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+{"meta":{"title":"Scientific Humility: Scientific Honesty \u00e2\u0080\u0093 Hypothesis and Science","type":"info:eu-repo\/semantics\/article","creator":"Puri, Bhakti Madhava","subject":"Philosophy","date":"2009","identifier":"oai:philarchive.org\/rec\/PURSHS","description":"It is not that scientists make an hypothesis first, and then try to find the data to fit that hypothesis. Rather, the process is first observation, then an hypothes is made to describe the data, then conclude that the data has been described by the hypothesis. But this is not an explanation of the phenomenon. It is merely a description of the data in different terms, usually mathematics. It is essentially a tautology. Thus to observe various points and connect them by a line or curve, then to find the mathematical formula that will construct that curve is said to be the law of the curve or the law governing the data points. If those data points happen to be the positions of a planet in space at different times, then the mathematical equation that produces the points on that curve is called the law of motion of the planets. Now, in origin of life studies, observation reveals that life comes from life only. There is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that life is produced out of non-living matter. It was Louis Pasteur who disproved this theory of abiogenesis. From a purely empirical viewpoint, therefore, we have no justification for stating that life comes from inanimate matter. The evidence is that throughout the entire history of modern science such a production of life from matter has never been observed. The question is: Why make a hypothesis about something that has never been observed? If we want to be scientific, then our hypothesis must match the data. Life comes from life is observed all over the Earth, and we might say, all over the universe as far as we have observed it. So where is the justification for claiming otherwise? Rather, we must conclude that the claim that life comes from matter is completely unscientific because it is not a conclusion based on any empirical observation at all. It is purely wishful thinking \u00e2\u0080\u0094 a \u00e2\u0080\u009cnaturalistic\u00e2\u0080\u009d or materialistic ideology that is masquerading as science. It is thus doubly deceitful since it is not only an unproven belief but an ideology that poses as a scientific theory.","datestamp":"2022-03-08T04:33:35Z","dup_signals":{"dup_doc_count":109,"dup_dump_count":54,"dup_details":{"curated_sources":2,"2019-13":4,"2019-04":1,"2018-51":1,"2018-47":3,"2018-43":2,"2018-39":3,"2018-34":3,"2018-30":3,"2018-26":2,"2018-22":3,"2018-17":1,"2018-13":5,"2018-09":2,"2018-05":2,"2017-51":2,"2017-47":1,"2017-43":4,"2017-39":2,"2017-34":3,"2017-30":2,"2017-26":4,"2017-22":1,"2017-17":4,"2017-09":3,"2017-04":2,"2016-50":2,"2016-44":2,"2016-40":2,"2016-36":2,"2016-30":1,"2016-26":1,"2016-22":1,"2016-18":1,"2016-07":1,"2015-48":1,"2015-35":1,"2015-32":1,"2015-27":1,"2015-22":1,"2015-14":1,"2014-52":1,"2014-49":2,"2014-42":4,"2014-41":2,"2014-35":2,"2014-23":2,"2014-15":1,"2019-18":1,"2017-13":5,"2015-18":1,"2015-11":1,"2015-06":1,"2014-10":1,"2013-48":1}}},"text":"\/7\/22, 8:23 AM Scientific Humility: Scientific Honesty \u2013 Hypothesis and Science | Darwin Under Siege https:\/\/scienceandscientist.org\/Darwin\/2009\/12\/07\/scientific-humility-scientific-honesty-hypothesis-and-science\/ 2\/4 January 2010 December 2009 November 2009 October 2009 Scientific Humility: Scientific Honesty \u2013 Hypothesis and Science Monday, December 7, 2009 || By: Sripad Bhakti Madhava Puri Maharaja, Ph.D. || Sripad Bhakti Madhava Puri Maharaja, Ph.D. Bhaktivedanta Institute It is not that scientists make an hypothesis first, [1] and then try to find the data to fit that hypothesis. Rather, the process is first observation, then an hypothes is made to describe the data, then conclude that the data has been described by the hypothesis. But this is not an explanation of the phenomenon. It is merely a description of the data in different terms, usually mathematics. It is essentially a tautology. Thus to observe various points and connect them by a line or curve, then to find the mathematical formula that will construct that curve is said to be the law of the curve or the law governing the data points. If those data points happen to be the positions of a planet in space at different times, then the mathematical equation that produces the points on that curve is called the law of motion of the planets. Now, in origin of life studies, observation reveals that life comes from life only. There is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that life is produced out of non-living matter. It was Louis Pasteur who disproved this theory of abiogenesis. From a purely empirical viewpoint, therefore, we have no justification for stating that life comes from inanimate matter. The evidence is that throughout the entire history of modern science such a production of life from matter has never been observed. The question is: Why make a hypothesis about something that has never been observed? If we want to be scientific, then our hypothesis must match the data. Life comes from life is observed all over the Earth, and we might say, all over the universe as far as we have observed it. So where is the justification for claiming otherwise? Rather, we must conclude that the claim that life comes from matter is completely unscientific because it 2\/7\/22, 8:23 AM Scientific Humility: Scientific Honesty \u2013 Hypothesis and Science | Darwin Under Siege https:\/\/scienceandscientist.org\/Darwin\/2009\/12\/07\/scientific-humility-scientific-honesty-hypothesis-and-science\/ 3\/4 is not a conclusion based on any empirical observation at all. It is purely wishful thinking - a \"naturalistic\" or materialistic ideology that is masquerading as science. It is thus doubly deceitful since it is not only an unproven belief but an ideology that poses as a scientific theory. Another area where ideology overrules scientific observation is the hypothesis of Darwinian evolution. A variety of different species is observed, but what has never been observed is one species producing another. Dogs give birth to dogs, however many breeding varieties may be produced. We have never in the course of human history observed a dog give birth to a horse. We have never observed populations of plants giving rise to a population of insects, etc. For the sake of a hypothesis based on no conclusive evidence whatsoever, the evolutionary ideology has taken control of biology to such severe degree that any other conception of the nature of life and its origin is not even considered part of science. But as we have noted here, ideology is not science. Or if we assume that ideology is part of science, then we must be willing to accept other ideological premises that at least agree with observed empirical facts. The facts are: the Cambrian explosion [2] occurs in which (a) species appear suddenly without any precursor species, and (b) no transitional forms have ever been observed being produced from any species in the history of mankind. The conclusion from the data should be: there is no such thing as evolution of species. This should be the working hypothesis based on observation. If such data is found that this hypothesis must be changed, then we will have to deal with that. But the data available at present has never supported evolution. The original idea of Darwin was based on specious reasoning only. The change in the size of bird beaks, does not indicate a drastic evolution of giraffes from zebras. Adaption within a species is a well known phenomenon. But this adaptability does not encompass a complete change of species. Modern advances in biology since the time of Darwin, that have allowed observation of the inner workings of simple cells, have created another great hurdle to Darwinian evolutionary thinking. The vast complexity of even the smallest cell shows that such organisms have no conceivable chance of ever having arisen by a random combination of chemical or biological parts. Thus advancement of science has provided more substantial evidence against evolution than ever before. The so-called tree-of-life has been completely chopped down to a very tenuous bush [3] due to the tracing of genetic lines through various species. The root of this bush is merely posited an extra, without any evidence whatsoever or even a plausible hypothesis for how a supposed original cell created the bush. The whole idea that we bring to the study of Nature, is that living organisms are each independent, self-subsisting life forms that somehow evolve or transmutate from one form to another. However, this viewpoint completely ignores the well-known interdependence of life forms on one another and on their environment. The true ecological unity of life on Earth, which is known as the Gaia principle (called Bhumi in Sanskrit texts), is not acknowledged in the insular concept of cellular life that is maintained today. We propose that Life is an organic unity that appears in a myriad of forms throughout the planet displaying its inherently determinate nature (as a unity in difference) as a varigated display of species from the lowly microbe to the dominate Bhumi conception, and beyond to encompass the rest of the universe. This is in keeping with the Vedantic worldview. Thus Life is a universal organic unity that exhibits itself as a complete spectrum of living unities, as much as white light when passed through a prism exhibits itself as a rainbow of colors. One color does not evolve from another, and so too does 2\/7\/22, 8:23 AM Scientific Humility: Scientific Honesty \u2013 Hypothesis and Science | Darwin Under Siege https:\/\/scienceandscientist.org\/Darwin\/2009\/12\/07\/scientific-humility-scientific-honesty-hypothesis-and-science\/ 4\/4 Life exhibit itself in a variety of forms that constitute the wholeness of Life in its full determinateness. Since the beginning of time, Veda has plainly stated the obvious that has always been observed by every man, woman and child who ever lived. \"janmady asya yato\" \u2013 the origin of everything is \"abhijnah svarat\" \u2013 the unitary Supreme Cognizant Being, as given in the very first text of Bhagavat Purana. [4] Consciousness, in other words, comes from consciousness. It does not come from unconscious matter, as materialism dogmatically avers without trace of even the slightest logical reasoning. Where there is cognition or consciousness, there is life. So life comes from life. This is the Vedic conclusion \"janmady asya yatah\" \u2013 the conclusion of Vedanta-sutra. [5] And it is scientific. This implies that whatever contradicts such conclusion must be unscientific, based purely on dogmatic ideology, or misguided ideology. Our position is that real scientific knowledge is based on the Vedantic viewpoint. And we are engaged in presenting that from a purely scientific and rational viewpoint for all the world to confirm and accept, and to overthrow the misconceived materialist ideology that has gained hegemony over the modern mind and soul of Man. This is the aim of the Bhaktivedanta Institute and We are ready to debate any challengers to convince them in the clearest way that Vedanta and Bhagavatam is to be the paradigm to guide future humanity toward genuine scientific knowledge. We request all scientists to learn this wisdom and verify it in their scientific research in order to establish the Vedanta and Bhagavatam as the authentic scientific knowledge by which humanity can make real progress in understanding the true nature of material nature and the spiritual self. References [1] Of course today, the mathematical system that is adopted for explaining physical phenomena is used to make predictions that are only later observed as proof of the validity of the mathematical equations. Thus the mathematical system of physics has its own symmetry laws that govern its validity without reference to the empirical data. The assumption is that the a priori system yields results that can be verified by empirical observation. But this is the reverse of the original observation-hypothesis-conclusion method of empirical science. [2] Much has been written about the Cambrian explosion or Biological Big Bang. See for example, Simon Conway-Morris, \"The Cambrian explosion of metazoans and molecular biology: would Darwin be satisfied?\" Cambridge Earth Sciences Publication ES 7550. [3] See for example, Graham Lawton, \"Why Darwin was wrong about the tree of life\", \"New Scientist,\" Issue 2692, 21 January 2009. Also, Eugene V Koonin, \"Darwinian evolution in the light of genomics\", a review in \"Nucleic Acid Research,\" 2009. [4] Srimad Bhagavatam 1.1.1 (see http:\/\/srimadbhagavatam.com\/1\/1\/1\/en1) [5] Vedanta-sutra 1.1.2 This entry was posted on Monday, December 7th, 2009 at 1:10 pm and is filed under Challenges\/Evidences, Origin of Life & Matter. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. Be the first of your friends to like this.Like Share Like 11 Share","subset":"phil_papers"}
+{"meta":{"title":"Mutual Funds of Irwin Consulting Planning in Singapore and Tokyo, Japan","type":"info:eu-repo\/semantics\/article","creator":"Mitchell, Brenda","subject":"Philosophy","date":"2006","identifier":"oai:philarchive.org\/rec\/MITMFO-5","description":"Mutual funds are common investments because they provide a cost-effective and effective means to vary your investments (or possess an assortment of securities -- stocks, bonds, etc.) without having to make a huge starting investment.","datestamp":"2022-01-12T05:20:16Z","dup_signals":{"dup_doc_count":109,"dup_dump_count":37,"dup_details":{"curated_sources":1,"2023-14":1,"2022-49":2,"2022-33":2,"2022-05":1,"2021-49":2,"2021-43":1,"2021-31":1,"2021-21":1,"2020-24":1,"2020-10":3,"2019-39":1,"2019-35":1,"2019-30":3,"2019-26":1,"2019-22":1,"2019-18":5,"2019-13":3,"2019-09":8,"2019-04":4,"2018-51":5,"2018-47":5,"2018-43":6,"2018-39":3,"2018-34":7,"2018-30":2,"2018-26":7,"2018-22":4,"2018-17":6,"2018-13":2,"2018-09":8,"2017-51":3,"2017-47":3,"2017-43":1,"2017-39":1,"2017-34":1,"2017-26":1,"2023-40":1}}},"text":"Mutual Funds of Irwin Consulting Planning in Singapore and Tokyo, Japan The Popularity of Mutual Funds Mutual funds are common investments because they provide a cost-effective and effective means to vary your investments (or possess an assortment of securities -stocks, bonds, etc.) without having to make a huge starting investment. Basics about Investing in Mutual Funds Buying shares of a mutual fund allows you to pool your money with other investors and letting the mutual fund (which is essentially a professional capital management firm) invest and administer the money to aid in achieving the fund's targeted financial objective (e.g., income, growth, or a mixture of both). This allows you to fast-track the setting up of a multi-faceted portfolio with as little investment as possible. When to consider Investing in Mutual Funds Since they are efficiently administered by experts and because they provide variety with essentially low starting cash input, mutual funds can be a viable option for the majority of investors. Many investors opt to invest in mutual funds instead of selecting a vast assortment of particular investments. Investing at Irwin Consulting Irwin Consulting advisors provides one of the wide-ranging choices of fund groups in the industry, and your Investment Counselor has the facilities to aid you in selecting the proper fund or basket of funds to satisfy your specific needs. Coordinate well with your Investment Counselor to design a mutual fund portfolio which fits your particular circumstances.","subset":"phil_papers"}
+{"meta":{"title":"The unreality of time","type":"info:eu-repo\/semantics\/article","creator":"McTaggart, John Ellis","subject":"Philosophy","date":"1908","identifier":"oai:philarchive.org\/rec\/MCTTUO","description":null,"datestamp":"2023-11-03T07:39:04Z","dup_signals":{"dup_doc_count":191,"dup_dump_count":61,"dup_details":{"curated_sources":2,"2022-33":1,"2021-43":1,"2021-25":2,"2019-26":1,"2019-09":1,"2019-04":1,"2018-51":1,"2018-47":1,"2018-43":1,"2018-39":1,"2018-34":1,"2018-30":1,"2018-26":1,"2018-22":2,"2018-17":2,"2018-13":4,"2018-09":1,"2018-05":1,"2017-51":2,"2017-47":1,"2017-43":4,"2017-39":2,"2017-34":4,"2017-30":3,"2017-26":4,"2017-22":3,"2017-17":4,"2017-09":4,"2017-04":4,"2016-50":4,"2016-44":4,"2016-40":4,"2016-36":4,"2016-30":6,"2016-26":2,"2016-22":3,"2016-18":2,"2016-07":6,"2015-48":6,"2015-40":4,"2015-35":4,"2015-32":4,"2015-27":4,"2015-22":4,"2015-14":4,"2014-52":3,"2014-49":4,"2014-42":7,"2014-41":5,"2014-35":6,"2014-23":4,"2014-15":6,"2023-06":1,"2017-13":5,"2015-18":4,"2015-11":4,"2015-06":2,"2014-10":3,"2013-48":4,"2013-20":6,"2024-30":1}}},"text":"Mind Association The Unreality of Time Author(s): J. Ellis McTaggart Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 17, No. 68 (Oct., 1908), pp. 457-474 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association Stable URL: http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/2248314 Accessed: 16-01-2017 04:10 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact email@example.com. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms Mind Association, Oxford University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Mind This content downloaded from 184.108.40.206 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms NEW SERIES. No. 68.] LOCTOBER, 1 908. A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGYAND PHILOSOPHY I.-THE UNREALITY OF TIME. BY J. ELLIS MCTAGGART. IT doubtless seems highly paradoxical to assert that Time is unreal, and that all statements which involve its reality are erroneous. Such an assertion involves a far greater departure from the natural position of mankind than is involved in the assertion of the unreality of Space or of the unreality of Matter. So decisive a breach with that natural position is not to be lightly accepted. And yet in all ages the belief in the unreality of time has proved singularly attractive. In the philosophy and religion of the East we find that this doctrine is of cardinal importance. And in the West, where philosophy and religion are less closely connected, we find that the same doctrine continually recurs, both among philosophers and among theologians. Theology never holds itself apart from mysticism for any long period, and almost all mysticism denies the reality of time. In philosophy, again, time is treated as unreal by Spinoza, by Kant, by Hegel, and by Schopenhauer. In the philosophy of the present day the two most important, movements (excluding those which are as yet merely critical) are those which look to Hegel and to Mr. Bradley. And both of these schools deny the reality of time. Such a concurrence of opinion cannot be denied to be highly significant-and is not the less significant because the doctrine takes such different forms, and is supported by such different arguments. I believe that time is unreal.' But I do so for reasons which are not, I think, employed by any of the philosophers whom I have mentioned, and I propose to explain my reasons in this paper. 31 This content downloaded from 126.96.36.199 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms 458 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART: Positions in time, as time appears to us prima' facie, are distinguished in two ways. Each position is Earlier than some, and Later than some, of the other positions. And each position is either Past, Present, or Future. The distinctions of the former class are permanent, while those of the latter are not. If M is ever earlier than N, it is always earlier. But an event, which is now present, was future and will be past. Since distinctions of the first class are permanent, they might be held to be more objective, and to be more essential to the nature of time. I believe, however, that this would be a mistake, and that the distinction of past, present and future is as essential to time as the distinction of earlier and later, while in a certain sense, as we shall see, it may be regarded as more fundamental than the distinction of earlier and later. And it is because the distinctions of past, present and future seem to me to be essential for time, that I regard time as unreal. For the sake of brevity I shall speak of the series of positions running from the far past through the near past to the present, and then from the present to the, near future and the far future, as the A series. The series of positions which runs from earlier to later I shall call the B series. The contents of a position in time are called events. The contents of a single position are admitted to be properly called a plurality of events. (I believe, however, that they can as truly, though not more truly, be called a single event. This -view is not universally accepted, and it is not necessary for my argument.) A position in time is called a moment. The first question which we must consider is whether it is essential to the reality of time that its events should form an A series as well as a B series. And it is clear, to begin-with, that we never observe time except as forming both these series. We perceive events in time as being present, and those are the only events which we perceive directly. And all other events in time which, by memory or inference, we believe to-be real, are regarded as past or future-those .earlier than the present being past, and those later than the present being future. Thus the events' of time, as observed by us, form an A series as well as a B series. It is possible, however, that this is merely subjective. It -may be the case that the distinction introduced among positions in time by the A series-the distinction of past, present and future -is simply a constant illusion of our minds, and that the real nature of time only contains the distinction of the B series-the distinction of earlier and This content downloaded from 22.214.171.124 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms THE UNREALITY OF TIME. 459 later. In that case we could not perceive time as it really is, but we might be able to think of it as it really is. This is not a very common view, but it has found able supporters. I believe it to be untenable, because, as I said above, it seems to me that the A series is essential to the nature of time, and that any difficulty in the way of regarding the A series as real is equally a difficulty in the way of regarding time as real. It would, I suppose, be universally admitted that time involves change. A particular thing, indeed, may exist unchanged through any amount of time. But when we ask what we mean by saying that there were different moments of time, or a certain duration of time, through which the thing was the same, we find that we mean that it remained the same while other things were changing. A universe in which nothing whatever changed (including the thoughts of the conscious beings in it) would be a timeless uiliverse. If, then, a B series without an A series can constitute time, change must be possible without an A series. Let us suppose that the distinction of past, present and future doesnot apply to reality. Can change apply to reality? What is it that changes ? Could we say that, in a time which formed a B_ series but not an A series, the change consisted in the fact that an event ceased to be an event, while another event began to be an event? If this were the case, we should certainly have got a change. But this is impossible. An event can never cease to be an event. It can never get out of any time series in which it once is. If N. is ever earlier than 0 and later than M, it will always be, and has always been, earlier than 0 and later than M, since the relations of earlier and later are permanent. And as, by our present hypothesis, time is constituted by a B series alone, N will always have a position in a time series, and has always had one.i That is, it will always be, and has always been, an event, and cannot begin or cease to be an event. Or shall we say that one event M merges itself into another event N, while preserving a certain identity by means of an unchanged element, so that we can say, not merely that M has ceased and N begun, but that it is M which has I It is equally true, though it does not concern us on the hypothesis which we are now considering, that whatever is once in an A series is always in one. If one of the determinations past, present, and future can ever be applied to N, then one of them always has been and always will be applicable, though of course nob always the same one. This content downloaded from 22.214.171.124 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms 460 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART: become N? Still the same difficulty recurs. M and N may have a common element, but they are not the same event, or there would be no change. If therefore M changes into N at a certain moment, then, at that moment, M has ceased to be M, and N has begun to be N. But we have seen that no event can cease to be, or begin to be, itself, since it never ceases to have a place as itself in the B series. Thus one event cannot change into another. Neither can the change be looked for in the numerically different moments of absoluate time, supposing such moments to exist. For the same arguments will apply here. Each such moment would have its own place in the B series, since each would be earlier or later than each of the others. And as the B series indicate permanent relations, no moment could ever cease to be, nor could it become another moment. Since, therefore, what occurs in time never begins or ceases to be, or to be itself, and since, again, if there is to be change it must be change of what occurs in time (for the timeless never changes), I' submit that only one alternative remains. Changes must happen to the events of such a nature that the occurrence of these changes does not hinder the events from being events, and the same events, both before and after the change. Now what characteristics of an event are there which can change and yet leave the event the same event ? (I use the word characteristic as a general term to include both the qualities which the event possesses, and the relations of which it is a term-or rather the fact that the event is a term of these relations.) It seems to me that there is only one class of such characteristics-namely, the determination of the event in question by the terms of the A series. Take any event-the death of Queen Anne, for example and consider what change can take place in its characteristics. That it is a death, that it is the death of Anne Stuart, that it has such causes, that it has such effects-every characteristic of this sort never changes. \" Before the stars saw one another plain\" the event in question was a death of an English Queen. At the last moment of time-if time has a last moment-the event in question will still be a death of an English Queen. And in every respect but one it is equally dev6id of change. But in one respect it does change. It began by being a future event. It became every moment an event in the nearer future. At last it was present. Then it became past, and will always remain so, though every moment it becomes further and further past. Thus we seem forced to the conclusion that all change is This content downloaded from 184.108.40.206 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms THE UNREALITY OF TIME. 461 dnly a change of the characteristics imparted to events by their presence in the A series, whether those characteristics are qualities or relations. If these characteristics are qualities, then the events, we must admit, would not be always the same, since an event whose qualities alter is, of course, not completely the same. And, even if the characteristics are relations, the events would not be completely the same, if-as I believe to be the case-the relation of X to Y involves the existence in X of a quality of relationship to Y.' Then there would be two alternatives before us. We might admit that events did really change their nature, in respect of these characteristics, though not in respect of any others. I see no difficulty in admitting this. It would place the determinations of the A series in a very unique position among the characteristics of the event, but on any theory they would be very unique characteristics. It 'is usual, for example, to say that a past event never changes, but I do not see why we should not say, instead of this, \" a past event changes only in one respect-that every moment it is further from the present than it was before \". But although I see no intrinsic difficulty in this view, it is not the alternative I regard as ultimately true. For if, as I believe, time is unreal, the admission that an event in time Would change in respect of its position in -the A series would not involve that anything really did change. Without the A series then, there would be no change, and consequently the B series by itself is not sufficient for time, since time involves change. The B series, however, cannot exist except as temporal, since earlier and later, which are the distinctions of which it consists, are clearly time-determinations. So it follows that there can be no B series where there is no A series, since where there is no A series there is no time. But it does not follow that, if we subtract the determinations of the A series from time, we shall have no series left at all. There is a series-a series of the permanent relations to one another of those realities which in time are eventsand it is the combination of this series with the A determinations which gives time. But this other series-let us I I am not asserting, as Lotze did, that a relation between X and Y consists of a quality in X and a quality in Y-a view which I regard as quite indefensible. I assert that a relation Z between X and Y involves the existence in X of the quality \" having the relation Z to Y \" so that a difference of relations always involves a difference in quality, and a change of relations always involves a change of quality. This content downloaded from 22.214.171.124 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms 462 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART: call it the C series-is not temporal, for it involves no change, but only an order. Events have an order. They are, let us say, in the order M, N, 0, P. And they are therefore not in the order M, 0, N, P, or 0, N, M, P, or in any other possible order. But that they have this order no more implies that there is any change than the order of the letters of the alphabet, or of the Peers on the Parliament Roll, implies any change. And thus those realities which appear to us as events might form such a series without being entitled to the name of events, since that name is only given to realities which are in a time series. It is only when change and time come in that the relations of this C series become relations of earlier and later, and so it becomes a B series. More is wanted, however, for the genesis of a B series and of time than simply the C series and the fact of change. For the change must be in a particular direction. And the C series, while it determines the order, does not determine the direction. If the C series runs M, N, 0, P, then the B series from earlier to later cannot run M, 0, N, P, or M, P, 0, N, or in any way but two. But it can run either M, N, 0, P (so that M is earliest and P latest) or else P, 0, N, M (so that P is earliest and Mi latest). And there is nothing either in the C series or in the fact of change to determine which it will be. A series which is not temporal has no direction of its own, though it has an order. If we keep to the series of the natural numbers, we cannot put 17 between 21 and 26. But we keep to the series, whether we go from 17, through 21, to 26, or whether we go from 26, through *21, to 17. The first direction seems the more natural to us, because this series has only one end, and it is generally more convenient to have that end as a beginning than as a termination. But we equally keep to the series in counting backward. Again, in the series of categories in Hegel's dialectic, the series prevents us from putting the Absolute Idea between Being and Causality. But it permits us either to go from Being, through Causality, to the Absolute Idea, or from the Absolute Idea, through Causality, to Being. The first is, according to Hegel, the direction of proof, and is thus generally the most convenient order of enumeration. But if we found it convenient to enumerate in the reverse direction, we should still be observing the series. A non-temporal series, then, has no direction in itself, though a person considering it may take the terms in one This content downloaded from 22.214.171.124 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms THE UNREALITY OF TIME. 463 direction or in the other, according to his own convenience And in the same way a person who contemplates a timeorder may contemplate it in either direction. I may trace the order of events from the Great Charter to the Reform Bill, or from the Reform Bill to the Great Charter. But in dealing with the time series we have not to do merely with a change in an external contemplation of it, but with a change which belongs to the series itself. And this change has a direction of its own. The Great Charter came before the Reform Bill, and the Reform Bill did not come before the Great Charter. Therefore, besides the C series and the fact of change there must be given-in order to get time-the fact that the change is in one direction and not in the other. We can now see that the A series, together with the C series, is sufficient to give us time. For in order to get change, and change in a given direction, it is sufficient that one position in the C series should be Present, to the exclusion of all others, and that this characteristic of presentness should pass along the series in such-a way that all positions on the one side of the Present have been present, and all positions on the other side of it will be present. That which has been present is Past, that which will be present is Future.' Thus to our previous conclusion that there can be no time unless the A series is true of reality, we can add the further conclusion that no other elements are required to constitute a time-series except an A series and a C series. We may sum up the relations of the three series to time as follows: The A and B series are equally essential to time, which must be distinguished as past, present and future, and must likewise be distinguished, as earlier and later. But the two series are not equally fundamental. The distinctions of the A series are ultimate. We cannot explain what is meant by past, present and future. We can, to some extent, describe them, but they cannot be defined. We can only show their meaning by examples. \" Your breakfast this morning,\" we can say to an inquirer, \" is past; this conversation is present; your dinner this evening is future.\" We can do no more. The B series, on the other hand, is not ultimate. For, given a C series of permanent relations of terms, which is 1 This account of the nature of the A series is not valid, for it involves a vicious circle, since it uses \" has been \" and \" will be \" to explain Past and Future. But, as I shall endeavour to show later on, this vicious circle is inevitable when we deal with the A series, and forms the ground on which we must reject it. This content downloaded from 126.96.36.199 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms 464 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART: not in itself temporal, and therefore is not a B series, and given the further fact that the terms of this C series also form an A series, and it results that the terms of the C series become a B series, those which are placed first, in the direction from past to future, being earlier than those whose places are further in the direction of the future. The C series, however, is as ultimate as the A series. We cannot get it out of anything else. That the units of time do form a series, the relations of which are permanent, is as ultimate as the fact that each of them is present, past, or future. And this ultimate fact is essential to time. For it is admitted that it is essential to time that each moment of it shall either be earlier or later than any other moment; and these relations are permanent. And this-the B seriescannot be got out of the A series alone. It is only when the A series, which gives change and direction, is combined with the C series, which gives permanence, that the B series can arise. Only part of the conclusion which I have now reached is required for the general purpose of this paper. I am endeavouring to base the unreality of time, not on the fact that the A series is more fundamental than the B series, but on the fact that it is as essential as the B series-that the distinctions of past, present and future are essential to time, and that, if the distinctions are never true of reality, then no reality is in time. This view, whether it is true or false, has nothing surprising in it. It was pointed out above that time, as we perceive it, always presents these distinctions. And it has generally been held that this is a real characteristic of time, and not an illusion due to the way in which we perceive it. Most philosophers, whether they did or did not believe time to be true of reality, have regarded thle distinctions of the A series as essential to time. When the opposite view has been maintained, it has generally been, I believe, because it was held (rightly, as I shall try to show later on) that the distinctions of present, past and future cannot be true of reality, and that consequently, if the reality of time is to be saved, the distinction in question must be shown to be unessential to time. The presumption, it was held, was for the reality of time, and this would give us a reason for rejecting the A series as unessen-tial to time. But of course this could only give a presumption. If the analysis of the notion of time showed that, by removing the A series, time was destroyed, this line of argument would be no longer open, and the unreality of the A series would involve the unreality of time. This content downloaded from 184.108.40.206 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms THE UNREALITY OF TIME. 465 I have endeavoured to show that the removal of the A series does destroy time. But there are two objections to this theory, which we must now consider. The first deals with those time-series which are not really existent, but which are falsely believed to be existent, or which are imagined as existent. Take, for example, the adventures of Don Quixote. This series, it is said, is not an A series. I cannot at this moment judge it to be either past, present or future. Indeed I know that it is none of the three. Yet, it is said, it is certainly a B series. The adventure of the galley-slaves, for example, is later than the adventure of the windmills. And a B series involves time. The conclusion drawn is that an A series is not essential to time. The answer to this objection I hold to be as follows. Time only belongs to the existent. If any reality is in time, that involves that the reality in question exists. This, I imagine, would be universally, admitted. It may be questioned whether all of what exists is in time, or even whether anything really existent is in time, but it would not be denied that, if anything is in time, it must exist. Now what is existent in the adventures of Don Quixote? Nothing. For the story is imaginary. The acts of Cervantes' mind when he invented the story, the acts of my mind when I think of the story-these exist. But then these form part of an A series. Cervantes' invention of the story is in the past. My thought of the story is in the past, the present, and-I trust-the future. But the adventures of Don Quixote may be believed by a child to be historical. And in reading them I may by an effort of the imagination contemplate them as if they really happened. In this case, the adventures are believed to be existent or imagined as existent. But then they are believed to be in the A series, or imagined as in the A series. The child who believes them historical will believe that they happened in the past. If I imagine them as existent, I shall imagine them as happening in the past. In the same way, if any one believed the events recorded in Morris's News from Nowhere to exist, or imagined them as existent, he would believe them to exist in the future or imagine them as existent in the future. Whether we place the object of our belief or our imagination in the present, the past, or the future, will depend upon the characteristics of that object. But somewhere in our A series it will be placed. Thus the answer to the objection is that, just as a thing is in time, it is in the A series. If it is really in time, it is really in the A series. If it is believed to be in time, it is believed This content downloaded from 22.214.171.124 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms 466 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART: to be in the A series. If it is imagined as in time, it is imagined as in the A series. The second objection is based on the possibility, discussed by Mr. Bradley, that there might be several independent timeseries in reality. For Mr. Bradley, indeed, time is only appearance. There is no real time at all, and therefore there are not several real series of time. But the hypothesis here is that there should be within reality several real and independent time-series. The objection, I imagine, is that the time-series would be all real, while the distinction of pasf, present, and future would only have meaning within each series, and could not, therefore, be taken as ultimately real. There would be, for example, many presents. Now, of course, many points of time can be present (each point in each time-series is a present once), but they must be present successively. And the presents of the different time-series would not be successive, since they are not in the same time. (Neither would they be simultaneous, since that equally involves being in the same time. They would have no time-relation whatever.) And different presents, unless they are successive, cannot be real. So the different time-series, which are real, must be able to exist independently of the distinction between past, piesent, and future. .I cannot, however, regard this objection as valid. No doubt, in such a case, no present would be the present-it would only be the present of a certain aspect of the universe. But then no time would be the time-it would only be the time of a certain aspect of the universe. It would, no doubt, be a real time-series, but I do not see that the present would be less real than the time. I am not, of course, asserting that there is no contradiction in the existence of several distinct A series. My main thesis is that the existence of any A series involves a contradiction. What I assert here is merely that, supposing that there could be any A series, I see no extra difficulty involved in there being several such series independent of one another, and that therefore there is no incompatibility between the essentiality of an A series for time and the existence of several distinct times. Moreover, we must remember that the theory of a plurality of time-series is a mere hypothesis. No reason has ever been given why we should believe in their existence. It has only been said that there is no reason why we should disbelieve in their existence, and that therefore they may exist. But if their existence should be incompatible with something else, This content downloaded from 126.96.36.199 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms THE UNREALITY OF TIME. 467 for which there is positive evidence, then there would be a reason why we should disbelieve in their existence. Now there is, as I have tried to show, positive evidence for believing that an A series is essential to time. Supposing therefore that it were the case (which, for the reasons given above, I deny) that the existence of a plurality of time-series was incompatible with the essentiality for time of the A series, it would be the hypothesis of a plurality of times which should be rejected, and not our conclusion as to the A series. I now pass to the second part of my task. Having, as it seems to me, succeeded in proving that there can be no time without an A series, it remains to prove that an A series cannot exist, and that therefore time cannot exist. This would involve that time is not real at all, since it is admitted that, the only way in which time can be real is by existing. The terms of the A series are characteristics of events. We say of events that they are either past, present, or future. If moments of time are taken as separate realities, we say of them also that they are past, present, or future. A characteristic may be either a relation or a quality. Whether we take the terms of the A series as relations of events (which seems the more reasonable view) or whether we take them as qualities of events, it seems to me that they involve a contradiction. Let us first examine the supposition that they are relations. In that case only one term of each relation can be an event or a moment. The other term must be something outside the time-series.' For the relations of the A series are changing relations, and the relation of terms of the time-series to one another do not change. Two events are exactly in the same places in the time-series, relatively to one another, a million years before they take place, while each of them is taking place, and when they are a million years in the past. The same is true of the relation of moments to each other. Again, if the moments of time are to be distinguished as separate realities from the events which happen in them, the relation between an event and a moment is unvarying. Each event is in the same moment in the future, in the present, and in the past. I It has been maintained that the present is whatever is simultaneous with the assertion of its presentness, the future whatever is later than the assertion of its futurity, and the past whatever is earlier than the assertion of its pastness. But this theory involves that time exists independently of the A series, and is incompatible with the results we have already reached. This content downloaded from 220.127.116.11 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms 468 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART: The relations which form the A series then must be relations of events and moments to something not itself in the time-series. What this something is might be difficult to say. But, waiving this point, l a more positive difficulty presents itself. Past, present, and future are incompatible determinations. Every event must be one or the other, but no event can be more than one. This is essential to the meaning of the terms. And, if it were not so, the A series would be insufficient to give us, in combination with the C series, the result of time. For time, as we have seen, involves change, and the only change we can get is from future to present, and from present to past. The characteristics, therefore, are incompatible. But every event has them all. If M is past, it has been present and future. If it is future, it will be present and past. If it is present, it has been future and will be past. Thus all the three incompatible terms are predicable of each event, which is obviously inconsistent with their being incompatible, and inconsistent with their producing change. It may seem that this can easily be explained. Indeed it has been impossible to state the difficulty without almost giving the explanation, since our language has verb-forms for the past, present, and future, but no form that is common to all three. It is never true, the answer will run, that M is present, past and future. It is present, will be past, and has been future. Or it is past, and has been future and present, or again is future and will be present and past. The characteristics are only incompatible when they are simPltaneous, and there is no contradiction to this in the fact that each term has all of them successively. But this explanation involves a vicious circle. For it assumes the existence of time in order to account for the way in which moments are past, present and future. Time then must be pre-supposed to account for the A series. But we have already seen that the A series has to be assumed in order to account for time. Accordingly the A series has to be pre-supposed in order to account for the A series. And this is clearly a vicious circle. What we have done is this-to meet the difficulty that my writing of thi,s article has the characteristics of past, present and future, we say that it is present, has been future, and will be past. But \"has been\" is only distinguished from \"is'\" by being existence in the past and not in the present, and \"will be \" is only distinguished from both by being existence in the future. Thus our statement comes to This content downloaded from 22.214.171.124 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms THE UNREALITY OF TIME. 469 this that the event in question is present in the present, future in the past, past in the future. And it is clear that there is a vicious circle if we endeavour to assign the characteristics of present, future and past by the criterion of the characteristics of present, past and future. The difficulty may be put in another way, in which the fallacy will exhibit itself rather as a vicious infinite series than as a vicious circle. If we avoid the incompatibility of the three characteristics by asserting that M is present, has been future, and will be past, we are constructing a second A series, within which the first falls, in the same way in which events fall within the first. It may be doubted whether any intelligible meaning can be given to the assertion that time is in time. But, in any case, the second A series will suffer from the same difficulty as the first, which can only be removed by placing it inside a third A series. The same principle will place the third inside a fourth, and so on without end. You can never get rid of the contradiction, for, by the act of removing it from what is to be explained, you produce it over again in the explanation. And so the explanation is invalid. Thus a contradiction arises if the A series is asserted of reality when the A series is taken as a series of relations. Could it be taken as a series of qualities, and would this give us a better result? Are there three qualities-futurity, presentness, and pastness, and are events continually changing the first for the second, anid the second for the third ? It seems to me that there is very little to be said for the view that the changes of the A series are changes of qualities. No doubt my anticipation of an experience M, the experience itself, and the memory of the experience are three states which have different qualities. But it is not the future M, the present M, and the past M, which have these three different qualities. The qualities are possessed by three distinct events-the anticipation of M, the experience M itself, and the memory of M, each of which is in turn future, present, and past. Thus this gives no support to the view that the changes of the A series are changes of qualities. But we need not go further into this question. If the characteristics of the A series were qualities, the same difficulty would arise as if, they were relations. For, as before, they are not compatible, and, as before, every event has all of them. This can only be explained, as before, by saying that each event has them successively. And thus This content downloaded from 18.104.22.168 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms 470 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART: the same fallacy would have been committed as in the pre- 'vious case. We have come then to the conclusion that the application of the A series to reality involves a contradiction, and that consequently the A series cannot be true of reality. And, since time involves the A series, it follows that time cannot be true of reality. Whenever we judge anything to exist in time, we are in error. And whenever we perceive anything as existing in time-which is the only way in which we ,ever do perceive things-we are perceiving it more or less as it really is not. We must consider a possible objection. Our ground for rejecting time, it may be said, is that time cannot be explained without assuming time. But may this not provenot that time is invalid, but rather that time is ultimate? It is impossible to explain, for example, goodness or truth unless by bringing in the term to be explained as part of the explanation, and we therefore reject the explanation as invalid. But we do not therefore reject the notion as erroneous, but accept it as something ultimate, which, while it does not -admit of explanation, does not require it. But this does not apply here. An idea may be valid of reality though it does not admit of a valid explanation. But it cannot be valid of reality if its application to reality involves :a contradiction. Now we began by pointing out that there was such a contradiction in the case of time-that the char- .acteristics of the A series are mutually incompatible and yet all true of every term. Unless this contradiction is removed, the idea of time must be rejected as invalid. It was to remove this contradiction that the explanation was suggested IIt is very usual to present Time under the metaphor of a spatial movement. But is it to be a movement from past to future, or from future to past? If the A series is taken as one of qualities, it will naturally be taken as a movement from past to future, since the quality of presentness -has belonged to the past states and will belong to the future states. If the A series is taken as one of relations, it is possible to take the movement either way, since either of the two related terms can be taken as the one which moves. If the events are taken as moving by a fixed point of presentness, the movement is from future to past, since the future events are those which have not yet passed the point, and the past are those which have. If presentness is taken as a moving point successively related to each of a series of events, the movement is from past to future. Thus we say that events come out of the future, but we say that we ourselves move towards the future. For each man identifies himself especially with his present state, as against his future or his past, since the present is the only one of which he has direct experience. And -thus the self, if it is pictured as moving at all, is pictured as moving with -the point of presentness along the stream of events from past to future. This content downloaded from 220.127.116.11 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms THE UNREALITY OF TIME. 471 that the characteristics belong to the terms successively. When this explanation failed as being circular, the contradiction remained unremoved, and the idea of time must be rejected, not because it cannot be explained, but because the contradiction cannot be removed. What has been said already, if valid, is an adequate ground for rejecting time. But we may add another consideration. Time, as we have seen, stands and falls with the A series. Now, even if we ignore the contradiction which we have just diicovered in the application of the A series to reality, was there ever any positive reason why we should suppose that the A series was valid of reality ? Why do we believe that events are to be distinguished as past, present and future ? I conceive that the belief arises from distinctions in our own experience. At any moment I have certain peroeptions, I have also the memory of certain other perceptions, and the anticipation of others again. The direct perception itself is a mental state qualitatively different from the memory or the anticipation of perceptions. On this is based the belief that the perception itself has a certain characteristic when I have it, which is replaced by other characteristics when I have the memory or the anticipation of it-which characteristics are called presentness, pastness, and futurity. Having got the idea of these characteristics we apply them to other events. Everything simultaneous with the direct perception which I have now is called present, and it is even held that there would be a present if no one had a direct perception at all. In the same way acts simultaneous with remembered perceptions or anticipated perceptions are held to be past or future, and this again is extended to events to which none of the perceptions I now remember or anticipate are simultaneous. But the origin of our belief in the whole distinction lies in the distinction between perceptions and anticipations or memories of perceptions. A direct perception is present when I, have it, and so is what is simultaneous with it. In the first place this definition involves a circle, for the words \" when I have it,\" can only mean \" when it is present \". But if we left out these words, the definition would be false, for I have many direct presentations which are at different times, and which cannot, therefore, all be present, except successively. This, however, is the fundamental contradiction of the A series, which has been already considered. The point I wish to consider here is different. The direct perceptions which I now have are those which This content downloaded from 184.108.40.206 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms 472 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART: now fall within my \" specious present \". Of those which are beyond it, I can only have memory or anticipation. Now the \" specious present \" varies in length according to circumstances, and may be different for two people at the same period. The event M may be simultaneous both with X's perception Q and Y's perception R. At a certain moment Q may have ceased to be part of X's specious present. M, therefore, will at that moment be past. But at the same moment R may still be part of Y's specious present. And, therefore, M will be present, at the same moment at which it is past. This is impossible. If, indeed, the A series was something purely subjective, there would be no difficulty. We could say that M was past for X and present for Y, just as we could say that it was pleasant for X and painful for Y. But we are considering attempts to take time as real, as something which belongs to the reality itself, and not only to our beliefs about it, and this can only be so if the A series also applies to the reality itself. And if it does this, then at any moment M must be present or past. It cannot be both. The present through which events really pass, therefore, cannot be determined as simultaneous. with the specious present. It must have a duration fixed as an ultimate fact. This duration cannot be the same as the duration of all specious presents, since all specious presents have not the same duration. And thus an event may be past when I am experiencing it as present, or present when I am experiencing it as past. The duration of the objective present may be the thousandth part of a second. Or it may be a century, and the accessions of George IV. and Edward VII. may form part of the same present. What reason can we have to believe in the existence of such a present, which we certainly do not observe to be a present, and which has no relation to what we do observe to be a present ? If we escape from these difficulties by taking the view, which has sometimes been held, that the present in the A series is not a finite duration, but a mere point, separating future from past, we shall find other difficulties as serious. For then the objective time in which events are will be something utterly different from the time in which we perceive them. The time in which we perceive them has a present of varying finite duration, and, therefore, with the future and the past, is divided into three durations. The objective time has only two durations, separated by a present which has nothing but the name in common with the present of experience, since it is not a duration but a point. What is This content downloaded from 188.8.131.52 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms THE UNREAIJITY OF TIME. 473 there in our experience which gives us the least reason to believe in such a time as this ? And so it would seem that the denial of the reality of time is not so very paradoxical after all. It was called paradoxical because it seemed to contradict our experience so violently-to compel us to treat so much as illusion which appears primda facie to give knowledge of reality. But we now see that our experience of time-centring as it does about the specious present-would be no less illusory if there were a real time in which the realities we experience existed. The specious present of our observations-varying as it does from you to me-cannot correspond to the present of the events, observed. And consequently the past and future of our observations could not correspond to the past and future of the events observed. On either hypothesis-whether we take. time as real or as unreal-everything is observed in a specious present, but nothing, not even the observations themselves, can ever be in a specious present. And in that case I do not see that we treat experience as much more illusory when we say that nothing is ever in a present at all, than when we say that everything passes through some entirely different present. Our conclusion, then, is that neither time as a whole, nor the A series and B series, really exist. But this leaves it possible that the C series does really exist. The A series was rejected for its inconsistency. And its rejection involved the rejection of the B series. But we have found no such contradiction in the C series, and its invalidity does not follow from the invalidity of the A series. It is, therefore, possible that the realities which we perceive as events in a time-serie? do really form a non-temporal series. It is also possible, so far as we have yet gone, that they do not form such a series, and that they are in reality no more a series than they are temporal. But I think-though I have no room to go into the question here-that the former view, according to which they really do form a C series, is the more probable. Should it be true, it will follow that in our perception of these realities as events in time, there will be some truth as well as some error. Through the deceptive form of time, we shall grasp some of their true relations. If we say that the events M and N are simultaneous, we say that they occupy the same position in the time-series. And there will be some truth in this, for the realities, which we perceive as the events M and N, do really occupy the same position in a, series, though it is not a temporal series. 32 This content downloaded from 188.8.131.52 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms 474 J. ELLIS MCTAGGART: THE UNREALITY OF TIME. Again, if we assert that the events M, N, 0, are all at different times, and are in that order, we assert that they occupy different positions in the time-series, and that the position of N is between the positions of M and 0. And it will be true that the realities which we see as these events will be in a series, though not in a temporal series, and that their positions in it will be different, and that the position of the reality which we perceive as the event N will be between the positions of the realities which we perceive as the events M and 0. If this view is adopted, the result will so far resemble those reached by Hegel rather than those of Kant. For Hegel regarded the order of the time-series as a reflexion, though a distorted reflexion, of something in the reat nature of the timeless reality, while Kant does not seem to have contemplated the possibility that 'anything in the nature of the noumenon should correspond to the time order which appears i-n the phenomenon. But the question whether such an objective C series does ,exist, must remain for future discussion. And many other ,questions press upon us which inevitably arise if the reality of time is denied. If there is such a C series, are positions in it simply ultimate facts, or are they determined by the varying amounts, in the objects which hold those positions, of .some quality which is common to all of them ? And, if so, what is that quality, and is it a greater amount of it which determines things to appear as later, and a lesser amount which determines them to appear as earlier, or is the reverse true ? On the solution of these questions it may be that our hopes and fears for the universe depend for their confirmation or rejection. And, again, is the series of appearances in time a series which is infinite or finite in length ? And how are we to deal with the appearance itself ? If we reduce time and change to appearance, must it not be to an appearance which changes and which isir time, and is not time, then, shown to be real after all ? This is doubtless a serious question, but I hope to show hereafter that it can be answered in a satisfactory way. This content downloaded from 184.108.40.206 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 04:10:47 UTC All use subject to http:\/\/about.jstor.org\/terms","subset":"phil_papers"}
+{"meta":{"title":"On the shortness of life","type":"info:eu-repo\/semantics\/book","creator":"Seneca, Lucius Annaeus","subject":"Philosophy","date":"1997","identifier":"oai:philarchive.org\/rec\/SENOTS-2","description":null,"datestamp":"2023-09-16T04:15:22Z","dup_signals":{"dup_doc_count":246,"dup_dump_count":66,"dup_details":{"curated_sources":2,"2023-50":4,"2023-14":2,"2023-06":1,"2022-49":2,"2022-33":1,"2022-27":2,"2022-21":1,"2022-05":1,"2021-49":2,"2021-43":2,"2021-39":1,"2021-31":1,"2021-21":1,"2021-17":1,"2021-04":2,"2020-45":2,"2020-34":2,"2020-29":1,"2020-24":1,"2020-16":2,"2020-10":2,"2020-05":6,"2019-51":1,"2019-47":2,"2019-39":2,"2019-35":3,"2019-30":2,"2019-26":1,"2019-22":3,"2019-13":4,"2019-04":6,"2018-51":2,"2018-47":6,"2018-43":1,"2018-39":3,"2018-34":1,"2018-30":8,"2018-26":4,"2018-22":3,"2018-17":3,"2018-13":1,"2018-09":6,"2018-05":5,"2017-51":4,"2017-47":4,"2017-43":7,"2017-39":6,"2017-34":11,"2017-30":4,"2017-26":12,"2017-22":5,"2017-17":3,"2017-09":4,"2017-04":2,"2016-50":3,"2024-26":3,"2024-22":2,"2024-18":3,"2024-10":3,"2017-13":6,"2015-18":11,"2015-11":11,"2015-06":10,"2014-10":9,"2013-48":8,"2013-20":6}}},"text":"On The Shortness of Life Lucius Seneca The majority of mortals, Paulinus, complain bitterly of the spitefulness of Nature, because we are born for a brief span of life, because even this space that has been granted to us rushes by so speedily and so swiftly that all save a very few find life at an end just when they are getting ready to live. Nor is it merely the common herd and the unthinking crowd that bemoan what is, as men deem it, an universal ill; the same feeling has called forth complaint also from men who were famous... It is not that we have a short space of time, but that we waste much of it. Life is long enough, and it has been given in sufficiently generous measure to allow the accomplishment of the very greatest things if the whole of it is well invested. But when it is squandered in luxury and carelessness, when it is devoted to no good end, forced at last by the ultimate necessity we perceive that it has passed away before we were aware that it was passing. So it is-the life we receive is not short, but we make it so, nor do we have any lack of it, but are wasteful of it. Just as great and princely wealth is scattered in a moment when it comes into the hands of a bad owner, while wealth however limited, if it is entrusted to a good guardian, increases by use, so our life is amply long for him who orders it properly. Why do we complain of Nature? She has shown herself kindly; life, if you know how to use it, is long. But one man is possessed by greed that is insatiable, another by a toilsome devotion to tasks that are useless; one man is besotted with wine, another is paralyzed by sloth; one man is exhausted by an ambition that always hangs upon the decision of others, another, driven on by the greed of the trader, is led over all lands and all seas by the hope of gain; some are tormented by a passion for war and are always either bent upon inflicting danger upon others or concerned about their own; some there are who are worn out by voluntary servitude in a thankless attendance upon the great; many are kept busy either in the pursuit of other men's fortune or in complaining of their own; many, following no fixed aim, shifting and inconstant and dissatisfied, are plunged by their fickleness into plans that are ever new; some have no fixed principle by which to direct their course, but Fate takes them unawares while they loll and yawn-so surely does it happen that I cannot doubt the truth of that utterance which the greatest of poets delivered with all the seeming of an oracle: \"The part of life we really live is small.\" For all the rest of existence is not life, but merely time. Vices beset us and surround us on every side, and they do not permit us to rise anew and lift up our eyes for the discernment of truth, but they keep us down when once they have overwhelmed us and we are chained to lust. Their victims are never allowed to return to their true selves; if ever they chance to find some release, like the waters of the deep sea which continue to heave even after the storm is past, they are tossed about, and no rest from their lusts abides. Think you that I am speaking of the wretches whose evils are admitted? Look at those whose prosperity men flock to behold; they are smothered by their blessings. To how many are riches a burden! From how many do eloquence and the daily straining to display their powers draw forth blood! How many are pale from constant pleasures! To how many does the throng of clients that crowd about them leave no freedom! In short, run through the list of all these men from the lowest to the highest-this man desires an advocate, this one answers the call, that one is on trial, that one defends him, that one gives sentence; no one asserts his claim to himself, everyone is wasted for the sake of another. Ask about the men whose names are known by heart, and you will see that these are the marks that distinguish them: A cultivates B and B cultivates C; no one is his own master. And then certain men show the most senseless indignation-they complain of the insolence of their superiors, because they were too busy to see them when they wished an audience! But can anyone have the hardihood to complain of the pride of another when he himself has no time to attend to himself? After all, no matter who you are, the great man does sometimes look toward you even if his face is insolent, he does sometimes condescend to listen to your words, he permits you to appear at his side; but you never deign to look upon yourself, to give ear to yourself. There is no reason, therefore, to count anyone in debt for such services, seeing that, when you performed them, you had no wish for another's company, but could not endure your own. Though all the brilliant intellects of the ages were to concentrate upon this one theme, never could they adequately express their wonder at this dense darkness of the human mind. Men do not suffer anyone to seize their estates, and they rush to stones and arms if there is even the slightest dispute about the limit of their lands, yet they allow others to trespass upon their life-nay, they themselves even lead in those who will eventually possess it. No one is to be found who is willing to distribute his money, yet among how many does each one of us distribute his life! In guarding their fortune men are often closefisted, yet, when it comes to the matter of wasting time, in the case of the one thing in which it is right to be miserly, they show themselves most prodigal. And so I should like to lay hold upon someone from the company of older men and say: \"I see that you have reached the farthest limit of human life, you are pressing hard upon your hundredth year, or are even beyond it; come now, recall your life and make a reckoning. Consider how much of your time was taken up with a moneylender, how much with a mistress, how much with a patron, how much with a client, how much in wrangling with your wife, how much in punishing your slaves, how much in rushing about the city on social duties. Add the diseases which we have caused by our own acts, add, too, the time that has lain idle and unused; you will see that you have fewer years to your credit than you count. Look back in memory and consider when you ever had a fixed plan, how few days have passed as you had intended, when you were ever at your own disposal, when your face ever wore its natural expression, when your mind was ever unperturbed, what work you have achieved in so long a life, how many have robbed you of life when you were not aware of what you were losing, how much was taken up in useless sorrow, in foolish joy, in greedy desire, in the allurements of society, how little of yourself was left to you; you will perceive that you are dying before your season!\" What, then, is the reason of this? You live as if you were destined to live forever, no thought of your frailty ever enters your head, of how much time has already gone by you take no heed. You squander time as if you drew from a full and abundant supply, though all the while that day which you bestow on some person or thing is perhaps your last. You have all the fears of mortals and all the desires of immortals. You will hear many men saying: \"After my fiftieth year I shall retire into leisure, my sixtieth year shall release me from public duties.\" And what guarantee, pray, have you that your life will last longer? Who will suffer your course to be just as you plan it? Are you not ashamed to reserve for yourself only the remnant of life, and to set apart for wisdom only that time which cannot be devoted to any business? How late it is to begin to live just when we must cease to live! What foolish forgetfulness of mortality to postpone wholesome plans to the fiftieth and sixtieth year, and to intend to begin life at a point to which few have attained! You will see that the most powerful and highly placed men let drop remarks in which they long for leisure, acclaim it, and prefer it to all their blessings. They desire at times, if it could be with safety, to descend from their high pinnacle; for, though nothing from without should assail or shatter, Fortune of its very self comes crashing down. The deified Augustus, to whom the gods vouchsafed more than to any other man, did not cease to pray for rest and to seek release from public affairs; all his conversation ever reverted to this subject-his hope of leisure. This was the sweet, even if vain, consolation with which he would gladden his labours-that he would one day live for himself. In a letter addressed to the senate, in which he had promised that his rest would not be devoid of dignity nor inconsistent with his former glory, I find these words: \"But these matters can be shown better by deeds than by promises. Nevertheless, since the joyful reality is still far distant, my desire for that time most earnestly prayed for has led me to forestall some of its delight by the pleasure of words.\" So desirable a thing did leisure seem that he anticipated it in thought because he could not attain it in reality. He who saw everything depending upon himself alone, who determined the fortune of individuals and of nations, thought most happily of that future day on which he should lay aside his greatness. He had discovered how much sweat those blessings that shone throughout all lands drew forth, how many secret worries they concealed. Forced to pit arms first against his countrymen, then against his colleagues, and lastly against his relatives, he shed blood on land and sea. Through Macedonia, Sicily, Egypt, Syria, and Asia, and almost all countries he followed the path of battle, and when his troops were weary of shedding Roman blood, he turned them to foreign wars. While he was pacifying the Alpine regions, and subduing the enemies planted in the midst of a peaceful empire, while he was extending its bounds even beyond the Rhine and the Euphrates and the Danube, in Rome itself the swords of Murena, Caepio, Lepidus, Egnatius, and others were being whetted to slay him. Not yet had he escaped their plots, when his daughter and all the noble youths who were bound to her by adultery as by a sacred oath, oft alarmed his failing years-and there was Paulus, and a second time the need to fear a woman in league with an Antony. When be had cut away these ulcers together with the limbs themselves, others would grow in their place; just as in a body that was overburdened with blood, there was always a rupture somewhere. And so he longed for leisure, in the hope and thought of which he found relief for his labours. This was the prayer of one who was able to answer the prayers of mankind. Marcus Cicero, long flung among men like Catiline and Clodius and Pompey and Crassus, some open enemies, others doubtful friends, as he is tossed to and fro along with the state and seeks to keep it from destruction, to be at last swept away, unable as he was to be restful in prosperity or patient in adversity-how many times does he curse that very consulship of his, which he had lauded without end, though not without reason! How tearful the words he uses in a letter written to Atticus, when Pompey the elder had been conquered, and the son was still trying to restore his shattered arms in Spain! \"Do you ask,\" he said, \"what I am doing here? I am lingering in my Tusculan villa half a prisoner.\" He then proceeds to other statements, in which he bewails his former life and complains of the present and despairs of the future. Cicero said that he was \"half a prisoner.\" But, in very truth, never will the wise man resort to so lowly a term, never will he be half a prisoner-he who always possesses an undiminished and stable liberty, being free and his own master and towering over all others. For what can possibly be above him who is above Fortune? When Livius Drusus, a bold and energetic man, had with the support of a huge crowd drawn from all Italy proposed new laws and the evil measures of the Gracchi, seeing no way out for his policy, which he could neither carry through nor abandon when once started on, he is said to have complained bitterly against the life of unrest he had had from the cradle, and to have exclaimed that he was the only person who had never had a holiday even as a boy. For, while he was still a ward and wearing the dress of a boy, he had had the courage to commend to the favour of a jury those who were accused, and to make his influence felt in the law-courts, so powerfully, indeed, that it is very well known that in certain trials he forced a favourable verdict. To what lengths was not such premature ambition destined to go? One might have known that such precocious hardihood would result in great personal and public misfortune. And so it was too late for him to complain that he had never had a holiday when from boyhood he had been a trouble-maker and a nuisance in the forum. It is a question whether he died by his own hand; for he fell from a sudden wound received in his groin, some doubting whether his death was voluntary, no one, whether it was timely. It would be superfluous to mention more who, though others deemed them the happiest of men, have expressed their loathing for every act of their years, and with their own lips have given true testimony against themselves; but by these complaints they changed neither themselves nor others. For when they have vented their feelings in words, they fall back into their usual round. Heaven knows! such lives as yours, though they should pass the limit of a thousand years, will shrink into the merest span; your vices will swallow up any amount of time. The space you have, which reason can prolong, although it naturally hurries away, of necessity escapes from you quickly; for you do not seize it, you neither hold it back, nor impose delay upon the swiftest thing in the world, but you allow it to slip away as if it were something superfluous and that could be replaced. But among the worst I count also those who have time for nothing but wine and lust; for none have more shameful engrossments. The others, even if they are possessed by the empty dream of glory, nevertheless go astray in a seemly manner; though you should cite to me the men who are avaricious, the men who are wrathful, whether busied with unjust hatreds or with unjust wars, these all sin in more manly fashion. But those who are plunged into the pleasures of the belly and into lust bear a stain that is dishonourable. Search into the hours of all these people, see how much time they give to accounts, how much to laying snares, how much to fearing them, how much to paying court, how much to being courted, how much is taken up in giving or receiving bail, how much by banquets-for even these have now become a matter of business-, and you will see how their interests, whether you call them evil or good, do not allow them time to breathe. Finally, everybody agrees that no one pursuit can be successfully followed by a man who is preoccupied with many things-eloquence cannot, nor the liberal studies-since the mind, when distracted, takes in nothing very deeply, but rejects everything that is, as it were, crammed into it. There is nothing the busy man is less busied with than living: there is nothing that is harder to learn. Of the other arts there are many teachers everywhere; some of them we have seen that mere boys have mastered so thoroughly that they could even play the master. It takes the whole of life to learn how to live, and-what will perhaps make you wonder more-it takes the whole of life to learn how to die. Many very great men, having laid aside all their encumbrances, having renounced riches, business, and pleasures, have made it their one aim up to the very end of life to know how to live; yet the greater number of them have departed from life confessing that they did not yet know-still less do those others know. Believe me, it takes a great man and one who has risen far above human weaknesses not to allow any of his time to be filched from him, and it follows that the life of such a man is very long because he has devoted wholly to himself whatever time he has had. None of it lay neglected and idle; none of it was under the control of another, for, guarding it most grudgingly, he found nothing that was worthy to be taken in exchange for his time. And so that man had time enough, but those who have been robbed of much of their life by the public, have necessarily had too little of it. And there is no reason for you to suppose that these people are not sometimes aware of their loss. Indeed, you will hear many of those who are burdened by great prosperity cry out at times in the midst of their throngs of clients, or their pleadings in court, or their other glorious miseries: \"I have no chance to live.\" Of course you have no chance! All those who summon you to themselves, turn you away from your own self. Of how many days has that defendant robbed you? Of how many that candidate? Of how many that old woman wearied with burying her heirs? Of how many that man who is shamming sickness for the purpose of exciting the greed of the legacy-hunters? Of how many that very powerful friend who has you and your like on the list, not of his friends, but of his retinue? Check off, I say, and review the days of your life; you will see that very few, and those the refuse. have been left for you. That man who had prayed for the fasces, when he attains them, desires to lay them aside and says over and over: \"When will this year be over!\" That man gives games, and, after setting great value on gaining the chance to give them, now says: \"When shall I be rid of them?\" That advocate is lionized throughout the whole forum, and fills all the place with a great crowd that stretches farther than he can be heard, yet he says: \"When will vacation time come?\" Everyone hurries his life on and suffers from a yearning for the future and a weariness of the present. But he who bestows all of his time on his own needs, who plans out every day as if it were his last, neither longs for nor fears the morrow. For what new pleasure is there that any hour can now bring? They are all known, all have been enjoyed to the full. Mistress Fortune may deal out the rest as she likes; his life has already found safety. Something may be added to it, but nothing taken from it, and he will take any addition as the man who is satisfied and filled takes the food which he does not desire and yet can hold. And so there is no reason for you to think that any man has lived long because he has grey hairs or wrinkles; he has not lived long-he has existed long. For what if you should think that that man had had a long voyage who had been caught by a fierce storm as soon as he left harbour, and, swept hither and thither by a succession of winds that raged from different quarters, had been driven in a circle around the same course? Not much voyaging did he have, but much tossing about. I am often filled with wonder when I see some men demanding the time of others and those from whom they ask it most indulgent. Both of them fix their eyes on the object of the request for time, neither of them on the time itself; just as if what is asked were nothing, what is given, nothing. Men trifle with the most precious thing in the world; but they are blind to it because it is an incorporeal thing, because it does not come beneath the sight of the eyes, and for this reason it is counted a very cheap thing-nay, of almost no value at all. Men set very great store by pensions and doles, and for these they hire out their labour or service or effort. But no one sets a value on time; all use it lavishly as if it cost nothing. But see how these same people clasp the knees of physicians if they fall ill and the danger of death draws nearer, see how ready they are, if threatened with capital punishment, to spend all their possessions in order to live! So great is the inconsistency of their feelings. But if each one could have the number of his future years set before him as is possible in the case of the years that have passed, how alarmed those would be who saw only a few remaining, how sparing of them would they be! And yet it is easy to dispense an amount that is assured, no matter how small it may be; but that must be guarded more carefully which will fail you know not when. Yet there is no reason for you to suppose that these people do not know how precious a thing time is; for to those whom they love most devotedly they have a habit of saying that they are ready to give them a part of their own years. And they do give it, without realizing it; but the result of their giving is that they themselves suffer loss without adding to the years of their dear ones. But the very thing they do not know is whether they are suffering loss; therefore, the removal of something that is lost without being noticed they find is bearable. Yet no one will bring back the years, no one will bestow you once more on yourself. Life will follow the path it started upon, and will neither reverse nor check its course; it will make no noise, it will not remind you of its swiftness. Silent it will glide on; it will not prolong itself at the command of a king, or at the applause of the populace. Just as it was started on its first day, so it will run; nowhere will it turn aside, nowhere will it delay. And what will be the result? You have been engrossed, life hastens by; meanwhile death will be at hand, for which, willy nilly, you must find leisure. Can anything be sillier than the point of view of certain people-I mean those who boast of their foresight? They keep themselves very busily engaged in order that they may be able to live better; they spend life in making ready to live! They form their purposes with a view to the distant future; yet postponement is the greatest waste of life; it deprives them of each day as it comes, it snatches from them the present by promising something hereafter. The greatest hindrance to living is expectancy, which depends upon the morrow and wastes to-day. You dispose of that which lies in the hands of Fortune, you let go that which lies in your own. Whither do you look? At what goal do you aim? All things that are still to come lie in uncertainty; live straightway! See how the greatest of bards cries out, and, as if inspired with divine utterance, sings the saving strain: The fairest day in hapless mortals' life Is ever first to flee. \"Why do you delay,\" says he, \"Why are you idle? Unless you seize the day, it flees.\" Even though you seize it, it still will flee; therefore you must vie with time's swiftness in the speed of using it, and, as from a torrent that rushes by and will not always flow, you must drink quickly. And, too, the utterance of the bard is most admirably worded to cast censure upon infinite delay, in that he says, not \"the fairest age,\" but \"the fairest day.\" Why, to whatever length your greed inclines, do you stretch before yourself months and years in long array, unconcerned and slow though time flies so fast? The poet speaks to you about the day, and about this very day that is flying. Is there, then, any doubt that for hapless mortals, that is, for men who are engrossed, the fairest day is ever the first to flee? Old age surprises them while their minds are still childish, and they come to it unprepared and unarmed, for they have made no provision for it; they have stumbled upon it suddenly and unexpectedly, they did not notice that it was drawing nearer day by day. Even as conversation or reading or deep meditation on some subject beguiles the traveller, and he finds that he has reached the end of his journey before he was aware that he was approaching it, just so with this unceasing and most swift journey of life, which we make at the same pace whether waking or sleeping; those who are engrossed become aware of it only at the end. Should I choose to divide my subject into heads with their separate proofs, many arguments will occur to me by which I could prove that busy men find life very short. But Fabianus, who was none of your lecture-room philosophers of to-day, but one of the genuine and old-fashioned kind, used to say that we must fight against the passions with main force, not with artifice, and that the battle-line must be turned by a bold attack, not by inflicting pinpricks; that sophistry is not serviceable, for the passions must be, not nipped, but crushed. Yet, in order that the victims of them nay be censured, each for his own particular fault, I say that they must be instructed, not merely wept over. Life is divided into three periods-that which has been, that which is, that which will be. Of these the present time is short, the future is doubtful, the past is certain. For the last is the one over which Fortune has lost control, is the one which cannot be brought back under any man's power. But men who are engrossed lose this; for they have no time to look back upon the past, and even if they should have, it is not pleasant to recall something they must view with regret. They are, therefore, unwilling to direct their thoughts backward to illspent hours, and those whose vices become obvious if they review the past, even the vices which were disguised under some allurement of momentary pleasure, do not have the courage to revert to those hours. No one willingly turns his thought back to the past, unless all his acts have been submitted to the censorship of his conscience, which is never deceived; he who has ambitiously coveted, proudly scorned, recklessly conquered, treacherously betrayed, greedily seized, or lavishly squandered, must needs fear his own memory. And yet this is the part of our time that is sacred and set apart, put beyond the reach of all human mishaps, and removed from the dominion of Fortune, the part which is disquieted by no want, by no fear, by no attacks of disease; this can neither be troubled nor be snatched away-it is an everlasting and unanxious possession. The present offers only one day at a time, and each by minutes; but all the days of past time will appear when you bid them, they will suffer you to behold them and keep them at your will-a thing which those who are engrossed have no time to do. The mind that is untroubled and tranquil has the power to roam into all the parts of its life; but the minds of the engrossed, just as if weighted by a yoke, cannot turn and look behind. And so their life vanishes into an abyss; and as it does no good, no matter how much water you pour into a vessel, if there is no bottom to receive and hold it, so with time-it makes no difference how much is given; if there is nothing for it to settle upon, it passes out through the chinks and holes of the mind. Present time is very brief, so brief, indeed, that to some there seems to be none; for it is always in motion, it ever flows and hurries on; it ceases to be before it has come, and can no more brook delay than the firmament or the stars, whose ever unresting movement never lets them abide in the same track. The engrossed, therefore, are concerned with present time alone, and it is so brief that it cannot be grasped, and even this is filched away from them, distracted as they are among many things. In a word, do you want to know how they do not \"live long\"? See how eager they are to live long! Decrepit old men beg in their prayers for the addition of a few more years; they pretend that they are younger than they are; they comfort themselves with a falsehood, and are as pleased to deceive themselves as if they deceived Fate at the same time. But when at last some infirmity has reminded them of their mortality, in what terror do they die, feeling that they are being dragged out of life, and not merely leaving it. They cry out that they have been fools, because they have not really lived, and that they will live henceforth in leisure if only they escape from this illness; then at last they reflect how uselessly they have striven for things which they did not enjoy, and how all their toil has gone for nothing. But for those whose life is passed remote from all business, why should it not be ample? None of it is assigned to another, none of it is scattered in this direction and that, none of it is committed to Fortune, none of it perishes from neglect, none is subtracted by wasteful giving, none of it is unused; the whole of it, so to speak, yields income. And so, however small the amount of it, it is abundantly sufficient, and therefore, whenever his last day shall come, the wise man will not hesitate to go to meet death with steady step. Perhaps you ask whom I would call \"the preoccupied\"? There is no reason for you to suppose that I mean only those whom the dogs that have at length been let in drive out from the law-court, those whom you see either gloriously crushed in their own crowd of followers, or scornfully in someone else's, those whom social duties call forth from their own homes to bump them against someone else's doors, or whom the praetor's hammer keeps busy in seeking gain that is disreputable and that will one day fester. Even the leisure of some men is engrossed; in their villa or on their couch, in the midst of solitude, although they have withdrawn from all others, they are themselves the source of their own worry; we should say that these are living, not in leisure, but in idle preoccupation. Would you say that that man is at leisure who arranges with finical care his Corinthian bronzes, that the mania of a few makes costly, and spends the greater part of each day upon rusty bits of copper? Who sits in a public wrestling-place (for, to our shame I we labour with vices that are not even Roman) watching the wrangling of lads? Who sorts out the herds of his pack-mules into pairs of the same age and colour? Who feeds all the newest athletes? Tell me, would you say that those men are at leisure who pass many hours at the barber's while they are being stripped of whatever grew out the night before? while a solemn debate is held over each separate hair? while either disarranged locks are restored to their place or thinning ones drawn from this side and that toward the forehead? How angry they get if the barber has been a bit too careless, just as if he were shearing a real man! How they flare up if any of their mane is lopped off, if any of it lies out of order, if it does not all fall into its proper ringlets! Who of these would not rather have the state disordered than his hair? Who is not more concerned to have his head trim rather than safe? Who would not rather be well barbered than upright? Would you say that these are at leisure who are occupied with the comb and the mirror? And what of those who are engaged in composing, hearing, and learning songs, while they twist the voice, whose best and simplest movement Nature designed to be straightforward, into the meanderings of some indolent tune, who are always snapping their fingers as they beat time to some song they have in their head, who are overheard humming a tune when they have been summoned to serious, often even melancholy, matters? These have not leisure, but idle occupation. And their banquets, Heaven knows! I cannot reckon among their unoccupied hours, since I see how anxiously they set out their silver plate, how diligently they tie up the tunics of their pretty slave-boys, how breathlessly they watch to see in what style the wild boar issues from the hands of the cook, with what speed at a given signal smooth-faced boys hurry to perform their duties, with what skill the birds are carved into portions all according to rule, how carefully unhappy little lads wipe up the spittle of drunkards. By such means they seek the reputation for elegance and good taste, and to such an extent do their evils follow them into all the privacies of life that they can neither eat nor drink without ostentation. And I would not count these among the leisured class either-the men who have themselves borne hither and thither in a sedan-chair and a litter, and are punctual at the hours for their rides as if it were unlawful to omit them, who are reminded by someone else when they must bathe, when they must swim, when they must dine; so enfeebled are they by the excessive lassitude of a pampered mind that they cannot find out by themselves whether they are hungry! I hear that one of these pampered people-provided that you can call it pampering to unlearn the habits of human life-when he had been lifted by hands from the bath and placed in his sedan-chair, said questioningly: \"Am I now seated?\" Do you think that this man, who does not know whether he is sitting, knows whether he is alive, whether he sees, whether he is at leisure? I find it hard to say whether I pity him more if he really did not know, or if he pretended not to know this. They really are subject to forgetfulness of many things, but they also pretend forgetfulness of many. Some vices delight them as being proofs of their prosperity; it seems the part of a man who is very lowly and despicable to know what he is doing. After this imagine that the mimes fabricate many things to make a mock of luxury! In very truth, they pass over more than they invent, and such a multitude of unbelievable vices has come forth in this age, so clever in this one direction, that by now we can charge the mimes with neglect. To think that there is anyone who is so lost in luxury that he takes another's word as to whether he is sitting down! This man, then, is not at leisure, you must apply to him a different term-he is sick, nay, he is dead; that man is at leisure, who has also a perception of his leisure. But this other who is half alive, who, in order that he may know the postures of his own body, needs someone to tell him-how can he be the master of any of his time? It would be tedious to mention all the different men who have spent the whole of their life over chess or ball or the practice of baking their bodies in the sun. They are not unoccupied whose pleasures are made a busy occupation. For instance, no one will have any doubt that those are laborious triflers who spend their time on useless literary problems, of whom even among the Romans there is now a great number. It was once a foible confined to the Greeks to inquire into what number of rowers Ulysses had, whether the Iliad or the Odyssey was written first, whether moreover they belong to the same author, and various other matters of this stamp, which, if you keep them to yourself, in no way pleasure your secret soul, and, if you publish them, make you seem more of a bore than a scholar. But now this vain passion for learning useless things has assailed the Romans also. In the last few days I heard someone telling who was the first Roman general to do this or that; Duilius was the first who won a naval battle, Curius Dentatus was the first who had elephants led in his triumph. Still, these matters, even if they add nothing to real glory, are nevertheless concerned with signal services to the state; there will be no profit in such knowledge, nevertheless it wins our attention by reason of the attractiveness of an empty subject. We may excuse also those who inquire into this-who first induced the Romans to go on board ship. It was Claudius, and this was the very reason he was surnamed Caudex, because among the ancients a structure formed by joining together several boards was called a caudex, whence also the Tables of the Law are called codices, and, in the ancient fashion, boats that carry provisions up the Tiber are even to-day called codicariae. Doubtless this too may have some point-the fact that Valerius Corvinus was the first to conquer Messana, and was the first of the family of the Valerii to bear the surname Messana because be had transferred the name of the conquered city to himself, and was later called Messala after the gradual corruption of the name in the popular speech. Perhaps you will permit someone to be interested also in this-the fact that Lucius Sulla was the first to exhibit loosed lions in the Circus, though at other times they were exhibited in chains, and that javelin-throwers were sent by King Bocchus to despatch them? And, doubtless, this too may find some excuse -but does it serve any useful purpose to know that Pompey was the first to exhibit the slaughter of eighteen elephants in the Circus, pitting criminals against them in a mimic battle? He, a leader of the state and one who, according to report, was conspicuous among the leaders of old for the kindness of his heart, thought it a notable kind of spectacle to kill human beings after a new fashion. Do they fight to the death? That is not enough! Are they torn to pieces? That is not enough! Let them be crushed by animals of monstrous bulk! Better would it be that these things pass into oblivion lest hereafter some all-powerful man should learn them and be jealous of an act that was nowise human. O, what blindness does great prosperity cast upon our minds! When he was casting so many troops of wretched human beings to wild beasts born under a different sky, when he was proclaiming war between creatures so ill matched, when he was shedding so much blood before the eyes of the Roman people, who itself was soon to be forced to shed more. he then believed that he was beyond the power of Nature. But later this same man, betrayed by Alexandrine treachery, offered himself to the dagger of the vilest slave, and then at last discovered what an empty boast his surname was. But to return to the point from which I have digressed, and to show that some people bestow useless pains upon these same matters-the man I mentioned related that Metellus, when he triumphed after his victory over the Carthaginians in Sicily, was the only one of all the Romans who had caused a hundred and twenty captured elephants to be led before his car; that Sulla was the last of the Roman's who extended the pomerium, which in old times it was customary to extend after the acquisition of Italian but never of provincial, territory. Is it more profitable to know this than that Mount Aventine, according to him, is outside the pomerium for one of two reasons, either because that was the place to which the plebeians had seceded, or because the birds had not been favourable when Remus took his auspices on that spot-and, in turn, countless other reports that are either crammed with falsehood or are of the same sort? For though you grant that they tell these things in good faith, though they pledge themselves for the truth of what they write, still whose mistakes will be made fewer by such stories? Whose passions will they restrain? Whom will they make more brave, whom more just, whom more noble-minded? My friend Fabianus used to say that at times he was doubtful whether it was not better not to apply oneself to any studies than to become entangled in these. Of all men they alone are at leisure who take time for philosophy, they alone really live; for they are not content to be good guardians of their own lifetime only. They annex ever age to their own; all the years that have gone ore them are an addition to their store. Unless we are most ungrateful, all those men, glorious fashioners of holy thoughts, were born for us; for us they have prepared a way of life. By other men's labours we are led to the sight of things most beautiful that have been wrested from darkness and brought into light; from no age are we shut out, we have access to all ages, and if it is our wish, by greatness of mind, to pass beyond the narrow limits of human weakness, there is a great stretch of time through which we may roam. We may argue with Socrates, we may doubt with Carneades, find peace with Epicurus, overcome human nature with the Stoics, exceed it with the Cynics. Since Nature allows us to enter into fellowship with every age, why should we not turn from this paltry and fleeting span of time and surrender ourselves with all our soul to the past, which is boundless, which is eternal, which we share with our betters? Those who rush about in the performance of social duties, who give themselves and others no rest, when they have fully indulged their madness, when they have every day crossed everybody's threshold, and have left no open door unvisited, when they have carried around their venal greeting to houses that are very far apart-out of a city so huge and torn by such varied desires, how few will they be able to see? How many will there be who either from sleep or self-indulgence or rudeness will keep them out! How many who, when they have tortured them with long waiting, will rush by, pretending to be in a hurry! How many will avoid passing out through a hall that is crowded with clients, and will make their escape through some concealed door as if it were not more discourteous to deceive than to exclude. How many, still half asleep and sluggish from last night's debauch, scarcely lifting their lips in the midst of a most insolent yawn, manage to bestow on yonder poor wretches, who break their own slumber in order to wait on that of another, the right name only after it has been whispered to them a thousand times! But we may fairly say that they alone are engaged in the true duties of life who shall wish to have Zeno, Pythagoras, Democritus, and all the other high priests of liberal studies, and Aristotle and Theophrastus, as their most intimate friends every day. No one of these will be \"not at home,\" no one of these will fail to have his visitor leave more happy and more devoted to himself than when he came, no one of these will allow anyone to leave him with empty hands; all mortals can meet with them by night or by day. No one of these will force you to die, but all will teach you how to die; no one of these will wear out your years, but each will add his own years to yours; conversations with no one of these will bring you peril, the friendship of none will endanger your life, the courting of none will tax your purse. From them you will take whatever you wish; it will be no fault of theirs if you do not draw the utmost that you can desire. What happiness, what a fair old age awaits him who has offered himself as a client to these! He will have friends from whom he may seek counsel on matters great and small, whom he may consult every day about himself, from whom he may hear truth without insult, praise without flattery, and after whose likeness he may fashion himself. We are wont to say that it was not in our power to choose the parents who fell to our lot, that they have been given to men by chance; yet we may be the sons of whomsoever we will. Households there are of noblest intellects; choose the one into which you wish to be adopted; you will inherit not merely their name, but even their property, which there will be no need to guard in a mean or niggardly spirit; the more persons you share it with, the greater it will become. These will open to you the path to immortality, and will raise you to a height from which no one is cast down. This is the only way of prolonging mortality-nay, of turning it into immortality. Honours, monuments, all that ambition has commanded by decrees or reared in works of stone, quickly sink to ruin; there is nothing that the lapse of time does not tear down and remove. But the works which philosophy has consecrated cannot be harmed; no age will destroy them, no age reduce them; the following and each succeeding age will but increase the reverence for them, since envy works upon what is close at hand, and things that are far off we are more free to admire. The life of the philosopher, therefore, has wide range, and he is not confined by the same bounds that shut others in. He alone is freed from the limitations of the human race; all ages serve him as if a god. Has some time passed by? This he embraces by recollection. Is time present? This he uses. Is it still to come? This he anticipates. He makes his life long by combining all times into one. But those who forget the past, neglect the present, and fear for the future have a life that is very brief and troubled; when they have reached the end of it, the poor wretches perceive too late that for such a long while they have been busied in doing nothing. Nor because they sometimes invoke death, have you any reason to think it any proof that they find life long. In their folly they are harassed by shifting emotions which rush them into the very things they dread; they often pray for death because they fear it. And, too, you have no reason to think that this is any proof that they are living a long time-the fact that the day often seems to them long, the fact that they complain that the hours pass slowly until the time set for dinner arrives; for, whenever their distractions fail them, they are restless because they are left with nothing to do, and they do not know how to dispose of their leisure or to drag out the time. And so they strive for something else to occupy them, and all the intervening time is irksome; exactly as they do when a gladiatorial exhibition is been announced, or when they are waiting for the appointed time of some other show or amusement, they want to skip over the days that lie between. All postponement of something they hope for seems long to them. Yet the time which they enjoy is short and swift, and it is made much shorter by their own fault; for they flee from one pleasure to another and cannot remain fixed in one desire. Their days are not long to them, but hateful; yet, on the other hand, how scanty seem the nights which they spend in the arms of a harlot or in wine! It is this also that accounts for the madness of poets in fostering human frailties by the tales in which they represent that Jupiter under the enticement of the pleasures of a lover doubled the length of the night. For what is it but to inflame our vices to inscribe the name of the gods as their sponsors, and to present the excused indulgence of divinity as an example to our own weakness? Can the nights which they pay for so dearly fail to seem all too short to these men? They lose the day in expectation of the night, and the night in fear of the dawn. The very pleasures of such men are uneasy and disquieted by alarms of various sorts, and at the very moment of rejoicing the anxious thought comes over them: \"How long will these things last?\" This feeling has led kings to weep over the power they possessed, and they have not so much delighted in the greatness of their fortune, as they have viewed with terror the end to which it must some time come. When the King of Persia, in all the insolence of his pride, spread his army over the vast plains and could not grasp its number but simply its measure, he shed copious tears because inside of a hundred years not a man of such a mighty army would be alive. But he who wept was to bring upon them their fate, was to give some to their doom on the sea, some on the land, some in battle, some in flight, and within a short time was to destroy all those for whose hundredth year he had such fear. And why is it that even their joys are uneasy from fear? Because they do not rest on stable causes, but are perturbed as groundlessly as they are born. But of what sort do you think those times are which even by their own confession are wretched, since even the joys by which they are exalted and lifted above mankind are by no means pure? All the greatest blessings are a source of anxiety, and at no time should fortune be less trusted than when it is best; to maintain prosperity there is need of other prosperity, and in behalf of the prayers that have turned out well we must make still other prayers. For everything that comes to us from chance is unstable, and the higher it rises, the more liable it is to fall. Moreover, what is doomed to perish brings pleasure to no one; very wretched, therefore, and not merely short, must the life of those be who work hard to gain what they must work harder to keep. By great toil they attain what they wish, and with anxiety hold what they have attained; meanwhile they take no account of time that will never more return. New distractions take the place of the old, hope leads to new hope, ambition to new ambition. They do not seek an end of their wretchedness, but change the cause. Have we been tormented by our own public honours? Those of others take more of our time. Have we ceased to labour as candidates? We begin to canvass for others. Have we got rid of the troubles of a prosecutor? We find those of a judge. Has a man ceased to be a judge? He becomes president of a court. Has he become infirm in managing the property of others at a salary? He is perplexed by caring for his own wealth. Have the barracks set Marius free? The consulship keeps him busy. Does Quintius hasten to get to the end of his dictatorship? He will be called back to it from the plough. Scipio will go against the Carthaginians before he is ripe for so great an undertaking; victorious over Hannibal, victorious over Antiochus, the glory of his own consulship, the surety for his brother's, did he not stand in his own way, he would be set beside Jove; but the discord of civilians will vex their preserver, and, when as a young man he had scorned honours that rivalled those of the gods, at length, when he is old, his ambition will lake delight in stubborn exile. Reasons for anxiety will never be lacking, whether born of prosperity or of wretchedness; life pushes on in a succession of engrossments. We shall always pray for leisure, but never enjoy it. And so, my dearest Paulinus, tear yourself away from the crowd, and, too much storm-tossed for the time you have lived, at length withdraw into a peaceful harbour. Think of how many waves you have encountered, how many storms, on the one hand, you have sustained in private life, how many, on the other, you have brought upon yourself in public life; long enough has your virtue been displayed in laborious and unceasing proofs-try how it will behave in leisure. The greater part of your life, certainly the better part of it, has been given to the state; take now some part of your time for yourself as well. And I do not summon you to slothful or idle inaction, or to drown all your native energy in slumbers and the pleasures that are dear to the crowd. That is not to rest; you will find far greater works than all those you have hitherto performed so energetically, to occupy you in the midst of your release and retirement. You, I know, manage the accounts of the whole world as honestly as you would a stranger's, as carefully as you would your own, as conscientiously as you would the state's. You win love in an office in which it is difficult to avoid hatred; but nevertheless believe me, it is better to have knowledge of the ledger of one's own life than of the corn-market. Recall that keen mind of yours, which is most competent to cope with the greatest subjects, from a service that is indeed honourable but hardly adapted to the happy life, and reflect that in all your training in the liberal studies, extending from your earliest years, you were not aiming at this-that it might be safe to entrust many thousand pecks of corn to your charge; you gave hope of something greater and more lofty. There will be no lack of men of tested worth and painstaking industry. But plodding oxen are much more suited to carrying heavy loads than thoroughbred horses, and who ever hampers the fleetness of such high-born creatures with a heavy pack? Reflect, besides, how much worry you have in subjecting yourself to such a great burden; your dealings are with the belly of man. A hungry people neither listens to reason, nor is appeased by justice, nor is bent by any entreaty. Very recently within those few day's after Gaius Caesar died-still grieving most deeply (if the dead have any feeling) because he knew that the Roman people were alive and had enough food left for at any rate seven or eight days while he was building his bridges of boats and playing with the resources of the empire, we were threatened with the worst evil that can befall men even during a siege-the lack of provisions; his imitation of a mad and foreign and misproud king was very nearly at the cost of the city's destruction and famine and the general revolution that follows famine. What then must have been the feeling of those who had charge of the corn-market, and had to face stones, the sword, fire-and a Caligula? By the greatest subterfuge they concealed the great evil that lurked in the vitals of the state-with good reason, you may be sure. For certain maladies must be treated while the patient is kept in ignorance; knowledge of their disease has caused the death of many. Do you retire to these quieter, safer, greater things! Think you that it is just the same whether you are concerned in having corn from oversea poured into the granaries, unhurt either by the dishonesty or the neglect of those who transport it, in seeing that it does not become heated and spoiled by collecting moisture and tallies in weight and measure, or whether you enter upon these sacred and lofty studies with the purpose of discovering what substance, what pleasure, what mode of life, what shape God has; what fate awaits your soul; where Nature lays us to rest When we are freed from the body; what the principle is that upholds all the heaviest matter in the centre of this world, suspends the light on high, carries fire to the topmost part, summons the stars to their proper changes-and ether matters, in turn, full of mighty wonders? You really must leave the ground and turn your mind's eye upon these things! Now while the blood is hot, we must enter with brisk step upon the better course. In this kind of life there awaits much that is good to know-the love and practice of the virtues, forgetfulness of the passions, knowledge of living and dying, and a life of deep repose. The condition of all who are preoccupied is wretched, but most wretched is the condition of those who labour at preoccupations that are not even their own, who regulate their sleep by that of another, their walk by the pace of another, who are under orders in case of the freest things in the world-loving and hating. If these wish to know how short their life is, let them reflect how small a part of it is their own. And so when you see a man often wearing the robe of office, when you see one whose name is famous in the Forum, do not envy him; those things are bought at the price of life. They will waste all their years, in order that they may have one year reckoned by their name. Life has left some in the midst of their first struggles, before they could climb up to the height of their ambition; some, when they have crawled up through a thousand indignities to the crowning dignity, have been possessed by the unhappy thought that they have but toiled for an inscription on a tomb; some who have come to extreme old age, while they adjusted it to new hopes as if it were youth, have had it fail from sheer weakness in the midst of their great and shameless endeavours. Shameful is he whose breath leaves him in the midst of a trial when, advanced in years and still courting the applause of an ignorant circle, he is pleading for some litigant who is the veriest stranger; disgraceful is he who, exhausted more quickly by his mode of living than by his labour, collapses in the very midst of his duties; disgraceful is he who dies in the act of receiving payments on account, and draws a smile from his long delayed heir. I cannot pass over an instance which occurs to me. Sextus Turannius was an old man of long tested diligence, who, after his ninetieth year, having received release from the duties of his office by Gaius Caesar's own act, ordered himself to be laid out on his bed and to be mourned by the assembled household as if he were dead. The whole house bemoaned the leisure of its old master, and did not end its sorrow until his accustomed work was restored to him. Is it really such pleasure for a man to die in harness? Yet very many have the same feeling; their desire for their labour lasts longer than their ability; they fight against the weakness of the body, they judge old age to be a hardship on no other score than because it puts them aside. The law does not draft a soldier after his fiftieth year, it does not call a senator after his sixtieth; it is more difficult for men to obtain leisure from themselves than from the law. Meantime, while they rob and are being robbed, while they break up each other's repose, while they make each other wretched, their life is without profit, without pleasure, without any improvement of the mind. No one keeps death in view, no one refrains from far-reaching hopes; some men, indeed, even arrange for things that lie beyond life-huge masses of tombs and dedications of public works and gifts for their funeral-pyres and ostentatious funerals. But, in very truth, the funerals of such men ought to be conducted by the light of torches and wax tapers, as though they had lived but the tiniest span. \"It's not that we have a short time to live, but that we waste a lot of it.\" -Lucius Annaeus Seneca","subset":"phil_papers"}
+{"meta":{"title":"Theodore George, Gert-Jan van der Heiden (Eds.): The Gadamerian Mind","type":"info:eu-repo\/semantics\/review","creator":"Lazurca, Vladimir","subject":"Philosophy","date":"2022","identifier":"oai:philarchive.org\/rec\/LAZRTG-2","description":null,"datestamp":"2023-09-30T14:00:32Z","dup_signals":{"dup_doc_count":120,"dup_dump_count":15,"dup_details":{"curated_sources":2,"2023-50":7,"2023-40":5,"2023-23":3,"2023-14":12,"2023-06":11,"2022-49":5,"2022-40":6,"2022-33":10,"2022-27":16,"2022-21":15,"2024-30":3,"2024-26":3,"2024-22":7,"2024-18":11,"2024-10":4}}},"text":"Theodore George, Gert-Jan van der Heiden (Eds.): The Gadamerian Mind Vladimir Lazurca Introduction Recent decades have witnessed a current of uncertainty surrounding the afterlife of Gadamer's philosophy. The critical challenges posed by poststructuralism, postmodernism, and deconstruction certainly had the potential to relegate philosophical hermeneutics to the role of a precursor or, worse, a vanquished adversary. What is more, a similar sentiment had troubled Gadamer himself, even before publishing his magnum opus. Finishing work on Truth and Method in 1959, he wondered whether it had not already come 'too late'. By then, the kind of reflection he was advocating would have been deemed superfluous, as other philosophical movements and reforms in the social sciences already appeared to have left the romantic conception of the Geisteswissenschaften in their wake (Gadamer 1972, 449; 2004, 555). As is well known, Truth and Method stood the test of the 20th century and indeed became one of the most important works of its time. This year marks the 20th anniversary of Gadamer's death, and it prompts an unavoidable question: does Gadamer's thought remain 'of its time', or is it equipped for the challenges of our own? The ambition of the volume under review is to show that the reception and scholarship of Gadamer's philosophy has been flourishing and that his influence remains felt within and beyond philosophy. Aims The Gadamerian Mind, edited by Theodore George and Gert-Jan van der Heiden, is the 8th volume in the Routledge Philosophical Minds. This series, currently encompassing 12 published titles and three forthcoming, aims to present a 'comprehensive survey of all aspects of a major philosopher's work, from analysis and criticism [...] to the way their ideas are taken up in contemporary philosophy and beyond' (ii). True to the series' objectives, this volume promises to be a 'comprehensive scholarly companion' (4) and a 'major survey of the fundamental aspects of Gadamer's thought' (i). It therefore focuses on the dominant themes of Gadamer's main body of work, philosophical hermeneutics. On the other hand, the purpose of this collection is to also show that the scholarly reception of Gadamer's philosophy has developed and increased in the decades since his death. Accordingly, in addition to tracing the diverse influence of his views in different areas of philosophy and other disciplines, the editors aim to chart new and emerging perspectives on his thinking in this 'new and comprehensive survey of Gadamer's thought and its significance' (1). Consequently, this collection promises to put forth a 'portrait of the Gadamerian mind'1 that comprises what they call an increase in being. The term is borrowed from Gadamer's discussion of images: according to him, an image is more than a mimetic replica of the original, but involves a presentation of what is essential, unique or merely possible in it, hence an increase in being. The editors thus aim to offer much more than a mere replication and exposition of Gadamerian themes. However, at a cursory glance, these different aims might in fact seem divergent. On the one hand, the volume aspires to be comprehensive, therefore selfcontained. As such, it will necessarily repeat the structure and at least some of the content of previous volumes with similar goals. Companion volumes, as is well known, tend to be rather conventional, both in format and subject matter. On the other hand, this volume aims to not only distinguish itself from existing scholarship, but also forward and develop Gadamer's own thinking. Hence, there is a danger, given these objectives, for it to splinter off in different directions and lose coherence. It will soon become clear that this danger is only apparent. Structure The Gadamerian Mind is composed of 38 chapters divided into six sections and enclosed by a brief introduction at the start and a comprehensive index at the end. The sections closely follow the stated aims. Roughly speaking, the first two sections review the main concepts and themes that return throughout Gadamer's work, predominantly \u2013 but not exclusively \u2013 in his philosophical hermeneutics. Sections three and four canvass the philosophical background, both contemporary and historical, of Gadamer's work, providing readers with contextual information about the diverse influences on his thought and its contemporary audience and critics. Finally, the concluding two sections focus on the second goal of this collection, that of assessing the importance of Gadamer's work in recent philosophy and beyond. The volume opens with Overviews, a section surveying the intellectual background of Gadamer's life and philosophy as well as showcasing the chief focal points of his work. The contributions in this first section explore aspects of Gadamer's intellectual biography and life, as well as sketching out the main outline of his philosophical legacy. His commitment to humanism and its significance, the importance of poetry and art in general for his thinking, the ongoing theme of dialogue and conversation are all touched on in this section. A stand-out essay, which highlights an important and often overlooked subject is Georgia Warnke's 'Gadamer on solidarity'. In this remarkably detailed and illuminating article, Warnke collects the threads of Gadamer's scattered remarks on solidarity and friendship into a general account. In dialogue with previous scholarship, she identifies the cardinal dimensions which articulate Gadamer's conception of solidarity. What emerges is brought into sharper focus through comparisons with relevant recent and contemporary accounts. 1 Unfortunately, there is an ambivalence throughout this volume as to the precise meaning of the Gadamerian mind. For some, it is a placeholder for Gadamer himself, as an aggregate of ideas, interests, and commitments, for others it stands for 'Gadamer's theory of the mind'. So, it is unclear whether such a portrait would be of the former or the latter. Given the nature of the Philosophical Minds series, the editors' intention is certainly for it to be of the former. But I believe a more thorough exploration of the latter would have been highly valuable and as such remains a missed opportunity of this collection. According to Warnke's reconstruction, Gadamer's understanding of solidarity is that of a substantive bond with others that does not depend on affinities or similarities, and neither on subjective intentions or attitudes. She finds here a stark contrast with some recent approaches, such as Banting and Wymlicka's, for whom solidarity is 'a set of attitudes and motivations' (2017, 3). In line with this definition, these authors look to various political institutions and policies which can reinforce the attitudes underlying democratic solidarity. As Warnke explains, from a Gadamerian perspective this project would have to seem futile. Given that he does not think solidarity is a matter of attitudes, he would contest that cultivating the relevant ones can foster it. Warnke proceeds to compare Gadamer's account to Rorty (1989), Shelby (2005), Jaeggi (2001), and Habermas (2001, 2008) in a highly persuasive and concise chapter on Gadamer's continued relevance and significance for contemporary debates in the philosophy of solidarity, identity, race, and public policy. Overviews is followed by Key Concepts, a section devoted to a critical examination and assessment of the primary conceptual makeup of Gadamer's acclaimed philosophical hermeneutics. The chapters contained here track the notions of truth, experience, tradition, language, play, translation, image (picture) and health. These are well-written by well-known scholars and provide an approachable and comprehensive introduction to these concepts. A particularly notable essay, and indeed relevant in the global circumstances of today, is Kevin Aho's 'Gadamer and health'. In his contribution, Aho details the enormous impact Gadamer's The Enigma of Health had within philosophy and explores the way Gadamer's pronouncements reflect the views of medical practitioners. According to Aho, the core aim of Gadamer's book is to liberate medicine from the scientific method that governs it in order to arrive at patients' own experiences of their illnesses and bodies. For Gadamer, health is hidden, enigmatic, it is 'the condition of not noticing, of being unhindered' (1996, 73). Further, he claims that it does not consist in 'an increasing concern for every fluctuation in one's general physical condition or the eager consumption of prophylactic medicines' (Gadamer 1996, 112). This, for Aho, reflects the transparency of our own bodies. What is especially noteworthy in Aho's contribution is the detailed account of exactly how and to what extent physicians and medical professionals are echoing Gadamer's views. There is ample evidence here, for Aho, that Gadamer can help lay the conceptual groundwork for reforming our understanding of health and care. Although this connection is not explored in the text, this article is especially important at a time where health is no longer defined along these lines, where sick bodies are asymptomatic, and a 'condition of not noticing' can characterize both illness and health. Unfortunately, there is also a notable absence from Key Concepts. Certainly, there are several important concepts not treated in this section and one could make a case for their inclusion. For instance, the concepts of pluralism, phronesis or scientific method are also key to Gadamer's philosophy and are absent here. But, in the editors' defence, a collective volume is finite, and their selection can certainly be justified with respect to these and perhaps other notions. There is, however, an omission for which this cannot be said. In their introduction, the editors state that Gadamer's name has become synonymous with philosophical hermeneutics, a field 'concerned with theories of understanding and interpretation' (1). A chapter dedicated to the concepts of understanding and interpretation, therefore, both undoubtedly key concepts in Gadamer's philosophy, should not be missing in a comprehensive scholarly companion, more so since Gadamer's use of these concepts is known to cause confusion and controversy among scholars and critics alike. This is a regrettable omission for which the other chapters, for all their merits, cannot make up. The third section is entitled Historical Influences and is devoted to outlining the most important philosophers who left their mark on Gadamer's thought and to evaluating his own account of their views. The papers composing this part examine the importance of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Dilthey, and Heidegger for Gadamer's thinking, undoubtedly the chief influences on his thought. Francisco J. Gonzalez opens this section with 'Gadamer and Plato: an unending dialogue', a veritable tour de force of erudition. Not only is this paper a brilliant survey of Gadamer's Plato studies and his significance for Gadamer's own thought, but this article also details the extent to which the study of Plato's dialogues played a key role in the development of Gadamer's own philosophy. Gonzalez identifies the chief contributions of Gadamer's commentaries and interpretations of Plato and investigates how his reading changed throughout his career. By subdividing Gadamer's engagement with Plato in five distinct periods and analysing his hermeneutical approach to the study of the dialogues, Gonzales brings this 'unending dialogue' of the two philosophers into clear view. This paper's discussion of the differences between these periods, the internal inconsistencies within them and the accounts of the parallel developments in Gadamer's own philosophy in these periods are highly valuable to scholars of Plato and Gadamer alike. The subsequent section, Contemporary Encounters, canvasses important conversations and debates between Gadamer and his critics about the possibility, nature, and limits of philosophical hermeneutics. The reader finds here all the usual suspects (Habermas, Derrida, Ricoeur, Vattimo) but will certainly be pleasantly surprised to see Paul Celan's name mentioned among them. In his 'Poem, dialogue and witness: Gadamer's reading of Paul Celan', Gert-Jan van der Heiden analyses a very important concern in Gadamer's later philosophy, namely poetry. He specifically centres on the relation between dialogue and poem. According to Gadamer, they are two distinct modes of language, each with their own specific modality of disclosing meaning. What follows is a compelling discussion of this difference and a welcome addition to Gadamer scholarship. The focus on Gadamer's interest in poetry is in general an important innovation to existing literature and can be seen throughout this volume. A noticeable omission from this section, however, is a chapter on the Italian philosopher and jurist Emilio Betti. He and Gadamer had a private, epistolary debate and a lengthy public controversy, yet news of their engagement has not yet fully reached English-language scholarship. This is especially unfortunate as part of their disagreement revolves around central issues in hermeneutics. One such point of contention is the conceptual relation between understanding and interpretation, an issue concerning which these authors had opposing views and were sternly critical of one another. Another source of disagreement was the issue of validity and correctness in interpretation as well as the question of the diversity of interpretative criteria required by the variety of available hermeneutic objects. On the latter point, Betti criticized Gadamer for his undifferentiated view of objects of interpretation and argued that different items demand different hermeneutic approaches. But the deeper differences between these thinkers are yet to be thoroughly examined in Anglo-American academia and Betti's unique voice is yet to be heard. I consider his omission from this collection regrettable for that reason. In the penultimate section of this volume, Beyond Philosophy, the editors have compiled essays detailing the impact and significance of Gadamer's work in areas and disciplines outside philosophy. From theology to jurisprudence, from medicine and healthcare to history and political science, Gadamer's influence is thoroughly discussed here and, for many working within philosophy, brought into the open for the very first time. This entire section is undoubtedly a vital addition to existing scholarship and one of the areas where this volume more clearly innovates. The collection concludes with Legacies and Questions, a section addressing significant philosophical currents that draw on Gadamer's work, whether positively through further development, or negatively through critical engagement. The papers collected here deal with the encounter of Gadamer's philosophy with postmodernism, analytic philosophy, race theory, metaphysics, and philosophy of culture. Particularly engaging and an excellent supplement to a growing literature is Catherine Homan's article on Gadamer's position within feminist philosophy. In her 'Gadamer and feminism', Homan surveys Gadamer's ambivalent reception by feminist philosophers. While many have criticized his position, others have viewed hermeneutics as fruitful for feminist purposes, adopting or adapting some of its cardinal tenets. In order to make sense of this varied reception, Homan enlists the help of Gadamerian hermeneutics itself. In particular, she claims that it is Gadamer's insight into tradition that helps us understand feminist replies to his philosophy as well as what she provocatively calls the 'tradition of feminism'. In her extensive treatment of the literature, Homan criticizes dominant strands of Gadamer reception in feminist philosophy by arguing that attending to tradition, rather than dismissing it, makes us better able to preserve valuable differences. Drawing hermeneutics and feminism together, she claims, invites more comprehensive interpretations and reinterpretations of both. A regrettable lacuna of Legacies and Questions has to do with Gadamer's reception in Anglo-America. Unfortunately, Greg Lynch's 'Gadamer in Anglo-America' is not primarily concerned with the full range of this phenomenon. At first, this essay details Gadamer's philosophical proximity to a well-known movement in the analytic philosophy of language, namely the so-called 'ordinary language philosophy'. Lynch considers this starting point to be 'the most natural spot in the analytic landscape' in relation to which Gadamer's philosophy ought to be discussed. After this initial section, which explores and assesses both significant commonalities and differences, Lynch proceeds to discuss the adoption of a Gadamerianinspired perspective by two prominent analytic philosophers, Richard Rorty (1979) and John McDowell (1994). While Lynch's treatment of this encounter and his critique of the adequacy of Rorty and McDowell's reading of Gadamer are highly informative and valuable, what unfortunately does not emerge from this paper is the extent to which Gadamer's reception in the 'Anglo-American' tradition of philosophy is still an ongoing process which continues to be relevant. This is most visible when it comes to Gadamer's proximity to Davidson and the ongoing exploration of their affinities in the philosophy of interpretation. Dialogues with Davidson (2011, ed. Jeff Malpas), an excellent volume on Davidson's work in areas of philosophy of action, interpretation, and understanding, provides a good example of the fruitfulness and proportion of this endeavour. Nine out of the 21 chapters of this collection critically examine and assess this proximity, not to mention the Foreword, where Dagfinn F\u00f8llesdal states that Gadamer is a 'natural point of contact' with Davidson's own views. In fact, Davidson himself claimed to have arrived 'in Gadamer's intellectual neighborhood' (1997, 421). Dialogues with Davidson is a small sample of a new and growing debate in contemporary scholarship which focuses on drawing Gadamer and Davidson's respective philosophies together and reaping the benefits of this comparison, thus bridging the unfortunate gap between the two major Western philosophical traditions. Gadamer is therefore very much part of an ongoing debate within analytic philosophy in recent decades and it is an oversight not to have included it in this collection. The volume closes with a very detailed and useful index. The unity of the collection As mentioned at the outset, this collection might at first seem controlled by two sets of strings, comprehensiveness on one hand, innovation on the other. And the task of coordination appeared daunting. But has this volume nonetheless been able to strike a balance? Has it delivered a 'portrait of the Gadamerian mind' that is at once comprehensive and tracks the state of the art? In my view, it has, and the articles cited are some excellent examples of the fruits that can be borne of this twofold ambition. These and many other papers in this collection show that the two directions can be harmonized into a cohesive volume. Moreover, this collection is not only held together by the skeleton of its primary goals. The connecting tissues stretching out between the chapters are just as vital to the unity of the work. A pertinent example of such a link, running through the various contributions, is the theme of conceptual innovation. Several of the articles undertake novel deconstructions of Gadamerian concepts, some authors opting at times for a reconstruction and retranslation instead. For instance, there is the increased and usefully articulated emphasis on the presentational, as opposed to the representational in Gadamer, not only as it relates to aesthetics (see James Risser, Cynthia R. Nielsen and G\u00fcnter Figal's chapters), but also to language, where, for Gadamer, it is being that comes to presentation (see Nicholas Davey and Carolyn Culbertson's contributions). The careful articulation of the differences between these concepts is a highly valuable, if unintended, sub-debate in this volume. Another instance of this new interest in conceptual analysis in Gadamer scholarship is David Vessey's 'Tradition'. In this extensive and comprehensive contribution, the author distinguishes between Gadamer's Tradition and \u00dcberlieferung, two concepts identically translated, and usually indistinctly understood. Through his careful analysis, Vessey has not only disambiguated some interpretations of Gadamer, but contributed positively to the philosophical study of tradition in English-speaking scholarship. On the other hand, some authors have proposed and explored renewed translations of Gadamerian concepts. One such instance is the concept of linguality (and lingual as an adjective), here presented as a translation of the Gadamerian Sprachlichkeit (for which linguisticality is the norm) but extending in use beyond the scope of Gadamer's own philosophy. Linguality, with its overtones of orality, might indeed be better fitted for a philosophy which sees the essence of language in its fluid, spoken form of Gespr\u00e4ch, as opposed to linguisticality, which evokes fixed structures and stable grammars. Bildung as enculturation, as opposed to the more common cultivation, might again figure as such an example. I, for one, salute these conceptual innovations and look forward to the fruits they might bear in the future. The way I see it, these 'connecting tissues', as I called them, constitute part of that increase in being promised at the outset. For it is not a simple terminological update. A philosopher's words are the body, and not only the dress of his thought. As such, the examples mentioned contribute to uncovering \u2013 for an English-speaking audience \u2013 the full texture of Gadamer's conceptual apparatus and the different layers of inferential relations present between concepts in the original. At the same time, they provide, as already mentioned, precise instruments for novel philosophical reflection. One could say, with Gadamer on one's side, that this represents a positive appropriation and integration of his philosophy into a new idiom, filled with possibilities for future application and potential insights into issues Gadamer himself didn't grapple with. In my view, this is an excellent way of keeping Gadamer and his philosophy alive through translation and appropriation, and of demonstrating their relevance. On the topic of translation, we can also applaud the inclusion of a chapter on this issue as one of Gadamer's key concepts. While one can argue whether the concept is key, this is certainly an area of research that has been growing backstage for a while. Although the author, Theodore George, does not mention this debate in his 'Translation', as that was not necessarily his purpose, his chapter will nevertheless bring this area of research into the mainstream, attracting new and significant contributions to this promising and burgeoning field. After all, a collection of this scholarly calibre does not, in spite of its goals, merely canvass the state of the art: it also establishes it. For this reason too it deserves praise. The Gadamerian Mind and the chapters it contains are more than likely to act as signposts marking the relevance and significance of a given topic. This is exactly why I have said that the absence of certain topics is regrettable. But it is also why the presence of others is praiseworthy, such as those explored in Kevin Aho, Georgia Warnke, Theodore George, or Catherine Homan's contributions. Concluding remarks Undoubtedly, the Gadamerian Mind is of the highest scholarly value as a comprehensive companion to Gadamer's thought and its significance. That his philosophy remains relevant is both successfully argued for and evident from the quality of the contributions collected here. But I have also been suggesting in the previous section that part of the value of this volume lies in its potential for impact, and it's important, in my submission, not to underestimate its possible repercussions for future research. In other words, this collection both provides an increase in being in Gadamer scholarship, as I've argued above, and promotes and forwards it through its selection of treated topics and its academic stature. The Gadamerian Mind stands as an open invitation for scholars to explore and actualize the latent possibilities of Gadamer's philosophy themselves. Bibliography Banting, Keith, and Will Kymlicka. 2017. The Strains of Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davidson, Donald. 1997. \"Gadamer and Plato's Philebus.\" In Hahn 1997: 421-432. Gadamer, HansGeorg. 1996. The Enigma of Health: The Art of Healing in the Scientific Age. Translated by Jason Gaiger and Nicholas Walker. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1972. \"Nachwort zur 3. Auflage.\" In Gadamer 1993, vol. II: 449-478. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1993. Gesammelte Werke. 8 vol. T\u00fcbingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 2004. Truth and Method. 2nd rev. edn. Translation revised by Weinsheimer J. and Marshall D.G. Continuum: London, New York. Habermas, J\u00fcrgen. 2001. \"The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy.\" In The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays, edited and translated by Max Pensky, 58\u2013 112. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Habermas, J\u00fcrgen. 2008. \"Prepolitical Foundations of the Constitutional State?\" In Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays, translated by Ciaran Cronin, 101\u2013 13. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hahn, Lewis Edwin. 1997. The Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer. The Library of Living Philosophers. Vol. 24. Chicago: Open Court. Jaeggi, Rahel. 2001. \"Solidarity and Indifference.\" In Solidarity in Health and Social Care in Europe, edited by R. ter Meulen, Will Arts, and R. Muffels, 287\u2013 308. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Malpas, Jeff. 2011. Dialogues with Davidson. Acting, Interpreting, Understanding. London and Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. McDowell, John. 1994. Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rorty, Richard. 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rorty, Richard. 1989. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shelby, Tommie. 2005. We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.","subset":"phil_papers"}
+{"meta":{"title":"American Enlightenment Thought","type":"info:eu-repo\/semantics\/article","creator":"Ralston, Shane J.","subject":"Philosophy","date":"2011","identifier":"oai:philarchive.org\/rec\/RALAET","description":null,"datestamp":"2023-09-11T17:12:22Z","dup_signals":{"dup_doc_count":124,"dup_dump_count":69,"dup_details":{"curated_sources":2,"2023-50":2,"2023-40":1,"2023-23":1,"2023-14":1,"2022-49":1,"2022-33":1,"2022-27":1,"2022-05":1,"2021-39":1,"2021-25":1,"2021-17":1,"2021-04":1,"2020-40":1,"2020-34":1,"2020-29":1,"2020-16":1,"2020-05":1,"2019-47":1,"2019-39":1,"2019-30":1,"2019-22":2,"2019-13":1,"2018-51":1,"2018-43":1,"2018-26":1,"2018-17":1,"2018-09":1,"2017-51":1,"2017-47":1,"2017-43":1,"2017-39":1,"2017-34":1,"2017-30":1,"2017-26":1,"2017-22":1,"2017-09":1,"2017-04":1,"2016-50":1,"2016-44":1,"2016-40":1,"2016-36":1,"2016-30":1,"2016-26":1,"2016-22":1,"2016-18":1,"2016-07":3,"2015-48":3,"2015-40":2,"2015-35":3,"2015-32":3,"2015-27":2,"2015-22":3,"2015-14":2,"2014-52":4,"2014-49":4,"2014-42":8,"2014-41":4,"2014-35":3,"2014-23":6,"2014-15":5,"2024-18":1,"2017-13":1,"2015-18":3,"2015-11":3,"2015-06":3,"2014-10":3,"2013-48":3,"2013-20":2,"2024-22":1}}},"text":"American Enlightenment Thought Although there is no consensus about the exact span of time that corresponds to the American Enlightenment, it is safe to say that it occurred during the eighteenth century among thinkers in British North America and the early United States and was inspired by the ideas of the British and French Enlightenments. Based on the metaphor of bringing light to the Dark Age, the Age of the Enlightenment (Si\u00e8cle des lumi\u00e8res in French and Aufkl\u00e4rung in German) shifted allegiances away from absolute authority, whether religious or political, to more skeptical and optimistic attitudes about human nature, religion and politics. In the American context, thinkers such as Thomas Paine, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams and Benjamin Franklin invented and adopted revolutionary ideas about scientific rationality, religious toleration and experimental political organization-ideas that would have farreaching effects on the development of the fledgling nation. Some coupled science and religion in the notion of deism; others asserted the natural rights of man in the anti-authoritarian doctrine of liberalism; and still others touted the importance of cultivating virtue, enlightened leadership and community in early forms of republican thinking. At least six ideas came to punctuate American Enlightenment thinking: deism, liberalism, republicanism, conservatism, toleration and scientific progress. Many of these were shared with European Enlightenment thinkers, but in some instances took a uniquely American form. Table of Contents 1. Enlightenment Age Thinking 1. Moderate and Radical 2. Chronology 3. Democracy and the Social Contract 2. Six Key Ideas 1. Deism 2. Liberalism 3. Republicanism 4. Conservatism 5. Toleration 6. Scientific Progress 3. Four American Enlightenment Thinkers 1. Franklin 2. Jefferson 3. Madison 4. Adams 4. Contemporary Work 5. References and Further Reading 1. Enlightenment Age Thinking The preand post-revolutionary era in American history generated propitious conditions for Enlightenment thought to thrive on an order comparable to that witnessed in the European Enlightenments. In the pre-revolutionary years, Americans reacted to the misrule of King George III, the unfairness of Parliament (\"taxation without representation\") and exploitative treatment at the hands of a colonial power: the English Empire. The Englishman-cumrevolutionary Thomas Paine wrote the famous pamphlet The Rights of Man, decrying the abuses of the North American colonies by their English masters. In the post-revolutionary years, a whole generation of American thinkers would found a new system of government on liberal and republican principles, articulating their enduring ideas in documents such as the Declaration of Independence, the Federalist Papers and the United States Constitution. Although distinctive features arose in the eighteenth-century American context, much of the American Enlightenment was continuous with parallel experiences in British and French society. Four themes recur in both European and American Enlightenment texts: modernization, skepticism, reason and liberty. Modernization means that beliefs and institutions based on absolute moral, religious and political authority (such as the divine right of kings and the Ancien R\u00e9gime) will become increasingly eclipsed by those based on science, rationality and religious pluralism. Many Enlightenment thinkers-especially the French philosophes, such as Voltaire, Rousseau and Diderot-subscribed to some form of skepticism, doubting appeals to miraculous, transcendent and supernatural forces that potentially limit the scope of individual choice and reason. Reason that is universally shared and definitive of the human nature also became a dominant theme in Enlightenment thinkers' writings, particularly Immanuel Kant's \"What is Enlightenment?\" and his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The fourth theme, liberty and rights assumed a central place in theories of political association, specifically as limits state authority originating prior to the advent of states (that is, in a state of nature) and manifesting in social contracts, especially in John Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Government and Thomas Jefferson's drafts of theDeclaration of Independence. a. Moderate and Radical Besides identifying dominant themes running throughout the Enlightenment period, some historians, such as Henry May and Jonathan Israel, understand Enlightenment thought as divisible into two broad categories, each reflecting the content and intensity of ideas prevalent at the time. The moderate Enlightenment signifies commitments to economic liberalism, religious toleration and constitutional politics. In contrast to its moderate incarnation, the radical Enlightenment conceives enlightened thought through the prism of revolutionary rhetoric and classical Republicanism. Some commentators argue that the British Enlightenment (especially figures such as James Hutton, Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith) was essentially moderate, while the French (represented by Denis Diderot, Claude Adrien Helv\u00e9tius and Fran\u00e7ois Marie Arouet) was decidedly more radical. Influenced as it was by the British and French, American Enlightenment thought integrates both moderate and radical elements. b. Chronology American Enlightenment thought can also be appreciated chronologically, or in terms of three temporal stages in the development of Enlightenment Age thinking. The early stage stretches from the time of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 to 1750, when members of Europe's middle class began to break free from the monarchical and aristocratic regimes-whether through scientific discovery, social and political change or emigration outside of Europe, including America. The middle stage extends from 1751 to just a few years after the start of the American Revolution in 1779. It is characterized by an exploding fascination with science, religious revivalism and experimental forms of government, especially in the United States. The late stage begins in 1780 and ends with the rise of Napol\u00e9on Bonaparte, as the French Revolution comes to a close in 1815-a period in which the European Enlightenment was in decline, while the American Enlightenment reclaimed and institutionalized many of its seminal ideas. However, American Enlightenment thinkers were not always of a single mind with their European counterparts. For instance, several American Enlightenment thinkers-particularly James Madison and John Adams, though not Benjamin Franklin-judged the French philosophes to be morally degenerate intellectuals of the era. c. Democracy and the Social Contract Many European and American Enlightenment figures were critical of democracy. Skepticism about the value of democratic institutions was likely a legacy of Plato's belief that democracy led to tyranny and Aristotle's view that democracy was the best of the worst forms of government. John Adams and James Madison perpetuated the elitist and anti-democratic idea that to invest too much political power in the hands of uneducated and property-less people was to put society at constant risk of social and political upheaval. Although several of America's Enlightenment thinkers condemned democracy, others were more receptive to the idea of popular rule as expressed in European social contract theories. Thomas Jefferson was strongly influenced by John Locke's social contract theory, while Thomas Paine found inspiration in JeanJacques Rousseau's. In the Two Treatises on Government (1689 and 1690), Locke argued against the divine right of kings and in favor of government grounded on the consent of the governed; so long as people would have agreed to hand over some of their liberties enjoyed in a pre-political society or state of nature in exchange for the protection of basic rights to life, liberty and property. However, if the state reneged on the social contract by failing to protect those natural rights, then the people had a right to revolt and form a new government. Perhaps more of a democrat than Locke, Rousseau insisted in The Social Contract(1762) that citizens have a right of self-government, choosing the rules by which they live and the judges who shall enforce those rules. If the relationship between the will of the state and the will of the people (the \"general will\") is to be democratic, it should be mediated by as few institutions as possible. 2. Six Key Ideas At least six ideas came to punctuate American Enlightenment thinking: deism, liberalism, republicanism, conservatism, toleration and scientific progress. Many of these were shared with European Enlightenment thinkers, but in some instances took a uniquely American form. a. Deism European Enlightenment thinkers conceived tradition, custom and prejudice (Vorurteil) as barriers to gaining true knowledge of the universal laws of nature. The solution was deism or understanding God's existence as divorced from holy books, divine providence, revealed religion, prophecy and miracles; instead basing religious belief on reason and observation of the natural world. Deists appreciated God as a reasonable Deity. A reasonable God endowed humans with rationality in order that they might discover the moral instructions of the universe in the natural law. God created the universal laws that govern nature, and afterwards humans realize God's will through sound judgment and wise action. Deists were typically (though not always) Protestants, sharing a disdain for the religious dogmatism and blind obedience to tradition exemplified by the Catholic Church. Rather than fight members of the Catholic faith with violence and intolerance, most deists resorted to the use of tamer weapons such as humor and mockery. Both moderate and radical American Enlightenment thinkers, such as James Madison, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, John Adams and George Washington, were deists. Some struggled with the tensions between Calvinist orthodoxy and deist beliefs, while other subscribed to the populist version of deism advanced by Thomas Paine in The Age of Reason. Franklin was remembered for stating in the Constitutional Convention that \"the longer I live, the more convincing proof I see of this truth-that God governs in the affairs of men.\" In what would become known as the Jefferson Bible (originally The Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth), Jefferson chronicles the life and times of Jesus Christ from a deist perspective, eliminating all mention of miracles or divine intervention. God for deists such as Jefferson never loomed large in humans' day-to-day life beyond offering a moral or humanistic outlook and the resource of reason to discover the content of God's laws. Despite the near absence of God in human life, American deists did not deny His existence, largely because the majority of the populace still remained strongly religious, traditionally pious and supportive of the good works (for example monasteries, religious schools and community service) that the clergy did. b. Liberalism Another idea central to American Enlightenment thinking is liberalism, that is, the notion that humans have natural rights and that government authority is not absolute, but based on the will and consent of the governed. Rather than a radical or revolutionary doctrine, liberalism was rooted in the commercial harmony and tolerant Protestantism embraced by merchants in Northern Europe, particularly Holland and England. Liberals favored the interests of the middle class over those of the high-born aristocracy, an outlook of tolerant pluralism that did not discriminate between consumers or citizens based on their race or creed, a legal system devoted to the protection of private property rights, and an ethos of strong individualism over the passive collectivism associated with feudal arrangements. Liberals also preferred rational argumentation and free exchange of ideas to the uncritical of religious doctrine or governmental mandates. In this way, liberal thinking was anti-authoritarian. Although later liberalism became associated with grassroots democracy and a sharp separation of the public and private domains, early liberalism favored a parliamentarian form of government that protected liberty of expression and movement, the right to petition the government, separation of church and state and the confluence of public and private interests in philanthropic and entrepreneurial endeavors. The claim that private individuals have fundamental God-given rights, such as to property, life, liberty and to pursue their conception of good, begins with the English philosopher John Locke, but also finds expression in Thomas Jefferson's drafting of the Declaration of Independence. The U.S. Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the Constitution, guarantees a schedule of individual rights based on the liberal ideal. During the constitutional convention, James Madison responded to the anti-Federalists' demand for a bill of rights as a condition of ratification by reviewing over two-hundred proposals and distilling them into an initial list of twelve suggested amendments to the Constitution, covering the rights of free speech, religious liberty, right to bear arms and habeas corpus, among others. While ten of those suggested were ratified in 1791, one missing amendment (stopping laws created by Congress to increase its members' salaries from taking effect until the next legislative term) would have to wait until 1992 to be ratified as the Twenty-seventh Amendment. Madison's concern that the Bill of Rights should apply not only to the federal government would eventually be accommodated with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment (especially its due process clause) in 1868 and a series of Supreme Court cases throughout the twentieth-century interpreting each of the ten amendments as \"incorporated\" and thus protecting citizens against state governments as well. c. Republicanism Classical republicanism is a commitment to the notion that a nation ought to be ruled as a republic, in which selection of the state's highest public official is determined by a general election, rather than through a claim to hereditary right. Republican values include civic patriotism, virtuous citizenship and property-based personality. Developed during late antiquity and early renaissance, classic republicanism differed from early liberalism insofar as rights were not thought to be granted by God in a pre-social state of nature, but were the products of living in political society. On the classical republican view of liberty, citizens exercise freedom within the context of existing social relations, historical associations and traditional communities, not as autonomous individuals set apart from their social and political ties. In this way, liberty for the classical republican is positively defined by the political society instead of negatively defined in terms of the pre-social individual's natural rights. While prefigured by the European Enlightenment, the American Enlightenment also promoted the idea that a nation should be governed as a republic, whereby the state's head is popularly elected, not appointed through a hereditary blood-line. As North American colonists became increasingly convinced that British rule was corrupt and inimical to republican values, they joined militias and eventually formed the American Continental Army under George Washington's command. The Jeffersonian ideal of the yeoman farmer, which had its roots in the similar Roman ideal, represented the eighteenth-century American as both a hard-working agrarian and as a citizen-soldier devoted to the republic. When elected to the highest office of the land, George Washington famously demurred when offered a royal title, preferring instead the more republican title of President. Though scholarly debate persists over the relative importance of liberalism and republicanism during the American Revolution and Founding (see Recent Work section), the view that republican ideas were a formative influence on American Enlightenment thinking has gained widespread acceptance. d. Conservatism Though the Enlightenment is more often associated with liberalism and republicanism, an undeniable strain of conservatism emerged in the last stage of the Enlightenment, mainly as a reaction to the excesses of the French Revolution. In 1790 Edmund Burkeanticipated the dissipation of order and decency in French society following the revolution (often referred to as \"the Terror\") in his Reflections on the Revolution in France. Though it is argued that Burkean conservatism was a reaction to the Enlightenment (or antiEnlightenment), conservatives were also operating within the framework of Enlightenment ideas. Some Enlightenment claims about human nature are turned back upon themselves and shown to break down when applied more generally to human culture. For instance, Enlightenment faith in universal declarations of human rights do more harm than good when they contravene the conventions and traditions of specific nations, regions and localities. Similar to the classical republicans, Burke believed that human personality was the product of living in a political society, not a set of natural rights that predetermined our social and political relations. Conservatives attacked the notion of a social contract (prominent in the work of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau) as a mythical construction that overlooked the plurality of groups and perspectives in society, a fact which made brokering compromises inevitable and universal consent impossible. Burke only insisted on a tempered version, not a wholesale rejection of Enlightenment values. Conservatism featured strongly in American Enlightenment thinking. While Burke was critical of the French Revolution, he supported the American Revolution for disposing of English colonial misrule while creatively readapting British traditions and institutions to the American temperament. American Enlightenment thinkers such as James Madison and John Adams held views that echoed and in some cases anticipated Burkean conservatism, leading them to criticize the rise of revolutionary France and the popular pro-French Jacobin clubs during and after the French Revolution. In the forty-ninth Federalist Paper, James Madison deployed a conservative argument against frequent appeals to democratic publics on constitutional questions because they threatened to undermine political stability and substitute popular passion for the \"enlightened reason\" of elected representatives. Madison's conservative view was opposed to Jefferson's liberal view that a constitutional convention should be convened every twenty years, for \"[t]he earth belongs to the living generation,\" and so each new generation should be empowered to reconsider its constitutional norms. e. Toleration Toleration or tolerant pluralism was also a major theme in American Enlightenment thought. Tolerance of difference developed in parallel with the early liberalism prevalent among Northern Europe's merchant class. It reflected their belief that hatred or fear of other races and creeds interfered with economic trade, extinguished freedom of thought and expression, eroded the basis for friendship among nations and led to persecution and war. Tiring of religious wars (particularly as the 16th century French wars of religion and the 17th century Thirty Years War), European Enlightenment thinkers imagined an age in which enlightened reason not religious dogmatism governed relations between diverse peoples with loyalties to different faiths. The Protestant Reformation and the Treaty of Westphalia significantly weakened the Catholic Papacy, empowered secular political institutions and provided the conditions for independent nation-states to flourish. American thinkers inherited this principle of tolerant pluralism from their European Enlightenment forebearers. Inspired by the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers John Knox and George Buchanan, American Calvinists created open, friendly and tolerant institutions such as the secular public school and democratically organized religion (which became the Presbyterian Church). Many American Enlightenment thinkers, including Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, read and agreed with John Locke's A Letter Concerning Toleration. In it, Locke argued that government is ill-equipped to judge the rightness or wrongness of opposing religious doctrines, faith could not be coerced and if attempted the result would be greater religious and political discord. So, civil government ought to protect liberty of conscience, the right to worship as one chooses (or not to worship at all) and refrain from establishing an official state-sanctioned church. For America's founders, the fledgling nation was to be a land where persons of every faith or no faith could settle and thrive peacefully and cooperatively without fear of persecution by government or fellow citizens. Ben Franklin's belief that religion was an aid to cultivating virtue led him to donate funds to every church in Philadelphia. Defending freedom of conscience, James Madison would write that \"[c]onscience is the most sacred of all property.\" In 1777, Thomas Jefferson drafted a religious liberty bill for Virginia to disestablish the government-sponsored Anglican Church-often referred to as \"the precursor to the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment\"-which eventually passed with James Madison's help. f. Scientific Progress The Enlightenment enthusiasm for scientific discovery was directly related to the growth of deism and skepticism about received religious doctrine. Deists engaged in scientific inquiry not only to satisfy their intellectual curiosity, but to respond to a divine calling to expose God's natural laws. Advances in scientific knowledge-whether the rejection of the geocentric model of the universe because of Copernicus, Kepler and Galileo's work or the discovery of natural laws such as Newton's mathematical explanation of gravity-removed the need for a constantly intervening God. With the release of Sir Isaac Newton's Principia in 1660, faith in scientific progress took institutional form in the Royal Society of England, the Acad\u00e9mie des Sciences in France and later the Academy of Sciences in Germany. In pre-revolutionary America, scientists or natural philosophers belonged to the Royal Society until 1768, when Benjamin Franklin helped create and then served as the first president of the American Philosophical Society. Franklin became one of the most famous American scientists during the Enlightenment period because of his many practical inventions and his theoretical work on the properties of electricity. 3. Four American Enlightenment Thinkers What follows are brief accounts of how four significant thinkers contributed to the eighteenth-century American Enlightenment: Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and John Adams. a. Franklin Benjamin Franklin, the author, printer, scientist and statesman who led America through a tumultuous period of colonial politics, a revolutionary war and its momentous, though no less precarious, founding as a nation. In his Autobiography, he extolled the virtues of thrift, industry and money-making (or acquisitiveness). For Franklin, the self-interested pursuit of material wealth is only virtuous when it coincides with the promotion of the public good through philanthropy and voluntarism-what is often called \"enlightened self-interest.\" He believed that reason, free trade and a cosmopolitan spirit serve as faithful guides for nation-states to cultivate peaceful relations. Within nation-states, Franklin thought that \"independent entrepreneurs make good citizens\" because they pursue \"attainable goals\" and are \"capable of living a useful and dignified life.\" In his autobiography, Franklin claims that the way to \"moral perfection\" is to cultivate thirteen virtues (temperance, silence, order, resolution, frugality, industry, sincerity, justice, moderation, cleanliness, tranquility, chastity, and humility) as well as a healthy dose of \"cheerful prudence.\" Franklin favored voluntary associations over governmental institutions as mechanisms to channel citizens' extreme individualism and isolated pursuit of private ends into productive social outlets. Not only did Franklin advise his fellow citizens to create and join these associations, but he also founded and participated in many himself. Franklin was a staunch defender of federalism, a critic of narrow parochialism, a visionary leader in world politics and a strong advocate of religious liberty. b. Jefferson A Virginian statesman, scientist and diplomat, Jefferson is probably best known for drafting the Declaration of Independence. Agreeing with Benjamin Franklin, he substituted \"pursuit of happiness\" for \"property\" in Locke's schedule of natural rights, so that liberty to pursue the widest possible human ends would be accommodated. Jefferson also exercised immense influence over the creation of the United States' Constitution through his extended correspondence with James Madison during the 1787 Constitutional Convention (since Jefferson was absent, serving as a diplomat in Paris). Just as Jefferson saw theDeclaration as a test of the colonists' will to revolt and separate from Britain, he also saw the Convention in Philadelphia, almost eleven years later, as a grand experiment in creating a new constitutional order. Panel four of the Jefferson Memorial records how Thomas Jefferson viewed constitutions: \"I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions, but laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered and manners and opinions change, with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times.\" Jefferson's words capture the spirit of organic constitutionalism, the idea that constitutions are living documents that transform over time in pace with popular thought, imagination and opinion. c. Madison Heralded as the \"Father of the Constitution,\" James Madison was, besides one of the most influential architects of the U.S. Constitution, a man of letters, a politician, a scientist and a diplomat who left an enduring legacy on American philosophical thought. As a tireless advocate for the ratification of the Constitution, Madison advanced his most groundbreaking ideas in his jointly authoring The Federalist Paperswith John Jay and Alexander Hamilton. Indeed, two of his most enduring ideas-the large republic thesis and the argument for separation-of-powers and checks-and-balances-are contained there. In the tenth Federalist paper, Madison explains the problem of factions, namely, that the development of groups with shared interests (advocates or interest groups) is inevitable and dangerous to republican government. If we try to vanquish factions, then we will in turn destroy the liberty upon which their existence and activities are founded. Baron d' Montesquieu, the seventeenth-century French philosopher, believed that the only way to have a functioning republic, one that was sufficiently democratic, was for it to be small, both in population and land mass (on the order of Ancient Athens or Sparta). He then argues that a large and diverse republic will stop the formation of a majority faction; if small groups cannot communicate over long distances and coordinate effectively, the threat will be negated and liberty will be preserved (\"you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens\"). When factions formed inside the government, a clever institutional design of checks and balances (first John Adams's idea, where each branch would have a hand in the others' domain) would avert excessive harm, so that \"ambition must be made to counteract ambition\" and, consequently, government will effectively \"control itself.\" d. Adams John Adams was also a founder, statesman, diplomat and eventual President who contributed to American Enlightenment thought. Among his political writings, three stand out: Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law (1776), A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, Against the Attack of M. Turgot (1787-8), and Discourses on Davila (1791). In the Dissertation, Adams faults Great Britain for deciding to introduce canon and feudal law, \"the two greatest systems of tyranny,\" to the North American colonies. Once introduced, elections ceased in the North American colonies, British subjects felt enslaved and revolution became inevitable. In the Defense, Adams offers an uncompromising defense of republicanism. He disputes Turgot's apology for unified and centralized government, arguing that insurance against consolidated state power and support for individual liberty require separating government powers between branches and installing careful checks and balances. Nevertheless, a strong executive branch is needed to defend the people against \"aristocrats\" who will attempt to deprive liberty from the mass of people. Revealing the Enlightenment theme of conservatism, Adams criticized the notion of unrestricted popular rule or pure democracy in the Discourses. Since humans are always desirous of increasing their personal power and reputation, all the while making invidious comparisons, government must be designed to constrain the effects of these passionate tendencies. Adams writes: \"Consider that government is intended to set bounds to passions which nature has not limited; and to assist reason, conscience, justice, and truth in controlling interests which, without it, would be as unjust as uncontrollable.\" 4. Contemporary Work Invocations of universal freedom draw their inspiration from Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Thomas Jefferson, but come into conflict with contemporary liberal appeals to multiculturalism and pluralism. Each of these Enlightenment thinkers sought to ground the legitimacy of the state on a theory of rational-moral political order reflecting universal truths about human nature-for instance, that humans are carriers of inalienable rights (Locke), autonomous agents (Kant), or fundamentally equal creations (Jefferson). However, many contemporary liberals-for instance, Graeme Garrard, John Gray and Richard Rorty-fault Enlightenment liberalism for its failure to acknowledge and accommodate the differences among citizens' incompatible and equally reasonable religious, moral and philosophical doctrines, especially in multicultural societies. According to these critics, Enlightenment liberalism, rather than offering a neutral framework, discloses a full-blooded doctrine that competes with alternative views of truth, the good life, and human nature. This pluralist critique of Enlightenment liberalism's universalism makes it difficult to harmonize the American Founders' appeal to universal human rights with their insistence on religious tolerance. However, as previously noted, evidence of Burkean conservatism offers an alternative to the strong universalism that these recent commentators criticize in American Enlightenment thought. What in recent times has been characterized as the 'Enlightenment project' is the general idea that human rationality can and should be made to serve ethical and humanistic ends. If human societies are to achieve genuine moral progress, parochialism, dogma and prejudice ought to give way to science and reason in efforts to solve pressing problems. The American Enlightenment project signifies how America has taken a leading role in promoting Enlightenment ideals during that period of human history commonly referred to as 'modernity.' Still, there is no consensus about the exact legacy of American Enlightenment thinkers-for instance, whether republican or liberal ideas are predominant. Until the publication of J. G. A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment (1975), most scholars agreed that liberal (especially Lockean) ideas were more dominant than republican ones. Pockock's work initiated a sea change towards what is now the widely accepted view that liberal and republican ideas had relatively equal sway during the eighteenthcentury Enlightenment, both in America and Europe. Gordon Wood and Bernard Bailyn contend that republicanism was dominant and liberalism recessive in American Enlightenment thought. Isaac Kramnick still defends the orthodox position that American Enlightenment thinking was exclusively Lockean and liberal, thus explaining the strongly individualistic character of modern American culture. 5. References and Further Reading \uf0b7 Bailyn, Bernard. The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1967. \uf0b7 Ferguson, Robert A. The American Enlightenment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997. \uf0b7 Hampson, Norman. The Enlightenment: An Evaluation of its Assumptions. London: Penguin, 1968. \uf0b7 Himmelfarb, Gertrude. The Roads to Modernity: The British, French and American Enlightenments. London: Vintage, 2008. \uf0b7 Israel, Jonathan. A Resolution of the Mind-Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. \uf0b7 Kramnick, Isaac. Age of Ideology: Political Thought, 1750 to the Present. New York: Prentice Hall, 1979. \uf0b7 May, Henry F. The Enlightenment in America. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. \uf0b7 O'Brien, Conor Cruise. The Long Affair: Thomas Jefferson and the French Revolution, 1785-1800. London: Pimlico, 1998. \uf0b7 O'Hara, Kieron. The Enlightenment: A Beginner's Guide. Oxford: OneWorld, 2010. \uf0b7 Pockock, John G. A. The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the American Republican Tradition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975. \uf0b7 Wilson, Ellen J. and Peter H. Reill. Encyclopedia of the Enlightenment. New York: Book Builders Inc., 2004. \uf0b7 Wood, Gordon. The Creation of the American Republic. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969. Author Information Shane J. Ralston Email: email@example.com Pennsylvania State University U. S. A. Article printed from Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http:\/\/www.iep.utm.edu\/amer-enl\/ Copyright \u00a9 The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. All rights reserved.","subset":"phil_papers"}
+{"meta":{"title":"Dietrich von Hildebrand and the Philosophy of Religion","type":"info:eu-repo\/semantics\/article","creator":"Shum, Peter","subject":"Philosophy","date":"2022","identifier":"oai:philarchive.org\/rec\/SHUDVH","description":"Dietrich von Hildebrand seeks to pursue the idea that the discipline of phenomenology can offer a way of surmounting what Kant saw as the intrinsic limitations of human metaphysical enquiry. In this book review of the 2021 edition of Hildebrand\u00e2\u0080\u0099s What is Philosophy?, Hildebrand\u00e2\u0080\u0099s train of thought is reconstructed in some detail, from his opening remarks about knowing in general through to his account of the intuition of essences, the question of objectivity, and the overarching purpose of philosophy. Hildebrand\u00e2\u0080\u0099s argument culminates in the claim that philosophy is not only the fundamental activity of a mind turned toward God, but is properly a preamble to religious faith. The review concludes by raising a number of objections to Hildebrand\u00e2\u0080\u0099s version of phenomenological realism.","datestamp":"2022-10-03T02:51:43Z","dup_signals":{"dup_doc_count":108,"dup_dump_count":15,"dup_details":{"curated_sources":2,"2023-50":8,"2023-40":2,"2023-23":4,"2023-14":11,"2023-06":10,"2022-49":6,"2022-40":1,"2022-33":10,"2022-27":18,"2022-21":9,"2024-26":6,"2024-22":5,"2024-18":8,"2024-10":7,"2024-30":1}}},"text":"Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 1 of 21 Book Review of Hildebrand, D. (2021), What is Philosophy?, (Steubenville, Ohio: Hildebrand Press). Introduction Any philosopher's epistemology will exert a considerable influence on his or her attitude toward the place and significance of religion in human life. Even for nonphilosophers, and those of us who may not be academically inclined, our openness and receptiveness toward religion will be implicitly influenced by numerous general epistemological considerations. These might include our understanding of what kinds of things are amenable to being known, the possible modalities of their disclosure, and the appropriate criteria for confirming the validity of any ostensible discovery. Dietrich von Hildebrand attaches particular significance to the place of religion in our lives, and to the kind of philosophical enquiry that can be conducive toward religious conviction and commitment. He thinks not only that philosophical knowledge has its climax in its knowledge of the existence and attributes of God, but that philosophy itself is the fundamental activity of the mind turned toward God, and that the proximity of an object's relation to God is the yardstick by which philosophers ought to rate the importance of the objects of philosophical knowledge. He maintains that religious convictions count as knowledge, and that God is able to disclose Himself to, and communicate with ordinary religious practitioners who may not themselves have the requisite intellectual capacities for critical philosophical enquiry. Impartial readers of What is Philosophy? are entitled to ask themselves whether Hildebrand's epistemology has the resources to warrant such a trenchant affirmation of the importance of religion. Of particular relevance here is Hildebrand's response to Kant's revolutionary claim that human knowledge about the universe is Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 2 of 21 necessarily delimited by subjective a priori features of the mind. An important part of Hildebrand's reply centres on the idea that synthetic a priori truths can be discovered during metaphysical enquiry because at least some objects are capable of being given to us in their essential being. Let us examine closely how Hildebrand develops his position, before trying to assess its strengths and weaknesses. Knowledge in General An important starting point for Hildebrand lies in the anthropological question concerning the distinction between humans and animals. Hildebrand observes that humans, unlike animals, are inclined to wonder about the meaning of life, and the destiny of their own species. This is part of what it means to say that humans are \"ordered toward eternity\". Philosophical questioning of this kind is an intrinsic part of being human. For this reason, Hildebrand regards epistemology as first philosophy, and begins the book with an account of knowledge in general. As the book proceeds, the epistemological enquiry narrows its focus to seek to clarify the true nature of a priori knowledge. When Hildebrand accords knowing the status of a foundational phenomenological datum, he means that knowing as such is an act of consciousness that cannot be reduced to anything else. He seeks to investigate the phenomenology of knowing: to consider \"what it is like\" to know something, and to bring to light the essential structures of this fundamental act. For Hildebrand, knowing is an intentional participation in the world. In the first instance, knowing is essentially receptive: it is a receiving, not a producing. Yet this is not the whole story, for if knowing is receptive, it is not purely passive. Knowing has an active element, in that there is a mental \"going with\" the object. This \"going with\" the object is an intellectual penetration of it. It is a \"making common cause\" with the object. We find, then, that while it is true Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 3 of 21 that the object discloses itself to the subject, there is an active cooperation on the part of consciousness with the self-disclosure of the object. Knowing is in this sense a mental possessing of the object, an intentional participation in the object's being. I note en passant that there is a connection between Hildebrand's \"going with\" account of knowledge and the topic of empathy. The subject's response to the object may be an affective one, such as love. On the other hand, a response could be theoretical, like conviction or conjecture. Hence an important difference between conviction and knowing is that knowing is a receiving, whilst conviction is a response to that receiving. In other words, conviction is secondary with respect to knowing. Conviction posits not only the existence of the object, but a state-of-affairs pertaining to the object. The question of the metaphysical positing of the object of knowledge over against merely affirming that there is a fact of the matter about the object's properties turns out to be an important theme in Hildebrand's epistemology as the book proceeds. Taking cognizance of something is predominantly passive, but judging and asserting are more active. A precondition of judging and asserting is a prior act of taking cognizance. The object of an act of judging is a state-of-affairs, i.e. a putative fact. Asserting objectifies knowing (taking cognizance) into a proposition. Basic Forms of Knowledge We find, then, that there are different kinds of knowledge, which can take place in different ways, and with different possible kinds of object being known. One kind of knowing involves the epistemic state of knowing about something, or knowing a fact, a set of facts, or a body of information. This kind of knowing can have varying levels of certitude. It is said to be superactual in the sense that I might happen to know [wissen], for example, that the capital of China is Beijing, regardless Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 4 of 21 of whether I am thinking about this fact at the present time. Superactual knowing is possible due to the conserving power of the human mind. Superactual knowledge can influence my understanding of a given situation in an implicit manner, i.e. a manner which is not consciously foregrounded. Hildebrand wants to include religious convictions in this kind of knowing. An important distinction that Hildebrand wishes to emphasise is between a static knowing and a dynamic coming to know something. An episode of taking cognizance is said to be (epistemically) dynamic because the subject comes to know something during the episode, something s\/he did not know before. Static cases of knowing are normally the outcome of a dynamic episode of taking cognizance, or of multiple such episodes. An epistemological theme that Hildebrand develops is this idea of a dynamic taking cognizance \"giving birth\" to a static possessing. The Nature of Philosophical Knowledge In Chapter 3, Hildebrand elaborates in more detail upon his taxonomy of different types of knowledge. Two key distinctions that he draws attention to are (a) the distinction between pre-systematic and philosophical enquiry; and (b) the distinction between na\u00efve and theoretical pre-systematic enquiry. As far as (a) is concerned, pre-systematic enquiry is the kind of enquiry we often undertake that falls short of the rigorous requirements of philosophy. As far as (b) is concerned, theoretical pre-systematic enquiry involves reflection, whilst na\u00efve pre-systematic enquiry does not. When Hildebrand looks more closely at instances of na\u00efve pre-systematic enquiry, he discovers that they come in several different types. Some instances are completely unthematic, whilst others are tacitly thematic. Some instances are what Hildebrand calls \"pragmatic\", such as a cook checking to see if a pan of water is Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 5 of 21 boiling. Pragmatic object thematicity sees the object in instrumental terms. There is a particularly important form of non-pragmatic enquiry, which Hildebrand calls \"special na\u00efve taking cognizance\". When special na\u00efve taking cognizance takes place, an object becomes \"crystal clear [...] in its deepest nature\" to the observer. An example of this is suddenly seeing the true nature of someone's personality. Theoretical knowledge is knowledge that stems from reflection, over against knowledge that stems from perception. This is to say that in the transition from na\u00efve enquiry to a theoretical attitude, something is gained, namely reflection, but something is also lost, namely proximity to the object. So-called \"organic\" theoretical knowledge grows \"organically\" out of episodes of na\u00efve taking cognizance. It is a kind of condensation of episodes of na\u00efve taking cognizance. The foregoing discussion of non-systematic enquiry positions Hildebrand to specify some of the distinctive characteristics of a truly philosophical form of enquiry. In philosophical enquiry, the degree of certitude attached to a state-of-affairs is always commensurate with its level of givenness. Philosophical taking cognizance seeks to penetrate to an even deeper level of the concrete givenness of the object than na\u00efve taking cognizance. Philosophical knowledge is always self-critical in the sense of examining its own (a) well-foundedness of premises; (b) stringency of arguments. (It is interesting to note in this context that notwithstanding the stress Hildebrand places on self-criticality and rigour in philosophy, he also maintains that there is a place under certain conditions for the transmission of philosophical truths by tradition.) A particularly high degree of knowledge thematicity is present during philosophical enquiry. Yet philosophical cognizance very often also foregrounds enquiry into the object in its own right. So there is in operation in philosophical enquiry both thematicity of enquiry and thematicity of the object. Sometimes the Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 6 of 21 thematicity of enquiry predominates, and sometimes the thematicity of the object predominates. In all cases, however, there needs to be an organic stemming of philosophical conclusions from episodes of na\u00efve taking cognizance. We might say that Hildebrand perceives a \"snake in the grass\" threatening the philosophical project. He places this threat under the rubric of \"superficial thinking\". Superficial thinking can be unself-critical, unsystematic, and liable to lose all authentic contact with the object. Hildebrand discusses a variety of possible causes of superficial thinking. Superficial thinking may rely on arguments that one has learned unquestioningly from someone else. It may involve an unjustified generalisation taken from a single perceptual episode. It may involve the unconscious acceptance of premises that are mistakenly presumed to be self-evident. Another mistake is to import a statement from science into philosophy and then treat the statement as metaphysical. An example of this would be claiming that miracles are impossible. The outcome of such lapses is often a prejudicing, impairment, or interruption of the accuracy of attempts at na\u00efve taking cognizance. The superficial thinker's enquiry fails to penetrate to the concrete givenness of the object. The Object of Philosophical Knowledge In Hildebrand's phenomenology, there emerges an alignment of truth with being. One example of this alignment is to be found in Hildebrand's view that the principle of non-contradiction is true not by virtue of being a tautology, but instead on the grounds that it is established by rational intuition. Hildebrand's justification here is that when an existent object is brought to givenness, its existence is intuitionally self-evident. In this context, one sees that it is not possible for something to both be and not be. This renders the principle of non-contradiction synthetic (i.e. not analytic) in the Kantian terminology. Hildebrand thus upholds Kant's synthetic\/analytic Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 7 of 21 distinction, even though he may on occasion use the term \"tautological\" in the place of analytic, and \"non-tautological\" in the place of synthetic. In Hildebrand's view, one of the most important aims of philosophy is to discover a priori states-of-affairs. But what exactly does Hildebrand mean by a priori? An a priori state-of-affairs is one which is intrinsically necessary. This does not mean that all a priori states-of-affairs are restricted to logic and mathematics. On the contrary, Hildebrand considers propositions like \"Moral values presuppose a person as bearer\", \"Love includes a desire for union\", \"Moral guilt presupposes responsibility\", and \"It is not possible for an object to both be and not be\" to be synthetic a priori. When it is discovered, an a priori state-of-affairs is known with certainty. This view of a priori knowledge is strongly influenced by that of Plato in Meno. It is distinct from another sense of the a priori that is common in philosophy, which is that of a formal prerequisite. For Hildebrand, it is certainly not the case that all a priori knowledge is obvious at first sight. Instead, a priori knowledge can be acquired by intuitional contact with the object, or by logical deduction, or by some combination of the two. Yet philosophers should be able to explain their a priori findings to others in such a way that they can become either self-evident or strictly proved by deduction. Deduction itself is ultimately founded upon an intuitional grasping of the truth of the laws of logic. A priori givenness is completely different from empirical givenness. Ascertaining an essentially necessary state-of-affairs does not depend upon empirical evidence. It depends only upon the givenness of a necessary essence. A necessary essence could be given in a dream or in an act of the imagination. The foundation of Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 8 of 21 the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge is the faculty of the intuition of a necessary essence. So experience is involved here, but not empirical experience. There are different types of unity. A heap of trash is an accidental unity. Secondly, the essence of gold, and of the lion species are known as morphic unities. Thirdly, in Hildebrand's terminology, there are necessary essential unities, which are the same as intrinsically necessary unities. Hildebrand also refers to these as genuine essences. Examples of genuine essences are love, triangle, person, number, moral value. This brings us to Hildebrand's notion of intelligibility. The heap of trash mentioned above is intelligible as a unity, but only just. It is lacking in meaningfulness. It has the character of being accidental or contingent. Of greater intelligibility are the morphic unities and the regularities in nature that can be discovered by science. These entities and patterns have a kind of necessity to them, but it is a natural necessity as opposed to an intrinsic necessity. We might say that they are naturally intelligible. Hildebrand reserves the highest level of intelligibility, which he calls incomparable intelligibility, for entities and states-of-affairs that are intrinsically necessary. Entities and states-of-affairs having the property of being incomparably intelligible are capable of being known with certainty. They become self-evident in the course of phenomenological enquiry. An example of an incomparably intelligible state-of-affairs is \"Moral values presuppose a person as bearer.\" Having intuitional access to a genuine essence is not the same as being able to define it. The essence of love, for example, is amenable to phenomenological investigation, but it is not amenable to being defined. In Hildebrand's view, it is a mistake to think that the intuition of genuine essences is somehow less Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 9 of 21 philosophically respectable than (a) finding a definition; (b) formulating a concept; or (c) deductive reasoning. A genuine essence, by virtue of its incomparable intelligibility, can be known with certainty by philosophers. This, however, is not the same as indefeasibility on the part of the knower. This is to say that philosophers are justified in attributing certainty to their knowledge of a genuine essence in the case that it becomes self-evident to them, but the findings of philosophers always remain defeasible. Hildebrand regards it as an absolutely certain philosophical discovery that genuine essences have their own autonomous being in their own ideal metaphysical sphere. Hildebrand understands metaphysics to be the philosophy of real being, both possible and actually existing. The metaphysical picture that he sets out involves a concrete sphere of individual objects and an ideal sphere of essences. Both the concrete and the ideal spheres count as real in Hildebrand's metaphysics. Hildebrand's main criticism of Kant is that Kant was wrong to think that metaphysical enquiry could not disclose synthetic a priori truths about the noumenal world. Hildebrand argues that he has disproven this key Kantian tenet, by showing that it is possible to acquire a priori knowledge of genuine essences. Statements affirming what we intuit about genuine essences are synthetic a priori truths about the way things are in themselves, which will hold true in any universe. Hildebrand admits that he does not provide a very detailed explication of how the ideal and concrete spheres interact with each other, saying that this is a very mysterious problem. What he is prepared to say on this matter is that the two spheres are \"bonded\" very closely, and that there is significant variation between such things as numbers, colours, moral values, and persons, in their modes of existence, and in the modes of \"bonding\" that can take place between the concrete and ideal spheres. The Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 10 of 21 relation between the concrete sphere and the ideal sphere is one of \"partaking\". Hildebrand also maintains that it is plausible to hypothesise that genuine essences exist \"in God\" in some sense or senses that remain to be clarified. This brings us to the question of the place and significance of God in Hildebrand's philosophy. Hildebrand's concept of God is that of an infinite person who is the ground and source of all existence. Hildebrand believes the Cosmological Argument validly shows the existence of such a God. This God has a sui generis mode of existence that Hildebrand calls \"necessary real existence\", which is a different mode of existence from that possessed by genuine essences. Objectivity and Independence from the Human Mind One of the main questions considered in Chapter 5 concerns the relation between electromagnetic waves and colours. Are they the same kind of thing? Is one more real than the other? Are colours fully objective? This discussion helps to illuminate Hildebrand's metaphysics, clarifying his view of which entities can be regarded as metaphysically real, and the place of the objects of science in this metaphysical picture. Hildebrand's investigation into the phenomenology of perceiving a colour concludes that colours are different from the objects of science, on the grounds that something cannot be such-and-such a colour mind independently, but instead can only be such-and-such a colour for a perceiving consciousness. Colours, then, cannot be said to be mind independent, because truth claims about the colour of objects presuppose the cooperation of the human mind. Hildebrand notes that the term \"subjective\" has many possible senses in philosophy, and that it is for this reason ambiguous to assert that colours are subjective. However, if \"subjective\" is taken strictly and solely in the sense of presupposing the cooperation of the human mind, Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 11 of 21 then propositions of the form \"X is subjectively such-and-such a colour\" are capable of being objectively true or false, with the proviso that such statements do not belong to science. This is sufficient, in Hildebrand's view, to make colours objectively real. An important corollary of this latter conclusion is that some things are objectively real without being mind independent. Colours and electromagnetic waves are on different \"levels\" of being, because electromagnetic waves are mind independent whilst colours are not. One of the most distinctive and unusual features of Hildebrand's account of our perception of the natural world lies in his view that some (and only some) phenomenal properties are capable of bearing a \"message\" character. The message characteristic consists in the relevant phenomenal property appearing as if it were a message, ostensibly from God. Colours are capable of bearing this characteristic. For a believer in God, this message character amounts to \"God-willed\". If something is \"God-willed\" it is thereby meaningful. Possessing a message character is evidence for the observer that an object is real. An example of this message character could be an apprehension by an observer that a blue sky is intended by God to look blue to humans. This gives the blueness of the sky an objective validity. Hildebrand's account of the message characteristic of certain phenomenal properties is bound up with his view that God created the world, and that humans are intended by God to be masters of creation. The manner in which an object appears to humans is held to be pertinent to its objective meaning, on the grounds that God created this world for humans. This line of reasoning supports Hildebrand's conclusion that colour has an objective meaning for humans. According to this view, one of the reasons God created electromagnetic waves was to make colours visible to Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 12 of 21 humans. The red colour of a rose is no mere illusion. Instead, if a rose looks red, it does so because it is intended to look like that by God. The Two Basic Themes of Knowledge The title of Chapter 6 turns out to be somewhat ambiguous, since it could refer either to the distinction between perceptual and non-perceptual knowledge or to the distinction between cognitive and contemplative knowing, both of which are relevant to what is discussed. Perceptual knowledge is more foundational than its nonperceptual counterpart, in Hildebrand's view, on the grounds that during perception [Wahrnehmung] the object is given presentationally to consciousness. Perceptual knowledge is what preoccupies Hildebrand in this chapter, and his main finding is that perception can contain both cognitive and contemplative moments. These are supplementary to the moment of \"taking cognizance\" that is discussed earlier in the book. Intellectual intuition supports both the cognitive and the contemplative parts of knowing an essence. Cognitive knowing, which precedes contemplative knowing, is a grasping or apprehension of the object for what it is. Cognitive knowing, in Hildebrand's terminology, is \"notional\", enabling the subject to \"appropriate\" the object. Contemplative knowing, by contrast, is more intimate, involving a \"dwelling within\" the object by consciousness. Contemplation is only appropriate in relation to certain kinds of \"spiritual\" object, such as an artwork, a personality, or a value. Taken collectively, Hildebrand proposes that the three perceptual moments of taking cognizance, cognition, and contemplation are able to \"fecundate\" the subject's mind in an especially \"intimate\" and \"plentiful\" way. Characteristic Features of Philosophical Knowledge and Enquiry When it comes to the question of philosophical method, Hildebrand sets great store on rigour. This is what Hildebrand means when he says that philosophical Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 13 of 21 enquiry must always be \"critical\". Premises must be justified; intuitions must be evident; arguments must be stringent. There can be no place for whimsical or fanciful thoughts. Indeed, philosophy, in Hildebrand's view, should be no less rigorous than science. However, Hildebrand does recognise that there is a difference between scientific rigour and philosophical rigour. Science and philosophy go about their business in different ways, and have differing methods. When it comes to valuing scientific and philosophical rigour, Hildebrand regards the form of exactness to be found in philosophy to be superior to that of science. Hildebrand recognises that this attitude toward rigour in philosophy raises a problem. If the highest quality philosophy really does proceed in such a rigorous way, why do so many philosophical questions remain mired in controversy? One would have thought that if the kind of rigour Hildebrand aspires to were attainable, then the field of philosophical knowledge would be expanding in much the same fashion, and with as little controversy, as mathematical and scientific knowledge. To be sure, controversies do arise from time to time in mathematics and science, but they are normally resolved relatively quickly. The situation is quite different in philosophy. In the course of Chapter 7, Hildebrand indicates three ways of defending himself against this objection. The first way is to argue that the view that philosophical debates seem to be intractably mired in controversy is excessively bleak. He contends that many important philosophical insights are completely uncontroversial. Examples of these are Augustine's \"Si fallor, sum\", Plato's distinction between a priori and empirical knowledge, and Kant's distinction between synthetic and analytic propositions. Such great philosophical discoveries are never \"dethroned\". This claim leads Hildebrand to suppose that there is no reason in principle why philosophical controversies should not be resolved satisfactorily, even Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 14 of 21 if the time it might take for such controversies to be resolved should happen to be de facto longer than is the norm in mathematics and science. Hildebrand's second line of response is to argue that there are two special reasons peculiar to the way humans carry out philosophical activity that are conducive to controversies arising. Firstly, not everyone develops the requisite philosophical capacities properly. This can result in some so-called \"philosophers\" departing from the strict requirements of critical philosophy. Secondly, some philosophical truths are opposed because people have a subconscious reluctance to accept the implications of such truths for their personal and moral life. Hildebrand's third line of response is to suggest that science is more controversial than we might think. From an historical perspective, we find that science continually replaces one theory with another. So science is \"controversial\" in that sense. Hildebrand fails to note, however, that mathematics is not \"controversial\" in this sense. The Meaning of Philosophy for the Human Person In the concluding chapter of What is Philosophy?, Hildebrand makes the case for an especially central role for philosophy in human life, by arguing that philosophical knowledge has its climax in our knowledge of the existence and attributes of God. Philosophy is continuous with the pre-scientific view of the world, which is a na\u00efve living contact. This means that instead of pulling the rug away from under the na\u00efve understanding of the world, as science often seems to do, philosophy starts from, and clarifies what is already given in, our na\u00efve living contact with the world. Philosophical enquiry is for this reason a more fundamental \"position\" of the human mind than the scientific attitude, and is able, furthermore, to grant the subject a participation in the being of its objects. Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 15 of 21 Only from the philosophical standpoint does the real meaning of things become clear. This affects our understanding of their relative value and consequently shapes the human personality in accordance with philosophical truth. Grasping philosophical truth, or coming into contact in some way with others who have themselves grasped philosophical truth, helps the individual to maintain and deepen his living contact with the world. The complaint that philosophy may seem abstruse and disconnected from real life is therefore mistaken. Not everyone can be a philosopher. Hildebrand considers some ways in which the enormous benefits flowing from philosophical knowledge might be shared with those who lack the intellectual wherewithal to grasp it directly. The answer is to begin at the level of na\u00efve living contact and then distil out of it the philosophical principle. Ordinary people rooted in a na\u00efve living contact with reality are endowed with a latent sense for truth. Such non-philosophers have a \"receptivity\" to philosophical truth since it is continuous with their own na\u00efve experience. This receptivity makes possible an encounter between the ordinary person and genuine philosophical findings. The bringing of philosophical truth to ordinary people is important in Hildebrand's eyes, since he regards philosophy as constituting the proper foundation for the formation of people's political views, and the foundation of a society's culture, art, and literature. Philosophy is thus capable of exerting a pervasive influence on the lives of ordinary people. The most important role that Hildebrand assigns to philosophy, however, is that it should be a preamble to faith. It orientates the mind toward the eternal, and prepares the soul for God's revelation. Yet it is worth noting that for a book stressing the foundational importance of philosophy for human life, the final chapter has a surprising claim embedded within it, for Hildebrand maintains that that which \"[...] is Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 16 of 21 disclosed by revelation remains beyond what is accessible to philosophy.\" This raises the problem of epistemological justification for what is putatively disclosed by revelation. Objection 1: The Question of Philosophical Rigour In support of his claim that philosophy is in the process of building up a generally accepted and uncontroversial body of knowledge, Hildebrand cites a number of important philosophical findings that attract few objections. This line of reasoning is not compelling for two reasons. Firstly, I note that the list of uncontroversial philosophical discoveries that Hildebrand cites is very short. Secondly, the premise that there exists a set of core philosophical discoveries that all or most philosophers can agree upon does not imply that the philosophers involved are working in a highly rigorous fashion. A group of art critics may agree, for example, that Shakespeare's King Lear and Mozart's The Magic Flute are indisputably great works of art, but it does not follow from this that the activity of art criticism is proceeding in a manner capable of building up a generally accepted and uncontroversial body of knowledge. One of the drawbacks of Hildebrand's intuitionism is that it can in itself be conducive toward philosophical controversy arising. If one philosopher affirms the intuitional self-evidence of X and another denies it, it is difficult to see how the matter can be settled, either by empirical evidence or the evidence of rational argumentation. Hildebrand's claim that some philosophers may be disinclined to accept self-evident moral truths due to a subconscious reluctance to accept the implications of such truths for their personal life seems speculative and unverifiable. It would have been more prudent of Hildebrand to investigate the reasons that such dissenters have provided for doubting the truth of such allegedly \"self-evident\" claims. Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 17 of 21 Objection 2: Existence of God An important part of Hildebrand's overall philosophical system is the view that there are good grounds for believing in the existence of God, understood as an infinite person who is the ground and source of all existence. This premise is not treated as a given by Hildebrand, but instead is found to be amenable to investigation and justification by philosophical activity itself. This is why Hildebrand inserts into Chapter 4 a brief two page discussion supporting the validity of the Cosmological Argument for the existence of God [136-7]. I wish to suggest that Hildebrand's discussion of the Cosmological Argument is inadequate for a number of reasons. Firstly, I would have expected some response from Hildebrand to Kant's objection to the cosmological proof of God contained in his First Critique. Kant argues that the cosmological proof relies on an ill-founded concept, namely that of an absolutely necessary being. Kant also objects that the cosmological proof applies the category of causation beyond the realm of possible experience. More generally, Hildebrand must have been aware of the significant philosophical controversy that has built up over many centuries surrounding the Cosmological Argument. A twentiethcentury philosopher whose system relies heavily on the presumed existence of God cannot simply wind back the clock and pretend he is writing in the Middle Ages. Secondly, the God that Hildebrand believes in is a personal God, and the Cosmological Argument, even if valid, does not purport to show the existence of a personal God, merely a first cause. This is another reason why Hildebrand's decision to cite the Cosmological Argument in Chapter 4 is slightly puzzling, when alternative philosophical arguments exist in favour of the existence of a personal God. Thirdly, if there were a personal God, one would have thought that such a God would wish to make Himself accessible to us in the expressly intuitional fashion that Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 18 of 21 Hildebrand places so much emphasis upon. I would have expected Hildebrand's argumentation in support of the existence of God to be intuitional and phenomenological, as opposed to cosmological. Objection 3: Colour The phenomenology of colour perception is a topic Hildebrand returns to on numerous occasions throughout this book. It is, however, not essential to the book's main theme, which is the perception of genuine essences. Hildebrand thinks colour in general, and individual colours, count as examples of genuine essences. I find Hildebrand's discussion of colour problematic for the following reasons. Firstly, there is the claim that one of the reasons God created electromagnetic waves was to make colours visible to humans. This is a speculative claim about the content of God's thoughts. No evidence, be it phenomenological, empirical, or rational, is provided to support it. The claim is philosophically baseless. Secondly, there is the claim that colours are among the phenomenal properties of an object capable of bearing the so-called \"message\" character, which consists in a colour appearing as if it were a message, ostensibly from God. This, in contrast to the claim about electromagnetic waves just discussed, is a phenomenological claim, but one which I believe is mistaken. I do not concur with it, on the grounds that an investigation into the phenomenology of colour perception could at best make the case for colours possessing an expressive quality, as opposed to a communicative quality. Communication is distinct from expression. Hence Hildebrand's claim about the communicative quality, or message characteristic, qua phenomenological claim, is in my opinion at odds with the descriptive facts. Objection 4: Ideal and Concrete Spheres Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 19 of 21 One way of objecting to a metaphysical position is to point out that it raises a new problem, one which would not have arisen if a different metaphysical approach had been adopted. Hildebrand's metaphysical position is susceptible to this line of objection, for it raises the question of how the ideal realm of essences and the concrete realm of individuals are supposed to interact. If the essence of the colour red is metaphysically real, and a red rose is metaphysically real, then the nature of their interaction also becomes a metaphysical question. Hildebrand registers his awareness of this problem in at least two ways. One way is to claim that he wishes to avoid a two-world metaphysics. Another way is to concede that the nature of the interaction between the ideal and concrete spheres must be very mysterious, and that he is unable, in this book at least, to make much headway in explicating it. Objection 5: Purely Subjective Transcendence According to Hildebrand, there is an essence not only of triangle as such, but an essence of every triangle. I have a worry, however, that Hildebrand is overlooking the distinction between the existence of an essence of a triangle T, and there being a fact of the matter about the properties of the triangle T. Suppose T is the triangle whose vertices are at the points (2,1), (5,9), and (17,3) in the plane. Mathematicians are able to investigate and meaningfully discuss the properties of T because T is fully defined and there is a fact of the matter about its properties, such as the length of its sides, and the internal angles at its vertices. I am not free to imagine the properties of T being anything I like, but am instead constrained by the facts of the matter. This is to say that T is subjectively transcendent to my mind, or any other mind. There is no obvious reason to commit ourselves to the claim that T exists metaphysically or that the essence of T exists metaphysically. T is a construct of the mind, a purely notional thing. T is an idea, and hence ideal, but not real. There is no obvious reason to think Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 20 of 21 that ideal things such as T are real. On the contrary, T is what Husserl would term irreal, that is, something that can be the object of meaningful intersubjective discussion and investigation, but which need not exist metaphysically. This line of reasoning seems to suggest that to assert that a genuine essence is real is metaphysically inflationary. Objection 6: Relation between philosophy and religion In Chapter 8, Hildebrand concludes his book's discussion by sharing with us his understanding of the relation between philosophy and religion. Man has an innate orientation toward God and the eternal. The overarching mission of philosophy is to be a \"preamble to faith\", by cultivating this orientation. This is what Hildebrand means when he refers to philosophy's obligation to prepare our souls \"for the acceptance of the revelation of God\". Yet what is disclosed by revelation remains \"beyond what is accessible to philosophy.\" By this Hildebrand means that the contents of such revelation are not amenable to discovery by the modalities of enquiry discussed in earlier chapters of his book. There is a problem here. The truth of such putative revelation is treated by Hildebrand as a given. Revelation from God is held to be true on the grounds that God is the source of all truth. Yet even in theological circles, there is legitimacy in a discussion concerning how any putative revelation can be confirmed as genuine. It is not clear why Hildebrand would regard such a discussion as non-philosophical, and why he chooses not to include the premises and constraints of any such discussion within the parameters of his epistemology. This leads the reader to conclude, in particular, that the account of knowledge in general that is contained in Chapter 1 is incomplete. Conclusion Shum, P. (2022), Review of Dietrich von Hildebrand's What is Philosophy?, in Phenomenological Reviews, 18 March 2022. Page 21 of 21 From an historical perspective, Hildebrand's What is Philosophy? can be situated within the context of a twentieth-century realism-idealism controversy sparked by Husserl's turn toward a version of transcendental idealism. Realists like Hildebrand had previously seen Husserl's early phenomenology as offering a potential way of returning to a form of enquiry that might overcome the constraints placed by Kant upon the limits of metaphysical knowledge. Unfortunately Hildebrand's attempt to break out of the Kantian epistemological constraints turns out to be susceptible to the objections that I have detailed: (1) Hildebrand's advocacy of philosophical rigour is undermined by the conduciveness of his intuitionism toward controversy; (2) Hildebrand does not make a convincing philosophical case for the existence of a personal God; (3) Hildebrand's phenomenological claim about the communicative quality of colour is at odds with the descriptive facts; (4) Hildebrand does not provide an adequate metaphysical account of the supposed interaction between the ideal realm of essences and the concrete realm of individuals; (5) It is metaphysically inflationary to think that it follows from there being a fact of the matter about the properties of X that X exists metaphysically; (6) Any putative revelation from God remains liable to a confirmation condition, and Hildebrand fails to include a discussion of such a confirmation condition within his epistemology.","subset":"phil_papers"}
+{"meta":{"title":"Female genital mutilation (FGM) and male circumcision: Should there be a separate ethical discourse?","type":"info:eu-repo\/semantics\/article","creator":"Earp, Brian D.","subject":"Philosophy","date":"2014","identifier":"oai:philarchive.org\/rec\/EARFGM","description":"It is sometimes argued that the non-therapeutic, non-consensual alteration of children\u00e2\u0080\u0098s genitals should be discussed in two separate ethical discourses: one for girls (in which such alterations should be termed 'female genital mutilation' or FGM), and one for boys (in which such alterations should be termed 'male circumcision\u00e2\u0080\u0098). In this article, I call into question the moral and empirical basis for such a distinction, and argue that all children - whether female, male, or indeed intersex\n           - should  be free from having parts of their genitals removed unless there is a pressing medical indication.","datestamp":"2020-02-20T10:32:43Z","dup_signals":{"dup_doc_count":232,"dup_dump_count":79,"dup_details":{"curated_sources":2,"2023-50":5,"2023-40":7,"2023-23":8,"2023-14":5,"2023-06":4,"2022-49":3,"2022-40":3,"2022-33":2,"2022-27":3,"2022-21":6,"2022-05":2,"2021-49":1,"2021-43":4,"2021-39":3,"2021-31":2,"2021-25":2,"2021-21":2,"2021-17":2,"2021-04":5,"2020-50":1,"2020-45":1,"2020-40":2,"2020-34":1,"2020-29":2,"2020-24":2,"2020-16":1,"2020-10":4,"2020-05":1,"2019-43":4,"2019-35":2,"2019-26":4,"2019-22":1,"2019-18":4,"2019-13":2,"2019-09":3,"2019-04":4,"2018-51":1,"2018-47":4,"2018-43":3,"2018-39":1,"2018-34":2,"2018-30":2,"2018-22":4,"2018-17":1,"2018-13":3,"2018-09":5,"2018-05":1,"2017-51":3,"2017-43":4,"2017-39":2,"2017-34":4,"2017-26":2,"2017-22":1,"2017-17":3,"2016-44":1,"2016-40":1,"2016-36":1,"2016-30":1,"2016-26":1,"2016-22":1,"2016-18":1,"2016-07":1,"2015-48":2,"2015-40":1,"2015-35":4,"2015-32":4,"2015-27":4,"2015-22":4,"2015-14":3,"2014-52":2,"2014-49":2,"2014-42":5,"2014-41":5,"2024-26":1,"2024-10":5,"2015-18":8,"2015-11":8,"2015-06":9,"2024-30":1}}},"text":"Female genital mutilation (FGM) and male circumcision: Should there be a separate ethical discourse? Brian D. Earp University of Oxford Abstract It is sometimes argued that the non-therapeutic, non-consensual alteration of children's genitals should be discussed in two separate ethical discourses: one for girls (in which such alterations should be termed 'female genital mutilation' or FGM), and one for boys (in which such alterations should be termed 'male circumcision'). In this article, I call into question the moral and empirical basis for such a distinction, and argue that all children-whether female, male, or indeed intersex-should be free from having parts of their genitals removed unless there is a pressing medical indication. * Note that citations are given in-text as hyperlinks in this paper, since it was first published in a slightly modified version at the University of Oxford's Practical Ethics website. Some references are provisional and may be updated. A more formal paper covering similar territory is available here: Earp, B. D. (2015). Female genital mutilation and male circumcision: Toward an autonomy-based ethical framework. Medicolegal and Bioethics, 5, 89-104. This is a published article. Author's copy. It may be cited as follows: Earp, B. D. (2014). Female genital mutilation (FGM) and male circumcision: Should there be a separate ethical discourse? Practical Ethics. University of Oxford. Available at: https:\/\/www.academia.edu\/8817976\/Female_genital_mutilation_FGM_an d_male_circumcision_Should_there_be_a_separate_ethical_discourse. DOI: 10.13140\/2.1.3530.4967. 2 Introduction When the Canadian ethicist Margaret Somerville began to speak and write critically about the non-therapeutic circumcision of infant boys, she was attacked by some critics, accusing her of \"detracting from the horror of female genital mutilation and weakening the case against it by speaking about it and infant male circumcision in the same context and pointing out that the same ethical and legal principles applied to both.\" When the anthropologist Kirsten Bell advanced similar arguments in her own university lectures, the reaction was \"immediate and hostile ... How dare I mention these two entirely different operations in the same breath! How dare I compare the innocuous and beneficial removal of the foreskin with the extreme mutilations enacted against females in other societies!\" One frequent claim is that FGM is analogous to \"castration\" or a \"total penectomy,\" such that any sort of ethical comparison between it and male circumcision is altogether inappropriate. Some other common assertions are these: Female genital mutilation and male circumcision are very different. FGM is barbaric and crippling (\"always torture,\" according to Tanya Gold), whereas male circumcision is comparatively inconsequential. Male circumcision is a \"minor\" intervention that might even confer health benefits, whereas FGM is a drastic intervention with no health benefits, and only causes harm. The \"prime motive\" for FGM is to control women's sexuality; it is inherently sexist and discriminatory and is an expression of male power and domination. Male circumcision, by contrast, has nothing to do with controlling male sexuality \u2013 it's \"just a snip\" and in any case \"men don't complain.\" FGM eliminates the enjoyment of sex, whereas male circumcision has no meaningful effects on sexual sensation or satisfaction. It is perfectly reasonable to oppose all forms of female genital cutting while at the same time accepting or even endorsing infant male circumcision. Yet almost every one of these claims is untrue, or is severely misleading at best. Such views derive from a superficial understanding of both FGM and male circumcision; and they are inconsistent with the latest critical scholarship concerning these and related practices. Their constant repetition in popular discourse, therefore, is unhelpful to advancing moral debate. I aim to show why in the course of what follows. What is going on here? To see the source of the problem, we need to begin by defining our terms-\"FGM\" and \"male circumcision.\" For FGM, The World Health Organization (WHO) gives us four major types, with multiple subdivisions: \u2022 Type I - Partial or total removal of the clitoris and\/or the prepuce (clitoridectomy). Type Ia, removal of the clitoral hood or prepuce only; Type Ib, removal of the clitoris with the prepuce. 3 \u2022 Type II - Partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora, with or without excision of the labia majora (excision). Type IIa, removal of the labia minora only; Type IIb, partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora; Type IIc, partial or total removal of the clitoris, the labia minora and the labia majora. \u2022 Type III - Narrowing of the vaginal orifice with creation of a covering seal by cutting and appositioning the labia minora and\/or the labia majora, with or without excision of the clitoris (infibulation). Type IIIa, removal and apposition of the labia minora; Type IIIb, removal and apposition of the labia majora. \u2022 Type IV - All other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for non-medical purposes, for example: pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and cauterization. The first thing to notice about this list is that \"FGM\" is not just one thing. Disturbingly, there are many different ways to nick, scratch, or cut off parts of a girl's vulva, ranging from, at the lowest end of the \"harm\" spectrum, pricking the clitoral hood (under anesthesia, and with sterile surgical equipment, as was proposed in the \"Seattle Compromise\" - note that this would qualify under FGM Type IV), up through various types of 'piercing' that do not necessarily remove tissue (of course, such piercing is common in 'Western' countries as a form of perceived \"cosmetic enhancement\"),* to interventions that alter the labia, but not the clitoris (the clinical term is labiaplasty \u2013 note that this is also popular in 'Western' countries), to, at the highest end, excising the (external) clitoris with a shard of glass and stitching together the labia with thorns. It is important to point out that the most severe types of FGM (such as the form just mentioned) are comparatively rare, whereas it is the more minor and intermediate forms that are more common. * Nota bene, such \"cosmetic\" surgeries in 'Western' countries are typically carried out under conditions of informed consent (a point to which I will return, as I think the moral analysis turns on this factor), although there is an alarming trend among some teenage girls in these countries - some as young as 13 or 14 - of having their labia reduced (or undergoing other forms of \"designer vagina\" surgery), apparently with the permission of their parents. Global health agencies such as the WHO, however, have been strangely silent on this issue, preferring instead to focus their FGM-eradication efforts almost entirely on the continent of Africa. In this African context, genital cutting (of whatever degree of severity) is most commonly performed around puberty, and is done to boys and girls alike. In most cases, the major social function of the cutting is to mark the transition from childhood to adulthood, and it is typically performed in the context an elaborate ceremony. Increasingly, however, African, Middle Eastern, Indonesian, and Malaysian genital alterations (again, of both boys and girls) are being carried out in hospital settings by trained medical professionals-and on infants as opposed to teenagers-on 4 the model of male circumcision in the United States. Understanding the harm It should be clear that the different forms of cutting listed above are likely to result in different degrees of harm, with different effects on sexual function and satisfaction, and different chances of developing an infection, and so on. But as Obermeyer notes in her systematic analysis of health consequences for FGM: It is rarely pointed out that the frequency and severity of complications are a function of the extent and circumstances of the operation, and it is not usually recognized that much of [our] information comes from studies of the Sudan, where most women are infibulated. The ill-health and death that these practices are thought to cause are difficult to reconcile with the reality of their persistence in so many societies, and raises the question of a possible discrepancy between our \"knowledge\" of their harmful effects and the behavior of millions of women and their families. Notwithstanding these gradient differences for types FGM, as well as the gradient consequences that vary along with them, all forms of FGM-no matter how sterilized or minor-are deemed to be mutilations. All are prohibited in Western democracies. Again: I am in support of the motives behind such legislation. I do not think that a sharp object should be taken to any girl's vulva unless it is to save her life or health, or unless she has given her fully-informed consent to undergo the procedure. In the latter case, of course, she wouldn't be a \"girl\" anymore, but rather an adult woman, who can make a decision about her own body. What about male circumcision? The story is very different when it comes to male circumcision. In no jurisdiction is the practice prohibited, and in many it is not even restricted: in some countries, including in the United States, anyone, with any instrument, and any degree of medical training (including none) can attempt to perform a circumcision on a non-consenting child- sometimes with disastrous consequences. As Davis notes, \"States currently regulate the hygienic practices of those who cut our hair and our fingernails ... so why not a baby's genitals?\" But just like FGM, circumcision is not a monolith; it isn't just one kind of thing. The original Jewish form of circumcision (until about 150 AD) was comparatively minor: it involved cutting off the overhanging tip of the foreskin-whatever stretched over the end of the glans-thus preserving (most of) the foreskin's protective and mechanical functions, as well as reducing the amount of erogenous tissue removed. The \"modern\" form is substantially more invasive: it removes one-third to one-half of the motile skin system of the penis (about 50 square centimeters of sensitive tissue in the adult organ), eliminates the gliding function of the foreskin (see here for a video demonstration), 5 and exposes the head of the penis to environmental irritation. Circumcision-and other forms of male genital cutting-are performed at different ages, in different environments, with different tools, by different groups, for different reasons. Traditional Muslim circumcisions are done while the boy is fully conscious, between ages 5 and 8, or possibly later; American (non-religious) circumcisions are done in a hospital, in the first few days of life, with or without an anesthetic (usually without), and using a range of different clamps and cutting devices; metzitzah b'peh, done by some ultra-Orthodox Jews, involves the sucking of blood from the circumcision wound, and carries the risk of herpes infection and permanent brain damage; subincision, carried out in aboriginal Australia and elsewhere, involves slicing open the urethral passage on the underside of the penis from the scrotum to the glans, often affecting urination as well as sexual function; circumcision among the Xhosa in South Africa is done as a rite of passage, in the bush, with spearheads, dirty knives, and other non-sterile equipment, and frequently causes hemorrhage, infection, mangling, and loss of the penis-see here for some disturbing pictures-as well as a very high rate of death. But even \"hospitalized\" or \"minor\" circumcisions are not without their risks and complications: in 2011, nearly a dozen boys were treated for \"life threatening haemorrhage, shock or sepsis\" as a result of their non-therapeutic circumcisions at a single children's hospital in Birmingham in England. Here is the important point. When people speak of \"FGM\" they are (apparently) thinking only-or primarily-of the most severe forms of female genital cutting, done in the least sterile environments, with the most drastic consequences likeliest to follow. This is so, notwithstanding the fact that such forms are the exception rather than the rule. When people speak of \"male circumcision\" (by contrast) they are (apparently) thinking only-or primarily-of the least severe forms of male genital cutting, done in the most sterile environments, with the least drastic consequences likeliest to follow, perhaps because this is the form with which they are culturally familiar. This then leads to the impression that \"FGM\" and \"male circumcision\" are \"totally different\" with the first being barbaric and crippling, and the latter being benign or even health-conferring (on which more in just a moment). Yet as the anthropologist Zachary Androus has written: The attitude that male circumcision is harmless [happens to be] consistent with Western cultural values and practices, while any such procedures performed on girls is totally alien to Western cultural values. [However] the fact of the matter is that what's done to some girls [in some cultures] is worse than what's done to some boys, and what's done to some boys [in some cultures] is worse than what's done to some girls. By collapsing all of the many different types of procedures performed into a single set for each sex, categories are created that do not accurately describe any situation that actually occurs anywhere in the world. So it depends on what one is talking about. Do those who oppose FGM (and that includes me) think (as I do) that even certain \"minor\" or \"medicalized\" forms of such cutting- 6 done without consent, and without a medical indication-are inconsistent with medical ethics, deeply-rooted moral and legal ideals about bodily integrity, the principle of personal autonomy, and a child's interest in an open future? Or is it only the wholesale removal of the clitoris \u2013 with a broken piece of glass \u2013 that inspires such condemnation? If the former is the case then consistency would seem to require that one be opposed to the non-therapeutic, non-consensual circumcision of boys as well: not only is it much more invasive than several \"minor\" (yet prohibited) forms of FGM, but it is numerically a much greater problem, occurring several millions of times per year. Cutting comes in degrees. Consequences vary. This is true for boys and for girls alike, and at some point the harms overlap. As a result of this realization, many scholars of ritual cutting are choosing to abandon the terms \"FGM\" and \"male circumcision\" (which presume a strict moral difference between them), and are using instead such terms as FGC, MGC, and IGC. These stand for female, male, and intersex genital cutting respectively; and they reflect no moral claims per se. Instead, the moral character of the genital cutting-regardless the person's sex or gender-can be assessed separately in terms of actual physical harms, as well with respect to such considerations as whether the cutting is therapeutic, consensual, or otherwise. So let us not be misled. There are many kinds of \"FGM\" as well as many kinds of \"male circumcision\" and the consequences vary for each one. But perhaps there are some other important differences between male and female forms of genital cutting \u2013 again, apart from the sex or gender of the person being cut \u2013 that could serve to justify their strict separation in terms of ethical discussion. Let us look at some further possibilities, from the set of common assertions I listed above. Male circumcision ... might ... confer health benefits, whereas FGM [has] no health benefits, and only causes harm. Both parts of this claim are misleading. First, how do we know that \"FGM\" (or FGC, as I'll say from now on) does not confer health benefits? Certainly the most extreme types of FGC will not contribute to good health on balance, but neither will the spearheads-and-dirty-knives versions of genital cutting on boys. What about other forms of FGC? Defenders of FGC-including some medical professionals in countries where FGC is culturally normative-regularly cite such \"health benefits\" as improved genital hygiene as a reason to continue the practice, and at least one study has shown a link between FGC and reduced transmission of HIV! Indeed, the vulva has all sorts of warm, moist places where bacteria or viruses could get trapped, such as underneath the clitoral hood, or among the folds of the labia; so who is to say that removing some of that tissue (with a sterile surgical tool) might not reduce the risk of various diseases? Fortunately, it's impossible to perform this type of research in the West, because any scientist who tried to do so would be arrested under anti-FGM laws (and would never get approval from an ethics review board). So we simply do not know. As a consequence of this, every time one sees the claim that \"FGM has no health benefits\" \u2013 7 a claim that has become something of a mantra for the WHO \u2013 one should read this as saying, \"we don't actually know if certain minor, sterilized forms of FGM have health benefits, because it is unethical, and would be illegal, to find out.\" Indeed, Western societies don't seem to think that \"health benefits\" are particularly relevant to the question of whether we should be cutting off parts of the external genitalia of healthy girls. Without the girl's consent, or a medical diagnosis, it's seen as impermissible no matter what. By contrast, a small and insistent group of (mostly American) scientists have taken it upon themselves to promote infant male circumcision, by conducting study after well-funded study to determine just what kinds of \"health benefits\" might follow from cutting off parts of the penis. Why is there a double standard here? (Actually, there is an answer to this question; and it hinges on prejudicial cultural influences on what constitutes science and medicine-as well as on what sorts of research questions are deemed worthy of funding, among other problematic factors.) Let us look at one example of a \"health benefit\" that has been attributed to MGC: a lowered risk of acquiring a urinary tract infection. When it comes to girls, who get UTIs after the age of 1 fully 10 times more frequently than boys do, doctors prescribe antibiotics and try other conservative treatments; they also encourage girls to wash their genitals and practice decent hygiene. When it comes to boys, however, circumcision apologists tout the wisdom of performing non-therapeutic, nonconsensual genital surgery, to the tune of 111 circumcisions to prevent a single case of UTI. Yet as Benatar and Benatar explain, \"UTI does not occur in 99.85% of circumcised infant males and in 98.5% of un-circumcised infant boys.\" And when it does occur, against those odds, it is both \"easily diagnosed and treatable with low morbidity and [low] mortality.\" So let's review: washing the genitals for girls, foreskin amputation for boys? With respect to reducing rates of HIV transmission in Africa-another health benefit that is frequently cited for MGC-remember that those studies were carried out on adult volunteers under conditions of informed consent, not on infants. I have no problem with a mature adult requesting surgery to remove a part of his own penis as a form of partial prophylaxis against HIV (in environments with very high base rates of such infection); that is certainly his right. Of course he would need to wear a condom either way to achieve any kind of reliable protection, but it's his body, and it's his decision to make. It's quite a different matter, however, to circumcise an infant-who is not at risk of HIV or other STIs unless he is molested, who cannot consent to the procedure in the first place, and who might prefer to practice safe sex strategies when he does become sexually active, rather than forfeit a part of his penis. See here, here, here, here, and here for further discussion of the \"health benefits\" arguments for MGC. The upshot is that they are not compelling, particularly in developed nations with functioning healthcare systems and access to soap and clean water. 8 So what other differences between FGC and MCG might justify their strict compartmentalization? Back to the assertions from above: The \"prime motive\" of FGM is to control women's sexualities \u2013 it is sexist and an expression of male power and domination. Male circumcision has nothing to do with controlling male sexuality. There is a lot to say here. First, female genital cutting is performed for different reasons at different times in different cultures; likewise for male genital cutting. Contrary to common wisdom, however, it is not the case that FGC is uniformly \"about\" the control of female sexuality. For example, in Sierra Leone: Among the Kono there is no cultural obsession with feminine chastity, virginity, or women's sexual fidelity, perhaps because the role of the biological father is considered marginal and peripheral to the central 'matricentric unit.' ... Kono culture promulgates a dual-sex ideology ... [The] power of Bundu, the women's secret sodality [i.e., initiation society that manages FGC ceremonies], suggest positive links between excision, women's religious ideology, their power in domestic relations, and their high profile in the 'public arena.' In nearly every place that FGC is performed, it is carried out by women (rather than by men) who do not typically view it as an expression of patriarchy, but who instead believe that it is hygienic (see above), as well as beautifying, even empowering, and as an important rite of passage with high cultural value. (The claim that such women are simply \"brainwashed\" is a gross oversimplification.) At the same time, the \"rite of passage\" ceremonies for boys in these societies are carried out by men; these are done in parallel, under similar conditions, and for similar reasons\u2013and often with similar (or even worse) consequences for health and sexuality: see this discussion by Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Nevertheless, anthropological research does suggest that FGC is, in some cultures\u2013 especially in Northeast Africa and parts of the Middle East\u2013intimately tied up with sexist expressions of patriarchal values; in these settings, the emphasis on female sexual 'purity' can more readily be discerned. As I have argued elsewhere, such an asymmetrical focus on female virginity in some corners of Islam (as expressed through genital cutting as well as through other practices) is extremely problematic and morally unjustifiable. However, it is important to note that, speaking generally: The empirical association between patriarchy and genital surgeries is not well established. The vast majority of the world's societies can be described as patriarchal, and most either do not modify the genitals of either sex or modify the genitals of males only. There are almost no patriarchal societies with customary genital surgeries for females only. Across human societies there is a broad range of cultural attitudes concerning female sexuality-from societies that press for temperance, restraint, and the control of sexuality to those that are more permissive and encouraging of sexual adventures and experimentation-but these 9 differences do not correlate strongly with the presence or absence of female genital surgeries. Indeed, in cultures where forms of FGC (and MGC) are culturally normative, many women regard the cutting as part of their cultural heritage and vigorously defend against the efforts of Western agencies, and sometimes the men in their own societies (see also here), who seek to wipe it out. Such a realization has led to the emergence of a counter-discourse among some Western feminists, who regard anti-FGC campaigns as a form of cultural imperialism. On this sort of view, the fight against FGC is inextricably bound up with a broader colonial and neo-colonial project of \"white people saving brown women from brown men\" (as well as from themselves). Thus as Nancy Ehrenreich writes in the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review: ... the mainstream anti-FGC position is premised upon an orientalizing construction of FGC societies as primitive, patriarchal, and barbaric, and of female circumcision as a harmful, unnecessary cultural practice based on patriarchal gender norms and ritualistic beliefs. ... Lambasting African societies and practices (while failing to critique similar practices in the United States) ... essentially implies that North American understandings of the body are \"scientific\" (i.e., rational, civilized, and based on universally acknowledged expertise), while African understandings are \"cultural\" (i.e., superstitious, un-civilized, and based on false, socially constructed beliefs). [Yet] neither of these depictions is accurate. North American medicine is not free of cultural influence, and FGC practices are not bound by culture-at least not in the uniform way imagined by opponents. Dustin Wax makes a similar argument: In the case of anti-FGC advocacy, the voice of \"brown women\" is almost entirely absent, literally silenced by an insistence that the horrendousness of the practice precludes any possible positive evaluation, and therefore the only valid voices are those that condemn FGC. All contradictory testimony is dismissed as the result of \"brainwashing,\" \"false consciousness,\" \"fear of male reprisal,\" \"antiWesternism\", \"ignorance,\" or other forms of willful or unwillful complicity. What about the other side of things? The usual claim is that male circumcision has \"nothing to do\" with controlling male sexuality. While it is probably true that most contemporary, Western parents who choose circumcision for their children do not do so out of a desire to \"control\" their sexuality (just as is true of most African parents who choose \"circumcision\" for their daughters), male genital cutting has been historically steeped in just such a desire, and it is implicated in problematic expressions of power to this day. Contrary to common wisdom, male genital cutting has indeed been used as a form of sexual control, and even punishment, for a very long time; the Jewish philosopher Maimonides argued that diminished sexual sensitivity was part of the point of doing circumcisions (to reduce excessive \"lust\" as well as \"concupiscence\"); circumcision was adopted into Western medicine in the Victorian period largely as a 10 means to combat masturbation (as well as other expressions of juvenile sexuality); and forced circumcision of enemies has been used as a means of humiliation since time immemorial: this practice continues among the Luo of Kenya (the Luo do not traditionally circumcise, and are often victims of such attacks), among numerous other groups. To return to the specific question of patriarchy, in Judaism, only the boys are allowed to \"seal the divine covenant,\" so the ritual is sexist on its face. But it's different in different communities. Moreover, the \"reasons\" given by most parents, when asked, as to why they wish to authorize a circumcision, are not necessarily the same as the \"reasons\" the practice originally came about, nor the \"reasons\" for which it was consciously performed in previous eras (i.e., as a \"cure\" for masturbation). Nevertheless, as the renowned anti-FGC activist Hanny Lightfoot-Klein has stated: \"The [main] reasons given for female circumcision in Africa and for routine male circumcision in the United States are essentially the same. Both promise cleanliness and the absence of odors as well as greater attractiveness and acceptability.\" So what are the implications here? Given that both male and female forms of genital cutting express different cultural norms depending upon the context, and are performed for different reasons in different cultures, and even in different communities or individual families, how are we meant to assess the permissibility of either one? Do we need to interview each set of parents to make sure that their proposed act of cutting is intended as an expression of acceptable norms? If they promise that it isn't about \"sexual control\" in their specific case, but rather about \"hygiene\" or \"aesthetics\" or something less symbolically problematic, should they be permitted to go ahead? But this is bound to fail. Every parent who requests a genital-altering surgery for their child \u2013 for whatever reason under the sun \u2013 thinks that they are acting in the child's best interests; no one thinks that they are \"mutilating\" their own offspring. Thus it is not the reason for the intervention that determines its permissibility, but rather the consequences of the intervention for the person whose genitals are actually on the line. So what kinds of consequences follow from FGC and MGC? Let us clear up one familiar legend: Male circumcision is \"just a snip\" and in any case \"men don't complain.\" Before addressing these oft-repeated claims about male genital cutting, let us reflect on the analogous female forms that tend to dominate popular discussions. The interventions associated with extreme forms of FGC are gut-wrenching to think about. Many people find FGC to be \"barbaric\" and \"inhumane\" in part because they can call to mind grotesque and vivid images of slicing and cutting-perhaps with a shard of glass-and they react with a mix of sadness, horror, and disgust. Much less disturbing, however, are the images apparently called to mind by male circumcision, as evidenced by the widely repeated (but false) declaration that circumcision is \"just a snip.\" Male circumcision is never \"just a snip.\" It is a frequently traumatic intervention; it is usually extremely painful, even in hospital settings, since adequate analgesia is rarely given; the same is true in ritual settings; and indeed sometimes the excruciating pain of 11 circumcision is used as a test of masculinity. As Nelson Mandela reported about his own (tribal) circumcision: Flinching or crying out was a sign of weakness and stigmatized one's manhood. I was determined not to disgrace myself, the group or my guardian. Circumcision is a trial of bravery and stoicism; no anaesthetic is used; a man must suffer in silence [Before] I knew it, the old man was kneeling in front of me. ... Without a word, he took my foreskin, pulled it forward, and then, in a single motion, brought down his assegai [knife]. I felt as if fire was shooting through my veins; the pain was so intense that I buried my chin in my chest. Many seconds seemed to pass before I remembered the cry, and then I recovered and called out, 'Ndiyindoda!' ['I am a man!'] In infant circumcision, the \"snip\"-if there is one-only comes at the end: the foreskin must first be separated from the head of the penis, to which it is adhered throughout much of childhood, then it is either stretched out and sliced, or crushed, or torn, or even strangled to the point of necrosis. When any of these things is done with unsterilized equipment, by a medically untrained practitioner, in environments with limited access to healthcare, the risk of serious infection, loss of the penis, and death is dramatically increased. I suggest that readers of this commentary watch this video (of a hospitalized, American circumcision) or this one (of a traditional Muslim circumcision) or this one (of a Jewish circumcision), or this one (of a circumcision in Uganda) so that they can permanently lay to rest the idea that circumcision is \"just a snip.\" It is time to retire this phrase; it should not be used any more. As to the notion that \"men don't complain\" \u2013 that is simply false. Just as some women who have undergone forms of FGC complain passionately about what was done to them without their consent, so too do some men who have undergone forms of MGC. Here are some examples of thoughtful and articulate complaints about MGC by resentful, circumcised men: here, here, here, and here. This man lost his penis. Several thousands of men are attempting \"foreskin restoration\" (Ron Low, personal communication), which is an arduous process of stretching skin from the shaft of the penis using weights, tapes, and other materials, in an attempt to \"restore\" some semblance of their pre-circumcised state. This is not an insignificant number. Of course, when men do complain, their feelings are often trivialized; but they continue to complain nevertheless \u2013 in increasing numbers, and ever more vocally as they find the courage to speak out. Many men do not complain, of course; but then many women who have undergone various forms of FGC do not complain either: in a survey of 3,805 Sudanese women, of whom 89% had experienced FGC, 96% said they would do it to their daughters and 90% favored the continuation of the practice generally. Yet it is enough that some men do complain, and that some women do as well: in both cases a healthy part of their body was removed, and without their informed permission. In Western societies, we teach our citizens that they have a right to bodily integrity: we forbid the tattooing of children, for 12 example, and we tell them that adults should not so much as touch them inappropriately. In this sort of social and legal environment, complaints about having a part of one's genitals removed without one's own consent should be treated with serious concern. Finally: FGM eliminates the enjoyment of sex, whereas male circumcision has no meaningful effects on sexual sensation or satisfaction. Again, this depends. Obviously more minor forms of FGC \u2013 such as ritual 'pricking,' some kinds of piercing, or even removal of the vaginal lips \u2013 will not eliminate erogenous sensation; however, does this make any of these interventions permissible, if they are done without consent? The answer, in my opinion, is \"no.\" Even the risk of damaging sensitive nerve tissue with a 'prick' should be avoided unless the person taking on the risk is acting freely as an informed adult. Or what about removing \"just\" the clitoral hood? The clitoris might lose some sensitivity over time, as it rubs against environmental factors (just as the penile glans seems to do after male circumcision; in fact the clitoral hood and the foreskin are anatomically analogous structures), but perhaps some sensation would be preserved, and in any case sexual enjoyment cannot be reduced to stimulation of the clitoris or even ability-toorgasm. Does that make \"clitoral unhooding\" OK? Not if it's done without consent. Finally, what about one of the most invasive forms of FGC \u2013 the excision of the external clitoris? According to a recent review published by the reputable Hastings Center, \"Research by gynecologists and others has demonstrated that a high percentage of women who have had genital surgery [including excision] have rich sexual lives, including desire, arousal, orgasm, and satisfaction, and their frequency of sexual activity is not reduced.\" Indeed, in one study, up to 86% of women who had undergone even \"extreme\" forms of FGC reported the ability to orgasm, and \"the majority of the interviewed women (90.51%) reported that sex gives them pleasure.\" These counterintuitive findings might be explained by the fact that much of the clitoris (including most of its erectile tissue) is actually underneath the skin and is therefore not removed by even the most invasive types of FGC: only the glans of the clitoris (the \"part that sticks out\") can be excised. But this does not, in my view, make the surgery somehow \"OK.\" Every girl's body is different, and the value she will end up placing on having in intact clitoral glans cannot be known in advance\u2013even in cultures in which the glans is socially stigmatized. At the end of the day, if a fully-informed adult woman chooses genital surgery for herself, it may be permissible on some analyses. However, it is not permissible on children. What about male circumcision? The same sort of reasoning applies. While the majority of circumcised men (whose circumcisions were not seriously \"botched\") report that they experience sexual pleasure during intercourse, and even enjoy sex quite a lot: (a) they do not have a point of comparison, unless they were circumcised in adulthood, so 13 they cannot know what sex would feel like had they not been circumcised (the same point applies to FGC done early enough in childhood), (b) the risk that a \"botch\" might in fact occur means that the surgery should be undertaken voluntarily, insofar as it is non-therapeutic in nature, (c) some men whose circumcisions did not result in \"botches\" may nevertheless experience adverse sexual outcomes, simply through the loss of erotogenic tissue, and (d) some men's sexual experiences are hampered via psychological mechanisms, including through the resentment they may feel at having been circumcised before they could object. Scientists are divided over the \"average\" effect of (expertly performed, perfectly executed) circumcision on key sexual outcome variables. What is not controversial, however, is that any sensation in the foreskin itself is guaranteed to be eliminated by circumcision (just as any sensation in the labia or the clitoral glans will be eliminated by labiaplasty or excision, respectively), as are \"any sexually-relevant functions associated with [the foreskin's] manipulation. In other words, a man without a foreskin cannot 'play' with his foreskin, nor can he glide it back and forth during sex. That these can be pleasurable activities, with great subjective value to genitally intact men and their partners, is uncontroversial.\" Finally, the most extreme forms of male genital cutting (e.g., when it leads to penile amputation) eliminate sexual capacity altogether. As Sara Johnsdotter has pointed out, there is no 1:1 relationship between amount of genital tissue removed (in either males or females), and subjective satisfaction while having sex, so \"FGM\" (and male \"circumcision\")-of whatever degree of severity- will affect different people differently. Each individual's relationship to their own body is unique, including what they find aesthetically appealing, what degree of risk they feel comfortable taking on when it comes to elective surgeries on their \"private parts,\" and even what degree of sexual sensitivity they prefer (for personal or cultural reasons). Thus each individual should be left to decide what to do with his or her own genitals when it comes to irreversible surgery. To summarize, if \"FGM\" is wrong because it \"destroys sexual pleasure\" \u2013 then forms of \"FGM\" that do not destroy sexual pleasure must (on this logic) be considered permissible, or else they should be given a different name. But if \"FGM\" is wrong because it involves cutting into the genitals of a vulnerable child, without a medical indication and without consent, thereby exposing the child to surgical risk (without the presence of any disease), and (in some cases) removing a healthy part of her body that she might later wish she could have experienced intact, then male circumcision is equally wrong on those grounds. This is true whether sexual pleasure is \"destroyed\" or whether it isn't, and whether a complaint is made later or not. Explaining the double standard Given everything that has been said so far about the relevant objective \"overlaps\" between male and female genital cutting, why exactly have they become so compartmentalized? Rebecca Steinfeld, a political scientist at Stanford who studies 14 ritual cutting, has speculated as follows: Alongside the differences in harm and misperceptions about the contrasting settings and ages at which the procedures take place, the double standard stems from two further factors: sexism and ethnocentrism. Male bodies are constructed as resistant to harm or even in need of being tested by painful ordeals, whereas female bodies are seen as highly vulnerable and in need of protection. In other words, vulnerability is gendered. And little girls are more readily seen as victims than little boys. The consequence of this ... is that patriarchy often allows men's experiences to remain unquestioned. Familiarity also creates comfort, and since MGC has been practised in the West for millennia and been routine in English-speaking countries for a century, we're desensitised. By contrast, since FGC is geographically or culturally remote, it's more liable to be seen as barbaric. On this last point, Andrew DeLaney (unpublished manuscript) gives a similar analysis: It is safe to say that [male genital cutting] is a norm in the United States, despite any activists' efforts to raise awareness about it. In the words of one law professor describing her generation, \"Everyone was circumcised.\" ... FGM, on the other hand, is likely a completely foreign idea to the vast majority of people living in the United States or the rest of the western world, with the only exposure to it being horrific reports that are presented based on cases or reports out of Africa. With this being the case, moral objection to the practice of FGM is taken as self-evident, with research and activism being conflated and data on FGM that is sometimes not actually investigated taken as true. All the while, [male genital cutting] occurs as a completely normalized practice. It is of course to be welcomed that ethicists, activists, and other stakeholders have been campaigning to protect the rights of girls to be free from non-therapeutic, nonconsensual cutting into their genital organs. I cannot state enough that I am in support of such efforts (although I do not favor the use of the term \"FGM\" for the reasons I have already given). My argument has been that they should not be stopping there. Female, male, and intersex genital cutting (for more on intersex, see, e.g., here) should be done exclusively with a medical indication or with the informed consent of the individual. Children of whatever gender should not have healthy parts of their most intimate sexual organs removed, before such a time as they can understand what is at stake in such a surgery and agree to it themselves. 15 References References are in-text as hyperlinks. They are provisional, and may be updated or replaced in later versions of this commentary. I am in the process of preparing a formal academic paper based upon the content and arguments presented in this document, in which references will be presented in the conventional fashion. Update as of 15 April, 2015 \u2013 the paper in question has now been published: Earp, B. D. (2015). Female genital mutilation and male circumcision: Toward an autonomy-based ethical framework. Medicolegal and Bioethics, 5, 89-104. About the author Brian D. Earp is a Research Fellow in Ethics at the University of Oxford. He holds degrees from Yale, Oxford, and Cambridge universities, including an M.Phil. degree in the history, philosophy, and sociology of science and medicine, focusing on male and female genital surgeries. Brian has served as a Guest Editor for the Journal of Medical Ethics, editing a special issue on the topic of childhood circumcision, and has published widely in the leading journals in his field.","subset":"phil_papers"}
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Dropbox is a free service that lets you bring all your photos, docs, and videos anywhere. Any file you save to your Dropbox will also automatically save to all your computers, phones, and even the Dropbox website. This means that you can start working on your computer at school or the office, and finish on your home computer. Never email yourself a file again! The Dropbox Folder After you install Dropbox on your computer, a Dropbox folder is created. If you're reading this guide, then that means you had no problems finding your Dropbox folder :). This folder is just like any other folder on your computer, but with a twist. Any file you save to your Dropbox folder is also saved to all your other computers, phones, and the Dropbox website. On top of your Dropbox is a green icon that lets you know how your Dropbox is doing: Green circle and check: All the files in your Dropbox are up to date. Blue circle and arrows: Files in your Dropbox are currently being updated. Dropbox Quick Start Adding files to your Dropbox Step 1 Drag and drop a file into your Dropbox folder. Step 2 The blue icon means your file's syncing with Dropbox. That's it! The green icon means that your file has finished saving to your other computers and the Dropbox website. Now that your file's in Dropbox, any changes made to it will be automatically detected and updated to your other computers. The Dropbox Right-click\/Context Menu When you Right-Click (Windows\/Linux) or Control-Click (Mac) a file or folder in your Dropbox, you'll see a menu that lets you do a few neat things with Dropbox: \u2022 Share a Folder Invite your friends, family and teammates to a folder in your Dropbox. It'll be as if you saved that folder straight to their computers. \u2022 View Previous Versions View a record of changes made to a file. You can choose to go back to an earlier version of a file if you'd like. \u2022 Browse on Dropbox Website View a file on the Dropbox website. \u2022 Get Link Make a link to any file or folder in your Dropbox. You can then send this link to anyone you'd like to view the file - even if they don't have Dropbox! The Dropbox Tray\/Menu bar icon The Dropbox tray or menu bar icon is located on the bottom (Windows) or top (Mac\/Linux) of your screen, and lets you check the status and settings of your Dropbox. The same green, blue, and red icons that appear on the files and folders in your Dropbox also appear over this icon to let you know the status of your Dropbox. Right-clicking this icon gives you a few options: \u2022 Open your Dropbox folder, the Dropbox website, or the Dropbox help center. \u2022 See which files were recently changed. \u2022 View an estimate of how long it will take Dropbox to finish updating files. \u2022 Change preferences for your connection, Dropbox folder location, and more. What do I do now? Try dragging some photos or docs into your Dropbox. Then visit the Dropbox website at https:\/\/www.dropbox.com. When you log in, your files will be waiting for you! To learn more about Dropbox, take our tour at http:\/\/www.dropbox.com\/tour or visit the help center at http:\/\/www.dropbox.com\/help. Frequently Asked Questions How much does Dropbox cost? Dropbox is free! If you run out of space, visit https:\/\/www.dropbox.com\/plans to view our available subscriptions. How much space does my Dropbox have? Free accounts come with 2GB of space (deleted files and revisions won't count against your limit). You can always check your usage by visiting your account settings page at https:\/\/www.dropbox.com\/account. How\tlong\tuntil\tmy\tfiles\tare\tfully\tsynced? Dropbox will download as fast or as slow as your network allows, and will try its best to not hog your connection. If you'd like to limit your upload or download rates, you can change them in Dropbox's preferences. For step by step instructions, visit the help article at https:\/\/www.dropbox.com\/help\/26. Dropbox\tis\tfast!\tHow\tcould\tit\thave\tpossibly\tsynced\tall\tof\tmy\tfiles\tin\tthat\ttime? Dropbox will look to see if it already has the file you're trying to upload. If it senses that it already has the file, it won't bother to upload it again. If the file has been changed recently, it will only upload\/download the changes rather than the whole thing. How secure is Dropbox? Dropbox takes the security of your files and of our software very seriously. Dropbox uses Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and AES-256 encryption. AES-256 is the same encryption standard used by banks to secure customer data. Can I access Dropbox on my mobile device? The Dropbox App is available for iPhone, iPad, Android, and Blackberry. To install Dropbox on your mobile device, visit http:\/\/www.dropbox.com\/mobile. You can also get to your Dropbox at any time by visiting http:\/\/www.dropbox.com from your phone.","subset":"phil_papers"}
+{"meta":{"title":"Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, \u00e2\u0080\u009cHeidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference\u00e2\u0080\u009d","type":"info:eu-repo\/semantics\/review","creator":"Bey, Facundo","subject":"Philosophy","date":"2017","identifier":"oai:philarchive.org\/rec\/BEYJDH","description":"Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Autor: Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Edited by Mireille Calle-Gruber, Translated by Jeff Fort, Foreword by Jean-Luc Nancy, Editorial: Fordham University Press, Fecha de Publicaci\u00c3\u00b3n: 2016, Formato: Hardback $85.00, P\u00c3\u00a1ginas: 116, Reviewed by: Facundo Bey (Universidad Nacional de General San Mart\u00c3\u00adn \/ CONICET-Universidad de Buenos Aires).","datestamp":"2020-05-20T12:45:13Z","dup_signals":{"dup_doc_count":103,"dup_dump_count":33,"dup_details":{"curated_sources":2,"2023-50":4,"2023-40":1,"2023-23":1,"2022-40":1,"2022-27":1,"2021-10":1,"2020-50":5,"2020-29":2,"2020-16":1,"2019-51":6,"2019-47":3,"2019-39":2,"2019-30":1,"2019-22":2,"2019-09":2,"2019-04":1,"2018-51":4,"2018-47":6,"2018-43":1,"2018-39":5,"2018-34":5,"2018-30":3,"2018-26":4,"2018-22":5,"2018-17":1,"2018-13":3,"2018-09":8,"2018-05":3,"2017-51":8,"2017-47":2,"2024-26":3,"2024-10":5,"2024-30":1}}},"text":"\/11\/2017 Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Phenom... http:\/\/reviews.ophen.org\/2017\/11\/22\/jacques-derrida-hans-georg-gadamer-philippe-lacoue-labarthe-heidegger-philosophy-politics-heidelberg-conferenc... 1\/6 Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference T\u00edtulo: Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Autor: Jacques Derrida, HansJacques Derrida, HansGeorg Gadamer, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Edited by Mireille Calle-Gruber, Translated by Jeff Fort, Foreword by Jean-Luc Nancy Georg Gadamer, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe Editorial: Fordham University Press Fecha de Publicaci\u00f3n: 2016 Formato: Hardback $85.00 P\u00e1ginas: 116 Reviewed by: Facundo Bey (Universidad Nacional de General San Mart\u00edn \/ CONICET-Universidad de Buenos Aires) On the evening of February 5, 1988, at the University of Heidelberg, three of the major and most influential figures of the 20th-century philosophy met in Heidelberg before a large audience. Fifty five years before, in the same lecture hall, Martin Heidegger, as Rector of the University of Freiburg, had given a speech that would be part of the firsts steps towards a running sore, \"a wound in thought itself\" [c'est une blessure de la pens\u00e9e] in Maurice Blanchot's words[i], a proper caesura, entitled \"Das Universit\u00e4t im neue Reich\" [The University in the New Reich]. Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg-Gadamer, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, three unquestionable distinguished Heidegger's interpreters, came together that February of 1988 for over two days to discuss the philosophical and political implications of Martin Heidegger's thought and legacy, under a Gadamer's sign of hospitality: the encounter took place in the common linguistic territory of the French language. Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference, edited by Mireille Calle-Gruber, and translated into English by Jeff Effort, collects the fruitful dialogues between these three thinkers and their exchanges with the audience during this unforgettable debate officially entitled \"Heidegger: Port\u00e9e philosophique et politique de sa pens\u00e9e\" [Heidegger: Philosophical and Political Dimensions of his Thought]. Days after the conference, once the text of the public debate was ready, Derrida, Gadamer, LacoueLabarthe, but also, Calle-Gruber-who was in charge of the presentation-and Reiner Wiehl-president 22\/11\/2017 Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Phenom... http:\/\/reviews.ophen.org\/2017\/11\/22\/jacques-derrida-hans-georg-gadamer-philippe-lacoue-labarthe-heidegger-philosophy-politics-heidelberg-conferenc... 2\/6 of the session-, all of them, agreed to defer the publication[ii]. Those were unquiet days: only a year before had been published the \"spectacular\" book by V\u00edctor Far\u00edas, Heidegger et le nazisme[iii] (1987) and, by the time of the Heidelberg Conference-partially motivated by the whirlwind generated by the Far\u00edas' book-the media focus was as never before concentrated on Heidegger's documented Nazism (which was already known from the 1960s, provided by Guido Schneeberger[iv], as Gadamer remembers[v]). Both Lacoue-Labarthe[vi] and Gadamer[vii], as it is well known, had largely discussed Far\u00edas provocative book, and had considered that was written not without recourse to misrepresentations and malicious omissions. Far\u00edas also devoted himself to denounce not only Heidegger Nazism but the socalled \"heideggerianism\", especially what he understood as its French decline: Jean Beaufret and Jacques Derrida, both unfairly associated to Robert Faurisson and his revisionist-negationist theories regarding the non existence of gas chambers in the nazi concentration camps. Thus, the gadamerian decision that the conference be delivered in French, besides representing an act of generosity, acquires a new meaning. Derrida, Gadamer and Lacoue-Labarthe faced in this conference the complexities of the discussion on a shared ground, each resorting to their own considerations while attempting to set up a dialogue (despite the manifest intention, at least from Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe, of not giving a full account of their own most well-known published texts). To begin, Lacoue-Labarthe invoked his thesis on the confrontation, \"the inmense debate\", that Heidegger, after the rectorship at Freiburg, would have started with what National Socialism meant in the history of the West, through the calling of art into question and the deconstruction of Western aesthetics, that is to say, the understanding of the essence of t\u00e9khne [viii]. One of the central thesis of Lacoue-Labarthe, that is present in his participation in the conference, is that the question of art occupies a nodal place in Heidegger's self-interpretation of the enigma of his own political commitment, since it would constitute his self-confrontation with National Socialism, his own Auseinandersetzung subsequent to the experience of the Rectorship. After 1934, Heidegger introduces poetry and the poet figure as the main references for the reflection on the German identity and, in this way, Nietzsche's previous dominant influence begins its decline to give way to the new hero: H\u00f6lderlin. The terms in which the myth and the tragedy would be thus later understood will not be those of the great German mimetic dream of Greece proper to nazi Wagnero-Nietzscheanism, but those of Dichtung, Sprache and Sage, which, in turn, overflow the aesthetic determination of the poetic. Gadamer, contributed to the conference with both his irreplaceable reflections and testimonies, but also reopening the interrupted conversation started in April 1981 at the Paris Goethe Institute with Jacques Derrida. Therefore, Gadamer's intervention was focused, on one hand, in its testimony value, maybe because the questions of the audience had conducted him too much in this way. In this respect, \"surprise\" and \"shock\" are the recurrent adjectives he used for describing what was then in 1933 his reaction to Heidegger's Rectorship chair acceptation, indissociable of the latter's public nazi commitment, specially when he had seemed to Gadamer politically much closer to National-Bolshevikism[ix] (which, in the eyes of Gadamer, as political Movement, had not a biologicist discourse). The main hypothesis of Gadamer is that Heidegger really believed for a moment that the nazi revolution was the possibility of a true spiritual renovation, but once he understood Nazism had become not more than a \"decadent revolution\", it was for him no more his revolution, he felt no responsible at all for anything. And that would explain his great ambiguities: first of all, his silence. But also the responsibility with respect to the great number of colleagues and students who followed him in his political decision together with the disturbing contradiction of writing contemporary on the \"forgetting of being\", the predominance of technics and the devastating consequences of the industrial revolution.[x] On the other hand, Gadamer presented a critical point of view of Heidegger's path to the \"fragmentation of metaphysical conceptualization by means of this force he exerted against words\"[xi], that involved a similar consideration regarding to Derrida, and that allowed Gadamer to understand himself closer to Paul Celan and his sense of fragmentation. Derrida, for its part, during the conference superbly questioned Heidegger's own questions and avoidances, as well as the meaning of legacy and responsibility. He asserted-by way of an improvised and risky hypothesis, later shared by Lacoue-Labarthe and Gadamer-that Martin Heidegger's silence, his unforgivable silence in the face of the barbaric horror of Nazi extermination, is the legacy that has bequeathed us. In Derrida's words: 22\/11\/2017 Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Phenom... http:\/\/reviews.ophen.org\/2017\/11\/22\/jacques-derrida-hans-georg-gadamer-philippe-lacoue-labarthe-heidegger-philosophy-politics-heidelberg-conferenc... 3\/6 What I am saying here is very risky, and I risk it as a hypothesis, while asking you to accompany me in this risk. [...] with a phrase spoken in the direction of an easy consensus, Heidegger woul have closed the matter. [...] I believe that if he had let himself go for a statement, let's say, of immediate moral reaction, or of a declaration of horror, or of nonforgiveness-a declaration that would not itself be a work of thought at the level of all that he had already thought-, well, perhaps we would feel more easily spared the work that we have to do today: because we have to do this work. That is what we have inherited.[xii] This hypothesis is, ultimately, the beginning of a response, an answer to the question of responsibility of thought. On the one hand, improvisation would be a kind of responsibility by means of risking a disarmed speech.[xiii] On the other hand, to be heir to a legacy supposes always a response, the act of responding for not only a call not chosen, but also one that comes before oneself[xiv]. This is the call that Far\u00edas book wanted to mute, the path this book tried to close by doing a \"case closed\" out of the Heidegger nazi commitment. For this commitment was not in 1988 nor now something someone can put into question. Heidegger's Nazism is indisputable. But to be heir to a legacy in the sense Derrida expressed it means a response to the dogmatic question where Far\u00eda's book seem to lead: \"is it posible yet to read Heidegger?\". Somehow, today the 1988 scenario recurs. The publication for the first time of the Heidelberg Conference in 2014, in its French first edition[xv], concurrent with the beginning of the publication of the Schwartze Hefte in Germany, revealed a \"dislocation\" [d\u00e9calage], as Jean-Luc Nancy has said[xvi], which comes not only from the very root of the problem itself, the relationship between Martin Heidegger and his political commitment with Nazism, but also from the mediatic racket generated by the very publication of the Schwartze Heftethemselves. The process, begun in 2014, of the gradual publication of the Schwartze Hefte, which are loaded with resounding anti-Semitic expressions (that occupy a new and important place in the philosophical work of Martin Heidegger, although are not the only elements of these books), challenges us today to think, demands pronouncements and explanations, in a climate of opportunism, confusion, obscurantism and controversy as it was that of the late eighties. Once again, the mass media (but not only the media) raise a false alternative that may be summarized as it follows: \"If he was a great philosopher, then he was not a Nazi; if he was a Nazi, then he has not been a great philosopher\"[xvii]. Thus, the task would be enormous for the heirs: none other than the terrifying and valuable mandate to think what Heidegger did not think, to say what he was not able to say[xviii], namely, the affinities and common roots among his thought, the essence of the West and Nazism; the subject of Nazism by itself; the basis for his National-Socialist engagement. Nowadays, the publication of the Schwartze Hefte came to dispel the silence, but did not liquidate the task. In any case, today there is no way to avoid the inevitable. As Donatella Di Cesare said: Even the stereotype of the philosopher lying in an impolitic conformity seems totally unmotivated. Heidegger was by no means a \"conformist\" and in the Black Notebooks-as in other works of the thirties-appears a politically radical philosopher. It will therefore be necessary to rewrite the chapter \"Heidegger and politics\" which promises to be much more complex than what has been assumed so far[xix]. That chapter today is beginning to be rewritten, little by little. To be sure, Donatella Di Cesare and Peter Trawny[xx]-editor of the Schwarze Hefte, published by Klostermann-provide today the most penetrating and accurate analysis on Heidegger's anti-Semitism (although each one from a different point of view). In particular, in direct relation to one of the main reflections that the publication of the Heidelberg Conference brings up, Di Cesare dedicated half of his Heidegger & Sons. Eredit\u00e0 e futuro di un filosofo (2015) to face the problem of Heidegger's legacy. Two paths seem to be shaped in the face of the intellectual inheritance of the German thinker. On the one hand, \"orthodoxy\", which either denies or trivializes the status of Heidegger's political statements, reacts with loyal impotence, marginalizing texts, problems, even people. On the other hand, a spectacular parade of pamphleteer whistleblowers sets out to hunt down the \"Heideggerians\", suspected subscribers of any action or omission of Heidegger. Of course, 22\/11\/2017 Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Phenom... http:\/\/reviews.ophen.org\/2017\/11\/22\/jacques-derrida-hans-georg-gadamer-philippe-lacoue-labarthe-heidegger-philosophy-politics-heidelberg-conferenc... 4\/6 these are false options that take us to just a single alternative: refusing to think. For, as Di Cesare affirms, \"an inheritance is never something that can be either fully received or, on the contrary, totally refuted\"[xxi]. We are heirs, whether we want it or not; that means having to learn to be both faithful and unfaithful[xxii]. Reading Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: the Heidelberg Conference will not dissipate the new questions that the publication of the Schwartze Hefteopened, but may give us both a vision of a path that must be understood as well as an understanding of some initial conclusions of three major philosophers that should be necessary overcome if we are really willing to confront once again to the challenges posed by Martin Heidegger's thought. References: Blanchot, Maurice. \"Notre compagne clandestine\", in Textes pour Emmanuel Levinas (Paris: J.-M. Place, 1980). Cohen, Richard A. Face to face with L\u00e9vinas (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986). Derrida, Jacques, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: the Heidelberg Conference (Fordham University Press, 2016). Di Cesare, Donatella. Heidegger e gli ebrei. I \u00abQuaderni neri\u00bb(Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2014). Di Cesare, Donatella. Heidegger & sons: eredit\u00e0 e futuro di un filosofo (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2015). [i] Cohen, Richard A. Face to face with L\u00e9vinas (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1986), 43. Originally in Blanchot, Maurice, \"Notre compagne clandestine\", in Textes pour Emmanuel Levinas (Paris: J.-M. Place, 1980), 81. [ii] Derrida, Jacques, Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: the Heidelberg Conference (Fordham University Press, 2016), xiii. [iii] Far\u00edas, V\u00edctor. Heidegger et le nazisme (Paris: Verdier, 1987). [iv] Schneeberger, Guido. Nachlese zu Heidegger (Bern: Suhr, 1962). [v] Derrida, Jacques, Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: the Heidelberg Conference, 63. [vi] \"Sur le livre de Victor Farias, Heidegger et le nazisme\", in Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. La fiction du politique: Heidegger, lart et la politique (Par\u00eds: Christian Bourgois, [1987] 1998), 173-188. The text resumes with some modifications an article appeared in the Journal Litt\u00e9raire: \"Le proc\u00e8s Heidegger\", Le Journal Litt\u00e9raire, no. 2: 115-117, December 1987-January 1988. [vii] Published originally as \"Zur\u00fcck von Syrakus?\", in Die Heidegger-Kontroverse, ed. J\u00fcrg Altwegg (Frankfurt am Main: Athen\u00e4um, 1988), 176-79; later was published in French in Le Nouvel Observateur, January 22-28, 1988, translated by Genevi\u00e8ve Carcopino. It was also translated into English as \"Back from Syracuse?,\" trans. John McCumber, Critical Inquiry15, no. 2 (Winter 1989): 427-30. The English version of Gadamer's text was included in the edition here reviewed. 22\/11\/2017 Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Phenom... http:\/\/reviews.ophen.org\/2017\/11\/22\/jacques-derrida-hans-georg-gadamer-philippe-lacoue-labarthe-heidegger-philosophy-politics-heidelberg-conferenc... 5\/6 [viii] Derrida, Jacques, Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: the Heidelberg Conference, 37-38. [ix] Ibid., 64-75. [x] Ibid., 11-12. [xi] Ibid., 41. [xii] Ibid., 35-36. [xiii] Ibid., 16. [xiv] Ibid., 65-68. [xv] Derrida, Jacques, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, and Mireille Calle-Gruber. La conf\u00e9rence de Heidelberg, 1988: Heidegger, port\u00e9e philosophique et politique de sa pens\u00e9e (Paris: Lignes, 2014). [xvi] Derrida, Jacques, Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: the Heidelberg Conference, vii. [xvii] Di Cesare, Donatella. Heidegger e gli ebrei. I \u00abQuaderni neri\u00bb (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2014), 3. All Di Cesare's translations by Facundo Bey. [xviii] Derrida, Jacques, Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: the Heidelberg Conference, 35. [xix] Di Cesare, Donatella. Heidegger & sons: eredit\u00e0 e futuro di un filosofo (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2015), 79. [xx] Trawny, Peter. Heidegger und der Mythos der j\u00fcdischen Weltverschw\u00f6rung (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, 2015). [xxi] Di Cesare, Heidegger & sons, 33. [xxii] Di Cesare, Heidegger & sons, 33-34. PUBLICADO POR Facundo Bey Ph. D. Candidate in Philosophy (UNSAM). Political Scientist (UBA). Political Science Adjunct Professor (USAL). Researcher (CIF, UBA). Scholar (CONICET). 22\/11\/2017 Jacques Derrida, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: Heidegger, Philosophy, and Politics: The Heidelberg Conference Phenom... http:\/\/reviews.ophen.org\/2017\/11\/22\/jacques-derrida-hans-georg-gadamer-philippe-lacoue-labarthe-heidegger-philosophy-politics-heidelberg-conferenc... 6\/","subset":"phil_papers"}
+{"meta":{"title":"Communicating hope with one breath","type":"info:eu-repo\/semantics\/article","creator":"Edwards, Stephen D.","subject":"Philosophy","date":"2011","identifier":"oai:philarchive.org\/rec\/EDWCHW","description":null,"datestamp":"2023-11-03T04:12:07Z","dup_signals":{"dup_doc_count":109,"dup_dump_count":51,"dup_details":{"curated_sources":2,"2022-40":1,"2021-21":1,"2020-40":1,"2018-26":2,"2018-22":1,"2018-17":2,"2018-13":1,"2018-09":2,"2017-51":2,"2017-47":1,"2017-43":2,"2017-39":1,"2017-34":2,"2017-30":1,"2017-26":2,"2017-22":1,"2017-17":2,"2017-09":3,"2017-04":3,"2016-50":3,"2016-44":3,"2016-40":3,"2016-36":3,"2016-30":1,"2016-26":3,"2016-22":3,"2016-18":2,"2016-07":2,"2015-48":2,"2015-40":2,"2015-35":1,"2015-32":2,"2015-27":2,"2015-22":2,"2015-14":2,"2014-52":2,"2014-49":4,"2014-42":3,"2014-41":4,"2014-35":3,"2014-23":4,"2014-15":2,"2023-40":1,"2017-13":3,"2015-18":2,"2015-11":2,"2015-06":2,"2014-10":2,"2013-48":3,"2013-20":2,"2024-30":1}}},"text":"http:\/\/www.hts.org.za Original Research DOI: 10.4102\/hts.v67i2.901 Communicating hope with one breath Author: Stephen D. Edwards1 Affiliation: 1 Department of Psychology, University of Zululand, South Africa Correspondence to: Stephan Edwards email: firstname.lastname@example.com Postal address: 3 Antigua, 32 Chartwell Drive, Umhlanga Rocks 4320, South Africa Dates: Received: 25 June 2010 Accepted: 11 Oct. 2010 Published: [to be released] How to cite this article: Edwards, S.D., 2011, 'Communicating hope with one breath', HTS Teologiese Studies\/Theological Studies 67(2), Art. #901, 7 pages. DOI: 10.4102\/hts.v67i2.901 \u00a9 2011. The Authors. Licensee: OpenJournals Publishing. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution License. The central thesis of this article was that the phenomenon of hope involves states and stages of consciousness development, which can be enhanced through breath control, meditation, prayer and related practices that have formed the essence of various spiritual healing traditions for millennia. In particular, it was argued that breath control can provide a vital foundation for consciousness transformation and the development of hope. Whilst breath control alone may lead to a state of pure, transcendent and\/or cosmic consciousness, the practical theological implications are that its effect of enhancing states and stages of consciousness may be anchored and amplified. This process can take place through further contemplative and intercessory meditation, prayer and related behaviour and will differ between people, groups, contexts, religious and\/or spiritual traditions. A particular method of breath control called One Breath, which is associated with pure consciousness and the experience of hope was described. Such an experience typically leads to further spiritual practice, healing and transformation. It was concluded that such ongoing spiritual practice is crucial for improving consciousness development, healing and hope for individuals, societies, planet Earth and the cosmos. Introduction In spite of (some might say because of) extensive developments in technology, the natural sciences, modern biomedicine and many other fields, contemporary existence on planet Earth remains plagued by human suffering, illness (particularly the HIV and AIDS pandemic), violence (international terrorism for example), crime, overpopulation, ecological crises and a host of other problems. Some of these problems seem to have changed very little over the centuries. Many give up in the face of what may seem insurmountable obstacles. Is there any hope? The rather provocative title was deliberately chosen to highlight the various practical theological intentions of this article, which can be unpacked as follows: \u2022 It is concerned with the communication of hope and related states of consciousness and experiences such as trust, faith, integrity and love. \u2022 It reflects the faith that such experiences are most meaningfully grounded in and directed by spiritual practice. \u2022 A form of breath-based spiritual healing called One Breath will be discussed. \u2022 On the basis of such practice, evidence will show that the state of consciousness called hope may be enhanced through one particular form of breath. In practical terms this is experienced as one, long, slow, relaxed and\/or apneustic breath whereby hope is enhanced through the feeling of being at one with the eternally infinite present here and now. \u2022 There is specific focus on the communication of hope through breath, meditation, prayer and related experiences such as pure consciousness, faith and love. In order to realise these intentions, the article explores the phenomenology of hope within the context of various ancient and modern spiritual and psychological healing traditions. These traditions include ancestor reverence, Hinduism, Taoism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam as well as psychotherapeutic systems such as psychoanalysis, cognitive behavioural therapy and family therapy. All of these systems converge in the recognition, validation and provision of evidence for insight, consciousness, peak experiences and therapeutic moments as being valuable precipitants in effecting healing changes (Corsini 1989; Ivey, Andrea, Ivey & Simek Morgan 2002; Wilber 1977, 2000, 2007). In addition to its bias in terms of the author's African, Christianorientated background, occupation as psychologist, lifelong interest in human spirituality and ongoing personal, spiritual practice, this article is particularly informed by the work of Ken Wilber, who is receiving increasing recognition in the field of practical theological literature (Ferreira 2010:1\u20138). By definition, practical theology refers to that descriptive, empirical, pragmatic, interpretive and normative field where religious traditions meet contemporary experience in transformative Page 1 of 7 http:\/\/www.hts.org.za Original Research DOI: 10.4102\/hts.v67i1.2.901 Page 2 of 7 activity (Osmer 2008:34; Woodward & Patterson 2000:1\u201322). This article is concerned with a practical theological, spiritual and psychological exploration into the phenomenology, communication and improvement of that special state of consciousness experienced as hope. It is psychological in the sense conveyed by the original broad meaning of the term as the study and use of the breath, soul or spirit of life that leaves a person at death and continues in some other form. The great chain or nest of being and\/or consciousness ranges from matter to body to mind to soul to spirit and vice versa, depending upon whether this chain is being viewed from an evolutionary or involutionary perspective. In terms of this chain of being, this article is particularly concerned with phenomena arising at the level of soul and spirit. Here, soul is defined as an individual, incarnated expression of spirit and spirit as the universal expression of soul (Hergenhahn 2001:1\u201380; Judith 2004:13; Wilber 2000:106\u2013108). Hope as a state of consciousness The phenomenon of hope has long been of interest to psychologists. For Erikson (1963:247\u2013250), the experience of hope marked the successful resolution of the first stage of ontogenetic development with its accompanying psychosocial crisis of trust versus mistrust. More recently, hope has formed a conceptual pillar of the positive psychology movement away from the so-called pathogenic model to a more salutogenic or fortigenic focus on human resilience, strengths, resourcefulness and life skills. This is evidenced in the design and evaluation of hope programmes (Pretorius, Venter, Temane & Wissing 2008:301\u2013310). Whilst most research typically views hope from a dynamic, intra-psychic perspective as an intra-personal phenomenon, or at the level of individual soul, if we examine hope from a transpersonal, spiritual perspective, a further, bigger picture emerges. Writing from this perspective, Wilber (1977:105\u2013141) has noted four typical human dualisms: subject-object (personworld), being-nonbeing (life-death), body-mind and egoshadow. All of these require integration before a state of pure consciousness can be fully realised. If we view hope as a state and\/or stage of consciousness, it implies both correlational and inferential relationships. That is to say, states and\/or stages of pure, pre-reflective, transcendent, cosmic, unitary and\/or non-dual consciousness will be both associated with, as well as lead to further, optimal experiences of hope. Such a state of pure consciousness has been variously described in the spiritual wisdom traditions as reflecting the source, context, ground and goal of all Being, Tao, Brahmin, God, Allah and so on. Wilber (1977:37\u201369, 2000:8, 2007:68\u201369) has referred to this as that which is always already arising, moment to moment, in non-dual union of emptiness and form, which follows earlier experiential stages of nature, deity and formless mysticism. In Christian terms, for example, this non-dual consciousness may be described as a feeling of being with that which was in the beginning, is now and will be forever; a mystical, contemplative Christian experience of oneness with Christ, the Trinity and\/or the Godhead. This is made possible through the life and death of the Christ. In Wilber's basic integral framework of psychology and spirituality, such a state of consciousness will become a more enduring, stable stage, to the extent that it is realised from various perspectives. This includes subjective, intersubjective and objective dimensions or first, second and third person terms. Alternatively, spirituality may become unbalanced through the over-emphasis on any perspective to the exclusion of others. For example, Spirit in the first person has been described as the great I or Witness of every moment, as great radiant You, Thou or We immediately revealed in sacred communion in the second person and in the third person as the Great It, Isness, Thusness and Suchness of every context. Wilber (2007:158\u2013161) notes that the theistic traditions that typically espouse second person experiences have tended to become very uncomfortable with first person experiences, resulting for example in the crucifixion of Jesus. Similarly, contemporary New Age spiritual movements may tend to neglect first or second person spirituality if third person, Gaia, Web of Life or ecosystemic views are too exclusively extolled. Whilst such a state of pure consciousness, alluded to by various spiritual, wisdom and healing traditions, is ultimately indescribable in language, logic or numbers, the enhanced consciousness aspects of the experience are neatly captured in Travis and Pearson's (2000) research into its phenomenological and physiological correlates. The phenomenological experience has been described by experienced meditators as a peaceful, unbounded state, characterised by an absence of time, space or body sense. Physiological correlates converge in terms of periods of relaxation and breath suspension, either in the form of breath retention or apneustic breathing, characterised by long slow in-breaths of more than 10 seconds duration. Practical Theological implications of breath control Whilst breath control alone can lead to a state of pure, transcendent and\/or cosmic consciousness, the practical theological implications are that its effect of enhancing states and stages of consciousness may be anchored and amplified further. This takes place through contemplative and intercessory meditation, prayer and related behaviour and will differ between people, groups, contexts, religious and\/or spiritual traditions. In depth investigations into transformations of consciousness associated with major spiritual traditions have indicated common developmental stages. For example, in Christianity such stages are referred to as: image (any persons God given, natural reality), metanoia [conversion], apatheia [purification or conversion], light [illumination and insight] and theosis [union with God\/ Godhead] (Wilber 2000:210\u2013211, 2007:79\u201381; Wilber, Engler & Brown 1985:300\u2013301). The practical theological mission and message of this article is one of transformation of consciousness through breath control, meditation and prayer in order to provide hope and healing for humanity, society and cosmos. The article is a sequel to an earlier contribution, which explicated practical theological, psychological, http:\/\/www.hts.org.za Original Research DOI: 10.4102\/hts.v67i2.901 Page 3 of 7 phenomenological, contextual and empirical perspectives on a breath-based apprehension of the Holy Spirit (Edwards 2009). One Breath as a form of breath-based spiritual healing A primary ethical obligation for all healing is to make whole, to transform from illness to health, to bring together and renew that which was fractured, broken or disordered and to integrate disparate parts. The phrase 'One Breath' has been used by Joy Manne (1999), in her excellent article on Buddhist breath work and the nature of consciousness. As used in this article, it has further additional meanings related to the experience of pure consciousness in relation to the primordial Spirit, characterised by immaterial emptiness, luminous awareness and infinite energy (Reid 1998:256). During meditation, the breath becomes increasingly slow, soft and stilled until there is the experience of being breathed by one original breath. This is an integrating and healing experience. Healing One Breath practice will be described in detail in the section that follows. The fundamental role of the breath in healing has timehonoured traditions. Over many centuries, indigenous healers in Africa, India, China and other areas of planet Earth have practised various forms of breath-based spirituality. Healing traditions variously extol a form of breath-energy called Ra and Ka (Ancient Egypt), N\/um (San), Umoya (Zulu), Elima (Congolese), Ruach Ha Kodesh (Hebrew), Prana (Hindi), Nafas Ruh (Moslem), Baraka (Sufi), Spiritus Sanctus (Latin), Pneuma (Greek), Chi (Chinese), Mana (Figian), Ni (Sioux), Manitu (Alonquin), Chindi (Navajo) (Myers 1993:24; Elinwood 2004:23; Reid 1998:90\u201394; Taub-Bynum 1984:55\u201356). This healing energy is typically experienced through what Jung (1957:46) has referred to as the 'breath-body' or 'spirit body.' Sitting still, standing and moving forms of breath co-ordinated behaviour may be viewed as providing a foundation for all forms of healing and transcendence as exemplified in alpha conditioning, biofeedback, transcendental meditation, !Kung healing dance and Tai chi (Edwards 2008:142; Reid 1998:181\u2013 199). Healthy breathing experiences that have been bodily re-experienced as anchors, provide a phenomenological foundation for various forms of imagery: \u2022 light, sound, colour, touch and movement used in breathwork \u2022 expressive therapy \u2022 progressive relaxation \u2022 systematic desensitisation \u2022 crisis intervention \u2022 other forms of holistic psychological caring \u2022 counselling \u2022 psychotherapy \u2022 illness prevention \u2022 health promotion \u2022 ultimate spiritual healing (Edwards 2008:152; Ivey, D'Andrea, Ivey & Simek-Morgan 2002:129\u2212152). The power of such breath-based healing becomes amplified in the context of any spiritual tradition as exemplified in Christian Hesychasm breathing practices or Buddhist breathing techniques. For example, contemporary indigenous Zulu healing is based on the spiritual energy of the ancestors. This energy takes different forms as reflected in ukububula\/ nokubhonga kwedlozi, the religious, spirit-power and supernatural force of the ancestors breathing through the Zulu divine-healer [isangoma]. Ancestors are experienced as the living-dead, continuing to care for descendents in an extended link going back to the First Cosmic Breath of Creation. During her (or, in rare cases, his) spiritual calling the Zulu divine healer is breathed by recently departed ancestors appearing to her in dreams, calling her to become a diviner and accompanying her through a spiritual rebirth experience until completion of her apprenticeship under a qualified diviner in a macro-process called ukuthwasa. Thereafter she experiences being breathed by the ancestors during the divine healing process. Spiritual healing power [umoya] is mobilised in African Indigenous Churches (AIC) as members dance around in a circle chanting 'woza umoya, woza umoya' [come spirit come]. More formal meetings are held in churches, community halls or private homes. Here, faith healers [abathandazi] or prophets [abaprofethi] may close windows and doors to keep out distractions and amplify spiritual breath energy for a time of intense individual, family or community healing and spiritual purification [ukuhlambulula]. This takes place in a religious ceremony that includes rituals, music, drama and dance. Faith healers typically require their clients to breathe the Holy Spirit [Umoya oNgcwele] and to drink and pray over holy water [isiwasho] (Oosthuizen, Wessels, Edwards & Hexam 1989:119\u2013181). Similar spiritual themes occur in various major spiritual traditions. From the Judaic perspective, Genesis 2:7 reads 'The Lord God formed the man from the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life and the man became a living being'. In Hindu Yogic and Taoist Chigung traditions, pranayama and chi-gung respectively refer to various forms of breath-energy skills. One particular branch of Buddhism, Zen, places great emphasis on the lifebreath. In Zen breathing techniques, special emphasis is on breathing as a grounding and meditation technique, through life-breath stored in the energetic, intestinal area of the belly. This is referred to in India as the third chakra or manipura, in China as the lower tantien and in Japan as the hara. Another Buddhist breathing technique is to walk barefoot on the grass, in grateful consciousness of all previous ancestral beings beneath one's feet. In Christianity, John 20:21 reads: Again Jesus said, 'Peace be with you! As the father has sent me, I am sending you.' And with that he breathed on them and said, 'Receive the Holy Spirit'. Various stages and levels of spirituality are outlined in the Islamic mystical tradition of Sufism. The term nafs refers to a process involving the breath, essence, self and nature of the incarnated soul in its quest to return to the realm of spirit through ultimately perfected nafs bringing the realisation that individuality and separateness are illusions and that only God exits (Edwards 2008:139; Reid 1998:160\u2013180) http:\/\/www.hts.org.za Original Research DOI: 10.4102\/hts.v67i1.2.901 Page 4 of 7 A famous founding father of phenomenological, behavioural and functionalist schools of thought in psychology, lauded for his work on philosophy and the varieties of religious experience, William James once remarked that the stream of consciousness was only a careless name for what, when scrutinised, revealed itself to consist chiefly in the stream of his own breathing (James 1890:239). As implied in all the spiritual healing traditions mentioned above, with practice, this individual, introspective insight becomes infinitely amplified in the ultimate experience of being breathed by pure Cosmic Consciousness as connoted in the phrase 'One Breath.' This personal and transpersonal, integrating and healing experience provides infinite energy for all healers in their commitment to care for people and contexts requiring healing. One Breath practice The basic form of One Breath practice involves sustained focus on relaxed breathing. Keeping on observing the breath and monitoring bodily experiences, one continually lets go all feelings and thoughts with deeper and deeper relaxation. After a while the breath becomes increasingly slow, still, silent, smooth, soft and stable. Sustained focus on deepening this state of relaxed breathing, continually letting all else go and witnessing whatever arises in moment to moment awareness will eventually lead to the experience of being breathed, rather than breathing. One Breath fundamentally refers to this simple, momentary experience of being breathed. Whilst it may not initially be easy to block out personal contexts of suffering, care, pain, crisis or other related circumstances, such an experience is available to everyone and deepens with practice. If one creates time, the easiest way to begin practice is immediately after waking up in the morning. A fundamental form of practice is to focus consciousness on belly breathing. Keeping still, one should relax and observe the movement of the belly just below the navel. This may be very difficult initially, but becomes easier with practice. It may help to place one hand on the belly just below the navel. Various sensations, feelings, thoughts and experiences will initially drift in and out of consciousness. These will become less distracting with continual returning of focused consciousness to belly breathing and after a while there will be pure consciousness. One Breath cannot be forced, but simply happens. This particular practice forms the foundation for various methods of relaxation, meditation and prayer, which focuses on breathing through the belly area, also known respectively in Yogic, Taoist and Zen traditions as manipura, tan tien and hara. Training typically focuses on the reflection of converging consciousness through one point awareness. Practice contexts vary depending upon the particular spiritual tradition, as in the following examples that have produced healing effects in the author's professional occupation as teacher, researcher and psychologist offering breath psychotherapeutic workshops (Edwards 2008:157\u2013161, 2009:255). At all levels of practice the emphasis is on remaining with the natural breathing pattern and it is extremely important that practitioners say within their individual comfort zones, especially with regard to their health status and particular religious and\/or spiritual inclination and\/or persuasion. One particular valuable form of a Christian-orientated One Breath contemplative prayer, which follows a centring period of silence and relaxed breathing, is for people to tune into their heart rates during each cycle of breathing in and breathing out. Once a comfortable, relaxed rhythm is established, the breathing pattern can be complemented with any images, words, phrase or sentences. For example, the sentence 'I am with I AM when we are with Jesus Christ', with the phrase 'I am with I AM when we are' may be repeated in synchrony with an eight heartbeat out-breath and 'with Jesus Christ' in-breath pattern respectively, with an ever deepening state of consciousness. Keating (2009:11\u2013160) provides in depth instruction on such contemplative practice. Previous empirical research indicated highly significant quantitative and qualitative improvements in spirituality perceptions and experiences of 59 participants following Christian-orientated African breath-based psychotherapeutic workshops as compared with a waiting list control group of 41 people (Edwards 2009:81\u201398). In Yogic traditions, further One breath practice may be based on conscious experience related to the in-breath, outbreath and breath retention, respectively known in yoga as puraka, recaka, antara kumbhaka and bahya kumbhaka. From a physiological perspective, every out-breath is associated with the relaxing parasympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system and every in-breath to the stimulating sympathetic division. Therefore, longer out-breaths increase relaxation and longer in-breaths stimulation. This is extremely valuable experiential knowledge in regulating one's arousal and energy levels. Another example in the Transcendental Meditation tradition relates to apneustic breathing. Again, this is preceded by relaxed abdominal respiration. Although it can be done in any posture, again the best, initial way is to relax fully whilst lying on one's back (savasana) and focusing consciousness on diaphragmatic belly breathing until this becomes even and regular. Breath is the bridge between body and mind. Once the breath becomes stable and stilled, a calm state of mind is induced and it becomes possible to count heart beats in order to monitor length of inand out-breaths. Breathing rate is approximately one quarter that of heart rate. For enhanced relaxation, a good rule is to double the length of the outbreath in relation to the in-breath, whilst gradually slowing the breathing rate. After about 10 breath cycles at this rate, the pattern becomes automatic. Physiologically, this change is associated with decreasing central nervous and reticular arousal system activity as consciousness descends to the medullar region of the brain stem responsible for respiration, heart-rate and blood pressure. This increased relaxation associated with decreased respiration, heart rate and blood pressure is a valuable precursor for any form of meditation or prayer. http:\/\/www.hts.org.za Original Research DOI: 10.4102\/hts.v67i2.901 Page 5 of 7 Increasingly stressful human life-styles associated with contemporary existence on planet Earth will benefit greatly through daily 15 minute practice of such a breathing pattern, whether or not this is enhanced by further formal meditation or prayer. From this base, it becomes easy to practice the apneustic breath by simply slowing down the breathing further to 10 to 15 heart beats for both inand out-breaths, with or without very brief periods of breath retention and witnessing whatever arises in the consciousness. With increasing practice, the whole breathing, consciousness and experiential pattern will become automatic and deeper and more meaningful levels of consciousness will accrue. Extensive research with experienced meditators has conclusively established the health benefits of long term meditation (Wilber 2001, 2007). The value of even one long slow, silent, smooth breath is the basis of everyday popular wisdom as reflected in the Zulu phrase 'ukhukhokh umoya' ['take a deep breath' or 'take a breather']. It is important to make the distinction between an over-breath and the relaxed diaphragmatic breath. The former is associated with hyperventilation that can occur through stressful clavicular and thoracic breathing and the latter with what research has established as the relaxation response (Benson, Beary, & Carol 1974:37). Practicing in long, slow apneustic breathing will bring the associated deep, meaningful levels of conscious experience and realisation of states and stages of pure consciousness termed One Breath. One Breath is always available in infinite, eternal presence. Further, life-long practice in both still and moving forms may lead to its constant consciousness. For example, a still sitting form could include a transcendental meditation in siddhasana posture repeating a One Breath 'aum' mantra or a One Breath energy circulating microcosmic orbit meditation. One Breath practice is enhanced through various yogic or chi-gung standing postures. Moving practice may involve the cultivation of One Breath stillness in pure consciousness during the sun salutation (surya namaskar), Eight Brocades or Tai Chi. Finally, One breath extends beyond meditation and prayer in its ultimate reality. Communicating hope Examples of communicating hope abound in literature on breathing, meditation, prayer and healing. The seven quotations that follow have been chosen for their practical facility to respectively communicate healing, breath, meditation, pure consciousness, oneness, hope and love in any practical theology curriculum. They reflect various spiritual, wisdom and or religious traditions. Quotation 1 'Woza moya, woza moya' (African Indigenous Church (AIC) circular healing dance chant of 'come spirit, come spirit'). This quotation will be familiar to any AIC member as well as observers of AIC meetings wherever these are held: on mountains, at the sea or river. It is instructive in its revelation of ancestral consciousness with special reference to the Holy Spirit (Edwards 2009:81\u201398). Quotation 2 We give many names to God even though He is One. The same is true of energy. There is nuclear energy, electrical energy, muscular energy and mental energy. All these are vital energy or life energy, called in Sanskrit, pranic energy or simply, prana. Prana is called Chi in China and Ki in Japan. Some suggest that the nearest traditional concept of prana in the West is the Holy Spirit of Christianity, a sacred power that is both immanent and transcendent ... Prana is usually translated as breath, yet this is only one of its many manifestations. According to the Upanishads, it is the principle of life and consciousness. It is equated with the soul (Atman). It is the breath of life of all beings in the universe. They are born through it and live by it, and when they die their individual breath dissolves into the cosmic breath. It is the most essential, real and present feature of every moment of our lives and yet it remains the most mysterious. It is Yoga's job, and especially pranayama's, to enter onto the heart of this mystery. Prana in the form of breath is the starting point ... (Iyengar 2005:65\u201366) The value of this quotation lies in its clarity of interpretation with regard to both the physical energising effect of breath as a primary form of nourishment and relationship with the environment as well as a key to more subtle dimensions involved in meditative breathing as recognised in Hindu, Buddhist, Christian and other traditions. Quotation 3 I do a breathing technique, alternate nostril breathing, pranayama prior to meditation. When meditating I don't think about breathing at all \u2013 it actually stops in fact or settles to such an extent that sometimes you wonder if you are breathing. The breath is so fine. It is not a conscious effort to arrive at that state \u2013 its just a by product of relaxation. I like to meditate at least once a day. Meditation means a state of non-conditional peace. It is not linked to any particular doctrine experiences\u2013 by that I mean one loses a sense of boundaries\u2013 then after the meditation one feels very relaxed, positive and in tune with life. I started with a Transcendental Meditation group, was initiated by a teacher into the technique, who said it was free of religion and philosophy\u2013 the founder is a Hindu, so perceptions in the teaching of this technique are related to this world view. As your breath becomes finer \u2013 consciousness transcends itself. You slip beyond conscious thinking into 'eternity' or unity with the 'absolute'. That is the basis of the philosophythat there is an absolute reservoir of creativity and intelligence underlying material life. You only know that you have experienced it and cannot verbalise it \u2013 simply know that you have been 'there' a period has passed that you cannot count; it's an experience of bliss and sometimes it's only for a fraction of a second that you have dipped into it. You can't force it, it comes when you least expect it. You cannot anticipate its coming, but even if it does not happen, the type of psychic rest you obtain is quite extra-ordinary. It's been demonstrated here at university \u2013 for weeks when I don't meditate I get depressed. One just needs to meditate once and suddenly one's take on life improves. (University colleague, personal communication) This quotation by a university colleague succinctly communicates the value of a Hindu pranayama technique in eliciting psychological and spiritual transformations of consciousness. http:\/\/www.hts.org.za Original Research DOI: 10.4102\/hts.v67i1.2.901 Page 6 of 7 Quotation 4 that blessed mood In which the burthen of the mystery, In which the heavy and the weary weight, Of all this unintelligible world Is lightened:that serene and blessed mood, In which the affections gently lead us on Until the breath of this corporeal frame And even the motion of our human blood Almost suspended, we are laid asleep In body and become a living soul; While with an eye made quite by the power Of harmony and the deep power of joy, We see into the life of things... And I have felt A presence that disturbs me with the joy Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime Of something far more deeply infused Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns And the round ocean and the living air And the blue sky and in the mind of man A motion and a spirit that impels all thinking things All objects of all thought And rolls through all things (Wordsworth's 'Lines composed a few miles above Tintern Abbey on Revisiting the Banks of the Wye during a Tour') Wordsworth's poem in this quotation are often used as examples of pure consciousness in the transcendental meditative traditions, as well as a form of nature mysticism that may facilitate deity, causal and non-dual consciousness transformations (Travis & Pearson 2000:77\u201389; Wilber 2000:14, 2007:93). Quotation 5 I pray also for those who will believe in me through their message, that all of them may be one, Father, just as you are in me and I am in you. May they also be in us so that the world may believe that that you have sent me. I have given them the glory that you gave me, that they may be one as we are one. I in them and you in me. May they be brought to complete unity to let the world know that you sent me and have loved them even as you have loved me. (Jn 17:20) This quotation from St John's gospel immediately conveys Jesus' apprehension of and union with God, the Father, through original Christian contemplative and intercessory prayer. Quotation 6 May the God of hope fill you with all joy and peace as you trust in him, so that you may overflow with hope by the power of the Holy Spirit. (Rm 15:13) Paul's letters in this and the following quotations are often used in Christian circles for their practical facility to directly reveal the communication of hope and related states of consciousness and experiences such as trust, faith, integrity and love. Quotation 7 'And now these three remain: faith, hope and love. But the greatest of these is love' (1 Cor 13:13). Conclusion The intention and vision of this article is an ancient one, as implied in all the time-honoured spiritual wisdom and healing traditions. The practical theological mission and message is one of personal and transpersonal transformation of consciousness through breath control, meditation and prayer in order to transform and heal society and cosmos. The ensuing communication of hope is an essential foundation for such transformation. Hope is defined as a state of consciousness, which implies that the most favourable states of consciousness realise optimal experiences of hope and create the most advantageous conditions for its communication. The aim was that the text reflexively communicates and the reader apprehends, the vast theoretical scope and direct experiential value of including some form of breath based meditative, contemplative and\/or intercessory praxis in the curricula of practical theology. During deep relaxation, breath control, meditation and prayer, the breath becomes increasingly slow, soft, silent, smooth, stilled and stable until there is the experience of being breathed by one original Breath. Although ultimately beyond language, logic or numbers, this non-dual experience is one of pure, transcendent, cosmic and\/or unity consciousness, profound relaxation, unbounded awareness and empty, luminous energy of the primordial Spirit as revealed in the various examples given above. Whilst it is recognised that such experience may simply refer to a transitory state of consciousness, the evidence from various spiritual healing and psychotherapeutic traditions is that one authentic glimpse of pure consciousness can lead to profound healing effects. It also typically leads to ongoing spiritual practice and further, deeper, more meaningful stages of hope through personal, social and cosmic transformation and healing. Although breath control alone can achieve wonders, the effect is amplified through further contemplative and intercessory meditation, prayer and related healing action which will differ between people, groups and contexts. For example, ancestral breathing may include memorial to family members in an extended link going back to the First Cosmic Breath of Creation. People of Muslim faith might focus on nafs progression and Allah. Christian breathing might include the Trinity of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, accompanied by images of Light, Love and Life. Buddhist breathing could involve meditation in clearing the mind to pure emptiness and beyond, possibly followed by a Lovingkindness meditation. People of Taoist persuasion could focus on the Way of harmonising the powers of heaven, earth and humanity. In addition to the generation of such experiences as hope and love, conscious One Breath practice typically leads to helpful http:\/\/www.hts.org.za Original Research DOI: 10.4102\/hts.v67i2.901 actions on behalf of other people and the environment at large. Such practice inevitably leads to hope for all sentient beings on planet Earth and the cosmos for the foreseeable future, because knowledge becomes conscious that each breath is a link to what has been called many names: God, the Absolute, Brahmin, Tao, Allah; of that reality which was, is and will be for ever. This One Breath is infinitely available. References Benson, H., Beary, J.F. & Carol, M.P., 1974, 'The relaxation response', Psychiatry, Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Processes 37(1), 37\u221246. Corsini, R.J., 1989, Current psychotherapies, F.E. Peacock, Itasca, IL. Edwards, S.D., 2008, 'Breath psychology: fundamentals and applications', Psychology and Developing Societies 20(2), 131\u2212164. 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+{"meta":{"title":"The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity","type":"info:eu-repo\/semantics\/article","creator":"Russell, Jason","subject":"Philosophy","date":"2019","identifier":"oai:philarchive.org\/rec\/RUSTCO-30","description":"The new narcissist is haunted not by guilt but by anxiety. He seeks not to inflict his own certainties on others but to find a meaning in life. Liberated from the superstitions of the past, he doubts even the reality of his own existence. Superficially relaxed and tolerant, he finds little use for dogmas of racial and ethnic purity but at the same time forfeits the security of group loyalties and regards everyone as a rival for the favors conferred by a paternalistic state. His sexual attitudes are permissive rather than puritanical, even though his emancipation from ancient taboos brings him no sexual peace. Fiercely competitive in his demand for approval and acclaim, he distrusts competition because he associates it unconsciously with an unbridled urge to destroy. Hence he repudiates the competitive ideologies that flourished at an earlier stage of capitalist development and distrusts even their limited expression in sports and games. He extols cooperation and teamwork while harboring deeply antisocial impulses. He praises respect for rules and regulations in the secret belief that they do not apply to himself. 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He seeks not to inflict his own certainties on others but to find a meaning in life. Liberated from the superstitions of the past, he doubts even the reality of his own existence. Superficially relaxed and tolerant, he finds little use for dogmas of racial and ethnic purity but at the same time forfeits the security of group loyalties and regards everyone as a rival for the favors conferred by a paternalistic state. His sexual attitudes are permissive rather than puritanical, even though his emancipation from ancient taboos brings him no sexual peace. Fiercely competitive in his demand for approval and acclaim, he distrusts competition because he associates it unconsciously with an unbridled urge to destroy. Hence he repudiates the competitive ideologies that flourished at an earlier stage of capitalist development and distrusts even their limited expression in sports and games. He extols cooperation and teamwork while harboring deeply antisocial impulses. He praises respect for rules and regulations in the secret belief that they do not apply to himself. Acquisitive in the sense that his cravings have no limits, he does not accumulate goods and provisions against the future, in the manner of the acquisitive individualist of nineteenth-century political economy, but demands immediate gratification and lives in a state of restless, perpetually unsatisfied desire. Keyword: The Culture of Narcissism; Language; Identity; Social Science; Introduction \"A characteristic of our times is the predominance, even in groups traditionally selective, of the mass and the vulgar. Thus, in intellectual life, which of its essence requires and presupposes qualification, one can note the progressive triumph of the pseudo-intellectual, unqualified, unqualifiable...\" (Wildavsky, 2018). Can Science be passionate? This question seems to sum up the life of Christopher Lasch, erstwhile a historian of culture later transmogrified into 2 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity an ersatz prophet of doom and consolation, a latter day Jeremiah. Judging by his (prolific and eloquent) output, the answer is a resounding no. There is no single Lasch. This chronicler of culture, did so mainly by chronicling his inner turmoil, conflicting ideas and ideologies, emotional upheavals, and intellectual vicissitudes. In this sense, of (courageous) self-documentation, Mr. Lasch epitomized Narcissism, was the quintessential Narcissist, the better positioned to criticize the phenomenon. Some \"scientific\" disciplines (e.g., the history of culture and History in general) are closer to art than to the rigorous (a.k.a. \"exact\" or \"natural\" or \"physical\" sciences). Lasch borrowed heavily from other, more established branches of knowledge without paying tribute to the original, strict meaning of concepts and terms. Such was the use that he made of \"Narcissism\". \"Narcissism\" is a relatively well-defined psychological term. I expound upon it elsewhere (\"Malignant self Love Narcissism Re-Visited\"). The Narcissistic Personality Disorder the acute form of pathological Narcissism is the name given to a group of 9 symptoms (see: DSM-4). They include: a grandiose Self (illusions of grandeur coupled with an inflated, unrealistic sense of the Self), inability to empathize with the Other, the tendency to exploit and manipulate others, idealization of other people (in cycles of idealization and devaluation), rage attacks and so on. Narcissism, therefore, has a clear clinical definition, etiology and prognosis. The use that Lasch makes of this word has nothing to do with its usage in psychopathology. True, Lasch did his best to sound \"medicinal\". He spoke of \"(national) malaise\" and accused the American society of lack of self-awareness. But choice of words does not a coherence make. Findings and Discussion Analytic Summary of Kimball Lasch was a member, by conviction, of an imaginary \"Pure Left\". This turned out to be a code for an odd mixture of Marxism, religious fundamentalism, populism, Freudian analysis, conservatism and any other -ism that Lasch happened to come across. Intellectual consistency was not Lasch's strong point, but this is excusable, even commendable in the search for Truth. What is not excusable is the passion and conviction with which Lasch imbued the advocacy of each of these consecutive and mutually exclusive ideas. 3 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity \"The Culture of Narcissism American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations\" was published in the last year of the unhappy presidency of Jimmy Carter (1979). The latter endorsed the book publicly (in his famous \"national malaise\" speech). The main thesis of the book is that the Americans have created a self-absorbed (though not self aware), greedy and frivolous society which depended on consumerism, demographic studies, opinion polls and Government to know and to define itself. What is the solution? Lasch proposed a \"return to basics\": self-reliance, the family, nature, the community, and the Protestant work ethic. To those who adhere, he promised an elimination of their feelings of alienation and despair. The apparent radicalism (the pursuit of social justice and equality) was only that: apparent. The New Left was morally self-indulgent. In an Orwellian manner, liberation became tyranny and transcendence irresponsibility. The \"democratization\" of education: \"...has neither improved popular understanding of modern society, raised the quality of popular culture, nor reduced the gap between wealth and poverty, which remains as wide as ever. On the other hand, it has contributed to the decline of critical thought and the erosion of intellectual standards, forcing us to consider the possibility that mass education, as conservatives have argued all along, is intrinsically incompatible with the maintenance of educational standards\". Lasch derided capitalism, consumerism and corporate America as much as he loathed the mass media, the government and even the welfare system (intended to deprive its clients of their moral responsibility and indoctrinate them as victims of social circumstance). These always remained the villains. But to this classically leftist list he added the New Left. He bundled the two viable alternatives in American life and discarded them both. Anyhow, capitalism's days were numbered, a contradictory system as it was, resting on \"imperialism, racism, elitism, and inhuman acts of technological destruction\". What was left except God and the Family? Lasch was deeply anti-capitalist. He rounded up the usual suspects with the prime suspect being multinationals. To him, it wasn't only a question of exploitation of the working masses. Capitalism acted as acid on the social and moral fabrics and made them disintegrate. Lasch adopted, at times, a theological perception of capitalism as an evil, demonic entity. Zeal usually leads to inconsistency of argumentation: Lasch claimed, for instance, that capitalism negated 4 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity social and moral traditions while pandering to the lowest common denominator. There is a contradiction here: social mores and traditions are, in many cases, THE lowest common denominator. Lasch displayed a total lack of understanding of market mechanisms and the history of markets. True, markets start out as mass-oriented and entrepreneurs tend to massproduce to cater to the needs of the newfound consumers. However, as markets evolve they fragment. Individual nuances of tastes and preferences tend to transform the mature market from a cohesive, homogenous entity to a loose coalition of niches. Computer aided design and production, targeted advertising, custom made products, personal services are all the outcomes of the maturation of markets. It is where capitalism is absent that uniform mass production of goods of shoddy quality takes over. This may have been Lasch's biggest fault: that he persistently and wrong-headedly ignored reality when it did not serve his pet theorizing. He made up his mind and did not wish to be confused by the facts. The facts are that all the alternatives to the known four models of capitalism (the Anglo-Saxon, the European, the Japanese and the Chinese) have failed miserably and have led to the very consequences that Lasch warned against... in capitalism. It is in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc, that social solidarity has evaporated, that traditions were trampled upon, that religion was brutally suppressed, that pandering to the lowest common denominator was official policy, that poverty material, intellectual and spiritual became all pervasive, that people lost all self reliance and communities disintegrated. There is nothing to excuse Lasch: the Wall fell in 1989. An inexpensive trip would have confronted him with the results of the alternatives to capitalism. That he failed to acknowledge his life-long misconceptions and compile the Lasch errata cum mea culpa is the sign of deepseated intellectual dishonesty. The man was not interested in the truth. In many respects, he was a propagandist. Worse, he combined an amateurish understanding of the Economic Sciences with the fervor of a fundamentalist preacher to produce an absolutely non-scientific discourse. Let us analyze what he regarded as the basic weakness of capitalism (in \"The True and Only Heaven\", 1991): its need to increase capacity and production ad infinitum in order to sustain itself. Such a feature would have been destructive if capitalism were to operate in a closed system. The finiteness of the economic sphere would have brought capitalism to ruin. But the world is NOT a closed economic system. 80,000,000 new consumers are added 5 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity annually, markets globalize, trade barriers are falling, international trade is growing three times faster than the world's GDP and still accounts for less than 15% of it, not to mention space exploration which is at its inception. The horizon is, for all practical purposes, unlimited. The economic system is, therefore, open. Capitalism will never be defeated because it has an infinite number of consumers and markets to colonize. That is not to say that capitalism will not have its crises, even crises of over-capacity. But such crises are a part of the business cycle not of the underlying market mechanism. They are adjustment pains, the noises of growing up not the last gasps of dying. To claim otherwise is either to deceive or to be spectacularly ignorant not only of economic fundamentals but of what is happening in the world. It is as intellectually rigorous as the \"New Paradigm\" which says, in effect, that the business cycle and inflation are both dead and buried. Lasch's argument: capitalism must forever expand if it is to exist (debatable) hence the idea of \"progress\", an ideological corollary of the drive to expand progress transforms people into insatiable consumers (apparently, a term of abuse). But this is to ignore the fact that people create economic doctrines (and reality, according to Marx) not the reverse. In other words, the consumers created capitalism to help them maximize their consumption. History is littered with the remains of economic theories, which did not match the psychological makeup of the human race. There is Marxism, for instance. The best theorized, most intellectually rich and well-substantiated theory must be put to the cruel test of public opinion and of the real conditions of existence. Barbarous amounts of force and coercion need to be applied to keep people functioning under contra-human-nature ideologies such as communism. A horde of what Althusser calls Ideological State Apparatuses must be put to work to preserve the dominion of a religion, ideology, or intellectual theory which do not amply respond to the needs of the individuals that comprise society. The Socialist (more so the Marxist and the malignant version, the Communist) prescriptions were eradicated because they did not correspond to the OBJECTIVE conditions of the world. They were hermetically detached, and existed only in their mythical, contradiction-free realm (to borrow again from Althusser). Lasch commits the double intellectual crime of disposing of the messenger AND ignoring the message: people are consumers and there is nothing we can do about it but try to present to them as wide an array as possible of goods and services. High brow and low brow have their 6 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity place in capitalism because of the preservation of the principle of choice, which Lasch abhors. He presents a false predicament: he who elects progress elects meaninglessness and hopelessness. Is it better asks Lasch sanctimoniously to consume and live in these psychological conditions of misery and emptiness? The answer is self evident, according to him. Lasch patronizingly prefers the working class undertones commonly found in the petite bourgeois: \"its moral realism, its understanding that everything has its price, its respect for limits, its skepticism about progress... sense of unlimited power conferred by science the intoxicating prospect of man's conquest of the natural world\". The limits that Lasch is talking about are metaphysical, theological. Man's rebellion against God is in question. This, in Lasch's view, is a punishable offence. Both capitalism and science are pushing the limits, infused with the kind of hubris which the mythological Gods always chose to penalize (remember Prometheus?). What more can be said about a man that postulated that \"the secret of happiness lies in renouncing the right to be happy\". Some matters are better left to psychiatrists than to philosophers. There is megalomania, too: Lasch cannot grasp how could people continue to attach importance to money and other worldly goods and pursuits after his seminal works were published, denouncing materialism for what it was a hollow illusion? The conclusion: people are ill informed, egotistical, stupid (because they succumb to the lure of consumerism offered to them by politicians and corporations). America is in an \"age of diminishing expectations\" (Lasch's). Happy people are either weak or hypocritical. Lasch envisioned a communitarian society, one where men are self made and the State is gradually made redundant. This is a worthy vision and a vision worthy of some other era. Lasch never woke up to the realities of the late 20th century: mass populations concentrated in sprawling metropolitan areas, market failures in the provision of public goods, the gigantic tasks of introducing literacy and good health to vast swathes of the planet, an ever increasing demand for evermore goods and services. Small, self-help communities are not efficient enough to survive though the ethical aspect is praiseworthy: \"Democracy works best when men and women do things for themselves, with the help of their friends and neighbors, instead of depending on the state.\" - \"A misplaced compassion degrades both the victims, who are reduced to objects of pity, and their would-be benefactors, who find it easier to pity their fellow citizens than to hold them up to impersonal standards, 7 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity attainment of which would entitle them to respect. Unfortunately, such statements do not tell the whole.\" No wonder that Lasch has been compared to Mathew Arnold who wrote: \"(culture) does not try to teach down to the level of inferior classes; ...It seeks to do away with classes; to make the best that has been thought and known in the world current everywhere... the men of culture are the true apostles of equality. The great men of culture are those who have had a passion for diffusing, for making prevail, for carrying from one end of society to the other, the best knowledge, the best ideas of their time.\" Culture and Anarchy a Quite Elitist View Unfortunately, Lasch, most of the time, was no more original or observant than the average columnist: \"The mounting evidence of widespread inefficiency and corruption, the decline of American productivity, the pursuit of speculative profits at the expense of manufacturing, the deterioration of our country's material infrastructure, the squalid conditions in our crime-ridden cities, the alarming and disgraceful growth of poverty, and the widening disparity between poverty and wealth ... growing contempt for manual labor... growing gulf between wealth and poverty... the growing insularity of the elites... growing impatience with the constraints imposed by long-term responsibilities and commitments.\" Paradoxically, Lasch was an elitist. The very person who attacked the \"talking classes\" (the \"symbolic analysts\" in Robert Reich's less successful rendition) freely railed against the \"lowest common denominator\". True, Lasch tried to reconcile this apparent contradiction by saying that diversity does not entail low standards or selective application of criteria. This, however, tends to undermine his arguments against capitalism. In his typical, anachronistic, language: 8 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity \"The latest variation on this familiar theme, its reductio ad absurdum, is that a respect for cultural diversity forbids us to impose the standards of privileged groups on the victims of oppression.\" This leads to \"universal incompetence\" and a weakness of the spirit: \"Impersonal virtues like fortitude, workmanship, moral courage, honesty, and respect for adversaries (are rejected by the champions of diversity)... Unless we are prepared to make demands on one another, we can enjoy only the most rudimentary kind of common life... (agreed standards) are absolutely indispensable to a democratic society (because) double standards mean second-class citizenship.\" This is almost plagiarism. Allan Bloom (\"The Closing of the American Mind\"): \"(openness became trivial) ...Openness used to be the virtue that permitted us to seek the good by using reason. It now means accepting everything and denying reason's power. The unrestrained and thoughtless pursuit of openness ... has rendered openness meaningless.\" Lasch: \"...moral paralysis of those who value 'openness' above all (democracy is more than) openness and toleration... In the absence of common standards... tolerance becomes indifference.\" \"Open Mind\" becomes: \"Empty Mind\". Lasch observed that America has become a culture of excuses (for self and the \"disadvantaged\"), of protected judicial turf conquered through litigation (a.k.a. \"rights\"), of neglect of responsibilities. Free speech is restricted by fear of offending potential audiences. We confuse respect (which must be earned) with toleration and appreciation, discriminating judgement with indiscriminate acceptance, and turning the blind eye. Fair and well. Political correctness has indeed degenerated into moral incorrectness and plain numbness. 9 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity But why is the proper exercise of democracy dependent upon the devaluation of money and markets? Why is luxury \"morally repugnant\" and how can this be PROVEN rigorously, formal logically? Lasch does not opine he informs. What he says has immediate truth-value, is non-debatable, and intolerant. Consider this passage, which came out of the pen of an intellectual tyrant: \"...the difficulty of limiting the influence of wealth suggests that wealth itself needs to be limited... a democratic society cannot allow unlimited accumulation... a moral condemnation of great wealth... backed up with effective political action... at least a rough approximation of economic equality... in the old days (Americans agreed that people should not have) far in excess of their needs.\" Lasch failed to realize that democracy and wealth formation are two sides of the SAME coin. That democracy is not likely to spring forth, nor is it likely to survive poverty or total economic equality. The confusion of the two ideas (material equality and political equality) is common: it is the result of centuries of plutocracy (only wealthy people had the right to vote, universal suffrage is very recent). The great achievement of democracy in the 20th century was to separate these two aspects: to combine egalitarian political access with an unequal distribution of wealth. Still, the existence of wealth no matter how distributed is a precondition. Without it there will never be real democracy. Wealth generates the leisure needed to obtain education and to participate in community matters. Put differently, when one is hungry one is less prone to read Mr. Lasch, less inclined to think about civil rights, let alone exercise them. Mr. Lasch is authoritarian and patronizing, even when he is strongly trying to convince us otherwise. The use of the phrase: \"far in excess of their needs\" rings of destructive envy. Worse, it rings of a dictatorship, a negation of individualism, a restriction of civil liberties, an infringement on human rights, anti-liberalism at its worst. Who is to decide what is wealth, how much of it constitutes excess, how much is \"far in excess\" and, above all, what are the needs of the person deemed to be in excess? Which state commissariat will do the job? Would Mr. Lasch have volunteered to phrase the guidelines and if so, which criteria would he have applied? Eighty percent (80%) of the population of the world would have considered Mr. Lasch's wealth 10 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity to be far in excess of his needs. Mr. Lasch is prone to inaccuracies. Read Alexis de Tocqueville (1835): \"I know of no country where the love of money has taken stronger hold on the affections of men and where a profounder contempt is expressed for the theory of the permanent equality of property... the passions that agitate the Americans most deeply are not their political but their commercial passions... They prefer the good sense which amasses large fortunes to that enterprising genius which frequently dissipates them.\" In his book: \"The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy\" (published posthumously in 1996) Lasch bemoans a divided society, a degraded public discourse, a social and political crisis, that is really a spiritual crisis. The book's title is modeled after Jose Ortega y Gasset's \"Revolt of the Masses\" in which he described the forthcoming political domination of the masses as a major cultural catastrophe. The old ruling elites were the storehouses of all that's good, including all civic virtues, he explained. The masses warned Ortega y Gasset, prophetically will act directly and even outside the law in what he called a hyperdemocracy. They will impose themselves on the other classes. The masses harbored a feeling of omnipotence: they had unlimited rights, history was on their side (they were \"the spoiled child of human history\" in his language), they were exempt from submission to superiors because they regarded themselves as the source of all authority. They faced an unlimited horizon of possibilities and they were entitled to everything at any time. Their whims, wishes and desires constituted the new law of the earth. Lasch just ingeniously reversed the argument. The same characteristics, he said, are to be found in today's elites, \"those who control the international flow of money and information, preside over philanthropic foundations and institutions of higher learning, manage the instruments of cultural production and thus set the terms of public debate\". But they are self appointed, they represent none but themselves. The lower middle classes were much more conservative and stable than their \"self appointed spokesmen and would-be liberators\". They know the limits and that there are limits, they have sound political instincts: \"...favor limits on abortion, cling to the two-parent family as a source of stability in a turbulent world, resist experiments with 11 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity 'alternative lifestyles', and harbor deep reservations about affirmative action and other ventures in largescale social engineering.\" And who purports to represent them? The mysterious \"elite\" which, as we find out, is nothing but a code word for the likes of Lasch. In Lasch's world Armageddon is unleashed between the people and this specific elite. What about the political, military, industrial, business and other elites? Yok. What about conservative intellectuals who support what the middle classes do and \"have deep reservations about affirmative action\" (to quote him)? Aren't they part of the elite? No answer. So why call it \"elite\" and not \"liberal intellectuals\"? A matter of (lack) of integrity. The members of this fake elite are hypochondriacs, obsessed with death, narcissistic and weaklings. A scientific description based on thorough research, no doubt. Even if such a horror-movie elite did exist what would have been its role? Did he suggest an elite-less pluralistic, modern, technology-driven, essentially (for better or for worse) capitalistic democratic society? Others have dealt with this question seriously and sincerely: Arnold, T.S. Elliot (\"Notes towards the Definition of Culture\"). Reading Lasch is an absolute waste of time when compared to their studies. The man is so devoid of self-awareness (no pun intended) that he calls himself \"a stern critic of nostalgia\". If there is one word with which it is possible to summarize his life's work it is nostalgia (to a world which never existed: a world of national and local loyalties, almost no materialism, savage nobleness, communal responsibility for the Other). In short, to an Utopia compared to the dystopia that is America. The pursuit of a career and of specialized, narrow, expertise, he called a \"cult\" and \"the antithesis of democracy\". Yet, he was a member of the \"elite\" which he so chastised and the publication of his tirades enlisted the work of hundreds of careerists and experts. He extolled self-reliance but ignored the fact that it was often employed in the service of wealth formation and material accumulation. Were there two kinds of self-reliance one to be condemned because of its results? Was there any human activity devoid of a dimension of wealth creation? Therefore, are all human activities (except those required for survival) to cease? Lasch identified emerging elites of professionals and managers, a cognitive elite, manipulators of symbols, a threat to \"real\" democracy. Reich described them as trafficking in 12 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity information, manipulating words and numbers for a living. They live in an abstract world in which information and expertise are valuable commodities in an international market. No wonder the privileged classes are more interested in the fate of the global system than in their neighborhood, country, or region. They are estranged, they \"remove themselves from common life\". They are heavily invested in social mobility. The new meritocracy made professional advancement and the freedom to make money \"the overriding goal of social policy\". They are fixated on finding opportunities and they democratize competence. This, said Lasch, betrayed the American dream!?: \"The reign of specialized expertise is the antithesis of democracy as it was understood by those who saw this country as 'The last best hope of Earth'.\" For Lasch citizenship did not mean equal access to economic competition. It meant a shared participation in a common political dialogue (in a common life). The goal of escaping the \"laboring classes\" was deplorable. The real aim should be to ground the values and institutions of democracy in the inventiveness, industry, self-reliance and self-respect of workers. The \"talking classes\" brought the public discourse into decline. Instead of intelligently debating issues, they engaged in ideological battles, dogmatic quarrels, name-calling. The debate grew less public, more esoteric and insular. There are no \"third places\", civic institutions which \"promote general conversation across class lines\". So, social classes are forced to \"speak to themselves in a dialect... inaccessible to outsiders\". The media establishment is more committed to \"a misguided ideal of objectivity\" than to context and continuity, which underlie any meaningful public discourse. The spiritual crisis was another matter altogether. This was simply the result of oversecularization. The secular worldview is devoid of doubts and insecurities, explained Lasch. Thus, single-handedly, he eliminated modern science, which is driven by constant doubts, insecurities and questioning and by an utter lack of respect for authority, transcendental as it may be. With amazing gall, Lasch says that it was religion which provided a home for spiritual uncertainties!!! Religion writes Lasch was a source of higher meaning, a repository of practical moral wisdom. Minor matters such as the suspension of curiosity, doubt and disbelief entailed by religious practice and the blood-saturated history of all religions these are not mentioned. Why spoil a good argument? 13 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity The new elites disdain religion and are hostile to it: \"The culture of criticism is understood to rule out religious commitments... (religion) was something useful for weddings and funerals but otherwise dispensable.\" Without the benefit of a higher ethic provided by religion (for which the price of suppression of free thought is paid SV) the knowledge elites resort to cynicism and revert to irreverence. \"The collapse of religion, its replacement by the remorselessly critical sensibility exemplified by psychoanalysis and the degeneration of the 'analytic attitude' into an all out assault on ideals of every kind have left our culture in a sorry state.\" Lasch was a fanatic religious man. He would have rejected this title with vehemence. But he was the worst type: unable to commit himself to the practice while advocating its employment by others. If you asked him why was religion good, he would have waxed on concerning its good RESULTS. He said nothing about the inherent nature of religion, its tenets, its view of Mankind's destiny, or anything else of substance. Lasch was a social engineer of the derided Marxist type: if it works, if it molds the masses, if it keeps them \"in limits\", subservient use it. Religion worked wonders in this respect. But Lasch himself was above his own laws he even made it a point not to write God with a capital \"G\", an act of outstanding \"courage\". Schiller wrote about the \"disenchantment of the world\", the disillusionment which accompanies secularism a real sign of true courage, according to Nietzsche. Religion is a powerful weapon in the arsenal of those who want to make people feel good about themselves, their lives and the world, in general. Not so Lasch: \"...the spiritual discipline against self-righteousness is the very essence of religion... (anyone with) a proper understanding of religion... (would not regard it as) a source of intellectual and emotional security (but as) ...a challenge to complacency and pride.\" There is no hope or consolation even in religion. It is good only for the purposes of social engineering. 14 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity The New Radicalism in America In this particular respect, Lasch has undergone a major transformation. In \"The New Radicalism in America\" (1965), he decried religion as a source of obfuscation. \"The religious roots of the progressive doctrine\" he wrote were the source of \"its main weakness\". These roots fostered an antiintellectual willingness to use education \"as a means of social control\" rather than as a basis for enlightenment. The solution was to blend Marxism and the analytic method of Psychoanalysis (very much as Herbert Marcuse has done q.v. \"Eros and Civilization\" and \"One Dimensional Man\"). In an earlier work (\"American Liberals and the Russian Revolution\", 1962) he criticized liberalism for seeking \"painless progress towards the celestial city of consumerism\". He questioned the assumption that \"men and women wish only to enjoy life with minimum effort\". The liberal illusions about the Revolution were based on a theological misconception. Communism remained irresistible for \"as long as they clung to the dream of an earthly paradise from which doubt was forever banished\". In 1973, a mere decade later, the tone is different (\"The World of Nations\", 1973). The assimilation of the Mormons, he says, was \"achieved by sacrificing whatever features of their doctrine or ritual were demanding or difficult... (like) the conception of a secular community organized in accordance with religious principles\". The wheel turned a full cycle in 1991 (\"The True and Only Heaven: Progress and its Critics\"). The petite bourgeois at least are \"unlikely to mistake the promised land of progress for the true and only heaven\". In \"Heaven in a Heartless world\" (1977) Lasch criticized the \"substitution of medical and psychiatric authority for the authority of parents, priests and lawgivers\". The Progressives, he complained, identify social control with freedom. It is the traditional family not the socialist revolution which provides the best hope to arrest \"new forms of domination\". There is latent strength in the family and in its \"old fashioned middle class morality\". Thus, the decline of the family institution meant the decline of romantic love (!?) and of \"transcendent ideas in general\", a typical Laschian leap of logic. 15 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity Even art and religion (\"The Culture of Narcissism\", 1979), \"historically the great emancipators from the prison of the Self... even sex... (lost) the power to provide an imaginative release\". It was Schopenhauer who wrote that art is a liberating force, delivering us from our miserable, decrepit, dilapidated Selves and transforming our conditions of existence. Lasch forever a melancholy adopted this view enthusiastically. He supported the suicidal pessimism of Schopenhauer. But he was also wrong. Never before was there an art form more liberating than the cinema, THE art of illusion. The Internet introduced a transcendental dimension into the lives of all its users. Why is it that transcendental entities must be white-bearded, paternal and authoritarian? What is less transcendental in the Global Village, in the Information Highway or, for that matter, in Steven Spielberg? The Left, thundered Lasch, had \"chosen the wrong side in the cultural warfare between 'Middle America' and the educated or half educated classes, which have absorbed avant-garde ideas only to put them at the service of consumer capitalism\". In \"The Minimal Self\" (1984) the insights of traditional religion remained vital as opposed to the waning moral and intellectual authority of Marx, Freud and the like. The meaningfulness of mere survival is questioned: \"Self affirmation remains a possibility precisely to the degree that an older conception of personality, rooted in Judeo-Christian traditions, has persisted alongside a behavioral or therapeutic conception\". \"Democratic Renewal\" will be made possible through this mode of selfaffirmation. The world was rendered meaningless by experiences such as Auschwitz, a \"survival ethic\" was the unwelcome result. But, to Lasch, Auschwitz offered \"the need for a renewal of religious faith... for collective commitment to decent social conditions... (the survivors) found strength in the revealed word of an absolute, objective and omnipotent creator... not in personal 'values' meaningful only to themselves\". One can't help being fascinated by the total disregard for facts displayed by Lasch, flying in the face of logotherapy and the writings of Victor Frankel, the Auschwitz survivor. \"In the history of civilization... vindictive gods give way to gods who show mercy as well and uphold the morality of loving your enemy. Such a morality has never achieved anything like general popularity, but it lives on, even in our own, enlightened age, as a reminder both of our fallen state and of our surprising capacity 16 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity for gratitude, remorse and forgiveness by means of which we now and then transcend it.\" He goes on to criticize the kind of \"progress\" whose culmination is a \"vision of men and women released from outward constraints\". Endorsing the legacies of Jonathan Edwards, Orestes Brownson, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Thomas Carlyle, William James, Reinhold Niebuhr and, above all, Martin Luther King, he postulated an alternative tradition, \"The Heroic Conception of Life\" (an admixture of Brownson's Catholic Radicalism and early republican lore): \"...a suspicion that life was not worth living unless it was lived with ardour, energy and devotion\". A truly democratic society will incorporate diversity and a shared commitment to it but not as a goal unto itself. Rather as means to a \"demanding, morally elevating standard of conduct\". In sum: \"Political pressure for a more equitable distribution of wealth can come only from movements fired with religious purpose and a lofty conception of life\". The alternative, progressive optimism, cannot withstand adversity: \"The disposition properly described as hope, trust or wonder... three names for the same state of heart and mind asserts the goodness of life in the face of its limits. It cannot be deflated by adversity\". This disposition is brought about by religious ideas (which the Progressives discarded): \"The power and majesty of the sovereign creator of life, the inescapability of evil in the form of natural limits on human freedom, the sinfulness of man's rebellion against those limits; the moral value of work which once signifies man's submission to necessity and enables him to transcend it...\" Martin Luther King was a great man because \"(He) also spoke the language of his own people (in addition to addressing the whole nation SV), which incorporated their experience of hardship and exploitation, yet affirmed the rightness of a world full of unmerited hardship... (he drew strength from) a popular religious tradition whose mixture of hope and fatalism was quite alien to liberalism\". Lasch said that this was the First deadly Sin of the civil rights movement. It insisted that racial issues be tackled \"with arguments drawn from modern sociology and from the scientific refutation of social porejudice\" and not on moral (read: religious) grounds. 17 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity So, what is left to provide us with guidance? Opinion polls. Lasch failed to explain to us why he demonized this particular phenomenon. Polls are mirrors and the conduct of polls is an indication that the public (whose opinion is polled) is trying to get to know itself better. Polls are an attempt at quantified, statistical self-awareness (nor are they a modern phenomenon). Lasch should have been happy: at last proof that Americans adopted his views and decided to know themselves. To have criticized this particular instrument of \"know thyself\" implied that Lasch believed that he had privileged access to more information of superior quality or that he believed that his observations tower over the opinions of thousands of respondents and carry more weight. A trained observer would never have succumbed to such vanity. There is a fine line between vanity and oppression, fanaticism and the grief that is inflicted upon those that are subjected to it. Conclusion This is Lasch's greatest error: there is an abyss between narcissism and self love, being interested in oneself and being obsessively preoccupied with oneself. Lasch confuses the two. The price of progress is growing self-awareness and with it growing pains and the pains of growing up. It is not a loss of meaning and hope it is just that pain has a tendency to push everything to the background. Those are constructive pains, signs of adjustment and adaptation, of evolution. America has no inflated, megalomaniac, grandiose ego. It never built an overseas empire, it is made of dozens of ethnic immigrant groups, it strives to learn, to emulate. Americans do not lack empathy they are the foremost nation of volunteers and also professes the biggest number of (tax deductible) donation makers. Americans are not exploitative they are hard workers, fair players, Adam Smith-ian egoists. They believe in Live and Let Live. They are individualists and they believe that the individual is the source of all authority and the universal yardstick and benchmark. This is a positive philosophy. Granted, it led to inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth. But then other ideologies had much worse outcomes. Luckily, they were defeated by the human spirit, the best manifestation of which is still democratic capitalism. The clinical term \"Narcissism\" was abused by Lasch in his books. It joined other words mistreated by this social preacher. The respect that this man gained in his lifetime (as a social scientist and historian of culture) makes one wonder whether he was right in criticizing the shallowness and lack of intellectual rigor of American society and of its elites. References 18 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity Bloom, A. (2008). Closing of the American mind. Simon and Schuster. BRADY, J. (2019). CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF BEING IN LA MUJER LOCA BY JUAN JOS\u00c9 MILL\u00c1S: HOW LANGUAGE SEEKS TO NORMALIZE ILIVING AT THE LIMITS. Disability in Spanish-speaking and US Chicano Contexts: Critical and Artistic Perspectives, 46. Braun, J. (2019). The Present Relevance of Christopher Lasch's The Culture of Narcissism for Studying the Sociology of Morality. The American Sociologist, 1-16. Dewi, E. W., Nurkamto, J., & Drajati, N. A. (2019). EXPLORING PEER-ASSESSMENT PRACTICE IN GRADUATE STUDENTS'ACADEMIC WRITING. LLT Journal: A Journal on Language and Language Teaching, 22(1), 58-65. Dickhaus, J., Brown, K. A., Ferrucci, P., & Anderson, M. L. (2019). AND THE AWARD GOES TO: EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF THE\" TROPHY CULTURE\" ON MILLENNIALS. Journal of Contemporary Athletics, 13(1), 39-51. Habibi, H. (2018). PROTECTING NATIONAL IDENTITY BASED ON THE VALUE OF NATION LOCAL WISDOM. International Journal of Malay-Nusantara Studies, 1(2), 24-40. Hall, S. (1985). Signification, representation, ideology: Althusser and the post\u2010structuralist debates. Critical Studies in Media Communication, 2(2), 91-114. Jackson, J. (2019). Sociality and Magical Language. Language and Psychoanalysis, 8(1), 83-97. King, M. L. (2014). The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr., Volume VII: To Save the Soul of America, January 1961 August 1962 (Vol. 7). Univ of California Press. Lasch, C. (1980). The culture of narcissism. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 44(5), 426. Lasch, C. (2018). The culture of narcissism: American life in an age of diminishing expectations. WW Norton & Company. Lasch, C. (1996). The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy. WW Norton & Company. Lasch, C. (1991). The True and Only Heaven (New York and London. Lasch, C. (1985). The minimal self: Psychic survival in troubled times. WW Norton & Company. Lasch, C. (1997). The new radicalism in America, 1889-1963: The intellectual as a social type. WW Norton & Company. SETYABUDI, S. S. P. (2019). NARCISSISTIC TRAITS AS PORTRAYED IN THE CHARACTER OF RAVENNA IN SNOW WHITE AND THE HUNTSMAN (Doctoral dissertation, Diponegoro University). Vaknin, S. (2019). Narcissism, Shame, Happiness. EC Psychology and Psychiatry, 8, 242-245. Wildavsky, A. (2018). The revolt against the masses: And other essays on politics and public policy. Routledge. 19 | The Culture of Narcissism: Cultural Dilemmas, Language Confusion and The Formation of Social Identity y Gasset, J. O., & Mar\u00edas, J. (1983). La rebeli\u00f3n de las masas. Orbis.","subset":"phil_papers"}
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Deciding upon a discovery In the land of theoretical physics, equations have always been king. Indeed, it would probably be fair to caricature theoretical physicists as members of a company called \"Equations-R-Us\", since we tend to view new equations as markers of progress. The modern era of equation prediction began with Maxwell in 1861, continued through the development of Einstein's equations of general relativity in 1916 and reached its first peak in the 1920s with the Schr\u00f6dinger and Dirac equations. Then a second, postwar surge saw the development of equations describing the strong force and the electroweak force, culminating in the creation of the Standard Model of particle physics in about 1973. The equations trend continues today, with the ongoing struggle to create comprehensive equations to describe superstring theory. This effort \u2013 which aims to incorporate the force of gravity into physical models in a way that the Standard Model does not \u2013 marks the extant boundary of a long tradition. Yet equations are not the only story. To an extent, geometrical representations of physical theories have also been useful when correctly applied. The most famous incorrect geometrical representation in physics is probably Johannes Kepler's model of planetary orbits; initially, Kepler believed the orbits could be described by five regular polygons successively embedded within each other, but he abandoned this proposition when more accurate data became available. A less well known but much more successful example of geometry applied to physics is Murray Gell-Mann's \"eightfold way\", which is a means of organizing subatomic particles. This organization has an underlying explanation using triangles with quarks located at the vertices. For the past five years, I and a group of my colleagues (including Charles Doran, Michael Faux, Tristan Hubsch, Kevin Iga, Greg Landweber and others) have been following the geometric-physics path pioneered by Kepler and Gell-Mann. The geometric objects that interest us are not triangles or octagons, but more complicated figures known as \"adinkras\", a name Faux suggested. The word \"adinkra\" is of West African etymology, and it originally referred to visual symbols created by the Akan people of Ghana and the Gyamen of C\u00f4te d'Ivoire to represent concepts or aphorisms. However, the mathematical adinkras we study are really only linked to those African symbols by name. Even so, it must be acknowledged that, like their forebears, mathematical adinkras also represent concepts that are difficult to express in words. Most intriguingly, they may even contain hints of something more profound \u2013 including the idea that our universe could be a computer simulation, as in the Matrix films. If you knew SUSY like we know SUSY... To understand what adinkras are, we must first examine the physical theory to which they relate: supersymmetry, commonly abbreviated as SUSY. The concept of symmetry is ubiquitous in nature, but on a more technical level it has been a powerful mathematical tool for the development of equations. Einstein recognized that there was a symmetry between the effects observed by someone in an accelerating spacecraft far away from all planets and those observed by someone standing on the planet's surface. He called this recognition the \"happiest thought\" of his life, and he used it to determine the form of his equations of general relativity, which describe how matter warps space and time to create gravity. Moving on to the Standard Model, the set of equations used to describe the physics of quarks, leptons (the family of particles that contains the electron) and force-carrying particles like the photon (carrier of the electromagnetic force) is also largely determined by symmetry groups. Photons, for example, possess a type of symmetry known as U(1), which means that two distinct photons can produce the same electric and magnetic forces on a charged particle. Another important symmetry is the SU(3) symmetry of quarks, which can be visualized using what mathematicians call a \"weightspace diagram\" (figure 1). This diagram shows the entire family of nuclear particles of which the proton, p, and neutron, n, are members. The location of particles in this diagram is determined by particle properties called isospin and strangeness, the values of which were first measured in the 1950s and 1960s. Six triangles lurk inside it \u2013 you can see them if you draw lines from the centre to each vertex \u2013 and this \"triangular\" symmetry is part of what leads to the designation SU(3). Such diagrams are more than pictures. In fact, it was an insight drawn from such diagrams that led Physicists have long sought to describe the universe in terms of equations. Now, James Gates explains how research on a class of geometric symbols known as adinkras could lead to fresh insights into the theory of supersymmetry \u2013 and perhaps even the very nature of reality Symbols of power Like their African forebears, mathematical adinkras represent concepts that are difficult to express in words, and they may even contain hints of something more profound James Gates is a theoretical physicist at the University of Maryland, US, e-mail gatess@ wam.umd.edu physicsworld.comFeature: Physics and geometry 34 Physics World June 2010 Gell-Mann and George Zweig to a new understanding of nuclear matter. Gell-Mann and Zweig realized that patterns in diagrams showing families of nuclear particles meant that those particles must be made up of smaller, more fundamental particles: quarks. The nuclear-particle octet diagram gets its name because there are particles associated with each of its six vertices, and two additional particles associated with its centre, hence an \"octet\" of particles. This diagram is useful as a kind of accounting tool: in certain nuclear reactions, two or more experiments will lead to simply related results if one member of this family is replaced by another. For example, measuring how a proton is deflected from a neutron by the strong nuclear force will yield a result that is directly related to the deflection of a \u03a3\u2013 particle from a neutron. This is the power of using symmetries. When we know that certain symmetries are present in nature, we can use one experiment to predict the outcome of many others. As its name implies, the theory of supersymmetry takes the idea of symmetry a step further. In the Standard Model there is a dichotomy between leptons and quarks \u2013 collectively called \"matter particles\" \u2013 and force-carrying particles like photons. All matter particles are fermions, particles with half-integer quantum spin that obey the Pauli exclusion principle. Forcecarrying particles, in contrast, are bosons, which have integer spin and can violate the exclusion principle. This means that not only photons but also gluons (which carry the strong nuclear force), the W and Z bosons (which carry the weak nuclear force), and even the hypothetical Higgs boson are all free to possess any Complex ideas, complex shapes Adinkras \u2013 geometric objects that encode mathematical relationships between supersymmetric particles \u2013 are named after symbols that represent wise sayings in West African culture. This adinkra is called \"nea onnim no sua a, ohu\", which translates as \"he who does not know can become knowledgeable through learning\". M a t W a rd physicsworld.com Feature: Physics and geometry 35Physics World June 2010 allowed quantum numbers in composite systems. SUSY breaks this rule that all matter particles are fermions and all carriers are bosons. It does this by relating each Standard Model particle to a new form of matter and energy called a \"superpartner\". In its simplest form, SUSY states that every boson has a corresponding \"super-fermion\" associated with it, and vice versa. These superpartners have not yet been observed in nature, but one of the main tasks of CERN's Large Hadron Collider (LHC) will be to look for experimental evidence of their existence. If the LHC finds these superpartners, then the Standard Model will have to be replaced by the Minimal Supersymmetric Standard Model (MSSM), or perhaps another more exotic variant. From the point of view of equations, however, SUSY presents an additional challenge. Even if the LHC finds evidence that we live in a supersymmetric universe, there are many different sets of equations that incorporate supersymmetry. How, then, do we pick the right ones? The answer, of course, is that we pick the equations that agree with experimental observations. However, we can also ask a more subtle question: how do we ensure that the SUSY property is made manifest at every stage of calculations involving the quantum behaviour of these equations? It is here that adinkras might prove useful. Just as a weight-space diagram is a graphical representation that precisely encodes the mathematical relations between the members of SU(3) families, so an adinkra is a graphical representation that precisely encodes the mathematical relations between the members of supersymmetry families. Building up adinkras Now that we know a little bit about how adinkras can be used, we can begin to discuss what they look like. All adinkras are constructed by starting with squares, cubes and their higher-dimensional generalizations; these structures provide a \"skeleton\" that is then \"decorated\" by additional operations. Each of these decorations has a mathematical significance, which I will discuss later. For the moment, let us just concentrate on building a simple adinkra. To make a square into an adinkra, we begin by placing a white dot at one vertex (figure 2). The rules of adinkras then dictate that the two line segments connected to the white dot must have black dots at their opposite ends. This means that the final unpopulated vertex is connected to \"black dot\" vertices, so it must be populated by a white dot. Next, we need to assign directions to each line segment, or link. To keep track of these different directions, we assign distinct colours to each of them: all links that point in the same direction are assigned the same colour, and links that point in different directions are never assigned the same colour. Then, we need to assign an \"edge-parity\" to each link: each coloured line can be drawn as either solid or dashed. Every two-colour closed path in an adinkra must contain an odd number of dashed links. One last rule is that white dots and black dots are never allowed to have the same vertical position; that is, no black dot in an adinkra is ever allowed to appear at the same height as a white dot. Figure 2 shows a square that has been \"decorated\" in two different ways and made into two distinct adinkras. There is no limit to the number of colours that may be used to construct an adinkra. As a result, higherdimensional adinkras have a certain aesthetic appeal (figure 3). As Einstein once said, \"After a certain high level of technical skill is achieved, science and art tend to coalesce in aesthetics, plasticity and form.\" Perhaps the \"artistic\" depictions shown here are an example of this. But adinkras, like Gell-Mann's octets, are not just pictures. In fact, they are in some ways rather similar to Feynman diagrams, which are the series of line drawings used to describe calculations in quantum electrodynamics. Like Feynman diagrams, adinkras are a This weight-space diagram shows the \"baryon octet\" group of particles, including the proton (p), neutron (n) and six more exotic species known as hyperons. Particles are arranged according to their isospin (how they interact with the strong nuclear force) and the number of strange quarks they contain (their \"strangeness\"). n p \u03a3\u2013 \u03a3+ \u03a30 \u039b \u039e0\u039e\u2013 1 Weight-space diagrams \u03a82 \u03a62 \u03a61 \u03a81 D2 D2 D1 D1 \u03a81 \u03a61 \u03a62 D2 D1D1 D2 \u03a82 D1\u03a61 = i\u03a81 D1\u03a62 = i\u03a82 D1\u03a81 = \u2202T\u03a61 D1\u03a82 = \u2202T\u03a62 D2\u03a61 = i\u03a82 D2\u03a62 = \u2013 i\u03a81 D2\u03a81 = \u2013\u2202T\u03a62 D2\u03a82 = \u2202T\u03a61 A square can be transformed into two distinct adinkras. The set of eight super-differential equations relates to the bottom adinkra. 2 From squares to adinkras physicsworld.comFeature: Physics and geometry 36 Physics World June 2010 precise mathematical description of calculations. They also serve as an aid to performing these calculations, since the way that adinkras are constructed provides a streamlined description of the most compact sets of equations with the SUSY property. But while Feynman diagrams describe calculations for particle quantum behaviour, adinkras are connected instead to mathematical objects known as Clifford algebras and superdifferential equations. Clifford algebras were introduced by the English mathematician and philosopher William Kingdom Clifford in the 1870s as mathematical constructions that generalize complex numbers. However, they also provide the mathematical basis for our modern understanding of fermions. Where adinkras are concerned, if one ignores the information contained in the vertical height of the same type of dots in an adinkra, then that adinkra provides an exact description of mathematical matrices associated with Clifford algebras. For example, using the rules associated with adinkras, the bottom adinkra in figure 2 yields two of the three \"Pauli matrices\" (elements of a Clifford algebra) that describe the spin states of fermions. A second connection to mathematics is even more similar to Feynman diagrams. It can be shown that each adinkra corresponds to a distinct set of super-differential equations. Super-differential equations involve both the ordinary derivative operator (invented by Newton and Leibnitz) and a newer type of operator called a \"super derivative\", which was invented in the mid-1970s by the mathematician Felix Berezin and then elaborated on by the physicists Abdus Salam and John Strathdee. Super derivatives, represented by the links in an adinkra, are similar to the ordinary derivative, except that they are allowed to violate the usual product rule for derivatives. The super-differential equations for the bottom adinkra derived from a square are shown in figure 2. Since there are only two types of coloured links, there are only two super derivatives: D1 associated with green links and D2 associated with red links. We also have two bosonic superfunctions (\u03a61 and \u03a62) associated with the correspondingly labelled white dots and two fermionic superfunctions (\u03a81 and \u03a82) associated with the correspondingly labelled black dots. As complex numbers generally consist of both a real and imaginary part, a superfunction consists of both bosonic and fermionic parts. To turn these components of the adinkra into a set of equations, we begin by picking one dot \u2013 let's use the bottom-left one as an example \u2013 and writing its associated superfunction, \u03a61, to the left of an equal sign. Next, we choose one of the coloured links and write its associated D to the left of the superfunction. For the green link this would be D1; for the red link it would be D2. Then we look to see what dot is at the other end of this link. If we pick the green link, the \"target dot\" is the one associated with the superfunction \u03a81, so this symbol belongs on the right of the equals sign. These rules alone are enough to give us the upper four equations in figure 2. To \"derive\" the second group of four equations we need to introduce the ordinary differential operation, denoted by . The manner in which it appears in the equations is controlled by the relative height of the dots within each diagram: whenever the \"starting\" dot is higher in the adinkra than the \"target\" dot, this ordinary derivative appears on the right-hand side of the corresponding equation. The dashed links simply insert minus signs into some equations. You should have enough information now to apply this analysis to the second diagram in order to write down its associated equations \u2013 although, in time-honoured fashion, I have left this as an exercise for the reader. SUSY and adinkras Returning now to the concept of supersymmetry, Salam and Strathdee devised a simple test to determine when systems of equations possess the property of SUSY. The system shown in figure 2 easily passes Salam and Strathdee's test, but this does not necessarily mean that they are the equations that theorists from the Equations-R-Us company are seeking. In fact, they are not: aside from the Pauli matrices, the square-derived adinkras are just too simple to be associated with differential equations that have physical meaning. The same is true for adinkras based on a 3D cube. However, with a 4D hypercube, or tesseract, it is a different story. The four-colour adinkra (figure 4) demonstrates a behaviour that is not present for adinkras with fewer colours: it can be broken into two separate, smaller adinkras. These smaller adinkras do have physical meaning. The one on the far right is in fact related to Maxwell's equations. If one first removes the uppermost open dot and then performs the Salam\u2013Strathdee test, then Maxwell's equations involving current charges emerge. Similarly, removing the two uppermost dots from the centre adinkra followed by the Salam\u2013Strathdee test leads to the These large n-colour folded adinkras represent complex systems of super-differential equations. 3 Multidimensional adinkras G re g o ry D L a n d w e b e r physicsworld.com Feature: Physics and geometry 37Physics World June 2010 equations for the behaviour of the electron and its SUSY partner (known as the \"selectron\"). Some of the equations described here have been known for some time to physicists who study SUSY. Yet it was not until 2009 that research on adinkras (arXiv:0902.3830) showed that these geometric objects can mimic the behaviour of the equations, and thus provided the first evidence that adinkras could be related to physics. The next key question to answer is whether the reverse process can also occur \u2013 beginning with an adinkra and using it to derive, via a set of welldefined rules, something like the Maxwell or Dirac equations. In 2001 (arXiv:hep-th\/0109109) my students and I conjectured that this could indeed be the case, but only if we could encode the properties of 4D equations onto objects in a mathematical 1D format. Though this conjecture has not yet been proven, work completed by Faux, Iga and Landweber in 2009 (arXiv:0907.4543, arXiv:0907.3605) has provided the strongest evidence to date of its correctness. So, just as weight-space diagrams opened a new way to conceptualize the physics of nuclear matter, it is conceivable that adinkras may yield an entirely new way to formulate theories that possess the property of SUSY. From theoretical physics to codes As it turns out, it is not just four-colour adinkras that can be separated into two smaller adinkras with the same number of colours; adinkras with more than four colours also possess this property of separability. But why does this occur only for four or more colours? Investigating this question launched our \"treasure hunt\" in a completely unexpected direction: computer codes. Modern computer and communication technologies have come to prominence by transmitting data rapidly and accurately. These data consist principally of strings of ones and zeros (called bits) written in long sequences called \"words\". When these computer words are transmitted from a source to a receiver, there is always the chance that static noise in the system can alter the content of any word. Hence, the transmitted word might arrive at the receiver as pure gibberish. One of the first people to confront this problem was the mathematician Richard Hamming, who worked on the Manhattan Project during the Second World War. In 1950 he introduced the idea of \"error-correcting codes\" that could remove or work around any unwanted changes to a transmitted signal. Hamming's idea was for the sending computer to insert extra bits into words in a specific manner such that the receiving computer could, by looking at the extra bits, detect and correct errors introduced by the transmission process. His algorithm for the insertion of these extra bits is known as the \"Hamming code\". The construction of such error-correcting codes has been pursued since the beginning of the computer age and many different codes now exist. These are typically divided into families; for example, the \"check-sum extended Hamming code\" is a rather complicated variant of the Hamming code and it belongs to a family known as \"doubly even self-dual linear binary error-correcting block codes\" (an amazing mouthful!). Yet whatever family they belong to, all error-correction codes serve the same function: they are used to detect errors and allow the correct transmission of digital data. How does this relate to adinkras? The middle adinkra in figure 4 is obtained by folding the image on the left of the figure. The folding involves taking pairs of the dots of the same type and \"fusing them together\" as if they were made of clay. In general, an adinkrafolding process will lead to diagrams where the associated equations do not possess the SUSY property. In order to ensure that this property is retained, we must carry out the fusing in such a way that white dots are only fused with other white dots, black dots with other black dots, and lines of a given colour and dashing are only joined with lines that possess the same properties. Most foldings violate this, but there is one exception \u2013 and it happens to be related to a folding that involves doubly even self-dual linear binary error-correcting block codes. The adinkra in figure 5 is the same as the left-hand part of figure 4 but for simplicity it is shown without dashed edges. We pick the bottom dot as a starting point and assign it an address of (0000). To move to any of the dots at the second level requires traversing one of the coloured links. There are four distinct ways in which this can be done. To move to any dot at the third level from the bottom dot requires the use of two different coloured links, and so on for the rest of the adinkra. In this way, every dot is assigned an address, from (0000) to (1111). These sequences of ones and zeros are binary computer words. To accomplish the folding that maintains the SUSY The \"decorated tesseract\" adinkra on the left can be broken down into two separate adinkras. The author's collaboration of mathematicians and other physicists has introduced the name \"gnomoning\" for this process of subtracting a smaller adinkra from larger ones. The word gnomoning was used by Euclid, the founder of geometry, to describe a plane figure obtained by removing a smaller figure that is similar to the larger one. + 4 Adinkras within adinkras Adinkras may yield an entirely new way to formulate theories that possess the property of supersymmetry physicsworld.comFeature: Physics and geometry 38 Physics World June 2010 property in the associated equations, we must begin by squeezing the bottom dot together with the upper dot. When their addresses are added bit-wise to one another, this yields the sequence (1111). If we continue this folding process, always choosing pairs of dots so that their associated \"words\" sum bit-wise to (1111), we can transform the adinkra on the left-hand side of figure 4 to the one on the right. Thus, maintaining the equations' SUSY property requires that the particular sequence of bits given by (1111) be used in the folding process. The process used to meet this criterion happens to correspond to the simplest member of the family containing the check-sum extended Hamming code. The part of science that deals with the transmission of data is called information theory. For the most part, this is a science that has largely developed in ways that are unrelated to the fields used in theoretical physics. However, with the observation that structures from information theory \u2013 codes \u2013 control the structure of equations with the SUSY property, we may be crossing a barrier. I know of no other example of this particular intermingling occurring at such a deep level. Could it be that codes, in some deep and fundamental way, control the structure of our reality? In asking this question, we may be ending our \"treasure hunt\" in a place that was anticipated previously by at least one pioneering physicist: John Archibald Wheeler. Life in the Matrix? Wheeler, who died in 2008, was an extremely wellregarded figure within physics. He served as advisor to a clutch of important physicists, including Richard Feynman, while his own work included the concept of the \"S-matrix\" (a mathematical tool that helps us understand Standard Model particles). Beyond the physics community, Wheeler is probably best known for coining the terms \"black hole\" and \"wormhole\". But he also coined a slightly less familiar phrase \u2013 \"it from bit\" \u2013 and this is what concerns us here. The idea of \"it from bit\" is a complex one, and Wheeler's own description of it is probably still the best. In 1990 he suggested that \"every 'it' \u2013 every particle, every field of force, even the space\u2013time continuum itself \u2013 derives its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely...from the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no questions, binary choices, bits\". The \"it from bit\" principle, he continued, \"symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical world has at bottom...an immaterial source and explanation: that which we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes\u2013no questions and the registering of equipmentevoked responses; in short, that all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and that this is a participatory universe\". When I first heard the idea of \"it from bit\" as a young physicist, I thought Wheeler must be crazy. The concept of a world made up of information just sounded strange, and (although I did not know it at the time) I was not the only one who thought so. However, sometimes crazy ideas turn out to be true, and Wheeler has been proved right before. As Feynman said, \"When I was [Wheeler's] student, I discovered that if you take one of his crazy ideas and you unwrap the layers of craziness from it one after another, like lifting layers off an onion, at the heart of the idea you will often find a powerful kernel of truth.\" Indeed, another of Wheeler's \"crazy\" ideas \u2013 his suggestion that a positron can be treated as an electron moving backwards in time \u2013 played a role in Feynman later winning a Nobel prize. As for my own collaboration on adinkras, the path my colleagues and I have trod since the early 2000s has led me to conclude that codes play a previously unsuspected role in equations that possess the property of supersymmetry. This unsuspected connection suggests that these codes may be ubiquitous in nature, and could even be embedded in the essence of reality. If this is the case, we might have something in common with the Matrix science-fiction films, which depict a world where everything human beings experience is the product of a virtual-reality-generating computer network. If that sounds crazy to you \u2013 well, you could be right. It is certainly possible to overstate mathematical links between different systems: as the physicist Eugene Wigner pointed out in 1960, just because a piece of mathematics is ubiquitous and appears in the description of several distinct systems does not necessarily mean that those systems are related to each other. The number \u03c0 , after all, occurs in the measurement of circles as well as in the measurement of population distributions. This does not mean that populations are related to circles. Yet for a moment, let us imagine that this alternative Matrix-style world contains some theoretical physicists, and that one of them asks, \"How could we discover whether we live inside a Matrix?\". One answer might be \"Try to detect the presence of codes in the laws that describe physics.\" I leave it to you to decide whether Wigner's warning should be applied to the theoretical physicists living in the Matrix \u2013 and to us. \u25a0 The decorated-tesseract adinkra and its associated computer \"words\". For simplicity, the adinkra is shown without dashed lines. (1111) (1110) (1101) (1011) (0111) (1100) (1001) (0110) (1010) (0101) (0011) (1000) (0100) (0010) (0001) (0000) 5 Coded adinkras physicsworld.com Feature: Physics and geometry 39Physics World June","subset":"phil_papers"}
+{"meta":{"title":"Section A: Abortion","type":"info:eu-repo\/semantics\/article","creator":"Abortion, Deregulating","subject":"Philosophy","date":"1994","identifier":"oai:philarchive.org\/rec\/ABOSAA","description":null,"datestamp":"2022-09-05T03:24:19Z","dup_signals":{"dup_doc_count":144,"dup_dump_count":49,"dup_details":{"curated_sources":2,"2018-26":1,"2018-13":1,"2018-05":1,"2017-47":1,"2017-43":1,"2017-39":1,"2017-34":1,"2017-30":1,"2017-26":1,"2017-22":1,"2017-17":1,"2017-09":1,"2017-04":2,"2016-50":2,"2016-44":1,"2016-40":2,"2016-36":2,"2016-30":2,"2016-26":2,"2016-22":1,"2016-18":2,"2016-07":2,"2015-48":1,"2015-40":2,"2015-35":2,"2015-32":2,"2015-27":2,"2015-22":2,"2015-14":2,"2014-52":2,"2014-49":3,"2014-42":6,"2014-41":4,"2014-35":4,"2014-23":3,"2014-15":3,"2023-40":1,"2024-26":3,"2024-22":5,"2024-18":2,"2024-10":2,"2017-13":11,"2015-18":9,"2015-11":8,"2015-06":8,"2014-10":8,"2013-48":8,"2013-20":8,"2024-30":1}}},"text":"After-birth abortion: why should the baby live? Alberto Giubilini,1 Francesca Minerva2 1Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia 2Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia Correspondence to Dr Francesca Minerva, CAPPE, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC 3010, Australia; francesca.minerva@unimelb. edu.au Received 25 November 2011 Revised 26 January 2012 Accepted 27 January 2012 Published Online First 23 February 2012 To cite: Giubilini A, Minerva F. J Med Ethics 2013;39:261\u2013263. ABSTRACT Abortion is largely accepted even for reasons that do not have anything to do with the fetus' health. By showing that (1) both fetuses and newborns do not have the same moral status as actual persons, (2) the fact that both are potential persons is morally irrelevant and (3) adoption is not always in the best interest of actual people, the authors argue that what we call 'after-birth abortion' (killing a newborn) should be permissible in all the cases where abortion is, including cases where the newborn is not disabled. INTRODUCTION Severe abnormalities of the fetus and risks for the physical and\/or psychological health of the woman are often cited as valid reasons for abortion. Sometimes the two reasons are connected, such as when a woman claims that a disabled child would represent a risk to her mental health. However, having a child can itself be an unbearable burden for the psychological health of the woman or for her already existing children,1 regardless of the condition of the fetus. This could happen in the case of a woman who loses her partner after she finds out that she is pregnant and therefore feels she will not be able to take care of the possible child by herself. A serious philosophical problem arises when the same conditions that would have justified abortion become known after birth. In such cases, we need to assess facts in order to decide whether the same arguments that apply to killing a human fetus can also be consistently applied to killing a newborn human. Such an issue arises, for example, when an abnormality has not been detected during pregnancy or occurs during delivery. Perinatal asphyxia, for instance, may cause severe brain damage and result in severe mental and\/or physical impairments comparable with those for which a woman could request an abortion. Moreover, abnormalities are not always, or cannot always be, diagnosed through prenatal screening even if they have a genetic origin. This is more likely to happen when the disease is not hereditary but is the result of genetic mutations occurring in the gametes of a healthy parent. One example is the case of Treacher-Collins syndrome (TCS), a condition that affects 1 in every 10 000 births causing facial deformity and related physiological failures, in particular potentially life-threatening respiratory problems. Usually those affected by TCS are not mentally impaired and they are therefore fully aware of their condition, of being different from other people and of all the problems their pathology entails. Many parents would choose to have an abortion if they find out, through genetic prenatal testing, that their fetus is affected by TCS. However, genetic prenatal tests for TCS are usually taken only if there is a family history of the disease. Sometimes, though, the disease is caused by a gene mutation that intervenes in the gametes of a healthy member of the couple. Moreover, tests for TCS are quite expensive and it takes several weeks to get the result. Considering that it is a very rare pathology, we can understand why women are not usually tested for this disorder. However, such rare and severe pathologies are not the only ones that are likely to remain undetected until delivery; even more common congenital diseases that women are usually tested for could fail to be detected. An examination of 18 European registries reveals that between 2005 and 2009 only the 64% of Down's syndrome cases were diagnosed through prenatal testing.2 This percentage indicates that, considering only the European areas under examination, about 1700 infants were born with Down's syndrome without parents being aware of it before birth. Once these children are born, there is no choice for the parents but to keep the child, which sometimes is exactly what they would not have done if the disease had been diagnosed before birth. ABORTION AND AFTER-BIRTH ABORTION Euthanasia in infants has been proposed by philosophers3 for children with severe abnormalities whose lives can be expected to be not worth living and who are experiencing unbearable suffering. Also medical professionals have recognised the need for guidelines about cases in which death seems to be in the best interest of the child. In The Netherlands, for instance, the Groningen Protocol (2002) allows to actively terminate the life of 'infants with a hopeless prognosis who experience what parents and medical experts deem to be unbearable suffering'.4 Although it is reasonable to predict that living with a very severe condition is against the best interest of the newborn, it is hard to find definitive arguments to the effect that life with certain pathologies is not worth living, even when those pathologies would constitute acceptable reasons for abortion. It might be maintained that 'even allowing for the more optimistic assessments of the potential of Down's syndrome children, this potential cannot be said to be equal to that of a normal child'.3 But, in fact, people with Down's syndrome, as well as people affected by many other severe disabilities, are often reported to be happy.5 Nonetheless, to bring up such children might be an unbearable burden on the family and on society as a whole, when the state economically provides for their care. On these grounds, the fact that a fetus has the potential to become a person who will have an (at least) acceptable life is no reason for prohibiting abortion. Therefore, we argue that, when circumstances occur after birth such that they would have justified abortion, what we call after-birth abortion should be permissible. In spite of the oxymoron in the expression, we propose to call this practice 'after-birth abortion', rather than 'infanticide', to emphasise that the moral Giubilini A, et al. J Med Ethics 2013;39:261\u2013263. doi:10.1136\/medethics-2011-100411 261 Featured article group.bmj.com on June 25, 2015 Published by http:\/\/jme.bmj.com\/Downloaded from status of the individual killed is comparable with that of a fetus (on which 'abortions' in the traditional sense are performed) rather than to that of a child. Therefore, we claim that killing a newborn could be ethically permissible in all the circumstances where abortion would be. Such circumstances include cases where the newborn has the potential to have an (at least) acceptable life, but the well-being of the family is at risk. Accordingly, a second terminological specification is that we call such a practice 'after-birth abortion' rather than 'euthanasia' because the best interest of the one who dies is not necessarily the primary criterion for the choice, contrary to what happens in the case of euthanasia. Failing to bring a new person into existence cannot be compared with the wrong caused by procuring the death of an existing person. The reason is that, unlike the case of death of an existing person, failing to bring a new person into existence does not prevent anyone from accomplishing any of her future aims. However, this consideration entails a much stronger idea than the one according to which severely handicapped children should be euthanised. If the death of a newborn is not wrongful to her on the grounds that she cannot have formed any aim that she is prevented from accomplishing, then it should also be permissible to practise an after-birth abortion on a healthy newborn too, given that she has not formed any aim yet. There are two reasons which, taken together, justify this claim: 1. The moral status of an infant is equivalent to that of a fetus, that is, neither can be considered a 'person' in a morally relevant sense. 2. It is not possible to damage a newborn by preventing her from developing the potentiality to become a person in the morally relevant sense. We are going to justify these two points in the following two sections. THE NEWBORN AND THE FETUS ARE MORALLY EQUIVALENT The moral status of an infant is equivalent to that of a fetus in the sense that both lack those properties that justify the attribution of a right to life to an individual. Both a fetus and a newborn certainly are human beings and potential persons, but neither is a 'person' in the sense of 'subject of a moral right to life'. We take 'person' to mean an individual who is capable of attributing to her own existence some (at least) basic value such that being deprived of this existence represents a loss to her. This means that many non-human animals and mentally retarded human individuals are persons, but that all the individuals who are not in the condition of attributing any value to their own existence are not persons. Merely being human is not in itself a reason for ascribing someone a right to life. Indeed, many humans are not considered subjects of a right to life: spare embryos where research on embryo stem cells is permitted, fetuses where abortion is permitted, criminals where capital punishment is legal. Our point here is that, although it is hard to exactly determine when a subject starts or ceases to be a 'person', a necessary condition for a subject to have a right to X is that she is harmed by a decision to deprive her of X. There are many ways in which an individual can be harmed, and not all of them require that she values or is even aware of what she is deprived of. A person might be 'harmed' when someone steals from her the winning lottery ticket even if she will never find out that her ticket was the winning one. Or a person might be 'harmed' if something were done to her at the stage of fetus which affects for the worse her quality of life as a person (eg, her mother took drugs during pregnancy), even if she is not aware of it. However, in such cases we are talking about a person who is at least in the condition to value the different situation she would have found herself in if she had not been harmed. And such a condition depends on the level of her mental development,6 which in turn determines whether or not she is a 'person'. Those who are only capable of experiencing pain and pleasure (like perhaps fetuses and certainly newborns) have a right not to be inflicted pain. If, in addition to experiencing pain and pleasure, an individual is capable of making any aims (like actual human and non-human persons), she is harmed if she is prevented from accomplishing her aims by being killed. Now, hardly can a newborn be said to have aims, as the future we imagine for it is merely a projection of our minds on its potential lives. It might start having expectations and develop a minimum level of selfawareness at a very early stage, but not in the first days or few weeks after birth. On the other hand, not only aims but also welldeveloped plans are concepts that certainly apply to those people (parents, siblings, society) who could be negatively or positively affected by the birth of that child. Therefore, the rights and interests of the actual people involved should represent the prevailing consideration in a decision about abortion and after-birth abortion. It is true that a particular moral status can be attached to a nonperson by virtue of the value an actual person (eg, the mother) attributes to it. However, this 'subjective' account of the moral status of a newborn does not debunk our previous argument. Let us imagine that a woman is pregnant with two identical twins who are affected by genetic disorders. In order to cure one of the embryos the woman is given the option to use the other twin to develop a therapy. If she agrees, she attributes to the first embryo the status of 'future child' and to the other one the status of a mere means to cure the 'future child'. However, the different moral status does not spring from the fact that the first one is a 'person' and the other is not, which would be nonsense, given that they are identical. Rather, the different moral statuses only depends on the particular value the woman projects on them. However, such a projection is exactly what does not occur when a newborn becomes a burden to its family. THE FETUS AND THE NEWBORN ARE POTENTIAL PERSONS Although fetuses and newborns are not persons, they are potential persons because they can develop, thanks to their own biological mechanisms, those properties which will make them 'persons' in the sense of 'subjects of a moral right to life': that is, the point at which they will be able to make aims and appreciate their own life. It might be claimed that someone is harmed because she is prevented from becoming a person capable of appreciating her own being alive. Thus, for example, one might say that we would have been harmed if our mothers had chosen to have an abortion while they were pregnant with us7 or if they had killed us as soon as we were born. However, whereas you can benefit someone by bringing her into existence (if her life is worth living), it makes no sense to say that someone is harmed by being prevented from becoming an actual person. The reason is that, by virtue of our definition of the concept of 'harm' in the previous section, in order for a harm to occur, it is necessary that someone is in the condition of experiencing that harm. If a potential person, like a fetus and a newborn, does not become an actual person, like you and us, then there is neither an actual nor a future person who can be harmed, which means that there is no harm at all. So, if you ask one of us if we would have been harmed, had our parents decided to kill us when we were fetuses or newborns, our answer is 'no', because they would have harmed someone who does not exist (the 'us' 262 Giubilini A, et al. J Med Ethics 2013;39:261\u2013263. doi:10.1136\/medethics-2011-100411 Featured article group.bmj.com on June 25, 2015 Published by http:\/\/jme.bmj.com\/Downloaded from whom you are asking the question), which means no one. And if no one is harmed, then no harm occurred. A consequence of this position is that the interests of actual people over-ride the interest of merely potential people to become actual ones. This does not mean that the interests of actual people always over-ride any right of future generations, as we should certainly consider the well-being of people who will inhabit the planet in the future. Our focus is on the right to become a particular person, and not on the right to have a good life once someone will have started to be a person. In other words, we are talking about particular individuals who might or might not become particular persons depending on our choice, and not about those who will certainly exist in the future but whose identity does not depend on what we choose now. The alleged right of individuals (such as fetuses and newborns) to develop their potentiality, which someone defends,8 is overridden by the interests of actual people (parents, family, society) to pursue their own well-being because, as we have just argued, merely potential people cannot be harmed by not being brought into existence. Actual people's well-being could be threatened by the new (even if healthy) child requiring energy, money and care which the family might happen to be in short supply of. Sometimes this situation can be prevented through an abortion, but in some other cases this is not possible. In these cases, since non-persons have no moral rights to life, there are no reasons for banning after-birth abortions. We might still have moral duties towards future generations in spite of these future people not existing yet. But because we take it for granted that such people will exist (whoever they will be), we must treat them as actual persons of the future. This argument, however, does not apply to this particular newborn or infant, because we are not justified in taking it for granted that she will exist as a person in the future. Whether she will exist is exactly what our choice is about. ADOPTION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO AFTER-BIRTH ABORTION? A possible objection to our argument is that after-birth abortion should be practised just on potential people who could never have a life worth living.9 Accordingly, healthy and potentially happy people should be given up for adoption if the family cannot raise them up. Why should we kill a healthy newborn when giving it up for adoption would not breach anyone's right but possibly increase the happiness of people involved (adopters and adoptee)? Our reply is the following. We have previously discussed the argument from potentiality, showing that it is not strong enough to outweigh the consideration of the interests of actual people. Indeed, however weak the interests of actual people can be, they will always trump the alleged interest of potential people to become actual ones, because this latter interest amounts to zero. On this perspective, the interests of the actual people involved matter, and among these interests, we also need to consider the interests of the mother who might suffer psychological distress from giving her child up for adoption. Birthmothers are often reported to experience serious psychological problems due to the inability to elaborate their loss and to cope with their grief.10 It is true that grief and sense of loss may accompany both abortion and after-birth abortion as well as adoption, but we cannot assume that for the birthmother the latter is the least traumatic. For example, 'those who grieve a death must accept the irreversibility of the loss, but natural mothers often dream that their child will return to them. This makes it difficult to accept the reality of the loss because they can never be quite sure whether or not it is irreversible'.11 We are not suggesting that these are definitive reasons against adoption as a valid alternative to after-birth abortion. Much depends on circumstances and psychological reactions. What we are suggesting is that, if interests of actual people should prevail, then after-birth abortion should be considered a permissible option for women who would be damaged by giving up their newborns for adoption. CONCLUSIONS If criteria such as the costs (social, psychological, economic) for the potential parents are good enough reasons for having an abortion even when the fetus is healthy, if the moral status of the newborn is the same as that of the foetus and if neither has any moral value by virtue of being a potential person, then the same reasons which justify abortion should also justify the killing of the potential person when it is at the stage of a newborn. Two considerations need to be added. First, we do not put forward any claim about the moment at which after-birth abortion would no longer be permissible, and we do not think that in fact more than a few days would be necessary for doctors to detect any abnormality in the child. In cases where the after-birth abortion were requested for nonmedical reasons, we do not suggest any threshold, as it depends on the neurological development of newborns, which is something neurologists and psychologists would be able to assess. Second, we do not claim that after-birth abortions are good alternatives to abortion. Abortions at an early stage are the best option, for both psychological and physical reasons. However, if a disease has not been detected during the pregnancy, if something went wrong during the delivery, or if economical, social or psychological circumstances change such that taking care of the offspring becomes an unbearable burden on someone, then people should be given the chance of not being forced to do something they cannot afford. Correction notice This article has been corrected since it was published Online First. The first author's affiliations have been corrected. Acknowledgements We would like to thank Professor Sergio Bartolommei, University of Pisa, who read an early draft of this paper and gave us very helpful comments. The responsibility for the content remains with the authors. Contributors AG and FM contributed equally to the manuscript. Competing interests None. Provenance and peer review Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed. REFERENCES 1 Abortion Act. London: Stationery Office, 1967. 2 European Surveillance of Congenital Anomalies. EUROCAT Database. http:\/\/www. eurocat-network.eu\/PRENATALSCREENINGAndDIAGNOSIS\/PrenatalDetectionRates (data uploaded 27 Oct 2011), (accessed 11 Nov 2011). 3 Kuhse H, Singer P. Should the Baby live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985:143. 4 Verhagen E, Sauer P. The groningen protocol-euthanasia in severely Ill newborns. N Engl J Med 2005;10:959\u201362. 5 Alderson P. Down's Syndrome: cost, quality and the value of life. Soc Sci Med 2001;5:627\u201338. 6 Tooley M. Abortion and infanticide. Philos Public Aff 1972;1:37\u201365. 7 Hare RM. Abortion and the golden rule. In: Hare RM, ed. Essays on Bioethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993:147\u201367. 8 Hare RM. A Kantian approach to abortion. In: Hare RM, ed. Essays on Bioethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993:168\u201384. 9 Hare RM. The abnormal child. Moral dilemmas of doctors and parents. In: Hare RM, ed. Essays on Bioethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993:185\u201391. 10 Condon J. Psychological disability in women who relinquish a baby for adoption. Med J Aust 1986;144:117\u201319. 11 Robinson E. Grief associated with the loss of children to adoption. In: Separation, reunion, reconciliation: Proceedings from The Sixth Australian Conference on Adoption. Stones Corner, Brisbane: Benson J, for Committee of the Conference, 1997:268\u201393, 278. Giubilini A, et al. J Med Ethics 2013;39:261\u2013263. doi:10.1136\/medethics-2011-100411 263 Featured article group.bmj.com on June 25, 2015 Published by http:\/\/jme.bmj.com\/Downloaded from live? 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+{"meta":{"title":"Anselm of Canterbury (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry)","type":"info:eu-repo\/semantics\/article","creator":"Sadler, Greg","subject":"Philosophy","date":"2006","identifier":"oai:philarchive.org\/rec\/SADAOC","description":null,"datestamp":"2023-09-11T17:12:24Z","dup_signals":{"dup_doc_count":251,"dup_dump_count":68,"dup_details":{"curated_sources":2,"2023-50":2,"2023-40":1,"2023-23":3,"2022-49":1,"2022-33":1,"2022-27":1,"2022-21":2,"2021-49":1,"2021-39":1,"2021-25":1,"2021-17":1,"2021-04":1,"2020-40":2,"2020-34":2,"2020-29":1,"2020-16":1,"2020-05":1,"2019-51":1,"2019-43":1,"2019-35":1,"2019-26":1,"2019-18":2,"2019-09":1,"2018-51":1,"2018-43":2,"2018-30":1,"2018-26":1,"2018-17":1,"2018-09":2,"2017-51":1,"2017-43":1,"2017-34":1,"2017-26":1,"2017-17":1,"2017-09":8,"2017-04":1,"2016-50":1,"2016-44":1,"2016-40":1,"2016-36":1,"2016-30":2,"2016-26":1,"2016-22":1,"2016-18":1,"2016-07":8,"2015-48":7,"2015-40":5,"2015-35":7,"2015-32":7,"2015-27":7,"2015-22":8,"2015-14":8,"2014-52":7,"2014-49":7,"2014-42":19,"2014-41":11,"2014-35":12,"2014-23":12,"2014-15":12,"2024-22":1,"2024-18":2,"2015-18":8,"2015-11":8,"2015-06":7,"2014-10":8,"2013-48":9,"2013-20":7,"2024-26":1}}},"text":"\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 1\/53 Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) Saint Anselm was one of the most important Christian thinkers of the eleventh century. He is most famous in philosophy for having discovered and articulated the so-called \"ontological argument;\" and in theology for his doctrine of the atonement. However, his work extends to many other important philosophical and theological matters, among which are: understanding the aspects and the unity of the divine nature; the extent of our possible knowledge and understanding of the divine nature; the complex nature of the will and its involvement in free choice; the interworkings of human willing and action and divine grace; the natures of truth and justice; the natures and origins of virtues and vices; the nature of evil as negation or privation; and the condition and implications of original sin. In the course of his work and thought, unlike most of his contemporaries, Anselm deployed argumentation that was in most respects only indirectly dependent on Sacred Scripture, Christian doctrine, and tradition. Anselm also developed sophisticated analyses of the language used in discussion and investigation of philosophical and theological issues, highlighting the importance of focusing on the meaning of the terms used rather than allowing oneself to be misled by the verbal forms, and examining the adequacy of the language to the objects of investigation, particularly to the divine nature. In addition, in his work he both discussed and exemplified the resolution of apparent contradictions or paradoxes by making appropriate distinctions. For these reasons, one title traditionally accorded him is the Scholastic Doctor, since his approach to philosophical and theological matters both represents and contributed to early medieval Christian Scholasticism. Table of Contents 1. Life 2. Influences 3. Methodology: Faith and Reason 4. The Proslogion 5. Gaunilo's Reply and Anselm's Response 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 2\/53 6. The Monologion 7. Cur Deus Homo 8. De Grammatico 9. The De Veritate 10. The De Libertate Arbitrii 11. The De Casu Diaboli 12. The De Concordia 13. The Fragments 14. Other Writings 15. References and Further Readings a. Primary Sources b. Secondary Sources 1. Life Anselm was born in 1033 in Aosta, a border town of the kingdom of Burgundy. In his adolescence, he decided that there was no better life than the monastic one. He sought to become a monk, but was refused by the abbot of the local monastery. Leaving his birthplace as a young man, he headed north across the Alps to France, eventually arriving at Bec in Normandy, where he studied under the eminent theologian and dialectician Lanfranc, whose involvement in disputes with Berengar spurred a revival in theological speculation and application of dialectic in theological argument. At the monastery of Bec, Anselm devoted himself to scholarship, and found an earlier childhood attraction to the monastic life reawakening. Unable to decide between becoming a monk at Bec or Cluny, becoming a hermit, or living off his inheritance and giving alms to the poor, he put the decision in the hands of Lanfranc and Maurilius, the Archbishop of Rouen, who decided Anselm should enter monastic life at Bec, which he did in 1060. In 1063, after Lanfranc left Bec for Caen, Anselm was chosen to be prior. Among the various tasks Anselm took on as prior was that of instructing the monks, but he also had time left for carrying on rigorous spiritual exercises, which would play a great role in his philosophical and theological development. As his biographer, Eadmer, writes: \"being continually given up to God and to spiritual exercises, he attained such a height of divine speculation that he was able by God's help to see into and unravel many most obscure and previously insoluble questions...\" (1962, p. 12). He became particularly well known, both in the monastic community and in the wider community, not only for the range and depth of his insight into human nature, the virtues and vices, and the practice of moral and religious life, but also for the intensity of his devotions and asceticism. In 1070, Anselm began to write, particularly prayers and meditations, which he sent to monastic friends and to noblewomen for use in their own private devotions. He also engaged in a great deal of correspondence, leaving behind numerous letters. Eventually, his teaching and thinking culmi5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 3\/53 nated in a set of treatises and dialogues. In 1077, he produced the Monologion, and in 1078 the Proslogion. Eventually, Anselm was elected abbot of the monastery. At some time while still at Bec, Anselm wrote the De Veritate (On Truth), De Libertate Arbitrii (On Freedom of Choice), De Casu Diaboli (On the Fall of the Devil), and De Grammatico. In 1092, Anselm traveled to England, where Lanfranc had previously been arch-bishop of Canterbury. The Episcopal seat had been kept vacant so King William Rufus could collect its income, and Anselm was proposed as the new bishop, a prospect neither the king nor Anselm desired. Eventually, the king fell ill, changed his mind in fear of his demise, and nominated Anselm to become bishop. Anselm attempted to argue his unfitness for the post, but eventually accepted. In addition to the typical cares of the office, his tenure as arch-bishop of Canterbury was marked by nearly uninterrupted conflict over numerous issues with King William Rufus, who attempted not only to appropriate church lands, offices, and incomes, but even to have Anselm deposed. Anselm had to go into exile and travel to Rome to plead the case of the English church to the Pope, who not only affirmed Anselm's position, but refused Anselm's own request to be relieved of his office. While archbishop in exile, however, Anselm did finish his Cur Deus Homo, also writing the treatises Epistolae de Incarnatione Verbi (On the Incarnation of the Word), De Conceptu Virginali et de Originali Peccato (On the Virgin Conception and on Original Sin), De Processione Spiritus Sancti (On the Proceeding of the Holy Spirit), and De Concordia Praescientia et Praedestinationis et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio (On the Harmony of the Foreknowledge, the Predestination, and the Grace of God with Free Choice). Upon returning to England after William Rufus's death, conflict eventually ensued between the archbishop and the new king, Henry I, requiring Anselm once again to travel to Rome. When judgment was made by Pope Paschal II in Anselm's favor, the king forbade him to return to England, but eventually reconciliation took place. Anselm died in 1109, leaving behind several pupils and friends of some importance, among them Eadmer, Anselm's biographer, and the theologian Gilbert Crispin. He was declared a doctor of the Roman Catholic Church in 1720, and is considered a saint by the Roman Catholic Church and the churches in the Anglican Communion. Today, Anselm is most well known for his Proslogion proof for the existence of God, but his thought was widely known in the Middle Ages, and still today in certain circles of scholarship, particularly among religious scholars, for considerably more than that single achievement. For fuller biographies of Anselm, see Eadmer's Vita Sancti Anselmi\/ The Life of St. Anselm: Archbishop of Canterbury, and Alexander's Liber ex dictis beati Anselmi. 2. Influences With the exception of St. Augustine, and to a lesser extent Boethius, it is difficult to definitively ascribe the influence of other thinkers to the development of St. Anselm's thought. To be sure, 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 4\/53 Anselm studied under Lanfranc, but Lanfranc does not appear to have been a significant influence on the actual content or expression of Anselm's thought, and he largely ignored Lanfranc's misgivings about the method of theMonologion. Anselm cites Boethius, but does not draw upon him extensively. Other figures have been proposed as influences on Anselm, for instance John Scotus Eriugena and Pseudo-Dionysus, but any such proposals are set in the proper framework by these remarks from Koyr\u00e9: \"The influence of these two great thinkers is not at all lacking in verisimilitude a priori.\" (Koyr\u00e9 1923, 109). It is possible that either one of them, or other thinkers, influenced Anselm, but going beyond mere possibility given the texts we possess is controversial. Discerning influences on Anselm's work is for the most part conjectural, precisely because Anselm makes so few references to previous thinkers in his work. In the preface to the Monologion he writes: \"Reexamining the work often myself, I have been able to find nothing that I have said in it, that would not agree [cohaereat] with the writings of the Catholic Fathers and especially with those of the blessed Augustine.\" (S. v. 1, p.8) [All citations of Anselm's texts (except for the Fragments) are the author's translations from S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archepiscopi Opera Omnia, abbreviated here as S., followed by (when needed) the volume and the page numbers. Latin terms in brackets or parentheses have been romanized to current orthography. All citations of the Fragments are the author's translations from the Ein neues unvollendetes Werk des heilige Anselm von Canterbury, henceforth abbreviated as u.W.] Anselm references Augustine's On the Holy Trinity, but as a whole work, giving no specific references. Clearly, Augustine was a major influence on Anselm's thought, but that is in itself rather unremarkable, since practically all of his contemporaries fit in one way or another into the broad stream of the Augustinian tradition. As Southern summarizes the issues: \"[T]he ambivalence of Anselm's relations to St. Augustine remains one of the mysteries of his mind and personality. Augustine's thought was the pervading atmosphere in which Anselm moved; but he was never content merely to reproduce Augustine.\" (1963, 32) In fact, one of the most important features of Anselm's work is its originality. As Southern has also pointed out, this originality was not confined to the treatises and dialogues. In his more devotional prayers and meditations, Anselm adapted traditional forms to new content, (1963, 34-47) \"open[ing] the way which led to the Dies Irae, the Imitatio Christi, and the masterpieces of later medieval piety.\" (1963, 47) Although clearly indebted to an Augustinian (neo)-Platonic tradition often termed \"Christian philosophy,\" Anselm's originality clearly furthered and expanded that tradition, and prepared the way for later Scholasticism. The term \"Christian philosophy\" was used in a variety of senses, particularly within and to denote the Augustinian tradition, and was applied to Anselm's work by numerous interpreters. A set of debates, which gave rise to a sizable literature, and which are still to some extent being continued today, took place in Francophone circles 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 5\/53 (spreading to German, Italian, Spanish, and English-speaking circles in later years) in the early 1930s, about the nature and possibility of \"Christian philosophy.\" One of the main participants, Etienne Gilson, in fact used Anselm's formula fides quaerens intellectum several times as one of the definitions of Christian philosophy. Anselm's work was influential for some of his contemporaries, and has continued to exercise influence in varying ways on philosophers and theologians to the present day. The so-called \"ontological argument\" has had numerous critics, defenders, and adaptors philosophically or theologically notable in their own right, among them St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Gassendi, Spinoza, Malebranche, Locke, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and an even greater number in the last century, not least of which were Charles Hartshorne, Etienne Gilson, Maurice Blondel, Martin Heidegger, Karl Barth, Norman Malcolm, and Alvin Plantinga. However, the \"argument\"(s) discussed in this literature are frequently not precisely what is found in Anselm's texts, and a sizable literature has developed addressing that very issue. Argument(s) for God's being or existence form only a small portion of Anselm's considerable and complex work, and his influence has been much wider and deeper than originating one perennial line of philosophical investigation and discussion. In his own time, he had several gifted students, among them Anselm of Laon, Gilbert Crispin, Eadmer (writer of the Vita Anselmi), Alexander (writer of the Dicta Anselmi), and Honorius Augustodunensis. His works were copied and disseminated in his lifetime, and exercised an influence on later Scholastics, among them Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham. For further discussion of Anselm's influence, cf. Ch\u00e2tillon, 1959, Southern, 1963, Rovighi, 1964, Hopkins, 1972, and Fortin, 2001. 3. Methodology: Faith and Reason The extent to which Anselm's work, and which portions of it, ought to be considered to be philosophy or theology (or \"philosophical theology,\" \"Christian philosophy,\" and so forth) is a long debated question. The answers (and their rationales) depend considerably on one's conceptions of philosophy and theology and their distinction and interaction. These admittedly important issues are set aside here in order to focus on three key features of Anselm's work: Anselm's pedagogical motivation and his intended audience; the notion of faith seeking understanding (fides quaerens intellectum); and Anselm's stylistics and dialectic. Anselm provides a paradigmatic account of the pedagogical motive structuring his works in theMonologion's Prologue. Some of the brothers have often and earnestly entreated me to set down in writing for them some of the matters I have brought to light for them when we spoke together in our accustomed discourses, about how the divine essence ought to be meditated upon and certain other things pertaining to that sort of meditation, as a kind of model for meditation.... They prescribed this 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 6\/53 form for me: nothing whatsoever in these matters should be made convincing [persuaderetur] by the authority of Scripture, but whatsoever the conclusion [finis], through individual investigations, should assert...the necessity of reason would concisely prove [cogeret], and the clarity of truth would evidently show that this is the case. They also wished that I not disdain to meet and address [obviare] simpleminded and almost foolish objections that occurred to me. (S. v. 1, p.7) The original audience for his writings was fellow Benedictine monks seeking a fuller understanding of the Christian faith and asking that Anselm provide an articulation of it in a form quite different than those typical and traditional of their time, namely, where such theological discussions were carried out primarily through citation and interpretation of Scripture and patristic authorities. Anselm expresses this pedagogical motive again in the Cur Deus Homo: \"I have often and most earnestly been asked by many, in speech and in writing, to commit in writing to posterity [memoriae. . commendem] reasonable answers [rationes] I am accustomed to give to those asking about a certain question of our faith.\" (S. v. 2, p.47) The goal of Anselm's treatises is not to provide a philosophical substitute for the Christian faith, nor to rationalize or systematize it solely in the light of natural reason. Rather, in the cases of the Monologionand Proslogion, he aims to treat meditatively, by reason's resources, central aspects of the Christian faith, namely, as he puts it in the Proslogion's Prologue: \"that God truly is, and that he is the supreme good needing no other, and that he is what all things need so that they are and so that they are well, and whatever else we believe about the divine substance.\" (S., v. 1, p. 93) In the other treatises (excepting theDe Grammatico, which he explicitly states to be for \"beginners in dialectic,\" and that it \"pertains to a different subject matter than [Sacred Scripture],\" S., v.1, p. 173), Anselm concerns himself with other important, and often interrelated, aspects of the Christian faith, developing the arguments through reasoning, rather than through explicit reliance on Scriptural or patristic authority in the course of argumentation. Over the course of his career, Anselm's intended audience expands considerably, however, particularly as he became involved in controversy over the Trinity that culminated in hisEpistola de Incarnatione Verbi and Cur Deus Homo. The Proslogion's Prologue provides a somewhat different, but clearly related motive for its production. After the Monologion, Anselm writes: \"considering that that work was constructed from an interlinking [concatenatione] of many arguments, I began to wonder if perhaps a single argument [unum argumentum] that needed nothing other than itself alone for proving itself.\" (S., v. 1, p. 93) Once he had uncovered this unum argumentum (\"single argument\") after great effort and difficulty, Anselm wrote about it and several other related topics, in the interest of sharing the joy it had brought him, or at least pleasing another who would read it (alicui legenti placiturum). Precisely what this single argument consists of has been a subject of considerable scholarly debate. A fairly common but clearly incorrect interpretation of the \"single argument\" takes it as referring 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 7\/53 only to the proof for God's existence or being in Chapter 2, or at most Chapters 2-4. At the other extreme, some commentators take the single argument to be the entirety of the Proslogion. A third, intermediary position argues that the unum argumentum is the entirety of the Proslogion, minus the last three chapters, for two reasons: 1) Anselm calls the last three chapters coniectationes; 2) Anselm says in the prooemium that he wrote the Proslogion about the argument itself (de hoc ipso) and about several other things (et de quibusdam aliis). As Anselm explains to his interlocutor Boso, his writing the De Conceptu Virginali is motivated by a purpose similar to that of the Proslogion, reexamining and rearticulating topics previously addressed in other works. For I am certain that when you read in the Cur Deus Homo. . . that, besides the one I set down there, another reason can be glimpsed [posse uideri], how God took on humanity without sin from the sinful mass of the human race, your most studious mind will be driven not a little to asking what this reason is. Accordingly, I feared that I would appear unjust to you if I conceal what I think on this [quod inde mihi videtur] from your enjoyment [dilectioni tuae]. (S., v. 2, p. 139) The prologue to the three connected dialogues (De Veritate, De Libertate Arbitrii, De Casu Diaboli) does not indicate conclusively whether they were written to answer specific requests of the monks. Clearly, however, they treat matters of both theological and philosophical interest arising out of reflection and discussion on Christian faith, life, and thought. Fides quaerens intellectum, \"faith seeking understanding\" was the Proslogion's original title and is an apt designation for Anselm's philosophical and theological projects as a whole. Anselm begins from, and never leaves the standpoint of a committed and practicing Catholic Christian, but this does not mean that his philosophical work is thereby vitiated as philosophy by operating on the basis of and within the confines of theological presuppositions. Rather, Anselm engages in philosophy, employing reasoning rather than appeal to Scriptural or patristic authority in order to establish the doctrines of the Christian faith (which, as a faithful and practicing believer, he takes as already established) in a different, but possible way, through the employment of reason. Faith seeking understanding goes beyond simply establishing faith's doctrines, however, precisely because it seeks understanding, the rational intelligibility (as far as is possible) of the doctrines. Anselm does cite Scripture at certain points in his work, as well as \"what we believe\" (quod credimus), but attention to his texts indicates that he does not rely on scriptural or doctrinal authority directly to resolve problems or to provide starting points for his reasoning. In some cases, he has the student or his own questioning voice (as in Proslogion, Chapter 8) bring up Scriptural passages of truths of Christian doctrine in order to raise problems that require a rational resolution. In other cases (as in De Concordia, Book 1 Chapter 5), he does use Scriptural passages as starting points for arguments, but for erroneous arguments that he then criticizes. In yet other cases, Anselm brings 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 8\/53 up Scripture precisely to explain how certain passages or expressions should be rightly understood (as in the De Casu Diaboli, explaining how God causing evil should be understood). Lastly, Anselm cites Scripture after the course of his argument in order to reconnect the rational argumentation with Christian revelation (as in Proslogion, Chapter 16, where Anselm's previous reasoning culminates in God \"inhabiting\" an \"inaccessible light\"). For discussion of Anselm and Scripture, cf. Barth, 1960, Tonini, 1970, and Henry, 1962. In his actual exercise of reason, Anselm displays both confidence in reason's capacity for providing understanding to faith, and awareness of the limitations human reason's exercise eventually runs into and becomes aware of. For instance, in Proslogion, Chapter 15, he concludes that God is not only that than which nothing greater can be thought, but something greater than can be thought. Another important aspect of Anselm's fides quaerens intellectum is that, in the Monologion, reason is employed by one who \"disputes and investigates with himself things he had not previously taken notice of [non animadvertisset],\" (S., v. 1, p. 8) and in the Proslogion, one \"striving to raise his mind to the contemplation of God, and seeking to understand what he believes.\" (S., v. 1, p. 94) Despite Anselm's deliberate employment of reason as a means to the truth about both the natural and the supernatural order, his rationalism is a mitigated one. Monologion Chapter 1 exemplifies this. Anselm's assessment is that one could persuade oneself of the truths argued for in the Monologion by the use of one's reason, but Anselm hastens to add: \"I wish it to be understood [accipi] that, even if a conclusion is reached [concludatur] seemingly as necessary [quasi necessarium] from reasons that seem good to me, it is not that it is entirely [omnino] necessary, but only that for the current time [interim] it be said to be able to appear necessary.\" (S., v. 1, p.14) Chapter 64 of the Monologion provides another important discussion of the use of reason and argument. Anselm distinguishes between being able to understand or explain that something is true or that something exists, and being able to understand or explain how something is true. Since the divine substance, the triune God is ultimately beyond the capacities of human understanding, reason, or more precisely the reasoning human subject, must recognize both the limits and the capacities of reason. I think that for someone investigating an incomprehensible matter it ought to be sufficient, if by reasoning towards it, he arrives at knowing that it most certainly does exist, even if he is unable to go further by use of the intellect [penetrare. . . intellectu] into how it is this way. Nor for that reason should we withhold the certainty of faith from those things that are asserted through necessary proofs [probationibus], and that are inconsistent with no other reason, if because of the incomprehensibility of their natural sublimity they do not allow themselves [non patiuntur] to be explained. (S., v. 1, p. 75) Anselm is not skeptically questioning or undermining the capacities of reason and argumentation. Not every possible object the intellect attempts to engage with presents such problems, but only 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 9\/53 God. Accordingly, although a completely full and exhaustively systematic account cannot be provided of the divine substance, this does not undermine the certainty of what reason has been able to determine. Stylistically, Anselm's treatises take two basic forms, dialogues and sustained meditations. The former represent pedagogical discussions between a fairly gifted and inquisitive pupil and a teacher. In the latter, Anselm provides, as noted earlier, models of meditation, but the model differs considerably from theMonologion to the Proslogion, for in the first treatise, Anselm aims to provide a model of a person meditating, or (using Aristotle's conception) engaging in dialectic with himself, while in the second case, the person addresses himself to the very God that he is attempting to comprehend as best as human capacities allow. In the dialogue Cur Deus Homo, a student, Boso, \"my brother and most beloved son\" (S., v. 2, p. 139) is called by name. In the majority of the dialogues, the student and teacher are not named; it is clear, however, that the teacher represents Anselm and presents Anselm's doctrines. The De Conceptu Virginali and the De Concordia are not written in the same dialogue form as the other treatises, but they are dialogical in their narrative voice(s), since Anselm addresses himself to another person (in the De Conceptu Virginali to Boso), articulating possible problems and objections his reader might make in order to address them. The dialogue form serves a pedagogical purpose and reflects the project of fides quaerens intellectum, exemplified well by this passage from the De Casu Diaboli: \"[L]et it not weary you to briefly reply to my silly questioning [fatuae interrogationi], so that I might know how I should respond to someone asking me the very same thing. Indeed, it is not always easy to respond wisely [sapienter] to someone who is asking foolishly [insipienter].\" (S., v. 1, p. 275) Interestingly, it appears that a recurring problem for Anselm was his treatises being copied and circulated without his authorization and before their final and finished state. He asserts this to be the case with the three connected dialogues and the Cur Deus Homo. The following sections provide discussions of, and excerpts from, many of Anselm's key works. With the exception of the Proslogion, Monologion, and Cur Deus Homo, the works are examined in chronological order (as best as we know it). These three works are discussed first and in this order because the Proslogion has garnered the most attention from philosophers (more than the earlierMonologion, with which it shares similar aims and content) and the Cur Deus Homo likewise has garnered more attention from theologians than the earlier three dialogues \"pertaining to study of Sacred Scripture\" (S., v.1, p. 173) (the De Veritate, De Libertate Arbitrii, and De Casu Diaboli). 4. The Proslogion 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 10\/53 In the Proslogion, Anselm intended to replace the many interconnected arguments from his previous and much longer work, the Monologion, with a single argument. Since the unum argumentum is supposed to prove not only that God exists, but other matters about God as well, as noted above, there is some scholarly controversy as to exactly what the argument is in the Proslogion's text. Clearly, the so-called \"ontological argument\" for God's existence in Chapter 2 plays a central role. It must be pointed out that Anselm nowhere uses the term \"ontological argument,\" nor in fact do the critics or proponents of the argument until Kant's time. It has unfortunately become so ingrained in our philosophical vocabulary, especially in Anglophone Anselm scholarship, however, that it would be pedantic to insist on not using it at all. An interesting and sizable recent literature has developed explicitly contesting the appellation \"ontological\" applied to Anselm's Proslogion proof(s) of God's being or existence, a partial bibliography of which is provided in McEvoy, 1994. Noting that God is believed to be something than which nothing greater can be thought (quo maius cogitari non potest), Anselm asks whether such a thing exists, since the Fool of the Psalms has said in his heart that there is no God. But certainly that very same Fool, when he hears this very expression I say [hoc ipsum quod dico]: \"something than which nothing greater can be thought,\" understands what he hears; and what he understands is in his understanding [in intellectu], even if he does not understand that thing to exist. For it is one thing to be in the understanding, and another to understand a thing to exist. . . . . Therefore even the fool is compelled to admit [convincitur] that there is in his understanding something than which nothing greater can be thought, since when he hears this he understands it, and whatever is understood is in the understanding. And certainly that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot exist in the understanding alone. For if it is in the intellect alone [in solo intellectu], it can be thought to also be in reality [in re], which is something greater. If, therefore, that than which a greater cannot be thought is in the intellect alone, that very thing than which a greater cannot be thought is that than which a greater can be thought. But surely that cannot be. Therefore, without a doubt, something than which a greater cannot be thought exists [exsistit] both in the understanding and in reality. (S., v. 1, p. 101-2) In Chapter 3, Anselm continues the argumentation, providing what some commentators take to be a second ontological argument. And, it so truly exists that it cannot be thought not to be. For, a thing, which cannot be thought not to be (which is greater than what cannot be thought not to be), can be thought to be. So, if that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought not to be, that very thing than which a greater cannot be thought is not that than which a greater cannot be thought, which cannot be compatible [convenire, i.e. with the thing being such]. Therefore, there truly is something than which a greater cannot be thought, and it cannot be thought not to be. (S., p. 102-3) Addressing himself to God, Anselm explains why God cannot be thought not to exist, indicating why God uniquely has this status. \"[I]f some mind could think something better than you, the creature would ascend over the Creator, and would engage in judgment about the Creator, which is 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 11\/53 quite absurd. And anything else whatsoever other than yourself can be thought not to exist. For you alone are the most true of all things, and thus you have being to the greatest degree [maxime], for anything else is not so truly [as God], and for this reason has less of being.\" (S., p. 103) This raises a puzzle, however. Why does the Fool not only doubt whether God exists, but assert that there is no God? One possible, but rather circular answer is provided at the end of Chapter 3. \"Why else, except because he is stupid and a fool?\" (S., p. 103) As Anselm knows, however, that does not really answer the question. Chapter 4 provides an answer. The Fool both does and does not think [cogitare] that God does not exist, since there are two senses of \"think\": A thing is thought of in one way when one thinks of the word [vox] signifying it, in another way when what the thing itself is is understood. Therefore, in the first way it can be thought that God does not exist, but in the second way not at all. Indeed no one who understands that which God is can think that God is not, even though he says these words in his heart, either without any signification or with some other signification not properly applying to God [aliqua extranea significatione]. (S., p. 103-104) Proslogion Chapters 5-26 deal progressively with the divine attributes, 5-23 either continuing or building off of the argument, and 24-26 being connected conjectures about God's goodness. In Chapter 5, Anselm deduces attributes of God from the same \"than which nothing greater can be thought\" he used in Chapters 2-4. What then are you, Lord God, that than which nothing greater can be thought? But what are you if not that which is the greatest of all things, who alone exists through himself, who made everything else from nothing? For whatever is not this, is less than what can be thought. But this cannot be thought about you. For what good is lacking to the supreme good, through which every good thing is? And so, you are just, truthful, happy, and whatever it is better to be than not to be. (S., p. 104) These attributes of God, what it is better to be than not to be, are filled out in Chapter 6 (percipient, omnipotent, merciful, impassible), Chapter 11 (living, wise, good, happy, eternal), and Chapter 18 (an unity). In Chapter 18, Anselm argues from God's superlative unity to the unity of his attributes. \"[Y]ou are so much a kind of unity [unum quiddam] and identical to yourself, that you are dissimilar to yourself in no way; indeed, you are that very unity, divisible by no understanding. Therefore, life and wisdom and the other [attributes] are not parts of you but all of them are one, and each of them is entirely what you are, and what the other [attributes] are.\" (S., p. 115) In Chapter 23, he employs this notion of superlative unity to explain how God can be a Trinity, indicating that all of the persons of the Trinity share equally and completely in the divine attributes. In the divine unity, the second person of the Trinity, the Son, or the Word is coequal to the first person, \"Truly, there cannot be anything other than what you are, or anything greater or lesser than 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 12\/53 you in the Word by which you speak yourself; for your Word is true [verum] in the same way that you are truthful [quomodo tu verax], and for that reason he is the very same truth as you, not other than you.\" (S., p. 117) The same holds for the third person of the Trinity, which is \"the one love, common to you and your Son, that is, the Holy Spirit who proceeds from both.\" (S., p. 117) Accordingly, for each of the persons of the Trinity, \"what any of them is individually is at the same time the entire Trinity, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; for, any one of them individually is not something other than the supremely simple unity and the supremely one simplicity, which cannot be multiplied or be one thing different from another.\" (S., p. 117) There are five other main matters that Anselm addresses in the Proslogion, the first three of which are sets of problems stemming from seeming incompatibilities in the divine attributes. Anselm puts these questions in Chapter 6. \"How can you be perceptive [es sensibilis] if you are not a body? How can you be omnipotent, if you cannot do everything? How can you be merciful and impassible at the same time?\" (S., p. 104) Anselm deals with the first briefly in Chapter 6, proposing that perceiving is knowing (cognoscere) or aimed at knowing (ad cognoscendum), so that God is supremely perceptive without knowing things through the type of sensibility human beings and animals have. The argumentation of Chapter 7 is particularly important. There are things that God cannot do, for instance lying, being corrupted, making what is true to be false or what has been done to not be done. It seems that a truly omnipotent being ought to be able to do these things. To be able to do such things, Anselm suggests, is not really to have a power (potentia), but really a kind of powerlessness (impotentia). \"For one who can do these things, can do what is not advantageous to oneself and what one ought not do. The more a person can do these things, the more adversity and perversity can do against that person, and the less that person can do against these.\" (S., p. 105) So, one who does these things does them through powerlessness, through having one's agency subjected to that of something other, rather than through one's power. This, as Anselm explains, relies on an inexact manner of speaking, where one expresses powerlessness or inability as a kind of power or ability In Chapters 8-11, through a longer and more sustained argument, Anselm answers the third question explaining how God can be both merciful and just at the same time. The explanation rests on God's mercy stemming from his goodness, which is not ultimately something different from God's justice, and which can be reconciled with it. Anselm concludes in Chapter 12: \"But certainly, whatever you are, you are not through another but through yourself. Accordingly, you are the very life by which you live, and the wisdom by which you are wise, and the goodness by which you are good to good people and bad people; and likewise with similar attributes.\" (S., p. 110) For God to be merciful to, forgive, and therefore not render justice to all transgressors, or likewise for God to not extend mercy, forgive, and therefore render justice to all transgressors would be for God to be something lesser than He is. It is, in effect, greater to be able to be just and merciful at the same time, which is possible for God precisely because justice and goodness coincide only in God. At the same 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 13\/53 time, Anselm concedes that when it comes to understanding precisely why God mercifully forgives of justly rendered judgment in a particular case is beyond our human capacities. For further discussion of Chapters 8-11, cf. Bayart, 1937, Corbin, 1988, and Sadler, 2006. The fourth main issue, discussed in Chapters 14-17, has to do with our limited knowledge of God, which stems both from human sinfulness and God's dazzling splendor. Again, as in Chapter 4, one can say that something is and is not the case at the same time, because it is being said in different and distinguishable ways. \"If [my soul] did not see you [God], then it did not see the light or the truth. But, is not the truth and the light what it saw and yet did it still not yet see you, since it saw you only in a certain way [aliquatenus] but did not see you exactly as you are [sicuti es]?\" (S., p. 111) The reason the human soul does not see God directly is twofold, stemming both from finite human nature and from infinite divine nature. \"But certainly [the human mind] is darkened in itself, and it is dazzled [reverbetur] by you. It is obscured by its own shortness of view [sua brevitate], and it is overwhelmed by your immensity. Truly it is restricted [contrahitur] in by its own narrowness, and it is overcome [vincitur] by your grandeur.\" (S., p. 112) For this reason, in Chapter 15, Anselm concludes that God is in fact \"greater than can be thought\" (maior quam cogitari potest). Finally, in Chapters 18-21, Anselm discusses God's eternity. Anselm first indicates that God's eternity is such that God is entirely present whenever and wherever God is, which is to say everywhere and at all times. Then, in Chapter 19, he begins to articulate the implications of God's eternity more fully, ultimately leading into a transformation of perspective. Just as it is not the case that there is eternity and God happens to be in and is therefore eternal, since the reality is that God is eternity itself, God is not in every time or place, but rather everything, all times and places, is in God, that is, in God's eternity. 5. Gaunilo's Reply and Anselm's Response Gaunilo, a monk from the Abbey of Marmoutier, while noting the value of the remainder of theProslogion, attacked its argument for God's existence on several counts. His arguments prefigure many arguments made by later philosophers against ontological arguments for God's existence, and Anselm's responses provide additional insight into the Proslogion argument. Gaunilo makes four main objections, and in each case, Gaunilo transposes Anselm's \"that than which nothing greater can be thought\" into \"that which is greater than everything else that can be thought.\" Gaunilo asserts that an additional argument is needed to move from this being having been thought to it being impossible for it not to be. \"It needs to be proven to me by some other undoubtable argument that this being is of such a sort that as soon as it is thought its undoubtable existence is perceived with certainty by the understanding.\" (S., v. 1, p. 126) He brings up this need for a further, 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 14\/53 unsupplied, argument twice more in his Reply, and in the last instance discusses what is really at issue. The Fool can say: \"[W]hen did I say that in the truth of the matter [rei veritate] there was such a thing that is 'greater than everything?' For first, by some other completely certain argument, some superior nature must be proven to exist, that is, one greater or better than everything that exists, so that from this we could prove all the other things that cannot be lacking to what is greater or better than everything else.\" (S., p. 129) A second problem is whether one can actually understand what is supposed to be understood in order for the argument to work because God is unlike any creature, anything that we have knowledge or a conception of . \"When I hear 'that which is greater than everything that can be thought,' which cannot be said to be anything other than God himself, I cannot think it or have it in the intellect on the basis of something I know from its species or genus. . . . For I neither know the thing itself, nor can I form an idea of it from something similar.\" (S., p. 126-7) Gaunilo continues along this line, arguing that the verbal formula employed in the argument is merely that, a verbal formula. The formula cannot really be understood, so it does not then really exist in the understanding. The signification or meaning of the terms can be thought, \"but not as by a person who knows what is typically signified by this expression [voce], i.e. by one who thinks it on the basis of a thing that is true at least in thought alone.\" (S., p. 127) Instead, what is actually being thought, according to Gaunilo, is vague. The signification or meaning of the terms is grasped only in a groping manner. \"[I]t is thought as by one who does not know the thing and simply thinks on the basis of a movement of the mind produced by hearing this expression, trying to picture to himself the meaning of the expression perceived.\" (S., p. 127) From this, Gaunilo concludes what he takes to be a denial of one of the premises of the argument: \"So much then for the notion that that supreme nature is said to already exist in my understanding.\" (S., p. 127) A third problem that Gaunilo raises is that the argument could be applied to things other than God, things that are clearly imaginary, so that, if the argument were valid, it could be used to prove much more than Anselm intended, namely falsities. Here, the example of the Lost Island is introduced. \"You can no longer doubt that this island excelling [praestantiorem] all other lands truly exists somewhere in reality, this island that you do not doubt to exist in your understanding; and since it is more excellent not to be in the understanding alone but also to be in reality, so it is necessary that it exists, since, if it did not, any other land that exists in reality would be more excellent than it.\" (S., p. 128) Anselm's responses are long, detailed, and dense. Anselm notes Gaunillo's alteration of the terms of the argument, and that this affects the force of the argument. You repeat often that I say that, because what is greater than everything else [maius omnibus] is in the understanding, if it is the understanding it is in reality \u2013 for otherwise what is greater than everything else would not be greater than everything else \u2013 but such a proof [probatio] is 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 15\/53 found nowhere in all of the things I have said. For, saying \"that which is greater than all\" and \"that than which nothing greater can be thought\" do not have the same value for proving that what is being talked about is in reality. (S., p. 134)Therefore if, from what is said to be \"greater than everything,\" what \"that than which nothing greater can be thought\" proves of itself through itself [de se per seipsum] cannot be proved in a similar way, you have unjustly criticized me for having said what I did not say, when this differs so much from what I did say. (S., p. 135) In Anselm's view, Gaunilo demands a further argument precisely because he has not understood the argument as Anselm presented it. Anselm also affirms that we can understand the meaning of the term, \"that than which nothing greater can be thought,\" and that it is not simply a verbal formula. Again, that you say that, when you hear it, you are not able to think or have in your mind \"that than which a greater cannot be thought\" on the basis of something known from its species or genus, so that you neither know the thing itself, nor can you form an idea of it from something similar. But quite evidently the matter is and remains otherwise [aliter sese habere]. For, every lesser good, insofar as it is good, is similar to a greater good. It is apparent to any reasonable mind that by ascending from lesser goods to greater ones, from those than which something greater can be thought, we are able to infer much [multum. . .conjicere] about that than which nothing greater can be thought. (S., p. 138) Anselm notes a similarity between the terms \"ineffable,\" \"unthinkable,\" and \"that than which nothing greater can be thought,\" for in each case, it can be impossible for us to think or understand the thing referred to by the expression, but the expression can be thought and understood. Earlier on, Anselm makes a distinction that sheds additional light on this distinction between thinking and understanding the expression, and thinking and understanding the thing referred to by the expression. He also employs a useful metaphor. \"[I]f you say that what is not entirely understood is not understood and is not in the understanding: say, then, that since someone is not able to gaze upon the purest light of the sun does not see light that is nothing but sunlight.\" (S., p. 132) We do not have to fully and exhaustively understand what a term refers to in order for us to understand the term, and that applies to this case. \"Certainly 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' is understood and is in the understanding at least to the extent [hactenus] that these things are understood of it.\" (S., p. 132) Anselm also clarifies the scope of his argument, indicating that it applies only to God: \"I say confidently that if someone should find for me something existing either in reality or solely in thought, besides 'that than which a greater cannot be thought,' to which the schematic framework [conexionem] of my argument could rightly be adapted [aptare valeat], I will find and give him this lost island, nevermore to be lost.\" (S., p. 134) 6. The Monologion 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 16\/53 This earlier and considerably longer work includes an argument for God's existence, but also much more discussion of the divine attributes and economy, and some discussion of the human mind. The proof Anselm provides in Chapter 1 is one he considers easiest for a person who, either because of not hearing or because of not believing, does not know of the one nature, greatest of all things that are, alone sufficient to itself in its eternal beatitude, and who by his omnipotent goodness gives to and makes for all other things that they are something or that in some way they are well [aliquomodo bene sunt], and of the great many other things that we necessarily believe about God or about what he has created. (S., v. 1, p. 13) The Monologion proof argues from the existence of many good things to a unity of goodness, a one thing through which all other things are good. Anselm first asks whether the diversity of good we experience through our senses and through our mind's reasoning are all good through one single good thing, or whether there are different and multiple good things through which they are good. He recognizes, of course, that there are a variety of ways for things to be good things, and he also recognizes that many things are in fact good through other things. But, he is pushing the question further, since for every good thing B through which another good thing A is good, one can still ask what that good thing B is good through. If goods can even be comparable as goods, there must be some more general and unified way of regarding their goodness, or that through which they are good. Anselm argues: \"you are not accustomed to considering something good except on an account of some usefulness, as health and those things that conduce to health are said to be good [propter aliquam utilitatem], or because of being of intrinsic value in some way [propter quamlibet honestatem], just as beauty and things that contribute to beauty are esteemed to be a good.\" (S., p. 14) This being granted, usefulness and intrinsic values can be brought to a more general unity. \"It is necessary, for all useful or intrinsically valuable things, if they are indeed good things, that they are good through this very thing, through which all goods altogether [cuncta bona] must exist, whatever this thing might be.\" (S., p. 14-5) This good alone is good through itself. All other good things are ultimately good through this thing, which is the superlative or supreme good. Certain corollaries can be drawn from this. One is that all good things are not only good through this Supreme Good; they are good, that is to say they have their being from the Supreme Good. Another is that \"what is supremely good [summe bonum] is also supremely great [summe magnum]. Accordingly, there is one thing that is supremely good and supremely great, i.e. the highest [summum] of all things that are.\" (S., p. 15) In Chapter 2, Anselm clarifies what he means by \"great,\" making a point that will assume greater importance in Chapter 15: \"But, I am speaking about 'great' not with respect to physical space [spatio], as if it is some body, but rather about things that are greater [maius] to the degree that they are better [melius] or more worthy [dignus], for instance wisdom.\" (S., p. 15) Chapter 3 provides further discussion of the ontological dependence of all beings on this being. For any thing that is or exists, there must be something through which it is or exists. \"For, everything 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 17\/53 that is, either is through [per] something or through nothing. But nothing is through nothing. For, it cannot be thought [non. . .cogitari potest] that something should be but not through something. So, whatever is, only is through something.\" (S., p. 15-6) Anselm considers and rejects several possible ways of explaining how it is that all things are. There could be one single being through which all things have their being. Or there could be a plurality of beings through which other beings have their being. The second possibility allows three cases: \"[I]f they are multiple, then either: 1) they are referred to some single thing through which they are, or 2) they are, individually [singula], through themselves [per se], or 3) they are mutually through each other [per se invicem].\" (S., p. 16) In the first case, they are all through one single being. In the second case, there is still some single power or nature of existing through oneself [existendi per se], common to all of them. Saying that they exist through themselves really means that they exist through this power or nature which they share. Again, they have one single ontological ground upon which they are dependent. One can propose the third case, but it is upon closer consideration absurd. \"Reason does not allow that there would be many things [that have their being] mutually through each other, since it is an irrational thought that some thing should be through another thing, to which the first thing gives its being.\" (S., p. 16) For Anselm three things follow from this. First, there is a single being through which all other beings have their being. Second, this being must have its being through itself. Third, in the gradations of being, this being is to the greatest degree. Whatever is through something else is less than that through which everything else together is, and that which alone is through itself. . . . So, there is one thing that alone, of all things, is, to the greatest degree and supremely [maxime et summe]. For, what of all things is to the greatest degree, and through which anything else is good or great, and through which anything else is something, necessarily that thing is supremely good and supremely great and the highest of all things that are. (S., p. 16) Chapter 4 continues this discussion of degrees. In the nature of things, there are varying degrees (gradus) of dignity or worth (dignitas). The example Anselm uses is humorous and indicates an important feature of the human rational mind, namely its capacity to grasp these different degrees of worth. \"For, one who doubts whether a horse in its nature is better than a piece of wood, and that a human being is superior to a horse, that person assuredly does not deserve to be called a human being.\" (S., p. 17) Anselm argues that there must be a highest nature, or rather a nature that does not have a superior, otherwise the gradations would be infinite and unbounded, which he considers absurd. By argumentation similar to that of the previous chapters, he adduces that there can only be one such highest nature. The scale of gradations comes up again later in Chapter 31, where he indicates that creatures' degrees of being, and being superior to other creatures, depends on their degree of likeness to God (specifically to the divine Word). 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 18\/53 [E]very understanding judges natures in any way living to be superior to non-living ones, sentient natures to be superior to non-sentient ones, rational ones to be superior to irrational ones. For since the Supreme Nature, in its own unique manner, not only is but also lives and perceives and is rational, it is clear that. . . what in any way is living is more alike to the Supreme Nature than that which does not in any way live; and, what in any way, even by bodily sense, knows something is more like the Supreme Nature than what does not perceive at all; and, what is rational is more like the Supreme Nature than what is not capable of reason. (S., p. 49) Through something akin to what analytic philosophers might term a thought-experiment and phenomenologists an eidetic variation, Anselm considers a being gradually stripped of reason, sentience, life, and then the \"bare being\" (nudum esse) that would be left: \"[T]his substance would be in this way bit by bit destroyed, led by degrees (gradatim) to less and less being, and finally to nonbeing. And, those things that, when they are taken away [absumpta] one by one from some essence, reduce it to less and less being, when they are reassumed [assumpta] . . . lead it to greater and greater being.\" (S., p. 49-50) In the chapters that follow, Anselm indicates that the Supreme Nature derives its existence only from itself, meaning that it was never brought into existence by something else. Anselm uses an analogy to suggest how the being of the Supreme Being can be understood. Therefore in what way it should be understood [intelligenda est] to be through itself and from itself [per se et ex se], if it does not make itself, not arise as its own matter, nor in any way help itself to be what it was not before?. . . .In the way \"light\" [lux] and \"to light\" [lucere] and \"lighting\" [lucens] are related to each other [sese habent ad invicem], so are \"essence\" [essentia] and \"to be\" [esse] and \"being,\" i.e. supremely existing or supremely subsisting. (S., p. 20) This Supreme Nature is that through which all things have their being precisely because it is the Creator, which creates all beings (including the matter of created beings) ex nihilo. In Chapters 8-14, the argument shifts direction, leading ultimately to a restatement of the traditional Christian doctrine of the Logos (the \"Word\" of God, the Son of the Father and Creator). The argumentation starts by examination of the meaning of \"nothing,\" distinguishing different senses and uses of the term. Creation ex nihilo could be interpreted three different ways. According to the first way, \"what is said to have been made from nothing has not been made at all.\" (S., p. 23) In another way, \"something was said to be made from nothing in this way, that it was made from this very nothing, that is from that which is not; as if this nothing were something existing, from which something could be made.\" (S., p. 23) Finally, there is a \"third interpretation. . . when we understand something to be made but that there is not something from which it has been made.\" (S., p. 23) The first way, Anselm says, cannot be properly applied to anything that actually has been made, and the second way is simply false, so the third way or sense is the correct interpretation. In 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 19\/53 Chapter 9, an important implication of creation ex nihilo is drawn out \"There is no way that something could come to be rationally from another, unless something preceded the thing to be made in the maker's reason as a model, or to put it better a form, or a likeness, or a rule.\" (S., p. 24) This, in turn implies another important doctrine: \"what things were going to be, or what kinds of things or how the things would be, were in the supreme nature's reason before everything came to be.\" (S., p. 24) In subsequent chapters, the doctrine is further elaborated, culminating in this pattern being the utterance (locutio) of the supreme essence and the supreme essence, that is to say the Word (verbum) of the Father, while being of the same substance as the Father. Chapter 15-28 examine, discuss, and argue for particular attributes of God, 15-17 and 28 being of particular interest. Chapter 15 is devoted to the matter of what can be said about the divine substance. Relative terms do not really communicate the essence of the divine being, even including expressions such as \"the highest of all\" (summa omnium) or \"greater than everything that has been created by it\" (maior omnibus . . .) \"For if none of those things ever existed, in relation to which [God] is called \"the highest\" and \"greater,\" it would be understood to be neither the highest nor greater. But still, it would be no less good on that account, nor would it suffer any loss of the greatness of its essence. And this is obvious, for this reason: whatever may be good or great, this thing is not such through another but by its very self.\" (S., p. 28) There are still other ways of talking about the divine substance. One way is to say that the divine substance is \"whatever is in general [omnino] better that what is not it. For, it alone is that than which nothing is better, and that which is better than everything else that is not what it is.\" (S., p. 29) Given that explanation, while there are some things that it is better for certain beings to be rather than not to be, God will not be those things, but only what it is absolutely better to be than not to be. So, for instance, God will not be a body, but God will be wise or just. Anselm provides a partial listing of the qualities or attributes that do express the divine essence: \"living, wise, powerful and all-powerful, true, just, happy, eternal, and whatever in like wise it is absolutely better to be than not to be.\" (S., p. 29) Anselm raises a problem in Chapter 16. Granted that God has these attributes, one might think that all that is being signified is that God is a being that has these attributes to a greater degree than other beings, not what God is. Anselm uses justice as the example, which is fitting since it is usually conceived of as something relational. Anselm first sets out the problem in terms of participation in qualities. \"[E]verything that is just is just through justice, and similarly for other things of this sort. Accordingly, that very supreme nature is not just unless through justice. So, it appears that by participation in the quality, namely justice, the supremely good substance can be called just.\" (S., p. 30) And this reasoning leads to the conclusion that the supremely good substance \"is just through another, and not through itself.\" (S., p. 30) 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 20\/53 The problem is that God is what he is through himself, while other things are what they are through him. In the case of each divine attribute, as in the later Proslogion, God having that attribute is precisely that attribute itself, so that for instance, God is not just by some standard or idea of justice extrinsic to God himself, but rather God is God's own justice, and justice in the superlative sense. Everything else canhave the attribute of justice, whereas God is justice. This argument can be extended to all of God's attributes What is perceived to have been settled in the case of justice, the intellect is constrained by reason to judge [sentire] to be the case about everything that is said in a similar way about that supreme nature. Whichever of them, then, is said about the supreme nature, it is not how [qualis] nor how much [quanta] [the supreme nature has quality] that is shown [monstratur] but rather what it is. . . .Thus, it is the supreme essence, supreme life, supreme reason, supreme salvation [salus], supreme justice, supreme wisdom, supreme truth, supreme goodness, supreme greatness, supreme beauty, supreme immortality, supreme incorruptibility, supreme immutability, supreme happiness, supreme eternity, supreme power [potestas], supreme unity, which is nothing other than supreme being, supremely living, and other things in like wise [similiter]. (S., p. 30-1) This immediately raises yet another problem, however, because this seems like a multiplicity of supreme attributes, implying that each is a particularly superlative way of being for God, suggesting that God is in some manner a composite. Instead, in God (not in any other being) each of these is all of the others. God's being alone, as Chapter 28 argues, is being in an unqualified sense. All other beings, since they are mutable, or because they can be understood to have come from non-being, \"barely (vix) exist or almost (fere) do not exist.\" (S., p. 46) Chapters 29-48 continue the investigation of the generation of the \"utterance\" or Word, the Son, from the Father in the divine economy, and 49-63 expand this to discussion of the love between the Father and the Son, namely the Holy Spirit, equally God as the Father and Son. 64-80 discuss the human creature's grasp and understanding of God. Chapter 31 is of particular interest, and discusses the relationship between words or thoughts in human minds and the Word or Son by which all things were created by the Father. A human mind contains images or likenesses of things that are thought of or talked about, and a likeness is true to the degree that it imitates more or less the thing of which it is likeness, so that the thing has a priority in truth and in being over the human subject apprehending it, or more properly speaking, over the image, idea, or likeness by which the human subject apprehends the thing. In the Word, however, there are not likenesses or images of the created things, but instead, the created things are themselves imitations of their true essences in the Word. The discussion in Chapters 64-80, which concludes the Monologion, makes three central points. First, the triune God is ineffable, and except in certain respects incomprehensible, but we can arrive at this conclusion and understand it to some degree through reason. This is because our argu5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 21\/53 ments and investigations do not attain the distinctive character (proprietatem) of God. That does not present an insurmountable problem, however. For often we talk about many things that we do not express properly, exactly as they really are, but we signify through another thing what we will not or can not bring forth properly, as for instance when we speak in riddles. And often we see something, not properly, exactly how the thing is, but through some likeness or image, for instance when we look upon somebody's face in a mirror. Indeed, in this way we talk about and do not talk about, see and do not see, the same thing. We talk about it and see it through something else; we do not talk about it and see it through its distinctive character [proprietatem]Now, whatever names seem to be able to be said of this nature, they do not so much reveal it to me through its distinctive character as signify it [innuunt] to me through some likeness. (S., v. 1, p. 76) Anselm uses the example of the divine attribute of wisdom. \"For the name 'wisdom' is not sufficient to reveal to me that being through which all things were made from nothing and preserved from [falling into] nothing.\" (S., p. 76) The outcome of this is that all human thought and knowledge about God is mediated through something. Likenesses are never the thing of which they are a likeness, but there are greater and lesser degrees of likeness. This leads to the second point. Human beings come closer to knowing God through investigating what is closer to him, namely the rational mind, which is a mirror both of itself and, albeit in a diminished way, of God. [J]ust as the rational mind alone among all other creatures is able to rise to the investigation of this Being, likewise it is no less alone that through which the rational mind itself can make progress towards investigation of that Being. For we have already come to know [jam cognitum est] that the rational mind, through the likeness of natural essence, most approaches that Being. What then is more evident than that the more assiduously the rational mind directs itself to learning about itself, the more effectively it ascends to the knowledge [cognitionem] of that Being, and that the more carelessly it looks upon itself, the more it descends from the exploration [speculatione] of that Being? (S., v. 1, p. 77) Third, to be truly rational involves loving and seeking God, which in fact requires an effort to remember and understand God. \"[I]t is clear that the rational creature ought to expend all of its capacity and willing [suum posse et velle] on remembering and understanding and loving the Supreme Good, for which purpose it knows itself to have its own being.\" (S., p. 79) 7. Cur Deus Homo The Monologion and Proslogion (although often only Chapters 2-4 of the latter) are typically studied by philosophers. The Cur Deus Homo (Why God Became Man) is more frequently studied by theologians, particularly since Anselm's interpretation of the Atonement has been influential in Christian theology. The method, however, as in his other works, is primarily a philosophical one, 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 22\/53 attempting to understand truths of the Christian faith through the use of reasoning, granted of course, that this reasoning is applied to theological concepts. Anselm provides a twofold justification for the treatise, both responding to requests \"by speech and by letter.\" The first is for those asking Anselm to discuss the Incarnation, providing rational accounts (rationes) \"not so that through reason they attain to faith, but so that they may delight in the understanding and contemplation of those things they believe, and so that they might be, as much as possible, 'always ready to satisfy all those asking with an account [rationem] for those things for which' we 'hope.'\" (S., v. 2, p. 48) The second is for those same people, but so that they can engage in argument with non-Christians. As Anselm says, non-believers make the question of the Incarnation a crux in their arguments against Christianity, \"ridiculing Christian simplicity as foolishness, and many faithful are accustomed to turn it over in their hearts.\" (S., p. 48) The question simply stated is this: \"by what reason or necessity was God made man, and by his death, as we believe and confess, gave back life to the world, when he could have done this either through another person, either human or angelic, or through his will alone?\" (S., p. 48) In Chapter 3, Anselm's interlocutor, his fellow monk and student Boso, raises several specific objections made by non-Christians to the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation: \"we do injustice and show contempt [contumeliam] to God when we affirm that he descended into a woman's womb, and that he was born of woman, that he grew nourished by milk and human food, and \u2013 so that I can pass over many other things that do not seem befitting to God\u2013 that he endured weariness, hunger, thirst, lashes, and the cross and death between thieves.\" (S., v. 2, p. 51) Anselm's immediate response mirrors the structure of the Cur Deus Homo. Each of the points he makes are argued in fuller detail later in the work. For it was fitting that, just as death entered into the human race by man's disobedience, so should life be restored by man's obedience. And, that, just as the sin that was the cause of our damnation had its beginning from woman, so the author of our justice and salvation should be born from woman. And, that the devil conquered man through persuading him to taste from the tree [ligni], should be conquered by man through the passion he endured on the tree [ligni]. (S., p. 51) The first book (Chapters 1-25), produces a lengthy argument, involving a number of distinctions, discussions about the propriety of certain expressions and the entailments of willing certain things. Chapters 16-19 represent a lengthy digression involving questions about the number of angels who fell or rebelled against God, whether their number is to be made up of good humans, and related questions. The three most important parts of the argument take the form of these discussions: the justice and injustice of God, humans, and the devil; the entailments of the Father and the Son willing the redemption of humanity; the inability of humans to repay God for their sins. 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 23\/53 Anselm distinguishes, as he does in the earlier treatise De Veritate, different ways in which an action or state can be just or unjust, specifically just and unjust at the same time, but not in the same way of looking at the matter. \"For, it happens sometimes [contingit] that the same thing is just and unjust considered from different viewpoints [diversis considerationibus], and for this reason it is adjudged to be entirely just or entirely unjust by those who do not look at it carefully.\" (S., p. 57) Humans are justly punished by God for sin, and they are justly tormented by the devil, but the devil unjustly torments humans, even though it is just for God to allow this to take place.\"In this way, the devil is said to torment a man justly, because God justly permits this and the man justly suffers it. But, because a man is said to justly suffer, one does not mean that he justly suffers because of his own justice, but because he is punished by God's just judgment.\" (S., p. 57) Not only distinguishing between different ways of looking at the same matter is needed, but also distinguishing between what is directly willed and what is entailed in willing certain things. On first glance, it could seem that God the Father directly wills the death of Jesus Christ, God the Son, or that the latter wills his own death. Indeed something like this has to be the case, because God does will the redemption of humanity, and this comes through the Incarnation and through Christ's death and resurrection. According to Anselm, Christ dies as an entailment of what it is that God wills. \"For, if we intend to do something, but propose to do something else first through which the other thing will be done, when what we chose to be first is done, if what we intend comes to be, it is correctly said to be done on account of the other...\" (S., p. 62-3) Accordingly, what God willed (as both Father and Son) was the redemption of the human race, which required the death of Christ, and required this \"not because the Father preferred the death of the Son over his life, but because the Father was not willing to restore the human race unless man did something as great as that death of Christ was.\" (S., p. 63) As Anselm goes on to explain, the determination of the Son's will then takes place within the structure of the Father's will. \"Since reason did not demand that another person do what he could not, for that reason the Son says that he wills his own death, which he preferred to suffer rather than that the human race not be saved.\" (S., p. 63-4) What was involved in Christ's death, therefore, was actually obedience on the part of the Son, following out precisely what was entailed by God's willing to redeem humanity. The central point of the argument is then making clear why the redemption of humanity would have to involve the death of Christ. Articulating this, Anselm begins by discussing sin in terms of what is due or owed to (quod debet) God. Sin is precisely not giving God what is due to him, namely: \"[e]very willing [voluntas] of a rational creature should [debet] be subject to God's will.\" (S., p. 68) Doing this is justice or rightness of will, and is the \"sole and complete debt of honor\" (solus et totus honor), which is owed to God. Now, sin, understood as disobedience and contempt or dishonor, is not as simple, nor as simple to remedy, as it first appears. In the sinful act or volition, which already requires its own compensation, there is an added sin against God's honor, which requires additional compensation. \"But, so long as he does not pay for [solvit] what he has wrongly taken [rapuit], he remains in fault. Nor does it suffice sim5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 24\/53 ply to give back what was taken away, but for the contempt shown [pro contumelia illata] he ought to give back more than he took away.\" (S., p. 68) Anselm provides analogous examples: one endangering another's safety ought to restore the safety, but also compensate for the anguish (illata doloris iniuria recompenset); violating somebody's honor requires not only honoring the person again, but also making recompense in some other way; unjust gains should be recompensed not only by returning the unjust gain, but also by something that could not have otherwise been demanded. The question then is whether it would be right for God to simply forgive humans sins out of mercy (misericordia), and the answer is that this would be unbefitting to God, precisely because it would contravene justice. It is really impossible, however, for humans to make recompense or satisfaction, that is to say, satisfy the demands of justice, for their sins. One reason for this is that one already owes whatever one would give God at any given moment. Boso suggests numerous possible recompenses: \"[p]enitence, a contrite and humbled heart, abstinence and bodily labors of many kinds, and mercy in giving and forgiving, and obedience.\" (S., p. 68) Anselm responds, however: \"When you give to God something that you owe him, even if you do not sin, you ought not reckon this as the debt that you own him for sin. For, you owe all of these things you mention to God.\" (S., p. 68) Strict justice requires that a human being make satisfaction for sin, satisfaction that is humanly impossible. Absent this satisfaction, God forgiving the sin would violate strict justice, in the process contravening the supreme justice that is God. A human being is doubly bound by the guilt of sin, and is therefore \"inexcusable\" having \"freely [sponte] obligated himself by that debt that he cannot pay off, and by his fault cast himself down into this impotency, so that neither can he pay back what he owed before sinning, namely not sinning, nor can he pay back what he owes because he sinned.\" (S., p. 92) Accordingly, humans must be redeemed through Jesus Christ, who is both man and God, the argument for which comes in Book II, starting in Chapter 6, and elaborated through the remainder of the treatise, which also treats subsidiary problems. The argument at its core is that only a human being can make recompense for human sin against God, but this being impossible for any human being, such recompense could only be made by God. This is only possible for Jesus Christ, the Son, who is both God and man, with (following the Chalcedonian doctrine) two natures united but distinct in the same person (Chapter7). The atonement is brought about by Christ's death, which is of infinite value, greater than all created being (Chapter 14), and even redeems the sins of those who killed Christ (Chapter 15). Ultimately, in Anselm's interpretation of the atonement, divine justice and divine mercy in the fullest senses are shown to be entirely compatible. 8. De Grammatico 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 25\/53 This dialogue stands on its own in the Anselmian corpus, and focuses on untangling some puzzles about language, qualities, and substances. Anselm's solutions to the puzzles involve making needed distinctions at proper points, and making explicit what particular expressions are meant to express. The dialogue ends with the puzzles resolved, but also with Anselm signaling the provisional status of the conclusions reached in the course of investigation. He cautions the student: \"Since I know how much the dialecticians in our times dispute about the question you brought forth, I do not want you to stick to the points we made so that you would hold them obstinately if someone were to be able to destroy them by more powerful arguments and set up others.\" (S., v. 1, p.168) The student begins by asking whether \"expert in grammar\" (grammaticus) is a substance or a quality. The question, and the discussion, has a wider scope, however, since once that is known, \"I will recognize what I ought to think about other things that are similarly spoken of through derivation [denominative].\" (S., p.144) There is a puzzle about the term \"expert in grammar,\" and other like terms, because a case, or rather an argument, can be made for either option, meaning it can be construed to be a substance or a quality. The student brings forth the argument. That every expert in grammar is a man, and that every man is a substance, suffice to prove that expert in grammar is a substance. For, whatever the expert in grammar has that substance would follow from, he has only from the fact that he is a man. So, once it is conceded that he is a man, whatever follows from being a man follows from being an expert in grammar. (S., v. 1, p.144-5) At the same time, philosophers who have dealt with the subject have maintained that it is a quality, and their authority is not to be lightly disregarded. So, there is a serious and genuine problem. The term must signify either a substance or a quality, and cannot do both. One option must be true and the other false, but since there are arguments to be made for either side, it is difficult to tell which one is false. The teacher responds by pointing out that the options are not necessarily incompatible with each other. Before explaining how this can be so, he asks the student to lay out the objections against both options. The student begins by attacking the premise \"expert in grammar is a man\" (grammaticum esse hominem) with two arguments No expert in grammar can be understood [intelligi] without reference to grammar, and every man can be understood without reference to grammar.Every expert in grammar admits of [being] more and less, and No man admits of [being] more or less From either one of these linkings [contextione] of two propositions one conclusion follows, i.e. no expert in grammar is a man. (S., p.146) 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 26\/53 The teacher states, however, that this conclusion does not follow from the premises, and uses a similar argument to illustrate his point. The term \"animal\" signifies \"animate substance capable of perception,\" which can be understood without reference to rationality. The teacher then gets the student to admit to a further proposition, \"every animal can be understood without reference to rationality, and no animal is from necessity rational,\" to which he adds: \"But no man can be understood without reference to rationality, and it is necessary that every man be rational.\" (S., p.147) The implication, which the student sees and would like to avoid, is the clearly false conclusion, \"no man is an animal.\" On the other hand, the student does not want to give up the connection between man and rationality. The teacher indicates a way out of the predicament by noting that the false conclusions are arrived at by inferring from the premises in a mechanical way, without examining what is in fact being expressed by the premises, without making proper distinctions based on what is being expressed, and without restating the premises as propositions more adequately expressing what the premises are supposed to assert. The teacher begins by asking the student to make explicit what the man, and the expert in grammar, are being understood as with or without reference to grammar. This allows the premises in the student's arguments to be more adequately restated. Every man can be understood as man without reference to grammar. No expert in grammar can be understood as expert in grammar without reference to grammar.No man is more or less man, and Every expert in grammar is more or less an expert in grammar. (S., v. 1, p.148-9) In both cases, it is now apparent that where it seemed previously there was a common term, and therefore a valid syllogism, there is in fact no common term. This does not mean that nothing can be validly inferred from them. But, in order for something to be validly inferred, a common term must be found. The teacher advises: \"The common term of a syllogism should be not so much in the expression brought forward [in prolatione] as in meaning [in sententia].\" (S., p.149) The reasoning behind this is that what \"binds the syllogism together\" is the meaning of the terms used, not the mere words, \"For just as nothing is accomplished if the term is common in language [in voce] but not in meaning [in sensu], likewise nothing impedes us if it is in our understanding [in intellectu] but not in the expression brought forward [in prolatione].\" (S., p.149) The first set of premises of the of the student's double argument can be reformulated then as the following new premises. To be a man does not require grammar, and To be an expert in grammar requires grammar. (S., p.149) Thus restated, the premises do have a common term, and a conclusion can be inferred from them namely: \"To be an expert in grammar is not to be a man, i.e., there is not the same definition for both of them.\" (S., p.149) What this conclusion means is not that an expert in grammar is not a 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 27\/53 man, but rather that they are not identical, they do not have the same definition. Other syllogisms, appearing at first glance valid but terminating in false conclusions, can similarly be transformed. One that deals directly with the student's initial question runs: Every expert in grammar is spoken of as a quality [in eo quod quale]. No man is spoken of as a quality. Thus, no man is an expert in grammar. (S., p.150) The premises can be reformulated according to their meaning: Every expert in grammar is spoken of as expert in grammar as a quality. No man is spoken of as man as a quality. (S., p.150) It is now apparent that again there is no middle term, and the conclusion does not validly follow. The student explores various possible syllogisms that might be constructed before the teacher indicates that the student, who ends with the conclusion, \"the essence of man is not the essence of expert in grammar,\" (S., p.150) has not fully grasped the lesson. The teacher brings in a further distinction, that of respect or manner (modo). This requires attention to what is actually being signified by the expressions \"man,\" and \"expert in grammar.\" An expert in grammar, who is a man, can be understood as a man without reference to grammar, so in some respect an expert in grammar can be understood without reference to grammar (that is, understood as man, not as an expert in grammar, which he nonetheless still is). And, a man, who is an expert in grammar, who is to be understood as an expert in grammar, cannot be so understood without reference to grammar. Another puzzle can be raised about man and expert in grammar, bearing on being present in a subject. An argument clearly going against Aristotle's intentions can be derived by using one of his statements as a premise. Expert in grammar is among those things that are in a subject. And, no man is in a subject. So, no expert in grammar is a man. (S., p.154) The teacher again directs the student to pay close attention to the meaning of what is being said. When one speaks about an \"expert in grammar,\" the things that are signified are \"man\" and \"grammar.\" Man is a substance, and is not present in a subject, but grammar is a quality and is present in a subject. So, depending on what way one looks at it, someone can say that expert in grammar is a substance and is not in a subject, if they mean \"expert in grammar\" insofar as the expert in grammar is a man (secundum hominem). Alternately, one can say that expert in grammar is a quality and is in a subject, if they mean \"expert in grammar\" with respect to grammar (secundum grammaticam). Similarly, \"expert in grammar\" can be regarded, from different points of view, as being primary or secondary substance, or as neither. 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 28\/53 \"Expert in grammar\" has been shown to be able to be both a substance and a quality, so that there is no inconsistency between them. The student then raises a related problem, asking why \"man\" cannot similarly be a substance and a quality. \"For man signifies a substance along with all those differentia that are in man, such as sensibility and mortality.\" (S., p.156) The teacher points out that the case of \"man\" is not similar to that of \"expert in grammar.\" \"[Y]ou do not consider how dissimilarly the name 'man' signifies those things of which a man consists, and how expert in grammar [signifies] man and grammar. Truly, the name 'man' signifies by itself and as one thing those things of which the entire man consists.\" (S., p.156) \"Expert in grammar,\" however, signifies \"man\" and \"grammar\" in different ways. It signifies \"grammar\" by itself (per se); it signifies \"man\" by something else (per aliud). Expertise in grammar is an accident of man, so \"expert in grammar\" cannot signify \"man\" in any unconditioned sense, but rather is something said of man (appellative hominis). The man is the underlying substance in which there can be grammar, and the underlying substance can be expert in grammar. So, \"expert in grammar\" can rightly be understood in accordance with Aristotle's Categories as a quality, because it signifies a quality. At the same time, \"expert in grammar\" is said of a substance, that is to say, man. This still raises some problems in the mind of the student, who suggests \"expert in grammar\" could be a having, or under the category of having, and asks whether a single thing can be of several categories. The teacher, conceding that the issue requires further study, maintains, directing the student through several examples, that a single expression that signifies more than one thing can be in more than one category, provided the things that are signified are not signified as actually one thing. 9. The De Veritate This dialogue, which Anselm describes in its preface as one of \"three treatises pertaining to the study of Sacred Scripture,\" dealing with \"what truth is, in what things [quibus rebus] truth is customarily said to be, and what justice is\" (S., v. 1, p. 173), begins with a student asking for a definition of truth. The dialogical lesson takes the truth of statements as a starting point. A statement is true \"[w]hen what it states [quod enuntiat], whether in affirming or in negating, is so [est].\" (S., v. 1, p. 177) Given this, Anselm's theory of truth appears at first glance a simple correspondence theory, where truth consists in the correspondence between statements and states of affairs signified by those statements. His theory is more complex, however, and relies on a Platonic notion of participation, or more accurately stated, weds together a correspondence theory with a Platonic participational view. \"[N]othing is true except by participating in truth; and so the truth of the true thing is in the true thing itself. But truly the thing stated is not in the true statement. So, it [the thing stated] should not be called its truth, but the cause of its truth. For this reason it seems to me that the truth of the 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 29\/53 statement should be sought only in the language itself [ipsa oratione].\" (S., v. 1, p. 177) It is very important at this point to keep in mind that Anselm is not saying that all truth is simply in language, but rather that the truth of statements, truth of signification, lies in the language used. The truth of the statement cannot be the statement itself, nor can it be the statement's signifying, nor the statement's \"definition,\" for in any of these cases, the statement would always be true. Instead, statements are true when they signify correctly or rightly, and Anselm provides the key term for his larger theory of truth, \"rectitude\" or \"rightness.\" \"Therefore its [an affirmation's] truth is not something different than rightness [rectitudo].\" (S., p. 178) Anselm notes, however, that even when a statement affirms that what-is-not is, or vice versa, there is stillsome truth or correctness to the statement. This is so because there are two kinds of truth in signifying, for a statement can signify that what is the case is the case, and it does signify what it signifies. \"There is one rightness and truth of the statement because it signifies what it was made to signify [ad quod significandum facta est]; and, there is another, when it signifies that which it received the capacity to signify [quod accepit significare].\" (S., p. 179) Accordingly, for Anselm, the truth of statements consists in part in the correspondence of the statement to the state of affairs signified, but also in the signification itself, the sense or meaning of the statement. \"It always possesses the latter kind of truth, but does not always possess the former. For, it has the latter kind naturally, but the former kind accidentally and according to usage.\" (S., p.179) For example, the expression \"it is day\" always possesses the second kind of truth, since the expression can always signify what it does signify; in other words, it can convey a meaning. But, whether or not it possesses the first kind of truth depends on whether in fact it is day. According to Anselm, in certain statements, the two kinds of truth or correctness are inseparable from each other, examples of these being universal statements, such as \"man is an animal.\" He goes on to discuss truth of other kinds, in thought, in the will, in action, in the senses, and in the being of things. Truth in thought is analogous to truth in signification, but Anselm discusses only the first kind of truth, where thoughts correspond to actual states of affairs, this being \"rightness\" of thought. Truth in the will likewise consists in rightness, in other words, willing what it is that one ought to will. With respect to actions, again truth is rightness, in this case goodness. \"To do good [bene facere] and to do evil [male facere] are contraries. For this reason, if to do the truth [veritatem facere] and to do good are the same in opposition, they are not different in their signification. . . . [T]o do what is right [rectitudinem facere] is to do the truth... Nothing is more apparent then than that the truth of an action is its rightness.\" (S., p. 182) But Anselm distinguishes between natural actions, such as a fire heating, which are non-rational and necessary, and non-natural actions, such as giving alms, which are rational and non-necessary. The natural type is always true, like the second kind of truth in signification. The non-natural type is sometimes true, sometimes false, like the first kind of truth in signification. Truth of the senses, 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 30\/53 Anselm argues, is a misnomer, as the truth or falsity involving the senses is not in the senses but in the \"judgment\" (in opinione). \"The inner sense itself makes an error [se fallit], rather than the exterior sense lying to it.\" (S., p. 183) Speaking of the second kind of truth in signification, and of the truth of natural actions involves reference to a \"Supreme Truth,\" namely, God. Everything that is, insofar as it is receives its being [quod est] from the Supreme Truth. An argument, placed in the mouth of the dialogue's teacher, follows from this: 1) \"If all things are this, i.e. what they are there [in the Supreme Truth], without a doubt they are what they ought to be.\" 2) \"But whatever is what it ought to be is rightly [recte est]. \"Thus, everything that is, is rightly.\" (S, p. 185) This, however, seems to present a genuine and serious problem, given the existence and experience of evil, specifically, \"many deeds done evilly\" (multa opera male), in the world as we know it. In order to address this, Anselm resorts to the traditional distinction between God causing and God permitting evil. Evil actions and evil willing ought not to be, but what happens when God permits it, because He permits it, ought to be. The solution to this puzzle lies in further distinction. \"For in many ways the same matter [eadem res] supports opposites when considered from different perspectives [diversis considerationibus]. This often happens to be the case for an action. . . .\" (S., p. 187) Anselm uses the example of a \"beating\" (percussio), which can be regarded both as an action, on the part of the agent, and as a passion, on the part of the passive sufferer. Both the active and the passive are necessarily connected. \"For a beating is of the one acting and of the one suffering, whence it can be said of either the action [giving a beating] and the passion [getting a beating].\" (S., p. 187) While these two are necessarily connected, the same is not true of the judgments that can be made regarding each side of the action, for instance the rightness of the action or the suffering. A person might be rightly beaten, but it may be wrong for this or that person to give the beating. The implication of this is that \"it can happen that according to nature an action or a passion should be, but in respect to the person acting or the person suffering should not be, since neither should the former do it nor the latter suffer it.\" (S., p. 188) In this case, and other similar cases, it is possible for the same thing to have seemingly contradictory determinations. The key here, however, is that the same thing is being \"considered from different perspectives [diversis considerationibus]\" (S., p. 188) Anselm then brings all of the other kinds of truth back to the truth of signification, not reducing them all to signification, but rather indicating how they are connected to each other. \"For, there is true or false signification not only in those things we are accustomed to call signs but also in all of the other things that we have spoken of. For, since something should not be done by someone unless it is something that someone should do, by the very fact that someone does something, he says and he signifies that he ought to do that thing.\" (S., p. 189) In every action, according to this doc5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 31\/53 trine, there is an implicit assertion of truth being made (rightly or wrongly) by the agent. For example, an expert tells a non-expert that certain herbs are non-poisonous, but avoids eating them, his action's (true) signification being more trustworthy than his (false) signification in his statement. This applies even further. So likewise, if you did not know that one ought not to lie and somebody lied in your presence, then even if he were to tell you that he himself ought not to lie, he would himself tell you more by his deed [opere] that he ought to lie than by his words that he ought not [to lie]. Similarly, when somebody thinks of or wills something, if you did not know whether he ought to will or think of that thing, and if you could see his willing or his thought, he would signify to you by that very action [ipso opere] that he ought to think about and will that thing. And, if he did ought to do so, he would speak the truth. But if not, he would lie. (S., p. 189) In Anselm's parlance, it is possible for action, willing, and thinking to be false, in other words, to be lies on the part of the acting, willing, or thinking subject. This involves a reference, noted earlier, to the Supreme Truth, God, more specifically to the truth of the being of things as they are in the Supreme Truth. All of the types of truth or rightness are ultimately determined or conditioned by the Supreme Truth, which is \"the cause of all other truths and rightnesses.\" Some of these other truths are themselves in turn causes as well as effects, while others are simply effects. \"Since the truth that is in the existence of things is an effect of the Supreme Truth, this is also the cause of the truth belonging to thoughts and the truth that is in propositions; but these two truths are not the cause of any truth.\" (S., p. 189) After having carried out these dialogic investigations of the various kinds of truth, Anselm is now ready to provide a definition: \"Accordingly, unless I am mistaken, we can establish the definition that [definire quia] truth is rightness perceptible only to the mind.\" (S., p. 191) This introduces the final discussion of the dialogue, the student asking: \"But since you have taught me that all truth is rightness, and since rightness seems to me to be the same thing as justice, teach me also what I might understand justice to be.\" (S., p. 191) The teacher's first response is that justice, truth, and rightness are convertible with each other. \"[W]hen we are speaking of rightness perceptible only to the mind, truth and rightness and justice are mutually defined in relation to each other [invicem sese definiunt].\" (S., p. 192) This relationship allows the rational investigating human being to use one of these terms, or rather their understanding of the meaning of the terms, to arrive at understanding of the others (which is in fact what is going on in the dialogue itself) \"[I]f somebody knows one of them and does not know the others, he can extend his knowledge [scientiam pertingere] though the known to the unknown. Verily, whoever knows one cannot not know the other two.\" (S., p. 192) Justice, however, has a sense more specific and appropriate to humans, \"the justice to which praise is owed, just as to its contrary, namely injustice, condemnation is owed.\" (S., p. 192) This sort of justice, Anselm argues, resides only in beings that know rightness, and therefore can will it. 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 32\/53 Accordingly, this kind of justice is present only in rational beings, and in human beings, it is not in knowledge or action but in the will. Justice is then defined as \"rightness of will,\" and as this could allow instances where one wills rightly, in other words what he or she ought to will, without wanting to be in such a situation, or instances where one does so want, but wills the right object for a bad motive, the definition of justice is further specified as \"rightness of will kept for its own sake\" (propter se servata). Anselm makes clear that this uprightness is received from God prior to the human being having it, willing it, or keeping it. And, it is in a certain way radically dependent on God's own justice. \"If we say that [God's] uprightness is kept for its own sake, we do not seem to be able to suitably [conuenienter] speak likewise about any other rightness. For just as [God's uprightness] itself and not some other thing, preserves itself, it is not through another but through itself, and likewise not on account of another thing but on account of itself.\" (S., p. 196) This leads to the final topic of the De Veritate, the unity of truth. According to Anselm, although there is a multiplicity of true things, and multiple and different ways for things to be truth, there is ultimately only one truth, prior to all of these, and in which they participate. From the discussions in earlier treatises, it is clear that this single and ultimate truth is, of course, God. 10. The De Libertate Arbitrii This treatise is the second of the three treatises pertaining to the study of Sacred Scripture, and it deals primarily with the nature of the human will and its relation to the justice or rightness of will discussed at the end of the De Veritate. The student begins by asking the central questions: Since free choice [liberum arbitrium] seems to be opposed to God's grace, and predestination, and foreknowledge, I desire to know what this free choice is and whether we always have it. For if free choice is \"to be able to sin and not sin,\" just as it is customarily said by some people, and we always have it, in what way can we be in need of any grace? For if we do not always have it, why is sin imputed to us when we would sin without free choice. (S., v. 1, p. 207) The immediate response is the denial that freedom of choice is or includes the ability to sin, for this would mean that God and the good angels, who cannot sin, would not have free choice. Anselm is unwilling even to entirely distinguish free choice of God and good angels from that of humans. \"Although the free choice of humans differs from the free choice of God and the good angels, still the definition of this freedom, in accordance with this name, ought to be the same in either case.\" (S., p. 208) It appears at first that a will which can turn towards sinning or not sinning is more free, but this is to be able to lose what befits and what is useful or advantageous for (quod decet et quod expedit) the one willing. To be able to sin is actually an ability to become more unfree. Key to the argument is that not sinning is understood as a positive condition of maintaining uprightness or righteousness (rectitudo). Anselm makes two key points in support of this. \"The will that cannot turn 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 33\/53 away from the righteousness of not sinning is thereby freer than one that can desert it [righteousness].\" (S., p. 208) The analysis of the conceptions of freedom, sin, and power are similar to those in Proslogion Chapter 7: \"The ability to sin, therefore, which when added to the will decreases its freedom and when taken away increases it, is neither freedom nor a part of freedom.\" (S., v. 1, p. 209) This raises two problems, however. Both the fallen angels and the first human were able to sin and did sin. Given the argument just made, being able to sin and freedom seem foreign (aliena) to each other, but if one does not sin from free choice, it seems one must sin of necessity. In addition, the notion of being a \"servant of sin\" requires clarification, specifically explaining how a free being can be mastered by sin, and thereby become a servant. Anselm makes a subtle distinction. In the case of the first man or the fallen angel, the Devil: He sinned by his choice which was free, but not through that from which [unde] it was free, i.e. by the ability through which he was able to [per potestatem qua poterat] not sin and to not serve sin, but rather by the ability of sinning that he had [per potestatem quam habebat peccandi], by which he was neither aided toward the freedom of not sinning nor compelled to the service of sinning. (S., v. 1, p. 210) Analogously to this, if somebody is able to be the servant of sin, this does not mean that sin is able to master him, so that his choice to sin, to become a servant of sin, is not free. Another question arises then, how a person, after becoming a servant of sin, would still be free, to which the answer is that one still retains some natural freedom of choice, but is unable to use one's freedom of choice in exactly the same way as one could prior to choosing to sin. (Later in Chapter 12, Anselm clarifies that being a \"servant of sin\" is precisely \"an inability to avoid sinning.\") The difference, however, is all important. The freedom of choice which they originally possessed was oriented towards an end, that of \"willing what they ought to will and what is advantageous for them to will,\" (S., p. 211) in other words, uprightness or righteousness (rectitudo) of will. Anselm then considers four different possible ways in which they had this freedom oriented towards righteousness or uprightness of will: 1. whether for acquiring it without anyone giving it, since they did not yet have it 2. whether for receiving it when they did not yet have it, if someone were to give it to them so that they might have it 3. whether for deserting what they received and for recovering by themselves what they had deserted 4. whether for always keeping it once it was received (S., v. 1, p. 211) The first three possibilities are rejected, leaving only the fourth. Rational creatures were originally given uprightness of will, which they were obliged to keep, but free (in one sense) to keep or lose. 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 34\/53 Freedom of choice, however, has a reason, namely, keeping this original uprightness-of-will for its own sake. There are then two different possible states. So long as one keeps uprightness-of-will for its own sake, one does so freely. Once one loses uprightness-of-will through use of one's free choice, one no longer has the ability to keep uprightness-of-will, really by definition, since one has after all lost it. Here, Anselm clarifies: \"Even if uprightness of will is lacking, still [a] rational nature does not possess less than what belongs to it. For, as I view it, we have no ability that by itself suffices unto itself for its action; and still, when those things are lacking without which our abilities can hardly be brought to action, we still no less say that we have those abilities that are in us.\" (S., p. 212-3) He employs two analogies, one general, and one more specific. One can have an ability or an instrument that can accomplish something, but when the conditions for its employment are lacking, it cannot by itself bring anything about. Likewise, seeing a mountain requires not only sight, but also light and a mountain actually being there to be seen. When uprightness of will is lacking, having been lost, one still has theability to keep it, but the conditions for having and keeping it are lacking. \"What prevents us from having the power of keeping uprightness of will for sake of that very uprightness, even if this very uprightness is absent, so long as within us there is reason, by which we are able to recognize it, and will, by which we are able to hold onto it? For the freedom of choice spoken of here consists in both of these [ex his enim constat].\" (S., p. 214) Chapters 5-9 discuss temptation, specifically how the will can be overcome by temptation, thereby turning away from or losing uprightness-of-will, by willing an action (for example, lying, murder, theft, adultery) contrary to God's will. Anselm concedes that a person can be placed in a situation where options are constrained, and where unwelcome consequences follow from every option, for instance, when a person is constrained to choose between lying and thereby avoiding death (for a while), and dying. The will is stronger than any temptation, or even the Devil himself, but both temptation and the Devil can create difficulties for the resisting person, and can constrain the situations of choice. In these cases, the will can allow itself to be overcome. This still involves free choice of the will, but this is a free choice for one sort of unfreedom or another. Anselm argues that \"a rational nature always possesses free choice, since it always possesses the ability of keeping uprightness of will for the sake of this rightness itself, even though with difficulty at some times.\" (S., p. 222) Once this uprightness has been lost, or rather abandoned freely, the free human being becomes a servant of sin because it cannot by itself regain that uprightness on its own. \"Indeed, just as no will, before it possessed uprightness, was able to acquire it unless God gave it, so, after it deserted what it had received, it is not able to regain it unless God gives it back.\" (S., p. 222) In such a condition, a human being remains free in the sense that they could keep uprightness-of-will, in other words, not sin, precisely by freely choosing to keep it, if they had it, which they do not. Once God gives it again, 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 35\/53 a human being is then once again free to keep it or to lose it. Freedom in the full sense for Anselm, therefore, consists in the ability to keep uprightness-of-will for its own sake, that is to say, choosing and acting in such a way as to keep oneself from losing it, even when faced with temptation. 11. The De Casu Diaboli This dialogue, considerably longer than the preceding De Veritate and De Libertate, further develops certain themes they raised, and addresses several other philosophical issues of major importance, including the nature of evil and negation, and the complexities of the will. The dialogue begins in an attempt to understand the implications of all created beings having nothing that they have not received from God. \"No creature has anything [aliud] from itself. For what does not even have itself from itself, in what way could it have anything from itself?\" (S., v. 1, p. 233) Only God, the Creator, alone has anything (quidquid) from himself. All other beings, as dependent on God for their being, have what they have from him. The student raises an initial problem in Chapter 1, having to do with divine causation. It seems then that God is the cause not only of created beings having something, and for their being, but also that God is then the cause for their passing into non-being. This would then mean that God is the cause not only for whatever is, but also for whatever is not. The teacher makes a needed distinction here. A thing is said to cause another thing to be in several different cases. One who actually causes something else to be is properly said to cause it. When one able to cause something not to be does not so cause it, and then the thing is (because the first thing does not interfere with the second thing being or coming to be), the first thing is improperly said to cause the second. Accordingly, God is said to cause things in both ways. God is also improperly said to cause what is not not to be, when what is actually meant by this is that God simply does not cause it to be. Likewise, when things pass from being to not-being, God does not cause this, even though he does not conserve them in being, because they simply return to their original state of non-being. This has a bearing on the question of divine responsibility for evil, setting up the other problems of the dialogue. Just as nothing that is not good comes from the Supreme Good, and every good is from the Supreme Good, likewise nothing that is not being [essentia] comes from the Supreme Being [essentia], and all being is from the Supreme Being. Since the Supreme Good is the Supreme Being, it follows that every being is a good thing and every good thing is a being. Therefore, just as nothing and non-being [non esse] are not being [essentia], likewise they are not good. So, nothing and non-being are not from He from whom nothing is unless it is good and being. (S., p. 235) 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 36\/53 The central problem is that of understanding how the Devil could be responsible for his own sin, given that what he has he has from God, and the lengthy argumentation in Chapter 3 sets in clear light the problem's complex nature. It seems that there is an inconsistency between God's goodness and the justness of his judgment, on the one hand, and the Devil not receiving perseverance from God who did not give it to him, on the other hand. The student is making the global assumption, however, that since giving X is the cause of X being received, not giving X is the cause of X not being received. In some cases this does not hold, however, and the teacher supplies an example. \"If I offer [porrigo] you something, and you accept it [accipis], I do not therefore give it because you receive it [accipis], but you therefore receive it because I give it, and the giving is the cause of the receiving.\" (S., p. 236) In that positive case, the giving is the cause of the receiving, but, if the case is made negative the order of causing what takes place (or rather what does not take place) is the opposite. \"What if I offer that very thing to someone else and he does not accept it? Does he therefore not accept it because I do not give it?\" The student realizes that the proper way of looking at matters is \"rather that you do not give it because he does not accept it.\" (S., p. 236) In cases like these, where not-giving X is not the cause of X not being received, if one does not give X, it can still be inferred that X is not received. This answer does not quell the student's initial misgivings, however, for it simply pushes the fundamental problem back further. \"If you wish to assert that God did not give to him because he did not receive, I ask: why did he not receive? Was it because he was not able to, or because he did not will to? For if he did not have the ability or the will to receive [potestatem aut uoluntatem accipiendi], God did not give it.\" (S., p. 237) This seems to place the responsibility for the Devil's lack back on God, and the student asks: \"[I]f he was not able to have the ability or the will to receive perseverance unless God gives it, in what did he sin, by not accepting what God did not give him to be able or to will to receive [posse aut uelle accipere]?\" (S., p. 237) The answer is that God in fact did give this ability and will, and the student concludes that the Devil did receive perseverance from God. The teacher makes two important clarifications. The first is that \"I did not say that God gave him the receiving of perseverance [accipere perseuerantiam], but rather to be able or to will to [posse aut uelle] receive perseverance.\" (S., p. 237) The student then concludes that since the Devil willed to and was able to (voluit et potuit) receive perseverance, he did in fact receive it. This leads to the second, much more involved clarification. There are cases where one is able to and wills to do something, but does not finish it or bring it about completely or perfectly, cases where one's initial will is changed before the thing is entirely finished. T: Then, you willed and you were able to persevere in what you did not persevere. S: Certainly I willed to, but I did not persevere in willing [in voluntate], and so I did not persevere in the action. T: Why did you not persevere in willing? 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 37\/53 S: Because I did not will to. T: But, so long as you willed to persevere in the action, you willed to persevere in that willing [in voluntate]? (S., p. 238) The will is marked by a reflexivity, as the student recognizes when the teacher asks why he did not persevere in willing. One can answer that he did not persevere in willing (which is the reason he did not then continue to will) because he did not will to. This type of explanation could be iterated infinitely, and would not really explain anything thereby. Instead, the explanation for failure of will (defectus. . . uoluntatis) requires reference to something else, and this requires coining a new expression. As the teacher says: \"Let us say. . . . that to persevere in willing is to 'will completely' [peruelle].\"(S., p. 238) And, he asks his student: \"When, therefore, you did not complete what you willed to and were able to, why did you not complete it?\" In response, the student supplies the conclusion: \"Because I did not will it completely.\" (S., p. 238) This allows a partial resolution to the problem: even though the Devil received the will and the ability to receive perseverance and the will and the ability to persevere, he did not actually receive the perseverance because he did not will it completely. Again, this answer simply pushes the problem to yet another level, leading the student to ask: Again I ask why he did not will completely. For when you say that what he willed he did not completely will, you are saying something like: What he willed at first, he did not will later. So, when he did not will what he willed before, why did he not will it unless because he did not have the will to? And by this latter I do not mean the will that he had previously when he willed it but the one that he did not have when he did not will it. But why did he not have this will, unless because he did not receive it? And, why did he not receive it, unless because God did not give it? (S., p. 239) The teacher reminds the student of the point established earlier, that God did not give to the Devil because the Devil did not receive. Again the failure is on the side of the creature, and at this point, the teacher asserts that the Devil could have received keeping (tenere) what he had but instead abandoned or deserted it (deseruit). The relation between not-receiving and desertion has a parallel structure to not-giving and not-receiving: the Devil did not receive because he deserted, and God did not give to the Devilbecause the Devil did not receive. Once again, this is only a partial solution, and it still seems that God could be responsible for the fall of the Devil, because God did not give something to the Devil, namely the will to keep, not to desert, what he had. The cause for someone deserting something, the student claims, is because that person does not will to keep it. The teacher's response here is similar to the previous responses, since he distinguishes cases where the causal relation the student asserts to hold does not hold. It is dissimilar, however, and brings the complex argumentation of Chapter 3 to a close, because it introduces the key notion of conflicting objects of the will. Using the example of a miser who would will both to keep his money and to have bread, which requires him to spend money, the teacher notes that in this case, willing to desert is prior to not willing to keep some good, precisely because 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 38\/53 one wills to desert the thing in order to have something that one prefers to have. In the case of the Devil then: the reason he did not will when he should have and what he should have was not that his will was deficient [defecit] because God failed [deo . . .deficiente] to give, but rather that the Devil himself, by willing what he should not have, expelled his good will because of an evil will arising. Accordingly, it was not because he did not have a good persevering will or he did not receive it, because God did not give it, but rather that God did not give it because the Devil, by willing what he should not have, deserted the good will, and by deserting it did not keep it. (S., p. 240) In Chapters 4-28, issues raised by this solution to the problem are explored: the complex nature of the will, and the ontological status of evil, nothing, and injustice. Chapter 4 introduces a key distinction in objects of the will, between justice (justitia) and what is beneficial, useful, or agreeable (commodum). The case of the Devil is the case for rational, willing creatures generally. The teacher notes: \"He could not have willed anything except for justice or what is beneficial. For, happiness, which all rational natures will, consists of beneficial things.\" And, the student confirms this: \"We can recognize this in ourselves, who will nothing except what we deem to be just or beneficial.\" (S., p. 241) The Devil went wrong by willing something beneficial, but which he did not have and was not supposed to have at the time he willed it; this was to will in a disordered manner (inordinate), and hereby to will the beneficial thing in such a way as to thereby not keep justice, precisely because willing the beneficial thing in a disordered way required abandoning justice. The Devil willed to be both like God and above God, by willing in such a way as to reject the order God introduced into things (including wills), or put in another way, using a term that somewhat resists translation: \"he willed something by his very own will alone [propria voluntate], which was subject [subdita] to nobody. For it should be for God alone to so will something by his very own will alone, so that he does not follow a will superior [to his own].\" (S., p. 242) The will, in both angels and human beings, is complex, and can be regarded from different though complementary points of view, and in terms of its objects, which may differ or coincide. Chapters 12-14 discuss the relationships between the will, happiness, and justice. There are two fundamental kinds of good and two kinds of evil: justice (justitia) and what is beneficial, useful, or agreeable (commodum); injustice, and what is harmful or unpleasant (incommodum). Rational beings, as well as other beings that can perceive, have a natural will for avoiding what is harmful or unpleasant (incommodum) and for possessing what is beneficial, useful, or agreeable (commodum), and by this natural will, which is for happiness, they move themselves to willing other things, such as means by which to achieve the good they will. In contrast, rational beings can be just or unjust, and can will justice or injustice. While all rational beings will happiness, not all of them will justice. It is possible for the two wills to conflict, and for 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 39\/53 one to will happiness inordinately, and in this way desert justice. Alternately, it is possible for one to will justice, which affects how happiness is willed. Justice, when it is added, would so temper the will for happiness, that it would both curb the will's excess and not cut off its ability of exceeding. So, because one would will to be happy, one could go to excess [excedere], but because one would will justly, one would not will to go to excess [excedere], and so having a just will for happiness one could and should be happy. And, by not willing what one ought not will, even though one could, one would merit being able to never will what should not be willed, and by always keeping justice through a restrained [moderatam] will, one would in no way be in need; but, if one were to desert justice through an unrestrained [immoderatam] will, one would be in need in every way. (S., p. 258) Chapters 15-16 show that the relation between justice and injustice is one of a good and its privation, or put another way, justice is something, meaning it has goodness and it has being, while injustice is nothing but the absence or privation of the justice that should exist, namely in a will. The priority of justice over injustice means that the will retains traces (vestigia) of the justice it abandoned, namely that it ought to have justice. Injustice, or the state of being unjust, does not have any being, meaning it is nothing. The relationships between evil, injustice, nothing, and the will are explained in Chapters 7-11, 1920, and 26. First, as the teacher explains, the will itself, considered as will is not nothing. \"Now, even if [the will, and the turning of the will] are not substances, still it cannot be proven that they are not beings [essentias], for there are many beings other than those which are properly called 'substances.' So then, a good will is not more something than an evil will is, nor is the latter more evil than the former is good.\" (S., p. 245) The conclusion of this is not that the evil will is not in fact evil, but rather that \"the evil will is not that very evil that makes evil people evil.\" (S., p. 245) The evil that makes people evil is instead injustice, the privation of justice, which is nothing. Saying that injustice and evil are in fact nothing raises a problem, however, for it does seem as if injustice and evil aresomething. For one, it seems that good and evil are both correlative to each other. \"[E]vil is a privation of the good, I concede, but I see that good is no less the privation of evil. (S., p. 247) Posing a second difficulty, it seems that \"evil\" must signify something, since \"evil\" is a name. Lastly, the effects of evil seem in our experience to be something, so it seems paradoxical to insist that their cause is \"nothing.\" These difficulties are resolved in several ways. First, as noted earlier, the relationship between evil or injustice as a privation, and its opposite, justice, is not a reciprocal one. Injustice is the privation of justice, justice is not the privation of injustice, but that which injustice is a privation of. Put another way, justice is something positive, and has being, and its being is not dependent upon or conditioned by its opposite and privation, injustice. 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 40\/53 A second resolution lies in noting that \"nothing\" does signify, but signifies by negation. As the teacher says, making an important distinction: \"[E]vil\" and \"nothing\" do signify something; still though what they signify is not evil or nothing. But, there is another way in which they signify something and what is signified is something; not truly something, though, but as-if something [quasi aliquid]. For indeed, many things are said in accordance with the form [of language] [secundum formam], which are not said in accordance with the reality [secundum rem]. (S., p. 250)So, in this way, \"evil\" and \"nothing\" signify something, and what is signified is something not in accordance with the reality but in accordance with the form of speaking. (S., p. 251) A third resolution resides in explaining the relationship between the evil and nothing(ness) of injustice and the seeming positivity and being of things that get called evil. The will itself, as something, is good; in-itself, willing objects of the will, from the basest pleasures to being-like God, is good. Even the base and unclean useful or pleasurable things that irrational animals take pleasure in (commoda infima et immunda quibusirrationalia animalia delectantur, S., p. 257) are in themselves good. What allows some positive existing thing to be an evil is the disorder it is involved in, and this has to do with the will, and with injustice as such, which are the source of any positivity evil has. \"[S]ince no thing is called \"evil\" except for an evil will or on account of an evil will \u2013 like an evil man and an evil action \u2013 nothing is clearer than that no thing is evil, nor is evil anything but the absence of the justice that has been deserted in the will, or in some thing because of an evil will.\" (S., p. 264)The absence of justice in the will, or injustice, is always strictly speaking nothing, the absence or lack of what ought to be. However, \"sometimes the evil that is harmful or unpleasant (incommodum) is clearly nothing, like blindness, other times it is something, like sadness or pain.\" (S., p. 274) What we typically focus on in thinking about evil are the latter cases. \"When, then, we hear the word 'evil,' we do not fear the evil that is nothing, but the evil that is something, which follows from the absence of the good. For, from injustice and blindness, which are evil and which are nothing, follow many harmful or unpleasant things (incommoda) that are evil and are something, and these are what we dread when we hear the word 'evil.'\" (S., p. 274) Accordingly, returning to the original issue, what creatures have that is good, they have from God, and what they have of evil derives from them (or from other creatures), but ultimately from nothing, that is to say, from a lack of what ought to be (or of what ought to have been). In any given case, of course, for instance the Devil's case, it may take considerable analysis to see how what God gave permitted evil to take place. 12. The De Concordia This late work is of particular interest for several reasons. In its content, it deals with matters examined by Anselm's previous works, developing his doctrines further. The De Concordia refers to earlier works by name, specifically De Veritate, De Libertate Arbitrii, De Casu Diaboli, and De 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 41\/53 Conceptu Virginali et de Originali Peccato. Stylistically, its form is intermediary between those of the treatises and those of the dialogues, for Anselm addresses the possible objections and responses of an interlocutor in the first book, but does so within one continuous discourse. By the second and third books, Anselm no longer addresses an interlocutor. The three main topics or \"questions\" of the title unevenly divide the books of the work. The first question, or problem, is how free choice (liberum arbitrium) and God's foreknowledge could be compatible. This is really a clash between freedom and necessity. \"[I]t is necessary [necesse est] that those things that God foreknows be going to happen [esse futura], and those that come to be through free choice do not arrive through any necessity.\" (S., v. 2, p. 245) Anselm's procedure is to assume both free choice and God's foreknowledge in order to see whether they do in fact contradict each other, reasoning that, if they are genuinely incompatible, some other impossibility will arise from them. The assumption does not in fact generate a contradiction. [I]f something is going to happen without necessity [sine necessitate], God, who foreknows all future things foreknows this very thing. So, what God foreknows necessarily [necessitate] is going to happen, just as it is foreknown. Accordingly, it is necessary [necesse est] for something to be going to happen without necessity. Therefore, for one who rightly understands this, the foreknowledge upon which necessity follows and the free choice from which necessity is removed do not seem contradictory at all, since it is necessary that God foreknows what is going to happen, and God foreknows something to be going to happen without any necessity. (S., p. 245) The interlocutor raises several objections. The first is easily resolved, since it consists in simply shifting the ground from actions in general to sinning. Since God foreknows whether a person will sin or not, it seems that it is then necessary that a person sins or does not sin. Anselm simply makes explicit the full significance of what is being asserted, after which it is clear that framing the issue in terms of sin simply generates the same structure. \"You should not say just: 'God foreknows that I am going to sin or I am not going to sin,' but rather: 'God foreknows that without necessity I am going to sin or I am not going to sin.'\" (S., p. 246) The second objection raises a puzzle that stems from the sense of \"necessity.\" \"Necessity seems to mean [sonare] compulsion or restraint [coactionem uel prohibitionem]. So, if it is necessary that I sin from my willing, I understand myself to be compelled by some hidden force to the will to sin; and if I do not sin, I am restrained from the will to sin.\" (S., p. 246-7) In response, Anselm notes that some things are said to necessarily be or not be, even when there is no compulsion or restraint. In the case of voluntary actions, God foreknows them, but this foreknowledge does not produce any compulsion or restraint. To the contrary, God foreknows them precisely as voluntary actions. There is a necessity involved, but one that \"follows,\" rather than \"precedes,\" or determines, the thing or event. 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 42\/53 Anselm provides examples of these two modalities of necessity. An uprising that is going to take place tomorrow does not occur by necessity. It could happen otherwise, although it will not. The sun rising tomorrow will happen by necessity. It must happen that way. The uprising, which will not be from necessity, is asserted to be going to happen only by a following necessity [sequenti necessitate], since what is going to happen is being said of what is going to happen. For, if it is going to happen tomorrow, by necessity it is going to happen. The sunrise, however, is understood to be going to happen by both kinds of necessity, namely the preceding [praecedenti] necessity that makes the thing be \u2013 so it will be, since it is necessary [necesse est] that it be \u2013 and the following necessity that does not compel it to be. (S., p. 250) When one says that it is necessary for what God foreknows to happen, care is needed lest these different modalities of necessity get mixed up. In the case of human willing, the necessity is of the following, not the preceding kind. There is a temporality involved in the necessity of human will. What the free will wills, the free will can and cannot not-will [non velle], and it is necessary that it will. For, it can not-will before it wills, since it is free, and once it wills, it cannot not-will, but rather it is necessary that it will, since it is impossible for it to will and not will the same thing at the same time. . . . there is a twofold necessity, because [what the will freely wills] is compelled to be by the will, and what happens cannot at the same time not happen. But the free will makes these necessities, which can avoid them [coming to be] before they are. (S., p. 251) Far from free will being incompatible with necessity and with God's foreknowledge, free will is in fact productive of some necessity. Anselm employs a line of reasoning similar to that used in earlier works, most notably in the De Veritate. \"Why then is it something astonishing if in this way something is from freedom and from necessity, when there are many things that are grasped in opposite ways by changing the point of view [diverse ratione]?\" (S., p. 253) Employing this technique of distinction allows him the conclude that they are in fact compatible: \"No inconsistency arises if, in accordance with the reasons given earlier, we assert one and the same thing to be necessarily going to be, since it is going to be, and that it is by no necessity compelled to be going to be, unless by that necessity that was said earlier to come to be from free will.\" (S., p. 253) In Chapter 5, ultimately in order to be able to provide a hermeneutic for seemingly problematic Scriptural passages, Anselm provides readers with an intellectual glimpse of eternity. Within eternity, there is no past or future, but only present; not the fleeting present of our temporal experience, but an eternal present, one that has an ontological priority over time as we experience it. \"Although nothing is there except what is present, it is not the temporal present, like ours, but rather the eternal, within which all times altogether are contained. If in a certain way the present time contains every place and all the things that are in any place, likewise, every time is encompassed [clauditur] in the eternal present, and everything that is in any time.\" (S., p. 254) 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 43\/53 The nature of temporal things is that, insofar as they are in time, they do not always exist, and they change from time to time, whereas, as they exist in eternity, they always exist and are unchangeable. Anselm again frames this in terms of different points of view. Something can be able to be changed in time and still be unchangeable in eternity \"For things that are changeable in time and unchangeable in eternity are not more opposed than not being in some time is to always being in eternity, or having been or going to be in accordance with time and not having been or not going to be in eternity.\" (S., p. 255) This allows a fuller understanding of the relation between God's foreknowledge and free choice. Before (in the temporal sequence) something is willed by a being existing in time, such as sinning or not sinning, it can be otherwise. It already exists in eternity, however, which is how God knows (or from our point of view, foreknows) it. Anselm deals briefly with the second question or problem, reconciling predestination with free choice. This question seems to present a more problematic issue than divine foreknowledge. One can, as Anselm does, reconcile divine foreknowledge with free human choices by taking the position that God knows the free human choices as free, but from a vantage point of eternity, in which the free, uncompelled or restrained human actions have already happened, or more properly expressed are already happening. Predestination, however, seems to involve God making things happen the way they do. There is a possible resolution, however; we can say: \"God predestines evil people and their evil works when he does not correct them and their evil works. But he is said to foreknow and predestine good things, because he causes [facit] that they be and that they be good; but for evil things, he only causes them to be what they are essentially, not that they are evil.\" (S., p. 261) That is, (in accordance with the positions developed in Anselm's earlier works), God never directly causes something evil, but rather provides the basis, in being and goodness, for what is then turned to evil, turned away from how it ought to be. God does predestine human actions, according to Anselm, but he predestines them precisely as free or voluntary actions, which does not impose a necessity upon them that does not come from the choosing person's willing, by the sort of following necessity discussed in relation to foreknowledge. For God \u2013 even though He predestines \u2013 does not cause [facit] these things by compelling or restraining the will, but rather by committing [dimittendo] it to its own power. But even though the will uses its own power, it does nothing that God does not do in good things by his grace, in bad things not by fault of his own will but the will of the person. . . And just as foreknowledge, which does not err, only foreknows what is true, just as it will be, whether it is necessary or spontaneous, likewise, predestination . . . predestines a thing only as it is in foreknowledge. (S., p. 261) The third question or problem is reconciling God's grace and human free choice. In the course of showing that there is no real contradiction between these, Anselm's treatment ranges over a number of issues. There are a variety of different viewpoints to be considered. Some, supporting themselves by appeal to Scripture, maintain that only divine grace leads to salvation; others, likewise ap5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 44\/53 pealing to other Scriptural passages, maintain that salvation depends on our will. Furthering the first position, some cite passages that seem to have good works and salvation depend on grace, and others point to the common enough experience of people who, despite their efforts, fail. In addition to Scriptural passages that teach that humans have free choice, or that urge people to do good and that condemn evil, there is a line of reasoning supporting free choice, namely: \"If nobody were to do good or evil through free choice, then there would be no reason why [nec ullo modo esset cur] God justly gives what they deserve [retribueret] to good people and bad people on account of the merits of each one.\" (S., p. 264) The position that Anselm develops can be summarized as the following: Grace and free choice are not only compatible, but they in fact cooperate with each other. So, setting aside the exception of baptized infants, grace and free choice are both required for one to be saved. The ways in which grace and free choice cooperate with each other, as well as the ways in which free choice fails to cooperate with grace, are complex. Four main features of this are: the relationship between uprightness or righteousness (rectitudo) and grace; the need for cooperation with grace through one's will; Anselm's threefold distinction about the will; and the will for happiness and the will for justice. Uprightness of will was discussed at length in Anselm's earlier works, but it receives a more sophisticated and nuanced treatment in the De Concordia. As before: \"There is no doubt that the will only wills rightly [recte] when it is upright [recta]. . . the will is not upright because it wills rightly, but it wills rightly because it is upright.\" (S., p. 265-6) When the will wills uprightness for its own sake, it quite clearly wills rightly, and as in the earlier works, the will thereby wills to remain in this uprightness. In the De Concordia treatment, however, it is possible for one to will more uprightness. \"I do not deny that an upright will wills an uprightness it does not yet have, when it wills to have a greater uprightness than it has; but I say that no will can will uprightness, if it does not have the uprightness by which it wills it.\" (S., p. 266) Later, Anselm says something very similar: It is said to those already converted [i.e. turned towards God, conservis]: \"be converted,\" either so that they are further converted or so that they keep themselves converted. For, those who say: \"convert us, God,\" are already in some way converted, since they have an upright will when they will to be converted. But they pray through what they have received so that their conversion be augmented, just like those who were believers and said: \"increase our faith.\" It is as if both of these groups said: \"increase in us what you gave us, bring to fruition [perfice] what you began. (S., p. 272) When one has uprightness, one can will to preserve it, but lacking it, one cannot simply will oneself to have it, and then thereby have it. In addition, a creature cannot have uprightness from itself, nor can it have it from another creature. Instead, it can only have it through God's grace. 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 45\/53 Grace, as Anselm states clearly, is not something simple to pin down. For one, there are many different ways in which grace is bestowed. As Anselm says, he is \"not up to the task [non. . .valeam] \u2013 for it does this in many ways \u2013 of enumerating the ways in which, after this uprightness has been received, grace aids free choice to keep what it received.\" (S., p. 267) For another, graces follow on graces, and this takes place in more than one way as well. For instance: \"If the will, by free choice keeping what it received, merits either an augmentation of the justice it has received, or even the power for a good will, or some sort of reward, all of these are fruits of the first grace, and \"grace for grace,\" and therefore all of this is to be imputed to grace. . .\" (S., p. 266-7) Free choice can cooperate with grace, grace that is first given, that is to say, the giving of the uprightness that the will receives by free choice, and then, in keeping this righteousness, cooperates with grace again. The grace can only be lost by the choices made to abandon uprightness in favor of something else. Worthy of note, in this treatise, Anselm gives a concrete example of this sort of grace. \"This uprightness is never separated from the will except when it wills something else that is not in harmony with this uprightness. Just as when somebody receives the uprightness of willing sobriety, and they reject it by wiling an immoderate pleasure of drinking. (S., p. 267) In Anselm's view, graces are offered in many ways, even at the moments when one is deciding. He give several examples of how grace assists the free choice of the will when one is tempted to abandon the uprightness one has received, \"by mitigating or even entirely cancelling the force of the besieging temptation, or by augmenting the affection of that same uprightness.\" (S., p. 268) Anselm supplies a principle of interpretation in these matters: \"In short, since everything is subject to God's ordination, whatever happens to a person that aids the free choice to receiving or keeping that uprightness of which I speak, is to be imputed entirely to grace.\" (S., p. 268) In his explanation of the extended metaphor of cultivation in Book 3, Chapter 6, Anselm provides further examples of grace, showing grace coming from grace and the involvement of free choice at each point. The metaphor is: [J]ust as the earth, without any cultivation by humans, brings forth innumerable herbs and trees without which human nature is nourished or by which it is even destroyed, those that most necessary to us for nourishing life [are not brought forth] without great labor and cultivation, and not without seeds. Likewise the human hearth, without teaching, without application [studio] spontaneously germinates thoughts and willings [voluntates] that are of no use for salvation or are even harmful, whereas those, without which we make no progress to salvation of the soul, never conceive and germinate without a seed of their own sort and laborious cultivation. (S., p. 270) Grace, the seed, involves, even requires human participation and effort, and at the same time aids the human effort at nearly every turn. Grace and human willing constantly interact. 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 46\/53 That [preachers] are sent, is a grace. And for this reason, preaching is a grace, since what comes down from grace is grace; and hearing [the Word preached] is grace, and understanding what is heard is grace, and uprightness of wiling is grace. Truly sending, preaching, hearing, understanding are nothing unless the will wills what the mind understands. . . So, what the mind conceives from hearing the Word is the seed of preaching and uprightness is the \"growth\" [incrementum] that God gives, without which \"neither he who plants nor he who waters is anything, but rather God who gives the growth.\" (S., p. 271) Anselm's discussion of the will in the De Concordia revisits some of the same doctrines developed in earlier works. A person is not forced by temptation or oppression to abandon uprightness of will, but rather fails to will to keep it because he or she wills something else. What a person wills, they either will on account of uprightness or some benefit. These motives can, and in some cases do, clash with each other. There is a finer analysis of the will, one used later as the starting point in the De Moribus attributed to Anselm. Since particular instruments have what they are [hoc quod sunt], and their aptitudes, and their uses, let us distinguish in the will that on account of which we call it an instrument, its aptitudes, and its uses. These aptitudes in the will we can call \"affections,\" since the instrument of willing is affected by its aptitudes.The will is spoken of equivocally, and in three ways. For, the instrument of willing is one thing, the affection of the instrument is another, and the use of this same instrument is yet another. The instrument of willing is that power [vis] of the soul that it uses for willing . . . The affection of this instrument is that by which this instrument itself is affected to willing something even when it does not think about what it wills . . . . The use of this very instrument is what we have only when we think about the thing that we will. (S., p. 280) There is only one instrument of willing, and the instrument itself does not admit of degrees. There are many uses of the will, that is, actual willings in concrete situations, using the instrument of the will. There are multiple affections or aptitudes of the will, and they do admit of greater and lesser degrees. Anselm states that all of these can be regarded as different wills, since they are not identical (they are distinguishable without being separable). The distinction also allows clarification of the agency of the will: \"The will as instrument moves all of the other instruments that we freely [sponte] use, both those that are part of us \u2013 like hand, tongue, sight \u2013 and those external to us \u2013 like pen, hatchet \u2013 and causes [facit] all of our voluntary motions. Indeed, it moves itself through its own affection, whence it can be called an instrument that moves its very self.\" (S., p. 283-4) Two affections are of particular importance, and allow clarification of how one deserts justice or uprightness of will. \"From these two affections, which we still call 'wills,' all the merit of a person comes, whether good or bad. These two wills differ, however, because the one which is to willing benefit is inseparable, but the one for willing uprightness is separable.\" (S., p. 284) This means that the will to benefit, which Anselm also calls \"will to happiness\" (uoluntas beatitudinis) is always part of the human being, whereas the will to justice is not. A person can will justice or uprightness (if they have it), in which case they do have it, or a person can not. It is by deserting justice, or by not willing the will to justice, in order to will something else, meaning happiness of such a sort that 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 47\/53 it is incompatible with justice, that the will as a whole, and a person as a whole goes astray. This then happens by the use of the person's free choice. 13. The Fragments Anselm left behind fragments of an unfinished work that is of some philosophical interest. Stylistically, they appear to have been intended to be a full dialogue, and the portions that we possess are written in polished Latin style. Their content consists in analyses of concepts and terminology central to certain parts of Anselm's work, and although the theme of uncritical acceptance of ordinary linguistic usage obscuring the real matters at hand is not a new one, the analyses are carried out to a degree of sophistication unparalleled by the extant works. The student begins the dialogue: \"There are many matters regarding which I have for some time wished your response, among which are ability [potestas] and inability [impotentia], possibility and impossibility, necessity and freedom. I enumerate all of these together at the same time, because the knowledge of them seems to me to be mixed up together.\" (u.W, p. 23) The student is led to several absurd conclusions in reasoning about these matters, which Anselm treated in earlier works, for example reconciling God being omnipotent with God being unable to do certain things, or it being impossible for God to do those things. The teacher indicates that what is needed is an understanding of the meaning of the verb \"to do\" (facere), and of what is, properly speaking (proprie) \"one's own\" (suum alicuius). \"To do\" (later, Anselm will indicate that agere, \"to act\" does this as well) has an interesting and unique status, since it is used colloquially as substitute for many other expressions, even including those involving \"not doing\" (non facere). The expressions which it may substitute for can be the proper responses to the question: \"what is he\/she doing?\" The teacher then introduces several discussions about causes. \"[E]verything of which any verb is said [i.e. any subject of which a verb is predicated], is some cause for what is signified by that verb being the case. And, every cause, in ordinary linguistic usage [usu loquendi] is said to \"make\" or do\" [facere] what it is the cause of.\" (u.W, p. 26) Some of these are straightforward, such as a person running causes that there is running. Some of these are not quite so straightforward. \"For, in this way, one who sits, makes there to be sitting, and one who suffers, makes there to be suffering, because if the one who suffers were not to be, there would not be a suffering.\" (u.W, p. 26) In addition, the being or nature of a thing is a cause for what can be said of it. \"If, for example, we say: '(a) human being is an animal,' (a) human being is a cause that there be an animal and that it be said that 'there is animal.' I do not mean that (a) human being is the cause for animal existing, but rather that (a) human being is the cause that it be and be called (an) animal. For by this name the entire human being is signified and conceived, in which whole animal is as a part.\" (u.W, p. 27-8) 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 48\/53 Next, the teacher notes that there are different ways (modis usus loquendi) of using the verb \"to do,\" \"to make,\" or \"to cause\" (facere), and although he concedes that their division is numerous and quite complicated (multiplex et nimis implicata), he advances a sixfold division of causing things to be or not to be. Two ways, when: 1. it causes what it is said to cause, or 2. it does not cause what it is said to cause not to be Four ways, when it causes or does not cause something else to be or not to be. For we say something to cause another thing to be, because. . . . 1. it causes something else to be, or 2. it does not cause something else to be, or 3. because it causes something else not to be, or 4. because it does not cause something else not to be. (u.W, p. 29) He provides examples of each of these: 1. . . . when somebody is said to cause another person to be dead by slaying him or her with a sword. 2. The only example . . . I have is if I posit someone who could resuscitate a dead person, but does not will to do so. . . . In other matters, examples are abundant, as when we say that somebody causes an evil to be, one that, when he or she is able to, that somebody does not cause it not to be. 3. . . . when it is asserted that someone killed another . . . because he or she ordered that the other be killed, or because he or she caused the killer to have a sword, or because he or she accused the one who was killed . . . . These people do not cause per se what is said to be caused . . . .but by doing something else . . . they act through an intermediary. 4. . . .when we pronounce someone to have killed another, who did not provide arms to the one who was killed before he or she was killed, or who did not retrain the killer, or who did not do something that, had he or she done it, the person would not have been killed 5. . . . by taking away the arms, one causes the one who is about to be killed to be disarmed, or by opening a door one causes the killer not to be closed up where he or she had been detained 6. . . . when by not disarming the killer, one does not cause them not to be armed, or by not leading the one who would be killed away, so that they would not be in the killer's presence. (u.W, p. 29-30) The same six modes also hold for \"to cause not to be\" (facere non esse), and Anselm provides examples for them as well. In all but the first mode, the one who is supposed to cause something does not cause it directly. Likewise, the modes hold for \"not to cause to be\" (non facere esse) and \"not to cause not to be\" (non facere non esse). These tools for analysis, the teacher suggests, can be used 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 49\/53 for other verbs, for \"is\" (esse), and for \"ought\" or \"owes\" (debere), allowing restatement of the expressions in forms better signifying what is really meant by the expressions. Willing, or \"to will\" (velle) presents an interesting set of conditions, for it parallels \"to do\" or \"to cause.\" \"We say 'to will' in the same six modes as 'to cause to be.' Likewise, we say 'to will not to be' in all of the different ways as 'to cause not to be.'\" (u.W, p. 37) This expression can also be dealt with under a fourfold division. In the first, \"efficient will\" (efficiens), \"we will in such a way that [ut], if we are able to, we cause to be what we will.\" (u.W, p. 38) In another type of willing, \"approving will\" (approbans), \"[w]e will something that we are able to cause to be but we do not cause to be, but still, if it happens, it pleases us, and we approve of it.\" (u.W, p. 38) In yet another type of willing, \"conceding will\" (concedens), \"we will something. . . like a creditor who, being indulgent, wills to accept from a debtor barley in place of the wheat [the debtor owes].\" (u.W, p. 38) In the last kind, \"someone is said to will what one neither approves nor concedes, but rather permits, when one could prohibit it.\" (u.W, p. 38) There is an order of implication to these wills as well: [T]he one that I have called \"efficient will,\" when it wills, so far as it is able, it causes it, and it also approves it, concedes it, and permits it. The \"approving\" will does not cause what it wills, but it does approve it, concede it, and permit it. The \"conceding\" will does not cause or approve what it wills, unless on account of something else, but it does concede and permit it. The \"permitting\" will does not cause, or approve, or concede what it wills, but only permits it even though it disapproves of it. (u.W, p. 38-9) These categories of analysis can be extended not simply to human willing, but also to the divine will, addressing some of the issues about the divine will and its compatibility with evil human or angelic acts raised and dealt with in the earlier works. Anselm also provides further classification of causes. Some causes are efficient causes, for instance the maker of an object, or the wisdom that makes somebody wise. Other causes are not efficient causes, including the matter from which something is made, or space and time, within which spatial and temporal things (localia et temporalia) come to be. All of these are causes in some sense, since they all have some role in what is, or is not, being so. Anselm also distinguishes between proximate, or immediate causes and distant, or mediated causes. \"Proximate causes are those that by themselves (per se) cause what they are said to cause, with no other mediate cause standing in between them and the effect that they cause, and distant [longinquae] causes are those that do not by themselves (per se) cause what they are said to cause, unless there is either one or more other mediating cause(s).\" (u.W, p. 40) The first two modes of \"to cause\" discussed earlier apply to proximate causes, the other four to distant causes. Both efficient causes and non-efficient causes can be proximate or distant causes, although, as Anselm points out, 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 50\/53 strictly speaking, distant causes are themselves proximate causes of something at least: \"Although very often causes are said to causes not by themselves (per se), but by another (per aliud), i.e. by a medium \u2013 whence they can be called distant causes \u2013 still every cause has its proximate effect that it causes by itself (per se) and whose proximate cause it is.\" (u.W, p. 41) All causes are involved in a linking or network of causes and effects whose ultimate origin is God. \"Every cause has causes going back all the way to the supreme cause of all, God, who since He is the cause of everything that is something, does not himself have a cause. Every effect whatsoever has many causes of diverse types, except for the first effect, since the supreme cause alone created everything.\" (u.W, p. 41) Anselm also discusses the meaning of \"something\" (aliquid) and \"ability\" (potestas) in the fragments, largely reiterating points made in earlier works. 14. Other Writings Anselm produced other works beyond those summarized and excerpted from here, including theEpistola de Incarnatione Verbi (on the Incarnation of the Word), De Conceptu Virginali et de Originali Peccato (on the Virgin Conception and Original Sin), De Processione Spiritus Sancti (on the Procession of the Holy Spirit), all of which contain some philosophical reasoning as well as theological. The last century has seen several other Anselmian texts made available to scholars. As noted earlier, theFragments come from an unfinished work edited and established by Dom F .S. Schmitt, O.S.B. Arguably of greater significance is the De Moribus (on Human Morals), edited and established by R. W. Southern and Dom Schmitt in Memorials of St. Anselm, which discusses the affections of the will at great length, in great detail, and through the use of many illuminating metaphors (similtudines). As Southern and Dom Schmitt note, this work was added to considerably and edited by an unknown redactor, then circulated and attributed to Anselm as the De Simultudinibus. Also included in that volume are the Dicta Anselmi (Anselm's Sayings), assembled and redacted most likely by Anselm's companion, the monk Alexander. In addition, Anselm left behind numerous letters, prayers, and meditations, many of very high literary and spiritual quality. 15. References and Further Readings Several readily accessible research bibliographies on Anselm exist. Two particularly useful ones are: Kienzler, Klaus. International Bibliography: Anselm of Canterbury (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press. 1999) Miethe, T.L. \"The Ontological Argument: A Research Bibliography,\" The Modern Schoolman v. 54 (1977) 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 51\/53 a. Primary Sources The standard scholarly version of Anselm's collected works is the edition by Dom F. S. Schmitt, O.S.B.S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia. 6 vols. (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons. 1940-1961). It was reprinted in 1968 by F. Fromann Verlag (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt), and is available currently on CD-ROM from Past Masters. Additional Latin writings may be found in Memorials of St. Anselm. R. W. Southern and F. S. Schmitt, O.S.B. eds. (Oxford University Press. 1969), and in Ein neues unvollendetes Werk des heilige Anselem von Canterbury, F. S. Schmitt, O.S.B., ed. (Munster: Aschendorf. 1936) There are numerous English translations of Anselm's works. Below are several of the most common: St. Anselm's Proslogion. Trans. M.J. Charlesworth. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965) Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works. Trans. Brian Davies and Gillian Evans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) St. Anselm: Basic Writings. Trans. S. N. Deane (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Press, 1962) The Letters of Saint Anselm of Canterbury. 3 vols. Trans. Walter Frohlich. (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Cistercian Publications. 1990-1994) Truth, Freedom, and Evil: Three Philosophical Dialogues. Trans. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (New York. 1967) Anselm of Canterbury. Trans. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (Toronto: Edwin Mellen. 1976). Includes, as v. 4, Jasper Hopkin's Hermeneutical and Textual Problems in the Complete Treatises of St. Anselm. A New Interpretive Translation of St. Anselm's Monologion and Proslogion. Trans. Jasper Hopkins (Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning. 1980) The Prayers and Meditations of Saint Anselm. Trans. Benedicta Ward (New York: Penguin Books. 1973) Anselm: Monologion and Proslogion. Trans. Thomas Williams. (Indianapolis: Hackett. 1995) Anselm: Three Philosophical Dialogues. Trans. Thomas Williams. (Indianapolis: Hackett. 2002) b. Secondary Sources In addition to the works referenced below, the entirety of the occasional volumes comprising Analecta Anselmiana, Spicilegium Beccense, and Anselm Studies are all to be highly recommended, as is The Saint Anselm Journal, which is online and affiliated with the Institute for Saint Anselm Studies. Adams, Marilyn McCord. \"Fides Quaerens Intellectum: St. Anselm's Method In Philosophical Theology,\" Faith and Philosophy, vol. 9, n. 4 (1992) 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 52\/53 Barth, Karl. Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum. Trans. Ian Robertson (Richmond: John Knox Press. 1960) Baumstein, Dom Paschal, O.S.B. \"Anselm Agonistes: The Dilemma of a Benedictine Made Bishop,\"Faith and Reason, v. 13 (1997-8) Baumstein, Dom Paschal, O.S.B. \"Revisiting Anselm: Current Historical Studies and Controversies,\"Cistercian Studies Quarterly, v. 28 (1993) Baumstein, Dom Paschal, O.S.B. \"St. Anselm and the Prospect of Perfection,\" Faith and Reason, v. 29 (2004) Bayert, J, S.J. \"The Concept of Mystery According to St. Anselm of Canterbury,\" Recherches de Th\u00e9ologie ancienne et m\u00e9di\u00e9vale, v. 9 (1937) Ch\u00e2tillon, Jean. \"De Guillaume d'Auxerre \u00e0 S. Thomas d'Aquin: l'argument de S. Anselme chez les premiers scholastiques du XIIIe si\u00e8cle,\" Spicilegium Beccense, v. 1. (Paris: Vrin. 1959) Cohen, Nicholas. \"Feudal Imagery or Christian Tradition? A Defense of the Rationale for Anselm's Cur Deus Homo,\" The Saint Anselm Journal, v. 2, n. 1 (2004) Corbin, Michel, S.J. \"La significations de l'unum argumentum du Proslogion,\" Anselm Studies, vol. 2 (1988) Corbin, Michel, S.J. Pri\u00e8re et raison de la foi: introduction \u00e0 l'oeuvre de S. Anselme de Cantorb\u00e9ry(Paris: Cerf. 1992) Davies, Brian and Brian Leftow, eds. The Cambridge Companion to Anselm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2004) Eadmer. Vita Sancti Anselmi, translated by R.W. Southern as The Life of St. Anselm: Archbishop of Canterbury (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd. 1962). Evans, Gillian Rosemary. A Concordance to the Works of St. Anselm (Millwood, New York: Kraus International Publications. 1984) Evans, Gillian Rosemary. Anselm. (Wilton, Connecticut: Morehouse-Barlow. 1989) Evans, Gillian Rosemary. Anselm and a New Generation (Oxford: Clarendon. 1980) Evans, Gillian Rosemary. Anselm and Talking about God (New York: Oxford University Press. 1978) Evans, Gillian Rosemary. \"The 'Secure Technician': Varieties of Paradox in the Writings of Saint Anselm,\" Vivarium, vol. 13 (1975) Fortin, John, O.S.B., ed. Saint Anselm: His Origins and Influence (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press. 2001) Gilson, Etienne. \"Sens et nature de l'argument de saint Anselme,\" Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litt\u00e9raire du Moyen Age, v. 9 (1934) Hartshorne, Charles. Anselm's Discovery (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.1965) Henry, D.P. \"St Anselm on Scriptural Analysis,\" Sophia, v. 1 (1962) Herrera, R.A. Anselm's Proslogion: An Introduction. (Washington D.C.: University Press of America. 1979) Herrera, R.A. \"St. Anselm's Proslogion: A Hermeneutical Task,\" Analecta Anselmiana, vol. 3 (1972) Hick, John and Arthur C. McGill. The Many-faced Argument: Recent Studies on the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God (New York: MacMillan. 1967) Hoegen, Maternus, ed. L'attualit\u00e0 filosofica di Anselmo d'Aosta (Rome: Pontifico Ateno S. Anselemo. 1990) Hopkins, Jasper. A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1972). Koyr\u00e9, Alexandre. L'id\u00e9e de Dieu dans la philosophie de St. Anselme (Paris: Editions Ernest Leroux. 1923) Matthews, Scott. Reason, Community and Religious Tradition: Anselm's Argument and the Friars.(Aldershot: Ashgate: 2001) McEvoy, James \"La preuve anselmienne de l'existence de Dieu est-elle ontologique?,\" Revue philosophique de 5\/17\/23, 2:24 PM Anselm | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy https:\/\/iep.utm.edu\/anselm-of-centerbury\/ 53\/53 Louvain, v. 92, n. 2-3 (1994). McIntyre, J. St. Anselm and His Critics: A Reinterpretation of Cur Deus Homo (London. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd. 1954) Paliard, Jacques \"Pri\u00e8re et dialectique: M\u00e9ditation sur le Proslogion de saint Anselme,\" Dieu Vivant, v. 6 (1946) Plantinga, Alvin. The Ontological Argument, from St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers(Garden City, New York: Anchor Books. 1965) Pouchet, Dom Jean Robert, O.S.B. \"Existe-t-il une 'synth\u00e8se' anselmienne,\" Analecta Anselmiana, vol. 1 (1969) Pouchet, Dom Jean Robert, O.S.B. La rectitudo chez saint Anselme: un itin\u00e9raire augustinien de l'ame \u00e0 Dieu (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes. 1964) Recktenwald, Engelbert. Die ethische Struktur des Denkens von Anselm von Canterbury(Heidelberg: Universit\u00e4ts Verlag. 1998) Rogers, Katherine. \"Can Christianity be Proven? Saint Anselm on Faith and Reason,\" Anselm Studies,vol. 2 (1998) Rogers, Katherine. The Anselmian Approach to God and Creation (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press. 1997) Rogers, Katherine. The Neoplatonic Metaphysics and Epistemology of Anselm of Canterbury(Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press. 1997) Rovighi, S. Vanni. \"Notes sur l'influence de saint Anselme au XIIe si\u00e8cle,\" Cahiers de Civilization M\u00e9di\u00e9vale, v. 7, n. 4 and v. 8, n. 1 (1964) Sadler, Gregory. \"Mercy and Justice in St. Anselm's Proslogion,\" American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 80, no. 1 (2006) Sontag, F. \"The Meaning of 'Argument' in Anselm's Ontological Proof,\" Journal of Philosophy, v. 64, (1968) Southern, R.W. Saint Anselm: A Portrait In Landscape (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1990) Southern, R.W. Saint Anselm and His Biographer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1963) Sweeney, Eileen. \"Anselm's Proslogion: The Desire for the Word,\" The Saint Anselm Journal, vol. 1 no. 1 (2003) Thonnard Fran\u00e7ois-Joseph, A.A., \"Caract\u00e8res augustiniens de la m\u00e9thode philosophique de saint Anselme,\" Spicilegium Beccense, v. 1. (Paris: Vrin. 1959) Tonini, Simone. \"La scrittura nelle opere sistematische di S. Anselmo: Concetto, Posizione, Significato,\"Analecta Anselmiana, vol. 2 (1970), p. 57-116. Van Fletern, Frederick and Joseph C. Schnaubelt, eds. Twenty-Five Years (1969-1994) of Anselm Studies: Review and Critique of Recent Scholarly Views.(Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press. 1996). Viola, Coloman and Frederick van Fleteren, eds. Saint Anselm \u2013 A Thinker for Yesterday and Today (Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press. 1990). Author Information Greg Sadler Email: email@example.com Marist College and ReasonIO U. S. A.","subset":"phil_papers"}
+{"meta":{"title":"Review: Marie-Eve Morin: Merleau-Ponty and Nancy on Sense and Being","type":"info:eu-repo\/semantics\/review","creator":"Ossino, Vanessa","subject":"Philosophy","date":"2023","identifier":"oai:philarchive.org\/rec\/OSSRMM","description":null,"datestamp":"2023-02-27T15:16:09Z","dup_signals":{"dup_doc_count":108,"dup_dump_count":9,"dup_details":{"curated_sources":2,"2023-50":8,"2023-40":17,"2023-23":13,"2023-14":26,"2024-30":3,"2024-26":5,"2024-22":8,"2024-18":13,"2024-10":13}}},"text":"Reviewed Work: Marie-Eve Morin (2022): Merleau-Ponty and Nancy on Sense and Being. Edinburgh University Press. Source: Phenomenological Reviews URL: https:\/\/reviews.ophen.org\/2023\/02\/17\/marie-eve-morin-merleau-ponty-and-nancy-onsense-and-being\/?lang=de Review by: Vanessa Ossino Introduction Marie-Eve Morin's comparative study of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Luc Nancy focuses on two objectives: First, it compares Merleau-Ponty's and Nancy's stances on the nature of the relation between \"sense\" and \"being\" which includes a lengthy analysis of their methods as well as an elaborate inquiry of their respective ontological framework. Secondly, Morin responds to \"the new realist critique of post-Kantian philosophy, according to which all post-Kantian thinkers in the phenomenological tradition would remain unable to think an outside worthy of the name.\" (183) Right from the beginning, it becomes apparent that the study is of relevance to the broader field of phenomenology, and promises nuanced insights into still pressing questions posed by new realists and post-phenomenologists. One of those questions being: To what extent is phenomenology able to speak of an \u00bboutside\u00ab which is not suspected of being a correlation of consciousness? Another challenge posed to phenomenology by the aforementioned philosophical strains is concerned with the claim that phenomenology narrows \u00bbsense\u00ab into \u00bbbeing\u00ab and vice versa. This is assumed in particular by 'traditional phenomenologists' with whom Morin mainly means Edmund Husserl and the early Martin Heidegger. Through her engagement with new realism and phenomenology, Morin frames her study in-between two antithetical stances: (1) The premise that sense and being are divided along the lines of a \u00bbsubjective inside\u00ab and an \u00bbobjective outside\u00ab (new realism). (2) The premise that being is a function of meaning, which reduces it to the limits of sense (Husserl and Heidegger of Sein und Zeit). The risk to which phenomenology allegedly exposes itself is that \"by reducing fact to sense, phenomenology abandons pure otherness or brute factuality, in order to arrogate to itself the right to speak\" (12). By bringing Derrida's critique of the phenomenological method into play, Morin places her focus in a still gaping wound of phenomenology, which is located at the bordercrossings of phenomenology and ontology. In the words of Derrida: 2 \"We pass from phenomenology to ontology (in the non-Husserlian sense) when we silently question the direction of the upsurge of naked factuality and cease to consider the fact in its phenomenological function. Then the latter can no longer be exhausted and reduced to its sense by the work of phenomenology, even were it pursued ad infinitum.\" (Derrida 1989, Edmund Husserl's 'Origin of Geometry': An Introduction, p. 151-2, trans. mod. by Morin) The logic by which phenomenology gets challenged here is as follows: If, for those phenomenologists that remain in the Kantian tradition, the limits of consciousness are the limits of what can be given, then transcendental subjectivity must be seen as the universe of possible sense and thus as possible being in its givenness. Through this perspective of questioning, Morin inscribes herself in the discourse on phenomenology's correlationism. The latter can be described as the view that subjectivity and objectivity cannot be understood or analysed apart from one another because both are always already intertwined or internally related. It is the view that we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking (theory) and being (reality) and never to either in isolation from or independently of the other. (Zahavi 2016: The end of what? Phenomenology vs. speculative realism, in: International Journal of Philosophical Studies, p. 294). In the words of Morin, the question that she confronts through her engagement with speculative realist states as follows: \"How to speak of an outside that is inscribed in the inside as absolute outside without falling into too much modesty or too much presumption?\" (3) Taking this question as guidance, Morin turns to Merleau-Ponty's and Nancy's respective philosophies, that in her view provide promising approaches responding to the posed questions. As for Merleau-Ponty, Morin rightly hints at his radicalization of the paradoxical relation between being and sense, which does not allow being to be limited to sense, but much rather points to a Being within which sense is entailed. Nancy's ontology of sense on the other hand is not situated within the theoretical realm of phenomenology, even though he is still concerned with a philosophy of experience. Both thinkers share an engaged interest in the torsion between inside and outside, which manifests in their \"displacement of the metaphysics of presence toward a thinking of the 'subject' as non-presence-to-self, as a co-existence with the world and with others prior to the division between subject and object [...].\" (15) In other words, both philosophers share the effort to think sense and being beyond a rigid subjective consciousness, without losing the focus on experience altogether. The well-structured introduction offers a plausible guide to the oftentimes in-transparent and enigmatic realms of Merleau-Ponty's and Nancy's ideas, promising a profound analysis of the different thought patterns as well as their respective ontologies, which touch on the same object and yet approach it from different angles. The study is divided into three parts: Body (I), Thing (II) and Being (III), with each part being divided into three chapters. The first chapter always thematizes Merleau-Ponty's stance on the notion in question, the second chapter respectively concerns Nancy's stance and the third chapter 3 brings the two philosophers into dialogue. This structure succeeds in guiding the reader carefully through the different thought realms of Merleau-Ponty and Nancy, leading to a two folded incline in Morin's argumentative fashion, in that each part includes an interim conclusion, with all three interim conclusions building up to a final conclusion. In what follows I will outline Morin's inquiry in accordance with the mentioned structure. I will do this in a rather detailed fashion in order to engage thoroughly with Morin's argumentation. Part I \u2013 Body The first part addresses Merleau-Ponty's and Nancy's respective conceptions of embodied existence and puts them into dialogue through distinguishing them in accordance with the conceptual pair of \u00bbunity\u00ab versus \u00bbdislocation\u00ab. Chapter 1 In this chapter, Morin puts Merleau-Ponty's well-known contention with Ren\u00e9 Descartes in relation to an underexposed perspective, which argues that Merleau-Ponty is driven by a \"desire to find the premise of his own theory in Descartes\" (see Morin 47 footnote 1, citing Isabel Thomas-Foigel 2011: 'Merleau-Ponty: De la perspective au chiasme, la rigueur \u00e9pist\u00e9mique d'une analogie', Chiasmi International 13, p. 387, Morin's translation). In stating that Merleau-Ponty finds in Descartes the necessary tools to overcome the cartesian dualism, Morin's begins her inquiry into Merleau-Ponty's notion of the lived-body in an unusual but daring fashion. Early on in the chapter Morin emphasizes that Merleau-Ponty's main interest in Descartes lies at the heart of the imminent tension between Descartes' \u00bbphilosophy of the understanding\u00ab and his \u00bbphilosophy of existence\u00ab, between \u00bbreflection\u00ab and the \u00bbunreflected\u00ab (31). Morin argues that Merleau-Ponty criticizes Descartes for excluding the lived experience of the unity of body and soul from his notion of nature as extension. Thereby, Descartes states that our lived experience cannot teach us anything more than what our understanding of it offers to us. It is in the periphery of Descartes' philosophy of understanding and reflection that Merleau-Ponty thus finds his guidance into a field of truth that is concerned with the \"obscure sphere of unreflected existence\" (30, cited in a note from Merleau-Ponty autumn 1957, Morin's translation). This \u00bbsphere of unreflected existence\u00ab is located at the \u2013 for Descartes \u2013 confused unified experience of two different substances: body and soul. And yet, this unified experience has a certain clarity in itself, one which 'renders unintelligible' once it is disentangled through analytical thought, as MerleauPonty points out. Therefore, he argues that the lived experience of the \u00bbunity of the body and the soul\u00ab offers us a certain intelligibility of the opaque realm of an unreflected existence, to which analytical thought can never account for sufficiently. Descartes' sixth meditation, in which he states that \"nature also teaches me [...] that I am not merely present in my body [...] but that I am very closely joined and [...] intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit\" (Descartes 1996: Meditations on First Philosophy, p. 56), reveals in the eyes of Merleau-Ponty that \"there is something before and after the 'series of reasons', and this something is called 'existence'.\" (32) 4 Thus, Morin highlights that Merleau-Ponty's own method develops through a circular reading of Descartes, in that he takes the sixth meditation with its emphasis on the unreflected unity of body and soul as remaining valid in the face of the second meditation, in which the cogito is elaborated. Followingly, the unreflected unity still holds accountable throughout a certain reflection, one that Merleau-Ponty calls \u00bbradical reflection\u00ab in contrast to the 'intellectualist' philosophies of reflection, including Husserl's phenomenological-transcendental reduction. Morin emphasizes that a radical reflection, far off from being an 'ultimate' reflection, is grounded on factical experience and concerns an existential philosophy that questions the \"ever-renewed experience of its own beginning in the unreflected and the description of that experience\" (34, citing Merleau-Ponty 2012: Phenomenology of Perception, lxxviii, trans. mod.). The difficulty in such a radical reflection lies in the fact, that it still has to account for a mode of openness of a certain prereflective and pre-linguistic towards reflection and language. In order to not fall back into the argument of a constituting consciousness, Merleau-Ponty therefore posits a \u00bbtacit cogito\u00ab on the grounds of a sensing and self-sensing lived body, a body which opens itself towards itself as well as towards the world through active-passively sensing of an 'outside' and 'inside' at what seems to be the same time. At the end of the chapter, Morin emphasizes, with regard to different objections that were raised after the publication of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, that the notion of \u00bbtacit cogito\u00ab still remains entangled with some kind of constituting consciousness, not being able to \"develop the specific way of being of the body [as a mediator] itself in a positive way.\" (42) Chapter 2 In the second chapter Morin enriches the idea of a possible operative cogito beyond a constituting consciousness through Nancy's reading of Descartes in Nancy's book Ego Sum. Through this engagement, she emphasizes Nancy's notion of the body not as mass but as differance (26). Similar to Merleau-Ponty, Nancy points to the special \u00bbkind of unit\u00ab in Descartes' sixth meditation, with the focus on the unit being \"neither-soul-nor-body\" (56) but an opening that articulates itself, not in the structure of a substantial presence but in that of a \u00bbto-itself\u00ab (57). As Morin emphasizes, Nancy here argues that \"the to-itself denotes [...] the movement of existence as being-towards itself so that [...] there is no self at the origin of this movement\" (57, my emphasis). Again, similar to Merleau-Ponty, Nancy focusses on the moment in which 'the subject' comes to its first articulation, which for him necessarily implies an experience that is given through the body. Beyond these similarities, the first grave difference between Merleau-Ponty and Nancy lies at the heart of their respective notions of \u00bbbody\u00ab. Where for Merleau-Ponty the lived body can still be posited as a certain subjective operative consciousness (at least in the Phenomenology of Perception), which indeed implies a subject, Nancy aims at egressing subject-philosophy in stating the utterance of the \u00bbego sum\u00ab as \"a pure performative, [...] without underlying substrate or subject (53, citing Nancy 2016: Ego Sum: Corpus, Anima, Fabula, p. 84-5). The performative utterance of the \u00bbego sum\u00ab is stated as an action without subject (54) or in the words of Derrida: as a \u00bbteleopoetic utterance\u00ab. With regard to the relation of body and ego, the teleopoetic utterance, by uttering 5 'ego', produces something proper: \"An I that can say 'I', and ob-jects the body, that is, throws it in front of itself. [...] [B]ut only because it is effectively not its own body [...] holds the body at a distance\" (57). The limit of the self for Nancy is a limit that does not lead to a solid ground but to an \u00bbabyssal intimacy\u00ab, which Morin, in accordance with Nancy, names the \"inside of the world\" (57). Reminding us of Merleau-Ponty's \u00bbradical reflection\u00ab in which a certain pre-reflective sets the stage for an endless endeavor of reflection, so too \u2013 but in a different fashion \u2013 Nancy hints at Descartes' sixth meditation in order to show that \"what is most inside is not some me that would finally coincide with itself but always something more [...] and opens me up to relation\" (58). The union of body and soul for Nancy is not a relation between two things, but an ontological spacing or opening-to of the other (60). For him, not only bodies are radically plural and fragmented, but so is the world and with that sense making itself. Sense-making, which constitutes on the model of touch in Nancy's thought, is always an experience of a limit (64). The world, far from being understood as a cosmos, follows the logic of a singularity that is always plural in its origin (80). Thus, a major difference between Nancy and Merleau-Ponty can be found in their elaboration of Descartes' unity of body and soul in the sixth meditation. Where Nancy follows the logic of divergence, Merleau-Ponty respectively focusses on a certain logic of entanglement (as can exemplary be seen in his notion of body-schema). Chapter 3 In this chapter Morin puts Nancy and Merleau-Ponty in a more direct conversation and refers her inquiry back to the guiding question of how the nuanced differences in their respective ontologies lead to new insights on Merleau-Ponty's path along the edge of phenomenology. Morin mainly focuses on the difference that \"lies in their respective ways of conceiving of sense and making sense\" (70). She casts this difference in terms of a \u00bbpriority of unity\u00ab (Merleau-Ponty) over \u00bbdislocation\u00ab (Nancy), which for her includes a priority of interiority over exteriority or of the moment of reappropriation and integration over the moment of alienation and separation. Even though Morin repeatedly emphasizes that Merleau-Ponty's philosophical endeavor aims at overcoming such dichotomies, and especially the dichotomy of interiority and exteriority, she oftentimes methodically draws back on such a dualistic thinking, which might leave the impression of a problematic tendency to undermine Merleau-Ponty's original thought beyond such dualisms. Yet, the reader gets a better sense of her usage of such conceptual pairs through her comparison of Merleau-Ponty's \u00bbbody-schema\u00ab and Nancy's description of the body as \u00bbcorpus\u00ab. Through engaging with the lived body as body-schema and Nancy's corpus as \"constituted by a fragmentation that is never mended\" and which \"difference spreads to the body's relation to the world\" (71) it becomes obvious that Morin uses such dichotomic pairs in an argumentativemethodological fashion, in order to highlight the nuanced differences of the two thinkers in a straightforward way. This leaves the impression that she somewhat simplifies the argument for readers who might not be too familiar with the respective philosophies. Nevertheless, such a 6 simplification through a contrasting dichotomic argumentative fashion to me seems like a valid methodological approach, especially with regard to the sometimes very opaque subtleness of Merleau-Ponty's and Nancy's ontologies. Without going into too much detail, it is sufficient to emphasize that in this third chapter Morin thoroughly shows how Merleau-Ponty's \u00bblived body\u00ab \u2013 which is distinguished by a body-schema that allows for the integration of my synesthetic perception, gestures and relation to the world as well as to others through a kind of pre-reflective synthesis -, differs in its way of sense-making from Nancy's \u00bbcorpus\u00ab \u2013 which is derived from Descartes' partes extra partes and highlights the plurality of my senses and of my bodily being in general and that cannot be collected into a systematic whole (76). Whereas for Merleau-Ponty sense is related to a unified pre-reflective synthesis (at least) given through the body-schema, sense for Nancy finds its place in the differentiation of multiple singularities. Interestingly, Morin concludes the chapter with a critical outlook on Nancy, arguing that: \"What Nancy emphasizes then is resistance to synthesis or unification, even if one must in the end say that the subject or the world finds in this resistance its 'stance', that is, a certain kind of unity\" (81). Part 2 \u2013 Thing As the title promises, the second part is concerned with the status of the object or thing in Merleau-Ponty's and Nancy's philosophies. Whereas the first part drew on Descartes as a dialogue partner, the second part starts a conversation with more recent thinkers of object-oriented ontology, new materialism and speculative realism. In order to better understand the 'accusation' of correlationism, Morin is concerned with the question of the strategic role of a supposed anthropomorphism in Merleau-Ponty's description of inhuman things. Chapter 4 In order to understand Merleau-Ponty's alleged \u00bbstrategic anthropomorphism\u00ab in his description of things, Morin engages with his phenomenology of perception which emphasizes the paradox that perception is always perspectival but nevertheless neither the perception of the thing for-itself nor of a sign of the thing. What Morin calls the \u00bbparadox of the in-itself-for-us\u00ab highlights the fact, that perception is not a mere step in the path of objective thought towards the objective relations behind an experience, but that perception itself, in its finite character, exposes the objective thing in its reality as it is given in its appearance. Speculative realists interpret this as a philosophy of immanence, predicating that phenomenology is stuck 'within', and thus, does not have the possibility of comparing reality as it would be 'without' consciousness (91). In order to not fall back on the difficulties of a philosophy of immanence respectively a philosophy of transcendence, Morin reminds us that Merleau-Ponty thinks reality at the level of the phenomenon, an order in which we are neither solely a being nor a constituting consciousness, but first and foremost we are mixed up with the world and others in that we are united to being 7 \"through the thickness of the world\" (Merleau-Ponty 2012: Phenomenology of Perception, p. 311, my emphasis). The notion of \u00bbthickness\u00ab that we encounter in Merleau-Ponty in different stages of his thought is not always easy to understand, since \u2013 similar to his notion of style \u2013 he doesn't really offer an explicit definition of it. Nevertheless, Morin lucidly underlines that \"this thickness is not a third thing that would stand between consciousness and being and hide the latter. It is rather the world not as thing but as promise of something more that sustains my explorations\" (92). We learn from this chapter, that in Merleau-Ponty's thinking 'the thing' offers itself to us through a certain manner or style, which we encounter in its phenomenality and not its mere appearance. In its phenomenality, an object is an \"intersensorial thing that speaks to all my senses\" (93) without being absorbed into the sum of its parts. Ultimately Morin encounters a sort of \u00bbstrategic anthropomorphism\u00ab in Merleau-Ponty's correlative concept of the lived body and its beingtowards-the-world. The important difference between a reductive anthropomorphism and Merleau-Ponty's stance lies in the fact, that for Merleau-Ponty one encounters the world through a body that is never fully mine, \"i.e. that is never constituted by and hence laid out in front of consciousness\" (97). The thickness of the world is a modality of the inexhaustibility of my relation to the world as well as my relation to myself as a bodily being. At the end of the chapter though, Morin rightly points to the fact that even though MerleauPonty was able to dialecticise the notion of subject and object into a system in which both are correlates, in the Phenomenology of Perception he is not yet able to account for the being of the dialectical relation itself. Chapter 5 Here Morin continues to inquire of a \u00bbstrategic anthropomorphism\u00ab in Merleau-Ponty. She mainly addresses two questions in this chapter: (1) Do objects refer us back to ourselves, since they are filled with our own possibilities projected in space? (2) If so, are objects mere internal possibilities? In order to answer these questions, Morin engages with a notion of \u00bbcautious anthropomorphism\u00ab introduced by Steven Shaviro and Jeffrey Cohen, to broaden the strategic anthropomorphism in Merleau-Ponty in order to show that his anthropomorphism is not about centering a thing around human abilities, feelings or categories, but much rather about how a thing appears to us in entering our existence and is thus always recognized in its own place, in which objects dialogically shape our experience of the world (115). Objects then might refer us back to ourselves but neither in a way that would lead us to acknowledge them directly or in their totality nor in a way that would amount to an alleged neutrality of intellectual contemplation. On the contrary, in accordance with a \u00bbcautious anthropomorphism\u00ab \u2013 that Morin sees reflected in Merleau-Ponty's \u00bbstrategic anthropomorphism\u00ab \u2013 objects are guaranteed an irreducibility to 8 mere intellectual ideas, in that they are given \u00bbin the flesh\u00ab which arouses certain \u00bbdesires\u00ab and amounts for the incompleteness of any exploration. With regard to Morin's own method, I here find it a bit irritating that, even though she underlines Merleau-Ponty's refusal to commit to a notion of an active constituting consciousness, she sometimes underlines that we, as sentient-beings, take an active positioning, in that \"we lend things our flesh in order to make them flesh\" (113, my emphasis). Although this might be a rather fussy critique, I would argue that such phrasing can be misleading with regard to Merleau-Ponty's argument, that the underlying structures of our engagement \u00bbin the flesh\u00ab are of a certain passivity. In fact, Merleau-Ponty prominently speaks of a passivity without passivism (Merleau-Ponty 2010: Institution and Passivity). Chapter 6 Morin starts the chapter with a synopsis of Nancy's \"radical desubjectivisation of freedom\" (119). For Nancy freedom does not resemble self-determination but it means \"to be absolutely without 'why'\" (120). Morin underlines: \"Freedom is the unfounded factuality of an existence that surprises itself in existing\" (120). She then continues to connect Nancy's notion of freedom with his understanding of \u00bbfinitude\u00ab that lies in the fact \"that any being must be exposed to an exteriority or an otherness in order to be what it is\" (120). The finitude of singularities in their infinite exposition to an exteriority expresses an open-ended movement of coming to presence. In putting Nancy in dialogue with his Heideggerian roots, Morin underlines that \u00bbthe freedom of the world\u00ab outreaches Heidegger's concept of world that stands for a \"coherent milieu of significance already laid out in advance\" (122). In emphasizing Nancy's depart from phenomenology through his detachment of sense-making from any form of intentional givenness, Morin uncovers Nancy's concept of world as \"the space of sense: the sharing of singularities exposed to one another: stone, ground, dog, grass, star, and me, and you\" (122). The world is thus free in its infinite finitude in that it signifies a \"groundlessness of the world, the ever-renewed coming-to-presence of the world [...]\" (120). To say that a thing exists then, is to affirm its structure of difference and spacing which is opposed to a pure in-itself as well as an essence for consciousness. In this way, sense is not reduced to its givenness and accessibility, be it to intentionality, a sentient lived body or a Dasein. In challenging phenomenology's access as the a priori of being-in-the-world, Nancy emphasizes \u00bbsense\u00ab as that \"what happens on the edge or threshold, in-between singularities, in the encounter with an [...] alterity that resists assimilation [...], to which there is access precisely only in the mode of non-access\" (125). The exposition of a thing thus, is an exposition of an \u00bbit-self\u00ab to itself and others. The question that hovers above this chapter followingly, is whether Nancy's materialism resembles a kind of unifying relationalism after all, in that one still has a certain kind of access to a thing by means of a contact-separation of surfaces. This impression deepens when Morin stresses in Nancy that \"I am able to encounter the stone only insofar as I am also already stone\" (125). A sentence which Morin further contextualizes in view of Merleau-Ponty's later ontology of flesh, an ontology that she argues to be too unifying in view of Nancy. She engages with this question 9 through further elaborating on Nancy's notion of sense as material, by which he means that senserelation resembles precisely not a givenness but a \"void \u2013 or space [...] which relates without gathering, or gathers without uniting\" (128). Followingly, Nancy's ontology does advocate a certain relationalism, with the main difference that it is not unifying, in that it hints at a \"materialism [which] is linked to the plurality of origins in their impenetrability\" (135). Part III \u2013 Being The final part of the book confronts Merleau-Ponty's \"carnal ontology\" more directly with Nancy's \"ontology of the singular plural\" in order to elaborate on their respective quests for \"a principle of non-dialectical difference that allows for the emergence of sense right at Being itself\" (145). Chapter 7 Morin starts the chapter with an extended dialogue of Merleau-Ponty, Nancy and Heidegger. She emphasizes that both, Merleau-Ponty and Nancy, \"seek to undo the metaphysical difference between existentia and essentia in favour of thinking of existence or presence that is not pure positivity but includes a moment of negativity that is not the other of presence but its opening\" (146). In terms of Merleau-Ponty, this chapter engages with his reappropriation of the notion of \u00bbWesen\u00ab through his reading of Husserl and Heidegger, in order to \"emphasize the intertwinement of fact and idea, or existence and essence\" (152). In this way, facticity becomes the ground or 'fabric' that gives essences their solidity. In order to further analyze the tools with which Merleau-Ponty and Nancy ponder Being beyond the dichotomy of presence and absence, negativism and positivism, Morin engages with MerleauPonty's ontology as a \"third genre d'\u00eatre between Being and Nothing\" (153) and continues with Nancy's annulment of the ontological difference through his emphasis that \"there are only beings, nothing behind, beneath or beyond them\" (164). Morin concludes the chapter with the lucid observation that for both philosophers the \u00bbil y a\u00ab or \u00bbes gibt\u00ab does not mean that Being gives the given. Through making a detour of a deconstructive reading of Heidegger she reasons that: \"Rather, we must hear the Heideggerian es gibt through Derrida's deconstruction of the gift in Given Time. [...] The gift must not only be thought as without giver and without given (beyond subject and object) but also as without property or propriety\" (163). Chapter 8 The last chapter is dedicated to the question, to what degree Merleau-Ponty's notion of flesh \"introduce[s] difference \u2013 differance, spacing \u2013 at the heart of sense, which would bring MerleauPonty's later thought in closer proximity to Nancy's ontology\" (169). She engages with this question through a reevaluation of the notion of \u00bb\u00e9cart\u00ab, which both thinkers use extensively. \u00bb\u00c9cart\u00ab in its broader sense is understood as divergence and hints at a self that is never truly 10 identical but only given through divergence, which thus becomes a constituent for sense. Following this thought, Morin asks how radical Merleau-Ponty's account of \u00bbdivergence\u00ab is. She points to his notion of \u00bbchiasm\u00ab and asks if its underlying assumption of reversibility succeeds in giving \"spacing, exteriority and alterity its due\" or if it ends up \"reinstating a massive unity at a higher level\" (178). Morin finds her answer in a final juxtaposition of Nancy and Merleau-Ponty. Because MerleauPonty repeatedly underlines that \u00bb\u00e9cart\u00ab is rooted in the notion of flesh, as the \"primordiality of \u00e9cart\" (180) and the \"formative medium of the object and the subject\" (Merleau-Ponty 1968: The Visible and The Invisible, p. 147), promiscuity and encroachment lie at the heart of \u00bb\u00e9cart\u00ab. This latter conclusion remains foreign to Nancy. Morin argues: \"Speaking of what happens between singularities, Nancy also uses the image of the intertwining or the knot, but insists on the absolute separation of the different strands being knotted\" (180). Followingly, Nancy in opposition to Merleau-Ponty, highlights an \u00bbontological void\u00ab at the limit that exposes bodies to themselves and each other (180), so that the in-between of singularities remain an \"absolute separation\" (180). For Merleau-Ponty on the other hand, the in-between already belongs to one flesh, which does not resemble a simple unity, but nevertheless does not include an ontological void. Conclusion To get to the point: Morin succeeds in her proclaimed aim, in that she effectively casts the differences in emphasis of the two respective philosophers, so that each is an important corrective to a tendency in the other's work (182). In approaching her study from the angle of speculative realism and its criticism of phenomenology's correlationism, she fruitfully offers an alternative reading of post-Kantian thinkers in the phenomenological tradition, that, in light of the criticism, \"would reduce all being to sense-making to a subjective process\" (183). Through her engagement with Nancy and Merleau-Ponty, Morin offers a coherent and pertinent proposition, which underlines that at least two positions in the broader post-Kantian phenomenological realm neither collapse being into sense nor reinstate a strong division between them. She concludes: \"[B]oth Merleau-Ponty and Nancy displace and reassess the role of the limit in sense-making as the place of separation and exposure\" (183) and thus of a place at the limit of subjective processes. Morin's study offers a highly relevant perspective in a time that \"demands a decentering of the human and an attentiveness to the human outside\" (184). In light of this, her book can also be read, not least (!), as a fruitful addition to the very lively discourse of a phenomenological geography, which engages with challenges that the climate-crisis impose on us as human beings.","subset":"phil_papers"}