or appointed as\n Director in any company without any hindrance.\n\nhttp://www.judis.nic.in\n 1/8\n W.P.No.35930 of 2019\n\n\n\n\n For Petitioner : Mr.S. Shanmuga Velayutham\n\n For Respondents : Mr.V. Athikesavan\n\n\n *****\n\n ORDERHeard Mr.S. Shanmuga Velayutham, Learned Counsel for the\n\n Petitioner and Mr.V.Athikesavan, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of\n\n the Respondents and perused the materials placed on record, apart from\n\n the pleadings of the parties.2. In this Writ Petition, the list dated 01.11.2017 published by\n\n the Registrar of Companies, Tamil Nadu, Chennai uploaded the website of\n\n the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, New Delhi disqualifying the Petitioner to\n\n hold the Office of the Directorship of a Company under Section 164 (2)(a) of theCompanies Act2013, which came into effect from 01.04.2014,\n\n is challenged with the consequential direction to the Respondents to\n\n permit the Petitioner to get re-appointed or appointed as Director in any\n\n other Company without any hindrance.3. The lists dated 08.09.2017 and 01.11.2017 published by the\n\n Registrar of Companies, Tamil Nadu, Chennai were the subject matter of\n\n\nhttp://www.judis.nic.in2/8W.P.No.35930 of 2019challenge before this Court in a batch of cases in W.P. No. 25455 of 2017\n\n etc. batch [(2018) 6 MLJ 704] and came to be disposed by this Court by\n\n order dated 03.08.2018, the operative portion of which is extracted\n\n below:-"29. In fine,(a) When the New Act 2013 came into effect from\n\n 1.4.2014, the second respondent herein has wrongly given\n\n retrospective effect and erroneously disqualified the\n\n petitioner-directors from 1.11.2016 itself before the deadline\n\n commenced wrongly fixing the first financial year from\n\n 1.4.2013 to 31.3.2014.(b) By virtue of the newSection 164(2)(a)of the 2013 Act\n\n using the expression “for any continuous period of three\n\n financial years” and in the light ofSection 2(41)defining\n\n “financial year” as well as their own General Circular No.08/14\n\n dated 4.4.2014, the first financial year would be from\n\n 1.4.2014 to 31.3.2015, the second financial year would be\n\n from 1.4.2015 to 31.3.2016 and the third financial year would\n\n be from 1.4.2016 to 31.3.2017, whereas the second\n\n respondent clearly admitted in paras 15 and 22 of the counter\n\n affidavit that the default of filing statutory returns for the\n\nhttp://www.judis.nic.in3/8W.P.No.35930 of 2019financial years commenced from 2013-14, 2014-15 and\n\n 2015-16 i.e., one year before the Act 2013 came into force.This is the basic incurable legal infirmity that vitiates the\n\n entire impugned proceedings.(c) By virtue of the first proviso toSection 96(1)of the\n\n 2013 Act, Annual General Meeting for the year ending on\n\n 31.3.2017 can be held within six months from the closing of\n\n financial year i.e., 30.9.2017, additionally in the light ofSection 164(2)(a)referring to “annual return” and “financial\n\n statement”, the time limit to file annual return underSection\n\n 92(4)of 2013 Act is sixty days from Annual General Meeting\n\n or the last date on which Annual General Meeting ought to\n\n have been held, hence, the time limit to file balance sheet\n\n underSection 137(1)of the 2013 Act is again thirty days\n\n from Annual General Meering. Therefore, in view of these\n\n legal position, the disqualification could get triggered off only\n\n on or after 30.10.2017 only, if any company fails to file\n\n annual forms for three financial years. Importantly, it is to be\n\n borne in mind that even beyond that time limit, additional\n\n time limit of 270 days was available by virtue of the then first\n\n proviso toSection 403.http://www.judis.nic.in4/8W.P.No.35930 of 2019(d) Although there is no statute or provision expressly\n\n spelling out the observance of the principles of natural justice\n\n against disqualification of directors, as the legal right of the\n\n petitioners to continue as director in other company or to be\n\n reappointed in any other company, which are scrupulously\n\n following the provisions of theCompanies Act, have been\n\n deprived of, the principles of natural justice should have been\n\n adhered to by issuing proper notice to all the directors.(e) When the disqualification clause was not attracted to\n\n the directors of private companies under the old Act of 1956,\n\n the same cannot be allowed to take a retrospective effect\n\n under the new Act, when the provision ofSection 164(2)(a)came into force only from 1.4.2014. This is also for one more\n\n reason that the failure to file the annual returns has been\n\n adequately taken care of by the penal provision underSection\n\n 92, making it clear that every officer of the company who is in\n\n default shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term\n\n which may extend to six months or with fine which shall not\n\n be less than fifty thousand rupees but which may extend to\n\n five lakh rupees, or with both. Again underSection 137, the\n\n failure to file the financial statement visits punishment with\n\n imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or\n\n\nhttp://www.judis.nic.in5/8W.P.No.35930 of 2019with fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but\n\n which may extend to five lakh rupees, or with both. Further,\n\n underSection 441(4), the default in filing returns or accounts\n\n compoundable by Tribunal or Regional Director or by any\n\n officer authorized by the Central Government.(f) In view of the above legal position, when the default in\n\n filing the accounts or returns are made as compoundable\n\n offence,Section 164(2)(a)providing the disqualification of\n\n director of private company not only in the defaulting\n\n company, but also from other company in which the petitioner\n\n is a director, diligently and meticulously following every\n\n provision of law, is certainly disproportionate to the lapse, as\n\n it is only regulatory in nature, because, notice to be sent\n\n underSection 248(1)of the Companies Act, 2013 by the\n\n Registrar of Companies for striking off the name of the\n\n company from the Registrar of Companies on the premise\n\n that the company has not been carrying on any business for a\n\n period of two financial years, is different from the\n\n disqualification underSection 164(2)(a), inasmuch as a\n\n company can be struck off, if the company has not been\n\n carrying on any business for a period of two financial years,\n\n whereas for disqualification, the criteria is three financial\n\n\nhttp://www.judis.nic.in6/8W.P.No.35930 of 2019years. Therefore, in my considered opinion, although the\n\n petitioners have not challenged the provision ofSection\n\n 164(2)(a), as the respondents have not followed the\n\n principles of natural justice, extinguishing the corporate life of\n\n the directors to the extent of disqualifying them to hold the\n\n directorship in the other companies, the said provision is\n\n liable to be read down, hence,Section 164(2)(a)is read down\n\n to the extent it disqualifies the directors in other companies\n\n which are scrupulously following the requirements of law,\n\n making it clear that no directors in other companies can be\n\n disqualified without prior notice.(g) However, it is made clear beyond any pale of doubt that\n\n the mischief of removal of the names of the companies by the\n\n Registrar of Companies and the disqualification of the\n\n directors in the defaulting company will go together, as it is\n\n inseparable, and the Registrar of Companies need not give\n\n fresh notice to the directors for their disqualification from the\n\n dormant company, if there is a failure to file the financial\n\n statement or annual return for any continuous period of three\n\n financial years as perSection 164(2)(a).30. For all the aforementioned reasons, the impugned\n\n\nhttp://www.judis.nic.in7/8W.P.No.35930 of 2019orders are set aside and the writ petitions shall stand allowed.\n\n Consequently, all the connected writ miscellaneous petitions\n\n are closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.''4. As the Petitioner in this case is similarly placed to the\n\n Petitioners in the aforesaid batch of cases relating to the same impugned\n\n list published in the website by the Respondents, he is entitled to identical\n\n relief that has been granted to them. Accordingly, the Writ Petition\n\n stand allowed and the impugned orders are set aside on the aforesaid\n\n terms. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. No\n\n costs.03.01.2020\n (½)\n\n smv\n\n Index : Yes/No\n Internet : Yes/No\n\n\n\n\nhttp://www.judis.nic.in8/8W.P.No.35930 of 2019To1.The Union of India\n Ministry of Corporate Affairs,\n Shastri Bhawan, Dr.Rajendra Prasad Road,\n New Delhi – 110001.2.The Registrar of Companies\n Block No.6, B Wing 2nd floor,\n Shastri Bhawan 26,\n Haddows road,\n Chennai – 600 034.http://www.judis.nic.in9/8W.P.No.35930 of 2019C.V.KARTHIKEYAN,J.smvW.P. No.35930 of 2019andW.M.P. No.36845 of 201903.01.2020\n\n\n\n\nhttp://www.judis.nic.in10/8

7e941320-6531-5b1d-bfbe-d27b3f143197

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Jharkhand High CourtDefence Estate Officer (Earlier ... vs Jayant Karnad on 6 September, 2021Bench:Shree Chandrashekhar,Ratnaker BhengraIN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI\n (Civil Miscellaneous Jurisdiction)\n\n CMP No. 282 of 2017\n With\n IA No. 7440 of 2017\nDefence Estate Officer (Earlier designated as Military Estate Officer) Bihar\n& Orissa Circle, Danapur Cantonment, PO & PS Danapur, District Patna,\nBihar. ... ... Petitioner\n Versus\n1. Jayant Karnad, son of Late Malti Rao Karnad @ Malti Karnad Rao and\nLate Shankar Rao Karnad, resident of 7, River View Enclave, PO TELCO\nWorks, PS TELCO, Town Jamshedpur, District East Singhbhum, Jharkhand.\n2. The Union of India through Ministry of Defence, South Block, PO & PS\nNew Delhi, New Delhi.\n3. General Officer, Commandant in 'C' Central Commandant Lucknow,\nCantt. PO & PS Lucknow Cantt, Lucknow UP.\n ... ... Opposite Parties\n -------\n (Through V.C.)\n CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR\n HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RATNAKER BHENGRA\n -------\n For the Petitioner : Mrs. Nitu Sinha, Advocate\n For the Opposite Parties : None\n -------\n th\nOrder No.05/ Dated: 6 September, 2021\nPer, Shree Chandrashekhar,J.By an order of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, these matters are\nassigned to the Bench consisting of one of us (Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ratnaker\nBhengra).2. A mentioning slip dated 24.08.2021 sent through e-mail by the\nlearned counsel for the applicant- Defence Estate Officer was received in the\nRegistry. The Bench Clerk obtained necessary permission and transmitted\nthe mentioning slip to the concerned section on 03.09.2021 for listing of\nthese applications on 06.09.2021.3. CMP No. 282 of 2017 is an application for restoration of LPA\nNo. 205 of 2009.4. On 18.04.2017, LPA No. 205 of 2009 was dismissed for default.5. The order dated 18.04.2017 reads as under:"07/Dated: 18th April, 20171. When the matter was called out, nobody appeared on behalf\n of appellant hence, this Letters Patent Appeal is hereby dismissed\n for default.2. Interim relief, if any, stands vacated."2 CMP No. 282 of 2017 with IA No. 7440 of 20176. The application for restoration has been filed with a delay of 72\ndays.7. IA No. 7440 of 2017 has been filed undersection 5of the\nLimitation Act for condoning the delay of 72 days in filing CMP No. 282 of\n2017.8. In IA No. 7440 of 2017, the applicant has averred thus:"3. That L.P.A. No. 205 of 2009 was dismissed for default on\n 18.04.2017 for non appearance before the Division Bench of\n Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.N. Patel and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ratnaker\n Bhengra.4. That it is humbly stated that the counsel for appellant came to\n know regarding the dismissed of Memo of Appeal (L.P.A. No. 205\n of 2009) on 8/08/2017 when the Liasioning Officer of the\n concerned department enquired about the status of the appeal and\n thereafter it was searched and it was learnt that the L.P.A. No.\n 205/2009 has been dismissed for default on 18.04.2017.5. That thereafter the certified copy of order dated 18.04.2017 was\n obtained from the office and it was communicated to the\n petitioner/appellant's office at Danapur and decision was being\n taken for filing restoration petition.6. That thereafter the C.M.P. Was drafted by the counsel of\n appellant and was send to the concerned department for vetting.\n Thus in this process limitation of about 72 days occurred in filing\n the restoration application.7. That, in the aforesaid facts and circumstances delay of 72 days\n in filing the restoration application may be condoned which is\n unintentional, otherwise petitioner/appellant will suffer irreparable\n loss and injury."9. In CMP No. 282 of 2017, the applicant has stated thus:"3. That the aforesaid L.P.A. No. 205 of 2009 was listed under the\n heading "For Hearing" at Sl. No. 62 on 18.04.2017.4. That it is humbly submitted that inadvertently it could not be\n marked by the clerk of that counsel for appellant and therefore,\n when the case was called out then on one appeared on behalf of the\n petitioner and it was dismissed for non appearance of the counsel\n by the Hon'ble Court. But unfortunately the counsel had no\n knowledge about the matter.5. That on 10.08.2017 the Liaisoning Officer of the counsel\n department of the petitioner came to office of the A.S.G.I. And\n enquired about the status of L.P.A. No. 205/2009. Thereafter the\n status was searched from the website and it was found that the\n L.P.A. No. 205/2009 has been dismissed for non appearance on\n 18.04.2017 by the Hon'ble Court.The certified copy of the order dated\n 18.04.2017 is annexed herewith and marked\n as Annexure-1 to this application.6. That after getting the information about the status of the L.P.A.\n No. 205/2009 the restoration petition was immediately drafted by\n the counsel of petitioner on and it was sent to the concerned\n department for approval and after receiving the vetted copy from\n the concerned department on 17/08/2017 it is being filed today on\n 18/08/2017.3 CMP No. 282 of 2017 with IA No. 7440 of 20177. That there is good grounds in Memo of Appeal (L.P.A. No.\n 205/2009) and there is every chance of success of the case.8. That it is submitted that if the Memo of Appeal is not restored to\n its original file the petitioner/appellant will suffer irreparable loss\n and injury."10. The case of the applicant is that a piece of land admeasuring\n4.46 acres comprised under MS Plot No. 557 situated at Morabadi, Booti\nRoad, Ranchi was in active occupation of defence forces and regular rents\nwere being paid. The occupation of the said land was regularized by way of\nhiring with effect from 01.04.1946 to 31.03.1960 at an annual rent of\nRs. 446/- payable with effect from 01.08.1953 and on the expiry of the\nperiod of sanction the Government decided to seek extension of lease period\nup to 31.03.1963 but when the owner was approached for executing the\nhiring agreement he refused. The further case of the applicant is that one\nB.M. Mukund Rao sworn an affidavit stating that his father, namely,\nSri B.M. Laxamana Rao passed away on 09.08.1966 and he was the only\nlegal heir. He further stated that his sister Mrs. Malti S. Karnad was married\nto Sri Shankar Rao Karnad and she has given "no objection" in his favour as\nregards right, title and interest over 4.46 acres of land. Accordingly, rent was\npaid to him and revised from time to time on his request. The said\nB.M. Mukund Rao passed away in the year 1998 and therefore payment of\nrent was withheld by the applicant.11. A writ petition was filed by Jayant Karnad, who is son of Malti\nS. Karnad and Shankar Rao Karnad, for payment of arrears of compensation\nand release of the aforesaid property. Jayant Karnad pleaded that after death\nof his wife, who died issue-less, B.M. Mukund Rao started living with his\nsister Malti S. Karnad at Jamshedpur and he died on 04.09.1998. After the\ndeath of his mother Mrs. Malti S. Karnad, he became the sole successor of\nthe estate of Late B.M. Mukund Rao.12. An application for impleadment was filed by one Mohan Kumar\nKapoor claiming himself as the constituted attorney of Salim Pasha Jagirdar\nand IA No. 1493 of 2007 was dismissed by the writ Court on 05.11.2007\nobserving thus:"I.A. No. 1493 of 20073/05.11.2007 Heard the parties.By filing this Intervention Application, one Mohan\n Kumar Kapoor has prayed for being added as\n Intervenor/Respondent in this writ petition on the ground that he4 CMP No. 282 of 2017 with IA No. 7440 of 2017has got right, title and interest in the property in question being\n holder of Registered Power Of Attorney. It is stated by the\n applicant that Mrs. Malti S. Karnad, wife of Sri Shankar Rao\n Karnad, by swearing an affidavit, had relinquished her right in\n favour of her brother Late B.M. Mukund Rao and said B.M.\n Munkund Rao had also sworn an affidavit declaring himself to be\n absolute owner of the properties. It is also stated that Late B.M.\n Mukund Rao had executed a Power of Attorney in favour of one\n Salim Pasha Jagirdar on 15.04.1998 who in turn executed a\n Power of Attorney on 06.12.2004 in favour of the applicant Mohan\n Kumar Kapoor and therefore, the applicant/Intervener is very\n much interested in the property in question for which, the present\n Writ Petition has been filed by Jayant Karnad for release of the\n property in view ofSection-6(1-A) of Requisitioning and\n Acquisition of Immoveable Property Act, 1952(R.A.I.P. Act) and\n in view ofRequisitioning and Acquisition of Immoveable Property\n (Amendment) Act, 1970.A reply counter affidavit to the Intervention\n Application has been filed by the respondent nos. 1 to 3 wherein, it\n is stated that the original owner of the property in question was\n one B.M. Lakshman Rao who died on 09.08.1968.Even according to the applicant, Late B.M. Mukund\n Rao executed Power of Attorney in favour of Salim Pasha\n Jagirdar on 15.04.1998 and thereafter, said B.M. Mukund Rao\n died on 04.09.1998.The power of attorney executed by Late B.M.\n Mukund Rao in favour of Salim Pasha Jagirdar became dead\n letter after his death on 04.09.1998 and as such, the power of\n attorney, if any, executed by Salim Pasha Jagirdar in favour of this\n applicant Mohan Kumar Kapoor regarding the properties of B.M.\n Mukund Rao has got no force in the eyes of law. Salim Pasha\n Jagirdar was not authorized to execute power of attorney in 2004\n in favour of Mohan Kumar Kapoor after the death of B.M.\n Mukund Rao.In this view of the matter, the prayer of the\n applicant for being added as Intervenor Applicant in the\n application, cannot be entertained.Accordingly, I.A. 1493 of 2007 is rejected.W.P.(S) No. 1903 of 2007Put up this application under the heading for\n 'Admission'."13. The writ petitioner filed IA No.1817 of 2008 which was\nallowed vide order dated 04.08.2008 and IA No. 3014 of 2008 filed by the\napplicant was dismissed on 22.10.2008.14. The order dated 04.08.2008 reads as under:"5. 4.8.08 I.A. No. 1817 of 2008\n Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that\n after filing of the writ application, a letter has been issued by the\n respondents wherein intention to pay rental due to the petitioner\n has been expressed by the respondents.This interlocutory application is disposed of with a\n direction to the respondents to make payment at the earliest,\n preferably within a period of two months from the date of\n receipt/production of a copy of this order.The aforesaid I.A. stands disposed of."5 CMP No. 282 of 2017 with IA No. 7440 of 201715. The order dated 22.10.2008 reads as under:"6. 22.10.08 I.A. No. 3014 of 2008\n Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and\n learned counsel appearing for the respondents over the\n interlocutory application bearing I.A. no.3014 of 2008 wherein\n prayer has been made to modify the order dated 4.8.2008 wherein\n respondents were directed to make payment to the petitioner\n preferably within a period of two months to the extent that the\n petitioner be asked to furnish succession certificate before being\n paid rental.Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, I\n do not find any reason whatsoever for making such modification\n as nothing has been placed before me so as to the petitioner be\n directed to file succession certificate.In that view of the matter, the order dated 4.8.2008 needs\n not to be modified.In the circumstances, the respondents must pay rental\n which is due to be paid to the petitioner by 20.11.2008.The aforesaid I.A stands disposed of."16. A learned Single Judge after noticingsection 6(1-A)(a) ofRequisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952read with\nRule 2(11) of the Defence of India Rule, 1939 held that the property\nrequisitioned even much before the commencement of 1970 Act would be\ndeemed to have been requisitioned under the said Act and as such the\nproperty requisitioned under theDefence of India Act, 1939would also fall\nwithin the provisions undersection 6(1-A)(a) ofRequisitioning and\nAcquisition of Immovable Property (Amendment) Act, 1970.17. The learned Single Judge after tracing history of the legislation\nallowed the writ petition and held as under:"In order to have a clear picture, one needs to have history of the\n legislations relating to requisition of property for the use of the\n Army. During the war, the lands and buildings were requisitioned\n under theDefence of India Act, 1939and the Rules made\n thereunder and such property continued to be the subject to\n requisition under the Requisitioned Land (Continuance of Power)\n Act, 1947.That Actwas due to expire on 31.03.1952 and as\n Government of India had no power to requisition any property\n outside Delhi, necessity was felt to take measure to ensure the\n continuance of the requisition of the premises already requisitioned\n under the Defence of India rule and continued to be the subject to\n requisition under the Requisitioned Land (Continuance of Power)\n Act, 1947 also to secure power for the Central Government to\n make fresh requisition in order to meet its demand, theRequisitioning the Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952was enacted and thereby the Act of 1947 got repealed. The said Act\n of 1952 was initially to operate for a period of 6 years but its\n duration was extended from time to time. Then came theRequisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property\n (Amendment) Act, 1970which made the Requisitioning Act of\n permanent nature but restricted the period for which requisitioned6 CMP No. 282 of 2017 with IA No. 7440 of 2017property could be retained under requisition to 3 years from the\n commencement of the aforesaid Amendment Act in the case of\n properties requisitioned before such commencement. Thus, the\n properties requisitioned before the commencement of the said\n Amendment Act could be retained under the requisition upto March\n 10, 1973. Even after expiry of March 10, 1973, large number of\n properties could not be released as there was still necessity of those\n properties and, therefore, it was decided to have a continued\n requisition for a longer period by amending Act from time to time.\n Lastly, the Act was amended by the Act 20 of 1985 whereby all the\n properties which were requisitioned prior to the amendment of\n requisitioning Act in 1970 were required to be released from\n requisition by 10th of March, 1985.Thus, it is evidently clear that even the properties\n requisitioned under the provision ofDefence of India Actread with\n Rules will be subject to de-requisition in terms of the provisions as\n contained inSection 6(1-A)(a) of the Requisitioning and\n Acquisition Act, 1952. Therefore, under the said provision the land\n in question should have been released by 10 th of March, 1985, but\n the Army has retained its possession till date which is certainly in\n gross-violation of the law.Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to have the property\n released in his favour. Consequently, respondents are hereby\n directed to release the land in question in favour of the petitioner\n without any further delay, preferably within a period of two months\n from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order.With the aforesaid direction/observation, this writ petition\n is allowed."18. The Defence Estate Officer, Bihar & Orissa Circle, Danapur\nCantonment filed LPA No. 205 of 2009 which was dismissed in default on\n18.04.2017.19. Mrs. Nitu Sinha, the learned counsel for the applicant submits\nthat the writ petitioner was a stranger and in spite of a direction by the\nauthorities of Danapur Cantonment he did not produce a succession\ncertificate and therefore a contentious issue has been raised in the Letters\nPatent Appeal.20. Now reverting to the application seeking condonation of delay\nand the application for restoration, we find that there is an apparent conflict\nin the statements made in both the applications insofar as the date when the\norder of dismissal of the Letters Patent Appeal came to the knowledge of the\napplicant. Mrs. Nitu Sinha, the learned counsel states that this was an\ninadvertent error committed in course of drafting which occurred in\nparagraph No.5 of CMP No. 282 of 2017 and in paragraph No.4 of\nIA No. 7440 of 2017.21. We are not influenced by such contradictory statements even\nthough the aforesaid applications are supported by affidavit of Defence7 CMP No. 282 of 2017 with IA No. 7440 of 2017Estate Officer, Danapur Cantonment but what is relevant for the present\npurposes is that the reasons given in these applications are wholly\nunsatisfactory. It is well-settled that the accrued right of the opposite party\ncannot be lightly dealt with. Each day's delay must be explained and a plea\nthat the application for condonation of delay preferred by the State\ninstrumentalities should be viewed leniently has not been approved by the\nHon'ble Supreme Court.22.In "Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources\nDepartment) v. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd." 2021\nSCC OnLine SC 233 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:"58. Likewise, merely because the government is involved, a\n different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down.\n This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media\n India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 ["Postmaster General"], as follows:"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well\n aware or conversant with the issues involved including the\n prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of\n filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that\n they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was\n possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings.\n In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are\n posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically\n merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a\n party before us.28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of\n condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or\n deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has\n to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view\n that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take\n advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of\n impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of\n making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern\n technologies being used and available. The law of limitation\n undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government."23. In CMP No. 282 of 2017, the applicant has taken a plea that the\nclerk of the learned counsel for the applicant could not mark the list and that\nis the reason no one could appear before the Court when the matter was\ncalled out for hearing. In the first place, an affidavit of the clerk of the\nlearned counsel for the applicant has not been filed in support of the\naforesaid statement made in paragraph No.4 of the application for\nrestoration. Except a bald statement as aforesaid, nothing has been produced\non record to persuade the Court to take a lenient view in the matter.24. We are conscious that in an application for condonation of\ndelay the Courts need not go into merits of the case and we have recorded8 CMP No. 282 of 2017 with IA No. 7440 of 2017brief history of the case only for the purpose of testing bona fide of the\napplicant. The Army was enjoying the property, which does not belong to it,\nand it has taken undue advantage of process of the Court - LPA No.205 of\n2009 was admitted for hearing. We further find that the plea taken by the\napplicant that the matter was not marked in the cause list for 18.04.2017\ndoes not appear to be correct. LPA No. 205 of 2009 was a hearing matter\nwhich must have appeared in the list either on the previous day or in the\ncause list of previous week and, therefore, the applicant must have had\ninformation about listing of the case for hearing. Both the applications are\ncompletely vague and copies of the letters written to the learned counsel\ninquiring about status of the case and the cause list of the relevant date(s)\nhave not been produced before us to demonstrate bona fide of the applicant.25. Even though in a passing, we may also observe that\nIA No. 1817 of 2008 filed before the writ Court for modification of the order\ndated 04.08.2008 by which the applicant was directed to pay rent to Jayant\nKarnad was dismissed on 22.10.2008 and the writ Court refused to direct the\nwrit petitioner to produce a succession certificate.26. The occupation of the land was admitted by the Army at least\nfrom 01.04.1946; a writ petition was filed in the year 2007, and; Letters\nPatent Appeal was filed in the year 2009. However, there is nothing on\nrecord to indicate that any step was taken by the applicant for hearing of the\nLetters Patent Appeal for long 8 years before it was dismissed in default on\n18.04.2017. Thereafter, there was some delay in hearing of CMP No. 282 of\n2017 on account of change of roster/assignment to a Bench but the fact\nremains that it is more than 11 years when the writ Court had passed a\ndirection for release of the property.27. Besides that the applicant has failed to demonstrate sufficient\ncause for condoning the delay, the application for restoration of the Letters\nPatent Appeal is devoid of merits and lacks bona fide.28. IA No. 7440 of 2017 and CMP No. 282 of 2017 stand dismissed.(Shree Chandrashekhar, J.)\n\n\n\nSharda/S.B. (Ratnaker Bhengra, J.)

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Delhi High Court - OrdersIdeal Public Bstc Institute Buhana & Anr vs National Council For Teacher Education ... on 3 May, 2021Author:Prateek JalanBench:Prateek Jalan$~12\n * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI\n\n + W.P.(C) 5110/2021\n\n IDEAL PUBLIC BSTC INSTITUTE\n BUHANA & ANR. ..... Petitioners\n Through: Mr. Amitesh Kumar and Ms. Priti\n Kumari, Advocates.\n\n versus\n\n NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR TEACHER\n EDUCATION & ANR. ..... Respondents\n Through: Mr. Jai Sahai Endlaw and Mr.\n Ashutosh Rana, Advocates.\n\n CORAM:\n HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN\n\n ORDER% 03.05.2021\n\n The proceedings in the matter have been conducted through video\n conferencing.CM APPLs. 15658-59/2021 (for exemptions)\n Exemptions allowed, subject to all just exceptions.\n These applications stand disposed of.W.P.(C) 5110/20211. Issue notice. Mr. Ashutosh Rana, learned counsel, accepts notice\n on behalf of respondents. The petition is taken up for disposal with the\n consent of learned counsel for the parties.2. The petitioner seeks an order directing the National Council forSignature Not VerifiedDigitally Signed W.P.(C) 5110/2021 Page 1 of 2By:SHITU NAGPALSigning Date:04.05.202107:17:10Teacher Education ["NCTE'] to process and decide their application for\n grant of recognition in respect of their proposed D.El.Ed. Course.3. Mr. Amitesh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits\n that the petitioner's application was first made in 2015 and remains\n pending with the NCTE since. He points out in the interregnum the\n jurisdiction of institutes in the State of Rajasthan was transferred from the\n Northern Regional Committee ["NRC"] to the Western Regional\n Committee ["WRC"] of the NCTE. The WRC, thereafter, filed M.A. No.\n 896/2020 in W.P.(C) 276/2012 before the Supreme Court, and prayed for\n extension of time to process such applications. By an order dated\n 02.03.2020, the Supreme Court granted extension of time till 03.03.2021.4. Having regard to the aforesaid, the WRC is directed to process the\n petitioner's application and pass an order in accordance with law and in\n terms of the Standard Operating Procedure of the respondents. In the\n event, the petitioners' application has already been decided, it will be\n open to the respondents to communicate their decision to the petitioner.5. The petition is disposed of in these terms.PRATEEK JALAN, J\n MAY 3, 2021\n 'vp'Signature Not VerifiedDigitally Signed W.P.(C) 5110/2021 Page 2 of 2By:SHITU NAGPALSigning Date:04.05.202107:17:10

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Manipur High CourtPh. Adim vs Rajesh Kumar on 18 October, 2022Author:Sanjay KumarBench:Sanjay KumarLAIRENM Digitally signed\nAYUM by LAIRENMAYUM\nINDRAJE INDRAJEET Item Nos. 17-18\n SINGH\nET Date: 2022.10.18\n\nSINGH\n 15:14:32 +05'30' IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR\n AT IMPHAL\n CONT.CAS(C) No. 118 of 2021\n Ph. Adim.\n ...Petitioner\n - Versus -\n Rajesh Kumar, IAS & 3 Ors.\n ...Respondents\n With\n MC(CONT.CAS(C)) No. 72 of 2022\n\n BEFORE\n HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJAY KUMAR\n ORDER18-10-2022\n\n Perusal of the seniority list placed before this Court reflects that\n contractors who completed their works in the year 2000/2001, finding place at\n serial Nos. 188 to 196, have not been paid a paise but a contractor who\n completed his work in Jan, 2006, finding mention at Sl. No. 550 of the\n seniority list, has been paid 8.38 lakhs out of the total dues of 9.3 lakhs. The\n purpose served by the seniority list is therefore not clear, as payments are\n being made arbitrarily on a pick and choose method.Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned senior counsel, appearing for respondent\n Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 & 7; and Mr. M. Devananda, learned counsel, appearing for\n respondent No. 5, seek time to get instructions in this regard.An affidavit shall be filed by the next date of hearing explaining in\n clear terms as to how payments are being made to those awaiting their dues,\n who find mention in this seniority list.Post on 18.11.2022.Mr. Y. Nirmolchand, learned senior counsel, appears for the\n officials of the Finance Department, and states that a copy of the seniority list\n has not been furnished to him.Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned senior counsel, undertakes to do so well\n before the next date of hearing.CHIEF JUSTICE\n\n Indrajeet

dea1654b-2158-5309-ba99-601e5856806d

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Telangana High CourtSilar Sohail vs The State Of Telangana And Another on 30 June, 2023Author:P. Madhavi DeviBench:P. Madhavi Devi[Type text]\n\n\n\n\nTHE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE P. MADHAVI DEVI\n\n\n WRIT PETITION NO.8571 OF 2023,\n WRIT PETITION NO.2365 OF 2023,\n WRIT PETITION NO.6914 OF 2023,\n WRIT PETITION NO.7834 OF 2023,\n WRIT PETITION NO.7872 OF 2023,\n WRIT PETITION NO.8345 OF 2023,\n WRIT PETITION NO.8354 OF 2023,\n WRIT PETITION NO.8360 OF 2023,\n WRIT PETITION NO.8368 OF 2023,\n WRIT PETITION NO.8390 OF 2023,\n WRIT PETITION NO.8566 OF 2023,\n WRIT PETITION NO.8825 OF 2023,\n WRIT PETITION NO.8856 OF 2023,\n WRIT PETITION NO.8859 OF 2023,\n WRIT PETITION NO.8927 OF 2023\n AND\n WRIT PETITION NO.8988 OF 2023\n\n\n COMMON ORDERIn all these Writ Petitions, the prayer of the petitioners is to\n\ndeclare the action of the respondents in rejecting the candidature of the\n\npetitioners by imposing the condition that a candidate must have\n\npossessed either Light Motor Vehicle (Transport with Badge Number)\n\nor HMV License, or both put together, continuously for a period of full\n W.P.No.8571 of 2023 & batch2two years and above as on the date of the Notification vide\n\nRc.No.39/Rect./Admn-1/2022 dt.25.04.2022 - SCT PC Driver and\n\nHMV License continuously for a period of full two years and above as\n\non the date of the Notification vide Rc.No.60/Rect./Admn-1/2022\n\ndt.20.05.2022 - Driver Operator in Fire Services issued by the 2nd\n\nrespondent, as improper, unjust, illegal, arbitrary, against the provisions\n\nofSection 15(1)of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 and\n\nunconstitutional and consequently to set aside the Rejection Memo\n\ngiven to the petitioners and to direct the 2nd respondent to consider the\n\npetitioners' licences as renewed underSection 15(1)of the Motor\n\nVehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 and to allow them for further\n\nselection process of driving test and final written examinations and to\n\npass such other orders as this Court may deem fit and proper in the\n\ncircumstances of the case.2. Brief facts leading to the filing of the present Writ Petitions are\n\nthat the respondents have issued the Notification dt.20.05.2022 for\n\nrecruitment to the post of Driver Operator in Telangana State Disaster\n\nResponse and Fire Services Department and another Notification\n\ndt.25.04.2022 for the post of SCT PC (Stipendiary Cadet Trainee Police\n W.P.No.8571 of 2023 & batch3Constable) Driver (Men) and other posts. One of the conditions for the\n\nsaid posts was that the candidates should possess either Light Motor\n\nVehicle (Transport with Badge Number) or HMV License or both put\n\ntogether continuously for a period of full two years and above, as on the\n\ndate of the Notification.3. It is submitted that the petitioners herein are possessing valid\n\ndriving licences, however, after their expiry, they were renewed and the\n\npetitioners obtained valid driving licences. However, the authorities\n\nhave rejected their candidature by holding that they did not have valid\n\ndriving licences for a continuous period of two years. It is submitted that\n\nby virtue of the interim order granted by this Court, the petitioners were\n\npermitted to participate in the physical efficiency test and also in the\n\nwritten examination, but the results have not been declared as directed\n\nby this Court. It is submitted that the petitioners possessed valid driving\n\nlicences and the period between the date of expiry and the application\n\nand renewal also has to be treated as continuous period of holding the\n\nlicence underSection 15(1)of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as\n\namended by Act No.32 of 2019. It is submitted that after the amendment\n\nof theMotor Vehicles Actin the year 2019, the period of 30 days for\n W.P.No.8571 of 2023 & batch4making an application for renewal of licence has been amended as one\n\nyear prior to or one year subsequent to the date of expiry. It is submitted\n\nthat Sub-Section (1) of Section 15 of the said Act provides for the\n\nrenewal of driving licences from the date of expiry and the First Proviso\n\nthereto provides that the application for renewal of licence can be made\n\neither one year prior to the date of its expiry or within one year after the\n\ndate of its expiry and the date of renewal shall be the date of expiry of\n\nthe driving licence. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted\n\nthat the First Proviso cannot be read in isolation, but has to be read in\n\ntandem with the Section and as the said Section provides for the renewal\n\nof a licence from the date of its expiry, the time of one year provided\n\nunder the First Proviso should be considered as the period within which\n\nan application for renewal can be made and the renewal should be\n\nconsidered as from the date of expiry. He further submitted that before\n\nthe amendment of Section 15 by the Amendment Act of 2019, the said\n\nProviso had made it clear that the application has to be made within a\n\nperiod of 30 days from the date of its expiry and if so made, the renewal\n\nshall be considered as extended from the date of its expiry itself and\n\nonly if it is made beyond the period of 30 days, the renewal shall be\n W.P.No.8571 of 2023 & batch5considered from the date of renewal. He submitted that by way of\n\namendment, it is only a change of extension of the period for making an\n\napplication and not erasing the period. It is submitted that it can never be\n\ncontemplated that the application has to be made only on the date of\n\nexpiry and the extension will be considered on such date. He placed\n\nreliance upon various case law for the proposition that when an\n\napplication is made under the amended provision ofSection 15(1)of the\n\nMotor Vehicles Act, 1988, then the renewal will be from the date of\n\nexpiry.4. The learned counsel for some of the other writ petitioners have\n\nalso submitted that while interpreting the statute, the purpose of\n\nconstruction has to be given to the provisions and an interpretation\n\nwhich leads to absurdity or confusion or friction or contradiction and\n\nconflict between its various provisions, or undermines, or tends to defeat\n\nor destroy the basic scheme and purpose of the enactment must be\n\neschewed. For this proposition, he placed reliance upon the decision of\n\nthe Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vivek Narayan Sharma and\n W.P.No.8571 of 2023 & batch6others (Demonetisation Case-5 J) Vs. Union of Indiaand others1.He\n\nfurther relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the\n\ncase ofT. Devadasan Vs. Union of Indiaand another2 to contend that\n\na proviso or an exception cannot be so interpreted as to nullify or\n\ndestroy the main provision.He alsoplaced reliance uponthe judgment\n\nof the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case ofUnion of India and others\n\nVs. Dileep Kumar Singh3for the proposition that a proviso does not\n\ntravel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso and therefore, the\n\ngolden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such\n\na manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a\n\nharmonious construction. He further submitted that theMotor Vehicles\n\nActis a beneficial legislation and in order to provide succour to the\n\nclaimants under theMotor Vehicles Act, the buffer period of making an\n\napplication has been extended to one year from the earlier period of 30\n\ndays. He submitted that under Sub-Section (4) ofSection 15and the\n\nSecond Proviso thereto, before the amendment in the year 2019, it read\n\nthat if the application is made more than five years after the driving\n\nlicence has ceased to be effective, the licensing authority may refuse to1(2023) 3 SCC 12AIR 1964 SC 1793(2015) 4 SCC 421\n W.P.No.8571 of 2023 & batch7renew the driving licence, unless the applicant undergoes and passes to\n\nits satisfaction the test of competence to drive referred to in Sub-Section\n\n(3) ofSection 9and by virtue of amendment, the period has been\n\nrestricted to one year. Therefore, he submitted that the period of 30\n\ndays was the period for making the application for renewal of the\n\nlicence from the date of its expiry, but the application could be\n\nsubmitted later on within the period up to five years for valid renewal of\n\nlicence and it is only after lapse of five years that the candidate would\n\nhave to go for a fresh application and had to undergo and pass the test of\n\ncompetence to drive referred to in Sub-Section (3) ofSection 9. It is\n\nsubmitted that after the amendments in the year 2019 to theMotor\n\nVehicles Act, the First Proviso to Sub-Section (1) ofSection 15and the\n\nSecond Proviso to Sub-Section (4) ofSection 15have been amended to\n\nincrease the buffer period to one year before and one year after the date\n\nof expiry and the validity period also has been modified to be one year\n\nfrom the date of expiry. It is submitted that if the objects and reasons for\n\nthe amendments of theMotor Vehicles Actin 2019 are also gone into, it\n\nis clear that the authorities under theMotor Vehicles Actintended to\n\nprovide benefit of validity of the driving licence beyond the date of\n W.P.No.8571 of 2023 & batch8expiry up to the period of one year before or after the expiry of the\n\nlicence. Therefore, he submitted that the candidates whose licences have\n\nbeen renewed within a period of one year from the date of expiry should\n\nbe considered as having continuous valid driving licence for the\n\nselection to the posts of SCT PC Driver and Driver Operator in Fire\n\nServices Department.5. The learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the\n\nrespondents, on the other hand, relied upon the provisions of theMotor\n\nVehicles Actto contend that any application made beyond the date of\n\nexpiry will have to be considered as renewal only from the date of\n\nrenewal and the gap between the date of expiry and renewal cannot be\n\nconsidered as continuation of the licence. He therefore submitted that\n\nthe respondents have rightly rejected the candidature of the petitioners.6. Having regard to the rival contentions and the material on\n\nrecord, this Court finds that theMotor Vehicles Actof 1988 is framed to\n\nregulate the law relating to motor vehicles. It has been held to be a\n\nbeneficial legislation to regulate and ensure road safety. The provisions\n\nof theMotor Vehicles Actare also meant to protect the pedestrians and\n\nthe persons injured in the road accidents. The licensing authority,\n W.P.No.8571 of 2023 & batch9therefore, prescribes certain criteria subject to the fulfilment of which,\n\nthe driving licence can be granted to an applicant.Section 9of the\n\nMotor Vehicles Act provides for grant of driving licence subject to the\n\napplicant passing the prescribed tests.Section 15thereof provides for\n\nrenewal of driving licences and for the sake of ready reference, the\n\nrelevant portion ofSection 15is reproduced hereunder:"15. Renewal of driving licences.--(1) Any licensing authority may,\n on application made to it, renew a driving licence issued under the\n provisions of this Act with effect from the date of its expiry:Provided that in any case where the application for the\n renewal of a licence is made either one year prior to date of its expiry\n or within one year after the date of its expiry, the driving licence shall\n be renewed with effect from the date of its renewal:Provided further that where the application is for the renewal\n of a licence to drive a transport vehicle or where in any other case the\n applicant has attained the age of forty years, the same shall be\n accompanied by a medical certificate in the same form and in the\n same manner as is referred to in sub-section (3) ofsection 8, and the\n provisions of sub-section (4) ofsection 8shall, so far as may be, apply\n in relation to every such case as they apply in relation to a learner's\n licence.(2) An application for the renewal of a driving licence shall be\n made in such form and accompanied by such documents as may be\n prescribed by the Central Government.W.P.No.8571 of 2023 & batch10(3) Where an application for the renewal of a driving licence\n is made previous to, or not more than one year after the date of its\n expiry, the fee payable for such renewal shall be such as may be\n prescribed by the Central Government in this behalf.(4) Where an application for the renewal of a driving licence\n is made more than one year after the date of its expiry, the fee payable\n for such renewal shall be such amount as may be prescribed by the\n Central Government:Provided that the fee referred to in sub-section (3) may be\n accepted by the licensing authority in respect of an application for the\n renewal of a driving licence made under this sub-section if it is\n satisfied that the applicant was prevented by good and sufficient cause\n from applying within the time specified in sub-section (3):Provided further that if the application is made more than one\n year after the driving licence has ceased to be effective, the licensing\n authority shall refuse to renew the driving licence, unless the\n applicant undergoes and passes to its satisfaction the test of\n competence to drive referred to in sub-section (3) ofsection 9.(5) .....................................(6) ....................................."For the sake of adjudication of the issue before this Court, the First\n\nProviso to Sub-Section (1) ofSection 15has to be considered. As held\n\nby the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vivek Narayan Sharma\n\nand others (Demonetisation Case-5 J) Vs. Union of India and others\n\n(1 supra), a proviso cannot be read in isolation but has to be considered\n W.P.No.8571 of 2023 & batch11in conformity with the main Section. Reading of the proviso cannot\n\nmake or render the main provision a nullity. Sub-Section (1) ofSection\n\n15provides that any licensing authority may, on an application made to\n\nit, renew a driving licence issued under the provisions of theMotor\n\nVehicles Actwith effect from the date of its expiry. The first proviso\n\nthereunder provides that where the application for the renewal of a\n\nlicence is made either one year prior to the date of its expiry or within\n\none year after the date of its expiry, the driving licence shall be renewed\n\nwith effect from the date of its renewal. There are two circumstances\n\nunder this proviso, the first circumstance is the application made prior to\n\nexpiry of licence and the second circumstance is the application made\n\nafter the date of expiry of licence but within one year thereafter. If the\n\nproviso were to be applied literally and if the application is made one\n\nyear prior to the date of expiry and it is renewed with effect from the\n\ndate of its renewal, then the applicant would be losing the validity of the\n\nlicence by a period of one year. However, if the application is made\n\nafter the date of expiry but within one year from the date of its expiry\n\nand the driving licence is renewed with effect from the date of its\n W.P.No.8571 of 2023 & batch12renewal, the applicant would be losing the period of validity within the\n\ngap of the date of expiry and the date of its renewal.7. Therefore, it is important to ascertain the intention of the\n\nLegislator for making the amendments vide Amendment Bill, 2019.\n\nFrom the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act 32 of 2019, the\n\nAmendment Bill, 2019, the following is the intention of the Legislation.(a) to facilitate grant of online learning licence;(b) to replace the existing provisions of insurance with simplified\n provisions in order to provide expeditious help to accident victims\n and their families;(c) to increase the time limit for renewal of driving licence from one\n month to one year before and after the expiry date;(d) to increase the period of renewal of transport licence from three\n years to five years;(e) to enable the licensing authority to grant licence even to the\n differently abled persons;(f) to enable the States to promote public transport, rural transport\n and last mile connectivity by relaxing any of the provisions of the\n Act pertaining to permits;(g) to increase the fines and penalties for violation of provisions of the\n Act; and(h) to make a provision for protection of Good Samaritans.W.P.No.8571 of 2023 & batch13The amendments made toSection 15are as under:"Amendment ofSection 15--InSection 15of the principal\n Act,--(i) in sub-section (1), in the first proviso, for the words "more\n than thirty days", the words "either one year prior to date of its expiry\n or within one year" shall be substituted;(ii) in sub-section (3), for the words "thirty days", the words\n "one year" shall be substituted; and(iii) in sub-section (4),--(a) for the words "thirty days", the words "one year" shall be\n substituted; and(b) in the second proviso, for the words "five years after the\n driving license has ceased to be effective, the licensing authority may",\n the words "one year after the driving licence has ceased to be effective,\n the licensing authority shall" shall be substituted."8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case ofSyed Mehaboob Vs.\n\nThe New India Assurance Company Limited4has held that theMotor\n\nVehicles Actis a beneficent legislation intended to place the claimant in\n\nthe same position that he was before the accident and to compensate him\n\nfor his loss and thus, it should be interpreted liberally so as to achieve\n\nthe maximum benefit.4(2011) 11 SCC 625\n W.P.No.8571 of 2023 & batch149. Thus, it can be noticed that the intention of the Legislator for\n\namendment of theMotor Vehicles Act, 1988by Act No.32 of 2019 in\n\nrespect ofSection 15was only to increase the time limit for renewal of\n\ndriving licence from one month to one year before and after the expiry\n\ndate only and not to change the date of application of the renewal. Thus,\n\nthe interpretation by the respondents of the amended provisions ofSection 15(1)of the Motor Vehicles Act by the Amendment Act 32 of\n\n2019 is misconceived. On such erroneous understanding of law, the\n\nrespondents have rejected the case of the petitioners. From the table\n\ngiven at pages 15 to 17 of the writ papers in W.P.No.8571 of 2023\n\ngiving details of each of the petitioners, their licence number and gap of\n\nrenewal, it is noticed that the gap of renewal ranged between a minimum\n\nof 1 day and a maximum of 294 days. Therefore, all the applications for\n\nrenewal are presumably within a period of one year from the date of\n\nexpiry and therefore, even though the date of renewal is subsequent to\n\nthe date of expiry, the renewal has to be considered as from the date of\n\nexpiry itself and consequently, the licence is to be considered as\n\ncontinuous.W.P.No.8571 of 2023 & batch1510. In view thereof, the impugned Rejection Memos in respect of all\n\nthe writ petitioners are set aside. The respondents are directed to\n\nconsider the candidature of all the writ petitioners herein as possessing\n\nvalid driving licence for a continuous period of two years and declare\n\nthe results and proceed for further selection process in accordance with\n\ntheir merit and in accordance with the rules and conditions of the subject\n\nNotifications.11. All the Writ Petitions are accordingly allowed. No order as to\n\ncosts in all these Writ Petitions.12. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in all these Writ Petitions\n\nshall stand closed.___________________________\n JUSTICE P. MADHAVI DEVI\n\n\nDate: 30.06.2023\nSvv

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High Court of MeghalayaShri. Quiwib R. Marak vs . Union Of India & Ors. on 15 November, 2023Author:H.S.ThangkhiewBench:H.S.ThangkhiewSerial No.26\n Regular List\n\n HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA\n AT SHILLONG\n\nWP(C). No. 272 of 2023\n Date of Order :15.11.2023\n\nShri. Quiwib R. Marak Vs. Union of India & Ors.\n\n\nCoram:\n Hon'ble Mr. Justice H.S.Thangkhiew, Chief Justice (Acting)\n\n\nAppearance:\n\nFor the Petitioner/Applicant(s) : Mr. S.Marpan, Adv.\n\nFor the Respondent(s) : Ms. S.Rumthao, Adv. viceDr. N.Mozika, DSGI for R 1, 4 & 5.Mr. N.D.Chullai, AAG with\n Mr. E.R.Chyne, GA for R 2 & 3.Affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1, 4 & 5\nindicating that whatever dues to which they were liable to pay for have\nbeen satisfied, which is for the period of 01-11-1999 to 30-09-2021.Ms. S.Rumthao, learned counsel vice Dr. N.Mozika, learned DSGI\nfor respondent Nos. 1, 4 & 5 submits that the remaining period in question\ni.e., from 02-01-1984 to 31-10-1999, the State respondent Nos. 2 & 3 are\nliable for the same.Mr. N.D.Chullai, learned AAG assisted by Mr. E.R.Chyne, learned\nGA for the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 prays that on this aspect he may be\nallowed to file an affidavit to clarify the matter. Prayer is allowed.1List this matter on 07-12-2023 for necessary affidavit.Chief Justice (Acting)\nMeghalaya\n15.11.2023\n"Samantha PS"2

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Madras High CourtAmbika Devi vs M.Seetharaman on 19 April, 2020Author:C.SaravananBench:C.Saravanan1/8 C.M.A.No.852 of 2020\n\n IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS\n\n DATED : 19.04.2020\n\n CORAM\n\n THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE C.SARAVANAN\n\n C.M.A.No.852 of 2020\n\n (Through Video Conferencing)\n\n 1.Ambika Devi\n 2.C.Vishal (Minor)\n (minor 2nd appellant is rep.by his\n mother & next friend Ambika Devi)\n 3.Pichammal\n (Minors rep.by their mother &\n Next friend , 1st appellant) ... Appellants\n\n vs.\n\n 1.M.Seetharaman\n (1st respondent was set exparte\n before the Tribunal)\n 2.Reliance General Insurance Co., Ltd.,\n Rai's Towers, Plot No.2054,\n 2nd Avenue, 2nd Floor, Anna Nagar,\n Chennai 600 040. .. Respondents\n\n\n\n Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed underSection 173of Motor Vehicles\n\n Act, 1988 against the Judgment and decree dated 10.07.2019 made in\n\n\nhttps://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/\n 2/8 C.M.A.No.852 of 2020\n\n M.C.O.P.No.2513 of 2014 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal,\n\n (Special Sub Judge No.1) Court of Small Causes, Chennai 104.\n\n\n\n\n For Appellants : M/s.C.Richard Suresh Kumar\n\n For 2nd Respondent : M/s.C.Bhuvana Sundari\n\n\n\n JUDGMENTThe claimants are the appellant in this appeal. The appellants seek for\n\n enhancement of the compensation awarded in the impugned Judgment and\n\n decretal order dated 19.01.2019 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal\n\n Chennai,(Special Sub Judge No.1) Court of Small Causes, Chennai 104 in\n\n M.C.O.P No.2513 of 2014.2. By the impugned Judgment and Decree, the Tribunal has awarded a\n\n sum of Rs.18,30,000/- together with interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of\n\n filing of the claim petition till the date of deposit, to the appellant/claimant. The\n\n Tribunal has awarded the aforesaid compensation under the following heads:-https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/3/8 C.M.A.No.852 of 2020Amount awarded by the\n Tribunal\n Heads\n Loss of dependency(Rs.14,000 x12x1/3x15) Rs. 16,80,000\n Loss of Consortium Rs. 40,000\n Loss of Love and affection Rs. 75,000\n Loss of Estate Rs. 15,000\n Transport charges Rs. 5,000\n Funeral Expenses Rs. 15,000\n Total Rs. 18,30,0003. Not being satisfied with the amounts awarded by the Tribunal, the\n\n appellants have filed the present appeal for enhancement of compensation.4. The brief facts of the case are that on 05.01.2014 at about 6.00 p.m.\n\n when the deceased Chandana Kumar was standing in the GNT Road, a insured\n\n van bearing Reg.No.TN.04.V.5143 belonging to the 1st respondent insured with\n\n the 2nd respondent was driven by its driver allegedly in a rash and negligent\n\n manner, knocked the said Chandana Kumar. As a result of impact, the said\n\n Chandana kumar sustained grievous injuries and died in the hospital.5. In this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal, the appellants seeks for\n\n enhancement of the compensation awarded on the ground that while awarding\nhttps://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/4/8 C.M.A.No.852 of 2020the aforesaid compensation of Rs.18,30,000/-, the Tribunal has taken the income\n\n of the deceased as Rs.10,000/- per month merely because the deceased was aged\n\n about 36 years at the time of death. The learned counsel for the\n\n appellants/claimants submits that though the deceased was aged about 36 years\n\n old, he was earning a sum of Rs.16,000/- per month and plus batta Rs.200/- per\n\n day.6. He further submits that the Tribunal ought to have considered the\n\n notional income of Rs.15,000/- p.m. in terms of the decision of the Division\n\n Bench of this Court reported in 2019(1) TNMAC 257. The learned counsel for\n\n the appellants submits that the Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs.40,000/-\n\n towards loss of love and affection and only a sum of Rs.15,000/- towards loss of\n\n consortium are very meagre. Hence, prays for enhancement of compensation .7. Defending the impugned Judgment and decree, the learned counsel\n\n for the 2nd respondent submits that the Tribunal has awarded as just\n\n compensation and the decision of the Division Bench of this Court cited above.8. The learned counsel for the second respondent-Insurance Company\n\n further contended that the appellants have not produced any material evidence\nhttps://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/5/8 C.M.A.No.852 of 2020to prove either the avocation or the income of the deceased. In absence of any\n\n material evidence with regard to avocation and income, a sum of Rs.10,000/-\n\n per month fixed by the Tribunal as notional income of the deceased cannot be\n\n said to be meagre. He therefore, prayed for dismissal of the appeal with partial\n\n modification.9. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the\n\n appellants and the learned counsel for the second respondent-Insurance\n\n Company and also perused all the materials available on record. The Tribunal\n\n considering the entire materials on record, has awarded a sum of Rs.18,30,000/-\n\n as compensation to the appellants, which is not meagre.10. The Tribunal has considered the notional income of the deceased as\n\n Rs.10,000/- p.m. The deceased was working as a lorry driver at VSM\n\n Transport. It is reasonable to assume that the deceased would have earned\n\n atleast Rs.15,000/- p.m. as a driver driving heavy vehicle. However, in absence\n\n of any direct evidence to substantiate the same, this Court is inclined to consider\n\n the notional income of the deceased as Rs.13,500/- p.m. for the purpose of\n\n awarding compensation. Accordingly, the compensation awarded by the\n\n Tribunal is re-computed as follows:-https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/6/8 C.M.A.No.852 of 2020Calculation of Pecuniary loss of estate:-Notional income of the deceased : Rs. 13,500/-Add : Future Prospect at 40% : Rs. 5,400/-\n ------------------\n : Rs. 18,900/-\n Deduction: Person Expenses 1/3rd : Rs . 6,300/-\n -----------------\n Monthly contribution to the family : Rs. 12,600/-\n -------------------\n\n\n Annual contribution to the family(12600 x 12) : Rs.1,51,200/-\n Age 36\n Multiplier 15 (1,51,200 x 15) : Rs.22,68,000/-\n\n\n\n\n Heads Re-quantified amount by\n this Court\n Pecuniary loss of estate Rs.22,68,000/-\n Loss of Consortium Rs. 40,000/-\n Loss of Love and Affection to the 2nd Rs. 80,000/-\n and 3rd appellant\n Loss of estate Rs. 15,000/-\n Transport charges Rs. 5,000/-\n Funeral expenses Rs. 15,000/-\n Total Rs.24,23,000/-11. The 2nd respondent-Insurance Company is therefore directed to\n\n deposit the enhanced award amount of compensation of Rs.24,23,000/- now\nhttps://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/7/8 C.M.A.No.852 of 2020determined by this Court together with interest at 7.5% p.a. from the date of the\n\n claim petition till the date of deposit to the credit of M.C.O.P.No.2513 of 2014\n\n on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, (Special Sub Judge No.1)\n\n Court of Small Causes, Chennai 104, less any amount already deposited, within\n\n a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this Judgment. The\n\n appellants are directed to pay necessary Court fee, if any, on the enhanced\n\n compensation.12. The aforesaid compensation of Rs.24,23,000/- is apportioned as\n\n follows:-Appellants On the Loss of Loss of consortium Loss of estate/ Total\n income Transport/Funeral\n / parental (Rs.24,23,000)\n Expenses\n (Rs.22,68,000) consortium\n\n / love and affection\n\n 1st appellant Rs. 10,18,000/- Rs. 40,000/- Rs.35,000/- Rs.10,93,000/-2nd appellant Rs. 10,00,000/- Rs. 40,000/- Nil Rs.10,40,000/-\n 3rd appellant Rs. 2,50,000/- Rs. 40,000/- Nil Rs. 2,90,000/-13. The 1st and 3rd appellants are permitted to withdraw their respective\n\n shares together with proportionate interest, less any amount already withdrawn,\n\n by filing suitable applications before the Tribunal.https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/8/8 C.M.A.No.852 of 2020C.SARAVANAN, J.kkd14. The shares of the minor 2nd appellant shall be deposited by the\n\n Tribunal in anyone of the nationalised Banks under re-investment scheme till he\n\n attains majority. The 1st appellant, who is the mother /guardian of the minor, is\n\n permitted to withdraw the accrued interest from the deposit of the minor once in\n\n three months directly from the said Bank. On attaining the age of majority, the\n\n 2nd appellant may be permitted to withdraw his respective shares by filing\n\n suitable applications before the Tribunal.15. Accordingly, this civil miscellaneous appeal is partly allowed. No\n\n costs.19.04.2021\n Index : Yes/No\n Internet : Yes / No\n kkd\n To:The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal\n (Special Sub Judge No.1)\n Court of Small Causes, Chennai 104,C.M.A.No.852 of 2020https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/

b83e9730-e882-52f5-aa9c-b788fcecc75b

court_cases

Delhi District CourtWhether Services Of vs Delhi Technological on 1 October, 2022IN THE COURT OF SH. JOGINDER PRAKASH NAHAR\n PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT-IX\n ROUSE AVENUE COURTS COMPLEX, NEW DELHI\n\n LIR No. 7962/16 CNR No. DLCT13-005084-2016\n\n Smt. Bebi\n W/o Sh. Dharambir\n R/o 765, Tahirpur Sarai\n Dilshad Garden\n Delhi-110095\n\n C/o Municipal Employees' Union\n Agarwal Bhawan, G.T. Road\n Tis Hazari, Delhi-110054 ......Workwoman\n\n Versus\n\n M/s. Commissioner\n East Delhi Municipal Corporation\n 419, Udyog Sadan\n Patparganj Industrial Area\n New Delhi-110096 ......Management\n\n\n Date of Institution : 23.04.2016\n Date of Award reserved on : 01.10.2022\n Date of Award : 01.10.2022\n\n\n REFERENCE U/SEC. 10(1) (C) AND 12(5) OF INDUSTRIAL\n\nLIR No. 7962/16\nBebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 1 of 50\n DISPUTE ACT, 1947 R/W GOVT. OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF\n LABOUR NOTIFICATION NO. S-11011/2/75/DK (IA)\n DATED 14th APRIL 1975 AND NOTIFICATION NO.\n F.1/31/616/Estt./2008/7458 DATED 3rd MARCH 2009\n\n AWAR D\n\n BRIEF FACTS AND REASONS FOR DECISION :-1. Vide this Award the present reference petition referred\n by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, District East, Vishwkarma\n Nagar, Jhilmil Colony, Delhi­110095, Labour Department, Govt.\n of the National Capital Territory of Delhi shall be disposed which\n was referred by appropriate Government/Office of Labour\n Commissioner arising between the parties.2. The present statement of claim was filed by the\n workwoman on 23.04.2016 submitting that she has joined the\n management on 02.03.1996 as 'Safai Karamchari' on fixed wages\n revised underMinimum Wages Act. She was employed as\n substitute Safai Karamchari and there is no difference in\n nomenclature from 'Substitute' to 'Daily Wager'. Vide order dated\n 22.07.2010 the management has converted substitute SafaiLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 2 of 50Karamcharies into daily wager Safai Karamchari who were\n engaged from 01.04.1994 to 31.03.1996. The workwoman had\n worked continuously and uninterruptedly upto 09.05.2012. The\n management has given offer letter dated 31.03.2011 to workwoman\n to work under regular post and thereby on such offer and post of\n the service of workwoman was regularised by the management\n vide office order dated 30.07.2011. Medical examination and\n police verification was also done. Suddenly on 09.05.2012 the\n management had sent a termination/disengagement order which is\n bad and illegal under law issued with malafide intention.\n workwoman is a regular employee who has not committed any\n misconduct. No show cause notice or charge sheet was issued to\n the workwoman. The removal order dated 09.05.2012 was issued\n by Assistant Commissioner who has no authority to do so as she is\n not the appointing authority. Unfair labour practice was committed.\n Termination of service was totally disproportionate to the\n allegations levelled by the management. No notice or notice pay or\n retrenchment compensation was paid. workwoman has worked for\n more than 240 days in a year preceding the date of her illegal\n termination and therefore she is entitled for protection underSection 25F,25Gand25Hof Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 r/w\n Rule 76, 77 and 78 of Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules, 1957. HerLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 3 of 50juniors are retained in service and even after her termination fresh\n concern are employed by the management. No seniority list was\n displayed by the management before the alleged termination of\n workwoman. Permission from appropriate Government was also\n not taken. The demand letter was sent by workwoman to the\n management is dated 18.05.2012 which was duly received at their\n office but no reply was given. Similarly conciliation proceedings\n stands failed. Accordingly workwoman has prayed that Award may\n be allowed in her favour thereby setting aside the order of\n termination with direction to reinstate the workwoman in service\n with continuity of service with full back wages. The workwoman\n has also claimed cost of litigation u/Sec. 11(7) of theIndustrial\n Disputes Act, 1947.3. In the written statement filed by the management it is\n submitted by the management that the workwoman was initially\n taken as Substitute Safai Karamchari against daily wages on\n 01.04.2003. She was not working continuously though she has\n engaged another person on her behalf work for management and\n she herself has worked somewhere else. Despite warnings by the\n concerned inspector she did not take care. In the year 2011 the\n substitute Safai Karamachari were considered for regularizationLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 4 of 50who were appointed prior to March 1996. Since the workwoman\n herein was appointed in the month of April, 2003 therefore she\n could not be considered for regularization in the year 2011. The\n workwoman including 84 Safai Karamacharies has done something\n malafide on which inquiry was conducted by vigilance department.\n Thereafter 84 Safai Karamacharies were disengaged vide order\n dated 09.05.2012. The workwoman managed to destroy the\n original records in connivance with account and sanitation\n department officials. Hence the conduct is fraudulent. The original\n documents in the application are not available with DEMS\n Department, Shahdara (South) Zone, EDMC and the documents\n are also not available in head quarter which was reported by the\n department vide letter dated 28.12.2015. The matter was referred\n to Anti Corruption branch, GNCT of Delhi who has some\n document including original files. It is admitted that the\n workwoman was so terminated. On conclusion of inquiry from\n Central Vigilance Cell show cause notice was issued to the\n workwoman to submit certain documents which workwoman fail\n to submit and thereby her services were terminated. Other claim of\n the workwoman are generally denied.4. On the pleadings of the parties and averments madeLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 5 of 50following issues are framed in the reference on 10.08.2017:1. Whether services of claimant (Bebi) were terminated\n by management of EDMC illegally and/or\n unjustifiably?OPW2. Relief.5. The sole witness of the workwoman is WW-1 who is\n workwoman herself who relied upon the documents which are\n Ex.WW1/1 to Ex.WW1/11 and on request of workwoman WE was\n closed on 05.10.2018. The management has examined MW-1/Sh.\n Dheeraj Kumar who relied upon the document which is\n Ex.MW1/1. On 01.06.2022 ME was closed by the order of the\n Court/this Tribunal.6. Final arguments are heard and record perused.7. The issue-wise findings are as follows:-8. ISSUE NO. 11. Whether services of claimant (Bebi) were terminated by\n management of EDMC illegally or unjustifiably? OPWLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 6 of 508.1 The workwoman has pleaded in her statement of claim\n that a letter was sent on the management by hand which was duly\n served and received by the management vide communication dated\n 18.05.2012 at point A. No reply is received from the management\n and it is presumed that the demand has been rejected. In the\n conciliation proceedings the management had non co-operative\n attitude. The letter dated 18.05.2012 is Ex.WW1/9 which was\n produced in evidence by WW-1. Ex.WW1/9 bears stamp of\n receiving from MCD dated 18.05.2012 at point A. No question is\n asked by the management regarding Ex.WW1/9 from the\n workwoman. The deposition of the workwoman in cross-\n examination that it did not send demand notice after termination of\n her job does not serve any purpose in view of the pleading and\n deposition by workwoman in evidence by way of affidavit. It was\n incumbent on the management to confront the workwoman on\n Ex.WW1/9 the demand notice and the stamp of management\n bearing on first page at point A of demand notice. Neither the\n signature of workwoman are confronted nor the original of the said\n document was asked from the workwoman. Hence the workwoman\n has proved that demand notice was sent to the management by\n preponderance of probability which was duly served on the\n management before filing this claim.LIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 7 of 508.2 WW-1 has deposed in same terms of her pleadings. She\n was disengaged vide Ex.WW1/8 bearing her name at sl.no. 9 of the\n said office order in the list B mentioning that "joined duty but\n absent from duty after joining". The workwoman was regularized\n vide order Ex.WW1/1. Ex.WW1/4 is the record of medical\n examination of the workwoman. It is admitted case of the\n management that only vigilance inquiry was conducted by the\n vigilance department on the ground of suspicion that some fake\n person are acting and representing on behalf of actual person and\n the fake person only are drawing the salary. No chargesheet or\n departmental inquiry was conducted against the workwoman.\n Letter was sent to the workwoman herein to submit documents\n regarding confirmation and verification which workwoman failed\n to produce that she was working on monthly salary of Rs.12,400/-\n continuously from Shahdara, South Zone. The workwoman has not\n complied with offer letter Ex.WW1/3 dated 31.03.2011. Show\n cause notice was issued to the workwoman and certain documents\n were asked which workwoman did not supply to the management.\n Therefore the service of the workwoman was terminated. The date\n of appointment of the workwoman with the management is claim\n by the management that she was appointed as substitute Safai\n Karamchari on daily wages on 01.04.2003. Workwoman hasLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 8 of 50pleaded that she was appointed as Safai Karamchari on 02.03.1996.\n However in parawise reply the management has not controverted\n the date of joining pleaded by the workwoman and in cross-\n examination the MW-1 has admitted as correct the date of joining\n of the workwoman with the management as 02.03.1996. The date\n of termination of workwoman is 09.05.2012 vide Ex.WW1/8.\n Hence admittedly the workwoman had uninterrupted and\n continuous service with the management for more than 240 days in\n a year counting backward from the last date of her termination\n which is 09.05.2012. Now the onus of proof has therefore shifted\n on the management who has disputed the identity of the\n workwoman that it is not the same workwoman who was employed\n by the management. The MCD had not conducted any departmental\n inquiry in respect of workwoman nor filed first information report\n if the identity of workwoman was disputed. The onus is on the\n management and not on the workwoman as the name of the\n workwoman with her husband's name and address is already\n available on record. The management has failed to show having\n given any notice to the workwoman asking her to submit her record\n of identity. Before employing a daily wager the management must\n also be taking the document of identity of workwoman. None of\n which were filed by the management. Hence management has notLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 9 of 50filed any document which could show it had given any sort of\n notice/chargesheet/department inquiry against the workwoman\n disputing that she is not employee of the management. Not only\n this the management must show on record that it had disputed this\n fact that workwoman is not its employee before the conciliation\n officer. Now disputing this fact before the present Court will\n amount to enlarging the scope of reference by the management and\n therefore which cannot be permitted before the present Court.\n Management has also pleaded that the workwoman had failed to\n produce any document to show eligibility for regularization. It is\n admitted fact on record that workwoman was already regularized\n by the management vide Ex.WW1/1. In the said exhibit the date of\n engagement of the workwoman is mentioned as 02.03.1996 at sl.\n no. 6764. All this while the management must be paying salary to\n the workwoman. Other than this it is mandatory requirement as perSection 25Dof Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to produce muster\n roll. In fact what the management has pleaded in the written\n statement regarding identity of the workwoman must be proved by\n the management on record as onus of the above fact as pleaded by\n the management lies on the management only. Without any\n application or notice and in absence of any complaint the above\n averments of the management are found vague in nature which areLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 10 of 50not specific to date, month and year.8.3 MW-1 has deposed that workwoman had joined her\n employment on 02.03.1996 as Safai Karamchari. It is admitted as\n correct that she was daily wager/muster roll w.e.f 22.07.2010 who\n was regularized vide order dated 30.07.2011 Ex.WW1/6. It is\n admitted as correct that the workwoman has completed formalities\n of regularization namely police verification, medical examination\n etc. It is admitted that no chargesheet or inquiry was conducted\n against the workwoman. Management does not have any document\n or material to show that workwoman is gainfully employed after\n 09.05.2012 in view of deposition of workwoman regarding her\n unemployment from the date of her illegal termination since\n 09.05.2012. MW-1 admits that management maintain complete\n wage records which he failed to show during evidence.8.4 The regularization of workwoman in the present case\n with the management is disputed by the management that due\n process is not followed. It is a question of fact and law between the\n parties. The disputed question of fact and law has to be established\n between the parties as per the burden and onus of proof during the\n course of trial. The relevant citation titled Anil Lamba & Ors. v.LIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 11 of 50Govt. of NCT & Ors. in W.P.(C) No. 1958/2017, 2017 SCC\n Online Del 7382: (2017) 238 DLT 760: 2017 Lab IC 3512:(2017) 163 DRJ 32 from Hon'ble High Court of Delhi wherein it is\n laid down that the contractual employee, daily wage employee, ad-hoc employee, irregular appointees, those appointed on contract,\n temporary employees, casual employees are all who are appointed\n not against sanctioned posts. The floating schemes to regularise\n appointees with no advertisements are issued. It is mandatory on\n the part of employee to invite applications from all the eligible\n candidates from the open market. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India\n in case titledState of Karnataka v. Uma Devihas laid down\n binding law which is judgment from Constitutional Bench. Inthe\n said judgmentthe illegal appointees are not given any relief but\n only irregular appointees are given relief to the effect that those\n who had worked ten years prior to the passing ofthe said decisionhad worked in their post without benefit of Court orders and who\n were eligible persons being appointed against vacancies in\n sanctioned post then Government and Government Organization\n were to float schemes to regularize appointments only for such\n irregular appointees from eligible candidates without means of\n advertisements as only one time measure and no further;LIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 12 of 502. So far as the first issue is concerned, learned senior counsel\n for the respondent no.3 places reliance upon para 3 of the\n advertisements issued with respect to the petitioners and as per\n which advertisements, appointment of the petitioners was to be\n on contractual basis and accordingly it is argued that\n contractual employees cannot seek regularization. One such\n advertisement para 3 reads as under:-"3. All appointments shall be on "contract basis" and will be\n initially for a period of four years‟ including a probationary\n period of one year. The contractual appointment may be\n extended for a further period of four years‟ based on\n performance of the candidate during the initial period of four\n years."3. Learned senior counsel for the respondent no.3 accordingly\n places reliance upon the ratio of the judgment delivered by this\n Court in a bunch of cases with lead case being W.P. (C)\n 10368/2016 titled asKumar Mayank Vs. Delhi Technological\n University & Anr.decided on 10.11.2016 that contractual\n employees cannot be confirmed in their services and their\n services cannot be regularized.It may be noted that inKumar\n Mayank's case (supra), this Court hasplaced reliance uponthe\n ratios of four judgments of the Supreme Court which hold that\n contractual employees cannot be regularized because this will\n amount to perpetrating fraud on those candidates who did not\n apply thinking that the posts are not permanent posts. The\n judgments of the Supreme Court in this regard are as under:-(i) Official Liquidator Vs. Dayanand & Others (2008) 10 SCC 1(ii) National Fertilizers Ltd. and Others Vs. Somvir Singh(2006)\n 5 SCC 493.(iii) Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Others Vs. L.V.\n Subramanyeswara and Another(2007) 5 SCC 326.(iv) State of Orissa and Another Vs. Mamata Mohanty(2011) 3 SCC 436.4. I completely agree with the arguments urged on behalf of theLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 13 of 50respondent no.3 because contractual employees cannot claim\n regularization of their services and confirmation of services in\n view of the ratios of four judgments of the Supreme Courtreferred to aboveand relevant paras laying down the ratio of\n which four judgments, along with the ratio of the Constitution\n Bench of Supreme Court in the case ofSecretary, State of\n Karnataka and Others Vs. Umadevi(3) and Others 2006 (4)\n SCC 1, have been given in paras 2 to 8 of the judgment inKumar Mayank's case (supra) and which paras read as under:-"2. It is now over 10 years since the of passing of the judgment\n by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case ofSecretary, State of Karnataka and Others Vs. Umadevi(3) and\n Others 2006 (4) SCC 1 and which judgment effectively puts to\n an end the „industry‟ created of temporary appointments and\n thereafter regularization of such temporary employees.The\n Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear inUmadevi's case\n (supra) that before appointing of persons on a\n regular/permanent basis there have to exist recruitment\n rules or specific eligibility criteria laid down for the\n appointments, there must be sanctioned posts, there must be\n vacancies in the sanctioned posts, and finally there must be\n issued advertisements for filling the posts; not as temporary or\n contractual posts but as permanent posts; so that there should\n be a level playing field of competition with respect to\n prospective appointees. Candidates can also be called from the\n lists of employment exchanges.Umadevi's case (supra) has laid\n down the following ratio:-"(I) The questions to be asked before regularization are:-(a)(i)Was there a sanctioned post (court cannot order creation of\n posts because finances of the state may go haywire), (ii) is there\n a vacancy, (iii) are the persons qualified persons and (iv) are the\n appointments through regular recruitment process of(b) A court can condone an irregularity in the appointment\n procedure only if the irregularity does not go to the root of the\n matter. (II) For sanctioned posts having vacancies, such postsLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 14 of 50have to be filled by regular recruitment process of prescribed\n procedure otherwise, the constitutional mandate flowing fromArticles 14, 16, 309, 315, 320etc is violated.\n (III) In case of existence of necessary circumstances the\n government has a right to appoint contract employees or\n casual labour or employees for a project, but, such persons form\n a class in themselves and they cannot claim equality(except\n possibly for equal pay for equal work) with regular employees\n who form a separate class. Such temporary employees cannot\n claim legitimate expectation of absorption/regularization as\n they knew when they were appointed that they were temporary\n inasmuch as the government did not give and nor could have\n given an assurance of regularization without the regular\n recruitment process being followed. Such irregularly\n appointed persons cannot claim to be regularized alleging\n violation ofArticle 21.Also the equity in favour of the millions\n who await public employment through the regular recruitment\n process outweighs the equity in favour of the limited number of\n irregularly appointed persons who claim regularization.\n (IV) Once there are vacancies in sanctioned posts such vacancies\n cannot be filled in except without regular recruitment process,\n and thus neither the court nor the executive can frame a\n scheme to absorb or regularize persons appointed to such\n posts without following the regular recruitment process.\n (V) At the instance of persons irregularly appointed the process\n of regular recruitment shall not be stopped. Courts should not\n pass interim orders to continue employment of such irregularly\n appointed persons because the same will result in stoppage of\n recruitment through regular appointment procedure.\n (VI) If there are sanctioned posts with vacancies, and qualified\n persons were appointed without a regular recruitment process,\n then, such persons who when the judgment of Uma Devi is\n passed have worked for over 10 years without court orders,\n such persons be regularized under schemes to be framed by the\n concerned organization.LIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 15 of 50(VII)The aforesaid law which applies to the Union and the\n States will also apply to all instrumentalities of the State\n governed byArticle 12of the Constitution".3. The aforesaid ratio of the Supreme Court can be culled out\n from the following paragraphs of the judgment of the Supreme\n Court inUmadevi's case (supra):-"2. Public employment in a sovereign socialist secular\n democratic republic, has to be as set down by the Constitution\n and the laws made thereunder. Our constitutional scheme\n envisages employment by the Government and its\n instrumentalities on the basis of a procedure established in that\n behalf. Equality of opportunity is the hallmark, and the\n Constitution has provided also for affirmative action to ensure\n that unequals are not treated equals. Thus, any public\n employment has to be in terms of the constitutional scheme.3. A sovereign government, considering the economic situation\n in the country and the work to be got done, is not precluded\n from making temporary appointments or engaging workers on\n daily wages. Going by a law newly enacted,The National Rural\n Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, the object is to give\n employment to at least one member of a family for hundred days\n in an year, on paying wages as fixed under that Act. But, a\n regular process of recruitment or appointment has to be resorted\n to, when regular vacancies in posts, at a particular point of time,\n are to be filled up and the filling up of those vacancies cannot be\n done in a haphazard manner or based on patronage or other\n considerations. Regular appointment must be the rule.4. But, sometimes this process is not adhered to and the\n Constitutional scheme of public employment is by-passed. The\n Union, the States, their departments and instrumentalities have\n resorted to irregular appointments, especially in the lower rungs\n of the service, without reference to the duty to ensure a proper\n appointment procedure through the Public Service Commission\n or otherwise as per the rules adopted and to permit these\n irregular appointees or those appointed on contract or onLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 16 of 50daily wages, to continue year after year, thus, keeping out\n those who are qualified to apply for the post concerned and\n depriving them of an opportunity to compete for the post. It has\n also led to persons who get employed, without the following of a\n regular procedure or even through the backdoor or on daily\n wages, approaching Courts, seeking directions to make them\n permanent in their posts and to prevent regular recruitment to\n the concerned posts. Courts have not always kept the legal\n aspects in mind and have occasionally even stayed the regular\n process of employment being set in motion and in some cases,\n even directed that these illegal, irregular or improper entrants be\n absorbed into service. A class of employment which can only be\n called 'litigious employment', has risen like a phoenix seriously\n impairing the constitutional scheme. Such orders are passed\n apparently in exercise of the wide powers underArticle 226of\n the Constitution of India. Whether the wide powers underArticle\n 226of the Constitution is intended to be used for a purpose\n certain to defeat the concept of social justice and equal\n opportunity for all, subject to affirmative action in the matter of\n public employment as recognized by our Constitution, has to be\n seriously pondered over. It is time, that Courts desist from\n issuing orders preventing regular selection or recruitment at\n the instance of such persons and from issuing directions for\n continuance of those who have not secured regular appointments\n as per procedure established. The passing of orders for\n continuance, tends to defeat the very Constitutional scheme of\n public employment. It has to be emphasized that this is not the\n role envisaged for High Courts in the scheme of things and their\n wide powers underArticle 226of the Constitution of India are\n not intended to be used for the purpose of perpetuating\n illegalities, irregularities or improprieties or for scuttling the\n whole scheme of public employment. Its role as the sentinel and\n as the guardian of equal rights protection should not be\n forgotten.5. This Court has also on occasions issued directions which\n could not be said to be consistent with the Constitutional scheme\n of public employment. Such directions are issued presumably onLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 17 of 50the basis of equitable considerations or individualization of\n justice. The question arises, equity to whom? Equity for the\n handful of people who have approached the Court with a claim,\n or equity for the teeming millions of this country seeking\n employment and seeking a fair opportunity for competing for\n employment? When one side of the coin is considered, the other\n side of the coin, has also to be considered and the way open to\n any court of law or justice, is to adhere to the law aslaid down\n bythe Constitution and not to make directions, which at times,\n even if do not run counter to the Constitutional scheme, certainly\n tend to water down the Constitutional requirements. It is this\n conflict that is reflected in these cases referred to the\n Constitution Bench.6. The power of a State as an employer is more limited than\n that of a private employer inasmuch as it is subjected to\n constitutional limitations and cannot be exercised arbitrarily\n (See Basu's Shorter Constitution of India).Article 309of the\n Constitution gives the Government the power to frame rules for\n the purpose of laying down the conditions of service and\n recruitment of persons to be appointed to public services and\n posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or any of the\n States. That Article contemplates the drawing up of a procedure\n and rules to regulate the recruitment and regulate the service\n conditions of appointees appointed to public posts. It is well\n acknowledged that because of this, the entire process of\n recruitment for services is controlled by detailed procedure\n which specify the necessary qualifications, the mode of\n appointment etc. If rules have been made underArticle 309of\n the Constitution, then the Government can make appointments\n only in accordance with the rules. The State is meant to be a\n model employer.The Employment Exchanges (Compulsory\n Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959was enacted to ensure\n equal opportunity for employment seekers. Though this Act\n may not oblige an employer to employ only those persons who\n have been sponsored by employment exchanges, it places an\n obligation on the employer to notify the vacancies that may arise\n in the various departments and for filling up of those vacancies,LIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 18 of 50based on a procedure. Normally, statutory rules are framed under\n the authority of law governing employment. It is recognized\n that no government order, notification or circular can be\n substituted for the statutory rules framed under the\n authority of law. This is because, following any other course\n could be disastrous inasmuch as it will deprive the security of\n tenure and the right of equality conferred on civil servants under\n the Constitutional scheme. It may even amount to negating the\n accepted service jurisprudence. Therefore, when statutory rules\n are framed underArticle 309of the Constitution which are\n exhaustive, the only fair means to adopt is to make appointments\n based on the rules so framed.xxxxx xxxxx11. In addition to the equality clause represented byArticle 14of\n the Constitution,Article 16has specifically provided for equality\n of opportunity in matters of public employment. Buttressing\n these fundamental rights, Article309 provides that subject to the\n provisions of the Constitution, Acts of the legislature may\n regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons\n appointed to public services and posts in connection with the\n affairs of the Union or of a State. In view of the interpretation\n placed onArticle 12of the Constitution by this Court,\n obviously, these principles also govern the instrumentalities\n that come within the purview ofArticle 12of the\n Constitution. With a view to make the procedure for selection\n fair, the Constitution byArticle 315has also created a Public\n Service Commission for the Union and Public Service\n Commissions for the States. Article 320deals with the functions\n of Public Service Commissions and mandates consultation with\n the Commission on all matters relating to methods of\n recruitment to civil services and for civil posts and other related\n matters. As a part of the affirmative action recognized byArticle\n 16of the Constitution,Article 335provides for special\n consideration in the matter of claims of the members of the\n scheduled castes and scheduled tribes for employment. The\n States have made Acts, Rules or Regulations for implementingLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 19 of 50the above constitutional guarantees and any recruitment to the\n service in the State or in the Union is governed by such Acts,\n Rules and Regulations. The Constitution does not envisage any\n employment outside this constitutional scheme and without\n following the requirements set down therein.12. In spite of this scheme, there may be occasions when the\n sovereign State or its instrumentalities will have to employ\n persons, in posts which are temporary, on daily wages, as\n additional hands or taking them in without following the\n required procedure, to discharge the duties in respect of the posts\n that are sanctioned and that are required to be filled in terms of\n the relevant procedure established by the Constitution or for\n work in temporary posts or projects that are not needed\n permanently. This right of the Union or of the State\n Government cannot but be recognized and there is nothing in\n the Constitution which prohibits such engaging of persons\n temporarily or on daily wages, to meet the needs of the\n situation. But the fact that such engagements are resorted to,\n cannot be used to defeat the very scheme of public\n employment. Nor can a court say that the Union or the State\n Governments do not have the right to engage persons in various\n capacities for a duration or until the work in a particular project\n is completed. Once this right of the Government is recognized\n and the mandate of the constitutional requirement for public\n employment is respected, there cannot be much difficulty in\n coming to the conclusion that it is ordinarily not proper for\n courts whether acting underArticle 226of the Constitution or\n underArticle 32of the Constitution, to direct absorption in\n permanent employment of those who have been engaged\n without following a due process of selection as envisaged by the\n constitutional scheme.Xxxxx53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where\n irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as\n explained inS.V. Narayanappa(supra), R.N.Nanjundappa\n (supra),and B.N.Nagarajan ( supra), and referred to in paragraphLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 20 of 5015 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant\n posts might have been made and the employees have continued\n to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of\n orders of courts or of tribunals. The question of regularization of\n the services of such employees may have to be considered on\n merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the\n cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that\n context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their\n instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a onetime\n measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have\n worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not\n under cover of orders of courts or of tribunals and should\n further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill\n those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in\n cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now\n employed. The process must be set in motion within six months\n from this date. We also clarify that regularization, if any already\n made, but not subjudice, need not be reopened based on this\n judgment, but there should be no further by-passing of the\n constitutional requirement and regularizing or making\n permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional\n scheme."4. It is now no longer res integra that in terms of the Constitution\n Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case ofSecretary,\n State of Karnataka and Others Vs. Umadevi(3) and Others 2006\n (4) SCC 1 before a person can seek regularization, four\n aspects must exist viz first of there existing sanctioned posts,\n second of there existing vacancies in sanctioned posts for which\n there exists authority/entitlement to fill up, thirdly that the\n persons who are appointed in vacancies against sanctioned posts\n are duly qualified persons, and fourthly appointment is made\n of persons who have been called through advertisements widely\n circulated so that there is open competition among the eligible\n persons.9. Supreme Court recently in the judgment in the case ofKendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Others Vs. L.V.LIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 21 of 50Subramanyeswara and Another(2007) 5 SCC 326 has held that\n if all the eligible candidates are not called by means of the\n advertisement, then, the process of recruitment will violate the\n ratio in the case ofUmadevi(supra) as alsoArticles 14and16of the Constitution of India.These observations have been made\n by the Supreme Court in para 10 of the judgment in the case ofKendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan(supra) and this para 10 reads as\n under:- "10. Had such regular vacancies been created, appellants\n would have been directed to be appointed on All India Basis.\n Respondents did not get their names registered in the Central\n Employment Exchange. Keeping in view the nature of the job\n and in particular that the posts are transferable throughout the\n country, an opportunity within the meaning ofArticles 14and16of the Constitution of India would mean an opportunity to all\n who are eligible therefore. Advertisement was issued for a\n limited purpose, namely, for leave vacancies, local employment\n exchanges were contacted only for filling of such posts and not\n regular posts." (underlining added)10. Another recent judgment of the Supreme Court and which in\n a way lays down the same ratio is the judgment in the case of\n State of Orissa and Another Vs. Mamata Mohanty (2011) 3 SCC436.In this judgment the Supreme Court has held that\n candidates who are not duly qualified if are appointed, the same\n would cause grave and irreparable injury to other\n unqualified candidates who would have otherwise applied, and\n therefore in such a case when unqualified persons seek\n regularization, that would be violative of the ratio in the case ofUmadevi(supra) as alsoArticles 14and16of the Constitution\n of India.The relevant observations of the Supreme Court in the\n case ofMamta Mohanty(supra) are made in para 36 of the\n judgment, and para 35 also is relevant because the same makes\n the legal position very clear that the object of issuing\n advertisement is to ensure open competition by calling of all the\n eligible candidates. These paras 35 and 36 read as under:-"35. At one time this Court had been of the view that calling the\n names from Employment Exchange would curb to certain extentLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 22 of 50the menace of nepotism and corruption in public employment.\n But, later on, came to the conclusion that some appropriate\n method consistent with the requirements ofArticle 16should be\n followed. In other words there must be a notice published in the\n appropriate manner calling for applications and all those who\n apply in response thereto should be considered fairly. Even if the\n names of candidates are requisitioned from Employment\n Exchange, in addition thereto it is mandatory on the part of\n the employer to invite applications from all eligible\n candidates from the open market by advertising the vacancies\n in newspapers having wide circulation or by announcement in\n Radio and Television as merely calling the names from the\n Employment Exchange does not meet the requirement of the\n said Article of the Constitution. (Vide Delhi Development\n Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Admn., : AIR 1992 SC\n 789, State of Haryana v. Piara Singh : AIR 1992 SC 2130,\n Excise Supdt. v. K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao : (1996) 6 SCC 216,\n Arun Tewari v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh:AIR 1998 SC\n 331, Binod Kumar Gupta v. Ram Ashray Mahoto:AIR 2005 SC\n 2103, National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Somvir Singh:AIR 2006 SC\n 2319, Telecom District Manager v. Keshab Deb: (2008) 8 SCC\n 402, State of Bihar v. Upendra Narayan Singh: (2009) 5 SCC 65\n and State of M.P. v. Mohd. Abrahim: (2009) 15 SCC 214.)36. Therefore, it is a settled legal proposition that no person\n can be appointed even on a temporary or ad hoc basis\n without inviting applications from all eligible candidates. If\n any appointment is made by merely inviting names from the\n Employment Exchange or putting a note on the Notice\n Board etc. that will not meet the requirement ofArticles 14and16of the Constitution. Such a course violates the mandates\n ofArticles 14and16of the Constitution of India as it deprives\n the candidates who are eligible for the post, from being\n considered. A person employed in violation of these provisions\n is not entitled to any relief including salary. For a valid and legal\n appointment mandatory compliance of the said Constitutional\n requirement is to be fulfilled. The equality clause enshrined inArticle 16requires that every such appointment be made by anLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 23 of 50open advertisement as to enable all eligible persons to compete\n on merit." (underlining added)11.InUmadevi's case (supra) the only exception which was\n carved out with respect to regularization of persons was those\n persons whose appointments were irregular as distinguished\n from illegal.Such irregular appointees who had worked for 10\n years prior to passing of the decision inUmadevi's case\n (supra), if they had worked in their posts without benefit of\n court orders, such eligible persons who had been appointed\n against vacancies in sanctioned posts, the government and\n governmental organizations were to float schemes to regularize\n appointments of such irregularly appointed persons on account\n of the fact that appointments made were only irregular i.e the\n recruitment process was of filling posts from eligible candidates\n without means of advertisements in newspapers and/or\n through the employment exchange.Para 53 of the judgment in\n the case ofUmadevi(supra) reads as under:-"53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where\n irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained inState of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa:AIR 1967 SC 1071, R.N.\n Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah: (1972) 1 SCC 409, and B.N.\n Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka: (1979) 4 SCC 507, and\n referred to in paragraph 15 above, of duly qualified persons in\n duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the\n employees have continued to work for ten years or more but\n without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunals. The\n question of regularization of the services of such employees may\n have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles\n settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the\n light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the\n State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps\n to regularize as a one time measure, the services of such\n irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in\n duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of courts or\n of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments\n are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that requireLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 24 of 50to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily\n wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in\n motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that\n regularization, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not\n be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no\n further by-passing of the constitutional requirement and\n regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as\n per the constitutional scheme." (emphasis added)12. A reference to para 53 above in the case ofUmadevi(supra)\n shows that irregular appointments were to be regularized only as\n a one-time measure.One time measure by its plain and simple\n language means that only for once at the time of passing of the\n judgment inUmadevi's case (supra) there can be regularization\n of irregularly appointed employees ie after the decision inUmadevi's case (supra), there cannot be regularization of\n appointees who are irregularly appointed i.e the appointments\n may not be illegal and only are irregular in the sense that\n appointment is not through the means of calling of eligible\n candidates vide circulations in newspapers for ensuring\n competition amongst the eligible candidates but even such\n persons cannot be regularized after the decision in Umadevi's\n case (supra) as even irregular appointments are in violation of\n recruitment rules and there cannot be violation of recruitment\n rules postUmadevi's case (supra).Therefore, in my opinion, the\n ratio of para 53 above ofUmadevi's case (supra) makes it clear\n that the issue of regularization of irregularly appointed\n employees postUmadevi's case (supra) is time and again not\n permissible because that is exactly what the ratio of Umadevi's\n case (supra) prohibits i.e regularization of persons appointed in\n violation of recruitment rules which will require calling of\n candidates by proper advertisements through newspapers.13. I may note that a Division Bench of two judges of the\n Supreme Court in the case ofU.P. State Electricity Board Vs.\n Pooran Chandra Pandey and Others(2007) 11 SCC 92 sought to\n water-down the ratio of the Constitution Bench judgment of the\n Supreme Court in the case ofUmadevi(supra), and thisLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 25 of 50judgment of a Division Bench of the two Judges of Supreme\n Court was specifically overruled by a Division Bench of three\n Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of Official Liquidator\n Vs. Dayanand and Others (2008) 10 SCC 1.In Dayanand's case\n (supra) the Supreme Court has made very strong observations\n that a Division Bench of two or three judges of the Supreme\n Court cannot be allowed to water-down the categorical ratio\n of the Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in\n the case ofUmadevi(supra) and made observations with\n respect to judicial discipline with respect to Benches of similar\n number of Judges being bound by the judgments passed by a\n Bench consisting of similar or larger number of judges.These\n observations are contained in paras 75 to 77 and 90 to 92 in\n Dayanand's case (supra) and these paras read as under:-"75. By virtue ofArticle 141of the Constitution, the judgment\n of the Constitution Bench inState of Karnataka v. Umadevi(3) (supra) is binding on all the courts including this Court\n till the same is overruled by a larger Bench.The ratio of the\n Constitution Bench judgment has been followed by different\n two-Judges Benches for declining to entertain the claim of\n regularization of service made by ad hoc/temporary/ daily\n wage/casual employees or for reversing the orders of the High\n Court granting relief to such employees - Indian Drugs and\n Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen : (2007) 1 SCC 408,\n Gangadhar Pillai v. Siemens Ltd.: (2007) 1 SCC 533, Kendriya\n Vidyalaya Sangathan v. L.V. Subramanyeswara: (2007) 5 SCC\n 326, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Dan Bahadur Singh: (2007)\n 6 SCC 207.However, inU.P. SEB v. Pooran Chandra Pandey:(2007) 11 SCC 92 on which reliance has been placed by Shri\n Gupta, a two-Judges Bench has attempted to dilute the\n Constitution Bench judgment by suggesting thatthe said\n decisioncannot be applied to a case where regularization has\n been sought for in pursuance ofArticle 14of the Constitution\n and that the same is in conflict with the judgment of the seven-Judges Bench inManeka Gandhi v. Union of India: (1978) 1\n SCC 248.LIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 26 of 5015. It is therefore clear that the ratio of the judgment in the case\n ofUmadevi(supra) really prevents regularization of persons\n who have been appointed pursuant to such an advertisement and\n which advertisement itself required employment only for a\n limited period, and therefore such persons who have been\n appointed for a limited period in terms of the advertisement\n requiring their appointments for limited periods, cannot seek\n regularization."(emphasis is mine)\n xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\n Once Supreme Court has allowed a scheme of regularization to\n be framed only once as per the ratio of para 53 of Umadevi's\n case (supra) restricted to those employees who had worked for\n ten years prior to the passing of the judgment inUmadevi's case\n (supra), then the law is that there cannot be schemes for\n regularization of contractually appointed persons (being\n irregular appointees) who are appointed for contractual periods\n after passing of the judgment inUmadevi's case (supra).8. The second prayer of the petitioners is that petitioners should\n not be replaced by other set of contractual employees, and to\n which legal position there is no dispute in view of the judgment\n of the Supreme Court in the case ofState of Haryana and\n Others Vs. Piara Singh and Others(1992) 4 SCC 118, and\n accordingly this relief prayed by the petitioners is granted that\n petitioners cannot be replaced by similarly situated\n employees except of course that in case there are legally valid\n reasons for not continuing the petitioners in their contractual\n services such as misconduct or other valid reasons as per law,\n then the respondent no.3 need not continue contractual services,\n however, reasons for not continuing the contractual\n employees will be made known to the petitioners by speaking\n orders and in case petitioners are not satisfied with the speaking\n orders then the petitioners can always challenge such orders in\n accordance with law.9. In view of the above, the writ petitions are dismissed to the\n extent of petitioners seek regularization of their services,LIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 27 of 50however, petitioners are granted the relief that they will not be\n replaced/dispensed with by similarly situated contractual\n employees, however, reserving liberty in the respondent\n no.3/employer to not continue the contractual services for valid\n legal reasons.8.5 In citation titledThe State of Bihar v. Devendra\n Sharmain Civil Appeal No. 7879 of 2019 (2020) 15 SCC 466\n dated 17.10.2019 from the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India it was\n held that an ad-hoc appointment is only a contingent appointment.\n Permanent vacancies should only be followed by regular\n recruitment process. Doctrine of legitimate expectation for illegal\n appointees and non regular appointees does not come into play as\n temporary employment, contractual or casual employees selection\n is not based on by proper recognised rules or procedure. He is\n aware of consequences of her appointment being temporary, casual\n or contractual in nature. The beneficiary of legitimate expectation\n must show depriving her from some advantage she had been\n permitted or some assurance has been received from the\n administrative authorities which would not be withdrawn without\n affording him opportunity of being heard. In the present case there\n was no such assurance is proved by the workwoman on record.\n There is Competent Authority for regular appointment andLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 28 of 50therefore the workwoman herein must show that they were\n appointed by the Competent Authority against sanctioned post.\n Illegal appointment without any method of recruitment and back\n door entries is an act of nepotism and favoritism which are\n therefore not irregular appointments but are illegal appointments.\n The relevant citation is reproduced hereasunder:17) When the present set of appeals came up for hearing before\n this Court on April 3, 2018, this Court found the following four\n categories of cases:"(i) Appointments made on the basis of forged appointment\n letter. They are at S.Nos. 2 to 48.(ii) Appointments made on the basis of forged nursing\n registration certificate. They are at S. Nos. 49-50-51.(iii) Appointments made by a person who was not competent to\n make the appointment. They are at S.Nos. 52 to 92.(iv) There is a residual category at S.NO. 1 i.e. appointment\n made by Dr. A.A. Mallick, Dy. Director, T.B. and S. Nos. 93 &\n 94 who are now claiming appointment. Their cases will be dealt\n with separately."18) The first category of cases was decided by three Judge\n Bench in Kirti Narayan Prasad on November 30, 2018 wherein,\n it was held as under:"17. In the instant cases the writ petitioners have filed the\n petitions before the High Court with a specific prayer to\n regularize their service and to set aside the order of termination\n of their services. They have also challenged the report submitted\n by the State Committee. The real controversy is whether the writ\n petitioners were legally and validly appointed. The finding of theLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 29 of 50State Committee is that many writ petitioners had secured\n appointment by producing fake or forged appointment letter or\n had been inducted in Government service surreptitiously by\n concerned Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer by issuing\n a posting order. The writ petitioners are the beneficiaries of\n illegal orders made by the Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical\n Officer. They were given notice to establish the genuineness of\n their appointment and to show cause. None of them could\n establish the genuineness or legality of their appointment before\n the State Committee. The State Committee on appreciation of\n the materials on record has opined that their appointment was\n illegal and void ab initio. We do not find any ground to disagree\n with the finding of the State Committee.In the circumstances,\n the question of regularisation of their services by invoking\n para 53 of the judgment inUmadevi(supra) does not arise.\n Since the appointment of the petitioners is ab initio void, they\n cannot be said to be the civil servants of the State. Therefore,\n holding disciplinary proceedings envisaged byArticle 311of the\n Constitution or under any other disciplinary rules shall not\n arise."19) The cases in the second category i.e. appointment on the\n basis of forged nursing registration stands on the same footing as\n category one though it is argued by the appellants in three\n appeals that nursing registration certificate is not forged but the\n matriculation certificate on the basis of which the candidates\n have undergone Auxiliary Nurse Mid-Wife 10 course was found\n to be forged. The State Committee has found that ANM\n certificate is a forged certificate. Even if, the certificate of ANM\n is not forged as argued before this Court but the Matriculation\n Certificate is said to be forged, the fact is that the educational\n qualification, a pre-condition for undergoing nursing course, was\n found to be forged. Therefore, the forgery is in the basic\n eligibility condition to undertake ANM course, which will vitiate\n the process of appointment. For the reasons recorded in Kirti\n Narayan Prasad, Civil Appeal Nos. 7906 of 2019, 7919 of 2019\n and 7920 of 2019 are dismissed.LIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 30 of 5020) Coming to third category of cases, Mr. Mukherjee, learned\n counsel for the State referred to the separate Government\n Circulars dated December 3, 1980 in respect of Class III and\n Class IV category posts. It is contended that appointments on\n such circulars have been found to be illegal by this Court in\n Ashwani Kumar, which view was in fact, approved later by\n Constitution Bench judgment in Uma Devi, wherein this Court\n held as under:"33. It is not necessary to notice all the decisions of this Court\n on this aspect. By and large what emerges is that regular\n recruitment should be insisted upon, only in a contingency can\n an ad hoc appointment be 10 for short, 'ANM' made in a\n permanent vacancy, but the same should soon be followed by a\n regular recruitment and that appointments to non- available\n posts should not be taken note of for regularisation. The\n cases directing regularisation have mainly proceeded on the\n basis that having permitted the employee to work for some\n period, he should be absorbed, without really laying down any\n law to that effect, after discussing the constitutional scheme for\n public employment.xx xx xx53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where\n irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in\n S.V. Narayanappa [(1967) 1 SCR 128 : AIR 1967 SC 1071] ,\n R.N. Nanjundappa [(1972) 1 SCC 409 : (1972) 2 SCR 799] and\n B.N.\n Nagarajan [(1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 4 : (1979) 3\n SCR 937] and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified\n persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made\n and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more\n but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of\n tribunals. The question of regularisation of the services of such\n employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of\n the principles settled by this Court in the cases above-referred to\n and in the light of this judgment................" (EmphasisLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 31 of 50Supplied)21) In Uma Devi, the argument that the employees have\n legitimate expectations was negated when this Court held as\n under:"46. .............. The doctrine can be invoked if the decisions\n of the administrative authority affect the person by depriving\n him of some benefit or advantage which either ( i) he had in\n the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and\n which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to\n do until there have been communicated to him some rational\n grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an\n opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from\n the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without\n giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for\n contending that they should not be withdrawn... There is no case\n that any assurance was given by the Government or the\n department concerned while making the appointment on daily\n wages that the status conferred on him will not be withdrawn\n until some rational reason comes into existence for withdrawing\n it. The very engagement was against the constitutional scheme.\n Though, the Commissioner of the Commercial Taxes\n Department sought to get the appointments made permanent,\n there is no case that at the time of appointment any promise was\n held out. No such promise could also have been held out in view\n of the circulars and directives issued by the Government after\n Dharwad decision [(1990) 2 SCC 396 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 274 :\n (1990) 12 ATC 902 : (1990) 1 SCR 544] . Though, there is a\n case that the State had made regularisations in the past of\n similarly situated employees, the fact remains that such\n regularisations were done only pursuant to judicial directions,\n either of the Administrative Tribunal or of the High Court and in\n some cases by this Court....47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets\n engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the\n engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognised\n by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of theLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 32 of 50consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or\n contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of\n legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an\n appointment to the post could be made only by following a\n proper procedure for selection and in cases concerned, in\n consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the\n theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully\n advanced by temporary, contractual or casual\n employees...."22) The State Committee has examined all the appointments and\n segregated appointments based on forged documents and also\n irregular appointments. Once the detailed report has been\n submitted examining the merit of each candidate, and when the\n judgment of this Court in Ashwani Kumar and Uma Devi\n conclusively answer the questions against the employees, no\n further discussion on the arguments raised would survive.\n However, since the arguments have been addressed in respect of\n the third category of cases i.e. appointments made by a\n person who was not competent to make the appointments,\n we shall consider as to what will be the effect of such\n appointments.31) Though, certain appointments have been made by Civil\n Surgeon which Mr. Mukherjee does not dispute as he was the\n competent authority but it is argued that none of the\n requirements to fill up the public post was adhered to.\n Appointments were made to the public posts without following\n any procedure and without there being any sanctioned post.37) Such judgment of the Full Bench was approved by three\n Judge Bench of this Court in a Judgment reportedR.\n Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala & Ors.12. This Court held\n as under: 11 AIR 1988 Patna 26 12 (2004) 2 SCC 105 "17.The\n point was again examined by a Full Bench of the Patna High\n Court inRita Mishra v. Director, Primary Education, Bihar[AIR\n 1988 Pat 26 : 1988 Lab IC 907 : 1987 BBCJ 701 (FB)] . The\n question posed before the Full Bench was whether a public\n servant was entitled to payment of salary to him for the workLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 33 of 50done despite the fact that his letter of appointment was forged,\n fraudulent or illegal. The Full Bench held: (AIR p. 32, para 13)\n "13. It is manifest from the above that the rights to salary,\n pension and other service benefits are entirely statutory in\n nature in public service. Therefore, these rights, including the\n right to salary, spring from a valid and legal appointment to\n the post. Once it is found that the very appointment is illegal\n and is non est in the eye of the law, no statutory entitlement\n for salary or consequential rights of pension and other monetary\n benefits can arise. In particular, if the very appointment is rested\n on forgery, no statutory right can flow from it."41) This Court inUnion of India & Anr. v. Raghuwar Pal\n Singh15was examining a case, where the appointment letter\n came to be issued without approval of the competent authority,\n then whether such appointment letter issued to the respondent,\n would be a case of nullity or a mere irregularity? If it is a case of\n nullity, affording opportunity to the incumbent 13 (2007) 8 SCC\n 249 14 (2009) 5 SCC 65 15 (2018) 15 SCC 463 would be a\n mere formality and non-grant of opportunity may not vitiate the\n final decision of termination of his services. This Court held that\n in absence of prior approval of the competent authority, the\n Director Incharge could not have hastened issuance of the\n appointment letter. The act of commission and omission of the\n Director Incharge would, therefore, suffer from the vice of lack\n of authority and nullity in law.42) InNidhi Kaim & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.16,\n a three Judge Bench was dealing with admission of students to\n MBBS Course on the basis of illegal and unfair admission\n process. The Court held as under:"92. ...Having given our thoughtful consideration to the above\n submission, we are of the considered view that conferring rights\n or benefits on the appellants, who had consciously\n participated in a well thought out, and meticulously\n orchestrated plan, to circumvent well laid down norms, for\n gaining admission to the MBBS course, would amount toLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 34 of 50espousing the cause of "the unfair". It would seem like\n allowing a thief to retain the stolen property. It would seem as\n if the Court was not supportive of the cause of those who had\n adopted and followed rightful means. Such a course would cause\n people to question the credibility of the justice-delivery system\n itself. The exercise of jurisdiction in the manner suggested on\n behalf of the appellants would surely depict the Court's\n support in favour of the sacrilegious. It would also\n compromise the integrity of the academic community. We are of\n the view that in the name of doing complete justice it is not 16\n (2017) 4 SCC 1 possible for this Court to support the vitiated\n actions of the appellants through which they gained admission to\n the MBBS course.xx xx xx44) In view of the aforesaid judgments, it cannot be said that the\n appointment of the employees in the present set of appeals 17\n (2017) 8 SCC 670 were irregular appointments. Such\n appointments are illegal appointment in terms of the ratio of\n Supreme Court judgment in Uma Devi. As such appointments\n were made without any sanctioned post, without any\n advertisement giving opportunity to all eligible candidates to\n apply and seek public employment and without any method of\n recruitment. Such appointments were backdoor entries, an act\n of nepotism and favoritism and thus from any judicial\n standards cannot be said to be irregular appointments but are\n illegal appointments in wholly arbitrary process.8.6 In view of above discussion, it is found that the\n employment of workwoman herein was in the nature of daily\n wager. It was not by method of regular recruitment process. Hence\n their status as a daily wager which is continuous in nature has to be\n protected. It is already discussed above in citation titledAnilLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 35 of 50Lamba & Ors. v. Govt. of NCT(supra) at para no. 8 that when\n petitioners are contractual employees then they can not be placed\n by similarly situated employees except of course that in case there\n are legally valid reasons. The reasons must be communicated to\n the workwoman by speaking orders which they always have right\n to challenge in accordance with law. In such view of the matter in\n the present case the workwoman herein were in employment of the\n management for more than 10 years. The protection is not\n available to them as a regular employee. However they are entitled\n to protection as a daily wager/contractual employees. The issuance\n of appointment letter to the workwoman must be proved by the\n workwoman on record by showing that their regular appointment\n was made on the basis of settled rules and principles by Competent\n Authority against sanctioned post. This is not proved by the\n workwoman on record. Public advertisement must have been\n shown to have been issued which is not proved in this case. The\n burden of proof is on the workwoman to show that she was a\n regular appointee which she failed to show. However she has\n sufficiently proved on record that she is a daily wager/contractual\n employee rendered more than 10 year long period of service for\n which she is entitled to protection u/Sec. 25F of Industrial Disputes\n Act, 1947. It is not the defence of the management that they do notLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 36 of 50need workwoman against the existing work and did not employ\n further workwoman in future after such termination of the\n workwoman herein. Hence the workwoman is found contractual\n employee/daily wager which needs to be protected herein.\n Therefore it is held that the termination of the workwoman as a\n daily wager/contractual employee by the management is illegal\n and arbitrary without following due process for which workwoman\n is held entitled for immediate reinstatement.8.7 The management has submitted that it has conducted\n vigilance inquiry. However no report of vigilance inquiry was\n placed on record. Even if any vigilance inquiry was conducted or it\n was concluded then also it cannot be imputed against the\n workwoman for the sole reason that no opportunity of being heard\n had been granted to the workwoman. In absence of any such\n opportunity the workwoman could not have replied or defend the\n allegations against him. No notice was given to the workwoman\n nor any chargesheet was issued which could culminate as a final\n report against the workwoman. The necessary law and supporting\n citation is reproduced hereasunder:Sachiv Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Sanawad v. Mahendra\n KumarS/o Mangilal Tanwarao, 2004 LLR 405 = 2003\n SCC OnLine MP 720 : (2004) 101 FLR 176 (MP) : (2004)LIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 37 of 504 LLJ (Supp) (NOC 307) 953 : 2004 LLR 405 that if the\n termination of an employee is based on no inquiry, no charge\n and not by way of punishment, then it becomes a case of\n illegal retrenchment. In such case, the workman will be\n entitled to reinstatement with full back wages.4. Parties led evidence. It was, however, concluded on facts\n and evidence that respondent has worked continuously for\n more than 240 days in one calendar year, that no charge-sheet or any inquiry was held prior to his termination, that\n no retrenchment compensation was paid prior to impugned\n termination, and that it was a case of dismissal without any\n basis or charge.5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner was unable to point out\n to me any mistake of law or fact in the impugned award, in so\n far as the aforementioned findings of facts were concerned.\n These findings are the only findings which need to be\n rendered on facts and evidence. Indeed, in order to attract the\n protection of labour laws, these are the only issues which\n need to be examined on facts on both sides. As observed\n supra, if the termination of an employee is based on no\n inquiry, no charge and not by way of punishment, then it\n becomes a case of illegal retrenchment. If an employee has\n worked for more then 240 days in one calendar year then\n he is entitled to have the protection of Labour Laws\n provided the employer is an Industry subjected to Labour\n Laws.6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that no order\n for payment of back wages could be given. I do not agree to\n this submission, as it has no merit. Firstly, once the\n termination is held to be bad in law then directions to pay\n back wages is a natural consequence and has to follow. It is\n only when the employer (as in this case petitioner) is able to\n show and prove that terminated employee was working for\n gains even after termination, the order for payment of backLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 38 of 50wages will not be passed.7.7. The burden to prove that employee was working for\n gains after termination lies on the employer. In the\n absence of any evidence not tendered, the direction to pay\n back wages has to follow. It is, however, necessary for the\n employee to state on oath that he remained unemployed\n after the termination of his service. In this case, the\n petitioner failed to lead any evidence on this issue against the\n respondent and on the other hand, the respondent did say that\n he remained unemployed. In view of this, the direction to pay\n back wages cannot be said to be illegal or unreasonable once\n it was held that termination is bad in law.In view of above it is held that the management has\n illegally and unjustifiably terminated the workwoman without\n following the principle of natural justice.9. Hence termination of workwoman on the basis of\n termination/disengagement order dated 09.05.2012 is therefore held\n illegal. It was held in case titledM.G. Umamahesh And Ors. v.\n The State of Karnataka, dated 12th August, 2003 Equivalent\n citations: ILR 2003 KAR 3672 from Hon'ble High Court of\n Karnataka wherein it was held at para no. 12 and 13 that once the\n service are regularised then order of cancellation or withdrawal of\n employees had acquired a vested right. Opportunity of hearing\n should be granted to them to put forth their case. Non grant of suchLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 39 of 50opportunity leads to remanding matter back to redo the same. A\n fresh affording of opportunity of hearing. The relevant paras are\n reproduced hereasunder:12. Sri V. Lakshminarayan, learned Counsel for the\n petitioners, nextly contends that the second respondent\n without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners\n could not have passed the impugned order and, therefore, the\n same is in violation of principles of natural justice.In the present case, by an order made on 5.11.1999, the\n services of the petitioners came to be regularised as Assistant\n Plantation Superintendents. By this, they have acquired a\n vested right and a new status. Any person can ill-afford to\n lose that status and also the monetary benefits attached to\n that status. If the authority intends to de-recognise the\n status once conferred, that a person against whom an\n order to his prejudice may be passed should be informed\n the tentative opinion of the authority for\n cancellation/withdrawal of the earlier order and give him\n an opportunity to offer his explanation, if any, and then\n only pass an order. This exercise is done by the\n respondent authority. This would satisfy the requirements\n of principles of natural justice. Therefore, the impugned\n order cannot be straight away condemned as one made\n without following the principles of natural justice. However,\n Sri Lakshminarayan, learned Counsel for the petitioners\n would contend that the principle 'no one shall be condemned\n un-heard' applies event to administrative orders. In the facts\n and circumstances of the present case, according to learned\n Counsel, apart from issuing a show cause notice, the\n authority passing order should have also granted a personal\n hearing to the persons who would be effected by the tentative\n opinion of the authority, since the tentative opinion expressed\n in the show cause notice, if it is confirmed would adversely\n affects the status and/or privileges of the petitioners.\n Therefore, submits that the respondent authority withoutLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 40 of 50affording an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioners\n could not have passed the impugned order.13. Sri M. Kumar, learned Counsel for the respondent\n authority, after obtaining appropriate instructions from the\n respondent authorities would firstly submits that the\n respondents before passing the impugned order had afforded\n an opportunity of "hearing" to the petitioners by issuing them\n a show cause notice and further directing them to offer their\n explanation, if any and this procedure would satisfy the\n requirement of principles of natural justice, and inspire of it,\n if the petitioners are of the view, that they should be heard in\n the matter, the respondent authority would give them an\n opportunity of oral hearing and pass a fresh order. The\n Submission of the learned Counsel is very fair and just. That\n only shows that the respondents do not have any animus\n against the petitioners nor they intend to deprive them their\n lawful rights, if they so deserve. The stand of the respondents\n really requires to be appreciated by this Court, for the sole\n reason, that they do not intend to stand on technical\n formalities.In view of the submission of the learned Counsel, it may not\n be necessary for this Court to express its view on the issue,\n whether the show cause notice issued by the respondents\n directing the petitioners to show cause against their tentative\n opinion would satisfy the requirements of principles of\n natural justice and whether was it absolutely necessary for the\n respondents to have afforded the petitioners an opportunity of\n hearing before framing the impugned order.Before I conclude, let me refer to the case law on which\n reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the\n petitioners. The learned counsel firstly relies upon the\n observations made by the apex court inNarasingha Patra and\n another's case. Inthe said decision, the pay scales of the\n Matriculates, who had undertaken ITI training, had been\n fixed at Rs. 300-410. That came to be modified by a\n subsequent order, after notice to the appellants therein, but anLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 41 of 50opportunity of hearing had not been granted. The appellants\n therein had approached the Central Administrative Tribunal.\n The Tribunal was of the view that since show cause notice\n was issued to the appellants, there was total compliance of\n the principles of natural justice. Therefore, had rejected the\n application filed by the appellants. Aggrieved by that order,\n the appellants therein had approached the Supreme Court.\n Before the Supreme Court, a specific contention was\n taken that the appellants were not heard in the matter\n and without hearing them, an order withdrawing the\n earlier benefits granted to them could not have been\n made. While considering this issue, the Apex Court was\n pleased to observe as under:"We heard the Counsel. We are of the view that in the\n totality of the circumstances the representations\n submitted by the appellants should be considered afresh\n after giving them an opportunity of being heard. The State\n Government shall do so within a period of three months from\n today and pass appropriate orders. The State Government\n shall not feel fettered by any of the observations contained in\n the order of the Tribunal. Pending the disposal of the\n representations, no recovery of amount alleged to have been\n paid shall be made."The other case law on which reliance was placed on is the\n case ofDirector, ESI Scheme, Orissa and Anr. v. Dr. Sabita\n Mohanty (SMT.) reported in 1995 SCC (L and S) 865,\n wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to observe as\n under:"We are afraid, this perception of the tribunal as to the ends of\n justice and their expeditious attainment prevailing over the\n delays inherent in what the tribunal assumes to be a\n dispensable formality of the filing of a counter and hearing of\n the other side is wholly erroneous and entirely unsupportable.\n Indeed, these words of Lord Wright in General Medical\n Council v. Spackman are worth recalling;LIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 42 of 50"If the principles of natural justice are violated in respect\n of any decision, it is, indeed, immaterial whether the same\n decision would have been arrived at in the absence of the\n departure from the essential principles of justice. The\n decision must be declared to be no decision."xxxxxxxxxx10. The workwoman has failed to show violation ofSection\n 25Gof Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as the burden of proof is on\n the workwoman first to prove that there was such category of\n person as "Safai Karamchari" by designation who were so\n categorized and their seniority list was prepared. He has also to\n prove that where he stood in such seniority list. In such\n circumstances of the case, it is held that workwoman has failed to\n discharge burden of proof in view of above provision of law and\n therefore it is held that workwoman is not entitled to benefit ofSection 25Gof Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The relevant citation\n titledMCD v. Rajpal2011 SCC Online Delhi 2048 from Hon'ble\n High Court of Delhi at para no. 8 and 13 is reproduced\n hereasunder:-8. It is correct that to applySection 25Gof the Act, it is not\n necessary that the workman should have worked for 240 days\n in a calendar year. At the same time, a person is not entitled\n to benefit underSection 25Gof the Act if conditions required\n are not fulfilled/satisfied. While onus on many a condition is\n on the management, but onus regarding "particular category"LIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 43 of 50is on the workman.InRegional Manager, SBI vs. Rakesh\n Kumar Tewari, 2006 (1) SCC 530, it has been observed by\n the Supreme Court:"14.Section 25Grequires the employer to "ordinarily\n retrench the workman who was the last person to be\n employed in a particular category of workman unless for\n reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other\n workman". This "last come first go" rule predicates (1) that\n the workman retrenched belongs to a particular category (2)\n that there was no agreement to the contrary and (3) that the\n employer had not recorded any reasons for not following the\n principle. These are all questions of fact in respect of which\n evidence would have to be led, the onus to prove the first\n requirement being on the workman and the second and third\n requirements on the employer. Necessarily a fair opportunity\n of leading such evidence must be available to both parties.\n This would in turn entail laying of a foundation for the case\n in the pleadings. If the plea is not put forward such an\n opportunity is denied, quite apart from the principle that no\n amount of evidence can be looked into unless such a plea is\n raised. [See Siddik Mahomed Shah v. Mt. Saran;Bondar\n Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors.]."13. We also find that the pleadings in the present case relating\n toSection 25Gare vague even in the affidavit by way of\n evidence filed by the respondents, (copy of such affidavit\n filed by Rajpal, is available on record), at best is ambiguous.\n It is merely alleged that there has been violation of Section\n 25F, G and H of the Act read with Rules 76, 77 and 78 of the\n Industrial Disputes Central Rules, 1957. No other details,\n facts and particulars have been stated.The case of the workwoman is not retrenchment\n simplicitor but alleged allegations of fraud as to the identity of the\n workwoman and also manipulation were made during terminationLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 44 of 50of the workwoman. Therefore the above allegations are affecting\n integrity of the workwoman which may also affect her future\n employment prospect. The above allegations are unsubstantiated\n which are found baseless and cannot be sustained under law.Accordingly, present issue is decided in favour of\n workwoman and against the management.11. R E L I E F\n\n\n 11.1 The workwoman has pleaded in the prayer clause of\n statement of claim at para no. 4 and para no. 10 of the evidence by\n way of affidavit Ex.WW1/A that she is unemployed till date since\n the date of her illegal termination. The burden of proof that the\n workwoman is employed since the date of her illegal termination is\n on management for which management failed to substantiate this\n fact in evidence. Hence it is held that workwoman was\n unemployed during the period of her illegal termination.11.2 It is already held above that the service of the\n workwoman was terminated illegally and unjustifiably.\n Management has submitted that service of the workwoman was\n terminated since long on 09.05.2012 and after such a long passageLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 45 of 50of time reinstatement may not be allowed to the workwoman.\n However the relevant citation in this regard is reproduced\n hereasunder which has laid down the law that once it is proved on\n record that the service of the workwoman is terminated illegally\n and unjustifiably for no fault of workwoman then not allowing\n reinstatement would amount to granting premium to the\n wrongdoer/management against the victim/workwoman. This is not\n permissible under law. The relevant citation is reproduced\n hereasunder:In the case titledDeepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior\n Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya and Ors., (2013) 10 SCC 324 wherein\n the concept of reinstatement was also discussed."38.1. In cases of wrongful termination of service,\n reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is\n the normal rule.38.2 The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while\n deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating authority\n or the court may take into consideration the length of service\n of the employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any,\n found proved against the employee/workman, the financial\n condition of the employer and similar other factors.38.3 Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose services\n are terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages is\n required to either plead or at least make a statement before\n the adjudicating authority or the court of first instance that\n he/she was not gainfully employed or was employed on\n lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid payment of full\n back wages, then it has to plead and also lead cogentLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 46 of 50evidence to prove that the employee/workman was gainfully\n employed and was getting wages equal to the wages he/she\n was drawing prior to the termination of service. This is so\n because it is settled law that the burden of proof of the\n existence of a particular fact lies on the person who makes a\n positive averment about its existence. It is always easier to\n prove a positive fact than to prove a negative fact. Therefore,\n once the employee shows that he was not employed, the onus\n lies on the employer to specifically plead and prove that the\n employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same\n or substantially similar emoluments.38.4 The cases in which the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal\n exercises power underSection 11-Aof the Industrial Disputes\n Act, 1947 and finds that even though the enquiry held against\n the employee/workman is consistent with the rules of natural\n justice and/or certified standing orders, if any, but holds that\n the punishment was disproportionate to the misconduct found\n proved, then, it will have the discretion not to award full back\n wages. However, if the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal\n finds that the employee or workman is not at all guilty of\n any misconduct or that the employer had foisted a false\n charge, then there will be ample justification for award or\n full back wages.38.5 The cases in which the competent court or tribunal\n finds that the employer has acted in gross violation of the\n statutory provisions and/or the principles of natural justice\n or is guilty of victimising the employee or workman, then the\n court or tribunal concerned will be fully justified in\n directing payment of full back wages. In such cases, the\n superior courts should not exercise power underArticle 226or 136 of the Constitution and interfere with the award passed\n by the Labour Court, etc. merely because there is a possibility\n of forming a different opinion on the entitlement of the\n employee/workman to get full back wages or the employer's\n obligation to pay the same. The courts must always keep inLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 47 of 50view that in the cases of wrongful/illegal termination of\n service, the wrongdoer is the employer and the sufferer is the\n employee/workman and there is no justification to give a\n premium to the employer of his wrongdoings by relieving\n him of the burden to pay to the employee/workman his dues\n in the form of full back wages.38.6 In a number of cases, the superior courts have\n interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory\n authority on the premise that finalisation of litigation has\n taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases the\n parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of\n infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for delay\n in the disposal of cases. For this the litigants cannot be\n blamed or penalised. It would amount to grave injustice to\n an employee or workman if he is denied back wages simply\n because there is long lapse of time between the termination of\n his service and finality given to the order of reinstatement.\n The courts should bear in mind that in most of these cases,\n the employer is in an advantageous position vis-a-vis the\n employee or workman. He can avail the services of best legal\n brain for prolonging the agony of the sufferer i.e. the\n employee or workman, who can ill-afford the luxury of\n spending money on a lawyer with certain amount of frame.\n Therefore, in such cases it would be prudent to adopt the\n course suggested inHindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v.\n Employees".11.3 In view of findings under issues above it is held that this\n case falls under the category of illegal retrenchment in violation of\n principle ofSec. 25Fof Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 without any\n justification and non compliance of principles of natural justice.\n Accordingly it is held that workwoman is held entitled and grantedLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 48 of 50the following reliefs:(i) Immediate reinstatement from the date of\n publication of this Award with;(ii) The workwoman is held entitled to full back wages\n as per grade and category of the workwoman herein\n given to the employees by the management from the\n date of filing of this statement of claim i.e. 23.04.2016\n till the date of reinstatement with;(iii) All consequential benefits from the date of her\n illegal termination till the date of her reinstatement.(iv) All the due amount be paid within one month of\n the date of publication of present Award with interest\n @6% per annum from the date of publication till its\n realization.(v) The workwoman is also awarded the cost of\n litigation for a total sum of Rs.20,000/- u/Sec. 11(7) ofIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947.Reference stands answered in the aforesaid terms.11.4 A copy of Award be sent to the Competent\n Authority/appropriate Government i.e., Joint/Deputy Labour\n Commissioner, Government of NCT of Delhi of Distt./Area\n concerned for publication which thereafter become enforceable\n u/Sec. 17A of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. Award is passedLIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 49 of 50accordingly.File be consigned to record room after due compliance.Announced in the open Court\n on 01.10.2022. JOGINDER Digitally signed by\n JOGINDER PRAKASH\n PRAKASH NAHAR\n Date: 2022.10.01\n NAHAR 16:21:40 +0530\n\n (JOGINDER PRAKASH NAHAR)\n PRESIDING OFFICER LABOUR COURT-IX\n ROUSE AVENUE COURT COMPLEX /NEW DELHILIR No. 7962/16Bebi v. East Delhi Municipal Corporation Page 50 of 50

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court_cases

Rajasthan High Court - JodhpurShyama Devi And Ors vs Nemi Chand And Ors on 16 September, 2020Author:Pushpendra Singh BhatiBench:Pushpendra Singh BhatiHIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT\n JODHPUR\n S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 878/2012\n\nUnited India Insurance Company Limited, Fort Road, Nagaur\nthrough its Legally Constituted Authority, Divisional Office, 12-D\nResidency Road, Jodhpur.\n ----Appellant\n Versus\n1. Smt.Shyama Devi W/o Lt. Sh. Parsaram.\n2. Ram Prakash S/o Late Sh. Parsaram.\n3. Mst. Manju D/o Late Sh. Parsaram (Minor).\n4. Gyan Prakash S/o Late Sh. Parsaram (Minor).\n Minors are represented through their natural guardian mother\nSmt. Shyama Devi.\n All by caste Jat, Residents of Village Asawari, Tehsil & District\nNagaur.\n5. Nemi Chand S/o Shri Madanlal mali, resident of Hospital\nRoad, Kuchera, District Nagaur.\n6. Haidar Ali S/o Mohd. Mazid, resident of Roon, Tehsil &\nDistrict Nagaur.\n7. Mada Ram S/o Shri Bhikha Ram Jat, Resident of Village\nBarani Khurd, Bhopalgarh, District Jodhpur.\n ----Respondents\n Connected With\n S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 639/2012\n1. Shyama Devi W/o Late Shri Parasram, aged 45 years,\n2. Ram Prakash S/o Late Shri Parasram, aged 17 years,\n3. Manju D/o Late Shri Parasram, aged 15 years,\n4. Gyanprakash S/o Late Shri Parasram, aged 11 years,\n All by caste Jat, Residents of Village Asawari, Tehsil & District\nNagaur. (The appellant no.2 to 4 being minor through natural\nguardian mother Shyama Devi)\n ----Appellants\n Versus\n1. Nemi Chand S/o Shri Madan Lal, by caste Mali, resident of\nHospital Road Kuchera, District Nagaur.\n2. Haidar Ali S/o Shri Mohammed Mazid, by caste Musalman,\nresident of Village Roon, Tehsil & District Nagaur.\n3. Mada Ram S/o Shri Bhikha Ram, by caste Jat, resident of\nVillage Barani Khurd, Bhopalgarh, District Jodhpur.\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (2 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n4. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. through Branch Manager,\nBranch Office Fort Road, Nagaur.\n ----Respondents\n\n\nFor Appellant(s) : Mr.Jagdish Vyas.\nFor Respondent(s) : Mr.Mahendra Choudhary.\n Mr.RS Choudhary.\n\n\n\n HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI\n\n Judgment\n\n07/09/2020\n\n1. In wake of onslaught of COVID-19, abundant caution is\n\nbeing taken while hearing the matters in Court.\n\n2. The insurance company has preferred Civil Misc. Appeal\n\nNo.878/2012 challenging the judgment dated 20.01.2012 passed\n\nby Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nagaur whereas the claimants\n\nhave preferred Civil Misc. Appeal No.639/2012 seeking\n\nenhancement of the compensation awarded vide aforesaid\n\njudgment.\n\n3. The unfortunate accident happened on 11.7.2009 at\n\nabout 6:00 PM while Parsaram (since deceased) was going on\n\nmotorcycle bearing registration No.RJ-21-3M-7518 from Village\n\nRoon to Merta Road, a jeep bearing registration no.RJ-19C-9710\n\ncame from opposite direction and hit the motorcycle as a result\n\nwhereof, Parsaram suffered grievous injuries and died during the\n\ncourse of treatment.\n\n4. Learned counsel for the appellant insurance company\n\nsubmitted that the learned Tribunal has substantially relied upon\n\ncriminal case documents particularly, FIR, site plan, site inspection\n\nmemo etc. without actually recording the nature of involvement of\n\nthe jeep in question in the accident. Learned counsel for the\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (3 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n\nappellant insurance company submitted that while the accident\n\nhad happened on 11.7.2009, the FIR was lodged on 12.7.2009\n\nwithout giving the registration number of the jeep in question and\n\nit was only at a belated stage on 3.9.2009, Ex.6 Fard Jabti was\n\nprepared when the driver of the jeep in question has brought the\n\nsame before the police authority. Learned counsel for the\n\nappellant insurance company submitted that on the same day i.e.\n\n3.9.2009 when the Fard Jabti was recorded and the vehicle in\n\nquestion i.e. Jeep No.RJ-19C-9710 for the first time came into\n\npicture, the notice underSection 133of the Motor Vehicles Act\n\nwas given. Learned counsel for the appellant insurance company\n\nfurther submitted that the challan documents do not deal with any\n\nexplanation regarding the tracing of the vehicle and the vehicle\n\ncoming into picture is a blurred fact which ought not to be taken\n\ninto consideration by the learned Tribunal. Learned counsel for the\n\nappellant insurance company further submitted that the criminal\n\ncase resulted into acquittal. Learned counsel for the appellant\n\ninsurance company further submitted that the criminal case\n\ndocuments cannot be the sole reason of granting compensation.\n\nLearned counsel for the appellant insurance company further\n\nsubmitted that there were no eye witnesses in the case. In\n\nsupport of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant\n\ninsurance company has relied upon the following judgments :-\n\n\n(I) Certified copy of the judgment dated 10.11.2017 passed in\n\nCriminal Original No.355/2009 in this accident against the driver\n\nNemichand wherein all the eye witnesses were declared hostile,\n\nrelevant paras no.9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 23 whereof read as\n\nunder :-\n\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (4 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n9- mDr lk{kh ih-M- 01 ds dFkukuqlkj fouksn ?kVuk dk izR;{kn'khZ lk{kh\ngSA vfHk;kstu lk{kh fouksn dqekj ih-M- 04 us vius l'kiFk dFkuksa esa ;g dgk\ngS fd fnukad 11-07-09 dks ?kjsyw dke ds fy, :.k x;k FkkA 'kke 5-30 cts\nokfil xkao :.k vk jgk FkkA rc ,d thi rst LihM ls vksojVsd djds\nfudyh mDr thi Qkjlkjke ds VDdj ekjdj pyh xbZA fQj jkts'k dks Qksu\ndjds cqyk;k blds ckn Qjlkjke dks thi esa Mkydj vlkojh o tks/kiqj\nysdj x,A Qjlkjke ckn esa [kRe gks x;kA\n izfrijh{kk esa mDr lk{kh ih-M- 04 fouksn dqekj us ;g cryk;k gS fd\nmlds thi ds uEcj rFkk thi ds pkyd ds ckjs esa /;ku ugha gSA\n bl izdkj mDr vfHk;kstu lk{kh ih-M- 04 fouksn dqekj us Hkh uk rks\nLi"V :i ls nq?kZVuk dkfjr djus okys thi jftLVªs'ku la[;k vkj ts 19 lh\n9710 dks gksuk crk;k uk gh mDr thi dk oDr nq?kZVuk pkyd vfHk;qDr dks\ngksuk crk;k gSA\n bl izdkj mDr izR;{kn'khZ lk{kh ih-M- 04 fouksn dqdkj ds c;kuksa ls\nHkh mDr rF; dh rkbZn ugha gksrh gS fd nq?kZVuk mDr thi jftLVªs'ku la[;k\nvkj-ts- 19 lh 9710 ls dkfjr gqbZ gks rFkk mDr thi dk pkyd vfHk;qDr\ngksA\n\n10- vfHk;kstu la[;k ih-M- 10 jkepUnz us Hkh vius l'kiFk dFkuksa esa ;g\ndgk gS fd mlds U;k;ky; esa c;ku nsus ds djhc rhu lky igys 'kke djhc\n6-15 cts og rFkk f'kojke :.k tkus okyh jksM+ ij ugha [kM+s Fks uk gh thi\njftLVªs'ku ua- vkj-ts- 19 lh 9710 ds pkyd dus gekjs ikl mDr thi jksdh\nvkSj uk gh mDr thi ls eksVjlkbfdy dk ,DlhMsUV gksus dh ckr crkbZA bl\nizdkj mDr vfHk;kstu lk{kh us Hkh mDr rF; dh rkbZn ugha dh gS fd nq?kZVuk\nmDr thi jftLVªs'ku la[;k vkj ts 19 lh 9710 ls dkfjr gqbZ gks rFkk mDr\nthi dk pkyd vfHk;qDr gksA\n\n11- vfHk;kstu lk{kh ih-M- 11 jkeizlkn us vius l'kiFk dFkuksa esa ;g dgk\ngS fd eksVjlkbfdy ij lokj Qjlkjke ds ,d thi tks rstxfr jQrkj ls\nvkbZ Fkh] us VDdj ekjhA Qjlkjke ds ?kjokyksa dks Qksu fd;k rFkk mldks\nbZykt ds fy, vLirky ys x,A vkxs mDr lk{kh vius ekSf[kd ijh{k.k esa\ngh ;g dfFkr djrk gS fd thi dk pkyd dkSu Fkk mls irk ughaA mDr\nlk{kh i{knzksgh ?kksf"kr gqvk gS rFkk fo}ku vfHk;kstu vf/kdkjh us mDr lk{kh ls\nfoLr`r ftjg dh gSA ftjg esa Hkh mDr lk{kh iqfyl c;ku izn'kZ ih- 10 esa\nthi pkyd usehpan dk uke ugha fy[kk;k tkuk Lohdkj fd;k gSA\n bl izdkj mDr lk{kh ih-M- 11 jkeizlkn ds c;kuksa ls Hkh mDr rF;\ndh rkbZn ugha gksrh gS fd nq?kZVuk mDr thi jftLVªs'ku la[;k vkj-ts- 19 lh\n9710 ls dkfjr gqbZ gks rFkk mDr thi dk pkyd vfHk;qDr gksA\n\n12- vfHk;kstu lk{kh ih-M- 13 txnh'k us vius l'kiFk c;kuksa esa ;g dgk\ngS fd pkj lky igys og eksVjlkbfdy ls :.k tk jgk Fkk mlds lkFk esa\neksgujke tkVk FkkA :.k o /kok ds chp ,DlhMsaV gqvk FkkA ,DlhMsaV fdl\nlk/ku ls gqvk rFkk mldk pkyd dkSu Fkk mls tkudkjh ugha gSA bl izdkj\nmDr p'enhn lk{kh us vfHk;kstu dgkuh dks lEcy iznku ugha fd;k gS rFkk\ni{knzksgh ?kksf"kr gqvk gSA izfrijh{kk esa mDr lk{kh us Li"V ;g LohdkjksfDr dh\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (5 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n gS fd mlus usekjke dh thi ls ,DlhMsaV gksrs ugha ns[kkA\n\n 13- vfHk;kstu lk{kh ih-M- 15 f'kojke us Hkh vius l'kiFk c;kuksa esa nq?kZVuk\n dkfjr djus okys lk/kku ds :i esa thi jftLVªs'ku la[;k vkj ts 19 lh\n 9710 dks ugha crk;k gS uk gh oDr nq?kZVuk mDr thi dk pkyd vfHk;qDr\n dk gksuk crk;k gSA bl izdkj mDr lk{kh ds c;kuksa ls Hkh bl rF; dh iqf"V\n ugha gksrh gS fd nq?kZVuk mDr okgu thi jftLVªs'ku la[;k vkj ts 19 lh\n 9710 ls dkfjr gqbZ gks rFkk mDr thi dk pkyd vfHk;qDr gksA\n\n 14- vfHk;kstu lk{kh ih-M- 16 thoujke us nq?kZVuk ugha ns[kuk Lohdkj\n fd;k gSA bl izdkj mDr lk{kh us Hkh bl rF; dh ys'kek= Hkh rkbZn ugha dh\n gS fd nq?kZVuk mDr okgu thi jftLVªs'ku la[;k vkj ts 19 lh 9710 ls\n dkfjr gqbZ gks rFkk mDr thi dk pkyd vfHk;qDr gksA\n\n 23- vc gesa bl rf; dk fu/kkZj.k djuk gS fd mDr nq?kZVuk vfHk;qDr }kjk\n mDr okgu thi jftLVªs'ku la[;k vkj ts 19 lh 9710 dks rstxfr\n mrkoysiu o mis{kkiw.kZ rjhds ls pykdj dkfjr dh xbZA mDr rF; ds lEcU/\n k esa iwoZ esa foLrkj ls foospu fd;k tk pqdk gS fd oDr nq?kZVuk mDr okgu\n thi jftLVªs'ku la[;k vkj ts 19 lh 9710 dk pkyd vfHk;qDr dk gksuk\n vfHk;kstu i{k dh lk{; ls izekf.kr ugha gqvk gSA blds vfrfjDr ifjoknh\n jkts'k dqekj us vis izfrijh{kk esa ekSds ij mifLFkr ugha gksuk Lohdkj fd;kA\n vfHk;kstu dgkuh ds vuqlkj ?kVuk ds izR;{kn'khZ lk{khx.k rFkk ?kVukLFky\n ij ?kVuk ds rqjUr i'pkr igqp a us okys lk{khx.k ih-M- 10 jkepUnz o ih-M- 11\n jkeizlkn] ih-M- 13 txnh'k] ih-M- 15 f'kojke o ih-M- 16 thoujke us\n vfHk;kstu dgkuh dh rkbZn ugha dh gSA mDr leLr lk{khx.k i{knzksgh ?kksf"kr\n gq, gSA bl izdkj i=koyh ij miyC/k leLr ekSf[kd lk{; ls ;g rF;\n HkyhHkkafr izekf.kr ugha gqvk gS fd mDr nq?kZVuk dkfjr djus esa vfHk;qDr dh\n mis{kk] xyrh ;k ykijokgh jgh gksA bl izdkj vfHk;kstu i{k ;g\n rf; ;qfDr;qDr :i ls lansg ls ijs izekf.kr djus esa vleFkZ jgk gS fd mDr\n nq?kZVuk vfHk;qDr }kjk mDr okgu thi jftLVªs'ku la[;k vkj ts 19 lh 9710\n dks rstxfr mrkoysiu o mis{kkiw.kZ rjhds ls pykdj dkfjr dh xbZA\n blh izdkj vfHk;qDr ds fo:) fdlh Hkh lk{kh us bl ckjs esa dksbZ\n dFku ugha fd;k gS fd vfHk;qDr oDr nq?kZVuk ekSds ls Hkkx x;k gks vkSj\n vkgr dks fpfdRldh; lqfo/kk ugha iznku djk, rFkk ?kVuk dh lwpuk\n fudVre iqfyl Fkkuk dks ugha nhA\n\n(II) Cholamandalam General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Smt. Badami\n\n& Ors. reported in 2018(2) RAR 587 (Raj.), relevant para no.6\n\nwhereof reads as under :-\n\n\n "6. In order to prove Issue No.1 claimants had failed\n to examine any eye-witness. The only witness examined by\n the claimants was A.W.1 Shri Pema. The said witness had not\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (6 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n witnessed the accident. It was necessary for the claimants to\n have proved that the accident had occurred on account of\n rash and negligent driving of respondent No.5 while driving\n the offending vehicle. Merely because challan had been\n presented in the criminal case, was not sufficient to decide\n Issue No.1 in favour of the claimants. The driver of the\n offending vehicle could be acquitted in the criminal case. So\n far as the claim petition was concerned, the claimants were\n required to examine the eye-witnesses to establish the\n manner of accident. Opposite party would have got an an\n opportunity to cross-examine the eye-witness to test his\n testimony with regard to the manner of accident. In the\n absence of examination of the eye-witness before the\n Tribunal, the opposite party has been denied its valuable right\n to cross-examine the said witness and establish their own\n plea. Although, as per the judgments relied upon by the\n learned counsel for the claimants given by Coordinate Bench\n of this Court (Single Bench), claim petition could be allowed\n in the absence of examination of eye-witness but in the\n considered opinion of this court, examination of an eye-\n witness before a claim petition could be allowed was\n essential. In case it is to be held that there was no need to\n examine an eye-witness and the claim petition could be\n allowed merely on the basis of the documents attached with\n the challan in the criminal case, then there is no need even to\n issue notice to the opposite party and the compensation could\n be granted merely on the filing of the claim petition alongwith\n challan papers. However, it cannot be done so. Before a claim\n petition could be allowed, the other party has to be heard.\n Claimants have to examine witnesses to prove the issues qua\n which onus is upon them. Other party gets a chance to cross-\n examine the witnesses and test the truthfulness of the said\n witnesses."\n\n(III) Mataji Bewa and others. vs. Hemanta Kumar Jena and\n\nanother, reported in 1994 ACJ 1303, relevant para no.6 whereof\n\n\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (7 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n\nreads as under :-\n\n\n "6. In view of the rival submissions of the parties, the\n first question that arises for consideration is whether the\n Tribunal was justified in holding that the deceased was\n travelling on the offending truck as a passenger and\n succumbed to the injury on account of the accident of the\n truck in question. The sole basis for the Tribunal to come to\n the aforesaid conclusion is the contents of a charge-sheet\n filed in the criminal case. The contents of a charge-sheet\n cannot possibly be treated as an evidence in the claim\n proceedings. The Tribunal obviously committed gross error of\n law in relying upon the said charge-sheet to come to the\n conclusion that the deceased was travelling on the truck as a\n passenger. On the other hand, the positive evidence of the\n claimants that the deceased was a pedestrian and the truck\n came and knocked him down has not been impeached in any\n manner by way of cross-examination. There was no\n justification on the part of the Tribunal to ignore that\n evidence of the claimants. In the aforesaid premises, the\n finding of the Tribunal that the deceased was travelling on\n the truck cannot be sustained and the said finding is\n accordingly set aside. On the evidence on record, it must be\n held that the deceased was a pedestrian and while going on\n the road, the offending truck came and knocked him down."\n\n(IV) Mahesh Kumar Sharma and another. vs. United India\n\nInsurance Co. Ltd. and others, reported in 2008 RAR 72 (Raj.),\n\nrelevant para no.10 whereof reads as under :-\n "10. Since learned Tribunal placed reliance on the\n statements of witnesses recordedu/S. 161CrPC. I deem it\n appropriate to examine the scope and object of this section.\n It is well settled that examination contemplated bySec. 161CRPC is not of judicial character. The statements of persons\n made before the police and before the Court on oath cannot\n be treated as identical and do not stand on the same footing.Sec. 162(1)contain a mandate to Investigating Police Officer\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (8 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n not to obtain signature of the person whose statement is\n reduced in writing. Thus every valid and lawful case diary is\n unsigned by the witness. The statement recordedu/S. 161CrPC cannot be used as a substantive piece of evidence. It\n could only be utilised for the purpose of contradicting the\n evidence of prosecution witnesses. Statement recorded U/S.\n 161CrPC cannot be used for any other purpose except\n specifyu/S. 162CrPC."\n\n\n(V) Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs. Meena Variyal and\n\nOrs, reported in (2007) 5 SCC 428, relevant paras no.10 & 11\n\nwhereof read as under :-\n\n "10. Before we proceed to consider the main aspect\n arising for decision in this Appeal, we would like to make\n certain general observations. It may be true that theMotor\n Vehicles Act, insofar as it relates to claims for compensation\n arising out of accidents, is a beneficent piece of legislation. It\n may also be true that subject to the rules made in that\n behalf, the Tribunal may follow a summary procedure in\n dealing with a claim. That does not mean that a Tribunal\n approached with a claim for compensation under the Act\n should ignore all basic principles of law in determining the\n claim for compensation. Ordinarily, a contract of insurance is\n a contract of indemnity. When a car belonging to an owner is\n insured with the insurance company and it is being driven by\n a driver employed by the insured, when it meets with an\n accident, the primary liability under law for payment of\n compensation is that of the driver. Once the driver is liable,\n the owner of the vehicle becomes vicariously liable for\n payment of compensation. It is this vicarious liability of the\n owner that is indemnified by the insurance company. A third\n party for whose benefit the insurance is taken, is therefore\n entitled to show, when he moves underSection 166of the\n Motor Vehicles Act, that the driver was negligent in driving\n the vehicle resulting in the accident; that the owner was\n vicariously liable and that the insurance company was bound\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (9 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\nto indemnify the owner and consequently, satisfy the award\nmade. Therefore, under general principles, one would expect\nthe driver to be impleaded before an adjudication is claimed\nunderSection 166of the Act as to whether a claimant before\nthe Tribunal is entitled to compensation for an accident that\nhas occurred due to alleged negligence of the driver. Why\nshould not a Tribunal insist on the driver of the vehicle being\nimpleaded when a claim is being filed?\n\n\n 11. As we have noticed, the relevant provisions of the\nAct are not intended to jettison all principles of law relating\nto a claim for compensation which is still based on a tortious\nliability. The Tribunal ought to have, in the case on hand,\ndirected the claimant to implead Mahmood Hasan who was\nallegedly driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.\nHere, there was also controversy whether it was Mahmood\nHasan who was driving the vehicle or it was the deceased\nhimself. Surely, such a question could have been decided\nonly in the presence of Mahmood Hasan who would have\nbeen principally liable for any compensation that might be\ndecreed in case he was driving the vehicle. Secondly, the\ndeceased was employed in a limited company. It was\nnecessary for the claimants to establish what was the\nmonthly income and what was the dependency on the basis\nof which the compensation could be adjudged as payable.\nShould not any Tribunal trained in law ask the claimants to\nproduce evidence in support of the monthly salary or income\nearned by the deceased from his employer Company? Is\nthere anything in theMotor Vehicles Actwhich stands in the\nway of the Tribunal asking for the best evidence, acceptable\nevidence? We think not. Here again, the position that theMotor Vehicles Actvis-a-vis claim for compensation arising\nout of an accident is a beneficent piece of legislation, cannot\nlead a Tribunal trained in law to forget all basic principles of\nestablishing liability and establishing the quantum of\ncompensation payable. The Tribunal, in this case, has chosen\nto merely go by the oral evidence of the widow when without\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (10 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n any difficulty the claimants could have got the employer -\n company to produce the relevant documents to show the\n income that was being derived by the deceased from his\n employment. Of course, in this case, the above two aspects\n become relevant only if we find the insurance company\n liable. If we find that only the owner of the vehicle, the\n employer of the deceased was liable, there will be no\n occasion to further consider these aspects since the owner\n has acquiesced in the award passed by the Tribunal against\n it.\n\n\n(VI) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Pawan Tikkiwal and Ors.\n\nreported in 2008 RAR 56 (Raj.), relevant para no.7 whereof reads\n\nas under :-\n "7. One of the settled principle of the law of evidence\n is that the first version of an incident contains the kernel of\n truth. For, it is the tendency of human beings to speak the\n truth immediately. Subsequently, after due deliberations, the\n facts can be changed, the story can be embroidered and a\n fictional version can be created. Thus, while appreciating the\n evidence, the courts consider the initial statement as\n containing the substratum of truth. In case there is a change\n in the factual foundation of the case, the court should be put\n on alert and should scrutinise the evidence meticulously so\n as to separate the wheat from the sheff."\n\n\n5. Learned counsel for the claimants categorically\n\nsubmitted that the appellant insurance company is trying to create\n\na mistrust in the mind of the Court even when the findings arrived\n\nat by the learned Tribunal are well reasoned and in accordance\n\nwith law. Learned counsel for the claimants submitted that in case\n\nany doubt was there upon the story of prosecution, then the\n\ninvestigating officer should have been called by the insurance\n\ncompany to negate the facts on record of the charge-sheet. There\n\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (11 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n\nwas no cross examination whatsoever on the part of the insurance\n\ncompany to refute the implication of the vehicle in question.\n\nLearned counsel for the claimants further submitted that a\n\npossibility of preponderance was created when the charge-sheet\n\nwas filed and it was for the insurance company to point out the\n\nloophole, if any, in the prosecution story. Learned counsel for the\n\nclaimants in support of his submissions has relied upon the\n\nfollowing judgments :-\n\n\n(I) National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Rajendra Singh & Ors.\n\nreported in MACD 2013(3) (Raj.) 1353, judgment whereof reads\n\nas under :-\n "This appeal is directed against the judgment and\n award dated 24.8.2005 passed by the Motor Accident Claims\n Tribunal, Sriganganagar, Camp at Suratgarh ('the Tribunal'),\n whereby the Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs.6,66,000/- as\n compensation for the death of one Gulab Singh.\n 2. The facts in brief are that an application for\n compensation underSection 166was filed before the\n Tribunal by the parents and wife of Gulab Singh with the\n averments that on 27.2.2002 their son / husband Gulab\n Singh was going on the road when Truck No. RRC-828 came\n from behind, which was being driven rashly and negligently\n by Awatar Singh and hit Gulab Singh from behind, the truck\n driver and owner of the vehicle admitted Gulab Singh at\n Suratgarh Hospital where he succumbed to injuries. It was\n indicated that the FIR of the said incident was lodged at\n Police Station Suratgarh and after investigation, the police\n has filed challan against the truck driver Awatar Singh. The\n claimants claimed a sum of Rs.25,80,000/- as compensation\n for untimely death of Gulab Singh, who was aged 27 years\n and was employed as a truck driver.\n 3. A reply to the application was filed by the owners\n and driver of the truck and it was contended that the fact of\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (12 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\nthe matter was that while going on the road from Bikaner to\nSuratgarh, they found a injured person lying at side of the\nroad and it was found that he was Gulab Singh, who was\nrelated to Amarjeet Singh, the owner of the truck, therefore,\nthey took the injured to the hospital and lodged the FIR\nagainst the unknown driver. However, subsequently, the\nrelatives, only with a view to claim compensation, have\nlodged false case against them and denied the factum of\naccident. However, it was stated that if they are found liable\nthen the liability for compensation for the death will be of the\nappellant-Insurance Company only.\n 4. The appellant-Insurance Company also filed its\nreply to the application and denied the involvement of the\nvehicle in the accident. Several other pleas seeking to\ndispute its liability based on the violation of policy conditions\nwere also raised. Ultimately, it was prayed that claim\napplication be dismissed.\n 5. The Tribunal framed four issues and on behalf of\nthe claimants AW-1 Puja wife of the deceased was examined\nand on behalf of the appellant-Insurance Company NAW-1\nSatyanarayan was examined. No other evidence was led by\nany of the parties.\n 6. The Tribunal after hearing the parties came to the\nconclusion that the accident occurred on account of rash and\nnegligent driving by the driver Awatar Singh and awarded\ncompensation of Rs.6,66,000/- alongwith interest @ 9% p.a.\nfrom the date of filing the application.\n 7. It was contended by learned counsel for the\nappellant-Insurance Company that the non-involvement of\nthe vehicle in question is writ large on the record of the case,\ninasmuch as, the FIR was lodged by Amarjeet Singh, the\nowner of the vehicle, who was himself with the vehicle at the\ntime of accident and incidentally, Gulab Singh, the deceased\nwas the relative, they took him to hospital, where he\nsuccumbed. It was submitted that the claimants have failed\nto lead any evidence and the evidence of AW-1 Puja is no\nevidence in the eye of law as she has specifically stated in\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (13 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\nher statement that she was not a eyewitness and she was\ngiving the statement as told to her by her father-in-law.\nConsequently, the finding recorded by the Tribunal which is\nbased on merely drawing adverse inference on account of\nnon-examination of the driver of the vehicle-in-question\ncannot be the basis.\n 8. It was submitted that as the owner and driver\nfailed to contest the claim by leading any evidence, the\nappellant-Insurance Company's application underSection\n170was allowed and thereafter, the evidence was led and\nthe officers of the appellant-Insurance Company have\nspecifically stated that the vehicle-in-question was not\ninvolved.\n 9. Learned counsel Mr. Joshi appearing for the\nrespondent No.3 duly supported the award impugned.\n 10. I have considered the rival submissions.\n 11. It is true that in the present case there has been\nno eyewitness of the accident and, therefore, the matter was\nrequired to be examined on the basis of probability based on\nthe evidence available on record.\n 12. On part of the claimants, AW-1 Puja, wife of the\ndeceased appeared in the witness-box and exhibited the\ndocuments prepared by the police authorities which included\nthe FIR, Final Report, Postmortem Report and other\nsupporting documents.\n 13. On part of the appellant-Insurance Company only\none line statement was made by NAW/4/1 Satyanarayan that\nthe vehicle-in-question was not involved in the accident. The\ndriver and owner of the vehicle after filing their written\nstatement choose not to appear in the witness-box and\nlooking to the nature of issue which was framed by the\nTribunal as to whether the vehicle was being driven rashly\nand negligently by Awatar Singh, which struck Gulab Singh,\nwhich resulted in his death, once the documents prepared by\nthe police authorities wherein challan was filed against the\ndriver of the vehicle and which documents have been held to\nbe admissible in evidence by this Court in R.S.R.T.C. v. Nand\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (14 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n Lal : ACTC 2001 (Raj.) 489 the burden shifted on the owner\n and driver of the vehicle and once they chose not to appear\n in the witness-box. The finding recorded by the Tribunal of\n drawing adverse inference against them cannot be faulted.\n 14. So far as the fact that FIR was lodged by owner of\n the vehicle himself cannot be a solitary sufficient ground to\n come to a conclusion that the said vehicle was not involved\n in the accident as such a presumption would lead to\n undesirable consequences.\n 15. In that view of the matter, the finding recorded by\n the Tribunal on issue No.1 cannot be faulted and the same\n does not require any interference. No other issue was\n pressed during the course of arguments.\n 16. In view of the above discussions, there is no\n substance in the appeal and the same is, therefore,\n dismissed. The execution of the award was stayed by this\n Court vide order dated 7.8.2006 it shall be required of the\n appellant - Insurance Company to comply with the award\n within a period of two months in terms of the award.\n 17. No costs."\n\n\n(II) New India Assurance Co. Ltd., Thro' Regional Manager, Jaipur\n\nvs. Yugal Kishore Sharma & Ors. reported in 2017(4) DNJ (Raj.)\n\n1513, relevant paras no.7, 8 & 11 whereof read as under :-\n\n\n "7. mijksDr of.kZr ?kVukdze ds voyksdu ls izdV gksrkgS fd izFke lwpuk\n fjiksVZ ?kVuk ds rqjUr i'pkr ntZ djk;k tkukrFkk jkstukepk fjiksVZ o izFke\n lwpuk fjiksVZ esa okgu ds fooj.k ds( i'pkr okgu Lokeh dks okgu ds pkyd\n o nq?kZVuk ds ckcr uksfVlfn;k tkuk ,oa vuqla/kku ds i'pkr okgu pkyd ds\n fo:) vkjksiizekf.kr gksus ij vkjksi i= izLrqr fd;k tkuk izdV gksrk\n gS]ftldk foospu v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us vius fu.kZ; esa foLr`r :ils fd;k gSA\n v/khuLFk U;k;ky; esa Dyses.V dh vksj ls p'enhnlk{kh ds :i esa ,-M-3 egs'k\n dqekj dks ijhf{kr djok;k x;k gSrFkk Dyses.V dh lk{; ds [k.Mu esa chek\n dEiuh dh vksj ls u rksnLrkosth lk{; esa chek dEiuh ds tkap\n vf/kdkjh }kjk dh xbZtkWap dk fjdkMZ is'k fd;k x;k gS] u chek dEiuh dh\n vksj ls[k.Mu esa xokg izLrqr gqvk gSA bl dze esa chek dEiuh dsvf/koDrk ds\n }kjk U;k;ky; eas ewy :i ls ;g rdZ j[kk x;kfd ;fn chek dEiuh dh vksj\n ls xokg izLrqr ugha Hkh fd;k x;kgS] rc Hkh v/khuLFk U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (15 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n fu.kZ; esa ,-M-3 egs'kdqekj 'kekZ dh lk{; ls lacaf/kr okgu dh nq?kZVuk esa\n fyIrrklafnX/k gS rFkk v/khuLFk U;k;ky; ds fu.kZ; ls ;g Hkh izdV gksrkgS fd\n vuqla/kku ds i'pkr iqfyl }kjk okgu dks nq?kZVuk esa fyIrekus tkus ds ckn\n vkjksi i= izLrqr fd;k x;k gS rFkk mDrvuqla/kku o vkjksi i= dks nq?kZVuk esa\n okgu dh fyIrrk ugha gksusds ifj.kkeLo:i pqukSrh fn;k tkuk Hkh izdV ugha\n gksrk gSA\n\n 8 bl U;k;ky; dh jk; esa ;fn okgu dks nq?kZVuk esa feF;k :i ls fyIr\n fd;k gksuk ekuk tk, rks ml dze esa chek dEiuh dh vksj ls vuqla/kku\n vf/kdkjh dks U;k;ky; esa ryc djkdj mldk ijh{k.k djok;k tkuk\n vko';d Fkk] ysfdu v/khuLFk U;k;ky; ds fu.kZ; o rF;ksa ls vuqla/kku\n vf/kdkjh dks ryc fd;k tkdj lk{; jsdMZ fd;k tkuk izdV ugha gksrk\n gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa vuqla/kku ds ifj.kke ds dze esa v/khuLFk( U;k;ky; }kjk\n fu.kZ; ikfjr fd;k x;k gS] mlesa fdlh izdkj dh =qfV ugha gSA\n\n 11 mijksDrkuqlkj iqfyl vuqla/kku] vuqla/kku esa miyC/k nLrkosth lk{;]\n okgu Lokeh dks fn;s x;s uksfVl ds lkFk&lkFkp'enhn xokg dk U;k;ky; esa\n ijh{k.k djus o izLrqr lk{; dkchek dEiuh dh vksj ls [k.Mu ds vHkko ,oa\n fook|d la[;k&1 ds dze esa okgu dh nq?kZVuk esa fyIrrk ds ckcr v/khuLFk\n U;k;ky; ustks fu"d"kZ fudkyk x;k gS] og iw.kZr% U;k;ksfpr gSA "\n\n(III) National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Sinitha & Ors. reported in\n\n2012 AIR (SCW) 10, relevant para no.19 whereof reads as\n\nunder :-\n "19. To substantiate his second contention, it would be\n essential for the petitioner to establish, that Shijo having\n occupied the shoes of the owner, cannot be treated as the\n third party. Only factual details brought on record through\n reliable evidence, can discharge the aforesaid onus. During\n the course of hearing, despite our queries, learned counsel\n for the petitioner could not point out the relationship\n between Shijo and the owner of the motorcycle involved in\n the accident. Shijo is not shown to be the employee of the\n owner. He was not even shown as the representative of the\n owner. In order to establish the relationship between the\n Shijo and the owner, the petitioner-Insurance Company could\n have easily produced either the owner himself as a witness,\n or even the claimants themselves as witnesses. These, or\n other witnesses, who could have brought out the relationship\n between the owner and Shijo, were not produced by the\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (16 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n petitioner herein, before the Tribunal. The petitioner has,\n therefore, not discharged the onus which rested on its\n shoulders. Since the relationship between the Shijo and the\n owner has not been established, nor the capacity in which he\n was riding the vehicle has been brought out, it is not\n possible for us to conclude, that Shijo while riding the\n motorcycle on the fateful day, was an agent, employee or\n representative of the owner. It was open to the petitioner to\n defeat the claim for compensation raised by the respondents\n by establishing, that the rider Shijo represented the owner,\n and as such, was not a third party, in terms of the judgment\n rendered by this Court in Oriental Insurance Company\n Limited case (supra). The petitioner failed to discharge the\n said onus. In view of the above, it is not possible for us to\n accede to the second contention advanced at the hands of\n the learned counsel for the petitioner."\n\n\n(IV) National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Smt. Pushpa Rana & Ors.\n\nreported in (2009) ACJ 287, relevant para no.11 whereof reads as\n\nunder :-\n "11. The last contention of the appellant insurance\n company is that the respondents claimants should have\n proved negligence on the part of the driver and in this regard\n the counsel has placed reliance on the Judgment of the\n Hon'ble Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v.\n Meena Variyal MANU/SC/7265/2007MANU/SC/7265/2007 :\n AIR2007SC1609 . On perusal of the award of the Tribunal, it\n becomes clear that the wife of the deceased had produced (i)\n certified copy of the criminal record of criminal case in FIR\n No. 955/2004, pertaining to involvement of the offending\n vehicle, (ii) criminal record showing completion of\n investigation of police and issue of charge sheet underSection 279/304-A, IPC against the driver; (iii) certified copy\n of FIR, wherein criminal case against the driver was lodged;\n and (iv) recovery memo and mechanical inspection report of\n offending vehicle and vehicle of the deceased. These\n\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (17 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n documents are sufficient proofs to reach the conclusion that\n the driver was negligent. Proceedings underMotor Vehicles\n Actare not akin to proceedings in a civil suit and hence strict\n rules of evidence are not required to be followed in this\n regard. Hence, this contention of the counsel for the\n appellant also falls face down. There is ample evidence on\n record to prove negligence on the part of the driver."\n\n\n(V) National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Smt. Pushpa Rana & Ors.\n\nreported in (2009) ACJ 287, relevant portion of para no.17\n\nwhereof reads as under :-\n\n\n "...True it is the FIR has not been formally proved, nor\n formally tendered in evidence, but then the fact remains\n that, from the perusal of the record it is clear that the\n certified copy has been produced by the claimants\n themselves, and in view of the jdugment of this Court, in is\n A.S.R.T.C. v. Nand Kishore, reported in 2002 ACJ 1564,\n which proceeds on the basis of the judgment of Hon'ble\n Supreme Court Madamanchi Fiamappa v. Muthalum\n Bojjappa, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1633, that if the\n document is certified copy of the public document, it need\n not be proved by calling a witness, and that strict rules ofEvidence Actare not to be insisted on by the Tribunal having\n limited jurisdiction. It has also been observed in Nand\n Kishore's case that the Tribunal, while dealing with the case\n of compensation of motor vehicles accident, are to allow\n such summary procedure as it thought fit, and the certified\n copy of the FIR, inspection map and site inspection memo,\n Panchhnama, injury report, or the postmortem report, as the\n case may be and, other relevant documents prepared by the\n police or the doctor, while discharging official duty are\n admissible in evidence without there being a formal proof. In\n that view of the matter it is overwhelmingly clear that, at the\n time of accident the vehicle was being used for carrying\n passengers for hire and reward."\n\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (18 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n\n\n(VI) Mangla Ram vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. reported in 2018\n\n(1) RAR 135 (SC), relevant paras no.16(15), 19, 20 & 21 whereof\n\nread as under :-\n\n "16. ...While dealing with a similar situation, this Court\n in Bimla Devi (supra) observed thus:-\n 15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly\n taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to\n be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused\n by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be\n possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants\n were merely to establish their case on the touchstone\n of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof\n beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied.\n For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken\n into consideration the respective stories set forth by\n both the parties.\n\n\n 19. In Dulcina Fernandes (supra), this Court\n examined similar situation where the evidence of claimant's\n eyewitness was discarded by the Tribunal and that the\n Respondent in that case was acquitted in the criminal case\n concerning the accident. This Court, however, opined that it\n cannot be overlooked that upon investigation of the case\n registered against the Respondent, prima facie, materials\n showing negligence were found to put him on trial. The Court\n restated the settled principle that the evidence of the\n claimants ought to be examined by the Tribunal on the\n touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly the\n standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have\n been applied as noted in Bimla Devi (supra). In paragraphs 8\n & 9, of the reported decision, the dictum in United India\n Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta (2011) 10 SCC 509, has\n been adverted to as under:\n\n\n\n\n (Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)\n (19 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n "8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta\n while considering the nature of a claim petition under\n theMotor Vehicles Act, 1988a three-Judge Bench of\n this Court has culled out certain propositions of which\n Propositions (ii), (v) and (vi) would be relevant to the\n facts of the present case and, therefore, may be\n extracted hereinbelow: (SCC p. 518, para 10)\n 10. (ii) The Rules of the pleadings do not strictly\n apply as the claimant is required to make an\n application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact,\n there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo\n motu initiated by the Tribunal.\n ***(v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim\n and determines the compensation, it does not do so as\n in an adversarial litigation. ...(vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such\n summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one\n or more persons possessing special knowledge of and\n matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the\n enquiry.9. The following further observation available in\n para 10 of the Report would require specific note:(Shila Datta case, SCC p. 519)10. ... We have referred to the aforesaid provisions\n to show that an award by the Tribunal cannot be seen\n as an adversarial adjudication between the litigating\n parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of\n compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after\n due enquiry, in accordance with the statute.In paragraph 10 of the reported decision [Dulcina\nFernandes and Ors. (supra)], the Court opined that non-\nexamination of witness per se cannot be treated as fatal to\nthe claim set up before the Tribunal. In other words, the\napproach of the Tribunal should be holistic analysis of the\nentire pleadings and evidence by applying the principles of\npreponderance of probability.20. In the above conspectus, the Appellant is justified\nin contending that the High Court committed manifest error\nin reversing the holistic view of the Tribunal in reference to\nthe statements of witnesses forming part of the charge-\nsheet, FIR, Jeep Seizure Report in particular, to hold that(Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)(20 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\nJeep No. RST-4701 driven by Respondent No. 2 was involved\nin the accident in question. Indeed, the High Court was\nimpressed by the Mechanical Investigation Report (Exh. 5)\nwhich stated that only a scratch mark on the mudguard of\nthe left tyre of the vehicle had been noted. On that basis, it\nproceeded to observe that the same was in contradiction to\nthe claim of the Appellant (claimant), ruling out the\npossibility of involvement of the vehicle in the accident. This\nconclusion is based on surmises and conjectures and also in\ndisregard of the relevant fact that the vehicle was seized by\nthe police after investigation, only after one month from the\ndate of the accident and the possibility of the same having\nbeen repaired in the meantime could not be ruled out. In\nother words, the reasons which weighed with the High Court\nfor reversing the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal\nupon holistic analysis of the entire evidence, about the\ninvolvement of Jeep No. RST-4701 in the accident, cannot be\ncountenanced. For, those reasons do not affect the other\noverwhelming circumstances and evidence which has come\non record and commended to the Tribunal about the\ninvolvement of the subject jeep in the accident in question.\nThis being the main edifice, for which the High Court allowed\nthe appeal preferred by Respondent Nos. 2 & 3, it must\nnecessarily follow that the finding of fact recorded by the\nTribunal on the factum of involvement of Jeep No. RST-4701\nin the accident in question will have to be restored for\nreasons noted hitherto.21. Another reason which weighed with the High Court to\ninterfere in the First Appeal filed by Respondent Nos. 2 & 3,\nwas absence of finding by the Tribunal about the factum of\nnegligence of the driver of the subject jeep. Factually, this\nview is untenable. Our understanding of the analysis done by\nthe Tribunal is to hold that Jeep No. RST-4701 was driven\nrashly and negligently by Respondent No. 2 when it collided\nwith the motorcycle of the Appellant leading to the accident.\nThis can be discerned from the evidence of witnesses and(Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)(21 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n the contents of the charge-sheet filed by the police, naming\n Respondent No. 2. This Court in a recent decision in Dulcina\n Fernandes (supra), noted that the key of negligence on the\n part of the driver of the offending vehicle as set up by the\n claimants was required to be decided by the Tribunal on the\n touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly not\n by standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Suffice it to\n observe that the exposition in the judgments already\n adverted to by us, filing of charge-sheet against Respondent\n No. 2 prima facie points towards his complicity in driving the\n vehicle negligently and rashly. Further, even when the\n Accused were to be acquitted in the criminal case, this Court\n opined that the same may be of no effect on the assessment\n of the liability required in respect of motor accident cases by\n the Tribunal. Reliance placed upon the decisions in Minu B\n Mehta (supra) and Meena Variyal (supra), by the\n Respondents, in our opinion, is of no avail. The dictum in\n these cases is on the matter in issue in the concerned case.\n Similarly, even the dictum in the case of Surender Kumar\n Arora (supra) will be of no avail. In the present case,\n considering the entirety of the pleadings, evidence and\n circumstances on record and in particular the finding\n recorded by the Tribunal on the factum of negligence of the\n Respondent No. 2, the driver of the offending jeep, the High\n Court committed manifest error in taking a contrary view\n which, in our opinion, is an error apparent on the face of\n record and manifestly wrong."(VII) Sunita and others. vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport\n\nCorporation and another reported in AIR 2019 SC 994, relevant\n\nparas no.21, 23, 25, 28 & 31 whereof reads as under :-"21. In the present case, we find that the Tribunal had\n followed a just approach in the matter of appreciation of the\n evidence/materials on record. Whereas, the High Court\n adopted a strict interpretation of the evidence on the(Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)(22 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\ntouchstone of proof beyond reasonable doubt to record an\nadverse finding against the appellants and to reverse the\nwell considered judgment of the Tribunal in a cryptic manner.23. The Tribunal had justly accepted the appellants'\ncontention that the respondents did not challenge the\npropriety of the said FIR No. 247/2011 (Exh. 1) and charge\nsheet (Exh. 2) before any authority. The only defence raised\nby the respondents to this plea was that the said FIR No.\n247/2011 was based on wrong facts and was filed in\nconnivance between the appellants/complainants and the\npolice, against which the respondents complained to the in\ncharge of the police station and the District Superintendent\nof Police but to no avail. Apart from this bald assertion, no\nevidence was produced by the respondents before the\nTribunal to prove this point. The filing of the FIR was\nfollowed by the filing of the chargesheet against respondent\nNo.2 for offences under u/Sections 279,337and304Aof the\nIPC andSections 134/187of the Act, which, again,\nreinforces the allegations in the said FIR insofar as the\noccurrence of the accident was concerned and the role of\nrespondent No.2 in causing such accident. Be that as it may,\nthe High Court has not even made a mention, let alone\nrecord a finding, of any impropriety against FIR 247/2011\n(Exh. 1) or chargesheet (Exh. 2) or the conclusion reached\nby the Tribunal in that regard. Yet, the FIR and the Charge\nsheet has been found to be deficient by the High Court.25. The Tribunal's reliance upon FIR 247/2011 (Exh. 1)\nand chargesheet (Exh. 2) also cannot be faulted as these\ndocuments indicate the complicity of respondent No.2. The\nFIR and chargesheet, coupled with the other evidence on\nrecord, inarguably establishes the occurrence of the fatal\naccident and also point towards the negligence of the\nrespondent No.2 in causing the said accident. Even if the\nfinal outcome of the criminal proceedings against respondent\nNo.2 is unknown, the same would make no difference atleast(Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)(23 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\nfor the purposes of deciding the claim petition under the Act.\nThis Court in Mangla Ram (supra), noted that the nature of\nproof required to establish culpability under criminal law is\nfar higher than the standard required under the law of torts\nto create liability.28. Clearly, the evidence given by Bhagchand withstood\nthe respondents' scrutiny and the respondents were unable\nto shake his evidence. In turn, the High Court has failed to\ntake note of the absence of cross examination of this witness\nby the respondents, leave alone the Tribunal's finding on the\nsame, and instead, deliberated on the reliability of\nBhagchand's (A.D.2) evidence from the viewpoint of him not\nbeing named in the list of eye witnesses in the criminal\nproceedings, without even mentioning as to why such\nabsence from the list is fatal to the case of the appellants.\nThis approach of the High Court is mystifying, especially in\nlight of this Court's observation [as set out in Parmeshwari\n(supra) and reiterated in Mangla Ram (supra)] that the strict\nprinciples of proof in a criminal case will not be applicable in\na claim for compensation under the Act and further, that the\nstandard to be followed in such claims is one of\npreponderance of probability rather than one of proof beyond\nreasonable doubt. There is nothing in the Act to preclude\nciting of a witness in motor accident claim who has not been\nnamed in the list of witnesses in the criminal case. What is\nessential is that the opposite party should get a fair\nopportunity to cross examine the concerned witness. Once\nthat is done, it will not be open to them to complain about\nany prejudice caused to them. If there was any doubt to be\ncast on the veracity of the witness, the same should have\ncome out in cross examination, for which opportunity was\ngranted to the respondents by the Tribunal.31. Similarly, the issue of nonexamination of the pillion\nrider, Rajulal Khateek, would not be fatal to the case of the\nappellants. The approach in examining the evidence in(Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)(24 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n accident claim cases is not to find fault with non examination\n of some "best" eye witness in the case but to analyse the\n evidence already on record to ascertain whether that is\n sufficient to answer the matters in issue on the touchstone of\n preponderance of probability. This court, in Dulcina\n Fernandes (supra), faced a similar situation where the\n evidence of claimant's eyewitness was discarded by the\n Tribunal and the respondent was acquitted in the criminal\n case concerning the accident. This Court, however, took the\n view that the material on record was prima facie sufficient to\n establish that the respondent was negligent. In the present\n case, therefore, the Tribunal was right in accepting the claim\n of the appellants even without the deposition of the pillion\n rider, Rajulal Khateek, since the other evidence on record\n was good enough to prima facie establish the manner in\n which the accident had occurred and the identity of the\n parties involved in the accident."(VIII) Bimla Devi and others. vs. Himachal Road Transport\n\nCorporation and others reported in 2009 AIR (SCW) 4298,\n\nrelevant paras no.14 & 15 whereof read as under :-"14. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has rightly\n proceeded on the basis that apparently there was absolutely\n no reason to falsely implicate the respondent Nos. 2 and 3.\n Claimant was not at the place of occurrence. She, therefore,\n might not be aware of the details as to how the accident\n took place but the fact that the First Information Report had\n been lodged in relation to an accident could not have been\n ignored. Some discrepancies in the evidences of the\n claimant's witnesses might have occurred but the core\n question before the Tribunal and consequently before the\n High Court was as to whether the bus in question was\n involved in the accident or not. For the purpose of\n determining the said issue, the Court was required to apply\n the principle underlying burden of proof in terms of the\n provisions ofSection 106of the Indian Evidence Act as to(Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)(25 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n whether a dead body wrapped in a blanket had been found\n at the spot at such an early hour, which was required to be\n proved by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3.15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly\n taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be\n borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a\n particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to\n be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to\n establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of\n probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt\n could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High\n Court should have taken into consideration the respective\n stories set forth by both the parties."(IX) Vimla Devi and others. vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and\n\nothers reported in 2018 DNJ (SC) 1400, relevant para no.16\n\nwhereof reads as under :-"16. At the outset, we may reiterate as has been\n consistently said by this Court in a series of cases that the\n Act is a beneficial piece of legislation enacted to give solace\n to the victims of the motor accident who suffer bodily injury\n or die untimely.The Actis designed in a manner, which\n relieves the victims from ensuring strict compliance provided\n in law, which are otherwise applicable to the suits and other\n proceedings while prosecuting the claim petition filed under\n the Act for claiming compensation for the loss sustained by\n them in the accident."6. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and\n\nperusing the record of the case, this Court finds that the thrust of\n\nthe arguments of learned counsel for the appellant insurance\n\ncompany was upon the implication of the vehicle in question i.e.\n\njeep no.RJ-19C-9710 being doubtful as though the accident(Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)(26 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n\nhappened on 11.7.2009 and the FIR was lodged against an\n\nunknown vehicle on 12.7.2009, there is no vehicle in picture until\n\n3.9.2009 when the fard jabti was prepared at the instance of the\n\ndriver who brought the vehicle in question to the police station\n\nand on the same day, the notice underSection 133of the Motor\n\nVehicles Act (Ex.9) was given. Though the precedent law relied\n\nupon by the learned counsel for the appellant insurance company\n\nclearly required the learned Tribunal not to believe the criminal\n\nproceedings in totality and on the face value, the law regarding\n\nthe requirement of the learned Tribunal to go into the facts and\n\ngive independent opinion in the criminal trial, is quite clear. In the\n\ngiven facts and circumstances, this Court takes note of the fact\n\nthat the insurance company has miserably failed to refute the\n\nprosecution story. The precedent law of Yugal Kishore Sharma\n\n(supra) clearly lays down that in case the prosecution story has to\n\nbe refuted, then the investigating officer ought to be called by the\n\ninsurance company and the insurance company need to produce\n\nsufficient documentary evidence that the investigation done by the\n\ninvestigating officer was not correct.In the present case, there is no indication to reflect that the\n\ninvestigating officer was ever called or any document whatsoever\n\nwas led by the insurance company to refute the prosecution story.This Court takes note of the fact that once the documents\n\nprepared by the police authorities wherein challan was filed\n\nagainst the driver of the vehicle and which documents have been\n\nheld to be admissible in evidence by this Court inR.S.R.T.C. vs.\n\nNand Lal, ACTC2001 (Raj.) 489, the burden shifted on the\n\ninsurance company, owner and driver of the vehicle. The insurance\n\ncompany in the present case has not called any witnesses so as to(Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)(27 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n\nquestion the implication of the vehicle in question. The learned\n\nTribunal had no reason not to accept the story given by the\n\nclaimants supported by the charge-sheet filed by the police. The\n\ncharge-sheet filed by the police is an unrefuted document. The\n\ninsurance company has made no efforts whatsoever to counter the\n\nsame or to produce any documentary evidence or to call the\n\ninvestigating officer or any person, which could discharge the\n\nburden of proof which shifted upon the insurance company due to\n\nthe preponderance of possibility. Thus, no interference is called for\n\nin the impugned judgment at the instance of the appellant\n\ninsurance company.7. In view of the above, the appeal of the Insurance\n\nCompany no.878/2012, having no merits, is hereby dismissed.8. Learned counsel for the claimants in the appeal seeking\n\nenhancement of the compensation submitted that there is no\n\nadversity regarding factual matrix of the case arrived at by the\n\nlearned Tribunal and he does not press the challenge on merits\n\nbut prays that the ends of justice would be met if on the factual\n\nmatrix arrived at by the learned Tribunal, the award is revisited\n\nwhile adhering to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in\n\nthe case ofNational Insurance Company Limited Vs. Pranay\n\nSethi & Ors.; AIR 2017 SC 5157.9. At the same time while considering the claimants'\n\nappeal no.639/2012, this Court is of the opinion that the limited\n\nprayer of adhering to the Pranay Sethi guidelines (supra) deserves\n\nto be accepted.10.In view of the above, learned counsel for the parties\n\nwere asked to jointly submit the calculation afresh as per the(Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)(28 of 28) [CMA-878/2012]\n\n\n\n judgment ofPranay Sethi(supra). Learned counsel have furnished\n\n the calculation afresh before this Court, which reads as follows:-Age of the Deceased 49 years.Multiplier 13Future Prospects 30%\n Deduction on count of Personal Expenses 1/4\n (4 dependents)\n Monthly Income of the Deceased 14,125/-\n Yearly income of the deceased 1,69,500./-\n Yearly income after deducting income tax 1,68,550/-\n (169500 - 950)\n Yearly Income after adding Future 2,19,115/-\n Prospects (30% of 1,68,550/- = 50,565/-)\n Yearly Income after deducting Personal 1,64,336/-\n Expenses (1/45 of 2,19,115= 54,778)\n Total Income after applying Multiplier of 21,36,368/-13Other Conventional Heads 70,000/-\n Total Compensation 22,06,368/-\n Compensation awarded by Tribunal 16,67,625/-\n Enhanced Compensation. 5,38,743/-11.In light of the precedent law ofNational Insurance\n\n Company Ltd Vs. Pranay Sethi(supra), the enhanced award of\n\n Rs.5,38,743/- is granted which shall be payable along with\n\n interest @ 6% per annum from the date of filing of claim petition\n\n till actual payment is made. The enhanced amount is to be paid\n\n within three months from today, failing which the same shall carry\n\n interest @ 9% per annum for the subsequent period (i.e. after\n\n three months from today) till actual payment is made.12. The appeal no.639/2012 is accordingly disposed of.13. All pending applications also stand disposed of.(DR. PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J\n\n SPhophaliya/-(Downloaded on 16/09/2020 at 08:50:56 PM)Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

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court_cases

Andhra Pradesh High Court - AmravatiSyed Arif Hussain, Guntur Dt. vs State Of A.P., Rep. By P.P., Hyd on 20 October, 2020Bench: A V Sai, B Krishna MohanTHE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI\n AND\n THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B.KRISHNA MOHAN\n\n CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1315 OF 2014\n\nJUDGMENT: (Per Hon'ble Sri Justice A.V.Sesha Sai)\n\n Sole-accused, who is the husband of the deceased, is the\n\nappellant in the present Criminal Appeal, filed underSection\n\n374(2)of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter\n\nreferred to, as 'CrPC'). In the instant appeal, challenge is to the\n\njudgment dated 21.10.2014, rendered by the XI Additional\n\nDistrict and Sessions Judge, Tenali, in Sessions Case No.180 of\n\n2013. By way of the said judgment, learned Sessions Judge,\n\nwhile finding the accused guilty of the offence punishable\n\nunderSection 302I.P.C., convicted the accused and sentenced\n\nhim to undergo imprisonment for life and also imposed fine of\n\nRs.1,000/- and, in default, to undergo imprisonment for three\n\nmonths.\n\n\n 2. According to the prosecution, the accused, having\n\naddicted to alcohol and suspecting the fidelity of his wife,\n\nmurdered the deceased on 12.07.2012, by beating her with\n\nchutney pounder.\n\n\n 3. In order to substantiate its case, the prosecution\n\nexamined P.Ws.1 to 12 and exhibited Exs.P.1 to P.26, besides\n\nmarking M.Os.1 to 7. On defence side, no witness was\n\nexamined. Ex.D.1 contradiction in the evidence of P.W.10 was\n\nmarked for the defence. Learned Sessions Judge, on the basis\n\nof the material available on record, framed the following points\n\nfor determination:\n 2\n\n\n\n\n (1) Whether the deceased-Ghousia @ Zaheeda was\n murdered?\n (2) If so, whether it is the accused who committed\n that murder?\n\n 4. Learned Sessions Judge, by way of the impugned\n\njudgment, convicted the accused and sentenced him to\n\nundergo imprisonment for life.\n\n\n 5. Heard Sri Gayatri Reddy, learned counsel for the\n\nappellant and Sri K.Srinivasa Reddy, learned Public Prosecutor\n\nappearing for the State, apart from perusing the material\n\navailable on record.\n\n\n 6. It is contended by the learned counsel for the\n\nappellant that the impugned judgment is highly erroneous and\n\ncontrary to law and if it is allowed to sustain, it would result in\n\nmiscarriage of justice; that in the absence of any eyewitnesses,\n\nthe Court below grossly erred in convicting the accused on\n\npresumptions and surmises; that no prosecution witness spoke\n\nabout the presence of the accused at the time of occurrence of\n\nthe alleged offence; that the prosecution failed to prove that the\n\naccused was present in the village on the date of offence; that\n\nthe evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 is not trustworthy and they are\n\ninterested witnesses and they are the brothers of the deceased\n\nand that they are not even eyewitnesses; that in the\n\nexamination underSection 313Cr.P.C., the accused denied his\n\npresence and no independent contra evidence is adduced to\n\nrebut the same; and that the prosecution failed to discharge its\n\ninitial burden of proving the presence of the accused as per\n 3Section 106of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Learned counsel\n\nplaces reliance on the following judgments:\n\n (1) 2010 (1) SCC (Crl.) 658 = 2009 (12) SCC 588\n (2) 2011 (3) ALT (Crl.) 145 (DB)\n (3) 2011(3) ALT (Crl.) 259\n\n 7.In Madala Appa Rao @ Appayya @ Sreenu v.\n\nState of A.P., rep. by Public Prosecutor, High Court,\n\nHyderabad (second cited supra), the composite High Court, at\n\nparagraph Nos.12 and 13, held as follows:\n\n 12. There are no eye witnesses to the\n incident.P.Ws.6 and 7 were declaredhostile.P.W.1 is\n the father of the deceased, who presented Ex.P.1\n report. He is not an eyewitness to the incident. He\n stated that upon the information given by his fourth\n daughter about the death of the deceased, he went\n to the house of the deceased and found the dead\n body of the deceased in the house. Therefore, his\n evidence is of no helpful to the prosecution case.\n However, he speaks about the quarrels between the\n accused and the deceased.P.W.3 stated that while\n he was coming to Gunadala for Marymatha\n Tirunallu, at about 9.00 or 9.30 a.m., the accused\n came to him and confessed before him that he\n murdered his wife. However, he deposed that the\n accused again told him that he said so, for\n "Yegatali" (joke).When P.W.3 came to Gunadala\n along with his daughter, he was told that the\n accused murdered his wife. Immediately, he went to\n the house of the accused and found the dead body\n of the deceased. But, he did not reveal to anybody\n about the alleged confession said to have been\n made by the accused. Except the evidence of P.W.3\n about the alleged confession said to have been\n made by the accused, no other evidence has been\n adduced by the prosecution. Therefore, the evidence\n of P.W.3 cannot be believed. In the present case, the\n accused is a tractor driver and he used to go to the\n job and return to house even after three days. Even\n though the deceased and accused are wife and\n husband, there is no evidence brought on record\n 4\n\n\n\n\n that on the date of the incident, the accused was\n present in the house along with the deceased.\n Further P.W.15-investigating officer in the cross-\n examination admitted that he did not observe the\n key of the tractor at the scene of offence and that\n none of the witnesses examined by him stated that\n they had seen the accused in his house one day\n prior to the incident. When the prosecution wants to\n establish the fact that the accused alone is the\n person who committed the murder of the deceased,\n it should positively establish the same by way of\n adducing cogent evidence. In the present case, the\n investigation officer as well as the learned Sessions\n Judge proceeded on the basis of mere suspicion and\n the investigation officer laid the charge sheet only\n on the basis of the confession recorded from the\n accused, which is inadmissible in evidence. The\n learned Sessions Judge has also on the basis of\n mere suspicion convicted the accused.\n 13. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the\n prosecution must establish all the pieces of\n incriminating circumstances by reliable and\n clinching evidence which would permit no\n conclusion other than the guilt of the accused. The\n evidence adduced by the prosecution should\n consistently point to the guilt of the accused.\n Admittedly, as stated by the learned counsel for the\n appellant, even though the appellant-accused and\n the deceased are husband and wife, in the absence\n of any positive evidence to show that they were last\n seen together prior to the date of occurrence, the\n offence committed cannot be attributed to the\n appellant. In view of the same, the conviction and\n sentence recorded by the learned Sessions Judge on\n the basis of mere suspicion cannot be sustainable\n and the same are liable to be set aside"\n\n\n 8.In Gopulapuram Balaiah v. State of Andhra\n\nPradesh1, the composite High Court, at paragraph Nos. 2, 4,\n\n18 and 19, held as follows:\n\n\n\n\n1\n 2006 (3) ALT (Crl) 403\n 5\n\n\n\n\n"2. The case of the prosecution leading to the conviction of\nthe appellant is as follows: the deceased bhoolaxmi is the\nwife of the accused. She belongs to pedda chepyal village\nand married the accused 16 years back and was blessed\nwith two daughters and one son. The accused migrated to\nsiddipet for eking livelihood by doing his professional work\nalong with his family members. About 10 years back, he\nconstructed a house at indiranagar locality at siddipet and\nwas residing in the same house, he started a workshop in\nthe town, which is about 3 to 4 kms away from his house.\nHe used to go to workshop daily in the morning and\nreturning house in the evening. He developed suspicion that\nthe deceased had illegal intimacy with their neighbour\nmuthyam and keeping the same in mind, he addicted to\nliquors and quarreled with the deceased very frequently.\nAbout five months back, he picked up a quarrel with the\nsaid muthyam, which was also attended and pacified by\nthe parents and blood relatives of the deceased. But, the\naccused did not change his behaviour and went on\nsuspecting the fidelity of the deceased and decided to do\naway with her life. Accordingly, on the morning of\n02-12-2004, as usual his children went to school and he\nwent to his workshop and at about 15-00 hours, he\nreturned to home unexpectedly and found the deceased\nspeaking with the said muthyam, which infuriated him. He\nwent inside the home and after closing the doors, murdered\nthe deceased by throttling her and went away by closing\nthe doors. He was seen going away in hurried manner by\np. Ws. 8 and 9 and also noticed that his shirt was torn at\nchest part. On a telephonic message passed to the wife of\np. W. 1, who is one of the brothers of the deceased, that the\ndeceased was in serious condition, p. W. 1 along with his\nmother went to the house of the deceased around 5.30\npm. and saw the deceased already died. Later, P.W.1\nlodged a compliant under Ex.P-1 with the police. On the\nbasis of the complaint, P.W.15, the Sub - Inspector of police,\nregistered crime no. 185 of 2004 undersection 302of IPC\nand issued fir under Ex.P11 and sent the same to the court.\nP. W. 18, the circle inspector of police took up investigation,\nvisited the scene of offence on 03-12-2004, conducted\ninquest over the dead body under Ex.P-4, prepared a rough\nsketch under Ex.P-12 in the presence of P.W.1 and another\nand sent the dead body for postmortem examination.\nP.W.14, the civil assistant surgeon working in the area\nhospital, Siddipet, conducted postmortem examination and\n 6\n\n\n\n\nopined that the death was due to asphyxia, fracture of\nhyoid and compression of hyoid and thyroid region. On 07-\n12-2004 at about 9-30 am, p. W. 18 apprehended the\naccused and interrogated in the presence of p. W. 12 and\nanother. The accused admitted his guilt and in his\npresence, the torn shirt was recovered under m. O. 2. After\ncompletion of the investigation, the police laid the charge\nsheet. The accused denied the charges and claimed for\ntrial.\n\n\n4. Smt. Gayathri Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant\ncontended that in the absence of any eyewitnesses to the\noccurrence there is a doubt whether the accused killed the\ndeceased and in all probability, the prosecution failed to\nprove the guilty of the accused for the commission of the\noffence. She further submitted that as per the evidence of\nP.W.16, the accused surrendered before the police but it is\nnot corroborating with the evidence of P.W.18, who stated\nthat they have arrested the accused on 07-12-2004 at\n9-30 P.M., which is falsifying the case of the prosecution.\nShe further contended that as per the evidence of P.W.3, the\ndaughter of the deceased, the accused treated the\ndeceased affectionately and she went to school in the\nmorning and by the time she returned to house at 4-15\nP.M., the deceased, was found dead. Therefore, in the\nabsence of any evidence that the accused visited the house\nat the time occurrence, it is not safe to rely upon the\nprosecution evidence to connect the accused with the\ncommission of offence.\n\n\n18. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on a\ndecision of the supreme court in Dasari Siva prasadReddy\nv. Publicprosecutor high court of A.P. wherein this court\nreversed the acquittal recorded by the sessions judge and\nconvicted the accused undersection 302of IPC and\nsentenced to life imprisonment. Further, the acquittal undersection 498IPC was confirmed. On further appeal by the\naccused to the supreme court, the supreme court held as\nfollows:\n\n\n "24. A strong suspicion, no doubt, exists against the\n appellant but such suspicion cannot be the basis of\n conviction, going by the standard of proof required\n in a criminal case. The distance between 'may be\n true' and 'must be true' shall be fully covered by\n 7\n\n\n\n\n reliable evidence adduced by the prosecution. But,\n that has not been done in the instant case. If,\n coupled with the circumstance unfolded by the\n evidence of P.W.3, the evidence of P.W.4 had been\n believed, it would have gone a long way in\n substantiating the prosecution case. But, in the\n instant case, apart from the fact that the appellant\n was at his house on the morning of 20th April,\n 1996, there is other circumstances whatsoever\n which connects the accused to the crime, though\n serious suspicion looms large about his involvement.\n The view taken by the trial court that the\n prosecution could not establish the complete chain\n of circumstances incriminating the accused is a\n reasonably possible view and the high court should\n not have disturb the same. Having regard to the\n state of available evidence, the benefit of doubt\n given to the accused by the trial court warranted no\n interference by the high court. "\n\n\n 19. In the present case, except the suspicion that the\n accused was harassing the deceased and suspecting her\n fidelity, no other circumstances have been established by\n the prosecution that the accused participated in the\n commission of offence. After going through the evidence and\n the judgment of the trial court, we are unable to accept the\n reasoning recorded by the trial court while convicting the\n accused. Therefore, the accused is entitled for benefit doubt\n and the conviction and sentence imposed on him are liable\n to be set aside".\n\n\n 9. On the contrary, while strongly supporting the\n\ncase of the prosecution, learned Public Prosecutor contends\n\nthat there is no error nor there exists any infirmity in the\n\nimpugned judgment and, in the absence of the same,\n\ninterference of this Court underSection 374(2)Cr.P.C. is not\n\nwarranted; that having regard toSection 106of the Indian\n\nEvidence Act, 1872, initial burden lies on the accused to\n\ndisprove his presence at the scene of offence and since he failed\n\nto discharge the same, the Court below is perfectly justified in\n 8\n\n\n\n\nconvicting the accused; that the oral and documentary\n\nevidence adduced by the prosecution clearly demonstrates that\n\nthe accused committed the offence; and that there are no\n\ncontradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and\n\nevidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution is consistent\n\nthroughout, as such, the conviction based on the same cannot\n\nbe faulted.\n\n 10. In the above background, now, the issues that\n\narise for consideration of this Court in this Criminal Appeal\n\nare:\n\n (1) Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the\n accused beyond reasonable doubt?\n (2) Whether the learned Sessions Judge is correct in\n convicting the accused for the offence underSection 302I.P.C.?\n (3) Whether the impugned judgment warrants any\n interference of this Court underSection 374(2)of\n Cr.P.C.?\n\n 11. It is a settled position of law that when there is no\n\neyewitness and the entire case of the prosecution rests on\n\ncircumstantial evidence, Courts are required to examine,\n\nevaluate and assess the evidence on record in a meticulous\n\nmanner and the chain of events is required to be continuous to\n\nestablish the guilt of the accused. Admittedly, in the instant\n\ncase, there is no eyewitness for the alleged offence and the\n\nentire prosecution case rests on circumstantial and medical\n\nevidence.\n\n\n 12. Prosecution Witnesses 3 to 7 in the instant case\n\nturned hostile. P.W.1 is the brother of the deceased and\n 9\n\n\n\n\naccording to him, the accused and the deceased were attending\n\nMason work and t he accused, having addicted to drinking,\n\nused to harass his sister by beating and abusing her and used\n\nto attribute illegal intimacy with their Mastry (P.W.10). He also\n\ndeposed that she used to inform the same to them and\n\ninformed the same to L.W.9-Shaik Yerra Babu and L.W.9\n\nconvinced the deceased to get on with the accused, keeping in\n\nview the interest of marital life and children. P.W.1 also stated\n\nabout his sister coming to his house on 17.06.2012 and\n\ncomplaining about the harassment by the accused and his\n\nsuspicion of her character and the factum of their consolation\n\nin the interest of their children and family life. He also deposed\n\nduring cross-examination that twice, they approached the\n\npolice prior to death of the deceased, but the police\n\ncompromised and sent them. It is significant to note that\n\nthough there was a suggestion that only after knowing the\n\ndeath of the deceased, the accused came from Hyderabad,\n\nP.W.1 categorically denied the same.\n\n\n 13. P.W.2, who is the elder brother of P.W.1 and son of\n\nthe father of P.W.1 through his first wife, also spoke in the\n\nsame lines as that of P.W.1. As stated supra, P.Ws.3 to 7 did\n\nnot support the case of the prosecution and they turned\n\nhostile. P.W.8, who is the Village Officer of Duggirala, acted as\n\na mediator and, according to him, on 12.07.2012 at about 9\n\na.m., police Duggirala called him to act as mediator and he\n\nexamined the scene of offence and found the dead body of the\n\ndeceased in a pool of blood. P.W.8 spoke about the seizure of\n\nchutney pounder (M.O.1), bloodstained earth (M.O.2) and\n 10\n\n\n\n\ncontrolled earth (M.O.3) under the cover of mediators report.\n\nHe also deposed that on 17.07.2012 at about 6 a.m., the\n\nInspector of Police, Tenali, called him to act as a mediator for\n\narrest and accordingly, he went to Duggirala old locks along\n\nwith police and another mediator, Shaik Basha, and, on seeing\n\nthe police, the accused started running and then, the police\n\nchased and caught hold of him and the accused confessed to\n\nhave killed his wife by hitting with chutney pounder,\n\nsuspecting her character and that he concealed his blood\n\nstained clothes towards the south of Upper Primary School,\n\nDuggirala, between hayrick heap and the school. He also\n\nspoke about the attestation of Ex.P.9 to the said effect. P.W.8\n\nalso spoke about the recovery of M.Os.4 and 5 under cover of\n\nEx.P.10 mediators report.\n\n\n 14. P.W.9 is the doctor, who conducted postmortem\n\nexamination and he opined that the deceased appears to have\n\ndied of head injury by using a blunt object and died of blood\n\nloss and shock. Ex.P.11 is the postmortem examination report,\n\nwhich shows the following injuries:\n\n 1.Lacerated injury over the occipital parietal region\n vertically 10 cm x 5 cm.2. Another lacerated injury horizontally 6x4 cm below\n the above injury.3. Contusion over the left eye of 5x5 cm.4. Skull fractured at the occipital parietal area of\n about 10 cm vertically and 5 cm horizontally\n through which brain expelled out.15. The case of the appellant, as contended by the\n\nlearned counsel for the appellant, is that the prosecution could11not completely establish the chain of events to connect the\n\naccused with the commission of offence and could not establish\n\nthe motive and failed to discharge its initial burden.16. P.W.1, as stated supra, categorically spoke about\n\nthe earlier conduct of the accused towards the deceased, i.e.,\n\nharassment, suspecting her fidelity. The evidence of P.W.1\n\nestablishes the motive of the accused for the offence underSection 302I.P.C. The deceased and the accused were\n\nadmittedly living under the same roof. The plea of alibi also\n\ncould not be substantiated by the defence by adducing\n\nevidence. It is pertinent to note that during the course of\n\nexamination of accused underSection 313Cr.P.C. also, the\n\nplea of alibi was not raised and there was no explanation\n\noffered to the said effect, except stating that the accused was\n\nnot attending mason work at Tenali by the time of death.\n\nTherefore, by any stretch of imagination, it cannot be\n\nconcluded that the appellant herein discharged his burden\n\nunderSection 106of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. On the\n\nother hand, the prosecution, by adducing the evidence,\n\ndischarged its initial burden.17. It is also required to be noted that according to\n\nF.S.L.Report, blood of human origin was detected on items 1, 2,\n\n3, 4, 6 and 7. Non-existence of blood of human origin on item\n\nNo.5 is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. In fact, learned\n\nSessions Judge considered the aspect of alibi at paragraph\n\nNo.28 of the impugned judgment. Learned Sessions Judge also\n\nfound that there is no evidence to show that the accused was12working at Hyderabad, except the hostile witnesses P.Ws.3 to\n\n5, who are close relatives of the accused.18. In support of his contentions and submissions,\n\nthe learned Public Prosecutor places reliance on the judgment\n\nof the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case ofTrimukh Maroti\n\nKirkan v. State of Maharashtra2, wherein the Hon'ble Apex\n\nCourt, at paragraphs 12, 15, 16 and 17, held as under:"12. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a\n house and in such circumstances where the assailants have\n all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time\n and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely\n difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the\n guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial\n evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the Courts. A\n Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that\n no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see\n that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties.\n (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution 1944 AC 315\n quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. inState of Punjab\n vs. Karnail Singh(2003) 11 SCC 271). The law does not\n enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such\n character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate\n extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to\n lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having\n regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is\n necessary to keep in mindSection 106of the Evidence Act\n which says that when any fact is especially within the\n knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is\n upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws\n some light on the content and scope of this provision and it\n reads:(b) A is charged with traveling on a railway without\n ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him."Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy\n inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would\n undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and2(2006) 10 SCC 68113amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge\ncannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of\ncircumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a\ncomparatively lighter character. In view ofSection 106of the\nEvidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the\ninmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how\nthe crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot\nget away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation\non the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case\nlies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all\non an accused to offer any explanation.15. In Ram Gulam Chaudhary & Ors. v. Sate of Bihar\n(2001) 8 SCC 311, the accused after brutally assaulting a boy\ncarried him away and thereafter the boy was not seen alive\nnor his body was found. The accused, however, offered no\nexplanation as to what they did after they took away the boy.\nIt was held that for the absence of any explanation from the\nside of the accused about the boy, there was every\njustification for drawing an inference that they have\nmurdered the boy. It was further observed that even\nthoughSection 106of the Evidence Act may not be intended\nto relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the\naccused beyond reasonable doubt, but the section would\napply to cases like the present, where the prosecution has\nsucceeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference\ncan be drawn regarding death. The accused by virtue of their\nspecial knowledge must offer an explanation which might\nlead the Court to draw a different inference.16. In a case based on circumstantial evidence where\nno eye- witness account is available, there is another\nprinciple of law which must be kept in mind. The principle is\nthat when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused\nand the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an\nexplanation which is found to be untrue, then the same\nbecomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to\nmake it complete. This view has been taken in a catena of\ndecisions of this Court. [See State of Tamil Nadu v.\nRajendran(1999) 8 SCC 679 (para 6);State of U.P. v. Dr.\nRavindra Prakash MittalAIR 1992 SC 2045 (para 40);State\nof Maharashtra v. Suresh(2000) 1 SCC 471 (para27);Ganesh Lal v. State of Rajasthan(2002) 1 SCC 731 (para15) andGulab Chand v. State of M.P. (1995) 3 SCC 574 (para4)].1417. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the\n murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading\n evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime\n they were seen together or the offence takes placed in the\n dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it\n has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer\n any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an\n explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong\n circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for\n commission of the crime. ..........."19. Admittedly, in the present case, there is no eye\n\nwitness and the entire case of the prosecution rests on the\n\ncircumstantial evidence. As observed supra, the prosecution,\n\nby examining P.W.1, successfully established the scene of\n\noffence which shows the involvement of the appellant-accused\n\nin the commission of the offence. It is also significant to note\n\nthat during 313Cr.P.C. examination also, the aspect of alibi\n\nwas not raised and there was no proper explanation offered\n\nwith regard to the said fact. It is also the submission of the\n\nlearned counsel for the appellant-accused that the case of the\n\nappellant-accused may be considered under part-II ofSection 304IPC. Since there is no eye witness for the\n\noccurrence of the offence and as the weapon used by the\n\nappellant-accused, i.e. the chutney pounder, is normally\n\navailable in every kitchen and in the absence of any cogent\n\nevidence that the appellant-accused had beaten the deceased\n\nwith an intention to cause her death, in the considered opinion\n\nof this Court, the conviction of the appellant-accused under\n\npart-II ofSection 304IPC will be just, proper and appropriate.1521. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is partly allowed\n\nand the conviction and sentence imposed against the accused,\n\nvide judgment, dated 21.10.2014, by the XI Additional District\n\nand Sessions Judge, Tenali, in Sessions Case No.180 of 2013,\n\nunderSection 302IPC, is altered to that ofSection 304-IIIPC\n\nand the accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous\n\nimprisonment for a period of ten years. However, the fine and\n\ndefault clause shall remain intact.As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in\n\nthis appeal, shall stand closed.____________________\n A.V.SESHA SAI, J\n\n\n\n _________________________\n B.KRISHNA MOHAN, J\nDate: 20.10.2020\n\nSiva/Tsy16THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI\n AND\n THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B.KRISHNA MOHAN\n\n\n\n\n CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1315 OF 2014\n\n\n\n\n Date: 20.10.2020\n\n\nsiva

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Take notes as you read a judgment using our Virtual Legal Assistant and get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out our Premium Member services -- Free for one month.\n\nCalcutta High Court (Appellete Side)\nSri Uday Jayantilal Shah vs Evergreen Drums & Cans Pvt.Ltd on 14 July, 2022 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA\n CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION\n APPELLATE SIDE\nPresent :\nThe Hon'ble JUSTICE BIVAS PATTANAYAK\n C.R.R. 307 of 2013\n With\n IA No. CRAN 1 of 2013(Old CRAN 2572 of 2013)\n Sri Uday Jayantilal Shah.\n -Vs-\n Evergreen Drums & Cans Pvt.Ltd.\n\n\nFor the Petitioner: Mr. Pawan Kumar Gupta, Adv.\nFor the State : Mr. Anwar Hossain, Adv.\n Ms. Sujata Das, Adv.\n\n\nHeard on: 06.06.2022.\n\n\nJudgment on: 14.07.2022\nBIVAS PATTANAYAK, J. : -\n1.The present revisional application has been filed by the petitioner-accused\n\nno.1 seeking order under Section 401/482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure\n\nfor quashing of a criminal proceeding in connection with Complaint Case No.\n\nC/96/2012 pending before Metropolitan Magistrate, 6 th Court, Calcutta, in\n\nrelation to offences under Sections 420/120B of the Indian Penal Code and all\n\nother orders connected thereto.\n\n\n2.The brief fact of the case is as follows:\n 2\n(i) The opposite party-complainant is a private limited company\n\n dealing in manufacture of drums, barrels, OTS cans, tin\n\n containers, BOP tapes and PP caps.\n\n(ii) The petitioner-accused no.1is an exclusive marketing agent for\n\n procuring orders, ensuring payments and submitting Sales Tax\n\n Form-H, in lieu of commission and for such service a written\n\n contract dated 3rd March, 2005 was entered between the\n\n petitioner-accused no.1 and the opposite party-complainant.\n\n(iii) In the month of April 2005, the petitioner-accused no.1 procured a\n\n purchase order of OTS cans on behalf of M/s Maa Fruits India Pvt.\n\n Ltd. which was accepted by the opposite party- complainant.\n\n(iv) The petitioner-accused no.1 assured and represented that as the\n\n OTS cans were meant for export the petitioner-accused no.1 will\n\n supply all relevant documents including Form-H and shipping\n\n documents.\n\n(v) The accused no.2 and others executed a bond with the Central\n\n Excise Department. The Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise\n\n endorsed and accepted the bond and instructed the opposite party-\n\n complainant to supply OTS cans.\n\n(vi) On the strength of the bond and believing the representations\n\n made by the petitioner-accused no.1 and other accused persons\n\n and on good faith the opposite party-complainant started\n\n manufacturing OTS cans by procuring materials on payment of\n 3\n\n\n Rs.6,73,558/- as Central Excise duties which was recoverable on\n\n submission of shipping documents.\n\n(vii) The materials were supplied to the accused persons. However the\n\n accused persons failed and/or neglected to furnish Sales Tax\n\n Form-H as well as shipping documents resulting in accrual of\n\n liability before the Sales Tax Authorities to the tune of\n\n Rs.3,02,635/- and other allied loss to the complainant-company.\n\n(viii) On such allegations the opposite party-complainant submitted a\n\n petition of complaint before the Additional Chief Metropolitan\n\n Magistrate, Calcutta, registered as C/96/2012.\n\n(ix) The learned Magistrate took cognizance of offence under Section\n\n 420/120B of the Indian Penal Code and the case was transferred\n\n to Metropolitan Magistrate, 6th Court, Calcutta for enquiry and\n\n disposal.\n\n(x) On 07.03.2012 the complainant was examined under Section 200\n\n of the Code of Criminal Procedure and thereafter the learned\n\n Magistrate directed Officer-in-charge, Shyampukur Police station\n\n to cause enquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal\n\n Procedure.\n\n(xi) On 27.04.2012, Officer-in-Charge, Shyampukur Police Station\n\n submitted report dated 25.04.2012 and upon consideration of\n\n such enquiry report the learned Magistrate issued processes\n\n against the petitioner-accused no.1 and others.\n 4\n3.Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order the petitioner has\n\nsought for quashing of the entire criminal proceedings.\n\n\n4.Mr.Pawan Kumar Gupta, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the\n\npetitioner submitted that the complaint filed by the opposite party-complainant\n\nprimarily do not disclose offences as alleged. Furthermore, the learned\n\nMagistrate without applying judicial mind to the purported report submitted\n\nby the Officer-in-Charge, Shyampukur Police Station, issued summons against\n\nthe accused(petitioner herein). The only allegation against the petitioner is that\n\nhe failed to submit Sales Tax Form-H due to which Sales Tax liabilities accrued\n\nresulting in loss to the opposite party-complainant, which can in no stretch of\n\nimagination constitute an offence of cheating and in support of his contention\n\nhe relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in Anil Ritolla\n\nAlias A.K. Ritolia versus State of Bihar and Another, reported in (2007)\n\n10 SCC 110.He further, referring to an order passed by Hon'ble High Court, at\n\nBombay in Summary Suit 2065 of 2006 filed by the petitioner for his unpaid\n\nbills, submitted that the dispute is civil in nature and does not attract any\n\ncriminal liability. Moreover the contract between the opposite party no.2-\n\ncomplainant and the accused no.1 (petitioner herein) was entered in the year\n\n2005 but the complaint has been filed in the year 2012 after a long delay which\n\nraises a serious doubt in the veracity of the complainant's case. In the light of\n\nhis above submissions he prayed that the entire proceedings in connection\n\nwith complaint case no. C/96/2012 should be quashed in the interest of\n\njustice.\n 5\n5.In spite of service of notice none appeared on behalf of the opposite party-\n\ncomplainant.\n\n\n6.It is found from averments made in the complaint that the petitioner is a\n\nmarketing agent for procuring orders, ensuring payments and submission of\n\nstatutory Sales Tax Form-H. On 3rd March, 2005 a contract was entered into\n\nbetween opposite party-complainant and the petitioner-accused no.1 for\n\nproviding the said service. In the month of April 2005, the petitioner-accused\n\nno.1 procured a purchase order of OTS cans on behalf of M/s Maa Fruits India\n\nPvt. Ltd. which was accepted by the opposite party-complainant. On assurance\n\nof the petitioner-accused no.1 and others that the OTS cans were meant for\n\nexport hence the shipping documents as well as Sales Tax Form-H will be made\n\nover to the complainant-company, it started manufacturing the OTS cans on\n\nsuch representation by purchasing materials upon payment of Central Excise\n\nDuties to the tune of Rs.6,73,558/- which was recoverable on presentation of\n\nshipping documents. Although the goods were supplied to the accused\n\npersons, yet, in spite of repeated persuasions those documents were not made\n\nover to the complainant-company resulting in loss including Sales Tax liability\n\nto the tune of Rs. 3,02,635/-. On 18.04.2022 learned advocate appearing for\n\nthe petitioner undertook before this court to file documents relating to Sales\n\nTax Form-H, however during the course of hearing he did not to produce those\n\ndocuments. Upon filing of the complaint and after examination of the\n\ncomplainant under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial\n\ncourt ordered for enquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n 6\n\n\nThe Investigating Agency submitted enquiry report. The report (Annexure D)\n\nclearly indicates of a prima facie case for proceeding into the petition. On the\n\nbasis of the aforesaid report revealing prima facie case the learned Magistrate\n\nissued processes against the petitioner-accused no.1 and others. In exercising\n\nits power under the Code at the stage of issuing process the Learned\n\nMagistrate is neither to scrutinize the evidence nor to weigh the probability or\n\nimprobability with the purpose of proving the case but simply to find out\n\nwhether materials calls for proceeding with the petition of complaint or not.\n\nTherefore, the proceeding before the Magistrate does not call for interference.\n\n\n7.Learned advocate for the petitioner referring to an order passed by High\n\nCourt, at Bombay in Summary Suit no. 2065 of 2006 filed by the petitioner for\n\nhis unpaid bills, submitted that the dispute is civil in nature and does not\n\nattract any criminal liability. The aforesaid order dated 16 thApril 2007 at page\n\n39 (Annexure F) shows that a Summary Suit was instituted under order 37 of\n\nthe Code of Civil Procedure by the petitioner in respect of three bills raised by\n\nhim in relation to agreement dated 3rdMarch, 2005. Be that as it may, it\n\nappears from the said order that some part payments were also made by the\n\nopposite party-complainant. There cannot be any doubt or dispute that an\n\noffence of cheating or fraud can be committed even if the parties enter into a\n\ncommercial transaction. Several disputes of civil nature may also contain the\n\ningredients of criminal offences and if so, will have to be tried as criminal\n\noffences even if they also amount to civil disputes. The crux of the postulate is\n\nthe intention of the person who induces another by his representation and not\n 7\n\n\nthe nature of transaction which would become decisive in discerning whether\n\nthere was commission of offence or not. The complainant-company has stated\n\nthat believing on the representation of the petitioner-accused no.1 and others\n\nthat they would furnish the requisite documents they proceeded to\n\nmanufacture the goods. The goods were supplied but requisite documents were\n\nnot furnished resulting in loss to the complainant-company and further in\n\nspite of persuasion those documents have not been handed over resulting in\n\nloss to the complainant-company. Such averments would primarily make out a\n\ncase for proceeding. The question whether the facts alleged would constitute\n\ninducement of the opposite party-complainant to enter into transaction with a\n\nview to deceive the complainant-company and cause unlawful loss are matters\n\nwhich needs to be considered and decided only on evidence. The issues raised\n\nin the present application squarely relate to question of fact which is to be\n\nassessed and decided in the trial.\n\n\n8. Further it has been strenuously argued on behalf of the petitioner that the\n\ncontract between the opposite party-complainant and the petitioner-accused\n\nno.1 was entered in the year 2005 and after a long lapse of period the\n\ncomplaint has been filed in the year 2012, raising a serious doubt in the\n\ngenuineness of the complainant's case. It is trite law that mere delay per se\n\nwould not make the complaint bad in law. The averments in the complaint\n\nreveal that there were repeated persuasions and demands made by the\n\ncomplainant-company before the accused persons to make good the wrongful\n\nloss. The statement of the complainant made during his examination under\n 8\nsection 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 07.03.2012 shows that of late\n\nthe company namely M/s Maa Fruits India Pvt Ltd(Accused no.2),on whose\n\nbehalf the order was procured, has been wound up and a new company has\n\nbeen formed. Thus the offence appears to be continuous one. In the matters of\n\ncontinuing offence no duration of time can be fixed for filing complaint. In\n\ncases of pecuniary loss and causing wrongful loss, time of filing complaint\n\ncannot be considered on the touchstone of promptitude in filing complaint like\n\nin other cases where there are possibilities of exaggeration and\n\nembellishments. The case of the complainant is based on documentary and\n\noral evidence pertaining to wrongful loss and there is hardly any scope for\n\nconcoction or introduction of coloured version. In such backdrop, I do not find\n\nany merit in the aforesaid contention raised by learned Advocate for the\n\npetitioner.\n\n\n9.As regards the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in Anil Ritolla\n\n(supra) relied on behalf of the petitioner it is found that excepting supply of\n\nForm "IX-C" of Bihar Sales Tax Rules other terms and conditions of the\n\ncontract were complied with, whereas in the case in hand there are allegations\n\nthat assurance were given by the petitioner-accused no.1 and others that as\n\nthe OTS cans were meant for export the shipping documents as well as Sales\n\nTax Form-H will be made over to the complainant-company and it started\n\nmanufacturing the OTS cans on such representation by purchasing materials\n\nupon payment of Central Excise Duties to the tune of Rs.6,73,558/- which was\n\nrecoverable on presentation of shipping documents. Although goods were\n 9\n\n\nsupplied yet those documents were never made over to the complainant-\n\ncompany resulting in loss. Thus the facts involved in the cited decision of the\n\nHon'ble Apex Court are distinguishable from the case in hand.\n\n10. The inherent powers under section 482 of the Code can be invoked and\n\nexercised only when the facts alleged in the complaint even if given face value\n\nand taken to be correct in their entirety, does not disclose an offence with\n\nwhich the accused is charged. In the present case in hand it is already found\n\nthat there are primary materials to proceed and as such invoking inherent\n\npower will lead to stifling of a legitimate litigation.\n\n11.In the light of above discussion this Court is of the view that the\n\nproceedings under challenge does not call for interference. Accordingly, the\n\npresent revisional application being CRR no. 307 of 2013 stands dismissed.\n\n12.It is however made clear that the observations made hereinabove shall not\n\nhave bearing on the rights and contentions of the parties before the trial court.\n\nAll the issues are kept open and the parties would be at liberty to assert those\n\nissues at the appropriate stage of trial.\n\n13.All connected applications, if any, stand disposed of.\n\n14.Interim orders, if any, stand vacated.\n\n15.Urgent Photostat Certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied\n\nto the parties expeditiously after complying with all necessary legal formalities.\n\n16.Let a copy of this order be sent to learned trial court for information.\n\n\n\n\n (Bivas Pattanayak, J.)

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Himachal Pradesh High CourtCWPOA/224/2019 on 26 May, 2020Author:Ajay Mohan GoelBench:Ajay Mohan Goel.CWPOA No.224 of 2019\n\n26.05.2020 Present: Presence of learned counsel for the petitioner\n stands exempted.Mr. Dinesh Thakur and Mr. Sanjeev Sood,\n Additional Advocate Generals, with Ms. Divya\n Sood, Deputy Advocate General, for the\n respondent­State through Video Conferencing.Presence of learned counsel for the represented\n respondent(s) on earlier dates of hearing, stands\n exempted.This petition has been re­registered as CWPOA\n\n No.224 of 2019 after having been received post abolition of\n\n Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal.In terms of the Note, contained in the Cause\n\n\n\n\n List, this case is being taken up by the Court without\n\n\n\n\n\n insisting upon the presence of the learned counsel for the\n\n parties, either in person or through Video Conferencing, as\n\n\n\n\n\n only the formal orders are being passed to put the present\n\n petition into circulation.List on 22.06.2020, to enable learned counsel for\n\n the parties to intimate the Court as to whether the grievance\n\n raised by way of present petition by the petitioner, still\n\n subsists or not. In case the issue, the subject matter of the\n\n petition still subsists, then the learned counsel to assist the\n\n Court in the adjudication of the petition.(Ajay Mohan Goel)\n Judge\n May 26, 2020\n (Rishi)::: Downloaded on - 26/05/2020 20:23:34 :::HCHP

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Andhra Pradesh High Court - AmravatiKorivi Syambabu vs Danda Raja Rao Anr. on 20 July, 2022Bench: V.SujathaHONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE V. SUJATHA\n\n M.A.C.M.A.No.1149 of 2006\n\nJUDGMENT:The appellant, who is injured, filed this appeal\n\naggrieved by the order and decree dated 07.10.2005 passed\n\nin M.V.O.P.No.517 of 2002 by the Motor Accident Claims\n\nTribunal-cum-I Additional District Judge's Court, Guntur,\n\ngranting a compensation of Rs.15,000/- with proportionate\n\ncosts and interest at 6% p.a. as against the claim of\n\n1,05,000/- for the injuries sustained by him in the\n\naccident occurred on 11.03.2002.For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred\n\nto as they are arrayed before the Tribunal.2. The claimant filed the O.P. underSection 166of the\n\nMotor Vehicles Act, claiming compensation of\n\nRs.1,05,000/- against the respondents 1 and 2, for the\n\ninjuries sustained by him. On 11.03.2002 at about\n\n2.00P.M., while the claimant was going on left side of N.H.9\n\nroad in Chilakaluripet town towards Narasaraopet Centre\n 2 VS, J\n\n MACMA.No.1149 of 2006\n\n\nand when he reached near Samrat Hotel, the driver of the\n\n1st respondent's auto coming from Ongole side with high\n\nspeed in a rash and negligent manner and without taking\n\nproper care, without blowing horn, dashed the claimant\n\nfrom behind, as a result of which, the claimant fell down\n\nand the auto tyre ran over his right leg and thus, he\n\nreceived grievous injuries to his right ankle joint resulting\n\npermanent disability. After first aid, he was taken to\n\nGovernment General Hospital, Guntur, where he took\n\ntreatment as inpatient. A case in Crime No.54 of 2002 was\n\nregistered by Chilakaluripet Town Police Station. The\n\nclaimant underwent operation and got inserted steel rods\n\nto his right ankle joint. He sustained permanent disability\n\ndue to the injuries and became disabled. He lost his\n\nearning capacity due to the disability. He spent amount\n\ntowards medicines and extra nourishment. Hence, the\n\nclaimant filed the O.P. seeking compensation for the\n\ninjuries sustained in the said accident.3. The 1st respondent remained ex parte. The 2nd\n\nrespondent-insurance company filed the counter denying\n 3 VS, J\n\n MACMA.No.1149 of 2006\n\n\nthe averments of the petition and disputed the accident as\n\nwell as the age, income and avocation of the injured.4. Basing on the above pleadings, the following issues\n\nare framed for its consideration:1) Whether the accident took place due to the rash and\n negligent driving of the driver of Auto No.AP-7W-\n 1455?2) Whether the petitioner is entitled for the\n compensation, if so, what amount and from which of\n the respondents?3) To what relief?5. During the course of trial, on behalf of the claimant,\n\nPW.1 was examined and Exs.A.1 to A.3 and X.1 and X.2\n\nwere marked. On behalf of the respondents, none were\n\nexamined and no documents were marked.6. The Tribunal, based on the evidence of PW.1 coupled\n\nwith Ex.A.1 to A.3, came to the conclusion that the\n\naccident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of\n\nthe lorry. Basing on the evidence of PW.2, the doctor, who\n\ntreated the injured, coupled with Ex.X.1 and X.2, the\n 4 VS, J\n\n MACMA.No.1149 of 2006\n\n\nTribunal, having observed that there was no medical record\n\nin assessing the disability, held that the claimant is\n\nentitled to an amount of Rs.15,000/- towards the injuries,\n\nand accordingly, awarded Rs.15,000/- towards\n\ncompensation with proportionate costs and interest at 6%\n\np.a. from the date of petition till realisation. Seeking\n\nenhancement of the compensation, the present appeal is\n\nfiled.7. Heard Sri Siva Ramakrishna, learned counsel\n\nappearing for the appellant and Sri N. Ramakrishna,\n\nlearned counsel for the 2nd respondent.8. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that\n\nthe Tribunal failed to take into account the evidence of\n\nPW.2-the doctor, who treated the claimant at the Hospital\n\nand ought to have assessed the disability at 30%. The\n\nTribunal erred in holding that there was no specific\n\nevidence to show how many days the claimant was in the\n\nhospital for treatment and there was no evidence to show\n\nthat the claimant lost his earning capacity due to the\n 5 VS, J\n\n MACMA.No.1149 of 2006\n\n\ndisability and awarded only Rs.15,000/- with interest at\n\n6% p.a. which is very meagre in nature.9. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the\n\ncase and the submissions of the counsel and on perusal of\n\nthe material on record coupled with the evidence on record\n\nand the award under appeal, this court found that the\n\nfindings given by the Tribunal that the accident occurred\n\ndue to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the\n\noffending auto on account of which the claimant sustained\n\ninjuries became final and needs no interference.10. Coming to the quantum of compensation, the\n\nTribunal, basing on the medical evidence and considering\n\nthe gravity of the injuries sustained by the claimant,\n\ngranted Rs.15,000/- towards compensation. As seen from\n\nthe award as well as the evidence of PW.2-the doctor, the\n\ninjured-claimant sustained the following two injuries:1) A contusion over medial malleoulus of the right ankle\n joint measuring 5 X 5cms;2) Abrasion of 3 X 2 cms size.6 VS, J\n\n MACMA.No.1149 of 2006The evidence of the doctor also shows that the present\n\nmovement of the ankle joint was restricted. Therefore, the\n\ninjuries sustained by the claimant can be considered to be\n\ngrievous in nature. Hence, in view of the severity of the\n\ninjuries, this court is of the considered opinion that the\n\nclaimant is entitled to be granted Rs.15,000/- for each\n\ninjury, which comes to Rs.30,000/-. Further, in view of the\n\ninjuries sustained by the claimant, obviously he must have\n\nspent some amount for the medicines etc. Though the\n\nclaimant claimed that he spent Rs.5,000/- towards medical\n\nexpenses, the Tribunal refused to grant the same. Having\n\nregard to the nature of the injuries sustained, obviously\n\nthe claimant must have spent some amount towards\n\nmedicines and extra nourishment etc. Hence, the claimant\n\nis entitled to be granted Rs.5,000/- towards medicines as\n\nclaimed.11. Coming to the claim of 30% permanent partial\n\ndisability, as per the evidence of PW.2-the doctor, it is\n\nfound that the present movement of the ankle joint is\n\nrestricted and it is difficult for the claimant to walk on the\n 7 VS, J\n\n MACMA.No.1149 of 2006\n\n\nuneven surface and he cannot perform the labourous\n\nactivity and the disability is 30% partially permanent,\n\nproving which, the claimant failed to file any disability\n\ncertificate. In the absence of proper evidence, this court is\n\nnot inclined to grant any amount under the head "loss of\n\nearnings".12. Coming to the rate of interest as awarded, the\n\nTribunal awarded interest at 6% p.a. from the date of\n\npetition till the date of deposit. Having considered the\n\nsubmissions of the learned counsel and in the facts and\n\ncircumstances of the case, interest of justice would be\n\nbetter served, if the rate of interest is enhanced to 7.5%\n\np.a. from 6%p.a.13. Therefore, in view of foregoing discussion, the appeal\n\nis partly allowed enhancing the quantum of compensation\n\nfrom Rs.15,000/- to Rs.35,000/- with interest at 7.5%\n\nfrom the date of petition till the date of realisation. There\n\nshall be no order as to costs.8 VS, J\n\n MACMA.No.1149 of 2006As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any,\n\npending shall stand closed._______________\n V. SUJATHA, J\n\nDate: 14.07.2022\nKsn

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court_cases

Take notes as you read a judgment using our Virtual Legal Assistant and get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out our Premium Member services -- Free for one month.\n\nIncome Tax Appellate Tribunal - Chennai\nDcit, Central Circle 2(2), Chennai vs N Ramasamy, Chennai on 29 December, 2023\n आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण, 'ए', यायपीठ, चे ई\n IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, 'A' BENCH : CHENNAI\n\n ी महावीर संह, उपा य एवं ी मंजुनाथ. जी, लेखा सद य के सम\n BEFORE SHRI MAHAVIR SINGH, VICE PRESIDENT AND\n SHRI MANJUNATHA.G, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER\n\n आयकर अपील सं./I.T.A Nos.127 & 128/CHNY/2019\n िनधारण वष /Assessment years : 2015-2016 & 2016-2017\n\nThe Deputy Commissioner of Vs. Shri. N. Ramasamy,\nIncome Tax, No.14/19, Saraswathi Street,\nCentral Circle 2(2), Mahaingapuram,\nNungambakkam High Road, Chennai 600 034.\nChennai 600 034.\n [PAN ADUPR 8003P]\n(अपीलाथ /Appellant) ( यथ /Respondent)\n\nअपीलाथ क ओर से/ Appellant by : Shri. Nilay Baran Som, IRS, CIT.\n यथ क ओर से /Respondent by : Shri. S. Sridhar, Advocate\n\nसुनवाई क तारीख/Date of Hearing : 18.12.2023.\nघोषणा क तारीख /Date of Pronouncement : 29.12.2023\n\n आदेश / O R D E R\n\nPER MAHAVIR SINGH, VICE PRESIDENT:\n\n\n These two appeals filed by the Revenue are arising out of two\n\ndifferent orders of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-18,\n\n(hereinafter the 'CIT(A)") Chennai in ITA Nos.281/17-18 and 282/17-18,\n\ndated 03.10.2018 respectively for the assessment years 2015-2016 and\n\n2016-2017. The assessments were framed by the Assistant Commissioner\n\nof Income Tax, Central Circle 2(2), Chennai for the assessment years\n\n2015-2016 and 2016-2017, u/s.143(3) r.w.s. 153A of the Income Tax Act,\n :- 2 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\n1961 (hereinafter the 'Act') and u/s.143 (3) of the Act, vide orders of\n\neven date 29.12.2017.\n\n\n2. First we take up ITA No.127/CHNY/2019 for the assessment\n\nyear 2015-2016 for adjudication. The first issue in this appeal of Revenue\n\nis with regard to order of the CIT(A) in deleting the addition made by the\n\nAssessing Officer being unexplained amount of gift received from his\n\nmother late Smt. Radha Narayanan to the tune of ₹1,74,00,000/-. For\n\nthis, the Revenue has raised the following grounds of appeal.\n\n\n\n ''2.1. The Learned CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition of\n Rs.1,74,00,000/-, claimed by the assessee as gift received from his\n mother, on the ground that the gift is genuine.\n\n 2.2. The Learned CIT(A) failed to appreciate that the assessee was unable\n to produce any document in support of his claim of gift, state the mode of\n receipt of gift and not even able to furnish the date of receipt of the gift.\n\n 2.3. The Learned CIT(A) ought to have noted that the assessee has not\n stated the occasion which necessitated gift of a whopping amount of\n Rs.1,74,00,000/- by the assessee's mother in favour of the assessee.\n\n 2.4. The Learned CIT(A) failed to note that the assessee could have\n received the gift by cash only, in the light of the quantum of gift not\n getting reflected in the assessee's bank account, and it is illogical that a\n person would have kept cash of Rs.1.74 crores in her possession, before\n gifting the cash to his son''.\n\n\n3. The brief facts of the case are that there was search and seizure\n\noperation conducted on the assessee on 30.09.2015. During the course of\n\nsearch certain incriminating materials were found and seized. Based on\n\nseized material, assessee had admitted an amount of ₹2,65,00,000/- as\n :- 3 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\nadditional income for the financial year 2014-2015 relevant to assessment\n\nyear 2015-16. Assessee had also agreed to disclose a sum of\n\n₹5,50,00,000/- to meet out the cost of acquisition of distribution rights of\n\nAranmanai movie and PISSASU movie. To explain the investments,\n\nassessee stated that out of total cost of acquisition of these movies of\n\n₹10,70,00,000/-, assessee has invested sum received from his mother late\n\nSmt Radha Narayanan of ₹1,74,00,000/- as gift. Assessee tried to explain\n\nthat the gift amount received from his mother of ₹1,74,00,000/- may be\n\nconsidered for set off against admitted income of ₹2,65,00,000/- and\n\n₹5,50,00,000/- during the search. The Assessing Officer noted that the\n\nassessee is unable to file any proof in support of gift received from his\n\nmother amounting to ₹1,74,00,000/- and hence he added this amount as\n\nunexplained by observing at para 6.2 and 6.4 of his assessment as under:-\n\n ''6.2 With regard to gift amount of Rs. 1,74,00,000/-\n received from his mother late. Smt. Radhananrayanan\n there is no proof in support of amount received and date of\n receipt and no proof for the mode of receipt. During\n scrutiny also except stating as gift received, no evidence\n was produced in support of his claim of gift received from\n his mother late. Smt. Radhananrayanan. In the absence of\n sufficient evidence/proof in support of the assesse claim of\n gift amount of Rs. 1,74,00,000/- is not acceptable.\n\n 6.4 In view of the above discussion, the assessee claim of\n gift amount of Rs. 1,74,00,000/- received from his mother\n late. Smt. Radhananrayanan and undisclosed realization of\n the picture "Aranmanai amounts of Rs. 91,00,000/- was\n not considered in the absence of proper evidence/proof and\n accordingly the above amount of Rs. 2,65,00,000/- added\n back to the assessee total income''.\n :- 4 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\nAggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT(A).\n\n4. The CIT (A), simpliciter, on the basis of statement of assessee\n\naccepted the explanation of the assessee by basing his reasoning on\n\nconjectures and surmises and accordingly he deleted the addition that\n\nreceipt of ₹1,74,00,000/- as unexplained is not backed by proper\n\nreasons, hence he deleted the addition by observing as under:-\n\n ''5.2. Smt. Radha Narayanan is no more and as the legal\n heir of Smt.Radha Narayanan, the Appellant naturally\n inherits the amounts held by her. Therefore, the availability\n of source in the hands of Smt. Radha Narayanan during her\n life time is the issue to be examined. Consequent to the\n Search Action in the group (late) Smt. Radha Narayanan\n was assessed to tax for the .AY.2012-13 in respect of her\n income u/s 153A of the Act. The appeal against the order\n passed on 2812.2017 was adjudicated by this office in ITA\n No.34/18-19 dated 28.8.2018 in which, the appeal of the\n Smt. Radha Narayanan was allowed. The appellant on\n behalf of Smt. Radha Narayanan had filed the Return of\n Income for the A.Y.2012-13 admitting a taxable income of\n Rs 1,14,37,860/- The issue under consideration in the said\n appeal was whether the addition made of Rs.38,50,000/-\n as LTCG is exempt otherwise. The Appellate proceedings\n found that the said land was agricultural in nature and\n cannot be termed as a capital asset as per section 2(14) of\n the Act. Independent of the finding, it is a foregone\n conclusion at present, that Smt. Radha Narayanan had the\n creditworthiness to provide such a sum to her son being the\n appellant. Therefore, treating the receipt of\n Rs.1,74,00,000/- as unexplained is not backed by proper\n reasons and hence the corresponding addition is deleted''.\n\nAggrieved, now the Revenue is in appeal before us.\n :- 5 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\n5. We have heard rival contentions and gone through the facts and\n\ncircumstances of the case. We note that assessee neither before the\n\nAssessing Officer nor before the CIT(A) has submitted any details except\n\nthat late Smt. Radha Narayanan was assessed to tax for the assessment\n\nyear 2012-2013 in respect of her income u/s.153A of the Act and an\n\nappeal against the order was adjudicated in ITA No.34/18-19 dated\n\n28.08.2018 wherein admitted taxable income was assessed at\n\n₹1,14,37,860/- and assessed addition of ₹38,50,000/- was made. Before\n\nus, the ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that he is ready to file\n\nevidences to prove the genuineness of the gift and also will file\n\nassessment record for assessment year 2012-2013 wherein the donor late\n\nSmt. Radha Narayanan had admitted her income and will also file the\n\nnexus of this amount with the gift amount. After considering the\n\nsubmissions of the assessee counsel and the rival submissions of ld.\n\nCIT(DR), we note that assessee be given one more opportunity to file\n\nthese details before the Assessing Officer to prove his claim of\n\ngenuineness of the gift received from his mother late Smt. Radha\n\nNarayanan. Assessee will file all the details to prove that the amount\n\nreceived during the financial year 2011-12 with that of money received in\n\nthe financial year 2014-15 relevant to the assessment year 2015-2016.\n\nHence, this issue is set aside and remitted back to the file of the\n :- 6 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\nAssessing Officer who will adjudicate the issue with proper reasoning\n\nafter hearing to the assessee.\n\n\n6. The second issue in this appeal is as regards to the order of\n\nthe ld. CIT(A) deleting the disallowance made by the Assessing Officer of\n\nexpenditure claimed or incurred on account of movie ''Aranmanai''\n\namounting to ₹3,36,00,155/-. For this, the Revenue has raised the\n\nfollowing ground Nos. 3.1 and 3.2.\n\n ''3.1. The Learned CIT(A) erred in deleting the disallowance of\n Rs.3,36,00,155/-, claimed by the assessee as expenditure\n incurred for the movie "Aranmanai".\n\n 3.2. The Learned CIT(A) failed. to appreciate that according to\n clause 8 of the Minimum Guarantee Agreement, executed by the\n assessee distributor with the producer, the amounts spent by\n the assessee towards paper publicity, hoardings, promotion,\n etc., will be on the producer's account and therefore, there can\n be no scope for the assessee to claim expenditure towards\n advertisement, marketing, distribution, etc''.\n\n\n\n\n7. The brief facts of the case are that during the course of search\n\nproceedings incriminating materials were seized and it was found that\n\nassessee had acquired distribution rights of the movie Aranmanai for a\n\nconsideration of ₹10,70,00,000/- i.e. ₹5,20,00,000/- in Cheque and\n\nbalance ₹5,50,00,000/- in cash. The Assessing Officer noted that\n\nassessee has not maintained proper books of accounts and has asked for\n\nexplanation. The assessee submitted that other expenses amounting to\n :- 7 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\n₹3,36,00,155/- was also incurred for the purchase of Aranmanai movie\n\napart from the purchase cost. The Assessing Officer noted that assessee\n\nhas failed to produce sufficient evidence in support of his claim and hence\n\nhe added this amount of ₹3,36,00,155/- to the total income of the\n\nassessee by observing in para 7.1 as under:-\n\n ''7.1 But during the scrutiny the assessee AR failed to\n produce sufficient evidence in support of his claim of\n expenditure ie,. Bills/and mode of payment etc.,. Moreover\n Out of the total purchase cost of Rs. 10.70 crores the\n assessee admitted only 5.00 crores in the books and an\n amount of Rs 5.70 Crores paid as cash out side the books.\n This means the assessee has not maintained the proper\n books of accounts the same is accepted by the assessee at\n the time of search. In this circumstances the expenditure\n claimed amounting to Rs. 3,36,00,155/- without proper\n bills/ vouchers and also in the absence of proper payment\n details/mode of payment etc., the assessee claim of\n additional expenditure claim is not acceptable. This issue\n was never stated by the assessee at the time of search\n proceedings also. Hence in the absence of sufficient\n evidence/proof in the support of the assess claim, the\n additional amount claimed as expenditure towards\n purchase of "ARANMANAI" movie amounting to Rs.\n 3,36,00,155/- is disallowed added back to the assessee\n total income''.\n\nAggrieved, assessee preferred an appeal before the CIT(A).\n\n8. The CIT(A) deleted addition by observing as under:-\n\n ''7. The same principle applies to the addition of Rs.\n 1,07,56,041/- in respect of the movie "PISASU". On\n verification of the cost, it is seen that, the same constitutes\n delivery, poster pasting, digital printing, and publicity\n expenses. A major portion of the expenditure have also\n :- 8 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\n suffered TDS and hence the genuineness of the same is not\n far from doubt. The copies of Ledger folio of the\n Corresponding expenditure are also available in the\n assessment record and it is found that the sums have\n actually been incurred. On the contrary, the A.O. has not\n illustrated that the expenses are otherwise bogus. Under\n such circumstances, when the search proceedings have not\n revealed anything contrary or adverse with regard to the\n genuineness of the expenses, the addition made of Rs.3.36\n Crores and 1.07 Crores are incorrect and therefore directed\n to be deleted. Accordingly, the corresponding Grounds of\n appeal are allowed''.\n\nAggrieved, now the Revenue is in appeal before us.\n\n9. We have heard rival contentions and gone through the facts and\n\ncircumstances of the case. Before us, the ld. CIT(DR) heavily relied on\n\nthe assessment order and he argued that the assessee is unable to\n\nproduce any evidence in respect of claim of expenditure that he has spent\n\n₹3,36,00,000/- for purchase of movie apart from the purchase cost. He\n\nargued that CIT(A) without bringing any evidence on record deleted the\n\naddition simpliciter on the reasoning that major portion of expenditure had\n\nsuffered TDS and hence genuineness of the same is far from doubting.\n\n\n\n\n10. On the other hand, the AR for the assessee drew our attention\n\nto assessee's submission filed before the CIT(A) that all documents and\n\npapers were seized by the investigation authorities which are nothing but\n\ndocuments relating to these expenses which are very much available on\n :- 9 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\nrecord. He argued that the supporting documents relating to the above\n\nsaid expenditure are in the possession of the Income Tax Department\n\nonly.\n\n\n\n11 We have noted that there is no such argument noted by the\n\nCIT(A). He has simpliciter deleted the addition on the basis that the\n\nexpenditure had suffered TDS and copies of ledger folio of the\n\ncorresponding expenditure is available in the assessment records . As the\n\nfindings is incomplete and unreasonable, there may be documents\n\navailable in the assessment records and the seized material relating to\n\nthese expenses, the should have been examined and then this issue could\n\nhave been decided. Hence in the interest of justice, the matter is set aside\n\nand remit back to the file of the Assessing Officer who will re adjudicate\n\nthe issue after examining the seized material in the possession of\n\ndepartment. The AO will find out the seized material and confront the\n\nsame with the assessee while deciding the issue. The assessee is also free\n\nto submit any evidence in this regard as per law. With the above\n\ndirections, the matter is remitted back to the file of the Assessing Officer\n\nfor fresh adjudication.\n\n\n12. The next issue in this appeal of Revenue is with regard to order of\n\nCIT(A) deleting the disallowance of expenditure incurred for film Pissasu\n :- 10 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\namounting to Rs.1,07,56,041/-. For this, the Revenue has raised the\n\nfollowing grounds of appeal.\n\n\n ''4.1. The learned CIT(A) erred in deleting the disallowance of Rs.\n 1,07,56,041/-, claimed by the assessee as expenditure incurred for the\n film "Pissasu".\n\n 4.2. The Learned CIT(A) failed to appreciate that the assessee has not\n established that the impugned expenditure has, in fact, been incurred by\n him.\n\n 4.3. The Learned CIT(A) ought to have noted that in the film industry,\n expenditure towards digital printing, poster pasting, etc., would be\n incurred on the producer's account and the assessee-distributor would not\n be fastened with such liability''.\n\n\n13. Since we have adjudicated the issue of expenditure in regard to\n\nmovie Aranmanai, with the same finding and the facts being identical,\n\nwe restore this issue also back to the file of the AO exactly on the same\n\ndirection. Hence, this issue is set aside and remitted back to the file of the\n\nAssessing Officer. This issue of the Revenue is allowed for statistical\n\npurposes.\n\n14. The next issue in this appeal of the Revenue is with regard to order\n\nof CIT(A) deleting the addition of attributable expenses such as boarding\n\nand lodging, commission paid, office building maintenance and travelling\n\namounting to Rs.9,46,269/-. For this, the Revenue has raised the following\n\ngrounds of appeal.\n :- 11 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\n ''5.1. The Learned CIT(A) erred in deleting the addition of Rs.9,46,269/-,\n attributable to expenses, such as, boarding & lodging, commission paid,\n office building maintenance and travelling.\n\n 5.2. The Learned CIT(A) failed to appreciate that the assessee did not\n produce any bills / vouchers to substantiate the expenditure and iIn the\n absence of bills / vouchers, the only inference could be that the impugned\n expenditure has not at all been incurred by the assessee.\n\n 5.3. The Learned CIT(A) ought to have noted that the burden of proof lies\n on the assessee to establish the genuineness of expenditure as well as\n that the expenditure has been incurred for business purposes.\n\n 5.4. Having regard to the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in the case of\n CIT v. Calcutta Agency Ltd. (19 ITR 191) to the effect that the burden of\n proving that an amount contended to be an expenditure, falls under\n section 37 (1), is on the assessee''.\n\n\n15. Brief facts of the case are that assessee claimed expenditure under\n\nthe following heads:-\n\n1. Boarding and Lodging Rs.2,63,518/-\n\n2. Commission paid Rs.15,00,000/-\n\n3. Office building maintenance Rs.11,63,000/-\n\n4. Travelling Rs.8,58,559/-\n\nTotaling Rs.37,85,077/-\n\nThe Assessing Officer during the course of assessment proceedings\n\nrequired the assessee to submit bills and vouchers in support of these\n\nexpenditure claimed. But assessee could not produce the same and hence\n\nconsidering the nature of expenditure, the Assessing Officer restricted the\n\ndisallowance of expenditure at 25%. Aggrieved assessee filed an appeal\n\nbefore the CIT(A).\n :- 12 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\n16. The CIT(A) deleted the addition by observing at para 7.1 as under:-\n\n ''7.1. In respect of addition of Rs.9,46,269/-, the AR for the\n appellant has provided the ledger account copy for the\n expenses incurred under the head (i) Boarding & Lodging\n (ii) Commission paid (iii) Office Building Maintenance & (iv)\n Travelling. On perusal of the same, it is seen that, all the\n above expenses have been made through banking channel.\n Hence, the addition made on account of the said\n expenditures is directed to be deleted. Accordingly, this\n ground of appeal is allowed''.\n\n\nAggrieved, the Revenue is in appeal before us.\n\n\n17. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the material\n\navailable on record. We noted that this expenditure is neither denied by\n\nthe AO nor the CIT(A). Even now before us, the Revenue has pointed out\n\nthat this expenditure is only normal expenditure but in the absence of any\n\nbills and vouchers, the AO has rightly estimated at 25% which is not very\n\nhigh. In the absence of evidence, we restrict the disallowance at 10% and\n\ndirect the AO accordingly. This ground of the Revenue is partly allowed.\n\n\n\n18. The last issue raised by the Revenue in this appeal is with regard to\n\norder of the ld. CIT(A) directing the AO to allow carry forward loss claimed\n\nin the return of income filed u/s.153A of the Act. For this, the Revenue has\n\nraised the following grounds of appeal.\n :- 13 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\n '6.1. The Learned CIT(A) erred in holding that the loss claimed in the\n return of income u/s.153A is to be carried forward, by observing that the\n return of income filed in response to notice u/s.153A is treated as filed\n u/s.139(1) of the I.T. Act, 1961.\n\n 6.2. The Learned CIT(A) failed to appreciate that in the case of CIT v. Sun\n Engineering Works (P) Ltd. (198 ITR 297) and Chettinad Corporation P.\n Ltd. v. CIT (200 ITR 320), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that\n reopening is only for the benefit of revenue and that assessments made\n u/s.153A being in the nature of reassessment proceedings, the said\n Hon'ble Supreme Court's decisions apply to return of income filed\n u/s.153A too.\n\n 6.3. The Learned CIT(A) ought to have noted that in corporate cases, the\n accounts have to be adopted in the Annual General Body meeting which\n cannot be changed at the whims of the assessee and that a fresh claim,\n such as a loss, cannot be claimed in the return of income filed in response\n to notice u/s.153A of the Act''.\n\n\n19. The brief facts of the case are that assessee filed its return of\n\nincome in response to notice u/s.153A of the Act on 05.09.2017 for the\n\nrelevant assessment year 2015-2016. A notice u/s.153A of the Act was\n\nissued by the AO based on seized material found during the course of\n\nsearch in the business and residential premises of the assessee. The\n\nassessee in its return of income declared total loss of Rs.4,27,80,214/-\n\nwhile filing return of income u/s.153A of the Act. The AO while computing\n\nincome of the assessee for the assessment year has disallowed the claim\n\nof loss but the CIT(A) after deleting the addition recomputed the loss and\n\nrevised the loss to be carried forward for future set-off for the reason that\n\nreturn filed by the assessee is in response to notice u/s.153A of the Act is\n\nto be treated as return filed u/s.139(1) of the Act and losses to be allowed\n\nto be carry forwarded. For this, the CIT(A) observed at para 8 as under:-\n :- 14 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\n\n ''8. Based on the discussion made in this Appellate Order, the loss\n for the year is recomputed as under:-\n\n\n Particulars Amount (in ₹)\n\n Loss Declared in return of income 4,26,71,136\n\n Reduction in losses on account of 91,00,000\n unexplained investment in the movie\n "Aranmanai' u/s.69B\n\n Revised Losses available for C/f and future 3,35,71,136\n set-off\n\n\n Since the return of income filed in response to notice u/s.153A is treated\n as filed u/s.139(1) the losses are allowed to be carried forward.\n\n\nAggrieved, the Revenue is in appeal before us.\n\n20. Before us, the ld. CIT(DR) tried to make a distinction between the\n\nreturn filed in response to 153A and the return filed in response to notice\n\nu/s.148 of the IT Act. The ld. CIT(DR) distinguished the Sections as\n\nunder:-\n\n\n Sec. 153A:\n\n "(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 139, section\n 147, section 148, section 149, section 151 and section 153, int\n eh case of a person where a search is initiated under section 132\n or books of account, other documents or any assets are\n requisitioned under section 132A after the 31st day of May,\n 2003, the Assessing Officer shall----\n\n (a) Issue notice to such person requiring him to furnish within\n such period, as may be specified in the notice, the return of\n income in respect of each assessment year falling within six\n :- 15 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\n assessment years (and for the relevant assessment year or\n years) referred to in clause (b), in the prescribed form and\n verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other\n particulars as may be prescribed and the provisions of this Act\n shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if such return were\n a return required to be furnished under section 139; (Emphasis\n Supplied)\n\n Sec. 148 (As applicable for A Y 2015-16):\n\n (1) Before making the assessment, reassessment, or\n recomputation under section 147, the Assessing Officer\n shall serve on the assessee a notice requiring him to\n furnish within such period as may be specified in the\n notice, a return of his income or the income of any other\n person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act\n during the previous year corresponding to the relevant\n assessment year, in the prescribed form and verified in the\n prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars\n as may be prescribed; and the provisions of this Act shall,\n so far as may be, apply accordingly as if such return were\n a return required to be furnished under section 139".\n\nThe ld. CIR(DR) further submitted that return u/s.148/153A is to be\n\nconstrued as return filed u/s.139; only 'so far as may be' and not in toto.\n\nTherefore, in view of the grounds of appeal are reproduced with the above\n\nsubmissions and also noting the fact that the CIT(A) has suo-moto allowed\n\nthe loss which was not claimed by the assessee in his appeal. He placed\n\nreliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of\n\nShrikant Mohta v. CIT reported in 414 ITR 270. The CIT (DR) further\n\ncontended that the assessee did not file the return within the time\n\nallowed in response to notice under section 153A of the Act. Therefore,\n\nthe assessee is not entitled to carry forward his loss. Hence, he prayed\n :- 16 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\nthat consequent to the AY 2016-17, recomputed loss for AY 2015-16\n\ncannot be allowed to be set off with the income for the AY 2016-17.\n\n21. On the other hand, ld. Counsel for the assessee had also placed\n\nreliance on the decision of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of\n\nShrikant Mohta (supra) wherein he argued that the Calcutta High Court\n\nhas answered the substantial question of law and the same is reproduced\n\nherein below:\n\n (1) Whether a loss return filed within the time specified in the\n notice under Section 153A(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act,\n 1961 is required to be treated as a return filed in\n accordance with the provisions of Section 139(3) for the\n purpose of carrying forward of the loss in terms of Section\n 72 read with Section 80 of the Act;\n\n For the purpose of carrying forward the loss in terms of\n Section 72 read with Section 80 of the Act, in a case\n where search operations have been conducted under\n Section 132 of the Act, the time to file the return within\n the meaning of Section 139(3) of the Act has to be\n regarded as the reasonable time afforded by the\n consequent notice under Section 153A (1)(a) of the Act.\n\n\n (2) In a case where Section 153A of the Income Tax Act, 1961\n applies, whether a return filed in response to the notice under\n Section 153A(1)(a) is required to be treated as a return under\n Section 139 and that any other return is of no consequence and\n non est:-\n\n When search operations are conducted under Section 132 of the\n Act, the obligation of the assessee to file any return remains\n suspended till such time that a notice is issued for such purpose\n under Section 153A(1)(a) of the Act. If the return is filed by the\n assessee within the reasonable time permitted by such notice\n under Section 153A(1)(a) of the Act, such return would then be\n deemed to have been filed within the time permitted under\n Section 139 (1) of the Act for the benefit under Section 139(3)\n of the Act to be availed of by the assessee.\n :- 17 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\n\nHe further submitted that, the entire matter was remanded back by\n\nthe Hon'ble Court by holding as follows:\n\n 17. In the light of the substantial questions of law being\n answered herein, a definitive final order cannot be passed\n without being sure of the date of issuance of the notice\n under Section 153A(1)(a) of the Act and the time afforded\n by such notice for the assessee to file the return. For such\n purpose, the orders impugned passed by the Appellate\n Tribunal require to be set aside and the matters remitted\n back to the Tribunal for the Tribunal to ascertain the\n details as to the date of the notice and the time afforded\n to file the return and pass an order in the light of the\n views expressed herein on the questions of law and it is\n ordered accordingly.\n\nIn view of the above, it was argued that there was no statutory\n\nprescription of time limit for filing the return of income under Section\n\n153A(1)(a) of the Act and in this regard, the statute envisages\n\ndiscretion to entertain the return of income for computation purposes.\n\nOn the facts of the case, he submitted that the return filed in\n\nresponse to notice under Section 153A of the Act on 05.09.2017 for\n\nAY 2015-16 and the said return of income was acted upon by the\n\nAssessing Officer in para 10 of the search assessment order. In the\n\nlight of the said admitted facts, the return of income filed being\n\nvalidated by the revenue in the search assessment order dated\n\n29.12.2017, the decision of the Calcutta High Court in reckoning such\n\nreturn as filed under Section 139(1) of the Act would support the\n\ndecision taken in the impugned order for the assessment year 2015-\n\n16 in granting such benefit. Accordingly, he pleaded for dismissing\n :- 18 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\nthe related grounds of appeal for the AY 2015-16 & pleads further for\n\ndismissal of the only ground taken by the revenue before the Bench\n\nfor the AY 2016-17 as a consequence of the stand taken for the AY\n\n2015-16 in the interest of justice.\n\n22. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the material\n\navailable on record. Admittedly, in the present case, before us, a notice\n\nu/s.153A of the Act was issued on 24.01.2017 and return is to be filed\n\nwithin thirty days as per the notice. But the assessee filed belated return\n\nor return filed after expiry of time limit fixed by the Department i.e.\n\n05.09.2017. It means assessee filed return almost after seven months\n\nfrom the expiry of the time limit fixed by the Revenue. At this point, as\n\nrelied by the decision of Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of\n\nShrikant Mohta (supra) by ld. CIT(DR), we note that Hon'ble Calcutta High\n\nCourt had held as under:;\n\n ''To boot, the second proviso to Section 153A(1) insofar as it is\n material for the present purpose, mandates that any\n "assessment or reassessment relating to... the relevant\n assessment year or years... pending on the date of initiation of\n the search under Section 132. shall abate". [Para 14]\n\n It goes without saying that since the search operations in this\n case were initiated on 2-9-2004, it was no longer necessary for\n this assessee to file his regular return by 31-10-2004\n notwithstanding the mandate of Section 139(1) of the Act. The\n obligation to file the return remained suspended, in view of the\n clear opening words of Section 153A(1) till such time that a\n notice was issued to him under clause (a) of such sub-section. If\n such is the meaning of Section 153A(1), the operation of Section\n 139(3) qua the time available for filing a return in order to avail\n of the benefit of carrying forward any loss stands extended till a\n return is called for under Section 153A(1)(a) and such return is\n :- 19 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\nfiled, provided the return is filed within the time indicated in the\nrelevant notice under Section 153A(1)(a) of the Act. There can\nbe no dispute to such being the effect of Section 153A(1)(a).\n[Para 15]\n\nUnfortunately, the notice issued under Section 153A(1)(a) is not\navailable in the records relied upon by the parties nor is there\nany reference to the date of such notice in any of the orders\nappended to the papers. Indeed, the time permitted by the\nrelevant notice under Section 153A(1)(a) for the assessee to file\nthe return is also not available. As recorded above, it is the\nsubmission of the assessee that such notice was received by the\nassessee on 27-3-2006 and it afforded a month's time to the\nassessee to file the assessee's return and the assessee's return\nfor the assessment year 2004-05 was filed on 26-4-2006. The\ndate when the return was filed, however, is verifiable from the\norders available. [Para 16]\n\nThus, a definitive final order cannot be passed without being\nsure of the date of issuance of the notice under Section\n153A(1)(a) and the time afforded by such notice for the\nassessee to file the return. For such purpose, the orders\nimpugned passed by the Tribunal requires to be set aside and\nthe matters remitted back to the Tribunal for the Tribunal to\nascertain the details as to the date of the notice and the time\nafforded to file the return and pass an order in the light of the\nviews expressed herein on the questions of law and it is ordered\naccordingly. [Para 17]\n\nFor the purpose of carrying forward the loss in terms of Section\n72 read with Section 80 in a case where search operations have\nbeen conducted under section 132 the time to file the return\nwithin the meaning of section 139(3) has to be regarded as the\nreasonable time afforded by the consequent notice under\nSection 153A(1)(a). [Para 18]\n\nWhen search operations are conducted under Section 132, the\nobligation of the assessee to file any return remains suspended\ntill such time that a notice is issued for such purpose under\nSection 153A(1)(a). If the return is filed by assessee within\nreasonable time permitted by such notice under Section\n153A(1)(a), such return would then be deemed to have been\nfiled within time permitted under section 139(1) for benefit\nunder Section 139(3) to be availed of by assessee. [Para 19]''\n :- 20 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\nWe noted that in this case before Calcutta High Court the return of income\n\nwas filed within the time allowed by revenue and not belatedly much after\n\nissuing notice u/s. 153A of the Act. But in the present case before us, the\n\nreturn of income in response to notice u/s. 153A of the Act was filed after\n\nseven months on 05.09.2017 as against notice issued on 24.01.2017. It\n\nmeans that the case laws Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in the case of\n\nShrikant Mohta (supra) is factualy distinguishable and not applicable to\n\nthe present case. Hence, the CIT(A) has erred in allowing set off of loss.\n\nIn view of the above, we allow this issue raised by the Revenue.\n\n\n23. Now, we take up ITA No.128/CHNY/2019 for the assessment year\n\n2016-2017 for adjudication.\n\n24 As regards to appeal of the Revenue, the only issue raised is with\n\nregard to claim of assessee to carry forward of loss quantified at\n\nRs.3,35,71,136/- not to be carried forward for the assessment year 2016-\n\n2017. For this, the Revenue has raised the following grounds of appeal.\n\n ''2.1. The learned CIT(A) erred in holding that the carry\n forward of loss, quantified at Rs.3,35,71,136/-, by the\n learned CIT(A) for the assessment year 2015-16 is to be\n set-off against the gross total income for the assessment\n year 2016-17.\n\n 2.2 It is submitted that appeal has been preferred for the\n assessment year 2015-16 on the issue of carry forward of\n loss and, as a corollary, appeal has been preferred on the\n set-off of such carry forward loss, for the assessment year\n 2016-17''\n :- 21 -: ITA Nos.127 & 128/Chny/2019\n\n\n\n 25. Since, we have adjudicated the issue in appeal No.127/CHNY/2019\n\n for the assessment year 2015- 2016 and hold that the loss cannot be carry\n\n forwarded, the order of the CIT(A) directing the AO to allow carry forward\n\n of loss of Rs.3,35,71,136/- have become redundant since there is no carry\n\n forward loss available to the assessee in this assessment year and hence\n\n this appeal of the Revenue stands allowed.\n\n 26. In the result, the appeal filed by the Revenue in ITA No.\n\n 127/CHNY/2019 for the assessment year 2015-2016 is partly allowed for\n\n statistical purpose and the appeal of the Revenue in ITA No.\n\n 128/CHNY/2019 for the assessment year 2016-2017 stands allowed.\n\n\n Order pronounced on 29th day of December, 2023 at Chennai.\n\n\n Sd/- Sd/-\n (मंजुनाथ. जी) (महावीर िसंह )\n (MANJUNATHA.G) (MAHAVIR SINGH)\n ले खा सद /ACCOUNTANT MEMBER उपा /VICE PRESIDENT\nचे ई/Chennai\n दनांक/Dated:29.12.2023.\n KV\n आदेश क ितिलिप अ ेिषत/Copy to:\n\n1. अपीलाथ /Appellant 2. यथ /Respondent 3.. आयकर आयु /CIT 4. िवभागीय\n ितिनिध/ DR 5. गाड फाईल/GF

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Take notes as you read a judgment using our Virtual Legal Assistant and get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out our Premium Member services -- Free for one month.\n\nState Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission\nPostmaster vs Manoj Kumar Mardaraj on 6 July, 2022\nSTATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSALCOMMISSION,ODISHA,CUTTACK\n\n FIRST APPEAL NO. 432 OF 2003\n(From an order dated 3..2002 passed by the District Consumer\nDisputes Redressal Forum, Kendrapara in CD Case No. 86 of\n2000).\n\n 1. Postmaster, Had Post Office,\n Kendrapaara\n\n 2. Superintendent of Post Offices,\n North Division,\n At/Po/Dist - Cuttack\n ... Appellants\n Vrs.\n\n Manoj Kumar Mardaraj,\n S/o Late Ghanashyam Mardaraj,\n Proprietor - Jayashree,\n At - Badahat, Po/Dist - Kendrapara\n\n ... Respondent\n ____________\n For the appellants : Mr P.K.Das, C.G.C.\n For the respondent : None\n _____________\n\n\nP R E S E N T:\n\n HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.P.CHOUDHURY, PRESIDENT,\n DR.P.K.PRUSTY, MEMBER\n AND\n MISS S.L.PATTNAIK, MEMBER\n 2\n\n\n\n\nDATED THE JULY, 2022\n ORDER\n\nMISS S.L.PATTNAIK, MEMBER\n\n Heard learned counsel for the Appellant.\n\n2. None appears for the Respondent.\n\n3. This Appeal is filed U/S 15 of erstwhile Consumer\n\nProtection Act,1986 ( hereinafter called the Act). Hereinafter,\n\nthe parties to this appeal shall be referred to with reference to\n\ntheir respective status before the Learned District Forum.\n\n4. The brief fact of the case is that, the complainant has\n\nbooked a registered parcel containing silk sarees weighing\n\n3.800 grams valued at Rs.13,525/- to send same to Anita silks,\n\nBangalore on 04.12.99 through Head Post Office, Kendrapara.\n\nThe complainant further stated that the said parcel was\n\nreturned on 22.12.99 with tampering of seals and underweight\n\ncondition with postal remarks "refused by the addressee". The\n\ncomplainant further submitted that he refused to accept\n\nsuspecting loss of contents and returned to concerned post\n\nman. The complainant further averred that he lodged a\n 3\n\n\n\n\ncomplaint on 23.12.99 before the O.P. no.2 through O.P no.1\n\nbut the O.Ps did not pay any heed to it. Hence he filed\n\ncomplaint alleging deficiency in service on the part of the postal\n\nauthorities for tampering the postal parcel.\n\n5. Upon notice being served, the O.Ps appeared and filed\n\ntheir written version jointly .The respondents averred that,\n\nregistered parcel was booked vide receipt No.1076 at\n\nKendrapara Head post office on 04.12.99. The O.Ps further\n\npleaded that although the registered parcel reached its\n\ndestination, but returned back with remark "refused" on\n\n21.12.99 to Kendrapara Head post office . The O.Ps further\n\nstated that the said parcel was sent to the complainant but he\n\nrefused to accept it. The O.Ps further contended that they sent\n\nan intimation to the complainant to open the delivery of parcel\n\non 23.12.1999 as per Rule-196 of P & T manual volume-V ,the\n\ncomplainant came but denied to open the parcel and\n\nsubmitted a representation to Superintendent of post office,\n 4\n\n\n\n\nCuttack, North Division claiming return of lost valuable\n\ncontents or cost of lost contents.\n\n6. The O.Ps further averred that since it is a registered\n\nparcel, there is no provision in the post office rules to ascertain\n\nthe contents and cost of the materials inside it. The\n\ninvestigation into the matter is going on. The O.Ps further\n\ncontended that, as per provision of Section-3-141 of post office\n\nguide -1992, Ex-gratia compensation up to Rs.100/- can be paid\n\nto the sender on account of loss of contents of registered\n\narticle. The O.Ps also contended that section-6 of the Indian\n\nPost Office Act 1898, the O.Ps are exempted from the liability\n\nfor loss ,mis-delivery, delay or damage to any postal article, so\n\nthe OPs prayed for dismissal of the complaint.\n\n7. After hearing both the parties, the District Forum passed\n\nthe following order .\n\n " xxx xxx xxx\n The O.Ps shall pay an amount of Rs.5,000/- towards\n loss of postal articles and Rs.2,000/- towards compensation\n for mental agony and in toto Rs.7,000/- to the complainant\n within two months from the date of communication of this\n 5\n\n\n\n\n order. Accordingly complaint is allowed in part. No order as\n to cost."\n8. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the\n\nimpugned order passed by the Learned District Forum is illegal\n\nand bad in law. The Forum has not rightly considered the\n\nstatutory provision of Rule-196 of P & T manual Volume-V. He\n\nfurther submitted that, learned District Forum should have\n\ndismissed the complaint keeping in view of the provisions given\n\nin Section-6 of the Indian post office Act-1898 and provision\n\ngiven in Section-3,141 of the Post office guide-1992. Hence he\n\nprayed for set aside of the impugned order.\n\n9. Considered the submission of counsel for the appellant,\n\nperused the DFR and impugned order.\n\n10. Onus lies on the complainant to prove the deficiency of\n\nservice on the part of the OPs.\n\n11. It is admitted fact that, the complainant booked the\n\nregistered parcel in dispute vide postal receipt No.1076 from\n\nKendrapara Head office on 04.12.99, which was transmitted to\n\nAnita Silks, Bangalore. It is also admitted fact that, the parcel\n 6\n\n\n\n\nwas returned to Kendrapara head office on 21.12.1999 with\n\npostal remark "refused". It is also admitted fact that, the\n\ncomplainant refused to accept the returned parcel due to\n\nshortage of weight. It is also not disputed that, the appellant\n\nmade a departmental complain for claiming return of lost\n\nvaluable contents or the cost of lost articles.\n\n12. On perusal of the record, it is found that the consumer\n\ndispute raised by the complainant was in regard to the alleged\n\ndeficiency in service on the part of the postal authorities by\n\ntampering the postal parcel containing sarees of valued\n\nRs.13,528/- weighting 3,800gram ,which the appellant sent\n\nthrough registered post to Anita Silks, Bangalore. Although the\n\nparcel reached its destination but it was returned back with\n\nremarks "refused".\n\n13. It is settled in law that complainant has to prove its case\n\nand deficiency in service on the part of OPs. It appears from\n\ncomplaint that complainant sent sarees for 3800 grams but has\n\nnot filed any parcel receipt showing weight of parcel content.\n 7\n\n\n\n\nHowever, OPs admitted in written version that parcel content\n\nwas 3800 grams. Now question arises loss of weight of parcel.\n\nBut not a single document is filed by complainant to prove\n\nsame. Learned District Forum also has not found .amount of\n\nloss but computed loss amount Rs.5,000/- by guess it cannot be\n\naccepted in eye of law because every fact must b established\n\nby legal evidence.\n\n14. However, it is admitted by both parties that OPs have\n\nstarted enquiry but it is continued since two years as observed\n\nby learned District Forum. Thus, it is clearly established that\n\nthere was a default on the part of the O.Ps for not completing\n\ninquiry in the matter which is deficiency in service on the part\n\nof OPs.\n\n15. On forgoing discussion, it is crystal clear that due to\n\ndeficiency on the part of the O.Ps, the complainant has\n\nsuffered in some extent.\n\n16. In view of above discussion while confirming order of\n\nlearned District Forum, we modify the operative portion of\n 8\n\n\n\n\norder directing OPs to remove deficiency in service by\n\nconcluding enquiry within one month from today and further\n\ndirect to pay compensation of Rs.5,000/- with interest @9% per\n\nannum from the date of impugned order till date of payment.\n\nNo cost.\n\n DFR sent back forthwith.\n\n Supply free copy of this order to the respective parties or\n\nthe copy of this order be downloaded from Confonet or\n\nWebsite of this Commission to treat same as copy supplied\n\nfrom this Commission.\n\nDate: .7.2022\nCuttack\n ..............................\n (Dr.D.P.Choudhury J)\n President\n\n .....................\n (Dr.P.K.Prusty)\n Member\n\n .............................\n (Miss S.L.Pattnaik)\n Member\n 9\n 10

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Manipur High CourtAthokpam Mangi Singh vs Smt. Athokpam Ningol Mayanglambam (O) ... on 11 September, 2023Author:Ahanthem Bimol SinghBench:Ahanthem Bimol SinghItem No. 39\n\n IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR\n AT IMPHAL\n\n CRP(C.R.P.Art.227) No. 33 of 2023\n\n Athokpam Mangi Singh.\n ...Petitioner\n - Versus -\n Smt. Athokpam Ningol Mayanglambam (O) Mangol Devi & Anr.\n ...Respondents\n\n B E F O R E\n HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEM BIMOL SINGH\n\n ORDER11-09-2023\n\n Mr. R.K. Tomma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner seeks one\n\n week's time for filing rejoinder affidavit.Prayer is allowed.List this case again on 21-09-2023.JUDGE\n\n Victoria\n\n\n\n\nNINGOM Digitally signed by\n\nBAM NINGOMBAM VICTORIA\n Date: 2023.09.11\n 13:43:12 +05'30'\nVICTORIA

5f285089-b438-547b-bd7f-c8bcae5f85de

court_cases

Delhi High Court - OrdersBritish Scaffolding Limited vs Deepak Transport Agency Limited on 13 December, 2023Author:Jasmeet SinghBench:Jasmeet Singh$~85\n * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI\n + RFA 858/2023\n BRITISH SCAFFOLDING LIMITED ..... Appellant\n Through: Ms Kanisshka Tyagi, Adv. (through\n VC)\n versus\n\n DEEPAK TRANSPORT AGENCY LIMITED ..... Respondent\n Through:\n\n CORAM:\n HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH\n ORDER% 13.12.2023CM APPL. 64371/20231. This is an application seeking ad-interim injunction in favour of the\n appellant and against the respondent by restraining the respondent from\n filing an execution petition for executing the impugned judgment dated\n 25.07.2023 passed by learned ADJ, West District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi\n in Suit No. 613624/2016 & Old CS No. 126/2001.2. Issue notice to the respondent by all modes including electronic on the\n appellant taking requisite steps within one week from today.3. List before the Joint Registrar on 06.02.2024, the date already fixed.4. List before the Court on 13.03.2024, the date already fixed.JASMEET SINGH, J\n DECEMBER 13, 2023/sr\n\n\n\n\nThis is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:41\n $~87\n * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI+ RFA 975/2023NEEL KAMAL (SINCE DECEASED)\n THROUGH HIS LEGAL HEIRS ..... Appellant\n Through: Mr Jawahar Chawla, Adv. (through VC)\n\n versus\n SADANAND (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH LR ASHOK\n KUMAR GOGIA (SINCE DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LRS\n\n ..... Respondent\n Through:CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH\n ORDER\n % 13.12.2023CM APPL. 64584/2023Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.\n The application stands disposed of.CM APPL. 64585/20231. This is an application seeking condonation of 25 days delay in re-\n filing the present appeal.2. In view of the submissions made by learned counsel and for the\n reasons stated in the application, the delay of 25 days in re-filing the appeal\n is condoned.3. The application is disposed of.RFA 975/20234. This is an appeal challenging the judgment dated 18.08.2023 passed\n by learned ADJ-09, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in CS No. 13948/2016\n\n\n\n\nThis is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:41\n titled as 'Sada Nand (since deceased) throughLRs v. Neel Kamal(since\n deceased) through LRs' wherein the suit for possession and recovery filed\n by the respondent was decreed.5. It is stated by Mr Chawla, learned counsel for the appellant that the\n learned ADJ failed to appreciate that the premises in dispute being open\n space/platform/thada/Phar falls within the definition of premises underSection 2(i)of the Delhi Rent Control Act and hence, the civil suit will not\n lie.6. For the said reasons, issue notice to the respondent by all modes\n including electronic on the appellant taking requisite steps within one week\n from today, returnable before the Joint Registrar on 05.01.2024.7. List before this Court on 02.05.2024.CM APPL. 64583/20238. This is an application seeking stay of operation of judgment dated\n 18.08.2023 passed by learned ADJ-09, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in\n CS No. 13948/2016 titled as 'Sada Nand (since deceased) throughLRs v.\n Neel Kamal(since deceased) through LRs.9. Learned counsel for the appellant is unable to state whether execution\n has been filed or not.10. For the said reasons, as of today there is no urgency in passing an\n interim order.11. Issue notice to the respondent by all modes including electronic on the\n appellant taking requisite steps within one week from today, returnable\n before the Joint Registrar on 05.01.2024.12. List before this Court on 02.05.2024.This is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:4113. In case an execution is filed, the appellant shall be at liberty to file an\n application seeking an earlier date.JASMEET SINGH, J\n DECEMBER 13, 2023/sr Click here to check corrigendum, if any\n\n\n\n\nThis is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:42\n $~88\n * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI+ RFA 977/2023MUKESH & ANR. ..... Appellants\n Through: Dr Suman Chaudhary, Adv.versus\n BABA HARI DASS LOK SEWA MANDAL (REGD.)\n THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT SH.RAJENDER SINGH DAGAR\n ..... Respondent\n Through:CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH\n ORDER\n % 13.12.2023CM APPL. 64592/2023Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.\n The application stands disposed of.RFA 977/2023 & CM APPL. 64590/2023 (Condonation of delay)1. This is an appeal challenging the judgment dated 07.02.2023 passed\n by learned ADJ-02, South West, Dwarka Court, Delhi in Civil Suit No.\n 530/2020 titled as 'Mukesh & Ors. Vs. Baba Hari Dass Lok Seva Mandal'\n wherein the suit for possession, permanent injunction and recovery of\n damages/mesne profits filed by the appellants was dismissed.2. It is stated by Dr Chaudhary, learned counsel for the appellants that\n the learned ADJ failed to appreciate that even though the site plan was not\n filed but the appellant filed the record from Revenue Department. She\n further states that the site plan is not required in a suit for possession as there\n is no partition being sought in the suit.3. For the said reasons, issue notice to the respondent by all modes\n\n\n\n\nThis is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:42\n including electronic on the appellants taking requisite steps within one week\n from today, returnable before the Joint Registrar on 08.01.2024.4. List before this Court on 07.05.2024.CM APPL. 64591/20235. This is an application seeking interim injunction filed on behalf of the\n appellant.6. Issue notice to the respondent by all modes including electronic on the\n appellants taking requisite steps within one week from today, returnable\n before the Joint Registrar on 08.01.2024.7. Since the appellant claims to be the owner of the suit property and has\n filed Revenue Records, it is directed that till the next date of hearing the\n respondent shall maintain status quo with regard to title and possession of\n the suit property.8. List before this Court on 07.05.2024.JASMEET SINGH, J\n DECEMBER 13, 2023\n sr\n Click here to check corrigendum, if any\n\n\n\n\nThis is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:42\n $~89 & 90\n * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI\n + CONT.CAS(C) 776/2020, CM APPL. 29936/2020 & CM APPL.39669/2022GURVINDER SINGH & ORS. ..... Petitioners\n Through: Mr Joby P Varghese, Mr Shahid Akhter and Mr\n Aby P Varghese, Advs.versus\n KUMAR RAJESH CHANDRA, DIRECTOR\n GENERAL SASHASTRA SEEMA BAL & ANR. ..... Respondents\n Through: Dr L C Singhi, Adv. (through VC)\n Inspector Janak Raj, SI Shrabanta Sarkat90+ CONT.CAS(C) 27/2021\n KANHAIYA LAL ..... Petitioner\n Through: Mr Joby P Varghese, Mr Shahid Akhter and Mr\n Aby P Varghese, Advs.versus\n KUMAR RAJESH CHANDRA, DIRECTOR\n GENERAL, SASHASTRA SEEMA BAL & ANR. ..... Respondents\n Through: Mr Anurag Ahluwalia, CGSC for R-1 and\n R-2/UOI.Inspector Janak Raj, SI Shrabanta Sarkat\n\n CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH\n ORDER\n % 13.12.20231. Mr Anurag Ahluwalia, learned CGSC states that the respondents are\n in the process of notifying the Recruitment Rules pursuant to the cadre\n review. He, however, states that they are clarifying the queries and\n objections raised by Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Law &\n\n\n\n\nThis is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:42\n Justice.2. The respondents are directed to expedite notifying the Recruitment\n Rules.3. List on 12.02.2024 for filing updated status report.JASMEET SINGH, J\n DECEMBER 13, 2023\n sr\n Click here to check corrigendum, if any\n\n\n\n\nThis is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:42\n $~94\n * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI\n + CONT.CAS(C) 685/2022\n VIKRAM ZUTSHI ..... Petitioner\n Through: Counsel (appearance not given)\n\n versus\n\n ANAHITA KAUL ..... Respondent\n Through: Ms Vandana Kahlon and Mr Rudra\n Kahlon, Advs.CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH\n ORDER\n % 13.12.20231. Mr Kahlon, learned counsel for the respondent states that he will\n obtain appropriate instructions from the respondent.2. In the meanwhile, on instructions learned counsel for the respondent\n states that the petitioner is at liberty to visit Sharjah, U.A.E and meet the\n child any number of times with 48 hours advance notice to the respondent in\n writing.3. List on 19.02.2024 for further proceedings.JASMEET SINGH, J\n DECEMBER 13, 2023\n sr\n Click here to check corrigendum, if any\n\n\n\n\nThis is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:42\n $~3\n * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI+ RFA 607/2023ANJU MATTOO ..... Appellant\n Through: Mr Anand Mishra, Adv.versus\n\n KRISHNA MATTOO ..... Respondent\n Through:\n\n CORAM:\n HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH\n ORDER\n % 13.12.2023CM APPL. 38794/2023Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.\n The application stands disposed of.CM APPL. 38793/20231. This is an application seeking condonation of 11 days delay in filing\n the appeal.2. In view of the submissions made by learned counsel and for the\n reasons stated in the application, the delay of 11 days in filing the appeal is\n condoned.3. The application is disposed of.RFA 607/20234. This is an appeal seeking to challenge the judgment and decree dated\n 27.02.2023 passed by learned ADJ-07, South East, Saket Courts, Delhi in\n CS No. 7806/2016 wherein the counter claim of the appellant was rejected.This is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:425. It is stated by Mr Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant that even\n though the issues were framed, without any evidence, the counter claim was\n rejected after filing of the evidence affidavit.6. For the said reasons, issue notice to the respondent by all modes\n including electronic on the appellant taking requisite steps within one week\n from today, returnable before the Joint Registrar on 08.01.2024.7. List before this Court on 13.05.2024.CM APPL. 38792/20238. This is an application seeking stay of further proceedings in CS No.\n 208722/2016 pending before learned ADJ-07, South East, Saket Couts,\n Delhi and also for grant of status quo with respect to rights, titles and\n interest with respect to the property 227-B, 3rd floor, Sant Nagar, East of\n Kailash, New Delhi till the pendency of the appeal.9. It is stated by Mr Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant that till the\n rejection of his counter-claim there was a status quo order.10. Issue notice to the respondent by all modes including electronic on the\n appellant taking requisite steps within one week from today, returnable\n before the Joint Registrar on 08.01.2024.11. List before this Court on 13.05.2024.12. It is directed that till the next date of hearing, the parties shall\n maintain status quo with regard to title and possession of the above\n mentioned property.JASMEET SINGH, J\n DECEMBER 13, 2023\n sr Click here to check corrigendum, if any\n\n\n\n\nThis is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:42\n $~59\n * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI\n + RFA 704/2019, CM APPL. 32947/2019, CM APPL. 9568/2020, CM\n APPL. 7544/2021, CM APPL. 20759/2022\n\n SEEMA BANSAL ..... Appellant\n Through: Ms Aditi Gupta, Adv. (DHCLSC)\n Appellant in person.versus\n\n DURGA DASS BANSAL & ORS ..... Respondents\n Through: Mr Pratyush, Adv.R-1 and R-2 in person.CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH\n ORDER\n % 13.12.20231. The petitioner may look for an alternative accommodation within two\n weeks from today and will bring the details. The respondent will also look\n for similar accommodation in BN Block, Shalimar Bagh and bring the\n details on next date of hearing.2. Mr Pratyush, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 states\n on instructions that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are ready and willing to pay\n rent upto Rs. 20,000/- per month for alternative accommodation in advance\n for two years.3. List on 14.02.2024.JASMEET SINGH, J\n DECEMBER 13, 2023\n sr\n Click here to check corrigendum, if any\n\n\n\n\nThis is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:42\n $~58\n * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI\n + RFA 830/2018, CM APPL. 40554/2018, CM APPL. 40555/2018\n DAV COLLAGE MANAGING COMMITTEE ..... Appellant\n Through: Mr Anurag Lakhotia, Adv. (through\n VC) with Mr Udit Dwivedi, Adv.versus\n\n RAMA SHARMA ..... Respondent\n Through: Mr Rajeev Lochan Mahunta, Mr\n Kaushal Chandra Jha and Ms Naina\n Chauhan, Advs.\n Respondent in person.\n CORAM:\n HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH\n ORDER\n % 13.12.20231. Mr Lochan, learned counsel for the respondent states that there is\n some confusion in the memo of parties. Mr Lakhotia, learned counsel for the\n appellant shall take necessary steps in this regard.2. Mr Lochan states that the appeal may be listed for hearing in due\n course in order to prepare his submissions.3. The appellant shall take steps to ensure that the statutory dues of the\n respondent are cleared within a period of four weeks from today in\n accordance with law. The appellant is required to file a compliance affidavit\n before the next date of hearing.4. List on 05.02.2024 for hearing.JASMEET SINGH, J\n DECEMBER 13, 2023/sr Click here to check corrigendum, if any\n\n\n\n\nThis is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:42\n $~9\n * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI\n + CONT.CAS(C) 363/2022 & CM APPL. 16473/2023\n KUSUM & ANR. ..... Petitioners\n Through: Dr. Ajay Chaudhary and Mr Vishesh Kumar,\n Advs. (through VC)\n versus\n ANIL KUMAR SHARMA ..... Respondent\n Through: Mr Jasvinder, Adv. for R-1 (through VC)\n Ms Anupriya Tanwar and Ms Sandhya Chawla,\n Advs. for R-2.Mr Abhinav Singh, Senior Panel Counsel for\n Govt. of U.P. with SI Vikrant Tomar and HC\n Pradeep Kumar, PS-Mathura\n CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH\n ORDER\n % 12.12.20231. Pursuant to the NBWs, respondent No.1 is present in Court. The\n NBWs issued against the respondent No.1 stands cancelled. He is directed to\n remain present in Court on each and every date of hearing.2. Respondent No.1 states that a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs was sent to the bank\n account of his previous counsel Ms Shalini Goswami for the purposes of\n sending it to the petitioners. The same has not been done. Let Court Notice\n be issued to Ms Shalini Goswami, Advocate for the next date of hearing.3. The respondent No.2 has no role in the contempt petition and he is\n deleted from the array of parties. Let fresh amended memo of parties be\n filed.4. List on 25.01.2024.JASMEET SINGH, J\n DECEMBER 12, 2023/sr Click here to check corrigendum, if any\n\n\n\n\nThis is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:42\n $~139\n * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI+ RC.REV. 517/2018RAJNI BAHL (SINCE DECEASED) THR LRS ..... Petitioners\n Through: Mr D.K. Rustagi and Mr J Karan\n Malhotra, Advs.Versus\n\n ARUN KUMAR NAYYAR ..... Respondent\n Through: Mr Ravinder Sethi, Sr. Adv. with Mr\n Puneet Sharma, Adv.\n\n\n CORAM:\n HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH\n ORDER\n % 11.12.2023CM APPL. 62414/2023Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.\n The application stands disposed of.CM APPL. 62413/20231. This is an application seeking clarification of the judgment dated\n 22.11.2023 wherein six months time was granted to the petitioner to vacate\n the premises.2. Mr. Sethi, learned senior counsel for the respondent states that is not\n within the ambit ofSection 14(7)of the Delhi Rent Control Act as the\n petitioner has already availed the benefit ofSection 14(7)of the Delhi Rent\n Control Act.This is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:423. Issue notice4. Mr. Rustagi, learned counsel accepts notice for the petitioner and\n states that he has instructions from his clients to handover vacant and\n peaceful possession on or before 31.12.2023 with the following conditions:a) The petitioners will pay the last paid rent upto 31.12.2023.b) The petitioners shall not alienate, encumber, part with possession\n or create any third party rights with respect to any portion of the tenanted\n premises.c) The petitioners shall pay up-to-date water and electricity charges\n before handing over of the possession.5. The same is acceptable to the respondents.6. Let an affidavit be filed on or before 15.12.2023 with an advance\n copy to the respondent.7. Taking the statement of Mr. Rustagi, learned counsel for the petitioner\n on record and binding the petitioners to the same, the application is disposed\n of.8. If the affidavit is not filed on or before 15.12.2023, the respondent\n will be at liberty to file an application for appropriate directions.9. Even though the application has become infructuous, Mr. Rustagi,\n learned counsel for the petitioners states that de-hors the fact that the\n petitioner is handing over vacant and peaceful possession of the property in\n question, the issue whether a Revisional Court should grant six months in\n terms ofSection 14(7)of the Delhi Rent Control Act or not must be\n adjudicated.10. Only for consideration of this point as an academic issue, list on\n 20.02.2024 at 03:00 p.m.\n\n\n\n\nThis is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:4211. Mr.Gaurav Duggal, Advocate Mobile No. 9811297368 is appointed\n as an Amicus to assist the Court.12. Let this order be communicated to him.JASMEET SINGH, J\n DECEMBER 11, 2023\n sr Click here to check corrigendum, if any\n\n\n\n\nThis is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:42\n $~145\n * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI\n + CONT.CAS(C) 1011/2023\n DR BEENA AGARWAL ..... Petitioner\n Through: Ms Meghna De, Adv.versus\n\n DR S B DEEPAK KUMAR SECRETARY ..... Respondent\n Through: Mrs Avnish Ahlawat, Standing\n Counsel (Services) GNCTD with Mrs\n Tania Ahlawat, Mr Nitesh Kumar\n Singh, Ms Laavanya Kaushik, Ms\n Aliza Alam and Mr Mohnish\n Sehrawat, Advs.CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH\n ORDER\n % 11.12.20231. This is a petition seeking initiation of contempt proceedings against\n the respondent for violation of the order dated 22.02.2023 passed in W.P.\n (C) 8547/2018. The operative portion of the said order reads as under:-"16. We find that the petitioner was considered by the UPSC and\n had secured more marks than Dr. Saroj Bala in that sense; she is\n slightly higher in the merit, though both of them were found "unfit".Be that as it may, the Supreme Court has granted the regularization\n in favor of Dr. Saroj Bala. In view of the stand of the UPSC, which\n stand was accepted by the learned ASG representing the Govt. of\n NCT of Delhi, there can be no contest.17. If that be so, there is no reason, why the petitioner, who is also\n\n\n\n\nThis is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:42\n similarly placed like Dr. Saroj Bala and has vast experience of\n more than 27 years and has been working as Head of the\n Department of Surgery, should not be given the same benefit as has\n been granted by the Supreme Court. For parity of reasons, the\n petitioner shall also be entitled to the benefit of regularization in\n the cadre subject to the fulfillment of other applicable conditions."2. It is stated by Ms. De, learned counsel for the petitioner that the\n petitioner should be given the same treatment as Dr. Saroj Bala.3. Ms. Kaushik, learned counsel for the respondent has handed over an\n order dated 08.12.2023 wherein Dr. Saroj Bala was granted regularization\n with effect from 30.11.2023. She states that as per parity and as per the\n judgment of'Dr. Saroj Bala v. The Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors.'\n [Civil Appeal No(s). 7115/2022] the petitioner also has been granted\n regularization from 30.11.2023.4. In this view of the matter, I am of the view that there is no\n intentional or malafide violation of the order dated 22.02.2023 passed in\n W.P. (C) 8547/2018.5. The contempt petition is disposed of.6. In case the petitioner is aggrieved by the action of the respondent, the\n petitioner is at liberty to initiate appropriate action in accordance with law.7. The order dated 08.12.2023 handed over in Court today is taken on\n record.JASMEET SINGH, J\n DECEMBER 11, 2023\n sr Click here to check corrigendum, if any\n\n\n\n\nThis is a digitally signed order.The authenticity of the order can be re-verified from Delhi High Court Order Portal by scanning the QR code shown above.\nThe Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/12/2023 at 23:19:42

2e2028a3-bb95-55aa-ac48-67d5972aaaed

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Central Administrative Tribunal - DelhiDevender Faujdar vs M/O Defence on 1 October, 2021Item No.11 1 OA No.2165/2021\n\n\n\n\n Central Administrative Tribunal\n Principal Bench, New Delhi\n\n OA No. 2165/2021\n\n This the 1st day of October,\n October 2021\n\n (Through Video Conferencing)\n\n Hon'ble Mr. A.K. Bishnoi, Member (A)\n Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)\n\nDevender Faujdar Recruitment/Gp.C\nS/o Sh. Naresh Singh,\nAged about 26 years.\nR/o Sarsena, The\n The-Weir, Bharatpur,\nRajesthan-321642.\n 321642. ....Applicant\n .Applicant\n\n (through Advocate: Shri U. Srivastava )\n\n VERSUS\n1. Union of India through, the Secretary, M/o Defence,\n New Delhi.\n\n2. The Director Centre for Personnel Talent\n Management (CEPTAM) DRDO,\n M/o Defence, Metcalfe House,\n Civil Line, Delhi\n Delhi-54. ...\n .. Respondents\n\n (through Advocate: Shri J.P.Tiwari)\n\n\n ORDER (Oral)\n\n Hon'ble Mr. R. N. Singh, Member (J):The present Original Application (OA) has been\n\nfiled by the applicant under Section 19 of AT Act., 1985,\n\nwhereby the applicant has challenged the inaction at theItem No.11 2 OA No.2165/2021end of the respondents in considering and finalizing the\n\nrequest of the applicant dated 12.01.2020 followed by a\n\nreminder dated 21.09.2021 {Annexure A/1 Colly)}.2. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that in\n\nthe aforesaid representation the applicant has requested\n\nto the respondents to consider his candidature under\n\nEWS category for recruitment to the post of\n\nAdministrative Assistant 'A' (English Typing), post code\n\n0401. In the aforesaid background, the applicant has\n\nprayed for the following relief(s):-" (a) Directing the respondents to place the relevant\n records pertaining to the present O.A. before\n their Lordships for the purpose adjudication in\n the matter, in the interest of justice.(b) Directing the respondents to considering and\n finalizing the request of the applicant\n dt.12.01.2020 followed through the reminder\n dt.21.09.2021 {Annexure A/1 (Colloy)} to\n consider his candidature under EWS category\n for recruitment to the post code 0401\n Administrative Assistant ' A' (English Typing)\n in accordance with the relevant rules and\n instructions on the subject with in some\n stipulated period.(c) Allowing the O. A. of the applicants with all\n other consequential benefits and costs.(d) Any other fit and proper relief may also be\n granted to the applicants."Item No.11 3 OA No.2165/20213. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that\n\nrespondents may be directed to consider the applicant's\n\naforesaid representation dated 12.01.2020.4. Issue notice to the respondents. Mr. J.P. Tiwari,\n\nlearned counsel, who appears on advance service accepts\n\nnotice on behalf of the respondents.5. To the limited prayer of the applicant's counsel,\n\nthere is no objection from the respondents.6. In the aforesaid background, without going into the\n\nmerits, the present OA is disposed of with a direction to\n\nthe respondents to consider applicant's aforesaid\n\nrepresentation dated 12.01.2020 and to dispose of the\n\nsame by passing an appropriate reasoned and speaking\n\norder as expeditiously as possible and preferably within\n\neight weeks of receipt of a copy of this order.The OA is disposed of in above terms, with no\n\ncosts.(Mr. R.N. Singh) (A.K. Bishnoi)\n Member (J) Member (A)\n\nmk/daya

1db8e9ff-dc25-5485-9004-7aec98661b04

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Telangana High CourtSmt. Zenath Sajida vs The State Of Telangana on 1 September, 2023HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE G. ANUPAMA CHAKRAVARTHY\n\n CRIMINAL PETITION NO.8428 OF 2023\n\nO R D E R:This Criminal Petition is filed underSection 482of the Code of\n\nCriminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C.') by the petitioners -\n\naccused Nos.2 to 5 to quash the proceedings against them in\n\nC.C.No.7744 of 2022 pending on the file of XIII Additional Chief\n\nMetropolitan Magistrate, Nampally, Hyderabad. The offences alleged\n\nagainst the petitioners are underSections 498(A),406and506of the\n\nIndian Penal Code andSections 3and4of the Dowry Prohibition Act,\n\n1961.2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri S.Ganesh, learned\n\nAssistant Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1 - State and perused\n\nthe record.3. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the\n\npetitioners are innocent and a false complaint has been foisted\n\nagainst them by the de-facto complainant with bald and general\n\nallegations. Learned counsel further contended that the police\n\nwithout duly investigating the case filed charge sheet against the\n\npetitioners. Therefore, prayed to quash the proceedings against\n\nthem.GAC,J\n Crl.P.No.8428_202324. On the other hand, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor\n\ncontended that after due investigation, the police have filed charge\n\nsheet against the petitioners. He further contended that it is not a fit\n\ncase to quash the proceedings against the petitioners at this juncture\n\nand the matter has to be decided only after conducting trial by the\n\nCourt below.5. On a perusal of the charge sheet, this Court is of the view that\n\ntruth or otherwise of the allegations made against the petitioners can\n\nbe decided only after conducting trial. Hence, this Court is not\n\ninclined to interfere with the proceedings against the petitioners.6. Taking into consideration the fact that petitioner No.1 - accused\n\nNo.2 is mother of accused No.1 and petitioners 2 to 4 - accused Nos.3\n\nto 5 are brothers of accused No.1; and only general allegations are\n\nleveled against them, this Court is of the considerable view that the\n\nappearance/attendance of the petitioners - accused Nos.2 to 5\n\nbefore the trial Court shall be dispensed with.7. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is disposed of. The\n\nappearance/attendance of the petitioners - accused Nos.2 to 5\n\nbefore the Court of XIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,\n\nNampally, Hyderabad in C.C.No.7744 of 2022 is dispensed with, unless\n\ntheir presence is required by the trial Court for a specific purpose or at\n GAC,J\n Crl.P.No.8428_20233the time of recording examination underSection 313Cr.P.C. and on\n\nthe date of pronouncement of judgment. Further, the petitioners are\n\nat liberty to move an application before the trial Court seeking to\n\ndischarge them from the case. On such application being filed and if\n\nprima facie case is not made out against them, the trial Court shall\n\nconsider the same and pass appropriate orders within a period of\n\nthree (03) weeks from the date of filing of the said discharge petition\n\nwithout being influenced by any of the observations made by this\n\nCourt in this order.Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed._______________________________\n G.ANUPAMA CHAKRAVARTHY, J\n\nDate: 01.09.2023\nns

09caef64-d3ae-5d17-8cdb-331123038b1f

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Jammu & Kashmir High CourtVijay Kumar And Others vs Director General on 1 July, 2022Sr.No. 29\n\n\n HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH\n AT JAMMU\n\n\n SWP No. 2001/2016\n IA No. 2/2016\n IA No. 1/2017\n CM No. 7182/2021\n CM No. 3209/2021\n IA No. 2/2017\n IA No. 1/2016\n\nVijay Kumar and others ..... Petitioners\n\n\n Through: Mr. Rakesh Chargotra, Advocate\n\n\n Vs\n\n\nDirector General, Doordarshan and others ..... Respondents\n\n\n Through: Mr. Sandeep Gupta, CGSC\n\n\nCoram: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAHUL BHARTI, JUDGE\n\n ORDER01.07.2022\n\n\n This Writ was filed on 9th, September, 2016.In this writ petition twenty petitioners have come to put forth\n\nthough jointly their individual grievance emanating from their working status\n\nbearing different nomenclature like casual production assistants, make up\n\nassistants, lightening assistants, floor assistants, carpenters, library assistants,\n\nC.G operators, graphic assistants, set assistants on assignment basis with the\n\nDoordarshan Kendra Jammu. Lately the petitioners came to be designated as\n\nSet Assistants and bear their such status as on date. To put it simply, the\n\npetitioners are the work force engaged for the purpose of facilitating the\n\nprogramme production of the Doordarshan Kendra, Jammu.2 SWP No. 2001/2016The concern which caught the petitioners in the course of their\n\nworking was that minimum seven days work engagement/functional\n\nassignment per calendar month available to them was sought to be lessened to\n\nthree days. The engagement of the petitioners can be more than any number of\n\ndays in a calendar month subject to work demand but the minimum number of\n\ndays for which they are supposed to have their assured engagement is seven\n\ndays per calendar month which keeps them earning their respective livelihood\n\nfrom their work at the uniform rate prescribed. Be that as it may be, the fact\n\nremains that the petitioners have been long serving their assignments on seven\n\ndays minimum assured work days. The number of years which the petitioners\n\nhave invested in this arrangement of working is good part of their working life\n\nand that has set in a well entrenched legitimate expectation. Any unfair/\n\nunilateral action on the part of the respondents in effecting the reduction of the\n\nminimum number of working days would mean loss of their earning for their\n\nlivelihood. Thus, the writ cause of the petitioners is legitimate.In the course of hearing the submissions in the case, the counsel for\n\nthe parties were found in consensus to the fact that the petitioners are serving\n\non the very same working arrangement of seven days minimum assignment\n\neven as on date without any disruption. The learned counsel for the\n\nrespondents submits that this fixation of minimum days of assignment of the\n\nset assistants by the respondents is a work pattern followed uniformly\n\nthroughout and there cannot be a discrimination. The learned counsel of the\n\nrespondents further submits that it is yearly fund allocation and availability\n\nwhich determines the fixation of the minimum days engagement.3 SWP No. 2001/2016Considering the fact that the petitioners have been working as Set\n\nAssistants on said minimum seven days calendar month minimum engagement\n\nbasis with the Doordarshan Kendra Jammu during the entire course of the\n\npendency of the writ petition, as admitted on both sides, this Court deems it fit\n\nthat the said minimum seven days calendar month work\n\nengagement/assignment in favour of the petitioners shall continue and the\n\nsame shall not be reduced unless and until the allocation of the yearly PP & SP\n\nfunds for the programme production purposes mandates schedule of the lower\n\nnumber of minimum days without any discrimination amongst similarly\n\nsituated set assistants with all Doordarshan Kendras. It is further directed that\n\nthe grievance of the petitioners as to their unpaid due emolument as accruing\n\non the date of filing of the writ petition from the respondent no. 2 & 3's end be\n\naddressed by the said respondents to clear their respective claims if any as to\n\nsaid unpaid and due emoluments.This writ petition is accordingly disposed off on the consensus\n\nbasis as stated by the learned counsel for the parties.(Rahul Bharti)\n Judge\nJammu\n01.07.2022\nMuneesh

3329f69a-0a15-567a-a0d8-3b7405dd05f8

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Bangalore District CourtSri.Venkatachalapathi vs The Managing Director on 28 September, 2020IN THE COURT OF SMALL CAUSES (SCCH­23)\n AT BENGALURU\n DATED THIS THE 28th DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2020\n\nPRESENT: SMT.ASHWINI M. HATTIHOLI\n (B.Com., LL.B),\n XXI ADDL. SCJ & ACMM\n MEMBER ­MACT,\n BENGALURU.\n\n MVC. No. 5320/2019\nPetitioner : Sri.Venkatachalapathi,\n Aged about 68 years,\n S/o Muthegowda,\n R/at.No.49/2, 17th 'A' main road,\n Maruthi Block, Srinagar,\n Bengaluru­560050.\n\n (By Sri.K.T.Madhu, Advocate )\n v/s\nRespondents : The Managing Director,\n BMTC, K.H.Road,\n Shanthinagar,\n Bengaluru­560027.\n (RC owner of the BMTC Bus\n bearing No.KA­01­FA­0626)\n\n (By Sri.M.N.Krishna, Advocate)\n JUDGMENTThis claim petition is filed by the petitioner undersection\n166of the Motor Vehicles Act, claiming compensation of\nRs.20,00,000/­ from the respondent on account of the injuries\nsustained by him in a Road Traffic accident on 6.7.2019.SCCH-23 2 MVC No.5320/20192. It is the case of the petitioner that on 6.7.2019 at\nabout 5.30 p.m., while he was stepping into the BMTC bus\nbearing Reg. No.KA­01­FA­0626 at Kengeri Satellite Bus stand,\nMysore road, Kengeri, Bengaluru, in order to travel towards\nRamohalli (Bengaluru south taluk), the driver of the said bus\nmoved the bus in a negligent manner without observing the fact\nthat he was getting into the bus. As a result, the petitioner fell\ndown and the rear wheel of the bus ran over the left leg of the\npetitioner, due to which he sustained grievous crush injuries to\nhis left leg. Immediately, he was shifted to Mathru hospital,\nKengeri, where he was given first aid treatment. Later on the\nsame day he was shifted to GIMS hospital, Kengeri, where he\nwas again given first aid and referred to a higher center. As\nsuch he was shifted to Sanjay Gandhi Institute of Trauma\nhospital, Bengaluru and was admitted there as an inpatient for\na period of 13 days, where he underwent multiple surgeries.\nDuring the course of treatment he developed abnormal kidney\nand liver functions. Hence he was referred to Victoria hospital,\nBengaluru, wherein the duty doctor gave him some initial\ntreatment relating to kidney and liver. He was then advised to\nget himself admitted after two days, since the beds in all the\nwards were full. Accordingly after two days he was again taken\nto Victoria hospital, where he was admitted as an inpatient for\n41 days and was treated by the Doctors of Nephrology,\nGastroenterology and Ortho departments. During the course ofSCCH-23 3 MVC No.5320/2019treatment, the petitioner developed Gangrene in the left leg.\nHence the above knee amputation of the left leg was done. That\nthe petitioner is still under the follow­up treatment and has\nspent Rs.5,00,000/­ towards medical expenses, food and\nnourishment, conveyance, attendant and other incidental\ncharges. The Kengeri Traffic police registered a case against the\ndriver of the said BMTC Bus in Crime No.83/2019, undersections 279and337of IPC. Prior to the accident the petitioner\nwas hale and healthy and was working as a coolie at Bengaluru\nSafety Glass works situated at Bommasandra, Bengaluru and\nearning a sum of Rs.15,000/­ p.m. Due to the accident the\npetitioner lost his left lower limb and is unable to walk\nindependently. He is also not able to attend his normal routine\nactivities which he was carrying on prior to the accident.\nTherefore the petitioner claims a compensation of\nRs.20,00,000/­ under all heads along with cost and interest @\n12% p.a.3. After service of notice, the respondent appeared before\nthe court and filed written statement specifically denying the\npetition averments. Further, emphatically denied the rashness\nand negligence attributed to the driver of the BMTC Bus bearing\nNo.KA­01­FA­0626. On the contrary, submitted that the BMTC\nbus referred above was in a scheduled trip from TTMC, Kengeri\nto Taverekere. In order to move the Bus from Kengeri bus stop\ntowards Mysore road, when the driver of the said bus slowly\nstarted moving it in front of the TTMC, Kengeri to Mysore roadSCCH-23 4 MVC No.5320/2019junction, at that point, the petitioner attempted to get into the\nrunning/ moving BMTC bus from the front automatic closed\ndoor. In the due course he lost the control and fell down under\nthe rear wheel of the Bus and sustained the alleged grievous\ninjuries to the left leg. In the alleged accident no other\npassenger was injured. The petitioner knowing fully well that\nattempting to board the running bus would result in injuries,\ndid so. Hence, the sole contributory negligent act of the\npetitioner resulted in the alleged accident. Therefore the\nrespondent is not vicariously or otherwise liable to pay any\ncompensation amount as claimed in the petition. In the police\ncomplaint and petition, the petitioner has falsely implicated the\nBMTC bus. That the compensation claimed is highly excessive\nand imaginary. Further the respondent has paid a sum of\nRs.10,000/­ to the petitioner towards interim compensation on\n12.7.2019, without prejudice to the grounds urged in the claim\npetition. On these grounds prayed to dismiss the claim petition\non exemplary costs.4. On the basis of the above pleadings, my predecessor­\nin­office framed the following;ISSUES1. Whether the petitioner proves that, on 6­7­\n 2019 at about 5.30 p.m on Kengeri Satellite\n Bus stand, Mysore road, Kengeri,\n Bengaluru, he sustained injuries in RTA\n caused by the driver of the BMTC busSCCH-23 5 MVC No.5320/2019bearing No.KA­01­FA­0626 on account of\n rash and negligent driving ?2. Whether the petitioner is entitled for\n compensation ? If so, to what amount and\n from whom ?3. What Order or award?5. During evidence, the petitioner got himself examined\nas P.W.1. Ex.P1 to P14 were marked on his behalf. Dr.Nagaraj\nB.N, S/o late B.K.N Swamy, Orthopaedic surgeon, SOADS was\nexamined as PW.2 and Ex.P18 to 20 were marked through this\nwitness. On the other hand, the driver of the BMTC bus\nbearing KA­01­FA­0626 was examined as RW.1. Ex's.R1 to R6\nwere marked.6. The counsel on both the sides filed their written\narguments. Further the counsel appearing for the petitioner\nalso addressed his oral arguments. Perused the entire\nmaterials placed on record. My answers to the above issues\nare as follows:­\n\n\n Issue No.1: In the Affirmative\n\n Issue No.2: Partly in the affirmative\n\n Issue No.3: As per final order\n\n for the followingSCCH-23 6 MVC No.5320/2019REASONS7. ISSUE No.1 : It is well known that the initial\nburden is squarely on the claimant to establish negligence\nwithout which proof, no compensation can be awarded. In the\nbackground of the principle that proof of negligence is a sine­\nqua­non to sustain a claim; the proof displayed by the parties\nto the lis ought to be analyzed in order to unveil the truth\nregarding rival contentions.8. The evidence affidavits filed by the petitioner as\nwell as respondent are nothing but replica of their respective\npleadings. However, perusal of the same reveals that the\nrespondent does not deny the occurrence of the accident on\nthe relevant date, time and place. Infact the factum of\naccident was admitted by RW.1, in the course of his cross\nexamination as " ಅಪಘಘತವವ ಕಕಕಗಕಗರಯ ನಮಮ ಬಸಸ‍ನಲಘಲಣದ ವಘವಪಪಯಲಲ\nಆಗರರತಪದಕ ಎಕದರಕ ನಜ." The specific defence of the respondent is\nthat the sole contributory negligent act of the petitioner\nresulted in the accident. In the same line, suggestions were\nmade to PW.1 which he outrightly denied as follows: " ನಘನರ\nಕಕಕಗಕಗರ ಬಸಸ‍ ನಲಘಲಣದ ಹಕಹರಭಘಗದ ಗಕಗಟಟಲಲ ಬಸಸ‍ ಹತಪದಕಲ. ಅಲಲ ನಲಘಲಣ\nಇಲಲದಕಗ ಇದಲರಹ ಸಹ ನಘನರ ಗಕಗಟಟಲಲ ಮರಚಚದ ಬಘಗಲನ ಬಸಟಲಲ ಹತಪಲರ ಪಪಯತಟ\nಪಟರಟ , ಕಕಳಗಕ ಬದಲದಕಲಗನಕ ಎಕದರಕ ಸರಯಲಲ. ನಘನರ ಹಕಹಗಗರತಪದಲ ಬಸಸನಟ ಹತಪಲರ\nಹಕಹಗಗ ನನಟ ತಪಪನಕದ ಬದರಲ ಗಘಯಗಕಹಕಡದಕಲಗನಕ ಎಕದರಕ ಸರಯಲಲ. ನನಗಕ 72\nವರರ ವಯಸಘಸಗದಲರಕದ ನನಟ ಅಜಘಗರಹಕತಕಯಕದ ಬಸಸನರಟ ಹತಪಲರ ಹಕಹಗಗSCCH-23 7 MVC No.5320/2019ಅಪಘಘತ ಮಘಡಕಕಹಕಡದಕಲಗನಕ ಎಕದರಕ ಸರಯಲಲ." Per contra, going\nfurther PW.1 categorically answered to the aforesaid\nsuggestions as " ನಘನರ ಬಸಸನರಟ ಹತಪಲರ ಹಕಹಗದಘಗ ಮರಕದನ ಚಕಪದ ಹತಪರ\nಬದಲರರತಕಪಗನಕ. ಸಘಕಕಯರ ಸಸಇಚಕಚಯಕದ, ಒಕದರ ಕಘಲರ ಬಘಗಲನಲಲ ಮತರಪ ಒಕದರ\nಕಘಲರ ಕಕಳಗಡಕ ಇದಘಲಗ ಬಸರಸ ಚಘಲನಕ ಮಘಡಕಕಹಕಡರ ಹಕಹಗಗದಲರಕದ ಬದಲರರತಕಪಗನಕ\nಎನರಟತಘಪರಕ. ನನಟ ಕಘಲಗಕ ಗಘಯವಘಗತರಪ."9. PW.1 emphatically deposed that when he was\nstepping into the offending bus, the driver of the said bus\nnegligently moved it, without observing that he was getting\ninto the bus. As a result he fell down and the rear wheel of\nthe bus ran over his left leg on account of which he sustained\ngrievous injuries. On the other hand, RW.1 (driver of the\noffending bus) testified to the effect that he was on duty in\nBMTC bus bearing No.KA­01­FA­0626 on 6.7.2019 at about\n5.00 p.m, which was in scheduled trip from Kengeri to\nTavarekere in Route No.226M/9 of BMTC bus service. The\nBus started from Kengeri TTMC bus stand to complete the trip\nand when he reached near the exit entrance at TTMC bus\nstand driving @ 13 kmph speed (as per the GPS), while taking\nleft turn to Bengaluru­Mysore highway main road, at that\npoint of time the petitioner came running and attempted to get\ninto the BMTC bus from the front door and lost control,\nthereby fell down and sustained injuries.10. First of all having regard to the age of the petitioner\nwhich was 68 years at the time of accident, the possibility ofSCCH-23 8 MVC No.5320/2019he attempting to board a moving bus is implausible. The other\nassertion of the respondent that PW.1 tried to climb the bus\nwhen its door was closed is also highly improbable. Even a\nsuggestion to the same effect was made to PW.1 which he\ndenied vociferously as "ನಘನರ ಮರಚಚದ ಬಘಗಲನ ಬಸಟಲಲ ಹತಪಲರ ಪಪಯತಟ\nಪಟರಟ, ಕಕಳಗಕ ಬದಲದಕಲಗನಕ ಎಕದರಕ ಸರಯಲಲ". Just for the sake of arguments\nalso if it is taken that he tried to board the moving bus, the\nfollowing elicitations brought out from RW.1's mouth are\nnoteworthy: " ಅಜದಘರರ ಓಡಬಕದರ ಬಸಟನರಟ ಹತಪಲರ ಪಪಯತಟಸದಲ ಎಕದರ\nಹಕಗಳದರಲ , ನಘನರ ಅದನರಟ ಕನಟಡಯಲಲ ನಕಹಗಡರರತಕಪಗನಕ . ಬಘಗಲರ ಹಘಕರವವದರ ಮತರಪ\nತಕರಕಯರವವದರ ನನಟ ಅಧಗನದಲಲ ಇರರತಪದಕ. ನನಟ ಬಸಸಗಕ ನವಘಹರಕ ಇದಲನರ." When\nRW.1 himself admits to have observed in the mirror of the bus\nthat the petitioner was trying to climb the bus (which\naccording to him was moving) , then what prevented him from\nstopping the bus which as per his own testimony was moving\nslowly, i.e., at the speed of 13 kmph? More so, when the\nopening and the closing of the door of the offending bus was in\nhis control. Interestingly when a conductor was deputed in\nthe offending bus, the occurring of such a mishap is totally\nunwarranted. Ex.P5 wound certificate indicates that the\npetitioner sustained crush injuries. Thus in case if the bus\nwas moving at a low speed then certainly the petitioner would\nnot have sustained crush injuries.11. The BMTC GPS report of the day of the accident\nthat is 6.7.2019, is marked at Ex.R1 and the entry highlighted\nis :SCCH-23 9 MVC No.5320/2019Time Location Speed KM/H6.7.2019 17:00 Kengeri TTMC 13But what deserves notice is that the accident had taken\nplace at 5.30 p.m, on 6.7.2019 ( as evident from Ex's.P1 to 3 &\n6 ). Hence Ex.R1 which shows the location of the offending\nbus from 5.00 p.m to 5.04 p.m, does not substantiate the\ndefence of the respondent. The sketch exhibited at Ex.R2\nreveals that the fateful accident occurred at the exit point of\nthe Kengeri Bus stand, while the offending bus was trying to\ntake left turn towards the Bengaluru­Mysore main highway\nroad. Admittedly since there is a national highway in front of\nthe Kengeri Bus stand, the buses entering into and leaving the\nBus stand will slow down for a moment, stop, give signal and\nthen proceed towards entry or exit. This establishes the fact\nthat the petitioner was trying to climb the offending vehicle\nwhile it was almost in a stationary position. Under such\ncircumstances, RW.1 was under an obligation to check\nwhether the petitioner completely boarded the bus and upon\nconfirmation had to move it. The very fact that he tried to\nmove the bus at the time when one of the legs of the petitioner\nwas on the ground and another on the foot board of the Bus\ndemonstrates the negligence on the part of the respondent.12. Ex.R3 photographs appear to be taken after the\noccurrence of the accident. Hence they are not of much availSCCH-23 10 MVC No.5320/2019to the respondent. Ex.P4­ IMV report discloses that the\naccident had not occurred due to any mechanical defects.\nEx.P6 is the charge sheet filed by the police against the driver\nof the offending vehicle i.e., RW.1 by opining that the accident\nhad taken place due to the negligence of the driver of the bus.13. Further RW.1 who specifically deposed that he\nlodged complaint before the jurisdictional police station but\nthey refused to take his complaint and that he would\nchallenge the orders of the criminal case falsely foisted against\nhim, admitted during the course of his cross examination that\n" ನನಟ ವರರದಲ ಚಘಜರಶಗಟಸ‍ ಹಘಕದಘಲರಕ ಮತರಪ ಪಪಕರಣ ಸಹ ನಘವಯಲಯದಲಲ\nಚಘಲಪಯಲಲ ಇದಕ ಎಕದರಕ ನಜ. ನಘನರ ಚಘಜರಶಗಟಸ‍ ಮತರಪ ಎಫಸಐಆರನರಟ ಚಘಲಕಕಜಸ‍\nಮಘಡಲಲ." This goes to show that the aforesaid defence is\nbaseless and is just taken to absolve the respondent from its\nliability of paying the compensation. Moreover it is settled law\nthat the term 'rashness and negligence' has to be construed\nlightly while deciding a petition for claim of compensation\nunder theM.V Actas compared to the word 'rashness and\nnegligence' as finds mention in theIndian Penal Code. This is\nbecause the chapter inM.V Actdealing with compensation is a\nbenevolent legislation and not a penal one. Therefore, based\non the above discussion I hold that the actionable negligence\non the part of the driver of the BMTC bus bearing No.KA­01­\nFA­0626 is proved. Accordingly, issue No.1 is answered in\nthe affirmative.SCCH-23 11 MVC No.5320/201914. ISSUE NO.2: PW.1 deposed that due to\naccidental injuries he suffered disability and incurred\nconsiderable medical and incidental expenses. Therefore, prays\nto award compensation. As already discussed above, the\npetitioner has proved that the accident took place due to rash\nand negligent driving of the driver of offending vehicle and\ntherefore, the petitioner is entitled for compensation.15. Petitioner deposed that he was aged about 68 years\nat the time of accident and was earning Rs.15,000/­ p.m, by\nworking as a coolie in Bengaluru Safety Glass works,\nBommasandra, Bengaluru. On the contrary the respondent\ndenied the age, avocation and income of the Petitioner. The\npolice and medical records reveal the age of petitioner as 72\nyears at the time of accident. The respondent, failed to adduce\nany evidence to disprove the age of the petitioner. However\nperusal of Ex.P.7­ Aadhaar card of the petitioner, indicates that\nhis date of birth is 4.7.1951. Thus it can be said that the\npetitioner was aged 68 years at the time of accident.16. Petitioner has not produced any document to\ndemonstrate his avocation. But as far as his income is\nconcerned he has placed on record his Bank pass books which\nare exhibited at Ex's.P16 and 17. Except this, absolutely no\nreliable evidence is placed before the Tribunal to prove his\navocation and income. To put it differently, no\ncontemporaneous documents are produced in support ofSCCH-23 12 MVC No.5320/2019Ex's.P16 & 17. Therefore the said documents are in no way\nhelpful to prove his avocation and income. Under such\ncircumstances this Tribunal considers the avocation of the\npetitioner as un­skilled labour and the notional income of the\npetitioner is taken as Rs.14,000/­ p.m. ( as the accident had\ntaken place in the year 2019). This Tribunal has taken into\nconsideration the notional income fixed by the Karnataka State\nLegal Service Authority, Bengaluru vide the letter No.KSLSA;\n15/NLA/2019 dated 13.8.2020 ( addressed by the Hon'ble\nMember Secretary Karnataka State Legal Services Authority to\nall the Chairpersons and Member Secretaries of all the DLSAs in\nthe State). The relevant portion thereof is reproduced as\nfollows:" Regarding fixation of notional income:Uniformity has to be there for awarding compensation\ntowards ' loss of income' , ' loss of income during laid up period'\nand ' loss of future prospects' . In many a case there would be\nno proof of income and in such circumstances, the Court may\nadopt the income indicated in the following table and same is\nalso being considered for settlement of cases before the\nPrincipal Bench and the Benches at Kalburgi & Dharwad. The\nzonal districts coming under the respective benches of the\nHon'ble High Court of Karnataka may adopt the table applicable\nto them.(Applicable to all districts coming under the Hon'ble\nHigh Court of Karnataka, Principal Bench, Bengaluru)SCCH-23 13 MVC No.5320/2019Year Income per month\n 2008 4,500/­\n 2009 5,000/­\n 2010 5,500/­\n 2011 6,500/­\n 2012 7,000/­\n 2013 8,000/­\n 2014 8,500/­\n 2015 9,000/­\n 2016 9,500/­\n 2017 11,000/­\n 2018 12,500/­\n 2019 14,000/­\n\n\n (Applicable to all districts coming under the Hon'ble\nHigh Court of Karnataka, Dharwad & Kalburgi Benches,\nBengaluru)\n\n Year Income per month\n 2000­01 3,000/­\n 2002­03 3,250/­\n 2004­05 3,500/­\n 2006 3,750/­\n 2007 4,000/­\n 2008 4,250/­\n 2009 5,000/­\n 2010 5,500/­\n 2011 6,000/­\n 2012 6,500/­\n 2013 7,000/­\n 2014­15 7,500/­ to 8,000/­SCCH-23 14 MVC No.5320/20192016 8,750/­\n 2017 10,250/­\n 2018 11,750/­\n 2019 13,250/­17. A person is not only to be compensated for the\nphysical injury, but also for the loss which he suffered as a\nresult of such injury. This means that he is to be compensated\nfor his inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those\nnormal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the\ninjuries, and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or\ncould have earned. In this back drop, this Tribunal proceeds to\ndetermine 'just and reasonable' compensation under the\nfollowing heads:Pain and Sufferings:Ex.P5­ wound certificate; Ex.P9­Progress sheet & Ex.P10­\nDischarge summary (both issued by Sanjay Gandhi Institute of\nTrauma & Orthopedics) show that due to accident PW.1\nsustained Crush injury of left foot multiple lacerated wound\nover the left foot extending up to medial aspect of the left lower\n1/3rd leg exposing the bones and tendons.As per medical records above said injuries are grievous in\nnature. Ex.P10­Discharge summary goes to show that Pw.1 was\ninitially admitted to Sanjay Gandhi Hospital, Bengaluru and he\ntook treatment there as an inpatient from 7.7.2019 to\n19.7.2019 (13 days). Thereafter due to non availability of multi­\nspeciality at the said hospital, he was referred to higher centerSCCH-23 15 MVC No.5320/2019(Ex.P9). Ex.P11 discloses that PW.1 was admitted as an\ninpatient at Victoria hospital from 21.7.2019 to 30.8.2019 (41\ndays). All these facts make it evident that PW.1 sustained above\ninjuries in the accident.It is not in dispute that the petitioner had remained in the\nhospital for a period of almost 2 months. It is not possible for\nthe Tribunals to make a precise assessment of the pain and\ntrauma suffered by a person whose limb is amputated as a\nresult of accident. Even if the victim of the accident gets\nartificial limb, he will suffer from different kinds of handicaps\nand social stigma throughout his life. Therefore this Tribunal\nfeels that the ends of the justice will be met by awarding the\npetitioner a sum of Rs.1,00,000/­ in lieu of Pain, suffering &\nTrauma caused due to the amputation of his left leg.18. Attendant charges, Extra nutritious food &\nconveyance charges:The case of an injured and disabled person, is however,\nmore pitiable and the feeling of hurt, helplessness, despair &\noften destitution enures everyday. The support that is needed\nby a severely handicapped person comes at an enormous price,\nphysical, financial and emotional, not only on the victim but\neven more so on his family & attendants and the stress saps\ntheir energy and destroys their equanimity. Ex's.P10 & 11\nreveal that the petitioner took treatment as an inpatient for 54SCCH-23 16 MVC No.5320/2019days. Undoubtedly, during the said period he would have\nincurred expenses towards attendant charges, as some family\nmember/s of the petitioner living his/her duties would have\naccompanied the petitioner to the hospital in order to take his\ncare. During the aforesaid period the petitioner might have also\nspent a considerable amount towards special diet, transport\nand nutrition. Accordingly considering the rate of inflation &\nrise in price index the same is quantified at Rs.1,800/­ per day.\nHence Rs.97,200/­ (1800 X 54) which is rounded off to\nRs.97,000/­ is awarded under this head.19. Medical expenses: Medical bills & prescriptions\nproduced at Ex's.P12 & 13 depict that PW.1 spent Rs.93,251/­\ntowards medical expenses. Except making the following\nsuggestion to PW.1 " ನ.ಪ.12 ಬಲರಲಗಳನರಟ ಸಸಷಟ ಮಘಡ ಈ ಕಕಗಸಗಕಹಸಸರ ಹಘಜರರ\nಪಡಸದಕಲಗನಕ ಎಕದರಕ ಸರಯಲಲ" , nothing worthwhile was elicited during\nthe cross examination of PW.1 so as to doubt the genuineness\nof the medical bills. However when this Court verified the said\nbills the amount mentioned at bill No.5 is Rs.4,202/­ whereas\nat the time of calculation petitioner has taken it as 5,002/­ i.e.,\nRs.800/­ excess calculation has been done by the petitioner.\nThus the petitioner is entitled for Rs.92,451/­ (Rs.93,251­ 800)\nwhich is rounded off to Rs.92,000/­ towards medical expenses.20. Loss of future income due to disability:PW.2­ Dr.Nagaraj B.N testified that on clinical\nexamination of PW.1 he found that the petitioner sustainedSCCH-23 17 MVC No.5320/2019Crush injury left foot multiple lacerated wound over the left foot\nextending up to medial aspect of the left lower 1/3rd leg\nexposing the bones and tendons.As per the Discharge summary the petitioner was treated\nat Sanjay Gandhi hospital with wound debridement and ORIF\nwith percutaneous K wire fixation on 7.7.2019, post operatively\nhe developed renal and hepatic impairment. Hence he was\nreferred to Victoria hospital, wherein he was treated for his\nmedical complications and he developed gangrene of the left\nlower limb hence, he underwent left lower limb above knee\namputation. Further, Petitioner complains that he is unable to\nwalk and needs external support and cannot carry his work as\ncheque collector. That on examination he found that the\npetitioner has above knee amputation of the left lower limb,\nstump measuring 9 inches. The recent X­ray of the left thigh\nshows absence of distal femur and leg bones. Further the\npetitioner was clinically and radiologically examined and the\nassessment of disability was done as per the Central govt.\nnotification dated 5.1.2018. The latest X­ray and clinical report\nof the petitioner, produced by the doctor were marked at Ex.P18\n& 19.PW.2 outrightly denied the suggestion that the limb of the\npetitioner was amputated due to gangrene and not on account\nof the injuries sustained in the accident. However, it is\npertinent to note that during the course of his treatment atSCCH-23 18 MVC No.5320/2019Victoria hospital, the petitioner developed Gangrene and hence\nhe underwent left lower limb above knee amputation.\nTherefore the suggestion made by the learned counsel for the\nrespondent is not tenable. The disability of the petitioner as\nshown by the doctor is: Permanent physical disability­ 80% to\nthe left lower limb; Whole body physical disability­ 32% &\nFunctional disability as cheque collector - 100%.21. All injuries and assessment of disability do not\nimpact the earning capacity, nor in a similar way. The disability\nhas to be seen in the context of the particular occupation or\ncalling that the victim is engaged in. The co­relation between\nthe physical disability suffered in an accident and the loss of\nearning capacity resulting from it was considered in great detail\nby the Hon'ble Apex Court in Rajkumar V/s Ajaykumar and\nanother (2011) 1 SCC 343. In the said case, the Apex Court\nheld that it is the functional disability which would be the\noperative criteria for assessing the loss of future earnings and\nnot the physical disability. There is a detailed discussion of the\nassessment of future loss of earning due to permanent\ndisability. After explaining the meaning of permanent disability\nand contrasting it with temporary disability and also the\nmanner in which permanent disability of different limbs\nexpressed by Doctors in the disability certificates is to be\ninterpreted, the Apex Court clarified that the assessment of\ncompensation under head of loss of future earnings wouldSCCH-23 19 MVC No.5320/2019depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability\non his earning capacity. The relevant paragraphs of the afore\ncited decision are culled out as follows:" Ascertainment of the effect of the\n permanent disability on the actual\n earning capacity involves 3 steps. The\n Tribunal has to first ascertain what\n activities the claimant could carry on in\n spite of the permanent disability and\n what he could not do as a result of the\n permanent disability ( this is also\n relevant for awarding compensation\n under the head of loss of amenities of\n life). The second step is to ascertain his\n avocation, profession and nature of work\n before the accident, as also his age. The\n third step is to find out whether (i) the\n claimant is totally disabled from earning\n any kind of livelihood or (ii) whether in\n spite of the permanent disability, the\n claimant could still effectively carry on\n the activities and function, which he was\n earlier carrying on or (iii) whether he was\n prevented or restricted from discharging\n his previous activities and functions, but\n could carry on some other or lesser scale\n of activities and functions. So that he\n continues to earn or can continue to earn\n his livelihood.xx xx xx\n We may now summarize the\n principles discussed above:SCCH-23 20 MVC No.5320/2019(I) All injuries (or permanentdisabilities arriving from injuries) , do not\n result in loss of earning capacity.(ii) The percentage of permanent\n disability with reference to the whole body\n of a person, cannot be assumed to be the\n percentage of loss of earning capacity. To\n put it differently the percentage of loss of\n earning capacity is not the same as the\n percentage of permanent disability (except\n in few cases, where the Tribunal on the\n basis of evidence concludes that the\n percentage of loss of earning capacity is\n the same as the percentage of permanent\n disability)(iii) The doctor who treated an injured\n claimant or who examined him\n subsequently to assess the extent of his\n permanent disability can given evidence\n only in regard to the extent of permanent\n disability. The loss of earning capacity is\n some thing that will have to be assessed by\n the Tribunal with reference to the evidence\n in entirety.(iv) The same permanent disability\n may result in different percentages of loss\n of earning capacity in different persons,\n depending upon the nature of profession,\n occupation or job, age, education and other\n factors."SCCH-23 21 MVC No.5320/201922. In the instant case petitioner has not convincingly\nestablished as to what avocation he was carrying on earlier to\nthe accident. If the say of the petitioner that he was working as\na coolie at some Glass Works i.e., office boy - doing the work of\ncollecting cheques & going to the Bank, is believed, then prior to\nthe accident he was engaged in active physical work. To a\ncoolie, loss of leg/s vitally affects not only his working capacity\nbut also his livelihood. That is to say the earning capacity of\nthe petitioner as on the date of the accident stands completely\nnegated and not reduced. He has been rendered permanently\nincapable of working as a coolie or to do any manual work. In\nmidst of the ongoing Covid situation, even physically fit persons\nare not able to get suitable jobs. Then the pitiable condition of\nthe petitioner would not fetch him any employment, muchless a\nsuitable employment. Therefore compensation for loss of future\nearning has to be just & proper so as to enable him to live a life\nof dignity.23. The Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner\nvehemently contended that the Functional disability of the\npetitioner is 100%, which is corroborated by the evidence of the\nDoctor . He also placed his reliance upon a recent decision\nreported in 2020 ACJ 1592 between Anthony V/s Managing\nDirector, KSRTC. But the point that merits consideration is\nthat as per the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court\nin Rajkumar V/s Ajaykumar, the doctor who treated anSCCH-23 22 MVC No.5320/2019injured claimant or who has subsequently assessed his extent\nof Permanent disability can give evidence only in regard to the\nextent of Permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is\nsomething that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with\nreference to the evidence in entirety. Thus in compliance of the\nratio of the Hon'ble Apex Court as stated supra, on appreciating\nthe evidence on record, the loss of earning capacity of the\npetitioner according to this Tribunal may be as high as 100%,\nbut in no case it would be less than 40%. Accordingly the\ncompensation for the loss of the petitioner's future earning\nmust be computed on that basis. As far as the decision relied\nupon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, the\nApex Court in the said decision observed that the injured aged\n45, employed as a Painter has been rendered incapable to work\nas a Painter or to do any manual work and thereby assessed the\nFunctional disability at 75%. However it is relevant to note that\nthe age of the claimant in the above cited decision was 45 years.\nBut having regard to the age of the petitioner in the instant case\nwhich was 68 years as on the date of accident, this Tribunal\ndeems it just to consider the functional disability of the\npetitioner at 40%. Though it is true that if the steps mentioned\nin the decision of Rajkumar V/s Ajaykumar in ascertaining the\neffect of Permanent disability on the actual earning capacity are\nfollowed, then the answer would be that the petitioner cannot\nindependently carry out any activity on his own. For everything\nhe would require an attendant's help. It is also true that he isSCCH-23 23 MVC No.5320/2019totally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood. However\nhaving regard to his avocation (Coolie) and age (68 years), his\nloss of earning capacity is computed at 40% by this Tribunal.\nThe appropriate multiplier applicable as per Sarla verma's case\nis "5". Thus Future loss of income is awarded at Rs.3,36,000/­\n(14,000 X 12 X 5 X 40/100) .24. Future medical expenses:The learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the\npetitioner is still taking follow­up treatment once in a week at\nVictoria hospital. Further the petitioner who had suffered left\nleg amputation due to the injuries suffered by him in the\naccident would require assistance of artificial limb for the rest of\nhis life. PW.2 was examined in this regard and the estimation\nquoted by him as per Ex.P.20 is Rs.2,15,000/­. During the\ncross examination it was suggested to him that he has shown\nthe estimation of Prosthesis at Rs.2,15,000/­ at a higher end to\nhelp the petitioner and that in some companies and hospitals\nthe price of Prosthesis is less. But interestingly nothing was\nput the said witness as to in what manner the amount\nmentioned in the quotation was exaggerated. Moreover a\nwrongdoer including his indemnifier cannot dictate terms to the\nvictim as to where he should go in for any future treatment.\nTherefore considering the expenses of the follow­up treatment\nand the estimation of Prosthesis a sum of Rs.2,50,000/­ is\nawarded under this head, which shall not carry any interest.SCCH-23 24 MVC No.5320/201925. Loss of income during laid­up period:This Tribunal has already considered the notional income\nof the petitioner as Rs.14,000/­ p.m. Admittedly PW.1\nsustained amputation of left leg above knee level. The petitioner\ntook treatment as inpatient for 54 days and is still visiting the\nVictoria hospital for follow­up treatment. Considering the\nnature of injuries sustained and the line of treatment it can be\nsaid that the petitioner requires at least 6 months to recover\nfrom the said injuries. Therefore, the total period for treatment\nis considered to be as six months. Hence this Tribunal awards\nRs.84,000/­ (Rs,14,000 X6) under this head.26. Loss of future happiness and amenities:PW.1 was aged 68 years at the time of accident. His left leg\nis amputed above knee. He suffered 32% permanent physical\ndisability to the whole body. He has to live for the rest of the life\nwith one artificial leg. He will not be able to live in the same\nmanner as he used to do earlier to the accident. That is to say\nhe will face difficulties in performing his day today activities and\nwill also not be able to enjoy his rest of the life. Further he will\nneed assistance to move around and will most likely need a\ncrutch to walk. Therefore it would be just and reasonable to\naward a sum of Rs.50,000/­ under the head.27. Future Prospects:As the petitioner was aged 68\nyears at the time of accident, he cannot be granted future\nprospects.SCCH-23 25 MVC No.5320/2019The calculation table stands as follows;1 Pain and sufferings : Rs. 1,00,000=00\n2 Attendant : Rs. 97,000=00\n charges,Nutritious food\n & conveyance charges\n3 Medical expenses : Rs. 92,000=00\n\n4 Loss of future income : Rs. 3,36,000=00\n due to disability\n5 Future medical : Rs. 2,50,000=00\n expenses\n6 Loss of income during : Rs. 84,000=00\n laid­up period\n7 Loss of future : Rs. 50,000=00\n happiness and\n amenities\n Total Rs. 10,09,000 =00\nDeduction of the interim Rs. 10,000=00\ncompensation paid to the\npetitioner on 12.7.2019\n Total Rs. 9,99,000 =0028. It is well settled that while awarding interest on the\n compensation amount, the Court has to take into account the\n rate of interest specified by the Nationalized Banks. In the\n decisions reported in 2013 AIR SCW 5375 & 2014 ACJ 1565,\n the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the Insurance company is\n liable to pay interest @ 9% p.a. In view of the above discussion,\n I am of the opinion that the Petitioner is entitled for\n compensation of Rs.9,99,000/­ along with interest at the rate\n of 9% p.a., from the date of filing of petition till realization. TheSCCH-23 26 MVC No.5320/2019Respondent being the insurer is liable and directed to pay the\ncompensation amount. Hence, I answer Issue No.2 as Partly\nin the Affirmative.29. ISSUE NO.3: In view of the discussion made supra\nin issues No.1 and 2, this Tribunal proceeds to pass the\nfollowing;ORDER\n The petition filed by the petitioner U/Sec. 166\n ofM.V Actis hereby partly allowed with costs.The petitioner is entitled to get compensation\n of Rs.9,99,000/­ (Rupees Nine lakhs ninety nine\n thousand only) with interest at the rate of 9% p.a.\n (excluding future medical expenses) from the date of\n petition till its deposit.The respondent is liable to pay and directed to\n deposit the compensation amount within a period of\n two months from the date of award.Out of the said compensation amount\n awarded, 25% of the compensation amount with\n proportionate interest shall be deposited in the name\n of petitioner in any Nationalized Bank/Scheduled\n Bank for a period of 3 years (without any\n encumbrance or premature withdrawal) with liberty\n to draw the accrued interest periodically and theSCCH-23 27 MVC No.5320/2019remaining 75% amount with proportionate interest\n shall be released to the petitioner on proper\n identification and verification.Advocate fee is fixed at Rs.1,000/­.Draw award accordingly.(Dictated to the Stenographer directly on computer and printout taken by her, then corrected\nand pronounced by me in the open court on this the 28 th day of September, 2020)\n\n\n\n\n (Ashwini M.Hattiholi)\n XXI Addl. Small Causes Judge\n & ACMM, Bengaluru.ANNEXURES\nList of witnesses examined for the petitioners:P.W.1 : Venkatachalapathi\nP.W.2 : Dr.Nagaraj.B.NList of documents got marked for the petitioners:Ex.P.1 : Copy of FIR\nEx.P.2 : Copy of Complaint\nEx P.3 : Copy of Panchanama\nEx.P.4 : Copy of MV report\nEx.P.5 : Copy of wound certificate\nEx.P.6 : Copy of charge sheet\nEx.P.7 : Notarized copy of Aadhaar card\nEx.P.8 : Notarized copy of Disability certificate\nEx.P.9 : Progress sheet\nEx.P.10& 11: Discharge summaries\nEx.P.12 : medical bills of Rs.93,251/­\nEx.P.13 : Prescriptions\nEx.P.14 : PhotosSCCH-23 28 MVC No.5320/2019Ex.P.15 : CD\nEx.P.16&17: Pass book\nEx.P.18 : Recent examination report\nEx.P.19 : X­ray\nEx.P.20 : EstimationList of witnesses examined for the respondents :Rw.1: Prakash.J.N\n\nList of documents marked for the respondents:Ex.R1: Copy of vehicle vacation report\nEx.R2: Copy of sketch made by the respondent\nEx.R3: Photos\nEx.R4: CD\nEx.R5: Copy of DL\nEx.R6: Copy of ID card\n\n\n (Ashwini M.Hattiholi)\n XXI Addl. Small Causes Judge\n & ACMM, Bengaluru.

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court_cases

Madras High CourtM.Ravichandran vs The Assistant Commissioner Of Central ... on 26 July, 2021Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2021 MAD 1691Author:S.M.SubramaniamBench:S.M.SubramaniamW.P.Nos.12321, 12322 & 12324 of 2014\n\n IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS\n\n DATED: 26.07.2021\n\n CORAM:\n\n THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.M.SUBRAMANIAM\n\n W.P.Nos.12321, 12322 & 12324 of 2014\n and M.P.Nos.1, 1 & 1 of 2014\n\n M.Ravichandran .. Petitioner in\n W.P.No.12321/2014\n\n N.Selvarasu .. Petitioner in\n W.P.No.12322/2014\n\n S.Sivakumar .. Petitioner in\n W.P.No.12324/2014\n\n Vs.\n\n 1.The Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise,\n 1, Vallalar Nagar, Manjakuppam,\n Cuddalore 607 001.\n\n 2.The Chief General Manager (Finance)\n Corporate Office, Neyveli Lignite Corporation,\n Neyveli. .. Respondents in\n all W.Ps.\n\n\n Prayer in W.P.No.12321/2014: Writ Petition filed underArticle 226of the\n Consitution of India, to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for\n the records relating to the order in Original No.67/2010-ST dated 07.04.2010\n passed by the 1st respondent and the consequential Notice of demand issued\n underSec.87(b)(i)of the Finance Act, 1994 in C.No.V/16/42/09-ST dated\n\n _____\n 1/10\nhttps://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/\n W.P.Nos.12321, 12322 & 12324 of 2014\n\n 10.03.2014 and quash the same as illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable and without\n authority of law and further direct the 1st respondent to pass orders afresh\n after proper verification of the payments made by the petitioner along with\n the challans and on merits in accordance with law.\n\n\n Prayer in W.P.No.12322/2014: Writ Petition filed underArticle 226of the\n Consitution of India, to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for\n the records relating to the order in Original No.27/2011-ST dated 08.11.2011\n passed by the 1st respondent and the consequential Notice of demand issued\n underSec.87(b)(i)of the Finance Act, 1994 in C.No.IV/16/STC/331/2009-\n ADJ dated 07.03.2014 and quash the same as illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable\n and without authority of law and further direct the 1st respondent to pass\n orders afresh after proper verification of the payments made by the petitioner\n along with the challans and on merits in accordance with law.\n\n\n Prayer in W.P.No.12324/2014: Writ Petition filed underArticle 226of the\n Consitution of India, to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus, calling for\n the records relating to the order in Original No.16/2010-ADJ dated\n 11.01.2010 passed by the 1st respondent and the consequential Notice of\n demand issued underSec.87(b)(i)of the Finance Act, 1994 in\n C.No.IV/16/STC/182/2010-ST dated 07.03.2014 by the 2nd respondent and\n quash the same as illegal, arbitrary, unreasonable and without authority of\n law and further direct the 1st respondent to pass orders afresh after proper\n verification of the payments made by the petitioner along with the challans\n and on merits in accordance with law.\n\n\n\n _____\n 2/10\nhttps://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/\n W.P.Nos.12321, 12322 & 12324 of 2014\n\n (In all W.Ps.)\n\n For Petitioner : Mr.M.A.Mudimannan\n\n For Respondents : Ms.R.Hemalatha (For R1)\n Senior Standing Counsel\n\n Mr.N.Nithianandam (For R2)\n\n COMMON ORDERThe Orders-in-Original dated 07.04.2010, 08.11.2011 and 11.01.2010\n\n respectively are sought to be quashed in the present Writ Petitions.2.The preamble of the orders impugned reveals that "Any person\n\n deeming himself aggrieved by this order may appeal against the same to the\n\n Commissioner of Central Excise, (Appeals), No.26/1, Nungambakkam High\n\n Road, Chennai 600 034 within 3 months from the date of receipt of this order\n\n underSection 85of Finance Act, 1994 read with Rule 8 of Service Tax\n\n Rules, 1994 in Form ST-4 in duplicate and be verified in the prescribed\n\n manner and be accompanied by a copy of the order appealed against". The\n\n procedures for filing an appeal are also contemplated in the orders impugned.\n\n However, the petitioner, instead of preferring an appeal, has chosen to file the\n\n present Writ Petitions, raising grounds both on merits and on legal grounds.\n\n\n\n _____3/10https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/\n W.P.Nos.12321, 12322 & 12324 of 20143.This Court is of the considered opinion that the importance of an\n\n appeal remedy, at no circumstances, be undermined by the High Court and\n\n findings of the appellate authority would be of greater assistance for the High\n\n Court for exercise of power of judicial review underArticle 226of the\n\n Constitution of India. This apart, adjudication of complete facts by the\n\n appellate authority based on the original records and evidences are not only\n\n important, the legislative intention is to redress the grievances of the\n\n aggrieved person. However, such an exercise cannot be undertaken by the\n\n High Court in a writ proceedings. In the event of not providing an\n\n opportunity to an aggrieved person to exhaust the appellate remedy,\n\n undoubtedly the aggrieved person is not only deprived of an opportunity for\n\n complete adjudication of the facts and the grounds of law, but there is a\n\n possibility of error, commission and omission by the High Court in view of\n\n the fact that the High Court is deciding certain facts only based on the facts\n\n filed by the respective parties. All these aspects are very much important. In\n\n most of the circumstances, the parties who are filing Writ Petitions are\n\n narrating the facts to suit their convenience and entire facts are not placed\n\n some times or the litigants are of the opinion that those facts may not be\n\n required for the purpose of deciding the Writ Petitions. Opinions in this\n\n regard, offered by the legal brains, are taken into consideration by the\n\n _____4/10https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/\n W.P.Nos.12321, 12322 & 12324 of 2014\n\n litigants and petitions are filed. This apart, the High Court will not have the\n\n benefit of complete scrutinisation of the original documents which all are to\n\n be done by the original authority as well as by the appellate authority having\n\n jurisdiction. This being the importance of an appellate remedy and the\n\n legislative intention, this Court is of an opinion that the parties, at all\n\n circumstances, are expected to exhaust the appellate remedy contemplated\n\n under the statutes. Only on exceptional circumstances, where the proceedings\n\n are issued by an incompetent authority having no jurisdiction, or an allegation\n\n of malafides are raised, then alone the Writ Petitions are to be entertained and\n\n certainly not in a routine manner. Even in case of raising an allegation of\n\n malafides, the authority against whom such an allegation is raised must be\n\n impleaded as party respondent in his personal capacity. All these aspects are\n\n looked into by the High Court, in order to provide complete justice to the\n\n litigants who all are having certain grievances against the actions of the\n\n authorities.4.Preferring an appeal is the rule. Entertaining a Writ Petition before\n\n exhausting the appellate remedy is an exception. Undoubtedly, writ\n\n proceedings may be entertained before exhausting the appellate remedy.\n\n However, it is to be ensured that there is an imminent threat or gross injustice\n\n _____5/10https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/\n W.P.Nos.12321, 12322 & 12324 of 2014\n\n warranting urgent relief to be granted. Mere violation of principles of natural\n\n justice is insufficient to entertain a writ proceedings underArticle 226of the\n\n Constitution of India, as every Writ Petition is filed based on one or the other\n\n ground stating that the principles of natural justice is violated or statutory\n\n requirements are not complied with or there is an illegality or otherwise.\n\n Thus, dispensing with an appellate remedy is to be granted cautiously in view\n\n of the fact that the very purpose and object of legislation providing an\n\n appellate remedy cannot be diluted nor the benefit be denied to the aggrieved\n\n person to exhaust the same. The statutory appellate authorities are the final\n\n fact finding authorities. Thus, the finding to be made by such appellate\n\n authorities with reference to the documents and evidences are of paramount\n\n importance for the purpose of exercise of judicial review by the High Court\n\n underArticle 226of the Constitution of India.5.The power of judicial review of the High Court underArticle 226of\n\n the Constitution of India is to scrutinize the processes through which a\n\n decision is taken by the competent authority by following the procedures as\n\n contemplated, but not the decision itself. Therefore, the routine entertainment\n\n of a Writ Petition by dispensing with appellate remedy is not preferable and\n\n such an exercise would cause injury to the institutional hierarchy and the\n\n _____6/10https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/\n W.P.Nos.12321, 12322 & 12324 of 2014\n\n importance attached to such appellate institutions. The appellate institutions\n\n provided under the statute at no circumstances be undermined by the higher\n\n Courts. The appellate forums are the final fact finding authorities and more\n\n so, possessing expertise in a particular field. Thus, the finding of such\n\n appellate forums would be a valuable assistance for the purpose of exercise of\n\n judicial review by the High Court underArticle 226of the Constitution of\n\n India. The High Court cannot conduct a roving enquiry with reference to the\n\n facts and circumstances based on the documents and evidences. Based on the\n\n mere affidavits filed by the litigants, the disputed facts cannot be concluded.\n\n Thus, the importance of fact finding by the appellate forums is of more value\n\n for the purpose of providing complete justice to the parties approaching the\n\n Court of law.6.The point of delay may be an acceptable ground for the purpose of\n\n entertaining a Writ Petition. The practise of filing the Writ Petition without\n\n exhausting the statutory remedies are in ascending mode and such Writ\n\n Petitions are filed with a view to avoid pre-deposits to be made in statutory\n\n appeals and on the ground that the appellate remedies are time consuming.7.In view of the facts and circumstances, the petitioner is at liberty to\n\n prefer an appeal in the prescribed format and complying with the procedures\n\n _____7/10https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/\n W.P.Nos.12321, 12322 & 12324 of 2014\n\n contemplated under the Act, before the jurisdictional appellate authority\n\n within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.\n\n In the event of filing any such appeal, the appellate authority shall condone\n\n the delay, if any, entertain the appeal and dispose of the same on merits and\n\n in accordance with law and by affording opportunity to the writ petitioner, as\n\n expeditiously as possible.8.The learned counsel for the petitioner made a submission that the\n\n similar issues were considered by the High Court of Madras in\n\n C.M.A.No.764 to 788 of 2015 and an order was passed on 30.04.2016. The\n\n petitioner is at liberty to pursue the grounds as well as the legal principles\n\n settled by this Court in the said judgment, in the grounds of appeal and during\n\n the arguments before the appellate authority.With these directions, all the Writ Petitions stand disposed of. No\n\n costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.26.07.2021\n gsa\n Index : Yes\n Speaking Order: Yes\n\n\n _____8/10https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/\n W.P.Nos.12321, 12322 & 12324 of 2014\n\n\n\n To1.The Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise,\n 1, Vallalar Nagar, Manjakuppam,\n Cuddalore 607 001.2.The Chief General Manager (Finance)\n Corporate Office, Neyveli Lignite Corporation,\n Neyveli._____9/10https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/\n W.P.Nos.12321, 12322 & 12324 of 2014\n\n\n\n S.M.SUBRAMANIAM, J.gsa\n\n\n\n\n W.P.Nos.12321, 12322 & 12324 of 2014\n\n\n\n\n 26.07.2021\n\n\n\n\n _____10/10https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/

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court_cases

Chattisgarh High CourtState Of Chhattisgarh And Ors vs Dauram Jaltare And Ors on 17 August, 20221\n\n\n\n NAFR\n\n\n HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR\n\n Writ Petition (227) No. 362 of 2013\n1. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, Distt Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh\n2. The Tehsildar, Raigarh, District- Raigarh, C.G.\n3. The Sub- Registrar, Raigarh, District- Raigarh, C.G.\n ---- Petitioners\n Versus\n1. Lalita Bai, W/o Shri Chaitan Ram, by caste- Gond, R/o Village-\n Pandaripani, P.S. Chakradhar Nagar, Tehsil and District- Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh\n2. Sangeeta, D/o Samuvel, caste- Uraon, R/o Rajiv Nagar, Raigarh,\n P.S. City Kotwali, District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh\n3. The Board Of Revenue C.G., Bilaspur\n ---- RespondentsWrit Petition (227) No. 120 of 20131. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, P.S. Chakradhar\n Nagar, Distt Raigarh, Chhattisgarh2. The Tahsildar, Raigarh, P.S. Chakradhar Nagar, Distt Raigarh, CG3. The Sub Registrar, Raigarh, P.S. Chakradhar Nagar, Distt Raigarh,\n CG---- Petitioners\n Versus1. M/s Shyamli Infraventure Pvt. Ltd., Through Its Director Dhruv\n Agrawal, S/o Shri Sadhu Ram Agrawal, R/o Gajanandpuram,\n Raigarh, P.S. City Kotwali, Dist Raigarh, Chhattisgarh2. Bhagat Ram S/o Ramsai,3. Ghurai S/o Ramsai\n No.2 to 3 are by caste- Sawara (aboriginal Tribe), R/o Vill\n Gopalpur, P.S. Chakradhar Nagar, Raigarh, Tahsil & Distt Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh4. The Board Of Revenue C.G., Bilaspur---- Respondents\n Writ Petition (227) No. 245 of 20141. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, P.S. Chakradhar\n Nagar, Distt. Raigarh C.G. , Chhattisgarh2. The Tahsildar, Raigarh, P.S. Chakardhar Nagar, Distt. Raigarh\n C.G.23. The Sub Registrar, P.S. Chakradhar Nagar Raigarh, Distt. Raigarh\n C.G.---- Petitioners\n Versus1. M/s Alok Infotech Private Limited, Through Amit Rateriya, Director,\n Subhash Chowk, Raigarh, P.S. City Kotwali Distt. Raigarh C.G.2. Nirakar, S/o Ratan Lal, R/o Village Nawapali, P.S. Chakradhar\n Nagar, Raigarh, Tah And Distt. Raigarh C.G.3. Umashankar, S/o Ratan Lal R/o Village Nawapali, P.S. Chakradhar\n Nagar, Raigarh, Tahsil And Distt. Raigarh C.G.4. Harilal S/o Shri Dukalu, Caste- Gond, R/o Village Nawapali, P.S.\n Chakradhar Nagar, Raigarh, Tahsil And Distt. Raigarh C.G.5. The Board Of Revenue, Chhattisgarh Bilaspur.---- Respondents\n Writ Petition (227) No. 356 of 20131. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, District- Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh2. The Tahsildar, Raigarh, Dist Raigarh, C.G.3. The Sub Registrar, Raigarh, Dist Raigarh, C.G.---- Petitioners\n Versus1. Ramesh Kumar Bareth S/o Kunjram Bareth, R/o Patelpali,\n Raigarh, P.S. Jute Mill, Raigarh, Tahsil & Distt Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh2. Gedi, S/o Shri Khora, by caste- Kanwar, R/o Regada, P.S.\n Chakradhar Nagar, Tahsil & District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh3. The Board Of Revenue, C.G., Bilaspur---- Respondents\n Writ Petition (227) No. 357 of 20131. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, P.S. Chakradhar\n Nagar, Distt Raigarh, Chhattisgarh2. The Tahsildar, Raigarh, P.S. Chakradhar Nagar, Dist Raigarh, CG3. The Sub Registrar, Raigarh, P.S. Chakradhar Nagar, Distt Raigarh,\n CG---- Petitioner\n Versus1. Bodhi Ram Uraon S/o Lt Shri Kartika Ram, Aged About 55 Years,\n R/o Vill Dogitarai, Tah And Distt Raigarh, P.S. Chakradhar Nagar,\n Distt Raigarh, Chhattisgarh2. Munudai Uraon W/o Lt Shir Kartik Ram, aged about 82 years, R/o\n Vill Dogitarai, P.S. Chakradhar Nagar, Tah And Dist Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh33. Sadhmati Wd/o Santosh4. Samaru S/o Santosh5. Laxmi D/o Santosh6. Gavel S/o Santosh7. Sushil Kumar S/o Joseph8. Gula S/o Joseph\n No.3 to 8 are by caste- Uraon, R/o Vill Goverdhanpur, P.S.\n Chakradhar Nagar, Tah And Dist Raigarh, Chhattisgarh9. M/s Venkatesh Krishi Sewa Kendra, Raigarh, P.S. City Kotwali,\n Tahsil & Distt Raigarh, Chhattisgarh10. The Board Of Revenue C.G., Bilaspur,---- Respondents\n Writ Petition (227) No. 358 of 20131. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, Distt Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh2. The Tahsildar, Raigarh, Dist Raigarh, C.G.3. The Sub Registrar, Raigarh, Dist Raigarh, C.G.---- Petitioners\n Versus1. Baldeo Ram, S/o Shri Khageshwar Ram, Aged About 50 Years,\n R/o Vill Jurda, P.S. Chakradhar Nagar, Tahsil & Dist Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh2. Kalpesh Patel S/o Shri Jasubhai Patel, Aged About 40 Years, R/o\n Mukut Nagar, P.S. City Kotwali, Tahsil & District : Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh3. The Board Of Revenue, Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur.---- Respondents\n Writ Petition (227) No. 359 of 20131. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, Distt Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh2. The Tahsildar, Raigarh, Dist Raigarh, C.G.3. The Sub Registrar, Raigarh, Dist Raigarh, C.G.---- Petitioner\n Versus1. Lalit Kumar Agrawal, S/o Shri Raj Kumar Agrawal, Aged About 40\n Years, R/o Vill Khairpur, Post- Raigarh, P.S. City Kotwali, Tahsil &\n District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh2. Balaji Buildcon, Raigarh Balaji Builders And Developers, Raigarh,\n Through Its Partners:-(a) Kailash Agrawal, S/o Parasram Agrawal, R/o Naya Ganj\n Raigarh, City Kotwali, Raigarh, Dist Raigarh4(b) Sushil Mittal, S/o Shiv Narayan, R/o Raigarh, P.S. City Kotwali,\n Dist Raigarh, Chhattisgarh(c) Pawan Kumar Chauhan, S/o Chintaram Chauhan, R/o\n Dhimarapur, Raigarh, P.S. City Kotwali,(d) Sushil Kumar S/o Shiv Kumar Agrawal, R/o Madhuban\n Apartment, Kotara Road, Raigarh, P.S. City Kotwali, Dist Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh3. The Board Of Revenue, Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur.---- Respondents\n Writ Petition (227) No. 360 of 20131. State Of Chhattisgarh S/o Through The Collector, Distt Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh2. The Tahsildar, Raigarh, District- Raigarh, C.G.3. The Sub Registrar, Raigarh, District- Raigarh, C.G.---- Petitioners\n Versus1. Pawan Chauhan, S/o Late Chintaram Chauhan, Caste- Gada, R/o\n Vill Dhimarapur, P.S. City Kotwali, Tahsil & Distt Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh2. Bahadur S/o Lalmani3. Budhiyarin D/o Lalmani\n (Respondents No.2 and 3 are by Caste- Gada, r/o Jurda, P.S.\n Chakradhar Nagar, Tah And Distt Raigarh, Chhattisgarh4. The Board Of Revenue C.G., Bilaspur---- Respondents\n Writ Petition (227) No. 361 of 20131. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, Distt Raigarh\n Chhattisgarh2. The Tahsildar Raigarh, Distt Raigarh, CG.3. The Sub Registrar Raigarh, Distt Raigarh, CG---- Petitioner\n Versus1. Kailash Agrawal S/o Vasudeo Agrawal R/o Vill Baikunthpur, P.S.\n Chakradhar Nagar, Tah And Dist Raigarh,Chhattisgarh2. Kumbhakaran S/o Shri Gosai, by caste- Kanwar, R/o Regada, P.S.\n Chakradhar Nagar, Tahsil & Dist Raigarh, Chhattisgarh3. The Board Of Revenue C.G., Bilaspur,---- Respondents\n Writ Petition (227) No. 363 of 20131. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, Distt Raigarh\n Chhattisgarh52. The Tehsildar, Raigarh, District- Raigarh,3. The Sub Registrar, Raigarh, District- Raigarh, C.G.---- Petitioners\n Versus1. Suresh Kumar Sharma S/o Goverdhan, caste- Bramhan, Aged\n About 47 Years, R/o Vill Jurda, P.S. Chakradhar Nagar, Tahsil &\n Dist Raigarh, Chhattisgarh2. Santosh Kumar Sharma S/o Vasudeo Sharam, R/o Raigarh, P.S.\n Kotwali, Raigarh, District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh3. The Board Of Revenue C.G., Bilaspur---- Respondents\n Writ Petition (227) No. 365 of 20131. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, Distt Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh2. The Tahsildar, Raigarh, Distt Raigarh, CG3. The Sub Registrar Raigarh, Distt Raigarh, CG---- Petitioners\n Versus1. Salik Ram S/o Birbal Ram, by caste- Ganda, Aged About 50 Years,\n R/o Vill Navapali, Raigarh, P.S. Chakradhar Nagar, Tahsil- Pusour,\n Dist Raigarh, Chhattisgarh2. Pawan Kumar Mittal S/o Shri Shyam Sunder Mittal, R/o Near\n Shyam Mandir, Raigarh, P.S. City Kotwali, Tahsil & District\n Raigarh, C.G.3. The Board Of Revenue C.G., Bilaspur---- Respondents\n Writ Petition (227) No. 366 of 20131. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, Distt Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh2. The Tahsildar, Raigarh, Dsitt Raigarh, CG3. The Sub Registrar Raigarh, Dist Raigarh, CG---- Petitioners\n Versus1. Dauram Jaltare S/o Shri Krishnachandra Jaltare, R/o Bauli Well,\n Raigarh, P.S. City Kotwali, Tahsil & Dist Raigarh, Chhattisgarh2. Natthu Lal S/o Jethram3. Chitari Bai S/o Jethram4. Nanaki S/o Jhitaku5. Etawar Singh S/o Nanhi6. Mangalu S/o Nanhi7. Guruwaru S/o Jhitaku6No.2 to 7 are by caste- Lohar, R/o Vill Regada, PS. Chakradhar\n Nagar, Tahsil & Distt Raigarh, Chhattisgarh8. The Board Of Revenue C.G., Bilaspur---- Respondents\n Writ Petition (227) No. 367 of 20131. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, Distt Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh2. The Tahsildar, Raigarh, Dsitt Raigarh, CG3. The Sub Registrar, Raigarh, Dist Raigarh, CG---- Petitioners\n Versus1. Ashok Agrawal S/o Shri Bhemsen Agrawal, R/o Laxmipur, Raigarh,\n P.S. City Kotwali, Tahsil & Dist Raigarh, Chhattisgarh2. Daharu S/o Samaru3. Bhagirathi S/o Samaru4. Gangaram S/o Samaru5. Shyamlal S/o Samaru6. Birbal S/o Bhagwatiya7. Sita D/o Bhagwatiya8. Koita D/o Bhagwatiya9. Makala Wd/o Bhagwatiya10. Kevara S/o Babulal11. Vijay S/o Payarelal12. Mandara S/o Pyarelal\n No.2 to 12 are by caste- Kharia, R/o Darramuda, P.S. Jute Mill,\n Raigarh, Tah Pusoure, Dist Raigarh, Chhattisgarh13. The Board Of Revenue C.G., Bilaspur---- Respondents\n\n\n Writ Petition (227) No. 368 of 20131. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, Distt Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh2. The Tahsildar, Raigarh, Dist Raigarh, CG.3. The Sub Registrar, Raigarh, Dist Raigarh, CG---- Petitioners\n Versus1. Dauram Jaltare S/o Shri Krishnachandra Jaltare, R/o Bauli Well,\n Raigarh, P.S. City Kotwali, Tahsil & Dist Raigarh, Chhattisgarh2. Puniram S/o Samaru Gond, Caste- Gond, R/o Vill Dhanuhardera,\n P.S. Jut Mill, Raigarh, Tah- Pusoure, Dist Raigarh, Chhattisgarh73. The Board Of Revenue C.G., Bilaspur---- Respondents\n\n\n Writ Petition (227) No. 369 of 20131. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, Distt Raigarh\n Chhattisgarh2. The Tahsildar, Raigarh, Dist Raigarh, CG.3. The Sub Registrar, Raigarh, Dist Raigarh, CG---- Petitioners\n Versus1. Sudarshan S/o Kunu Ram, by caste- Gond, R/o Vill Pandaripani,\n P.S. Chakradhar Nagar, Tah And Distt Raigarh, Chhattisgarh2. Sangeeta D/o Samuvel, Caste- Uraon, R/o Rajiv Nagar, Raigarh,\n P.S. City Kotwali, Raigarh, District : Raigarh, Chhattisgarh3. The Board Of Revenue C.G. Bilaspur,---- Respondents\n Writ Petition (227) No. 370 of 20131. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, Distt Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh2. The Tahsildar, Raigarh, Distt Raigarh, CG3. The Sub Registrar, Raigarh, Dist Raigarh, CG---- Petitioners\n Versus1. M/s Alok Infotech Private Limited, Through Amit Rateriya S/o\n Sanjay Rateriya, Director, M/s Alok Infotech Private Ltd, R/o\n Subhash Chowk, Raigarh, P.S. City Kotwali, Distt Raigarh,\n Chhattisgarh2. Nirakar Gond S/o Ratan Lal Gond, Caste- Gond, R/o Nawapali,\n P.S. Chakradhar Nagar, Tah And Distt Raigarh, Chhattisgarh3. The Board Of Revenue C.G., Bilaspur,---- Respondents\n Writ Petition (227) No. 573 of 20131. State Of Chhattisgarh, Through The Collector, P.S. Chakradhar\n Nagar, Dsitrict Raigarh C.G.,2. The Sub Registar, Raigarh, P.S. Chakradhar Nagar, District\n Raigarh C.G.---- Petitioners\n Versus1. Sadguru Developers, Through Its Partner Kailash Agrawal S/o\n Vasudeo Agrawal, R/o Dheemarapur Chowk, P.S. City Kotwali\n Tahsil And Distt. Raigarh C.G.82. Khuduti Bai, age not known, Wd/o Lt. Shri Dharam Das, Caste-\n Panika R/o Village Urdana P.S. City Kotwali Tahsil And Distt.\n Raigarh, Chhattisgarh3. The Board Of Revenue, C.G. Bilaspur---- Respondents\n\n  Mr. Shikhar Sharma, Advocate for petitioners.\n  Mr. Hariom Rai, Mr. Pawan Kumar Kashyap, Mr. Pawan Kumar,\n Mr. Vijay Deshmukh and Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha, Advocates for\n respective respondents. Ms. Priyambada Singh, Dy. Govt. Advocate for State.Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey\n Order on Board\n17-08-2022\n\n\nHeard.1. These matters were taken up yesterday but there was no\n\n representation on behalf of the private respondents, therefore, the\n\n matters were passed over for today. Today, these matters have\n\n been taken for hearing in first half but except learned counsel for\n\n petitioner i.e. State, no one has appeared on behalf of the private\n\n respondents, therefore, matters were passed over again. When\n\n matters were called again Mr. Hariom Rai, learned counsel for\n\n respondent in W.P.(227) No.120/2013 and W.P.(227) No.360/2013,\n\n Mr. Pawan Kumar Kashyap in W.P.(227) No.365/2013, Mr. Pawan\n\n Kumar, appearing on behalf of Mr. Vijay Deshmukh in W.P.(227)\n\n No.367/2013 and Mr. Manoj Kumar Sinha in W.P.(227)\n\n No.245/2014 are present and in rest of matters there is no\n\n representation at all.2. The issue involved in these cases is not res integra, therefore,9matter is heard finally in presence of learned counsel for the\n\n petitioner i.e. State and the learned counsel for the respondents in\n\n some of the cases.3. In W.P.(227) No.362 of 2013, the order passed by Board of\n\n Revenue, Bilaspur dated 08.10.2010 is under challenge, likewise\n\n in other petitions, similar orders passed by the Board of Revenue\n\n have been challenged. By the impugned order, the Board of\n\n Revenue has permitted private respondents to sell their land in\n\n question and granted permission under Sections 165(6) and\n\n 165(7) of the C.G. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter referred\n\n to as "the Code of 1959"). The objections were filed after issuance\n\n of circular by the Collector, Raigarh dated 25/30-9-2004, wherein it\n\n was observed that permission to alienate the property obtained\n\n from the Government under Section 158(3) of the Code, 1959\n\n shall not be granted by the order of authority not below than the\n\n rank of Collector and revenue authorities were directed to record\n\n specifically "untransferrable land obtained from Government" in the\n\n Revenue Records. The copy of circular issued by the Collector,\n\n Raigarh dated 25/30-9-2004 is given below:-" dk;kZ y ; dysD Vj] jk;x<+] ftyk & jk;x<+ ( Nrrhlx<+)\n\n dzzekad @l0v0jk0@04@5688 jk;x<+] fnukad 25@30 9&2004\n\n izfr]\n 1vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh (jk0) loZ2.rglhynkj@vfr0rg0@uk;c rglhynkj (loZ)3.jktLo fujh{kd (loZ)\n\n ftyk& jk;x<+ (N0x0)\n\n\n fo"k;%& 'kklu ls izkIr Hkwfe ds laca/k esaA10N0x0 Hkw&jktLo lafgrk 1959 dh /kkjk 185 dh mi/kkjk ([k) ds rgr\n dksbZ Hkh ,slk O;fDr tks dksbZ Hkwfe jkT; ljdkj ls /kkj.k djrk gS ;k dksbZ\n Hkh ,slk O;fDr tks /kkjk 158 dh mi/kkjk (3) ds v/khu HkwfeLokeh vf/kdkj esa\n Hkwfe /kkj.k djrk gS vFkok ftls dksbZ Hkwfe ljdkjh iV~Vsnkj ds #i es n[ky\n j[kus dk vf/kdkj jkT; ljdkj ;k dysDVj }kjk fn;k tkrk gS vkSj tks\n rRi'pkr ,slh Hkwfe dk HkwfeLokeh cu tkrk gS] ,slh Hkwfe dk varj.k dysDVj\n dh inJs.kh ls vfHkUu in Js.kh ds fdlh jktLo vf/kdkjh dh vuqKk tks\n ys[kc} fd, tkus okys dkj.kksa ls nh tkosxh] ds fcuk ugh djsxkA jk;x<+\n vuqfoHkkx esa bl izdkj Hkwfe dk fodz; fcuk vuqefr ds gksus dh f'kdk;r izkIr\n gqbZ gS] tks mDr lafgrk ds ,slh izko/kkuks ds mYya?ku gSA vr vki [kljs es\n ,slh Hkwfe ij "'kklu ls izkIr Hkwfe vgLrkarj.kh;" ntZ djsaA vkids }kjk\n dk;Zokgh u djus ls ;fn bl izdkj ds Hkwfe dk voS/k #i ls fodz; gksuk ik;k\n tkrk gS rks lacaf/krksa ds fo#) dk;Zokgh dh tkosxh rFkk 'kklu dks gqbZ {kfr dh\n olwyh dh tkosxh\n lgh@&\n dysDVj\n jk;x<+\n\n\n i`0dz0 @l0v0jk0@04 jk;x<+] fnukad 25&9&2004\n\n\n izfrfyfi%&\n vij dysDVj] jk;x<+ dks vko';d dk;Zokgh gsrq lwpukFkZ A\n lgh@&\n dysDVj\n jk;x<+4. Against this circular, many cases were filed before the Board of\n\n Revenue and Board of Revenue granted permission to sell the\n\n property and consequently, sale-deeds were also executed.5. In this batch of petitions, the State has assailed the orders passed\n\n by the Board of Revenue on different dates while exercising its\n\n power conferred under Section 08 of the Code, 1959 and granted\n\n permission to grant lease deed of the Government land and set\n\n aside the circular issued by the Collector, Raigarh, dated 25/30-9-\n\n 2004, wherein it was directed that a Government land shall not be\n\n transferred by the order of authority not below than the rank of11Collector. Further, the Revenue authorities were directed to record\n\n specifically "untransferrable land obtained from Government" in the\n\n revenue records. Against the order issued by the Collector,\n\n Raigarh, dated 25/30-9-2004, many applications were filed before\n\n the Board of Revenue and the Board of Revenue, while exercising\n\n power under Section 08 of the Code, 1959 has allowed the\n\n applications moved by the private respondents and permitted them\n\n to alienate the property. The State has come before this Court\n\n against the orders passed by the Board of Revenue on different\n\n dates in different Miscellaneous Case Numbers.6. An identical issue came up before this Court in W.P.(227) No.115\n\n of 2013 inState of Chhattisgarh and Others Vs. Pawan\n\n Chauhan and Othersdecided on 23.08.2018, wherein the power\n\n and jurisdiction of Board of Revenue under Section 08 of Code of\n\n 1959 to consider and grant application for permission to sell the\n\n land under Section 165(6)(ii) of the Code of 1959, in light of\n\n Section 08 of the Code of 1959 only confers administrative\n\n jurisdiction to Board of Revenue, was under consideration. It was\n\n also considered that whether the power of the Board of Revenue\n\n under Section 08 of the Code of 1959 is akin to the power of High\n\n Court underArticle 227of Constitution of India.7. It is also observed in the case ofState of Chhattisgarh Vs. Pawan\n\n Chauhan (Supra) that "the Board of Revenue has no business to\n\n lift the ban imposed by the Collector under the provisions of law, it\n\n could have been relaxed by the competent authority, if applied for\n\n by the aggrieved person, and in the manner provided under the12law. The Board of Revenue has exercised the jurisdiction not\n\n vested in it and exceeded its authority by not only granting\n\n permission which has been conferred to the Collector under\n\n Sections 165(6)(ii) and 165(7) of the Code, 1959 but also further\n\n exceeded the jurisdiction by lifting/relaxing the ban imposed and\n\n by directing the competent authority to furnish 22 point information\n\n and further directing the Deputy Registrar to register the sale\n\n deed."8. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment passed in case ofState\n\n of Chhattisgarh and others Vs. Pawan Chauhan & Others(Supra)\n\n are reproduced here:-10. In the erstwhile Madhya Bharat State, the Board of\n Revenue was constituted under the M.B. Board of Revenue\n Ordinance, 1948 dated the 15th January, 1948. Similarly, in\n the former Central Provinces, the Board of Revenue was\n constituted under the C.P. and Berar Board of Revenue\n Ordinance, 1949. In the former Madhya Pradesh, the\n provisions of the Ordinance were enacted as the C.P. and\n Berar Board of Revenue Act, 1949, which was later on\n repealed by the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1954. On the eve\n of the formation of the new Madhya Pradesh State, three\n Boards of Revenue were functioning for the Mahakoshal,\n Madhya Bharat and Vindhya Pradesh regions and these\n three Boards were integrated by notification dated the 1st\n November, 1956. Exercising the powers under Section 8 of\n the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1954, the\n Government of the new Madhya Pradesh State constituted\n the Board of Revenue for the new State. This Board was\n exercising different powers and discharging different\n functions in the different regions according to the regional13laws. By virtue of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the\nM.P. Land Revenue Code, 1954, the Board of Revenue\nfunctioning immediately before the 2nd October, 1959, was\ndeemed to be the Board of Revenue constituted under this\nCode. Section 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue\nCode, 1959 states as under: -"3. Constitution of Board of Revenue--(1) There\n shall be a Board of Revenue for Madhya Pradesh\n consisting of a President and two or more other\n members as the State Government may, from time to\n time, think fit to appoint.(2) The Board of Revenue as constituted and\n functioning for the several regions of this State\n immediately before the coming into force of this Code,\n hereinafter in this Chapter referred to as the existing\n Board, shall with effect from the date of coming into\n force of this Code, be deemed to be the Board of\n Revenue for Madhya Pradesh constituted under this\n section.(3) The President and members of the existing Board\n shall be the first President and members respectively of\n the Board of Revenue for Madhya Pradesh.11. At this stage, it would be appropriate to consider the\nreport of the Select Committee in which following\nobservations appear about the Board of Revenue: -"The Committee noted that the Bill as drafted entrusted\n the Board of Revenue with judicial and administrative\n powers. It was explained to the Committee that the\n functions entrusted to the Board were primarily judicial\n but an enabling provision was made with a view to\n obviate difficulty in cases it was later on considered\n necessary to entrust superintendence of administrative\n side also to Board. The Committee sees no objection to14this. The Committee considered that in case the Board\n decides to sit at different places in the State on circuit\n there shall be a provision for enabling it to do so,\n considering the expanse of the State. A new clause 3-A\n (section 4 of the Code) has been inserted to serve this\n object."12. At this stage, it would also be appropriate to notice\nSection 8 of the Code constituted under Section 3(2), which\nhas been conferred the power of superintendence. Section 8\nof the Code states as under: -"8. Powers of superintendence of Board. --The\n Board shall, in respect of all matters subject to its\n appellate or revisional jurisdiction, have\n superintendence over all authorities in so far as such\n authorities deal with such matters and may call for\n returns."13. A careful perusal of the aforesaid provision would show\nthat the Board of Revenue has been conferred the power of\nsuperintendence in respect of all matters subject to its\nappellate or revisional jurisdiction and the said Board would\nexercise the power of superintendence over all authorities in\nso far as such authorities deal with such matters and also\nempowered to call for returns. It is not an unqualified\nprovision and confers administrative jurisdiction to the Board\nsubject to its appellate or revisional jurisdiction.17.In the matter ofPest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Pest\nControl (India) Pvt. Ltd. Employees' all India Union and\nothers , the Bombay High Court defining the scope of\nsupervisory jurisdiction held as under: -"9. The main challenge to the above order is on the\n ground that the Industrial Court acted patently beyond\n its limited supervisory jurisdiction in taking upon itself\n the task of reappreciating the entire evidence and15passing a fresh order as if it was the original authority\n or an authority sitting in appeal over the order of the\n Labour Court. The jurisdiction of the Industrial Court\n under section 44 of the Act, according to the petitioner,\n is very limited. It is only supervisory in nature. In the\n instant case, the Industrial Court went far beyond its\n powers and in that view of the matter itself the\n impugned order is liable to be set aside and quashed."18.In the matter ofHameed Kunju v. Nazim, the Supreme\nCourt has held that in exercise of jurisdiction underArticle\n227of the Constitution of India, the Court should not decide\nthe writ petition like original court and observed as under: -"26. In any case, in our considered view, the executing\n court having seized of the applications filed by the\n respondent, there was no justification on the part of\n the High Court to have entertained the writ petition and\n decided them like an original court. All that the High\n Court, in such circumstances, could do was to request\n the executing court to dispose of the pending\n applications (IAs) filed by the respondent on their\n respective merits leaving the parties to challenge the\n orders once passed on such applications by filing\n appeal, before the appellate authorities. It was,\n however, not done.40. In so doing, the High Court failed to see that the\n High Court curtailed the judicial powers of the trial\n Court in passing appropriate order on such\n applications. The High Court had no jurisdiction to\n issue directions to the trial court to pass a particular\n order by either allowing the application or rejecting it.\n All that the High Court could do in such case was to\n remand the case and leave the trial court to pass\n appropriate orders on the application(s) in exercise of\n its judicial discretion."1625. The Code clearly confers the jurisdiction to the Collector\nunder Section 165(6)(ii) of the Code to grant permission,\ntherefore, the jurisdiction has to be exercised by the\nCollector only, neither the authority higher than Collector nor\nany other authority including the Board of Revenue can\nexercise that power. The Collector is one of the revenue\nofficers mentioned in Section 11 of the Code. Whereas the\nBoard of Revenue is not a Revenue Officer, but it is a\nRevenue Court, neither the Board of Revenue nor any\nmember of the Board of Revenue is Revenue Officer. It is\nthus, clear that the Board of Revenue is a Revenue Court as\nprovided under Section 31 of the Code. However, the\nRevenue Officers mentioned in Section 11 of the Code are\nboth Revenue Officers and Revenue Courts. The Board\nbeing only a Revenue Court can administratively supervise\nthe working of Revenue Officer under the provisions of the\nCode subject to its appellate and revisional jurisdiction, but\nunder Section 8 of the Code no original jurisdiction of judicial\nrevision has been conferred to the Board of Revenue, it is\nonly administrative in nature. As such, the order passed by\nthe Board of Revenue directly entertaining the application\nand granting that application in exercise of power which has\nnot been statutorily conferred to him is absolutely without\njurisdiction, as there is no semblance of jurisdiction\nconferred to the Board of Revenue under Section 8 of the\nCode to grant application under Sections 165(6)(ii) and\n165(7) of the Code.26. In the matter of Joint Action Committee of Air Line\nPilots' Association of India (ALPAI) and others v.\nDirector General of Civil Aviation and others, the\nSupreme Court while relying upon the earlier judgments held\nthat an authority vested with the power to act under the\nstatute alone should exercise its discretion following the\nprocedure prescribed therein and observed as under:-17"27. Similar view has been reiterated by this Court inCommr. of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji,Bahadursinh\n Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M. KamaliaandPancham Chand v. State of H.P.observing that an\n authority vested with the power to act under the statute\n alone should exercise its discretion following the\n procedure prescribed therein and interference on the\n part of any authority upon whom the statute does not\n confer any jurisdiction, is wholly unwarranted in law. It\n violates the constitutional scheme.28. In view of the above, the legal position emerges\n that the authority who has been vested with the power\n to exercise its discretion alone can pass the order.\n Even a senior official cannot provide for any guideline\n or direction to the authority under the statute to act in a\n particular manner."27. There is yet another reason for not upholding the order,\nas the Board of Revenue has relaxed the ban imposed by\nthe Collector under its jurisdiction, however, the Board of\nRevenue has no business to lift the ban imposed by the\nCollector under the provisions of law, it could have been\nrelaxed by the competent authority, if applied for by the\naggrieved person, and in the manner provided under the\nlaw. The Board of Revenue has exercised the jurisdiction not\nvested in it and exceeded its authority by not only granting\npermission which has been conferred to the Collector under\nSections 165(6)(ii) and 165(7) of the Code, but also further\nexceeded the jurisdiction by lifting/relaxing the ban imposed\nand directing the competent authority to furnish 22 point\ninformation and further directing the Deputy Registrar to\nregister the sale deed. In the considered opinion of this\nCourt, the order passed by the Board of Revenue granting\npermission under Section 165(6)(ii) of the Code and relaxing\nthe ban deserves to be quashed being wholly without18jurisdiction and authority of law.9. From the ratiolaid down byCoordinate Bench of this Court in case\n\n ofState of Chhattisgarh Vs. Pawan Chauhan (Supra), it is crystal\n\n clear that the Board of Revenue has no power to relax or lift the\n\n ban imposed by the competent authority i.e. 'Collector'. The Board\n\n of Revenue has committed illegality by exceeding its jurisdiction,\n\n thereby granting permission to sale/alienate the Government land,\n\n which was banned by the Collector, Raigarh under its jurisdiction.10. Consequently, the Writ Petitions are allowed and the orders\n\n passed by the Board of Revenue in respective Writ Petitions are\n\n hereby set aside and registration of sale deeds, if any, are also\n\n quashed.11. With these observation(s)/direction(s), these petitions stand\n\n disposed of.Sd/-(Rakesh Mohan Pandey)\n Judge\nMonika

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Telangana High CourtSri. Shahid Khan vs The State Of Telangana on 20 May, 2021Author:K. LakshmanBench:K. LakshmanTHE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN\n\n CRIMINAL PETITION No.3872 OF 2021\n\nORDER:This is an application for anticipatory bail. The petitioners\n\nherein are Accused Nos.1 and 2 in Cr.No.97 of 2021 of Velgatoor\n\nPolice Station, Jagitial District. The offence alleged against the\n\npetitioners is underSection 420IPC r/w.Section 34of IPC.2. Heard Sri B.Krishna Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners,\n\nlearned Assistant Public Prosecutor and perused the record.3. The allegations against the petitioners herein are that they\n\nfloated the company i.e., L-9, Link Line and Companies,\n\nHyderabad and both petitioners are Directors of the said company.\n\nThe son of complainant paid an amount of Rs.4,00,000/- to the\n\npetitioners herein on the promise made by them to provide a job to\n\nhim. Despite receiving the said amount, petitioners have not\n\nprovided any job to the son of complainant.4. Learned Counsel for the petitioners would submit that the\n\nson of complainant has invested the amount in the said company\n\nand petitioners herein never cheated the son of complainant as\n\nalleged in the complaint and cheque numbers were also mentioned\n\nspecifically.5. A perusal of the record would reveal that since the\n\npunishment for the offence alleged against the petitioners is seven\n\nyears and below seven years, the investigating officer has already\n\ninvoked the procedure laid down inSection\n\n41-ACr.P.C., by way of issuing notice on 25.04.2021.26. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that due to\n\nshortage of time and due to present Covid-19 pandemic situation,\n\nsince the distance between the place where petitioners are residing\n\nand the police station is above 250 Kms, therefore, petitioners have\n\nnot appeared before the investigating officer. However, he would\n\nsubmit that petitioners are ready to cooperate with the\n\ninvestigating officer by appearing before him and also by\n\nfurnishing the information and documents as sought in concluding\n\nthe investigation.7. In view of the said submissions, considering the fact that the\n\ninvestigating officer has already invoked the procedure laid down\n\nunderSection 41-ACr.P.C., this Petition is disposed of directing\n\nthe investigating officer in Cr.No.97 of 2021 pending on the file of\n\nPolice Station Velgatoor, Jagital District to strictly follow the\n\nprocedure laid down underSection 41-ACr.P.C. The investigating\n\nofficer is further directed to issue fresh notice underSection 41-ACr.P.C., to the petitioners by giving reasonable time to them to\n\nsubmit their explanation along with the documents in support of\n\ntheir contentions. Petitioners shall cooperate with the investigating\n\nofficer by furnishing the information and documents as sought in\n\nconcluding the investigation.Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand disposed\n\nof.__________________\n K. LAKSHMAN, J\nDate: 20.05.2021\nRds3THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN\n\n\n\n\n CRIMINAL PETITION No.3872 OF 2021\n\n Dated : 20.05.2021\n\nRds

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Take notes as you read a judgment using our Virtual Legal Assistant and get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out our Premium Member services -- Free for one month.\n\nSecurities Appellate Tribunal\nSushil Global Commodities Pvt. Ltd. vs Sebi on 7 April, 2021\nBEFORE THE SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL\n MUMBAI\n\n Date : 07.04.2021\n\n\n Misc. Application No. 74 of 2020\n And\n Appeal No. 71 of 2020\n\nCD Commo Search Pvt. Ltd. ..... Appellant\n\n Versus\n\nNational Commodity & Derivatives\nExchange Ltd. .....Respondent\n\n\n\nMr. Joby Mathew, Advocate with Mr. Anshuman Sugla, Advocate\nfor the Appellant.\nMr. Anubhav Ghosh, Advocate with Mr. Ravishekhar Pandey,\nAdvocate i/b The Law Point for the Respondent.\n\n\n\n With\n Appeal No. 104 of 2020\n\nAnand Rathi Commodities Ltd. ..... Appellant\n\n Versus\n\nNational Commodity & Derivatives\nExchange Ltd. .....Respondent\n\n\nMr. Saurabh Bachhawat, Advocate i/b Mr. Harsh Kesharia, Advocate\nfor Appellant.\n 2\n\n\n\nMr. Anubhav Ghosh, Advocate with Mr. Ravishekhar Pandey,\nAdvocate i/b The Law Point for the Respondent.\n\n\n\n With\n Misc. Application No. 122 of 2020\n And\n Appeal No. 125 of 2020\n\nSushil Global Commodities Pvt. Ltd. ..... Appellant\n\n Versus\n\nNational Commodity & Derivatives\nExchange Ltd. .....Respondent\n\n\nMr. J. J. Bhatt, Advocate with Ms. Rinku Valanju, Mr. Pratham\nMasurekar, Ms. Hetal Joshi, Mr. Aditya Shah, Advocates i/b R V\nLegal for the Appellant.\nMr. Anubhav Ghosh, Advocate with Mr. Ravishekhar Pandey,\nAdvocate i/b The Law Point for the Respondent.\n\n\n\nORDER :\n1. List these appeals on May 17, 2021.\n\n\n2. Parties will take instructions from the Registrar 48 hrs. before\n\nthe date fixed in order to find out as to whether the appeal would be\n\nheard through video conference or through physical hearing.\n 3\n3. The present matter was heard through video conference due\n\nto Covid-19 pandemic. At this stage it is not possible to sign a copy\n\nof this order nor a certified copy of this order could be issued by the\n\nRegistry. In these circumstances, this order will be digitally signed\n\nby the Private Secretary on behalf of the bench and all concerned\n\nparties are directed to act on the digitally signed copy of this order.\n\nParties will act on production of a digitally signed copy sent by fax\n\nand/or email.\n\n\n Justice Tarun Agarwala\n Presiding Officer\n\n\n\n Justice M. T. Joshi\n Judicial Member\n07.04.2021 RAJALA Digitally signed\n by RAJALAKSHMI\n KSHMI HDate:\n NAIR\nPTM 2021.04.09\n H NAIR 09:05:51 +05'30'

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Take notes as you read a judgment using our Virtual Legal Assistant and get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out our Premium Member services -- Free for one month.\n\nPatna High Court - Orders\nVinod Kumar Singh vs The State Of Bihar on 8 December, 2021 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA\n Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No 9675 of 2020\n======================================================\nRameshwar Bharti @ Rameshwar Bharati\n\n ... ... Petitioner/s\n Versus\nThe State of Bihar\n\n ... ... Respondent/s\n WITH\n Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No 9823 of 2020\n======================================================\nShivji Sah @ Sheoji Sah\n\n ... ... Petitioner/s\n Versus\nThe State of Bihar\n\n ... ... Respondent/s\n WITH\n Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No 9838 of 2020\n======================================================\nRajesh Kumar Singh\n\n ... ... Petitioner/s\n Versus\nThe State of Bihar\n\n ... ... Respondent/s\n WITH\n Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No 9877 of 2020\n======================================================\nVivek Kumar Singh\n\n ... ... Petitioner/s\n Versus\nThe State of Bihar\n\n ... ... Respondent/s\n WITH\n Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No 9894 of 2020\n======================================================\nVinod Kumar Singh\n\n ... ... Petitioner/s\n Versus\nThe State of Bihar\n\n ... ... Respondent/s\n WITH\n Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No 537 of 2021\n======================================================\n Patna High Court CWJC No.9675 of 2020(4) dt.08-12-2021\n 2/4\n\n\n\n\n Sanjay Kumar Singh\n\n ... ... Petitioner/s\n Versus\n The State of Bihar\n\n ... ... Respondent/s\n WITH\n Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No 579 of 2021\n ======================================================\n Shesh Nath Tiwari\n\n ... ... Petitioner/s\n Versus\n The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary\n\n ... ... Respondent/s\n WITH\n Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No 891 of 2021\n ======================================================\n Rajesh Kumar\n\n ... ... Petitioner/s\n Versus\n The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary\n\n ... ... Respondent/s\n WITH\n Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No 976 of 2021\n ======================================================\n Bhim Shankar Pathak\n\n ... ... Petitioner/s\n Versus\n The State of Bihar\n\n ... ... Respondent/s\n WITH\n Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No 1005 of 2021\n ======================================================\n Amindar Kumar Singh @ Amindar Singh\n\n ... ... Petitioner/s\n Versus\n The State of Bihar\n\n ... ... Respondent/s\n WITH\n Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No 1182 of 2021\n ======================================================\n Smt Kiran Kumar @ Kiran Devi @ Kiran Kumari\n\n ... ... Petitioner/s\n Patna High Court CWJC No.9675 of 2020(4) dt.08-12-2021\n 3/4\n\n\n\n\n Versus\n The State of Bihar\n\n ... ... Respondent/s\n WITH\n Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No 2189 of 2021\n ======================================================\n Santosh Kumar Singh\n\n ... ... Petitioner/s\n Versus\n The State of Bihar\n\n ... ... Respondent/s\n ======================================================\n Appearance :\n (In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No 9675 of 2020)\n For the Petitioner/s : Mr Sumeet Kumar Singh, Advocate\n For the Respondent/s : Mr.Lalit Kishore (Ag )\n (In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 9823 of 2020)\n For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Sumeet Kumar Singh\n For the Respondent/s : Mr.Lalit Kishore (Ag)\n (In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 9838 of 2020)\n For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Sumeet Kumar Singh\n For the Respondent/s : Mr.Lalit Kishore (Ag)\n (In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 9877 of 2020)\n For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Sumeet Kumar Singh\n For the Respondent/s : Mr.Lalit Kishore (Ag)\n (In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 9894 of 2020)\n For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Sumeet Kumar Singh\n For the Respondent/s : Mr.Lalit Kishore ( Ag )\n (In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 537 of 2021)\n For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Sumeet Kumar Singh\n For the Respondent/s : Mr.Lalit Kishore ( Ag )\n (In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 579 of 2021)\n For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Sumeet Kumar Singh\n For the Respondent/s : Mr.Lalit Kishore (Ag)\n (In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 891 of 2021)\n For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Sumeet Kumar Singh\n For the Respondent/s : Mr.Lalit Kishotr ( Ag )\n (In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 976 of 2021)\n For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Sumeet Kumar Singh\n For the Respondent/s : Mr.Lalit Kishore (Ag)\n (In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1005 of 2021)\n For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Sumeet Kumar Singh\n For the Respondent/s : Mr.Lalit Kishore (Ag)\n (In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1182 of 2021)\n For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Sumeet Kumar Singh\n For the Respondent/s : Mr.Lalit Kishore (Ag)\n (In Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 2189 of 2021)\n For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Sumeet Kumar Singh\n For the Respondent/s : Mr.Lalit Kishore (Ag)\n ======================================================\n Patna High Court CWJC No.9675 of 2020(4) dt.08-12-2021\n 4/4\n\n\n\n\n CORAM: HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE CHAKRADHARI SHARAN SINGH\n and\n HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MADHURESH PRASAD\n\n ORAL ORDER\n (Per: HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE CHAKRADHARI SHARAN SINGH)\n\n4 08-12-2021 As requested on behalf of the Corporation, list this\n\n case on 20.12.2021.\n\n\n (Chakradhari Sharan Singh, J)\n\n\n (Madhuresh Prasad, J)\n\nM.E.H./-\n\nU

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Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)Shukdeb Maiti vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors on 20 February, 2023Author:T.S. SivagnanamBench:T. S. Sivagnanam,Hiranmay BhattacharyyaItem No.2.\n\n IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT CALCUTTA\n CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION\n APPELLATE SIDE\n\n\n HEARD ON: 20.02.2023\n\n DELIVERED ON: 20.02.2023\n\n\n CORAM:\n\n THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T. S. SIVAGNANAM\n AND\n THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HIRANMAY BHATTACHARYYA\n\n\n WPST 47 of 2022\n With\n I.A. No.CAN 1 of 2022\n\n Shukdeb Maiti.\n Vs.\n The State of West Bengal & ors.\n\n\nAppearance:-\n\nMr. Uday Narayan Betal,\nMr. Partha Sarathi Mondal .... for the petitioner.\n\nMr. S. N. Mookherjee, ld. A. G.,\nMr. Tapan Kr. Mukherjee, ld. A.G.P.,\nMr. Sanjay Basu,\nMr. Piyush Agarwal,\nMs. Shrivalli Kajaria,\nMs. Debdooti Dutta ...... for the respondents.\n 2\n\n\n\n\n JUDGMENT(Judgment of the Court was delivered by T.S. SIVAGNANAM, J.)1. The writ petition had been filed by one Shukdeb Maiti\n\npraying for issuance of a writ of mandamus to show cause as to\n\nwhy the order dated 15th February, 2022 passed by the learned\n\nTribunal in O.A. No. 606 of 2021 shall not be set aside and / or\n\nquashed and thereby direct the respondent authorities to appoint\n\nthe applicant to the post of Medical Technologist (Lab) Grade -\n\nIII by allowing full marks for possessing the qualification of\n\nM.Sc. MLT as essential qualification as well as marks for\n\nexperience as per the notification / advertisement issued by the\n\nrespondents / department.2. The writ petition was heard by the Division Bench on\n\nvarious dates, it would suffice to note that during the course\n\nof hearing, the Division Bench was of the prima facie opinion\n\nthat there were glaring errors in the selection process. It may\n\nnot be necessary for us to advert into the various orders passed\n\nby the Division Bench from time to time. Suffice to note the\n\norder dated 13th July, 2022.3. Before we go into the said order, one other order passed by\n\nthe Division Bench, which needs to be referred is the order3dated 6th July, 2022. On going through the order, we find that\n\ncertain strong observations had been made, though prima facie in\n\nnature about the selection process. The respondents have filed\n\nI.A. No.CAN 1 of 2022 to recall/modify/clarify the order dated\n\n6th July, 2022 primarily on the ground that incomplete records\n\nwere placed before this Court, which led to certain adverse\n\nobservations being made by the Division Bench in its order dated\n\n6th July, 2022.4. In the latter part of this order, we shall deal with I.A.\n\nNo.CAN 1 of 2022. Reverting back to the order dated 13 th July,\n\n2022, from which we find that the petitioner was directed to\n\npoint out the discrepancies in the manner in which the selection\n\nwas conducted with a request to the learned Advocate General to\n\ntake necessary instructions on the errors and / or discrepancies\n\ndisclosed by the petitioner through his learned counsel.5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has disclosed such\n\nerrors and the learned Advocate General has personally examined\n\nthe same and the outcome of such exercise has been brought on\n\nrecord in the form of a supplementary affidavit filed by the\n\nappropriate authority of the respondents / department. From the\n\ndiscrepancies, which were pointed out by the petitioner and upon\n\nthorough verification by the learned Advocate General, it is4found that the case of the writ petitioner has to be accepted\n\nand he is to be awarded 15 marks for possessing the M.Sc.\n\nqualification. Similar exercise was done in respect of the other\n\ncandidates as well and it is found that 8 candidates in the\n\n"Unreserved" category and 1 candidate in the "ST" category are\n\nalso qualified for being appointed. In such circumstances, it\n\nis to be seen as to what is the nature of order and direction\n\nthat has to be issued in this writ petition.6. We are conscious of the fact that the present proceeding is\n\nnot in the nature of a public interest litigation as there is a\n\nbar in entertaining a public interest litigation in service\n\nmatters. The writ petition challenges an order passed by the\n\nlearned Tribunal before whom the writ petitioner was the\n\napplicant projecting his individual grievance. Earlier, a set of\n\n7 candidates had approached this Court by filing an application\n\nin I.A. No.CAN 2 of 2022 by which they sought for addition of\n\nparties to the writ petition and claimed that they also should\n\nbe declared as successful in the selection process.7. The Division Bench by order dated 5th August, 2022 dismissed\n\nI.A. No.CAN 2 of 2022 on the ground that in the writ petition,\n\nthe applicants cannot be added as parties nor their cases can be\n\nconsidered as they have to file an independent application5before the learned Tribunal. In the given facts and\n\ncircumstances, a workable solution needs to be found so that the\n\nselection process is completed by rectifying the defects and\n\ndiscrepancies so that all the candidates, who are rightful\n\nentitled to be selected are appointed to the said post.8. In our view, the order dated 5th August, 2022 dismissing\n\nI.A. No.CAN 2 of 2022 will not strictly be a bar for this Court\n\nto take a holistic view in the matter, more particularly, in the\n\nlight of the order passed by the Division Bench dated 13 th July,\n\n2022 and the exercise that was done by the learned Advocate\n\nGeneral, which has yielded certain results.9. Therefore, in our view, ends of justice would be met if a\n\ncomprehensive order is passed in this writ petition so as to\n\ncover the discrepancies of all candidates, though it is the writ\n\npetitioner, who was the only candidate, who had only approached\n\nthe learned Tribunal by way of an application.10. The discrepancies, which have been now ascertained and\n\nagreed to be rectified by the respondents cannot be strictly\n\nconstrued to be a case of any nepotism or any cherry picking but\n\nappears to be mistakes committed by the selecting authorities\n\neither due to improper verification or conducting an exercise\n\nwithout due application of mind.611. In any event, the selection authority is bound to take\n\nutmost care to ensure that the rights of the candidates, who are\n\nentitled to be selected are in no manner jeopardised by their\n\ninaction or their failure to take note of the relevant facts or\n\non account of non-application of mind.12. Be that as it may, now that the discrepancies have been\n\nfound out and it is admitted by the respondents that not only\n\nthe petitioner, but 8 candidates of the "Unreserved" category\n\nand 1 candidate of the "ST" category are all qualified to be\n\nappointed to the said post. Therefore, we are inclined to\n\nissued the following orders / directions.13. As observed earlier, the order dated 5th August, 2022\n\ndismissing I.A.No.CAN 2 of 2022 will not strictly come in the\n\nway of this Court issuing general directions so as to cover all\n\nthe candidates as this order will not only be comprehensive but\n\nwould meet the ends of justice.14. In the light of the admitted facts as placed before this\n\nCourt in the form of a supplementary affidavit, there will be a\n\ndirection to the respondents to select and appoint the\n\npetitioner and other 8 candidates in the "Unreserved" category\n\nand 1 candidate in the "ST" category, whose names have been\n\ndisclosed in the supplementary affidavit. Their appointments7shall take effect from 10th July, 2020 and for the purpose of\n\ncalculating their length of service, the said date shall be\n\nreckoned. However, for the purposes of monetary benefits, it\n\nshall be only with effect from the date on which they are\n\nappointed and joined the respective post.15. It is submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner\n\nthat since the entire process has taken thus long and the\n\ncandidates on being appointed and after having joined the post\n\nsince notional benefit has been given with effect from 10 th July,\n\n2020, they will be entitled for two increments. This position\n\nneeds no clarification as our order clearly states that the\n\nappointments shall take notional effect from 10th July, 2020,\n\ni.e. the length of service of the respective candidates\n\nincluding the petitioner shall be reckoned from 10th July, 2020\n\nfor all purposes except for pay and allowances as the petitioner\n\nand the other candidates are not entitled for any salary for the\n\nperiod for which they have not worked.16. In the light of the above orders, I.A. No.CAN 1 of 2022 is\n\nallowed and the prima facie observations made by the Division\n\nBench in the said order shall stand vacated.17. The above direction shall be complied with by the\n\nrespondents / department as expeditiously as possible but8preferably within a period of three weeks from the date of the\n\nreceipt of the server copy of this judgment and order.18. There shall be no order as to costs.19. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied\n\nfor, be furnished to the parties expeditiously upon compliance\n\nof all legal formalities.(T.S. SIVAGNANAM, J)\n\n\n\nI agree,\n\n (HIRANMAY BHATTACHARYYA, J.)\n\n\n\nNAREN/PALLAB(AR.C)

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Telangana High CourtN. Lakshminarayana vs K.Vijayalaxmi And 9 Others on 11 November, 2022HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SAMBASIVA RAO NAIDU\n\n C.R.P.NO.683 of 2022\n\n\nORDER :This Civil Revision Petition has been filed by the petitioner\n\nunderArticle 227of Constitution of India. The petitioner/plaintiff\n\nin O.S.No.600 of 2015 (old suit O.S.No.1150 of 2008) and\n\nrespondent No.1 in I.A.No.1056 2018 on the file of Senior Civil\n\nJudge, Medchal. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order of\n\nSenior Civil Judge, Medchal (herein after will be referred as trial\n\nCourt), in the above referred I.A.No.1056 of 2018 by which the\n\ntrial Court allowed the application filed by respondents No.1 to\n\n3/plaintiffs No.1 to 3 and permitted them to be impleaded as\n\nplaintiffs No.2 to 4 in the main suit, filed this revision.2. I.A.No.1056 of 2018 has been filed by three\n\npetitioners, who are respondents No.1 to 3 underOrder 1 Rule 10\n\nC.P.C. with a request to permit them to be impleaded as plaintiffs\n\nNo.2 to 4 in O.S.No.600 of 2015 which was filed by the present\n\npetitioner. In support of the said petition, the respondent No.1,\n\nwho is the petitioner No.1 in the said I.A.No.1056 of 2018 filed her\n\naffidavit. As per the said affidavit, it is averred that the\n 2 SSRN,JC.R.P. No.683 of 2022petitioner/plaintiff is the son of one Nemuri Balraj and his second\n\nwife Kousalya, whereas respondents No.1, 2 and one Shantha\n\n(Shanthamma) the wife of respondent No.3 are daughters of said\n\nBalraj through his first wife Pentamma. Respondents No.1 to 3\n\nhave claimed that Balraj and Pentamma had several immovable\n\nproperties and Late Balraj has procured immovable properties also\n\nin the name of his second wife Kousalya, including the properties\n\nshown in the main suit. The mother of respondents No.1, 2 and\n\nShanthamma, died Intestate by leaving them as her legal heirs.3. They have further pleaded that the petitioner herein\n\nbeing their brother has filed the main suit for the benefit of\n\nrespondents No.1 to 3/petitioners, but they were not made as\n\nparties to the suit. They have further pleaded that as their rights\n\nover the property are involved in the suit, they are necessary\n\nparties to the main suit. The petitioner herein has filed O.S.No.\n\n9 of 1993 in respect of properties situated at Lothkunta Village and\n\nin the said suit, a Preliminary Decree was passed on 08-09-1993.\n\nHe has filed another suit vide O.S.No.399 of 2004 against\n\nrespondents No.1 to 3 before VI Senior Civil Judge, City Civil\n\nCourt, Hyderabad. But he did not assign any reason for not adding\n\nthe respondents as parties in O.S.No.600 of 2015. Therefore, they\n 3 SSRN,JC.R.P. No.683 of 2022sought for permission to implead themselves as plaintiffs No.\n\n2 to 4.4. The petitioner herein opposed the said petition, he has\n\nfiled a counter stating that the property shown in the schedule fell\n\nto his share in the family settlement deed dated 28-10-1981 along\n\nwith his brothers. The respondents have admitted the said family\n\nsettlement in O.S.No.399 of 2004. He has denied the claim of the\n\nrespondents that they are female share holders of the property\n\nand while disputing the other averments of the above referred\n\naffidavit, further stated that the respondents/petitioners are not\n\nnecessary parties to the suit. He has also claimed that as per the\n\nfamily settlement, Kousalya got the suit schedule property and it is\n\nsubject matter of O.S.No.399 of 2004. The respondents have filed\n\nI.A.No.1056 of 2018 at the instigation of defendants No.1 to 5 in\n\nthe main suit. In fact respondents No.1 to 3 were allotted\n\n'I' schedule property i.e., to an extent of 500 Square yards apart\n\nfrom gold, silver and other household articles but suppressing the\n\nabove facts filed the said petition only to harass the petitioner.\n\nTherefore, he sought for dismissal of the petition.4 SSRN,JC.R.P. No.683 of 20225. The trial Court having heard both parties allowed the\n\npetition and permitted the respondents No.1 to 3/petitioners No.1\n\nto 3 to be impleaded as plaintiffs No.2 to 4 in O.S.No.600 of 2015.6. The petitioner who is respondent in interlocutory\n\napplication and plaintiff in the main suit, filed the present revision\n\non the following grounds.7. The petitioner has claimed that the trial Court ought to\n\nhave seen that respondents No.1 to 3 are not proper and\n\nnecessary parties to the suit, they have no locus-standi to be\n\nadded as plaintiffs. The trial Court should have seen that the relief\n\nclaimed by the petitioner herein is against defendants thereby, no\n\nother 3rd party can be impleaded as plaintiff in the main suit to\n\nenlarge the scope of the suit. He has also claimed that if there is\n\nany dispute in between the petitioner and proposed parties, it\n\nmust be worked out elsewhere but not in the present suit.8. The petitioner further claimed that the trial Court\n\nought to have observed that the presence of proposed plaintiffs is\n\nnot necessary and their presence cannot decide the "lis", pending\n\nbetween the petitioner and defendants on record. The main suit\n\ncan be disposed effectively even without impleading the\n\nrespondents No.1 to 3 as parties to the suit. If the proposed\n 5 SSRN,JC.R.P. No.683 of 2022plaintiffs are added, the scope of litigation will be expanded and\n\ndefendants therein will take an advantage of the situation.9. The petitioner further stated that in the main suit, the\n\nevidence of the plaintiff as well as the defendants was already\n\nrecorded. The suit stands posted for examination of witnesses on\n\nbehalf of the defendant No.3, who is Tahasildar. Therefore, if a\n\n3rd party is added to the suit, at that stage, it is nothing but\n\nre-opening the suit for denova trial. He has also claimed that the\n\ntrial Court ought not to have allowed the application filed by\n\nrespondents No.1 to 3 against the wishes of original plaintiff\n\nthereby, the order passed by the trial Court is a material illegality\n\nand irregularity, as such sought for setting aside the order.10. Heard both parties.11. Now the points for consideration are :1. Whether the respondents No.1 to 3 are proper and\n necessary parties, if so, can they be impleaded as plaintiffs\n No.2 to 4 to the main suit?2. Whether the order of the trial Court is liable to be set aside\n on the grounds raised by the petitioner/plaintiff?12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted\n\nthat there is no dispute about the relationship between the parties.\n\nEven according to the averments made in the previous litigation\n 6 SSRN,JC.R.P. No.683 of 2022and as per the affidavit filed in support of the petition, Late Balraj\n\nhas got two wives. Respondents No.1, 2 and their sister Shantha\n\nare daughters of Balraj through his first wife Pentamma. The\n\npetitioner herein is son of Balraj through his second wife Kousalya.\n\nThere was a settlement between all the family members and as\n\nper the admitted case of proposed parties, shares were already\n\nallotted among the children and other family members of Balraj.\n\nThe property shown in the schedule of O.S.No.600 of 2015 was\n\nexclusively purchased by Kousalya thereby, the proposed parties\n\nhave no right to claim any share. He has further argued that\n\nO.S.No.600 of 2015 was not filed for partition of joint family\n\nproperties but it was filed by the petitioner/plaintiff against\n\ndefendants therein for declaration of a particular document as null\n\nand void, not binding the plaintiff. The reliefs sought for in\n\nO.S.No.600 of 2015 are completely different to the claims of\n\nrespondents No.1 to 3. The petitioner did not sought for any relief\n\nagainst the proposed parties. He has also submitted even\n\notherwise, the petitioner who is master of his own suit cannot be\n\nforced to amend the suit by impleading the respondents No.1 to 3\n\nas plaintiffs No.2 to 4 because such amendment will enlarge the\n\nscope of the suit.7 SSRN,JC.R.P. No.683 of 202213. The learned counsel for the respondents has submitted\n\nthat since there is no dispute about the relationship between\n\npetitioner and respondents No.1 to 3 and as the property shown in\n\nthe plaint schedule is a joint family property, the proposed\n\nplaintiffs have got right to implead themselves as plaintiffs No.2\n\nto 4. He has also argued that in the present revision which is filed\n\nunderArticle 227of Constitution of India, the scope is very limited.\n\nThe order of the trial Court cannot be set aside under the\n\nrevisional jurisdiction of this Court underSection 115of Civil\n\nProcedure Code or underArticle 227of Constitution of India.\n\nWhen this Court wanted to know from the learned counsel as to\n\nhow an application underOrder 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. without any\n\nconsequential amendment annexed, as required under Rule 28 of\n\nCivil Rules of Practice is maintainable, the learned counsel\n\nvehemently argued that there may not be any serious amendment\n\nof the plaint except adding the respondents No.1 to 3 as plaintiffs\n\nNo.2 to 4, therefore, the absence of any consequential amendment\n\nalong with petition filed under order 1Rule 10 C.P.C. may not\n\ncause any prejudice to the contentions of the respondents No.1 to\n\n3 thereby, sought for dismissal of the revision petition.8 SSRN,JC.R.P. No.683 of 202214. Both the parties i.e., petitioner herein and proposed\n\nplaintiffs have claimed earlier there were suits and other\n\nproceedings between the children of Balraj born to his first wife\n\nPentamma, and second wife Kousalya. The respondents No.1 to 3\n\nwanted to come on record as plaintiffs No.2 to 4 on the main\n\nground that their right over joint family property is involved in the\n\nsuit. In view of this particular stand taken by the plaintiffs, it is\n\njust and necessary to verify what is the case of petitioner in\n\nO.S.No.1150 of 2008. As per the averments made in O.S.No.1150\n\nof 2008, the petitioner/plaintiff has filed the said suit for\n\ndeclaration to declare a sale deed executed by defendants No.1 to\n\n3 on 16-07-2007 as null and void and not binding the plaintiff with\n\na consequential relief of direction, defendant No.8 to hand over\n\nphysical possession of the property to the plaintiff. He has also\n\nsought for eviction of defendants No.1 to 5 or any person claiming\n\nright on the suit schedule property through defendants No.1 to 5.\n\nHe has sought for a direction to the defendant No.6, M.R.O. to\n\nmutate the name of plaintiff in the Revenue Records. The\n\npetitioner/plaintiff sought for a direction to restrain defendant\n\nNo.7, Sub-Registrar, Shameerpet, from registering the suit\n\nschedule property at the instance of defendants No.1 to 5.9 SSRN,JC.R.P. No.683 of 202215. As per the plaint averments vide para No.8 of the\n\nplaint, the petitioner/plaintiff has submitted that one Nemuri Sailu\n\ninherited different extents of land from different survey numbers,\n\nafter the death of said Sailu all such properties devolved upon his\n\nson namely N. Balrajaiah Goud, who is the father of plaintiff and\n\nsaid Balrajaiah Goud, who was a Excise Contractor incurred losses\n\nin his business and could not pay the amount due to the\n\nGovernment. Therefore, the Government conducted the auction\n\nfor the sale of his share in the land. In the said auction,\n\nEeswaraiah and B.Chandraiah purchased the properties from\n\nSy.Nos.739, 740, 760-B, 762, 763 and they in turn sold all the\n\nproperties in favour of Kousalya, the mother of petitioner/plaintiff.\n\nIn view of these pleadings, the petitioner claims an exclusive right\n\non the properties shown in the suit schedule. There may be some\n\nother suits between petitioner/plaintiff and respondents/proposed\n\nplaintiffs. O.S.No.600 of 2015 has been filed by the\n\npetitioner/plaintiff on the ground that his mother acquired all the\n\nsuit schedule properties under a registered sale deed. He has filed\n\nan application before the Revenue Authorities for mutation of his\n\nname. He has also pleaded that inspite of a family settlement\n\nagreement between the parties, the defendants No.1 to 5 in the\n 10 SSRN,JC.R.P. No.683 of 2022main suit started dealing with the properties and executing sale\n\ndeeds in favour of 3rd parties thereby, he prayed for declaration to\n\ndeclare such sale deeds as void apart from seeking other\n\nconsequential reliefs.16. The trial Court disposed the application filed by\n\nrespondents No.1 to 3 vide its order dated 22-01-2022. A perusal\n\nof the order would show the trial Court extracted the averments\n\nmade in the affidavit filed by the petitioner, counter affidavit as\n\nwell as the averments of the main suit, disposed the interlocutory\n\napplication by observing that by virtue ofOrder 1 Rule 10 C.P.C.,\n\nthe presence of impleading party is just and essential to answer\n\nthe real issue is in question. The Court below allowed the\n\napplication by a single sentence to the effect that when the\n\nrelationship of petitioners is not disputed by petitioner/plaintiff,\n\nthere is a contentious issue between the plaintiffs including the\n\nproposed plaintiffs, thereby they can be impleaded as parties to\n\nthe suit.17. The petition filed by respondents No.1 to 3 was underOrder 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. which reads as follows :"Suit in the Name of wrong plaintiff, The general rule in\n regard to prosecution of parties is that the plaintiff in a suit,\n be dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he\n wishes to litigate and cannot be compelled to sue a person\n 11 SSRN,JC.R.P. No.683 of 2022against whom he does not seek any relief. Consequently a,\n person who is not a party has no right to be prosecuted\n against the wishes of the Plaintiff, But this general rule is\n subject to the Provisions of Order 1 Rule 10(2)of the Code of\n Civil Procedure, 1908, which provides for dominus litis of\n proper or necessary parties Suit in the Name of wrong\n plaintiff".18. A perusal of the above provision would indicate that\n\nthe Court on its own motion or upon on application filed by a\n\nparty, permit them to be impleaded as plaintiff only on the ground\n\nthat the presence of the proposed party is very much essential for\n\ncomplete and effective adjudication of the main dispute.\n\nTherefore, in order to appreciate the application filed by the\n\nrespondents No.1 to 3, it must be established before the trial Court\n\nthat the presence of the proposed parties more particularly, as\n\nplaintiffs No.2 to 4 is required for complete and effective\n\nadjudication of the main suit.19.In a Judgment between "Varanasi Madhava Rao Vs.\n\nNarayansetti Govind Rajulu & Ors."1, the High Court of Andhra\n\nPradesh made an observation that :"If there is a specific averment on behalf of the petitioner/\n plaintiff and defendants in the suit colluded to harm the interest of\n proposed parties, they can be impleaded as parties to the suit and11999 (3) A.P.L.J. 230 (HC)\n 12 SSRN,JC.R.P. No.683 of 2022it is to avoid multiplicity of the suit and give finality to the\n\n litigation".20. In view of the specific averments made in the plaint\n\nand in view of the affidavit filed in support of the application of the\n\nproposed plaintiffs even if the respondents No.1 to 3 are added as\n\nplaintiffs, such presence cannot decide the disputes between the\n\nparties and since the main suit is filed by the petitioner/plaintiff for\n\na specific relief, that sale deeds executed by defendants No.1 to 3\n\nare not binding upon him. The presence of the proposed parties as\n\nplaintiffs No.2 to 4 is not at all required.21.In another Judgment between "Prakash Rao\n\nDandgey Vs. Sathyanarayana Dandgey"2, this High Court\n\nmade an observation that :"The power of the Court to order amendment of the\n pleadings is confined to allowing a party to alter or amend his own\n pleadings. This provision does not confer power on the Court to\n allow an impleaded party to amend or alter the pleadings of\n another party already on record".22. The said order was passed in a revision petition filed\n\nagainst the order in I.A.No.607 of 2007 filed under Order 1 Rule\n\n10 r/wSection 151C.P.C. and Rule 28 of A.P. Civil Rules of2(2014) 6 ALD 461\n 13 SSRN,JC.R.P. No.683 of 2022Practice with a request to implead petitioner in the above\n\ninterlocutory application as plaintiff in the suit and for a\n\nconsequential relief of amendment of the plaint. Even though the\n\napplication was opposed by the petitioner who is defendant in the\n\nmain suit, the trial Court allowed the application. The Court made\n\nan observation that Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. permits a party to\n\nseek the relief of amendment of pleadings as also consequential\n\nrelief in an application filed under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C.23.In another Judgment between "Major P.T. Choudary\n\nVs. Mohammed Abdul Basheer Khan and others"3, while\n\ndisposing a Civil Revision Petition against the order of a trial Court\n\nin an interlocutory application filed under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) r/w\n\norder 22 Rule 10 andSection 151C.P.C., this Court made an\n\nobservation that\n\n "If a 3rd party is aggrieved by the suit pending between\n plaintiff and defendant can file a separate suit and this order will\n not come in their way provided there was a cause of action".24. In another Judgment between "Devarapu Padma\n\nand others Vs. Guntur Teacher's Housing Cooperative\n\nBuilding Society"4, the Judgment referred above is almost on the3(2007) 2 ALD 6754(2013) 6 ALD 567\n 14 SSRN,JC.R.P. No.683 of 2022same lines of the present case. In this Judgment, some 3rd parties\n\nhave invokedOrder 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. and sought to be impleaded\n\nas plaintiffs to a suit. The said application was allowed by the trial\n\nCourt permitting them to be impleaded as parties to the main suit.\n\nAggrieved by the plaintiff, this Court made the following\n\nobservations:"It is not uncommon that applications are filed to implead\n strangers, as parties to the suit. However, filing of an application to\n implead an individual as the plaintiff is almost a rarity. It would be\n possible only when an individual who does not have any independent\n identity, but is sailing with the plaintiffs in all respects and is not\n claiming any individual claims. In such an extent, he can be impleaded\n as plaintiff, that too at his request.In certain cases, in addition to the plaintiffs, who were already on\n record, some of the defendants may be transposed as the plaintiffs or\n the third parties also can be added as plaintiffs. Wherever such steps are\n taken, no independent relief can be claimed on behalf of the persons\n who were newly added as the plaintiffs. They must sail with the existing\n plaintiffs on record. In this case, however, separate reliefs are sought to\n be claimed on behalf of each of the persons sought to be added as\n plaintiffs. For all practical purposes, if each plaintiff, who is sought to be\n added, will be claiming individual and independent relief for him, the\n\n question of limitation, court fee and other aspects would arise".25. The Court further observed as follows :"By no stretch of imagination, the relief of impleading strangers,\n as parties to the suit, that too as the plaintiffs, on the one hand, and\n amendment of the plaint on the other, can be treated as interconnected\n 15 SSRN,JC.R.P. No.683 of 2022with each other. The order under revision passed by the trial Court\n cannot be sustained in law.26. The record further shows that the petition filed by the\n\nrespondents No.1 to 3 underOrder 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. was filed at\n\nthe fag end of the trial. As per the counter filed by the petitioner\n\nherein, it is very clear that the evidence of both parties were\n\nalready recorded.27. As per the pleadings placed before the Court and\n\naccording to the other record relied on by both parties, it is true\n\nthat the petitioner/plaintiff claims right on some landed properties\n\nby virtue of registered sale deed executed in favour of his mother\n\nwhereas, the proposed parties, who are children of Balraj through\n\nhis first wife Pentamma have claimed that their father procured\n\nsome properties in the name of Kousalya, the mother of the\n\npetitioner/plaintiff, thereby they have got right over those\n\nproperties and as the said properties are shown in the plaint\n\nschedule, they are proper and necessary parties to the suit. They\n\ndid not explain any cause of action as to how they can be added as\n\nplaintiffs to the suit by enlarging the scope of plaint which is filed\n\nagainst the defendants for a specific purpose for declaration of sale\n\ndeeds executed by plaintiffs No.1 to 5 are not binding the plaintiff.16 SSRN,JC.R.P. No.683 of 2022It is not the case of respondents No.1 to 3 that the above referred\n\nsale deed executed by defendants No.1 to 5 are not binding on\n\nthem, they cannot claim such a declaration without any supporting\n\nplaint averments, the entire suit is filed on the basis of a particular\n\ncause of action which respondents No.1 to 3 cannot adopt. They\n\nhave not explained as to how a decree if passed in favour of the\n\npetitioner/plaintiff would effect their rights. If really they are being\n\naggrieved by the act of the petitioner/plaintiff, they have to file a\n\nseparate suit even though it is multiplicity of proceedings. They\n\ncannot claim an order for their addition as plaintiffs to the suit filed\n\nby the petitioner/plaintiff herein.28. In the result, petition is dismissed.Consequently, Miscellaneous applications if any, are closed.\nThere shall be no order as to costs.__________________________\n JUSTICE SAMBASIVA RAO NAIDU\n\nDate: 11.11.2022\nPLV\n 17 SSRN,JC.R.P. No.683 of 2022

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court_cases

Take notes as you read a judgment using our Virtual Legal Assistant and get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out our Premium Member services -- Free for one month.\n\nKerala High Court\nOmanakuttan.K.G vs Union Of India on 28 June, 2021WP(C): 12585/2021 1\n\n\n\n\n IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM\n PRESENT\n THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.MANIKUMAR\n &\n THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY\n MONDAY, THE 28TH DAY OF JUNE 2021 / 7TH ASHADHA, 1943\n WP(C) NO. 12585 OF 2021\n PETITIONER/S:\n\n OMANAKUTTAN.K.G\n AGED 44 YEARS\n S/O. GOPALAN, RESIDING AT KIZHAKKEKURIYEDATHU\n HOUSE, AMARAVATHI (P.O.), KUMALI,IDUKKI DISTRICT\n 685 509.\n BY ADVS.\n M.VIVEK\n ARUN ASHOK\n NEENA JAMES\n RESPONDENT/S:\n\n 1 UNION OF INDIA\n REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY HOME AFFAIRS, NORTH\n BLOCK, CABINET SECRETARIAT, RAISINA HILL NEW\n DELHI 10001.\n 2 STATE OF KERALA\n REPRESENTED BY HOME SECRETARY SECRETARIAT,\n THIRUVANANTHAPURAM 695 001.\n 3 THE STATE POLICE CHIEF,\n POLICE HEAD QUARTERS, VAZHUTHACAUD,\n THIRUVANANTHAPURAM 695 010.\n 4 THE REGISTRAR GENERAL,\n HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM 682 031.\n 5 WHATSAPP INC,\n REP BY CEO, 650, CASTRO STREET, SUIT 120-219\n MOUNTAIN VIEW, CALIFORNIA 94041, USA.\n 6 WHATSAPP APPLICATIONS SERVICES PRIVATE LTD.,\n REP BY CEO, SALARPURA SATTVA KNOWLEDGE CITY LEVEL\n 1 UNIT 2, PLOT NO. 2, INORBIT MALL ROAD, HITECH\n CITY, HYDERABAD, TELENGANA, 500081.\n WP(C): 12585/2021 2\n\n\n\n\n OTHER PRESENT:\n\n SRI. P.VIJAYAKUMAR, ASG FOR R1\n\n SRI. T.A.SHAJI, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PROSECUTION\n AND SRI.P.NARAYANAN, SR GP FOR R2 AND R3\n\n SRI KAPIL SIBAL, SR ADV, SRI. MUKUL ROHATGI, SR\n ADV., SRI TEJAS KARIA, ADV, SRI PAVIT SINGH\n KATOCH, ADV, SRI AASISH SOMASI, ADV, MS. AKSHI\n RASTOGI, ADV, SRI. KOSHY JOHN, ADV AND SRI.\n THOMAS P KURUVILLA, ADV FOR R5\n\n SRI. ARVIND DATAR, SR ADV, SRI. VIVEK REDDY, SR\n ADV, SRI AJIT WARRIER, ADV, SRI. SHASHANK MISHRA,\n ADV, MS. PREETI KOLLURI, ADV, SRI. SHANTANU\n MATHUR, ADV, AND SRI.PRAJITH P, ADV FOR R6\n\n\n THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR\n ADMISSION ON 28.06.2021, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY\n DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:\n WP(C): 12585/2021 3\n\n\n\n C.R.\n JUDGMENT\n S. Manikumar, C. J.\n\n Instant public interest writ petition has been filed for the\n\n following reliefs:\n\n "(i) Issue a writ mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order\n or direction commanding respondent No. 1, to direct the\n respondent Nos.5 and 6, to comply with the Information\n Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media\n Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, in the interest of the nation.\n\n (ii) Issue a writ mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order\n or direction commanding respondents 1 to 3, to pass\n appropriate orders directing the investigating agencies and\n other lawful authorities having the power of investigation\n and enquiry, not to rely on contents of WHATSAPP in their\n functioning and not to arrest or take into custody any\n individual, on the basis of WHATSAPP contents, which may\n appear like an act of crime or violation of law.\n\n (iii) Issue a writ mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order\n or direction commanding respondent No.4, to pass\n appropriate orders to all the Courts of Law under the\n jurisdiction of High Court of Kerala that WHATSAPP\n contents shall not be considered at all for any purpose\n while conducting a trial, inquiry, or any other proceedings.\n WP(C): 12585/2021 4\n (iv) Issue a writ mandamus or any other appropriate writ or\n order or direction commanding respondent Nos. 5 and 6, to\n co-operate with the lawful authorities of the country and to\n provide with the needed data, so as to aid the authorities in\n maintaining the law and order in the country, and thus, to\n sub serve the justice system in India.\n\n (v) If the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 are not willing to co-operate\n with the lawful authorities in India, then issue a writ\n prohibition or any other appropriate writ, order or\n direction, commanding the 1st respondent to ban/cease the\n operations of WHATSAPP mobile application managed by\n respondents 5 and 6 in India, in the best interest of the\n country."\n 2. The writ petition is filed in public interest, seeking for a\n\n ban on the social media platform WhatsApp, for the scope of\n\n manipulations at user end, and for the reason that it cannot trace\n\n the origin of a message, both media and text, that was circulated\n\n using its services.\n\n\n 3. Petitioner has stated that WhatsApp Applications Services\n\n Private Ltd., represented by its CEO, Hitech city, Hyderabad,\n\n respondent No.6, has approached the High Court of Delhi, claiming\n\n that it is not amenable to the newly introduced IT Rules, 2021\n\n because of the end-to-end encryption, and thus, it cannot trace the\n WP(C): 12585/2021 5\n\n\n\n origin of the messages circulated through it, and claims that the\n\n newly introduced Information Technology (Intermediary\n\n Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, is against the\n\n right to privacy, as held in Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and\n\n another v. Union of India and others [(2017) 10 SCC 1].\n\n 4. But, on the contrary, the 6 th respondent, in its privacy\n\n policy, has stated that it will store the messages sent by a user, in\n\n certain circumstances, and that it will store and use all sorts of\n\n information and activities of its users. It also has access and uses\n\n the contacts in the address book of a user and can identify the\n\n contacts which are non users of its services. For identifying the\n\n non-user numbers, the App will use the contact numbers to search\n\n in its servers which in itself is violating privacy of the non-users.\n\n 5. Petitioner has further stated that the App is not free from\n\n manipulations and lacks security. A message received in the form\n\n of media can easily be manipulated even by any common man. A\n\n receiver can change the media received by him and such\n\n manipulation could easily cause unrest or panic among the general\n\n public and could be used against an individual. The App lacks\n WP(C): 12585/2021 6\n\n\n\n security and reliability of messages and is a threat to society. The\n\n App is used by anti national and anti-social elements for their\n\n activities, as the same cannot be traced, due to the claim of the\n\n messaging App that the services are end-to-end encrypted. The\n\n respondents 5 and 6 are not cooperating with the law enforcement\n\n agencies of the country and trying to be above the law of the\n\n country in the guise of the technology.\n\n\n 6. Petitioner has also stated that the App has a separate\n\n privacy policy for the European Region, which is in tune with the\n\n laws prevailing in that region, and it is hesitant to abide by the\n\n laws of our country. In such circumstances, petitioner has filed this\n\n public interest writ petition for the reliefs stated supra.\n\n\n 7. In support of the prayers sought for, petitioner has raised\n\n the following grounds:-\n\n A. Since it is revealed from Ext. P1 that the App can be\n misused for creating false evidences, any registration of\n crimes by a lawful authority or taking cognizance by the\n judiciary or any action by an executive body or\n evidences produced in any court of law on the basis of\n Whatsapp messages, video, images, documents etc. are\n to be nullified as untrustworthy.\n WP(C): 12585/2021 7\n B. The reliance placed on the instant messaging service\n such as Whatsapp for serving court summons and\n notices by the court of law and other lawful bodies are\n also at stake and the authenticity of the same will be\n questioned if the person on the other end is misusing\n the technique as narrated in paragraph (9). Moreover,\n even by using the well-known and highlighted features\n of the App, the purpose of such services can be easily\n defeated.\n\n C. Since the App is exposed to the bugs and errors and can\n easily be manipulated by any person who has no\n hacking knowledge at all, any kind of communications\n sent through the said app could be manipulated.\n\n D. Since the App in its privacy policy clearly stated that\n they will collect any type of data from its user including\n "messages", and their phone's battery level, signal\n strength etc., which obviously do not even come under\n the service area of the App, then they are bound to\n cooperate with the lawful investigating agencies and\n the court of law of the country to serve the justice\n system of the land.\n\n E. Respondents 5 and 6 on various litigations and\n advertisements made a false statement that messages\n sent through it are end-to-end encrypted and hence,\n they have no access to it. The App claims that privacy of\n an Indian citizen is protected as even the App or the 5 th\n respondent have no access to the messages sent\n through it. The said statement itself is contradictory to\n WP(C): 12585/2021 8\n\n\n\n Exhibit-P3 privacy policy of the App, in which, the App\n admits that it can store the messages.\n\n F. Since respondents 5 and 6 are amenable and generous\n enough to create a separate privacy policy or amend\n their privacy policies with respect to the laws prevailing\n in the European Region, then they are bound to co-\n operate with the lawful authorities of India and to\n comply with the laws of this land.\n\n G. Respondents 5 and 6 are claiming immunity of the\n technology and privacy and are not cooperating with\n the lawful authorities of India. Then there is no\n justification for the lawful authorities in relying on\n WhatsApp contents such as messages and activities to\n prosecute any person in a crime or any other\n judicial/quasi-judicial proceedings and use the same as\n evidence against any person.\n\n H. Now, the App has challenged the new Information\n Technology Guidelines claiming them as violating\n privacy of a citizen. The App in itself violates the\n privacy of its users and other non-user contacts of the\n user and blames the laws of this land as violating rights\n of the citizens.\n\n I. Any detention or legal prosecution on the basis of any\n evidence procured from the App will curtail the basic\n fundamental rights of a citizen of India.\n\n J. The App shall abide by the laws of this country so as to\n function here. If the App is not willing to change its\n technology and abide by the rule of law by cooperating\n WP(C): 12585/2021 9\n\n\n\n with the lawful authorities of the country; then the App\n shall not be permitted to operate in this country.\n\n K. The 1st respondent has banned many websites and\n mobile applications for being against the interest of the\n country. The 1st respondent is bound to pass\n appropriate orders banning the functioning of the App\n in the country.\n\n 8. Today, when the matter came up for admission, Mr. M.\n\n Vivek, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the 1 st\n\n respondent is not making the intermediaries, to comply with the\n\n latest guidelines issued by the Government, which has come into\n\n force with effect from 26.05.2021.\n\n 9. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and\n\n perused the material on record.\n\n 10. Government of India, Ministry of Information and\n\n Technology, have introduced the Information Technology\n\n (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules,\n\n 2021, by virtue of the powers conferred under Section 87 of the\n\n Information Technology Act, 2000. It has got various features,\n\n including due diligence, by intermediaries and grievance redressal\n\n mechanism, additional due diligence to be observed by significant\n WP(C): 12585/2021 10\n\n\n\n social media intermediary, additional due diligence to be observed\n\n by an intermediary in relation to news and current affairs content,\n\n notification of other intermediary, code of ethics and procedure\n\n and safeguards in relation to digital media, grievance redressal\n\n mechanism, self regulating mechanism - level I and level II,\n\n oversight mechanism - level III, furnishing of information,\n\n disclosure of information and general guidelines for classification\n\n of films and other entertainment programmes, including web\n\n based serials.\n\n\n 11. Going by the provisions of the Rules, it is explicit that the\n\n Rules take care of every situation that are required for properly\n\n regulating and controlling the mechanism, with respect to the\n\n information and other technology provided by the appropriate\n\n platforms. Without producing any supporting materials to\n\n substantiate the claim, the petitioner has made vague statements,\n\n alleging that Government is not doing anything to control and\n\n regulate the platform in question. However, the rules made by the\n\n Government prove the fact that the Union Government have taken\n\n stock of the situations, and accordingly, adequate provisions are\n WP(C): 12585/2021 11\n\n\n\n made in the rules, to streamline all the aspects, to protect the\n\n interests of the nation and laws. Laws are meant to be\n\n implemented. Any person aggrieved is entitled to challenge the\n\n rules. Merely because the rules are challenged in Delhi High Court,\n\n mandamus as prayed for in prayer No. (i) cannot be issued.\n\n\n 12. In prayer No. (ii), petitioner has sought for a direction to\n\n the investigating agencies not to rely on the contents of WhatsApp\n\n in their functioning, and not to arrest or take into custody any\n\n individual, on the basis of WhatsApp contents, which may appear\n\n like an act of crime or violation of law. This Court cannot issue\n\n such a direction, having regard to the power and decision of the\n\n investigating agencies to arrest or not to arrest, which depends\n\n upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and it is for the\n\n investigating agencies to decide as to how to go about a case and\n\n what are all the material evidence required for successful\n\n culmination of a prosecution. The significant aspect herein to be\n\n considered is that if any such omnibus direction is issued, it would\n\n be nothing but, interfering with the statutory framework by which,\n\n the criminal justice system functions in the country.\n WP(C): 12585/2021 12\n 13. Relief No. (iii) sought for by the petitioner, for a\n\n mandamus commanding the Registrar General, High Court of\n\n Kerala, to pass appropriate orders to all the Courts of Law under\n\n the jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerala that WhatsApp\n\n contents shall not be considered at all for any purpose, while\n\n conducting trial, inquiry, or any other proceedings, prayer sought\n\n for also cannot be granted, since the Registrar General, cannot\n\n exercise supervisory powers under Article 227 of the Constitution\n\n of India.\n\n 14. Moreover, while seeking for such a direction, petitioner is\n\n unmindful of the vital and robust facts on which cases are to be\n\n decided by the trial courts, by virtue of the powers conferred on\n\n them, under various penal statutes, basic and foundational,\n\n substantive and procedural laws, such as Indian Penal Code, 1860,\n\n Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Indian Evidence Act, 1872,\n\n Information Technology Act, 2000, and a cart load of other special\n\n enactments.\n\n 15. Suffice to say, in effect, the petitioner is calling upon this\n\n Court to overlook such core and deep seated judicial aspects, in\n WP(C): 12585/2021 13\n\n\n\n order to vindicate the issue of end-to-end encryption, formulated\n\n by the technological platform in question. We are afraid that, by\n\n seeking for such a relief, petitioner is calling upon this Court, to\n\n issue directions, beyond the comprehension of the Constitution\n\n and the laws.\n\n 16. Appropriate Government, enforcing the rules can demand\n\n co-operation of the law enforcing agencies to provide the required\n\n data, denial or acceptance, of which, is certainly a cause of action,\n\n for the aggrieved. It is too premature to issue a mandamus, as\n\n sought for by the petitioner.\n\n 17. The petitioner is seeking for omnibus directions, without\n\n taking into account the laws made by the Parliament and\n\n Legislature of the States. We find no reasons, to issue any writ of\n\n prohibition, as sought for by the petitioner.\n\n Converging so, we have no hesitation to arrive at the\n\n conclusion that petitioner has failed to make out any case of\n\n arbitrariness or illegality on the part of the respondents, justifying\n\n interference, exercising the power of judicial review conferred\n WP(C): 12585/2021 14\n\n\n\n under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and therefore, he is\n\n not entitled to get any reliefs, as sought for in the writ petition.\n\n\n In the result, this writ petition fails, accordingly dismissed.\n\n\n\n Sd/-\n\n S. MANIKUMAR\n CHIEF JUSTICE\n\n\n Sd/-\n\n SHAJI P. CHALY\n JUDGE\n\n\n Eb\n\n\n\n ///TRUE COPY///\n\n P. A. TO JUDGE\n WP(C): 12585/2021 15\n\n\n\n\n APPENDIX OF WP(C) 12585/2021\n\n PETITIONER ANNEXURE\n EXHIBIT P1 A DEMONSTRATION SCREEN RECORDINGS VIDEO\n OF THE POSSIBLE MANIPULATION ON THE\n APP.\n EXHIBIT P2 THE PRINTOUT OF A VERY DETAIL ARTICLE\n ABOUT THE ISSUES OF SERVING OF LEGAL\n NOTICES AND SUMMONS THROUGH WHATAPP\n PUBLISHED IN THE CYBER BLOG INDIA DATED\n 14.09.2020\n EXHIBIT P3 THE PRINTOUT OF THE PRIVACY POLICY OF\n THE APP AS PUBLISHED IN ITS WEBSITE.

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Uttarakhand High CourtUnknown vs Union Of India And Others on 27 May, 2020Author:Sudhanshu DhuliaBench:Sudhanshu Dhulia,Ravindra MaithaniIN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL\n Writ Petition (PIL) No. 58 of 2020\n\nSachdanand Dabral\n ....Petitioner\n\n\n Versus\n\n\nUnion of India and others ....Respondents\nPresent:- Mr. Shiv Bhatt, Advocate for the petitioner.\n Mr. S.N. Babulkar, learned Advocate General, Mr. H.M.\n Raturi, Deputy Advocate General, Mr. Vinod Nautiyal,\n Deputy Advocate General and Mr. Paresh Tripathi, learned\n Chief Standing Counsel assisted by Mr. Yogesh Pandey, Addl.\n C.S.C., Mr. Anurag Bisaria, Standing Counsel, Mr. Anil\n Bisht, Standing Counsel and Mr. Suyash Pant, Brief Holder\n for the State.\n Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, learned Assistant Solicitor General of\n India assisted by Mr. V.K. Kaparwan, Advocates.\n\n\n\n Writ Petition (PIL) No. 51 of 2020\n\nRajendra Arya\n ....Petitioner\n\n\n Versus\n\n\nUnion of India and others ....Respondents\nPresent:- Mr. Piyush Garg, Advocate for the petitioner.\n Mr. S.N. Babulkar, learned Advocate General, Mr. H.M.\n Raturi, Deputy Advocate General, Mr. Vinod Nautiyal,\n Deputy Advocate General and Mr. Paresh Tripathi, learned\n Chief Standing Counsel assisted by Mr. Yogesh Pandey, Addl.\n C.S.C., Mr. Anurag Bisaria, Standing Counsel, Mr. Anil\n Bisht, Standing Counsel and Mr. Suyash Pant, Brief Holder\n for the State.\n Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, learned Assistant Solicitor General of\n India assisted by Mr. Sanjay Bhatt and Mr. V.K. Kaparwan,\n Advocates.\n Ms. Anjali Bhargava, Advocate for B.S.N.L.\n 2\n\n\n\n\n Writ Petition (PIL) No. 50 of 2020\n\nIn Re in the Matter of to Provide Adequate Security to\nDoctor and Other Para Medical Professionals\n ....Petitioner\n\n\n Versus\n\n\nPrincipal Secretary/Secretary, Health Department\nGovt. of Uttarakhand and others\n ....Respondents\nPresent:- Mr. Dushyant Mainali, petitioner in person.\n Mr. S.N. Babulkar, learned Advocate General, Mr. H.M.\n Raturi, Deputy Advocate General, Mr. Vinod Nautiyal,\n Deputy Advocate General and Mr. Paresh Tripathi, learned\n Chief Standing Counsel assisted by Mr. Yogesh Pandey, Addl.\n C.S.C., Mr. Anurag Bisaria, Standing Counsel, Mr. Anil\n Bisht, Standing Counsel and Mr. Suyash Pant, Brief Holder\n for the State.\n Mr. Rakesh Thapliyal, learned Assistant Solicitor General of\n India assisted by Mr. Sanjay Bhatt and Mr. V.K. Kaparwan,\n Advocates.\n\n\nHon'ble Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.Hon'ble Ravindra Maithani, J.Although in this matter 02.06.2020 had\nalready been fixed earlier, but the case has been listed before\nthis Court on an urgency application filed by the petitioner in\nWrit Petition (PIL) No. 58 of 2020.2. Today Mr. Shiv Bhatt, learned counsel for the\npetitioner in Writ Petition (PIL) No. 58 of 2020 has apprised\nthis Court that the directions given by this Court in the order\ndated 20.05.2020 have not been followed at all nor is there\nany effort on part of the State authorities in this direction.\nToday the counsel for the petitioner has also apprised this\nCourt that the conditions in some quarantine centers in the3border districts are pathetic. There is a complete lack of\nfacilities in many of the quarantine centers in Pithoragarh\nand Dehradun. Not only this, the learned counsel for the\npetitioner has also apprised this Court that there has been\nan incident where a Government Official has manhandled a\nperson simply for asking for better facilities in the quarantine\ncenter.3. Since the Secretary, Health, Government of\nUttarakhand Sri Amit Negi, is before this Court, we direct\nhim to do a formal inquiry in this matter and apprise this\nCourt through the learned Advocate General by the next date\nof listing.4. Meanwhile, Mr. Amit Negi, Secretary, Health\nhas apprised this Court about the progress on the three\ndirections which this Court has given by order dated\n20.05.2020. Let a compliance report be made by the\nGovernment, to this Court in writing through the office of the\nlearned Advocate General by the next date of listing. There\nwould be no need of an affidavit.5. Meanwhile, what we have been informed, as of\nnow, is that although the Government has not been able to\nconstruct and make functional any quarantine centers on\nborder itself, for logistical reasons, but such quarantine\ncenters have been established in the border districts i.e. in\nDistricts Nainital, Udham Singh Nagar, Haridwar and\nDehradun.6. As already referred above, it has been brought\nto our notice that the conditions in many of these quarantine4centers, to say the least, is pathetic. It has also been alleged\nthat there are not enough toilets in these centers. Many of\nthese institutional quarantine centers are in extreme\nunhygienic conditions. We therefore direct the concerned\nSecretaries of the District Legal Services Authorities of\nNainital, Udham Singh Nagar, Haridwar and Dehradun to\nmake a personal visit of these quarantine centers within\nthree days from today and file its report before the Registrar\nGeneral online. The district administration shall provide\nthem with such logistics and preventive gear, keeping the\npresent condition Covid-19 pandemic in mind.7. Mr. Amit Negi, Secretary, Health has very fairly\nsubmitted that it is possible that in this short duration some\nof the quarantine centers may actually be lacking in facilities,\nhowever, he has assured this Court that all efforts shall be\nmade to upgrade these quarantine centers by providing\nsufficient toilets and by maintaining a proper hygiene in\nthese centers and that he will make sure that the inmates in\nthese quarantine centers are given their meals in proper\ntime, three times a day.8. The Registrar General of the High Court is\ndirected to inform the State Legal Services Authority and the\nSecretary of the above mentioned District Legal Services\nAuthorities for compliance of the order.9. List these matters on 02.06.2020.(Ravindra Maithani, J.) (Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.)\n 27.05.2020\nAvneet/

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Rajasthan High CourtShivraj Gurjar @ Shiva S/O Sugna vs State Of Rajasthan on 11 August, 2020Author:Pankaj BhandariBench:Pankaj BhandariHIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN\n BENCH AT JAIPUR\n\n S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 8717/2020\n\nShivraj Gurjar @ Shiva S/o Sugna, R/o Ghoda Basti, Near Govt.\nSchool Jawahar Nagar Kota Raj. (At Present Confined At Central\nJail Kota )\n ----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan, through P.P.\n ----RespondentConnected With\n S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 8824/2020\nKamal @ Choka S/o Ashok, R/o Near Ghoda Chauraha Ghoda\nBasti Kota Ps Jawahar Nagar Kota Raj. (At Present In Central Jail\nKota)----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan, through PP----Respondent\n\n\nFor Petitioner(s) : Mr. Abdul Rahim Khan through V.C.\n Mr. Nitin Kumar Sharma through VC.\nFor State : Mr. Bhawani Shankar Sharma, PP\n\n\n HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PANKAJ BHANDARI\n Order\n\n11/08/20201. Petitioners have filed these bail applications under Section\n\n439 of Cr.P.C.2. F.I.R. No.246/2020 was registered at Police Station Mahaveer\n\nNagar, Kota for offence under Sections 307, 341, 323, 143 of\n\nI.P.C.3. It is contended by counsel for the petitioners that similarly\n\nsituated co-accused has been enlarged on bail.(Downloaded on 11/08/2020 at 09:57:58 PM)(2 of 2) [CRLMB-8717/2020]\n\n\n 4. Learned Public Prosecutor has opposed these bail\n\n applications.5. I have considered the contentions.6. Considering the contentions put forth by counsel for the\n\n petitioners, I deem it proper to allow these bail applications.7. These bail applications are accordingly allowed and it is\n\n directed that accused petitioners shall be released on bail provided\n\n each of them furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs.1,00,000/-\n\n (Rupees One Lac only) together with two sureties in the sum of\n\n Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) each to the satisfaction\n\n of the learned trial court with the stipulation that they shall appear\n\n before that Court and any court to which the matter is transferred,\n\n on all subsequent dates of hearing and as and when called upon to\n\n do so.8. A copy of this order be placed in connected file.(PANKAJ BHANDARI),J\n\n CHANDAN /36-37(Downloaded on 11/08/2020 at 09:57:58 PM)Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

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Allahabad High CourtPoorva Agarwal vs State Of U.P. And Another on 27 July, 2022Bench: Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, Umesh Chandra SharmaHIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD\n \n \n\n?Court No. - 47\n \n\n \nCase :- CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 9582 of 2022\n \n\n \nPetitioner :- Poorva Agarwal\n \nRespondent :- State of U.P. and Another\n \nCounsel for Petitioner :- Syed Ahmed Faizan,Sr. Advocate,Zaheer Asghar\n \nCounsel for Respondent :- G.A.\n \n\n \nHon'ble Mahesh Chandra Tripathi,J.Hon'ble Umesh Chandra Sharma,J.1. Heard Sri S.F.A. Naqvi, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Syed Ahmed Faizan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri G.P.Singh, learned AGA appearing for the respondents.2. This writ petition has been filed praying for the following reliefs:"(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned First Information Report dated 07.01.2021 registered as Case Crime No. 0001 of 2021, underSections 409,419,420IPC, Police Station- Rani Ki Sarai, District- Azamgarh (Annexure No. 1 to this writ petition).(ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to arrest or harass the petitioner in pursuance of impugned First Information Report."3. Learned AGA has raised an objection that the petitioner had on an earlier occasion approached this Court by filing a writ petition, Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 3160 of 2022 (Poorva Agrawal Vs. State of UP & Another) which was dismissed vide order dated 5.4.2022, in the following terms:-"Heard learned counsel for the petitioners, learned counsel for the first informant and learned A.G.A. for the State.The writ petition seeks quashing of the FIR dated 07.01.2021 giving rise to Case Crime No. 1 of 2021, underSections 409,419and420I.P.C., Police Station- Rani-Ki-Sarai, District- Azamgarh.The allegation in the FIR is that Nitin Singh, Branch Manager and the petitioner, his wife, have caused a lost of Rs. 66.83 lacs. Temporary over drafts to the tune of Rs. 37.91 lakhs were approved and these unauthorized temporary over drafts were transferred the same day to the sundries account to the Bank of India. They also transferred the balance amount in 7 NPA accounts to the tune of Rs. 27.88 to the sundries account although their powers had already been stayed tempering overdrafts were drawn and credited to various savings bank accounts without any authorization by the account holders. Out of this amount a sum of Rs. 21.29 lakhs was recovered by the Bank. The two officials were suspended on 07.01.2020.The contention of learned counsel is that the petitioner has been implicated only because she is the wife of Nitin Singh, the erstwhile Bank Manager. Her services have been terminated but no recovery had been ordered from her. Her role in the matter is merely one of verification of the entries made by her husband. Other persons who have also verified the transfers made by Nitin Singh have not been proceeded against and they are still working which shows that the petitioner has been victimized and the bank has been following double standards.In paragraph 7 of the writ petition, it has been averred that the impugned FIR has been lodged during the currency of the departmental proceedings while in paragraph 24, it has been averred that Harendra Yadav, Amit Kumar Mishra also verified the entries made by Nitin Singh. They were also served with charge-sheets. However, Sunil Kumar Singh and Amit Kumar Mishra have been let of with warnings whereas a third person Harendra Yadav has been punished by with holding one increment. No FIR has been lodged against the aforesaid three persons.Learned AGA on the other hand has submitted that there is a specific allegation in the FIR that part of the amount which was illegally transferred by the illegal entries made by Nitin Singh, and verified by the petitioner, his wife was also transferred to her personal account. This shows that she is a direct beneficiary of the illegal actions. The FIR thus clearly discloses an offence against the petitioner. The writ petition is therefore liable to be dismissed.In this regard the submission of Shri Satish Chaturvedi, counsel for petitioner is that she was totally unaware of such transfer into her personal account.In our opinion, the issue whether the petitioner was aware or not about the illegal transfer of money into her account is to be the subject matter of investigation and the evidence that may be collected and adduced. It is not possible to rule on the issue at the moment. Besides, the same is, at best, a disputed question of fact, beyond the scope of this writ petition.However, since we agree with the submission of learned AGA that the allegations against the petitioner in the impugned FIR constitute a cognizable offence, the petition has to necessarily fail.The petition is accordingly dismissed. "4. It is submitted that the present writ petition essentially seeks similar reliefs as prayed for in the earlier writ petition which was dismissed vide the aforesaid order and in view thereof the present petition being a second writ petition for almost the same cause of action cannot be entertained.5. The principle underlying Order XXIII Rule 1of the Codeof Civil Procedure which is founded on public policy mandates that successive writ petitions cannot be entertained for the same relief. The Supreme Court in M/s Sarguja Transport Service Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors. held as follows:-"7. .......The principle underlying R. 1 of O. XXIII of the Code is that when a plaintiff once institutes a suit in a Court and thereby avails of a remedy given to him under law, he cannot be permitted to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter again after abandoning the earlier suit or by withdrawing it without the permission of the Court to file fresh suit. Invito beneficium non datur. The law confers upon a man no rights or benefits which he does not desire. Whoever waives, abandons or disclaims a right will loose it. In order to prevent a litigant from abusing the process of the court by instituting suits again and again on the same cause of action without any good reasonthe Codeinsists that he should obtain the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit after establishing either of the two grounds mentioned in sub-rule (3) of R. 1 of O. XXIII. The principle underlying the above rule is founded on public policy, but it is not the same as the rule of res judicata contained inS. 11of the Code which provides that no court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly or substantially in issue has been directly or substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. The rule of res judicata applies to a case where the suit or an issue has already been heard and finally decided by a Court. In the case of abandonment or withdrawal of a suit without the permission of the Court to file a fresh suit, there is no prior adjudication of a suit or an issue is involved, yetthe Codeprovides, as stated earlier, that a second suit will not lie in sub-rule (4) of R. 1 of O. XXIII of the Code when the first suit is withdrawn without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3) in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.8. ...........It is common knowledge that very often after a writ petition is heard for some time when the petitioner or his counsel finds that the Court is not likely to pass an order admitting the petition, request is made by the petitioner or by his counsel to permit the petitioner to withdraw from the writ petition without seeking permission to institute a fresh writ petition. A Court which is unwilling to admit the petition would not ordinarily grant liberty to file a fresh petition while it may just agree to permit the withdrawal of the petition........."6. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Upadhyaya & Co. Vs. State of UP & Ors. and referring to the case of Sarguja Transport Service (supra) it was held as follows:-"13. The aforesaid ban for filing a fresh suit is based on public policy. This Court has made the said rule of public policy applicable to jurisdiction underArticle 226of the Constitution (Sarguja Transport Service v. STAT [(1987) 1 SCC 5 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 19]). The reasoning for adopting it in writ jurisdiction is that very often it happens, when the petitioner or his counsel finds that the court is not likely to pass an order admitting the writ petition after it is heard for some time, that a request is made by the petitioner or his counsel to permit him to withdraw it without seeking permission to institute a fresh writ petition. A court which is unwilling to admit the petition would not ordinarily grant liberty to file a fresh petition while it may just agree to permit withdrawal of the petition. When once a writ petition filed in a High Court is withdrawn by the party concerned, he is precluded from filing an appeal against the order passed in the writ petition because he cannot be considered as a party aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court. If so, he cannot file a fresh petition for the same cause once again......"7. It is well settled that thoughthe Codedoes not apply to writ proceedings, the principles underlying therein which are founded on public policy may be extended and made applicable in writ proceedings also in the interest of administration of justice. We may refer to the judgment in the case of Public Service Commission, Uttaranchal Vs. Mamta Bisht & Ors. wherein it was held as follows:-"9. .....Undoubtedly, provisions of CPC are not applicable in writ jurisdiction by virtue of the provision of Section 141 CPC but the principles enshrined therein are applicable. (Vide Gulabchand Chhotelal Parikh v. State of Gujarat(AIR 1965 SC 1153),Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot(1974) 2 SCC 706 : AIR 1974 SC 2105) and Sarguja Transport Service v. STAT (1987) SCC 5 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 19 : AIR 1987 SC 88."8. Even if a party does not pray for a particular relief in the earlier writ petition, which ought to have been claimed, he/she cannot file successive writ petitions claiming the said relief, as it would be barred by the principles of constructive res judicata as enshrined in Explanation IV toSection 11and also Order II Rule 2of the Code. In this regard reference may be held to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay Vs. T.P. Kumaran and M/s. D. Cawasji & Co. & Ors. Vs. State of Mysore & Anr. In M/s. D. Cawasji it was held as under:-"18. .......Be that as it may, in the earlier writ petitions, the appellants did not pray for refund of the amounts paid by way of cess for the years 1951-52 to 1965-66 and they gave no reasons before the High Court in these writ petitions why they did not make the prayer for refund of the amounts paid during the years in question. Avoiding multiplicity of unnecessary legal proceedings should be an aim of all courts. Therefore, the appellants could not be allowed to split up their claim for refund and file writ petitions on this piece-meal fashion. If the appellants could have, but did not, without any legal justification, claim refund of the amounts paid during the years in question, in the earlier writ petitions, we see no reason why the appellants should be allowed to claim the amounts by filing writ petitions again. In the circumstances of this case, having regard to the conduct of the appellants in not claiming these amounts in the earlier writ petitions without any justification, we do not think we would be justified in interfering with the discretion exercised by the High Court in dismissing the writ petitions which were filed only for the purpose of obtaining the refund........"9. We may refer to the Allahabad High Court Rules (Rules of the Court, 1952) which have been made the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in exercise of powers conferred by theArticle 225of the Constitution of India wherein under Rule 7 of Chapter XXII there is a specific bar against filing of a second application for a direction, order or writ underArticle 226on the same set of facts.10. For ease of reference Rule 7 under Chapter XXII of the High Court Rules is being extracted below:-"7. No second application on the same facts.- Where an application has been rejected, it shall not be competent for the applicant to make a second application on the same facts."11. We may refer to the case of M/s Munna Industries Vs. State of UP & Ors. wherein it was held that in terms of the provisions of Chapter XXII Rule 7 of the High Court Rules no second application on the same facts, where an earlier application has been rejected, shall be entertained.12. In the context of the aforementioned Rule, a Full Bench of this Court in Surya Deo Mishra Vs. State of UP & Ors. held as follows:-"23. ......Rule 7 of Chapter XXII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 provides that, where an application has been rejected, it shall not be competent for the applicant to move a second application on the same fact. Even if the petitioner has withdrawn the earlier writ petition without a prayer to file a fresh writ petition, a second writ petition for the same cause of action is not maintainable. This cardinal rule of public policy to discourage multiplicity of proceedings, also incorporated in Order II, Rule 2of the Codeof Civil Procedure, the principles whereof are also applicable to writ proceedings, is too well settled to merit any elaboration. For this, it will be sufficient to refer to the judgments inB.N. Singh v. State of U.P. [1979 ALJ 1184];Dr. Ramji Dwivedi v. State of U.P. And others[1983 (9) ALR 92 (Sum) : AIR 1984 SC 1506 : 1983 UPLBEC 426.];Niranjan Rai v. District Inspector of Schools[1991 (18) ALR 398.]; Sahib Ram v. State of Haryana [JT 1995 (1) SC 24.];Harish Chandra Srivastava v. State of U.P. and others[(1967) 3 UPLBEC 1840 (DB).];Keshav Tripathi v. State of U.P. And others[1996 (28) ALR 54 (Sum) : 1997 ALJ 28 (DB).] andS.L. Bathla v. State Bank of India. [1999 (81) FLR 28 (Sum) : (1999) 1 UPLBEC 233]."13. The general principles on the basis of which the bar against entertaining successive writ petitions is founded has been succinctly explained in State of UP & Anr. Vs. Labh Chand, in the following terms:-"20. When a Judge of Single Judge Bench of a High Court is required to entertain a second writ petition of a person on a matter, he cannot, as a matter of course, entertain such petition, if an earlier writ petition of the same person on the same matter had been dismissed already by another Single Judge Bench or a Division Bench of the same High Court, even if such dismissal was on the ground of laches or on the ground of non-availing of alternative remedy. Second writ petition cannot be so entertained not because the learned Single Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the same, but because entertaining of such a second writ petition would render the order of the same Court dismissing the earlier writ petition redundant and nugatory, although not reviewed by it in exercise of the recognised power. Besides, if a learned Single Judge could entertain a second writ petition of a person respecting a matter on which his first writ petition was dismissed in limine by another learned Single Judge or a Division Bench of the same Court, it would encourage an unsuccessful writ petition to go on filing writ petition after writ petition in the same matter in the same High Court, and have it brought up for consideration before one Judge and another. Such a thing, if is allowed to happen, it could result in giving full scope and encouragement to an unscrupulous litigant to abuse the process of the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction underArticle 226of the Constitution in that any order of any bench of such Court refusing to entertain a writ petition could be ignored by him with impunity and relief sought in the same matter by filing a fresh writ petition. This would only lead to introduction of disorder, confusion and chaos relating to exercise of writ jurisdiction by Judges of the High Court for there could be no finality for an order of the Court refusing to entertain a writ petition. It is why, the rule of judicial practice and procedure that a second writ petition shall not be entertained by the High Court on the subject matter respecting which the first writ petition of the same person was dismissed by the same Court even if the order of such dismissal was in limine, be it on the ground of laches or on the ground of non-exhaustion of alternative remedy, has come to the accepted and followed as salutary rule in exercise of writ jurisdiction of Courts."14. The Supreme Court in Forward Construction Co. & Ors. Vs. Prabhat Mandal (Regd) Andheri & Ors. referring to Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC held that the order dismissing the first writ petition operates as res judicata between the parties and the person against whom the order has been passed has got no right to file a second petition on the same set of facts. We may refer to the following extract from the judgment:-"20. ......Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject-matter of the litigation and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. The principle underlying Explanation IV is that where the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided..........."15. This Court is thus of the view that in view of the specific bar under Rule 7 of Chapter XXII of the High Court Rules, and also the principles underlying the provisions contained inthe Codeof Civil Procedure, referred to above, which are founded on public policy, no second writ application on the same facts where an earlier application has been rejected, may be entertained.16. In view of the aforementioned discussion the present writ petition being a second petition on the same set of facts and for similar cause of action and for almost identical reliefs as in the earlier writ petition which had been dismissed vide order dated 5.4.2022, we are not inclined to entertain the same.17. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.Order Date :- 27.7.2022\n \nA.K.Srivastava

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Jharkhand High CourtSanjay Rajak vs The State Of Jharkhand on 6 November, 2023Author:Sujit Narayan PrasadBench:Sujit Narayan Prasad,Navneet Kumar1 Cr. Appeal(DB) No.489/2023\n\n\n\n IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI\n Cr. Appeal (DB) No.489 of 2023\n ------Sanjay Rajak, aged about 23 years, son of Sitaram Rajak, resident\nof village-Mordiha, P.O. and P.S.-Thakurgangti, District-Godda,\nJharkhand .... .... Appellant\n Versus\n\nThe State of Jharkhand .... .... Respondent\n\nCORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD\n HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVNEET KUMAR------For the Appellant : Mrs. Chandana Kumari, Advocate\n For the State : Mrs. Snehalika Bhagat, A.P.P.------17/Dated: 06.11.2023\nPer Sujit Narayan Prasad, J:I.A. No.3253 of 20231. The instant interlocutory application has been filed underSection\n\n389(1)of the Cr.P.C. for suspension of sentence dated 31.01.2023\n\npassed in Special POCSO Case No.10 of 2021 by the learned Special\n\nJudge (POCSO) Godda, in connection with Thakurgangti P.S. Case\n\nNo.74 of 2020, corresponding to G.R. Case No.284 of 2021, whereby\n\nand whereunder, the appellant has been convicted underSection 376\n\n(DA)of the IPC andSection 6of the POCSO Act and sentenced to\n\nundergo imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the\n\nremainder of that person's natural life along with fine of\n\nRs.1,00,000/- and in default of payment of fine, he has to further\n\nundergo rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence underSection 6of POCSO Act.2 Cr. Appeal(DB) No.489/20232. The prosecution story as per F.I.R. in brief is that on\n\n23.12.2020, the daughter of the informant-Santlal Pandit was alone\n\nin her house. At 4 p.m. when the informant returned to his house, his\n\ndaughter was not present at house, thereafter they searched out the\n\nVictim. On 24.12.2020, the informant found his daughter behind the\n\nhouse of Doman Sah, in which, no one was living. After being asked,\n\nshe said that the accused Chhotu Pandit and Sanjay Rajak\n\n(appellant herein) had sexually assaulted her on allurement.3. Accordingly, F.I.R being Thakurgangti P.S. Case No.74 of 2020\n\nhas been lodged for the offences undersection 376Dof the IPC and\n\nundersections 4/6of the POCSO Act.4. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that\n\nit is a case where the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the\n\ncharge beyond all reasonable doubts. Such argument has been\n\nmade on the following grounds:(i) There are contradictions in the evidences of the victim in her\n\nstatement undersection 164Cr.P.C and deposition before the learned\n\ncourt which is evident from the statement of victim underSection 164Cr.P.C, wherein, she has stated that the accused persons including\n\nthe appellant have allured her and taken to adjacent house, whereas,\n\nin deposition before the court, she stated that her mouth was pressed\n\nand taken to the said place of occurrence.(ii) As per the medical examination, no injury was found on the\n\nprivate part of victim.(iii) There is no legal evidence to prove that there was any sexual3 Cr. Appeal(DB) No.489/2023penetration which is the most important ingredient to prove a case\n\nunderSection 6of the POCSO Act and in absence of the same, the\n\njudgment of conviction and order of sentence is illegal.(iv) The prosecution has failed to follow the procedure prescribed\n\nunder Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice Care and Protection of\n\nChildren) Rules, 2000, which is mandatory in nature and as such, the\n\nvictim cannot be said to be minor.(v) Learned trial court has committed illegality in giving finding with\n\nregard to the age of the victim, save and except, the finding of the\n\ndoctor, which is never perfect evidence to find out the original age of\n\nthe victim.5. Learned counsel for the appellant, on the aforesaid premise,\n\nhas submitted that it is a fit case where the sentence is required to be\n\nsuspended.6. While, on the other hand, the learned APP appearing for the\n\nState has vehemently opposed the prayer for suspension of sentence\n\non the following grounds:(i) The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that victim\n\nwas not minor at the time of occurrence is totally misconceived\n\nbecause P.W. 2 Dr. Usha Singh has medically examined the victim\n\nand submitted her age about 16 Years. Further, P.W. 3, Dr. Deepak\n\nKumar, Radiologist has also medically examined the victim and\n\ndetermined her age as 16 years. Therefore, it can be stated that at\n\nthe time of occurrence, victim was minor.(ii) It is admitted fact that no sign of sexual intercourse was found in4 Cr. Appeal(DB) No.489/2023the medical examination of the victim but from the record, it appears\n\nthat the medical examination of victim was conducted after delay of 4\n\ndays and that is the probable reason for the lack of medical evidence\n\nfor sexual assault.(iii) It is settled connotation of law that in cases of sexual assault,\n\nthe statement of prosecutrix may alone form the basis of conviction.(iv) Social feedback of the neighbors and common villagers\n\nregarding the release of the accused appellant is negative as per the\n\nReport of concern Police Station which is appended as Annexure-1 to\n\nthe objection affidavit as filed by the state.(v) Further,Sections 29and30of the POCSO Act raised a\n\nstatutory presumption against the accused/appellant regarding his\n\nculpable mental state or regarding commission of offence by him\n\nunless contrary is proved.7. Learned A.P.P, based upon the aforesaid argument, has\n\nsubmitted that it is not a case where sentence is required to be\n\nsuspended.8. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties, perused\n\nthe finding recorded by learned trial Court in the impugned order as\n\nalso the testimonies of the witnesses including the documents\n\navailable in Lower Court Records.9. This Court, before appreciating the argument advanced on\n\nbehalf of parties and in order to examine as to whether in the given\n\nfacts of the case it is a fit case where sentence is to be suspended,\n\ndeems it fit and proper to refer the settled position of law regarding5 Cr. Appeal(DB) No.489/2023consideration to be made at the time of suspension of sentence, as\n\nhas been settled by Hon'ble Apex Court inPreet Pal Singh vs. State\n\nof U.P., reported in (2020) 8 SCC 645 has held at paragraphs 32 and\n\n35 as under:"32.InMauji Ram v. State of U.P.[ (2019) 8 SCC\n\n 17] , this Court referred toAjay Kumar Sharma v.\n\n State of U.P.[ (2005) 7 SCC], Lokesh Singh v. State\n\n of U.P. [ (2008) 16 SCC 753] and Dataram Singh v.\n\n State of U.P. [ (2018) 3 SCC 22] and stated\n\n categorically that this Court had time and again\n\n emphasised the need for assigning reasons while\n\n granting bail.35. There is a difference between grant of bail underSection 439CrPC in case of pre-trial arrest and\n\n suspension of sentence underSection 389CrPC\n\n and grant of bail, post-conviction. In the earlier case,\n\n there may be presumption of innocence, which is a\n\n fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and\n\n the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts\n\n and circumstances of the case, on the principle that\n\n bail is the rule and jail is an exception, as held by\n\n this Court in Dataram Singh v. State of U.P.\n\n [Dataram Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC 22 :(2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 675] However, in case of post-conviction bail, by suspension of operation of6 Cr. Appeal(DB) No.489/2023the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the\n\n question of presumption of innocence does not\n\n arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule\n\n and jail an exception attracted, once there is\n\n conviction upon trial. Rather, the court\n\n considering an application for suspension of\n\n sentence and grant of bail, is to consider the\n\n prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with\n\n other factors. There should be strong\n\n compelling reasons for grant of bail,\n\n notwithstanding an order of conviction, by\n\n suspension of sentence, and this strong and\n\n compelling reason must be recorded in the order\n\n granting bail, as mandated inSection 389(1)CrPC."10. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment, that during considering\n\nsuspension of sentence undersection 389of Cr.P.C which is the\n\npost-conviction stage, the presumption of innocence in favour the\n\naccused cannot be available and at this stage, the Court's only duty is\n\nto see that the prima-facie case is made out or not.11. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case ofOmprakash\n\nSahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary & Anr., (2023) 6 SCC 123 has\n\nbeen pleased to hold that the appellate court should not reappreciate\n\nthe evidence at the stage ofSection 389CrPC and try to pick up a\n\nfew lacunae or loopholes here or there in the case of the prosecution.7 Cr. Appeal(DB) No.489/2023Such would not be a correct approach.12. We are now proceeding to examine material available on record\n\nand the rival submissions advanced on behalf of parties.13. From perusal of the record, it is evident from the testimony of\n\nP.W. 2, Dr. Usha Singh who has medically examined the victim and\n\nsubmitted the age of victim about 16 Years. Further P.W.3, Dr.\n\nDeepak Kumar, Radiologist who was the member of the Medical\n\nBoard which was constituted for the determination of the age of the\n\nvictim, has also medically examined the victim and determined her\n\nage as 16 years. Further P.W.4, Dr. Kumari Sushma who was also\n\nthe member of the Medical Board has found the age of victim near\n\nabout 16 years on the basis of dental examination of the victim.14. Thus, it is evident from the deposition of P.W.2, 3 and 4 that at\n\nthe time of occurrence, the age of victim was 16 years and as per the\n\nstipulation made underSection 2(d)of the Juvenile Justice Act she\n\nwas child at the time of the said occurrence and as such, the consent\n\nof such minor is immaterial for sexual act.15. It is apparent from the testimony of victim/prosecutrix (P.W.1)\n\nthat she has fully substantiated the case of the prosecution. In her\n\nexamination-in-chief, she has stated that accused persons including\n\nthe appellant had pressed her mouth and taken away her in the\n\nKhandahar (carcase) and committed rape upon her. The testimony of\n\nP.W.1 has been fully substantiated by the testimony of the P.W.7\n\nmother of deceased and P.W.8, the informant and father of the victim.16. P.W. 8 has categorically stated in his testimony that his8 Cr. Appeal(DB) No.489/2023daughter has stated to him about the offence of rape committed with\n\nher by the accused persons. He has further deposed that he found\n\nthe victim near the Khandahar (carcase) house of Doman Shah.17. Further, P.W.7 has testified in her testimony that victim has told\n\nher that the accused including the appellant committed rape with her\n\nin Khandahar, (carcase) house of Doman Shah and the victim was\n\nfound at the said place of occurrence.18. Thus, the deposition of the victim before the Court has been\n\nfortified by the testimonies of the P.W.7 and P.W.8.19. The foremost argument which has been advanced on behalf of\n\nappellant is that as per the medical report, victim was not subjected to\n\nthe sexual assault, therefore, appellant cannot be held liable for the\n\nsaid offences.20. In this context, it is pertinent to mention here that in such type of\n\nheinous crime, conviction can be based upon the sole testimony of\n\nthe prosecutrix. Corroboration is not a sine qua non for a conviction in\n\nrape case. However, it depends upon that how much confidence is to\n\nbe transpired from the testimony of the prosecutrix.21. This Court, on the basis of the said position of law and coming\n\nback to the material available on record has found that the victim\n\n(P.W.1), who has subjected to sexual assault by the appellant, has\n\nsupported the prosecution version and the testimony of the victim has\n\nbeen fully corroborated by P.W.7 and 8.22. From the record, it appears that the medical examination of\n\nvictim was conducted after delay of 4 days and it cannot be ruled out9 Cr. Appeal(DB) No.489/2023that it is the probable reason that there is no medical evidence of\n\nsexual assault.23. Further, underSection 29of POCSO Act, a mandatory\n\npresumption qua certain offences is to be drawn against the accused\n\nin a prosecution for offences under this Act, unless the contrary is\n\nproved. Similarly,Section 30of POCSO Act mandates that the\n\nSpecial Court shall draw a presumption of the existence of culpable\n\nmental state of the accused where culpable mental state is required\n\non the part of accused, it shall be a defence for the accused to prove\n\nthe fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act\n\ncharged as an offence in that prosecution.24. This Court, considering the aforesaid facts and after taking into\n\nconsideration the settled proposition of law as also the mandate of\n\nthe provision of thePOCSO Act, prima-facie is of the view that it is\n\nnot a fit case where sentence is required to be suspended.25. Accordingly, interlocutory application being I.A. No.3253 of 2023\n\nstands dismissed.26. It is made clear that any observation made herein will not\n\nprejudice the issue on merit as the appeal is lying pending for its\n\nconsideration.27. Let a copy of this order be forwarded to the appellant through\n\nJail Superintendent.(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)\n\n\n\n Rohit/- (Navneet Kumar, J.)

54dd76dd-1e25-5571-aeac-c2d2635657bf

court_cases

Rajasthan High Court - JodhpurHans Raj vs State Of Rajasthan on 14 September, 2020Author:Dinesh MehtaBench:Dinesh Mehta(1 of 14) [CW-5753/2020]\n\n\n HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT\n JODHPUR\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5753/2020\nNirmla Jat D/o Raichand Jat, Aged About 39 Years, R/o Vpo\nNagdi Tehsil Khinvsar, District Nagour At Present Working On The\nPost Of Teacher Grade Ii (Hindi) At Govt. Senior Secondary\nSchool Madpura Tehsil Khinvsar District Nagour (Raj.).----Petitioner\n Versus1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Department Of\n Education, Government Of Rajasthan, Jaipur.2. The Education Department (Secondary) Through Its\n Director, Government Of Rajasthan, Bikaner (Raj.).3. The Joint Director, Secondary Education, Government Of\n Rajasthan, Ajmer Zone, Ajmer (Raj.).4. The Joint Director, Secondary Education, Government Of\n Rajasthan, Pali Zone, Pali (Raj.).----Respondents\n\nFor Petitioner(s) : Mr. Mahaveer Bishnoi\n Mr. Kailash Jangid\n Mr. Ashok Kumar Choudhary\n Mr. Inderjeet Yadav\n Mr. Sushil Solanki\n Mr. Madhu Lal Deora\n Mr. K. R. Saharna\n Mr. Devi Lal Rawla\n Mr. Surendra Singh Choudhary\n Mr. Varda Ram Choudhary\n Mr. RJ Punia\n Mr. Kan Singh Oad\n Mr. Kailash Meghwal\n Mr. Tanwar Singh\n Mr. Rakesh Kumar Chotia\n Mr. Sumit Singhal\n Mr. Awar Dan Ujjwal\n Mr. Shree Kant Verma\n Mr. Ramniwas\n Mr. Vinod Choudhary\n All through Jitsi Meet App\nFor Respondent(s) : Mr. Hemant Choudhary with\n Mr. Vishal Jangid(Downloaded on 15/09/2020 at 08:52:44 PM)(2 of 14) [CW-5753/2020]\n\n\n JUSTICE DINESH MEHTA\n\n Judgment\n\n14/09/20201. The petitioners, involved in the present group of writ\n\npetitions (enumerated in the Schedule appended with the present\n\norder, which be treated an intergral part of this order), have\n\napproached this Court being aggrieved of the State's action of\n\nreshuffling of divisions and allotment of new division vide order\n\ndated 20.07.2020.2. For the purpose of present controversy, facts apropos are\n\nnarrated in para No. 3 to 8 infra:-3. The petitioners herein were selected and given appointment\n\nas Senior Teacher Grade - II in various subjects, pursuant to\n\nadvertisement dated 13.07.2016.4. It is pertinent that some candidates, selected pursuant to\n\nthe advertisement in question, were given posting according to\n\ntheir merit cum preference consequent to counselling.5. Some of the selected candidates, did not join, for which\n\ncandidates from reserve list were considered and offered\n\nappointment.6. Some candidates filed a writ petition at Jaipur Bench of this\n\nCourt interalia raising a grievance that persons less meritorious\n\nthan them had been given postings of their choice, whereas\n\ndespite having secured higher marks, they were not allotted the\n\ndesired divisions/postings, as they stood occupied by the\n\ncandidates though lower in merit.(Downloaded on 15/09/2020 at 08:52:44 PM)(3 of 14) [CW-5753/2020]7. Single Bench of this Court at Jaipur in its judgment dated\n\n2.4.2019 (SB Civil Writ Petition No. 23680/2018:Sunita Kumari\n\nMeena Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) and Division Bench in its\n\njudgment dated 29.08.2019 rendered in DB SAW No.815/2019\n\n(State of Rajasthan & Ors. V. Poonam Sharma) exhaustively\n\nconsidered the law on the subject and gave comprehensive\n\ndirections. The operative portion of the Division Bench Judgment\n\nreads thus :"15.............This meant that if there were some delays\n in forwarding recommendations, the allocations of\n concerned divisions had to be made finally. Until the\n entire picture emerged with regard to recommendation\n of candidates, the State could have well made\n provisional cadre allocations, which could have been\n finalized, after all recommendations had been\n received. In such latter event, the State would have\n been able to ensure that MRC candidates had a choice\n to seek the division which they wanted, given their\n relative merit ranking. In such an event, by application\n of the rule indicated in Para 72 (iv) of the judgment in\n Ramesh Ram(supra), MRC candidates would have\n been provided with a choice of being treated as those\n belonging to the general category, or being treated as\n reserved category candidates.16. In the light of the above discussion, the Court is of\n opinion that the findings and conclusions recorded by\n the Single Judge are reasonable. The following\n directions are consequently issued:(a) The State shall issue a circular/order within four\n weeks, expressly stating that cadre allocations (to\n different divisions) made are only provisional and that\n such allocations would be made finally in a time bound\n manner, to be clearly indicated in such an order or\n circular;(Downloaded on 15/09/2020 at 08:52:44 PM)(4 of 14) [CW-5753/2020](b) Await the receipt of all recommendations for 3\n months and thereafter take up the process of\n determination of cadre allocations, in accordance with\n the rules and circulars applicable and complete such\n cadre allocations within 6 months from today;(c) The State is further directed that cadre\n allocations made finally pursuant to the above\n directions, shall not be treated as transfers, but\n instead as revised initial postings of the concerned\n teachers.(d) The circular issued pursuant to the above\n directions shall also mention that it has been issued\n pursuant to the present order.17. The State's appeals therefore have to fail. They\n are according dismissed, subject to the above\n directions."8. The Petitioners, herein, have raised a number of grievances.\n\nBut the genesis of all grievance lies in the contention/allegation\n\nthat the respondents have not followed the above directions in its\n\nletter and spirit.9. Sheet anchor of their argument was that neither guidelines\n\ndated 19.06.2020 & 26.06.2020 are, nor State's action is in sync\n\nwith the judgment of Division Bench rendered in the case ofState\n\nof Rajasthan V. Poonam Sharma(supra).10. It was highlighted that the respondents have invited options\n\nonly from the candidates whose zones/divisions, according to\n\nthem (on the basis of their merit position), were going to be\n\nchanged.11. The relevant part [Para No.B (1)] of the guidelines dated\n\n19.06.2020 reads thus :(Downloaded on 15/09/2020 at 08:52:44 PM)(5 of 14) [CW-5753/2020]\n\n\n "B fj'kQy lEHkkx vkoaVu ds i'pkr~ inLFkkiu dh izfdz;k :-ofj"B v/;kid (fofHkUu fo"k;) HkrhZ ijh{kk - 2016 ds fj'kQy vkoaVu i'pkr~ ftu\n vH;fFkZ;ksa dk lEHkkx ifjorZu gks jgk gS dsoy mUgha vH;fFkZ;ksa को uohu vkoafVr lEHkkx\n esa inLFkkiu gsrq Counselling Camp (ijke'kZ f'kfoj) lfEefyr fd;k tk;sxk rFkk ftu\n vH;fFkZ;ksa dk fj'kQy vkoaVu i'pkr~ lEHkkx ifjorZu ugha gqvk gSa mudk inLFkkiu\n LFkku ;Fkkor~ jgsxkA"12. Learned counsel for the petitioners invited Court's attention\n\ntowards notice dated 26.06.2020, which was accompanied by a\n\nlist containing particulars of around 3000 candidates.13. The moot question which needs to be examined, is, whether\n\nthe State has followed the Division Bench judgment and the law\n\non the subject? or as to whether the guidelines/circulars issued by\n\nthe State are in-tandem with the Division Bench judgment.14. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the State\n\nwas not justified in confining the option only to the candidates\n\nwhose divisions were going to change. According to them, the\n\nDivision Bench judgment in case ofState of Rajasthan V. Poonam\n\nSharma(supra) was unequivocal and the State was required to\n\ngive option to all the candidates, irrespective of the fact whether\n\ntheir division were going to be changed or not.15. It was argued that even if a candidate's division was not\n\nlikely to change, still he/she ought to have been given chance to\n\nopt for another District or another school at a vacant position, in\n\nlight of the State's Circular dated 04.03.2018.16. Learned counsel for the petitioners asserted that after\n\nallotment of division, the options simplicitor were asked without\n\nnotifying category-wise total vacant posts; the candidates have(Downloaded on 15/09/2020 at 08:52:44 PM)(6 of 14) [CW-5753/2020]\n\n\nbeen accommodated only against the position, which were lying\n\nvacant or fell vacant pursuant to reshuffle.17. Mr. Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the\n\nrespondents, submitted that a perusal of the reply and the\n\nposition of allotment of vacant posts leaves not even an iota of\n\ndoubt. He added that, no lesser meritorious candidate has been\n\ngiven better posting. Candidates having higher merit or\n\nmeritorious reserve category candidates have been considered in\n\ntheir own category.18. Learned Government Counsel submitted that the State has\n\nrightly invited options from only those candidates whose divisions\n\nwere changed, as per their merit position. He tried to justify\n\nrespondents' action by saying that it was done with a view to\n\navoid unnecessary exercise of inviting option from all the\n\ncandidates. He emphasised that the respondents had done their\n\nhomework or in house exercise and thereafter invited options only\n\nfrom those candidates whose divisions were going to be changed.19. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the\n\nrespondents have complied with the judgment of Single Judge\n\nBench so also the Division Bench and as there was no direction to\n\nchange the posting (within the Division) in terms of Para-B of the\n\nCircular dated 04.03.2018, such exercise has not been done and\n\nthat is why the position/posting which were held by the teachers,\n\nwhose division remained intact, were not shown in the list of\n\navailable schools/vacant seats.20. It was also admitted by Mr. Choudhary that the posts held by\n\nthe teachers, whose divisions have not been changed, have not\n\nbeen reflected in the list published and the exercise in question(Downloaded on 15/09/2020 at 08:52:44 PM)(7 of 14) [CW-5753/2020]\n\n\nhas been carried out on the basis of vacant seats (ignoring the\n\npost held by the teachers whose divisions have not been\n\nchanged).21. He however submitted that even if a further direction is\n\nissued to comply with Clasue-B of the circular dated 04.03.2018;\n\nit is not necessary that the petitioners, who are 76 in number will\n\nbe given desired or satisfactory posting, as that too would be\n\ngiven in accordance with their merit/preference. He added that if\n\nthe entire exercise is ordered to be done qua 5212 teachers, it will\n\nlead to unnecessary shifting of the teachers, who have already\n\naccepted their postings.22. Heard.23. It is true that the Division Bench has expressly and\n\nunequivocally directed the State to invite options from all the\n\ncandidates. No leeway was given to the State to invite options\n\nonly from the candidates whose divisions were likely to be\n\nchanged.24. Stand of the State is not in conformity with the Division\n\nBench judgment dated 29.08.2019 rendered in the case ofState\n\nof Rajasthan Vs. Poonam Sharma(supra).25. It is to be noted that not only the Division Bench judgment\n\neven the guidelines dated 19.06.2020 envisages that after\n\nallotment of division, the preference would be given as under : -**6- fj'kQy lEHkkx vkoaVu ds i'pkr~ ofj"B v/;kid ds inLFkkiu gsrq\n ofj;rk dze dk fu/kkZj.k fuEu dze esa fd;k tkosa :-(a) 40 izfr'kr ls vf/kd fnO;kax vH;FkhZ (jktLFkku yksd lsok vk;ksx dh\n esfjV ds dze esa)(Downloaded on 15/09/2020 at 08:52:44 PM)(8 of 14) [CW-5753/2020](b) fo/kok ,oa ifjR;drk efgyk (jktLFkku yksd lsok vk;ksx dh esfjV ds dze\n esa)(c) efgyk vH;FkhZ (jktLFkku yksd lsok vk;ksx dh esfjV ds dze esa )(d) 'ks"k vU; vH;FkhZ (jktLFkku yksd lsok vk;ksx dh esfjV ds dze esa) "26. An additional affidavit has been filed by the respondent -\n\nState on 03.09.2020 interalia setting out in detail the process of\n\nallotment of division adopted by them.27. Having gone through the additional affidavit and process\n\nchalked out therein, this Court is satisfied that the respondents\n\nhave adhered to the directions of the Division Bench given on\n\n29.08.2019 and so also the guideline dated 04.03.2018 so far as\n\nallotment of Division/Range is concerned - All the candidates have\n\nbeen allotted division/range strictly in accordance with their\n\nmerit/preference.28. The issue which still concerns the Court or remains to be\n\nadjudicated upon is, whether the process so adopted by the\n\nrespondents pursuant to the Division Bench's directions could be\n\nbeyond the guidelines dated 04.03.2018.29. A careful reading of the Judgments of the Single Bench inSuman Meena(supra) and Division Bench inState of Rajasthan\n\nVs. Poonam Sharma(supra) reveals that the issue which was\n\ncanvassed, considered and decided was confined to\n\nallotment/allocation of Division/Range only. The Division Bench\n\nhas noticed the Circular dated 04.03.2018 and para 6 of Part B of\n\nthe Circular and has given general direction to comply with the\n\nsame.30. This Court finds substance in the submission of the\n\npetitioners that the respondents were required not only to comply(Downloaded on 15/09/2020 at 08:52:44 PM)(9 of 14) [CW-5753/2020]\n\n\nwith the Para-A of the guidelines dated 04.03.2018, they were\n\nequally obliged to give posting in accordance with Part 'B' of the\n\ncircular aforesaid, once divisions are allotted.31. As a matter of fact, after allocation of divisions, the\n\nrespondents ought to have published category-wise position of all\n\nthe respective schools in the concerned division, which has\n\nadmittedly not been done by the respondents. Consequently,\n\nlimited vacant seats were made available to the petitioners for\n\ngiving their choices.32. This Court finds that the respondents have not adhered to\n\nthe guidelines dated 04.03.2018. Subsequent guidelines dated\n\n19.06.2020, particularly para No. B (1) thereof (reproduced in\n\npara No. 11 above), issued by the respondent - State, are\n\ncontrary to its parimateria stipulations in the Circular dated\n\n04.03.2018.33. Strictly speaking impugned exercise done by the respondents\n\nis incomplete and cannot stand the scrutiny on the anvil of\n\nfairness and reasonableness, but given the fact that all the\n\nteachers have now been allotted appropriate divisions/ranges on\n\nthe basis of their merit cum preference and almost all of them\n\n(except 76 petitioners herein) are satisfied, direction to undertake\n\nthe de novo exercise in the era of spread of pandemic COVID-19\n\nmay lead to undesired disturbance, which in the opinion of this\n\nCourt, should be avoided.34. There is yet another reason, for which this Court does not\n\ndeem it appropriate to direct the respondents to undertake the\n\nexercise afresh. Seniority of the teachers is reckoned division\n\nwise. Now all the teachers have been allotted the division(Downloaded on 15/09/2020 at 08:52:44 PM)(10 of 14) [CW-5753/2020]\n\n\naccording to their merit cum preference. When it comes to\n\nposting, it has to be noted that they are subject to intra division\n\ntransfers, hence, posting at a particular place cannot be claimed\n\nas a matter of right. Posting is only a matter of convenience,\n\nwhich can be addressed/redressed at a later point of time.35. Hence, considering the submission of the State, as noticed in\n\npara No. 21 above and in view of the common consensus and\n\nalternative oral submission of all the learned counsel for the\n\nrespective petitioners, this Court deems it appropriate and in the\n\ninterest of all the concerned, particularly the candidates (who are\n\nnot before this Court) to dispose of all the writ petitions with\n\nfollowing directions:-(i) The State shall publish latest subject-wise and category-wise vacant position of each division on its website, within a\n\nperiod of 15 days from today.(ii) All the petitioners herein may submit representations to\n\nthe Director, giving choice(s) qua the vacant positions [out of their\n\ndivision(s)], so published by the State. Representation(s) be\n\nfurnished within a period of four weeks from publication of such\n\nlist.(iii) The petitioners shall also be permitted to request for\n\nmutual transfer within their division.(iv) The Director/Joint Director shall decide petitioners'\n\nrepresentations within a period of four weeks thereafter, while\n\ntrying to accommodate the petitioners in accordance with the\n\npreference given by them, of course, if the relevant law/guidelines\n\nso permit.(Downloaded on 15/09/2020 at 08:52:44 PM)(11 of 14) [CW-5753/2020](v) In case, petitioners' representations are rejected, the\n\nrespondents shall pass a reasoned order under intimation to the\n\nconcerned.(vi) The petitioners will be free to take up their remedies\n\nagainst such orders, in accordance with law.36. Interim orders, if any, shall continue till 30.11.2020.37. All the interlocutory applications also stand disposed of.(DINESH MEHTA),J\n 111to186-A.Arora/-(Downloaded on 15/09/2020 at 08:52:44 PM)(12 of 14) [CW-5753/2020]\n\n\n\n SCHEDULE\n\nS.No. Civil Writ Petition No. Petitioner(s) Respondents\n\n 1. SB Civil Writ Petition No.5842/2020 Pappu Ram Kumar State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n\n 2. SB Civil Writ Petition No.5852/2020 Rajaram State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 3. SB Civil Writ Petition No.5861/2020 Satyawati Saran State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 4. SB Civil Writ Petition No.5866/2020 Laxman Singh State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 5. SB Civil Writ Petition No.5878/2020 Suresh State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 6. SB Civil Writ Petition No.5883/2020 Bheru Lal Pareek State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 7. SB Civil Writ Petition No.5889/2020 Bhanver Lal Yogi State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 8. SB Civil Writ Petition No.5918/2020 Surendra Kumar State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 9. SB Civil Writ Petition No.5919/2020 Poonam Bansal State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 10. SB Civil Writ Petition No.5921/2020 Naresh Bai Meena State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 11. SB Civil Writ Petition No.5923/2020 Ram Niwas State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 12. SB Civil Writ Petition No.5925/2020 Lala Ram State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 13. SB Civil Writ Petition No.5935/2020 Saroj Kaswan State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 14. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6050/2020 Shilochana Jakhar State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 15. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6085/2020 Ramchandra Bishnoi State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 16. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6086/2020 Krishan Kant Meena State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 17. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6097/2020 Neha Sharma State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 18. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6105/2020 Sarla Kumari State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 19. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6107/2020 Santra Sain State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 20. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6108/2020 Susheela Chhagan State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 21. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6116/2020 Ephat Janhan State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 22. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6118/2020 Laxman Swami State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 23. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6135/2020 Om Siyag State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 24. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6137/2020 Sonu Anand State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 25. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6153/2020 Nirmala Kaswan State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 26. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6156/2020 Mukesh Kumar State of Raj. &\n Kumawat Ors.\n 27. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6157/2020 Rajendra Prasad State of Raj. &\n Verma Ors.\n 28. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6159/2020 Om Prakash Saini State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n 29. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6169/2020 Bhagwati Kumari State of Raj. &\n Ors.(Downloaded on 15/09/2020 at 08:52:44 PM)(13 of 14) [CW-5753/2020]\n\n30. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6171/2020 Pooja Dhindharia State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n31. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6173/2020 Pradeep Kumar State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n32. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6175/2020 Smt. Sunita State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n33. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6218/2020 Santosh Locchab State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n34. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6221/2020 Murli Dhar Swami State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n35. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6255/2020 Manohari State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n36. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6278/2020 Sumer Ram State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n37. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6343/2020 Om Prakash State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n38. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6353/2020 Prahalad Kumawat State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n39. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6355/2020 Mukesh State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n40. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6361/2020 Ajay Kumar State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n41. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6363/2020 Geeta Rani State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n42. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6364/2020 Ram Swaroom State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n43. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6374/2020 Bhanwar Lal Gurjar State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n44. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6380/2020 Bhanwar Lal State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n45. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6395/2020 Reena Kumari State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n46. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6400/2020 Anju Kumari State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n47. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6405/2020 Shyam Sunder Jatav State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n48. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6410/2020 Sandeep Kaur State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n49. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6414/2020 Prashila State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n50. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6415/2020 Vishnu Kumar State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n51. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6417/2020 Kiran Singaria State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n52. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6418/2020 Jagdish Prasad State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n53. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6419/2020 Lal Chand State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n54. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6420/2020 Satyaprakash State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n55. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6424/2020 Hans Raj State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n56. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6425/2020 Hansraj Verma State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n57. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6427/2020 Shivraj Barth State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n58. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6428/2020 Rajendra Kumar State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n59. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6459/2020 Jitendra Kumar Jatav State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n60. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6461/2020 Nisha State of Raj. &\n Ors.\n61. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6463/2020 Sunil Kumar State of Raj. &(Downloaded on 15/09/2020 at 08:52:44 PM)(14 of 14) [CW-5753/2020]\n\n Ors.62. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6473/2020 Antima Kumari Meena State of Raj. &\n Ors.63. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6513/2020 Krishna Prajapat State of Raj. &\n Ors.64. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6537/2020 Dilip Kumar State of Raj. &\n Ors.65. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6576/2020 Rajender Kumar State of Raj. &\n Ors.66. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6604/2020 Kaushaliya State of Raj. &\n Ors.67. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6605/2020 Ashok Kumar State of Raj. &\n Ors.68. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6617/2020 Giriraj Bairwa State of Raj. &\n Ors.69. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6628/2020 Ram Phal State of Raj. &\n Ors.70. SB Civil Writ Petition No.6727/2020 Pramila Kaswan State of Raj. &\n Ors.71. SB Civil Writ Petition No.7091/2020 Dau Ram State of Raj. &\n Ors.72. SB Civil Writ Petition No.7130/2020 Himani Dangi State of Raj. &\n Ors.(Downloaded on 15/09/2020 at 08:52:44 PM)Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

fc2c2b18-d19b-5755-9796-da07161c4581

court_cases

Jharkhand High CourtBanti Kumar vs The State Of Jharkhand ... Opposite ... on 7 June, 2021Author:Anil Kumar ChoudharyBench:Anil Kumar ChoudharyIN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI\n A.B. A. No. 3389 of 2021\n\n 1.Banti Kumar2. Shyam Sundar Kumar ... Petitioners\n\n Versus\n\n The State of Jharkhand ... Opposite Party\n\n\n\n Coram: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY\n\n For the Petitioners : Mr. D. K. Chakraverty, Adv.For the State : Ms. Anuradha Sahay, Addl. P.P.\n\n\n\n\n02 / 07.06.2021 Heard the parties through Video Conferencing.Apprehending their arrest, the petitioners have moved\n this Court for grant of privilege of anticipatory bail in connection\n with Mahila P.S. Case No. 36 of 2020 registered underSections 341,323,452,504,506,354,34of the Indian Penal Code.Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the\n allegation against the petitioners is that the petitioners trespassed to\n the house of the informant and outraged the modesty of the daughter\n of the informant. It is then submitted that the allegations against the\n petitioners are all false and both the petitioners are minors. It is\n further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that the\n petitioners have no criminal antecedents, as mentioned in paragraph\n 13 of the anticipatory bail application and the occurrence took place\n because of the petty dispute. It is next submitted that the petitioners\n are ready to co-operate with the investigation of the case and also\n undertakes to pay Rs. 5,000/- jointly as ad interim victim\n compensation to the informant without prejudice to their defence\n and they undertake not to annoy or disturb the informant or his\n family members in any manner during pendency of the case hence,\n the petitioners be given the privilege of anticipatory bail.The learned Addl. PP opposes the prayer for anticipatory bail of\n the petitioners.Considering aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I am\n inclined to grant the privilege of anticipatory bail to the petitioners.\n Hence, in the event of arrest by the police or surrender within a\nperiod of six weeks from the date of this order, the petitioners shall be\nreleased on bail on depositing Rs. 5,000/- jointly by way of demand\ndraft drawn in favour of informant as ad interim victim\ncompensation and on furnishing bail bond of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees\nTwenty Five Thousand) each with two sureties of the like amount\neach to the satisfaction of learned J.M., 1st class, Bokaro in connection\nwith Mahila P.S. Case No. 36 of 2020 subject to the condition that the\npetitioners will not annoy or disturb the informant or his family\nmembers in any manner during pendency of the case and will co-\noperate with the Investigation of the case and will appear before the\nInvestigating Officer as and when noticed by him and will submit\nmobile number and photocopy of Aadhaar card at the time of\nsurrender in the court below with an undertaking not to change\nmobile number during the pendency of the case along with the other\nconditions laid down undersection 438 (2)Cr. P.C.\n In case of depositing aforesaid demand draft by the\npetitioners, learned court below is directed to issue notice to the\ninformant and release the demand draft in his favour on proper\nidentification forthwith.(ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY, J.)\nSmita/-

fe089031-f953-59fc-8010-318a36fb733e

court_cases

Take notes as you read a judgment using our Virtual Legal Assistant and get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out our Premium Member services -- Free for one month.\n\nPatna High Court\nM/S Dna Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd vs The State Of Bihar on 12 December, 2022 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA\n Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.21419 of 2019\n ======================================================\n M/s DNA Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Head office- G-11, Sector-11, Noida\n U.P., Local office at AT-1, Murlidhar Apartment, Murli Path, Bailey\n Road, P.O.- Danapur Cantt, P.S.- Rupaspur, District- Patna- 801503\n through its project Manager Cum Authorized Signatory, Mohan Kumar\n aged about 50 years Male, Son of Sukhdeo Roy.\n\n ... ... Petitioner/s\n Versus\n\n\n1. The State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary Public Health\n Engineering Department, Vishveswaraiya Bhawan, Patna.\n2. The Engineer-in-Chief Cum Special Secretary, Public health\n Engineering Department, Vishveswaraiya Bhawan, Patna.\n3. The Chief Engineer, Public Health Engineering Department, Patna.\n4. The Superintendent Engineer, Public Health Engineering Circle Ara.\n5. The Executive Engineer, Public Health Division, Shahpur, Ara.\n6. The Assistant Engineer, Public Health Division, Shahpur, Ara.\n7. The Junior Engineer, Public Health Division, Shahpur, Ara.\n8. The District Magistrate, Bhojpur.\n9. The Circle Officer, Shahpur, Bhojpur.\n10. Manoj Kumar Mishra, Son of Bisheshwar Mishra, Care Taker,\n Karnamepur, Shahpur, Ara.\n\n ... ... Respondent/s\n ======================================================\n Appearance :\n For the Petitioner/s : Mr. Lakshmi Kant Sharma, Advocate\n Mr. Rakesh Kumar Sharma, Advocate\n Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate\n For the Respondent/s : Mr. Arvind Ujjwal, SC-4\n ======================================================\n Patna High Court CWJC No.21419 of 2019 dt.12-12-2022\n 2/10\n\n\n\n\n CORAM: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE\n and\n HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PARTHA SARTHY\n ORAL JUDGMENT\n (Per: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE)\n\n\n Date : 12-12-2022\n\n Petitioner has prayed for the following relief(s):-\n\n "That this is an application for issuance of appropriate\n writ/ writs, order/ orders, Direction/ directions\n commanding the respondent authorities for making\n payment of outstanding due amount of Rs. 4856000/-\n (Rupees Forty eight lacs fifty six thousand only) to the\n petitioner against execution of Arsenic/fluoride free\n Rural Piped water supply Scheme pursuant to\n agreement dated 03.06.2008 with admissible interest.\n Petitioner further seeks any other relief/reliefs for\n which he is found entitled in the eye of law and in the\n facts and circumstances of the present case."\n\n Learned counsel for the petitioner prays that the instant\n\n petition be disposed of exactly in the same terms as contained in\n\n judgment dated 14.09.2022 passed by this Court in CWJC\n\n No.13024 of 2022, titled as M/s. Raghoji House of Distribution\n\n Vs. The State of Bihar & Ors.\n\n No objection to such prayer being allowed.\n\n In the instant case, allegedly, petitioner is not being\n\n paid the outstanding dues of Rs. 4856000/- (Rupees Forty eight\n\n lacs fifty six thousand only) submitted by him by the respondents\n Patna High Court CWJC No.21419 of 2019 dt.12-12-2022\n 3/10\n\n\n\n\n together with interest thereon.\n\n Petitioner made repeated requests to the authorities\n\n concerned.\n\n There is no response to the petitioner's request.\n\n The dispute still survives and petitioner's request for\n\n clearance of dues remains pending.\n\n Well, without going into the merits of the issues, on all\n\n counts, the dispute could have been resolved in terms of the Bihar\n\n State Litigation Policy, 2011.\n\n In M/s. Raghoji House of Distribution (Supra), We\n\n had passed the following observations and directions:-\n\n "5. We also notice that even in those cases where the\n parties are governed by the Dispute Resolution Mechanism,\n provided in terms of the agreement(s) or statutes, parties are\n forced to litigate endlessly before different legal foras, be it\n this Court or the statutory Tribunals.\n 6. We see no reason as to why the respondent State\n does not apply and take recourse to the mechanism provided\n under its own policy termed as the "Bihar State Litigation\n Policy,2011". We also see no reason as to why the\n respondent State does not resort to the provisions of Section\n 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.\n 7. Unfortunately, parties are made to run from pillar\n to post, and as we have noticed, it is only where the officers\n of the State are interested, be it for whatever reason and\n consideration, that case of few favoured individuals are\n settled and issues resolved, leaving the significant majority\n to litigate.\n 8. The instant case, in our considered view, is the best\n example where the officers and the officials of the State are\n found to have been lacking in adhering to the litigation\n policy, even worse, responding to the petitioner's request\n made in terms of written communications. For the purposes\n of setting up a stall as part of Krishi Pradarshani, during the\n Sonepur Mela, petitioner's services were availed. He\n Patna High Court CWJC No.21419 of 2019 dt.12-12-2022\n 4/10\n\n\n\n\n erected a tent and submitted his bill for which only part\n payment was released.\n 9. Petitioner claims the outstanding amount to be\n Rs.21,67,056. The District Agriculture Officer, Saran,\n Chapra, the concerned officer, has already forwarded\n favourably, request for release of the amount, to the higher\n authorities. This is vide communication dated 17.08.2019.\n Unfortunately, the superior officers slept over the matter and\n despite petitioner's repeated request and reminders, and the\n last one being on 01.07.2022 (Annexure-3), no action stands\n taken, forcing initiation of current proceedings.\n 10. The Litigation Policy does state that-\n "1.1 (b) Responsible litigant means:\n a. That litigation will not be resorted to for the sake\n of litigating."...\n\n ... "1.2 This Policy is also based on the recognition\n that it is the responsibility of the Government to protect\n the rights of the citizens, to respect fundamental rights\n and that those in charge of the conduct of Government\n litigation should never forget these basic principles."\n\n "1.3 The twin underlying objective of this Policy is\n to reduce pressure on the overloaded judiciary and\n expedite dispensation of justice..."\n\n "IV. PREVENTION/CONTROL OF\n AVOIDABLE LITIGATION\n A\n 4.A Setting up Grievance Redressal System\n 4.A ( 1). Very often the major causes of litigation\n involving the State Government are from arbitrariness\n in decision making or non application of mind or non-\n response/ improper response to representations made\n by employees, including retired employees/ parties. It\n is seen that in most cases in respect of service matters\n the cause of action arises out of relief not being given\n as per the Rules, Government instructions or policy\n decisions as are in force. It is also seen that in most\n cases before the matter reaches the Court the affected\n party undeservedly spends a lot of his time and effort\n over redressal of his grievance through normal\n administrative channels. In this situation all\n Departments of the State Government shall set up\n effective Grievance Redressal Committees in order to\n pre-empt a large number of avoidable litigation.\n Patna High Court CWJC No.21419 of 2019 dt.12-12-2022\n 5/10\n 4. A(2). It shall be mandatory for employees,\n including those retired, to seek redressal, at the first\n instance, through this system before approaching the\n Courts.\n 4. A(3). A time limit of eight weeks or so may be\n fixed for deciding such representations.\n 4. A(4). Such Grievance Redressal Committees shall\n be set up in each Department at the State Level,\n District Level and Sub-Divisional Level and each of\n them shall have a Grievance Cell. All cases and issues\n at the request of the aggrieved party shall be reviewed\n to redress genuine grievances.\n 4. A(5) The Department Level Grievance Committee\n shall be headed by the Principal Secretary/ Secretary of\n the Department concerned and shall meet once a month\n to review the efficiency of the Grievance Redressal\n System in the Department. Similarly at the District and\n Sub-Divisional Level, the Committee shall be headed\n by the District Magistrate or Sub Divisional Officer, as\n the case may be. The District Sub Divisional Level\n Grievance Redressal Committees shall meet once every\n month on the first Tuesday of each month; if this is a\n holiday, the Committee will meet on the next working\n day excluding "Janata ka Darbar" days, i.e., Mondays\n and Thursdays. Where it is found that certain\n Government instructions require to be reviewed, it shall\n refer the same to the State Level Empowered\n Committee. As seniority matters are a major source of\n litigations these shall be resolved expeditiously by the\n Department and seniority lists should be updated,\n printed and published regularly."\n\n "4.B. Quick Action on Representations/ Legal\n Notices\n\n 4.B(1). A legal notice is intended to alert the State to\n negotiate a just settlement or at least have the courtesy\n to tell the potential outsider why the claim is being\n resisted. Nowadays such notices have become a\n formality. When such a legal notice is served upon any\n Department asking for the relief the same should be\n decided expeditiously in accordance with the prevalent\n Rules/ Instructions and by a detailed speaking order.\n Timely response would avoid waste of public money\n and promote expeditious work in Court in cases which\n deserve to be attended to."\n Patna High Court CWJC No.21419 of 2019 dt.12-12-2022\n 6/10\n\n\n\n\n (Emphasis supplied)\n\n 11. Though in relation to a Government employee, but\n in reference to the Litigation Policy, in LPA No.1322 of\n 2018 titled as The District Manager, Bihar State Food\n and Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. Begusarai v.\n Anuradha Devi & Ors. disposed of on 01.02.2022, we had\n issued the following directions:-\n\n "17. We notice that State has formulated a Litigation\n Policy with the avowed object of not only reducing\n litigation, saving avoidable cost on unproductive\n litigation, reducing avoidable load on judiciary with\n respect to Government induced litigation. This is in tune\n with the mandate of Article 39-A of the Constitution of\n India, obligating the State to promote equal justice and\n provide free legal aid. In fact, by virtue of the clauses of\n the State Litigation Policy, the State is under an\n obligation to take steps to reduce litigation, wherever\n possible. Now, if the employees are not paid their dues\n within time, obviously, they are left with no remedy but\n to rush to the Courts.\n 18. Of late, litigation pertaining to employees of the\n State has increased more so on account of illegal actions.\n The action assailed is of mis-governance or avoidable\n omissions on the part of the Government. Why should\n the State force an employee/legal heir to litigate in a case\n where emoluments, which are undisputed, are not\n disbursed in time. An employee/legal heir has a\n constitutional right to receive the same within time, so\n also State is under a constitutional obligation and duty to\n disburse it within time.\n 19. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we\n dispose of the appeal in the following manner:-\n (a) The present Appeal stands dismissed upholding\n the the judgment and order dated 25.06.2018 passed by\n a learned Single Judge of this Court in CWJC\n No.11609 of 2014 titled as Anuradha Devi Versus\n The State of Bihar & Ors.\n (b) The appellant shall positively pay the entire\n amount in terms of the impugned judgment to the writ\n petitioner, namely Anuradha Devi, within a period of\n three weeks from today, failing which she shall be\n entitled to interest @ 12% per annum. Appellant shall\n ensure the same, else the amount of interest shall be\n recovered from his salary. Affidavit of compliance shall\n Patna High Court CWJC No.21419 of 2019 dt.12-12-2022\n 7/10\n\n\n\n\n be filed within two months from today.\n (c) Joint Registrar (List) shall ensure supply copy\n of this order to all concerned. For compliance, matter be\n placed before the Court on 05.05.2022.\n (d) The Chief Secretary to the Government of\n Bihar, shall ensure providing a mechanism, enabling the\n employees to vent out their grievances of non-\n disbursement of due and admissible\n wages/salaries/emoluments. One such mechanism being\n of setting up a 'Web Portal' at the level of the Principal\n Secretary/ Secretary of the concerned Department(s),\n where the employees can lodge their\n grievances/complaints. Such grievances/ complaints\n shall be processed and adequately responded to within a\n period of reasonable period. This would facilitate\n speedy redressal of genuine grievances and prevent\n unnecessary litigation, clogging the wheels of\n administration of justice. Such endeavour shall only be\n in the spirit of Litigation Policy, framed by the State\n Government. We see great advantage in the use of\n information and technology. Not only it would result\n into effective and efficient redressal of grievances, if\n any, but also improve efficiency in the affairs of\n governance of the State, further instilling confidence\n and trust amongst the employees.\n (e) Non disbursement of monetary benefits, except\n in the event of the dictum of law would entail\n consequences of recovery of the amount of interest from\n the delinquent officer incharge for such disbursement."\n (Emphasis supplied)\n\n 12. In this view of the matter, we are constrained to\n dispose of the present petition with the following\n direction(s):-\n (a) The Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar, shall\n issue appropriate directions to the heads of all the\n concerned departments ensuring expeditious,\n consideration of the claims/counter claims set up by\n the parties, including that of the State; disposal of\n requests/representations; and disbursement of money\n undisputedly found due and payable;\n (b) The person empowered and authorized to take such a\n decision be directed to have the needful done within\n a reasonable period which normally, unless the laws\n otherwise prescribes, should not be more than six\n Patna High Court CWJC No.21419 of 2019 dt.12-12-2022\n 8/10\n\n\n\n\n months from the date of receipt of such claim;\n (c) In the event of the authority concerned sitting over\n the matter or not taking any action, appropriate action\n be taken/proceedings initiated against such person;\n (d) In so far as the instant case is concerned, Respondent\n No. 2, namely, the Principal Secretary, Agriculture\n Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, is directed\n to have the petitioner's case examined and ensure\n early decision and disbursement of petitioner's\n legitimate dues payable under the work order. This,\n positively be done within a period of two months\n from today.\n\n 13. We may clarify that in the instant case, we have\n not adjudicated the claims on merits and leave it open for\n the authority concerned to take a decision in accordance\n with law."\n\n As mutually agreed, the instant petition stands disposed\n\n of in terms of judgment passed by this Court in M/s. Raghoji\n\n House of Distribution (Supra) and the directions contained\n\n therein shall also govern the instant case mutatis mutandi, to the\n\n extent possible.\n\n In so far as the instant case is concerned,\n\n (i) Respondent no. 5, namely, The Executive Engineer,\n\n Public Health Division, Shahpur, Ara, is directed to have the\n\n petitioner's case examined and ensure early decision and\n\n disbursement of petitioner's legitimate dues payable, if any, under\n\n the work order. As also consideration of all claims. This,\n\n positively be done within a period of two months from today,\n Patna High Court CWJC No.21419 of 2019 dt.12-12-2022\n 9/10\n\n\n\n\n failing which costs of Rs.5,000/- shall be paid to the petitioner to\n\n be recovered from the personal salary of the officer concerned.\n\n (ii) Respondent No. 1, namely, the Principal Secretary\n\n Public Health Engineering Department, Vishveswaraiya Bhawan,\n\n Patna, shall ensure putting in place effective mechanism for\n\n grievance redressal. This must also be done on a digital platform.\n\n Also the general public be informed of availability and\n\n functioning of such mechanism.\n\n (iii) Failure would result into initiation of proceedings\n\n for having deliberately violated the order and consequential action\n\n of stoppage of salary of the concerned officer.\n\n (iv) All issues, on merit, facts and law, are left open to\n\n be decided by the decision making authority. However, such\n\n decision has to be in compliance of all principles of natural\n\n justice.\n\n (v) Liberty reserved to the parties to initiate a fresh\n\n action, should the need so arise.\n\n (vi) Respondent no. 5, namely, The Executive Engineer,\n\n Public Health Division, Shahpur, Ara, shall file an affidavit of\n\n compliance of the order within a period of three months from\n\n today and on failure, Registry shall place the file on the judicial\n\n side.\n\n (vii) Shri Arvind Ujjwal, learned SC 4, appearing for\n Patna High Court CWJC No.21419 of 2019 dt.12-12-2022\n 10/10\n\n\n\n\n the Respondents, undertakes to immediately communicate a copy\n\n of this order, both to Respondent No. 1, namely, the Principal\n\n Secretary Public Health Engineering Department, Vishveswaraiya\n\n Bhawan, Patna, and Respondent no. 5, namely, The Executive\n\n Engineer, Public Health Division, Shahpur, Ara. This he shall do\n\n by all modes.\n\n Writ petition stands disposed of with the aforesaid\n\n observations and directions.\n\n Interlocutory Application(s), if any, shall stand disposed\n\n of.\n\n (Sanjay Karol, CJ)\n\n\n (Partha Sarthy, J)\n\navinash/Sujit\nAFR/NAFR\nCAV DATE\nUploading Date 14.12.2022\nTransmission Date

b4b13c37-c4ae-59be-a608-d5d66031bf4a

court_cases

Delhi District CourtThrough: Mr. S.K. Singh vs Joseph P A ..........Accused on 24 November, 2022IN THE COURT OF MS. AAKANKSHA, METROPOLITAN\n MAGISTRATE, (NI ACT)­07\nSOUTH­WEST DISTRICT, DWARKA COURTS, NEW DELHI\n\n\n\nCt. Case No. 12406 of 2019\nCNR No. DLSW02­016773­2019\n\n\n\nP A Joseph .........Complainant\n\n Through: Mr. S.K. Singh, Advocate\n\n Versus\n\nJoseph P A ..........Accused\n\n Through: Mr. Alex Joseph, Advocate\n\n\n\n\n (1) Name of the complainant P A Joseph, Proprietor of M/s\n Maggie Prints\n\n R/o A­1/12, Chanakya Place,\n Part­I, Street No. 10, C­1,\n Janakpuri, New Delhi­59\n\n (2) Name of the accused Joseph P A\n\n R/o D­II/145 & 146, First\n Floor, Jeevan Park, Janakpuri,\n New Delhi­59\n\n (3) Offence complained of or Section 138 Negotiable\n provedInstruments Act, 1881(4) Plea of accused Pleaded not guilty\n\n (5) Date of institution of case 04.04.2019\n\n\n\n Ct. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 1 of 33\n (6) Date of conclusion of 17.11.2022\n arguments\n\n (7) Date of Final Order 24.11.2022\n\n (8) Final Order ACQUITTAL\n\n\n\n\n JUDGMENT1. The complainant P.A. Joseph has instituted this\ncomplaintu/s 138Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter\nreferred to as 'NI Act') against accused Joseph P.A. on 08.09.2014.2. The factual matrix as can be culled out from the\ncomplaint is that accused and complainant had a friendly relation and\naccused took a loan of Rs. 25,00,000/­ from the complainant for a\nperiod of one year for business purpose, after passing of the period of\none year complainant contacted accused for repayment of the said\nloan, by way of phone as well as personal visit but the accused kept on\ndelaying the matter, finally accused issued the cheque in question\nbearing no. 067565 dated 14.07.2014 drawn on State Bank of\nTravancore, Main Najafgarh Road, Tilak Nagar, Delhi for an amount\nof Rs. 25,00,000/­ to the complainant with assurance of its\nencashment upon presentment. However, to the complainant's dismay\nthe said cheque was returned unpaid, when it was presented for\nencashment, with remarks "Funds Insufficient" vide return memo\ndated 16.07.2014. The complainant then issued a legal notice dated\n25.07.2014 calling upon the accused to pay the cheque amount withinCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 2 of 3315 days from the receipt thereof, the same was duly served upon the\naccused but accused failed to pay the amount due thus constraining\nthe complainant to file this complaintu/s 138Negotiable Instruments\nAct, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as 'NI Act') seeking redress against\nthe dishonor of the cheque in question.3. With a view to establish a prima facie case in order to\nenable the court to summon the accused, complainant led pre­\nsummoning evidence by way of affidavit Ex.CW­1/A. The\ncomplainant relied upon following documentary evidence:(a) Original cheque bearing no. 067565 dated 14.07.2014 for a sum of\nRs. 25,00,000/­ drawn on State Bank of Travancore, which is Ex. CW­\n1/1.(b) Original cheque return memo dated 16.07.2014, which is Ex.CW1/2.(c) Postal receipt, which is Ex. CW­1/3.(d) Speed post tracking report, which is Ex. CW­1/4.(e) Office copy of legal notice dated 25.07.2014, which is Ex. CW­\n1/5.Complainant closed his pre­summoning evidence on 14.11.2014.4. On the basis of above material and finding a prima facie\ncase made out against the accused, the accused was summoned vide\norder dated 14.11.2014. Accused entered his first appearance on the\ndate fixed i.e. 12.03.2015.Ct. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 3 of 335. Noticeu/s 251Cr.P.C. was framed against accused on\n19.10.2015 stating out to him the substance of accusation, to which he\npleaded not guilty and claimed trial. His defence was recorded at the\nstage of framing of notice in compliance of directions passed by\nHon'ble High Court of Delhi inRajesh Aggarwal v. State171 (2010)\nDLT 51. The accused took defence that he had taken loan of a sum of\nRs. 1,00,000/­ from complainant and repaid the same in cash, that\ncomplainant made him pay interest of Rs. 2,25,000/­ over and above\nRs. 1,00,000/­ in cash, when he asked complainant to return the\ncheque, he refused and asked him to pay more money as interest\nwhich he refused to pay, a blank signed cheque was given to the\ncomplainant as security at the time of taking loan of Rs. 1,00,000/­\nand that he has no liability towards complainant.6. Accused was granted right to cross­examine the\ncomplainant on an application filedu/s 145(2)NI Act vide order dated\n13.01.2016. The complainant was examined as CW­1 thereby\nadopting his pre­summoning evidence as post­summoning evidence\nand was cross­examined and discharged. Vide separate statement of\ncomplainant, complainant evidence was closed on 22.06.2017.7. Statement of accused was recordedu/s 313Cr.P.C. r/wsection 281Cr.P.C. on 01.02.2018 wherein all the incriminating\nevidence was put to the accused and he was granted an opportunity to\nexplain the circumstances appearing against him at trial. While\nexplaining the circumstances appearing in evidence against him,Ct. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 4 of 33accused stated without oath that he did not give the cheque in question\nto complainant towards any legal liability but gave a blank signed\ncheque as security to complainant, that he did not receive any legal\nnotice, that he had taken Rs. 1,00,000/­ from complainant on interest\nand gave blank signed cheque to complainant at that time as security\ntowards repayment of loan, complainant made him pay Rs. 2,25,000/­\nas interest over and above Rs. 1,00,000/­ which he paid in cash, thus\nhe had returned entire loan amount with interest, when he asked\ncomplainant to return his cheque complainant asked him to pay more\nmoney as interest but he refused, therefore complainant misused his\nsecurity cheque and that he has no liability towards complainant.\nAccused preferred to lead evidence in his defence.8. At the stage of defence evidence, despite several\nopportunities being given accused failed to lead evidence and thus\ndefence evidence was closed vide order dated 17.12.2019.9. At the stage of final arguments, an applicationu/s 311Cr.P.C. was preferred by complainant on 04.02.2020, which\napplication was allowed vide order dated 13.02.2020 and\ncomplainant/CW­1 was re­examined on 01.11.2022, wherein he relied\nupon a receipt, which is Ex.CW­1/6. He was duly cross­examined and\nCE was closed vide order dated 01.11.2022. Statement of accused was\nagain recordedu/s 313Cr.P.C. r/wsection 281Cr.P.C. on 01.11.2022\nitself wherein all the new incriminating evidence was put to the\naccused and he was granted an opportunity to explain the\ncircumstances appearing against him at trial. While explaining the\ncircumstances appearing in evidence against him, accused statedCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 5 of 33without oath that although he admits his signatures on the said receipt\nEx.CW­1/6 but he took only Rs. 1,00,000/­ from complainant with\ninterest @ 18% p.a. and has already paid Rs. 3,25,000/­ to the\ncomplainant by way of cash. Accused preferred not to lead additional\ndefence evidence.10. At the stage of final arguments, Ld. counsel for\ncomplainant submitted that accused has taken loan of Rs. 25,00,000/­\nfrom complainant and accepted taking the said loan on a stamp paper\nand also gave the cheque in question to the complainant in discharge\nof his liability and thus prayed to convict the accused. He also filed\nwritten arguments to the effect that accused took loan of Rs. 25 lac\nfrom complainant and issued the cheque in question after one year,\nhowever the said cheque was dishonoured and accused failed to pay\nthe cheque amount even after receipt of legal notice, that accused\ncould not rebut the examination of complainant.Per contra, Ld. counsel for accused submitted that in the\ncaseu/s 138Cr.P.C. the burden upon accused is only to shift the\nburden of proof and not to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt,\nthat complaint is silent on the date, month or year of giving of loan\nand the source of arranging such a huge amount of Rs. 25,00,000/­, it\nis further mentioned in the complaint that after one year passed\naccused handed over to the complainant the cheque in question which\nis dated 14.07.2014, therefore it implies that the loan would have been\nadvanced in the year 2013 if the averments of the complaint are\nadmitted. However, during cross­examination on 23.03.2016 CW­1\ndeposed that he gave loan in 2012 in cash and that he did not\nwithdrew such amount from bank, that he has no facility of keepingCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 6 of 33cash in his office. That no document has been placed on record by\ncomplainant to prove giving of the loan except the receipt and cheque.\nIn complaint, he pleads that he gave loan first and received cheque\nafter one year, but in his evidence he deposed that cheque and receipt\nof taking loan were handed over on the same day, if this preposition is\naccepted then since the cheque was allegedly given in 2014 the receipt\nshould be also of 2014. It was further contended that CW­1 deposed\nthat his annual turnover was around Rs.10 lacs and that he is the sole\nproprietor of his proprietorship concern and is also income tax payee,\nwhen his annual turnover is Rs.10 lacs how can he arrange a huge\namount of Rs. 25 lacs for advancing it to accused, further he has\nadmitted not reflecting the said loan in his income tax return and also\ndeposed that there was no reason for him not to reflect the same in his\nincome tax return, that later CW­1 changed his statement and deposes\nthat he took Rs. 10 lac from business and Rs. 15 lac from his brother­\nin­law but he does not remember when he took such a huge amount\nfrom his brother­in­law, that in complaint it is pleaded that accused\ntook loan for business purpose but in evidence he deposed that\naccused took loan for higher study of children but he did not ask about\nthe details of such education even while advancing such a huge\namount, then he deposed that accused took loan for higher studies of\nhis children and for business. It has been further submitted that\ncomplainant then filed an applicationu/s 311Cr.P.C. to place on\nrecord a receipt when accused already submitted his written\narguments, that such application is also a part of record and therefore\nmust be read, that in the said application complainant has pleaded that\nin 2012 he gave loan to accused for business and education (the same\nnot being mentioned in his complaint), he further pleaded in his\napplication that accused gave a receipt with signatures of himself and\nhis wife (but neither in the cheque nor in the receipt signature of wifeCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 7 of 33of accused has been taken) and also pleads that the amount was\narranged by complainant from his relatives, brother­in­law, friends\nand family (which is in contradiction to his complaint and his\nevidence). That when CW­1 was again cross­examined, he deposed\nthat his application was correct but later admitted that the fact of\nreceipt being signed by wife of accused is wrong and that he did not\ntake any amount from his friends, thus he has been constantly\nchanging is version in his complaint, then in his evidence, then in his\napplicationu/s 311Cr.P.C and then again in his cross­examination, he\nalso deposed that he does not know where the receipt was prepared\nand thus his credibility has been shaken by his own testimony, later\nCW­1 deposed that he gave friendly loan but in his first cross­\nexamination he deposed that he gave loan at interest @ 18 % p.a. It\nhas been concluded by Ld. counsel for accused that can a person\nwhose turnover was Rs.10 lacs p.a. advance loan of Rs. 25 lacs when\nhe does not even remember the date, month or year of advancing such\nhuge amount, that he does not know how he arranged the money, first\nhe said he arranged money from his business, then changed his stand\nand said he took part amount from his brother­in­law, then he said he\ntook money from his friends and family also and lastly he said no he\ndid not take loan from his friends, thus complainant's evidence has no\ncredibility, that if the background of accused is seen from cross­\nexamination of CW­1 he deposed that accused used to supply\nhousehold articles from a one room shop at Uttam Nagar, that it\ncannot be believed that knowing such fact complainant advanced such\na huge amount to accused, that if the pleadings are to be believed\nsince cheque pertains to the year 2014 the loan would have been given\nin 2013 but the receipt is of 2012, that even in the receipt there is no\nparentage, age or residence of accused, that any paper prior to being\nstamped requires sufficient details of the person and then the seal ofCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 8 of 33notary is affixed but all that is lacking in the said receipt. Ld. counsel\nfor accused further stated that he earlier filed written arguments prior\nto filing of applicationu/s 311Cr.P.C. by complainant and he is\nrelying only on the cases cited in his written submissions and thus\nrelied upon the following cases praying to acquit the accused:Vipul\nKumar Gupta v. Vipin Gupta2012VIIIAD (Delhi) 218, K. Prakashan\nv. P.K. Surenderan(2008) 1 SCC 258, Kulvinder Singh v. Kafeel\nAhmed 2013 2AD (Delhi) 81, Devender Kumar v. Khem Chand Crl.Rev. P. No. 679 of 2012, Kamala S. v. Vidyadharan M.J.(2007) 5\nSCC 264, M/s Rahul Builders v. M/s Arihant Fertilizers & Chemical\n& anr. (2008) 2 SCC 321, John K. Abraham v. Simon C. Abraham&\nanr. (2014) 2 SCC 236.11. After hearing the arguments advanced on behalf of both\nthe parties and perusing the record carefully, the appreciation of\nevidence and findings of the court are as below.12. It would be apposite to first consider the legal position\nserving as base to the offence underlyingSection 138NI Act. The\nfollowing legal requirements need to be satisfied in order to constitute\nan offenceu/s 138NI Act, as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the\ncase titled as Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. M/s Pennar Peterson\nSecurities Ltd.: (2000) 2 SCC 745:(i) that a person must have drawn a cheque on an account\n maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount\n of money to another person from out of that account for the\n discharge of any debt or other liability;Ct. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 9 of 33(ii) that the cheque has been presented to the bank within a pe­\n riod of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within\n the period of its validity whichever is earlier;(iii) that the cheque is returned by the bank unpaid either be­\n cause of the amount of money standing to the credit of the ac­\n count is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the\n amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement\n made with the bank;(iv) that the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque\n makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money\n by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque,\n within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the\n bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid;(v) that the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the\n said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course\n of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice;The above legal requirements are cumulative, meaning thereby that\nonly if all the aforementioned ingredients are satisfied can the person\nwho had drawn the cheque be held liable for offenceu/s 138NI Act.13. Burden of proof: The claim based under the provisions\nofNegotiable Instruments Actis an exception to the general rule of\nlaw that burden of proof lies on the prosecution. The two specific\nprovisions viz.Section 118 (a)and139of NI Act contemplates that a\npresumption is attached in regard to each and every negotiable\ninstrument that the same was drawn and issued against due dischargeCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 10 of 33of the liability and thus, whenever any claim is made on the basis of a\nnegotiable instrument, the presumption has to be drawn in favour of\nthe holder of the cheque (drawee) and the law has put the burden to\nrebut the presumption on the accused that the cheque was not issued\nby him against discharge of a debt or a liability. In case, the accused is\nnot able to rebut the presumption and fails to prove his defence, the\npresumption becomes absolute and it has to be assumed that the\ncheque was issued by the accused in discharge of debt or liability and\nconsequently, accused is assumed guilty of the offence. It was held by\nHon'ble Supreme Court in the case ofRangappa v. Mohan: 2010\n(11) SCC 441 that presumption ofSection 139of N.I. Act also\nincludes the existence of legally enforceable debt:14. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with\n the respondent claimant that the presumption mandated\n bySection 139of the Act does indeed include the exis­\n tence of a legally enforceable debt or liability.Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case ofHiten P. Dalal v.\nBratindranath Banerjee: 2001 (6) SCC 16 held that the presumption\nmentioned in thesection 139NI Act is a presumption of law and not a\npresumption of fact and thus, this presumption has to be drawn in\nfavour of the drawee and the burden to rebut the presumption with the\nprobable defence is on the accused.This is indeed an instance of the rule of 'reverse onus', where it\nis incumbent on the accused to lead what can be called 'negative evi­\ndence' i.e. to lead evidence to show non­existence of liability. Keeping\nin view that this is a departure from the cardinal rule of 'presumption\nof innocence' in favour of the accused and that negative evidence is\nnot easy to be led by its very nature, it is now settled that the accusedCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 11 of 33can displace this presumption on a scale of preponderance of probabil­\nities and the lack of consideration or a legally enforceable debt need\nnot be proved to the hilt or beyond all reasonable doubts. The accused\ncan either prove that the liability did not exist or make the non­exis­\ntence of liability so probable that a reasonable person, ought under the\ncircumstances of the case, act on the supposition that it does not exist.\nHe can do so either by leading own evidence in his defence or even by\npunching holes in the case of the complainant in the testing ordeal of\ncross­examination. This can be deciphered from relevant para no.21 ofHiten P. Dalal(supra):21. In other words, provided the facts required to form the ba­\n sis of a presumption of law exist, no discretion is left with the\n Court but to draw the statutory conclusion, but this does not\n preclude the person against whom the presumption is drawn\n from rebutting it and proving the contrary. A fact is said to be\n proved when, "after considering the matters before it, the\n Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so\n probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of\n the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists".Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively estab­\n lished but such evidence must be adduced before the Court in\n support of the defence that the Court must either believe the\n defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably\n probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the 'pru­\n dent man'.Further, in Bharat Barrel v. Drum Manufacturing: AIR 1999 SC\n1008 Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the accused has to rebut theCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 12 of 33presumption and mere denial of passing of consideration is no de­\nfence.It is, thus, clear that in cases ofSection 138NI Act, upon proof\nof foundational facts, law presumes in favour of drawee that the\ncheque was issued by the accused in discharge, wholly or in part, of\nlegally enforceable debt or liability and the burden to rebut the same is\nupon the accused. The burden does not have to be conclusively estab­\nlished but the accused has to prove his defence on preponderance of\nprobability.14. Now applying the above law to the facts of the present\ncase, it has to be adjudged whether the legal requirements laid down\nhereinabove have been fulfilled in the instant case.14.1. The first legal requirement is:"A person must have drawn a cheque on an account\n maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount\n of money to another person from out of that account for the\n discharge of any debt or other liability."At the outset, it has to be proved that the accused had issued the\ncheque in question on his account maintained with a bank for\ndischarge of any debt or other liability. In the instant case, accused has\nadmitted his signatures on the cheque in question in his statementCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 13 of 33recordedu/s 313Cr.P.C. and in notice framedu/s 251Cr.P.C. The\ncheque in question has also been drawn on the account maintained by\nhim with State Bank of Travancore. The said fact has not been denied\nby accused at any stage of proceeding.It was held in the case of Kalamani Tex & anr. v. P.\nBalasubramanian: 2021 SCC Online SC 75 Hon'ble Supreme Court\nheld that:"14. Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain\n reading of its judgment that the trial court completely\n overlooked the provisions and failed to appreciate the\n statutory presumption drawn underSection 118andSection\n 139of NI Act. The statute mandates that once the\n signature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable\n instrument are established, then these 'reverse onus' clauses\n become operative. In such a situation, the obligation shifts\n upon the accused to discharge the presumption imposed\n upon him."The above said principle has also been crystallized by Hon'ble\nSupreme Court in the case ofBasalingappa v. Mudibasappa: (2019)\n5 SCC 418, by observing that:"25. We having noticed the ratiolaid down bythis Court in\n above cases onSections 118(a)and139, we now\n summarize the principles enumerated by this Court in\n following manner:(i) Once the execution of cheque is admittedSection 139of\n the Act mandates a presumption that the cheque was for the\n discharge of any debt or other liability.Ct. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 14 of 33(ii) The presumption underSection 139is a rebuttable\n presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the\n probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the\n presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities.(iii) To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to\n rely on evidence led by him or accused can also rely on the\n materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a\n probable defence. Inference of preponderance of\n probabilities can be drawn not only from the materials\n brought on record by the parties but also by reference to\n the circumstances upon which they rely.(iv) That it is not necessary for the accused to come in the\n witness box in support of his defence,Section 139imposed\n an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden.(v) It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness\n box to support his defence."14.2. In the instant case, the accused having admitted his\nsignatures on the cheque in question and the said cheque being drawn\non his bank account, a mandatory presumption automatically arises in\nfavour of complainant by virtue ofSection 118(a)r/w 139NI Actthat\nthe cheque in question was issued by him in discharge of, whole or\npart of, legally enforceable debt or case liability.14.3. Now the burden shifts upon accused to rebut the above\npresumption by raising a probable defence, by leading evidence or\nbringing such facts on record in the cross­examination of theCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 15 of 33complainant that could make the latter's case improbable. If, in such a\ncase, the accused is proved to have discharged the initial onus of proof\nplaced on him by showing that the existence of consideration was\nimprobable or doubtful or illegal, then the onus will again shift back\nto the complainant who will then be under an obligation to prove it as\na matter of fact and failure to do so will disentitle him to any relief on\nthe basis of the negotiable instrument (as held inSatish Sharma v.\nState NCT of Delhi& anr.: (2013) 204 DLT 289).14.4. The accused has chosen to do so by cross­examining the\ncomplainant. It is undisputed fact that complainant and accused were\nknown to each other and that accused handed over the cheque in\nquestion to the complainant. However, the defence of accused has\nbeen that he borrowed only an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/­ from\ncomplainant and handed over a blank signed cheque as security for its\nrepayment, that he even repaid the same in cash along with interest of\nRs. 2,25,000/­ which complainant made him to pay, but when he\ndemanded his cheque back complainant asked for more money as\ninterest and when accused denied to pay the same, complainant\nrefused to return his cheque and that he has no legal liability towards\ncomplainant.14.5. The plea of defence that the cheque in issue was given as\nsecurity, does not affect the case of complainantu/s 138NI Act in\nview of authoritative pronouncement by Hon'ble Supreme Court in\nthe case ofI.C.D.S. Ltd. v. Beena Shabeer(2002) 2 SCC 426 wherein\nit was observed that:Ct. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 16 of 33"Section 138of NI Act does not distinguish between a cheque\n issued by the debtor in discharge of an existing debt or other\n liability, or a cheque issued as a security cheque on the promise\n that on the due future date the debt which shall have\n crystallized by then, shall be paid. So long as there is a debt\n existing, in respect whereof the cheque in question is issued, in\n my view, the same would attractSection 138of NI Act in case\n of its dishonor."Thus, so long as the debt is existingSection 138Cr.P.C. can be\ninvoked.14.6. The complainant/CW­1, during his cross­examination,\ndeposed that accused used to supply him all consuming household\nitems from southern India and that he used to pay for the same then\nand there, accused had a shop at Uttam Nagar which was of medium\nsize and contained only one room, that he gave Rs. 25,00,000/­ in cash\nto accused from his office in 2012 but he does not remember the date\nand month, the said amount was not withdrawn from any bank, there\nis no facility of keeping cash in full time at his office, accused gave\nreceipt of cash, accused himself filled the details of the cheque,\naccused gave cheque and receipt together, he contacted accused to\nreturn the amount again in 2014, that he is also doing small business\nof advancing friendly loan since 6­7 years but does not have any\nlicence for the same, he runs a proprietorship firm in the name of\nMagie Printers and his income tax reflects annual business turnover\nwhich is approximately Rs. 10,00,000/­, that he gave Rs. 10,00,000/­\nfrom his business and Rs. 15,00,000/­ from his brother­in­law but\ndoes not remember date/month/year of taking this amount from hisCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 17 of 33brother­in­law, he did not show this loan of Rs. 25,00,000/­ in his\nincome tax return, there is no reason for not showing said loan in\nincome tax return, that the accused took the said loan from him for\nhigher studies of the children but he did not ask accused about the\ndetails of such higher study or for which child he required loan,\naccused requested for loan in 2012, that accused took loan for higher\nstudy of children and for business purpose, he charges interest rate @\n18% p.a. for friendly loan but he does not keep account details/books\nof Magie Printers or of any friendly loan dealing. Later he relied upon\na receipt Ex. CW­1/6 upon which he was cross­examined. He deposed\nthat he had gone through the entire applicationu/s 311Cr.P.C. and\neach averment is correct but then deposed that the statement in para\nno. 2 of his application regarding taking receipt from accused which\nbears signature of accused and his wife are wrong, that the statement\nin para no.2 regarding help taken by complainant from his relatives,\nbrother­in­law, friends and family members is true but he did not take\nany help from his friends and the same is incorrect, that the relatives is\nhis brother­in­law only, that he also did not take help from his family\nmembers and the said fact in para no.2 is also wrong, he does not\nknow where the said receipt was prepared, the suggestion that accused\ngave receipt along with cheque is incorrect, the receipt was given to\nhim at the time of taking loan, there was no one at his office at the\ntime of taking the receipt, he did not insist on making anyone the\nwitness, the receipt does not bear his address, it does not bear terms\nand conditions of loan, he did not give the loan for earning interest or\nprofit, that he did not mention about the receipt in his complaint or\nevidence by way of affdavit and denied the suggestion of the receipt\nbeing false and fabricated.Ct. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 18 of 3314.7. It is settled law that accused need not lead evidence and\nit is sufficient if he raises probable defence by cross­examining the\ncomplainant. From the testimony of complainant, it is evident that the\ncomplainant has been retracting from his previous statements.\nComplainant does not know the date or month of advancing such a\nhuge amount of Rs. 25,00,000/­ to the accused, he failed to even aver\nabout the year of advancing the loan in his complaint. Although he\ndeposed in his cross­examination that he advanced the said loan in the\nyear 2012, but the cheque in issue is dated 14.07.2014 and according\nto the pleadings of the complainant himself, accused issued the said\ncheque after one year from advancement of the loan. The date on the\ncheque being 14.07.2014, either the year of advancement of the same\nbeing 2012 is deposed incorrectly or the pleadings and testimony of\nCW­1 that the cheque was issued after one year from advancement of\nloan, is incorrect.14.8. The testimony of complainant suffers from material\ncontradiction with respect to purpose of alleged loan. In complaint and\nin examination in chief, CW­1 deposed that the alleged loan of Rs.\n25,00,000/­ was taken by accused for business purpose. However,\nduring cross­examination, CW­1 firstly deposed on 23.03.2016 that\naccused took loan for business purpose, and later voluntarily corrected\nhimself and deposed that the loan was taken by accused for higher\nstudies of children as well as for business purpose. He further stated\nthat he did not enquire about the details of such study for which such a\nhuge amount was taken by accused nor did he enquire about the child\nfor whose education the said amount was being taken by accused. He\nalso did not maintain any details or record of such loan account.Ct. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 19 of 3314.9. The accused has challenged the source and capacity of\ncomplainant in advancing a huge sum of Rs. 25,00,000/­ to the\naccused. The complainant's testimony reveals that he himself is\nunaware as to how he arranged such a huge amount of Rs.\n25,00,000/­. The complaint is silent on the said aspect. However,\nduring cross­examination, he first deposed that he arranged the money\nin hard cash from his business. Upon being questioned, he stated that\nhis office does not have facility of full time keeping of such a huge\namount of money and that he did not withdrew such amount from the\nbank. Later, when he was questioned about his income, he deposed\nthat he arranged Rs. 10,00,000/­ from his business and remaining\namount of Rs. 15,00,000/­ was taken from his brother­in­law. Yet\nagain, he filed an applicationu/s 311Cr.P.C. stating that he arranged\nthe said amount from his relatives, brother­in­law, friends and family\nmembers and in his deposition, first he agreed that the contents of his\napplication are correct but then retracted from the same and stated that\nhe did not take help from his friends or family members and that\nrelatives means his brother­in­law only. Thus, the testimony of\ncomplainant failed to withstand the challenge posed by accused during\ncross­examination. Moreover, despite such challenge, complainant\nfailed to examine his brother­in­law from whom he states to have\nborrowed a huge amount of Rs. 15,00,000/­, the date/month or even\nyear of which CW­1 does not remember.14.10. Further, CW­1 deposed that he is an income tax payer\nwithout default and that his income tax return also reflects the\nturnover of his business. He then deposed that his annual turnover is\napproximately Rs. 10,00,000/­ and that he also lends money on\nfriendly loan but does not have any such license. It was then that CW­Ct. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 20 of 331 changed his earlier testimony and stated that he took Rs. 10,00,000/­\nfrom his business and Rs. 15,00,000/­ from his brother­in­law. Ld.\ncounsel for accused has argued that how can a person having annual\nturnover of Rs. 10,00,000/­ advance friendly loan of Rs. 25,00,000/­.\nThe contentions of Ld. counsel for accused have merit, specifically in\nview of the further deposition of CW­1 wherein he stated that he did\nnot reflect such loan transaction in his income tax return, that he does\nnot maintain any books/ record of such transaction, that he did not\nwithdraw such amount from his bank and that he gave such amount\nfrom his shop but his shop does not have facility of keeping such huge\nhard cash. The fact that complainant who had only a business friendly\ndealing with accused having a medium size shop at Uttam Nagar who\nused to supply household items to complainant, would part with an\namount of money which was more than double the stated annual\nturnover of entire business of complainant, that too without any\ninterest or profit and without any witness to the same, is hard to appeal\nthe conscience of a prudent person.14.11. The only evidence of such a huge transaction is stated to\nbe a receipt Ex. CW­1/6. However, the same has also been challenged\nto be forged and fabricated by accused in cross­examination of\ncomplainant. The receipt does not bear any date. It does not bear any\nparentage, age or any details including residential address of either\nparty. It merely mentions that Joseph PA "is taking" friendly loan\nfrom PA Joseph for a sum of Rs. 25 lacs for his business purpose and\nhis children's studies on 07.03.2012. The language of the receipt and\nthe words "is taking" and "on "7 th March 2012" only suggests that the\nreceipt was executed on 07.03.2012. Ld. counsel for accused has\nchallenged the said receipt arguing that this receipt does not findCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 21 of 33mention in the complaint or in the evidence by way of affidavit of\ncomplainant. This receipt was brought on record at the stage of final\narguments after accused filed his written submissions and no reason\nfor not bringing the same on record finds mention either in the\ncomplaint or in the evidence by way of affidavit. Further, the\napplicationu/s 311Cr.P.C. was filed by complainant alleging that he\nwished to bring on record a receipt signed by accused and his wife but\nupon being cross­examined, CW­1 deposed that the said statement\nwas incorrect and that the receipt does not bear signature of wife of\naccused. Also, it mentions that the loan was taken on 07.03.2012.\nHowever, evidence of complainant depicts that the receipt was given\nat the time of taking of loan and that the cheque was handed over after\none year from the loan, but the cheque is dated 14.07.2014, which\ndepicts that the cheque was given after more than two years from\nalleged advancement of loan. Also, complainant has given\ncontradictory statement when he stated that the cheque and receipt\nwere issued at the same time. Furthermore, CW­1 also does not know\nwhere the receipt was prepared. Only the signatures of accused on the\nsaid receipt are admitted by him in his statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C.14.12. Now the question arises as to the evidentiary value of\nstatementu/s 313Cr.P.C. and can mere admission by accused of his\nsignatures on receipt Ex.CW­1/6 without admitting its contents, that\ntoo in his statementu/s 313Cr.P.C bring home conviction? The\nanswer to the above question is in negative. It is settled law that the\nstatement of accusedu/s 313Cr.P.C. is not a substantive piece of\nevidence. It can be used for appreciating evidence led by the\nprosecution/complainant to accept or reject it. It is, however, not a\nsubstitute for the evidence of prosecution/complainant. Such aCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 22 of 33statement can be used as an aid to lend credence to the evidence led by\nprosecution/complainant. But ultimately, the case of\nprosecution/complainant must stand on its own legs. In the present\ncase, complainant does not know who signed the receipt as he stated\nin his applicationu/s 311Cr.P.C. that the receipt was signed by\naccused and his wife and in his cross­examination deposed that it was\nonly signed by accused. Complainant also does not know where the\nsaid receipt was prepared. He has also given contradictory statements\nregarding issuance of cheque along with execution of receipt or\nthereafter. The receipt merely bears the names of parties without any\nreference to their parentage, age, or residential address, no witness has\nsigned the same. It does not bear the terms and conditions of loan or\npromise to return the same after a specified period upon which the\nliability of accused can be said to have arisen.14.13. Now coming to the case laws referred by Ld. counsel for\naccused and their relevance to the present case.14.13.1.In the case ofVipul Kumar Gupta v. Vipin Gupta2012\nVIIIAD (Delhi) 218 Hon'ble High Court of Delhi affirmed the\njudgment of Trial court and acquitted the accused observing that\nbefore a person is convicted for having committed an offenceu/s 138NI Act it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the cheque in\nquestion must have been issued by him in discharge of his liability or\nlegally recoverable debt and some of the reasons for doubting the\nsame were non­mentioning by complainant in his income tax return or\nbooks of account, the factum of loan having been given by him as by\nno factor can the loan amount of Rs. 9,00,000/­ be said to be a smallCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 23 of 33amount which a person would not reflect in his income tax return or\nbooks of account in case the same has been lent to a person, non­\nmentioning of date, time or year of loan in complaint and evidence,\nthe cheque having particulars written in two different inks.In\nKulvinder Singh v. Kafeel Ahmed 2013 2AD (Delhi) 81 Hon'ble\nHigh Court of Delhi upheld the order of acquittal and observed that if\ncomplainant advanced huge amount of money of Rs. 9,30,000/­ he\nought to have shown to the court the source from where he had\ngenerated such a huge amount, but he has failed to reflect the same in\nhis income tax return or books of account, this creates a doubt\nregarding truthfulness of the stand taken by complainant that he\nadvanced loan of Rs. 9,30,000/­ to accused. In the present case as\nwell, the complainant has failed to mention advancement of huge sum\nof Rs. 25,00,000/­ in his income tax returns or to keep any books of\naccount or record thereof. In the present case as well, the signature of\naccused is in different ink than the handwriting on the cheque filling\nthe remaining particulars, and the complainant has failed to show the\nsource from where he arranged such a huge amount, his annual\nturnover of business only being less than half of the alleged sum of\nmoney lent.14.13.2.In the case ofK. Prakashan v. P.K. Surenderan(2008)\n1 SCC 258 it was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that in cases of\ncheque returned with remarks "stop payment", if stoppage of payment\nbefore due date of the cheque is allowed to take the transaction out of\npurview ofSection 138NI Act, it will shake the confidence which a\ncheque is otherwise intended to inspire regarding payment being\navailable on the due date, and in such cases if two views are possible,\nthe appellate court shall not reverse a judgment of acquittal onlyCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 24 of 33because another view is possible to be taken. The above case is not\nrelevant to the adjudication of present case as the cheque in question\nin this case has been returned unpaid with remarks 'funds\ninsufficient'. The case of M/s Rahul Builders v. M/s Arihant\nFertilizers & Chemical & anr. (2008) 2 SCC 321 also does not relate\nto the issue in the present case, in so far as the above referred case\nrelated to notice of demand being not proper.InDevender Kumar v.\nKhem Chand Crl. Rev. P. No. 679 of 2012 Hon'ble High Court of\nDelhi observed that the accused appears to have rebutted the existence\nof legally enforceable debt by establishing that no loan was advanced\nto him even though there was an agreement and a corresponding\npromissory note and an affidavit, the loan was not shown in income\ntax return of complainant, an adverse inference could be draw upon\ncomplainant on that account and the loan amount appears to be\ndoubtful. In the above referred case, ,the loan agreement did not\ncontain any acknowledgment of disbursement of loan amount of Rs.\n1.40 lacs, the agreement merely indicated that on terms and conditions\nindicated, a friendly loan was agreed to be given to accused, it was an\nagreement to pay the loan amount in future, it was not signed by any\nwitness and it was found that an agreement was entered into without\nactual transfer of money. This case is also not relevant to the decision\nof the present case as no agreement of loan has been executed in the\npresent case but only a receipt of payment which also has been\ndisputed.14.13.3.InKamala S. v. Vidyadharan M.J.(2007) 5 SCC 264, it\nwas held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that the standard of proof in\ndischarge of the burden in terms ofSection 139NI Act being ofCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 25 of 33preponderance of probability, the inference therefore can be drawn not\nonly from the materials brought on record but also from the reference\nto the circumstances upon which the accused relies upon. The burden\nof proof upon accused is not as high as that of the prosecution.14.13.4.InJohn K. Abraham v. Simon C. Abraham& anr.\n(2014) 2 SCC 236, Hon'ble Supreme Court affirmed the decision of\nacquittal of Trial court on the grounds that in order to draw\npresumption u/s 188 r/w 139 burden lies on complainant to show that\nhe had requisite funds for advancing the sum of money/loan in\nquestion to the accused, that the issuance of cheque by accused in\nsupport of repayment of money advanced was true, that the accused\nwas bound to make payment as had been agreed while issuing cheque\nin favour of complainant, butin that casethe complainant was not\naware of the date when substantial amount of Rs. 1,50,000/­ was\nadvanced by him to accused, he failed to produce relevant documents\nin support of the alleged source for advancing money to accused, he\nwas not aware as to when and where the transaction took place for\nwhich the cheque in question was issued to him by accused, he was\nnot sure as to who wrote the cheque and making contradictory\nstatements in this regard.14.14. In view of above referred case laws, in the present case\nalso complainant has miserably failed to prove the source of huge\namount of cash of Rs. 25,00,000/­ albeit he has mentioned\ncategorically that he did not withdraw any amount from his bank; he\nhas given contradictory statements regarding the arrangement of the\nsaid amount whether he arranged it by himself, or from his brother­in­Ct. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 26 of 33law, or from his family members and friends and relatives; he has\nfailed to prove the date/time/month or year of lending the said loan; he\nhas failed to prove the receipt of loan the date on which goes contrary\nto the pleadings and examination in chief of complainant; he does not\nknow who signed the receipt as contradictory statement was made in\nthe applicationu/s 311Cr.P.C.; he does not know where the receipt\nwas prepared; he has failed to establish the requirement of loan for\nwhich he agreed to part away with huge amount of cash that too\nwithout any interest and without having any personal relationship with\naccused; in fact complainant has given contradictory statements with\nrespect to purpose of loan and whether the cheque in question was\nissued at the time the receipt was executed or thereafter; he has failed\nto reflect the advancement of such a huge amount of loan in his\nincome tax return; the signature on the cheque also appears to be in an\nink different from that of remaining particulars; the complainant has\nhimself stated his annual turnover of Rs. 10,00,000/­ and yet parted\nwith more than twice that amount in a single day to a person he had\nfriendly business relationship is hard to believe. Thus, accused has\ndischarged his burden, by preponderance of probability and raised a\ndoubt in the case of complainant by raising above factors.14.15. Thus, accused has been able to successfully rebut the\npresumption of law and discharge the burden of proof by raising a\nprobable defence that the cheque in question was not issued in\ndischarge of his liability as the lending of Rs. 25,00,000/­ by\ncomplainant has not been proved.The first legal requirement is, thus, proved in favour of\naccused and against the complainant.Ct. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 27 of 3315. The second legal requirement is:"That cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of\n six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the pe­\n riod of its validity whichever is earlier."The cheque in question Ex. CW­1/3 is dated 02.01.2017. The cheque\nreturn memo Ex. CW­1/4 is dated 04.01.2017 and the statement of\naccount Ex.DW­4/2 reflects that the cheque was presented for\nencashment on 04.01.2017, which proves that the cheque in question\nwas presented within the period of its validity. Further, defence has\nfailed to controvert the said fact.Thus, the second legal requirement is adjudicated in favour\nof complainant.16. The third legal requirement is:"That cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of\n the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is in­\n sufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount\n arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made\n with the bank."Section 146NI Act presumes the fact of dishonour of cheque upon\nproduction of bank's slip or memo having the official mark denoting\nthat the cheque in question has been dishonoured. This is also a rebut­\ntable presumption and the upon production of such bank memo, the\nburden shifts upon accused to disprove the same.Ct. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 28 of 33In the instant case, a presumption has been raised in favour of com­\nplainant by virtue ofSection 146NI Act that the cheque in question\nwas dishonoured for the reason stated therein viz. Funds insufficient\nand therefore, the burden now shifts upon the accused to rebut this\npresumption by establishing some reasonable justification for the\nsame. But the accused has admitted his signatures on the cheque in\nquestion and the fact of its dishonor.Thus, the third legal requirement is adjudicated in favour\nof complainant.17. The fourth legal requirement is:"The payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a\n demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving\n a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty\n days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regard­\n ing the return of the cheque as unpaid."The cheque was dishonoured vide return memo dated 04.01.2017 and\nthe complainant sent a legal notice dated 18.01.2017 (Ex.CW­1/5) ad­\ndressed to the accused. Corresponding speed post receipt (Ex.CW­1/6)\nis also on record. The complainant has alleged that accused also sent a\nreply to the said legal notice though it has not been produced in evi­\ndence. Nervertheless, the accused has admitted receiving the notice in\nhis plea of defence and did not dispute his address mentioned on the\nnotice. The notice has been sent by post correctly addressed to the ac­\ncused within a period of thirty days from the date of return memo.Ct. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 29 of 3317.1. In this regard,Section 27General Clauses Act comes\ninto play which gives rise to presumption that service of notice has\nbeen effected when it is sent to the correct address of accused by reg­\nistered post. It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case titled\nasC.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammad: (2007) 6 SCC 555 that:14.Section 27[General Clauses Act] gives rise to presumption\n that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the\n correct address of accused by registered post. In view of the\n said presumption when stating that a notice has been sent by\n registered post to the address of the drawer, it is unnecessary\n to further aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the\n notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the\n addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless\n and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of\n notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the\n letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of\n business."Thus, in view ofSection 27General Clauses Act it is presumed that\nthe accused received the legal notice, as he admitted his address as\ncorrectly mentioned on the legal notice (Ex.CW­1/5).17.2. Even otherwise, law expects a person pleading non­receipt of\nany demand notice to prove his bona fide by making the payment of\nthe cheque amount within 15 days of receiving court summons. This is\ncrystallized by the verdict of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case titledCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 30 of 33asC.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed& anr.: (2007) 6 SCC\n555:"17. It is also to be borne in mind that the\n requirement of giving of notice is a clear departure\n from the rule of Criminal Law, where there is no\n stipulation of giving of a notice before filing a\n complaint. Any drawer who claims that he did not\n receive the notice sent by post, can, within 15 days of\n receipt of summons from the court in respect of the\n complaint undersection 138of the Act, make payment\n of the cheque amount and submit to the Court that he\n had made payment within 15 days of receipt of\n summons (by receiving a copy of complaint with the\n summons) and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be\n rejected. A person who does not pay within 15 days of\n receipt of the summons from the Court along with the\n copy of the complaint undersection 138of the Act,\n cannot obviously contend that there was no proper\n service of notice as required undersection 138, by\n ignoring statutory presumption to the contrary underSection 27of the G.C. Act andsection 114of the\n Evidence Act."17.3. In the case at hand, despite issuance of summons and\nappearance of accused before the court, accused has failed to pay the\ncheque amount to the complainant and thus is precluded from raising\nthe plea of non­service of demand notice.Ct. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 31 of 33The fourth legal requirement is, thus, adjudicated in favour\nof complainant.18. The fifth legal requirement is:"The drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said\n amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of\n the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice."It has been presumed hereinabove that the accused received the legal\nnotice. It is an undisputed fact and also a matter of record that the ac­\ncused has failed to make the payment till date let alone making pay­\nment within 15 days of receipt of notice. The defence taken by ac­\ncused for not making the payment within the statutory period of 15\ndays has been that he has no liability to pay the complainant.Thus, the fifth legal requirement is adjudicated in favour of\ncomplainant.19. All the legal requirements constituting an offenceu/s 138NI\nAct being cumulative in nature, the fact that the first legal requirement\nhas not been proved in favour of complainant, the ingredients\nnecessary to bring home the guilt of accused remain incomplete.\nAccordingly, accused Joseph P.A. is acquitted for the alleged\noffenceu/s 138NI Act.Ct. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 32 of 3320. Bonds under Section 437­ACr.P.C. are accepted for a period of\nsix months from today.Announced in the open\ncourt on 24.11.2022\n\n (Aakanksha)\n Metropolitan Magistrate(NI Act)­07\n South West District, Dwarka Courts\n New DelhiCt. Case No. 12406/2019 Page 33 of 33

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Take notes as you read a judgment using our Virtual Legal Assistant and get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out our Premium Member services -- Free for one month.\n\nIncome Tax Appellate Tribunal - Chandigarh\nSatyawan, Jind vs Ito, W-1, Jind on 21 May, 2021\n आयकर अपील य अ धकरण,च डीगढ़ यायपीठ "एकल सद यीय', च डीगढ़\n IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, CHANDIGARH BENCH\n 'SMC' CHANDIGARH\n\n ीमती दवा संह, या#यक सद य\n BEFORE: SMT. DIVA SINGH, JM\n\n आयकर अपील सं./ ITA No. 1258/CHD/2019\n नधा रण वष / Assessment Year : 2011-12\nShri Satyawan, बनाम The ITO,\nH.No. 280, Block No. 85, Ward-1,\n VS\nVillage Nagura, Jind. Jind.\n\n थायी लेखा सं./PAN No: DEIPS9534G\nअपीलाथ /Appellant यथ /Respondent\n आयकर अपील सं./ ITA No. 1259/CHD/2019\n नधा रण वष / Assessment Year : 2011-12\nShri Dayanand, बनाम The ITO,\nS/o Shri Hukam Singh, Ward-1,\n VS\nWard No. 15, Jind.\nModern Colony, Safidon,\nJind.\n थायी लेखा सं./PAN No: ATUPD6915A\nअपीलाथ /Appellant यथ /Respondent\n नधा रती क! ओर से/Assessee by : Shri Nikhil Goyal, C.A. &\n Shri Ashok Goyal, C.A.\n राज व क! ओर से/ Revenue by : Shri Ashok Khanna, Addl. CIT\n सन\n ु वाई क! तार&ख/Date of Hearing : 20.05.2021\n उदघोषणा क! तार&ख/Date of Pronouncement : 21.05.2021\n\n Hearing conducted via Webex\n\n आदे श/ORDER\n By the present appeals, the assessees assail the correctness of the order dated\n\n17.07.2019 and 28.06.2019 respectively of CIT(A), Hissar pertaining to 2011-12\n\nassessment year on various grounds.\n\n2. However at the time of hearing, ld. AR submitted that the assessees have\n\navailed of "The Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2020" by way of filing\n ITA-1258&1259/CHD/2019\n A.Y. 2011-12\n Page 2 of 2\n\napplications which have been accepted by the Department by issuance of Forms No.\n\n3. Copies filed. In these circumstances, relying upon the applications, both dated\n\n17.05.2021 prayer for withdrawal of the appeals is made.\n\n3. The ld. Sr.DR Shri Ashok Khanna on a perusal of record had no objection to\n\nthe prayer of the assessee.\n\n4. I have heard the submissions and perused the material on record. In the\n\naforementioned peculiar facts and circumstances considering the record and the\n\nsubmissions, the appeals of the assessees are dismissed as withdrawn. Said order\n\nwas pronounced at the time of virtual hearing itself in the presence of the parties via\n\nWebex.\n\n5. In the result, the appeals of the assessees are dismissed as withdrawn.\n\n Order pronounced on 21st May,2021.\n\n Sd/-\n ( दवा संह )\n (DIVA SINGH)\n या#यक सद य/Judicial Member\n"पन\n ू म"\nआदेश क ितिलिप अ ेिषत/ Copy of the order forwarded to :\n 1. अपीलाथ / The Appellant 2. यथ / The Respondent 3.आयकर आयु / CIT 4.आयकर आयु (अपील)/ The CIT(A) 5.िवभागीय ितिनिध,\n आयकर अपीलीय आिधकरण, च डीगढ़/ DR, ITAT, CHANDIGARH 6.गाड फाईल/ Guard File\n आदेशानुसार/ By order,\n सहायक पंजीकार/ Assistant Registrar

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Patna High CourtDeonandan Paswan vs The State Of Bihar on 20 January, 2020Bench:Hemant Kumar Srivastava,Prabhat Kumar SinghIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA\n Letters Patent Appeal No.1366 of 2018\n In\n Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.19201 of 2012\n ======================================================\n Deonandan Paswan, Son of Late Deocharan Paswan, resident of Village-\n\n Ganjpar Jalalpur, P.O.- Maranchi, P.S.- Punpun, District- Patna.\n\n\n\n ... ... Appellant\n\n Versus\n1. The State Of Bihar through the Chief Secretary, Govt. of Bihar, Old\n Secretariat, Patna.\n2. Director General of Police, Bihar, Patna.\n3. Senior S.P. Patna.\n\n\n ... ... Respondents\n ======================================================\n Appearance :\n\n For the Appellant : Mr.Ram Hriday Prasad, Advocate\n\n M/s. Maruti Kumari, Advocate\n\n For the State : Mr. Saroj Kumar Sharma, AC to AAG-3\n\n ======================================================\n CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT KUMAR\n SRIVASTAVA\n and\n HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PRABHAT KUMAR SINGH\n ORAL JUDGMENT\n (Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT KUMAR\n SRIVASTAVA)\n\n\n Date : 20-01-2020\n Heard learned counsel appearing for the appellant as\n\n well as learned AC to AAG-3 appearing for the respondents.\n\n 2. The appellant is aggrieved by the judgment dated\n\n 05.09.2018passed by learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 19201 of\n\n 2012 by which and whereunder the learned Single Judge dismissed\n Patna High Court L.P.A No.1366 of 2018 dt.20-01-20202/9the above stated writ petition declining to interfere into the\n\n Annexure-2 contained in writ petition (issued by the Senior\n\n Superintendent of Police, Patna) by which and whereunder the\n\n Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna having exercised the power\n\n underArticle 311(2)(b)of the Constitution of India dismissed the\n\n appellant from the service.3. Brief facts of the case is that the appellant was\n\n appointed as Constable in the year 1974 and served his department\n\n near about for 33 years and in the year 2006, he was transferred\n\n from Patna to Samastipur vide office order no. 11219/2006. The\n\n appellant did not join at district Samastipur nor appeared before\n\n the concerned authority to take the transfer order. The appellant\n\n absented himself for near about one and half years and between\n\n the aforesaid period, several orders were sent to him and a notice\n\n was also published in daily newspaper but in spite of all the efforts\n\n taken by the department, the appellant did not turn up. Thereafter,\n\n the competent authority having exercised the power underArticle\n\n 311(2)(b)of the Constitution of India passed the dismissal order\n\n without initiating any departmental proceeding against the\n\n appellant. Subsequently, the appellant after passing dismissal order\n\n appeared before the competent authority and tendered his joining\n\n but the same was refused by the competent authority on the ground\n Patna High Court L.P.A No.1366 of 2018 dt.20-01-20203/9that he had already been dismissed from the service. The appellant\n\n approached this court by filing CWJC No. 19201 of 2012 praying\n\n therein to quash the order of dismissal but the learned Single Judge\n\n dismissed the above stated writ petition passing the impugned\n\n judgment dated 05.09.2018 against which the appellant has\n\n approached this appellate court.4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant relied\n\n upon the decision rendered by Division Bench of this court in the\n\n case ofMd. Salam vs. Union of Indiathrough the Secretary,\n\n Ministry of Home and others reported in 2016(1) PLJR 292\n\n wherein having relied upon the case ofUnion of India vs.\n\n Tulsiram Patelreported in (1985) 3 SCC 398 the Division Bench\n\n held that whether it was practicable to hold an inquiry or not, must\n\n be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable\n\n to do so in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable\n\n view of the prevailing situation.5. Learned counsel of the appellant further submits that\n\n in the present case, the competent authority did not give any\n\n reason as to why the departmental proceeding was not held before\n\n dismissing the appellant from the service. He further submits that\n\n as a matter of fact, the appellant met an accident and got injury on\n\n his heel for which he remained under treatment for more than nine\n Patna High Court L.P.A No.1366 of 2018 dt.20-01-20204/9months and when he regained his health, he approached the\n\n competent authority and tendered his joining but unfortunately,\n\n before tendering his joining, the competent authority had already\n\n passed the dismissal order exercising the power given byArticle\n\n 311(2)(b)of the Constitution of India. He, further, submits that\n\n appellant did not get any opportunity to explain the circumstances\n\n in which he remained absent and could not join his post.6. On the other hand, learned AC to AAG-3 appearing\n\n for the respondents submits that admittedly, the appellant remained\n\n absent for near about one and half years and several attempts were\n\n taken by the concerned authority to communicate the order of\n\n transfer to him but the appellant avoided to take order of his\n\n transfer and furthermore, he did not join his new assignment. He,\n\n further, submits that admittedly, the transfer order of the appellant\n\n was issued in the year 2006 and according to appellant, he met\n\n accident in the year 2007 but between issuance of his transfer\n\n order as well as meeting so-called accident he did not join his new\n\n assignment nor has given any explanation in respect of above\n\n stated period. He, further, submits that the appellant was member\n\n of a disciplined force and he not only violated the order of his\n\n superiors but also showed his indiscipline attitude towards his\n\n higher authority which cannot be tolerated in the disciplined force\n Patna High Court L.P.A No.1366 of 2018 dt.20-01-20205/9and, therefore, in the aforesaid circumstance, the disciplinary\n\n authority took the aid ofArticle 311(2)(b)of the Constitution of\n\n India for passing dismissal order. Learned AC to AAG-3, further,\n\n submits that disciplinary authority has assigned the specific\n\n reasons as to why they were going to take the aid ofArticle 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India and the aforesaid reasons are quite\n\n satisfactory and that was the reason the learned Single Judge did\n\n not interfere into the order of disciplinary authority.7. Having heard the contentions of the parties, we went\n\n through the record as well as record of writ court. It is not in\n\n dispute that the disciplinary authority can pass an order against his\n\n employee under underArticle 311(2)(b)of the Constitution of\n\n India but before exercising the aforesaid power, the concerned\n\n authority has to satisfy himself that to hold an inquiry is not\n\n reasonably practicable and furthermore, disciplinary authority is\n\n bound to record his reasoning in writing before passing any\n\n adverse order against the concerned employee exercising power\n\n underArticle 311(2)(b)of the Constitution of India.In the case ofUnion of India vs. Tulsiram Patel(supra) the Constitutional\n\n Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court has already held as follows:-"130. The condition\n precedent for the application of clause (b) is\n the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority\n Patna High Court L.P.A No.1366 of 2018 dt.20-01-20206/9that "it is not reasonably practicable to hold"the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) ofArticle 311.What is pertinent to note is that\n the words used are "not reasonably\n practicable" and not "impracticable".According to Oxford English Dictionary\n "practicable" means "capable of being put\n into practice, carried out in action, effected,\n accomplished, or done; feasible". Webster's\n Third New International Dictionary defines\n the word "practicable" inter alia as meaning\n "possible to practice or perform; capable of\n being put into practice, done or\n accomplished; feasible". Further, the words\n used are not "not practicable" but " not\n reasonably practicable". Webster's Third New\n International Dictionary defines the word\n "reasonably" as "in a reasonable manner: to a\n fairly sufficient extent". Thus, whether it was\n practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be\n judged in the context of whether it was\n reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a\n total or absolute impracticability which is\n required by clause (b). What is requisite is\n that the holding of the inquiry is not\n practicable in the opinion of a reasonable\n man taking a reasonable view of the\n prevailing situation......"Patna High Court L.P.A No.1366 of 2018 dt.20-01-20207/98. In the present case, Annexure-2 to the writ petition,\n\n the dismissal order passed underArticle 311(2)(b)of the\n\n Constitution of India, goes to show that the competent authority\n\n assigned the reason that due to long absence of the appellant, it\n\n was not possible and practicable to initiate departmental\n\n proceeding against him but in the same order the competent\n\n authority admitted that if the departmental proceeding was\n\n initiated against the appellant, the aforesaid departmental\n\n proceeding might be proceeded ex parte. The competent authority\n\n further assigned the reason that if departmental proceeding is\n\n initiated against the appellant, there is every possibility that\n\n aforesaid departmental proceeding may linger for several years\n\n which will tarnsih the image of the police department. The perusal\n\n of above stated reasonings given by the competent authority goes\n\n to show that competent authority was in a position to initiate\n\n departmental proceeding against the appellant. No doubt, the\n\n aforesaid departmental proceeding may be proceeded ex parte\n\n against the appellant but the reasonings given by the competent\n\n authority go to show that departmental proceeding could have\n\n been initiated against the appellant and there was no hurdle in\n\n initiating the departmental proceeding against the appellant.\n\n Therefore, in our view, the reasonings given by the competent\n Patna High Court L.P.A No.1366 of 2018 dt.20-01-20208/9authority for passing order underArticle 311(2)(b)of the\n\n Constitution of India are not satisfactory.9. However, in course of hearing, it is informed on\n\n behalf of the appellant that the appellant would have been retired\n\n in the year 2014, if he had been in service. Learned counsel of the\n\n appellant further submits that even if the case of the department\n\n assumed to be true, then also, for a petty offence, the appellant was\n\n given a very harsh punishment and there is nothing on the record\n\n that prior to 2006, the appellant had violated the order of his\n\n superiors, particularly, in the circumstance, when he served his\n\n institution for near about 33 years.10. Although, the competent authority wrongly\n\n exercised the power underArticle 311(2)(b)of the Constitution of\n\n India but taking note of the fact that appellant would have been\n\n retired in the year 2014, if he had been in service and, therefore, in\n\n our view, it would be useless to remit the matter to the competent\n\n authority for initiating fresh proceeding against the appellant.11. Therefore, in the aforesaid circumstance, the\n\n impugned judgment dated 05.09.2018 is, hereby, set aside and,\n\n accordingly, this Letters Patent Appeal stands allowed. The matter\n\n is remitted to the competent authority to award appropriate\n\n punishment proportionate to conduct of the appellant. The\n Patna High Court L.P.A No.1366 of 2018 dt.20-01-20209/9competent authority shall take decision within two months from\n\n the date of receipt/production of copy of this judgment.(Hemant Kumar Srivastava, J)\n\n\n ( Prabhat Kumar Singh, J)\n\n\nshahzad/-AFR/NAFR AFR\nCAV DATE N.A\nUploading Date 06.02.2020\nTransmission Date N.A.

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Uttarakhand High CourtBA1/2747/2019 on 24 April, 2020Author:N.S. DhanikBench:N.S. DhanikBA1 2747/2020\nHon'ble N.S. Dhanik, J.(Via Video Conferencing)\n Mr. Ajay Veer Pundir, Advocate, for\nthe applicant.Mr. G.S. Sandhu, Government\nAdvocate, assisted by Mr. J.S. Virk and\nMs. Manisha Rana Singh, AGA for the\nState.Learned State Counsel seeks time\nto file objections against the interim bail\napplication.As prayed for, list on 04.5.2020.\n Meanwhile, objections be filed.(N.S. Dhanik, J.)\n 24.4.2020\nPrabodh

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Gauhati High CourtMousumi Swargiary vs The Commissioner And Secretary To ... on 16 June, 2020Page No.# 1/7\n\nGAHC010081652020\n\n\n\n\n THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT\n (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)\n\n Case No. : WP(C) 2438/2020\n\n 1:MOUSUMI SWARGIARY\n REP. BY HER FATHER SRI NRIPEN SWARGIARY, R/O. H/NO.-9, NAMGHAR\n PATH 4TH APBN GATE, NO.-2, LUTUMA, HILLSIDE, BINOVA NAGAR,\n GUWAHATI, P.O. LUTUMA, PIN-781018, P.S. FATASHIL AMBARI, DIST.\n KAMRUP (M), ASSAM.\n\n VERSUS\n\n 1:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM AND 2\n ORS.\n HEALTH DEPTT., ASSAM, DISPUR,-781006.\n\n 2:THE JOINT DIRECTOR\n HEALTH DEPTT.\n ASSAM\n KHARGHULI\n GUWAHATI-781004.\n\n\n 3:THE IN CHARGE\n MATERNITY AND CHILD WELFARE HOSPITAL\n DHIRENPARA\n GUWAHATI-781025\n KAMRUP (M)\n\nAdvocate for the Petitioner : MR. S KHOUND\n\nAdvocate for the Respondent : SC, HEALTH\n Page No.# 2/7\n\n BEFORE\n HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE N. KOTISWAR SINGH\n\n ORDERDate : 16-06-2020\n\n Heard Mr. S. Khound, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. D. Bora,\nlearned Standing Counsel, Health Department appearing for the respondents.2. The present petition has been filed by the father of one minor, aged about 16 years 22\ndays stating that his daughter got acquainted with a neighbour who was about 25 years old,\nalso living as a tenant and after certain romantic relationship between the daughter and the\naforesaid person, it resulted in the pregnancy of his daughter who is still a minor, who is\nabout 16 years.3. It has been stated that the petitioner came to know about the pregnancy of her minor\ndaughter only when she missed her periods for 4 (four) consecutive months and upon\nenquiry into the matter, her daughter disclosed that she had physical relationship with the\naforesaid person which lead to her pregnancy.Thereafter, the petitioner immediately took his daughter to a Doctor who advised for\nnecessary tests and upon such tests, it was revealed that the petitioner's daughter was\npregnant for 22 weeks and 1 day when the test was conducted on 06.05.2020.4. Petitioner submits that the aforesaid act of her daughter was without her consent and\nwithout realising the gravity of the situation she brought to herself and her parents. It has\nbeen submitted that in a traditional society like in the present one in which the petitioner and\nher daughter and other family members are living, she may be subject to social astrociation\nand thus, are very concerned about her daughter's physical and mental condition and also for\nthe child which she is bearing. Accordingly, the petitioner had approached the Maternity and\nChild Welfare Hospital, Dhirenpara, Guwahati for termination of the pregnancy of his\ndaughter. However, the Hospital authority expressed their inability to terminate the pregnancy\nof his daughter on the ground that the pregnancy of being more than 20 weeks and such\ntermination is not permissible under theMedical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971.5. Petitioner submits that considering the fact that the petitioner's daughter is a minor\nand was misled by her neighbour and if the said pregnancy is allowed to continue by giving\nbirth to a child, this will cause serious social stigma not only to her but also to the future of\n Page No.# 3/7\n\nthe child who may be ostracised in the society and the petitioner is also not sure whether his\ndaughter will be able to bear the trauma of child with and its aftermath. It has been\naccordingly, submitted that because of the aforesaid reasons the petitioner's daughter may\nsuffer from serious mental anxiety and trauma which may also cause serious threat to her life\nin the process and to the unborn child.6. While this Court understands the anxiety of the petitioner as the father of a minor child\nwho is a victim of an illegal act by an insensitive adult. Unfortunately, the law is very clear\nthat there cannot be any termination of pregnancy if the pregnancy exceeds 20 weeks unless\nit is immediately necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman as provided under the\naforesaidMedical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971.7. In order to appreciate this legal position, it may be appropriate to refer to Sub Sections\n(2), (3) and (4) ofSection 3of the aforesaid Act, which read as follows:"3. .......................(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (4), a pregnancy may be terminated by a\n registered medical practitioner,-(a) where the length of the pregnancy does not exceed twelve weeks, if such\n medical practioner is, or(b) where the length of the pregnancy exceeds twelve weeks but does not\n exceed twenty weeks, if not less than two registered medical practioners are,\n Of the opinion, formed in good faith that(i) the continuance of the pregnancy would involve a risk to the life of\n the pregnant woman or of grave injury to her physical life or mental\n health; or(ii) there is a substantial risk that if the child were born, it would suffer\n from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously\n handicapped."Explanation 1- Whether any pregnancy is alleged by the pregnant woman to have\n been caused by rape, the anguish caused by such pregnancy shall be presumed to\n constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman.\n Explanation 2- Where any pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device or\n Page No.# 4/7\n\n method used by any married woman or her husband for the purpose of limiting the\n number of children, the anguish caused by such unwanted pregnancy may be\n presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman.\n (3) In determining whether the continuance of a pregnancy would involve such risk of\n injury to the health as is mentioned in sub-section (2), account may be taken to the\n pregnant woman's actual or reasonable foreseeable environment.4(a) No pregnancy of a woman, who has not attained the age of eighteen\n years, or who, having attained the age of eighteen years, is a [mentally ill\n person] shall be terminated except with the consent in writing or her\n guardian.(b) Save as otherwise provided in cause (a), no pregnancy shall be\n terminated except with the consent of the pregnant woman."8. Perusal of the aforesaid provision makes very clear that a pregnancy may be\nterminated by a Registered Medical Practioner where the length of pregnancy does not\nexceed 12 weeks and where the pregnancy exceeds 12 weeks but does not exceed 20 weeks,\nthe termination can be allowed, if in the opinion of the Registered Medical Practioner, the\ncontinuance of pregnancy would involve risk of life to the pregnant woman and or grave\ninjury to her physical and mental health. Similarly, such termination is allowed if there is a\nsubstantial risk that if the child were born, it would suffer from physical and mental\nabnormalities as to be seriously handicapped .9. It has been further provided under the Explanation 1 toSection 3(2) that where the\npregnancy is allegedly caused by rape, the anguish caused by such pregnancy shall be\npresumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman. It has\nbeen further provided that where pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device or\nmethod used by any married woman or her husband for the purpose of limiting the children,\nthe anguish caused by such unwanted pregnancy may be presumed to constitute a grave\ninjury to the mental health of the pregnant woman.It has been also provided under Sub-Section (3) that in determining whether the\ncontinuance of pregnancy would involve such risk of injury to the health as mentioned in sub\nSection (2), account may be taken to the pregnant woman's actual or reasonable foreseeable\nenvironment.Page No.# 5/710. It has been further provided underSection 5of the aforesaid Act that the provisions ofSection 4and provisions of sub-Section (2) ofSection 3as relate to the length of the\npregnancy and about the opinion of not less than two the Registered Medical Practitioners,\nshall not apply to the termination of a pregnancy by a Registered Medical Practitioner in a\ncase where he is of the opinion, formed in good faith, that the termination of such pregnancy\nis immediately necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman.Section 5of the aforesaid Act reads as follows,\n "5.Sections 3and4when not apply.- (1) The provisions ofsection 4, and so much of\n the provisions of sub-section (2) ofsection 3as relate to the length of the pregnancy and the\n opinion of not less than two registered medical practitiones, shall not apply to the termination of\n a pregnancy by a registered medical practitioner in a case where he is of opinion, formed in good\n faith, that the termination of such pregnancy is immediately necessary to save the life of the\n pregnant woman.(2) Notwithstanding anything contained inthe Indian Penal Code(45 of 1860), the termination\n of a pregnancy by a person who is not a registered medical practitioner shall be an offence\n punishable under that Code, and that Code shall, to this extent, stand modified.\n (3) Whoever terminates any pregnancy in a place other than that mentioned insection 4, shall be\n punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than two years but\n which may extend to seven years .(4) Any person being owner of a place which is not approved under clause (b) ofsection 4shall\n be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than two years but\n which may extend seven years."11. From the above, it is crystal clear that ordinarily, termination of pregnancy which has\nnot exceeded 12 weeks may be permissible. However, in the event, the pregnancy exceeds\n12 weeks but is less than 20 weeks, it will be permissible only on the contingent that there is\nrisk to life of pregnant woman or it may cause grave injury to her physical or mental health\nand also that there is a substantial risk to the child if the child is born and the child would\nsuffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped. Further\nonly when if there is immediate threat to the life of the pregnant woman, such termination\neven if more than 20 weeks can be allowed underSection 5.Page No.# 6/712. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the decision of this Court rendered inShri Bhatou Boro vs. State of Assam, 2018 2 GLR 577, in support of his contention,\nthat this Court had allowed termination of pregnancy in respect of a minor child.Perusal of the aforesaid decision would indicate that the victim of such minor child was\nabout 11 years, who was a victim of sexual assault by an elderly neighbour.It has been noted that the Court also referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme\nCourt rendered inMerry Santosh Pal vs. Union of India, (2017) 3 SCC 462, where the\nHon'ble Supreme Court had allowed termination of pregnancy of a woman who was of 24\nweeks pregnancy.13. Perusal of the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would indicate that\nHon'ble Supreme Court allowed the termination of the pregnancy as the Hon'ble Supreme\nCourt took the view that there was great danger to the physical and mental health of the\npregnant woman and that was on the basis of certain opinion of the Medical Board\nconstituted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Ultrasonography diagnosis had revealed live\nfetus with anencephaly, which can result serious danger to the life of mother.14. Accordingly, this Court under the circumstances mentioned in the aforesaid case\ndirected the Medical Board of the Gauhati Medical College and Hospital to evaluate the\nfeasibility of the termination of pregnancy after taking into consideration the various\nparameters of law.15. In the present case, this Court does not readily find any such material which would\ncover any provision of theMedical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 to enable termination\nof the pregnancy of the petitioner's daughter. Because of the paucity of the materials before\nthe Court, regarding the risk to the lives of the pregnant mother and the unborn child which\ncould warrant termination of pregnancy under the aforesaid provisions of the Act, the Court\nrefrains from making any further observation.16. However, considering the facts and circumstances as mentioned above, this Court\nwould direct the State respondents more particularly respondent No. 1 constitute a Medical\nBoard immediately consisting of minimum 2 (two) Registered Medical Practioners and one\nPsychologist at the earliest to ascertain as to whether the termination of the pregnancy of the\npetitioner's daughter is necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman as provided underSection 5of the aforesaidMedical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 and on the basis of the\n Page No.# 7/7\n\nopinion of the Medical Board which will record the detail reasons with necessary supporting\ndata for arriving at any conclusion keeping in mind legal requirements as contemplated underSection 5of the Act, necessary decision and action as contemplated underSection 5of the\nAct may be taken.Thus, if the case of the petitioner's daughter is covered by circumstances warranting\ntermination of the pregnancy based on the report of the Medical Board, the respondents No.\n2 and 3 will do the needful.17. Accordingly, the petitioner will produce his daughter before the respondent No. 3 when\nso directed by the respondent No. 1 by constituting a Board of Medical Board for examination\nas directed above.18. With the above observations and directions, the present petition stands disposed of.19. Copy of this order may be furnished to the learned counsel for all the parties.JUDGE\n\n\n\nComparing Assistant

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Telangana High CourtGodishela Sai Kiran Goud vs The State Of Telangana on 27 December, 2022Crl.Petition No.11723 of 2022\n 1\n\n\n\n\n THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER\n\n CRIMINAL PETITION No.11723 OF 2022\n\nO R D E R:This Criminal Petition is filed underSection 482of the Code\n\nof Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C.') by the petitioner-\n\nAccused to quash the proceedings against him in FIR No.489 of\n\n2022 pending on the file of Station House Officer, Sircilla Police\n\nStation, Rajanna-Sircilla District, registered for the offence\n\npunishable underSection 307read withSection 34of Indian Penal\n\nCode (for short "IPC").2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner - Accused and\n\nlearned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent - State.\n\nPerused the material on record.3. The 2nd respondent filed a complaint on 17.12.2022 stating\n\nthat this petitioner along with two others followed his brother's car\n\nnamely Bandari Shayamchandar in a Jeep and dashed against the\n\nvictim, for which reason he fell on the ground and sustained injuries\n\non the head.Crl.Petition No.11723 of 202224. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that according\n\nto his instructions simple injuries were received by the victim.5. As seen from the record, a complaint was filed by this\n\npetitioner against the victim which was registered by Ellanthakunta\n\nPolice, Rajanna Sircilla District vide Crime No.290 of 2022 for the\n\noffences underSections 279,290,323, 506 and427read withSection 34of IPC.6. On perusal of the contents of the complaint, there is no\n\nallegation that this petitioner was driving the jeep, where the 2nd\n\nrespondent's brother received injuries, this Court deems this\n\nappropriate to direct the Investigating Officer in FIR No.489 of 2022\n\npending on the file of Station House Officer, Sircilla Police Station,\n\nRajanna-Sircilla District, to conclude the investigation without taking\n\nany coercive steps against the petitioner - Accused. Further, the\n\npetitioner shall co-operate with the Investigating Officer as and\n\nwhen required for the purpose of investigation.7. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is disposed off.Crl.Petition No.11723 of 20223Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed._____________\n K.SURENDER, J\nDate: 26.12.2022\nns

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court_cases

Gauhati High CourtPage No.# 1/99 vs The State Of Assam And 3 Ors on 2 November, 2021Author:Sanjay Kumar MedhiBench:Sanjay Kumar MedhiPage No.# 1/99\n\nGAHC010031262020\n\n\n\n\n THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT\n (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)\n\n Case No. : WP(C)/909/2020\n\n AMAR SHEEL AND 25 ORS.\n C/O- LATE KANTI SHEEL, VILL- DIPRANG, P.O- BARPAK, P.S- MAYONG,\n DIST- MORIGAON, ASSAM, PIN- 782411\n\n 2: MD. SOLEMAN KHAN\n S/O LT. GIASH UDDIN AHMED\n VILL BELBARI\n P.O BARBALA\n P.S\n DIST BARPETA\n PIN- 781316\n\n 3: ABHIJIT BALO\n S/O- ABHINASH CH BALO\n WARD NO.7\n NEAR PUNJAB HOTEL\n P.O- NORTH LAKHIMPUR\n DIST- LAKHIMPUR\n ASSAM\n\n 4: CHINU BALA DEVI\n C/O- DAMAN SINY NATH\n VILL- BASHBARI (PT. II)\n P.O- NORTH BOITAMARI\n DIST\n P.S- BONGAIGAON\n PIN- 783380\n\n 5: ARUP KALITA\n S/O- SAHADEV KALITA\n VILL- KUMAR KATA\n P.O- CHALANTAPARA\n DIST- BONGAIGAON\n ASSAM\n Page No.# 2/99\n\nPIN- 783388\n\n6: MD. IBRAHIM KHAN\n S/O- LATE MD. BELAN KHAN\nVILL- GOMA\n P.O- GOMAFULBARI\n P.S- TARABARI\n DIST- BARPETA\nASSAM\n PIN- 781302\n\n7: EMRAN HUSSAIN\n S/O- ABDUL HAKIM\nVILL- SALMARABORI\n P.O- BECHAMARI\n P.S- DHING\n DIST- NAGAON\nASSAM\n PIN- 782123\n\n8: PANNA LAL CHAUHAN\n S/O- H RAMADHAR CHAUHAN\nVILL- CHAUHAN BASTI\n P.O- PUBSILPUTA\n DIST- KARBI ANGLONG\n PIN- 781316\n\n9: MRS. REKHA DEKA\n C/O- BONSHIDHAR DEKA\nVILL- DHAPKATA BARSATRA\n P.O- RRL\n DIST- JORHAT\nASSAM\n PIN- 781316\n\n10: MRS RUPALI BURAGOHAIN\n C/O- MR. SAHASI MOHAN\nVILL- KATHPAR GAON\n P.O- BANMUKH\n P.S- SIVASAGAR\n DIST- SIVASAGAR\nASSAM\n\n11: DEEPA SARMAH\n C/O- TANKA NATH SARMAH\n VILL AND P.O- SIMLITOLA\n DIST- GOALPARA\nASSAM\n Page No.# 3/99\n\nPIN- 783130\n\n12: MS BARNALI HAZARIKA\n C/O- SRI ATUL SAIKIA\nVILL- RAIDONGIA GAON\n P.O- KAMARBONDHA ALI\n DIST- GOLAGHAT\nASSAM\n PIN- 785625\n\n13: MD. BAHARUL ISLAM\n C/O- LATE IZZAT ULLAH\nVILL- DHINGBORI PATHAR\n P.O- KASHORI\n P.S- JURIA\n DIST- NAGAON\nASSAM\n PIN- 782124\n\n14: MRS ANIMA GOGOI\n C/O- TANURAM GOGOI\nVILL- TIPOMIA\n P.O- NAMTI CHARIALI\n DIST- SIVASAGAR\nASSAM\n PIN- 785684\n\n15: MALEK OSTOR\n S/O- HABIBUR RAHMAN\nVILL- BARPETA\n P.O- ROWMARI\n P.S- RUPAHI HAT\n DIST- NAGAON\nASSAM\n PIN- 782125\n\n16: DIBYAJYOTI BORA\n C/O- NAREN CH BORA\nVILL- RUPAIBORI\n P.O- AHATGURI\n P.S- DHARAMTUL\n DIST- MORIGAON\nASSAM\n PIN- 782412\n\n17: MRS LUCKY KONWAR\n S/O- MR. KAMAL CH KONWAR\nVILL- KONWARIGAON\n Page No.# 4/99\n\n(BORPATHER)\nP.O- KONWARIGAON\nDIST- DIBRUGARH\nASSAM\nPIN- 786615\n\n18: DIGANTA BORGOHAIN\n S/O- LATE KASHINATH BORGOHAIN\nVILL 2 NO. NA BHAKATIA\n P.O- RAJGARH\n DIST- DIBRUGARH\nASSAM\n PIN- 786611\n\n19: DHANDEEP MEDHI\nVILL- MOLIGAON\n P.O- BOITAMARI\n P.S- ABHAYAPURI\n DIST- BONGAIGAON\nASSAM\n PIN- 783389\n\n20: BONDITA GOGOI\n C/O- NITYANANDA GOGOI\nVILL- DAKSHIN PATH GAON\n P.O- BARUAJAN\n DIST- JORHAT\nASSAM\n PIN- 785630\n\n21: A B MEHBOOB AHMED LASKAR\n C/O- NITYAM UDDIN LASKAR\nVILL AND P.O- DAKSHIN MOHANPUR PT-7\n DIST- CACHAR\n PIN- 788119\n\n22: NEELIMA CHOUDHURY\n D/O- MATIUR RAHMAN CHOUDHURY\nVILL- BARBHITA (PADMAPARA)\n P.O- JATRADIA\n DIST- BARPETA\nASSAM\n PIN- 781305\n\n23: DHIREN BORO\n S/O- SURENDRA NATH BORO\nVILL- PUB BALIGAON\n P.O AND P.S- GOGAMUKH\n Page No.# 5/99\n\nDIST- DHEMAJI\nASSAM\nPIN- 787034\n\n24: SAMINA KHATUN\n D/O- SAMSUL ALI\nVILL- DUDHNOI THEKASU PT- II\n P.O- DUDHNOI\n DIST- GOALPARA\n PIN- 783124\n\n25: MAHESWAR NATH\n S/O- PICHU NATH\nVILL- PESKAR PARA\n P.O AND P.S- BAGUAN\n DIST- GOALPARA\nASSAM\n PIN- 783129\n\n26: A M MASHUQUE AHMED\n S/O- ATAUR VRAHMAN MAZUMDAR\nVILL AND P.O- BARJATRAPUR\n P.S- BARKHOLA\n DIST- CACHAR\nASSAM\n PIN- 78811\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM, EDUCATION\nDEPTT, DISPUR, GUWAHATI- 781006\n\n2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\n EDUCATION DEPTT\n ELEMENTARY\n DISPUR\n GHY- 781006\n\n3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI- 781019\n\n4:THE UNION OF INDIA\n REP. BY THE JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF INDIA\n DEPTT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION AND LITERACY\n MIN OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT\n Page No.# 6/99\n\n SHASTRI BHAWAN\n NEW DELHI- 11000\n\nAdvocate for the Petitioner : MR K K MAHANTA\n\nAdvocate for the Respondent : SC, ELEM. EDU\n\n\n\n\n Linked Case : WP(C)/1824/2020\n\n NEELAM KUMAR SHARMA AND 2 ORS.\n S/O RAM JANAM SHARMA\n R/O- BORAGADHOY CENTRAL NAMGHAR ROAD\n P.O. AND P.S. DULIAJAN\n DIST- DIBRUGARH\n ASSAM\n PIN- 786602.\n\n 2: JIARUL\n S/O- MD. AFSAR ALI\n R/O- VILL. NADIRMUKH\n P.O. AND P.S. KHARUPETIA\n DIST- DARRANG\n ASSAM\n PIN- 784115.\n\n 3: PROBIN DOLEY\n S/O- SRI SASHIDHAR DOLEY\n R/O- VILL./P.O.- MECHAKI TONGANI\n P.S. SILAPATHAR\n DIST- DHEMAJI\n ASSAM\n PIN- 787110.\n VERSUS\n\n THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\n REP. BY THE COMM. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\n EDUCATION DEPTT.\n DISPUR\n GHY.-06.\n\n 2:THE SECY.\n GOVT. OF ASSAM\n EDUCATION DEPTT. (ELEMENTARY) IN THE ASSAM ELEMENTARY\n Page No.# 7/99\n\nEDUCATION DEPTT.\nDISPUR\nGHY.-06.\n3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\nGHY.-19.\n4:THE UNION OF INDIA\nREP. BY THE JT. SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA\nDEPTT. OF SCHOOL EDUCATION AND LITERACY\nMINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT\nSHASTRI BHAWAN\nNEW DELHI- 110001.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR. S B PRASAD\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1199/2020\n\nUJJAL DAS\nS/O. RAJBALLAV DAS\nR/O. VILL. SOUTH TOKRERCHARA PART-IV\nP.O. GOLAKGANJ\nP.S. GOLAKGANJ\nDIST. DHUBRI\nASSAM\nPIN-783334.\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) DEPTT.\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI-781006.\n\n2:THE PERSONAL (B) DEPTT.\n\nGOVT. OF ASSAM\nREP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI-06.\n3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\n Page No.# 8/99\n\nKAHILIPARA ASSAM\nGUWAHATI-781019.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR. P A AHMED\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/898/2020\n\nABUL KALAM AND ANR.\nS/O- MD. ALI AKHBAR\nR/O- VILL- RAIPUR\nP.O- BALABHITA\nP.S- BARPETA ROAD\nDIST- BARPETA\nASSAM\nPIN- 781313\n\n2: MD. INSAN ALI\nS/O- ABDUR RAHMAN\n R/O- VILL- PADMAPUKHURI\n P.O- EKARABARI\n P.S- ROWTA\n DIST- UDALGURI\nASSAM\n PIN- 784514\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\nDEPTT OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY)\nJANATA BHAWAN\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI- 781006\n\n2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY\nTO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\n DEPTT OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY)\n JANATA BHAWAN\n DISPUR\n GUWAHATI- 781006\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n GOVT OF ASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI- 781019\n Page No.# 9/99\n\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR. P D NAIR\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1363/2020\n\nSUTRIPTI MUKHARJEE AND 5 ORS.\nW/O- DIPAK KUMAR PAUL\nD/O- LT. SHRINIVAS MUKHARJEE\nR/O- HARI MOHAN LANE\nHOUSE NO. 02\nP.O. RANGHIKHARI\nDIST.- CACHAR\nASSAM\nPIN- 788005.\n\n2: RUPAK KANTI DEY\nS/O- LT. JATINDRA MOHAN DEY\n R/O- VILL. SHYAMA PRASAD ROAD\n P.O. KARIMGANJ\n P.S. AND DIST.- KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\n PIN- 788710.\n\n3: AMAL REGOM\nS/O- LT. DHANIRAM REGON\nR/O- VILL. DERGE SONOWAL GAON\nP.O. BENGENA ATI SATRA\nP.S.- KAMALABARI\nDIST- MAJULI\nASSAM\nPIN- 785106.\n\n4: BABUL ALOM CHOUDHURY\nS/O- LT. KHALILUR RAHMAN CHOUDHURY\nR/O- VILL. KALINAGAR\nP.O.- SIALTEK\nP.S.- KATIGORAH\nDIST.- CACHAR\nASSAM\nPIN- 788802.\n\n5: SATYABATI RAY\nD/O- UTTAM CH. RAY\nR/O- VILL. PATILADAHA\n Page No.# 10/99\n\nP.O. PATILADAHA\nP.S. MANIKPUR\nDIST.- BONGAIGAON\nASSAM\nPIN- 783391.\n\n6: HEMEN KUMAR ROY\nS/O- SUNIL KUMAR ROY\nR/O- VILL. AND P.O. PATILADAHA\nP.S. MANIKPUR\nDIST.- BONGAIGAON\nASSAM\nPIN- 783391.\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) DEPTT.\nDISPUR\nGHY.-06.\n\n2:THE PERSONAL (B) DEPTT.\n GOVT. OF ASSAM\nREP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECY.\n DISPUR\n GHY.-06.\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nKAHILIPARA\nASSAM\n GHY.- 781019.\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. P A AHMED\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1233/2020\n\nANJU DAS\nR/O- SHRI GOPAL DAS\nR/O- KEOTPARA\nAZARA\nP.O. AND P.S. AZARA\nGHY\nDIST.- KAMRUP (M)\nASSAM- 781017\nE-MAIL-[email protected]Page No.# 11/99\n\nM.NO.- 9957107475\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nDEPTT. OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) JANATA BHAWAN\nDISPUR\nGHY-06\n\n2:THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nDEPTT. OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY)\n JANATA BHAWAN\n DISPUR\n GHY-06\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n GOVT. OF ASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GHY-19\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. P D NAIR\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/899/2020\n\nRANJU KAKATI AND 2 ORS.\nW/O- SHRI DULAL CHANDRA HALOI\nR/O- VILL. MUGKUCHI\nP.O. MUGKUCHI\nP.S. AND DIST- NALBARI\nASSAM- 781334\n\n2: SMTI. KARABI SAIKIA\nW/O- SHRI KANAK CHANDRA SAIKIA\n R/O AMULAPATTY\n P.O. AND P.S. MORIGAON\n DIST.- MORIGAON\nASSAM- 782105.\n\n3: SMT. GEETAMANI DEKA\nW/O SHRI PANKAJ BAISHYA\nR/O- VILL. JAPARKUCHI\nP.O. CHOWK BAZAR\n Page No.# 12/99\n\nDIST.- NALBARI\nASSAM- 781335.\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nDEPTT. OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY)\nJANATA BHAWAN\nGHY.- 781006.\n\n2:THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nDEPTT. OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY)\n JANATA BHAWAN\n DISPUR\n GHY.-06.\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\nGOVT. OF ASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GHY.-19.\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. P D NAIR\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1422/2020\n\nMAHENDRA PATHAK\nS/O- LT. DHARESWAR PATHAK\nVILL. AND P.O. CHENGA\nP.S. TARABARI\nDIST.- BARPETA\nASSAM.\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER - PRINCIPAL SECY.\nDEPTT. OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nDISPUR\nGHY.-06.\n\n2:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\n Page No.# 13/99\n\nGHY.-19.\n3:THE MISSION DIRECTOR\nSARBA SIKSHA ABHIJAN\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\nGHY.-19.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MRS. R DEVI\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1418/2020\n\nASHISH CHAKRABORTY AND 20 ORS.\nS/O. LT. ASHUTOSH CHAKRABORTY\nVILL. BAHBARI\nP.O. KUMARIKATA\nDIST. BAKSA\nBTR\nASSAM\nPIN-781360.\n\n2: BUBUL PATHAK\nS/O. SRI RAMANI PATHAK\nVILL. BAREIGAON\n P.O. TAMULPUR\n DIST. BAKSA\n BTR\nASSAM\n PIN-781367.\n\n3: HARI RAM PATHAK\n\nS/O. LT. BAPAN PATHAK\nVILL. SAURAGURI\nP.O. TALULPUR\nDIST. BAKSA\nBTR\nASSAM\nPIN-781367.\n\n4: BISWAJIT DASGUPTA\nS/O. LT. MONARANJAN DASGUPTA\nR/O. JYOTINAGAR\nWARD NO.1\nMARIANI\n Page No.# 14/99\n\nP.O. MARIANI\nDIST. JORHAT\nASSAM\nPIN-785634.\n\n5: HEMANTA RAJKONWAR\nS/O. SRI TARUN RAJKONWAR\nR/O. LAKWA UJANI KONWAR GAON\nP.O. LAKWA\nDIST. CHARAIDEO\nASSAM\nPIN-785698.\n\n6: JASMIN PARBIN LASKAR\nD/O. MR. NURUL HAQUE LASKAR\nVILL. JAMIRA\nP.O. JAMIRA BAZAR\nDIST. HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN-788162.\n\n7: KARTIK DEBNATH\nS/O. SRI KALIPADA DEBNATH\nR/O. NO.3 BISHNUPUR\nP.O. BHOTAGAON\nDIST. CHIRANG\nBTR\nASSAM\nPIN-783390.\n\n8: RITA MONI DAS\nS/O. LT. THAGESWAR DAS\nR/O. ASSAM PRISONS HEAD QUARTER COLONY\nP.O. KHANAPARA\nDIST. KAMRUP (M0\nASSAM\nPIN-781022.\n\n9: SAHARUL HUSSAIN LASKAR\nS/O. AJIRUDDIN LASKAR\nVILL. BANGRAM\nP.O. BHAGA BAZAR\nDIST. CACHAR\nASSAM\nPIN-788120.\n\n10: SARAT KAKATI\nS/O. LT. HANGSHA RAM KAKATI\n Page No.# 15/99\n\nVILL. SILPOTA\nP.O. KACHARISON\nDIST. UDALGURI\nBTR\nASSAM\nPIN-781367.\n\n11: SHAHJAMAL SARKAR\nS/O. ABDUL MOZID SARKAR\nVILL. KAYETHPARA PT. II\nP.O. KAYETHPARA\nDIST. BONGAIGAON\nBTR\nASSAM\nPIN-781367.\n\n12: SUBHRATA CHOUDHURY\nD/O. SRI AMALENEDU BIKASH CHOUDHURY\nR/O. SREEPALLY LANE\nVIVEKNANDA ROAD\nSILCHAR\nDIST. CACHAR\nPIN-788007.\n\n13: BIRAJ KUMAR SUBBA\nS/O. PRASAD SUBBA\nR/O. EKRANI BASTI\nSUKHANJAN\nBOKAJAN\nKARBI ANGLONG\nP.O. BOKAJAN\nPIN-782480.\n\n14: MOSTAFIZUR RAHMAN\nS/O. JAMSHED ALI\nR/O. VILL. NO.2 THEKERABARI\nP.O. BALABARI\nDIST. DARRANG\nPIN-784190.\n\n15: SANJIB KUMAR CHOUDHURY\nS/O. LT. RAM KUMAR CHOUDHURY\nR/O. VILL. GAURANGTARI PT. II\nP.O. PHUTKIBARI\nDIST. DHUBRI\nPIN-783301.\n\n16: ABDUR RAHMAN LASKAR\n Page No.# 16/99\n\nS/O. ASAB ALI LASKAR\nVILL. JOYDHANPUR\nP.O. LAILAPUR\nDIST. CACHAR\nPIN-788120.\n\n17: UKEN LOYING\nS/O. LT. BANESWAR LOYING\nVILL. BADULIPAR 10 NO. GRANT\nP.O. BADULIPAR\nDIST. GOLAGHAT\nPIN-785611.\n\n18: GUNIL BORDOLOI\nS/O. SATBAR BORDOLOI\nVILL. PASCHIM BULA\nP.O. AMSOI\nDIST. NAGAON\nPIN-782103.\n\n19: SUKANTI MANTA\nD/O. PABAN MANTA\nVILL. SAHARI\nP.O. AMSOI\nDIST. NAGAON\nPIN-782103.\n\n20: DIPANJALI SAIKIA\nD/O. BALIRAM SAIKIA\nVILL. AKHOIPHUTIA\nSIBSAGAR\nP.O. AKHOIPHUTIA\nDIST. SIBSAGAR\nPIN-785640.\n\n21: BHOBOTUSH DEBNATH\nS/O. USHA RANJAN NATH\nR/O. ASHRAM ROAD\nWARD NO.15\nP.O. HAILAKANDI\nDIST. HAILAKANDI\nPIN-788151.\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT.\nDISPUR\n Page No.# 17/99\n\nGUWAHATI\nPIN-781006.\n\n2:THE SECRETARY\nTO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\n ELEMENTARY EDUCATION DEPTT.\n JANATA BHAWAN\n DISPUR\n GUWAHATI-781006.\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\n\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\nGUWAHATI\nPIN-781019.\n4:THE UNION OF INDIA\n\nREP. BY THE JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA\nDEPTT. OF SCHOOL EDUCATION AND LITERACY\nMINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT\nSHASTRI BHAWAN\nNEW DELHI\nPIN-110001.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR. T DEURI\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1122/2020\n\nSANKAR MEDHI AND 2 ORS.\nS/O- SRI KARENDRA MEDHI\nVILL- SIDHABARI\nP.O- BAKAITARI\nP.S- MATIA\nDIST- GOALPARA\nASSAM\nPIN- 783101\n\n2: MAMREZ ALI AHMED\nS/O- LATE SHAMEZ UDDIN\nVILL- TEMURA\n P.O- DAKUA\n P.S- BARPETA\n DIST- BARPETA\nASSAM\n Page No.# 18/99\n\nPIN- 781309\n\n3: MD. ALI AKBAR\nMD. AMIRUDDIN MUNSHI\nVILL- MAMUDPUR PART-II\nP.O- DOLGOMA\nP.S- MATIA\nDIST- GOALPARA\nASSAM\nPIN- 783101\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI- 06\n\n2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT\n ELEMENTARY\n DISPUR\n GUWAHATI- 781006\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI- 781019\n 4:THE UNION OF INDIA\nREP. BY THE JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF INDIA\n MIN OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT\n SHASTRI BHAWAN\n NEW DELHI- 110001\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. M A SHEIKH\nAdvocate for : SC\n EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/905/2020\n\nSMT. MOUSUMI DEURI AND 2 ORS.\nW/O SRI DIPAK MAHANTA\nR/O PACHAMTOLA\nP.O.-CHAMPAK NAGAR\nP.S.-CHHAYGAON\nDIST-KAMRUP\nASSAM-781025\n Page No.# 19/99\n\n\n2: SMT. RUNUMI KALITA\nW/O MR. JUGAL DEKA\n R/O SATMILE\n NEAR JALUKBARI GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL\n P.O.-GAUHATI UNIVERSITY\n P.S.-JALUKBARI\n DIST-KAMRUP (M)\nASSAM-781014\n\n3: SMT. HIRAJYOTI BHARADWAJ\nD/O JITEN SARMA\nR/O VILL-HAZARIKAPARA\nP.O.-HAZARIKAPARA\nP.S.-SIPAJHAR\nDIST-DARRANG\nASSAM-784145\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE\nGOVERNMENT OF ASSAM\nDEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY)\nJANATA BHAWAN\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI-781006\n\n2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM\n DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY)\nJANATA BHAWAN\n DISPUR\n GUWAHATI-781006\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\n ASSAM\nGOVERNMENT OF ASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI-781019\n ------------\n Advocate for : MR. P D NAIR\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/4182/2020\n\nMRINALI GHARPHALIA\nW/O- SRI JITU DUARAH\n Page No.# 20/99\n\nR/O- MRIDANGPARA VILLAGE BARUA NAGAR\nP.O. BARUA NAGAR\nP.S. BORHAT\nDIST.- CHARAIDEO\nASSAM\nPIN- 785692\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE GOVT. OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMM./SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nDEPTT. OF EDUCATION\nDISPUR\nASSAM\nGHY-06\n\n2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nELEMENTARY EDUCATION DEPTT.\n DISPUR\n GHY-06\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GHY-19\n 4:THE UNION OF INDIA\nREP. BY THE JOINT SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA\n DEPTT. OF SCHOOL EDUCATION AND LITERACY\n MINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT\n SHASTRI BHAWAN\n NEW DELHI\n PIN- 110001\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. D GOGOI\nAdvocate for : SC\n EDU appearing for THE GOVT. OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1204/2020\n\nRUPASHRI PATOWARY AND 12 ORS.\nD/O- RABINDRA PATOWARY\nBARPETA TOWN\nP.O- BARPETA\nP.S- BARPETA\nDIST- BARPETA\nASSAM\n Page No.# 21/99\n\nPIN- 781301\n\n2: SRIMANTA KR SARMA\nS/O- SRI DIMBESWAR SARMA\nVILL- PUB DIGHALDARI\n P.O- DIGHALDARI\n P.S- RAHA\n DIST- NAGAON\nASSAM\n PIN- 782103\n\n3: KABITA SAIKIA\nS/O- SRI HIREN SAIKIA\nVILL- PURANI GUDAM HATIGAON\nP.O- PURANI GUDAM\nDIST- NAGAON\nASSAM\nPIN- 782141\n\n4: JABA RANI KALITA\nC/O- BHASKARJYATI SABI\nVILL- CHHAYGAON (ABJIARI)\nP.O- CHAYGAON\nP.S- MORIGAON\nDIST- KAMRUP\nASSAM\nPIN- 781124\n\n5: JESMINA HUSSAIN\nD/O- BELLAL HUSSAIN\nVILL- ISLAM NAGAR\nCHAR BIDYAPARA\nP.O- AM CO ROAD\nP.S- DHUBRI\nDIST- DHUBRI\nASSAM\nPIN- 783323\n\n6: BIPUL NEOG\nS/O- RAGHU NATH NEOG\nVILL 1 NO. MAJGAON\nP.O- LALUK\nP.S- N LAKHIMPUR\nDIST- LAKHIMPUR\nASSAM\n\n7: BOLIN MICHANG\nS/O- SANTURAM MICHANG\n Page No.# 22/99\n\nVILL- MOHARICHUK GAON\nP.O- KARATIPAR\nP.S- GARAMUR\nDIST- MAJULI\nASSAM\nPIN- 785104\n\n8: WARISA RAHMAN\nD/O- LATE SAYIDUR RAHMAN\nVILL- MANIRAM DEWAN ROAD\nMORIKALLONG CHARIALI\nP.S- SADAR\nDIST- NAGAON\nASSAM\nPIN- 782001\n\n9: LINA SAIKIA\nD/O- DURGESWAR SAIKIA\nR/O- NA ALI DHEKIAJULI SONARI GAON\nP.O- NA ALI DHEKIAJULI\nP.S- TITABAR\nDIST- JORHAT\nASSAM\nPIN- 785009\n\n10: ILA SARKAR\nS/O- GOPAL CHANDRA SARKAR\nVILL- SOUTH HILL COLONY LUMDING\nP.O- LUMDING\nP.S- LUMDING\nDIST- HOJAI\nASSAM\nPIN- 782447\n\n11: KHAGEN BARUAH\nS/O- JITEN BARUAH\nVILL- NAMDUM DUMIA\nDIST- NAGAON\nASSAM\nPIN- 782123\n\n12: NIBEDITA GOSWAMI\nSHIV NATH GOGOI PATH\n2ND BYE LANE\nH NO. 22-A\nP.O- BAGHARBORI\nPANJABARI\nGUWAHATI- 22\n Page No.# 23/99\n\n\n13: RUMA DAS\nC/O- NILAKAMAL KARMAKAR\n2ND LINK ROAD\nLANE NO. 13\nH NO. 3\nDIST- CACHAR\nASSAM\nPIN- 788006\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION (ELEM) DEPTT\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI- 781006\n\n2:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI- 781019\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR R A AHMED\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1368/2020\n\nRIJU CHUTIA AND 30 ORS.\nD/O- UMA CHUTIA\nR/O- VILL- KEKURI\nP.O- KEKURI\nP.S- DHAKUAKHANA\nDIST- LAKHIMPUR\nASSAM\nPIN- 787055\n\n2: BISTIRAM KHERKATARY\nS/O- BABURAM KHERKATARY\n R/O- VILL AND P.O- BHAGAWAN GAON\n P.S- SILAPATHAR\n DIST- DHEMAJI\nASSAM\n PIN- 787059\n\n3: LABANYA BHARALEE\n Page No.# 24/99\n\nD/O- PURNA KANTA BHARALEE\nR/O- VILL AND P.O- MAKHIBAHA\nP.S- TIHU\nDIST- NALBARI\nASSAM\nPIN- 781374\n\n4: MISBAUR RAHMAN\nS/O- MD. ABDUL SALAM MIA\nR/O- VILL AND P.O- DIGHALZAR\nP.S DIST- NAGAON\nASSAM\nPIN-\n\n5: DIPALI BOROO\nD/O- BHUGESWAR BOROO\nR/O- VILL- BAROGHORIA\nP.O- RAJAPUKHURI\nP.S- URIAMGHAT\nDIST- GOLAGHAT\nASSAM\nPIN- 785601\n\n6: HOMENDRA GOGOI\nS/O- DIPICHARAN GOGOI\nR/O- VILL- PANDHOWA\nP.O- PANDHOWA TINIALI\nP.S- TENGAKHAT\nDIST- DIBRUGARH\nASSAM\nPIN- 786103\n\n7: BOBY SAIKIA\nD/O- CHANDRA SAIKIA\nR/O- VILL- TELIAGAON\nP.O AND P.S- TELIAGAON (PURANIGUDAM)\nDIST- NAGAON\nASSAM\nPIN- 782141\n\n8: SAIFUL ISLAM\nS/O- LATE ABDUL KADER\nR/O- VILL- HATIJANA\nP.O- JASHIHATI PARA\nP.S- HOWLY\nDIST- BARPETA\nASSAM\nPIN- 781316\n Page No.# 25/99\n\n\n9: PURUSOTTAM RABIDAS\nS/O- TULASI RABIDAS\nR/O- VILL- CHIVACHERRA\nP.O- OLIVACHERRA\nDIST- KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\nPIN- 788737\n\n10: RUNUMA BORAH\nD/O- SRI BHOGESWAR BORAH\nR/O- VILL- 1 NO. KAKOPATHAR\nDIST- TINSUKIA\nASSAM\nPIN- 786152\n\n11: AMZAD ALI\nS/O- SUKUR ALI\nR/O- VILL MORAN CHANGMAI GAON\nP.O- MORAN\nP.S- MORANHAT\nDIST- CHARAIDEO\nASSAM\nPIN- 785669\n\n12: AKAN BURA GOHAIN @ AKAN GOHAIN\nS/O- DIMBESWAR BURAGOHAIN\nR/O- VILL- KEKURI\nP.O- JIADHAR CHARIALI\nDIST- DHEMAJI\nASSAM\nPIN- 787057\n\n13: BIMAL KALITA\nS/O- LATE SUCHIL KALITA\nR/O- VILL- UPARTOLA\nP.O- UPARTOLA\nP.S- DUDHNOI\nDIST- GOALPARA\nASSAM\nPIN- 783124\n\n14: MANTU ROY\nS/O- DINESH ROY\nR/O- VILL- THEKERALOGA\nP.O- UTTAR AMLOGA\nP.S- RANGAPARA\nDIST- SONITPUR\n Page No.# 26/99\n\nASSAM\nPIN- 784103\n\n15: JOTISH CHANDRA DAS\nS/O- SRI MOHANBASHI DAS\nR/O- VILL KELMA PT- III\nP.O- SADIRKHAL\nP.S- KATIGORA\nDIST- CACHAR\nASSAM\n\n16: RUMI DAS\nD/O- LATE GANESH CHANDRA DAS\nR/O- VILL- KALAYAHATI\nSUNDARIDIYA\nP.O- BARPETA\nP.S- BARPETA\nDIST- BARPETA\nASSAM\nPIN- 781301\n\n17: RANJITA DAS\nD/O- LATE THAKUR DAS\nR/O- BELTOLA SURVEY\nP.O- DISPUR\nP.S- DIST- KAMRUP(M)\nGUWAHATI\nASSAM\nPIN- 781028\n\n18: KRISHNA BHUYAN\nS/O- LATE LOKNATH BHUYAN\nR/O- VILL NO.1 GOSAIPATHAR\nP.O AND P.S- BIHPURIA\nDIST- LAKHIMPUR\nASSAM\n\n19: TUTUMANI PATAR\nS/O- MAHIKANTA PATAR\nR/O- VILL NO.2\nGITATOLA\nP.O- BARANGANI\nDIST- MORIGAON\nASSAM\n\n20: JIBON PHUKAN\nS/O- HARI KANTA PHUKAN\nR/O- VILL- JAJALIHABI\n Page No.# 27/99\n\nMORANHAT\nDIST- CHARAIDEO\nPIN- 785670\nASSAM\n\n21: NILAM BORUAH\nS/O- JUGAL BORUAH\nR/O- VILL- LATHOW JORHATIA\nP.O- NOWBOICHA\nDIST- LAKHIMPUR\nASSAM\nPIN- 787023\n\n22: RUPA BORGOHAIN\nD/O- PURNANANDA BURAGOHAIN\nR/O- AT ROAD\nTEOK\nD C DUTTA PATH\nDIST- JORHAT\nPIN- 785112\nASSAM\n\n23: RENUMAI DOWARI\nD/O- GIRISH DOWARI\nR/O- VILL- MALABARI\nP.O- MOHEMARI\nP.S- DHAKUAKHANA\nDIST- LAKHIMPUR\nASSAM\nPIN- 787005\n\n24: KAKOLI PHUKAN\nD/O- LATE JIBA PRASAD PHUKAN\nR/O- VILL- MOIDOMIA\nP.O- MOIDOMIA\nDIST- LAKHIMPUR\nASSAM\n\n25: JOGESWAR REGON\nS/O- LATE GONESH REGON\nR/O- VILL- KANGKAN CHAPARI\nP.O- BETMUKH\nDIST- LAKHIMPUR\nASSAM\n\n26: ARUNIMA SAIKIA\nD/O- SRI KAMAL CHANDRA SAIKIA\nR/O- BARPETA WARD NO.9\n Page No.# 28/99\n\nP.O AND DIST- BARPETA\nASSAM\nPIN- 781301\n\n27: BIJUMONI BORA\nD/O- DATRAM BORA\nR/O- GANDHINAGAR\nBARPETA\nASSAM\nPIN- 781301\n\n28: ASHIM CHANDA\nS/O- AJIT JUMAR CHANDA\nR/O- NEPALI PATTY HOLA\nTEZPUR\nSONITPUR\nASSAM\nPIN- 784001\n\n29: HARGOBIND PATIR\nS/O- LAKHI KANTA PATIR\nR/O- VILL- BERKEP\nP.O- BADHAKARA\nP.S- BOGINADI\nDIST- LAKHIMPUR\nASSAM\nPIN- 787032\n\n30: PRIYALATA KUMBANG\nD/O- RAVI KANTO KUMBANG\nR/O- VILL NO.1 MRKANG SELEK\nP.O- JONAI\nDIST- DHEMAJI\nASSAM\n\n31: SHANTANA CHAKRABORTY\nD/O- DWIJENDRA KUMAR CHAKRABORY\nR/O- H NO. 252\nR K MISSION ROAD\nNEAR RAMKRISHNA MISSION\nMISSIONPARA\nP.O- AND DIST- BONGAIGAON\nPIN- 783380\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS\nREP. BY COMMISSIONER TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT\n Page No.# 29/99\n\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI- 781006\n\n2:THE SECRETARY\nTO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\n EDUCATION DEPTT (ELEM) IN THE ASSAM ELEM EDU DEPTT\n DISPUR\n GUWAHATI- 781006\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI- 781019\n 4:THE UNION OF INDIA\nREP. BY THE JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF INDIA\n DEPTT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION AND LITERACY\n MIN OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT\n SHASTRI BHAWAN\n NEW DELHI- 10001\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. S B PRASAD\nAdvocate for : SC\n EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1207/2020\n\nNITYA NANDA PHUKAN AND 9 ORS.\nS/O- LATE JITEN PHUKAN\nVILL- JEHENIA GAON\nP.O- SAMAGURI\nP.S- AMGURI\nDIST- SIVASAGAR\nASSAM\nPIN- 785680\n\n2: RUBUL HAZARIKA\nS/O- BODON HAZARIKA\nVILL- HALOWA\n P.O- CHARINGIA\n P.S- AMGURI\n DIST- SIVASAGAR\nASSAM\n PIN- 785680\n\n3: SHYAMLAL NEWAR\nS/O- MON NARAYAN NEWAR\nVILL- PHILLOBARI TINIALI\n Page No.# 30/99\n\nP.O- ARUNODY\nDIST- TINSUKIA\nASSAM\nPIN- 786160\n\n4: MD. RAJIQUL ISLAM\nS/O- MD. ABDUR RAHMAN\nVILL- DALGAON KHUTI\nP.O- DALGAON\nDIST- DARRANG\nASSAM\nPIN- 781124\n\n5: LALIT KR BARBARUA\nS/O- LATE PURNANANDA BARBARUAH\nVILL- BARHAMPUR\nP.O- BARHAMPUR\nP.S- SADAR\nDIST- NAGAON\nASSAM\nPIN- 782102\n\n6: PINKI RANI SAHA\nW/O- BHASKAR SAHA\nBISHNU RAVA PATH\nBYE LANE -1\nBHASKAR NAGAR\nP.O- BINOVA NAGAR\nKAMRUP(M)\nGUWAHATI- 18\n\n7: NEPAL CHANDRA ROY\nLATE BRAJALAL ROY\nJAYANTA NAGAR\nWARD NO. 01\nP.O- KHARUPETIA\nP.S- KHARUPETIA\nDIST- DARRANG\n\n8: MINAKA GIRI\nW/O- HEMSAGAR ACHARYA\nVILL- KARIBIL NEPALI\nP.O- KAWRI PATHER\nP.S- HELEM\nDIST- BISWANATH\nPIN- 784170\n\n9: GAKUL BARUAH\n Page No.# 31/99\n\nVILL- DHOLE BAGAN\nP.O- DHOLE BAGAN\nP.S- MATHURAPUR\nDIST- SIVASAGAR\nASSAM\nPIN- 785686\n\n10: ANUPAMA DAS\nW/O- GOPINATH PATOWARY\nVILL- BIHDIA\nP.O- BIHDIA\nP.S- BAIHATA CHARIALI\nDIST- KAMRUP\nPIN- 781381\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) DEPTT\nDISPUR\nGHY- 781006\n\n2:THE PERSONNEL (B) DEPTT\nGOVT OF ASSAM\n REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY\n DISPUR\n GHY- 06\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI- 781019\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR R A AHMED\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1288/2020\n\nTENZING BASUMATARY\nS/O LT. KANURAM BASUMATARY\nR/O VILL. KALAPANI\nP.O. MIJIKAJAN\nP.S. GINGIA\nDIST. BISWANATH\nASSAM\n Page No.# 32/99\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nDEPTT. OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY)\nJANATA BHAWAN\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI\nDIST. KAMRUP (M)\nASSAM\nPIN-781006\n\n2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY\nTO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\n DEPTT. OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY)\n JANATA BHAWAN\n DISPUR\n GUWAHATI\n DIST. KAMRUP (M)\nASSAM\n PIN-781006\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMETARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\n DIST. KAMRUP (M)\nASSAM\n GUWAHATI-781019\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. P J SAIKIA\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/2486/2020\n\nAJITA NATH AND 6 ORS.\nD/O- RAJIB NATH\nR/O- VILL- HALGHAT\nP.O AND P.S- NILAMBAZAR\nDIST- KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\nPIN- 788722\n\n2: RAJAUL KARIM\nS/O- ABDUL HAQUE\n R/O- VILL- NIAMATAKHANI\n Page No.# 33/99\n\nP.O- MULLAGANJ BAZAR\nDIST- KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\nPIN- 788179\n\n3: SAFATUN NESSA\nD/O- LATEABDUL WAHAB BARBHUIY\nR/O- VILL- BHABANIPUR\nP.O- AMALA\nDIST- HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN- 788164\n\n4: TAPAZUL ALI\nS/O- HAJI TAYAB ALI BARBHUIYA\nR/O- VILL- MAZUMDER BAZAR\nP.O- TARAPUR PT VII\nDIST- CACHAR\nASSAM\nPIN- 788003\n\n5: MASHUK AHMED MAZUMDER\nS/O- MAKRAM ALI MAZUMDER\nR/O- VILL- HAILAKANDI TOWN\nWARD NO. 4\nP.O- HAILAKANDI\nDIST- HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN- 788151\n\n6: ABDUL AZIM BARBHUIYA\nS/O- MONIR ALI BARBHUIYA\nR/O- VILL BORBOND PART III\nP.O- BALIURA\nDIST- HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN- 788155\n\n7: H M FAKRUL ALAM LASKAR @ HM FAKRUL BARBHUIYA\nS/O- ABDUL WAHAB LASKAR\nR/O- VILL BASBARI -I\nP.O- BASBARI\nDIST- HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN- 788152\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS\n Page No.# 34/99\n\nTHROUGH THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF\nASSAM\nEDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) DEPTT\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI- 781006\n\n2:SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\nPERSONNEL (B) DEPTT\n DISPUR\n GUWAHATI- 781006\n 3:THE MISSION DIRECTOR\nSARBA SIKSHA ABHIYAN\nASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI- 781019\n 4:THE DIRECTOR\nELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI- 781019\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MD. I HUSSAIN\nAdvocate for : GA\nASSAM appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/4511/2020\n\nANKUR DEV CHOUDHURY\nS/O LATE BHUDHAR DEV CHAUDHURY\nRESIDENT OF VILLAGE PATACHARKUCHI\nPO AND PS PATACHARKUCHI\nDIST BARPETA\nASSAM 781326\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS\nREPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPARTMENT\nDISPUR GUWAHATI 781006\n\n2:THE SECRETARY\nTO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\n EDUCATION DEPARTMENT (ELEMENTARY) IN THE ASSAM ELEMENTARY\nEDUCATIN DEPARTMENT\n Page No.# 35/99\n\nDISPUR GUWAHATI 781006\n3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\nGUWAHATI 781019\n4:THE UNION OF INDIA\nREPRESENTED BY THE JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA\nDEPARTMENT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION AND LITERACY\nMINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT SHASTRI BHAWAN\nNEW DELHI 10001\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR. S B PRASAD\nAdvocate for : ASSTT.S.G.I. appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/857/2020\n\nRAJASREE BORA\nD/O- SHRI KHAGENDRA NATH BORA\nR/O- VILL. BARIGAON\nJORHAT\nP.O.\nP.S. AND DIST.- JORHAT\nASSAM.\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY ITS COMMISSIONER\nTO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT.\nDISPUR\nGHY.-06.\n\n2:THE SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT.\n ELEMENTARY DISPUR\n GHY.- 781006.\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\n GHY.-781019.\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. P K SHARMA\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n Page No.# 36/99\n\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1018/2020\n\nNAYAN JYOTI SARMA AND 14 ORS.\nC/O- LT. DEBENDRA NATH SARMA\nR/O- VILL.- MAKHIBAHA\nP.O.- MAKHIBAHA\nDIST.- NALBARI\nASSAM\n PIN.- 781374.\n\n2: GAUTAM BARMAN\nS/O LT. KESHAB CH. BARMAN\nR/O VILL BAMUNDI\n\nP.O BAMUNDI\nDIST KAMRUP\n\nASSAM\nPIN 781103\n\n 3: MANGALU BORDOLOI\nC/O- BIMAL BORDOLOI\nVILL. - KUSHTOLI\nP.O. - BARANGANI\nDIST. MORIGAON\nASSAM\nPIN- 782127\n\n4: CHITTA RANJAN KALITA\nS/O\nDEBA KANTA KALITA\nR/O VILL\nKALJHAR\n\nP.O\n BARBALA\nDIST.\n BARPETA\nASSAM\n PIN\n 781316\n\n\n5: JAYANTA SAIKIA\nS/O\n Page No.# 37/99\n\nNALIN SAIKIA\nR/O- VILL\nGONDAI GURI\n\nP.O.\n KATHAL GURI\nDIST.\n DIBRUGARH\nASSAM\n PIN\n 785675\n\n6: SRI SIMANTA SAIKIA\nS /O\nLATE KESHAB SAIKIA\nR/O\nVILL\nPATIAPAM\n\nP. O.\n PATIAPAM\nDIST.\n HOJAI\n\nASSAM\nPIN\n782426.\n\n 7: HEMA KANTA BHUMIZ\nS/O\n LT. BISHAN BHUMIZ\nR/O VILL\nATIGAON (KAPILI KAN)\nP.O\n JAMUNAMUKH\nDIST\n NAGAON\nASSAM\n PIN\n 782428\n\n8: RIJUMONI BORA\nW/O\nPRASANTA BORA\nR/O- VILL\nKAMAR GAON\nP.O.\nJAMUNAMUKH\n Page No.# 38/99\n\nDIST.\nHOJAI\n\nASSAM\nPIN\n782428.\n\n9: MANOJ TALUKDAR\nC/O\nPRANAB TALUKDAR\nR/O VILL.\nDUMURIA\n\nP.O.\n BHREKAMARI\nDIST.\n BARPETA\n\nASSAM\nPIN\n781325\n\n 10: BIPUL BORAH\nC/O\n DONDIRAM BORAH\nR/O VILL.\n MOHIJAN POTIA\nP.O.\n MOHIJAN\n\nDIST\nLAKHIMPUR\nASSAM\nPIN\n787032.\n\n 11: KAKUMONI DAS\nC/O\n RAMNATH DAS\nR/O VILL\n GHARMORA\nP.O.\n GHARMORA\n\nDIST\nLAKHIMPUR\nASSAM\nPIN\n Page No.# 39/99\n\n787032.\n\n12: APURBA DAS\nC/O\nSRI RAJEN CH. DAS\nR/O VILL\nBAHANA\nP.O\nMANAHKUCHI\nDIST\nKAMRUP\n\nASSAM\nPIN\n781104\n\n13: IFTEKAR MONDOL\nS/O\nSEKANDER ALI MONDOL\nR/O VILL\nSADULLA BARI\n\nP.O\n KALAPANI\nDIST\n SOUTH SALMARA MANKACHAR\n\nASSAM\nPIN\n783131.\n\n 14: JYOTISH GOGOI\nS/O.\n SOMESWAR GOGOI\nR/O- VILL\n CHETIA GAON\nP.O.\n CHETIA GAON\nDISTRICT\n NORTH LAKHIMPUR\n\nASSAM\nPIN\n787001.\n\n15: ABUL HUSSAIN SK\nS/O JASMATULLAH SK\nR/O- VILL. DEBOTTAR HASDAHA PT-V\n Page No.# 40/99\n\nP.O. KISMAT HASDAHA\nDIST.DHUBRI\nASSAM\n PIN-783334\n VERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\nREPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER\nTO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPARTMENT\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI- 781006.\n\n2:THE SECRETARY\nTO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\n\nEDUCATION DEPARTMENT\n ELEMENTARY DISPUR\n GUWAHATI\n 781006.\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI\n 781019.\n 4:THE UNION OF INDIA\nREPRESENTED BY THE\nJOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA\nDEPARTMENT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION ANDLITERACY\n MINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT\n\nSHASTRIBHAWAN\nNEW DELHI 110001.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR K K MAHANTA\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1985/2020\n\nBHANU BORAH\nW/O SIR SUBHASH BURAGOHAIN\nR/O VILL. HAAHCHARA\nP.O. HAAHCHARA\nP.S. SIBSAGAR SADAR\nDIST. SIBSAGAR (ASSAM)\n Page No.# 41/99\n\nPIN-785701\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nELEMENTARY EDUCATION DEPTT. DISPUR\nGUWAHATI-6\n\n2:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI-781019\n 3:THE UNION OF INDIA\nREP. BY THE JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA\n DEPTT. OF SCHOOL EDUCATION AND LITERACY\n MINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT SASHTRI BHAWAN\nNEW DELHI-110001\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. D P BORAH\nAdvocate for : ASSTT.S.G.I. appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/2083/2020\n\nDIPAK SHARMA\nS/O- PADMALAL SHARMA\nVILL- BAHABARI\nP.O. GANGMOUTHAN\nP.S. BIHALI\nDIST.- BISWANATH\nASSAM\nPIN- 784167\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) DEPTT.\nDISPUR\nGHY-6\n\n2:THE PERSONAL (B) DEPTT.\nGOVT. OF ASSAM\n REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECY.\n Page No.# 42/99\n\n DISPUR\n GHY-6\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GHY-19\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR R A AHMED\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU (R1\n3) appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/854/2020\n\nABDUR RAHMAN LASKAR\nS/O. LT. ASAB ALI LASKAR\nVILL. JAYDANPUR\nP.O. LAILAPUR\nP.S. DHOLAI\nDIST. CACHAR\nASSAM\nPIN-788120.\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR.\nREP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY.\nGOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) DEPTT.\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI-06.\n\n2:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\n\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\nGUWAHATI\nPIN-781019.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR. M U MAHMUD\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR.\n Page No.# 43/99\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/901/2020\n\nBORNALEE BHUYAN\nW/O- SRI ANUPAM BORAH\nR/O- FLAT 461\nAPARTMENT\nP.O- MEHERPUR\nDIST- CACHAR\nASSAM\nPIN- 788015\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\nDEPTT OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) JANATA BHAWAN\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI- 781006\n\n2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY\nTO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\n DEPTT OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY)\n JANATA BHAWAN\n DISPUR\n GUWAHATI- 781006\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n GOVT OF ASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GHY- 781019\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. P D NAIR\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1214/2020\n\nBHUBAN DAS AND 2 ORS.\nS/O- LATE MILAN DAS\nVILL- PAREYAPARA\nP.O- CHIKIHALI\nDIST- BONGAIGAON\nASSAM\n\n2: LACHIT DEKA\n Page No.# 44/99\n\nS/O- LATE BHABANI DEKA\nVILL- KAHITALI\nP.O- MANGALDAI\nDIST- DARRANG\nASSAM\n\n3: BHABANANDA PATAR\nS/O- LATE LILA KANTA PATAR\nVILL- MAJORBORI\nP.O- HABIBORNGABARI\nDIST- MORIGAON\nASSAM\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI- 781006\n\n2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\n\nEDUCATION DEPTT\nELEMENTARY\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI- 781006\n3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\nGUWAHATI- 781019\n4:THE UNION OF INDIA\nREP. BY THE JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF INDIA\nDEPTT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION AND LITERACY\nMIN OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT\nSHASTRI BHAWAN\nNEW DELHI- 110001\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR. U J SAIKIA\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1565/2020\n\nSANKAR KUMAR ROY AND 37 ORS.\nS/O. SUDHANYA CH. ROY\nVILL. PINGTHAL\n Page No.# 45/99\n\nP.O. RUKNI\nP.S. DHOLAI\nDIST. CACHAR\nSTATE- ASSAM\nPIN-788116.\n\n2: SAHIDUL HOQUE CHOUDHURY\nS/O. BABUR ALI CHOUDHURY\nVILL. CHANDIPUR PT-I\n P.O. JANAKI BAZAR\n P.S. ALGAPUR\n DIST. HAILAKANDI\n STATE ASSAM\n PIN-788801.\n\n3: NUR AHMED CHOUDHURY\nS/O. MOIN UDDIN CHOUDHURY\nVILL. KAJIDAHAR PT-I\nP.O. KAJIDAHAR\nP.S. SONAI\nDIST. CACHAR\nASSAM\nPIN-788115.\n\n4: SABUBUR RAHMAN\nS/O. ABDUL MANNAN\nVILL. DEWAKURI\nP.O. LALARCHAK\nP.S. KARIMGANJ\nDIST. KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\nPIN-788713\n\n5: RAYHANA BEGOM\nS/O. LT. MUFASSIL ALI\nVILL. DIGHIRPAR\nP.O. BADARPUR\nP.S. BADARPUR\nDIST. KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\nPIN-788806.\n\n6: AZMAL HUSSAIN BARBHUIYA\nS/O. FARAS UDDIN BARBHUIYA\nVILL. TANTOO\nP.O. TANTOO\nP.S. LALA\nDIST. HAILAKANDI\n Page No.# 46/99\n\nASSAM\nPIN-788163.\n\n7: FAZLUL HAQUE BARBHUIYA\nS/O. LT. ABDUS SATTAR BARBHUIYA\nVILL. CHIPORSANGON PT-III\nP.O. CHIPORSANGON\nP.S. ALGAPUR\nDIST. HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN-788801.\n\n8: ABU MD. ZAFAR SADIQUE\nS/O. ABDUS SUKUR\nVILL. FARAMPASHA-II(TIKIPUR) P.O. KAYASTHAGRAM\nP.S. NILAMBAZAR\nDIST. KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\nPIN-788719.\n\n9: SUJOY DAS\nS/O. SUDHAMOY DAS\nVILL. CHANTILLA\nP.O. CHANTILLA\nP.S. RATABARI\nDIST. KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\nPIN-788736.\n\n10: JOYA SUDRADHAR\nD/O. BHULU SUDRADHSR\nVILL. GORAGRAM\nP.O. SONAPUR\nP.S. KATIGORAH\nDIST. CACHAR\nASSAM\nPIN-788817.\n\n11: SURAIYA AKTAR LASKAR\nS/O. RAHMAT ALI LASKAR\nVILL. VICHINGCHA PT-I\nP.O. VICHINGCHA\nP.S. HAILAKANDI\nDIST. HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN-788151.\n\n12: RAFAT MAMUN MAZUMDER\n Page No.# 47/99\n\nS/O. ABUL HUSSAIN MAZUMDER\nR/O. NAZRUL SARANI\nHAILAKANDI TOWN\nP.O. RATANPUR ROAD\nP.S. HAILAKANDI\nDIST. HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN-788155.\n\n13: SHAHIN SULTANA LASKAR\nD/O. ASHRAF UDDIN LASKAR\nVILL. BHAJANTIPUR PT-I\nP.O. RATANPUR\nP.S. HAILAKANDI\nDIST. HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN-788155.\n\n14: IKBAL HUSSAIN BARBHUIYA\nS/O. NAZIR UDDIN BARBHUIYA\nVILL. TANTOO\nP.O. TANTOO\nP.S. LALA\nDIST. HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN-788163.\n\n15: AYNAL HOQUE LASKAR\nS/O. SUR UDDIN LASKAR\nVILL. DAKSHIN MOHANPUR PT-VII\nVILL. DAKSHIN MOHANPUR\nP.S. SONAI\nDIST. CACHAR\nASSAM\nPIN-788119.\n\n16: SALMAN LASKAR\nS/O. BANGUL HOQUE LASKAR\nVILL. DOKSHIN MOHONPUR PT-VI\nP.O. KACHUDARAM\nP.S. KACHUDARAM\nDIST. CACHAR\nASSAM\nPIN-788119.\n\n17: PARBIZ BEGIM BAIG\n\nD/O. LT. ABDUL DAKIR BAIG\n Page No.# 48/99\n\nVILL. DEORAIL\nP.O. BADARPUR\nP.S. BADARPUR\nDIST. KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\nPIN-788806.\n\n18: RAJOSHREE DAS\nD/O. ARUN KUMAR DAS\nVILL. KARIMGANJ\nP.O. KARIMGANJ\nDIST. KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\nPIN-788710.\n\n19: KHALEDA BEGAM BARBHUIYA\nS/O. MOSUR ALI BARBHUIYA\nVILL. VICHINGCHA PT-II\nP.O. VICHINGCHA PT-II\nP.S. HAILAKANDI\nDIST. HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN-788155.\n\n20: RUBIYA BEGUM LASKAR\nD/O. MOINUL HOQUE LASKAR\nVILL. BASHDHAR PT-I\nP.O. MATIJURI\nP.S. HAILAKANDI\nDIST. HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN-788155.\n\n21: TANIE CHOUDHURY\nD/O. TAROON CHOUDHURY\nVILL. MAIZDIHI WARD NO.I\nP.O. SETTLEMENT ROAD\nP.S. KARIMGANJ\nDIST. KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\nPIN-788712.\n\n22: SURAJ KUMAR DAS\nS/O. SUSHEN KUMAR DAS\nVILL. TULARGRAM PT-I\nP.O. SONAIMUKH\nP.S. SONAIKUKH\nDIST. CACHAR\n Page No.# 49/99\n\nASSAM\nPIN-788119.\n\n23: MAHBUBUL BARI CHOUDHURY\nS/O. LT. AZIZUR RAHMAN CHOUDHURY\nVILL. ALGAPUR PT-I\nP.O. KALIBARI BAZAR\nP.S. ALGAPUR\nDIST. HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN-788150.\n\n24: PRIYANKA UPADHAYAYA\nD/O. HIRA LAL UPADHAYAYA\nVILL. SILCOORIE\nP.O. SILCOORIE\nP.S. SILCHAR SADAR\nDIST. CACHAR\nASSAM\nPIN-788118.\n\n25: BABAR AHMED CHOUDHURY\nS/O. LT. KHALILUR RAHMAN CHOUDHURY\nVILL. SAJPUR\nP.O. BISHNUNAGAR\nP.S. KARIMGANJ\nDIST. KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\nPIN-788781.\n\n26: RABIA BEGIM LASKAR\nD/O. SIRAJ UDDIN LASKAR\nVILL. JAMIRA BAGAN\nP.O. JAMIRA\nP.S. RAMNATHPUR\nDIST. HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN-788162.\n\n27: N. AMONA SINGHA\nD/O. N. ARUN KUMAR SINGHA\nVILL. BHITORGANGAPUR PT-I\nP.O. JARAITOLA BAZAR\nP.S. BORKHOLA\nDIST. CACHAR\nASSAM\nPIN-788127.\n Page No.# 50/99\n\n28: FAKHAR UDDIN BARBHUIYA\nS/O. MOZID ALI BARBHUIYA\nVILL. DHOLAI MOLAI PT-I\nP.O. DHOLAI MOLAI\nP.S. KATLICHERRA\nDIST. HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN-788161.\n\n29: JAHANARA BEGUM CHOUDHURY\nD/O. BADAR UDDIN CHOUDHURY\nVILL. MAHAMMED PUR PT-I\nP.O. RONGPUR SOUTH\nP.S. LALA\nDIST. HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN-788163.\n\n30: DILWAR HUSSAIN\nS/O. RAFIQUL HAQUE\nVILL. KAZIRGRAM\nP.O. BHANGA BAZAR\nP.S. BADARPUR\nDIST. KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\nPIN-788701.\n\n31: YOUNUS UDDIN AHMED\nS/O. NIZAM UDDIN AHMED\nVILL. GARKHAPAR\nP.O. BADARPUR\nP.S. BADARPUR\nDIST. KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\nPIN-788806.\n\n32: NAZIA AHMED\nS/O. NIZAM UDDIN AHMED\nVILL. GARKHAPAR\nP.O. BADARPUR\nP.S. BADARPUR\nDIST. KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\nPIN-788806.\n\n33: RIAZUL ISLAM MAZUMDER\nS/O. MUDORIS ALI MOZUMDER\nVILL. NITAINAGAR PT-II\n Page No.# 51/99\n\nP.O. NITAINAGAR\nP.S. HAILAKANDI\nDIST. HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN-788155.\n\n34: SONMANI DEKA\nD/O. RATNESWER DEKA\nVILL. PATILADAHA\nP.O. PATILADAHA\nP.S. MANIKPUR\nDIST. BONGAIGAON\nASSAM\nPIN-783391.\n\n35: SURAIYA PARVEEN\nD/O. ABUL KALAM\nC/O. ABUL QUASIM\nVILL. DEORAIL\nNEAR RAILWAY STATION\nP.O. AND P.S. BADARPUR\nDIST. KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\nPIN-788806.\n\n36: NAZIRA SULTANA MAZUMDER\nD/O. LT. ABDUL MOTIN MAZUMDER\nW/O. KHAIRUL HUDHA CHOUDHURY\nVILL. SAIDBAND-1\nP.O. AND P.S. ALGAPUR\nDIST. HAILAKANDI\nASSAM\nPIN-788150.\n\n37: NILAKSHI HAZARIKA\nD/O. MILESWAR HAZARIKA\nVILL. NAKHAT\nP.O. NAKHAT\nP.S. MORAN\nDIST. DIBRUGARH\nASSAM\nPIN-785676.\n\n38: RASHID AHMED TAPADER\nS/O. LT. MOIN UDDIN TAPADER\nVILL. TARINIPUR-III\nP.O. SIALTEK\nP.S. KATIGARAH\n Page No.# 52/99\n\nDIST. CACHAR\nASSAM\nPIN-788802.\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\nTHROUGH THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) DEPTT.\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI-781006.\n\n2:SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\n\nPERSONNEL (B) DEPTT.\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI-781006.\n3:THE MISSION DIRECTOR\n\nSARBA SIKSHA ABHIYAN (NOW KNOWN AS SAMAGRA SIKSHA ABHIJAN)\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\nGUWAHATI-781019.\n4:THE DIRECTOR\n\nELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\nGUWAHATI-781019.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR. H A TALUKDAR\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/2540/2020\n\nARUP DAS AND ANR.\nS/O- ADHIR KUMAR DAS\nR/O- VILL- SADARASHI\nP.O- SADARASHI\nDIST- KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\nPIN- 788709\n\n2: PRANJAL HAZARIKA\nS/O- LATE JATINDRA NATH HAZARIKA\n R/O- VILL- KUJIDAH\n Page No.# 53/99\n\nP.O- HATICHONG\nDIST- NAGAON\nASSAM\nPIN- 782142\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS\nTHROUGH THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF\nASSAM\nEDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) DEPTT\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI- 781006\n\n2:SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\nPERSONNEL(B) DEPTT\n DISPUR\n GUWAHATI- 781006\n 3:THE MISSION DIRECTOR\nSARBA SIKSHA ABHIYAN (NOW KNOWN AS SAMAGRA SIKSHA ABHIJAN)\nASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI- 781019\n 4:THE DIRECTOR\nELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI- 781019\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. I HUSSAIN\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1183/2020\n\nAFZALUR RAHMAN AND 9 ORS.\nS/O. HABIBUR RAHMAN\nVILL. SAGOLCHARA PART-III\nP.S. DHUBRI\nDIST. DHUBRI\nASSAM\nPIN-783324.\n\n2: ABDUR ROUF SARKER\nS/O. SK MOZIBOR ROHMAN\nVILL. KHARUABANDHA\n P.S. SOUTH SALMARA\n Page No.# 54/99\n\nDIST. SOUTH SALMARA MANKACHAR\nASSAM.\n\n3: ZAKIR HUSSAIN\nS/O. ABUBAKKAR SIDDIQUE\nVILL. ADABARI PART-II\nP.S. DHUBRI\nDIST. DHUBRI\nASSAM\nPIN-783324.\n\n4: PRODIP NATH\nS/O. DINARAM NATH\nVILL. BARUABARI\nP.S. GARMUR\nDIST. MAJULI\nASSAM\nPIN-785106.\n\n5: SOHRAB AHMED\nS/O. MD. AFSAR ALI\nVILL. KAWAIMARI EXCESS AREA\nP.O. NALIGAON\nDIST. BARPETA\nASSAM\nPIN-4781352.\n\n6: NAZMUL HOQUE\nS/O. ALAUDDIN SHEIKH\nVILL. KACHUDOLA PART-II\nP.O. KHELUAPARA\nDIST. BONGAIGAON\nASSAM.\n\n7: RASHIDUL ISLAM AKAND\nS/O. HABIBAR RAHMAN AKAND\nVILL. ADABARI PART-II\nP.S. DHUBRI\nDIST. DHUBRI\nASSAM\nPIN-783324.\n\n8: SHAHJAHAN AHMED\nS/O. MD. MOHFIZUL HOQUE\nVILL. PATHURIA\nP.S. MANKACHAR\nDIST. SOUTH SALMARA MANKACHAR\nASSAM\n Page No.# 55/99\n\nPIN-783131.\n\n9: NURUL ISLAM KHAN\nS/O. MOHAR ALI KHAN\nVILL. FALIMARI PART-II\nP.S. GAURIPUR\nDIST. DHUBRI\nASSAM\nPIN-783325.\n\n10: ASHRAFUZZAMAN SHEIKH\n\nS/O. MD. BAKTOZAMAN SK\nVILL. NEW FERAMARI\nP.S. SOUTH SALMARA\nDIST. SOUTH SALMARA MANKACHAR\nASSAM\nPIN-783135.\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT.\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI-06.\n\n2:THE SECRETARY\nTO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\n EDUCATION DEPTT.\n ELEMENTARY\n DISPUR\n GUWAHATI-06.\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\n\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\nGUWAHATI-781019.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR. M AHMED\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1011/2020\n\nREJINA SULTANA\nD/O. SHUKUR ALI AHMED\n Page No.# 56/99\n\nR/O. TENGNAMARI\nWARD NO.4\nP.O. AND P.S. ABHAYAPURI\nDIST. BONGAIGAON\nASSAM\nPIN-783383.\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR.\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY\nGOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) DEPTT.\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI-06.\n\n2:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\n\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\nGUWAHATI\nPIN-781019.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR. M U MAHMUD\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/964/2020\n\nBHANITA DAS\nW/O- MR. GAUTAM KUMAR DAS\nR/O- H NO. 132\nOPP NURSERY CHOWK\nN H 37\nGOTANAGAR\nGUWAHATI\nASSAM\nPIN- 781033\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\nDEPTT OF EDUCATION (ELEM)\n Page No.# 57/99\n\nJANATA BHAWAN\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI- 781006\n\n2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY\nTO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\n DEPTT OF EDUCATION (ELEM)\n JANATA BHAWAN\n DISPUR\n GUWAHATI- 781006\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n GOVT OF ASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI- 781019\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. P D NAIR\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1246/2020\n\nTASMIN SULTANA AND 12 ORS.\nW/O- INNOS ALI\nR/O- VILL- TATIKATA\nP.O. MOIRABARI\nP.S. MORIGAON\nDIST.- MORIGAON\nASSAM\nIN- 782105\n\n2: SHURUPJAN AHMED\nW/O- ABDUR ROUF ANSARI\n R/O- VILL- SONTOLI\n P.O. MAHATALI\n P.S. BOKO\n DIST.- KAMRUP\nASSAM\n PIN- 781136\n\n3: BIPUL SARMA\nS/O- DINESH SARMA\nR/O- VILL- KUSUMPUR\nP.O. HIMGULU P.S. KAMALPUR\n\nDIST.- KAMRUP\n Page No.# 58/99\n\nASSAM\nPIN- 781380\n\n4: RATAN KUMAR ROY\nS/O- LT. SUREN ROY\nR/O- VILL- SOLA\nP.O. CHAMARIA\nP.S. BOKO\nDIST.- KAMRUP\nASSAM\nPIN- 781136\n\n5: JULHAS HUSSAIN\nS/O- LT. SIRAJ UDDIN\nR/O- VILL- SOUTH KACHUBARI\nP.O. CHANDKHIRA\nP.S. PATHARKANDI\nDIST.- KARIMGANJ\nASSAM\nPIN- 788725\n\n6: JOHN MAZUMDAR\nS/O- LT. HIREN MAZUMDAR\nR/O- VILL- BHALUKGHATA\nP.O. BHALUKGHATA\nP.S. BOKO\nDIST.- KAMRUP\nASSAM\nPIN- 781136\n\n7: RENUMAI SAIKIA\nW/O- ROBIN SAIKIA\nR/O- VILL- MALAMORA\nP.O. MALAMORA\nP.S. KUMARGAON\nDIST.- GOLAGHAT\nASSAM\nPIN- 785621\n\n8: PUSPA GOGOI\nS/O- PUNARAM GOGOI\nR/O- VILL- KALAKATA\nP.O. KALAKATA P.S. DHEMAJI\nDIST.- DHEMAJI\nASSAM\nPIN- 787058\n\n9: JOGAPROVA DIHINGIA\n Page No.# 59/99\n\nS/O- PURNA KANTA DIHINGIA\nR/O- VILL- HATHKHULA BENGALI GAON\nP.O. CHABUWA\nP.S. CHABUWA\nDIST.- DIBRUGARH\nASSAM\nPIN- 786184\n\n10: PRANAB KUMAR BAISHYA\nS/O- PRAMOD CH BAISYA\nR/O- BONDA\nNARENGI\nP.O. BONDA\nP.S. NOONMATI\nGHY- 26\nDIST.- KAMRUP\nASSAM\n\n11: JHUMA DAS\nW/O- BIDHAN DEB\nR/O- VILL- DHIRENPARA\nP.O. DHIRENPARA\nP.S. GORCHUK\nGHY- 25\nDIST.- KAMRUP\nASSAM\n\n12: RUMA DAS\nW/O- RAJIB ROY\nR/O- VILL- RUPBON DOOMDOOMA\nP.O. AND P.S. DOOMDOOMA\nDIST.- TINSUKIA\nASSAM\nPIN- 786151\n\n13: NIBEDITA LAHON\nD/O- SRI INDRA LAHON\nR/O- VILL- RUPNAGAR\nDOWARAH CHUK\nP.O. RAJABHETA\nP.S. DIBRUGARH\nASSAM\nPIN- 786008\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMM. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT.\n Page No.# 60/99\n\nDISPUR\nGHY-06\n\n2:THE SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT.\n ELEMENTARY\n DISPUR\n GHY-06\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GHY-19\n 4:THE UNION OF INDIA\nREP. BY THE JOINT SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA\n DEPTT. OF SCHOOL EDUCATION AND LITERACY\n MINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT\n SHASTRI BHAWAN\n NEW DELHI- 110001\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. R ALI\nAdvocate for : ASSTT.S.G.I. appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1349/2020\n\nSHAHAB UDDIN AHMED\nS/O- SOHRAB ALI\nVILL- PAHARPUR KATULY\nP.O- HABIDUNGRA\nDIST- BARPETA\nASSAM\nPIN- 781314\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS\nREP. BY COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY GOVT OF ASSAM\nDEPTT OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY)\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI- 06\n\n2:THE SECRETARY\nTO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\n EDUCATION DEPTT (ELEM)\n DISPUR\nASSAM\n Page No.# 61/99\n\nGHY- 06\n3:THE DIRECTOR\nELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\nGUWAHATI- 19\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR K BHUYAN\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1016/2020\n\nBANYASHREE THAKUR AND 21 ORS.\nC/O- BIPUL THAKUR\nR/O- VILL- KAILASHPUR PATH\nHENGRABARI\nP.O- HENGRABARI\nDIST- KAMRUP(M)\nASSAM\nPIN- 781036\n\n2: MRS. RUMI GOSWAMI\nC/O- MR. RIPUON SARMAH\nVILL- JAMKHALA\nP.O.- BHOMORAGURI\nP.S.- ULUONI\nDIST.-NAGAON\nASSAM\nPIN-782143\n\n 3: MALABIKA SHARMA\nC/O SADANANDA SARMA\nR/O- VILL. NAKUCHI (RANGIA)\nP.O. MARANJANA (RURAL)\nDIST. KAMRUP (RURAL)\nASSAM\n PIN. 781354\n\n 4: CHANDRALEKHA CHOUDHURY\nVILL- CHHAYGAON (CHOUDHURYPARA)\nP.O.- CHHAYGAON\nDIST.- KAMRUP\nASSAM\nPIN- 781124\n Page No.# 62/99\n\n 5: RAMESH CHANDRA KALITA\nS/O LT. KONAK CH. KALITA\nR/O- VILL. NIZ SARABARI\nP.O. DEADHANIGHAT\nDIST. DARRANG\n\nASSAM\nPIN NO. 784147\n\n 6: SRI MRINAL CHAKRAVARTY\nVILL- BHERUA\nP.O-DUNI\nDIST.- DARRANG\nASSAM\nPIN-784148\n\n 7: RAJIB HORE\nS/O- SHYAM LAL HORE\nVILL- KAMRUP (M)\nP.O.- REST CAMP\n PANDU\nP.S.- JALUKBARI\nDIST.- KAMRUP(M)\nASSAM\nPIN-781012\n\n 8: BHADRA KANTA PATAR\nC/O- BHUBAN CH. PATAR\nVILL- KUSHTALI\nP.O- BARANGANI\nDIST- MORIGAON\nASSAM\nPIN- 782127\n\n9: SUBHASH CH. BHAGAWATI\nVILL ND P.O- AKAYA\nDIST- BARPETA\nASSAM\nPIN- 781329\n\n 10: SEEMA DEVI\nC/O- RANJIT BORA\nVILL- CHALCHALI\n RANGIAGAON\nP.O. - CHALCHALI\n P.S.- SAMAGURI\nDIST. - NAGAON\nASSAM\n Page No.# 63/99\n\nPIN- 782124.\n\n11: MAMONI SHILL MAZUMDAR\nVILL- JAGRATAPARA\nP.O. - KRISHNAI\nDIST.-GOALPARA\nASSAM\n\nPIN-783126.\n\n12: RATUL DEKA\nS/O- DHENU RAM DEKA VILL MIKIRBHETA P.O. MIKIRBHETA\nDIST. MORIGAON\nASSAM PIN-782001\n\n 13: HEMANTA DUTTA\nC/O- RUDRA DUTTA\nVILL- CHOWKHAM GAON\n P.O. - SABOTI\nP.S. - NORTH LAKHIMPUR\nDIST. - LAKHIMPUR\nASSAM\nPIN- 787051.\n\n 14: SWARNA PRAVHA BORDOLOI\nC/O- UTPAL PHUKAN\nVILL- KAPAHERA BHAKAT GAON\nP.O. - KAPAHERA\n P.S.- MIKIRBHETA\nDIST. MORIGAON\nASSAM\nPIN- 782103.\n\n15: JATINDRA KUMAR BHARATI\nC/O- SABHARAM NATH\nVILL- ALIKUCHI\nP.O.- ALIKUCHI\nP.S.- RAHA\nDIST.- NAGAON\nASSAM\nPIN- 782103.\n\n16: BHABESH BHARALI\nC/O- SARAT BHARALI VILL. P.O. - AKAYA DIST. BARPETA\nASSAM PIN- 781329.\n\n17: PADUM RANI BARMAN\nC/O- BHABESH LAHKAR\n Page No.# 64/99\n\nVILL.- BURBURI\nGHOGARPAR\nDIST.- NALBARI\nASSAM\nPIN-781369.\n\n 18: POLI DEKA\nC/O- SRI SASDHAR DEKA\nVILL- MADANPUR\nP.O- DEUDUAR\nP.S- CHANGSARI\nDIST- KAMRUP (R)\nASSAM\nPIN- 781101.\n\n 19: AJANTA BORDOLOI\nC/O- NARESHWAR BORDOLOI\nVILL. - RAJAPATHAR TINIALI\nP.O. - SILPUTA TINIALI\nDIST. KARBI- ANGLONG\nASSAM\nPIN-782482.\n\n 20: JAYA NATH\nC/O- MAHESHWAR NATH\nVILL. - TIPLAI\nP.O. - TIPLAI\nP.S. - RANGJULI\nDIST. - GOALPARA\nASSAM\nPIN- 783130.\n\n 21: RUMI BHUYAN\nC/O- DIGANTA BHUYAN\nVILL- OATING T.E\nP.O. - OATING\nDIST. - GOLAGHAT\nASSAM\nPIN-785603.\n\n 22: TUTUMANI CHOUDHURY\nC/O- MR. PRADIP DAS\nVILL. - NAKUL NO.1\nP.O. - RANGIA\n\nDIST. - KAMRUP(R)\nASSAM\nPIN-781354.\n Page No.# 65/99\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI- 781006\n\n2:THE SECRETARY\nTO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\n\nEDUCATION DEPARTMENT\nELEMENTARY DISPUR\nGUWAHATI 781006.\n3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\n\nASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI 781019.\n 4:THE UNION OF INDIA\nREPRESENTED BY THE\nJOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA\nDEPARTMENT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION ANDLITERACY\n MINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT\n\nSHASTRIBHAWAN\nNEW DELHI 110001.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR K K MAHANTA\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1467/2020\n\nKRISHNA ROY AND 2 ORS.\nC/O. PROF. SOUMIK ROY\nQUARTER NO. B-83 TEZPUR UNIVERSITY CAMPUS\nP.O. NAPAAM\nP.S. BORGHAT\nDIST. SONITPUR\nASSAM\nPIN-784028.\n\n2: DIPANJU BORA\nC/O. SRI PROBHAT BORA\nVILL. BORBHETI SONARI GAON\n Page No.# 66/99\n\nP.O. BORBHETI\nP.S. DHING\nDIST. NAGAON\nASSAM\nPIN-782123.\n\n3: JURI DEVI\nD/O. KHAGEN CH. BORDOLOI\nVILL. GHUMATI GAON\nP.O. KAPAHERA\nDIST. MORIGAON.\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) DEPTT.\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI-781006.\n\n2:THE PERSONAL (B) DEPTT.\n\nGOVT. OF ASSAM\nREP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI-06.\n3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\n\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\nGUWAHATI-781019.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR R A AHMED\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/935/2020\n\nNIRANJAN BORDOLOI AND 30 ORS.\nVILL- KAKODONGA CHABOOKDHARA GAON\nP.O- NAMKHTUAL\nP.S- DERGAON\nDIST- GOLAGHAT\nPIN- 785626\n\n2: BIMAN BHARALI\nVILL- MOKNONG SANTIPUR\n Page No.# 67/99\n\nP.O- MOKNONG\nP.S- MERAPANI\nDIST- GOLAGHAT\n\n3: AMARDIP BARMAN\nVILL- RUPIABATHAN\nP.O- CHAMATA\nP.S- BELSOR\nDIST- NALBARI\n\n\n4: MADHURJYA RAIDONGIA\nVILL- SIMEN CHAPORI\nP.O- SIMEN CHAPORI\nDIST- DHEMAJI\nPIN- 787061\n\n5: MINAKSHI BORAH\nVILL- BAGH GAON\nP.O- SIMEN CHAPORI\nP.S- SIMEN CHAPORI\nDIST- DHEMAJI\n\n6: RATNA SAIKIA\nVILL- SIMEN CHAPORI HENSUWA\nP.O- SIMEN CHAPORI\nDIST- DHEMAJI\n\n 7: ABDUR RAHMAN\nP.O AND P.S- JAJORI\n DIST- NAGAON\nASSAM\n\n8: EUSUF ALI\nVILL- KHATANIAPARA\nP.O AND P.S- DHULA\nDIST- DARRANG\n\n9: DHRUBAJYOTI RAJKONWAR\nVILL- 3 NO. SIMEN CHAPORI\nP.O- SIMEN CHAPORI\nDIST- DHEMAJI\nASSAM\n\n10: ABDUL LATIF\nVILL- GUAKUCHI\nP.O- GUAKUCHI\nDIST- NALBARI\n Page No.# 68/99\n\nPIN- 781369\n\n11: NISHAMONI SAIKIA\nKANCHAN NAGAR\nNEAR PRATIKSHA HOSPITAL\nHENGRABARI\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI\nKAMRUP (M)\nPIN- 781036\n\n12: DIBYAJYOTI PATHAK\nM G ROAD\nWARD NO.3\nP.O AND P.S- ABHAYAPURI\nDIST- BONGAIGAON\nASSAM\nPIN- 783384\n\n13: GITIKA DUTTA\nMAZGAON\nNORTH GUWAHATI\nKAMRUP\n\n14: ALTAF HUSSAIN MAZUMDAR\nVILL HAKAMA PT- V\nP.O AND P.S- BILASIPARA\nDIST- DHUBRI\nASSAM\nPIN- 783348\n\n15: SAFIQUL ALI AHMED\nWARD NO.7\nBILASIPARA\nP.O AND P.S- BILASIPARA\nDIST- DHUBRI\nASSAM\nPIN- 783348\n\n16: MOZAHARUL ISLAM CHOUDHURY\nVILL- PASHUAR KHAL PT- 2\nP.O- BOALKAMRI\nP.S- BILASIPARA\nDIST- DHUBRI\nASSAM\n\n17: MARFUN NEHAR BEGUM\nVILL- ULUBARI\n Page No.# 69/99\n\nP.O AND P.S- DALGAON\nPIN- 784116\nDIST- DARRANG\nASSAM\n\n18: HAFIZ UDDIN\nVILL- BANGALJHAR\nP.O- BASHBARI\nP.S- BAGUAN\nDIST- GOALPARA\nPIN- 783129\n\n19: RASHMI DEVI\nVILL- CHARAIDOLONI\nP.O- MADHABPUR\nDIST- LAKHIMPUR\n\n20: JONMONI BHUYAN\nVILL- PANIGAON\nDIST- LAKHIMPUR\nPIN- 787052\n\n21: RITURADHA GOHAIN\nVILL- MOHPARA\nP.O- CHALCHALI\nDIST- NAGAON\nASSAM\nPIN- 782141\n\n22: SATYAJEET SAIKIA\nVILL- RABAR CHAPORI\nP.O- MADHUPUR\nPIN- 787033\nDIST- LAKHIMPUR\n\n23: ABDUL KADER\nVILL- BALARCHAR PART 3\nP.O- KIRTANPARA\nDIST- BONGAIGAON\nPIN- 783384\n\n24: PURNIMA NATH\nVILL- DURAMARI\nP.O- SORBHOG\nDIST- BORPETA\nPIN- 781317\n\n25: DIMPI BORA (CHOWDHURY)\n Page No.# 70/99\n\nVILL- GRAHAM BAZAR (TINSUKIA)\nP.O AND DIST- DIBRUGARH\nPIN- 786001\n\n 26: GITANJALI BORUAH\nP.O- JAMUGURI\n PIN- 785683\n DIST- SIVSAGAR\n\n27: PRITIMOY DEVI\nVILL- DHRAMTALA\nP.O- BAMUNKUCHI\nDIST- BARPETA\nPIN- 781329\n\n28: MOUCHUMI DUTTA\nVILL- KHARAGARH GHURACHOWA\nP.O- KHEMDOI PUKHURI\nDIST- SIVASAGAR\nPIN- 785666\n\n29: INDUKALPA SAIKIA\nVILL- PANCHALAI NO.1\nP.O- LASKAR PATHAR\nDIST- HOJAI\nP.O- LANKA\nPIN- 782446\n\n30: MONISHA SARMA BORUAH\nAMGURI\nHILOIDARI GAON\nP.O- AMGURI\nDIST- SIVASAGAR\nPIN- 785680\n\n31: JURIMONI BORA\nSURVEY\nASHOK PATH\nH NO. 27\nGUWAHATI- 28\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI\n Page No.# 71/99\n\n2:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. S S GOSWAMI\nAdvocate for : SC\n EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/903/2020\n\nMANIK ALI\nS/O- MR. JAFAR ALI\nR/O- VILL. PATHALI KUCHI\nP.O. GAJIA\nP.S. AND DIST.- BARPETA\nASSAM- 781314\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nDEPTT. OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY)\nJANATA BHAWAN\nGHY.- 781006.\n\n2:THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nDEPTT. OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY)\n JANATA BHAWAN\n DISPUR\n GHY.-06.\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\nGOVT. OF ASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GHY.-19.\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. P D NAIR\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1730/2020\n Page No.# 72/99\n\nNABA KRISHNA DUTTA\nS/O. LT. SURJYA DUTTA\nVILL. BORIPARA\nP.O. DHARAPUR\nP.S. AZARA\nGUWAHATI-781017\nDIST. KAMRUP (M)\nASSAM.\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STAE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) DEPTT. SECRETARIAT BUILDING\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI\nASSAM\n781006.\n\n2:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\n\nGOVT. OF ASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\nGUWAHATI\nASSAM\n781019.\n3:THE MISSION DIRECTOR\n\nSSA\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\nGUWAHATI-781019.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR. S M SARMA\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STAE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1092/2020\n\nDIPALI BARUAH AND 10 ORS.\nD/O- MAHENDRA BARUAH\nVILL. UPAHUPARA (COLLEGE NAGAR)\nP.O. MANGALDAI\nPIN- 784125\nDIST.- DARRANG (ASSAM).\n Page No.# 73/99\n\n\n2: MD. NAZRUL ISLAM\nS/O- MD. SUKUR ALI\nVILL. NAGESWAR\n P/O- KHARUPETIA\n PIN- 784115\n DIST.- DARRANG (ASSAM).\n\n3: BASAB CHANDRA DEKA\nS/O- JADAB CHANDRA DAS\nVILL. BHURKUCHI\nP/O- NIZNAMATI\nPIN- 781355\nDIST. NALBARI (ASSAM).\n\n4: UPENDRA NATH DAS\nS/O- LT. RAJENDRA NATH DAS\nVILL. KANEBARI\nP/O- BHETHUA\nPIN- 781325\nDIST. BARPETA (ASSAM).\n\n5: RAJEN BARUAH\nS/O- LT. MUKHESWAR BARUAH\nVILL. BISH GHARIA\nP.O. AND P.S. SIMEN CHAPORI\nDIST.- DHEMAJI (ASSAM)\nPIN- 787061.\n\n6: BISHNU PRASAD LASKAR\nS/O LT. MAHESWAR LASKAR\nVILL. AND P.O- BALIGAON\nRAHA\nDIST.- NAGAON (ASSAM)\nPIN- 782144.\n\n7: RUNUMI TALUKDAR\nW/O- BIKUL RANJAN DAS\nR/O- VILL. AND P.O. MIRZA\nPIN- 781125\nDIST. KAMRUP (ASSAM).\n\n8: HIRANYA SAIKIA\nR/O- RAJABARI\nP.O RAJABARI\nDIST. BIHPURIA\nDIST.- LAKHIMPUR\nASSAM.\n Page No.# 74/99\n\n\n9: ANUL HUSSAIN AHMED\nS/O- MUSLIM UDDIJ AHMED\nR/O- VILL. BAREGARH\nP.O. AMBARI\nP.S. ABHAYAPURI\nDIST.- BONGAIGAON\nASSAM.\n\n10: RABIN DEKA\nS/O- LT. RAMESH CH. DEKA\nR/O- BISWANATH COLLEGE CAMPUS\nP.O. BISWANATH CHARIALI\nDIST.- BISWANATH\nASSAM.\n\n11: ALPANA BORGOHAIN\nD/O- LT. HEMKANTA BORGOHAIN\nR/O- NO. 4 CHAPATALI\nP.O. BHADAI PANCHALI\nPS. DULIAJAN\nDIST.- DIBRUGARH\nASSAM.\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT. (ELEMENTARY)\nDISPUR\nGHY.- 06.\n\n2:THE COMM. AND SECY.\nTO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\n EDUCATION DEPTT. (ELEMENTARY)\n DISPUR\n GHY.-06.\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nKAHILIPARA\n GHY.-19.\n 4:THE UNION OF INDIA\nREP. BY THE JT. SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA\n DEPTT. OF SCHOOL EDUCATION AND LITERACY\n MINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT\n SHASTRI BHAWAN\n NEW DELHI- 110001.\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. S BORTHAKUR\nAdvocate for : SC\n Page No.# 75/99\n\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/858/2020\n\nPARIS DUTTA\nD/O- DEBESWAR DUTTA\n R/O- VILL BIJIJAN\n TITABAR\n P.O AND P.S- TITABAR\n DIST- JORHAT\nASSAM\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS\nREP. BY ITS COMMISSIONER TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT\nDISPUR\nGHY- 781006\n\n2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT\n ELEMENTARY\n DISPUR\n GUWAHATI- 781006\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GHY- 19\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. P K SHARMA\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1024/2020\n\nDIPAK KUMAR ROY AND ANR.\nS/O. PARESH CHANDRA ROY\nVILL. DEBATTAR HUSDAHA PART-V\nP.O. DEBATTAR HUSDAHA\nP.S. GOLAKGANJ\nDIST. DHUBRI\nASSAM\n Page No.# 76/99\n\nPIN-783334.\n\n2: MOKTAR ALI SHEIKH\nS/O. EBRAHIM ALI SHEIKH\n R/O. VILL. PASCHIM GAIKHOWA PART-II\n P.O. DIMAKURI\n P.S. GOLAKGANJ\n DIST. DHUBRI\nASSAM\n PIN-783334.\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) DEPTT.\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI-781006.\n\n2:THE PERSONAL (B) DEPTT.\n\nGOVT. OF ASSAM\nREP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI-06.\n3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\n\nKAHILIPARA ASSAM\nGUWAHATI-781019.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR. M DUTTA\nAdvocate for : GA\nASSAM appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1239/2020\n\nARUP KUMAR HAZARIKA AND 19 ORS.\nS/O- JOY NATH HAZARIKA\nVILL. PHALENGI CHUK GAON\nP.O DIHINGIA\nPS. TITABOR\nDIST.- JORHAT (ASSAM).\n\n2: BHABENDRA KUMAR BISWAS\nS/O- LT. PURNAKANTA BISWAS\nVILL. SATGAON\n P.O. JALUGUTI\n Page No.# 77/99\n\nDIST.- MORIGAON (ASSAM).\n\n3: NARAYAN SARMAH\nS/O- SRI BISHNU SARMAH\nVILL. PURANIBHETI\nP/O- PANPUR\nP.S. JAMUGURI\nDIST. SONITPUR (ASSAM).\n\n4: SMTI. DITIMONI TAMULI\nD/O- BHUBAN CH. TAMULI\nVILL. KAWAIMARI\nP/O- HAIBORGAON\nDIST. NAGAON (ASSAM).\n\n5: PALLAB RAJKHOWA\nS/O- KAMAL RAJKHOWA\nVILL. CHARINGIA GAON\nP.O.- KATHALGURI\nDIST. GOLAGHAT (ASSAM).\n\n6: SAIDUL ISLAM\nS/O MD. ASHAB ALI\nVILL.- BOGULAMARI\nP.O. LANKA\nP.S. KALGACHIA\nDIST.- BARPETA (ASSAM).\n\n7: JAKIR HUSSAIN\nS/O- DELWAR HUSSAIN\nR/O- VILL. GOALPARA PT-III\nP.O. ABHAYAPURI\nDIST.- BONGAIGAON (ASSAM).\n\n8: SARAT TAMULI\nS/O- UPEN TAMULI\nR/O- VILL.- LECHAIGAON\nP.O.- PHUKANARHAT\nDIST.- LAKHIMPUR\nASSAM.\n\n9: SMTI. HEMALATA MEDHI\nD/O- LANKESWAR MEDHI\nR/O- VILL. SIALMARI\nP.S. TIHU\nDIST.- NALBARI\nASSAM.\n Page No.# 78/99\n\n10: MINAKSHI RAY\nD/O- BONGSHIDHAR RAY\nR/O- KAKAIJANA\nP.O- KAKAIJANA\nP.S. ABHAYAPURI\nDIST.- BONGAIGAON\nASSAM.\n\n11: CHIRANJIT RABHA\nS/O- PURBANI RABHA\nR/O- BALIJURI\nP.O. BAKALIPARA\nP.S. CHAYGAON\nDIST. KAMRUP\nASSAM.\n\n12: GAUTAM DAS\nS/O- THANURAM DAS\nR/O- PANICHAKUWA\nP.S. PULIBOR\nDIST.- JORHAT\nASSAM.\n\n13: GHANA BAHADUR CHETRY\nS/O- GANGA BAHADUR CHETRY\nR/O- DONGBIL\nP.S. BIHPURIA\nDIST. LAKHIMPUR\nASSAM.\n\n14: JUGALANANDA DAS\nS/O- LT. PARAMANANDA DAS\nR/O- MIRZA (BISHNUPUR)\nP.S. MIRZA\nDIST.- KAMRUP\nASSAM.\n\n15: JOHNMONI KALITA\nS/O- SRI BHABEN KALITA\nR/O- TILANA\nP.O.- MUGKUCHI\nDIST.- NALBARI\nASSAM.\n\n16: HAIDAR ALI\nS/O- ABDUL WAHEB\nR/O- GHAKPARA\nP.O. DHANTOLA BAZAR\n Page No.# 79/99\n\nP.S. BONGAIGAON\nDIST.- BONGAIGAON\nASSAM.\n\n17: DIPA DIHINGIA\nD/O- LT. LANKESWAR DIHINGIA\nR/O- KENDUGURI MAJ PATHAR\nP.O. KACHALU\nP.S. TINGKHONG\nDIST.- DIBRUGARH\nASSAM.\n\n18: RAJIB HAZARIKA\nS/O- LT. DIMBESWAR HAZARIKA\nR/O- NA- CHUNGI KHANGIA GAON\nP.O. JALUKANI BARI\nP.S. TITABOR\nDIST.- JORHAT\nASSAM.\n\n19: HEMCHANDRA TAMULI\nS/O- KESHAB TAMULI\nR/O- LECHAI GAON\nP.O. NORAGAON\nP.S. PANI GAON\nDIST.- LAKHIMPUR\nASSAM.\n\n20: YASHPAL REGMI\nS/O- BALLAV REGMI\nR/O- 2 NO. CHITALMARI\nP.O. CHITALMARI\nP.S. DHEKIAJULI\nDIST.- SONITPUR\nASSAM.\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT. (ELEMENTARY)\nDISPUR\nGHY- 781006.\n\n2:THE COMM. AND SECY.\nTO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\n EDUCATION DEPTT. (ELEMENTARY)\n DISPUR\n GUWAHATI- 781006.\n Page No.# 80/99\n\n3:THE UNION OF INDIA\nREP. BY THE JT. SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA\nDEPTT. OF SCHOOL EDUCATION AND LITERACY\nMINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT\nSHASTRI BHAWAN\nNEW DELHI - 110001.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR. S BORTHAKUR\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1380/2020\n\nSEEMA CHANGMAI AND 5 ORS.\nW/O- SRI BHASKAR GOGOI\nRESIDENT OF VILLAGE- SONARI\nP.O.\nP.S- SONORI\nDISTRICT- CHARAIDEO\nASSAM.\n\n2: KARABI PHUKON\nW/O- DIMBESWAR BORAH\nRESIDENT OF VILLAGE- RAIDONGIYA\n NAKACHARI\n P.O.- TEOK GHAT\n P.S.- SONARI\n DISTRICT- CHARAIDEO\nASSAM.\n\n3: SRI ANIL DUTTA\nSON OF HEMA KANTA DUTTA\nRESIDENT OF VILLAGE- NA-PAMUA\nP.O.- GHAMORA\nDISTRICT- LAKHIMPUR\nASSAM\n\n4: NANI BHARALI GOGOI\nW/O SRI MAHENDRA GOGOI\nRESIDENT OF VILLAGE- TIMON BORTANI\nP.O.- RAHON\nDISTRICT- CHARAIDEO\nASSAM.\n\n5: DIPAK GOGOI\nSON OF LATE PANCHA PRASAD GOGOI RESIDENT OF VILLAGE- MURATIA\n Page No.# 81/99\n\nP.O.- SAPOTIA\nDISTRICT- LAKHIMPUR\nASSAM.\n\n6: SUBHASH GOHAIN\nSON OF NOGEN GOHAIN\nRESIDENT OF VILLAGE- MAIBELA\nP.O.- SAFRAI DISTRICT- CHARAIDEO\nASSAM.\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS\nREPRESENTED BY THE COMMISSIONER TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPARTMENT\nGOVT. OF ASSAM\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI- 6.\n\n2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM\n\nELEMENTARY EDUCATION DEPARTMENT\n GOVT. OF ASSAM\n DISPUR\n GUWAHATI- 6\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF THE ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nGOVERNMENT OF ASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI-19.\n 4:THE UNION OF INDIA\nREPRESENTED BY THE JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF\nINDIA\n DEPARTMENT OF SCHOOL EDUCATION AND LITERACY\n MINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT\n SHASTRI BHAWAN\n NEW DELHI- 110001.\n ------------\n Advocate for : MR. N BORAH\nAdvocate for : SC\n EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/900/2020\n\nSABRINA AHMED\nW/O- MD. JAKIR HUSSAIN\nR/O- HOUSE NO. 3\nGANDHIBASTI\n Page No.# 82/99\n\nNEW SARANIA\nP.O. SILPUKHURI\nP.S. CHANDMARI\nDIST.- KAMRUP(M)\nASSAM- 781003\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nDEPTT. OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY)\nJANATA BHAWAN\nGHY.- 781006.\n\n2:THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nDEPTT. OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY)\n JANATA BHAWAN\n DISPUR\n GHY.-06.\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\nGOVT. OF ASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GHY.-19.\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. P D NAIR\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1015/2020\n\nNAVAJYOTI KONWAR AND 2 ORS.\nS/O- SRI SUCHENDRA NATH KONWAR\nVILL. BHITORUAL\nP.O. - BHITORUAL\nDIST. SIVSAGAR\nPIN- 785682.\n\n2: BHABEN GOGOI\nS/O- LT. PHATIK CHANDRA GOGOI\nVILL. DUBDORIA\n P.O. KHANAMUKH\n DIST.- SIVSAGAR\n PIN- 785682.\n Page No.# 83/99\n\n3: PRAGJYOTI DUARAH\nS/O- LT. JIBAN DUARAH\nVILL. AND P.O. JELENGITOOP\nDIST- JORHAT\nPIN- 786682.\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\nDISPUR\nGHY.- 781006.\n\n2:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\nASSAM\n GHY.- 781019.\n 3:THE SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nELEMENTARY EDUCATION\n DISPUR\n GHY.- 781006.\n 4:THE UNION OF INDIA\nREP. BY THE JT. SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA\n DEPTT. OF SCHOOL EDUCATION AND LITERACY\n MINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT\n SHASTRI BHAWAN\n NEW DELHI- 110001.\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. C BORUAH\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/978/2020\n\nMONICA BEGUM\nW/O. SAHID ANOWAR\nR/O. H.NO.-26\nFRIENDS PATH\nHATIGAON\nGUWAHATI\nP.O. AND P.S. HATIGAON\nDIST. KAMRUP (M)\nASSAM\nPIN-781038.\n Page No.# 84/99\n\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nDEPTT. OF EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY)\nJANATA BHAWAN\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI-781006.\n\n2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECY.\nTO THE GOVT. OF DEPTT. EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY)\n JANATA BHAWAN\n DISPUR\n GUWAHATI-781006.\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\n\nASSAM\nGOVT. OF ASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\nGUWAHATI-781019.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR. I CHOUDHURY\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1229/2020\n\nDIPANKAR HAZARIKA AND 47 ORS\nC/O- SUREN HAZARIKA\nVILL- AZARGURI GAON\nP.O- KAWOIMARI NO.2\nDIST- JORHAT\nASSAM\nPIN- 785617\nTET\nASSAM (LP) ROLL NO. 1700869 AND CTET (UO) ROLL 199006581\n\n2: MANOWAR HUSSAIN\nC/O- MATIOR RAHMAN\nVILL- TELIPARA\n P.O- BAGDOBA\n P.S- DHUPDHARA\n DIST- GOALPARA\nASSAM\n Page No.# 85/99\n\nPIN- 783123 TET ASSAM (LP) ROLL NO. 1302911\n\n3: NIBEDITA KALITA\nD/O- LATE BONGSHIDHAR KALITA\nVILL- POKAMURA BAHEK GAON\nP.O- BORBHETA\nDIST- JORHAT\nASSAM\nPIN- 785004\nTET ASSAM (LP) ROLL 1702034\n\n4: DIPANJALI DUTTA\nD/O- SRI GOHIN CH DUTTA\nVILL- DOHUTIA\nP.O- DOHUTIA\nDIST- JORHAT\nASSAM\nPIN- 785617\nTET\nASSAM (UP) ROLL NO. 1700860\n\n5: SUMI PHUKON\nW/O- SANJIB GOGOI\nVILL- BONGAON\nP.O- BONGAON\nDIST- GOLAGHAT\nASSAM\nPIN- 785611\nTET\nASSAM (UP) ROLL NO. 1403330\n\n6: SANGEETA BORA\nD/O- PRAFULLA BORAH\nVILL- KAKODONGA KOCHALIAL GAON\nP.O- NAMKHATOWAL\nDIST- GOLAGHAT\nASSAM\nPIN- 785626\nCTET (UP) ROLL 107002312\n\n7: SANGITA BHUYAN\nD/O- TONKESWAR BHUYAN\nVILL- KAKODONGA NAMKHATOWAL GAON\nP.O- NAMKHATOWAL\nDIST- GOLAGHAT\nASSAM\nPIN- 785626\nTET ASSAM (UP) ROLL 1403252\n Page No.# 86/99\n\n\n8: AMI NEOG\nC/O- BUPESWAR NEOG\nVILL- CHANGMAI\nP.O- PHULPANICHIGA\nDIST- SIVASAGAR\nASSAM\nPIN- 785683\nTET\nASSAM\n(UP)\nROLL NO. 2800045\n\n9: DIPAM JYOTI DUTTA\nS/O- MAKHON DUTTA\nVILL- DIHINGIA GAON\nP.O- CHENGELI GAON\nDIST- JORHAT\nASSAM\nPIN- 785010\nTET ASSAM (UP) ROLL 1700850\n\n10: MAMUMONI SARMAH\nS/O- BHUGIL NEOG\nVILL- KAKOPATHER\nP.O- KAKOPATHER\nDIST- TINSUKIA\nASSAM\nPIN- 785675 TET\nASSAM\n(UP) ROLL NO. 3101654\n\n11: SISURAM DAS\nS/O- AKON CH DAS\nVILL- TORFAT GAON\nP.O- BAMBORAHI\nDIST- GOLAGHAT\nASSAM\nPIN- 785626\nTET\nASSAM (LP) ROLL NO. 677935\n\n12: PUROBI GOGOI\nS/O- LATE MADHAB GOGOI\nVILL- CHAKIMUKH\nP.O- CHAKIMUKH\nNAZIRA\nDIST- SIVASAGAR\n Page No.# 87/99\n\nASSAM\nPIN- 785685\nTET\nASSAM (LP AND UP) ROLL NO. 2801809\n\n13: BINITA BHARALI\nD/O- BHASKARJYOTI BARMAN\nVILL- BILTOLA\nBANIPUR PATH\nH NO. 17\nDIST- KAMRUP(M)\nASSAM\nTET\nASSAM (LP) ROLL 1807869\n\n14: MONTU DAS\nS/O- DHARANIDHAR DAS\nVILL AND P.O- SIKARHATI\nDIST- KAMRUP\nASSAM\nTET\nASSAM (LP AND UP) ROLL NO. 1903686\n\n15: MANABI RAJBONGSHI\nW/O- DULAL TALUKDAR\nVILL- KUMARIKATA\nP.O- DEHAR KALAKUCHI\nDIST- DARRANG\nASSAM\nCTET (UP) ROLL NO. 106024731\n\n16: SIKHAMONI SAHARIA\nD/O- BANESWAR SAHARIA\nVILL- NA BHETI\nP.O- MORIGAON\nDIST- MORIGAON\nASSAM\nDIST- MAJULI\nASSAM\nTET 2504365\n\n17: BULMONI NATH\nS/O- RAJEN CH NATH\nVILL- SONARIATI\nP.O- RANGACHAHI\nDIST- MAJULI\nASSAM\nTET\n Page No.# 88/99\n\nASSAM (UP)\nROLL NO. 2400303\n\n18: GITANJALI DEKA\nD/O- LATE PRADIP CH DEKA\nVILL NO. 1 HAZARIKAPARA\nP.O- HAZARIKAPARA\nP.S- SIPHAJHAR\nDIST- DARRANG\nASSAM\nTET\nASSAM (LP) ROLL 0801715\n\n19: NUR JAHAN BEGUM\nD/O- MD. NIJAM ALI\nVILL- KHAMAR MANIKPUR\nP.O- KRISHNAI\nDIST- GOALPARA\nASSAM\nTET\nASSAM (LP AND UP) ROLL NO. 1303896\n\n20: ROSIDA BEGUM\nW/O- INAMUDDIN AHMED\nVILL AND P.O- NAHARANI\nDIST- GOLAGHAT\nASSAM\nTET\nASSAM (LP AND UP)\nROLL NO. 1402888\n\n21: RAJANI HAZARIKA\nS/O- LATE DEHIRAM HAZARIKA\nVILL- JALAH\nNAGAON\nP.O- OPAR UJARA\nTET\nASSAM\n(LP) ROLL 2607240\n\n22: SWAPANA DUTTA\nD/O- NAGENDRA DUTTA\nVILL- CHAPRAKATA PART-1\nP.O CHAPRAKATA\nDIST BONGAIGAON\nTET\nASSAM (LP) ROLL NO. 105135\n Page No.# 89/99\n\n23: PARINITA BISWAS\nD/O- RAKHAL BISWAS\nVILL NAYAPARA PART-I\nP.O- CHAPRAKATA\nDIST- BONGAIGAON\nASSAM\nTET\nASSAM\nROLL NO. 06000448 IN SERVICE SINCE 2012\n\n24: DEBAJYOTI BORA\nS/O- DIMBESWAR BORA\nVILL- GHURIA GAON\nP.O UPAR UZARA\nDIST- NAGAON\nASSAM\nTET\nASSAM (LP) ROLL NO. 2610947\n\n25: BASANTA KR SAIKIA\nS/O- LATE MANIK CH SAIKIA\nVILL- KHETRI GAON\nP.O- CHAKALA GHAT\nDIST- NAGAON\nASSAM\nTET\nASSAM (UP) ROLL NO. 2601169\n\n26: HEREMBA NATH\nS/O- LATE KESHAB NATH\nVILL- GITANAGAR\nP.O- GOALPARA\nDIST- GOALPARA\nTET\nASSAM (LP AND UP) ROLL NO. 1301893\n\n27: RAJAMONI SAIKIA\nS/O- LATE BHARAT CH SAIKIA\nVILL- BORBHETI SONARI GAON\nP.O- BORBHETI\nDIST- SONARI\nASSAM\nTET\nASSAM (UP) ROLL NO. 2607101\n\n28: HIRALAL BORPHUKAN\nS/O- BIRESWAR PHUKAN\nVILL- TILOIBARI NEPALI GAON\n Page No.# 90/99\n\nP.O- TILOI NAGAR\nDIST- DIBRUGARH\nASSAM\nTET\nASSAM (LP AND UP) ROLL NO. 1101137\n\n29: MOMI SONOWAL\nD/O- LATE NABA SONOWAL\nVILL- RUPAI SAIDING\nBIJAY NAGAR\nDIST- TINSUKIA\nASSAM\nTET\nASSSAM (UP) ROLL NO. 3101836\n\n30: BUDDHA BIKASH HAZARIKA\nS/O- RAJANIKANTA HAZARIKA\nVILL- MELAMORA\nDIST- GOLAGHAT\nASSAM\nTET\nASSAM (UP) ROLL NO. 1400592\n\n31: LAKHI PRASAD CHUTIA\nS/O- SRI UMESH CHUTIA\nVILL- BURKHA KURI\nDIST- DHEMJAI- 787026\nASSAM\nPIN- 787026\nTET\nASSAM (LP AND UP) ROLL NO. 0902619\n\n32: BIPUL SAIKIA\nS/O- LILA KANTA SAIKIA\nVILL- KAKAYAL\nDIST- DHEMAJI\nASSAM\nPIN- 787026\nTET\nASSAM (LP AND UP) ROLL NO. 0900723\n\n33: BUBUL SAIKIA\nS/O- BHUGMAN SAIKIA\nVILL- MICHAMARI\nDIST- DHEMAJI\nASSAM\nPIN- 787026\nTET\n Page No.# 91/99\n\nASSAM (UP)\nROLL NO. 0900869\n\n34: PRANAB BORUAH\nS/O- LATE BOLAI BORUAH\nVILL- MORA GAON\nP.O- BORDOLONI\nDIST- DHEMAJI\nASSAM\nPIN- 787026\nTET\nASSAM (LP) ROLL 0904007\n\n35: ATUL BURAGOHAIN\nS/O- LATE JAGESWAR BURAGOHAIN\nVILL- GOHAIN CHAPORI\nP.O- KHALIHAMARI\nDIST- DHEMAJI\nASSAM\nPIN- 787053\nTET\nASSAM (UP) ROLL 0900302\n\n36: MAMI DAS\nD/O- LATE DHANJYOTI DAS\nVILL- WEST JALUKBARI\nNAMGHAR PATH\nP.O- GUWAHATI UNIVERSITY\nDIST- KAMRUP (M)\nASSAM\nPIN- 781014\nTET 1810657\n\n37: SUKRESWAR BORDOLOI\nS/O- HAZARU BORDOLOI\nVILL- CHIKABARI\nDIST- MORIGAON\nASSAM\nPIN- 782105\nTET ROLL NO. 2504460\n\n38: BABITA DEKA\nW/O- MAKUNDA DEKA\nVILL NO.1 GERIMARI\nDIST- DARRANG\nASSAM\nPIN- 784125\nTET\n Page No.# 92/99\n\nASSAM (LP AND UP)\nROLL NO. 0800676\n\n39: SIDDHESWAR RABHA\nS/O- KARMESWAR RABHA\nVILL- BARJHAR\nP.O- BORDUAR\nDIST- KAMRUP\nASSAM\nPIN- 781120\nTET\nASSAM\nROLL NO. 1906456\n\n40: GAKUL DEKA\nS/O- LATE MANIK DEKA\nVILL AND P.O- BARKOLA\nDIST- NAGAON\nASSAM\nPIN- 782144\nTET\nASSAM\n\nOLL NO. 2602357\n\n41: TASMIA SULTANA\nVILL- TALIKATA\nP.O AND P.S- MONIBORI\nDIST- MORIGAON\nASSAM\nPIN- 782126\nCTET (LP AND UP) ROLL NO. 106030125\n\n42: DIPANWITA HAZARIKA\nD/O- TANKESWAR HAZARIKA\nVILL- CHITRANAGAR TONGLA\nDIST- UDALGURI\nBTAD\nTET\nASSAM\nROLL NO. 2602457\n\n43: BISHNU PRASAD LASKAR\nS/O- LATE MOHESWAR LASKAR\nVILL AND P.O- BALIGAON\nRAHA\nDIST- NAGAON\nASSAM\n Page No.# 93/99\n\nPIN- 782144\nTET\nASSAM (LP) ROLL NO. 2601469\n\n44: JAHIDA BEGUM\nW/O- ZAKIR HUSSAIN\nVILL- HALDHIA GAON\nP.O- GHUGUBARI\nDIST- BARPETA\nASSAM\nPIN- 781319\nTET\nASSAM (UP)\nROLL NO. 0203302\n\n45: JAMILA KHATUL\nD/O- MD. FAZRUL HOQUE\nVILL AND P.O- ASONIKANDI\nDIST- DHUBRI\nASSSAM\nCTET (LP)\nROLL NO. 106029987\n\n46: MOTLAB ALI SK\nS/O- GOLAPUDDIN\nVILL GERAMARI PART-I\nP.O- GERAMARI\nDIST- DHUBRI\nASSAM\nPIN- 783339\nCTET (LP AND UP)\nROLL 1005093\n\n47: KAMAL SARMAH\nS/O- KRISHNA LAL SARMAH\nVILL- HAKAMA JAMUGURIHAT\nP.O- PANPUR\nDIST- SONITPUR\nPIN- 784180\nCTET (LP)\nROLL NO. 105041010\n\n48: MUNINDRA MOHAN DAS\nS/O- RAMESH CH DAS\nVILL- KAMRUP GAON\nP.O- SIKARHATI\nDIST- KAMRUP\nASSAM\n Page No.# 94/99\n\nPIN- 782103\nTET (LP AND UP) ROLL NO. 1907016 (LV 60)\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION (ELEM) DEPTT\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI- 781006\n\n2:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI- 781019\n 3:THE UNION OF INDIA\nREP. BY THE JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF INDIA\n DEPTT OF SOCIAL EDUCATION AND LITERACY\n MIN OF HRD\n SHASTRI BHAWAN\n NEW DELHI- 110001\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. A DEKA\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1017/2020\n\nMOSHAROF ALOM AHMED\nS/O- NASIR UDDIN AHMED\nR/O- VILL. NO. 1 SOUTH RANGAPANI\nP.O. BALDA BAZAR\nP.S. BOKO\nDIST.- KAMRUP\nASSAM\nPIN- 781127.\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) DEPTT.\nDISPUR\nGHY.- 781006.\n\n2:THE PERSONAL (B) DEPARTMENT\n Page No.# 95/99\n\nGOVT. OF ASSAM\nREP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECY.\nDISPUR\nGHY.- 06.\n3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nKAHILIPARA\nASSAM\nGUWAHATI- 781019.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR. M DUTTA\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1290/2020\n\nDEBAJIT SARMA AND ANR.\nS/O. BRAJEN SARMA\nVILL. JHAKUAPARA\nP.O. BHURARGARH\nDIST. DARRANG\nASSAM.\n\n2: MONIRUL ISLAM MOLLAH\nS/O. SAMSUL HOQUE MOLLAH\nVILL. BALIABIL\n P.S. MANKACHAR\n DIST. SOUTH SALMARA MANKACHAR\nASSAM.\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT.\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI-06.\n\n2:THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\n\nEDUCATION DEPTT.\nELEMENTARY\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI-06.\n3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\n\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\n Page No.# 96/99\n\nGUWAHATI-781019.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR. M AHMED\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1008/2020\n\nDIPIKA KAKOTY\nD/O- LT. PRADIP KAKOTY\nR/O- TITABOR TINIALI\nP.O AND P.S. TITABOR\nDIST.- JORHAT\nASSAM.\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\nREP. BY ITS COMMISSIONER\nTO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT.\nDISPUR\nGHY.- 781006.\n\n2:THE SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT.\n DISPUR\n GHY.- 781006.\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\n GHY.-19.\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR. P K SHARMA\nAdvocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/971/2020\n\nRUMI DEVI\nD/O. JOGESWAR NATH\nVILL. AMONIGAON\nP.O. BHELEUGURI\n Page No.# 97/99\n\nP.S. SAMAGURI\nDIST. NAGAON\nASSAM\nPIN-782140\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER\nTO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT.\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI-781006.\n\n2:THE SECRETARY\n\nTO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\nEDUCATION DEPTT.\nELEMENTARY DISPUR\nGUWAHATI-781006.\n3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\n\nASSAM\nKAHILIPARA\nGUWAHATI-781019.\n4:THE UNION OF INDIA\nREP. BY THE JOINT SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF INDIA DEPTT. OF\nSCHOOL EDUCATION AND LITERACY\nMINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT\nSHASTRI BHAWAN\nNEW DELHI-110001.\n------------\nAdvocate for : MR K K MAHANTA\nAdvocate for : SC\nELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 3 ORS.\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1330/2020\n\nDIPALI BORAH\nW/O- SRI DEBEN CH HAZARIKA\nVILL- UTTAR BOKRAJHAR\nP.O- TENGABARI\nP.S- KOLAIGAON\nPIN- 784525\nDIST- UDALGURI\n Page No.# 98/99\n\nASSAM\n\n\nVERSUS\n\nTHE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS\nREP. BY THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY TO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\nDEPTT OF EDUCATION (ELEM)\nJANATA BHAWAN\nDISPUR\nGUWAHATI- 781006\n\n2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY\nTO THE GOVT OF ASSAM\n DEPTT OF EDUCATION (ELEM)\n JANATA BHAWAN\n DISPUR\n GUWAHATI- 781006\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\nASSAM\n GOVT OF ASSAM\n KAHILIPARA\n GUWAHATI- 781019\n ------------\nAdvocate for : MR B BURAGOHAIN\nAdvocate for : SC\n EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS\n\n\n\nLinked Case : WP(C)/1317/2020\n\nFARIDA KHATUN AND ANR.\nD/O- LT SUKUR ALI\nW/O- ABDUL BATEN\n R/O- VILL. CHELABARI/ PADUPARA\n P.O. AMBARI\n P.S. DHUPDHARA\n DIST.- GOALPARA\nASSAM\n PIN- 783123.\n\n2: EMRAN HUSSAIN\nS/O- AMAN ULLAH\n R/O- VILL. PACHIM SINGIMARI\n P.O. SINGIMARI\n P.S. RUPAHI HAT\n DIST.- NAGAON\n Page No.# 99/99\n\n ASSSAM\n PIN- 782125.\n VERSUS\n\n THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n REP. BY THE COMM. AND SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM\n EDUCATION (ELEMENTARY) DEPTT.\n DISPUR\n GHY.-06.\n\n 2:THE PERSONNEL (B) DEPTT.\n GOVT. OF ASSAM\n REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECY.\n DISPUR\n GHY.-06.\n 3:THE DIRECTOR OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION\n KAHILIPARA\n ASSAM\n GHY.- 781019.\n ------------\n Advocate for : MR. B U LASKAR\n Advocate for : SC\n ELEM. EDU appearing for THE STATE OF ASSAM AND 2 ORS.\n\n\n\n BEFORE\n HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI\n\n ORDER02-11-2021\n It is jointly submitted by the parties that the issue involved is similar to the issue\nalready heard by this Court in a bunch of Writ Petition which are pending for judgment.Accordingly, list these matters after 2(two) weeks.JUDGE\n\n\n\nComparing Assistant

5a0ee943-18d6-5897-af49-f1cf8dbe1eb4

court_cases

Bangalore District CourtSri M.Ashrith Patel vs S/O.Sri.Munikrishnappa on 30 January, 2021IN THE COURT OF LXXIII ADDL.CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS\n JUDGE, MAYOHALL UNIT, BANGALURU. (CCH.74)\n\n PRESENT:\n Sri.Yamanappa Bammanagi, B.A., LL.B., (Spl.,)\n LXXIII Addl.City Civil & Sessions Judge,\n Mayohall Unit, Bangaluru.\n\n Dated this the 30th day of January, 2021.\n\n Crl.Appeal. No.25162/2018\nAppellant/ Sri M.Ashrith Patel,\nAccused: S/o.Sri.Munikrishnappa,\n aged about 33 yrs,\n R/at.No.242, Patel Residency\n Ground Floor, Behind IIMB, Bilekahalli,\n Bannerghatta Road,\n Bengaluru­560 076.\n (By Sri.H.Manjunath - Adv.)\n\n V/S\nRespondent/ Sri.Mohan.H.S.,\nComplainant: S/o Sri Seetharamiah,\n aged about 36 yrs,\n Residing at No.211, 5th Main,\n Ravi Kirlosker Layout, Chikkabidarakallu,\n Nagasandra Post,\n Bengaluru­ 560 073.\n (By Sri.Kemparaju - Adv.)\n\n JUDGMENTBeing aggrieved by the judgment and sentence, passed\n\nby the learned XIV ACMM, Bengaluru, in CC No.2Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n52795/2018, dated 09.08.2018, convicting the\n\nappellant for the offence punishable under Section 138 of\n\nN.I.Act, sentencing him to pay fine of Rs.5,25,000/­, with\n\ndefault clause of 7 Months simple imprisonment and out of\n\ncompensation amount appellants shall pay Rs.5,000/­ to the\n\nstate. Challenging the legality and correctness of judgment\n\nand sentence of trial court the appellant is before the court.2. Brief facts of the case:The respondent herein filed complaintu/S 200of\n\nCr.P.C ofCr.P.C., against the accused for the offence\n\npunishableu/s 138of the N.I. Act. It is alleged on the\n\ncomplaint that the complainant/Respondent and\n\nappellant/accused are well known to each other for one\n\nyear, the Accused had approached to the complainant for\n\nfinancial help of Rs. 4,50,000/­ to improve his business, the\n\ncomplainant had given hand loan of Rs. 4,50,000/­ to the\n\nAccused on 25.09.2016, Accused assured to repay the same3Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nwithin six months. In order to repay the same, the accused\n\nhas paid Rs. 26,000/­ to the complainant in the month of\n\nJanuary 2017, by cash and for remaining amount the accused\n\nhas issued two cheques bearing No. 642860, for sum of Rs.2,31,000/­, dated 13.05.2017 and cheque bearing No.\n\n6428602, for sum of Rs. 1,93,000 dated: 20.05.2017, both\n\ncheques drawn on Vijaya Bank, Bilekahalli, Bengalore, said\n\ncheques were present for encashment on 10.08.2017 and\n\nanother cheque on 16.08.2017, same was dishonored and\n\nreturned to the complainant with Bank endorsement as\n\n"PAYMENT STOPPED BY DRAWER" on 14.08.2017 and\n\n18.08.2017 due to dishonor of cheques, the complainant\n\nissued notice to the accused through RPAD on 12.09.2017,\n\ncalling upon the accused persons to pay the cheques amount,\n\nsame was served on the accused, Accused replied to the\n\nnotice and denied the due. Hence, the complaint for the\n\noffense punishable U/s 138 of theN.I. Act.4Crl.A. No.25162/20183. Being satisfied with the material placed before it,\n\nthe trial court recorded sworn statement, took the cognizance\n\nof the offence punishableu/s 138of the N.I. Act. Against the\n\naccused and complainant is examined as C.W. 1 and issued\n\nthe summonsu/s 204of Cr.P.C to the accused. In\n\npursuance to summons, the accused appeared through his\n\ncounsel, filed bail application and accused enlarged on bail\n\nand during the trial before trial court the accused was on bail,\n\nplea was recorded on 13.06.2018, the accused not plead\n\nguilty and claimed to be tried.4. The complainant was examined as C.W. 1 and got\n\nmarked Ex. P. 1 to 8, C.W. 1 was cross­examined by the\n\nLearned Counsel for the accused and closed his evidence on\n\n28.06.2018, accused statement u/s 313 of Cr. P.C was\n\nrecorded by the trial court. The accused got himself\n\nexamined as D.W. 1 and got marked Ex.D.1 to 6, D.W. 1 was\n\ncross examined by the Learned Counsel for the complainant.5Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nTrial court heard the argument of the Learned\n\nCounsel for the complainant and the accused. After hearing\n\nargument on both side, the trial court has recorded the order\n\nof conviction, convicting the accused for the offence\n\npunishableu/s 138of N.I. Act, with fine of Rs. 5,25,000/­,\n\nwith default clause, in default of payment of fine the\n\naccused shall under go simple imprisonment for period of\n\nseven months. Further, ordered that out of fine amount, the\n\naccused shall pay Rs. 5,20,000/­ to the complainant as\n\ncompensation and remaining Rs. 5,000/­ shall be paid to the\n\nstate being aggrieved by the same, the accused is before this\n\ncourt challenging the correctness and legality of the trial\n\ncourt judgment and order of conviction of the on the\n\nfollowing:­\n\n "GROUNDS1. The trial court failed to consider\n the existence of legally recoverable\n debt to issue two cheques, the6Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n financial capacity of the\n complainant and admission of\n PW1 in cross­examination. In view\n of the fact that, the complainant\n did not stated his financial\n capacity, this fact was not\n considered by the trial court. Thus\n the finding of the trial court is\n liable to be set­aside.2. No documents were produced by\n the complainant before the trial\n court for payment of loan to the\n accused, the transaction is hit bysection 25of the Indian Contract\n Act. The trial court failed to\n appreciate rebuttal evidence led by\n the accused.3. The trial court failed appreciate\n the material placed before it, which\n are not sufficient to constitute the\n offence punishable U/Sec.138of\n the N.I. Act, the complainant has\n misused the cheque against the7Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n accused. No loan has taken\n by the accused from the\n complainant.4. The Notice issued by the\n complainant does not bears the\n signatures of the accused or his\n Advocate. So, incomplete Notice.5. The complainant being a mediator\n to obtain Bank loan, fraudulently\n taken cheque from the accused\n saying that Bank is required blank\n cheques for security of the loan.Believing the words of complainant\n that, he will submit the cheques to\n the bank, the accused has handed\n over the cheque in question to the\n complainant, on enquiry with\n bank, it is found that the\n complainant did not produced the\n said cheque before the Bank and\n retained cheque with him and\n misused against the accused by\n filing the complaint, thus8Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n complainantt and Ravindra\n Babu had colluded and misused the\n cheques. The complainant failed to\n examine Ravindra Babu.6. The complainant has filed the\n complaint after 6 days delay. The\n trial court, without enquiry,\n allowed the application and\n condoned the delay.7. Application filed by the accused to\n recall PW1 and DW1 were not\n considered by the trial court, No\n opportunities was given by the trial\n court.5. After admitting the appeal, this court has passed the\n\norder on the application filed U/s 389(1) of C.R.P.C and\n\nstayed the operation and execution of trial court order on\n\n10.09.2018, on condition that the accused shall deposit\n\n20% of cheque amount, and fine amount of Rs. 5,000/­\n\nwithin one month from the date of order. and issued the\n\nnotice to the Respondent/Complainant, the Respondent9Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nappeared through his counsel on 05.10.2028,\n\nposted for LCR, LCR received on 26.02.2019, posted for\n\nargument, on 29.04.2019, heard argument of the Learned\n\nCounsel for appellant and the Learned Counsel for\n\nRespondent.6. In support of argument, the Learned Counsel for the\n\nappellant relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court\n\npassed in Criminal Appeal No. 636/19 in case of\n\nBasalingappa V/s Mudibasappa and decision reported ini) AIR 2003 Supreme Court 182, ii) 20019(1) KCCR\n\n212,iii) 2008 (1) KCCR 334, iv) 2012 (3) KCCR 2057, v)\n\n2008 (4) KCCR 2477, vi) ILR 2009 KAR 172, vii) 2015 AIR\n\nSCW 541, viii) 2013 (3) KCCR 1940, viii) AIR 2009 NOC\n\n2327 (BOM) , ix) 2010 (5) KCCR 3397, x) LAWS (BOM)\n\n2016 9 43, xi)AIR 2019 Supreme Court 942, xii) ILR 1990\n\nKAR 1064 and xiii) (2007) 2 Supreme Court Cases 258.10Crl.A. No.25162/20187. I have perused the grounds of appeal, re­\nappreciated oral and documentary evidence, led by the\ncomplainant and the accused and perused the material\nplaced before the court and considered the arguments of the\nLearned Counsel for the Appellant and Complainant/\nRespondent. On perusal of the same, the points that would\narise for my consideration are as follows:­1. Whether the appellant/\n accused made out grounds to\n show that the order of\n conviction and sentence\n recorded by the trial court in\n CC No.52795/2018, dtd.09.08.2018, deserves to be set\n aside, and thereby call for the\n interference of this court?2. What order or decree?8. My answer to the above points are as follows:­\n\n Point No.1: In the Affirmative,\n\n Point No.2: As per the final order,\n for the following:­\n\n REASONS9. POINT No.1: The Complainant has filed the\n\ncomplaint u/s 200 Cr. P.C, against the accused, for the11Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\noffense punishableu/s 138of the N.I. Act, it is contended\n\nin the complaint that accused and complainant are known to\n\neach other for one year prior to alleged transaction and the\n\naccused had approached the complainant for financial help\n\nof Rs. 4,50,000/­ and complainant paid the said amount to\n\nthe accused. So the accused has taken hand loan from the\n\ncomplainant in order to re­pay the same, the accused has\n\nissued two cheques which were presented for encashment,\n\nbut returned with Bank endorsement "PAYMENT STOPPED\n\nBY DRAWER". Hence, the Respondent/Complainant has filed\n\nthe complaint before the trial court against the accused for\n\nthe offence punishableu/s 138of the N.I. Act and issued\n\nsummons to the accusedu/s 204of Cr.P.C and accused\n\nappeared before the trial court and accused is enlarged on\n\nbail, plea recorded and the complainant got examined himself\n\nas PW.1 and cross examined by the learned counsel for\n\naccused, thereafter, accused statementu/s 313of Cr.P.C was12Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nrecorded and accused got examined himself as D.W. 1\n\nand got marked Ex. D.1 to 6, after hearing argument of the\n\nLearned Counsel for the parties the trial court has recorded\n\nthe conviction order convicting the accused for the offence\n\npunishableu/s 138of the N.I. Act , holding that accused\n\nfailed to rebut the presumption availableu/s 139of the N.I.\n\nAct.10. Now the question before the court is as to whether\n\nthe material available before the trial court are sufficient to\n\nhold that the accused has not rebutted the presumption\n\navailable to the complainant and complainant proved the\n\ncase against the accused.11. In order to answer this question it is necessary to\n\nre­appreciate the entire oral and documentary evidence, led\n\nby both the parties with reference to facts on issues.12. To hold guilty undersection 138of the N.I. Act,\n\ndrawer has to issues cheque with the knowledge that he has13Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nnot maintained sufficient amount in his account to\n\nhonour the cheques as requiredu/s 138of N.I. Act.13. Secondly, legally recoverable debt due to the\n\ncomplainant. Thirdly, cheque were dishonored for the\n\nreasons mentioned in the Bank Memo, Forthly accused failed\n\nto pay the cheque amount after notice, fifthly the\n\ncomplainant served the notice to the accused prior to filing\n\nof the complainant.14. The defence of the accused is that the accused\n\nbeing contractor, doing business of Building Construction\n\nwork in the name and style as "Patel Consturctions" one\n\nMahadevswamy was known to the accused and said\n\nMahadevswamy has given mobile number of the\n\ncomplainant, the accused toled to the complainant that he\n\nwas under need of money. So, the complainant has\n\nintroduced one Ravindra Babu to the accused, since said\n\nRavindra Babu having contact with Banks, and further,14Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\ncomplainant told to the accused that he can help the\n\naccused in availing the loan from the Bank, after two days the\n\naccused had met said Ravindra Babu at Kanak Hotel\n\nBengalore, and accused has told to Ravindra Babu about his\n\nfinancial need, and said Ravindra Babu verified the\n\ndocuments and agreed to made avail the loan from Hinduja\n\nLeyland Finance and the accused told to Mr. Ravindra Babu\n\nthat he was under need of Rs. one Crore and accused has\n\ntaken loan of Rs. One crore from Hinduja Leyland Finance.15. So, the accused has taken loan of Rs. 1,00,00,000/­\n\nfrom the Hinduja Leyland Finance, through said Ravindra.\n\nFurther, it is the case of the accused that since accused has\n\ntaken loan of Rs. 1,00,00,000/­ through Ravindra Babu and\n\ncomplainant, because complaint had introduced Mr.\n\nRavindra Babu to the accused. Hence, they demanded 4\n\ncheques for the security of Rs. One crore loan amount the\n\naccused has handed over 4 Vijay Bank cheques to15Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\ncomplainant as security for the said loan of Rs.\n\n1,00,00,000/­ cheques No. 642859 to 642862. Thereafter,\n\naccused has enquired with the bank about the cheque as to\n\nwhether Hinduja Leyland Finance, Bank has received 4\n\ncheque for security of loan amount, on inquiry with Bank, the\n\nBank informed to the accused that the Bank did not required\n\ncheques for security because Bank has taken sale deeds as\n\nsecurity for the said loan. Hence, the accused has filed\n\nrequisition to his Bank to stop the payment.16. So, the complainant and said Ravindra acting as\n\nmediator for the loan, have taken cheques from the accused\n\ncolluding with the said Ravindra, has misused the said\n\ncheques by presenting the same and filed false complainant.17. Now it is relevant to appreciate the documentary\n\nevidence produced by the appellant/accused Ex. D.1 to 6. Ex.\n\nD 2 is the account statement of the accused which shows that\n\nthe accused has taken loan of Rs. 10624933/­ from the16Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nHindujja Leyland Finance, which is not in dispute. So, on\n\nappreciation of this document it is clear that the accused\n\nbeing contractor, was under need of money more then one\n\ncrore. So, if a person who is under need of money, taken\n\nloan of Rs. more than crore, can takes or asked for help of\n\nRs.4,50,000/­, one can understand that if accused was\n\nunder need of Rs. 5 to 10 lakhs, then he can taken such\n\namount of Rs. 4,50,000/­ for his necessary.18. Trial court, at its judgment, page No. 19 at lost\n\nlines wrongly understood and hold that in Ex.D.2 there is a\n\nclear reference as to security for the loan. As per Ex. D. 2 the\n\naccused has taken loan of Rs. One crore from the Hindujja\n\nLeyland Finance, is not in dispute and it is specific case of\n\nthe accused that he has taken loan of Rupees One crore from\n\nthe said finance and for said loan the complainant and\n\nRavindra Babu were the mediator, they demanded cheques\n\nfor security of said loan taken from the Bank, cheques were17Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nhanded over to the complainant, because\n\ncomplaint and Ravindra Babu are the mediator for the loan,\n\nHence the accused believed the complianant and Ravindra\n\nBabu. The complainant and said Ravindra Babu have\n\ndemanded cheques as security for the loan, after issuing the\n\nsaid cheques the accused has enquired with Bank and\n\nrealized that the Bank did not demanded any cheques for\n\nthe said loan but it is for the complainant and said Ravindra\n\nBabu who had mis leaded the accused and taken cheques\n\nfrom the accused. When accused came to know that the Bank\n\nhas not required any cheques for security, suddenly the\n\naccused has submitted representation to stop the payment\n\ncheques.19. Now it is relevant appreciate fact that the accused\n\nhas issued 4 cheques bearing Nos. 642859 to 642862, cheque\n\nNo. 642859 and 642860, dated 09.05.2017, but two cheque\n\nNo .642859, dated 25.05.2017 and cheque No. 642860 dated18Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n13.05.2017, are long dated of cheques hence, the\n\ncomplainant has demanded the cheques, hence accused\n\nissued cheque bearing No. 642861 dated 13.05.2017 and\n\ncheques No. 642862 dated 20.05.2017 of Vijay Bank for\n\nsecurity for loan taken from Hindujja Leyland Finance.20. Ex. D.3 is the complaint lodged by the accused\n\nagainst the present Respondent/Complainant, the relevant\n\nportion of the Ex.D.3, reads thus:"5. ಸಸರರಶನರ ಉದದದದಶಶ\n ಈ ರದರನ ಸಸರಸಸಶವದದನದಸರರದ\n ಪರಸರರದದಸರರಗದ ಮದಹನ‍ಕದಮಸರ ರವರದ\n ನಮಗದ ಬಸನದಸ‍ ಮಸಡಲದ ಹಸರದಜಸ\n ಲದಲಲಸಲಸಡ‍ ಪದಲನಸನನನ ಲಮಟದಡ‍ನಲಲ ಲದದದನ‍\n ಕದದಡಸದವವದಸಗ ಹದದಳ ನನನ ಬಳ ಇರದವ\n ದಸಖಸಲಸತಗಳಳ ಹಸಗದ ವಜಯ ಬಸಲಸಕ‍ನಲಲ\n ನನನ ಹದಸರನಲಲರದವ ನಸಲದಲ ಚದಕ‍ ನಸ .\n 642859 , 642860 , 642861, 642862\n ಗಳನದನ ಪಡದರದ 1 ಕದದದಟ 6 ಲಕ ರದಗಳನದನ\n ಲದದದನ‍ ?ಕದದಡಸರದದ ಇದಸರ ನಸತರ ಮದಹನ‍\n ಕದಮಸರ ರವರದ ನನನಸರ ಪಡದರ ಚದಕ\n ಬಸಲಸಕಗದ ನದಡದದ ತಮಮ ಬಳಯಲಲಯದ19Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n ಇಟದಟಕದದಸಡದ ನನನ ಬಳ ಬಸರದ ನನಗದ ನಸನದ\n ಸಸಲವಸಗ ನದಡರ 4 ಲಕರ 24 ಸಸವರ ರದ\n ಹಣವನದನ ವಸಪಸ‍ ಕದದಡದ ಎಸರದ\n ಕದದಳಳತತರದತಸತರದ ನಸನದ ಅವರಗದ ರಸವವದದದ\n ಹಣವನದನ ಕದದಡಬದದಕಸಗಲಲ ಆರದರಸರ\n ಸರರಯನದನ ಠಸಣದಗದ ಕರದಯಸ ಸದಕತ ತಳಳವಳಕದ\n ನದಡ ಬಸದದದದಬಸತ ? ಮಸಡಕದದಡಬದದಕದಸರದ\n ನದಡರ ರದರದ ಇತಸಲದ."21. Ex. D.2 is the sanction letter issued by the Hindujja\n\nLeyland Finance Ltd,which reflects fact that the accused has\n\ntaken loan of Rs. 1,06,24,933/­ and EMI of Rs. 1,64,970/­,\n\nwhich is not in dispute. When these facts are not in dispute\n\nby the complainant, extract EX.D. 2 sanction letter detail of\n\nloan I am of the opinion that the appellant has rebutted the\n\npresumption underSection 139of N.I. Act. In support of my\n\nopinion I have appreciated that Bank endorsement Ex. P.3\n\nand P4 produced by the complainant.22. Ex.P.3 is the endorsement issued by the Bank shows\n\nthe reasons for which the cheques bearing No.642862 was20Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\ndishonors on 18.08.2017, according Bank the cheque\n\nbearing No. 642862 was as dishonor as "PAYMENT\n\nSTOPPED BY DRAWER"Ex. P.4 is also Bank endorsement which reflects that\n\ncheque bearing No. 642860 dishonoured for reasons of\n\n"PAYMENT STOPPED BY DRAWER" on 14.08.2017.23. On perusal of the Bank endorsement some of the\n\nfacts are true, one is the cheque issued by the accused is\n\nbelongs to his account, secondly the reasons for which cheque\n\nwas dishonoured. Whether it was dishonoured for insufficient\n\nfund in the account of accused, if it is found that the cheque\n\nwas dishonoured for fund is not sufficient then the intention\n\nof the accused can be inferred that accused has issued cheque\n\nwith knowledge that he had not Maintained Balance in the\n\naccount to honour the cheques.24. If the cheque was dishonoured for payment\n\nstopped by drawer, then the accused had issued cheques21Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nwithout any menserea, but the subsequent facts which\n\nforced the accused to stop the payment. So, accused has\n\nrebutted the presumption availableu/s 138of NI Act. On\n\nbasis of reason for dishonour of cheques the intention of the\n\naccused to commit crime was absolutely absent. The cheques\n\nwere dishonoured for stop payment by the drawer, the facts\n\nwhich was forced the accused to stop the payment was that\n\nthe complainant colluding with the said Ravindra Babu, had\n\nobtained the cheques from the accused by saying that\n\nHinduja Lyland Finance has sanctioned loan of Rupees more\n\nthan one crore, hence the Bank demanded security cheques\n\nfor the said loan. Believing the complainant and reasons as\n\nthe complainant and Ravindra Babu are mediator for the said\n\nloan and issued the cheque. The accused had enquired with\n\nBank and realized that Bank did not demanded any cheques\n\nfor security from the accused for the said loan. The facts\n\nwhich mis leaded by the complainant forced the accused to22Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nstop the payment to avoid further fraud. To substantial\n\nthis facts it is relevant to appreciate the cross of C.W. 1 at\n\npage 6 para 2 which reads thus:"ಬದಸಗಳಳರನ ರವದಸರದಬಸಬದ ಎನದನವವರದ\n ನನಗದ ಪರಚಯರವರದ ಎಸರರದ ಸರ. ಸರರ\n ರವದಸರದಬಸಬದರವರದ ಹಸರದಜಸ ಲದಲಲಸಲಸಡ‍\n ಫದಲನಸನನ ಲಮಟಡ‍ನ ಪರವಸಗ\n ಪಡದರದಕದದಳಳಲದ ಗಸದಹಕರಗದ ಸಹಸಯ\n ಮಸಡದತಸತರದ ಎಸರರದ ಸರ. ನಸನದ ಆರದದದಪಗದ\n ಸರರ ರವದಸರದಬಸಬದರವರನದನ ಪರಚಯ\n ಮಸಡಸಕದದಟಟದದದ ಎಸರರದ ಸರ. ಸರರ\n ರವದಸರದಬಸಬದರವರದ ಆರದದದಪಗದ ಹಸರದಜಸ\n ಲದಲಲಸಲಸಡ‍ ಫದಲನಸನನ ಲಮಟದಡ‍ನಲಲ ಸಸಲ\n ಮಸಡಸಕದದಟಟರದರದ ಎಸರರದ ಸರ. ಆ ರದತ\n ರವದಸರದಬಸಬದರವರದ ದನಸಸಕ 14.06.2017\n ರಸರದ ಒಸರದ ಕದದದಟ ಆರದ ಲಕ ರದಪಸಯ\n ಸಸಲ ಮಸಜದರದ ಮಸಡಸಕದದಟಟರದರದ ಎಸರರದ\n ಇರಬಹದರದ. ನನಗದ ದನಸಸಕ ಸರರಸಗ\n ಗದದತತಲಲ . ನಸನದ ರವದಸರದಬಸಬದರವರದದಸದಗದ\n ಸದದರಕದದಸಡದ ನಸನದ ಮತದತ\n ರವದಸರದಬಸಬದರವರದ ಮದಸದಸಳತತ ವಹಸ\n ಆರದದದಪಗದ ಹಸರದಜಸ ಲದಲಲಸಲಸಡ‍ ಫದಲನಸನನ\n ನಸರ ಸಸಲ ಮಸಡಸಕದದಟಟದದದವವ ಎಸರರದ23Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n ಸರಯಲಲ.ರವದಸರದಬಸಬದರವರದ ಆರದದದಪಯ ಪರ\n ಮಸಡದತತರದ ಎಲಸಲ ಕದಲಸಗಳಳ ನನಗದ\n ತಳದರದತತವದ ಎಸರರದ ಸರಯಲಲ. ಸಸಕಸತಇಚದಚಯರ ಹದದದಳಳತಸತರದ. ಕದಲವಮಮ ಅವರದ\n ನನಗದ ವಚಸರಗಳನದನ ಹದದಳಳತತರದರದ ಎಸರದ."25. This portion of evidence of the complainant clearly\n\nshows that complainant and Ravindra Babu have acted as\n\nmediator in having loan of Rs.1,06,00,000/­, the accused has\n\nbelieved the words of complainant and the said Ravindra\n\nBabu. So the evidence of the complainant is sufficient to\n\nhold that the accused has rebutted the presumption available\n\nto the complainant. Now it is relevant to extractsec. 139of\n\nthe N.I. Act which reads thus:"Sec. 139. Presumption in\n favour of the holder. ­It is shall be\n presumed, unless the contrary is\n proved that holder of a cheque\n received the cheque of the nature\n referred to inSec. 138fro the24Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n discharge, in whole or in\n part, of any deft or other liability."26. In the case on hand the complainant has admitted\n\nthat he has introduced Ravindra Babu of Bangalore to the\n\naccused for having loan from the Hindujja Leyland Finance\n\nLtd and it is also clear from the evidence of complainant as\n\nwell as accused that accused has taken loan of\n\nRs.1,06,24,933/­, from Hindujja Leyland Finance Ltd, and\n\nthe complainant and said Ravindra Babu are the mediator for\n\nhaving said loan. Under such circumstance the question of\n\ntaking loan from the complainant by the accused does not\n\narise. Offcourse, the complainant has pleaded in the\n\ncomplainant that he has advanced the loan of Rs. 4,50,000/­\n\nto the accused on 25.09.2016. But, the accused has taken\n\nloan more then one crores from the Bank 2.5.2017 as per\n\nthe sanction letter Ex.D2 . But, there is no considerable gap\n\nbetween loan taken by the accused from the Bank and alleged25Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nloan of Rs. 4,50,000/­ from the complainant. So, the\n\naccused being contractor admittedly, was under need of\n\nmoney more then one crore for his business. It is also case of\n\nthe complainant that accused has approached the\n\ncomplainant for loan of Rs. 4,50,000/­ for improving the\n\nbusiness of the accused. If the alleged loan of Rs. 4,50,000/­\n\nis appreciated from the angle of improving the business of the\n\naccused, then it cannot be accepted. The accused being the\n\ncontractor taken loan Rs. 1,06,24,933/­ from the Bank.\n\nLooking to the nature of business of the accused a prudent\n\nmen can believe and acted upon that a person being\n\ncontractor can take loan of Rs. 1,06,24,933/­for improving\n\nhis business but no prudent men can believe that the\n\nbusiness men of contractor can improve his business in such a\n\namount of Rs. 4,50,000/­ looking to the surrounding\n\ncircumstance of the fact, admittedly, that the complainant\n\nand said Ravindra Babu has played Role in having a loan of26Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nRs. 1,06,24,933/­ from the Bank. It is also the\n\ncircumstances which made the accused to believe the\n\ncomplainant to give a blank cheques to the complainant\n\nsince, complainant is the person who has made an\n\nopportunity to have a loan of such a huge amount of Rs.\n\n1,06,24,933/­. Under these circumstances it can be safely\n\nheld that accused has rebutted the presumptions available to\n\nthe complainant.27. In support of my findings I relied on the judgment\n\nreported in (1973) to SCC 808 in case of Kali Ram v/s\n\nstate of Himachal Pradesh. The lordship have held in the\n\njudgment at Para 23, which reads thus:"One of the cardinal principles\n which has always to be kept in view\n in our system of administration of\n justice for criminal cases is that a\n person arraigned as an accused is\n presumed to be innocent unless that\n presumption is rebutted by the27Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nprosecution by production of\nevidence as may show him to be\nguilty of the offence with which he\nis charged. The burden of proving\nthe guilt of the accused is upon the\nprosecution and unless it relieves\nitself of that burden, the courts\ncannot record a finding of the\nguilt of the accused. There are\ncertain cases in which statutory\npresumptions arise regarding the\nguilt of the accused, but the burden\neven in those cases is upon the\nprosecution to prove the existence\nof facts which have to be present\nbefore the presumption can be\ndrawn. Once those facts are shown\nby the prosecution to exist, the\ncourt can raise the statutory\npresumption and it would, in such\nan event, be for the accused to rebut\nthe presumption. The onus even in\nsuch cases upon the accused is not\nas heavy as is normally upon the28Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n prosecution to prove the guilt\n of the accused. If some material is\n brought on the record consistent\n with the innocent of the accused\n which may reasonably be true, even\n though it is not positively proved to\n be true, the accused would be\n entitled to acquittal."28. It is specific defense of the accused that the\n\ncomplainant has no source of income to give loan of Rs.\n\n4,50,000/­ to the accused even in the cross of PW.1 the\n\nLearned Counsel for the accused has specifically suggested to\n\nPW.1 at page 7 first para of cross examination of P.W.1,\n\nwhich reads thus:"ಸದಪದಟಸಬರ 2016 ರಲಲ ಆರದದದಪಗದ\n ನಸಲದಲವರದ ಲಕ ರದಪಸಯಗಳನದನ ಕದದಡದವ\n ಆರರಕ ಸಸಮಥಲವದದ ನನಗದ ಇರಲಲಲ . ಎಸರರದ\n ನಸನದ ಆದಸಯ ತದರಗದ ಪಸವತದಸರನಲಲ ."29. I have perused the contents of the complainant and\n\ndeposition of P.W.1 on perusal of the same it is clear that,29Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nthe complainant no where stated in the complaint or in\n\nthe chief examination about his financial capacity and source\n\nof income to advanced the loan. Even the complainant did\n\nnot produced any single document to show that he was\n\nhaving financial capacity and source of income to advance\n\nthe said loan of Rs.4,50,000/­. Now it is relevant extract the\n\nchief examination of PW.1 at page 5, last lines which\n\ncontinued to page No.6, which reads thus:"ನಸನದ ನನನ ರದರನಲಸಲಗಲದ ನನನ ಮದಖಲ\n ವಚಸರಣದಯ ಪದಮಸಣಪತದರಲಸಲಗಲದ ನಸನದ\n ಎನದ ಕದಲಸ ಮಸಡದತತದದದದನದ, ನನಗದ ಎಲಲಸರ\n ರದಡದಡ ಬಸತದ ಎಸಬದರನದನ ಹದದಳಲಲ ಎಸಬ\n ಸಲಹದಯನದನ ಆರದದದಪಯ ಪರ ವಕದಲರದ\n ಸಸಕಗದ ಹದದಳ‍ತತದಸದರದ. ಸರರ ಅಸಶವವ\n ಫರಸರದದಸರರ ರದರನಲಲ ಮತದತ ಪದಮಸಣ\n ಪತದರ ಅಸಶರಲಲಯದ ನಮದದಸದದದ\n ಇರದದರರಸರ ಸರರ ಸಜದಶನ‍ ಸದಕತವಲಲವದಸರದ\n ಪರಗಣಸ ಅರನದನ ನರಸಕರಸಲಸಯತದ ."30. Now it is relevant extract law laid down by the\n\nHon'ble Appex Court in criminal appeal No. 636/2019. In30Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\ncase of Basalingappa V/s Mudibasappa. The lordship\n\nhave held in the decision at Para 24 at Page 30 of the\n\njudgment, which reads thus:"During his cross­examination,\n when financial capacity to pay Rs. 6\n lakhs to the accused was\n questioned, there was no\n satisfactory reply given by the\n complainant. The evidence on\n record, thus, is a probable defence\n on behalf of the accused, which\n shifted the burden on the\n complainant to prove his financial\n capacity and other facts."31. Further, the Learned Counsel for the appellate\n\nrelied on the decision reported in 2019(1) KCCR 212 in\n\ncase ofB.P. Venkatesulu v/s K.P. Maninayar. He lordship\n\nheld thus:"CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,\n 1974­Sections 397 and 401­31Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nNEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS\nACT. 1981­Sections 138and139­\nPresumption that the holder of a\ncheque received the cheque for the\ndischarge, in whole or in part, of\nany debt or liability­Presumption\nrebuttable and may get displaced by\nthe very prosecution material on\nrecord or through independent\nevidence led by the accused or from\nsuspicious circumstance clouding\nthe prosecution case and damaging\nit.Held: That under the facts\nand circumstances of the case\narising out of alleged a loan\nagreement dated 14.8.1987\nexecuted in favour of thecomplainant and dated 14.12.1990\nfor repayment of the principal\namount referred to in the\nagreement, even though the\nagreement stipulated repayment\nwithin 4 years from the date of the32Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n agreement with interest at 12%\n p.a., together with erasure and\n retyping of the month "12" in the\n agreement and complainant himself\n not having been shown to have\n been financially capable of\n advancing Rs.1,50,000/­ to the\n accused as on the date of the alleged\n agreement, the presumption undersection 139stood rebutted.\n Therefore, the Sessions Judge was\n right in setting aside the conviction\n of the accused by the Magistrate\n and acquitting him."32. Further, the Learned Counsel for the appellant\n\nrelied on the decision reported in 2012 (3) KCCR 2057 in\n\ncase ofVeerayya v/s G.K. Madivalar."Criminal Revision petition No.\n 1571 of 2010, decided on\n 30.11.2011\n A. NEGOTIABLE INSTURMENTS\n ACT, 1881­section 138­Offence33Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nunder­Revision against\nconviction and sentenceu/s 397and401of Cr.P.C­Complainanant's\ncase that he had lent Rs. 2,00,000/­\ntp accused and that the cheque was\nissued in discharge of debt­ Axcept\nCheque no other document­\nComplainant running a Tailoring\nshop on foot path with a tin shed­\nAT no point of time had a bank\nbalance of more than Rs.50,000/­\nNo proof as to other source of\nincome from land­No evidence that\nhe had a Bank balance of Rs. 2\nlakhs on the day he has alleged to\nhave advanced the loan­His Civil\nSuit was dismissed as not proved­\naccused's contention that cheque\ngiven to his counsel was misused by\ncomplainant and his advocate.Held, mere issuance of cheque\nis not sufficient unless it is shown\nthat said cheque was issued towards\ndischarge of a legally recoverable34Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n debt­when the financial\n capacity of complainant is\n questioned, the complainant has to\n establish his financial capacity­\n Judgments of courts below were set\n aside­ petitioner was acquitted of\n offenceu/s 139of N.I. Act."33. Further, the Learned Counsel for the appellant\n\nrelied on the decision reported in 2008 (4) KCCR 2477 in\n\ncase of Shivamurthy v/s Amruthraj.Criminal Revision Petition No. 1507 of 2005, decided\n\non 27.06.2008\n\n "NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT,\n 181­Sections 138and142­ Cheque\n Bouncing­Concurrent findings of\n conviction challenged in revision­\n accused revision petitioner\n convicted for having a dishonored\n a cheque for Rs. 75,000/­\n Complainant alleging hand loan­\n question of payment made towards35Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nlegally enforceable\ndebt­presumption arisingu/s 139­\nWhether rebutted­case of the\naccused was that two blank cheques\nwere stolen by his employee, and\none was misused by the\ncomplainant­ct as well as the first\nappellant court on the admission\nthat the cheque was admitted to\nhave the signature of the accused\nconvicted the accused.In revision Held: Even\naccording to the complainant there\nwas no documentary evidence to\nprove lending of money of Rs.75,000/­ to the accused and accused\nhas not executed any document\nevidencing receipt of money as\nloan.Apart from his oral evidence,\nthe complainant has not placed any\nother evidence to prove the existence\nof legally enforceable debt or\nliability. AS noticed above, there is36Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n no documentary evidence in\n proof of lending of Rs. 75,000/­\n It is only after satisfying that\n the complainant has proved\n existence of legally enforceable debt\n or liability, the Court could have\n proceeded to draw presumptionu/s\n 139plaintiff theN.I. Actand\n thereafter find out as to whether or\n not the accused has rebutted the\n said presumption."34. Further, the Learned Counsel for the appellant\n\nrelied on the decision reported in ILR 2009 KAR 172 in\n\ncase ofSri A.V. Vishwanath Pai v/s Sri. Vivekanand S.\n\nBhat."NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT,\n 1881 ­SECTION 138­ offence under­\n Conviction­Appealed against and\n sentence - Conviction and sentence\n confirmed­revision against ­Section\n 139­Presumption under­Held,\n Existence ofg legally recoverable37Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\ndebt is not a matter of\npresumption undersection 139of\nthe Act; as,section 139merely\nraises a presumption in favour of\nthe complainant that the cheque\nwas issued for discharge of any debt\nand other liability­ Both the Courts\nexamined the case of the accused on\nthe assumption that the\npresumption undersection 139of\nthe Negotiable Instruments Act\nextends not only to the issuing of\nthe said cheque towards existing\nlegally recoverable debt but also to\nthe existence of legally enforceable\ndebt as on the date of its issue. ON\nFACTS,HELD, the accused has\nsuccessfully established his defence\nversion by adducing his own\nevidence and also by eliciting in the\ncross­examination of PW.1, and\nalso by producing Ex.D.1, the\nstatement of his accounts with his\nBanker. Therefore, it is quite clear38Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n that as on the date of the\n cheque in question, bearing No.\n 973199, which came to be\n presented during the year 2004,\n there did not exist any legally\n enforceable debt payable by the\n accused to the complainant. Hence,\n Conviction and sentence passed by\n the trial court/affirmed by the\n Appellant Court is not sustainable\n in law."35. Further, the Learned Counsel for the appellant\n\nrelied on the decision reported in 2013 (3) KCCR 1940 in\n\ncase ofSmt. Lakshmi Subramanya v/s B.V. Nagesh. The\n\nlordship have held at Head Note­C thus:"C. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS\n Act, 1981­Section 138­Acquittal­Factum of lending­ Complainant\n nor reflecting in his IT return­\n Acccused borrowing Rs. 5 lakhs­\n Documentary evidence showing\n payment of that amount and Rs. 339Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n lakhs towards interest­\n Complainant's allegation of lending\n Rs. 8 lakhs cannot be sustained­\n After appreciation of evidence\n Magistrate Justified in acquitting\n accused."36. The specific case of the complainant is that accused\nis Civil Contractor by profession and he was under need of\nmoney for improvement of his business. In the month of\nSeptember 2016 the accused had approached the\ncomplainant for financial assistance of Rs.4,50,000/­. On the\nrequest of the accused, complainant had advanced the loan of\nRs.4,50,000/­. In order to repay the said amount, the\naccused had paid sum of Rs.26,000/­ on 12.1.2017 and\nissued cheque in question for remaining amount, same was\ndishonoured. After compliance of provisions ofSection 138of N.I. Act, the complainant has filed complaint. In support\nof his claim the complainant produced as many as 8\ndocuments, which have been marked at Ex.P.1 to P.8.Ex.P.1 is the original cheque dated 20.5.2017, which\nbears the signature of accused. Ex.P.2 is the original cheque\ndated 13.5.2017 for the amount of Rs.1,93,000/­ and\nRs.2,31,000/­ respectively and Ex.P.3 and P.4 are the bank40Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nendorsements. Ex.P.5 is the legal notice and Ex.P.6 and\nP.7 are the postal receipts and acknowledgement. Ex.P.8 is\nthe reply notice.On perusal of the oral and documentary evidence led by\nthe parties, it is clear that issuance of the cheque and\nsignature is not in dispute. Thus, the trial court has given\ninitial benefits ofSection 139of N.I. Act. Ofcourse, the\naccused has admitted signature on the cheque such admission\nare entitle for prosecution as per the lawlaid down inRangappa case. But, it is a rebuttal presumption. If the\naccused rebutted the presumption by producing documentary\nevidence or by eliciting from the complainant in the cross\nexamination then again burden of proof of complainant's\ncase shift on the complainant to prove his case. In the case\non hand, on perusal of the oral and documentary evidence as\ndiscussed, the accused has rebutted presumption available to\nthe complainant but, complainant failed to prove his case\nafter rebutting the presumption.37. I have gone through the impugned judgment it is\nseen that, trial court has relied on the admission of the\naccused that the accused has admitted the signature and\nissuance of cheque hence, the complainant has proved the\ningredients of section of 138 ofN.I. Act. The findings of the41Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\ntrial court is not correct for the reason that though it is a\nsettle principal of law that on admission of signature on the\ncheque is sufficient to hold that the complainant is entitle to\nhave a shelteru/s 139of N.I. Act but, that is not the proof of\ncase of the complainant,section 139of the N.I. Act shifts the\nburden of the proof on the accused. If, the accused\nsucceeded in rebutting the presumption then again it is for\nthe complainant to prove his case independently, if the\ncomplainant failed to prove his case after rebuttal of the\npresumption then the accused is entitled for the acquittal.\nSo, accused has rebutted the presumption by producing the\ndocumentary evidence. In the case hand trial court did not\nconsider the evidence of accused and documents produce by\nthe accused at Ex. D.1 to D.6. Ex. D.2 is the document which\nclearly establishes that the accused has taken loan of Rs.\n1,06,24,933/­. Further Ex. D.2 gives the details of the loan\ntaken by the accused in the Hindujja Leyland Finance Ltd,\nto substantiate this fact the complainant has clearly admitted\nthat complainant and Ravindra Babu had acted has a\nmediator in availing loan from Hindujja Leyland Finance Ltd.38. When the accused proves that the complainant was\nnot having source of income to advanced the loan. Even\ncomplainant did not stated the fact that he was financially fit42Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nfor advancing the loan. The trial court has totally ignored\nthe evidence of accused with reference to financial capacity of\nthe complainant.39.Section 139of the N.I Act shifts the burden on the\naccused to prove the fact which rebuttes the presumption\ntaken by the complainant.Section 139of the N.I. Act is only\nshifts the burden of proof but it does not provides that the\ncomplainant has proved the ingredients ofsection 139of N.I.\nAct if in case complainant was provided shelteru/s 139of\nN.I. Act.40. On perusal of the entire material placed before the\n\ncourt and on re­appreciation of oral and documentary\n\nevidence it is clearly established that the accused has rebutted\n\nthe presumption available to the complainant by proving the\n\nfact that complainant was not having financial capacity to\n\nadvance the loan, On the other hand, the complainant failed\n\nto prove his financial capacity after rebutting the\n\npresumption. Further by proving the fact that the complaint\n\nwas acted as mediator to have loan from the Bank.43Crl.A. No.25162/201841. Further, the complainant failed to prove\nthe existence of legally recoverable debt since, there is no\ndocument to show that he has paid the loan amount of Rs.\n4,50,000/­ to the accused. It is admitted by the complainant\nthat when accused approached to the complainant for\nfinancial help at that time he has introduced Ravindrakumar\nBabu who had contact with the banks and he can help the\naccused in availing the loan for the accused. This fact clearly\nestablishes that the accused was not financially fit to advance\nthe loan to the accused. Further,it is admitted in the cross­\nexamination that said Ravindra Babu has introduced the\naccused to the Hindujja Leyland Finance Ltd and the\naccused has taken loan from the said finance more then one\ncrore through said Ravindra Babu, which corroborates\nEx.D.2 . On these admitted facts it can be safely held that\nthe complainant was not financially fit for advancing the loan\nto the accused and there was no legally recoverable debt. In\nsupport of my finding I relied on the decision reported in\n(2015)1 Supreme Court cases 99 in case of K. Subramani\nV/s K. Damodhara Naidu. The lordships have held that:"Debt, Financial and Monetary Laws-Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881-\n Ss. 138, 118 and 139 - Dishonour of44Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\ncheque - Legally recoverable debt\nnot proved as complainant could not\nprove source of income from which\nalleged loan was made to appellant­\naccused - Presumption in favour of\nholder of cheque, hence, held, stood\nrebutted - Acquittal restored.­ Accused took a loan of Rs.14\nlakhs in cash from complainant,\npromising to repay with 3% interest\nper month and issued post­dated\ncheque - Cheque was dishonoured\nwith an endorsement "funds\ninsufficient" ­ Trial court acquitted\nappellant for want of proof of\nlegally recoverable debt payable by\naccused - High Court set aside\nacquittal and remanded the case for\nretrial finding that presumption\nunderS. 139of NI Act accrues to\nbenefit of complainant unless\naccused rebuts that presumption -\nSource of loan amount claimed by\ncomplainant to be savings from his45Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nsalary and an amount of Rs.5\nlakhs derived by him from sale of\nSite No.45 belonging to him - There\nis no averment with regard to said\nsale in complaint or in chief­\nexamination of complainant or in\nhis income tax return -Complainant obtained a loan of\nRs.1,49,205/­ from LIC in year\n1997 when alleged loan of Rs.14\nlakhs is claimed to have been\ndisbursed to appellant - Wife of\ncomplainant in another criminal\ncase stated that present accused had\nnot taken any loan from her\nhusband - Held, trial court rightly\ncame to conclusion that\ncomplainant had no source of\nincome to lend a sum of Rs.14 lakhs\nto accused and he failed to prove\nthat there was any legally\nrecoverable debt payable by accused\nto him."46Crl.A. No.25162/201842. I relied on decision reported in (2014)2\n\nSCC 236, In case of John K. Avraham V/s Simon C.\n\nAvraham,and another. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held\n\nthus:"Debt, financial and monetary laws­\n negotiable instrument Act, 1881­Ss.\n 118, 139 and 138­dishonour of\n cheque­drawing presumptionsu/s\n 118r/wsection 139­Pre requisites\n for, when cheque is repayment of a\n loan/advanced money­proof\n required on the part complainant­\n Held, in order to draw presumption\n u/s 118 r/wsection 139, burden\n lies on complainant to show:(i) that he had the requisite funds\n for advancing the sum of money/\n loan in question to accused, (ii)\n that the issuance of cheque by\n accused in support of repayment of\n money advanced was true, and iii)\n that the accused was bound to\n make payment as had been averred47Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nwhile issuing cheque in\nfavour of complainant­in present\ncase complainant not aware of the\ndate when substantial amount of\nRs.1,50,000/­ was advanced by him\nto appellant­accused­Respondent\ncomplainant failed to produce\nrelevant documents in support of\nthe alleged source for advancing\nmoney to accused­complainant also\nnot aware as to be when and where\ntransaction took place for which\ncheque in question was issued to\nhim by accused­complainant also\nnot sure as to who wrote the\ncheque and making contradictory\nstatements in this regard­in view of\nthe said serious defects/lacunae in\nevidence of complainant, judgment\nof High Court reversing acquittal\naccused by trial court, held, was\nperverse and could not sustained­\nacquittal restored."48Crl.A. No.25162/201843. Further, I relied on the judgment passed by the\n\nHon'ble High Court, Mumbai in C/A No.4694/2008\n\ndecided on 24.2.2009(Bombay) in case of Sanjay Mishra/s\n\nKanishka Kapoor @ Nikki and another. The lordships have\n\nheld that:"(a)Negotiable Instruments Act,\n SS. 138 Explanation and 139­\n Dishnonour of cheque­Respondenty\n acquitted of offence punishable\n undersection 138, Negotiable\n Instruments Act­amount allegedly\n advanced to the respondent was\n unaccounted cash­ applicant had\n not disclosed the same to the\n income tax department at the\n relevant time and therefore it was\n an unaccounted amount­it could\n not be said that liability to rep[ay\n unaccounted cash amount was a\n legally enforceable debt within the\n meaning of explanation tosection\n 138of the Act­ Order of trial court49Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\nacquitting the respondent was\nproper application rejected(Paras\n11 to 13)(b) Negotiable Instruments Acts,\nSS. 138 and 139­ Presumption\nunder ­in order to attractsection\n138, the debt or liability has to be a\n"legally recoverable" debt or\nliability.(para12)(c) Negotiable Instruments Acts,S.\n138­Applicability­provision ofsection 138cannot be resorted to\nfor recovery of unaccounted\namount­A cheque issued in\ndischarge of alleged liability of\nrepaying "unaccounted" cash\namount cannot be said to be a\ncheque issued in discharge of a\nlegally enforceable debt or liability\nwithin the meaning of explanation\ntosection 138of the Act­Such an\neffort to misuse the provision ofsection 138has to be discouraged.50Crl.A. No.25162/2018(d) negotiable Instruments\nAct,S.139­ Presumption under­\nRebuttal of ­Considerations.It is true that merely because\namount advanced is not shown in\nIncome Tax Return, in every case,\none cannot jump to be conclusion\nthat the presumption undersection\n139of the Negotiable Instruments\nAct stands rebutted. There may be\ncases where a small amount less\nthan sum of Rs. 20,000/­is\nadvanced in cash by way of loan\nwhich not shown the said amount\nin the Income Tax Return as it is\nrepayable within few days or few\nmonths in the Income Tax Return as\nit is repayable within few days or\nfew months in the same financial\nyear. In such a case the failure to\nshow the amount in the Income Tax\nReturn not by itself amount to\nrebuttal of presumption undersection 139of the said Act. If in a51Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\ngiven case the amount\nadvanced by the complainant to the\naccused is a large amount in\nIncome Tax return or Books of\nAccounts of the complainant may be\nsufficient to rebut the presumption\nundersection 139of the Act. (para7)(e) Negotiable Instruments Acts,\nSS. And 138­ Presumption under\n­fro rebutting the presumption\nundersection 139, it is not\nnecessary in every case for the\naccused to step into the witness box­\nstandard of proof on the part of the\naccused and that of prosecution in a\ncriminal case is different­\nProsecution has to prove so as to\nprove a defense is "preponderance\nof probability" ­Inference of\npreponderance of probabilities can\nbe drawn even by reference to\ncircumstantials.(para)1152Crl.A. No.25162/2018(f)Negotiable Instruments\n Act,S.138­ Object of ­is to ensure\n that commercial and mercantile\n activities are conducted in smooth\n and healthy manner­ Explanation\n tosection 138clearly provides the\n debt or other liability referred to in\n section means a legally enforceable\n debt or other liability­if liability to\n repay unaccounted cash amount is\n held to be a legally recoverable\n debt, it will render the explanation\n tosection 138nugatory. (Para15)"44.In support of my finding I relied on the decision\n\nreported in 2016(5) KCCR 1341 in case ofSmt. Threja v/s\n\nSmt. Jayalaxmi, The Hon'ble High Court of Katakana held\n\nthus:"Criminal Revision Petition No. 662of 2010, decided on 6.4.2016.Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881­Sections 138,139and118­\n Acquittal­ Legally recoverable debt­53Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n Burden lies on complainant to\n prove­ Source of income­\n complainant not producing any\n bank account details to support her\n claim­ also admitting that there\n was no monetary transaction\n between her and accused­Check's\n issued by complainant to accused\n not forthcoming­ accused pleading\n that cheque in question was not\n issued for a vialing money from\n complainant­Courts below\n attaching much importance to\n presumption undersections 118and139without looking into\n categorical admission elicited from\n complainant­judgment of conviction\n set aside."45. In support my finding I relied on the decision\n\nreported in ILR 2007 KAR 2709 in case of M. Senguttuvan\n\nv/s Mahadev Swamy. The lordships have held that:54Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n"NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS\nACT, 1881­SECTION 138­Offence\nunder­Section 139­Presumption\nunder­Rebuttal of­Order of\nacquittal­Appealed against­HELD,\nThat the presumption underSection\n139of the Act need not be rebutted\nonly by leading defence evidence\nand the said presumption can be\nrebutted even on the basis of the\nfacts elicited in the cross­\nexamination of the complainant as\nhas been done in the present case­\nJudgment of acquittal is justified."In support my finding I relied on the\ndecision reported in ILR 2007 KAR\n2709 in case of M. Senguttuvan\nv/s Mahadev Swamy. The\nlordships have held that:"NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT,\n1881­SECTION 138­Offence under­Section 139­Presumption under­\nRebuttal of­Order of acquittal­\nAppealed against­HELD, That the55Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n presumption underSection\n 139of the Act need not be rebutted\n only by leading defence evidence\n and the said presumption can be\n rebutted even on the basis of the\n facts elicited in the cross­\n examination of the complainant as\n has been done in the present case­\n Judgment of acquittal is justified."on admitted fact and the evidence\n led by the accused it can be safely\n held that accused rebutted the\n presumptionu/s 139of N.I.Act."46. On appreciating the oral and documentary\n\nevidence led by both the parties and material placed before\n\nthe court and reasons assigned and relying on the decision\n\nreferred above, the observation of the trial court in the\n\njudgment of conviction, recorded by the trial court, in CC\n\nNo. 52795/2018, dated: 09.08.2018, is not correct under the\n\nlaw and fact interference of this court required. Hence, I\n\nanswer this point in the Affirmative.56Crl.A. No.25162/201847. POINT No.2: In view of the discussion made\n\non point No.1, I proceed to pass the following:­\n\n ORDER\n\n The appeal preferred by the\n Appellant/Accused, U/S 374 of\n theCr.P.C. is hereby allowed.Consequently, the judgment of\n conviction and sentence recorded\n by the learned XIV ACMM Court,\n Mayohall Unit, Bengalore, in CC\n No 52795/2018, dated\n 09.08.2018, convicting the\n Appellant/Accused for the offence\n punishable U/s 138 of theN.I.\n Act, is hereby set­aside and the\n Appellant/Accused is hereby\n acquitted for the offences\n punishable U/s 138 of the\n N.I.Act.Further, the trial court is\n hereby directed to release 20%\n of cheque amount with fine57Crl.A. No.25162/2018\n\n\n amount of Rs. 5000/­ in thename of the Appellant/Accused,\n after proper identification if the\n accused/appellant deposited\n 20% of the cheques amount with\n fine amount Rs. 5000/­ in order\n to comply with the order\n passed by this court on\n 10.09.2018, after appeal period.Remit the LCR to the trial\n court, along with the copy of the\n judgment.No order as to costs.(Dictated to the Stenographer, on computer, after\ncomputerization, corrected and pronounced by me the Open\nCourt, this the 30th day of January, 2021.)\n\n\n\n (Yamanappa Bammanagi)\n LXXIII Addl. CC & SJ, M.H. Unit,\n B'luru.(CCH­74)\n 58\n Crl.A. No.25162/2018

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Andhra Pradesh High Court - AmravatiM/S. J M Laboratories vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 16 June, 2023l' `.i\nI\n\n\n\n\n ` lN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMA\n FRIDAY, THE SIXTEENTH DAY OF JUNE\n ll^/O THOUSAND AND TWENTY THREE\n :PRESENT:\n THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE K SREENIVASA REDDY\n\n IANo. 2OF2022\n IN\n CRLP NO: 7682 OF 2022\n ` Between:\n 1. M/s. J M Laboratories, Village bhanat, P.O Ghatti,Subathu Road, Solan,\n HimachaI Pradesh 173211, Represented by its partners & Authorized\n signatory\n 2. Sri. Sandeep Sharma, Partner, M/s J M Laboratories, Village- bhanat, P.O\n Ghatti,Subathu Road, Solan, HimachaI Pradesh 173211 S/o Sukhdev Mani\n Sharma, R/o Block No.7, Sugndha Apartments, South Enclave, Near Saproon\n Gurudevara Sahib, Solan, Himachal;--Pfadesh\n 3. Smt. Veena Sharma, Partner,LM/s J M Laboratories, Village-bhanat. P.O\n Ghatti,Subathu Road, Solah, Himachal Pradesh 173211 W/o. -Sandeep\n Sharma,block No 7, Sugndha Apartinents, South Enclave. Near Saproon\n Gurudevara Sahib, Solan. Hi'inachal',PFadesh.\n 4. SrI'. Sahil Sharma, Partner, M/s J M Laboratories, Village- bhanat, P.O Ghattil\n Subathu Road, Solan, Himachal Pradesh 173211 S/o. Sandeep Sharma, R/o\n block No 7, Sugndha Apartments, South Enclave, Near Saproon Gurudevara\n Sahib, Solan, HimachaI Prad6sh. ,,`l.ill.\n 5. Sri. Kumar Rakesh Vijay, Partner, M/s J M Laboratories, Village- bhanat, P.O\n Ghatti, Subathu Road, Solan, HimachaI Pradesh 173211 S/o Gunnidhi, R/o\n H.No 1105, M See 04, Punchkulla, Haryana,\n ...Petitioners/Accused 1 to 5\n\n AND\n 1. The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep-by its Public Prosecutor, High Court of\n Judicature at Amaravathi,\n 2. The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep by-Drug Inspector, Tuni, East Godavari\n Dl'strict,\n i,\n\n I\n ...Respondents\n La\n Petition under section 482 of.Cr.P.Craying that in the circumstances stated\n in the memo of grounds filed in s!upporffof.-the -petition, th-e-hid-h--6-;iri--m-a`y-`b-;\n Pleased tO Stay all further proceedings including the appearance of the\n PetitI'OnerS/Accused 1 to 5 I'n CC':699 of 2019 Dt.09.07.2019 on the file of lSt\n ADDITIONAL JUDICIAL FIRST CRASS MAGISTRATE- TUNl, for the alleged\n offence punishable under Sectl'pn.27 (d). of the Drugs andCosmetics Act. 1940 ,I\n Pending dl'sposal of CRLP No. 7682 of 2022, on the file of the High Court.\n\n Petl'tion coming on for hearing, upon perusing the petition and the\n memorandum of grounds filed in support thereof and the earlier order of the High\n Court dt.29.09.2022 made herein and upon hearing the arguments of sRl'€\n THANDAVA YOGESH, Advocate for the petitioners, and of ASSISTANT PUBLIC\n PROSECUTOR for the Respondent No.1, the Court made the following\n\n\n\n\n + i\n prc RDER-.\n\n llAt request, list the matter 6h, '26,06-~,2023,\n\n Interim order granted ear[je; js extended for a further period of three (3)\n weeks."\n\n 3, `\n -I\n\n\n\n\n }|\n 'pF\n Sd/-B. CHITTI JOSEPH\n ASSISTAN\n\n\n / L=\n a _ =c-co-a\n I lTIF¥UE 'CdPY I I\n A:\n\n SECTION OFFICER\n The I Addl't,tonal Judl-cial Magistrate of First class, TunI'.\n one cc to sRl. THANDAVA YOGESH, Advocate [opuc]\n Two ccs to publ,-c prosecutor ,Hl'gh Court ofAP [OUT]\n One spare copy\n\n ER ( ,I\n\n\n\n\n ? /\n\n\n\n\n i| <--\n Jr\n\n\n\n\n +\n\n\n\n\n i=\n\n\n\n\n//,\n j*\n\n\n\n\nHIGH COURT\n\n\n\n\nSRKJ\n\n\n\n\nDATED: 16/O6/2023\n\n\n\n\nNOTE I. LIST THE MATTER ON 26.06.2O23\n\n\n\n\n ORDERlANo. 2OF 2022\n IN\n CRLP NO: 7682 OF 2022\n\n\n\n\n INTERIM ORDER EXTENDED

24b6bd4e-9126-527e-b3ff-1da95f77ff91

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Take notes as you read a judgment using our Virtual Legal Assistant and get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out our Premium Member services -- Free for one month.\n\nSecurities Appellate Tribunal\nSunil Patel vs Sebi on 28 February, 2022\nBEFORE THE SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL\n MUMBAI\n Date : 28.02.2022\n\n Misc. Application No. 674 of 2021\n And\n Appeal No. 461 of 2021\n\nSoma Textiles & Industries Ltd. & Ors. ... Appellants\n\n Versus\n\nSecurities & Exchange Board of India ...Respondent\n\n\n With\n Misc. Application No. 731 of 2021\n And\n Appeal No. 462 of 2021\nP. Bandyopadhyay ....Appellant\n\n Versus\n\nSecurities & Exchange Board of India .... Respondent\n\n\n With\n Misc. Application No. 768 of 2021\n And\n Appeal No. 463 of 2021\nSunil Patel ..... Appellant\n\n Versus\n\nSecurities and Exchange Board of India ... Respondent\n\n\nMs. Aishwarya Shubhangi, Advocate i/b Triad Law Chambers for\nthe Appellants.\n 2\n\n\nMr. Mihir Mody, Advocate with Mr. Arnav Misra, Mr. Mayur\nJaisingh, Advocates i/b K. Ashar & Co. for the Respondent.\n\n\nORDER :\n1. Adjourned on the request of the learned counsel for the\n\nappellant. List on April 6, 2022.\n\n\n2. Parties will take instructions from the Registrar 48 hrs. before\n\nthe date fixed in order to find out as to whether the appeal would be\n\nheard through video conference or through physical hearing.\n\n\n3. The present matter was heard through video conference due\n\nto Covid-19 pandemic. At this stage, it is not possible to sign a copy\n\nof this order nor a certified copy of this order could be issued by the\n\nRegistry. In these circumstances, this order will be digitally signed\n\nby the Private Secretary on behalf of the bench and all concerned\n\nparties are directed to act on the digitally signed copy of this order.\n\nParties will act on production of a digitally signed copy sent by fax\n\nand/or email.\n\n\n Justice Tarun Agarwala\n Presiding Officer\n\n\n Justice M. T. Joshi\n RAJALA Digitally\n by\n signed Judicial Member\n28.02.2022 KSHMI NAIR\n RAJALAKSHMI H\n\n Date: 2022.03.03\nPTM H NAIR 16:58:50 +05'30'

b333be1b-718b-552b-afe5-6e8b35316734

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Rajasthan High CourtSuresh Mali S/O Madho Lal Mali vs State Of Rajasthan on 18 February, 2021Author:Ashok Kumar GaurBench:Ashok Kumar GaurHIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN\n BENCH AT JAIPUR\n\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 8306/2020\n\nVandana Tak W/o Shri Chiranji Lal Tak,\n ----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan\n ----RespondentConnected With\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10252/2020\nBanshi Lal Saini S/o Shri Moolchand Saini----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10775/2020\nShiv Prasad S/o Durga Lal Agarwal----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10838/2020\nJamana Lal S/o Girdhar Singh----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10843/2020\nPrem Singh Panwar S/o Roop Singh Panwar----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11785/2020\nAjit Arora S/o Shri Baljeet Singh Arora----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 6178/2020\nHotel Paramount(Downloaded on 19/02/2021 at 09:53:25 PM)(2 of 16) [CW-8306/2020]----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 8303/2020\nSports Restaurant----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 8305/2020\nJagdamba Restaurant----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 8309/2020\nHotel Paramount----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9318/2020\nHina Restaurant----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10089/2020\nSports Restaurant----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10090/2020\nJagdamba Restaurant----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10241/2020(Downloaded on 19/02/2021 at 09:53:25 PM)(3 of 16) [CW-8306/2020]\n\n\nJyoti Devi W/o Shri Vinod Kumar----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10242/2020\nPooja D/o Shri Suresh Chand Yadav----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10243/2020\nGyan Prakash Sharma S/o Shri Hariram Sharma,----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10244/2020\nVinod Garg S/o Shri Bal Mukand----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10245/2020\nKhema Gupta W/o Shri Vijay Kumar----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10246/2020\nPooja D/o Shri Karan Singh----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10247/2020\nJaideep Rathee S/o Shri Bhagwan Rathee----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent(Downloaded on 19/02/2021 at 09:53:25 PM)(4 of 16) [CW-8306/2020]\n\n\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10248/2020\nSumit Kumar S/o Shri Balraj Singh,----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10249/2020\nSahina D/o Shri Rahul Khan----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10250/2020\nKamla Devi W/o Shri Indra Prakash Malhotra----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10251/2020\nMukesh Sharma S/o Shri Manohar Lal Sharma----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10253/2020\nMithlesh W/o Shri Sheetal Chand----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10254/2020\nSita Kanwar W/o Shri Nand Singh Rajawat----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10255/2020\nAshok Kumar S/o Shri Kishori Lal----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan(Downloaded on 19/02/2021 at 09:53:25 PM)(5 of 16) [CW-8306/2020]----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10256/2020\nOmprakash Yadav S/o Shri Brijmohan Yadav----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10257/2020\nSushma D/o Shri Abhay Singh----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10258/2020\nSona Bai Balai W/o Shri Rakesh Kumar----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10259/2020\nMahendra Kumar Jaiswal S/o Shri Shobhnath----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10260/2020\nSivram S/o Shri Bhore Lal----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10611/2020\nChotya @ Chhotya Meena S/o Shri Ramhet Meena----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10695/2020\nGanpat Bairwa S/o Korya Bairwa,----Petitioner\n Versus(Downloaded on 19/02/2021 at 09:53:25 PM)(6 of 16) [CW-8306/2020]\n\n\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10710/2020\nGuddi Gurjar W/o Gambhir Gurjar----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10711/2020\nManisha Kumari D/o Prabhu Lal----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10712/2020\nGayatri Devi W/o Mansingh Gurjar----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10724/2020\nForanti Devi W/o Shri Ramesh Meena----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10727/2020\nMeena W/o Akheraj Singh Naruka----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10729/2020\nRamsahay Gurjar S/o Kailash Chand Gurjar----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10740/2020\nAmit Kumar Bansal S/o Shri Shiv Prasad Bansal,----Petitioner(Downloaded on 19/02/2021 at 09:53:25 PM)(7 of 16) [CW-8306/2020]\n\n\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10741/2020\nArvind Kumar Mahawar S/o Shri Mohan Lal Mahawar,----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10748/2020\nMeva Devi W/o Ram Kishan----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10766/2020\nAniruddh Singh Chauhan S/o Brajmohan Singh Chauhan----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10776/2020\nVijay Kumari W/o Chhotu Singh----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10777/2020\nSmt. Sanjay Saini W/o Shri Meghraj Saini----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10785/2020\nKuldeep Kour W/o Sudarshan Bhatiya----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10789/2020\nPriyanka Bairwa D/o Harkesh Bairwa,(Downloaded on 19/02/2021 at 09:53:25 PM)(8 of 16) [CW-8306/2020]----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10842/2020\nKamlesh Gauttam S/o Hari Prasad Gauttam----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10898/2020\nLaxman Singh Khichi S/o. Shri Onkar Singh Khichi----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11050/2020\nManoj Kumar S/o Radheshyam----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11337/2020\nSavita W/o Shri Jasram----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11340/2020\nManju Devi W/o Shri Basant Kumar----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11343/2020\nPayal Jain W/o Shri Sourabh Jain----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11665/2020(Downloaded on 19/02/2021 at 09:53:25 PM)(9 of 16) [CW-8306/2020]\n\n\nM/s Sunil Wines----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11666/2020\nM/s Royal Retailers----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11667/2020\nM/s Paan Wines----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11668/2020\nM/s Rakesh Wine----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11669/2020\nRajendra Rai S/o Shri Nand Kishore----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11670/2020\nJora Bhai S/o Shri Sadas Bhai Nai----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11671/2020\nM/s Deepanshu Wines----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent(Downloaded on 19/02/2021 at 09:53:25 PM)(10 of 16) [CW-8306/2020]\n\n\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11672/2020\nM/s Sparrow Store----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11673/2020\nKailash Chand Choudhary S/o Shri Munga Ram----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11678/2020\nChena Ram Kumawat S/o Shri Tilok Ram----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11679/2020\nM/s East Wines----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11680/2020\nM/s Ashish Wine----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11681/2020\nShiv Kishore S/o Shri Ram Sewak----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11682/2020\nJahangir Khan Nagra S/o Shri Saddik Mohammad Nagra----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan(Downloaded on 19/02/2021 at 09:53:25 PM)(11 of 16) [CW-8306/2020]----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11708/2020\nM/s Abhimanyu Wines----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11710/2020\nShubham Goyal S/o Shri Mohan Lal----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11752/2020\nRekha Sharma W/o Shri Kishan Sharma----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11768/2020\nKinni Kumar Saini W/o Shri Sharwan Lal Saini----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11770/2020\nNajma Bano W/o Shri Mohammad Skil----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11780/2020\nAnish Ali Panwar S/o Shri Riyaj Mohammad Panwar----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11781/2020\nM.s. Fajruddin Nirwan S/o Shri Mangi Lal Nirwan----Petitioner\n Versus(Downloaded on 19/02/2021 at 09:53:25 PM)(12 of 16) [CW-8306/2020]\n\n\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11782/2020\nSarita Sanwariya W/o Shri Surendra Kumar Sanwariya----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11783/2020\nTafjal Hussain Tak S/o Shri Mustak Ali----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11784/2020\nAslam Ali S/o Shri Manoj Ali----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11787/2020\nVijay Laxmi W/o Shri Brij Raj Shekhawat----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11788/2020\nNishit Dixit S/o Shri Dwarka Prasad Dixit----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11790/2020\nGokul Singh S/o Shri Radheshyam----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11791/2020\nSunil Arora S/o Shri Atmprakash----Petitioner(Downloaded on 19/02/2021 at 09:53:25 PM)(13 of 16) [CW-8306/2020]\n\n\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11792/2020\nMohd. Hafij S/o Shri Ibrahim Choupdar----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11793/2020\nTikam Chand S/o Shri Gopal Singh----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11797/2020\nGopal S/o Shri Govind Ram----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11789/2020\nGulab Singh Verma S/o Shri Sheesh Ram Verma----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11802/2020\nNeha Sharma W/o Shri Sachin Kumar----Petitioner\n Versus\nThe State Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12051/2020\nRamnri W/o Shri Mitha Lal----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12052/2020\nManbai D/o Shri Batti Lal Meena(Downloaded on 19/02/2021 at 09:53:25 PM)(14 of 16) [CW-8306/2020]----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12053/2020\nRakesh Kumar Meena S/o Shri Bharat Lal Meena----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12054/2020\nHotel Ranthambhore Van Vihar----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12129/2020\nKomal Kanwar W/o Shri Jitendra Singh Rajawat----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12130/2020\nBrijesh @ Birjesh Rai S/o Shri Chand Prakash Rai----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12131/2020\nRohitash Singh S/o Rajendra Singh----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12163/2020\nMadan Lal S/o Ramji Lal----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12164/2020(Downloaded on 19/02/2021 at 09:53:25 PM)(15 of 16) [CW-8306/2020]\n\n\nSuresh Mali S/o Madho Lal Mali----Petitioner\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan----Respondent\n\n\nFor Petitioner(s) : Mr.Ashutosh Bhatia, Adv.Mr.Veyankatesh Garg, Adv.\n Mr.Ashindra Gautam, Adv.\n Mr.Pradeep Kumar, Adv.For Respondent(s) : Mr.M.S. Singhvi, Advocate General\n assisted by Mr. Darsh Pareek, Adv. &\n Mr.Siddhant Jain, Adv.Mr.Praveen Poswal, Adv.Mr.Vivek Dangi, Adv. with Mr.Sameer\n Sharma & Mr.Hitesh Jadawat, Adv.Mr.Shiv Kumar Parihar, Adv.\n Mr.Prabhu Narayan Saini, Adv.\n Mr.Surendra Singh, Adv.HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR GAUR\n Order\n\n18/02/2021\n\n Learned Advocate General Mr.M.S. Singhvi submits that\n\nthough similar petitions have been dismissed by this Court while\n\npassing the order in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1441/2021\n\n(Girish Rangwani vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) and other\n\nconnected writ petitions, decided vide order dated 15.02.2021,\n\nhowever, if the petitioners intend to take benefit from the order\n\npassed by Division Bench at Principal Seat, Jodhpur in D.B.\n\nSpecial Appeal Writ No.50/2021 (Shyam Singh vs. State of\n\nRajasthan & Ors.) and other connected matters, at-least, the\n\npetitioners are required to furnish security to the State as the\n\nState may not suffer loss of the revenue in the event matters are\n\ndecided against the petitioners.(Downloaded on 19/02/2021 at 09:53:25 PM)(16 of 16) [CW-8306/2020]\n\n\n\n Learned counsel for the petitioners--Mr.Ashutosh Bhatia\n\n wants time to seek instructions from his clients as what kind of\n\n security can be furnished by them to the respondent-State.Learned counsel Mr.Ashutosh Bhatia further submits\n\n that after dismissal of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1441/2021\n\n (Girish Rangwani vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) by this Court, the\n\n Principal Seat at Jodhpur has again passed an interim order and\n\n learned counsel wants to produce the copy of the same.List all these cases on 23.02.2021 along-with S.B. Civil\n\n Writ Petition Nos.12598/2020, 12537/2020, 13204/2020,\n\n 13211/2020, 13760/2020, 12911/2020, 12912/2020,\n\n 12913/2020, 13111/2020, 13112/2020, 13113/2020,\n\n 13114/2020, 13118/2020, 12961/2020, 12962/2020,\n\n 13147/2020, 13155/2020, 13157/2020, 13179/2020,\n\n 13180/2020, 13213/2020, 13216/2020, 12949/2020,\n\n 12968/2020, 12960/2020, 13005/2020, 13168/2020,\n\n 13408/2020, 13409/2020, 13449/2020, 13450/2020,\n\n 12458/2020, 13718/2020, 13723/2020, 11608/2020,\n\n 11585/2020, 11590/2020, 11591/2020, 11588/2020,\n\n 11589/2020, 11593/2020, 11594/2020, 11586/2020,\n\n 11595/2020, 11587/2020, 11784/2020, 11592/2020,\n\n 13165/2020, 13166/2020, 13167/2020, 10090/2020, 8769/2020,\n\n 11432/2020, 11709/2020, 11862/2020, 12945/2020.8659/2020, 331/2021 & 140/2021.A copy of this order be placed in each petition.(ASHOK KUMAR GAUR), J\n Himanshu Soni/Sakshi/\n 209, 104-200 (except 189 & 198)(Downloaded on 19/02/2021 at 09:53:25 PM)Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

06d5856f-a68e-53eb-83e1-b59210d49035

court_cases

Madras High CourtFuture General India Insurance Company ... vs Mumtaz Begum on 24 August, 2020Author:S.M.SubramaniamBench:S.M.SubramaniamC.M.A.No.739 of 2020\n\n\n IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS\n\n DATED: 24-08-2020\n\n CORAM\n\n THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.M.SUBRAMANIAM\n\n C.M.A. No.739 of 2020\n And\n C.M.P.No.4548 of 2020\n\n\n Future General India Insurance Company Limited,\n No.55, Vijayaraghava Road,\n T.Nagar,\n Chennai-17. .. Appellant\n\n vs.\n\n\n 1.Mumtaz Begum\n\n 2.Rizwana Begum\n\n 3.Khader Mohideen\n\n 4.M/s.Indian Reinforcing Company Welded\n Mash Pvt. Ltd.,\n Old No.6, New No.13,\n Mount Poonamallee Road,\n Nandanambakkm,\n Chennai-600 089. .. Respondents\n\n\n\n\n 1/16\n\n\nhttp://www.judis.nic.in\n C.M.A.No.739 of 2020\n\n The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is preferred underSection 173of\n the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, against the judgment and decree dated\n 28.08.2019 passed in M.C.O.P. No.97 of 2015 on the file of the learned V\n Judge, V Small Causes Court-cum-Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal,\n Chennai.\n\n For Appellant : Ms.C.Harini for M/s.M.B.Gopalan\n Associates.\n\n For Respondents-1 to 3 : Mr.T.G.Balachandran\n\n For Respondent-4 : Notice sent, service awaited\n\n\n JUDGMENTThe appellant-Future General India Insurance Company\n\n Limited filed the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal, challenging the\n\n judgment and decree dated 28.08.2019 passed in M.C.O.P. No.97 of 2015\n\n on the file of the learned V Judge, V Small Causes Court-cum-Motor\n\n Accidents Claims Tribunal, Chennai.2. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-\n\n Insurance Company mainly contended that the quantum of compensation\n\n awarded by the Tribunal is not only excessive but also not in consonance2/16http://www.judis.nic.inC.M.A.No.739 of 2020with the facts and circumstances of the case. The monthly income of\n\n Rs.11,000/- fixed by the Tribunal is without any basis and in the absence of\n\n any evidence, the Tribunal ought not to have fixed the monthly income of\n\n Rs.11,000/-. This apart, the Tribunal has wrongly applied the multiplier.\n\n The Tribunal has applied the multiplier 13, which is inapplicable to the\n\n present case. In fact, the multiplier 9 is applicable, considering the age of\n\n the deceased. Therefore, the award is liable to be set aside.3. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents-\n\n claimants opposed the abovesaid contentions of the learned counsel\n\n appearing on behalf of the appellant-Insurance Company, by stating that the\n\n deceased was aged about 59 years at the time of accident and was running a\n\n Tea Stall with Snacks and Tiffin Centre from 08.09.2008 by taking on lease\n\n the shop with all articles from the owner Raghu, who was the owner of the\n\n shop. PW-3 Fazurulla was working as the Manager of the deceased's Tea\n\n Stall and the Manager has deposed before the Tribunal that he was receiving\n\n the monthly payment of Rs.12,000/- from the deceased Mr.Mohamed\n\n Basheer and therefore, the income fixed by the Tribunal is not excessive and3/16http://www.judis.nic.inC.M.A.No.739 of 2020in fact, lesser than that of the actual income of the deceased.4. The deceased was running a Tea Stall from 05.00 A.M. to\n\n 10.00 P.M. and the Tea Stall was situated at No.92, Kodambakkam High\n\n Road, Chennai, which is a busy area. Five persons were employed in the\n\n Tea Stall of the deceased and the said Tea Stall was running with good\n\n profit and the Lease Deed (Ex.P-14) also reveals that the income of the Tea\n\n Stall is on the higher side.5. The learned counsel for the respondents-claimants reiterated\n\n that the accident occurred in the year 2014 and therefore, the notional\n\n income of Rs.15,000/- is to be fixed by the Tribunal.6. Contrarily, the Tribunal has erroneously fixed the monthly\n\n income of the deceased as Rs.11,000/- and therefore, the monthly income of\n\n the deceased is to be enhanced.7. In reply, the learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance4/16http://www.judis.nic.inC.M.A.No.739 of 2020Company contended that in the absence of any proof to establish the actual\n\n income of the deceased, the respondents-claimants, in the appeal filed by\n\n the appellant-Insurance Company, cannot claim enhancement of monthly\n\n income of the deceased, which was fixed by the Tribunal based on the Bank\n\n Statement.8. It is further contended that no evidence has been produced\n\n by the claimants before the Tribunal to establish the actual income of the\n\n deceased. The oral evidence of the Manager of the Tea Stall is insufficient\n\n and he is an interested witness. This apart, the Tribunal has applied wrong\n\n multiplier and the claimants have not preferred any appeal, questioning the\n\n award.9. The erroneous application of multiplier by the Tribunal is\n\n not seriously contested between the parties. On the basis of which the\n\n Tribunal has committed an error in adopting 13 multiplier. In fact, the\n\n applicable multiplier is 9. The age of the deceased was 59 years at the time\n\n of accident and therefore, the Tribunal has committed an error in applying5/16http://www.judis.nic.inC.M.A.No.739 of 2020the multiplier 13 instead of the multiplier 9.10. Under these circumstances, the respondents-claimants\n\n contested a case for enhancement of monthly income from Rs.11,000/- to\n\n Rs.15,000/-. The Tribunal has fixed a sum of Rs.11,000/- towards monthly\n\n income of the deceased based on the Bank Statement.11. The learned counsel for the respondents-claimants made a\n\n submission that Rs.15,000/- per month would be appropriate in view of the\n\n fact that the deceased was running a Tea Stall and the notional income of\n\n the Tea Shop must be Rs.15,000/-.12.In this regard, the learned counsel for the respondents-\n\n claimants relied on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble\n\n Supreme Court of India in the case ofNational Insurlance Company\n\n Limited vs. Pranay Sethi and Others[(2017) 16 SCC 680], wherein the\n\n Hon'ble Supreme Court made an observation thatSection 168of the Act\n\n deals with the concept of “Just Compensation” and the same has to be6/16http://www.judis.nic.inC.M.A.No.739 of 2020determined on the foundation of fairness, reasonableness and equitability on\n\n acceptable legal standard because such determination can never be in\n\n arithmetical exactitude.13. The concept of “Just Compensation” was being repeatedly\n\n reiterated by the Apex Court in humpty dumpty number of judgments. The\n\n “Just Compensation” and the “Procedures” to be adopted in the Common\n\n Parlance to arrive a just compensation is also guidelined in many decisions.\n\n However, while adopting the process to reach the just compensation, the\n\n Courts are bound to look into the documents and the evidences produced by\n\n the parties.14. As far as running of Tea Stall is concerned, it is a self-\n\n employment and the income depends on various factors and mitigating facts\n\n and circumstances. There is a small Tea Stall or a Big Tea Stall. There is a\n\n Tea Stall, which may run in loss or in far of much profit. All these factors\n\n are to be factually established for the purpose of arriving the just\n\n compensation. The question arose what would be the procedure which can7/16http://www.judis.nic.inC.M.A.No.739 of 2020be followed for the purpose of ascertaining the factual income of a self-\n\n employed business person.15. In the present case, the accident occurred on 25.08.2014.\n\n The deceased was aged about 59 years at the time of accident. The deceased\n\n left behind his wife, son and daughter. His son and daughter are majors and\n\n the daughter got married. Son of the deceased is employed in abroad.\n\n Therefore, the deceased was running a Tea Stall with the support of some\n\n other employees. However, to establish the income of the deceased, the\n\n claimants are bound to produce some evidence or documents. In the absence\n\n of any such documents or evidence, it would be difficult for the Courts to\n\n arrive the actual income to grant just compensation.16. In the present case, the Tribunal considered the facts and\n\n circumstances. The Ex.P-1 FIR registered in Crime No.447/TN1/2014 dated\n\n 25.08.2014 reveals that the driver of the car bearing Registration No.TN-10-\n\n AR-3007 has been shown as accused and the case has been registered underSections 279and304(A)IPC. Ex.P-2 is the copy of the rough sketch8/16http://www.judis.nic.inC.M.A.No.739 of 2020prepared by the Inspector of Police, Pondy Bazaar Traffic Investigation\n\n Wing, which shows the scene of occurrence. Ex.P-3 is the copy of the\n\n charge sheet filed against the driver of the car. The appellant-Insurance\n\n Company had not adduced any contra evidence to deny the accident. PW-2\n\n eye-witness deposed that the accident had occurred due to the rash and\n\n negligent act of the driver of the car. Accordingly, the Tribunal fixed the\n\n liability on the appellant-Insurance Company.17. As far as the quantum of compensation is concerned, Ex.P-\n\n 14 is the Management Agreement between the deceased and one Mr.Raghu\n\n for running the Tea Stall at Kodambakkam High Road, Chennai. Ex.P-16 is\n\n the copy of the Bank Statement of the deceased from 02.01.2014 to\n\n 31.01.2016. However, the Tribunal made a finding that the Bank Statement\n\n will not reveal the accurate monthly income of the deceased. PW-3, who\n\n claimed to be the Manager of the Tea Stall, deposed that the deceased was\n\n earning profit of Rs.25,000/- per month. However, they have not produced\n\n any Bank Statement to establish the said profit or the Income Tax Returns,\n\n so as to arrive some definite conclusion with reference to the monthly9/16http://www.judis.nic.inC.M.A.No.739 of 2020income the deceased.18. The Manager of the Tea Stall is the interested witness and\n\n is only an oral evidence. In the absence of any documentary evidence\n\n regarding the income of the deceased is insufficient and therefore, the\n\n Tribunal has considered the Bank Statement produced by the claimants and\n\n arrived a conclusion that the monthly income of the deceased can be fixed\n\n as Rs.11,000/- and accordingly, calculated the compensation.19. This Court has carefully considered the documents as well\n\n as the reasonings furnished in the award. Though the Manager of the Tea\n\n Stall deposed that the profit of the Tea Stall would be Rs.25,000/- per\n\n month, absolutely, there is no document to establish the same. There is no\n\n Income Tax Returns and there is no Bank Statement to establish such an\n\n amount of profit in the Tea Stall of the deceased. The transaction of the\n\n Bank Statement reveals that the income is not clear. The accurate monthly\n\n income of the deceased was not established even through the Bank\n\n Statement, Ex.P-16, which was produced from 02.01.2014 to 31.01.2016.10/16http://www.judis.nic.inC.M.A.No.739 of 202020. This apart, the Tea Stall was opened in the year 2008. Even\n\n as per the claimants, the accident occurred in the year 2014 and therefore,\n\n the deceased was running the Tea Stall for about 5-1/2 years. While-so, the\n\n claimants are bound to establish the monthly income of the deceased\n\n through some documents. In the absence of any such documents, this Court\n\n cannot interfere with the award passed by the Tribunal.21. As far as the adaptation of multiplier is concerned, the\n\n Tribunal has committed an error in applying the multiplier 13. In fact, the\n\n multiplier 9 would be applicable to the case of the respondents-claimants. In\n\n the event of applying the multiplier 9, the compensation would be reduced\n\n to a large extent and therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that\n\n the monthly income fixed by the Tribunal as Rs.11,000/- shall be enhanced\n\n to Rs.12,000/-, so as to mitigate the total compensation.22. Undoubtedly, it is a fatal case and the deceased was aged\n\n about 59 years at the time of accident. However, wife of the deceased alone11/16http://www.judis.nic.inC.M.A.No.739 of 2020is the dependent. The deceased was running a Tea Stall. The claimants\n\n could not able to establish the monthly income of the deceased. The\n\n Tribunal has fixed the monthly income of the deceased as Rs.11,000/-.23. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered\n\n opinion that a sum of Rs.12,000/- shall be fixed as monthly income of the\n\n deceased and the multiplier 9 is to be applied for the purpose of calculating\n\n the compensation. Accordingly, the total compensation of Rs.14,18,500/-\n\n awarded by the Tribunal. Therefore, Rs.12,000/- must be a proper income to\n\n be fixed for the purpose of calculating the compensation. Thus, the income\n\n of the deceased fixed by the Tribunal as Rs.11,000/- per month is enhanced\n\n as Rs.12,000/- per month and the future prospects 10% of monthly income\n\n i.e., Rs.12,000/- x 10% = Rs.1,200/-. Thus, the future prospects would be\n\n Rs.13,200/- (Rs.12,000/- + Rs.1,200/-). Accordingly, one-third (1/3rd)\n\n personal expenses is to be deducted (Rs.13,200/- x 1/3 = Rs.4,400/-).24. Accordingly, the quantum of compensation of\n\n Rs.14,18,500/- granted by the Tribunal is modified as detailed hereunder:-12/16http://www.judis.nic.inC.M.A.No.739 of 2020Rs.Loss of income 9,50,400/-\n (Rs.8,800/- x 12 x 9)\n Consortium 40,000/-\n\n Love and Affection 80,000/-\n (Rs.40,000/- x 2)\n\n Loss of Estate 10,000/-\n Funeral Expenses 15,000/-\n\n Transportation 10,000/-\n\n -------------------\n Rs.11,05,400/-\n ============Thus, the respondents/claimants are entitled to get the total compensation of\n\n Rs.11,05,400/- along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum.25. The appellant-Insurance Company is directed to deposit the\n\n modified award amount along with accrued interest at the rate of 7.5% per\n\n annum, if not already deposited, within a period of twelve weeks from the\n\n date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and on such deposit being made,\n\n the respondents-claimants are permitted to withdraw the total compensation\n\n of Rs.11,05,400/- along with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum by filing\n\n appropriate applications before the Tribunal and the balance amount, if any,13/16http://www.judis.nic.inC.M.A.No.739 of 2020deposited shall be returned to the appellant-Insurance Company. The\n\n respective parties are permitted to file appropriate applications before the\n\n Tribunal and all the payments are to be made through RTGS.26. Accordingly, the judgment and decree dated 28.08.2019\n\n passed in M.C.O.P. No.97 of 2015 on the file of the learned V Judge, V\n\n Small Causes Court-cum-Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Chennai stands\n\n modified to the above extent and consequently, the C.M.A.No.739 of 2020\n\n stands allowed in part. However, there shall be no order as to costs.\n\n Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.24-08-2020\n Index : Yes/No.\n Internet: Yes/No.\n Speaking Order/Non-Speaking Order\n Svn14/16http://www.judis.nic.inC.M.A.No.739 of 2020To\n\n The V Judge,\n V Small Causes Court-cum-Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal,\n Chennai.15/16http://www.judis.nic.inC.M.A.No.739 of 2020S.M.SUBRAMANIAM, J.SvnCMA No.739 of 202024-08-202016/16http://www.judis.nic.in

3212260f-acec-5371-ba6b-919ac358672f

court_cases

Rajasthan High Court - JodhpurManaging Committee vs Keshu Lal Teli on 26 August, 2022Author:Arun BhansaliBench:Arun BhansaliHIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT\n JODHPUR\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9552/2019\n\n1. Managing Committee, Vidya Bhawan Society, Fatehpura,\n Udaipur. Through The Secretary.\n2. Managing Committee, Vidhya Bhawan Rural Institute\n Polytechnic College, Fatehpura, Udaipur. Through The\n Secretary.\n ----Petitioners\n Versus\n1. Ratanlal Meghwal S/o Shri Jai Chand Meghwal, Opposite\n Dagai Mand Ara Machine, Village And Post Lakadvaas,\n Tehsil Girva, District Udaipur.\n2. The Director, Technical Education, Jodhpur.\n3. Rajasthan Non Government Educational Institution\n Tribunal, Secretariat, Jaipur.\n ----Respondents\n Connected With\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9555/2019\n1. Managing Committee, Vidya Bhawan Society, Fatehpura,\n Udaipur. Through The Secretary.\n2. Managing Committee, Vidhya Bhawan Rural Institute\n Polytechnic College, Fatehpura, Udaipur. Through The\n Secretary.\n ----Petitioners\n Versus\n1. Kundan Singh Chouhan S/o Shri Shiv Singh Chouhan, R/o\n 22 Narayan Nagar, Badgaon, Tehsil Girwa, District\n Udaipur.\n2. The Director, Technical Education, Jodhpur.\n3. Rajasthan Non Government Educational Institution\n Tribunal, Secretariat, Jaipur.\n ----Respondents\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9563/2019\n1. Managing Committee, Vidya Bhawan Society, Fatehpura,\n Udaipur Through The Secretary.\n2. Managing Committee, Vidhya Bhawan Rural Institute\n\n\n (Downloaded on 27/08/2022 at 09:29:38 PM)\n (2 of 17) [CW-9552/2019]\n\n\n Polytechnic College, Fatehpura, Udaipur Through The\n Secretary.\n3. Managing Committee, Vidhya Bhawan Senior Secondary\n School, Fatehpura, Udaipur Through The Secretary.\n ----Petitioners\n Versus\n1. Amit Jain S/o Shri Gyan Chand Jain, R/o A-110,\n Nityanand Nagar, Queens Road, Jaipur.\n2. The Director, Technical Education, Jodhpur.\n3. Rajasthan Non Government Educational Institution\n Tribunal, Secretariat, Jaipur.\n ----Respondents\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9651/2019\n1. Managing Committee, Vidya Bhawan Society, Fatehpura,\n Udaipur. Through The Secretary.\n2. Managing Committee, Vidhya Bhawan Rural Institute\n Polytechnic College, Fatehpura, Udaipur. Through The\n Secretary.\n ----Petitioners\n Versus\n1. Prem Singh Jhala S/o Late Shri Maan Singh Jhala, R/o\n Kadmal House, Parshuram Colony, Neemachkhera, Devali,\n District Udaipur.\n2. The Director, Technical Education, Jodhpur.\n3. Rajasthan Non Government Educational Institution\n Tribunal, Secretariat, Jaipur.\n ----Respondents\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9655/2019\n1. Managing Committee, Vidya Bhawan Society, Fatehpura,\n Udaipur. Through The Secretary.\n2. Managing Committee, Vidhya Bhawan Sr. Secondary\n School, Fatehpura, Udaipur. Through The Secretary.\n ----Petitioners\n Versus\n1. Ratan Lal Dangi S/o Late Shri Hira Lal Dangi, R/o Village\n Bhalo Ka Guda, Via Zinc Smelter, Udaipur.\n2. The Commissioner/director, Secondary Education\n\n\n (Downloaded on 27/08/2022 at 09:29:38 PM)\n (3 of 17) [CW-9552/2019]\n\n\n Department, Government Of Rajasthan, Bikaner.\n3. Rajasthan Non Government Educational Institution\n Tribunal, Secretariat, Jaipur.\n ----Respondents\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9759/2019\n1. Managing Committee, Vidya Bhawan Society, Fatehpura,\n Udaipur. Through The Secretary.\n2. Managing Committee, Vidhya Bhawan Rural Institute\n Polytechnic College, Fatehpura, Udaipur. Through The\n Secretary.\n ----Petitioner\n Versus\n1. Keshu Lal Teli S/o Late Shri Uma Shanker Teli, R/o 5/576,\n Outside Chandpole, Brahmpole Marg, District Udaipur.\n2. The Director, Technical Education, Jodhpur.\n3. Rajasthan Non Government Educational Institution\n Tribunal, Secretariat, Jaipur.\n ----Respondents\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9763/2019\n1. Managing Committee, Vidya Bhawan Society, Fatehpura,\n Udaipur. Through The Secretary.\n2. Managing Committee, Vidhya Bhawan Rural Institute\n Polytechnic College, Fatehpura, Udaipur. Through The\n Secretary.\n ----Petitioners\n Versus\n1. Manoj Paliwal S/o Late Shri Chatur Lal Paliwal, R/o 265,\n Krishnapura, Road No. 8, Behind St. Paul School, District\n Udaipur.\n2. The Director, Technical Education, Jodhpur.\n3. Rajasthan Non Government Educational Institution\n Tribunal, Secretariat, Jaipur.\n ----Respondents\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11066/2019\n1. Managing Committee Vidya Bhawan Society, Fatehpura,\n Udaipur, , Through The Secretary.\n2. Managing Committee Vidhya Bhawan Rural Institute\n\n\n (Downloaded on 27/08/2022 at 09:29:38 PM)\n (4 of 17) [CW-9552/2019]\n\n\n Polytechnic College, Fatehpura, Udaipur, Through The\n Secretary.\n ----Petitioners\n Versus\n1. Vibhor Bhatnagar S/o Shri Banshilal Bhatnagar, R/o 9,\n Havala Marg, Ajanta Hotel Street, District Udaipur.\n2. The Director, Technical Education, Jodhpur.\n ----Respondents\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7419/2020\n1. Managing Committee, Vidya Bhawan Society, Fatehpura,\n Udaipur, Through The President.\n2. Managing Committee, Vidya Bhawan Secondary School,\n Ramgiri, Udaipur Through The Secretary.\n ----Petitioners\n Versus\n1. Smt. Jai Shree Jain W/o Shri Probhat Jain, R/o 6-A,\n Mahaveer Colony, Ashok Nagar, Udaipur.\n2. The Director/Commissioner, Secondary Education, Govt.\n of Rajasthan, Bikaner.\n ----Respondents\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 8001/2020\n1. Managing Committee, Vidya Bhawan Society, Fatehpura,\n Udaipur, Through The President.\n2. Managing Commiittee, Vidhya Bhawan Senior Secondary\n School, Fatehpura, Udaipur. Through The Secretary.\n ----Petitioners\n Versus\n1. Pushplata Shrimali W/o Shri Harish Chandra Shrimali, R/o\n 286, Fatehpura, Udaipur.\n2. The Director/commissioner, Secondary Education, Govt.\n Of Rajasthan, Bikaner.\n ----Respondents\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 8002/2020\n1. Managing Committee, Vidya Bhawan Society, Fatehpura,\n Udaipur, Through The President.\n2. Managing Commiittee, Vidhya Bhawan Senior Secondary\n School, Fatehpura, Udaipur. Through The Secretary.\n\n (Downloaded on 27/08/2022 at 09:29:38 PM)\n (5 of 17) [CW-9552/2019]\n\n\n ----Petitioners\n Versus\n1. Shagufta Anjum W/o Shri Sirazuddin, R/o 14, Titawala Ki\n Badi Kharol Colony, Tank Building Ke Aage, Udaipur.\n2. The Director/commissioner, Secondary Education, Govt.\n Of Rajasthan, Bikaner.\n ----Respondents\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 8004/2020\n1. Managing Committee, Vidya Bhawan Society, Fatehpura,\n Udaipur, Through The President.\n2. Managing Commiittee, Vidhya Bhawan Senior Secondary\n School, Fatehpura, Udaipur. Through The Secretary.\n ----Petitioners\n Versus\n1. Ram Prasad Bangar S/o Shri Laxmi Narayan Bangar, R/o\n 8/9 Matra Chaya Vidhya Vihar Colony, Near Shrinath\n Colony, Pula, Fatehpura, District Udaipur.\n2. The Commissioner, Secondary Education, Govt. Of\n Rajasthan, Bikaner.\n ----Respondents\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 8320/2020\n1. Managing Committee, Vidya Bhawan Society, Fatehpura,\n Udaipur. Through Its President.\n2. Managing Committee, Vidya Bhawan Secondary School,\n Ramgiri, Udaipur. Through Its Secretary.\n ----Petitioners\n Versus\n1. Dr. Anju Sharma W/o Dr. Chandra Prakash Sharma, R/o\n Plot No. 5, Luvnet, Shivam Complex, Ara Machine Wali\n Gali, Badgaon, Udaipur.\n2. The Director/commissioner, Secondary Education, Govt.\n Of Rajasthan, Bikaner.\n ----Respondents\n S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12397/2020\n1. Managing Committee, Vidya Bhawan Society, Fatehpura,\n Udaipur, Through The President.\n2. Managing Committee, Vidya Bhawan Senior Secondary\n\n\n (Downloaded on 27/08/2022 at 09:29:38 PM)\n (6 of 17) [CW-9552/2019]\n\n\n School, Fatehpura, Udaipur. Through The Secretary.\n ----Petitioners\n Versus\n1. Mrs. Madhu Bordia W/o Sh. Dileep Kumar Bordia, 45\n Modern Complex, Pula, Bhuwana Road, Udaipur - 313001\n (Rajasthan)\n2. The Director / Commissioner, Secondary Education, Govt.\n Of Rajasthan, Bikaner.\n ----Respondents\n\n\nFor Petitioner(s) : Mr. Rakesh Arora with\n Mr. Naresh Singh.\nFor Respondent(s) : Mr. Kailash Choudhary for\n Mr. Manish Vyas, AAG.\n Mr. Sarwan Kumar for\n Mr. Hemant Choudhary, GC.\n Mr. Manish Pitaliya.\n Mr. Sushil Solanki.\n Mr. S.K. Maru.\n\n\n\n HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN BHANSALIOrder\n\n26/08/2022\n\n The matters come up on applications filed by the petitioners\n\nfor disposal of the present writ petitions.With the consent of the parties, the applications are allowed\n\nand the petitions are finally heard.These writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners\n\naggrieved against judgments passed by Rajasthan\n\nNon-Government Educational Institutions Tribunal, Jaipur ('the\n\nTribunal') dated 23.4.2015 (in CWP No.7419/2020), 8.2.2016 (in\n\nCWP No.8004/2020), 14.2.2017 (in CWP No. 11066/2019),\n\n10.3.2017 (in CWP No. 12397/2020), 10.3.2017 (in CWP No.\n\n8002/2020), 23.4.2015 (in CWP No. 8320/2020), 26.2.2019 (in\n\nCWP No.9655/2019), 13.3.2019 (in CWP No.9763/2019),(Downloaded on 27/08/2022 at 09:29:38 PM)(7 of 17) [CW-9552/2019]\n\n\n\n13.3.2019 (in CWP No.9563/2019), 18.3.2019 (in CWP\n\nNo.9759/2019), 18.3.2019 (in CWP No. 9651/2019), 18.3.2019\n\n(in CWP No. 9555/2019), 18.3.2019 (in CWP No.9552/2019) and\n\n26.9.2019 (in CWP No.8001/2020) and in four cases the\n\nproceedings initiated by the respondents-teachers/employees\n\nseeking execution of the judgments passed by the Tribunal before\n\nthe Civil Court also.The respondents-teachers/employees approached the\n\nTribunal for due amount of gratuity, leave encashment and\n\npayment pertaining to the arrears of pay based on revision of pay\n\nscales.The Tribunal by its various orders, ordered for payment of\n\nthe amount due to the teachers/employees. While accepting the\n\napplications, the directions in following nature were given-"izkFkhZx.k dks lEiw.kZ jkf"k ij cdk;k gksus dh\n fnukad ls Hkqxrku fd;s tkus dh fnukad rd 06 izfr"kr\n okf"kZd C;kt dh nj ls ns; C;kt lfgr jkf"k vizkFkhZ\n la[;k 01 o 03 }kjk vnk dh tk;sA\n mijksDr vuqrks"kksa ds lEcU/k esa vizkFkhZ la[;k 01 o\n 03 us ;fn dksbZ Hkqxrku izkFkhZx.k dks dj fn;k gks rks og\n lek;kstu fd;s tkus ;ksX; jgsxkA\n vizkFkhZ la[;k 02 dks funsZ"k fn;s tkrs gS fd os\n mijksDr fu.kZ; dh ikyuk vizkFkhZ la[;k 01 o 03 ls\n djk;k tkuk lqfuf"pr djsA foi{khx.k ekuuh; mPp\n U;k;ky; }kjk Mh-ch- flfoy Lis"ky vihy ¼fjV½ laŒ\n 663@2015 jkt0 jkT; o vU; cuke izcU/k lfefr] Jh\n Hkxoku nkl rksMh dkWyst tfj;s lfpo] y{e.kx<+ ftyk\n lhdj esa ikfjr fu.kZ; fnukad 06-11-2015 esa fn;s x;s\n funsZ"kksa dh ikyuk lqfuf"pr djsA"The present petitions have been filed by the petitioner\n\ninstitution seeking to question the direction of the Tribunal in\n\nordering for payment of amount of interest on the due amount\n\nand/or the execution proceedings initiated by the judgment(Downloaded on 27/08/2022 at 09:29:38 PM)(8 of 17) [CW-9552/2019]\n\n\n\nholders before the Executing Court for recovery of the amount of\n\ninterest from the petitioner institution.Learned counsel for the petitioners made submissions that\n\nissue raised by the petitioners regarding its responsibility to make\n\npayment of interest is concluded by judgment in Managing\n\nCommittee, Rajasthan Mahila Parishad and Anr. Vs. Mohan Giri\n\nGoswami & Ors. : SBCWP No. 1958/2016 decided on 9.11.2016,\n\nwherein this Court came to the conclusion that, insofar as, the\n\ndirection to pay interest on the amount of gratuity was concerned,\n\nthe petitioner institution were liable, however, for rest of the\n\ninterest, the petitioner institution were not liable for payment.Against the above judgment dated 9.11.2016, the\n\nrespondent approached Division Bench and Division Bench inMohan Giri Goswami Vs. Managing Committee, Rajasthan Mahila\n\nParishad: D.B. Spl. Appl.Writ No. 178/2017 decided on\n\n13.3.2018, upheld the order passed by the Single Judge and,\n\ntherefore, as the issue raised is squarely covered by order in the\n\ncase of Mohan Giri Goswami (supra), the petitions deserve to be\n\nallowed and the order passed by the Tribunal to the extent of\n\ndirection to pay interest on the amount other than the amount of\n\ngratuity, deserves to be set aside and the execution applications\n\npending before the Executing Court in this regard deserve to be\n\ndismissed to the said extent. Further submissions were made that\n\nthe liability to pay interest, if any, is that of the State and the\n\nTribunal was not justified in exonerating the State, who was solely\n\nresponsible for the delay, in this regard.Learned counsel appearing for the respondents-teachers/employees made submissions that even if the petitioner\n\ninstitution is not liable to pay interest, as laid down by this Court(Downloaded on 27/08/2022 at 09:29:38 PM)(9 of 17) [CW-9552/2019]\n\n\n\nin Management Committee of Shri Swetamber Jain Secondary\n\nSchool Vs. Rajasthan Non-Government Educational Institutions\n\nTribunal, Jaipur : SBCWP No. 8228/2013 decided on 8.2.2017 at\n\nJaipur Bench as upheld inDirector, Secondary Education Vs.\n\nManaging Committee, Shree Shwetambar Jain Secondary School,\n\nJaipur: D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1439/2019 decided on\n\n22.1.2021 at Jaipur Bench, the State is liable to make payment of\n\nthe amount of interest and that in light of the said lawlaid down\n\nbythe Division Bench, the State be directed to pay the interest.Learned counsel appearing for the State attempted to make\n\nsubmissions that the delay in making payment of the amount of\n\ngrant-in-aid to the petitioner institution was on account of the fact\n\nthat the due drawn statements etc. were not supplied by the\n\npetitioner institution in time and, therefore, the State also cannot\n\nbe saddled with the liability to pay interest.I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel\n\nfor the parties and have perused the material available on record.The petitioner, in its petitions has made specific reference to\n\nthe fact that the petitioner institution, on account of non-payment\n\nof the amount of grand-in-aid, had to file SBCWP No. 1442/2013,\n\nwhich came to be decided on 21.3.2014 with direction to the State\n\nGovernment to release the grant and when the amount was not\n\npaid, the petitioner institutions had to file S.B. Writ Contempt\n\nPetition No. 502/2016, wherein ultimately the payment was made\n\nto the petitioner institutions.In that view of the matter, the plea sought to be raised by\n\nthe State seeking to justify the delay and/or accusing the\n\npetitioner institutions for the delay cannot be accepted.(Downloaded on 27/08/2022 at 09:29:38 PM)(10 of 17) [CW-9552/2019]\n\n\n\n Insofar as, the plea raised by the petitioner institution\n\nregarding its liability to pay interest is concerned, this Court in the\n\ncase of Management Committee, Rajasthan Mahila Parishad\n\n(supra), inter alia, came to the following conclusion:-"In view of the above, no case is made out by\n the petitioner Institution for interference in the\n direction issued by the Tribunal for payment of\n interest on the amount of gratuity payable to the\n respondents.So far as the direction of the Tribunal regarding\n payment of interest on the amount of leave\n encashment and arrears of salary based on revised\n pay scales is concerned, the said issue is already\n settled by the Division Bench in the case of Managing\n Committee, Bhartiya Shiksha Prachar Samiti (supra),\n wherein, the appeal filed by the Managing Committee\n was allowed in part by holding the appellant\n Institution therein liable to pay the statutory interest\n on gratuity, however, amount of interest on leave\n encashment dues was denied by the Division Bench.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of\n D.D.Tewari (supra) held that where there is undue\n delay in payment of retiral benefits to the employees,\n they are entitled to grant of interest and in the case\n of Jai Narain Vyas University (supra) this Court on\n account of statutory provisions held that interest was\n payable.A perusal of the record clearly indicates that\n insofar as the amount of leave encashment and\n payment of arrears of salary based on revised pay\n scales are concerned, the same was delayed on\n account of petitioner not receiving the amount of\n grant-in-aid from the respondent State. Besides the\n above, the amount of arrears of salary based on\n revised pay scales cannot be termed as retiral\n benefit.As already noticed hereinbefore, in the case of\n Managing Committee, Bhartiya Shiksha Prachar\n Samiti (supra), the Division Bench partly allowed the(Downloaded on 27/08/2022 at 09:29:38 PM)(11 of 17) [CW-9552/2019]\n\n appeal of the Managing Committee holding that for\n grant of interest on leave encashment, the Tribunal\n had no power. The judgment cited by the counsel for\n the respondents No.1 does not deal with the power of\n the Tribunal to award interest, which is a\n jurisdictional aspect and as the Division Bench has\n held in the case of Managing Committee Bhartiya\n Shiksha Prachar Samiti (supra) that the Tribunal does\n not have jurisdiction, therefore, irrespective of the\n submissions made by counsel for the respondent\n No.1, the respondents No.1 are not entitled to\n payment of interest on the amount of leave\n encashment as well as arrears of salary based on\n revised pay scales.In view of the above discussion, the writ\n petitions filed by the petitioner Institution are partly\n allowed. The orders dated 3/11/2015 passed by the\n Tribunal are set aside to the extent it provides for\n payment of interest on leave encashment dues as\n well as arrears of salary based on revised pay scales,\n however, the direction to the extent of payment of\n interest on the amount of gratuity is upheld. The\n amount of gratuity as well as interest thereon shall\n be paid to the respondents No.1 by the petitioner\n Institution within a period of three months. The\n amount, if any, deposited by the petitioner Institution\n with the Executing Court pursuant to the directions\n issued by the Tribunal be adjusted in the amount\n payable to the respondents No.1".Against the above order, in the case of Mohan Giri Goswami\n\n(supra), the Division Bench, inter alia, came to the following\n\nconclusion:-"16. It is in the backdrop of the aforesaid facts that\n the claim of the teachers for grant of interest on\n delayed payment of enhanced salary and leave\n encashment has to be considered.17. We note that as regards gratuity the aided\n institutions have agreed to pay interest @ 6% per(Downloaded on 27/08/2022 at 09:29:38 PM)(12 of 17) [CW-9552/2019]\n\n annum for the period payment of gratuity was\n delayed.18. The facts noted hereinabove clearly bring out\n that the aided institutions did their best to ensure\n timely payment to its employees. They fought tooth\n and nail with the State to obtain the grant-in-aid. The\n litigious facts aforementioned show that repeatedly\n the State obstructed the claim by these institutions.\n Thus, the aided institutions cannot be saddled with\n any liability to pay interest on the delayed payments\n qua the enhanced salary and leave encashment. If at\n all the liability would be that of the State. But there is\n no direction in any decision for the State to pay\n interest on the belated disbursement of the grant-in-\n aid.19. In that view of the matter, the learned Single\n Judge has correctly held that on enhanced salary and\n leave encashment no interest is payable for the\n period of delay by the respondent-institutions.20. The law in the two decisions cited by learned\n counsel for the appellants would apply when the\n employer is solely responsible for the delayed\n payment.21. In the instant case, the employer took all\n possible measures to ensure that the State releases\n the grant-in-aid within time and from that money\n enhanced salary as per the Revised Pay Scales Rules\n could be disbursed as also the amount due on\n encashment of the leave which had accumulated in\n the leave account of the teachers.22. The three appeals are accordingly dismissed".(emphasis supplied)\n\n In view of the above legal position, the direction of the\n\nTribunal, ordering for payment of interest on the entire amount by\n\nthe petitioner institution cannot be sustained. As laid down in the\n\ncase of Mohan Giri Goswami (supra), the petitioner institution is\n\nnot liable for payment of interest except on the amount of\n\ngratuity.(Downloaded on 27/08/2022 at 09:29:38 PM)(13 of 17) [CW-9552/2019]\n\n\n\n Coming to the submissions made by learned counsel for the\n\npetitioner and teachers/employees regarding wrong exoneration of\n\nthe State from payment of amount of interest, the Tribunal, for\n\napparently no reason and despite noticing the judgment inState\n\nof Rajasthan Vs. The Management Committee, Shri Bhagwan Das\n\nTodi College: D.B. Civil Special Appeal Writ No. 663/2015,\n\ndecided on 6.11.2015 at Jaipur Bench, wherein the Division Bench\n\nhad specifically laid the responsibility on the State to disburse the\n\namount to the extent of grant-in-aid to the institution, has not\n\ndirected the State to make payment of the amount of interest\n\nwithout discussion and indicating any reason.A coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Management\n\nCommittee of Shri Swetamber Jain Secondary School (supra),\n\nwhile accepting a similar plea of the institution, inter alia, directed\n\nas under:-"(i) The State Government shall pay the amounts\n due to private respondents as per the "due drawn"statements received from the petitioner school\n proportionate to the approved grant-in-aid to it on\n sanctioned posts within five weeks from the date of\n receipt of a certified copy of this order. Interest as\n directed by the Tribunal shall be paid by the State\n Government on the aforesaid amounts."(emphasis supplied)\n\n Feeling aggrieved of the direction to pay interest, the State\n\napproached the Division Bench, wherein the Division Bench in the\n\ncase ofDirector, Secondary Education(supra), inter alia, noticing\n\nthe submissions in this regard, came to the following conclusion:-"It has been submitted on behalf of appellants\n that the order of learned Single Judge to the extent\n of directions relating to payment of interest by the\n State Government is arbitrary, unjustified and against(Downloaded on 27/08/2022 at 09:29:38 PM)(14 of 17) [CW-9552/2019]\n\nthe Rules, and is liable to be quashed and set aside\nto the extent of directions to the State Government\nto pay interest as directed by the learned Tribunal. It\nhas also been submitted that provisions of Rules of\n1993 clearly state that aided institutions shall pay the\namount payable to the employees and shall apply for\nreimbursement to the State Government to the\nextent of admissible grant-in-aid. The State\nGovernment in no manner is under any obligation to\npay interest on such amount. The State Government\ncannot be made liable for payment of interest for no\nfault on its part. It has also been submitted that the\nlearned Single Judge has also misinterpreted the\nobservations and directions given in the case ofState\nof Rajasthan v. The Management Committee Sh.\nBhagwan Das Todi College(supra).It has been vehemently argued on behalf of\nrespondents that the order of the learned Single\nJudge is perfectly in accordance with applicable Rules\nand Law aslaid down bythis Court.We have perused the record of the case as well\nas impugned order dated 08.02.2017 passed by the\nlearned Single Judge. A perusal of the impugned\norder reveals that during the course of arguments it\nwas admitted on the part of State Government\nthat :-"the State Government was obliged to pay\n the employees of the petitioner school\n working on sanctioned posts as per the due\n drawn statement submitted by the\n petitioner school and the amount due to the\n extent of percentage under the approved\n grant-in-aid."It was also admitted on the part of the State that :-"the due drawn statements sent by the\n petitioner school had been received by the\n State Government and on requisite\n verification, payment due as per the\n directions of the court inState of Rajasthan\n Vs. The Management Committee Sh.Bhagwan Das Todi College(supra) and(Downloaded on 27/08/2022 at 09:29:38 PM)(15 of 17) [CW-9552/2019]\n\n Managing Committee Vs. Shri P. K. Goyal\n (supra), would be made to the private\n respondents within four weeks."Thus, during the course of arguments in writ\npetitions it was admitted on behalf of the State that\n"due drawn" statements had been submitted by the\npetitioner schools to the State Government. Hence, it\nalso becomes clear that even after submission of\n"due drawn" statements by the petitioner schools, no\npayment was made by the appellant State. The\npetitioner schools were rather subjected to execution\nproceedings in respect of the amounts payable by the\nState Government to an extent of approved grant-in-\naid for sanctioned posts on which private respondents\nwere engaged by the petitioner schools.InMohan Giri Goswami v. Managing\nCommittee, Raj. Mahila Par. & Ors [D.B. Spl. Appl.\nWrit No. 178/2017], and two other appeals, decided\non 08.03.2018, following observations have been\nmade by this court: -18. The facts noted hereinabove clearly\n bring out that the aided institutions did their\n best to ensure timely payment to its\n employees. They fought tooth and nail with\n the State to obtain the grant-in-aid. The\n litigious facts aforementioned show that\n repeatedly the State obstructed the claim by\n these institutions. Thus, the aided\n institutions cannot be saddled with any\n liability to pay interest on the\n delayed payments qua the enhanced salary\n and leave encashment. If at all the liability\n would be that of the State. But there is no\n direction in any decision for the State to pay\n interest on the belated disbursement of the\n grant-in-aid.The facts of this case also reveal that the\npetitioner schools as required, did send the due\ndrawn statement to the State, yet no payment was\nmade to petitioner schools and the petitioner schools\nwere facing execution petitions filed by private(Downloaded on 27/08/2022 at 09:29:38 PM)(16 of 17) [CW-9552/2019]\n\n respondents following the judgments dated\n 27.11.2012, 10.12.2012, 17.03.2015 and\n 07.04.2015 passed by the Tribunal.Rule 15 of Rules of 1993 reads as under :-Payment of Recurring Grant.- (1) Payment\n of grant-in-aid may be sanctioned by the\n Director of Education regularly to the\n institution already on the grant-in-aid list\n within the budget provision in the current\n financial year.(2) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxx\n Thus, the argument of learned counsel for\n appellant that State is only required to reimburse the\n payment which has already been made by the\n institution to the employees, has no applicability in\n this matter. Therefore, for this delayed payment of\n the amount, the petitioner schools (aided\n institutions) cannot be saddled with the liability to\n pay interest.In view of above, the order of learned Single\n Judge directing the State Government to pay interest\n on the aforesaid amounts, does not suffer from vice\n of illegality and we are of the considered opinion that\n the order passed by learned Single Judge does not\n call for any interference.No ground for interference is made out and the\n appeals are accordingly dismissed."(emphasis supplied)\n\n From the above, it would be seen that Division Bench, after\n\nthoroughly considering the aspect of direction to pay interest\n\ncame to the conclusion that the order passed by the learned\n\nSingle Judge did not call for any interference.In view of the above fact situation, the State alone is\n\nresponsible to make payment of interest on the amount other than\n\nthat of gratuity payable to the teachers/employees.Consequently, the writ petitions filed by the petitioner are\n\nallowed to the extent that other than the amount of gratuity(Downloaded on 27/08/2022 at 09:29:38 PM)(17 of 17) [CW-9552/2019]\n\n\n\n payable to the respondents-teachers/employees, the petitioner\n\n institution shall not be responsible for payment of interest and to\n\n that extent directions given by the Tribunal in the impugned\n\n judgments shall stand set aside and in 4 cases, where execution\n\n proceedings are pending before the Executing Court, the petitioner\n\n institution shall not be proceeded against to the above extent.It is further directed that the interest as directed by the\n\n Tribunal shall be paid by the State on the amount other than the\n\n amount of gratuity within a period of eight weeks and the\n\n respondents-teachers/employees would be free to proceed against\n\n the State for payment of the amount of interest in terms of the\n\n above directions.(ARUN BHANSALI),J\n 12-sumer/-(Downloaded on 27/08/2022 at 09:29:38 PM)Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

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Supreme Court of IndiaSujit Tiwari vs The State Of Gujarat on 28 January, 2020Author: Deepak GuptaBench: L. Nageswara Rao, Deepak GuptaNON­REPORTABLE\n\n\n IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA\n CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION\n\n\n\n\n CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1897 OF 2019\n(@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 3478 OF 2019)\n\n\n\n\nSUJIT TIWARI …APPELLANT(S)\n\n\n Versus\n\n\n\nSTATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)\n\n\n\n JUDGMENTDeepak Gupta, J.1. This bail application has been filed by one of the accused\n\nand we are giving the facts necessary only for the decision of his\n\ncase.12. The Indian Coast Guard received some intelligence inputs\n\nwith regard to suspicious activities of a ship MV Hennry.\n\nTherefore, the Indian Coast Guard took their own ship and\n\nintercepted the vessel on 29.07.2017. The intercepted vessel MV\n\nHennry was flying a flag of Panama. The Master of the ship was\n\none Suprit Tiwari, and there were 7 other crew members, all\n\nIndian nationals. The Master and the crew members were not in\n\npossession of any licence, permit and could not even produce any\n\ndocument pertaining to departure from last port of call i.e. Abu\n\nDhabi in U.A.E. or for the next port of call, i.e., Bhavnagar in\n\nGujarat. It is alleged that the Master Suprit Tiwari when\n\nquestioned admitted that they were carrying contraband\n\nsubstance in the nature of narcotics in the ship. He identified\n\nthe locations and approximately 1445 kg of narcotics substance\n\nin 1526 packets was recovered. This was hidden in two cavities\n\nmodified in the two tanks on both sides at stern of the vessel and\n\nalso in the bollards and railings on both sides of the weather\n\ndeck. These cavities and railings had been fabricated for\n\nconcealing narcotics which were stored in water proof packets.3. Information in this regard was given to the Narcotics\n\nControl Bureau, Ahmedabad (for short ‘NCB’). The NCB carried2out investigation and after completing some investigation, filed a\n\ncomplaint before the Special Judge, NDPS Court at Porbandar in\n\nGujarat on 22.12.2017 against the Master and the 7 crew\n\nmembers and 5 other persons including the appellant Sujit\n\nTiwari, who is the brother of the Master of the ship Suprit Tiwari.\n\nIn the complaint it is mentioned that after the Indian Coast\n\nGuard informed the NCB, a team of NCB went to Porbandar and\n\nonce the ship MV Hennry came to the jetty on 31.07.2017, the\n\nsame was boarded by the officials of the NCB, including the\n\nIntelligence Officer. Information was collected by the officials of\n\nthe Indian Coast Guard and the Intelligence Officer opened one of\n\nthe packets and found that it contained a substance which was a\n\nlight brownish powder which on testing gave positive result for\n\nheroin. Thereafter, all the 8 persons i.e., Master and crew of the\n\nship were detained and the contraband substance was off­loaded\n\nfrom the vessel and taken to the premises of the police\n\nauthorities. Thereafter, the narcotic substance was weighed,\n\nsamples were taken and further investigation was done.4. According to Suprit Tiwari he was working for an Iranian\n\nNational Sayed Ali Moniri (Seyed Mahmoud) and it was Sayed Ali\n\nMoniri who purchased the heroin and got the cavities made in3the ship. He offered huge amounts to the Master and crew\n\nmembers to illegally transport the heroin. Two crew members\n\nwho did not accept the offer left the ship.5. According to Suprit Tiwari, 4 Iranians namely Ebrahim,\n\nMustafa, Mohammad and Rasool accompanied them on the ship\n\nand they started for Sharjah and reached Dubai the next day.\n\nAbout 1500 kg of heroin was loaded on the ship in Gwadar Port,\n\nPakistan and 1 Pakistani National named Khalid Mohammad also\n\njoined the accused here. However, instead of going towards\n\nEgypt, as directed by their boss, Suprit Tiwari and crew members\n\ndecided to bring the ship to India and changed the name of their\n\nvessel from Prince­II to MV Hennry. Suprit Tiwari and crew\n\nmembers after landing in India decided to sell all the drugs and\n\nget the ship dismantled as soon as the drugs got delivered to\n\nVishal Kumar Yadav and Irfan Sheikh who assured them to buy\n\nthe entire consignment. According to Suprit Tiwari, all the non­\n\nIndian crew members, i.e. four Iranians and one Pakistani\n\nnational deboarded the ship after concealment of drugs.6. The Master and crew members destroyed the Automatic\n\nIdentification System (AIS) of the ship so that it could not be\n\ntraced by the owner or any other person. In his voluntary4statement, Suprit Tiwari revealed that he had informed his\n\nbrother Sujit Tiwari about some illegal activity in which he was to\n\nmake a huge amount of money and he also told Sujit that he\n\nwould get Rs. 50 crores through hawala. The appellant Sujit\n\nTiwari was arrested on 04.08.2017. The allegation against the\n\nappellant is that he was part of the conspiracy to smuggle the\n\nhuge quantity of contraband into India and therefore he should\n\nnot be granted bail.7. Mr. Siddharth Dave, learned senior counsel for the\n\nappellant urges that there is no material to connect the appellant\n\nwith the crime. He has also argued that the appellant is entitled\n\nto a default bail since the investigation has not been completed\n\nwithin the period prescribed underSection 167of the Code of\n\nCriminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘CrPC’) read withSection 36Aof the Narcotic Drugs andPsychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for\n\nshort ‘NDPS Act’).8. On the other hand, Mr. K.M. Natraj, learned ASG appearing\n\nfor the respondents submits that keeping in view the bar ofSection 37of the NDPS Act, no bail can be granted to the\n\nappellant. As far as default bail is concerned he submits that5since the complaint was filed within time, the appellant cannot\n\nget benefit ofSection 167CrPC read withSection 36Aof the\n\nNDPS Act even if investigation has not been completed. While\n\ndeciding this bail application we are conscious of the provisions\n\nofSection 37of the NDPS Act which lays down two limitations;\n\none, that the court is prima facie of the view that the appellant is\n\nnot guilty of the offence and secondly, that he is not likely to\n\ncommit any offence while on bail.9. We have gone through the statement made by the appellant\n\nunderSection 67of the NDPS Act. Without going into the\n\nquestion whether the statement is admissible or not, as this\n\nmatter has been referred to a larger bench, we are, for the\n\npurpose of this case, taking the statement into consideration\n\neven though the appellant has resiled from the same.10. The prosecution story is that the appellant was aware of\n\nwhat his brother was doing and was actively helping his brother.\n\nAt this stage we would not like to comment on the merits of the\n\nallegations levelled against the present appellant. But other than\n\nthe few WhatsApp messages and his own statement which he has\n\nresiled from, there is very little other evidence. At this stage it\n\nappears that the appellant may not have even been aware of the6entire conspiracy because even the prosecution story is that the\n\nbrother himself did not know what was loaded on the ship till he\n\nwas informed by the owner of the vessel. Even when the heroin\n\nwas loaded in the ship it was supposed to go towards Egypt and\n\nthat would not have been a crime under theNDPS Act. It seems\n\nthat Suprit Tiwari and other 7 crew members then decided to\n\nmake much more money by bringing the ship to India with the\n\nintention of disposing of the drugs in India. During this period\n\nthe Master Suprit Tiwari took the help of Vishal Kumar Yadav\n\nand Irfan Sheikh who had to deliver the consignment to Suleman\n\nwho had to arrange the money after delivery. The main allegation\n\nmade against the appellant is that he sent the list of the crew\n\nmembers after deleting the names of 4 Iranians and Esthekhar\n\nAlam to Vishal Kumar Yadav and Irfan Sheikh through\n\nWhatsApp with a view to make their disembarkation process\n\neasier. Even if we take the prosecution case at the highest, the\n\nappellant was aware that his brother was indulging in some\n\nillegal activity because obviously such huge amount of money\n\ncould not be made otherwise. However, at this stage it cannot be\n\nsaid with certainty whether he was aware that drugs were being\n\nsmuggled on the ship or not, though the allegation is that he7made such a statement to the NCB underSection 67of the NDPS\n\nAct.11. At this stage, without going into the merits, we feel that the\n\ncase of the appellant herein is totally different from the other\n\naccused. Reasonable possibility is there that he may be\n\nacquitted. He has been behind bars since his arrest on\n\n04.08.2017 i.e. for more than 2 years and he is a young man\n\naged about 25 years. He is a B.Tech Graduate. Therefore, under\n\nfacts and circumstances of this case we feel that this is a fit case\n\nwhere the appellant is entitled to bail because there is a\n\npossibility that he was unaware of the illegal activities of his\n\nbrother and the other crew members. The case of the appellant\n\nis different from that of all the other accused, whether it be the\n\nMaster of the ship, the crew members or the persons who\n\nintroduced the Master to the prospective buyers and the\n\nprospective buyers.12. We, however, feel that some stringent conditions will have to\n\nbe imposed upon the appellant.13. We direct that the appellant Sujit Tiwari be released on bail\n\nupon furnishing a bail bond in the sum of Rs.10,00,000/­ (Ten\n\nLakhs only), with two sureties of the like amount to the8satisfaction of the Special Judge, NDPS Court at Porbandar on\n\nthe following conditions:­(a) The appellant shall deposit his passport, if any\n with the Court.(b) The appellant shall either stay in Porbandar or\n Kolkata. He shall not go to any other place.(c) The appellant shall give his cell­phone number to\n the police authorities and shall not change his cell­phone\n number without permission of the trial court.(d) Whether the appellant remains in Porbandar or\n Kolkata, in Kolkata he shall report to the Entally police\n station daily at 09:00 A.M. , and in Porbandar he shall\n report to the Investigating Officer of the NCB at 09:00\n A.M. everyday.(e) The appellant shall join the investigation as and\n when called upon to do so before the authorities of the\n NCB.(f) The appellant shall not in any manner hamper or\n try to interfere in the investigation.(g) Once the trial begins, the appellant shall not in\n any manner try to delay the trial.14. If the appellant violates any of these terms, the NCB shall be\n\nentitled to straightaway apply to the Special Judge for\n\ncancellation of his bail.915. The appeal is disposed of on the aforesaid terms. Pending\n\napplication(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.……………………………….J.(L. Nageswara Rao)\n\n\n\n\n ………………………………..J.(Deepak Gupta)\n\nNew Delhi\nJanuary 28, 202010

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Central Information CommissionDr Sagar Mitrajit Gaikwad vs Department Of Health & Family Welfare on 18 February, 2020के ीय सूचना आयोग\n Central Information Commission\n बाबा गंगनाथ माग, मुिनरका\n Baba Gangnath Marg, Munirka\n नई द ली, New Delhi - 110067\n\nि तीय अपील सं या / Second Appeal No.:- CIC/MOHFW/A/2018/610798-BJ-Penalty\n\nDr. Sagar Mitrajit Gaikwad\n\n ....अपीलकता/Appellant\n\n VERSUS\n बनाम\n\nCPIO\nMinistry of Health and Family Welfare\nDept. of Health and Family Welfare\nNirman Bhawan, New Delhi - 110011\n ... ितवादीगण /Respondent\n\nDate of Hearing : 17.02.2020\nDate of Decision : 18.02.2020\n\nDate of RTI application 04.11.2017\nCPIO's response Not on Record\nDate of the First Appeal 09.12.2017\nFirst Appellate Authority's response Not on Record\nDate of diarised receipt of Appeal by the Commission Nil\n\n ORDERFACTS:The Appellant vide his RTI application sought information on 05 points regarding the copy of\ncomplete file or proceeding or minutes or all information available which led to inclusion of\ndiploma courses of college ofPhysicians and Surgeons, Mumbai, in First Schedule of the MCI\nAct, 1956, by Gazette Notification dated 17th October, 2017 and issues related thereto.Dissatisfied due to non-receipt of any response from the CPIO, the Appellant approached the\nFAA. The reply of the CPIO/ order of the FAA, if any is not on the record of the Commission.HEARING:Facts emerging during the hearing:The following were present:Page 1 of 7Appellant: Dr. Sagar Mitrajit Gaikwad, arrived late, through VC;Respondent: Mr. Amit Biswas, US, MoHFW and Mr. D. V. K. Rao,\nDy. Secretary (Former CPIO);The Appellant remained absent during the hearing. Mr. Mohan Kumar, DIO NIC studio at\nSolapur confirmed the absence of the Appellant. However, the Appellant arrived after\ncompletion of the hearing and while tendering his unconditional apology for the delay in arrival\nsubmitted that the information sought was not received by him, till date. On being enquired by\nthe Commission whether any e-mail/speed post was received from the Respondent, the Appellant\nacknowledged that an e-mail had been received but he had not yet perused the same. In its reply,\nthe Respondent while tendering unconditional apology for ignoring the initial response to the\nRTI application informed the Commission that 500 pages of information had since been\nfurnished to the Applicant through speed post and e-mail. The former CPIO, Mr. D. V. K. Rao,\nDy. Secretary present at the hearing profusely pleaded for pardon for the delay that occurred due\nto other pressing legal work in the Ministry. The Commission was in receipt of a written\nsubmission from the Respondent dated 14th February, 2020, wherein it was submitted that the\nMinistry had given reply to the Applicant on 12.02.2020 without receiving requested money.\nFurthermore, it was submitted that the Ministry also keeps updating and uploading information\non its official site.The Commission referred to the definition of informationu/s 2(f)of the RTI Act, 2005 which is\nreproduced below:"information" means any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-\n mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, report,\n papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information\n relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other\n law for the time being in force."Furthermore, a reference can also be made to the relevant extract ofSection 2 (j)of the RTI Act,\n2005 which reads as under:"(j) right to information" means the right to information accessible under this Act which\n is held by or under the control of any public authority and includes ........"In this context a reference was made to the Hon'ble Supreme Court decision in 2011 (8) SCC\n497 (CBSE Vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay), wherein it was held as under:35..... "It is also not required to provide 'advice' or 'opinion' to an applicant, nor\n required to obtain and furnish any 'opinion' or 'advice' to an applicant. The reference to\n 'opinion' or 'advice' in the definition of 'information' insection 2(f)of the Act, only\n refers to such material available in the records of the public authority. Many public\n authorities have, as a public relation exercise, provide advice, guidance and opinion to\n the citizens. But that is purely voluntary and should not be confused with any obligation\n under theRTI Act."Furthermore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Khanapuram Gandaiah Vs. Administrative\nOfficer and Ors. Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.34868 OF 2009 (Decided on January 4, 2010)\nhad held as under:6. "....Under the RTI Act"information" is defined underSection 2(f)which provides:Page 2 of 7"information" means any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-\n mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, report,\n papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information\n relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other\n law for the time being in force."This definition shows that an applicant underSection 6of the RTI Act can get any\n information which is already in existence and accessible to the public authority under\n law. Of course, under theRTI Actan applicant is entitled to get copy of the opinions,\n advices, circulars, orders, etc., but he cannot ask for any information as to why such\n opinions, advices, circulars, orders, etc. have been passed."7. "....the Public Information Officer is not supposed to have any material which is not\n before him; or any information he could have obtained under law. UnderSection 6of\n the RTI Act, an applicant is entitled to get only such information which can be accessed\n by the "public authority" under any other law for the time being in force. The answers\n sought by the petitioner in the application could not have been with the public authority\n nor could he have had access to this information and Respondent No. 4 was not obliged\n to give any reasons as to why he had taken such a decision in the matter which was\n before him."Having heard both the parties and on perusal of the available records, the Commission at the\noutset was appalled to learn about the callous and casual approach exhibited by the Respondent\nPublic Authority Officials in replying to the RTI application/ First Appeal. The Commission\nobserved that theRTI Act, 2005stipulates time limits in its various provisions relating to\nresponding to RTI Applications, transfer of applications, filing and disposing of first appeal to\nensure that a culture of information dissemination is strengthened so that a robust functioning of\nthe democracy gets established. This was recognised by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi inMujibur Rehman vs Central Information Commission (W.P. (C) 3845/2007)(Dated 28 April,\n2009) wherein it was held as under:"14.......The court cannot be unmindful of the circumstances under which the Act was\n framed, and brought into force. It seeks to foster an "openness culture" among state\n agencies, and a wider section of "public authorities" whose actions have a significant or\n lasting impact on the people and their lives. Information seekers are to be furnished\n what they ask for, unless the Act prohibits disclosure; they are not to be driven away\n through sheer inaction or filibustering tactics of the public authorities or their officers.\n It is to ensure these ends that time limits have been prescribed, in absolute terms, as\n well as penalty provisions. These are meant to ensure a culture of information\n disclosure so necessary for a robust and functioning democracy."With regard to providing a clear and cogent response to the Appellant, the Commission referred\nto the decision of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court inJ P Aggarwal v. Union of India (WP (C) no.\n7232/2009 wherein it was held that:" 7"it is the PIO to whom the application is submitted and it is who is responsible for\n ensuring that the information as sought is provided to the applicant within the\n statutory requirements of the Act.Section 5(4)is simply to strengthen the authority of\n the PIO within the department; if the PIO finds a default by those from whom he hasPage 3 of 7sought information. The PIO is expected to recommend a remedial action to be taken".The RTI Actmakes the PIO the pivot for enforcing the implementation of the Act."8.............The PIO is expected to apply his / her mind, duly analyse the material before\n him / her and then either disclose the information sought or give grounds for non-\n disclosure."Furthermore, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the matter of R.K. Jain vs Union of India, LPA\nNo. 369/2018, dated 29.08.2018, held as under:"9................................ That apart, the CPIO being custodian of the information or the\n documents sought for, is primarily responsible under the scheme of theRTI Actto supply\n the information and in case of default or dereliction on his part, the penal action is to be\n invoked against him only."A reference can also be made to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh in\nthe matter of Block Development Officer, Paonta Sahib vs. State Information Commission and\nAnr., CWP No. 6072 of 2012 dated 27.06.2018 held as under:"9. It is vehemently urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order\n suffers from vice of arbitrariness and, therefore, should be quashed and set aside. It was\n further argued that the petitioner on receipt of the application had transferred it to the\n concerned authorities and, therefore, there was no lapse on his part. He would also urge\n that the petitioner did not know the intricacies of theRTI Actand, therefore, he\n could not have been penalized.10. I find no merit in the contention put-forth by the petitioner. It is more than\n settled that ignorance of law can be no excuse. Once the petitioner is designated as\n PIO, then all the more he is deemed to have knowledge and even otherwise the least\n that was required of him was to have acquainted himself thoroughly with the\n provisions of theRTI Act. Therefore, the explanation as sought to be put-forth by\n the petitioner at this stage clearly reflects the lackadaisical attitude of the petitioner.\n The only reasonable explanation for the cause of delay can be accepted and not lame\n excuses."Moreover, the Commission observed that it should be the endeavour of the CPIO to ensure that\nmaximum assistance should be provided to the RTI applicants to ensure the flow of information.\nIn this context, the Commission referred to the OM No.4/9/2008-IR dated 24.06.2008 issued by\nthe DoP&T on the Subject "Courteous behavior with the persons seeking information under theRTI Act, 2005" wherein it was stated as under:"The undersigned is directed to say that the responsibility of a public authority and its\n public information officers (PIO) is not confined to furnish information but also to\n provide necessary help to the information seeker, wherever necessary."Furthermore, in OM No. 20/10/23/2007-IR dated 09.07.2009, while elaborating on the duties and\nresponsibilities of the FAA, it was stated that:Page 4 of 7"3. Deciding appeals under theRTI Actis a quasi judicial function. It is, therefore,\n necessary that the appellate authority should see that the justice is not only done but it\n should also appear to have been done. In order to do so, the order passed by the\n appellate authority should be a speaking order giving justification for the decision\n arrived at.5..............................The Actprovides that the first appellate authority would be an officer\n senior in rank to the CPIO. Thus, the appellate authority, as per provisions of the Act,\n would be an officer in a commanding position vis a vis' the CPIO. Nevertheless, if, in any\n case, the CPIO does not implement the order passed by the appellate authority and the\n appellate authority feels that intervention of higher authority is required to get his order\n implemented, he should bring the matter to the notice of the officer in the public authority\n competent to take against the CPIO. Such competent officer shall take necessary action\n so as to ensure implementation of theRTI Act. "The Commission also observed that the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the matter ofR.K. Jain\nv. CIC and Anr.in W.P.(C) 4152/2017 dated 10.10.2017 had held as under on the issue of power\nof the Commission to impose penalty :"4. The petitioner's case is that once having rejected the explanation submitted by the\n CPIO (respondent no.2), the CIC was left with no discretion except to levy a penalty at\n the rate of ₹250/- per day, subject to maximum of ₹25,000/-. The petitioner contends that\n the CIC had grossly erred in restricting the penalty to only ₹5,000/- as the delay in\n providing the information was quantified for 485 days.5. The question whether the CIC had the discretion to restrict the penalty or whether\n penalty as provided underSection 20of the Act is mandatory, is no longer res integra.\n The said question was considered by a Division Bench of this Court inAnand Bhushan v.\n R.A. Haritash: ILR (2012) 4 Delhi 657 and the relevant extract ofthe said decisionis set\n out below....6. In view of the above, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the discretion\n exercised by the CIC. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed."The Commission thus observed that there is complete negligence and laxity in the public\nauthority in dealing with the RTI applications. It is abundantly clear that such matters are being\nignored and set aside without application of mind which reflects disrespect towards theRTI Act,\n2005itself. The Commission expressed its displeasure on the casual and callous approach\nadopted by the respondent in responding to the RTI application. It was felt that the conduct of\nRespondent was against the spirit of theRTI Act, 2005which was enacted to ensure greater\ntransparency and effective access to the information.Page 5 of 7DECISION:Keeping in view the facts of the case and the submissions made by both the parties and in light\nof the decisions cited above, the Commission finds that as per the provisions ofSection 20(1)of\nthe RTI Act, 2005, this is a fit case for levying a penalty of Rs. 2,000/- on\nMr. D. V. Kameshwara Rao, Dy. Secretary and the then CPIO for not providing the\ninformation to the Appellant within the stipulated time frame in contravention to the provisions\nof theRTI Act, 2005.The FAA, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Dept. of Health and Family Welfare is\ndirected to recover the amount of Rs 2,000/- from the salary of Mr. D. V. Kameshwara Rao,\nDy. Secretary and the then CPIO on receipt of this order and remit the same by way of Demand\ndraft drawn in favour of "Pay and Accounts Officer, CAT" payable at New Delhi and send\nthe same to Dy. Registrar, (CR-II) email:[email protected], Room No. 106, First Floor,\nCentral Information Commission, CIC Bhavan, Baba Gangnath Marg, Munirka, New\nDelhi-110067 within 30 days from the date of receipt of this order.The Commission further instructs the Respondent to convene periodic conferences/seminars to\nsensitize, familiarize and educate the concerned officials about the relevant provisions of theRTI\nAct, 2005for effective discharge of its duties and responsibilities.\nFurthermore, it is appalling to note that the FAA had also not acted in accordance with the\nprovisions of theRTI Act, 2005, and therefore is advised to be alert and cautious in the\nimplementation of theRTI Act, 2005with due diligence and care.The Appeal stands disposed with the above directions.(Bimal Julka) (िबमल जु का)\n (Information Commissioner) (सूचना आयु )\n\nAuthenticated true copy\n(अ भ मा णत स या पत त)\n\n\n\n\n(K.L. Das) (के .एल.दास)\n(Dy. Registrar) (उप-पंजीयक)\n011-26182598/[email protected]दनांक / Date: 18.02.2020Page 6 of 7Copy to:1. The Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 'A' Wing, Nirman Bhawan,\n New Delhi-110011 (with the instruction to ensure discipline with regard to the replies to\n the RTI applications within the stipulated time period as per the provisions ofSection 7\n (1)and19 (6)of the RTI Act, 2005)2. Mr. Devesh Deval, FAA and Director, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Dept. of\n Health and Family Welfare, Room No. 243, "A" Wing, Nirman Bhawan,\n New Delhi - 110011Page 7 of 7

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Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)Babul Sk @ Babul Sekh & Anr vs Unknown on 15 May, 2020Author:Sanjib BanerjeeBench:Sanjib Banerjee1\n\n\n\n\n CRM 3553 of 2020\n CRAN 1849 of 2020\n (Via Video Conference)\n\nIn Re : An application for anticipatory bail underSection 438of the Code of Criminal Procedure in\nconnection with G.R. 960 of 2020 arising out of Kaliachak P.S. Case No. 164 of 2020 dated\n23.2.2020underSections 302and34of the Indian Penal Code.And\n\nIn the matter of : Babul Sk @ Babul Sekh & anr. ..... Petitioners\n\n Mr. Saloman Hasan .... for the Petitioners\n\n Mr. N. Ahmed,\n Mr. Sudip Ghosh,\n Mr. Tanmoy Ghosh,\n Ms. Sukannya Bhattacharjee,\n Mr. Pradipta Ganguly, ...for the State.\n\n\n\n The petitioners undertake to affirm and stamp the petition as per the Rules within 48 hours\n\nof resumption of normal functioning of the court. The petition is taken up through video conference\n\non the basis of such undertaking.Considering the material collected against the petitioners and the grave of nature of\n\naccusation against them, the petitioners do not qualify to obtain anticipatory bail.CRM 3553 of 2020 and CRAN 1849 of 2020 are rejected.(Sanjib Banerjee, J.)\n\n\n\n (Kausik Chanda, J.)2

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Supreme Court - Daily OrdersAnnapurna Devi vs Sumit Awasthi on 9 December, 2022IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA\n CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION\n\n\n\n TRANSFER PETITION(S)(CIVIL) NO(S). 32/2021\n\n\n ANNAPURNA DEVI PETITIONER(S)\n\n\n VERSUS\n\n\n SUMIT AWASTHI RESPONDENT(S)\n\n O R D E RIn spite of being duly served, none appears for the\n\n respondent.We have considered the facts of the case and grounds on\n\n which transfer has been sought. On such consideration, we are\n\n satisfied with the grounds urged by the petitioner and accept\n\n the same. Therefore, MAT Suit No.908 of 2020 titled as “Sumit\n\n Awasthi v. Annapurna Devi” pending before the Court of District\n\n Judge at Howrah, West Bengal is ordered to be transferred to\n\n the Court of Principal Judge, Family Court at Fatehpur-District, Uttar Pradesh.The District Judge at Howrah, West Bengal shall send the\n\n case record to the transferee court promptly and without any\nSignature Not Verified\n\nDigitally signed by\n delay.Narendra Prasad\nDate: 2022.12.10\n13:14:52 IST\nReason:The transfer petition is, accordingly, allowed.1Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.….........................J\n (B.R. GAVAI)\n\n\n\n ...........................J\n ( VIKRAM NATH )\nNEW DELHI\nDECEMBER 09, 20222ITEM NO.1 COURT NO.9 SECTION XVI-A\n\n S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A\n RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS\n\nTRANSFER PETITION(S)(CIVIL) NO(S). 32/2021\n\nANNAPURNA DEVI PETITIONER(S)\n\n VERSUS\n\nSUMIT AWASTHI RESPONDENT(S)\n\n(IA No. 3702/2021 - EX-PARTE STAY\n IA No. 3703/2021 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)\n\nDate : 09-12-2022 This matter was called on for hearing today.CORAM :HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE B.R. GAVAI\n HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAM NATH\n\nFor Petitioner(s) Mr. Manish Jain,Adv.Mr. Piyush Sharma,Adv.Mr. Vikash Kumar Verma,Adv.\n Mr. Saurabh,Adv.Mr. Rajesh Kumar,Adv.Mr. Anshul Sharma,Adv.Priyatam Bhardwaj,Adv.Mr. Arvind Gupta, AOR\nFor Respondent(s)\n\n\n UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following\n O R D E R\n\n The transfer petition is allowed, in terms of the signed\norder.(NARENDRA PRASAD) (ANJU KAPOOR)\nASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)\n\n (Signed order is placed on the file)3

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Central Information CommissionChetan Madhwani vs Chief Commissioner Of Income Tax (Cca) , ... on 21 August, 2020Author:Neeraj Kumar GuptaBench:Neeraj Kumar Guptaके ीय सूचना आयोग\n Central Information Commission\n बाबा गंगनाथ माग, मुिनरका\n Baba Gangnath Marg, Munirka\n नई द ली, New Delhi - 110067\n\nि तीय अपील सं या/Second Appeal No. CIC/CCITJ/A/2019/601185\n\nChetan Madhwani ... अपीलकता /Appellant\n VERSUS\n बनाम\n1. CPIO, Income Tax Officer, Ward ... ितवादीगण/Respondents\n(1)(2), Kota.\n\n2. CPIO, O/o. Chief Commissioner\nOf Income Tax, Jaipur.\n\nRelevant dates emerging from the appeal:\n\nRTI : 13-09-2018 FA : 22-09-2018 SA : 22-01-2019\n\nCPIO : 19-09-2018 FAO : 15-01-2019 Hearing : 17-08-2020\n\n ORDER1. The appellant filed an application under theRight to Information Act, 2005(RTI Act) before the Central Public Information Officer (CPIO), O/o. Chief\nCommissioner Of Income Tax, Jaipur seeking action taken on his Tax Evasion\nPetition (TEP) dated 19-03-2018.2. The CPIO responded on 19-09-2018. The appellant filed the first appeal\ndated 22-09-2018 which was disposed of by the first appellate authority on 15-01-\n2019. Thereafter, he filed a second appeal u/Section 19(3)of the RTI Act before\nthe Commission requesting to take appropriate legal action against the CPIO\nu/Section 20of the RTI Act, 2005 and also to direct him to provide the sought for\ninformation.Hearing:3. The appellant, Mr. Chetan Madhwani attended the hearing through audio\nconferencing. Mr. Ramkesh Meena, ITO participated in the hearing representingPage 1 of 3the respondent(s) through audio conferencing. The written submissions are taken\non record.4. The appellant submitted that the respondent had attached an old letter dated\n30-07-2018 along with the online reply dated 19-09-2018 thereby indicating that\nthe information sought did not pertain to the Kota office. However, O/o. Chief\nCommissioner of Income Tax, Jaipur had transferred the RTI application to the\nKota office on 13-09-2018 since the information pertained to the Kota office.5. The respondent(s) submitted that the CPIO of Kota office had already given\na reply dated 19-09-2018 to the appellant saying that the third party information\nexempted u/Section 8(1)(j)of the RTI Act, 2005 cannot be provided to him.\nFurther, they informed the Commission that the matter is still under investigation.\nDecision:6. This Commission observes that there is no harm in disclosing only the status\nof the TEP and therefore, the CPIO is directed to provide a reply to the appellant\nthereby indicating the current status of the TEP dated 19-03-2018, within a period\nof 15 working days from the date of receipt of this order. However, the personal\ndetails of Shri Suresh and Smt. Krishna Kumari against whom the TEP has been\nfiled cannot be disclosed u/Section 8(1)(j)of the RTI act, 2005.7. Further it is observed that the CPIO, Kota had sent a wrong attachment\nalong with the reply dated 19-09-2018 saying that the information did not pertain\nto their office despite the fact that the CPIO, Kota was the custodian of\ninformation. Therefore, the CPIO, Kota is directed to show cause as to why penalty\nshould not be imposed on him for deliberately sending an old attachment unrelated\nto the RTI application, within a period of 15 working days from the date of receipt\nof this order.8. With the above observations, the appeal is disposed of.9. Copy of the decision be provided free of cost to the parties.नीरज कु मार गु ा)\n Neeraj Kumar Gupta (नीरज ा\n Information Commissioner (सूसूचना आयु )\n िदनां क / Date: 17-08-2020\nAuthenticated true copy\n(अिभ मािणत स यािपत ित)\n\nS. C. Sharma (एस. सी. शमा),Dy. Registrar (उप-पंजीयक),(011-26105682)Page 2 of 3Addresses of the parties:1. The CPIO\n Income Tax Officer Ward (1)(2) Office Of The\n Income Tax Officer/CPIO Ward 1(2), Kota,\n Dainik Navjyoti Bhawan, Awatbhata Road,\n Kota - 324009.2. The CPIO\n O/o. Chief Commissioner Of Income Tax,\n RTI Cell, NCR Building, Statue Circle,\n Jaipur-302005.3. Shri Chetan MadhwaniPage 3 of 3

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Income Tax Appellate Tribunal - AhmedabadThe Acit, Circle-1(1)(1), Vadoadara vs Darshanam Life Space Pvt. Ltd, Vadodara on 8 March, 2021आयकर अपील य अ धकरण, अहमदाबाद यायपीठ 'बी', अहमदाबाद ।\n IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL\n " B " BENCH, AHMEDABAD\n\n BEFORE SHRI MAHAVIR PRASAD, JUDICIAL MEMBER &\n SHRI AMARJIT SINGH, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER1. आयकर अपील सं./I.T.A. No.2040/Ahd/2018 - By Revenue2. आयकर अपील सं./I.T.A. No.2061/Ahd/2018 - By Assessee\n ( नधा रण वष / Assessment Year : 2012-13)1. The Asst.CIT बनाम/ 1. Darshanam Life Space\n Circfle-1(1)(1) Vs. Pvt.Ltd., 3 r d Floor\n Vadodara - 390 007 Platinum Complex\n Opp. Ganga Jamna Hospital\n Subhanpur,Vadodra-3900232. Darshanam Life 2. The Dy.CIT\n Space Pvt.Ltd. Circle-1(1)(1), Vadodara\n Vadodara-390023\n थायी ले खा सं . /जीआइआर सं . / PAN/GIR No. : AADCD 2030 M\n (अपीलाथ /Appellants) .. ( यथ / Respondents)\n Revenue by : Shri Vinod Tanwani, CIT-DR\n Assessee by : Shri Mukund Bakshi AR\n\n सन\n ु वाई क तार ख / Date of Hearing 11/02/2021\n घोषणा क तार ख /Date of Pronouncement 08/03/2021\n\n आदे श / O R D E R\n\nPER SHRI AMARJIT SINGH - AM:The captioned appeals have been filed at the instance of the\nRevenue and Assessee respectively against the appellate order of the\nCommissioner of Income Tax(Appeals)-1, Ahmedabad [CIT(A) in short]\ndated 30/07/2018 arising in the assessment order passed under s.143(3)\nr.w.s.147 of theIncome Tax Act, 1961(hereinafter referred to as "the\nAct") dated 29/12/2016 relevant to Assessment Year (AY) 2012-13.ITA No.2040/Ahd/2018 (By Revenue)and ITA No.2061/Ahd/2018 (By Assessee)\n ACIT vs. Darshanam Life Space P.Ltd.Asst.Year: 2012-1322. Since the issues are inter-connected, both the appeals were heard\ntogether and are being disposed of by this consolidated order for the sake\nof convenience.3. First, we take up the Revenue's appeal, i.e. ITA No.2040/Ahd/2018\nfor AY 2012-13. The Revenue has raised the following grounds of\nappeal:-1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld.CIT(A)\n erred in deleting the addition of Rs.3,86,04,360/- which was made on\n account of estimation of accommodation entries at Rs.25,73,62,400/- and\n thereafter restricting the addition to 15% of such estimate amounting to\n Rs.3,86,04,360/-, without appreciating the findings that the assessee has\n accepted to have make payment of Rs.6,43,406/- to Mr. Rami and Mr.Rami\n has also accepted payment for accommodation entries from various parties.2. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld.CIT(A)\n failed to appreciate that the decision of the AO is based on binding decision\n of Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the case of M/s.Vijay Protien Ltd. vs. CIT\n 58 Taxmann.com 344 [2015] as well as the decisions of Hon'ble\n jurisdictional ITAT in the cases ofPavankumar M.Sanghvi v. ITO Ward-5(1), Baroda and in the case ofACIT, Circle-4, Surat vs. Sunday Exports\n Ltd.3. The facts in brief are that the assessee-company has filed its return of\nincome on 30/09/2012 declaring total income at Rs.3,96,91,870/-.\nAssessmentu/s.143(3)of the Act was finalized on 24/03/2015 and total\nincome was determined on Rs.55,61,49,800/- which was reduced to\nRs.4,54,35,860/- after giving appeal effect. Subsequently, the Assessing\nOfficer has received information from ACIT, Central Circle-2(4),\nAhmedabad who has assessed the case of Shri Jaymesh Rami, Director of\nAayurshi Infraprojects Pvt.Ltd. u/s.153A regarding providing ofITA No.2040/Ahd/2018 (By Revenue)and ITA No.2061/Ahd/2018 (By Assessee)\n ACIT vs. Darshanam Life Space P.Ltd.Asst.Year: 2012-133accommodation entries. The Affidavit of Shri Jayesh Rami was also\nreceived by the Assessing Officer, wherein he had admitted that he was\nengaged in the business of entry providing on charging of commission at\nRs.0.25 to 0.35 per 100 rupees. The Assessing Officer observed that the\nassessee has paid a sum of Rs.6,43,406/- to Shri Jaymesh Rami during the\nyear under consideration. Therefore, the Assessing Officer has reopened\nthe case after recording reasonu/s.148of the Act on 18/06/2015. A noticeu/s.143(2)of the Act was issued on 13/06/2006. During the course of\nassessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer has issued show-cause\nnotice dated 26/09/2016 to the assessee briefly stating that Shri Jaymesh\nRami has received commission of Rs.6,43,406/- from the assessee-\ncompany. It was further pointed out that the assessee had shown this\namount in the name of M/s.Rami Brothers in whose bank account this\namount was credited, while PAN of Shri Jaymesh Rami was mentioned\nalong with the name of M/s.Rami Brothers. In the show-cause notice, the\nAssessing Officer has computed an amount of Rs.25,73,62,400/-\n(6,43,406*100/0.25) being inflated expenditure and asked the assessee by\nthe same should not be added to its total income. In response to the show-\ncause notice, the assessee has explained vide letter dated 04/10/2016 that it\nhas not entered into any transaction with M/s.Aayurshi Infraprojects\nPvt.Ltd as per its books of accounts which were produced for verification.\nIt was also submitted that assessee-company has actually availed the\nservices of site leveling/soil filling from M/s.Rami Brothers during the\nFinancial Year 2010-11 and also enclosed the copy of invoice. The\nassessee has also explained that for availing these services, it has madeITA No.2040/Ahd/2018 (By Revenue)and ITA No.2061/Ahd/2018 (By Assessee)\n ACIT vs. Darshanam Life Space P.Ltd.Asst.Year: 2012-134payment of Rs.6,43,406/- during the year under consideration. It is further\nexplained that assessee-company was not aware of any business of\nproviding accommodation entries by Shri Rami.4.1. The assessee has also requested the Assessing Officer to furnish the\n following particulars.1) The details of entries alleged to have been provided.2) The copy of statement recorded by the authorities concerning the\n assessee.3) Copy of Affidavit.4) Any other communication made in this regard.However, vide letter dated 14/10/2016, the Assessing Officer has\nsupplied only the following documents.1) The copy of statement of Shri.Jaymesh R.Rami2) The copy of Affidavit of Shri Jaymesh R.Rami.However, the assessee was allowed to make inspection of the record\nreceived from ACIT, Central Circle-2(4), Ahmedabad. Thereafter, the\nassessee has made submission of 28/10/2016 stating that it has not entered\nany transaction of obtaining accommodation entries as alleged on the basis\nof the statement of Shri Jaymesh Rami furnished to the assessee vide letter\ndated 14/10/2016. It was also explained that in the Affidavit Shri Jaymesh\nRami has stated of providing accommodation entries to several parties but\nin the list of parties name of the assessee was not reflected. Even in theITA No.2040/Ahd/2018 (By Revenue)and ITA No.2061/Ahd/2018 (By Assessee)\n ACIT vs. Darshanam Life Space P.Ltd.Asst.Year: 2012-135Affidavit also, nothing was mentioned about transaction with the assessee-\ncompany. However, the assessee-company had transaction amounting to\nRs.6,43,406/- with M/s.Rami Brothers in the FY 2010-11 and that\ntransaction had nothing to do with Shri Jaymesh Rami. However, the\nAssessing Officer has not agreed with the explanation and objection made\nby the assessee-company. The Assessing Officer stated that assessee has\naccepted the fact that it has paid an amount of Rs.6,43,406/- to Shri\nJaymesh Rami and Shri Rami has accepted that he has received some\namounts from various parties for providing of accommodation entries and\ndetails provided by Shri Jaymesh Rami included the details in respect of\nthe assessee. Therefore, Assessing Officer was of the view that Shri\nJaymesh Rami has provided accommodation entries to the assessee.\nConsequently, the Assessing Officer has held that 15% of the total amount\nof accommodation entries computed by the Assessing Officer to be\ndisallowed. Therefore, Assessing Officer has computed at 15% of the total\naccommodation entries of Rs.25,73,62,400/- to the amount of\nRs.3,86,04,360/- and added to the total income of the assessee.5. Aggrieved assessee has filed appeal before the Ld.CIT(A) against the\norder of the Assessing Officer in making addition of Rs.3,86,04,360/-.6. The Ld.CIT(A) has restricted the addition to the extent of\nRs.7,91,406/- only and the relevant portion of the order of the Ld.CIT(A)\nis reproduced hereunder:ITA No.2040/Ahd/2018 (By Revenue)and ITA No.2061/Ahd/2018 (By Assessee)\n ACIT vs. Darshanam Life Space P.Ltd.Asst.Year: 2012-136"4.2. Ground No.1 and 2 originally raised in the appeal memo are pertaining\nto estimation of value of accommodation entries at Rs.25,73,62,400/- and then\n15% disallowance thereof resulting into addition of Rs.3,86,04,360/-. As is\nevident from the statement of Shri Jaymeshbhai R Rami recorded by the ACIT,\nCentral Circle-2(4), Ahmedabad on 20.03.2015 during the course of the\nassessment proceedings in the case of M/s. Aayurshi Infraprojects Pvt. Ltd., he\nwas director in 5 companies for monthly income of Rs.5,000/- to Rs.6,000/- as\nmentioned below:Sr Name of the Company Address\nNo.\n1 M/s. Krutarth Projects Pvt.Ltd. 35-252, Vandan\n Apartment\n Ankur Road, Naranpura,\n Ahmedabad\n2 M/s.Alton Infrastructure Pvt.Ltd. 2515, Sadumata ni Pole,\n Shahpur, Ahmedabad\n 380 001\n3 M/s.Disharth Infraprojects Pvt.Ltd. 2646-3, Gamala ni Pole,\n Nr. Hakim ni Khadki,\n Shahpur\n Ahmedabad 380 001\n4 M/s Aayurshi Infraprojects Pvt.Ltd. 35-252, Vandan\n Apartment, Ankur road,\n Naranpura, Ahmedabad\n5 M/s.Kalgi Marketing Pvt.Ltd. D-5, Kiran Nagar,\n Govt.Quarters,\n O/s. Shahpur,\n Ahmedabad 380 001Further, Shri Jaymesh R Rami in response to question No.9, had given the list\nof entities to whom accommodation entries were provided which are as under:I. M/s. Kesar Buildcon Pvt. Ltd.\n II. M/s. Infinity Comptrade Pvt. Ltd.\n III. M/s. Entire Ceramics\n IV. M/s. Sampati Securities\n V. M/s. Prime Commodities\n VI. Jolly Anureet Kaur\n VII. M/s. Profile Biochemical Pvt. Ltd.ITA No.2040/Ahd/2018 (By Revenue)and ITA No.2061/Ahd/2018 (By Assessee)\n ACIT vs. Darshanam Life Space P.Ltd.\n Asst.Year: 2012-137VIII.M/s. B.B. Tradelink Pvt. Ltd.\n IX. M/s. Rishabh Probuild Pvt. Ltd.\n X. M/s. Sanskruti Megastructure Pvt. Ltd. :He has also submitted affidavit dated 11.03.2015, contents of which are\nreproduced as under:"I the undersigned JAYMESH R RAMI, Hindu, adult, present\n communication address at 35/252, Vandan Apartment Nr. Ankur Cross\n Road, Haranpura, Ahmedabad-380013 do hereby solemnly affirm on\n oath that I was involved in the business as well as engaged in providing\n accommodative entries during FY 2010-11, FY 2011-12 and FY 2012-\n 13 relevant to AY 2011-12, AY2012-13 and AY 2013-14. Separate\n submission with regard to papers/documents/accounts was given on 09-\n 03-2015 along with the submission.In this business of entry provider, rate of commission is ranging from\n 0.25 paisa to 0.35 paisa per 100 rupees and out of that minimum\n expenses incurred is about 0.05 paisa to 0.10 paisa and net income\n received from this business was about 0.30 paisa.Further it is stated that I was a party in the document block No.222 TP.\n Scheme no.4 final plot no. 40 at Village Kudasan, Gandhinagar, which\n was executed on 22-07-2010 vide registration deed no. 13990 dated 22-\n 07-2010. As per the document there is mention of receipt of Rs.10 Lacs\n but in fact it was part of providing accommodative arrangement for this\n document for which I received on only 10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand\n only). Thus, I am stating on oath which may be considered at the time\n of working out of my income as entry provider.This affidavit I given to assess me on the principal of real income\n earned.What ever stated above is to true the best of my knowledge and belief."From the above facts, it is clear that Shri Jaymeshbhai R Rami has not\nmentioned the name" of the appellant anywhere for providing accommodation\nentries. The appellant has provided a list of major purchases to the tune of\nRs.21,62,78,302/- to the AO during the course of the assessment proceedings,ITA No.2040/Ahd/2018 (By Revenue)and ITA No.2061/Ahd/2018 (By Assessee)\n ACIT vs. Darshanam Life Space P.Ltd.Asst.Year: 2012-138but, none of the parties therein was same as mentioned by Shri Jaymeshbhai R\nRami. All the purchases as per this list placed at Pages 22 to 24 of the paper\nbook are from the parties stationed in Vadodara. The AO in his assessment\norder has also not identified or pointed out even a single item of purchase\nmade from the 5 companies through which Shri Jaymesh R Rami claimed to\nhave been providing accommodation entries. In view of the above facts, the Ld.\nAR has objected to the additions made.4.2.1. As regards the payment of Rs.6,43,406/- by the appellant, the appellant\nhas filed a copy of bill issued by M/s. Rami Brothers (Labour Contractors) for\nRs.7,91,406/- being the labour charges for soil filling at site with JCB and\nclaimed that the payment was made by account payee cheque for this work. The\nAO has not established by any cross verification that the bill raised for soil\nfilling at the construction site of the appellant was bogus. Nowhere in the\nstatement or affidavit, Shri Jaymeshbhai R Rami has stated that the amount\nof Rs.6,43,406/- received from the appellant was for commission. Under these\ncircumstances, the action of the AO in extrapolating the amount of\naccommodation entries by considering Rs.6,43,406/- as commission @ 0.25%\nis without any basis and unsustainable in law. At the cost of repetition, it is\nworthwhile to mention here again that the AO could not find even a single\ninstance of purchase from the entities run by Shri Jaymesh R Rami except for\nan entry of Rs.7,91,406/-. The Ld. AR has heavily argued that even a surveyu/s\n133Awas carried out in the case of the appellant on 10.12.2014 and no\nevidence of bogus purchase/accommodation entries was found. On the basis of\nsurvey action, assessmentu/s 143(3)in the year under consideration was\ncompleted on 24.03.2015/27.03.2015. A perusal of the assessment order reveals\nthat there was no iota of evidence regarding accommodation entries and bogus\npurchases.4.2.2. The Ld. AR has also pointed out that the AO had allowed him inspection\nof documents received from ACIT, Central Circle-2(4), Ahmedabad, on\n21.10.2016 and there is no adverse material against the appellant except for an\nentry of Rs.6,43,406/- at sr. No. 39 of the chart containing names of 69\npersons. In order to verify the contentions of the Ld. AR, I have obtained\ncomplete report of ACIT, Central Circle-2(4), Ahmedabad dated 08.06.2015\nwhich was the basis for re-opening and additions made. As a matter of fact, on\nthe basis of entries found credited in the bank accounts of Shri Jaymesh R Rami,\nwith Axis Bank, Dhanlaxmi Bank & Yes Bank, a list of accommodation entries\nhad been prepared.This list contains name and address of parties to whomITA No.2040/Ahd/2018 (By Revenue)and ITA No.2061/Ahd/2018 (By Assessee)\n ACIT vs. Darshanam Life Space P.Ltd.Asst.Year: 2012-139accommodation entries have been provided and name of the appellant is\nappearing only once at Sr.No.39 for Rs.6,43,406/- on 30.07.2011. Further, on\nthe basis of these accommodation entries, the ACIT, central Circle-2(4),\nAhmedabad has completed assessmentu/s 143(3)/153Ain the case of Shri\nJaymeshkumar R Rami for AY 2012-13 & AY 2013-14 vide orders dated\n30.03.2015. In those orders, the summary of accommodation entries has been\nmentioned as under:AY Credit Entries (Rs.) Debit Entries (Rs.)\n\n 2010-11 27,50,000/- 27,45,000/-\n\n 2011-12 46,77,329/- 46,77,400/-\n\n 2012-13 4,99,89,448/- 4,99,91,893/-\n\n 2013-14 1,38,58,608/- 1,38,70,064/-On the .basis of above, the AO in the case of Mr. Rami has assessed net income\nat 1% of accommodation entries as commission earned and accordingly, made\nadditions of Rs.4,99,919/- in AY 2012-13 (i.e. 1% of Rs.4,99,91,893/-) and "Rs.1,38,701/- in AY 2013-14 (i.e. 1% of Rs.1,38,70,064/-). The AO had\nconsidered the debit entries instead of credit entries because of one being\nhigher of two. Therefore, from the above, it is crystal clear that the AO in the\ncase of entry provider had considered that amount credited in his bank accounts\nas value of accommodation entries including one pertaining to the appellant\nand not as commission. Accordingly, entry of Rs.6,43,406/- pertaining to\nappellant being part of total entries of ₹4,99,89,448/- has to be also treated as\naccommodation entry only instead of commission payment.4.2.3. Undisputedly, the AO has neither made any independent enquiry from the\nsuppliers nor allowed cross examination of the third party though specifically\ndemanded and accordingly, the appellant submitted that the additions based on\nhypothesis, conjectures and suspicion are liable to be deleted. It is also said\nthat addition based on the statement of third party without affording\nopportunity of cross examination are also liable to be deleted. In support of\nthese contentions, the Ld. AR has relied upon various decisions as mentioned in\nthe written submission. In the case of Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. (1954) 26ITA No.2040/Ahd/2018 (By Revenue)and ITA No.2061/Ahd/2018 (By Assessee)\n ACIT vs. Darshanam Life Space P.Ltd.Asst.Year: 2012-1310ITR 775 (SC), it has been held that though ITO is not fettered by technical rules\nof evidence and pleadings and he is entitled to act on material which may not be\naccepted as evidence on account of law, but in making assessment, he is not\nentitled to make a pure guess and pass assessment order without reference to\nany evidence or any material at all. This decision has been followed in various\ncases and hence still holds good. The ratio laid by the Hon'ble Supreme Court,\nthus favourably supports the case of the appellant. ;4.2.4. In view of the above factual and legal position, thus, it emerges that the\nAO has estimated value of accommodation entries devoid of any documentary\nevidences or material and hence, the same cannot be sustained. Consequently,\nthe addition made on this account by disallowing 15% of such estimated\naccommodation entries again on adhoc basis also deserves to be deleted.\nAccordingly, the addition made by the AO having no legs to stand is directed to\nbe deleted. However, undoubtedly, the appellant has made a payment of\nRs.6,43,406/- in respect of purchase of services of soil filling from Shri Jaymesh\nR Rami amounting to Rs.7,91,406/- which certainly should be treated as\naccommodation entry. Accordingly, the AO is directed to make the disallowance\nof Rs.7,91,406/- only. Thus, appellant succeeds partly in respect of both the\ngrounds of appeal.5. In result, the appeal is partly allowed."7. During the course of hearing before us, the Ld.DR has supported the\norder of the Assessing Officer. On the other hand, the ld.counsel for the\nassessee has filed paper-book comprising details of document filed before\nthe Assessing Officer and CIT(A). During the course of assessment\nproceedings and appellate proceedings, the ld.counsel for the assessee has\ncontended that as per the copy of invoice of Rs.7,91,406/- placed in the\npaper-book pertaining to labour charges of Rs.7,91,406/- issued in favour\nof M/s.Rami Brothers as labour contractors, it is clear that assessee has not\navailed any accommodation entry from Shri Jaymesh Rami. The\nld.counsel for the assessee has also referred the other documents placed inITA No.2040/Ahd/2018 (By Revenue)and ITA No.2061/Ahd/2018 (By Assessee)\n ACIT vs. Darshanam Life Space P.Ltd.Asst.Year: 2012-1311the paper-book, i.e. confirmation of account and details of purchases made\nduring the year by the assessee-company. The ld.counsel for the assessee\nhas also supported the order of the Ld.CIT(A).8. Heard both the sides and perused the material available on record.\nDuring the year under consideration, the Assessing Officer has reopened\nthe assessment in the case of the assessee on the basis of information\nreceived from ACIT, Central Cir-2(4), Ahmedabad who assessed the case\nof Shri Jaymesh Rami, Director of Aayurshi Infraprojects Pvt.Ltd.\nu/s.153A of the Actin providing of accommodation entries. The\nAssessing Officer, during the course of assessment proceedings, has\npointed out that assessee has paid a sum of Rs.6,43,406/- to M/s.Rami\nBrothers while PAN of Shri Jaymesh Rami was mentioned along with the\nname of M/s.Rami Brothers. The Assessing Officer has received\ninformation that Shri Jaymesh Rami, Director of Aayurshi Infraprojects\nPvt.Ltd. was engaged in providing of accommodation entries. The\nAssessing Officer has also received Affidavit of Shri Jaymesh Rami,\nwherein he admitted that he was engaged in the business of entry\nproviding on charging of commission @ 0.25 to 0.35 per 100 rupees. On\nthe basis of these information, the Assessing Officer has treated the\namount of Rs.6,43,406/- as commission paid by the assessee-company to\nShri Jaymesh Rami for obtaining accommodation entries. The Assessing\nOfficer has treated the commission rate @ 0.25 per 100 rupees and worked\nout accommodation entries to the amount of Rs.25,73,62,400/-\n(6,43,406*100/0.25). The assessee-company has submitted that it hasITA No.2040/Ahd/2018 (By Revenue)and ITA No.2061/Ahd/2018 (By Assessee)\n ACIT vs. Darshanam Life Space P.Ltd.Asst.Year: 2012-1312never had any business with the companies named by Shri Rami As in his\nstatement Shri Jaymesh Rami has stated that he was Director of the five\ncompanies which were engaged in the business of providing entry and the\nassessee has not any transaction with those companies. The list of those\nfive companies discussed in the order of the CIT(A) are as under:-"Sr Name of the Company Address\nNo.\n1 M/s. Krutarth Projects Pvt.Ltd. 35-252, Vandan Apartment\n Ankur Road, Naranpura,\n Ahmedabad\n2 M/s.Alton Infrastructure Pvt.Ltd. 2515, Sadumata ni Pole,\n Shahpur, Ahmedabad 3800013 M/s.Disharth Infraprojects Pvt.Ltd. 2646-3, Gamala ni Pole,\n Nr. Hakim ni Khadki,\n Shahpur\n Ahmedabad 380 001\n4 M/s Aayurshi Infraprojects Pvt.Ltd. 35-252, Vandan\n Apartment, Ankur road,\n Naranpura, Ahmedabad\n5 M/s.Kalgi Marketing Pvt.Ltd. D-5, Kiran Nagar,\n Govt.Quarters,\n O/s. Shahpur, Ahmedabad\n 380 001"8.1. Further, we have noticed in the detailed finding given by the\nLd.CIT(A) that Shri Jaymesh R.Rami had also given the list of entities to\nwhom he has provided accommodation entries and noticed that he has not\nmentioned the name of the assessee-company anywhere for providing\naccommodation entries. During the course of assessment proceedings,\nassessee has also provided the list of parties from whom it has made major\npurchases to the amount of Rs.21,62,78,302/- during the year underITA No.2040/Ahd/2018 (By Revenue)and ITA No.2061/Ahd/2018 (By Assessee)\n ACIT vs. Darshanam Life Space P.Ltd.Asst.Year: 2012-1313consideration and none of the party contained in the list which was\nmentioned by Shri Jaymesh Rami as accommodation provided entities.\nIn respect of payment of Rs.6,43,406/-, the assessee has filed a copy of\nbill issued by M/s.Rami Brothers (Labour Contractors) of Rs.7,91,406/-\nbeing the labour charges from soil filling at site and the payment was made\nby "A/c. Payee Cheque" for this work. It is noticed that the ld.CIT(A) has\ncorrectly mentioned in his finding that Assessing Officer has not\nestablished by any cross-verification that the aforesaid bill was bogus.\nThe Assessing Officer has computed the accommodation entries amount at\nthe rate of 0.25% on hypothetical manner without any basis and relevant\nevidences. In his finding, the Ld.CIT(A) has held that ACIT Central\nCircle-2(4) Ahmedabad in the case of Shri Jaymeshkumar R.Rami has\nassessed net income at 1% of accommodation entries as commission\nearned and made addition of Rs.4,99,919/- (1% of Rs.4,99,91,893). The\nLd.CIT(A) has further held that Assessing Officer in the case of entry\nprovider had considered that amount credited in his bank account as value\nof accommodation entries including one pertaining to the assessee of\nRs.6,43,406/-. The Ld.CIT(A) is also justified in stating that Assessing\nOfficer has neither made any independent enquiry from the suppliers nor\nallowed any cross-examination of the third party though specifically\ndemanded by the assessee-company and made the additions based on\nhypothesis, conjectures and suspicion.8.2. In the light of the above facts and considering the detailed finding of\nthe Ld.CIT(A), we do not find any infirmity in the decision of theITA No.2040/Ahd/2018 (By Revenue)and ITA No.2061/Ahd/2018 (By Assessee)\n ACIT vs. Darshanam Life Space P.Ltd.Asst.Year: 2012-1314ld.CIT(A), therefore both the grounds of appeal of the Revenue stand\ndismissed.9. Now we take up the assessee's appeal in ITA No.2061/Ahd/2012 for\nAY 2012-13.10. In this appeal, the assessee has listed the solitary ground of appeal\nin disallowing the expenditure of Rs.7,91,406/- stating that the\ndisallowance was erroneous in facts and law as no such expenditure was\nclaimed during the year under consideration.11. Without reiterating the facts as elaborated while adjudicating the\nappeal of the Revenue, i.e. ITA No.2040/Ahd/2018 for AY 2012-13\n(supra), it is noticed that Ld.CIT(A) has restricted the addition to the\nextent of Rs.7,91,406/- on the basis of invoice placed on record in respect\nof labour charges for soil filling from M/s.Rami Brothers. However, on\nperusal of the bill, it is noticed that this bill was raised on 07/03/2011\npertaining to FY 2010-11 which clearly demonstrates that this expenditure\nwas not claimed during the year under consideration. However, it is\nnoticed that in his finding the Ld.CIT(A) has concluded that AO of the\nCentral Circle-2(4), Ahmedabad has considered the amount credited in the\nbank account of Shri Rami as value of accommodation entries. Since in\nthe case of the assessee the payment of Rs.6,43,406/- was considered as\naccommodation entries and it is noticed that assessee has not reconciled\nthis payment with outstanding amount of Rs.7,91,406/- as per invoice\nraised for labour charges, therefore we restrict the disallowance to theITA No.2040/Ahd/2018 (By Revenue)and ITA No.2061/Ahd/2018 (By Assessee)\n ACIT vs. Darshanam Life Space P.Ltd.Asst.Year: 2012-1315extent of Rs.6,43,406/-. Thus, this ground of appeal of the assessee is\npartly allowed.12. In the combined result, appeal of the Revenue is dismissed, whereas\nthe appeal of the assessee is partly allowed.This Order pronounced in Open Court on 08 / 03/2021\n\n\n Sd/- Sd/-\n( MAHAVIR PRASAD ) (AMARJIT SINGH )\n JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER\n\nAhmedabad; Dated 08/ 03 /2021\n\nट .सी.नायर, व.&न.स./T.C. NAIR, Sr. PS\nआदे श क त!ल"प अ#े"षत/Copy of the Order forwarded to :\n\n1. अपीलाथ / The Appellant\n2. यथ / The Respondent.\n3. संबं(धत आयकर आयु*त / Concerned CIT4. आयकर आयु*त(अपील) / The CIT(A)-1, Ahmedabad5. -वभागीय &त&न(ध, आयकर अपील य अ(धकरण, अहमदाबाद / DR, ITAT, Ahmedabad6. गाड3 फाईल / Guard file.ु ार/ BY ORDER,\n आदे शानस\n\n स या-पत &त //True Copy//\n\n उप/सहायक पंजीकार (Dy./Asstt.Registrar)\n आयकर अपील य अ धकरण, अहमदाबाद / ITAT, Ahmedabad1. Date of dictation .. 4.3.21 (dictation-pad 27 - pages attached at the end of this appeal-file)2. Date on which the typed draft is placed before the Dictating Member ...4.3.21/5.3.213. Other Member...4. Date on which the approved draft comes to the Sr.P.S./P.S.................5. Date on which the fair order is placed before the Dictating Member for\n pronouncement......6. Date on which the fair order comes back to the Sr.P.S./P.S....... 8.3.217. Date on which the file goes to the Bench Clerk..................... 8.3.218. Date on which the file goes to the Head Clerk..........................................9. The date on which the file goes to the Assistant Registrar for signature\n on the order..........................10. Date of Despatch of the Order..................

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Chattisgarh High CourtVidhyakshee Ramteke vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 13 July, 2021Author:P. Sam KoshyBench:P. Sam Koshy1\n\n\n NAFR\n\n HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR\n\n WPS No. 3553 of 2021\n Vidhyakshee Ramteke W/o Subhesh Pagare Aged About 32 Years\n Working As Guest Faculty (History) At Govt. Rani Durgawati College,\n Wadrafnagar, District- Balrampur- Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh., District :\n Balrampur, Chhattisgarh\n ---- Petitioner\n Versus\n 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of\n Higher Education Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur,\n District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh\n 2. Additional Director Directorate Of Higher Education Department\n ,atal Nagar, Naya Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District :\n Raipur, Chhattisgarh\n 3. Principal Govt. Rani Durgawati College, Wadrafnagar, District-\n Balrampur- Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh., District : Balrampur,\n Chhattisgarh\n ----RespondentsFor Petitioner : Mr. Govind Prasad Dewangan, Advocate\n For State : Ms. Abhyunnati Singh, P.L.\n\n\n Hon'ble Shri Justice P. Sam Koshy\n Order on Board\n13/07/20211. The grievance of the petitioner in the present writ petition is that\n\n since the petitioner was working as a Guest Lecturer under the\n\n respondent No.3 for the academic year 2020-21, the respondents\n\n should not be permitted to replace the petitioner by another set of\n\n contractual Guest Lecturers.2. The contention of the petitioner is that the petitioner has undergone\n\n a due process of selection for being appointed as a Guest Lecturer\n\n and that the services of the petitioner also was satisfactory as there\n\n is no complaint whatsoever, so far as the competency of the\n\n petitioner is concerned. It is further the contention of the petitioner2that now that the academic session is over, the respondents should\n\n not be permitted to go in for a fresh recruitment process for filling up\n\n of the posts of Guest Lecturers under the respondent No.3 for the\n\n subject in which the petitioner was taking classes.3. Counsel for the petitioner relies upon the judgment of this Court\n\n passed in the case of "Manju Gupta & others v. State of\n\n Chhattisgarh & others" WPS No. 4406/2016, decided on\n\n 27.02.2017, whereby the similarly placed Guest Lecturers under the\n\n Director (Industrial Training Institute) have been granted protection\n\n from being replaced by another set of Guest Lecturers.4. The State counsel opposing the petition submits that it is a case\n\n where no cause of action has till date arisen, in as much as the\n\n petitioner has filed the writ petition only on apprehension and since\n\n there is no cause of action, the matter is premature and deserves to\n\n be rejected.5. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on perusal\n\n of record, what is admitted is that the petitioner was appointed vide\n\n Annexure P/1. The order of appointment specifically had a clause\n\n mentioning that the appointment so made are till an alternative\n\n arrangement is made by way of regular recruitment/contractual/\n\n transfer.6. Further from the records, it also does not appear that the\n\n performance of the petitioner, at any point of time, was found to be\n\n unsatisfactory.In the case of "Manju Gupta" (supra), this Court in\n\n paragraphs No. 8 to 11 has held as under:-"8. True it is, that the Petitioners' status is that of a Guest\n Lecturer but that does not mean that they do not have any3right. There is always a legitimate expectation of the\n Petitioners that since the filling up of the posts has not been\n initiated by way of a regular appointment or by contractual\n appointments, the Petitioners would be permitted to\n continue.9. The undisputed fact is that the Petitioners were given\n appointment only on undertaking given by them pursuant to\n an advertisement by the Respondents. In the undertaking\n which was made to be furnished by the Petitioners, they\n were made to undertake that their appointment would be till\n the posts are filled up by regular/contractual appointment.\n This by itself clearly gives an indication that unless the\n Respondents fill up the sanctioned vacant posts by either\n regular recruitment or by way of contractual appointment,\n the Petitioners would continue as Guest Lecturers. On the\n practical aspect also the fact that the Petitioners are\n discharging the duties of Guest Lecturers for last more than\n 1-2 years, itself is a good ground for permitting the\n Petitioners to continue on the said posts as Guest Lecturers,\n simply for the reason of their experience on the said post, as\n fresh recruitment would mean that persons with no or less\n experience would be participating in the recruitment\n process, which also would not be in the interest of the\n students who are undertaking training in the respective\n institutions.10. Taking into consideration the decision of the Supreme\n Court in the case of Piara Singh (supra) and which has been\n further reiterated in the case of Dr. Chanchal Goyal (supra),\n this Court has no hesitation in reaching to the conclusion\n that the advertisement (Annexure P-1) so issued by the\n Respondents is definitely not in the interest of the students\n undertaking training at Industrial Training Institute,\n Ambikapur, and the same would amount to violation ofArticle 21of the Constitution of India and the same therefore\n deserves to be and is accordingly quashed. The\n advertisement would be deemed to be quashed only to the\n extent of the recruitment against the posts at which the\n Petitioners are discharging. That is to say, the Respondents\n would be entitled to fill up the posts which are lying vacant\n by way of Guest Lecturers where there are no Guest\n Lecturers available.11. It is directed that the Respondents would not be entitled\n for filling up the posts of Guest Lecturer by replacing the\n Petitioners unless the Respondents come up with a stand\n that the services of the Petitioners were dis-satisfactory. The\n qaushment of the advertisement issued by the Respondents\n would also not come in the way of the Respondents for\n filling up of the sanctioned vacant posts by regular\n recruitment or by way of contractual appointment for which\n the Respondents shall be free."7. This Court, under the given circumstances, is inclined to accept the\n\n same analogy in the case of the petitioner also and accordingly it is\n\n ordered that unless there is any complaint received against the\n\n performance of the petitioner, the respondents are restrained from\n\n going in for any fresh recruitment of a Guest Lecturer for the said4subject under the respondent No.3-college against which the\n\n petitioner was engaged.8. It is however made clear that the protection to the petitioner would\n\n be only to the extent of not being replaced by another set of Guest\n\n Lecturers. This would not preclude the State Government from\n\n going in for filling up of the post by way of a regular appointment or\n\n by way of engaging contractual teachers under the rules for\n\n contractual employment.9. So far as the claim of remuneration as per the guidelines of the\n\n UGC is concerned, it would be open for the petitioner to make a\n\n suitable representation before the respondent No.1 in this regard,\n\n who in turn would take a policy decision, so far as the remuneration\n\n part payable to the Guest Lecturers, keeping in view of the\n\n guidelines, that have been laid down by the UGC.10. With the aforesaid observations, the present writ petition stands\n\n disposed off.Sd/-(P. Sam Koshy)\n Judge\nVed

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Take notes as you read a judgment using our Virtual Legal Assistant and get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out our Premium Member services -- Free for one month.\n\nCalcutta High Court\n(India) Property Services ... vs Masterly Commercial on 24 April, 2023OD-8\n\n IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA\n Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction\n ORIGINAL SIDE\n\n AP/88/2023\n\n COLLIERS INTERNATIONAL\n (INDIA) PROPERTY SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED\n VS\n MASTERLY COMMERCIAL\n FACILITY MAINTENANCE PRIVATE LIMITED\n\nBEFORE:\nThe Hon'ble JUSTICE SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA\nDate : 24th April, 2023\n\n Appearance:\n Mr. Kumarjit Banjernee, Adv.\n Ms. Sanchari Chakraborty, Adv.\n Ms. Akansha Chowdhury, Adv.\n Ms. Abhishikta Choudhury, Adv.\n ...for the petitioner\n\n Ms. Vedika Sureka, Adv.\n ...for the respondent\n The Court:- Learned counsel for the petitioner points out to the arbitration\n\nclause contained in the property management service agreement between the\n\nparties dated June 9, 2020. It is clear from the said clause, that is, Clause 13 of\n\nthe agreement that the same provides for arbitration in case of any dispute\n\narising out of or in connection with the agreement and any other document to be\n\nexecuted in connection therewith, including any question regarding its existence,\n\nvalidity or termination.\n\n The invocation notice is also annexed at page 52 of the writ petition. It is\n\nevident from the said invocation notice dated October 20, 2022 and the reply\n\nthereto that the pre-conditions for invocation of Section 11 of the Arbitration and\n\nConciliation Act, 1996 have been satisfied. Since the dispute is inherently\n 2\n\narbitrable and falls within the purview of the arbitration clause, as indicated\n\nabove, there is no bar in appointing an arbitrator.\n\n In as much as the opposition of the respondent is concerned, the same is\n\nprimarily related to the merits of the contentions of the party relating to the\n\ndispute itself and will be decided by the arbitrator, as and when appointed.\n\n Accordingly, AP/88/2023 is allowed, thereby appointing Mr. Tanmay\n\nMukherjee (Mob. No: 9874218610), an Advocate practising in this Court and a\n\nmember of the Bar Association as the sole arbitrator to resolve the disputes\n\nbetween the parties, subject to obtaining his declaration/consent under Section\n\n12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.\n\n\n (SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, J.)\n\nS.Bag

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Delhi High CourtSc Narang vs State (Nct Of Delhi) & Anr. on 18 November, 2022Author:Talwant SinghBench:Talwant SinghNeutral Citation Number 2022/DHC/005195\n\n\n\n\n $~63\n * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI\n % Order pronounced on 18.11.2022\n\n + CRL.REV.P. 25/2021 & CRL.M.A. 994/2021\n SC NARANG ..... Petitioner\n Through: Mr. S. Rajappa, Mr. N.B. Joshi & Mr.\n R. Gowrishankar, Advocates.\n versus\n\n STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR. ..... Respondents\n Through: Mr. Ritesh Kr. Bahri, APP for State.\n\n CORAM:\n HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TALWANT SINGH\n\n Talwant Singh, J.:1. The petitioner has filed this revision petition against order dated\n 24.12.2020 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in case FIR\n No.528/2017, PS Dwarka (South), Delhi underSection 21of the POCSO\n Act read withSection 75of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of\n Children) Act, 2015(JJ Act), summoning the revisionist to face the trial.2. In brief facts, it is mentioned that Maxfort School, Dwarka admits\n children from Nursery up to Class 12. In Nursery-KG and Class 1, there are\n two teachers and one Aayah per classroom. The FIR was lodged on\n 19.11.2017 by respondent no.2, who is the mother of a girl child studying in\n KG, aged about 4.5 years.2.1 It is mentioned in the FIR that after returning from school on\n 17.11.2017 (Friday), the girl child complained of pain in her private parts\n and upon enquiry from the child, the complainant/respondent no.2 learnt\n from her daughter that her classmate, another boy of the same age hadSignature Not VerifiedSigned By:HARIOM Crl. Rev. P. 25/2021 Page 1 of 10Signing Date:29.11.202212:55:42Neutral Citation Number 2022/DHC/005195\n\n\n\n\n touched her private parts and had inserted his finger inside.\n 2.2 The FIR was registered underSection 376IPC andSection 21of the\n POCSO Act. Investigation was taken up. The statements of the witnesses\n were recorded. Documents were seized alongwith footage from CCTV\n cameras. It is admitted that several CCTV cameras were installed in the\n school in and around the corridors and near the classroom and the work of\n installing the CCTV cameras in classrooms was going on.\n 2.3 The victim told the doctor that the incident had taken place inside the\n classroom and inside the washroom. The complainant/respondent No.2 had\n contacted the school authorities through Whatsapp messages and telephonic\n conversations but the school thought it prudent to wait for better particulars\n before filing a complaint with the police, keeping in view the tender age of\n the boy and the girl child.2.4 The school authorities assembled in the school premises on\n 19.11.2017 awaiting for respondent no.2, however, she informed that she\n was getting an FIR registered with the police. After making enquiries and\n having attempted to get better particulars, the school authorities\n independently informed the police on 20.11.2017 vide DD Entry No.26B\n lodged at PS Dwarka (South).2.5 The information sought by the police authorities was provided vide\n letter dated 21.11.2017. Since the prime accused was less than 7 years of\n age, so the police filed the charge sheet underSection 21of the POCSO Act\n read withSection 75of the JJ Act against the four persons being the\n Principal of the school, two teachers and the Vice-Chairman/Officiating\n Chairman of the Managing Committee of the school.2.6 The petitioner was described as the silent Chairman of the school. AllSignature Not VerifiedSigned By:HARIOM Crl. Rev. P. 25/2021 Page 2 of 10Signing Date:29.11.202212:55:42Neutral Citation Number 2022/DHC/005195\n\n\n\n\n the four accused appeared before the Court and they were admitted to bail.\n In the charge sheet, the IO had specifically mentioned about the CCTV\n footage which showed that the two concerned children did not go to the\n washroom together and they were seen coming out of the classroom with\n other children. Teacher Mrs. Aastha Kalra was in the classroom and Ayah\n Pushpa Juial was seen periodically entering and leaving the classroom.\n 2.7 The first protest petition was filed by the complainant on 26.04.2018\n alleging that some more accused ought to be arrayed before the learned Trial\n Court. Accordingly, on 29.11.2018, a supplementary report underSection\n 173Cr.P.C. was filed by the IO in which 7 persons named by the\n complainant in her protest petition were placed in Column No.12 as during\n investigation, the IO did not find sufficient material to put up the said\n persons for trial. In the investigation, it has been noted that the petitioner is\n not an authorised signatory on cheques or on salary slips and even before\n Education Department he was not the authorised signatory, so the IO\n concluded that the petitioner has not been an active but only a silent\n Chairman and he has no role in the functioning of the school.\n 2.8 The second protest petition was filed by the complainant on\n 09.09.2020 and in that petition, the present impugned order was passed on\n 24.12.2020, summoning the present petitioner to face trial underSection 75of the J.J. Act. Same has been challenged before this Court.3. The grounds cited in the present petition are thatSection 75of the JJ\n Act is attracted only against an accused person, who holds actual charge or\n actual control over a child at the time of the impugned incident and there\n cannot be a case of remote or constructive control exercised by virtue of\n holding a particular position in the hierarchy of an organisation.Signature Not VerifiedSigned By:HARIOM Crl. Rev. P. 25/2021 Page 3 of 10Signing Date:29.11.202212:55:42Neutral Citation Number 2022/DHC/005195\n\n\n\n\n 3.1 The next ground is that in criminal law, vicarious liability cannot be\n fastened for a crime and the petitioner cannot be held liable for the\n negligence of the school staff. The further ground is that the status of the\n petitioner has been examined by the learned Trial Court by looking at the\n irrelevant material, for example, the petitioner was named in the magazine\n and on school website as Hon'ble Chairman, who was seen participating in\n Annual day function of the school.3.2 The mobile telephone issued in the name of petitioner/Mr. S.C.\n Narang -Pitampura Leasing and Housing Finance Ltd. was being used by\n Mr. Naveen Narang, who was Vice-Chairman/Officiating Chairman of the\n School Management Committee. It is also submitted that the learned Trial\n Court proceeded on the basis of presumptions.3.3 The next ground taken is that the impugned order suffers from an\n inherent lack of consistency and reasoning.3.4 And lastly, the ground taken is that the presence and absence of a\n CCTV camera could not have avoided the incident from taking place but it\n is only an aid in investigation.3.5 On these grounds, it has been prayed that the impugned order dated\n 24.12.2020 may be set aside.4. Notice was issued.5. The complainant/respondent no.2 has filed a short affidavit taking\n preliminary objections, mentioning therein that she was not served with a\n copy of the petition in advance, rather she received a message from the IO\n on the date when the matter was listed.5.1 It is further submitted that the petition suffers from lack of jurisdiction\n as the revisional powers can be exercised only in exceptional cases and thisSignature Not VerifiedSigned By:HARIOM Crl. Rev. P. 25/2021 Page 4 of 10Signing Date:29.11.202212:55:42Neutral Citation Number 2022/DHC/005195\n\n\n\n\n is not a case where this Court can be approached with a request to exercise\n its discretioning power under criminal revision.Section 75of the JJ Act andSection 21of the POCSO Act cast responsibility on the persons who failed\n to report the commission of an offence under these Acts and whose wilful\n negligence has caused the child to be assaulted, abused or exposed and the\n school management is also covered in the same.5.2 It has been further submitted that there is sufficient material on record\n to prima facie show that the present petitioner was Chairman of Maxfort\n School, Dwarka and there is no document to show the contrary.6. In brief submission, it is also mentioned that in the list of Managing\n Committee, the name of the present petitioner has been mentioned as\n Chairman; the petitioner is his capacity as Chairman had signed the letter of\n promotion, promoting Mrs. Priyanka Bhatkoti to the post of Principal of\n Maxfort School; the said Mrs. Priyanka Bhatkoti was a subordinate of the\n present petitioner and was in touch with him throughout and she was\n seeking instructions from him.6.1 The phone number from which the call was made to Mrs. Priyanka\n Bhatkoti, Principal, is subscribed by the present petitioner. The call detail\n record shows that the petitioner was duly informed about the incident of\n sexual assault of the child as he was in constant touch with the Principal of\n the school.6.2 The name of the petitioner was included in the supplementary charge\n sheet after the complainant had filed the protest petition but his name was\n mentioned in Column No.12 of the supplementary charge sheet, which was\n filed on 29.11.2018. No evidence has been placed on record by the petitioner\n to prove that the mobile phone subscribed to him was used by his son, whoSignature Not VerifiedSigned By:HARIOM Crl. Rev. P. 25/2021 Page 5 of 10Signing Date:29.11.202212:55:42Neutral Citation Number 2022/DHC/005195\n\n\n\n\n is the Vice-Chairman of the school.6.3 The official website of Maxfort School shows the petitioner as\n Chairman of the school and there are many photographs on the said website\n which make it clear that the petitioner is the Chairman of Maxfort School,\n Dwarka and is actively participating in the school activities and functions.\n 6.4 In February, 2020, an interview of the petitioner was published in\n Magazine 'Education Today' where he has been shown as the Chairman of\n the School. The petitioner has not followed the clear instructions of the\n Directorate of Education dated 15.12.2017 whereby all the schools were\n required to install CCTV cameras throughout the school, including the\n classrooms and it was due to the failure to install the CCTV cameras in the\n classrooms, which facilitates the incident to take place.\n 6.5 The petitioner has been duly summoned by the learned Sessions Court\n by the impugned order and there is no procedural irregularity or defect in the\n impugned order and the present petition is misconceived. It is a glaring\n example of botched up investigation. Under these circumstances, it has been\n prayed that the revision petition may be disposed of.7. I have heard the arguments. The relevant portion of the impugned\n order is as under:"20. After hearing the detailed arguments and perusal of the record, the\n court has following observations to make:-It goes without saying that if a parent sends a child to the school, the school\n authorities have to ensure the safety and security of the child. The initial\n charge sheet was filed by the IO against four accused personsu/s 21POCSO Act andsection 75JJ Act against the Principal Mrs. Priyanka\n Bhattikoti, Coordinator Mrs. Neetu Singh, Class Teacher of the child victim\n Mrs. Maitri Sarkar and Vice Chairman Mr. Naveen Narang. A protest\n petition was filed by the complainant against the charge sheet and further\n investigation was directed subsequent to which supplementary charge sheet\n was filed by the IO and all the accused namely Satish Chander NarangSignature Not VerifiedSigned By:HARIOM Crl. Rev. P. 25/2021 Page 6 of 10Signing Date:29.11.202212:55:42Neutral Citation Number 2022/DHC/005195\n\n\n\n (Chairman), Deepa Kumar (Director), Astha Kalra (Teacher), Pushpa Juyal\n (Maid), Madhuri Bisht (Teacher), Anu Sehrawat (Manager) and\n V.S.Ravindran (The School Counselor) and all the accused were kept in\n column no.12 without arrest. The present order is being passed for deciding\n the objections made by the complainant against the accused being placed in\n column no.12 in the supplementary charge sheet.21. The first accused who has been placed in column no.12 of the charge\n sheet is Shri S.C.Narang. It has been argued by learned counsel for the\n complainant that Sh. S.C.Narang was the Chairman of the Maxford School\n and had been placed in column no.12 because he was referred as silent\n Chairperson and had no active participation in the school functioning.\n However, the list of the Managing Committee Members brought on record\n by the IO clearly shows that name of Chairman as Mr. S.C.Narang.He was the signing authority for promotions and appointments and was\n continuously kept informed about the incident and its inquiry till the\n complaint was made to the police. The CDR collected by the IO also shows\n that the call was made on the phone of S.C.Narang. The record of the\n telephone number on which calls were made were procured from the Bharti\n Airtel and the same was found to be belonging to Mr. S.C.Narang. IO has\n kept nothing on record to show that the said number was used by someone\n else apart from the registered customer. The interview published in various\n magazines and on the social networking sites also show him as the\n Chairman and actively involved with various functions and activities of the\n school. It has been stated by the IO in the first charge sheet that the CCTV\n camera had to be installed as per the guidelines of the Directorate of\n Education but same were not present in the classroom. In the considered\n opinion of the Court, apart from the Principal and the other managing\n committee members, it was also a responsibility of the Chairman to ensure\n that all the guidelines of the Directorate of Education which had been made\n compulsory for the safety and security of the children had to be followed\n and as the classroom had no CCTV cameras which was against the\n guidelines. The guidelines of the Directorate of Education dated 15.09.2017\n have made it mandatory to install sufficient number of CCTV cameras in\n school premises so as to mandatorily covered all classrooms, labs, corridor,\n parking, library, vacant rooms, areas outside washroom and all isolated\n areas and also ensure 360 degree coverage of the entire school premises. It\n has also been directed in the order that the CCTV camera should be\n functional round the clock along with recording facility of minimum 15\n days or above.As per the final report, CCTV footages of only playground, main gate and\n corridor were made available to the IO by the school on 28.11.2017 and\n CCTV technician gave a statement to the IO that no tampering had beenSignature Not VerifiedSigned By:HARIOM Crl. Rev. P. 25/2021 Page 7 of 10Signing Date:29.11.202212:55:42Neutral Citation Number 2022/DHC/005195\n\n\n\n done w.r.t. the same on 6.12.2017. Other than the said CCTV footages no\n other footage was provided by the school and as per the final report filed by\n the IO, no CCTV had been installed in the school which was against the\n DOE recommendation. There has been a prima face neglect by the\n Chairman towards his duty in installation of CCTV cameras. I therefore take\n cognizance against accused S.C.Narang and S.C.Narang is summoned under\n column no.11u/s 75JJ Act for wilful neglect as a result of which cruelty\n was inflicted upon the child victim."7.1 It is clear that the learned Trial Judge has taken cognizance underSection 75of the JJ Act against the present petitioner. The said Section is\n reproduced hereunder:"75. Punishment for cruelty to child. - Whoever, having the actual charge\n of, or control over, a child, assaults, abandons, abuses, exposes or wilfully\n neglects the child or causes or procures the child to be assaulted, abandoned,\n abused, exposed or neglected in a manner likely to cause such child\n unnecessary mental or physical suffering, shall be punishable with\n imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine of one\n lakh rupees or with both:Provided that in case it is found that such abandonment of the child by the\n biological parents is due to circumstances beyond their control, it shall be\n presumed that such abandonment is not wilful and the penal provisions of\n this section shall not apply in such cases:Provided further that if such offence is committed by any person employed\n by or managing an organisation, which is entrusted with the care and\n protection of the child, he shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment\n which may extend upto five years, and fine which may extend upto five\n lakhs rupees:Provided also that on account of the aforesaid cruelty, if the child is\n physically incapacitated or develops a mental illness or is rendered mentally\n unfit to perform regular tasks or has risk to life or limb, such person shall be\n punishable with rigorous imprisonment, not less than three years but which\n may be extended upto ten years and shall also be liable to fine of five lakhs\n rupees."7.2 The above Section clearly points out that any person managing the\n organisation to whom the care and protection of the child was handed over\n and he wilfully neglects the child or causes the child to be assaulted or\n abused or neglected the child in a manner, exposing the child to unnecessarySignature Not VerifiedSigned By:HARIOM Crl. Rev. P. 25/2021 Page 8 of 10Signing Date:29.11.202212:55:42Neutral Citation Number 2022/DHC/005195\n\n\n\n\n mental and physical suffering, the said act is included in the definition of the\n offence prescribed underSection 75of the JJ Act.8. In the present case, more or less, it has been accepted by the present\n petitioner that he was the Chairman of the School at the relevant time when\n the minor child was assaulted and abused. His defence that he was not in-\n charge of the day-to-day activities of the school and he was not even made\n aware about the incident. The mobile phone, which was subscribed in his\n name, was actually used by his son, who was the Vice-Chairman and in\n actual control of the affairs of the school. These are the issues to be decided\n during trial.9. At the stage of taking cognizance underSection 75of the JJ Act, the\n learned Trial Judge has to see as to whether the person was managing the\n institution where a child was physically/sexually abused and as mentioned in\n the impugned order, prima facie it has been brought on record that the\n petitioner was the Chairman of the School Management Committee at the\n relevant time and through the mobile phone duly subscribed in his name, he\n was in regular touch with the Principal of the School on 19.11.2017 and his\n active involvement in the affairs of the School is also proved on the basis of\n the promotion letter of the Principal duly signed by him, his active\n participation in the functions of the school and his interview to a Magazine\n wherein he has been interviewed as the Chairman of the School in question.10. It is needless to repeat that at the stage of taking cognizance and\n summoning, the Court has to see only the prima facie material available\n before it. In my view there was sufficient material to take cognizance against\n the present petitioner underSection 75of the JJ Act.11. This Court is also conscious that the petitioner has invoked theSignature Not VerifiedSigned By:HARIOM Crl. Rev. P. 25/2021 Page 9 of 10Signing Date:29.11.202212:55:42Neutral Citation Number 2022/DHC/005195\n\n\n\n\n revisional jurisdiction of this Court where the scope of interference is quite\n limited to the extent that this Court can only examine the correctness,\n legality or propriety of any order, apart from legality of any proceedings of\n the lower Court. In the present case, on the basis of the facts and the law\n stated herein above, this Court finds that the impugned order does not suffer\n from any illegality, incorrect prima facie appreciation or any irregularity. In\n view of the above, the revision petition is liable to be dismissed and the\n same is hereby dismissed.12. It is made clear that nothing stated herein above shall come in the way\n of the petitioner, when arguments are addressed on his behalf at the stage of\n charge, and the learned Trial Court shall hear the arguments on charge\n without getting influenced by anything stated herein above.13. The petition is disposed of.TALWANT SINGH, J\n NOVEMBER 18, 2022/pa\n Click here to check corrigendum, if anySignature Not VerifiedSigned By:HARIOM Crl. Rev. P. 25/2021 Page 10 of 10Signing Date:29.11.202212:55:42

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Patna High CourtFarooque Shahab @ Farooque Saheb vs The State Of Bihar on 28 November, 2023Author:Ashutosh KumarBench:Ashutosh KumarIN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA\n CRIMINAL APPEAL (DB) No.572 of 2023\n Arising Out of PS. Case No.-498 Year-2018 Thana- SIWAN CITY District- Siwan\n ======================================================\n Farooque Shahab @ Farooque Saheb, Son of Late Saiyad Zahir Hussain\n Resident of village - Kutub Chapra, P.S. - Hussainganj, Distt. - Siwan\n ... ... Appellant/s\n Versus\n1. The State of Bihar\n2. Yamini Mohib, Son of Mohibul Haque Resident of village - Kutub Chapra\n P.S. - Hussainganj, Distt. - Siwan\n3. Nami @ Arif, Son of Mohibul Haque Resident of village - Kutub Chapra\n P.S. - Hussainganj, Distt. - Siwan\n4. Shamshad Ali, Son of Hasan Imam Resident of village - Purani Kila\n Pokhra, P.S. - Siwan town, Distt. - Siwan\n5. Firoz, Son of Md. Serajuddin Resident of village - Purani Kila Pokhra, P.S. -\n Siwan town, Distt. - Siwan\n ... ... Respondent/s\n ======================================================\n Appearance :\n For the Appellant/s : Mr. Devendra Kumar Singh, Advocate.\n Mr. Ajay Kumar Tiwari, Advocate.\n For the Respondent/s : Mr. Parmeshwar Mehta, APP.\n For the Respondent Nos. 2 to 5: Mr. Manish Chandra Gandhi, Advocate.\n Mr. Navin Kumar, Advocate.\n Mr. Himanshu Ranjan, Advocate.\n ======================================================\n CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR\n and\n HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NANI TAGIA\n ORAL JUDGMENT(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMAR)\n\n Date : 28-11-2023\n\n\n We have heard Mr. Devendra Kumar Singh,\n\n learned Advocate for the appellant, Mr. Manish Chandra\n\n Gandhi, learned Advocate for respondent Nos. 2 to 5 and\n\n Mr. Parmeshwar Mehta, learned APP for the State.2. The father of the deceased, who was\n\n examined as P.W. 6 at the Trial, is aggrieved by the\n Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.572 of 2023 dt.28-11-20232/5judgment and order of acquittal of respondent Nos. 2 to 5\n\n dated 06.04.2023, passed by the learned Sessions Judge,\n\n Siwan, in Sessions Trial No. 142 of 2019, arising out of\n\n Siwan Town P. S. Case No. 498 of 2018, G.R. No. 4586\n\n of 2018.3. The FIR was lodged by P.W. 6 alleging that\n\n his son/ Feraz Ahmad, who was 18 years old and working\n\n as a compounder with Dr. Md. Shadab (P.W. 5) was shot\n\n dead while he was coming back home. The deceased died\n\n in hospital.4. In his fardbeyan, P.W. 6 has raised suspicion\n\n on respondent Nos. 2 to 5 because of old land dispute\n\n with them.5. A bare reading of the fardbeyan/ statement of\n\n P.W. 6 would reveal that P.W. 6 was informed about the\n\n occurrence by one Om Prakash, who has not been\n\n examined at the Trial and he had named the respondent\n Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.572 of 2023 dt.28-11-20233/5Nos. 2 to 5 on the basis of suspicion and that also\n\n because of an old land dispute with them.6. During the trial, P.W. 6 himself and P.Ws. 1\n\n and 2, who are the mother and sister of the deceased\n\n have claimed to have heard from the deceased that\n\n respondent Nos. 2 to 5 were responsible for his death.7. The Investigating Officer of this case (P.W. 8)\n\n has completely denied that witnesses had spoken during\n\n the course of investigation about their having heard from\n\n the deceased about the participation of respondent Nos. 2\n\n to 5.8. All the three witnesses, namely, P.Ws. 6, 1\n\n and 2 though claimed that when they met the deceased in\n\n the hospital, the deceased was conscious but such tall\n\n claims of the afore-noted witnesses falls to the ground\n\n when their deposition is scrutinized in some detail.9. P.W. 6 did not make a correct statement\n\n before the Trial Court, which fact becomes evident from a\n Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.572 of 2023 dt.28-11-20234/5bare reading of the fardbeyan statement where the\n\n implication of respondent Nos. 2 to 5 was only on the\n\n basis of suspicion.10. The Trial Court has rightly observed that a\n\n dying declaration, if uncontaminated, could be the basis\n\n for conviction but not when it replete with doubts.11. It is normally not expected that all details\n\n would be provided by the informant in his fardbeyan but\n\n the basic facts about the source of information to him\n\n about respondent Nos. 2 to 5 was necessarily to be given\n\n in the fardbeyan, if P.W. 6 is to be believed. Had he\n\n learnt from the deceased while he was alive that\n\n respondent Nos. 2 to 5 had killed him, he would have\n\n certainly said so in the fardbeyan.12. Even the statements of the afore-noted\n\n P.Ws. 6, 1 and 2 inter se, there are discrepancies\n\n regarding the overt act of killing the deceased.Patna High Court CR. APP (DB) No.572 of 2023 dt.28-11-20235/513. Non-examination of the person who first\n\n disclosed about the deceased having been killed by a\n\n group of marauders and P.W. 5 in whose employment\n\n was the deceased shortly before he died, not knowing\n\n about any of the assailants makes the prosecution case\n\n highly doubtful.14. It clearly appears that an attempt has been\n\n made by the informant (P.W. 6) to anyhow implicate\n\n respondent Nos. 2 to 5 with whom he has enmity.15. We, therefore, put our imprimatur on the\n\n judgment of the Trial Court holding respondent Nos. 2 to\n\n 5 to be absolutely innocent.16. The appeal is dismissed.(Ashutosh Kumar, J)\n\n\n (Nani Tagia, J)\nmanoj/saurav-AFR/NAFR NAFR\nCAV DATE NA\nUploading Date 29.11.2023.\nTransmission Date 29.11.2023.

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Central Administrative Tribunal - DelhiO P Gaud vs Delhi Jal Board on 12 October, 20221\nItem No. 03\n OA No. 2422/2022\n\n\n\n Central Administrative Tribunal\n Principal Bench: New Delhi\n\n O.A. No.2422/2022\n\n This the 12th day of October, 2022\n\n Hon'ble Mr. R. N. Singh, Member (J)\n Hon'ble Mr. Tarun Shridhar, Member (A)\n\n\n O.P. Gaud (Ex E.E. (Civil),\n S/o Late Gopal Gaud,\n R/o 47-Type-III, Jal Vihar Colony,\n Lajpat Nagar-I, New Delhi-110024.\n\n ...Applicant\n\n(In person)\n\n Versus\n\n\nDelhi Jal Board,\nThrough its CEO,\nGovt. of NCTD, Varunalaya Phase-II,\nKarol Bagh, New Delhi-110055.\n ...Respondents\n\n\n(By Advocate : Shri Bhuvnesh Shukla for Shri Rajeev\nKumar)\n 2\nItem No. 03\n OA No. 2422/2022\n\n\n\n\n ORDER (ORAL)Hon'ble Mr. Tarun Shridhar, Member (A) :-The applicant, aggrieved by the disciplinary\n\nproceedings initiated against him under Rule 14 of the\n\nCCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, has preferred the present\n\nOriginal Application seeking the following relief(s) :-"a) Quash and set aside the impugned\n orders no 20 dated 27.01.2014 & no\n 49 dated 22.04.2014 of appointment\n of IO/PO by the Respondent:b) Quash and set aside the Impugned\n Charge-Memo dated 04.09.2013 and\n subsequent Inquiry Proceedings/\n Findings of Inquiry Officer, in the\n interest of justice;c) Direct the respondent to implement by\n issuing immediately the order dated\n 31.10.2013 of exoneration of the\n Applicant from all the charges\n recorded by the then Disciplinary\n Authorityd) Direct the respondent to release the\n salaries of the period of medical leave\n w.e.f. 17.12.2012 to 05.09.2013\n alongwith 18% interest on total\n amount of salaries w.e.f. 05.09.2013\n till date of payment and all other\n consequential benefits in accordance\n with law; ande) Restrain the Respondent from issuing\n any adverse order other than the\n order of exoneration dated\n 31.10.2013 of the Applicant from all3Item No. 03OA No. 2422/2022the charges recorded by the then\n Disciplinaryf) Award the cost of OA case.g) Pass any such order/orders as this\n Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and\n proper in the facts and circumstances\n of the present case."2. We have heard the applicant in person.3. Let us break the orders/documents which the\n\napplicant is challenging : (a) he challenges the order\n\ndated 27.01.2014. This is an order vide which the\n\nDisciplinary Authority has appointed the Inquiry\n\nOfficer; (b) Challenge is made to an order dated\n\n22.04.2014, vide which the Presenting Officer to assist\n\nin the inquiry has been appointed; (c) He seeks\n\nquashing of the impugned charge memo 04.09.2013;(d) He seeks implementation of an order dated\n\n31.10.2013 vide which, according to him he has been\n\nexonerated of the charges against him; (e) Thereafter,\n\nhe makes a prayer for release of his salary along with\n\n18% interest and further a restraint upon the\n\nrespondents from passing any adverse order against\n\nhim.4Item No. 03OA No. 2422/20224. Having heard the applicant in person at great\n\nlength and going through the voluminous documents\n\non record, we find that pursuant to the impugned\n\ncharge memo issued way back in the year 2013, the\n\nInquiry Officer has already completed the inquiry and\n\nsubmitted his report. Therefore, in view of these\n\ndevelopments, prayer to quash and set aside the order\n\nappointing the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer\n\ni.e. (a) and (b) of para 3 is meaningless. Further, the\n\ncharge memo can also not be gone into at this stage\n\nas the applicant himself has participated in the\n\ndetailed inquiry and Inquiry Officer has already\n\nsubmitted his report. As far as the so called order\n\ndated 31.10.2013 vide which the applicant claims that\n\nhe has been exonerated, we do not find any such\n\norder on record and despite our repeatedly asking the\n\napplicant to produce such order, he has not been able\n\nto do so. What he is referring to is internal file\n\nnotings, which he claims to be an order exonerating\n\nhim. However, the typed copies of the internal file\n\nnotings have also not been filed.5Item No. 03OA No. 2422/20225. The latest order on this issue is order dated\n\n18.01.2022, which is placed on file. The said order\n\nhas been issued in response to a representation\n\nregarding the disciplinary proceedings preferred by\n\nthe applicant and this order categorically states that\n\nthough the inquiry into charges against the applicant\n\nis complete, however, the final decision of the\n\ndisciplinary authority in the matter has been kept\n\nunder suspension on the ground that the applicant\n\nalready stands dismissed from service in another\n\ndepartmental proceeding. The competent authority\n\nwhile passing the said order has held that little\n\npurpose would be served in deciding the present\n\nmatter until or unless the appeal or other legal\n\nremedies in the departmental case, in which the\n\napplicant has been dismissed, are exhausted.\n\nMoreover, the said order dated 18.01.2022, vide\n\nwhich, the disciplinary proceedings have been kept\n\nunder suspension has also not been put to any\n\nchallenge.6. Against this background and in the facts and\n\ncircumstances of the case as narrated above, we are of\n\nthe considered view that this OA is not only devoid of6Item No. 03OA No. 2422/2022merits but also amounts to misuse of process of law\n\nand deserves to be dismissed at the admission stage\n\nitself with heavy cost. However, since the applicant is\n\nappearing in person, we are restraining ourselves from\n\nimposing any cost upon him. However, as stated\n\nabove, the OA stands dismissed at the admission\n\nstage itself.There shall be no order as to costs.(Tarun Shridhar) (R. N. Singh)\n Member (A) Member (J)\n\n\n /rk/

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Take notes as you read a judgment using our Virtual Legal Assistant and get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out our Premium Member services -- Free for one month.\n\nCalcutta High Court (Appellete Side)\nSamrat Ghosh vs The State Of West Bengal & Ors on 16 November, 2021 14 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA\n16.11.2021 CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION\n sb\n Ct 23 APPELLATE SIDE\n (Via Video Conference)\n WPA 17170 of 2021\n\n Samrat Ghosh\n Vs.\n The State of West Bengal & Ors.\n\n Mr. Sukumar Ghosh,\n Mrs. Moumita Ghosh\n .. For the petitioner.\n\n Mrs. Jhuma Chakraborty,\n Mr. Aritra Ghosh\n .. For the State.\n\n\n Affidavit of service filed in Court today is taken on\n\n record.\n\n\n The petitioner while working as a Civic Volunteer\n\n under Pandua Police Station, District - Hooghly, was\n\n implicated in a criminal case, being Pandua Police Station\n\n Case No. 331/2020 dated 19th October, 2020 and had\n\n been arrested. The petitioner has, however, been enlarged\n\n on bail.\n\n\n Charge sheet according to the respondents have\n already been filed against the petitioner under sections\n\n 323/325/354B/427/448/34 of the Indian Penal Code.\n\n\n It is the allegation of the petitioner that without any\n\n show-cause, the petitioner has been restrained from\n\n joining his duties. The petitioner challenges such action\n\n on the part of the respondents.\n 2\n\n\n\n\n On behalf of the respondents it is further submitted\n\nthat the Officer-in-Charge of Pandua Police Station after\n\nthe charge sheet was filed had requested the\n\nSuperintendent of police, Hooghly (Rural) District, to\n\ndemobilize the petitioner from 19th October, 2020 till\n\ndisposal of the criminal case. The Zonal Committee of the\n\nsaid zone by a decision communicated vice memo no.\n\n3092/RO dated 7th December, 2020 temporarily\n\ndemobilized the petitioner due to his involvement in the\n\ncriminal case with effect from passing of the said order\n\ndated 7th December, 2020.\n\n\n The petitioner, however, disputes the filing of the\n\ncharge sheet.\n\n\n The fact remains that a Civic Volunteer on a\n\ncontractual engagement which is also on temporary basis\n\nlike the petitioner cannot question the action of being\n\ndemobilized when he is admittedly one of the accused in a\n\ncriminal case and had also been arrested in connection\n\nthereto. It is not unusual for the employer to lose\n\nconfidence and reliance on a Civic Volunteer like the\n\npetitioner. The conduct of the petitioner is such that the\n\nemployer can consider him to be disentitled to continue as\n\na Civic Volunteer, assisting the police authorities.\n\n\n The petitioner is therefor not entitled to any of the\n\nreliefs claimed in the writ petition. The writ petition is\n 3\n\n\n\n\naccordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.\n\n\n Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if\n\napplied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of\n\nnecessary formalities.\n\n\n (Arindam Mukherjee, J.)

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Take notes as you read a judgment using our Virtual Legal Assistant and get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out our Premium Member services -- Free for one month.\n\nLok Sabha Debates\nRegarding Notices Of Adjournment Motion. on 29 November, 2021\n Seventeenth Loksabha \n\n \n\n \n\n \n \n\n an> \n\n \n\nTitle: Regarding notices of Adjournment Motion. \n\nमाननीय अध्यक्ष : माननीय सदस्यगण, मुझे कुछ माननीय सदस्यों द्वारा कुछ विषयों पर स्थगन प्रस्ताव की सूचनाएं प्राप्त हुई हैं । मैंने स्थगन प्रस्ताव की किसी भी सूचना के लिए अनुमति प्रदान नहीं की है । \n\n… ( व्यवधान) \n\nमाननीय अध्यक्ष : मैं आपको कह रहा हूँ कि जब मैं विषय पर बोलने के लिए कहूँ, तब आपको बोलना चाहिए । \n\n… ( व्यवधान)

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High Court of MeghalayaSmti. Sheba Dhar vs . State Of Meghalaya on 31 August, 2021Author:W. DiengdohBench:W. DiengdohSerial No. 04\n Regular List\n\n HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA\n AT SHILLONG\n\nBA. No. 7 of 2021\n Date of Order: 31.08.2021\nSmti. Sheba Dhar Vs. State of Meghalaya\nCoram:\n Hon'ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge\n\nAppearance:\nFor the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. K. Ch. Gautam, Adv.\nFor the Respondent(s) : Mr. A.H. Hazarika, GA.i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No\n Law journals etc.:ii) Whether approved for publication\n in press: Yes/No\n\n\n Matter taken up today via video conferencing.Heard learned counsels for the parties.\n The C.D as called for by this Court vide order dated 24.08.2021 has been\nproduced today before this Court.Upon hearing the learned counsels, this matter is reserved for order.Judge\n\n\nMeghalaya\n31.08.2021\n"D. Nary, PS"

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Telangana High CourtSmt. Ravichettu Lalitha vs The State Of Telangana on 4 August, 2021Author:G. Sri DeviBench:G. Sri DeviHONOURABLE JUSTICE G. SRI DEVI\n\n CRIMINAL PETITION NO.6058 OF 2021\n\nORDER:This Criminal Petition is filed underSection 482of the Code of\n\nCriminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) seeking quashing of investigation in\n\nCrime No.315 of 2021 of P.S. Raidurgam, Cyberabad, registered\n\nagainst the petitioners/A-1 and A-2 for the offence punishable underSections 419,420,406,506and120Bof the Indian Penal Code.Though the learned counsel for the petitioners/A-1 and A-2\n\nfiled the present petition for quashing of investigation in the\n\nabovementioned crime, he restricts his prayer seeking a direction to\n\nthe Investigating agency to follow the procedure prescribed underSection 41-Aof the Cr.P.C. and the guidelines prescribed by the Apex\n\nCourt inArnesh Kumar v. State of Biharand another1.Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would submit that the\n\ndirections of the Apex Court have to be followed and implemented.In that view of the matter, the Criminal Petition is disposed of\n\ndirecting the police to abide by the directions of the Apex Court as set\n\nout inArnesh Kumarcase (supra).Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending shall stand closed._________________\n (G. SRI DEVI, J)\n4th August 2021\nRRB\n\n\n\n\n1 AIR 2014 SC 2756

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Bangalore District CourtSmt.Rekha Hiremath vs M/S.Tgs Constructions Pvt. Ltd on 3 February, 2020O.S.No.928/2018\n 1\n\n IN THE COURT OF LXVII ADDL CITY CIVIL AND\n SESSIONS JUDGE; BENGALURU CITY (CCH.No.68)\n\n PRESENT\n SRI.K.SUBRAMANYA, B.Com., LL.M.\n LXVII ADDL CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS JUDGE ,\n BENGALURU.\n\n Dated this the 3 rd day of February 2020.\n O.S.No.928/2018\n\nPLAINTIFF : Smt.Rekha Hiremath,\n W/o.Mallikarjun Hiremath,\n 38 years,\n R/at.Flat No.T-2, 3rd Floor,\n S.L.V.Nest 2nd Main Road,\n Coconut Garden,\n Nagarabhavi Main Road,\n Bengaluru.\n[\n (By Sri.H.M., Advocate)\n\n .Vs.\nDEFENDANTS : 1. M/s.TGS Constructions Pvt. Ltd.,\n A Company registered and\n incorporated under theCompanies Act.\n Office at No.L-142, 5th Avenue,\n Ground Floor, 5th Main Road,\n 6th Sector, HSR Layout,\n Bengaluru.\n Rep. by its Managing Director,\n Dr.Mandeep Kour.\n\n 2. Sri.Mandeep Kour,\n S/o.Harjith Singh.\n O.S.No.928/2018\n 2\n\n3. Sri.Jasdeep Singh,\n S/o.Harjith Singh.\n Defendant Nos.2 and 3 are the\n Directors of defendant No.1.\n R/at.No.12-70/6,\n 2nd 'B' Main Road,\n Kempanna Layout,\n Hulimavu, Bannerghatta Road,\n Bengaluru.\n\n4. Sri.Dileep Singh,\n Director.\n\n5. Sri.Kushal,\n Director.\n\n6. Sri.Buddam Sudhakar,\n Director.\n Defendant Nos.4 to 6 are the\n Directors of the defendant No.1.\n No.L-142, 5th Avenue,\n Ground Floor, 5th Main Road,\n 6th Sector, HSR Layout,\n Bengaluru.\n\n7. Sri.Sachin Nayak @\n Sumanthkumar Das @ Yogesh,\n S/o.Late Vasanth Nayak @ Deenanath,\n 37 years,\n R/at.No.974, 4th Cross,\n 2nd Main Road, 1st 'A' Block,\n Kothanur Dinne,\n Jambusavari Layout,\n J.P.Nagar 8th Stage,\n Bengaluru.\n\n(Defendant Nos.1 to 7 - Exparte)\n O.S.No.928/2018\n 3\n\n Date of institution of suit : 2.02.2018\n Nature of Suit : Money Suit\n Date of commencement of 20.12.2019\n evidence :\n Date on which the judgment is 3.02.2020\n pronounced:\n Duration taken for disposal : Year/s Month/s Day/s\n 02 00 01\n\n\n (K.SUBRAMANYA)\n LXVII Addl.City Civil and Sessions Judge,\n BENGALURU.\n\n\n JU DG M E NT\n The plaintiff has filed this suit under Order VII Rule 1\nr/w.Section 26of C.P.C., praying the court to direct the\ndefendants to pay a sum of Rs.7,78,400/- together with\ninterest at 8% per annum, from the date of suit till realization\nand also costs of the suit.\n\n2. The plaint averments in brief are as under:\n\n The defendant No.1 is the Private Limited Company\nregistered under the provisions of theCompanies Act, 1956having its Registered Office at HSR Layout, Bengaluru. The\ndefendant Nos.2 to 7 are the Directors of the defendant No.1\ncompany.\n O.S.No.928/2018\n 4\n\n The defendants have issued a paper publication inviting\napplications from the public, who are aspirants to own a\nresidential plots in and around Bengaluru and they have\npublished that they are the owners of the land bearing survey\nNo.86/P-P3 measuring 2 acres of land, situated at Kodigehalli\nVillage, Yeshwanthpur Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk and they\nare forming a layout in the said land. The said land is\navailable by way of house sites to the public. The defendants\nhave assured that the layout will be developed in all respects\nwith all civic amenities. On readover the advertisement, the\nplaintiff had approached the defendants and expressed her\nwillingness to purchase the plot and the price has been\nnegotiated between the plaintiff and defendants for valuable\nconsideration of Rs.15,15,000/-. The plaintiff had agreed to\npurchase the plot as offered by the defendants.\n\n The defendants have executed a Memorandum of\nUnderstanding, dated:1.08.2016 agreed to allot the plot\nmeasuring 1200 sq. feet to the plaintiff and the said project is\nknown as "TGS Bhagyalakshmi". The said layout is fully\ndeveloped under the aforesaid name and hence, the plaintiff\nhas paid a sum of Rs.6,95,000/- by way of RTGS to the\ndefendants from her account. The defendants having\nacknowledged the receipt of the said amount from the\nplaintiff, have executed a Memorandum of Understanding in\nfavour of the plaintiff. As per the said Memorandum of\n O.S.No.928/2018\n 5\n\nUnderstanding, the defendants have agreed and assured that\nthe plot will be allotted within 14 months from the date of\nbooking and any rate not later than 20 months from the date\nof Memorandum of Understanding. The defendants have\nfurther agreed that in the event of their failure to allot the\nplaintiff within 20 months as agreed, they have agreed to\nrefund the entire amount they received together with interest\nat 8% per annum within 90 days upon expiry of 20 months.\nThe defendants were not able to form the layout, were not\nable to allot the plot in favour of the plaintiff as assured.\n\n Finally, the plaintiff had approached the defendants on\nseveral occasions and requested them to allot the plot as per\nthe Memorandum of Understanding. However, there is no\nresponse from the defendants either for allotment of plot or\nfor refund of the advance amount paid by the plaintiff. The\nplaintiff having doubted the bonafides of the defendants, has\nissued the legal notice, dated:19.06.2017 calling upon the\ndefendants to cancel the Memorandum of Understanding,\ndated:1.08.2016 and requested them to refund the advance\namount of Rs.6,95,000/-, which was paid by the plaintiff on\n1.08.2016. The said legal notice was returned unserved as\n"left". Thereafter, the plaintiff had approached Madiwala\nPolice and lodged the complaint in Crime No.103/2017 for the\noffence underSections 406,409,420and120(B)of IPC and\nthe criminal case is pending consideration.O.S.No.928/20186In spite of receiving a sum of Rs.6,95,000/- from the\nplaintiff, the defendants have neither allotted the site as per\nthe Memorandum of Understanding, dated:1.08.2016 nor\nrefund the said amount. Hence, the plaintiff was constrained\nto file this suit against the defendants seeking the aforesaid\nrelief.3. The suit summons was issued to the defendant was\nreturned unserved. Hence, the paper publication was issued\nunderOrder V Rule 20 of C.P.C. In spite of it, the defendants\nhave failed to appear before the court and hence, they were\nplaced exparte.4. The plaintiff came to be examined herself as P.W.1 and\ngot marked the documents Exs.P.1 to 10.5. Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for plaintiff.\nThe learned counsel for plaintiff has also submitted his\nwritten arguments.6. The point that arise for my consideration are as under:(1) Whether the plaintiff proves that she has paid\n an advance amount of Rs.6,95,000/- to the\n defendants and the defendants have failed to\n allot the plot as per M.O.U., and failed to\n refund the amount, as agreed ?(2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of\n the amount as claimed in the plaint ?\n (3) What Order or Decree ?O.S.No.928/201877. My findings to the above points are as under:POINT No.1 - In the Affirmative,\n POINT No.2 - In the Affirmative,\n POINT No.3 - As per the final order,\nfor the following :R E A SON S8. POINT No.1 : The plaintiff (P.W.1) has filed an affidavit\nunderOrder XVIII Rule 4 of C.P.C., and reiterated the facts\nstated in the affidavit. The plaintiff has contended that the\ndefendant No.1 is the Private Limited Company registered\nunder the provisions of theCompanies Act, 1956having its\nRegistered Office at HSR Layout, Bengaluru. The defendant\nNos.2 to 7 are the Directors of the defendant No.1 company.\nThe defendants have issued a paper publication inviting\napplications from the public, who are aspirants to own a\nresidential plots in and around Bengaluru and they have\npublished that they are the owners of the land bearing survey\nNo.86/P-P3 measuring 2 acres of land, situated at Kodigehalli\nVillage, Yeshwanthpur Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk and they\nare forming a layout in the said land. The said land is\navailable by way of house sites to the public. The defendants\nhave assured that the layout will be developed in all respects\nwith all civic amenities. It is further contended that, on\nreadover the advertisement, she had approached the\ndefendants and expressed her willingness to purchase the\n O.S.No.928/20188plot and the price has been negotiated between herself and\ndefendants for valuable consideration of Rs.15,15,000/- and\nshe had agreed to purchase the plot as offered by the\ndefendants.The defendants have executed a Memorandum of\nUnderstanding, dated:1.08.2016 agreed to allot the plot\nmeasuring 1200 sq. feet to her and the said project is known\nas "TGS Bhagyalakshmi". The said layout is fully developed\nunder the aforesaid name and hence, she has paid a sum of\nRs.6,95,000/- by way of RTGS to the defendants from her\naccount. The defendants having acknowledged the receipt of\nthe said amount, have executed a Memorandum of\nUnderstanding in her favour. As per the said Memorandum\nof Understanding, the defendants have agreed and assured\nthat the plot will be allotted within 14 months from the date\nof booking and any rate not later than 20 months from the\ndate of Memorandum of Understanding. The defendants have\nfurther agreed that in the event of their failure to allot the\nplaintiff within 20 months as agreed, they have agreed to\nrefund the entire amount they received together with interest\nat 8% per annum within 90 days upon expiry of 20 months.\nThe defendants were not able to form the layout, were not\nable to allot the plot in favour of her as assured.Finally, she had approached the defendants on several\n O.S.No.928/20189occasions and requested them to allot the plot as per the\nMemorandum of Understanding. However, there is no\nresponse from the defendants either for allotment of plot or\nfor refund of the advance amount paid by her. She is having\ndoubted the bonafides of the defendants, has issued the legal\nnotice, dated:19.06.2017 calling upon the defendants to\ncancel the Memorandum of Understanding, dated:1.08.2016\nand requested them to refund the advance amount of\nRs.6,95,000/-, which was paid by the plaintiff on 1.08.2016.\nThe said legal notice was returned unserved as "left".\nThereafter, she had approached Madiwala Police and lodged\nthe complaint in Crime No.103/2017 for the offence underSections 406,409,420and120(B)of IPC and the criminal\ncase is pending consideration. In spite of receiving a sum of\nRs.6,95,000/- from her, the defendants have neither allotted\nthe site as per the Memorandum of Understanding,\ndated:1.08.2016 nor refund the said amount.9. In support of her case, the plaintiff has relied upon the\ndocumentary evidence marked in 'P' series such as Receipt,\nLetter of plaintiff, dated:19.08.2016, Memorandum of\nUnderstanding, Bank Account Statement info., Copy of legal\nnotice, Postal Receipt, Returned RPAD Cover, Certified copy of\nRegistration Certificate, Certified copy of FIR and Copy of\ncomplaint.O.S.No.928/20181010. The primary documentary evidence is relied underSections\n62to65of Indian Evidence Act. On perusal of the documents, it is\nclear that the defendants TGS Constructions Pvt. Ltd., has offered\nto allot sites and the plaintiff intended to purchase the same under\nproposed project i.e., TGS Bhagyalakshmi, situated at Kodigehalli,\nBengaluru. As per the Memorandum of Understanding, the\nplaintiff has deposited amount of Rs.6,95,000/-, but the\ndefendants have failed to allot the plot and made repayment as\nagreed with interest. Therefore, there is violation and breach of\ncontract and terms & conditions of Memorandum of\nUnderstanding. The defendants remained exparte and not\nsubjected the plaintiff/PW.1 to cross examination so as to place\nrebuttal evidence. Therefore, the unrebutted and unchallenged\ntestimony of P.W.1 remains on record for appreciation in favour of\nthe plaintiff's case. The defendant Nos.2 to 7 being the Directors of\nthe defendant No.1 company are jointly and severally liable to pay\nthe suit claim of the plaintiff. Hence, I answer the Point Nos.1 and\n2 in the Affirmative.11. POINT No.3: My finding on this point is as per the\nfollowing :O R DE R\n The suit of the plaintiff is decreed with costs.The defendant Nos.1 to 7 are jointly and severally liable to\npay the suit claim amount of Rs.7,78,400/- together with\n O.S.No.928/201811interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of suit till\nrealization, as perSection 34of C.P.C.,\n\n Draw decree accordingly.(Dictated to the Judgment-writer, transcript thereof is corrected and then\npronounced by me in the open court on this the 3rd day of February 2020)\n\n\n\n\n (K.SUBRAMANYA)\n LXVII Addl.City Civil and Sessions Judge,\n BENGALURU.SCHEDULE "A" PROPERTY\n All that piece and parcel of the property bearing survey\nNo.86/P-P3, measuring 2-00 acres, situated at Kodigehalli\nVillage, Yeshwanthpur Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk,\nBengaluru and bounded on :East by : Property belonging to Narasimhaiah;West by : Government Road ;\n North by : Property belongs to Lakshminarasimhaiah;\n South by : Channappa.\n\n\n SCHEDULE "B" PROPERTYAll that piece and parcel of the plot measuring 1200 sq.\nfeet in the proposed Project known as "TGS Bhagyalakshmi"\nto be developed in the schedule 'A' property.O.S.No.928/201812A NN E X U R E1. WITNESSES EXAMINED IN FAVOUR OF THE PLAINTIFF:P.W.1 Rekha Hiremath2. DOCUMENTS MARKED IN FAVOUR OF THE PLAINTIFF:Ex.P.1 Receipt\n Ex.P.2 Letter of plaintiff, dated:19.08.2016.\n Ex.P.3 Memorandum of Understanding\n Ex.P.4 Bank Account Statement info.\n Ex.P.5 Copy of legal notice\n Ex.P.6 Postal Receipt\n Ex.P.7 Returned RPAD Cover\n Ex.P.8 Certified copy of Registration Certificate\n Ex.P.9 Certified copy of FIR\n Ex.P.10 Copy of complaint3.WITNESSES EXAMINED AND THE DOCUMENTS MARKED IN\n FAVOUR OF THE DEFENDANTS :-- NIL --(K.SUBRAMANYA)\n LXVII Addl.City Civil and Sessions Judge,\n BENGALURU.

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Central Information CommissionSunayana Mishra vs Ministry Of Youth Affairs & Sports on 9 August, 2023Author:Saroj PunhaniBench:Saroj Punhaniके ीय सूचना आयोग\n Central Information Commission\n बाबागंगनाथमाग , मुिनरका\n Baba Gangnath Marg, Munirka\n नई द ली, New Delhi - 110067\n\n\nFile No : CIC/MOYAS/A/2022/143828\n\nSunayana Mishra ......अपीलकता /Appellant\n\n VERSUS\n बनाम\nCPIO,\nEquestrian Federation of India,\nHeadquarters: T1, Station Road,\nCariappa Marg, Delhi Cantt-110010. .... ितवादीगण /Respondent\n\n\nDate of Hearing : 07/08/2023\nDate of Decision : 07/08/2023\n\nINFORMATION COMMISSIONER : Saroj Punhani\n\nRelevant facts emerging from appeal:\n\nRTI application filed on : 14/05/2022\nCPIO replied on : 01/07/2022\nFirst appeal filed on : 02/06/2022\nFirst Appellate Authority order : 01/09/2022\n2nd Appeal/Complaint dated : 08/09/2022\n\n\nInformation sought:The Appellant filed an RTI application dated 14.05.2022 seeking the following\ninformation:"In which national under mentioned riders participated?\nWhich team they represented?1What was their position?1. Mal chand Bishnoi. 2. Naveen Punia.3. Bhagwan Singh. 4. Ravindra Singh.5. Gaurav Joshi. 6. Rakesh Gwala.7. Bhaghand Bairwa 8. Jyoti.9. Punit Kureeya. 10. Partap Singh."The CPIO furnished a reply to the appellant on 01.07.2022 stating as under:2The Equestrian Sports is an individual/club-based sport wherein state wise\nparticipation is not feasible. However, athletes can avail benefits from their state\nbased on domicile certificate.Result of above-mentioned competitions are available on our website, and it can\nbe downloaded.Submitted for your information please."Being dissatisfied, the appellant filed a First Appeal dated 22.06.2022. FAA's order\ndated 01.09.2022 upheld the reply of the CPIO.Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied, the appellant approached the Commission with\nthe instant Second Appeal on the ground of false and misleading response from\nthe CPIO.Relevant Facts emerging during Hearing:The following were present:-Appellant: Not present.Respondent: Col. Jaiveer Singh, CPIO present through intra-video conference.The CPIO while reiterating the contents of his reply stated that a point wise reply\nalong with relevant inputs has already been provided to the Appellant. Even3otherwise, the details of averred third-party candidates regarding their\nparticipation in the sports competition, their level/position, etc. are available on\nthe website and can be easily accessed therefrom.Decision:The Commission upon a perusal of records observes that the information sought\nby the Appellant regarding the third party players contain the elements of\npersonal information of third party which is hit bySection 8(1)(j)of RTI Act. The\nsame can be garnered from a bare perusal of the text ofSection 8(1)(j)of the RTI\nAct as under:"8. Exemption from disclosure of information.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, there shall be no\n obligation to give any citizen,\n xxx(j) information which relates to personal information the disclosure of\n which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would\n cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual unless the\n Central Public Information Officer or the State Public Information Officer or\n the appellate authority, as the case may be, is satisfied that the larger\n public interest justifies the disclosure of such information;.."In this regard, attention of the Appellant is also drawn towards a judgment of the\nHon'ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of Central Public Information\nOfficer, Supreme Court ofIndia Vs. Subhash Chandra Agarwalin Civil Appeal No.\n10044 of 2010 with Civil Appeal No. 10045 of 2010 and Civil Appeal No. 2683 of\n2010 wherein the import of "personal information" envisaged underSection\n8(1)(j)of RTI Act has been exemplified in the context of earlier ratioslaid down bythe same Court in the matter(s) of Canara Bank Vs. C.S. Shyamin Civil Appeal\nNo.22 of 2009;Girish Ramchandra Deshpande vs. Central Information\nCommissioner & Ors., (2013) 1 SCC 212 and R.K. Jain vs. Union of India & Anr.,\n(2013) 14 SCC 794.The following was thus held:"59. Reading of the aforesaid judicial precedents, in our opinion, would\n indicate that personal records, including name, address, physical, mental\n and psychological status, marks obtained, grades and answer sheets,\n are all treated as personal information. Similarly, professional records,\n including qualification, performance, evaluation reports, ACRs,\n disciplinary proceedings, etc. are all personal information. Medical4records, treatment, choice of medicine, list of hospitals and doctors\n visited, findings recorded, including that of the family members,\n information relating to assets, liabilities, income tax returns, details of\n investments, lending and borrowing, etc. are personal information. Such\n personal information is entitled to protection from unwarranted invasion\n of privacy and conditional access is available when stipulation of larger\n public interest is satisfied. This list is indicative and not exhaustive..."Nonetheless, a point wise reply along with relevant desired information furnished\nby the CPIO which is already in public domain, is in the spirit ofRTI Actmerits of\nwhich cannot be called into question.In view of the above and considering more particularly the absence of the\nAppellant during hearing despite receipt of intimation, no further relief can be\ngranted in the matter.The appeal is disposed of accordingly.Saroj Punhani (सरोज पुनहािन)\n हािन)\n Information Commissioner (सूचना आयु )\nAuthenticated true copy\n(अिभ मािणत स#यािपत ित)\n\n(C.A. Joseph)\nDy. Registrar\n011-26179548/[email protected]सी. ए. जोसेफ, उप-पंजीयक\n दनांक /5

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High Court of MeghalayaActing Syiem Of Hima Mylliem vs . Muniswell Kurkalang on 18 August, 2020Author:W. DiengdohBench:W. DiengdohSerial No. 02\n Regular List\n\n HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA\n AT SHILLONG\nCRP No. 12 of 2020\nWith MC(CRP) No. 5 of 2020\n\n Date of Order: 18.08.2020\nActing Syiem of Hima Mylliem Vs. Muniswell Kurkalang\nCoram:\n Hon'ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge\n\nAppearance:\nFor the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. W. Jyrwa, Adv. vice\n Mr. L. Khyriem, Adv.\nFor the Respondent(s) : Mr. S. Changkija, Adv. viceMr. B. Bhattacharjee, Adv.i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No\n Law journals etc.:ii) Whether approved for publication\n in press: Yes/No\n\n\n Heard Mr. W. Jyrwa, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the\nconducting counsel for the petitioner, Mr. L. Khyriem who prays for\nadjournment of this matter on account of bereavement of the said conducting\ncounsel.Mr. S. Changkija, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the\nconducting counsel for the respondent, Mr. B. Bhattacharjee has no objection\nto the prayer so made by the learned counsel for the petitioner.Accordingly, list this matter on 25.08.2020 for hearing along with CRP.\nNo. 20 of 2020, CRP. No. 21 of 2020, CRP. No. 22 of 2020, CRP. No. 23 of\n2020, CRP. No. 24 of 2020, CRP. No. 25 of 2020, CRP. No. 26 of 2020 and\nCRP. No. 27 of 2020.Judge\n\n\nMeghalaya\n18.08.2020\n"D. Nary, PS"

adddc01d-1aa2-5939-a628-37e9e3017470

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Orissa High CourtABLAPL/4296/2020 on 24 April, 2020Author:S.K. PanigrahiBench:S.K. PanigrahiABLAPL No.4296 of 2020\n\n\n\n\n02. 24.04.2020 Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for\n the State.\n Learned counsel for the State is directed to obtain up-to-date\n Case Diary by the next date.\n The matter be listed three weeks after.\n As an interim measure, it is directed that the petitioners shall not\n be arrested in the meanwhile in connection with 2(a) C.C. No.84 of 2020\n corresponding to P.R. No.38 of 2019-20 of Bhadrak (Excise Range)\n pending in the court of the learned S.D.J.M., Bhadrak subject to the\n condition that they shall cooperate with the investigation.\n As Lock-down period is continuing for COVID-19, learned\n counsel for the petitioners may utilize the soft copy of this order\n available in the High Court's website or print out thereof at par with\n certified copies in the manner prescribed, vide Court's Notice No.4587,\n dated 25.03.2020.\n .............................\n S.K. Panigrahi, J.JB

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Telangana High CourtM/S. Santhosh Granites vs The State Of Telangana on 10 December, 2021Author:Shameem AktherBench:Shameem AktherTHE HON'BLE Dr. JUSTICE SHAMEEM AKTHER\n\n WRIT PETITION No.33357 of 2021\n\nORDER:Heard learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned\n\nGovernment Pleader for Mines and Geology for the respondents\n\nand perused the record. With the consent of both the parties, this\n\nwrit petition is being disposed of at the stage of admission itself.2. This writ petition is filed by the petitioner, wherein, the\n\nfollowing prayer is made:"...To issue a Writ, Order or direction more particularly one in\n the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the\n Respondent No.4 in not issuing transit permits to the\n petitioner to dispatch granite blocks from the quarry lease\n area of the Petitioner on the pretext of pending revision\n application before Respondent No.1 challenging the Demand\n notice No 1501/VigKNR/2013-14/45. dated 13.08.2021 as\n illegal, arbitrary and against Principles of Natural Justice and\n violative ofArticle 14, 19and21of the Constitution of India\n and consequently to direct the Respondent No.1 to set aside\n the Demand No 1501/VigKNR/2013-14/45 dated 13.08.2021\n for the grounds stated in the revision application and pass\n such other order or orders..."3. When the matter is taken up for hearing, learned counsel for\n\nthe petitioner has submitted that the issue raised in the present writ\n\npetition is squarely covered by the orders passed by this Court in\n\nW.P.No.21766 of 2020, dated 03.12.2020.4. The above said submission is not disputed by the learned\n\nGovernment Pleader for Mines and Geology.5. In view of the same and for the reasons alike in the order,\n\ndated 03.12.2020, passed by this Court in W.P.No.21766 of 2020,\n\nthe present Writ Petition is disposed of directing the respondent No.1\n\nto dispose of the Revision Application of the petitioner, within a\n\nperiod of two (2) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this2order. Pending Revision Application, the respondents are directed to\n\ngrant temporary permission to the petitioner, subject to payment of\n\nRs.1,30,594/- towards normal seigniorage fee, as quantified in the\n\ndemand notice, dated 13.08.2021, within a period of two (2) weeks\n\nfrom today. On granting such permission as ordered above, the\n\npetitioner shall continue to pay the normal seigniorage fee. It is\n\nmade clear that said amount of Rs.1,30,594/- to be paid by the\n\npetitioner shall be subject to the result of the Revision Application\n\npending before the respondent No.1.Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this Writ Petition,\n\nshall stand close. There shall be no order as to costs.______________________\n Dr. SHAMEEM AKTHER, J\n10th December, 2021.Note:Registry is directed to annex a\ncopy of the order dated 03.12.2020,\npassed in W.P.No.21766 of 2020\nalong with this order.(B/o)\n SSP

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Delhi District CourtAar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd vs Usha Anand 1/16 on 1 December, 2022IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHINAV AHLAWAT\n METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE, DWARKA COURTS, NEW\n DELHI\n Criminal Complaint No.:35660/2019\n Aar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd. ......... Complainant\n Versus\n Usha Anand ......... Accused\n\n\n1. Name & address of the complainant: Aar Kay Finelease Pvt\n Ltd., 4, State Bank\n Nagar,\n Paschim Vihar, New\n Delhi­63\n (Through its authorized\n Representative Sh. Ram\n Niwas Dahiya.)\n\n2. Name & address of the accused : Usha Anand\n w/o Sh. Manmohan Rai\n Anand\n R/o H. No.C­3/233\n Janakpuri\n Near Rainbow School,\n New Delhi­11058\n3. Offence complained of : U/s 138,The\n Negotiable Instruments\n Act,1881.\n4. Date of Institution of case : 24.09.2019\n5. Plea of accused : Pleaded not guilty.\n6. Final order : Convicted\n7. Date of decision of the case : 01.12.2022\n\n\n\nCC no.35660/2019\nAar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd Vs Usha Anand 1/16\n JUDGMENT1. Vide this judgment, I shall dispose of the aforementioned complaint\n case as filed by the complainant, Aar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd.\n (hereinafter referred to as the complainant) against accused, Usha\n Anand, (hereinafter referred to as the accused). The present\n complaint has been filed against the accusedu/s 138of Negotiable\n Instrument Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as theNI Act).2. The brief facts as alleged by the complainant in his complaint are that\n complainant is a private Ltd Company incorporated underCompanies Act. The present complaint has been signed and filled\n through its Authorized Representative being a lawful authority by\n power of attorney dated 25.10.2013 which has been executed in\n pursuance of resolution dated 10.10.2013. The complainant through\n the present complaint submitted that vide agreement dated\n 26.07.2017 (loan account number 285/2017), accused took a loan of\n Rs. 20 lakhs from the complainant company against property number\n C­3/233, Janakpuri, Delhi­58 from the complainant for a period of 24\n months on interest at 16% per annum. That against this loan the\n above said property was mortgaged in favour of the complainant and\n interest payable by the accused came to Rs. 6,40,000/­ and thereby\n total amount repayable by the accused was Rs. 26,40,000/­. The said\n amount was to be repaid in 24 monthly installments of Rs. 1,10,000/­\n each.3. That towards the repayment of the above said loan, accused issued\n two cheques in favour of the complainant towards the discharge of\n liability of the loan which are cheque bearing no. 204225 datedCC no.35660/2019Aar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd Vs Usha Anand 2/16\n 25.05.2019 & cheque bearing no.204226 dated 25.06.2019, both for\n an amount of Rs.1,10,000/­ drawn on Central Bank of India,\n Janakpuri, Delhi (Cheques in question).4. It is further averred in the complaint that when the complainant\n presented both the cheques to his banker the same were returned\n unpaid by the banker of the complainant vide cheque returning\n memos dated 25.07.2019 with the remarks "Funds Insufficient".5. Thereafter, the complainant served a legal demand notice upon the\n accused through his counsel on 09.08.2019 and upon the expiry of\n statutory period when accused failed to make the payment of cheques\n in question, complainant had filed the present complaint case.6. In order to prove his case, complainant in the pre­summoning\n evidence, examined himself as CW1 by way of affidavit Ex. CW1/A\n and relied upon following documents which are as follows:a) Ex. CW1/1 is copy of power of attorney (OSR)b) Ex. CW1/2 and Ex. CW1/3 are the cheques in questionc) Ex. CW1/4 and Ex. CW1/5 Original cheque returning memos.d) Ex. CW1/6 Legal Demand Notice\n e) Ex. CW1/7 is postal receipt\n f) Ex. CW1/8 is the tracking report\n g) Mark A copy of certificate of incorporation\n h) Mark B is the copy of loan agreement with schedule.7. Upon appreciation of pre­summoning evidence and upon finding\n prima facie case against the accused, the accused was summoned for\n an offence punishable undersection 138NI Act. Thereafter NoticeCC no.35660/2019Aar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd Vs Usha Anand 3/16\n u/s 251 Cr.Pc was framed against the accused on 31.03.2022 to\n which she pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.8. Ld. counsel for accused failed to move the application u/s 145(2) NI\n Act despite repeated opportunities, thereby the right of the accused to\n cross examine the complainant was closed vide order dated\n 31.05.2022 and matter was listed for recording of statement u/s 313\n Cr.PC.9. Statement of accusedu/s 313Cr.PC was recorded on 01.06.2022\n wherein all the incriminating circumstances which were against the\n accused were put to her to which accused stated that it was correct\n that she took a loan of Rs 20 Lakhs from the complainant and\n accused further stated that she had paid Rs 9 Lakhs back to the\n complainant and that she was willing to clear all the outstanding\n amount. Accused further admitted her signature on the cheques in\n question but denied filling in the particulars on the cheques and\n stated that she never received any legal demand notice from the\n complainant.10. Thereafter, the matter was listed for Defence Evidence. Accused\n moved the applicationu/s 315Cr.PC along with list of witnesses and\n the same was allowed upon the non­objection of the AR for the\n complainant vide order dated 17.08.2022. Thereafter, despite many\n opportunities accused failed to lead any defence and remained absent\n and ultimately vide order dated 10.10.2022, DE was closed and\n matter was fixed for final arguments.11. In the final arguments, the counsel for complainant submitted thatCC no.35660/2019Aar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd Vs Usha Anand 4/16\n complainant has been able to prove all the ingredientsu/s 138NI Act\n which stood corroborated by the documentary evidence led in the\n evidence. The counsel for complainant further submitted that accused\n has not brought any defence and has neither rebutted the presumption\n arising in favour of the complainant in terms ofSection 118&139of\n NI Act in as much as testimony of CW1 has remained uncontroverted\n in material particulars.12. On the other hand, the husband of accused submitted that his wife,\n i.e., the accused was willing to clear the remaining amount and again\n sought adjournment. Despite opportunity being granted to the\n husband of accused to ensure the presence of their counsel, husband\n of accused again insisted for adjournment stating that they were\n willing to pay the remaining amount but the same was not allowed as\n already many adjournment were granted to enable the accused to\n clear the remaining amount, however every time, accused failed to\n pay any amount to the complainant. Final arguments were concluded\n and record of the case and evidence of both the parties were\n thoroughly perused.13. Before proceedings to the merits of the case, it is important to lay\n down the basic provision ofSection 138of NI Act,1881. In order to\n ascertain whether accused has committed offenceu/s 138NI Act the\n following ingredients have to be proved which are as follows:a) A person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him\n in a bank for payment of a certain sum of money to another person\n from out of that account for the discharge of any legally enforceable\n debt or liability;CC no.35660/2019Aar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd Vs Usha Anand 5/16\n b) cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of three monthsfrom the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity\n whichever is earlier;c) That cheque has been returned by the bank unpaid, either because of\n the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient\n to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid\n from that account by an agreement made with the bank;d) The payee or the holder in due course of the cheque has made a\n demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice\n in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within 30 days of the receipt of\n information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as\n unpaid; ande) The drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of\n money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15\n days of the receipt of the said notice.14. It becomes imperative to mention thatSection 139of NI Act\n provides a statutory presumption in favour of the drawee that the\n cheque was issued to him in discharge of a debt or other liability of a\n legally enforceable nature. Also, the said provision must be read\n along withSection 118of NI Act which states that every negotiable\n instrument is presumed to have been drawn and accepted for\n consideration. That said, what follows is that trial undersection 138NI Act is structured on the premise of the reverse onus of proof\n theory since the offence is a document based technical one. The\n journey of evidence begins not from the home of the prosecution\n story but from the point of the defence. The presumptions carved out\n in favour of the complainant are those of law and not those of facts.15. In this regard, reliance can be placed on K. N. Beena v.Muniyappan (AIR 2001 SC 2895), it was observed as follows: ­\n\n "Thus, in complaints underSection 138,\n the Court has to presume that the chequeCC no.35660/2019Aar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd Vs Usha Anand 6/16\n had been issued for a debt or liability. This\n presumption is rebuttable. However, the\n burden of proving that a cheque had not\n been issued for a debt or liability is on the\n accused.This Court in the case ofHiten P.\n Dalal vs. Bratindranath Banerjeereported\n in (2001) 6 SCC 16 has also taken an\n identical view."The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case ofHiten P. Dalal vs.\n Bratindranath Banerjee(AIR 2001 SC 3897), observed as follows:"Because bothSections 138and139require that the Court "shall presume" the\n liability of the drawer of the cheques for the\n amounts for which the cheques are drawn,\n as noted inState of Madras vs. A.\n Vaidyanatha Iyer, (AIR 1958 SC 61), it is\n obligatory on the Court to raise this\n presumption in every case where the\n factual basis for the raising of the\n presumption had been established. It\n introduces an exception to the general rule\n as to the burden of proof in criminal cases\n and shifts the onus on to the accused\n (ibid)."Also, in the case ofK. Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan[1999(4) RCR (Criminal) 309], it has been held by the Hon'ble\n Supreme Court as under:"As the signature in the cheque is admitted\n to be that of the accused, the presumption\n envisaged inSection 118of the NI Act can\n legally be inferred that the cheque was\n made or drawn for consideration on the\n date which the cheque bears.Section 139of\n the Act enjoins on the court to presume that\n the holder of the cheque received it for the\n discharge of any debt or liability."16. Further, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the\n presumption underSection 139NI Act, the standard of proof forCC no.35660/2019Aar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd Vs Usha Anand 7/16\n doing so is that of "preponderance of probabilities". As held in\n Rangappa vs. Srimohan [(2010) 11 SCC 441], the Hon'ble\n Supreme Court has observed:"Keeping this in view, it is a settled position\n that when an accused has to rebut the\n presumption underSection 139, the\n standard of proof for doing so is that of\n preponderance of probabilities. Therefore,\n if the accused is able to raise a probable\n defence which creates doubts about the\n existence of a legally enforceable debt or\n liability, the prosecution can fail.As clarified in the citations, the accused\n can rely on the materials submitted by the\n complainant in order to raise such a\n defence and it is conceivable that in some\n cases the accused may not need to adduce\n evidence of his/her own."17. Thus, as laid down in catena of decisions it is an established law that\n onus lies upon the accused to rebut the presumption and to establish\n that cheque in question was not given in respect of any debt or\n liability, with the standard of proof being preponderance of\n probability. Therefore, it becomes critical to examine whether the\n explanation of the accused coupled with the evidence on record is\n sufficient to dislodge the presumption envisaged bySection 118&139of NI Act.18. Being cumulative, it goes without saying that it is only when all the\n aforementioned ingredients are satisfied that the person who had\n drawn the cheque can be deemed to have committed an offenceu/s\n 138NI Act. This criminal liability can be attached by proving each\n of the elements of the section under which liability is sought to be\n enforced. I shall now go on to appreciate the evidence, documentaryCC no.35660/2019Aar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd Vs Usha Anand 8/16\n or oral, in the light of how compellingly it satisfies each of such\n ingredient, if it all.Appreciation of Evidence and finding:19. On appearance of accused, notice of accusationu/s 251Cr.PC was\n served upon the accused on 31.03.2022, to which accused pleaded\n not guilty and claimed trial. The accused stated that she had taken a\n loan of Rs. 20 lakhs from the complainant in the year 2017 which\n was to be repaid back with an EMI of Rs. 1,10,000/­ for a period of\n 23 months. Accused further stated that she had already repaid back\n around Rs. 9 lakhs and she was willing to pay back the remaining\n amount which was around Rs. 11 lakhs.The accused admitted her signature on the cheques in\n question but denied filling in the other particulars on the cheques.\n Accused further stated that she does not remember receiving any\n legal demand notice from the complainant.20. It is settled law that, once accused admits the signature on impugned\n cheque, a statutory presumption arises in favour of the complainant\n u/s 139NI Actr/wSection 118NI Act.Accused has remained silent throughout the trial and not stated\n anything to rebut the presumption. Accused also failed to cross\n examine the complainant on the defence raised by her in her answers\n undersection 251CrPC and further failed to lead any evidence in her\n defence. No evidence, material or record has been brought by the\n accused to substantiate the defence taken by her when notice u/s 251\n crpc was framed.21. In order to rebut the statutory presumption, it was burden upon theCC no.35660/2019Aar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd Vs Usha Anand 9/16\n accused to prove the facts she pleaded in answer to the notice under\n 251Cr.PC. No material in support of such plea having come on the\n record, the statutory presumptionu/s 139NI Act in the case in hand\n has not been rebutted.Reliance can be taken from the decision of Hon'ble\n Supreme Court in the case of M/s Kumar Exports vs M/s Sharma\n Carpets, SLP(Crl.) 955/2007, wherein while discussing the denial\n of existence of legally enforceable debt in the context ofSection 139NI Act, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that:­,\n "bare denial of the consideration and existence of debt,\n apparently would not serve the purpose of accused and\n something which is probable has to be brought on the record\n by the accused. Something which is probable has to brought\n on record for getting the proof of burden shifted to\n complainant".This ratio has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the\n case of Kishan Rao vs Shankar Gouda SLP (Crl.) 10030 of 2016.22. Further, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basa\n Lingapa vs Mudibasappa, SLP (Crl) 8641/2018 wherein it was\n stated that it is not fatal to the case of the accused if he fails to lead\n defence evidence. The court explained that accused can rely on\n material submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a\n defence and it is conceivable that in some cases accused may not\n need to adduce evidence of his or her own.Accused in the present case has not even availed the right to\n cross examine the complainant and also failed to place on record any\n cogent evidence nor pointed out any infirmities in the complainantCC no.35660/2019Aar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd Vs Usha Anand 10/16\n evidence. Accused has not led any evidence to show either the loan\n has been repaid or that there is no outstanding liability against her.23. In view of the principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex\n Court of India and Delhi High Court in the above referred decisions,\n it makes very clear that ones the holder in due course i.e.\n complainant proves that, the cheque in question belongs to drawer\n and the signature on the cheque are admitted by the drawer,\n mandatory requirements as requiredu/s 138NI Act, a presumption\n u/s 118 and 139 ofNI Actindeed does extend to the existence of\n legally enforceable debt.In the present case also, the complainant has complied with\n the mandatory requirement and has proved that, the accused had\n issued the cheques in question in his favour and accused has also\n admitted her signature on the cheques when notice of accusationu/s\n 251Cr.PC was served upon her. Therefore, presumptions have to be\n drawn towards the legally enforceable debt as persection 139NI\n Act.24. Further, as perSection 103of Indian Evidence Act, a person who\n asserts a fact must prove the same unless the law otherwise provides.\n In the present case, the onus was upon the accused to prove that she\n no longer owed any liability towards the complainant or that she had\n returned the due amount of money as claimed by the complainant\n and that nothing remained to be paid to the complainant, and the\n same rested on the accused.Accused has failed to bring on record any evidence that\n can satisfy the factum of repayment. No evidence of whatsoeverCC no.35660/2019Aar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd Vs Usha Anand 11/16\n nature, was led by the accused. An adverse inference can be drawn\n against the accused that the cheques in question issued by the\n accused was towards discharging the liability.25. It is also important to note that during the pendency of the case,\n accused had merely stated that she was ready to pay the remaining\n amount of loan, however, accused failed to show that the remaining\n loan amount or the amount mentioned on the cheques in question\n were repaid.It will be utter disregard to the established principle of\n evidence, if this court accepts the oral explanation or answer given\n by the accused during notice framing or submission made at the time\n of final arguments, devoid of any documentary evidence to\n concretize the proof. The story of the accused, in the absence of any\n credible evidence, cannot be taken as gospel truth.26. Further as laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court inRangappa v\n Mohan, 20110 11 SCC 441, wherein it was observed that, "In the\n light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent­\n claimant that the presumption mandated bysection 139of the Act\n does indeed include the existence of the legally enforceable debt or\n liability.Without placing on record any evidence to disprove that cheque was\n not issued in discharge of liability, the accused has failed to rebut the\n presumption.CC no.35660/2019Aar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd Vs Usha Anand 12/1627. Now that the defences taken by the accused are dealt with, let us\n examine the potentiality of the prosecution story. The complainant\n story is that complainant is a private limited company and vide loan\n agreement no.285/17 dated 26.07.2017 Mark B, accused took a loan\n of Rs. 20 lakhs from the complainant returnable along with an\n interest @ 16% per month and hence a total amount of Rs.\n 26,40,000/­ was to be repaid by the accused in 24 monthly\n instalments of Rs.1,10,000/­ each.Complainant has placed on record the copy of the loan\n agreement dated 26.07.2017 Mark B along with its schedule for\n repayment of the EMIs, regarding the lending of the loan amount to\n the accused, but in the absence of any contrary evidence, the\n unchallenged testimony of the complainant has to be believed as\n accused has admitted the fact of taking the loan from the\n complainant. Further, despite the opportunities given accused failed\n to cross examine the complainant. As such there was no rebuttal\n evidence on behalf of the accused to rebut the presumption available\n underSections 118and139of the NI Act.28. In the present matter, despite giving sufficient time, accused neither\n cross­examined the complainant nor led any defence evidence,\n therefore the evidence placed by the complainant remained\n unchallenged and there was no reason to disbelieve the version of the\n complainant.Accused has not brought forth not even an iota of evidence to\n pillar her defence. Accused did not bring any evidence to impeach\n the credibility of the document tendered by the complainant. Burden\n lied heavily on the accused to have probablized the factum ofCC no.35660/2019Aar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd Vs Usha Anand 13/16\n repayment of the EMI amount or repayment of the loan amount.\n Therefore, considering the admission of the accused that signature on\n the cheques in question belongs to her and compelling documentary\n evidence placed on record and failure of the accused to put forth any\n reasonable and believable defence, the first element of thesection\n 138NI Act stands assembled.29. As for the second condition qua the presentation of the cheques\n within three months is concerned, the same is satisfied upon the\n perusal of the cheques in question Ex CW1/2 and Ex. CW1/3 dated\n 25.05.2019 and 25.06.2019 respectively while the return memos Ex\n CW1/4 and Ex. CW1/5, both dated 25.07.2019, thus, being presented\n within the prescribed period of limitation of three months. The\n defence did not adduce any evidence whatsoever to contradict the\n same.30. The third condition pertains to the cheque being returned unpaid\n owing to their being dishonored. Bank return memo or slip is prima­\n facie proof of the dishonor.Section 146of the Negotiable\n Instruments Act, 188, in this regard comes into play which raises a\n presumption that the court shall presume the fact of dishonor of the\n cheque in case of cheque is returned vide a return memo issued by\n the bank having thereon the official mark denoting that the cheque\n has been dishonored. Perusal of bank dishonour memos i.e., Ex\n CW1/4 and Ex. CW1/5 shows that cheques in question on being\n presented in the bank were returned dishonoured due to "funds\n insufficient" on 25.07.2019. As the defence has failed to rebut the\n said presumption, hence the said condition is also satisfied.CC no.35660/2019Aar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd Vs Usha Anand 14/1631. Further, the legal notice was served by the complainant upon the\n accused on the address of the accused. The accused stated during\n framing ofu/s 251Cr.PC that she does not remember whether she\n had received the legal demand notice from the complainant whereas\n during the recording statementu/s 313Cr.PC accused stated that she\n did not receive any legal demand notice from the complainant.Perusal of the noticeu/s 251Cr.PC and statementu/s\n 313Cr.PC reveals that address mentioned as mentioned by the\n accused on both is the same address upon which the legal demand\n notice was sent by the complainant. Therefore, a presumption of\n deemed service is drawn undersection 27General Clauses Act\n which provides that where notice is sent to the correct address, the\n same shall be presumed to have been duly served. Also, in CC Alavi\n Haji Vs. Palapatti Mohammad (Crl.) 767/2007 the Hon'ble\n Supreme Court of India held that "where the notice is sent by\n Registered post by correctly addressing the drawer of the cheque, the\n mandatory requirement of issue of notice in terms of clause (b) of\n proviso tosection 138Act stands complied with.Accused has failed to adduce any evidence to rebut the\n presumption of due service. As such, the legal notice stood served\n upon the accused, thus implying the satisfaction of the fourth\n condition.32. The last condition is that accused fails to make the payment within\n fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the legal demand notice.\n In the present case, the accused has evidently failed to make the\n payment within the fifteen days contending that she owes no legal\n liability to pay the amount mentioned in the cheques in question. The\n accused has miserably failed to prove the said assertion and thus, theCC no.35660/2019Aar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd Vs Usha Anand 15/16\n last limb of what will entail the liability against the accused, is also\n structured.33. Ratio: Finally, having considered the totality of the facts and the\n circumstances of the case, the accused has failed to rebut the\n presumption in favour of the complainant as spelled undersection\n 139NI Act. The law as laid down undersection 138NI Act, 1881 is\n made out against the accused. The weight of the evidence adduced\n by the complainant to prove his case against the accused is sufficient\n enough to impute criminality on the accused. Complainant has\n successfully proved all the essential ingredients ofSection 138of the\n Act. Therefore, accused is held guilty and convicted for commission\n of offence punishable undersection 138of the Negotiable Instrument\n Act, 1881.Let the convict be heard on the quantum of sentence separately.34. Let the copy of this judgment be given to the convict free of cost.Announced in the open court on Abhinav Ahlawat\n01.12.2022 MM­NI Act­02,\n South West District\n Dwarka Courts, DelhiCC no.35660/2019Aar Kay Finelease Pvt Ltd Vs Usha Anand 16/16

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Madras High CourtMr.Sezhiyan vs The Superintendent Of Police on 12 October, 2020Author:R.PongiappanBench:R.PongiappanW.P.No.14483 of 2020\n\n IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS\n\n DATED : 12.10.2020\n\n CORAM :\n\n THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.PONGIAPPAN\n\n W.P.No.14483 of 2020\n\n Mr.Sezhiyan ... Petitioner\n Vs\n 1.The Superintendent of Police,\n Office of the Superintendent of Police,\n Cuddalore, Cuddalore District,\n Tamil Nadu.\n\n 2.The Deputy Superintendent of Police,\n Office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police,\n Sethiyathope, Cuddalore District,\n Tamil Nadu.\n\n 3.The Inspector of Police,\n Sethiyathope Police Station,\n Sethiyathope, Cuddalore district,\n Tamil Nadu.\n\n 4.The Sub Inspector of Police,\n Orathur Police Station,\n Orathur, Bhuvanagiri Taluk,\n Cuddalore District, Tamil Nadu.\n\n 5.The Sub-collector,\n Office of the Sub Collector,\n Chidambaram, Cuddalore District. ... Respondents\n\n 1/10\n\n\nhttp://www.judis.nic.in\n W.P.No.14483 of 2020\n\n\n\n PRAYER: Writ Petition filed underArticle 226of the Constitution of India\n praying for issuance of Writ of Mandamus, directing the respondent to remove the\n petitioner name from the history sheeted rowdy list S.No.24, on the file of the 3rd\n respondent police.\n\n\n For Petitioner : Mr.P.R.Thiruneelakandan.\n For Respondents : Mrs.M.Prabhavathi,\n Additional Public Prosecutor.\n\n ORDERThe matter was heard through "Video Conference".2.This Writ Petition has been filed seeking direction, directing the\n\n respondent to remove the petitioner name from the history sheeted rowdy list\n\n S.No.24, on the file of the 3rd respondent police.3.The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit the\n\n petitioner engage in political life and used to lead agitation etc., for certain common\n\n issues for the interest of the larger public and no case has been registered against\n\n the petitioner except one case in Crime No.155 of 2011 wherein the police alleged2/10http://www.judis.nic.inW.P.No.14483 of 2020that the petitioner's tractor was involved in illegal sand quarry. Therefore, he sought\n\n for allowing this petition.4.The learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents\n\n submitted that the petitioner is an habitual offender indulging in rowdy activities,\n\n extortion, katta panchayats, etc. Hence, History Sheeted Rowdy Book was opened\n\n at the third respondent police station as against the petitioner and it is being\n\n extended regularly as per the Police Standing Order. Therefore, he prays to dismiss\n\n the Criminal Original Petition.5.Heard Mr.S.Doraisamy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and\n\n Mrs.M.Prabhavathi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the\n\n respondents.6.The issue involved in this Criminal Original Petition has already been dealt\n\n with by the Madurai Bench of this Court and detailed order has been passed in\n\n W.P.(MD)No.19651 of 2017 on 26.09.2018. On the basis of the above said Order,\n\n the Director General Of Police, Chennai issued a circular in Rc.No. 66569/Crime3/10http://www.judis.nic.inW.P.No.14483 of 20203(2)/2019 dated 24.04.2019, which reads as follows :7.From the above judgments the following principles\n emerge insofar as history sheeters are concerned:a. In order to facilitate the study of crime and criminals,\n the Police Standing Orders provides a mechanism, whereby\n every Police Station shall maintain a crime history, which shall\n be a confidential record. In this record all cases of crime that\n are mentioned in PSO No.742, which provides various classes of\n crime, shall be entered and even an attempt to commit those\n offences, are entered in the records maintained in the Police\n Station.b. These crime records maintained by the Various Police\n Stations shall be reviewed every year by the Inspector of Police\n of the concerned Police Station. On such review, the Inspector of\n Police has to furnish a concise appreciation of the years crime\n for the benefit of the Superior Officers and also to make\n suggestions in order to improve the quality of crime control. The\n review undertaken by the Inspector of Police is not merely a\n catalogue of the crime in the year. It should reflect the valuable\n suggestions in order\n to prevent such crimes in future and to provide ways and means\n of handling serious offences in an effective manner.c. History Sheet can be opened by the concerned Police\n Station under two circumstances. The first circumstance is4/10http://www.judis.nic.inW.P.No.14483 of 2020provided under PSO No.746, which states that the history sheet\n can be opened against a person who is a resident (permanently\n or temporarily) within the station limit, who is known or believed\n to be addicted to commission of crime, whether convicted or not.\n Here the thrust is on the habituality or the propensity to commit\n a crime by a person, which is sought to be monitored by opening\n a history sheet.d. The second category of persons against whom history\n sheet can be opened are the persons, who are convicted for\n various offences that has been listed in PSO No.747, wherein\n opening of the history sheet is automatic.e. In the first category of opening history sheet, month\n wise scrutiny or a close watch on the person concerned is\n contemplated. Here also there is sub-catogrization as, close\n watch bad characters and non-close watch bad characters. In\n the former, the entry shall be made month wise and in the later,\n the entry shall be made once in a quarter. What is entered is\n normally anything of interest in respect of the bad character,\n which goes to the notice of the Police. These records must be\n checked and brought upto date once in a year. Here the main\n thrust is on ?Current Doings?.f. In the second category of opening history sheet, a mere\n act of conviction under the offences listed in PSO No.747 is\n enough. The name of the persons, who have been convicted for5/10http://www.judis.nic.inW.P.No.14483 of 2020those offences can be retained for a period of two years after\n their release from jail.g. PSO No.748, is the most important provision, which\n deals with discontinuance of history sheet. This provision is\n common to both the categories falling under PSO Nos.746 and747. As per PSO No.748,\n the Superintendent of Police may order a closure of a history\n sheet at any time. But, the Divisional Officer can order closure of\n history sheet only after the expiry of the period stipulated in PSO\n No.747.h. As per PSO 748, where retention of the history sheet is\n considered to be necessary, even after two years of registration,\n orders of an Officer of and above the rank of Assistant\n Superintendent of Police/ Deputy Superintendent of Police must\n be taken for extension for the first instance upto the end of next\n December. For further annual extension from January to\n December, separate orders must be passed every time by an\n Officer of and above the rank of Assistant Superintendent of\n Police / Deputy Superintendent of Police. This provision is made\n applicable even for rowdy sheeters.i. For the purpose of passing such orders, there must be\n valid materials available on record and it cannot be passed on\n the whims and fancies of the Police Officers. Therefore, the\n authority empowered to extend the period of retention of the6/10http://www.judis.nic.inW.P.No.14483 of 2020names of the persons in the history sheet, should record his\n reasons based on both objective and subjective instructions.j. Branding a person as a history sheeted rowdy, taints the\n name and image of the person. It is true that the entire purpose\n of maintaining a history sheet is to ensure public peace.\n However, it should be balanced with the fundamental right\n guaranteed to every citizen underArticle 21of the Constitution\n of India. Therefore, a fair and reasonable decision, based on\n the materials, with sufficient reasons, becomes sine\n qua non to retain the name of a person as a history sheeter\n beyond the period stipulated in the Police Standing Orders.k. This Court has time and again brought the above\n principle to the notice of the Higher Police Officials and in one\n of the judgments inManivanan Vs. Staterepresented by The\n District Collector, Coimbatore District and Others, reported in\n (2013) 7 MLJ 501, this Court felt that there is lack of\n understanding on the part of the Police in maintaining\n history sheet and therefore, directed the Director General of\n Police to issue necessary instructions / guidelines / circulars\n with regard to the manner in which it has to be maintained and\n the manner in which the orders will have to be passed for\n extension of the period to continue a person as a history sheeter.8.The above principles that has been culled out of various\n decisions of this Court will now be applied to each case in order7/10http://www.judis.nic.inW.P.No.14483 of 2020to see if the Police officials have scrupulously followed all the\n Police Standing Orders and the judgments of this Court, while\n retaining the name of a person as a history sheeter, beyond the\n stipulated period."7.In view of the above circular passed by the Director General of Police,\n\n Chennai, this Court is inclined to pass the following orders ;the third respondent is directed to consider the petitioner's representation\n\n and pass orders, on merits and in accordance with law, within a period of eight\n\n weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order.8.With the above directions, the Criminal Original Petition stands disposed\n\n of.12.10.2020\n\n ay\n\n Index: Yes/No\n Internet: Yes/No8/10http://www.judis.nic.inW.P.No.14483 of 2020To1.The Superintendent of Police,\n Office of the Superintendent of Police,\n Cuddalore, Cuddalore District,\n Tamil Nadu.2.The Deputy Superintendent of Police,\n Office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police,\n Sethiyathope, Cuddalore District,\n Tamil Nadu.3.The Inspector of Police,\n Sethiyathope Police Station,\n Sethiyathope, Cuddalore district,\n Tamil Nadu.4.The Sub Inspector of Police,\n Orathur Police Station,\n Orathur, Bhuvanagiri Taluk,\n Cuddalore District, Tamil Nadu.5.The Sub-collector,\n Office of the Sub Collector,\n Chidambaram, Cuddalore District.6.The Public Prosecutor,\n High Court of Madras,\n Chennai.9/10http://www.judis.nic.inW.P.No.14483 of 2020R.PONGIAPPAN, J.ayW.P.No.14483 of 2020Dated:12.10.202010/10http://www.judis.nic.in

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Delhi High CourtM/S Space Optical Company vs Commissioner Trade Taxes & Ors. on 31 August, 2020$~2\n* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI\n\n+ W.P. (C) 5380/2020\n M/S SPACE OPTICAL COMPANY ..... Petitioner\n Through: Mr.Varun Nischal with Mr. Arif\n Ahmed Khan, Advocates.\n\n versus\n\n COMMISSIONER OF\n TRADE TAXES & ORS. ...... Respondents\n Through: Mr.Satyakam, ASC for NCT of Delhi.\n\n% Date of Decision: 31st August, 2020\n\nCORAM:\nHON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN\nHON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA\n\n JUDGMENTMANMOHAN, J: (Oral)\n\nC.M.Nos.19386-19387/2020\n Exemption allowed, subject to all just exception.\n Accordingly, the applications stand disposed of.\nW.P. (C) 5380/2020 & C.M.No.19385/20201. The petition has been heard by way of video conferencing.2. Present petition has been filed challenging the order dated 25 th June,\n2020 passed by the Objection Hearing Authority (for short 'OHA') whereby\npetitioner's claim for input tax credit (for short 'ITC') has been disallowed\nunderSection 9(2)(g)of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004 (for shortW.P. (C) 5380/2020 Page 1 of 3'DVAT Act'). The petitioner also challenges the default notices of\nassessment of tax, interest and penalty dated 28th March, 2016 and 13th\nApril, 2016 issued under DVAT Act for the tax periods 1 st and 2nd quarters\n2015-2016.3. In the present case, it has been averred that twelve other objections\npending before the special OHA for other tax periods arising out of the same\ncause of action, on similar facts and issue have been allowed in favour of the\npetitioner vide orders dated 13th July, 2020 setting aside the default\nassessment notices.4. As there were two sets of contrary orders arising from the same set of\nfacts, learned counsel for the respondents had on the last date of hearing\nsought time to obtain instructions.5. Today Mr.Satyakam, learned ASC for Govt. of NCT of Delhi, on\ninstructions, states that the matter has been discussed with the Zonal In-\ncharge and considering the facts and circumstances as well as the legal\nposition, he wishes to withdraw the impugned order passed by the OHA,\nwith liberty to pass a fresh order in accordance with law after hearing the\npetitioner in a time bound manner.6. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that the present assessment is\nbarred by limitation.7. Keeping in view the aforesaid, the impugned order dated 25 th June,\n2020 passed by the OHA is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the\nOHA. The OHA is directed to decide the matter within twelve weeks. All\nthe rights and contentions of the parties are left open.8. Accordingly, the present petition along with pending application stand\ndisposed of.W.P. (C) 5380/2020 Page 2 of 39. The order be uploaded on the website forthwith. Copy of the order be\nalso forwarded to the learned counsel through e-mail.MANMOHAN, J\n\n\n\n SANJEEV NARULA, J\nAUGUST 31, 2020\nKAW.P. (C) 5380/2020 Page 3 of 3

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Take notes as you read a judgment using our Virtual Legal Assistant and get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out our Premium Member services -- Free for one month.\n\nNational Company Law Appellate Tribunal\nDstr Infrastructure & Projects Llp vs Dharm Vir Gupta on 9 November, 2020\n NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, NEW DELHI\n Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 962 of 2020\n\nIn the matter of:\n\nDSTR Infrastructure & Projects LLP ....Appellant\nVs.\nDharm Vir Gupta ....Respondent\n\n\nPresent:\n\n Appellant: Mr. Vishnu Kumar and Mr. Ilam Paridi, Advocates.\n\n\n ORDER\n\n (Through Virtual Mode)\n\n\n\n09.11.2020: In terms of the un-dated impugned order which appears to\n\nhave been passed in September, 2020, the Adjudicating Authority (National\n\nCompany Law Tribunal), New Delhi, Court-IV has reduced the claim of the\n\nResolution Professional for the dues claimed by him during the Corporate\n\nInsolvency Resolution Process of 'DSTR Infrastructure & Projects LLP'-\n\n('Corporate Debtor') from claimed amount of Rs.3,80,000 to Rs.2,50,000/-,\n\nhaving regard to the fact that the Resolution Professional discharged duties for\n\na period which was slightly below two months. Together with the expenses\n\nincurred by the Resolution Professional, the Adjudicating Authority allowed his\n\nclaim at Rs.4,27,143/- which is assailed as being exorbitant, having regard to\n\nthe fact that the claim of the Operational Creditor has been settled at Rs.12.5\n\nLakh which includes the fee of the Interim Resolution Professional.\n\n\n Contd/-............\n -2-\n\n\n Be that as it may, it cannot be disputed that the claim on account of fee\n\nand the expenses incurred by the Resolution Professional is on a higher side\n\nwhen the amount of settlement is taken into account as it roughly works out to\n\naround 35%. The inflated fee claimed for discharge of professional duties by the\n\nResolution Professional, more so when the constitution of the Committee of\n\nCreditors was stayed and the expenses incurred being disproportionate, the\n\namount allowed cannot be justified. Same requires interference.\n\n\n Having regard to all the relevant factors, we are of the considered opinion\n\nthat an amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- will be commensurate with the nature of duties\n\nperformed by the Resolution Professional and the expenses incurred in the wake\n\nof constitution of the Committee of Creditors stayed by this Appellate Tribunal,\n\nto be paid to the Resolution Professional. With the aforesaid reduction, the\n\nappeal is disposed of.\n\n\n [Justice Bansi Lal Bhat]\n Acting Chairperson\n\n\n [Justice Anant Bijay Singh]\n Member (Judicial)\n\n\n [Shreesha Merla]\n Member (Technical)\n\nAR/g\n\n Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 960 of 2020

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Chattisgarh High CourtM/S A.S. Nutratech Private Ltd vs Central Bank Of India on 26 September, 2022NAFR\n\n HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR\n\n\n Writ Petition (C) No.4106 of 2022\n\n Order Reserved on : 22.9.2022\n Order Passed on : 26.9.2022\n\n M/s A.S. Nutratech Private Ltd. through its Director, Shailesh\n Bhargava, having its Corporate Office at D-60, First Floor, Opposite\n Heritage Hospital, Above Bank of Maharashtra, Sector 3, Devendra\n Nagar, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh\n ---- Petitioner\n versus\n\n 1. Central Bank of India through the Chief Manager, Civil Lines Branch,\n Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh\n 2. Zonal Manager, Central Bank of India, 9, Arera Hill, Jail Road, Bhopal\n - 462 011, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh\n 3. Head Office, Central Bank of India Mumbai Main Office Building, 1 st\n Floor, M.G. Road, Fort, Mumbai - 4000234\n --- Respondents\n\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------For Petitioner : Ms. Shailja Shukla, Advocate\nFor Respondents No.2 & 3 : Shri Anand Shukla, Advocate\nFor Respondent No.1 : None-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Hon'ble Shri Justice Arvind Singh Chandel\n\n C.A.V. ORDER1. The issue involved in the instant petition is as to its maintainability.2. The instant writ petition has been moved underArticle 226of the\n\n Constitution of India with the following prayer:(1) Set aside the impugned order dated 29.8.2022 (Annexure\n\n P1) passed by Respondent 1 and2(2) Direct the Respondents/authorities to settle the Non-Performing Asset (NPA) account of the Petitioner under the\n\n Scheme 2022-23.3. Facts of the case, in brief, are that the Petitioner is a company duly\n\n registered under theCompanies Actand is engaged in\n\n manufacturing of refined rice bran oil and vegetable oil having its\n\n factory at District Mahasamund. For the purposes of running the\n\n aforesaid plant/factory, loan facilities were sought from the\n\n Respondent 1/Bank and the same was sanctioned in terms of Cash\n\n Credit to the tune of Rupees Three Crores and Forty Lakhs and\n\n term loan to the tune of Rupees Ten Crores. Along with these\n\n loans, assets including the lands of the company/Petitioner were\n\n also mortgaged with Respondent 1/Bank. Both the above loan\n\n accounts were declared as Non-Performing Asset (NPA) by the\n\n Respondent/Bank on 31.3.2018. The Respondent/Bank initiated\n\n proceeding under theSecuritisation and Reconstruction of\n\n Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002(henceforth 'the Act of 2002') and issued a notice underSection\n\n 13(2)of the Act of 2002 to the Petitioner on 10.4.2018 and also\n\n took symbolic possession of the secured assets of the\n\n company/Petitioner on 4.7.2018. In the year 2021, a scheme was\n\n floated by the Respondent/Bank, whereby the Non-Performing\n\n Assets valued till Rupees Ten Crores of the Bank throughout the\n\n country were sought to be settled after sacrificing certain\n\n percentage of the outstanding amount. Since the outstanding\n\n amount of the company/Petitioner was more than Rupees Ten3Crores, it was asked to reduce the same and bring it to Rupees Ten\n\n Crores so that the benefit of the scheme could be availed by the\n\n Petitioner. In furtherance thereof, the Petitioner deposited a sum of\n\n Rupees One Crore. Thereafter, One Time Settlement (OTS) plan\n\n was submitted by the Petitioner to the Bank on 15.11.2021. As\n\n directed by the Bank, the offer was revised by the Petitioner vide\n\n Annexure P6, but this was not accepted by the Bank and was\n\n rejected vide Annexure P7. Thereafter, on 6.7.2022, a new\n\n scheme was floated by the Respondent/Bank titled as "Special One\n\n Time Settlement Scheme, 2022-23" (henceforth 'the scheme 2022-\n\n 23'). As contained in the instant petition, the Petitioner is eligible\n\n for this scheme and, therefore, the Petitioner applied under this\n\n new scheme vide Annexure P9. The OTS proposal of the\n\n Petitioner was rejected vide the impugned letter dated 29.8.2022\n\n (Annexure P1). Hence, this petition.4. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to mention the fact that in\n\n paragraph 8.16 of the petition the Petitioner has pleaded that the\n\n Respondent/Bank has issued an auction notice on 5.9.2022 for sale\n\n of two properties mortgaged with the Petitioner and the auction is to\n\n take place on 27.9.2022. It is further pleaded therein that as\n\n contained in Rule 8(6) and proviso to Rule 8(6) of the Security\n\n Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (henceforth 'the Rules of\n\n 2002'), the authorised officer shall serve a notice of 30 days to the\n\n borrower for sale of immovable assets, but, the notice has been\n\n issued on 5.9.2022 and the auction is to take place on 27.9.2022\n\n and, therefore, Rule 8(6) and proviso thereto of the Rules of 20024have also not been complied with. At this juncture, it would also be\n\n appropriate to mention here that along with this writ petition the\n\n Petitioner has filed I.A. 1/2022 praying for stay of the effect and\n\n operation of the impugned auction notice dated 5.9.2022, but, in\n\n this regard, the Petitioner has not made any prayer in the relief\n\n clause of the writ petition.5. Learned Counsel appearing for Respondents 2 and 3 submitted\n\n that as admitted by the Petitioner himself, a notice underSection\n\n 13(2)of the Act of 2002 has been issued against him on 10.4.2018\n\n and symbolic possession of the secured assets of the\n\n Petitioner/company has also been taken by the Bank on 4.7.2018.\n\n Referring to Annexure P11, Learned Counsel further submitted that\n\n the sale notice for sale of immovable properties has also been\n\n issued to the Petitioner as contained in Rule 8(6) of the Rules of\n\n 2002. Thus, it is clear that the proceedings are initiated under the\n\n Act of 2002. Therefore, the Petitioner has only remedy available to\n\n approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) as contained inSection 17of the Act of 2002. Therefore, the instant petition is not\n\n maintainable and deserves to be dismissed as not maintainable.\n\n Reliance was placed on (2018) 3 SCC 85 (Authorized Officer, State\n\n Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C.), 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1255\n\n (Bijnor Urban Cooperative Bank Limited, Bijnor v. Meenal Agarwal)\n\n and (2022) 5 SCC 345 (Phoenix ARC Private Limited v. Vishwa\n\n Bharati Vidya Mandir).6. In counter, Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner submitted5that the Petitioner has not approached this Court challenging the\n\n proceedings of recovery so drawn under the Act of 2002, but the\n\n instant petition has been filed being aggrieved by the illegal and\n\n arbitrary action of the Respondent/Bank in not giving the benefit of\n\n the scheme of 2022-23 to the Petitioner, which is violative of the\n\n fundamental rights of equity as guaranteed underArticle 14of the\n\n Constitution of India. The Debts Recovery Tribunal does not have\n\n jurisdiction to grant the relief as prayed for by the Petitioner in the\n\n present petition. Therefore, there is no alternative remedy available\n\n to the Petitioner to go to the DRT. Thus, this petition is well\n\n maintainable before this Court underArticle 226of the Constitution\n\n of India.7. I have heard Learned Counsel appearing for the parties and\n\n perused the entire petition and the documents annexed thereto with\n\n due care.8. When a proceeding is already drawn underSection 13(4)of the Act\n\n of 2002, whether a remedy is available to the Petitioner/company\n\n underArticle 226of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court\n\n dealing with this issue inAuthorized Officercase (supra) observed\n\n as under:"7. TheSection 13(4)notice along with possession\n notice under Rule 8 was issued on 21.4.2015. The remedy underSection 17of the SARFAESI Act was now available to the\n respondent if aggrieved. These developments were not brought\n on record or placed before the Court when the impugned interim\n order came to be passed on 24.4.2015. The writ petition was\n clearly not instituted bona fide, but patently to stall further action\n for recovery. There is no pleading why the remedy available6underSection 17of the Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal\nwas not efficacious and the compelling reasons for by-passing\nthe same. Unfortunately, the High Court also did not dwell upon\nthe same or record any special reasons for grant of interim relief\nby direction to deposit.10.InUnited Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010)\n8 SCC 110 the High Court had restrained further proceedings\nunderSection 13(4)of the Act. Upon a detailed consideration of\nthe statutory scheme under theSARFAESI Act, the availability\nof remedy to the aggrieved underSection 17before the Tribunal\nand the appellate remedy underSection 18before the Appellate\nTribunal, the object and purpose of the legislation, it was\nobserved that a writ petition ought not to be entertained in view\nof the alternate statutory remedy available holding: (SCC pp. 123\n& 128, paras 43 & 55)\n "43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked\n the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily\n not entertain a petition underArticle 226of the\n Constitution if an effective remedy is available to\n the aggrieved person and that this Rule applies\n with greater rigour in matters involving recovery\n of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money\n and the dues of banks and other financial\n institutions. In our view, while dealing with the\n petitions involving challenge to the action taken\n for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court\n must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by\n Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of\n such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as\n they not only contain comprehensive procedure for\n recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution\n of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the\n grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in\n all such cases, the High Court must insist that\n before availing remedy underArticle 226of the\n Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies\n available under the relevant statute.* * *55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite\n repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High\n Courts continue to ignore the availability of\n statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the\n SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction underArticle 226for passing orders which have serious\n adverse impact on the right of banks and other\n financial institutions to recover their dues. We7hope and trust that in future the High Courts will\n exercise their discretion in such matters with\n greater caution, care and circumspection."11.InUnion Bank of India v. Panchanan Subudhi,\n (2010) 15 SCC 552, further proceedings underSection 13(4)were stayed in the writ jurisdiction subject to deposit of\n Rs.10,00,000 leading this Court to observe as follows: (SCC pp.\n 553-54, para 7)\n "7. In our view, the approach adopted by the\n High Court was clearly erroneous. When the\n respondent failed to abide by the terms of one-time\n settlement, there was no justification for the High\n Court to entertain the writ petition and that too by\n ignoring the fact that a statutory alternative remedy\n was available to the respondent underSection 17of the Act."12. The same view was reiterated inKanaiyalal\n Lalchand Sachdev v. State of Maharashtra, 2009 SCC OnLine\n Bom 2388, observing: (SCC p. 789, para 23)\n "23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court\n rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that\n an efficacious remedy was available to the\n appellants underSection 17of the Act. It is well\n settled that ordinarily relief under Articles\n 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not\n available if an efficacious alternative remedy is\n available to any aggrieved person."9. With regard to refusal of grant of benefit of One Time Settlement\n\n Scheme, inBijnor Urbancase (supra), it was observed by the\n\n Supreme Court as under:"28. Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, no\n borrower can, as a matter of right, pray for grant of benefit of\n One Time Settlement Scheme. In a given case, it may happen\n that a person would borrow a huge amount, for example Rs.100\n Crores. After availing the loan, he may deliberately not pay any\n amount towards installments, through able to make the payment.\n He would wait for the OTS Scheme and then pray for grant of\n benefit under the OTS Scheme under which, always a lesser\n amount than the amount due and payable under the loan account8will have to be paid. This, despite there being all possibility for\nrecovery of the entire loan amount which can be realised by\nselling the mortgaged/secured properties. If it is held that the\nborrower can still, as a matter of right, pray for benefit under the\nOTS Scheme,in that case, it would be giving a premium to a\ndishonest borrower, who, despite the fact that he is able to make\nthe payment and the fact that the bank is able to recover the\nentire loan amount even by selling the mortgaged/secured\nproperties, either from the borrower and/or guarantor. This is\nbecause under the OTS Scheme a debtor has to pay a lesser\namount than the actual amount due and payable under the loan\naccount. Such cannot be the intention of the bank while offering\nOTS Scheme and that cannot be purpose of the Scheme which\nmay encourage such a dishonesty.30. The sum and substance of the aforesaid discussion\nwould be that no writ of mandamus can be issued by the High\nCourt in exercise of powers underArticle 226of the\nConstitution of India, directing a financial institution/bank to\npositively grant the benefit of OTS to a borrower. The grant of\nbenefit under the OTS is always subject to the eligibility criteria\nmentioned under the OTS Scheme and the guidelines issued\nfrom time to time. If the bank/financial institution is of the\nopinion that the loanee has the capacity to make the payment\nand/or that the bank/financial institution is able to recover the\nentire loan amount even by auctioning the mortgaged\nproperty/secured property, either from the loanee and/or\nguarantor, the bank would be justified in refusing to grant the\nbenefit under the OTS Scheme. Ultimately, such a decision\nshould be left to the commercial wisdom of the bank whose\namount is involved and it is always to be presumed that the\nfinancial institution/bank shall take a prudent decision whether\nto grant the benefit or not under the OTS Scheme, having regard\nto the public interest involved and having regard to the factors\nwhich are narrated hereinabove.31. In view of the aforesaid discussion and for the\nreasons stated above, we are of the firm opinion that the High\nCourt, in the present case, has materially erred and has exceeded\nin its jurisdiction in issuing a writ of mandamus in exercise of its\npowers underArticle 226of the Constitution of India by\ndirecting the appellant-Bank to positively consider/grant the\nbenefit of OTS to the original writ petitioner. The impugned\njudgment and order passed by the High Court is hence\nunsustainable and deserves to be quashed and set aside and is\naccordingly quashed and set aside."910.InPhoenix ARCcase (supra), it was observed by the Supreme\n\n Court as under:"16. Assuming that the communication dated 13.8.2015\n can be said to be a notice underSection 13(4)of the SARFAESI\n Act,in that casealso, in view of the statutory remedy available\n underSection 17of the SARFAESI Act and in view of the lawlaid down bythis Court in the cases referred to hereinabove, the\n writ petitions against the notice underSection 13(4)of the\n SARFAESI Act was not required to be entertained by the High\n Court. Therefore, the High Court has erred in entertaining the\n writ petitions against the communication dated 13.8.2015 and\n also passing the ex parte ad interim orders directing to maintain\n the status quo with respect to possession of secured properties on\n the condition directing the borrowers to pay Rs.1 Crore only (in\n all Rs.3 crores in view of the subsequent orders passed by the\n High Court extending the ex parte ad interim order dated\n 26.8.2015) against the total dues of approximate Rs.117 crores.\n Even the High Court ought to have considered and disposed of\n the application for vacating the ex parte ad interim relief, which\n was filed in the year 2016 at the earliest considering the fact that\n a large sum of Rs.117 crores was involved.18. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that a writ\n petition against the private financial institution - ARC - the\n appellant herein underArticle 226of the Constitution of India\n against the proposed action/actions underSection 13(4)of the\n SARFAESI Act can be said to be not maintainable. In the\n present case, the ARC proposed to take action/actions under theSARFAESI Actto recover the borrowed amount as a secured\n creditor. The ARC as such cannot be said to be performing\n public functions which are normally expected to be performed by\n the State authorities. During the course of a commercial\n transaction and under the contract, the bank/ARC lent the money\n to the borrowers herein and therefore the said activity of the\n bank/ARC cannot be said to be as performing a public function\n which is normally expected to be performed by the State\n authorities. If proceedings are initiated under theSARFAESI\n Actand/or any proposed action is to be taken and the borrower\n is aggrieved by any of the actions of the private bank/bank/ARC,\n borrower has to avail the remedy under theSARFAESI Actand\n no writ petition would lie and/or is maintainable and/or\n entertainable. Therefore, decisions of this Court inPraga Tools\n Corpn. v. C.A. Imanual, (1969) 1 SCC 585 and Ramesh\n Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, (2012) 12 SCC 331 relied upon by\n the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the borrowers are not10of any assistance to the borrowers.21. Applying the law laid down by this Court inState\n Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85 to the\n facts on hand, we are of the opinion that filing of the writ\n petitions by the borrowers before the High Court underArticle\n 226of the Constitution of India is an abuse of process of the\n court. The writ petitions have been filed against the proposed\n action to be taken underSection 13(4). As observed\n hereinabove, even assuming that the communication dated\n 13.8.2015 was a notice underSection 13(4),in that casealso, in\n view of the statutory, efficacious remedy available by way of\n appeal underSection 17of the SARFAESI Act, the High Court\n ought not to have entertained the writ petitions. ....."11. On examination of the facts of the instant case in the light of above\n\n observations of the Supreme Court, it is clear that the\n\n Petitioner/company borrowed loan from the Respondent/Bank. Both\n\n the loan accounts of the Petitioner were declared as Non-\n\n Performing Assets. Notice underSection 13(2)of the Act of 2002\n\n has also been served on the Petitioner on 10.4.2018. Symbolic\n\n possession of the premises of the Petitioner/company has also\n\n been taken by the Respondent/Bank as contained in Rule 8(1) of\n\n the Rules of 2002. In compliance of Rule 8(6) of the Rules of 2002,\n\n sale notice for the sale of immovable properties has also been\n\n served on the Petitioner. Thus, it is well established that the\n\n proceeding under the Act of 2002 has already been drawn against\n\n the Petitioner. Though the Petitioner has not challenged in the\n\n instant petition any of the proceedings pending under the Act of\n\n 2002, the fact remains that the proceedings have already been\n\n drawn against the Petitioner under the Act of 2002. Therefore, as\n\n observed by the Supreme Court in the above cited cases, the\n\n Petitioner/company has the only remedy available to approach the11Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) as contained inSection 17of the\n\n Act of 2002. Thus, it is held that the instant writ petition filed underArticle 226of the Constitution of India is not maintainable before\n\n this Court.12. Consequently, with the aforesaid observations, the instant writ\n\n petition is dismissed as not maintainable.Sd/-(Arvind Singh Chandel)\n JUDGE\nGopal

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Chattisgarh High CourtA B C (Minor) vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 17 March, 2022Author:Narendra Kumar VyasBench:Narendra Kumar VyasPage 1 of 4\n\n NAFR\n HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR\n CRR No. 56 of 2022\n  ABC (Minor) (Delinquent Juvenile) (The Details Of The Applicant\n Is Filed Separately Under Sealed Envelope) ----Applicant\n Versus\n  State of Chhattisgarh, through District Magistrate, Raipur,\n District Raipur (C.G.) ---- RespondentFor Applicant : Mrs. Richa Pandey, Advocate\nFor Respondent/State : Mr. Priyanshu Gupta, Panel Lawyer\n\n\n Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas\n Order on Board\n\n\n17.03.20221. This Criminal revision underSection 102of the Juvenile\n\n Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015\n\n (hereinafter referred to as "Act of 2015") is directed against\n\n the judgment dated 04-2-2022 passed by the Learned\n\n Special/Additional Sessions Judge (FTC Additional Charge)\n\n Raipur (C.G.) in Criminal Appeal No. 1/2022 upholding the\n\n order dated 25-11-2021 of the Juvenile Justice Board, Mana\n\n Camp, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) rejecting the bail\n\n application of the applicant/juvenile in connection with Crime\n\n No. 512/2021 registered at Police Station- Khamtrai, District-\n\n Raipur (C.G.) for the ofence underSection 302/34of IPC andSections 25&27of the Arms Act.2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the deceased Komal\n\n Sahu @ Lalu Sahu was the brother of complainant namely\n\n Birendra Sahu. On 22-8-2021 Komal Sahu did not come back\n\n to his house. On 23-8-2021 complainant Birendra Sahu was\n\n informed by one person stating that his brother was foundPage 2 of 4lying dead near the house of Pukhraj Singh and unknown\n\n person killed and threw him. The complainant after having\n\n received the information about the death of his brother went\n\n to Police Station and lodged report in Police Station, on the\n\n basis of which Police conducted investigation and after\n\n investigation ofence underSection 302of IPC andSections\n\n 25&27of the Arms Act has been registered before the police\n\n Station. The charge-sheet has been fled against the present\n\n applicant.3. Learned counsel for the applicant would submit that the\n\n applicant has been falsely implicated in this case and there\n\n is no evidence that the applicant has committed the aforesaid\n\n ofence. She would further submit that the present case, the\n\n Juvenile Justice Board as well as the Appellate Court have\n\n completely ignored to consider the statutory scheme ofSection 12of the Act of 2015, which itself is pari materia ofSection 12of the Act of 2000 while considering the\n\n application for grant of bail underSection 12of the Act of\n\n 2015. Learned counsel for the applicant would further submit\n\n that grant of bail to a juvenile is rule and exceptional\n\n circumstances under which, it could be rejected are under\n\n those which have been exhaustively enumerated inSection\n\n 12of the Act of 2015 itself. Unless those grounds are made\n\n out, a juvenile is required to be granted bail. It is further\n\n contended that in the present case, report of the Probation\n\n Officer fled before the Juvenile Justice Board does not\n\n indicate anywhere that his release would bring him in\n\n association with any known criminals or expose them to\n\n moral, physical or psychological danger or would otherwisePage 3 of 4defeat the ends of justice. It is contended that the Juvenile\n\n Justice Board as well as the appellate authority have rejected\n\n the bail application by mechanically applying the aforesaid\n\n clauses, though bereft of any material. Counsel for the\n\n applicant would also submit that the applicant is in\n\n observation home since 24-8-2021 and he has completed\n\n more than seven months in custody, therefore, he may be\n\n extended beneft of bail.4. Per contra, learned counsel for the State would submit that\n\n the order passed by the two Courts below being fully justifed\n\n and in accordance with the provisions ofSection 12of the Act\n\n does not warrant any interference and the instant revision\n\n deserves to be set aside.5. The provisions regarding grant of bail to a juvenile as perSection 12of the Act, clearly shows that the legislature has\n\n used the word "shall" in the said Section with great stress\n\n and with somewhat mandatory force which in other words\n\n means ordinarily irrespective of the nature of ofence\n\n whenever a juvenile applies for bail he should be released on\n\n bail. The learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of\n\n Jaleshwar Barman @ Dadu Vs. State of Chhattisgarh\n\n (CRR No.963/2016) andShrawan Bhagat Vs. State of\n\n Chhattisgarh (CRR No.67/2014) aggregatively discussed\n\n onSection 12and it is held that use of word "shall" by the\n\n legislative provisions inSection 12of the Act is of great\n\n signifcance and which raises a presumption that the\n\n particular provision is imperative and makes it manifest that\n\n ordinarily the board is under obligation to release the juvenile\n\n on bail with or without surety, but the juvenile shall not be soPage 4 of 4released in certain circumstances as latter part of the Section\n\n also uses the word "shall" imposing certain mandatory\n\n conditions prohibiting the release of the Juvenile by the\n\n Board. This court vide its order dated 18-1-2022 has called\n\n for the case diary as well as the status report from the\n\n concerned Probation Officer, Government Rehabilitation\n\n Centre, Camp Mana, Raipur and in pursuance of the said\n\n direction, a report has been submitted which does not\n\n indicate that there is a chance of in contact with the persons\n\n having criminal antecedents. The status report further shows\n\n that the general condition of the family of the\n\n applicant/juvenile is normal, he is a school going student and\n\n there is no adverse report against him.6. On perusal of the record, I do not fnd any reasonable ground\n\n having been brought before the Juvenile Justice Board or the\n\n Police Authorities in respect of the so called threat of the\n\n juvenile getting exposed to moral, physical or psychological\n\n danger or come in the company of known criminal.7. In view of the aforesaid consideration, the impugned order\n\n dated 4-1-2022 could not be sustained and is therefore, set\n\n aside. The application underSection 12of the Act of 2015 is\n\n allowed. The applicant shall be released on bail forthwith on\n\n furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 25,000/-, by the\n\n parents or guardians of the applicant, as the case may be, to\n\n the satisfaction of the Juvenile Justice Board for his\n\n appearance before the Board, as and when directed.8. The revision is accordingly allowed . Sd/-(Narendra Kumar Vyas)\n Judge\nRaju

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High Court of MeghalayaShri. Living Dkhar vs . State Of Meghalaya & Anr. on 31 July, 2023Author:W. DiengdohBench:W. DiengdohSerial No. 01\nSupplementary List\n\n\n\n HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA\n AT SHILLONG\n\nAB No. 14 of 2023\n Date of Order: 31.07.2023\nShri. Living Dkhar Vs. State of Meghalaya & Anr.\n\nCoram:\n Hon'ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge\n\nAppearance:\nFor the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. J. Shylla, Adv.\n Mr. M.L. Nongpiur, Adv.\nFor the Respondent(s) : Mr. N.D. Chullai, AAG withMr. E.R. Chyne, GA (For R 1)i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No\n Law journals etc.:ii) Whether approved for publication\n in press: Yes/No\n\n\n Heard Mr. J. Shylla, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr.\nN.D. Chullai, learned AAG.The petitioner has approached this Court with an application underSection 438Cr.P.C praying for grant of pre-arrest bail in connection with\nKhliehriat P.S. Case No. 09(03) 2023 undersection 366IPC read withsections 3(a)/4/5(l)/6of the POCSO Act.Before the learned counsel for the petitioner could go on to the merits\nof the case, this Court has notice certain discrepancies in the petition1inasmuch as the name of the alleged minor/survivor has been indicated in the\npetition which is not in conformity with the observations made by the Hon'ble\nSupreme Court in cases where minors are involved. To this extent, the learned\ncounsel has submitted that he may be allowed to make necessary corrections.It is also submitted that since the complainant has been arrayed as\nrespondent No. 2 in this petition, therefore, notice may be allowed to be issued\nupon the said respondent.Finally, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the\nmeantime, the petitioner may be allowed to be enlarged on interim bail\npending final disposal of this petition.The learned AAG has strongly opposed the prayer for grant of interim\nbail on the ground that in the petition itself at para 2 it is clearly stated that the\npetitioner is already a married person and as such, could not have been\ninvolved in a love relationship with the alleged survivor.In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that it is an\nallegation of the complainant and it is not the admitted position as far as the\npetitioner is concerned.This Court on consideration of the submission made, without going into\nthe merits of the matter, would allow the prayer made by the petitioner for\ncorrection of the petition and also for issue of notice upon the respondent No.2.\n As far as the prayer for interim bail, at this point of time this Court, for\nends of justice, would allow the prayer made. The petitioner is accordingly\ngranted interim bail on conditions that he shall not abscond or have any\ncontacts or even intimidate the survivor or witnesses and that he shall\ncooperate with the I/O as and when required. The interim bail will be for a\nperiod till the next date fixed or until further order.2Mr. Chullai has submitted that he may be allowed to file copy of the\ncase diary along with the status report.Allowed.List this matter on 10.08.2023.Judge\n\nMeghalaya\n31.07.2023\n"Tiprilynti-PS"3

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Central Information CommissionS. Zakir Hussain vs Chief Commissioner Of Income Tax (Cca), ... on 16 September, 2021Author:Neeraj Kumar GuptaBench:Neeraj Kumar Guptaके ीय सूचना आयोग\n Central Information Commission\n बाबा गंगनाथ माग,मुिनरका\n Baba Gangnath Marg, Munirka\n नई द ली, New Delhi - 110067\n\nि तीय अपील सं या/Second Appeal No. CIC/CCACH/A/2020/103761\n\nMr. S. Zakir Hussain ... अपीलकता/Appellant\n VERSUS\n बनाम\nCPIO ... ितवादी /Respondent\nO/o. the Income Tax Officer, Non-\nCorporate Ward No. 6(5) Income\nTax Department, Room No. 214,\n2nd Floor, Wanaparthy Block No.\n121, MG Road, Chennai-600034\n\nRelevant dates emerging from the appeal:-\n\nRTI : 28-08-2019 FA : 06-10-2019 SA : 22-01-2020\n\nCPIO : 27-09-2019 FAO : 06-11-2019 Hearing : 14-09-2021\n\n ORDER1. The appellant filed an application under theRight to Information Act,\n2005(RTI Act) before the Central Public Information Officer (CPIO) O/o. The\nIncome Tax Officer, Non-Corporate Ward No. 6(5), MG Road, Chennai. The\nappellant seeking information on five points, including inter-alia as under:-"1. Whether any audit objections were raised in connection with the\n assessment of the assesse for the assessment year 2010-11? lf so,\n what are those audit objections?2. Copy" of the correspondences by the Audit party with the\n Assessing Officer / Principal Chief Commissioner/ Principal\n Commissioner/Chief Commissioner / Commissioner of income\n Tax and vice-versa, in connection with the assessee's assessment\n for the assessment year 2010". etc.2. As the CPIO denied the information sought undersection 8(1)(e)of the\nRTI Act, 2005, the appellant filed the first appeal dated 06-10-2019 requesting\nthat the information should be provided to him. The first appellate authority\ndisposed of the appeal vide ordered dated 06-11-2019. Thereafter the appellantPage 1 of 4filed a second appeal u/Section 19(3)of the RTI Act before the Commission on\nthe ground that information has not been provided to him and requested the\nCommission to direct the respondent to provide complete and correct\ninformation.Hearing:3. The appellant attended the hearing through audio-call. The respondent,\nShri R. Balaji Vishwanath, ITO/ CPIO attended the hearing through audio-call.4. The respondent submitted their written submissions dated 09.09.2021 and\nthe same has been taken on record.5. The appellant submitted that complete and correct information has not\nbeen provided to him by the respondent on his RTI application dated\n28.08.2019. He further submitted that denying of such information, documents\nof which can be submitted by the respondent in the parliament but not to the\ncitizens is against the spirit of theRTI Act, 2005.6. The respondent submitted that vide their letter dated 27.09.2019, they\nhave denied the information to the appellant underSection 8(1)(e)of the RTI\nAct. The FAA vide its order dated 06.11.2019 has also upheld the reply\nfurnished by the CPIO. The respondent further submitted that a similar matter\nhas already been heard by the Commission vide second appeal no.\nCIC/CCACH/A/2018/126848-BJ, dated 15.11.2019, wherein the Commission\ndeclined to intervene in the matter on the grounds that the matter is subjudice\nbefore the Hon'ble High Court of Madras. Furthermore it is submitted that the\ninformation sought by the appellant pertains to the internal process of the\ndepartment and hence cannot be furnished. Upon being queried by the\nCommission whether the Hon'ble High Court of Madras has given any stay\norder with regards to non- furnishing of the information sought by the appellant.\nthe respondent replied in Negative.Decision:7. The Commission, after hearing the submissions of both the parties and\nafter perusal of records, observes that upon the bare reading of the judgment as\nreferred by the respondent vide second appeal no.CIC/CCACH/A/2018/126848-\nBJ, dated 15.11.2019, it is clear that the said decision deals with the RTI\napplication dated 12.02.2018 only, wherein the appellant has sought the date\nwhen the audit section had communicated to the assessing officer/ income tax\nofficer reference of his assessment and issues related thereto. The respondent\nmade a combined submissions in the matter which was reproduced as it is and\nwas not factored upon by the Commission in the order. The Commission alsoPage 2 of 4observes that since no stay order has been passed by the Hon'ble High Court of\nMadras in this regard as stated by the respondent, the Commission is required to\nadjudicate upon the same as per the provisions of theRTI Act, 2005.8. With regards to query no. 01 & 02 of the RTI application, the\nCommission observes that the query pertains to the internal audit report of the\npublic authority for their own interpretation and reliance and hence is a report of\nfiduciary capacity that cannot be disclosed under Section. 8(1)(e) of theRTI\nAct, subjected to the decision passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Madras if\nthe matter is still pending litigation before the same as claimed by the\nrespondent.9. Insofar as query no. 03 to 05 of the RTI application is concerned the\nCommission observes that the correspondence between the Principal Chief\nCommissioner and the Assessing Officer regarding the reopening of the case of\nthe appellant is directly related to the act of the public authority on assessment\nof the appellant's own income and should be shared with him in the interest of\ntransparency and fair functioning of the assessment wing. Therefore, the\nCommission directs the respondent to furnish the information sought by the\nappellant on query no. 03 to 05 of the RTI application upon charging the\nrequisite fees as per the Rule 4 of the Right to Information Rules, 2012, within a\nperiod of 30 days from the date of receipt of this order under the intimation to\nthe Commission.10. The Commission also instructs the Respondent Public Authority to\nconvene periodic conferences/seminars to sensitize, familiarize and educate the\nconcerned officials about the relevant provisions of theRTI Act, 2005for\neffective discharge of its duties and responsibilities.11. With the above observations, the appeal is disposed of.12. Copy of the decision be provided free of cost to the parties.नीरज कु मार गु ा)\n Neeraj Kumar Gupta (नीरज ा\n सूचना आयु )\n Information Commissioner (सू\n\n दनांक / Date : 14-09-2021Page 3 of 4Authenticated true copy\n(अिभ मािणत स यािपत ित)\n\nS. C. Sharma (एस. सी. शमा),\nDy. Registrar (उप-पंजीयक),\n(011-26105682)\n\nAddresses of the parties:\n\n\n1. CPIO\n O/o. the Income Tax Officer,\n Non-Corporate Ward No. 6(5)\n Income Tax Department, Room No. 214,\n 2nd Floor, Wanaparthy Block No. 121,\n MG Road, Chennai-600034\n\n2. Mr. S. Zakir Hussain\n AdvocatePage 4 of 4

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Rajasthan High CourtAslam S/O Shri Rati Mohammed @ Kala vs State Of Rajasthan on 9 April, 2021Author:Mahendar Kumar GoyalBench:Mahendar Kumar GoyalHIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN\n BENCH AT JAIPUR\n\n S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 5565/2021\n\n1. Aslam S/o Shri Rati Mohammed @ Kala, Aged About 28\n Years,\n2. Shahrukh S/o Shri Rati Mohammed @ Kala, Aged About\n 24 Years,\n Both are R/o Chikani PS Sadar Distt. Alwar (Presently At\n Sub Jail Kishangarhbas)\n ----Accused/Petitioners\n Versus\nState Of Rajasthan, Through PP\n ----RespondentFor Petitioner(s) : Mr. Inder Raj Saini with\n Mr. Nikhil Saini\nFor Respondent(s) : Mr. Pankaj Agarwal, PP\n Mr. Aditya Karan Mathur\n\n\n\n HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL\n\n Order\n\n09/04/2021\n The present bail application has been filed under Section 439\n\nCr.P.C. The petitioners have been arrested in connection with FIR\n\nNo.486/2020 registered at Police Station Khairthal (Police District\n\nBhiwadi), District Alwar for the offence(s) under Section(s) 498-A,\n\n406, 323 & 307 of IPC and later on for the offence under Sections\n\n498-A, 406 & 323 of I.P.C.Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that they have\n\nfalsely been implicated in this case wherein the injured Smt.\n\nTasleema has jumped into a dry well on her own. He submitted\n\nthat even the Investigating Agency has, after investigation, did\n\nnot find the allegation of throwing Smt. Tasleema into the well to(Downloaded on 15/04/2021 at 08:44:19 PM)(2 of 3) [CRLMB-5565/2021]\n\n\nbe true. Learned counsel submitted that all the independent\n\nwitnesses including the witnesses who have taken her out of the\n\nwell, have stated in their statements recorded underSection 161CrPC that at the time of taking her out of the well, she was\n\nconscious and did not level any allegation against any person of\n\nthrowing her in the well. He submitted that the petitioners are in\n\ncustody since 23.02.2021, investigation as against them is\n\ncomplete, trial of the case will take time, they have no criminal\n\nantecedents and prayed for their release on bail.Learned Public Prosecutor assisted by learned counsel for the\n\ncomplainant opposing the prayer submitted that Smt. Tasleema\n\nwas thrown into the well by the petitioners after mercilessly\n\nbeating her when her family members failed to meet demand of\n\ndowry. They submitted that Smt. Tasleema has received injury in\n\nher backbone resulting into paralysis. They submitted that looking\n\nto the gravity of allegation against the petitioners, they do not\n\ndeserve indulgence of bail.Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the\n\nrecord.All the independent witnesses such as Asid, Rajkumar and\n\nSuresh including the witnesses namely Israel and Shrichand who\n\nhave taken Smt. Tasleema out of the well, have categorically\n\nstated that at the time of taking her out, she was conscious and\n\ndid not level any allegation against any person including the\n\npetitioners of throwing her forcibly in the well. The record also\n\nreveals that the petitioners have taken the injured to the hospital\n\nimmediately thereafter and the present FIR has been lodged after\n\nsix days from the date of incident. As per the medical opinion(Downloaded on 15/04/2021 at 08:44:19 PM)(3 of 3) [CRLMB-5565/2021]\n\n\n available on record, the injury could cause paralysis; but, there is\n\n no evidence on record to suggest that Smt. Tasleema is suffering\n\n from paralysis on account of injuries suffered by her. Rather, in her\n\n statement recorded under Setion 161CrPCon 01.12.2020 and\n\n supplementary statement dated 05.04.2021, Smt. Tasleema has\n\n not stated that she is suffering from paralysis on account of\n\n injuries.In view thereof and taking into consideration the submissions\n\n advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners, their length of\n\n custody and absence of criminal antecedents; but, without\n\n expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, this Court\n\n deems it just and proper to enlarge the petitioners on bail.Accordingly, the bail application is allowed and it is directed\n\n that accused-petitioners 1. Aslam S/o Shri Rati Mohammed @\n\n Kala & 2. Shahrukh S/o Shri Rati Mohammed @ Kala shall\n\n be released on bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C. in connection with\n\n afore-mentioned FIR registered at concerned Police Station,\n\n provided each of them shall furnish a personal bond in the sum of\n\n Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lac only) together with two sureties in\n\n the sum of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) each to the\n\n satisfaction of the trial Court with the stipulation that they shall\n\n comply with all the conditions laid down under Section 437(3)\n\n Cr.P.C.(MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL),J\n\n PRAGATI/128(Downloaded on 15/04/2021 at 08:44:19 PM)Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

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Take notes as you read a judgment using our Virtual Legal Assistant and get email alerts whenever a new judgment matches your query (Query Alert Service). Try out our Premium Member services -- Free for one month.\n\nCalcutta High Court (Appellete Side)\nSignet Media Services Pvt. Ltd. & ... vs Unknown on 6 December, 2022 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA\n06-12-2022 Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction\n Subha\nItem no.23 CRR 776 of 2021\n Ct no.34\n\n In the matter of : Signet Media Services Pvt. Ltd. & ors. .....petitioners.\n\n\n In Re : An application under Section 401 read with Section 397 of the\n Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n\n Mr. Subhabrata Datta\n Ms. Debjani Roy Choudhuri\n Mr. Aranya Saha\n ......for the petitioners.\n\n Mr. Sandipan Ganguly, Sr. Advocate\n Mr. Dipanjan Dutt\n Mr. Tanmoy Roy\n ....for the opposite party.\n\n\n The present revisional application has been preferred\n\n challenging the order dated February 21, 2017 passed by the learned\n\n Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta as also the subsequent orders\n\n passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 15th Court, Calcutta in\n\n connection with Complaint Case No. 17228 of 2017 under Sections\n\n 138 read with Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.\n\n Mr. Dutta, learned advocate appearing for the petitioners\n\n submits that the present case was initiated in utter disregard of the\n\n provisions of law. To that effect, learned advocate submits that the\n\n constituted attorney who filed the complaint on behalf of M/s. Asha\n\n Communication was not empowered to continue with the case in view\n\n of the fact that the proprietress of M/s. Asha Communication namely,\n\n Smt. Mahua Lahiri expired during the pendency of the proceedings.\n 2\n\n\n\n\n Learned advocate submits that the factum of death of the\n\nproprietress was not informed to the court and orders were passed by\n\nthe learned Metropolitan Magistrate in respect of the issuance of\n\nsummons/warrant of arrest and there was a progress in the\n\nproceedings before the learned trial court.\n\n Learned advocate submits that because of the warrant of\n\narrest, one of the accused was arrested and was detained for a night\n\nand subsequently he was produced before the court.\n\n Additionally, it has been submitted that if the allegations\n\nmade in the petition of complaint is accepted in its entirety, the same\n\nalso do not make out a case for the petitioners to face trial in a court of\n\nlaw.\n\n Mr. Ganguly, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of\n\nthe complainant submitted that at the relevant time when the\n\ncomplaint was filed before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,\n\nCalcutta, the proprietress, Mahua Lahiri was alive.\n\n It is a fact that during the pendency of the proceedings, she\n\nhas expired. It has been stressed that mere death of the complainant\n\ndo not automatically terminate the proceedings.\n\n To that effect, learned advocate has drawn the attention of this\n\ncourt to the provisions of Section 256 of the Code of Criminal\n\nProcedure as well as Section 302 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\n Learned advocate has relied upon the judgement of the\n\nHon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jimmy Jahangir Madan -Vs. -\n\nBolly Cariyappa Hindley (Dead) By LRs. Reported in (2004) 12 SCC\n\n509; Chand Devi Daga & Ors. -Vs.- Manju K. Humatani & Ors.\n 3\n\n\n\n\nReported in (2018) 1 SCC 71 and Balasaheb K. Thackeray & Anr. -vs-\n\nVenkat alias Babru, S/o Wamanrao reported in (2006) 5 SCC 530.\n\n Both the learned advocates relied on paragraph 13 of\n\nChand Devi Daga & Anr. (supra) which is set out as follows:-\n\n "13. This Court had the occasion to consider Sections 256 and\n 302 in Balasaheb K. Thackeray v. Venkat [Balasaheb K.\n Thackeray v. Venkat, (2006) 5 SCC 530 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 630]\n . In the above case complaint was filed under Section 500 read\n with Section 34 IPC. A petition was filed under Section 482 of the\n 1973 Code against the order of issue of process in the High Court\n which was dismissed. SLP was filed in this Court in which notice\n was issued [Balasaheb K. Thackeray v. Venkat, SLP (Cri) No.\n 4367 of 2003, order dated 31-10-2003 (SC), wherein it was\n directed:"Issue notice. Mr Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, learned\n counsel takes notice on behalf of Respondent 1 and seeks two\n weeks' time for filing counter-affidavit. Time prayed for is\n granted. One week's time thereafter is granted for rejoinder-\n affidavit. Stay of further proceedings."] and during the pendency\n of the appeal it was noted that the complainant had died. It was\n contended that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that the\n complainant is dead. This Court in the above context referred to\n Sections 256 and 302. This Court repelled the argument of the\n appellant that complaint be dismissed on the ground that\n complainant had died. Following was held in paras 3 to 6: (SCC\n pp. 531-32)\n "3. The learned counsel for the appellants with reference to\n Section 256 of the Code submitted that the complaint was to be\n dismissed on the ground of the death of the complainant. As\n noted above the learned counsel for Respondent 1's legal heirs\n submitted that the legal heirs of the complainant shall file an\n application for permission to prosecute and, therefore, the\n complaint still survives consideration.\n 4. At this juncture it is relevant to take note of what has been\n 4\n\n\n\n\nstated by this Court earlier on the principles applicable.\nIn Ashwin Nanubhai Vyas v. State of Maharashtra [Ashwin\nNanubhai Vyas v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 983 : 1967\nCri LJ 943] with reference to Section 495 of the Code of Criminal\nProcedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as "the old Code") it was\nheld that the Magistrate had the power to permit a relative to act\nas the complainant to continue the prosecution. In Jimmy\nJahangir Madan v. Bolly Cariyappa Hindley [Jimmy Jahangir\nMadan v. Bolly Cariyappa Hindley, (2004) 12 SCC 509 : 2004\nSCC (Cri) Supp 317] after referring to Ashwin case [Ashwin\nNanubhai Vyas v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 983 : 1967\nCri LJ 943] it was held that heir of the complainant can be\nallowed to file a petition under Section 302 of the Code to\ncontinue the prosecution.\n5. Section 302 of the Code reads as under:\n'302. Permission to conduct prosecution.--(1) Any Magistrate\ninquiring into or trying a case may permit the prosecution to be\nconducted by any person other than a police officer below the\nrank of Inspector; but no person, other than the Advocate General\nor Government Advocate or a Public Prosecutor or Assistant\nPublic Prosecutor, shall be entitled to do so without such\npermission:\nProvided that no police officer shall be permitted to conduct the\nprosecution if he has taken part in the investigation into the\noffence with respect to which the accused is being prosecuted.\n(2) Any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally\nor by a pleader.'\n6. To bring in application of Section 302 of the Code, permission\nto conduct the prosecution has to be obtained from the Magistrate\ninquiring into or trying a case. The Magistrate is empowered to\npermit the prosecution to be conducted by any person other than\na police officer below the rank of Inspector; but no person other\nthan the Advocate General or the Government Advocate or a\nPublic Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor shall be entitled\n 5\n\n\n\n\n to do so without such permission."\n\n While the learned advocate for the complainant/opposite party\n\nemphasized that the substitution in a complaint case is possible, the\n\nlearned advocate for the petitioners on the other hand contradicted\n\nsuch submission and stressed that the issue is not whether the\n\naccused company/complainant cannot be substituted but the issue\n\nremains as to whether the same being not informed to the trial court\n\nand obtaining orders are justified in the circumstances when there is\n\nno complainant in this case.\n\n I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned\n\nAdvocate for the petitioners and assessed the records of the case. From\n\nthe records it transpires that till date the stage of examination under\n\nSection 251 of the Cr.P.C. has not been reached. The complainant\n\nMahua Lahiri was alive when the cognizance of the offence was taken\n\nand the learned Magistrate was pleased to issue process/summons\n\nagainst the accused persons. Once the learned Magistrate was pleased\n\nto issue summons in respect of the accused persons the rest of the\n\nproceedings were restricted between the Court and the accused\n\npersons as it was duty of the Court to compel the appearance of an\n\naccused to appear before the Court of law.\n\n On a consideration of the issue involved, I am of the opinion\n\nthat the basic foundation is the definition of the complaint under\n\nSection 2(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in cases under the\n\nNegotiable Instruments Act, it is the holder in due course of the\n\ncheque who has got the right to file the case.\n\n The settled principles of law empowers the complainant to\n 6\n\n\n\n\nfile a substitution petition at any stage of the case.\n\n Accordingly on this issue the proceedings cannot be quashed.\n\n So far as the other issues are concerned, relating to the\n\nprovisions of Section 141 of the N. I. Act., records reflect that the\n\nallegations are that the petitioner nos. 2 & 3 happen to be the\n\nauthorized signatories and Director of the accused company.\n\n There is nothing on record to show that the accused no. 3 was\n\nnot a director at the relevant period of time or an authorized signatory\n\nof the accused company.\n\n The learned advocate for the petitioners relied upon the\n\njudgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relating to vicarious liability\n\nas settled in Sabitha Ramamurthy and another vs .R.B.S\n\nChannabasavaradhya reported in (2006) 10 Supreme Court Cases 581\n\nand Mannalal Chamaria & Anr.- vs. State of West Bengal & anr.\n\nReported in (2014) 13 Supreme Court Cases 751.\n\n In the petition of complaint in paragraph 2 it has been\n\naverred that the accused nos. 2 and 3 are the authorized signatories,\n\ndirectors of the accused no. 1 and are running their business at 104,\n\nBidhannagar Road, Kolkata - 700067 along with other allegations.\n\n This particular allegation/averment made in the petition of\n\ncomplaint distinguishes the distinctive role, which the accused nos. 2\n\nand 3 are supposed to exercise, being Director of the company. As\n\nsuch, the allegations do suffice the necessary requirements for\n\nproceeding in a case under Sections 138 and 141 of the N. I. Act.\n\n Having regard to the observations made above, I am of the\n\nopinion that there is no scope for interference in respect of the\n 7\n\n\n\n\nproceedings pending against the petitioners.\n\n The contentions so advanced relate to question of facts\n\nparticularly with respect to the Directors who in course of the trial\n\nwould by adducing evidence or by way of cross-examination would\n\nprove their innocence so far as their vicarious liability under Section\n\n141 of the N. I. Act is concerned.\n\n With the aforesaid observations, the present revisional\n\napplication being CRR 776 of 2021 is disposed of\n\n Pending applications, if any, are consequently disposed of.\n\n All concerned parties are to act in terms of a copy of this order duly\n\ndownloaded from the official website of this court.\n\n\n\n [Tirthankar Ghosh, J]