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0 | Analyze the following opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS): 503 U.S. 257
112 S.Ct. 1151
117 L.Ed.2d 400
PFZ PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioner,v.Rene Alberto RODRIGUEZ, et al.
No. 91-122.
March 9, 1992.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Case below, 928 F.2d 28.
PER CURIAM.
1
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
What is the issue area that the opinion pertains to? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
1 | In the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS) opinion: 112 S.Ct. 1845
504 U.S. 188
119 L.Ed.2d 1
Roger Keith COLEMANv.Charles E. THOMPSON, Warden, et al.
No. A-877 (91-8336).
May 20, 1992.
PER CURIAM.
1
As the District Court below observed, this is now the twelfth round of judicial review in a murder case which began eleven years ago. Yet despite having had eleven years to produce exculpatory evidence, Coleman has produced what, in the words of the District Court, does not even amount to a "colorable claim of innocence." District Court opinion at 19. We are hardly well-positioned to second guess the District Court's factual conclusion—we certainly have no basis for concluding that Coleman has produced "substantial evidence that he may be innocent." Post, at 189 (emphasis added). Indeed, a good deal of Coleman's effort in this latest round is devoted to an attempt to undermine an expert's genetic analysis that further implicated him in the crime—an analysis conducted after trial at Coleman's request under the supervision of the Commonwealth's courts.
2
Contrary to the dissent's characterization, Coleman's claim is far from "substantially identical" to that of Leonel Herrera, see Herrera v. Collins, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1074, 117 L.Ed.2d 279 (cert. granted, Feb. 19, 1992). In Herrera the District Court concluded that the evidence of innocence warranted further inquiry. See 954 F.2d 1029 (CA5 1992). Here, in contrast, the District Court reviewed Coleman's claim of innocence and rejected it on the merits.
3
The application for stay of execution presented to the Chief Justice and by him referred to the full Court is denied.
4
It is so ordered.
5
Justice STEVENS concurs in the denial of a stay and would deny the petition for writ of certiorari.
6
Justice BLACKMUN, dissenting.
7
Last Term the Court ruled that Roger Coleman could not present his arguments on the merits to the federal courts, simply because the person then acting as his attorney had made a trivial error in filing his notice of appeal three days late. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). While I dissented from that ruling—and still believe it was erroneous—I found some consolation in the Court's suggestion that matters might have been different had Coleman argued that he was actually innocent of the crime. See id., at 501 U.S., at ---- - ----, ----, 111 S.Ct., at ---- - ----, ----.
8
Coleman has now produced substantial evidence that he may be innocent of the crime for which he was sentenced to die. Yet the Court once again turns him away, this time permitting the Commonwealth of Virginia to execute him without a hearing at which his evidence could be fully presented. The Court's ruling is all the more troubling for me, in view of this Court's decision to hear argument next Term in a case in which the petitioner contends, just as Coleman does, that evidence of his innocence entitles him to a hearing on the merits. Herrera v. Collins, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1074, 117 L.Ed.2d 279 (1992).
9
I have previously voted to stay an execution pending this Court's decision next Term in Herrera. See Ellis v. Texas, 503 U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1285, 117 L.Ed.2d 509 (1992); Ellis v. Collins, 503 U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1285, 117 L.Ed.2d 510 (1992). I cannot believe that Coleman, who raises a substantially identical claim, should be denied all possibility of relief simply because his petition reached this Court later than did Leonel Herrera's. Accordingly, I would stay the execution.
10
Justice SOUTER would grant the application for stay of execution.
What is the issue area being addressed in the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 0 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Criminal Procedure |
2 | Given the following opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"505 U.S. 830
112 S.Ct. 2709
120 L.Ed.2d 669
Walter LEE, Superintendent of Port Authority Police, Petitioner,v.INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS, INC., et al.
No. 91-339.
June 26, 1992.
PER CURIAM.
1
For the reasons expressed in the opinions of Justice O'CONNOR, Justice KENNEDY, and Justice SOUTER, see post, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2711, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in No. 91-155 and concurring in judgment in No. 91-339), post, 112 S.Ct., at 2711 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment), and post, 112 S.Ct., at 2715 (SOUTER, J., concurring in judgment in No. 91-339 and dissenting in No. 91-155), the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that the ban on distribution of literature in the Port Authority airport terminals is invalid under the First Amendment is
2
Affirmed.
3
Chief Justice REHNQUIST, with whom Justice WHITE, Justice SCALIA and Justice THOMAS join, dissenting.
4
Leafletting presents risks of congestion similar to those posed by solicitation. It presents, in addition, some risks unique to leafletting. And of course, as with solicitation, these risks must be evaluated against a backdrop of the substantial congestion problem facing the Port Authority and with an eye to the cumulative impact that will result if all groups are permitted terminal access. Viewed in this light, I conclude that the distribution ban, no less than the solicitation ban, is reasonable. I therefore dissent from the Court's holding striking the distribution ban.
5
I will not trouble to repeat in detail all that has been stated in No. 91-155, International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2701, --- L.Ed.2d ----, describing the risks and burdens flowing to travelers and the Port Authority from permitting solicitation in airport terminals. Suffice it to say that the risks and burdens posed by leafletting are quite similar to those posed by solicitation. The weary, harried, or hurried traveler may have no less desire and need to avoid the delays generated by having literature foisted upon him than he does to avoid delays from a financial solicitation. And while a busy passenger perhaps may succeed in fending off a leafletter with minimal disruption to himself by agreeing simply to take the proffered material, this does not completely ameliorate the dangers of congestion flowing from such leafletting. Others may choose not simply to accept the material but also to stop and engage the leafletter in debate, obstructing those who follow. Moreover, those who accept material may often simply drop it on the floor once out of the leafletter's range, creating an eyesore, a safety hazard, and additional clean-up work for airport staff. See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 816-817, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2134-2135, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) (aesthetic interests may provide basis for restricting speech); Sloane Supplemental Affidavit ¶ 10, App. 514 (noting increased maintenance problems that result from solicitation and distribution).
6
In addition, a differential ban that permits leafletting but prohibits solicitation, while giving the impression of permitting the Port Authority at least half of what it seeks, may in fact prove for the Port Authority to be a much more Pyrrhic victory. Under the regime that is today sustained, the Port Authority is obliged to permit leafletting. But monitoring leafletting activity in order to ensure that it is only leafletting that occurs, and not also soliciting, may prove little less burdensome than the monitoring that would be required if solicitation were permitted. At a minimum, therefore, I think it remains open whether at some future date the Port Authority may be able to reimpose a complete ban, having developed evidence that enforcement of a differential ban is overly burdensome. Until now it has had no reason or means to do this, since it is only today that such a requirement has been announced.
7
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons stated in the opinion in No. 91-155, 112 S.Ct. 2701, I respectfully dissent.
"
The relevant issue area is: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 2 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | First Amendment |
3 | Based on the provided opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS): 507 U.S. 290
113 S.Ct. 1231
122 L.Ed.2d 636
John Robert DEMOS, Jr.v.Michael C. STORRIE et al.
No. 92-6846.
March 8, 1993.
PER CURIAM.
1
Pro se petitioner John R. Demos, Jr. has made 48 in forma pauperis filings in this Court since the beginning of the October 1988 Term, many of which challenged sanctions imposed by lower courts for frivolous filings. Almost two years ago, we prospectively denied Demos leave to proceed in forma pauperis "in all future petitions for extraordinary relief." In re Demos, 500 U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 1569, 1570, 114 L.Ed.2d 20 (1991) (per curiam ). At that time, we said that Demos "remains free under the present order to file in forma pauperis requests for relief other than an extraordinary writ, if he qualifies under this Court's Rule 39 and does not similarly abuse that privilege." Ibid.
2
Since then, Demos has filed 14 petitions for certiorari. We denied the first seven petitions outright, and denied Demos leave to proceed in forma pauperis under our Rule 39.8 as to the following six. Today, we invoke Rule 39.8 again with respect to the instant petition. Demos is allowed until March 29, 1993, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit the petition in compliance with this Court's Rule 33. Because Demos has refused to heed our prior warning, we further direct the Clerk to reject all future petitions for certiorari from Demos in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33. See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 397, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (per curiam ). Demos' continued course of abusive filings plainly warrants this sanction.
3
It is so ordered.
4
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BLACKMUN joins, dissenting.
5
In my opinion, the administration of special procedures for disposing of repetitive and frivolous petitions is less efficient than our past practice of simply denying such petitions.* I continue to adhere to my previously stated views on this issue, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 397, 398, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 355, 357, 116 L.Ed.2d 293 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting), and would deny certiorari rather than invoking Rule 39 in this case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
*
The next issue the Court will confront in developing its Rule 39.8 jurisprudence, for instance, is whether to apply orders like today's retroactively, to petitions pending on the date they are issued.
Determine the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 1 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Civil Rights |
4 | Based on the provided opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS): 510 U.S. 1
DAYv.DAY
No. 92-8788.
Supreme Court of United States.
Decided October 12, 1993.*
Since this Court's Rule 39.8 was first invoked in June 1993 to deny pro se petitioner Day in forma pauperis status, he has filed eight more petitions for certiorari, all of them demonstrably frivolous.
Held: Day is denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the instant cases, and the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from him in noncriminal matters unless he pays the required docketing fee and submits his petition in compliance with this Court's Rule 33. This order will free the Court's limited resources to consider the claims of those petitioners who, unlike Day, have not abused the certiorari process.
Motions denied.
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PER CURIAM.
1
Pro se petitioner Roy A. Day requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request pursuant to Rule 39.8. Day is allowed until November 2, 1993, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petitions in compliance with this Court's Rule 33. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Day in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.
2
Day is an abuser of this Court's certiorari process. We first invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Day in forma pauperis status last June. See In re Day, 509 U. S. 902 (1993). At that time he had filed 27 petitions in the past nine years. Although Day was granted in forma pauperis status to file these petitions, all were denied without recorded dissent. Since we first denied him in forma pauperis status last June, he has filed eight more petitions for certiorari with this Court—all of them demonstrably frivolous.
3
As we have recognized, "[e]very paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's limited resources. A part of the Court's responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice." In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180, 184 (1989) (per curiam). Consideration of Day's repetitious and frivolous petitions for certiorari does not promote this end.
4
We have entered orders similar to the present one on previous occasions to prevent pro se petitioners from filing repetitious and frivolous requests for certiorari, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992) (per curiam), and repetitious and frivolous requests for extraordinary relief. See In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177 (1991) (per curiam); In re McDonald, supra.
5
Day's refusal to heed our earlier warning requires us to take this step. His abuse of the writ of certiorari has been in noncriminal cases, and so we limit our sanction accordingly. The order therefore will not prevent Day from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. But it will free this Court's limited resources to consider the claims of those petitioners who have not abused our certiorari process.
6
It is so ordered.
Notes:
*
Together with No. 92-8792,Day v. Bekiempis, No. 92-8888, Day v. Heinrich et al., No. 92-8905, Day v. GAF Building Materials Corp., No. 92-8906, Day v. Clinton et al., No. 92-9018, Day v. Black et al., No. 92-9101, Day v. Deason et al., and No. 93-5430, Day v. Day, also on motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
Adhering to the views expressed in the dissenting opinions in Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U. S. 928, 931 (1983), In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180, 185 (1989), and Wrenn v. Benson, 490 U. S. 89, 92 (1989), I would deny these petitions for writs of certiorari without reaching the merits of the motions to proceed in forma pauperis. In the future, however, I shall not encumber the record by noting my dissent from similar orders denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis, absent exceptional circumstances.
Determine the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 1 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Civil Rights |
5 | Considering the following statement from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"510 U.S. 4
IN RE SASSOWER
No. 92-8933.
Supreme Court of United States.
Decided October 12, 1993.*
In the three years prior to this Term, pro se petitioner Sassower had filed 11 petitions. However, in the last four months, he has suddenly increased his filings and now has 10 petitions pending before this Court, all of them patently frivolous.
Held: Sassower is denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis in the instant cases, pursuant to this Court's Rule 39.8, and the Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions for certiorari nor any petitions for extraordinary writs from him in noncriminal matters, unless he pays the required docketing fee and submits his petition in compliance with this Court's Rule 33. For the important reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177, and In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180, the Court feels compelled to enter this order, which will allow the Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who, unlike Sassower, have not abused the Court's process.
Motions denied.
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PER CURIAM.
1
Pro se petitioner George Sassower requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request pursuant to Rule 39.8. Sassower is allowed until November 2, 1993, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petitions in compliance with this Court's Rule 33. For the reasons explained below, we also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari nor any petitions for extraordinary writs from Sassower in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.
2
Prior to this Term, Sassower had filed 11 petitions in this Court over the last three years. Although Sassower was granted in forma pauperis status to file these petitions, all were denied without recorded dissent.* During the last four months, Sassower has suddenly increased his filings. He currently has 10 petitions pending before this Court—all of them patently frivolous.
3
Although we have not previously denied Sassower in forma pauperis status pursuant to Rule 39.8, we think it appropriate to enter an order pursuant to Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992). In both In re Sindram, 498 U. S. 177 (1991) (per curiam), and In re McDonald, 489 U. S. 180 (1989) (per curiam), we entered orders similar to this one without having previously denied petitioners' motions to proceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39.8. For the important reasons discussed in Martin, Sindram, and McDonald, we feel compelled to enter the order today barring prospective filings from Sassower.
4
Sassower's abuse of the writ of certiorari and of the extraordinary writs has been in noncriminal cases, and so we limit our sanction accordingly. The order therefore will not prevent Sassower from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed on him. The order, however, will allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our process.
5
It is so ordered.
6
JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE GINSBURG took no part in the consideration or decision of the motion in No. 93-5252.
Notes:
*
Together with No. 92-8934,Sassower v. Mead Data Central Inc. et al., No. 92-9228, Sassower v. Crites et al., No. 93-5045, Sassower v. Kriendler & Relkin et al., No. 93-5127, Sassower v. Feltman et al., No. 93-5128, Sassower v. Puccini Clothes et al., No. 93-5129, Sassower v. A. R. Fuels, Inc., et al., No. 93-5252, Sassower v. Reno, No. 93-5358, Sassower v. Abrams, Attorney General of New York, and No. 93-5596, In re Sassower, also on motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
*
SeeSassower v. New York, 499 U. S. 966 (1991) (certiorari); In re Sassower, 499 U. S. 935 (1991) (mandamus/prohibition); In re Sassower, 499 U. S. 935 (1991) (mandamus/prohibition); Sassower v. Mahoney, 498 U. S. 1108 (1991); In re Sassower, 499 U. S. 904 (1991) (mandamus/prohibition); In re Sassower, 498 U. S. 1081 (1991) (habeas corpus); In re Sassower, 498 U. S. 1081 (1991) (mandamus/prohibition); Sassower v. United States Court of Appeals for D. C. Cir., 498 U. S. 1094 (1991) (certiorari); Sassower v. Brieant, 498 U. S. 1094 (1991) (certiorari); Sassower v. Thornburgh, 498 U. S. 1036 (1991) (certiorari); Sassower v. Dillon, 493 U. S. 979 (1989) (certiorari).
"
What is the central issue area addressed in the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 1 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Civil Rights |
6 | Considering the following statement from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"510 U.S. 42
CAVANAUGH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION, PAROLE, AND PARDON SERVICES, et al.v.ROLLER
No. 92-1510.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued November 8, 1993.
Decided November 30, 1993.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 984 F. 2d 120.
Carl N. Lundberg argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, and Edwin W. Evans, Chief Deputy Attorney General.
W. Gaston Fairey, by appointment of the Court, 509 U. S. 920, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
1
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
"
What is the central issue area addressed in the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
7 | Given the excerpt from a Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS) opinion:
"510 U.S. 124
TENNESSEEv.MIDDLEBROOKS
No. 92-989.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued November 1, 1993.
Decided December 13, 1993.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 840 S. W. 2d 317.
Charles W. Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Kathy Morante Principe.
David C. Stebbins, by appointment of the Court, 508 U. S. 937, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Paul R. Bottei and Lionel R. Barrett, Jr.*
PER CURIAM.
1
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
2
Justice Blackmun dissents.
Notes:
*
Briefs ofamici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette and Ward A. Campbell, Deputy Attorneys General, and Mark L. Krotoski, Special Assistant Attorney General, and by officials for their respective States as follows: James H. Evans, Attorney General of Alabama, Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, John M. Bailey, Chief State's Attorney of Connecticut, Charles M. Oberly III, Attorney General of Delaware, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General of Idaho, Pamela Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Chris Gorman, Attorney General of Kentucky, Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General of Montana, Don Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General of Nevada, Robert J. Del Tufo, Attorney General of New Jersey, Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Susan B. Loving, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General of Pennsylvania, T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Mark Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota, Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, and Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming; for the Appellate Committee of the California District Attorney's Association by Gil Garcetti and Harry B. Sondheim; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger.
"
Identify the pertinent issue area being discussed: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
8 | Based on the provided opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS): 510 U.S. 132
BURDENv.ZANT, WARDEN
No. 92-8836.
Supreme Court of United States.
Decided January 10, 1994.
The first time petitioner Burden's habeas petition was before this Court, his case was remanded so that his claim that his pretrial counsel's conflict of interest denied his right to effective assistance of counsel could be considered by the Court of Appeals "free from" that court's erroneous failure to credit a state-court finding that the key prosecution witness was granted immunity while represented by Burden's counsel. 498 U. S. 433. In rejecting his claim a second time, the Court of Appeals held that it did not have to presume the immunity finding's correctness because the state court had not adequately developed the finding. It reasoned that the state court's conclusion amounted to mere personal impression on an issue not subject to significant dispute at trial and stated that the District Court had found that the key witness had not been granted immunity.
Held: The Court of Appeals' decision was based on a manifest error. The District Court did not make the immunity finding as claimed by the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals overlooked evidence strongly supporting Burden's contention regarding an immunity deal. On remand, the Court of Appeals or, subject to its further order, the District Court must determine whether counsel's representation created an actual conflict of interest adversely affecting his performance.
Certiorari granted; 975 F. 2d 771, reversed and remanded.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
PER CURIAM.
1
In Burden v. Zant, 498 U. S. 433 (1991) (per curiam), we reversed a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which had upheld denial of habeas relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to conflict of interest. The case is before us again on a petition seeking review of the decision rendered on remand, 975 F. 2d 771 (1992), in which the Court of Appeals once again rejected Burden's claim that he had been deprived of the right to be represented by counsel free of conflict of interest.
2
In our earlier unanimous per curiam opinion, we held that the courts below had failed to accord the presumption of correctness apparently due a state-court determination bearing on the conflict claim (i. e., that Dixon, the key prosecution witness allegedly represented by Burden's pretrial counsel, "`was granted immunity from prosecution,'" 498 U. S., at 436). See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d). We directed the Court of Appeals on remand to evaluate Burden's conflict-of-interest claim "free from" the "erroneous failure to credit the state trial court's finding . . . ." 498 U. S., at 438.
3
In the decision now before us, the Eleventh Circuit majority first held that there was no need for a federal habeas court to presume the correctness of the immunity finding, because it had not been "adequately developed" in the state trial court proceeding. See 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(3). The majority reasoned that the trial court's conclusion, contained in an administrative report to the State Supreme Court, see Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-35(a) (1990), and not labeled a finding of fact or conclusion of law, amounted to the trial judge's mere personal "impression" on an issue not subject to significant dispute at trial. See 975 F. 2d, at 774-775. Declaring it "improper" to defer to the judge's "comment," id., at 775, the Court of Appeals explained that it would uphold its prior denial of relief on the basis of a District Court finding, said to be that "Dixon did not testify under a grant of transactional immunity or pursuant to a promise that the State would not prosecute him," ibid. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Anderson maintained that the District Court's order contained no such finding and that his colleagues had overlooked the record of evidence strongly supporting Burden's contention that some sort of immunity deal had, in fact, been struck.
4
Reviewing the record, we are convinced that Judge Anderson was correct, that the decision of the Court of Appeals was grounded on manifest mistake, and that reversal is warranted on that basis alone. We therefore grant the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse and remand for the Eleventh Circuit, or subject to its further order the District Court, to determine whether Mr. Kondritzer's representation created "an actual conflict of interest adversely affect[ing] [his] performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335, 350 (1980).
5
Reversed and remanded.
Determine the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 0 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Criminal Procedure |
9 | In the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS) opinion:
"511 U.S. 222114 S.Ct. 1472128 L.Ed.2d 165
BOCA GRANDE CLUB, INC., Petitionerv.FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, INC.
No. 93-180.
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Jan. 11, 1994.
Decided April 20, 1994.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
David F. Pope, Tampa, FL, for petitioner.
Stuart C. Markman, Tampa, FL, for respondent.
Ronald J. Mann, Washington, DC, for U.S. as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court.
Syllabus
*
Held: The judgment is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1461, --- L.Ed.2d ---- which adopts the proportionate share rule, under which actions for contribution against settling defendants are neither necessary nor permitted. P. 1472.
990 F.2d 606 (CA11 1993), vacated and remanded.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
1
We granted certiorari, 509 U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 39, 125 L.Ed.2d 788 (1993), to consider the question whether, in an action against several alleged joint tortfeasors under general maritime law, the plaintiff's settlement with one defendant bars a claim for contribution brought by nonsettling defendants against the settling defendant. Because the opinion that we announce today in McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1461, --- L.Ed.2d ---- adopts the proportionate share rule, under which actions for contribution against settling defendants are neither necessary nor permitted, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with that opinion.
2
It is so ordered.
*
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.
"
What is the relevant issue area of the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 7 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Economic Activity |
10 | Considering the following statement from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"513 U.S. 557115 S.Ct. 1059130 L.Ed.2d 1050
Eloise ANDERSON, Director, California Department of Social Services, et al., Petitioners,v.Deshawn GREEN, Debby Venturella and Diana P. Bertollt, etc.
No. 94-197.
Supreme Court of the United States
Feb. 22, 1995.
PER CURIAM.
1
Under Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC), 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., the Federal Government partially reimburses States for welfare programs that either comply with all federal prescriptions or receive a waiver from the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). 42 U.S.C. § 1315. California seeks to change its AFDC program by limiting new residents, for the first year they live in California, to the benefits paid in the State from which they came. See Cal.Welf. & Inst.Code Ann. § 11450.03 (West Supp.1994). Green and other new residents who receive AFDC benefits challenged the constitutionality of this California statute in a federal court action; they maintain that the payment differential between new and long-term residents burdens interstate migration and thus violates the right to travel recognized in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), and its progeny. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California enjoined the payment differential, Green v. Anderson, 811 F.Supp. 516, 523 (1993), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Green v. Anderson, 26 F.3d 95 (1994). We granted California's petition for certiorari. 513 U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 306, 130 L.Ed.2d 218 (1994). We now find, however, that no justiciable controversy is before us, because the case in its current posture is not ripe.
2
The California statute provides that the payment differential shall not take effect absent receipt by the State of an HHS waiver. See Cal.Welf. & Inst.Code Ann. § 11450.03(b) (West Supp.1994). HHS originally granted a waiver, which was in effect when the District Court and Court of Appeals ruled. But "ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing," and "it is the situation now rather than the situation at the time of the [decision under review] that must govern." Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140, 95 S.Ct. 335, 357, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974). After the Court of Appeals ruled in this case, it vacated the HHS waiver in a separate proceeding, concluding that the Secretary had not adequately considered objections to California's program. Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1073-1076 (CA9 1994). The Secretary did not seek this Court's review of the Beno decision. California acknowledges that even if it prevails here, the payment differential will not take effect. Tr. of Oral Arg. 3-6. Absent favorable action by HHS on a renewed application for a waiver, California will continue to treat Green and others similarly situated the same way it treats long-term California residents. The parties have no live dispute now, and whether one will arise in the future is conjectural. See Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 90 S.Ct. 200, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969) (per curiam ) (after this Court noted probable jurisdiction, Colorado legislature reduced to two months challenged six-month residency requirement for voting in presidential elections; revival of controversy consequently became too speculative to warrant Court's passing on substantive issues).
3
In view of the impediment to dispositive adjudication, we direct the vacation of prior judgments in this case. As we explained earlier this Term, in deciding whether to disturb prior judgments in a case rendered nonjusticiable, we have inquired, pivotally, "whether the party seeking relief from the judgment below caused the [nonjusticiability] by voluntary action." U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 386, 391, 130 L.Ed.2d 233 (1994). Unlike settlement, see ibid., or a losing party's decision to forgo appeal, see Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 83, 108 S.Ct. 388, 395, 98 L.Ed.2d 327 (1987), California's loss of the federal approval necessary to implement its program was not voluntary. Vacatur is appropriate, therefore, to "clea[r] the path for future relitigation of the issues between parties and [to] eliminat[e] a judgment, review of which was prevented through happenstance." United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40, 71 S.Ct. 104, 107, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950).
4
Accordingly, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded to that court with directions to order the vacation of the District Court's judgment and the dismissal of the case.
5
It is so ordered.
"
What is the central issue area addressed in the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
11 | In the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS) opinion:
"514 U.S. 208115 S.Ct. 1446131 L.Ed.2d 324
Fred A. WHITAKERv.SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY (MERRILL REESE, INC., Real Party in Interest).
No. 94-7743.
Supreme Court of the United States
April 17, 1995.
PER CURIAM.
1
Pro se petitioner Fred Whitaker has filed a petition for writ of certiorari and requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. Pursuant to Rule 39.8, we deny petitioner's request to proceed in forma pauperis.* Petitioner is allowed until May 8, 1995, to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petition in compliance with this Court's Rule 33. For the reasons explained below, we also direct the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from petitioner in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.
2
Petitioner is a prolific filer in this Court. Since 1987, he has filed 24 petitions for relief, including 6 petitions for extraordinary relief and 18 petitions for certiorari. Fifteen of the twenty-four petitions have been filed in the last four Terms, and we have denied all 24 petitions without recorded dissent. We also have denied petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to Rule 39.8 of this Court for the last three petitions in which he has sought extraordinary relief. See In re Whitaker, 513 U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 570, 130 L.Ed.2d 488 (1994); In re Whitaker, 511 U.S. ---, 114 S.Ct. 2098, 128 L.Ed.2d 661 (1994); In re Whitaker, 506 U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 489, 121 L.Ed.2d 428 (1992). And earlier this Term, we directed the Clerk of the Court "not to accept any further petitions for extraordinary writs from petitioner in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33." 513 U.S., at ----, 115 S.Ct., at 570. Though we warned petitioner at that time about his "frequent filing patterns with respect to petitions for writ of certiorari," ibid., we limited our sanction to petitions for extraordinary writs.
3
We now find it necessary to extend that sanction to petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner. In what appears to be an attempt to circumvent this Court's prior order, petitioner has labeled his instant petition a "petition for writ of certiorari" even though it would seem to be more aptly termed a "petition for an extraordinary writ": he argues that the California Supreme Court erred in denying his petition for review of a California Court of Appeals order which denied his petition for writ of mandate/prohibition seeking to compel a California trial judge to make a particular ruling in a civil action filed by petitioner. And the legal arguments petitioner makes in his instant "petition for writ of certiorari" are, just as those made in his previous 18 petitions for certiorari, frivolous. As we told petitioner earlier this Term, "[t]he goal of fairly dispensing justice . . . is compromised when the Court is forced to devote its limited resources to the processing of repetitious and frivolous requests." Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
4
Petitioner's abuse of petitions for certiorari has occurred only in noncriminal cases, and we limit our sanction accordingly. This order therefore will not prevent petitioner from filing a petition for certiorari to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed upon him. But like other similar orders we have issued, see In re Sassower, 510 U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2, 126 L.Ed.2d 6 (1993); Day v. Day, 510 U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 4, 126 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993); Demos v. Storrie, 507 U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1231, 122 L.Ed.2d 636 (1993); Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 397, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), this order will allow the Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our process.
5
It is so ordered.
6
Justice STEVENS, dissenting.
7
A simple denial would adequately serve the laudable goal of conserving the Court's "limited resources." Ante, at ____. See generally In re Whitaker, 513 U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 570, 130 L.Ed.2d 488 (1994) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
8
I respectfully dissent.
*
Rule 39.8 provides: "If satisfied that a petition for a writ of certiorari, jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ, as the case may be, is frivolous or malicious, the Court may deny a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis "
"
What is the relevant issue area of the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 1 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Civil Rights |
12 | In the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS) opinion:
"514 U.S. 669115 S.Ct. 1732131 L.Ed.2d 714
UNITED STATES, Petitionerv.Juan Paul ROBERTSON.
No. 94-251.
Supreme Court of the United States
May 1, 1995.
Drew S. Days, III, Sol. Gen., Jo Ann Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael R. Dreeben, Acting Deputy Sol. Gen., Miguel A. Estrada, Asst. to the Sol. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for petitioner.
Glenn Stewart Warren (Appointed by this Court), San Diego, CA, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
1
Respondent, Juan Paul Robertson, was charged with various narcotics offenses, and with violating § 1962(a) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V), by investing the proceeds of those unlawful activities in the "acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). He was convicted on some of the narcotics counts, and on the RICO count by reason of his investment in a certain gold mine. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the RICO conviction on the ground that the Government had failed to introduce sufficient evidence proving that the gold mine was "engaged in or affect[ed] interstate commerce". 15 F.3d 862, 868 (1994). We granted the United States' petition for certiorari. 513 U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 354, 130 L.Ed.2d 309 (1994).
2
The facts relevant to the "engaged in or affecting interstate commerce" issue were as follows: Some time in 1985, Robertson entered into a partnership agreement with another man, whereby he agreed to finance a goldmining operation in Alaska. In fulfillment of this obligation, Robertson, who resided in Arizona, made a cash payment of $125,000 for placer gold mining claims near Fairbanks. He paid approximately $100,000 (in cash) for mining equipment and supplies, some of which were purchased in Los Angeles and transported to Alaska for use in the mine. Robertson also hired and paid the expenses for seven out-of-state employees to travel to Alaska to work in the mine. The partnership dissolved during the first mining season, but Robertson continued to operate the mine through 1987 as a sole proprietorship. He again hired a number of employees from outside Alaska to work in the mine. During its operating life, the mine produced between $200,000 and $290,000 worth of gold, most of which was sold to refiners within Alaska, although Robertson personally transported approximately $30,000 worth of gold out of the State.
3
Most of the parties' arguments, here and in the Ninth Circuit, were addressed to the question whether the activities of the gold mine "affected" interstate commerce. We have concluded we do not have to consider that point. The "affecting commerce" test was developed in our jurisprudence to define the extent of Congress's power over purely intrastate commercial activities that nonetheless have substantial interstate effects. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942). The proof at Robertson's trial, however, focused largely on the interstate activities of Robertson's mine. For example, the Government proved that Robertson purchased at least $100,000 worth of equipment and supplies for use in the mine. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' suggestion, all of those items were not purchased locally ("drawn generally from the stream of interstate commerce," 15 F.3d, at 869 (internal quotation marks omitted)); the Government proved that some of them were purchased in California and transported to Alaska for use in the mine's operations. Cf. United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U.S. 271, 285, 95 S.Ct. 2150, 2159, 45 L.Ed.2d 177 (1975) (allegation that company had made local purchases of equipment and supplies that were merely manufactured out of state was insufficient to show that company was "engaged in commerce" within the meaning of § 7 of the Clayton Act). The Government also proved that, on more than one occasion, Robertson sought workers from out of state and brought them to Alaska to work in the mine. Cf. id., at 274, 95 S.Ct., at 2153. Furthermore, Robertson, the mine's sole proprietor, took $30,000 worth of gold, or 15% of the mine's total output, with him out of the State.
4
Whether or not these activities met (and whether or not, to bring the gold mine within the "affecting commerce" provision of RICO, they would have to meet) the requirement of substantially affecting interstate commerce, they assuredly brought the gold mine within § 1962(a)'s alternative criterion of "any enterprise . . . engaged in . . . interstate or foreign commerce." As we said in American Building Maintenance, a corporation is generally "engaged 'in commerce' " when it is itself "directly engaged in the production, distribution, or acquisition of goods and services in interstate commerce." Id., at 283, 95 S.Ct., at 2158. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186, 195, 95 S.Ct. 392, 398, 42 L.Ed.2d 378 (1974).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
5
Reversed.
"
What is the relevant issue area of the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 0 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Criminal Procedure |
13 | Considering the following statement from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS): 515 U.S. 321115 S. Ct. 2552132 L. Ed. 2d 252
BRETT C. KIMBERLIN, PETITIONERv.J. MICHAEL QUINLAN ET AL.
No. 93-2068
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
June 12, 1995, Decided
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT .
6 F.3d 789, vacated and remanded.
Per Curiam.
1
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for further consideration in light of Johnson v. Jones, ante, p. 304.
What is the relevant issue area addressed in the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
14 | Given the following opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"515 U.S. 951116 S.Ct. 4132 L.Ed.2d 879
J.D. NETHERLAND, Wardenv.Lem Davis TUGGLE.No. A-209.
Supreme Court of the United States
Sept. 14, 1995.
PER CURIAM.
1
Applicant asks that we vacate a stay of execution granted Tuggle by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Because we agree with applicant that the stay was improvidently entered, we grant his application to vacate, provided that the stay shall remain in effect until September 20, 1995, to allow Tuggle's counsel opportunity to seek a further stay in this Court.
2
On June 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion vacating the District Court's grant of habeas relief, finding all of Tuggle's constitutional claims to be without merit. Tuggle v. Thompson, 57 F.3d 1356. The court stayed the issuance of its mandate on August 2, however, and granted Tuggle a 30-day stay of execution pending t he filing of a timely petition for certiorari in this Court; then on August 25 it extended the stay of execution for the full 90 days allowed to file a certiorari petition in this Court.
3
Both actions of the court were taken by summary order without opinion or discussion. Nothing indicates that the Court of Appeals even attempted to undertake the three-part inquiry required by our decision in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895-896, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3395-3396, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983). See also Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46, 48, 104 S.Ct. 311, 312, 78 L.Ed.2d 43 (1983) (per curiam ); Autry v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1, 2-3, 104 S.Ct. 20, 21-22, 78 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983) (per curiam ). There is no hint that the court found that "four Members of th[is] Court would consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for the grant of certiorari" or that "a significant possibility of reversal" existed. Barefoot, supra, at 895, 103 S.Ct., at 3395. We think the inescapable conclusion is that the Court of Appeals mistakenly believed that a capital defendant as a matter of right was entitled to a stay of execution until he has filed a petition for certiorari in due course. But this view was rejected in Autry, supra, at 2, 104 S.Ct., at 21, and Maggio, supra, at 48, 104 S.Ct., at 312.
4
Accordingly, the application to vacate the stay of execution is granted.
5
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice GINSBURG joins, dissenting.
6
Because there is no support in the record for the conclusion that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion when it granted a stay of execution to enable respondent Tuggle to file a petition for certiorari, I respectfully dissent. The fact that the respondent has substantial grounds for challenging the constitutionality of his death sentence is demonstrated both by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the District Court and by the 19-page opinion filed by the Court of Appeals. Tuggle v. Thompson, 57 F.3d 1356 (CA4 1995). Promptly after that opinion was announced, respondent filed a motion for a stay of execution supported by an explanation of why "the three-part inquiry," ante, at __, described in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895-896, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3395-3396, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983), warranted that relief. It is disrespectful to the Court of Appeals to assume that its grant of that motion did not implicitly endorse the reasoning in respondent's moving papers.
7
The stay of execution would merely have given respondent the opportunity to seek the review in this Court that has been authorized by Congress and our Rules. In my opinion it is both unwise and unfair to require a death row inmate who has acted diligently at all stages of his litigation to prepare and file a petition raising substantial claims more promptly than other litigants. I would deny the warden's application.
8
Justice SOUTER would deny the application to vacate stay of execution.
9
Justice BREYER, for reasons stated in the first paragraph of Justice STEVENS' dissent, votes to deny the application.
"
Identify the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 0 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Criminal Procedure |
15 | Based on the provided opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS): 516 U.S. 122116 S.Ct. 560133 L.Ed.2d 459
State of LOUISIANA, plaintiff,v.State of MISSISSIPPI.
No. 121, Original.
Supreme Court of the United States
Dec. 4, 1995.
1
Decree entered. The State of Louisiana's prayer that the claim of title by defendants Julia Donelson Houston, et al., in and to the lands and water bottoms lying between the Mississippi River on the east and the Louisiana-Mississippi boundary line as fixed in the decree on the west be canceled and forever held for naught is denied. The Court retains jurisdiction to entertain such further proceedings, enter such orders and issue such writs as may from time to time be deemed necessary or advisable to give proper force and effect to this decree or to effectuate the rights of the parties in the premises.
ON BILL OF COMPLAINT
DECREE
2
This cause having come on to be heard on the Report of the Special Master heretofore appointed by the Court, and the exceptions filed thereto, and having been argued by counsel for the several parties, and this Court having stated its conclusions in its opinion announced on October 31, 1995, 516 U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 290, 133 L.Ed.2d 265 (1995), and having considered the positions of the respective parties as to the terms of the decree, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
3
1. The boundary between the State of Louisiana and the State of Mississippi along the Mississippi River between North Latitude 32x 49' 25" and North Latitude 32x 44' lies along the line described as follows:
4
Beginning at Pt. 1 at North Latitude 32x 49' 25" and West Longitude 91x 09' 27"; thence to Pt. 2, Latitude 32x 49' and Longitude 91x 09' 34"; thence to Pt. 3, Latitude 32x 49' 47" and Longitude 91x 09' 37"; thence to Pt. 4, Latitude 32x 48' 30" and Longitude 91x 09' 39"; thence to Pt. 5, Latitude 32x 48' and Longitude 91x 09' 47"; thence to Pt. 6, Latitude 32x 47' 18" and Longitude 91x 09' 51"; thence to Pt. 7, Latitude 32x 47' 6" and Longitude 91x 09' 54"; thence to Pt. 8, Latitude 32x 47' and Longitude 91x 09' 59"; thence to Pt. 9, Latitude 32x 46' 50" and Longitude 91x 10' 7"; thence Pt. 10, Latitude 32x 46' 35" and Longitude 91x 10' 14"; thence to Pt. 11, Latitude 32x 46' 20" and Longitude 91x 10' 16"; thence to Pt. 12, Latitude 32x 46' and Longitude 91x 10' 18"; thence to Pt. 13, Latitude 32x 45' 45" and Longitude 91x 10' 20"; thence to Pt. 14, Latitude 32x 45' 30" and Longitude 91x 10' 18"; thence to Pt. 15, Latitude 32x 45' 15" and Longitude 91x 10' 12"; thence to Pt. 16, Latitude 32x 45' and Longitude 91x 10' 01"; thence to Pt. 17, Latitude 32x 44' 45" and Longitude 91x 09' 49"; thence to Pt. 18, Latitude 32x 44' 30" and Longitude 91x 09' 38"; thence to Pt. 19, Latitude 32x 44' 23" and Longitude 91x 09' 30"; thence to Pt. 20, Latitude 32x 44' 15" and Longitude 91x 09' 18"; thence to Pt. 21, Latitude 32x 44' 07" and Longitude 91x 09'; thence to Pt. 22, Latitude 32x 44' and Longitude 91x 08' 44".
5
2. The State of Louisiana's prayer that the claim of title by defendants Julia Donelson Houston, et al., in and to the lands and water bottoms lying between the Mississippi River on the east and the Louisiana-Mississippi boundary line as fixed in the preceding paragraph on the west be cancelled and forever held for naught is DENIED.
6
3. The Court retains jurisdiction to entertain such further proceedings, enter such orders and issue such writs as may from time to time be deemed necessary or advisable to give proper force and effect to this decree or to effectuate the rights of the parties in the premises.
Determine the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 10 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Interstate Relations |
16 | Given the excerpt from a Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS) opinion:
"516 U.S. 233116 S. Ct. 804133 L. Ed. 2d 610
No. 94-2003
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
January 16, 1996
Henry B. Gutman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Kerry L. Konrad, Jeffrey E. Ostrow, Arthur R. Miller, Neal D. Goldman, and Donald J. Rosenberg.
Gary L. Reback argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Michael Barclay, Susan A. Creighton, and Katherine L. Parks. *
* Morton David Goldberg, June M. Besek, Davis O. Carson, and Jesse M. Feder filed a brief for Digital Equipment Corp. et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Altai, Inc., by Susan Gertrude Braden; for the American Committee for Interoperable Systems et al. by Peter M. C. Choy and Paul Goldstein; for Computer Scientists by Ron Kilgard and Karl M. Tilleman; for the League for Programming Freedom by Eben Moglen and Pamela S. Karlan; for the Software Forum by Diane Marie O'Malley; for the Software Industry Coalition et al. by Thomas F. Villeneuve; for the Software Protection Committee of the Minnesota Intellectual Property Law Association by Steven W. Lundberg, Daniel J. Kluth, and Rudolph P. Hofmann, Jr.; for Copyright Law Professors by Pamela Samuelson; and for Peter S. Menell et al. by Mr. Menell, pro se.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the American Intellectual Property Law Association by Don W. Martens, Baila H. Celedonia, and Charles L. Gholz; for Economics Professors and Scholars by Joshua R. Floum; for Users Groups by Rex S. Heinke; and for Howard C. Anawalt, pro se.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT.
49 F.3d 807, affirmed by an equally divided Court.
JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
PER CURIAM.
1
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
2
JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
"
Identify the pertinent issue area being discussed: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 7 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Economic Activity |
17 | Examine the provided opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"516 U.S. 297116 S.Ct. 769133 L.Ed.2d 721
Robert ATTWOODv.Harry K. SINGLETARY, Jr., Secretary, Florida Department Of Corrections.
No. 95-6710.
Supreme Court of the United States
Jan. 22, 1996.
PER CURIAM.
1
Pro se petitioner Robert Attwood requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request pursuant to Rule 39.8. Attwood is allowed until February 12, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and to submit his petition in compliance with this Court's Rul e 33. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Attwood in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.
2
Attwood has abused this Court's certiorari process. In November 1995, we twice invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Attwood in forma pauperis status. See Attwood v. Smith and Attwood v. Palm Beach Post, 516 U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 416, 133 L.Ed.2d 334. At that time, Attwood had filed seven petitions in this Court during the prior year, and he has filed two since. All were patently frivolous and were denied without recorded dissent.
3
We enter the order barring prospective filings for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 113 S.Ct. 397, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Attwood's abuse of the writ of certiorari has been in noncriminal cases, and so we limit our sanction accordingly. The order will not prevent Attwood from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed against him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our certiorari process.
4
It is so ordered.
5
Justice STEVENS, dissenting.
6
Because experience with the administration of orders like the one the Court is entering in this case today has merely reinforced my conviction that our "limited resources" would be used more effectively by simply denying petitions that are manifestly frivolous, I respectfully dissent. Perhaps one day reflection will persuade my colleagues to return to "the great tradition of open access that characterized the Court's history prior to its unprecedented decisions in In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180 [109 S.Ct. 993, 103 L.Ed.2d 158] (1989) (per curiam), and In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177 [111 S.Ct. 596, 112 L.Ed.2d 599] (1991) (per curiam)." See Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 4, 113 S.Ct. 397, 398, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
"
Deduce the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 1 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Civil Rights |
18 | In the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS) opinion: 516 U.S. 363116 S.Ct. 870134 L.Ed.2d 1
Sylvester JONESv.ABC-TV et al.
No. 95-7186.
Supreme Court of the United States
Feb. 26, 1996.
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PER CURIAM.
1
Pro se petitioner Sylvester Jones requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny this request pursuant to Rule 39.8. Jones is allowed until March 18, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and to submit his petition in compliance with this Court's Rule 33.1. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Jones in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.1.
2
Jones has abused this Court's certiorari process. In October 1992 we first invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Jones in forma pauperis status in two petitions for certiorari. See Jones v. Wright, 506 U.S. 810, 113 S.Ct. 48, 121 L.Ed.2d 16; In re Jones, 506 U.S. 810, 113 S.Ct. 45, 121 L.Ed.2d 16. At that time, Jones had filed over 25 petitions in this Court, all of which were patently frivolous and had been denied without recorded dissent. And since October 1992, we have invoked Rule 39.8 five times to deny Jones in forma pauperis status. See Jones v. Schulze, 513 U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 52, 130 L.Ed.2d 11 (1994); In re Jones, 510 U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 437, 126 L.Ed.2d 371 (1993); Jones v. Jackson, 510 U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 55, 126 L.Ed.2d 24 (1993); Jones v. Suter, 508 U.S. 949, 113 S.Ct. 2439, 124 L.Ed.2d 657 (1993); Jones v. Jackson, 506 U.S. 1047, 113 S.Ct. 962, 122 L.Ed.2d 119 (1993). Currently, Jones has at least two more petitions for certiorari pending.
3
We enter the order barring prospective filings for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 113 S.Ct. 397, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Jones' abuse of the writ of certiorari has been in noncriminal cases and so we limit our sanction accordingly. The order will not prevent Jones from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed against him. The order will, however, allo w this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our certiorari process.
4
Justice BREYER took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion.
5
It is so ordered.
6
Justice STEVENS, dissenting.
7
For the reasons I have previously expressed, I respectfully dissent. See Attwood v. Singletary, 516 U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 769, 770, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (1996) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 4, 113 S.Ct. 397, 398, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (STEVENS, J., dissenting); Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16, 18, 112 S.Ct. 355, 356-57, 116 L.Ed.2d 293 (1991) (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
What is the issue area being addressed in the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 1 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Civil Rights |
19 | Given the opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"516 U.S. 365116 S.Ct. 872134 L.Ed.2d 4
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,v.State of MAINE et al. (Massachusetts Boundary Case)
No. 35, Original.
Supreme Court of the United States
Feb. 26, 1996.
1
on exception to the report of the special master
2
The joint motion for entry of a supplemental decree is granted.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE
3
The Court having, by its decision of February 25, 1986, adopted the recommendation of its Special Master that Vineyard Sound constitutes historic inland waters and overruled the exception of Massachusetts to the Report of its Special Master herein insofar as it challenged the Master's determination that the whole of Nantucket Sound does not constitute historic or ancient inland waters, and having, to this extent, adopted the Master's recommendations and confirmed his Report:
4
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
5
1. For the purposes of the Court's Decree herein dated October 6, 1975, 423 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 23, 46 L.Ed.2d 1 (affirming the title of the United States to the seabed more than three geographic miles seaward of the coastline, and of the States to the seabed within the three geographic mile zone), the coastline of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts shall be determined on the basis that the whole of Vineyard Sound constitutes state inland waters and Nantucket Sound (with the exception of interior indentations which are described in paragraphs 2(c), (d) and (e) below) is made up of territorial seas and high seas.
6
2. For purposes of said Decree of October 6, 1975, the coastline of Massachusetts includes the following straight lines:
7
(a) A line from a point on Gay Head on Martha's Vineyard (approximately 41x21'10"N, 70x50'07"W) to the southwestern point of Cuttyhunk Island (approximately 41x24'39"N, 70x56'34"W);
8
(b) A line from a point on East Chop (approximately 41x28'15"N, 70x34'05"W) to a point on Cape Cod (approximately 41x33'10"N, 70x29'30"W);
9
(c) A line from a point southeast of East Chop (approximately 41x27' 30"N, 70x33'18"W) to a point west of Cape Pogue (approximately 41x25'06"N, 70x27'56"W) on the island of Martha's Vineyard;
10
(d) A line from a point on Point Gammon on Cape Cod (approximately 41x36'36"N, 70x15'40"W) to the southwestern-most point of Monomoy Island (approximately 41x33'02"N, 70x00'59"W); and
11
(e) A line from a point on the west coast of Great Island (approximately 41x37'08"N, 70x16'15"W) to a point on Hyannis Point on Cape Cod (approximately 41x37'27"N, 70x17'34"W).
12
3. The Court retains jurisdiction to entertain such further proceedings, enter such orders, and issue such writs as from time to time may be deemed necessary or advisable to effectuate and supplement the decree and the rights of the respective parties.
13
Justice SOUTER took no part in the consideration or decision of this motion and supplemental decree.
"
Specify the relevant issue area covered in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 9 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Federalism |
20 | Given the opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"516 U.S. 415116 S.Ct. 1036134 L.Ed.2d 46
UNITED STATES, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and JANET RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL, PETITIONERSv.CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC TELEPHONE COMPANY OF VIRGINIA et al.
No. 94-1893
NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED, PETITIONER
v.
BELL ATLANTIC CORPORATION et al.
No. 94-1900
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued December 6, 1995
Decided February 27, 1996
On Writs of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Per Curiam.
1
The judgment is vacated and the cases are remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for consideration of the question whether they are moot.
"
Specify the relevant issue area covered in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
21 | In the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS) opinion: 517 U.S. 343116 S.Ct. 1311134 L.Ed.2d 464
LIANG-HOUH SHIEHv.EDWARD KAKITA et al.
No. 95-7587
LIANG-HOUH SHIEH
v.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-7588
LIANG-HOUH SHIEH
v.
JEROLD KRIEGER et al.
No. 95-7589
On motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
Nos. 95-7587, 95-7588 and 95-7589.
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided April 1, 1996
Per Curiam.
1
In these three petitions for certiorari, pro se petitioner Liang-Houh Shieh requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis under Rule 39 of this Court. We deny his requests pursuant to Rule 39.8. Shieh is allowed until April 22, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit his petitions in compliance with this Court's Rule 33.1. We also direct the Clerk not to accept any further petitions for certiorari from Shieh in noncriminal matters unless he pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.1.
2
Shieh has abused this Court's certiorari process. In March 1996, we invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Shieh in forma pauperis status. See Shieh v. State Bar of California, 516 U. S. ___. To date, Shieh has filed 10 petitions in this Court in less than three years. All have been both patently frivolous and denied without recorded dissent.
3
We enter the order barring prospective filings for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1 (1992). Shieh's abuse of the writ of certiorari has been in noncriminal cases, and so we limit our sanction accordingly. The order will not prevent Shieh from petitioning to challenge criminal sanctions which might be imposed against him. The order will, however, allow this Court to devote its limited resources to the claims of petitioners who have not abused our certiorari process.
4
It is so ordered.
5
djq Justice Stevens, dissenting.
6
For the reasons I have previously expressed, I respectfully dissent.
7
See Jones v. ABC-TV, 516 U. S. ___, ___ (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Attwood v. Singletary, 516 U. S. ___, ___ (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U. S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Zatko v. California, 502 U. S. 16, 18 (1991) (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
What is the issue area being addressed in the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 1 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Civil Rights |
22 | In the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS) opinion: 517 U.S. 345116 S.Ct. 1312134 L.Ed.2d 494
MICHAEL BOWERSOX, SUPERINTENDENT, POTOSI CORRECTIONAL CENTERv.DOYLE J. WILLIAMSNo. A-828On application to vacate stay of execution
Supreme Court of the United States
April 9, 1996
Per Curiam.
1
Doyle J. Williams is scheduled to be executed by the State of Missouri on April 10, 1996. On January 11, 1996, a Federal District Court denied Williams' third federal habeas corpus petition, finding all of Williams' claims to be abusive, successive, or procedurally defaulted. On March 8, 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit entered a summary order staying Williams' execution. The Court of Appeals scheduled oral argument for May 13, 1996, and resolved that the stay would remain in effect pending submission of the case and that Court's further order. The summary order gives no explanation for the Court of Appeals' conclusion that oral argument is necessary or that entry of a stay was appropriate. The Court of Appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc, and we now have before us an application to vacate the stay.
2
"A stay of execution pending disposition of a second or successive federal habeas petition should be granted only when there are `substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted.'" Delo v. Stokes, 495 U. S. 320, 321 (1990) (per curiam) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 895 (1983)). Entry of a stay on a second or third habeas petition is a drastic measure, and we have held that it is "`particularly egregious'" to enter a stay absent substantial grounds for relief. Delo v. Blair, 509 U. S. 823 (1993) (citation omitted). On the record before us, we can discern no such grounds. We are persuaded by the report prepared by Magistrate Judge Hays, which meticulously addresses each of Williams' claims and finds each to be abusive, successive, procedurally defaulted, or meritless, and by the District Court's order adopting that report, in which the District Court also denied Williams' dilatory motion to amend the habeas petition. The Court of Appeals abused its discretion by entering a stay on this record.
3
To the extent the Court of Appeals discerned substantial grounds for relief, it failed to reveal them in its summary order granting the stay. Although we hesitate to say that a Court of Appeals must, in every case, explain the basis for its entry of a stay, we see fit to remind the lower courts that entry of a stay without explanation is disfavored. Cf. Netherland v. Tuggle, 515 U. S. ___ (1995) (per curiam). When a court of appeals fails to articulate its reasons for granting a stay, we lose the benefit of that court's views and must resort to other portions of the record in evaluating whether to vacate the stay. In this case, the District Court's careful treatment of Williams' claims and the surface implausibility of those claims persuade us that the stay should not have been granted, and the Court of Appeals' summary order does not convince us otherwise.
4
Accordingly, the application to vacate the stay of execution is granted.
5
It is so ordered.
6
Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.
7
I would deny the application to vacate the stay of Williams' execution. A diligent appellate court has granted a certificate of probable cause and scheduled this case for argument on May 13. Those actions signal to me the existence of reasons, not the absence of reasons, for granting a stay. At the very least, before acting irretrievably, this Court might have invited prompt clarification of the Court of Appeals' order. Appreciation of our own fallibility, and respect for the judgment of an appellate tribunal closer to the scene than we are, as I see it, demand as much.
What is the issue area being addressed in the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 0 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Criminal Procedure |
23 | Considering the following statement from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS): 518 U.S. 149116 S.Ct. 2066135 L.Ed.2d 453
ARTHUR CALDERON, WARDENv.CHARLES EDWARD MOORE, Jr.On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
No. 95-1612.
Decided June 17, 1996
Per Curiam.
1
Respondent Charles Edward Moore, Jr., was convicted of first-degree murder in a California state court, and sentenced to death. The District Court granted habeas relief, concluding that the state court had denied Moore his right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975). The District Court thus vacated the judgment of conviction and ordered the warden, petitioner here, to "release Moore from custody after the expiration of 60 days unless, within 60 days hereof, the State of California grants Moore the right to a new trial." App. A to Brief in Opposition A65.
2
The State filed a notice of appeal and sought a stay of the District Court's order pending appeal, but its various stay applications were respectively denied by the District Court, the Ninth Circuit, 56 F. 3d 39 (1995), and by Justice O'Connor, in her capacity as Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit. The State accordingly set Moore for retrial, and simultaneously pursued its appeal of the District Court's order on the merits to the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals, observing that the "State of California has granted petitioner Charles Edward Moore, Jr., a new trial," dismissed the State's appeal as moot. App. A. to Pet. for Cert.
3
It is true, of course, that mootness can arise at any stage of litigation, Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 (1974); that federal courts may not "give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions," Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 653 (1895); and that an appeal should therefore be dismissed as moot when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant "any effectual relief whatever" in favor of the appellant. Ibid. The available remedy, however, does not need to be "fully satisfactory" to avoid mootness. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 13 (1992). To the contrary, even the availability of a "partial remedy," is "sufficient to prevent [a] case from being moot." Ibid.
4
In this case, to say the least, a "partial remedy" necessary to avoid mootness will be available to the State of California (represented here by petitioner). While the administrative machinery necessary for a new trial has been set in motion, that trial has not yet even begun, let alone reached a point where the court could no longer award any relief in the State's favor. Because a decision in the State's favor would release it from the burden of the new trial itself, the Court of Appeals is not prevented from granting "any effectual relief whatever" in the State's favor, Mills, supra, at 653, and the case is clearly not moot. We therefore grant the respondent's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
5
It is so ordered.
What is the relevant issue area addressed in the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
24 | Analyze the following opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS): 519 U.S. 1117 S. Ct. 378136 L. Ed. 2d 1
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR VIETNAMESE ASYLUM SEEKERS, INC., ET AL
No. 95-1521
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October 21, 1996
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.
PER CURIAM.
1
The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for further consideration in light of Section 633 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRA) (enacted as Division C of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996)).
What is the issue area that the opinion pertains to? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 1 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Civil Rights |
25 | Analyze the following opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS): 519 U.S. 59117 S.Ct. 466136 L.Ed.2d 369
In re Maria Luisa Costell GAYDOS.
No. 96-5831.
Supreme Court of the United States
Dec. 2, 1996.
PER CURIAM.
1
Pro se petitioner Maria L. Gaydos seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis and requests this Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering (1) the Clerk of the District Court for the District of New Jersey to file her Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit challenging this Court's orders in 10 previous cases in which Gaydos was denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis under this Court's Rule 39.8;* (2) the disqualification of William T. Walsh, Clerk of the District Court, and William K. Suter, Clerk of this Court; and (3) the issuance of summons under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 4. In the alternative, she asks this Court to exercise its original jurisdiction over her FOIA suit because her complaint concerns this Court's orders.
2
We deny petitioner's requests. Petitioner is allowed until December 23, 1996, within which to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit her petition in compliance with Rule 33.1. For the reasons discussed below, we direct the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further petitions for certiorari or for extraordinary writs in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless she first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits her petition in compliance with Rul e 33.1.
3
Petitioner has a history of frivolous, repetitive filings. She has been denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis 10 times, and she has filed at least 8 other petitions. This most recent petition is nearly incomprehensible, and alludes to, among other things, fraud by the staff of this Court and impending impeachment proceedings against Clerks Walsh and Suter in the House of Representatives. We also note that the relief she purports to seek has already been granted: The District Court docketed petitioner's FOIA complaint as Case No. 96-CV-42435 on September 9, 1996, and promptly dismissed it ''in its entirety'' the following week.
4
We enter the order barring future in forma pauperis filings for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 113 S.Ct. 397, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). Because petitioner has limited her abuse of our processes to noncriminal cases, we limit our sanction accordingly.
5
It is so ordered.
6
Justice STEVENS, dissenting.
7
For reasons previously stated, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 4, 113 S.Ct. 397, 398, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), and cases cited, I respectfully dissent.
*
Rule 39.8 provides: ''If satisfied that a petition for a writ of certiorari, jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ . . . is frivolous or malicious, the Court may deny a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ''
What is the issue area that the opinion pertains to? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 1 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Civil Rights |
26 | Based on the provided opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS): 519 U.S. 145117 S.Ct. 578136 L.Ed.2d 507
Daniel GREENEv.GEORGIA.
No. 96-5369.
Supreme Court of the United States
Dec. 16, 1996.
PER CURIAM.
1
Petitioner was convicted of murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault by a jury in Taylor County, Georgia and sentenced to death. At trial, over petitioner's objection, the court excused for cause five jurors who expressed reservations about the death penalty. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), as ''controlling authority'' for a rule that appellate courts must defer to trial courts' findings concerning juror bias. Greene v. State, 266 Ga. 439, 440-442, 469 S.E.2d 129, 134-135 (1996).
2
Wainwright v. Witt, supra, delineated the standard under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments for determining when a juror may be excused for cause because of his views on the death penalty: whether these views would '' 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' '' Id., at 424, 105 S.Ct., at 852. Addressing petitioner's federal constitutional challenge to the juror disqualifications in this case, the Georgia Supreme Court correctly recognized that Witt is, ''the controlling authority as to the death qualification of prospective jurors . . . . '' Greene, 266 Ga., at 440, 469 S.E.2d, at 134.*
3
Witt also held that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal courts must accord a presumption of correctness to state courts' findings of juror bias. Wainwright, supra, at 426-430, 105 S.Ct., at 853-855. The Supreme Court of Georgia said that Witt was also ''controlling authority'' on this point, and it therefore ruled that ''[t]he conclusion that a prospective juror is disqualified for bias is one that is based upon findings of demeanor and credibility which are peculiarly within the trial court's province and such findings are to be given deference by appellate courts. Wainwright v. Witt, [469 U.S.,] at 428 [105 S.Ct., at 854].'' Greene, supra, at 441, 469 S.E.2d 129.
4
Witt is not ''controlling authority'' as to the standard of review to be applied by state appellate courts reviewing trial courts' rulings on jury selection. Witt was a case arising on federal habeas, where deference to state court findings is mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). But this statute does not govern the standard of review of trial court findings by the Supreme Court of Georgia. There is no indication in that court's opinion that it viewed Witt as merely persuasive authority, or that the court intended to borrow or adopt the Witt standard of review for its own purposes. It believed itself bound by Witt's standard of review of trial court findings on jury-selection questions, and in so doing it was mistaken.
5
In a similar case involving a state court's mistaken view that the First Amendment required it to reach a particular result, we said ''[w]e conclude that although the State of Ohio may as a matter of its own law privilege the press in the circumstances of this case, the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not require it to do so.'' Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578-579, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 2859, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977). Here, too, the Supreme Court of Georgia is free to adopt the rule laid down in Witt for review of trial court findings in jury-selection cases, but it need not do so. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are therefore granted, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
6
It is so ordered.
*
We express no opinion as to the correctness of the Supreme Court of Georgia's application of the Witt standard in this case.
Determine the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
27 | Given the opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"519 U.S. 233117 S. Ct. 759136 L. Ed. 2d 674
TOM GRIMMETT, TRUSTEE FOR THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE OF VINCENT SIRAGUSA, AND JOANNE SIRAGUSA, PETITIONERS v.PATRICIA L. BROWN ET AL.
No. 95-1723.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
January 14, 1997
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, Reported
Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 75 F.3d 506.
PER CURIAM.
1
The writ of certiorari in this case is dismissed as improvidently granted.
"
Specify the relevant issue area covered in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
28 | Given the following opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"519 U.S. 355117 S.Ct. 795136 L.Ed.2d 825
D. Dean BIBLES, Director, Oregon Bureau of Land Managementv.OREGON NATURAL DESERT ASSOCIATION.
No. 96-713.
Supreme Court of the United States
Feb. 18, 1997.
PER CURIAM.
1
In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(6), did not forbid disclosure of a mailing list maintained by petitioner, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and sought by respondent, the Oregon Natural Desert Association (ONDA). In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied upon the "substantial public interest in knowing to whom the government is directing information, or as ONDA characterizes it, "propaganda,' so that those persons may receive information from other sources that do not share the BLM's self-interest in presenting government activities in the most favorable light. '' 83 F.3d 1168, 1171 (C.A.9 1996) (emphasis added). "There is,'' the Court of Appeals said, "a significant public interest in knowing with whom the government has chosen to communicate and in providing those persons with additional information .. . . '' Id., at 1172 (emphasis added).
2
These statements, which are the sum total of the Court of Appeals' analysis of the public interest in disclosure, make clear that the court's judgment rested on a perceived public interest in "providing [persons on the BLM's mailing list] with additional information.'' That is inconsistent with our opinion in Department of Defense v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 114 S.Ct. 1006, 127 L.Ed.2d 325 (1994), which said that "the only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing analysis'' is "the extent to which disclosure of the information sought would "she[d] light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties' or otherwise let citizens know "what their government is up to.''' Id., at 497, 114 S.Ct., at 1013 (emphasis added) (quoting Department of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 1482, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989)). ""[T]he purposes for which the request for information is made,''' we said, have no bearing on whether information must be disclosed under FOIA. 510 U.S., at 496, 114 S.Ct., at 1013 (quoting Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, supra, at 771, 109 S.Ct., at 1480).
3
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
4
It is so ordered.
"
Identify the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 4 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Privacy |
29 | Examine the provided opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"522 U.S. 446118 S. Ct. 903139 L. Ed. 2d 892
LORENZO ARTEAGA v.UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT; LORENZO ARTEAGA, PETITIONER v.PETE WILSON, GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL
No. 97-6749
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
February 23, 1998, Decided
ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PER CURIAM.
1
Pro se petitioner Lorenzo Arteaga seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal with prejudice of petitioner's complaint for failure to amend his complaints pursuant to the District Court's instructions.
2
We deny petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis. He is allowed until March 16, 1998, within which to pay the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and to submit his petition in compliance with Rule 33.1. For the reasons discussed below, we also direct the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further petitions for certiorari in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless he first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits his petition in compliance with Rule 33.1.
3
Petitioner has filed 20 petitions with this Court, 16 in the past two Terms. All have been denied without recorded dissent. In 1997, we invoked Rule 39.8 to deny petitioner in forma pauperis status. Arteaga v. California, 118 S. Ct. 42, 139 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1997). Petitioner nevertheless has filed another frivolous petition with this Court. In his petition and supplemental petition, Arteaga appears to assert that he is an innocent person falsely imprisoned and to allege numerous constitutional violations and conspiracies among prison, court, and government officials. He does not address the reasons for the District Court's dismissal.
4
Accordingly, we enter this order barring prospective in forma pauperis filings by petitioner in noncriminal cases for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 121 L. Ed. 2d 305, 113 S. Ct. 397 (1992).
5
It is so ordered.
6
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
7
For reasons previously stated, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 4, 121 L. Ed. 2d 305, 113 S. Ct. 397 (1992), and cases cited, I respectfully dissent.
"
Deduce the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 1 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Civil Rights |
30 | Examine the provided opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"523 U.S. 206118 S.Ct. 1124140 L.Ed.2d 310
GLENDORAv.John PORZIO et al.
No. 97-7300.
Supreme Court of the United States
March 9, 1998.
PER CURIAM.
1
Pro se petitioner Glendora seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Second Circuit. The District Court dismissed petitioner's claims alleging violation of her due process rights and a conspiracy to violate her due process rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 42 U.S.C. §1985, respectively. The claims, which arose out of a dispute with her landlord, were based on purported "sewer service'' used by her landlord's lawyers and acceptance of the affidavits of service by the state court trial judge. The Second Circuit denied petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed her appeal as frivolous.
2
We deny petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis. She is allowed until March 30, 1998, to pay the docketing fees required by Rule 38 and to submit her petition in compliance with Rule 33.1. For the reasons discussed below, we also direct the Clerk of the Court not to accept any further petitions for certiorari in noncriminal matters from petitioner unless she first pays the docketing fee required by Rule 38 and submits her petition in compliance with Rule 33.1.
3
Petitioner has filed 14 petitions with this Court since 1994. All have been denied without recorded dissent. In 1997, we invoked Rule 39.8 to deny petitioner in forma pauperis status. Glendora v. DiPaola, 522 U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 410, 139 L.Ed.2d 313 (1997). Petitioner nevertheless has filed another frivolous petition with this Court. In her petition, Glendora asserts that the state trial court judge who presided over her dispute with her landlord sanctioned "sewer service'' by her landlord's lawyers, and that the District Court and Court of Appeals sanctioned this conduct. She does not address the District Court's reasons for dismissing her complaint.
4
Accordingly, we enter this order barring prospective in forma pauperis filings by petitioner in noncriminal cases for the reasons discussed in Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 113 S.Ct. 397, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (per curiam).
5
It is so ordered.
6
Justice STEVENS, dissenting.
7
For reasons previously stated, see Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1, 4, 113 S.Ct. 397, 398, 121 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), and cases cited, I respectfully dissent.
"
Deduce the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 1 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Civil Rights |
31 | Given the following opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"523 U.S. 613118 S. Ct. 1693140 L. Ed. 2d 789
RANDALL RICCI, PETITIONER v.VILLAGE OF ARLINGTON HEIGHTS
No. 97-501
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
May 4, 1998, Decided
1
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.
Per Curiam
2
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted
3
.
"
The relevant issue area is: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
32 | Given the following opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"528 U.S. 110120 S.Ct. 659145 L.Ed.2d 560
SyllabusNOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NEW YORKv.HILL
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
No. 98-1299.
Argued November 2, 1999
Decided January 11, 2000
New York lodged a detainer against respondent, an Ohio prisoner, under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). Respondent signed a request for disposition of the detainer pursuant to IAD Article III and was returned to New York to face murder and robbery charges. Article III(a) provides, inter alia, that, upon such a request, the prisoner must be brought to trial within 180 days, "provided that for good cause shown a , the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court a may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance." Although respondent's counsel initially agreed to a trial date set beyond the 180-day period, respondent subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the IAD's time limit had expired. In denying the motion, the trial court concluded that defense counsel's explicit agreement to the trial date constituted a waiver or abandonment of respondent's IAD rights. After respondent was convicted of both charges, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the trial court's refusal to dismiss for lack of a timely trial. The State Court of Appeals, however, reversed and ordered that the indictment be dismissed; counsel's agreement to a later trial date, it held, did not waive respondent's IAD speedy trial rights.
Held: Defense counsel's agreement to a trial date outside the IAD period bars the defendant from seeking dismissal on the ground that trial did not occur within that period. This Court has articulated a general rule that presumes the availability of waiver, United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 200-201, and has recognized that the most basic rights of criminal defendants are subject to waiver, Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936. For certain fundamental rights, the defendant must personally make an informed waiver, but scheduling matters are plainly among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls. Requiring the defendant's express assent for routine and often repetitive scheduling determinations would consume time to no apparent purpose. The text of the IAD, by allowing the court to grant "good-cause continuances" when either "prisoner or his counsel" is present, contemplates that scheduling questions may be left to counsel. Art. III(a) (emphasis added). The Court rejects respondent's arguments for affirmance: (1) that the IAD's provision for "good-cause continuances" is the sole means for extending the time period; (2) that the defendant should not be allowed to waive the time limits given that they benefit not only the defendant but society generally; and (3) that waiver of the IAD's time limits can be effected only by an affirmative request for treatment contrary to, or inconsistent with, those limits. Pp. 3-8.
92 N. Y. 2d 406, 704 N. E. 2d 542, reversed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Opinion of the Court
1
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 98-1299
NEW YORK, PETITIONERv.MICHAEL HILL
2
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OFNEW YORK
3
[January 11, 2000]
4
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.
5
This case presents the question whether defense counsel's agreement to a trial date outside the time period required by Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers bars the defendant from seeking dismissal because trial did not occur within that period.
6
* The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a compact entered into by 48 States, the United States, and the District of Columbia to establish procedures for resolution of one State's outstanding charges against a prisoner of another State. See N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law
"
Identify the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 0 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Criminal Procedure |
33 | Considering the following statement from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"535 U.S. 228
ADAMS ET AL.v.FLORIDA POWER CORP. ET AL.
No. 01-584.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Argued March 20, 2002.
Decided April 1, 2002.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 255 F. 3d 1322.
John G. Crabtree argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Edward L. Scott.
Glen D. Nager argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Daniel H. Bromberg, Rodney E. Gaddy, and Nancy F. Reynolds.*
PER CURIAM.
1
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
2
It is so ordered.
Notes:
*
Briefs ofamici curiae urging reversal were filed for AARP et al. by Laurie A. McCann, Daniel B. Kohrman, Thomas W. Osborne, and Melvin Radowitz; for the Cornell University Chapter of the American Association of University Professors et al. by Michael Evan Gold; and for the National Employment Lawyers Association by Cathy Ventrell-Monsees.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Atlantic Legal Foundation by Martin S. Kaufman; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Mark S. Dichter, Stephen A. Bokat, and Joshua A. Ulman; for the Equal Employment Advisory Council by Ann Elizabeth Reesman and Rae T. Vann; and for the Pacific Legal Foundation by John H. Findley.
Alfred W. Blumrosen, Ruth G. Blumrosen, Archibald J. Thomas III, and Russell S. Bohn filed a brief for the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers as amicus curiae.
"
What is the central issue area addressed in the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
34 | Examine the provided opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"535 U.S. 682
MATHIAS ET AL.v.WORLDCOM TECHNOLOGIES, INC., ET AL.
No. 00-878.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Argued December 5, 2001.
Decided May 20, 2002.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Because, after full briefing and oral argument, it is clear that petitioners were the prevailing parties below and seek review of uncongenial findings not essential to the judgment and not binding upon them in future litigation, certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. See New York Telephone Co. v. Maltbie, 291 U. S. 645 (per curiam).
Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 179 F. 3d 566.
Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General of Illinois, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were James E. Ryan, Attorney General, A. Benjamin Goldgar and Michael P. Doyle, Assistant Attorneys General, Myra L. Karegianes, John P. Kelliher, and Thomas R. Stanton.
Barbara McDowell argued the cause for the United States as respondent under this Court's Rule 12.6 urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Katsas, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Mark B. Stern, Charles W. Scarborough, and John A. Rogovin.
Paul M. Smith argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondents WorldCom Technologies, Inc., et al. were William M. Hohengarten, Michael B. DeS-anctis, Darryl M. Bradford, John J. Hamill, William Single IV, Brian J. Leske, and Richard Metzger. David W. Carpenter, Stephen B. Kinnaird, and Marc C. Rosenblum filed a brief for respondent AT&T Communications of Illinois, Inc., et al. Stephen M. Shapiro, John E. Muench, Theodore A. Livingston, Robert M. Dow, Jr., Michael W. McConnell, Martin H. Redish, and William M. Schur filed a brief for respondent Illinois Bell Telephone Co., dba Ameritech Illinois.*
PER CURIAM.
1
We granted certiorari to consider three questions: (1) whether a state commission's action relating to the enforcement of an interconnection agreement is reviewable in federal court under 47 U. S. C. § 252(e)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. IV); (2) whether a state commission waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity by voluntarily participating in the regulatory scheme established by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56; and (3) whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), permits suit for prospective relief against state public utility commissioners in their official capacities for alleged ongoing violations of that Act. 532 U. S. 903 (2001). After full briefing and oral argument, it is now clear that petitioners were the prevailing parties below, and seek review of uncongenial findings not essential to the judgment and not binding upon them in future litigation. As a general rule, a party may not appeal from a favorable judgment simply to obtain review of findings it deems erroneous. See New York Telephone Co. v. Maltbie, 291 U. S. 645 (1934) (per curiam).
2
We have since granted certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to review the same questions, arising in the same factual context. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md., and United States v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md., 534 U. S. 1072 (2001). Our decision in those cases is released today. See Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md., ante, p. 635. The writ in this case is dismissed as improvidently granted.
3
It is so ordered.
4
JUSTICE O'CONNOR took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Notes:
*
Briefs ofamici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of New Jersey et al. by John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, Andrea Silkowitz and Nancy Kaplen, Assistant Attorneys General, and Stefanie A. Brand, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Thurbert E. Baker of Georgia, Alan G. Lance of Idaho, Steve Carter of Indiana, Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Jennifer M. Granholm of Michigan, Ray Cooper of North Carolina, Herbert D. Soll of the Northern Mariana Islands, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, and Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah; for the Coalition for Local Sovereignty by Kenneth B. Clark; for the Council of State Governments et al. by Richard Ruda and James I. Crowley; and for the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission by Maryanne Reynolds Martin and Bohdan R. Pankiw.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for BellSouth Corp. et al. by Mark L. Evans, Michael K. Kellogg, Sean A. Lev, Aaron M. Panner, William P. Barr, Mark J. Mathis, Michael D. Lowe, Charles R. Morgan, and John W. Hunter; and for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund by Lesley Szanto Friedman, Aidan Synnott, Martha F. Davis, and Isabelle Katz Pinzler.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners et al. by James Bradford Ramsay, Carl F. Patka, and Neil T. Erwin; and for Sprint Corp. by David P. Murray.
"
Deduce the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 7 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Economic Activity |
35 | Examine the provided opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"536 U.S. 862
UNITED STATESv.BASS
No. 01-1471.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Decided June 28, 2002.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Claiming that the United States filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty in respondent's capital murder case because of his race, respondent moved to dismiss the notice and, in the alternative, for discovery of information relating to the Government's capital charging practices. The District Court granted his discovery motion and dismissed the notice after the Government said that it would not comply with the discovery order. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Held: The Sixth Circuit's decision is contrary to United States v. Armstrong, 517 U. S. 456, 465, in which this Court held that a defendant seeking discovery on a selective prosecution claim must show some evidence of both discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent. As to evidence of discriminatory effect, a defendant must make a credible showing that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted. Id., at 465, 470. The Sixth Circuit concluded that respondent had made such a showing based on nationwide statistics demonstrating that the Government charges blacks with a death-eligible offense more than twice as often as it charges whites and that it enters into plea bargains more frequently with whites than with blacks. Even assuming that a nationwide showing can satisfy the Armstrong requirement, raw statistics regarding overall charges say nothing about charges brought against similarly situated defendants. And the plea bargain statistics are even less relevant, since respondent declined the plea bargain offered him.
Certiorari granted; 266 F. 3d 532, reversed.
PER CURIAM.
1
A federal grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of Michigan returned a second superseding indictment charging respondent with, inter alia, the intentional firearm killings of two individuals. The United States filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Respondent, who is black, alleged that the Government had determined to seek the death penalty against him because of his race. He moved to dismiss the death penalty notice and, in the alternative, for discovery of information relating to the Government's capital charging practices. The District Court granted the motion for discovery, and after the Government informed the court that it would not comply with the discovery order, the court dismissed the death penalty notice. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's discovery order. 266 F. 3d 532 (2001). We grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and now summarily reverse.
2
In United States v. Armstrong, 517 U. S. 456, 465 (1996), we held that a defendant who seeks discovery on a claim of selective prosecution must show some evidence of both discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent. We need go no further in the present case than consideration of the evidence supporting discriminatory effect. As to that, Armstrong says that the defendant must make a "credible showing" that "similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted." Id., at 465, 470. The Sixth Circuit concluded that respondent had made such a showing based on nationwide statistics demonstrating that "[t]he United States charges blacks with a death-eligible offense more than twice as often as it charges whites" and that the United States enters into plea bargains more frequently with whites than it does with blacks. 266 F. 3d, at 538-539 (citing U. S. Dept. of Justice, The Federal Death Penalty System: A Statistical Survey (1988-2000), p. 2 (Sept. 12, 2000)).* Even assuming that the Armstrong requirement can be satisfied by a nationwide showing (as opposed to a showing regarding the record of the decisionmakers in respondent's case), raw statistics regarding overall charges say nothing about charges brought against similarly situated defendants. And the statistics regarding plea bargains are even less relevant, since respondent was offered a plea bargain but declined it. See Pet. for Cert. 16. Under Armstrong, therefore, because respondent failed to submit relevant evidence that similarly situated persons were treated differently, he was not entitled to discovery.
3
The Sixth Circuit's decision is contrary to Armstrong and threatens the "performance of a core executive constitutional function." Armstrong, supra, at 465. For that reason, we reverse.
4
It is so ordered.
Notes:
*
In January 1995, the Department of Justice (DOJ) instituted a policy, known as the death penalty protocol, that required the Attorney General to make the decision whether to seek the death penalty once a defendant had been charged with a capital-eligible offense. See Pet. for Cert. 3 (citing DOJ, United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-10.010et seq. (Sept. 1997)). The charging decision continued to be made by one of the 93 United States Attorneys throughout the country, but the protocol required that the United States Attorneys submit for review all cases in which they had charged a defendant with a capital-eligible offense. Ibid.
"
Deduce the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 0 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Criminal Procedure |
36 | Given the excerpt from a Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS) opinion:
"537 U.S. 1
FORD MOTOR CO. ET AL.v.McCAULEY ET AL.
No. 01-896.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued October 7, 2002.
Decided October 15, 2002.
Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 264 F.3d 952.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Walter E. Dellinger, John H. Beisner, Brian P. Brooks, Jonathan D. Hacker, Christopher R. Lipsett, and Bruce M. Berman.
Steve W. Berman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Roger W. Kirby, James G. Lewis, and Russell J. Drake.*
PER CURIAM.
1
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
2
It is so ordered.
Notes:
*
Briefs ofamici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General McCallum, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Barbara McDowell, Barbara C. Biddle, and Thomas M. Bondy; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Evan M. Tager, David M. Gossett, and Robin S. Conrad; for the Business Roundtable by Bruce E. Clark; for the National Association of Manufacturers by Carter G. Phillips, Gene C. Schaerr, Paul J. Zidlicky, Michael S. Lee, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin Riegel; for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America by David Klingsberg, Thomas A. Smart, and Mark S. Popofsky; for the Product Liability Advisory Council by Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr.; and for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. by Sheila L. Birnbaum, Douglas W. Dunham, and Ellen P. Quackenbos.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White and Laura C. Tharney; and for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice by Roger L. Mandel, Marc R. Stanley, Mark A. Chavez, Arthur Bryant, and Michael Quirk.
"
Identify the pertinent issue area being discussed: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
37 | Given the opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"537 U.S. 99
BORDEN RANCH PARTNERSHIP ET AL.v.UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS ET AL.
No. 01-1243.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued December 10, 2002.
Decided December 16, 2002.
261 F. 3d 810, affirmed by an equally divided Court.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
Timothy S. Bishop argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Arthur F. Coon, Kyriakos Tsakopoulos, and Edmund L. Regalia.
Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Sansonetti, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, David C. Shilton, and Sylvia Quast.*
PER CURIAM.
1
The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
2
JUSTICE KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Notes:
*
Briefs ofamici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Alabama et al. by William H. Pryor, Jr., Attorney General of Alabama, Nathan A. Forrester, Solicitor General, and Alyce S. Robertson, Deputy Solicitor General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, John Cornyn of Texas, and Jerry W. Kilgore of Virginia; for the American Farm Bureau Federation et al. by John J. Rademacher; for the American Forest & Paper Association by Steven P. Quarles, J. Michael Klise, Ellen B. Steen, and William R. Murray; for the California Farm Bureau Federation et al. by Robin L. Rivett and M. Reed Hopper; for the National Association of Home Builders by Virginia S. Albrecht, Andrew J. Turner, Duane J. Desiderio, and Thomas Jon Ward; for the National Stone, Sand and Gravel Association et al. by Lawrence R. Liebesman; and for Save Our Shoreline by Nancie G. Marzulla, Roger J. Marzulla, Brenda D. Colella, and David L. Powers.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New Jersey et al. by David Samson, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Patrick DeAlmeida and Rachel J. Horowitz, Deputy Attorneys General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Earl I. Anzai of Hawaii and Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., of West Virginia; for the Association of State Wetlands Managers by Patrick A. Parenteau; for the National Wildlife Federation et al. by Howard I. Fox; and for Dr. Joy Zedler et al. by John D. Echeverria.
"
Specify the relevant issue area covered in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 7 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Economic Activity |
38 | Given the opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"538 U.S. 720
KANSASv.NEBRASKA.
No. 126, Orig.
Supreme Court of United States.
Decree entered May 19, 2003.
1
ON BILL OF COMPLAINT.
2
The Final Report of the Special Master is received and ordered filed.
DECREE
3
This cause, having come to be heard on the Second Report of the Special Master appointed by this Court, and on the Parties' Joint Motion for Approval of Final Settlement Stipulation, which accompanies said Report, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
4
1. The Final Settlement Stipulation executed by all of the parties to this case and filed with the Special Master on December 16, 2002, is approved;
5
2. This action is recommitted to the Special Master for the sole purpose of deciding procedural questions arising in the completion by the state parties of the RRCA Groundwater Model pursuant to the binding procedures prescribed by the Final Settlement Stipulation. All claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims for which leave to file was or could have been sought in this case arising prior to December 15, 2002, are hereby dismissed with prejudice effective upon the filing by the Special Master of a final report certifying adoption of the RRCA Groundwater Model by the state parties.
"
Specify the relevant issue area covered in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 10 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Interstate Relations |
39 | Based on the provided opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS): 539 U.S. 111
DOW CHEMICAL CO. ET AL.v.STEPHENSON ET AL.
No. 02-271.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued February 26, 2003.
Decided June 9, 2003.
273 F. 3d 249, vacated and remanded in part, and affirmed by an equally divided Court in part.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Louis R. Cohen, Andrew L. Frey, Philip Allen Lacovara, Charles A. Rothfeld, Richard B. Katskee, Michele L. Odorizzi, Steven Brock, and John C. Sabetta.
Gerson H. Smoger argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Mark R. Cuker and Ronald Simon.*
PER CURIAM.
1
With respect to respondents Joe Isaacson and Phyllis Lisa Isaacson, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further consideration in light of Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U. S. 28 (2002).
2
With respect to respondents Daniel Raymond Stephenson, Susan Stephenson, Daniel Anthony Stephenson, and Emily Elizabeth Stephenson, the judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
3
JUSTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Notes:
*
Briefs ofamici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Insurance Association et al. by Herbert M. Wachtell, Jeffrey M. Wintner, Craig A. Berrington, Lynda S. Mounts, Jan S. Amundson, Quentin Riegel, and Robin S. Conrad; for the Product Liability Advisory Council by John H. Beisner; and for the Washington Legal Foundation by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Louisiana et al. by Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General of Louisiana, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Mike Beebe of Arkansas, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Mike Hatch of Minnesota, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, and Mike McGrath of Montana; for the American Legion et al. by William A. Rossbach and P. B. Onderdonk, Jr.; for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Jeffrey Robert White; for Law Professors by David L. Shapiro, John Leubsdorf, and Henry P. Monaghan; for the Lymphoma Foundation of America et al. by Raphael Metzger; for Public Citizen by Brian Wolfman; and for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice by Brent M. Rosenthal, Leslie Brueckner, and Misty A. Farris.
Patrick Lysaught filed a brief for the Defense Research Institute as amicus curiae.
Determine the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
40 | In the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS) opinion:
"546 U.S. 1
ANTHONY KANE, WARDENv.JOE GARCIA ESPITIA.
No. 04-1538.
Supreme Court of United States.
Decided October 31, 2005.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
PER CURIAM.
1
Respondent Garcia Espitia, a criminal defendant who chose to proceed pro se, was convicted in California state court of carjacking and other offenses. He had received no law library access while in jail before trial—despite his repeated requests and court orders to the contrary—and only about four hours of access during trial, just before closing arguments. (Of course, he had declined, as was his right, to be represented by a lawyer with unlimited access to legal materials.) The California courts rejected his argument that his restricted library access violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Once his sentence became final, he petitioned in Federal District Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. §2254. The District Court denied relief, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that "the lack of any pretrial access to lawbooks violated Espitia's constitutional right to represent himself as established by the Supreme Court in Faretta [v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975)]." Garcia Espitia v. Ortiz, 113 Fed. Appx. 802, 804 (2004). The warden's petition for certiorari and respondent's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted, the judgment below reversed, and the case remanded.
2
A necessary condition for federal habeas relief here is that the state court's decision be "contrary to, or involv[e] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). Neither the opinion below, nor any of the appellate cases it relies on, identifies a source in our case law for the law library access right other than Faretta. See 113 Fed. Appx., at 804 (relying on Bribiesca v. Galaza, 215 F. 3d 1015, 1020 (CA9 2000) (quoting Milton v. Morris, 767 F. 2d 1443, 1446 (CA9 1985)); ibid. ("Faretta controls this case").
3
The federal appellate courts have split on whether Faretta, which establishes a Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, implies a right of the pro se defendant to have access to a law library. Compare Milton, supra, with United States v. Smith, 907 F. 2d 42, 45 (CA6 1990) ("[B]y knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to counsel, the appellant also relinquished his access to a law library"); United States ex rel. George v. Lane, 718 F. 2d 226, 231 (CA7 1983) (similar). That question cannot be resolved here, however, as it is clear that Faretta does not, as §2254(d)(1) requires, "clearly establis[h]" the law library access right. In fact, Faretta says nothing about any specific legal aid that the State owes a pro se criminal defendant. The Bribiesca court and the court below therefore erred in holding, based on Faretta, that a violation of a law library access right is a basis for federal habeas relief.
4
The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
5
It is so ordered.
"
What is the relevant issue area of the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 0 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Criminal Procedure |
41 | Analyze the following opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
546 U.S. 410 (2006)
WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE, INC.
v.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION.
No. 04-1581.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued January 17, 2006.
Decided January 23, 2006.
James Bopp, Jr., argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Richard E. Coleson and M. Miller Baker.
Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Deputy Solicitor General Garre, Malcolm L. Stewart, Lawrence H. Norton, Richard B. Bader, David Kolker, and Harry J. Summers.[*]
*411 PER CURIAM.
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), § 203, as amended, 116 Stat. 91, prohibits corporations from using their general treasury funds to pay for any "electioneering communications." 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2000 ed., Supp. III). BCRA § 201 defines "electioneering communications" as any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that refers to a candidate for federal office and that is broadcast within 30 days of a federal primary election or 60 days of a federal general election in the jurisdiction in which that candidate is running for office. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (2000 ed., Supp. III). Appellant Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), brought this action against the Federal Election Commission (FEC), seeking a judgment declaring BCRA unconstitutional as applied to several broadcast advertisements that it intended to run during the 2004 election. WRTL also sought a preliminary injunction barring the FEC from enforcing BCRA against those advertisements. WRTL does not dispute that its advertisements are covered by BCRA's definition of prohibited electioneering communications. Instead, it contends that BCRA cannot be constitutionally applied to its particular communications because they constitute "grassroots lobbying advertisements." Brief for Appellee 35 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the FEC has statutory authority to exempt by regulation certain communications from BCRA's prohibition on electioneering communications, § 434(f)(3)(B)(iv), at this point, it has not done so for the types of advertisements at issue here.
The three-judge District Court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction and subsequently dismissed WRTL's *412 complaint in an unpublished opinion. We noted probable jurisdiction, 545 U.S. 1164 (2005). Appellant asks us to reverse the judgment of the District Court because that court incorrectly read a footnote in our opinion in McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), as foreclosing any "as-applied" challenges to the prohibition on electioneering communications. We agree with WRTL that the District Court misinterpreted the relevance of our "uphold[ing] all applications of the primary definition" of electioneering communications. Id., at 190, n. 73. Contrary to the understanding of the District Court, that footnote merely notes that because we found BCRA's primary definition of "electioneering communication" facially valid when used with regard to BCRA's disclosure and funding requirements, it was unnecessary to consider the constitutionality of the backup definition Congress provided. Ibid. In upholding § 203 against a facial challenge, we did not purport to resolve future as-applied challenges.
The FEC argues that the District Court also rested its decision on the alternative ground that the facts of this case "suggest that WRTL's advertisements may fit the very type of activity McConnell found Congress had a compelling interest in regulating." No. 04-1260 (DC, Aug. 17, 2004), App. to Juris. Statement 8a. It is not clear to us, however, that the District Court intended its opinion to rest on this ground. For one thing, the court used the word "may." For another, its separate opinion dismissing WRTL's challenge with prejudice characterized its previous opinion as holding that "WRTL's `as-applied' challenge to BCRA is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell." Id., at 3a. Given this ambiguity, we cannot say with certainty that the District Court's dismissal was based on this alternative ground.
We therefore vacate the judgment and remand the case for the District Court to consider the merits of WRTL's as-applied challenge in the first instance.
It is so ordered.
NOTES
[*] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Steven R. Shapiro, Mark J. Lopez, and Joel M. Gora; for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations by Jonathan P. Hiatt, Laurence E. Gold, and Michael B. Trister; for the Center for Competitive Politics et al. by Erik S. Jaffe; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America by Jan Witold Baran, Thomas W. Kirby, Caleb P. Burns, Stephen A. Bokat, and Amar D. Sarwal; for Citizens United et al. by Herbert W. Titus, William J. Olson, and John S. Miles; and for Senator Mitch McConnell by Theodore B. Olson and Douglas R. Cox.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for AARP et al. by Daniel R. Ortiz; for Douglas L. Bailey by Randy L. Dryer; for Frances R. Hill by J. Gerald Hebert; for Senator John McCain et al. by Bradley S. Phillips, Seth P. Waxman, Randolph D. Moss, Roger M. Witten, Fred Wertheimer, Donald J. Simon, Alan Morrison, Charles G. Curtis, Jr., Trevor Potter, Paul Ryan, and Scott L. Nelson; and for Norman Ornstein et al. by H. Christopher Bartolomucci.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Alliance for Justice by Ruth Eisenberg; and for the Coalition of Public Charities by Robert F. Bauer.
What is the issue area that the opinion pertains to? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 2 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | First Amendment |
42 | Given the opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
" Cite as: 547 U. S. ____ (2006) 1
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JEFFREY JEROME SALINAS v. UNITED STATES
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 05–8400. Decided April 24, 2006
PER CURIAM.
The petition for writ of certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are
granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is re
manded to the Fifth Circuit for further consideration.
The Fifth Circuit concluded that petitioner’s prior con
viction for simple possession of a controlled substance
constituted a “controlled substance offense” for purposes of
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Man
ual §4B1.1(a) (2003). The term “controlled substance
offense” is defined in pertinent part, however, as “an
offense under federal or state law . . . that prohibits . . .
the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit
substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export,
distribute, or dispense.” §4B1.2(b) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit erred in treating petitioner’s
conviction for simple possession as a “controlled substance
offense.” The Solicitor General acknowledges that the
Fifth Circuit incorrectly ruled for the United States on
this ground. Brief in Opposition 8–9.
"
Specify the relevant issue area covered in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 0 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Criminal Procedure |
43 | Given the following opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"
547 U.S. 516 (2006)
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES, INC.
v.
WILLIAMS et al.
No. 05-465.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued April 26, 2006.
Decided June 5, 2006.
Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Richard D. Bernstein, Juan P. Morillo, and Steven T. Cottreau.
Howard W. Foster argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were John E. Floyd, Joshua F. Thorpe, Ronan P. Doherty, Bobby Lee Cook, and Matthew Thames.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Fisher, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Sangita K. Rao.[*]
PER CURIAM.
The writ of certiorari limited to Question 1 presented by the petition, granted at 546 U.S. 1075 (2005), is dismissed as improvidently granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh *517 Circuit for further consideration in light of Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., ante, p. 451.
It is so ordered.
NOTES
[*] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America et al. by Beth S. Brinkmann, Seth M. Galanter, Alison Tucher, Robin S. Conrad, and Amar D. Sarwal; and for the National Association of Manufacturers et al. by Michael J. Mueller, Jan S. Amundson, and Quentin Riegel.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Immigration Political Action Committee et al. by Barnaby W. Zall; and for the National Association of Shareholder and Consumer Attorneys by Kevin P. Roddy and G. Robert Blakey.
"
The relevant issue area is: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
44 | Analyze the following opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
547 U.S. 512 (2006)
WHITMAN
v.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION et al.
No. 04-1131.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued December 5, 2005.
Decided June 5, 2006.
Pamela S. Karlan argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Thomas C. Goldstein, Amy Howe, and Kevin K. Russell.
Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Keisler, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, John P. Elwood, William Kanter, Jeffrey A. *513 Rosen, Paul M. Geier, Jerome M. Mellody, Mark A. Robbins, Steven E. Abow, and Robin M. Richardson.[*]
PER CURIAM.
Terry Whitman, the petitioner, is an employee of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and is subject to the agency's drug and alcohol testing program. Without first seeking to pursue grievance procedures under his collective-bargaining agreement, he filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, alleging the FAA tested him in a nonrandom manner, in violation of his constitutional rights and 49 U.S. C. § 45104(8).
The FAA has its own procedural framework for the resolution of claims by its employees; and for this purpose it adopts certain sections of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), including Chapter 71 of Title 5, which sets forth the rules for grievances. 49 U.S. C. § 40122(g)(2)(C). The District Court held that, under the provisions of the CSRA, it was without jurisdiction to consider the petitioner's claims. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, stating that because "5 U.S. C. § 7121(a)(1), as amended in 1994, does not expressly confer federal court jurisdiction over employment-related claims covered by the negotiated grievance procedures of federal employees' collective bargaining agreements," his claims are precluded. 382 F.3d 938, 939 (2004). This Court granted certiorari to review the judgment. 545 U.S. 1138 (2005).
The Court of Appeals was correct to say that 5 U.S. C. § 7121(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction. Another statute, howevera very familiar onegrants jurisdiction to the *514 federal courts over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S. C. § 1331. The question, then, is not whether 5 U.S. C. § 7121 confers jurisdiction, but whether § 7121 (or the CSRA as a whole) removes the jurisdiction given to the federal courts, see Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642 (2002) (holding that "even if [47 U.S. C.] § 252(e)(6) does not confer jurisdiction, it at least does not divest the district courts of their authority under 28 U.S. C. § 1331 to review the Commission's order for compliance with federal law"), or otherwise precludes employees from pursuing remedies beyond those set out in the CSRA, cf. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 443-444 (1988); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) ("The question is phrased in terms of `prohibition' rather than `authorization' because ... judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress").
In deciding the question of jurisdiction and preclusion, the Court would be required first to ascertain where Whitman's claims fit within the statutory scheme, as the CSRA provides different treatment for grievances depending on the nature of the claim. It may be, for example, that the FAA's actions, as described by the petitioner, constitute a "prohibited personnel practice." See 5 U.S. C. § 2302(b); 49 U.S. C. § 40122(g)(2)(A). Both the petitioner and the Government say they do not, but because the ultimate question may be jurisdictional, this concession ought not to be accepted out of hand. See Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 652 (1973) ("Parties, of course, cannot confer jurisdiction; only Congress can do so"). The Court of Appeals did not decide whether the petitioner's allegations state a "prohibited personnel practice." The proper course, then, is to remand for the Court of Appeals to address the matter, see National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Smith, 525 *515 U. S. 459, 470 (1999), as well as the ultimate issue of preclusion. The various other issues raised before this Court, but not decided below, may also be addressed on remand, including: whether the petitioner has challenged final agency action; whether the petitioner has exhausted his administrative remedies; whether exhaustion is required given this statutory scheme and the Administrative Procedure Act, as interpreted in Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993); and whether the Government has forfeited its exhaustion-of-remedies argument. It may be that a decision on these questions can obviate the need to decide a more difficult question of preclusion.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE ALITO took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
NOTES
[*] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Federation of Government Employees et al. by Thomas S. Williamson, Jr., Sarah L. Wilson, Mark D. Roth, and Gony Frieder; for the National Treasury Employees Union by Gregory O'Duden, Elaine D. Kaplan, and Barbara A. Atkin; and for Allen Dotson by Amanda Frost and Brian Wolfman.
What is the issue area that the opinion pertains to? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
45 | Considering the following statement from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
127 S. Ct. 638 (2006)
549 U.S. 69
Reymundo TOLEDO-FLORES, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 05-7664.
Supreme Court of United States.
December 5, 2006.
PER CURIAM.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
It is so ordered.
What is the relevant issue area addressed in the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
46 | Given the following opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"
127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007)
Mario CLAIBORNE, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES.
No. 06-5618.
Supreme Court of United States.
June 4, 2007.
Lee T. Lawless, Federal Public Defender, Michael Dwyer, Assistant Public Defender, Counsel of Record, David Hemingway, Research & Writing Attorney, St. Louis, MO, for Petitioner.
Paul D. Clement, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Alice S. Fisher, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Dan Himmelfarb, Matthew D. Roberts, Assistants to the Solicitor General, Nina Goodman, Jeffrey P. Singdahlsen, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
PER CURIAM.
The Court is advised that the petitioner died in St. Louis, Missouri, on May 30, 2007. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is therefore vacated as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 71 S. Ct. 104, 95 L. Ed. 36 (1950).
It is so ordered.
"
Identify the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
47 | Given the excerpt from a Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS) opinion:
" Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008) 1
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AVRON J. ARAVE, WARDEN v. MAXWELL HOFFMAN
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 07–110. Decided January 7, 2008
PER CURIAM.
Respondent Maxwell Hoffman was convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to death. See State v. Hoff
man, 123 Idaho 638, 851 P.2d 934 (1993). Hoffman
sought federal habeas relief on the grounds that, inter
alia, his counsel had been ineffective during both pretrial
plea bargaining and the sentencing phase of his trial. The
District Court, finding that Hoffman had received ineffec
tive assistance of counsel during sentencing but not during
plea bargaining, granted Hoffman’s federal habeas peti
tion in part and ordered the State of Idaho to resentence
him. Civ. Action No. 94–0200–S–BLW (Mar. 30, 2002),
App. to Pet. for Cert. 38, 65. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing,* but
reversed with respect to the ineffective assistance claim
during plea negotiations. 455 F.3d 926, 942 (2006). The
Ninth Circuit thus granted the writ, ordering the District
Court to direct the State either to release Hoffman or to
“offe[r] [him] a plea agreement with the ‘same material
terms’ offered in the original plea agreement.” Id., at 943.
The State sought, and we granted, certiorari. 552 U. S.
___ (2007).
——————
* The State initially cross-appealed the District Court’s grant of
Hoffman’s habeas petition for ineffective assistance of counsel at
sentencing. The State, however, subsequently withdrew that cross-
appeal, leaving in place the District Court’s order granting habeas
relief as to Hoffman’s death sentence. 455 F.3d 926, 931 (CA9 2006).
2 ARAVE v. HOFFMAN
Per Curiam
Hoffman now abandons his claim that counsel was
ineffective during plea bargaining. See Respondent’s
Motion to Vacate Decision Below and Dismiss the Cause
as Moot. He “no longer seeks or desires the relief ordered
by the Court of Appeals with respect to the plea offer.” Id.,
at 3. Rather, Hoffman now “wishes to withdraw his claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with plea
bargaining” and asks this Court to dismiss his appeal with
prejudice on that issue so that he may proceed with the
resentencing ordered by the District Court. Ibid.
The State, in its response, notes that Hoffman’s re
quested relief is “virtually identical to the request made by
the state in its Petition for Certiorari.” Response to Re
spondent’s Motion to Vacate Decision Below and Dismiss
the Cause as Moot, p. 3. The State therefore agrees that
the instant motion to vacate and dismiss with prejudice
moots Hoffman’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
during plea negotiations and asks that the motion be
granted.
We grant respondent’s motion. Because his claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel during pretrial plea bar
gaining is moot, we vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals to the extent that it addressed that claim. The
case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit with directions that it instruct the
United States District Court for the District of Idaho to
dismiss the relevant claim with prejudice. Deakins v.
Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 200–201 (1988); United States
v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39–40 (1950).
It is so ordered.
"
Identify the pertinent issue area being discussed: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
48 | Examine the provided opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
" Cite as: 549 U. S. ____ (2007) 1
Statement of STEVENS and KENNEDY, JJ.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
LAKHDAR BOUMEDIENE ET AL.
06–1195 v.
GEORGE W. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, ET AL.
KHALED A. F. AL ODAH, NEXT FRIEND OF FAWZI
KHALID ABDULLAH FAHAD AL ODAH, ET AL.
06–1196 v.
UNITED STATES ET AL.
ON PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Nos. 06–1195 and 06–1196. Decided April 2, 2007
The petitions for writs of certiorari are denied.
Statement of JUSTICE STEVENS and JUSTICE KENNEDY
respecting the denial of certiorari.
Despite the obvious importance of the issues raised in
these cases, we are persuaded that traditional rules gov
erning our decision of constitutional questions, see Ash-
wander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring), and our practice of requiring the exhaustion
of available remedies as a precondition to accepting juris
diction over applications for the writ of habeas corpus, cf.
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944) (per curiam), make it
appropriate to deny these petitions at this time. However,
“[t]his Court has frequently recognized that the policy
underlying the exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine does not
require the exhaustion of inadequate remedies.” Marino
v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 570, n. 12 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring). If petitioners later seek to establish that the
2 BOUMEDIENE v. BUSH
Statement of STEVENS and KENNEDY, JJ.
Government has unreasonably delayed proceedings under
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Tit. X, 119 Stat.
2739, or some other and ongoing injury, alternative means
exist for us to consider our jurisdiction over the allegations
made by petitioners before the Court of Appeals. See 28
U.S. C. §§1651(a), 2241. Were the Government to take
additional steps to prejudice the position of petitioners in
seeking review in this Court, “courts of competent jurisdic
tion,” including this Court, “should act promptly to ensure
that the office and purposes of the writ of habeas corpus
are not compromised.” Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062,
1064 (2006) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in denial of certio
rari). And as always, denial of certiorari does not consti
tute an expression of any opinion on the merits. See Rasul
v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480–481 (2004) (majority opinion of
STEVENS, J.); id., at 487 (KENNEDY, J., concurring in
judgment).
"
Deduce the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 0 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Criminal Procedure |
49 | Given the following opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
" Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 1
Statement of SCALIA, J.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 07–343
_________________
PATRICK KENNEDY, PETITIONER v. LOUISIANA
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
[October 1, 2008]
Statement of JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF
JUSTICE joins, respecting the denial of rehearing.
Respondent has moved for rehearing of this case be-
cause there has come to light a federal statute enacted in
2006 permitting the death sentence under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice for rape of a minor. See Pub L.
109–163, §552(b)(1), 119 Stat. 3263. This provision was
not cited by either party, nor by any of the numerous
amici in the case; it was first brought to the Court’s atten-
tion after the opinion had issued, in a letter signed by 85
Members of Congress. Respondent asserts that rehearing
is justified because this statute calls into question the
majority opinion’s conclusion that there is a national
consensus against capital punishment for rape of a child.
I am voting against the petition for rehearing because
the views of the American people on the death penalty for
child rape were, to tell the truth, irrelevant to the major-
ity’s decision in this case. The majority opinion, after an
unpersuasive attempt to show that a consensus against
the penalty existed, in the end came down to this: “[T]he
Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judg-
ment will be brought to bear on the question of the accept-
ability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amend-
ment.” Ante, at ___ (slip op., at 24). Of course the
Constitution contemplates no such thing; the proposed
2 KENNEDY v. LOUISIANA
Statement of SCALIA, J.
Eighth Amendment would have been laughed to scorn if it
had read “no criminal penalty shall be imposed which the
Supreme Court deems unacceptable.” But that is what
the majority opinion said, and there is no reason to believe
that absence of a national consensus would provoke second
thoughts.
While the new evidence of American opinion is ulti-
mately irrelevant to the majority’s decision, let there be no
doubt that it utterly destroys the majority’s claim to be
discerning a national consensus and not just giving effect
to the majority’s own preference. As noted in the letter
from Members of Congress, the bill providing the death
penalty for child rape passed the Senate 95–0; it passed
the House 374–41, with the votes of a majority of each
State’s delegation; and was signed by the President.
JUSTICE KENNEDY’s statement posits two reasons why this
act by Congress proves nothing about the national consen-
sus regarding permissible penalties for child rape. First,
it claims the statute merely “reclassif[ied]” the offense of
child rape. Ante, at 2. But the law did more than that; it
specifically established (as it would have to do) the penalty
for the new offense of child rape—and that penalty was
death: “For an offense under subsection (a) (rape) or sub-
section (b) (rape of a child), death or such other punish-
ment as a court-martial may direct.” §552(b)(1), 119 Stat.
3263 (emphasis added). By separate executive order, the
President later expressly reauthorized the death penalty
as a punishment for child rape. Exec. Order No. 13447, 72
Fed. Reg. 56214 (2007). Based on these acts, there is
infinitely more reason to think that Congress and the
President made a judgment regarding the appropriateness
of the death penalty for child rape than there is to think
that the many non-enacting state legislatures upon which
the majority relies did so—especially since it was widely
believed that Coker took the capital-punishment option off
the table. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
Cite as: 554 U. S. ____ (2008) 3
Statement of SCALIA, J.
Second, JUSTICE KENNEDY speculates that the Eighth
Amendment may permit subjecting a member of the mili-
tary to a means of punishment that would be cruel and
unusual if inflicted upon a civilian for the same crime.
That is perhaps so where the fact of the malefactor’s
membership in the Armed Forces makes the offense more
grievous. One can imagine, for example, a social judgment
that treason by a military officer who has sworn to defend
his country deserves the death penalty even though trea-
son by a civilian does not. (That is not the social judgment
our society has made, see 18 U.S. C. §2381, but one can
imagine it.) It is difficult to imagine, however, how rape of
a child could sometimes be deserving of death for a soldier
but never for a civilian.
"
Identify the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 0 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Criminal Procedure |
50 | In the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS) opinion:
" Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 1
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
LAWRENCE W. NELSON, AKA ZIKEE v.
UNITED STATES
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08–5657. Decided January 26, 2009
PER CURIAM.
Lawrence Nelson was convicted of one count of conspir
acy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute
more than 50 grams of cocaine base. See 21 U.S. C. §846.
The District Court calculated Nelson’s sentencing range
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and im
posed a sentence of 360 months in prison (the bottom of
the range). During sentencing, the judge explained that
under Fourth Circuit precedent, “ ‘the Guidelines are
considered presumptively reasonable,’ ” so that “ ‘unless
there’s a good reason in the [statutory sentencing] fac
tors . . . , the Guideline sentence is the reasonable sen
tence.’ ” Pet. for Cert. 10.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed Nelson’s conviction and sentence. United
States v. Nelson, 237 Fed. Appx. 819 (2007) (per curiam).
It noted that within-Guidelines sentences are presump
tively reasonable, and rejected Nelson’s argument that the
District Court’s reliance on that presumption was error.
Id., at 821.
Nelson filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. We
granted the petition, vacated the judgment, and remanded
the case to the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in
light of Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). Nelson
v. United States, 552 U. S. ___ (2008).
On remand and without further briefing, the Fourth
Circuit again affirmed the sentence. 276 Fed. Appx. 331
(2008) (per curiam). The court acknowledged that under
2 NELSON v. UNITED STATES
Per Curiam
Rita, while courts of appeals “may apply a presumption of
reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a
proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines,” 551
U.S., at 347, “the sentencing court does not enjoy the
benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sen
tence should apply,” id., at 351. Instead, the sentencing
court must first calculate the Guidelines range, and then
consider what sentence is appropriate for the individual
defendant in light of the statutory sentencing factors, 18
U.S. C. §3553(a), explaining any variance from the former
with reference to the latter. Nonetheless, the Fourth
Circuit upheld the sentence, finding that the District
Court did not treat the Guidelines as “mandatory” but
rather understood that they were only advisory. 276 Fed.
Appx., at 333.
Nelson has again filed a petition for a writ of certiorari,
reasserting, inter alia, essentially the same argument he
made before us the first time: that the District Court’s
statements clearly indicate that it impermissibly applied a
presumption of reasonableness to his Guidelines range.
The United States admits that the Fourth Circuit erred in
rejecting that argument following our remand; we agree.
Our cases do not allow a sentencing court to presume
that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range is
reasonable. In Rita we said as much, in fairly explicit
terms: “We repeat that the presumption before us is an
appellate court presumption. . . . [T]he sentencing court
does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the
Guidelines sentence should apply.” 551 U.S., at 351. And
in Gall v. United States, 552 U. S. ___ (2007), we reiter
ated that district judges, in considering how the various
statutory sentencing factors apply to an individual defen
dant, “may not presume that the Guidelines range is
reasonable.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11–12).
In this case, the Court of Appeals quoted the above
language from Rita but affirmed the sentence anyway
Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 3
Per Curiam
after finding that the District Judge did not treat the
Guidelines as mandatory. That is true, but beside the
point. The Guidelines are not only not mandatory on
sentencing courts; they are also not to be presumed rea
sonable. We think it plain from the comments of the
sentencing judge that he did apply a presumption of rea
sonableness to Nelson’s Guidelines range. Under our
recent precedents, that constitutes error.
The petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 555 U. S. ____ (2009) 1
BREYER, J., concurring in judgment
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
LAWRENCE W. NELSON, AKA ZIKEE v.
UNITED STATES
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08–5657. Decided January 26, 2009
JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins, con
curring in the judgment.
The Solicitor General confessed that the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred. Given the nature of
the error, and in light of the Solicitor General’s confession,
I would grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the judg
ment of the Court of Appeals, and remand for further
proceedings.
"
What is the relevant issue area of the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 0 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Criminal Procedure |
51 | Based on the provided opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS): Cite as: 559 U. S. ____ (2010) 1
Per Curiam
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
JAMAL KIYEMBA ET AL. v. BARACK H. OBAMA,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 08–1234. Decided March 1, 2010
PER CURIAM.
We granted certiorari, 558 U. S. ___ (2009), on the ques
tion whether a federal court exercising habeas jurisdiction
has the power to order the release of prisoners held at
Guantanamo Bay “where the Executive detention is in
definite and without authorization in law, and release into
the continental United States is the only possible effective
remedy,” Pet. for Cert. i. By now, however, each of the
detainees at issue in this case has received at least one
offer of resettlement in another country. Most of the
detainees have accepted an offer of resettlement; five
detainees, however, have rejected two such offers and are
still being held at Guantanamo Bay.
This change in the underlying facts may affect the legal
issues presented. No court has yet ruled in this case in
light of the new facts, and we decline to be the first to do
so. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718, n. 7
(2005) (“[W]e are a court of review, not of first view”).
Under these circumstances, we vacate the judgment and
remand the case to the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit. It should determine, in
the first instance, what further proceedings in that court
or in the District Court are necessary and appropriate for
2 KIYEMBA v. OBAMA
Per Curiam
the full and prompt disposition of the case in light of the
new developments.
It is so ordered.
Determine the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
52 | Considering the following statement from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS): Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 1
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AMERICAN TRADITION PARTNERSHIP, INC., FKA
WESTERN TRADITION PARTNERSHIP, INC.,
ET AL. v. STEVE BULLOCK, ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF MONTANA, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF MONTANA
No. 11–1179. Decided June 25, 2012
PER CURIAM.
A Montana state law provides that a “corporation may
not make . . . an expenditure in connection with a candi-
date or a political committee that supports or opposes a
candidate or a political party.” Mont. Code Ann. §13–
35–227(1) (2011). The Montana Supreme Court rejected
petitioners’ claim that this statute violates the First
Amendment. 2011 MT 328, 363 Mont. 220, 271 P.3d 1.
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, this
Court struck down a similar federal law, holding that
“political speech does not lose First Amendment protection
simply because its source is a corporation.” 558 U.S. ___,
___ (2010) (slip op., at 26) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). The question presented in this case is whether the
holding of Citizens United applies to the Montana state
law. There can be no serious doubt that it does. See U. S.
Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. Montana’s arguments in support of
the judgment below either were already rejected in Citi-
zens United, or fail to meaningfully distinguish that case.
The petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment of
the Supreme Court of Montana is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 567 U. S. ____ (2012) 1
BREYER, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AMERICAN TRADITION PARTNERSHIP, INC., FKA
WESTERN TRADITION PARTNERSHIP, INC.,
ET AL. v. STEVE BULLOCK, ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF MONTANA, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF MONTANA
No. 11–1179. Decided June 25, 2012
JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUS-
TICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting.
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the
Court concluded that “independent expenditures, includ
ing those made by corporations, do not give rise to corrup
tion or the appearance of corruption.” 558 U.S. ___, ___
(2010) (slip op., at 42). I disagree with the Court’s hold-
ing for the reasons expressed in Justice Stevens’ dissent
in that case. As Justice Stevens explained, “technically in
dependent expenditures can be corrupting in much the
same way as direct contributions.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at
67–68). Indeed, Justice Stevens recounted a “substantial
body of evidence” suggesting that “[m]any corporate inde
pendent expenditures . . . had become essentially inter
changeable with direct contributions in their capacity to
generate quid pro quo arrangements.” Id., at ___ (slip op.,
at 64–65).
Moreover, even if I were to accept Citizens United, this
Court’s legal conclusion should not bar the Montana Su
preme Court’s finding, made on the record before it, that
independent expenditures by corporations did in fact lead
to corruption or the appearance of corruption in Montana.
Given the history and political landscape in Montana, that
court concluded that the State had a compelling interest in
limiting independent expenditures by corporations. 2011
MT 328, ¶¶ 36–37, 363 Mont. 220, 235–236, 271 P.3d 1,
2 AMERICAN TRADITION PARTNERSHIP, INC. v. BULLOCK
BREYER, J., dissenting
36–37. Thus, Montana’s experience, like considerable ex
perience elsewhere since the Court’s decision in Citizens
United, casts grave doubt on the Court’s supposition that
independent expenditures do not corrupt or appear to do
so.
Were the matter up to me, I would vote to grant the
petition for certiorari in order to reconsider Citizens United
or, at least, its application in this case. But given the
Court’s per curiam disposition, I do not see a significant
possibility of reconsideration. Consequently, I vote in
stead to deny the petition.
What is the relevant issue area addressed in the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 2 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | First Amendment |
53 | Considering the following statement from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
" Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2013) 1
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. UNITED STATES
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 13–113. Decided December 2, 2013
PER CURIAM.
When a taxpayer overpays his taxes, he is generally
entitled to interest from the Government for the period
between the payment and the ultimate refund. See 26
U.S. C. §6611(a). That interest begins to run “from the
date of overpayment.” §§6611(b)(1), (b)(2). But the Code
does not define “the date of overpayment.”
In this case, after the Internal Revenue Service advised
Ford Motor Company that it had underpaid its taxes from
1983 until 1989, Ford remitted a series of deposits to the
IRS totaling $875 million. Those deposits stopped the ac-
crual of interest that Ford would otherwise owe once the
audits were completed and the amount of its underpay-
ment was finally determined. See §6601; Rev. Proc. 84–
58, 1984–2 Cum. Bull. 501. Later, Ford requested that the
IRS treat the deposits as advance payments of the addi-
tional tax that Ford owed. Eventually the parties deter-
mined that Ford had overpaid its taxes in the relevant
years, thereby entitling Ford to a return of the over-
payment as well as interest. But the parties disagreed
about when the interest began to run under 26 U.S. C.
§6611(b)(1). Ford argued that “the date of overpayment”
was the date that it first remitted the deposits to the IRS.
Ibid. The Government countered that the date of over-
payment was the date that Ford requested that the IRS
treat the remittances as payments of tax. The difference
between the parties’ competing interpretations of §6611(b)
is worth some $445 million.
Ford sued the Government in Federal District Court,
2 FORD MOTOR CO. v. UNITED STATES
Per Curiam
asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. §1346(a)(1). The
Government did not contest the court’s jurisdiction. See
Brief in Opposition 3, n. 3. The District Court accepted
the Government’s construction of §6611(b) and granted its
motion for judgment on the pleadings. A panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding
that §6611 is a waiver of sovereign immunity that must be
construed strictly in favor of the Government. 508 Fed.
Appx. 506 (2012).
Ford sought certiorari, arguing that the Sixth Circuit
was wrong to give §6611 a strict construction. In Ford’s
view, it is 28 U.S. C. §1346—not §6611—that waives the
Government’s immunity from this suit, and §6611(b) is a
substantive provision that should not be construed strictly.
See Gómez-Pérez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 491 (2008);
United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S.
465, 472–473 (2003). In its response to Ford’s petition for
certiorari, however, the Government contended for the
first time that §1346(a)(1) does not apply at all to this suit;
it argues that the only basis for jurisdiction, and “the only
general waiver of sovereign immunity that encompasses
[Ford’s] claim,” is the Tucker Act, 28 U.S. C. §1491(a).
Brief in Opposition 3, n. 3. Although the Government
acquiesced in jurisdiction in the lower courts, if the Gov-
ernment is now correct that the Tucker Act applies to this
suit, jurisdiction over this case was proper only in the
United States Court of Federal Claims. See §1491(a).
This Court “is one of final review, ‘not of first view.’ ”
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 529
(2009) (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718,
n. 7 (2005)). The Sixth Circuit should have the first oppor-
tunity to consider the Government’s new contention with
respect to jurisdiction in this case. Depending on that
court’s answer, it may also consider what impact, if any,
the jurisdictional determination has on the merits issues,
especially whether or not §6611 is a waiver of sovereign
Cite as: 571 U. S. ____ (2013) 3
Per Curiam
immunity that should be construed strictly.
The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of
the Sixth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
"
What is the central issue area addressed in the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 11 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Federal Taxation |
54 | In the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS) opinion: Cite as: 573 U. S. ____ (2014) 1
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
TARA SHENEVA WILLIAMS v. DEBORAH K.
JOHNSON, ACTING WARDEN
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 13–9085. Decided July 1, 2014
PER CURIAM.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for considera-
tion of petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim under the
standard set forth in 28 U.S. C. §2254(d).
It is so ordered.
What is the issue area being addressed in the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 0 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Criminal Procedure |
55 | Given the following opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
"
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USA.GOV
Supreme Court of the United States
"
Identify the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 7 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Economic Activity |
56 | Examine the provided opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
" Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2016) 1
Per Curiam
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 14–1516
_________________
STEPHEN DUNCAN, WARDEN, PETITIONER v.
LAWRENCE OWENS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
[January 20, 2016]
PER CURIAM.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently
granted.
It is so ordered.
"
Deduce the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 8 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Judicial Power |
57 | Given the following opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
" Cite as: 577 U. S. ____ (2016) 1
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
MELENE JAMES v. CITY OF BOISE, IDAHO, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF IDAHO
No. 15–493. Decided January 25, 2016
PER CURIAM.
Under federal law, a court has discretion to “allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reason-
able attorney’s fee” in a civil rights lawsuit filed under 42
U.S. C. §1983. 42 U.S. C. §1988. In Hughes v. Rowe, 449
U.S. 5 (1980) (per curiam), this Court interpreted §1988 to
permit a prevailing defendant in such a suit to recover
fees only if “the plaintiff ’s action was frivolous, unreason-
able, or without foundation.” Id., at 14 (quoting Chris-
tiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
In the decision below, the Idaho Supreme Court con-
cluded that it was not bound by this Court’s interpretation
of §1988 in Hughes. According to that court, “[a]lthough
the Supreme Court may have the authority to limit the
discretion of lower federal courts, it does not have the
authority to limit the discretion of state courts where such
limitation is not contained in the statute.” 158 Idaho
713, 734, 351 P.3d 1171, 1192 (2015). The court then pro-
ceeded to award attorney’s fees under §1988 to a prevailing
defendant without first determining that “the plaintiff ’s
action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without founda-
tion.” The court’s fee award rested solely on its interpreta-
tion of federal law; the court explicitly refused to award
fees under state law. Id., at 734–735, 351 P. 3d, at 1192–
1193. We grant certiorari, and now reverse.
Section 1988 is a federal statute. “It is this Court’s
responsibility to say what a [federal] statute means, and
once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to
2 JAMES v. BOISE
Per Curiam
respect that understanding of the governing rule of law.”
Nitro-Lift Technologies, L. L. C. v. Howard, 568 U. S. ___,
___ (2012) (per curiam) (slip op., at 5) (quoting Rivers v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). And for good reason. As Jus-
tice Story explained 200 years ago, if state courts were
permitted to disregard this Court’s rulings on federal law,
“the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United
States would be different in different states, and might,
perhaps, never have precisely the same construction,
obligation, or efficacy, in any two states. The public mis-
chiefs that would attend such a state of things would be
truly deplorable.” Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat.
304, 348 (1816).
The Idaho Supreme Court, like any other state or fed-
eral court, is bound by this Court’s interpretation of federal
law. The state court erred in concluding otherwise. The
judgment of the Idaho Supreme Court is reversed, and the
case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
"
The relevant issue area is: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 5 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Attorneys |
58 | Considering the following statement from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS):
" Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 1
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
MICHAEL DAMON RIPPO, PETITIONER v.
RENEE BAKER, WARDEN
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA
No. 16–6316. Decided March 6, 2017
PER CURIAM.
A Nevada jury convicted petitioner Michael Damon
Rippo of first-degree murder and other offenses and sen-
tenced him to death. During his trial, Rippo received
information that the judge was the target of a federal
bribery probe, and he surmised that the Clark County
District Attorney’s Office—which was prosecuting him—
was playing a role in that investigation. Rippo moved for
the judge’s disqualification under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, contending that a judge
could not impartially adjudicate a case in which one of the
parties was criminally investigating him. But the trial
judge declined to recuse himself, and (after that judge’s
indictment on federal charges) a different judge later
denied Rippo’s motion for a new trial. The Nevada Su-
preme Court affirmed on direct appeal, reasoning in part
that Rippo had not introduced evidence that state authori-
ties were involved in the federal investigation. Rippo v.
State, 113 Nev. 1239, 1246–1250, 946 P.2d 1017, 1023–
1024 (1997) ( per curiam).
In a later application for state postconviction relief,
Rippo advanced his bias claim once more, this time point-
ing to documents from the judge’s criminal trial indicating
that the district attorney’s office had participated in the
investigation of the trial judge. See, e.g., App. to Pet. for
Cert. 236–237, 397. The state postconviction court denied
relief, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed. Rippo v.
State, 132 Nev. ___, ___, 368 P.3d 729, 743–745 (2016). It
2 RIPPO v. BAKER
Per Curiam
likened Rippo’s claim to the “camouflaging bias” theory
that this Court discussed in Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S.
899 (1997). The Bracy petitioner argued that a judge who
accepts bribes to rule in favor of some defendants would
seek to disguise that favorable treatment by ruling against
defendants who did not bribe him. Id., at 905. We ex-
plained that despite the “speculative” nature of that theory,
the petitioner was entitled to discovery because he had
also alleged specific facts suggesting that the judge may
have colluded with defense counsel to rush the petitioner’s
case to trial. See id., at 905–909. The Nevada Supreme
Court reasoned that, in contrast, Rippo was not entitled to
discovery or an evidentiary hearing because his allega-
tions “d[id] not support the assertion that the trial judge
was actually biased in this case.” 132 Nev., at ___, 368
P. 3d, at 744.*
We vacate the Nevada Supreme Court’s judgment be-
cause it applied the wrong legal standard. Under our
precedents, the Due Process Clause may sometimes de-
mand recusal even when a judge “ ‘ha[s] no actual bias.’ ”
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986).
Recusal is required when, objectively speaking, “the prob-
ability of actual bias on the part of the judge or deci-
sionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); see Williams v.
Pennsylvania, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 6)
(“The Court asks not whether a judge harbors an actual,
subjective bias, but instead whether, as an objective mat-
ter, the average judge in his position is likely to be neu-
——————
* The court further relied on its bias holding to determine that Rippo
had not established cause and prejudice to overcome various state
procedural bars. 132 Nev., at ___, 368 P. 3d, at 745. Because the court
below did not invoke any state-law grounds “independent of the merits
of [Rippo’s] federal constitutional challenge,” we have jurisdiction to
review its resolution of federal law. Foster v. Chatman, 578 U. S. ___,
___ (2016) (slip op., at 8).
Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 3
Per Curiam
tral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for
bias” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Our decision in
Bracy is not to the contrary: Although we explained that
the petitioner there had pointed to facts suggesting actual,
subjective bias, we did not hold that a litigant must show
as a matter of course that a judge was “actually biased in
[the litigant’s] case,” 132 Nev., at ___, 368 P. 3d, at 744—
much less that he must do so when, as here, he does not
allege a theory of “camouflaging bias.” The Nevada Su-
preme Court did not ask the question our precedents
require: whether, considering all the circumstances al-
leged, the risk of bias was too high to be constitutionally
tolerable. As a result, we grant the petition for writ of
certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, and we vacate the judgment below and remand
the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
"
What is the central issue area addressed in the opinion? Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 3 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Due Process |
59 | Based on the provided opinion from the Supreme Court of USA (SCOTUS): Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 1
Per Curiam
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NORTH CAROLINA, ET AL. v. SANDRA LITTLE
COVINGTON, ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 16–1023. Decided June 5, 2017
PER CURIAM.
The North Carolina General Assembly redrew state
legislative districts in 2011 to account for population
changes revealed by the 2010 census. In May 2015, several
registered North Carolina voters (here called plaintiffs)
brought this action in the U. S. District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina, alleging that 28 majority-
black districts in the new plan were unconstitutional
racial gerrymanders. The District Court ruled for the
plaintiffs in August 2016, holding that race was the pre-
dominant factor in the design of each challenged district,
and that in none was that use of race “supported by a
strong basis in evidence and narrowly tailored to comply
with [the Voting Rights Act].” 316 F. R. D. 117, 176
(MDNC 2016).* The court declined to require changes in
time for the then-impending November 2016 election, but
ordered the General Assembly to redraw the map before
North Carolina holds any future elections for that body.
See App. to Juris. Statement 148–149.
Three weeks after the November 2016 election, the
District Court ordered additional relief. In addition to
setting a March 2017 deadline for the General Assembly’s
drawing of new districts, the court ordered that “[t]he
term of any legislator elected in 2016” from a district later
——————
* By separate order, we have summarily affirmed the District Court’s
ruling on the merits of the plaintiffs’ racial-gerrymandering claims.
See No. 16–649, post, p. ___.
2 NORTH CAROLINA v. COVINGTON
Per Curiam
modified by that remedial plan “shall be shortened to one
year” (rather than the regular two). Id., at 203. Those
legislators would then be replaced by new ones, to be
chosen in court-ordered special elections in the fall of
2017. The legislators elected in those special elections,
too, were then to “serve a one year term.” Id., at 204.
Finally, in order to make this regime workable, the court
also suspended provisions of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion requiring prospective legislators to reside within a
district for one year before they may be elected to repre-
sent it. See id., at 203 (citing N. C. Const., Art. II, §§6–7).
To explain why these measures were warranted, the court
stated: “While special elections have costs, those costs pale
in comparison to the injury caused by allowing citizens to
continue to be represented by legislators elected pursuant
to a racial gerrymander.” App. to Juris. Statement 200.
North Carolina appealed the District Court’s remedial
order to this Court, and we granted a stay pending appeal.
See 580 U. S. ___ (2017). The State now contends that
“the remedial order should be vacated for the simple rea-
son that the district court failed to meaningfully weigh
any equitable considerations.” Juris. Statement 22. We
share that assessment and now vacate the order.
Relief in redistricting cases is “‘fashioned in the light of
well-known principles of equity.’” Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 585 (1964). A district court therefore must
undertake an “equitable weighing process” to select a
fitting remedy for the legal violations it has identified,
NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm’n, 470 U.S.
166, 183, n. 36 (1985), taking account of “‘what is neces-
sary, what is fair, and what is workable,’” New York v.
Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 129 (1977). And in the
context of deciding whether to truncate existing legisla-
tors’ terms and order a special election, there is much for a
court to weigh. Although this Court has never addressed
whether or when a special election may be a proper remedy
Cite as: 581 U. S. ____ (2017) 3
Per Curiam
for a racial gerrymander, obvious considerations include
the severity and nature of the particular constitutional
violation, the extent of the likely disruption to the ordi-
nary processes of governance if early elections are im-
posed, and the need to act with proper judicial restraint
when intruding on state sovereignty. We do not suggest
anything about the relative weight of these factors (or
others), but they are among the matters a court would
generally be expected to consider in its “balancing of the
individual and collective interests” at stake. Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
Rather than undertaking such an analysis in this case,
the District Court addressed the balance of equities in
only the most cursory fashion. As noted above, the court
simply announced that “[w]hile special elections have
costs,” those unspecified costs “pale in comparison” to the
prospect that citizens will be “represented by legislators
elected pursuant to a racial gerrymander.” App. to Juris.
Statement 200. That minimal reasoning would appear to
justify a special election in every racial-gerrymandering
case—a result clearly at odds with our demand for careful
case-specific analysis. For that reason, we cannot have
confidence that the court adequately grappled with the
interests on both sides of the remedial question before us.
And because the District Court’s discretion “was barely
exercised here,” its order provides no meaningful basis for
even deferential review. Winter v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 27 (2008).
For these reasons, we vacate the District Court’s reme-
dial order and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Determine the relevant issue area discussed in the opinion: Options: Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, Miscellaneous | 1 | ['Criminal Procedure', 'Civil Rights', 'First Amendment', 'Due Process', 'Privacy', 'Attorneys', 'Unions', 'Economic Activity', 'Judicial Power', 'Federalism', 'Interstate Relations', 'Federal Taxation', 'Miscellaneous'] | Civil Rights |